### NUM BER 13-05- 563- CV 

## COURT OF A PP EA LS T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X AS CORPUS CHRI ST I - 

## EDI NBURG
A RA NSAS COUNTY NA VI GATION DIST RIC T NO. 1, A pp ellan t,
v. JOH N WIL LIA M JOH NSO N, ETA L., A pp ellees
. On ap pe al f rom th e 3 6th D istrict Co urt of A rans as Co un ty , T exas . 

## ME MOR A N D U M OP I N I ON B efo re J u st ic es R o d rig u ez , G arza , a n d V el a M em o ra n d u m Op in io n b y J u st ic e Ga rza T his is a boun dary dispu te betw een a ppe llant, Ara nsas Cou nty N avig ation Distri ct No. 1 (t he “D is tr ict” ), and appel lee s, John W il li am Johns on, Bobbi e Jean Ho o fa rd , and Dav id Gl en M oss , tempora ry admi nis trator

of the e sta te of D eborah D eni se Johns on Gunnel s (t he “J ohnso ns” ). The tr ial cour t re ndered jud g ment on a jur y v erdict div est ing the Di str ict of a port ion of

the proper

ty conv ey ed to i t by

the Stat e of Tex as in 1947, conc lud ing tha t such con v eyance encro ache d upo n the Jo hnso ns’ prop erty. By six issu es, th e District
c on te nd s t ha t th e tr i al c ou rt er red

. W e affi r m.B a y S tre e t i n F u l to n i s n o w k n o w n a s C a s te rli n e D rive

. W e w i l l h e re re fe r t o th e s tre e t a s B a y S tre e t, 1 w h ic h w a s its n a m e a s u s e d in a ll d e p ic tio n s o fth e a r e a a t is s u e p r e s e n te d a t t r ia l. 2 I. B A CKGRO UND On Jan uary 21, 194 7, th e Sta te of T exas issued a pat ent (the “19 47 Pa ten t”) w hich g ra nted to t he D is tr ict a parcel of land si tuate d on the w est er n s hore of Aransas Bay at the town of Fulton, Te x as. T he 1 947 Pate nt de scribed th e prop ert y, wh ich w as mo stly submerg ed unde r Aransas Bay , by metes and bounds

. Th e D is tr ict c lai ms t hat i t had
re q uest ed th e pat ent from the Stat e to f a cilit ate i ts efforts to c onst ru ct a breakw ater and to dredg e a h ar bor

on t he subj ect proper

ty

. The w est er n bound ar y of the p ro per

ty ce ded by the 1947 P atentl ay

so me 320 feet eastof Bay Street. 1 Ov er the si x d e cades si nce the 1 947 Pa tent, the Di str ict made sev eral improv ements to the p ro per ty , i ncl udi ng the cons tr uct ion of a c oncrete b ulk head, the ins tal la ti o n o f

p ili ng s for

boatsl ips , and the ins tal lat ion of ele ctr ic al and w ater uti li ti es for boa ts docke d in tho se slips. T he subject property, w hich w as a raw shore line in 194 7, is
now a de v elo ped har bor

and mari na. The John sons ow n w ater front pro per

ty in Fult on sit uated on the southw estco rn er of Ful ton H ar bor

. The proper ty ow ned by

the Johns ons is formall y desc ri bed as “t he W ater Front east of Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, an d 5 o f Bloc k 1 , F ult on Tow nsi te.” I t i s u ndi sput ed th at t he proper ty extends from Bay

Streeton its w estsi de to the w est er n s horeli ne of Aransas Bay on i ts eastsi de. A t vari o us ti mes s inc e the 1947 Patentw as is sued, the Johns ons had eit her operated a m ar ina on t he s horeli ne proper ty or l eased the mari na for others t o operate. On A pr il 12, 1989, the D is tr ict not ified H oofard t hat a por ti on of the proper

ty bei ng used by the Johns ons as a mar ina bel ong ed to the Di str ict and that the Johns ons had no lea se ag re ement w it h the Dis tr ict that w oul d all ow such use. In 1992, John Johns on met
w it h the Aransas Co u nty Sur v ey or , J erald Br undrett, to dis cus s t he matt er
. Br undrett
ex pla ine d to Johns on th at t he w est er n bound ar y of the l and c eded t o the D is tr ict ac cordin gO n Jul y 7, 200 3, t he Jo hnsons f i l ed a “ T hi r d Am ended P et i t i on f or D ecl ar at or y Judgm ent & O t her 2 R e lie f ” w h ic h a d d e d a s d e f e n d a n ts D a n G ill, T o n y D o m in g u e z , L yn n W ild m a n , F e lix K e e le y, a n d D o u g N o r r e ll, nam ed b ot h as i ndi v i dual s and i n t hei r off i ci al capa ci t i es as com m i ssi oner s of t he Di st r i ct

. O n Novem ber18, 2003, t he t r i al cour t di sm i ssed t he Johnson s’ case agai nst t hese def endan t s bywr i t t en o r der

. T he Jo hnsons d o n o t c h a lle n g e th is d is m is s a l o n a p p e a l, a n d th e s e d e f e n d a n ts a r e n o t p a r tie s to th is a p p e a l. Addi t i onal l y , we no t e t hat , sev er al m ont hs aft er t he Jo hnsons f i l ed t hei r f i nal am ended pet i t i on, t he T exas Supr em e Cour t r ul ed t hat t r espass t o t r y t i t l e i s t he excl usi v e r em edy f or bou ndar y di sput es an d t hat re l i e f u n d e r th e D e c l a ra to ry J u d g m e n ts A c t i s n o t a v a i l a b l e i n s u c h d i s p u te s
. M artin v. Am er m an , 133 S. W

. 3d 262, 268 ( T ex. 200 4)

. Subsequent l y , t he T exas L egi sl at ur e am ended t he Decl ar at or y Judg m ent s Act t o r ef l ect th a t: a pe r son [ i nt er est ed u ndera deed, wi l l , wr i t t en co nt r act , orot herwr i t i ngs co nst i t ut i ng a

cont r act orwhose r i ght s, st at us, or ot her l egal r el at i ons ar e aff ect ed by a st at ut e, m uni ci pal or di nance, cont r act orf r anchi se] m ay obt ai n a de t erm i nat i on u ndert hi s chap t er when t he sol e i ssue co ncer ni ng t i t l e t o r eal pr oper t y i s t he d et er m i nat i on o ft he p r operbou ndar y l i ne bet ween ad j oi ni ng p r oper t i es. Act ofA pr
. 18, 2007, 80t h Leg. , R

. S. , ch. 305, § 1, 200 7 T EX
. S ESS

. L AW S E RV
. 5 8 3 , 5 8 3 (c o d i fie d a t T EX
. C IV
. P RAC

. & R EM
. C OD E A NN
. § 37. 004( c) (Ver non Supp. 2007) )

. T he D i st r i ct has not ra i sed t he i ssue o fwhet her t he M artin r ul i ng a ppl i es t o t hi s case or i f t he am ended st at ut e appl i es r et r oact i v el y , and so we do not consi der i t h e re
. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 4 7 .1 ; M a rtin e z v . E l P a s o C o u n ty , 218 S. W

. 3d 8 41, 844 ( T ex. App. –El Paso 20 07, pet

. di sm ’ d) ( “ W hen r ev i ewi ng a ci v i l m at t er , an appel l at e cou r t has no d i scr et i on t o con si dera n i s sue n ot rai s ed i n t he ap pe l l an t ’ s bri ef. ”)

.

Al ong wi t h t hei r f i r st am ended answer , t he D i st r i ct al so f i l ed a coun t er cl ai m aga i nst t he Jo hnsons 3 c o n te n d i n g th a t i t h a d e q u i ta b l e ti tl e to th e p ro p e rty i n q u e s ti o n
. S p e c i fic a l l y , t h e D i s tri c t a l l e g e d th a t:

B y w ri t t en c on t rac t da t ed A ug us t 20 , 19 46 , t he J oh ns on s ’ pre de c es s ors i n t i t l e ag re e d to conv ey t o t he [ D i st r i ct ] i n f ee si m pl e “ t he W at er Fr ont East of Lot s 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 i n Bl ock 1, T ow ns i t e of

Ful t on, Ar ansas C ount y , T exas” ( her ei naft er r ef er r ed t o as “ t he W at er f r ont R eser v e” ) and i n r et ur n, t he [ D i st r i ct ] agr eed t o gr ant t he Jo hnsons’ pr edecesso r s i n t i t l e a 99- y earl ease oft he sa m e r eal est at e. T hi s coun t er cl ai m was sev er ed b y wr i t t en o r derof t he t r i al cour t dat ed M ar ch 18 , 200 4. Accor di ng t o t he Johnson s, a f i nal j udgm ent was r ender ed i n t he se v er ed ca se i n f av or of t he Di st r i ct

. T he Di st r i ct st at es t hat 3 to the 1947 Patent lay

acros s a porti on of

the mari na proper

ty . At t he ti me, th e mar ina w as bei ng operated by

a t enant , Al b y’s Seafood ( “A lby ”) , w hic h w as pay ing rent t o bot h the John sons a nd the District. W hen Alby’ s lease wi th th e Joh nson s termin ate d on Janu ary 1, 20 00, t he D is tr ict beg an c harg ing rent direct ly to the o w ners o f the boat s d ock ed atthe mari na. On M arch 3 0 , 2 0 0 1 , the J ohnso ns filed su itag ain st the D is tr ict s eeki ng damag es from the Di str ict as w ell as dec larator y and inj unct iv e reli ef. The J ohnso ns cl aimed that 2 they , notthe Di str ict, w ere ri g htful ow ners of the prop erty on w hic h the mar ina w as loc ated and therefore tha t the District ow ed to them any rentpaymen ts paid to the Distri ct for use of the mar ina proper

ty

. The Di str ict fil ed a firs t amende d answer o n October 29, 2003, den ying the Johns ons’ al leg ati ons and al so ass erti ng i n the al ter nati v e a d efense bas ed upo n the statu te of

limitation s. 3i t s cl ai m t o owner shi p oft he Jo hnson pr oper t y as r ef l ect ed i n t hi s coun t er cl ai m “ i s ent i r el y sepa r at e f r om t he

D i s tri c t’ s c l a i m b a s e d o n th e 1 9 4 7 P a te n t a n d d o e s n o t a ff e c t th e i s s u e s ra i s e d i n th i s c a s e .” I n a n y e v e n t, nei t herpar t y chal l enges t he o r derof sev er ance, and we do not consi dert he i ssue h er e. T h e r e c o r d r e f le c ts th a t th e p a r tie s s tip u la te d th a t t h e is s u e s o fa tt o r n e y’s f e e s a n d d a m a g e s w o u ld 4 b e s u b m i tte d to th e tri a l c o u rt a n d w o u l d n o t b e a n i s s u e fo r th e ju ry. P rio r to th e e n try o f th e fi n a l ju d g m e n t, t he co ur t den i ed t he J oh ns on s ’ r equest f or at t or ney ’ s f ees. W i t h r espect t o da m ages, t he f i nal j udgm ent st at ed: Af t ert he r endi t i on o ft he j ur y ’ s v er di ct , t he p ar t i es s t i pu l at ed t hat t he a m ount of dam ages cl ai m ed b y t he [ Johnson s] i s exact l y off set byt he cr edi t t o whi ch t he [ D i st r i ct ] i s ent i t l ed f or th e v a lu e o fim p r o v e m e n ts it m a d e in g o o d f a ith to th e d is p u t e d p r o p e r ty w h ile it w a s in possessi on. 4 The lo cat ion of the w est er n boundary of the proper

ty g ra nted by

the 1947 P atent , def ined precisely by me tes an d bo und s in the pat entd ocum ent , is undispu ted . Moreover, the p arti es ag re ed th at t he east er n boundar y of t he Johns ons’ proper ty w as defined b y

the natural shoreli ne of Aransas Bay , w it hout re g ard to any ar ti fici al alt erati ons of the s horeli ne. The cent ra l is sue in dis pute, then , w as the a ctu al loc ati on of the natural shoreli ne. The Johns ons cl aimed that itl ay to the e astof the w est er n boundar y of the D is tr ict’ s p ro per ty
as spec ified i n the 1947 Patent , and therefore t he 1947 Pat ent e ncroache d upon the Johns ons’ proper

ty

. The Di str ict, on th e oth er hand, co ntended thatthe natural shoreli ne
w as situa ted t o the west o f t he w este rn b oun dary of t he District’s property as specif ied in the 1 947 Pa tent, and so there w as no enc ro achment

. The matter

proceed ed to j ur

y tr ial pr imar il y

on t he i ss ue of the loc ati on of the shoreli ne. The ju ry

retur ned a v erdict fav orabl e to the J ohnso ns, and on J une 8, 2005, the tr ial co urt rendered a jud g ment based upon that v erdict. The j udg ment s tated i n rele v ant 4 part th at th e Joh nson s “are e ntitled t o posse ssion and o w nersh ip of a ll th e W ate rf ront ea st of Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Block 1 of

Fulton T ownsite.” The ju d gm entalso precisely defined t he proper

ty belong ing to the Johns ons as encompas si ng the area c ontai nin g the mari na. The Di str ict fil ed a moti on to co rrectthe jud g ment and for new tr ial on J uly

1, 2005. The tr ial co urt den ied the moti on on September 8, 2005. This appeal ens ued. II. D I S CUS S I ON On ap pea l, the District alleges that: ( 1) the e v iden ce w as legally and factu allyT he Di st r i ct enu m er at es ei ght separ at e i ssues on appeal , i ncl udi ng t wo r egar di ng su ff i ci encyof t he 5 ev i dence and t wo r egar di ng a l l eged er r or s i n t he j ur y char ge. For pur poses of or gani z at i on, we r enum bert he D i st r i ct ’ s i ssues a s si x and add r ess t hem as set f or t h ab ov e.

T he T exas Supr em e Cour t has hel d t hat “sh orel i ne b ounda r i es i n ci v i l l aw l and gr ant s m ust be 6 de t erm i ne d wi t h r efe ren c e t o m ea s ure d m ea n d ai l y hi gh w ater l eve l s
. ” J o h n G

. & M a r i e S t e lla K e n e dy

M e m ’l Found. v. D ew hur

st , 9 0 S .W .3 d 2 6 8 , 2 8 1 (T e x . 2 0 0 2 ); L u tte s v . S ta te , 324 S. W

. 2d 1 67, 187 ( T ex. 195 8)

. T he l and gr ant s at i ssue i n Lut t es and Kenedy wer e exe cut ed i n t he ear l y 19t h cent ur y and so M exi can o r Spani sh ci v i l l aw r egar di ng sh or el i ne b ounda r i es ap pl i ed. Al t hough nei t herpar t y cont ends t hat M exi can o r Spani sh ci v i l l aw i s appl i cabl e t o t he l and gr ant at i ssue h er e, t hey do not app eart o di sput e t hat t he m ean dai l y hi gh wat erl ev el det er m i nes t he l ocat i on o fa nat ur al shor el i ne f or pur poses oft hi s case.

Er osi on i s t he p r ocess o fwear i ng away t he l and; accr et i on i s t he p r ocess o fgr adual enl ar gem ent 7 o f th e l a n d

. C oa s t al

I nd us
. W ater A uth. v. York , 53 2 S

. W

. 2d 94 9, 95 2 (T ex
. 19 76 ). 5 ins uff ic ien t to suppo rt the jur y ’s v erdict; (2 ) er ro rs in the j ur y ch arg e req uired a new

tr ial ; ( 3) the j ur y ’s v erdict doe s n ot s uppor t t he j udg ment; (4 ) the J ohnso ns’ tr ial co unsel as ked improp er q ue s ti on s o f t he p ros pe c ti v e j urors a t v oi r d i re; ( 5) t he t r i al c ou rt i mp rop er ly all ow ed th e tes ti mony

of a prev iou sl y

undisc los ed w it ness ; and ( 6) the Di str ict w as enti tl ed to sub mission of

its claim of

title by limitat ions. 5 W e note at the outs et of ou r anal y si s that the par ti es do notdi sput e two w ell -s ettl ed ten ets of

law wi th regard to riparian land bo und aries. First, a shoreline b oun dary i s deter mined by

measu ri ng the shoreli ne atthe mean dai ly hi g h w ater

l e vel, o r hig h ti de. 6 Seco nd, w hen a boundar y is defined bya s horeli ne, a nd th at s horeli ne mov es ov er ti me, the bou nda ry

moves alon g w ith the shoreline only if t he land is “ gradu ally

or imperce ptibly added o r tak en to or from” the shore by erosi on or ac creti on. Coa sta l Indus . Water Auth. v. York , 532 S.W .2d 949, 952 (Tex

. 1976)

. If, how ev er , the shoreli ne mov es seaw ard by 7
means othe r than natural acc re ti on, t he boun dar y st ay s w here i t w as and t he r ipa ri an ow ner does not b ecome ow ner of the n ew

l and. See Lori

no v. Cra wfor

d Packi ng C o. , 175 S.W .2d 410 , 414 (Tex. 1943 ). Further , t h e s eaward mo v em entof a shoreline bou nda ry is p re s u m e d t o b e a rt if ic ia l, a n d t h e b u rd e n is p la c e d o n t h e ri p a ri a n o wn e r t o p ro ve other w is e. Lutte s v

. St ate , 324 S.W .2d 167 , 187 (Tex. 1958 ). A
. Suf

fi cien cy o f th e Ev id ence By i ts firs t is sue, the Di str ict all eg es that the ev ide nce produce d at t ri al w as nei ther legally nor factu ally

su f f icient to supp ort the jury ’s v erdict. W e disagree. An app ellate court6

w il l sus tai n a c hal len g e to the l eg al suffici ency of ev ide nce onl y if: (1 ) there i s a co mplet e abse nce o f

ev iden ce of

a v ital fact; ( 2 ) t he co urt is barred by r ules of law or of ev iden ce f rom giv ing w eight to the only evide n c e o f fered to prove a v ital fact; (3) the ev iden ce offered to prov e a v it al fact is no more than a mere sc int il la; or (4) the ev ide nce est abl is hes
conc lus iv ely the oppos it e of a v it al fact. City of Kel ler v. Wils on , 168 S.W .3d 8 02, 8 10 (Tex . 200 5)

. In c onducti ng a l eg al suffici ency rev iew , w e c re dit e vide n ce suppor ti ng the judgme nt if

rea sona ble jurors co uld, and d isregard co ntrary evidence u nless reaso nab le jurors c oul d not

. Id. at 827; Villago m ez v. Rockwo o d

Sp e c ialties, In c. , 210 S.W .3d 7 20, 748 (Te x
. App .–Corp us Christi 200 6, pet. de nied ). M ore tha n a scintilla of ev iden ce exists, and t he ev ide nce is l eg all y su ff ic ien t, if the ev ide nce furni shes some reason abl e bas is for differi ng co ncl usi ons by re asona ble minds about a v it al fact’ s e x is tenc e. Lee Lew is Constr. Co. v. Har

ri son , 70 S. W .3d 778 , 782 -83 (Te x . 200 1). In co n d uct ing a fact ual su ff ic ien cy rev iew , w e mustnot merel y su bst it ute o ur jud g ment for that of the j ur y ; rather , w e v iew

al l the ev ide nce in a neut ra l li g ht t o det er mine
w hether the cont est ed findi ng i s s o c ontrar y to the g re at w eig ht an d preponderance of the evidence a s to be m anifestly unju st, sho ck th e c o n s c ie nce, or clearly dem onst rate bia s. Golden Ea gleAr

cher y, Inc . v . Jack son , 116 S.W .3d 7 57, 7 6 1 ( T e x. 2003) ; Poo l v. Ford Mo tor C o. , 715 S.W .2d 6 29, 6 35 ( Tex . 198 6) ; Vi ll agom ez , 210 S.W .3d a t 749

. 1. Th e Jo hn son s’ E v id ence The John sons ’ ev ide nce at t ri al cent ered on th e t e st imony of Hen ry

W ar re n, a li c e n s e d l a n d s u r

v e y o r
. W a r re n h a d c o n d u c t e d a s u r v e y o f t h e ma r i n a p ro p e rt yand
conc lud ed that the proper ty that w as g ra nted to the Di str ict by the 1947 P atentenc ro ached upon t he proper

ty bel ong ing to the J ohnso ns. I n doin g s o , W a rren deter mined that the
or ig ina l, natural shoreli ne—an d thus the east er n boundar y of the J ohnso ns’ proper ty —l ay to t he eas t of the w est er n bound ar y of the p ro per

ty ce ded t o the D is tr ict i n 1947. The record reflect s t hat W ar re n bas ed hi s fin din g s p ri mari ly upon four di fferentT he Jo hnsons’ t r i al coun sel di d no t l i st O wens as a wi t ness i n i t s l i st off act wi t nesses f or t r i al f i l ed 8 wi t h t he t r i al cour t

. T he D i st r i ct obj ect ed t o O wens t est i fy i ng as a r ebut t al wi t ness; t he t r i al cour t den i ed t he obj ect i on. T hi s deci si on of t he t r i al cour t , whi ch i s now bei ng appea l ed by t he D i st r i ct , wi l l be di scussed her ei n. 7 depi cti ons of the s horeli ne as i t ex is ted a ro und t he ti me o f t h e 1 9 4 7 Patent: ( 1) a map made for the D is tr ict i n M ay 1947 by Ja mes Jar boe; (2) a pla t made for th e D is tr ict i n 1946 by W . A. Raatz, a District engineer; (3) a surv ey cond ucte d in 194 6 by the District as pa rt of an appli cat ion to cons tr ucta breakw ater ; and (4) a hy drog ra phi c map prepared by the U. S. A rmy

C or ps of Eng ine ers. Al l four maps depicted tw o protr usi ons of land extendi ng eastof Bay Stree t, sep arate d by a harbor. Th e W arren surv ey conclu ded , base d on these maps, that the n atural shoreli ne in that area lay to the east of bo th protr usi ons of land and t h e h a rb o r, in A ra n s a s B a y. To ex pla in w hy

the natural shoreli ne lay not onl y to the east of the land, but al so to the e astof the h ar bor , W ar re n asse rt ed th at bo at ow ners “ ki ck ed out ” the l and t hat
or ig ina ll y ex is ted w here the har bor now w as si tuate d. “K ic ki ng out, ” acc ordin g to W ar re n, is a c ru de form of dredg ing w hereby one w oul d back one’ s boat up onto the lan d, and r un th e pro p e lle rs o f

th e bo a t t o a git a te a n d lo o se n th e di rtlying u n d e rn e a th , le a ving a rou gh chann el. W ar re n testi fied that he had i nter v iew ed s ev eral “h is tor ic al w it ness es” w ho had describe d the “kicki ng out” process. The John sons al so present ed te sti mony from t hree w it ness es w ho l iv ed i n F ult on and who d e sc rib ed th e nat ure of the shoreli ne as i t ex is ted a ro und t he ti me of the 19 47 Patent

. Gene Spr ink le, a F ult on resi dent si nce his bi rt h i n 1932, tes ti fied th at t he l and as it orig inally existed w as “kicked ou t” to creat e t h e h a rbor and that“I hav e do ne a little bit of i t [ki ck ing out] my sel f.” Spr ink le als o tes ti fied th at an oy ste r re ef ex is ted i n 1938 sout h of the tw o p ro t r u s i o n s o f l a n d

. G e n e D e F o r re s t , b o r n i n 1 9 3 0 a n d a l s o a l i fe t i me ar ea re si dent, al so tes ti fied reg ardin g the oy ste r re ef and the “k ic ki ng out” proces s. Fi nal ly , t he J ohnso ns present ed the testi mony of Dale Ow ens. O w ens tes ti fied th at 8 he l iv ed for sev enteen y ears n ear the Ful ton w ater

front, st arti ng w it h the y ear of his bi rt h in 1933. Ow ens drew

a r udi mentar

y map of the a re a i n q uest ion as he remembere d i t from8

b e fo re 1 9 4 7 ; t h e m a p wa s a d m it t e d in t o e vid e n c e
. T h e O we n s m a p in c lu d e d t h e two protr usi ons of l and separated by a har bor as w ell as the oy ste r re ef t o the sout h of the protr usi ons. O w ens tes ti fied th at t h e re w ere s unflow ers a nd bl ack ber ri es g ro w ing al ong the p ro tr usi on of l and l ay ing to the s outh of the harbor and that he knew

this bec ause he had “ pic ke d them [the bla ck ber ri es] many ti mes.” W hen as ked by the Johns ons’ tr ial
c ou ns el w he th er

or n ot “ bl ue be r r i es g row o n fi l l ,” O w en s res po nd ed : “ N ott o my know led g e.” The J ohnso ns arg ued t hat O w ens’ s te st imony sh ow ed th at t he l and protr usi ons coul d not hav e been arti fici al and t herefore t hey musthav e been lan dw ard of t h e n a t u ra l s h o re li n e ; i. e
. , p a rto f t h e Jo h n s o n s ’ p ro p e rt y. 2. Th e D ist rict ’s E v id ence The Di str ict’ s t ri al ev ide nce cons is ted o f te st im o n y from tw o w it ness es as w ell as several depiction s o f

t he area t hat , accord ing to t he District, conclu siv ely show that the re
w as an ar

ti fici al seaw ard move ment of the shoreli ne betw een 193 0 and 1948. F irst, the Di str ict present ed a pla t of the area ati ss ue c re ated in 1878 w hic h s how ed th e s horeli ne ly ing j ustto the east of Bay Street, w it h no subs tanti al lan d mass es extendi ng i nto A ra nsas B a y. T h e Di s t ri c ta ls o in t r o d u c e d a 1 8 8 8 m a p o f t h e a re a t h a tsi m il a rl y sh o we d o n ly a smal l sl iv er

of lan d i n betw een Ba y Street a nd th e s horeli ne. T he District a lso prese nte d several ae rial ph oto graph s o f t he area t o the ju ry . First
w as a phot og ra ph ta ken in 1930, w hic h the D istri ct c la im s i s t he ear li estkn ow n aer ial photog ra ph of the are a at is sue. The 19 30 phot og ra ph, t aken from w hat a ppears t o be direct ly ov er head, did not show Bay Street; thi s w as becau se, ac cordin g to the Di str ict, the street h ad been pl atted but had n o t yetb een bui lt

. The Di str ict present ed a copy of the photog ra ph w it h a dotte d blu e li ne draw n in; Jerald Br undrett, the Aransa s County Sur v ey or , t est ified thatthe blu e l ine ac curatel y repr e se n te d t he future l ocat ion of Bay Street. The 1930 photog ra ph show ed onl y a s li v er of lan d ex is ti ng betw een t he dotted b lue li ne and the s horeli ne.I n ad di t i on t o t he 1930 and 1948 ov er head phot ogr aphs, t he Di st r i ct i nt r oduced as ev i dence obl i que 9 aer i al phot ogr aphs of t he ar ea t aken i n 1946 and i n 1947. Bot h obl i que aer i al phot ogr aphs cl ear l y show t he pr ot rus i on s of

l and t hat app ear ed i n t he 1 948 ov er head phot ogr aph. Because bot h t he 1 930 and 1948 phot ogr aphs wer e t aken f r om t he sa m e an gl e— t hat i s, fr om di r ect l y over head t he ar ea at i ssue— t he Di st r i ct em phasi z ed t he co m par i son b et ween t hose t wo phot ogr aphs as ev i dence t hat t he sh or el i ne h ad m ov ed. 9 The Di str ict compared thi s 1930 photog ra ph w it h another ov er head aeri al pho tograph take n in 194 8. T he 1948 pho tograph showed tha t Bay Stree t had bee n bu ilt by thatti me; i t al so show ed th e two protr usi ons of land extendi ng eastw ard from Bay Street int o Aransas Bay

. The D is tr ict present ed the compar is on of 19 30 and 1948 ph otog ra phs 9 to t he j ur

y i n the form of a s er ies of sl ide s, w it h the l atter phot og ra ph ti nted blu e and super impos ed on the for mer at v ar iou s l ev els of transpa re ncy
. The first sl ide co nsi ste d of both photog ra phs w it h the 1948 photog ra ph bei ng 100% transpa re nt, so that the jur y sa w onl y the 1930 ph otog ra ph; t he suc ces si v e s li des g ra dual ly i ntroduce d the 1948 photog ra ph at l ow er l ev els of transpa re ncy unti l the fin al sl ide w hic h pres e n ted only the 1948 p h o t o g ra p h

. B r u n d re t t t e s t i fi e d t h a t t h e d i re c t c o mp a r i s o n o f t h e tw o p h o t o g ra phs w as appropr iat e bec ause th e y were “ g eo- re cti fied” ; t hat i s, ali g ned as to sc ale and common g eog ra phi cal features. The present ati on c lea rl y sh ow ed protr usi ons of land in the 1 948 pho tograph a t the location w here no land app eare d in the 193 0 ph oto graph . Th e District cont end ed th at th is w as con clu s ive p roof thatthe sho reline ha d mo v ed d rama tically
seaw ard betw een 193 0 and 1948. Even if th e jury

foun d tha t the shoreline had moved, th e bo und aryto the John sons’ proper ty w oul d nev erthe le ss mov e al ong w it h the sh oreli ne i f it w ere s how n tha t t he
mov ement w as the resul t of natu ra l acc re ti on or erosi on. See York , 532 S.W .2d a t 952 ; Lor ino , 175 S.W .2d a t 414. For that reas on, the D is tr ict arg ued t hat n ot on ly w as there a clear mo v em entin the shore line betw een 193 0 and 194 8 as dep icted in th e ph oto graph s, but t hat t his mov ement w as too d ra mati c i n too sh ort a per iod o f time to hav e been the
re sul t of natu ra l acc re ti on. Kather ine Bl ount , a ge olo g y and env ironmental sc ien ces professor

at Tex as A&M U niv ersi ty –Co rp us Chr is ti , t est ified w it h referenc e to the 1 930 and 194 8 pho tograph s tha t “this ma gnitude of chan ge doe sn’t hap pen natu rally along a fairlySpeci f i cal l y , t he Di st r i ct pr opoun ded an i nt er r ogat or y t o t he Jo hnsons aski ng t he f ol l owi ng: “ D o y ou 10 cont end t hat t he p or t i on o ft he 1947 pat ent pr oper t y w hi ch y ou cl ai m t o own was l andwar d of t he l i ne o fm ean hi gh wat eras i t exi st ed i n 19 30? I fso, st at e t he co m pl et e f act ual basi s f or t hat cont ent i on. ” T he Jo hnsons re s p o n d e d b y o b je c ti n g to th e i n te rr o g a to ry a n d s ta ti n g : “A l l o f th e J o h n s o n s ’ F u l to n B e a c h M a rin a p ro p e rty w as an d c on t i nu es t o b e a bo ve m ea n hi gh w ater. ” T he D i s t ri c t t he n m ove d t o c om pe l t he Jo hn s on s ’ an s w er.

T he Jo hnsons’ posi t i on was cl ar i f i ed i n t he f ol l owi ng e xchange bet ween t he Jo hnsons’ coun sel and t he t r i al cour t at a subsequ ent pr e- t r i al hea r i ng:

[ Johnson s’ coun sel ] : [ W ] i t h r espect t o j ust whet herwe t hi nk t he l and was t her e, t he l and

was al way s t her e. And t her e has been no – t he l and was nev er bel ow m ean hi gh t i de, and so t her e was n o accr et i on n ecessar y t o m ake i t abov e m ean hi gh t i de. T H E CO URT : [ A d d r e s s i n g Di s t r i c t ’ s c o u n s e l ] A l l r i g h t

. I fI u n d e r s t a n d h i s a n s we r t o y our

i n t e r r o g a t o r y i n wh i c h wh a t y o u ’ r e wa n t i n g t o kn o w i s a r e t h e y m aki ng a cl ai m her e t odayt hat t her e ha s bee n som e ki nd o faccr et i on r egar di ng t he shor el i ne t hat woul d basi cal l y go t o t hei r ben ef i t , y ou’ v e al r eadydi scussed i n y ourpar t i cul ar sy nopsi s to the C our t

. And y ou want t o know whet her t hey ’ r e cl ai m i ng t hat t he b ounda r y chan ged, i fy ou woul d, by accr et i on, and t hey ’ r e say i ng n o. [A d d r e s s in g J o h n s o n s ’ c o u n s e l] Is th a t c o r r e c t, M r . C o n o ly? [J o h n s o n s ’ c o u n s e l ]: T h a t’ s c o rr e c t. 10 low energ y env ironment c oast li ne l ik e the Tex as coas t.” 3. A nal ysis T he District claims tha t its ev iden ce con clusiv ely esta blishe d t h a tt here w as a seaw ard mov ement of the sh oreli ne i n betw een 1930 an d 1946; moreov er , i t not es that the Johns ons canno t now cl aim that suc h mov ement w as g ra dual or i mperc epti ble

. See York , 532 S.W .2d at 952. That is becau se the J ohnso ns’ tr ial co unsel ex pli ci tl y forec los ed th at
a ss e rt io n ata p re -t ria l h e a rin g. 10 How ev er , t he J ohnso ns do notbas e the ir arg ument on the ass erti on th at t here w as a nat ural mo v em entin t he sh oreline between 19 30 a nd 1 948 thatw ould have caused their boundar y to shi ft to t he east

. Rat her , t he J ohnso ns cl aim that there w as no mov ement at all of the s horeli ne, a s d efined by the mean dai ly

hi g h tide. Acc ordin g to the J ohnso ns, to the exten t the 193 0 a n d 1 9 4 8 p h oto graph s app ear to sh ow a dif feren t shoreline , this is beca use a chan nel or harb or w as “kicked out ” of land th at alrea dy existed. Th e Joh nson s’ trial counse l emp hasized tha t the “kicking o ut” proce ss was th e reaso n tha t, w here there
a p p e a re d t o b e a so l i d s h o re li n e in 1 9 3 0 , t h e re a p p e a re d t o b e a h a rb o r i n b e twe e n two protrusio ns of

land in 19 46. T he Johnso ns’ coun sel essen tially asked the jury to disregard11

the p hotog ra phi c compar is on, w hic h, if tak en as ac curate, “g eo- re cti fied” depi cti ons of the nat ural shore line at th e relevant time s, showed tha t land had bee n ad ded o ver those
s ixt e e n ye a rs ra t h e r t h a n t a k e n a wa y. T he District conte nds th at t h e ju ry w as no t f ree to d isregard the ph oto graph ic compar is on, w hic h the y consi der

to be c oncl usi v e proof that a s eaw ard mov ement of the shoreli ne i n fact did o cc u r. H ow ev er , t he j ur y w as not o bli g ed to bel iev e tha t t he 1930 p h o to gra p h ac cu ra te ly de p ict e d th e m e a n da ily hi gh wat e r le vel o f Ara n sa s B a y. Alt h o u gh the p hotog ra phs of the s horeli ne are probati v e w hen v iew ed toge ther , t hey do n ot conclu siv ely esta blish tha t W arren’s test imo ny regarding the bou nda ry o f t h e Joh nson s’ proper ty w as inc or re ct. Se e Cit y o f Ke ller

, 168 S.W .3d at 810. A lt houg h i t may appear to the D is tr ict t hat the jur

y ’s disc ounti ng of

the photog ra phi c c ompar is on w as unreason abl e, the j ur y w as not req uired to bel iev e tha t ev ide nce any more tha n the y were req uired to bel iev e the tes ti mony

of any par

ti cul ar w it ness
. See i

d. at 81 9 ( “J urors a re the sol e j udg es of the cred ibility

of t he w itnesse s a nd the weig ht to giv e the ir test imo ny. T hey may choose to be liev e on e w itness a nd d isbelieve ano the r.”). Ind eed , W arren te stif ied as follows: [F ]or a ph oto t o be si g nific ant i n the dete rmi nati on of the shore, y ou hav e to know the day , y ou hav e to know the ti me and y ou hav e to know the ele v ati on o f t h e w a t e r

a s s h o w n b y

t i d e g a g e s , a n d t h e n y o u c a n u s e i tt o d e t e rmi ne w here the sho re is. T h e D is tr ict di d notpresentany ev ide nce as to t he ti me of day or y ear w hen t he 1930 photog ra ph w as tak en. W ar re n’s tes ti mony therefore prov ide d a reason abl e bas is for t he jur y to conc lud e that the 1930 photog ra ph did not accuratel y depictthe natural shoreli ne as de f ined bythe m ean dailyhigh w ate r lev el. Mo re ov er , Spr ink le tes ti fied that he re cal led fishi ng for flounder on l and now cl aimed by the Di str ict, as ear ly

as 1938. Ac cordin g to the J ohnso ns, thi s t est imony i ndi cat ed th at t h e ma r i n a p ro p e rt y w a s t o t h e w e s t o f t h e n a t u ra l s h o re l i n e
. A l t h o u g h t h e D i s t r i c tmay c o n s id e r d u b io u s t h e t e s t im o n y o f a 7 2 -ye a r- o ld m a n re ga rd in g h is e xp e ri e n c e s a s a si xy ear-o ld, as i n Spr ink le’ s c ase, the jur y cl ear ly did not. A re v iew ing cour t canno t s ubst it ute12

it s j udg ment for that of the trier o f f a ct, so l ong as the ev ide nce falls w it hin a z one of
re asona ble di sag re ement. Id. at 822. W e conc lud e that the ev ide nce furni shed a re asona ble basi s for th e c ontent ion that W ar re n’s su rv ey

proper ly

l ocat ed th e nat ural shoreli ne defini ng the boundar y of the Johns ons’ proper

ty

. As suc h, t here w as more than a sci nti ll a of ev ide nce to s uppor t t hat findi ng
. See Har

ri son , 70 S. W .3d at 782 -83. Th e evidence did notconclusively estab lish that W ar re n’s su rv ey

w as inc or re ct. See Cit y o f Ke ll er , 1 6 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t8 1 0

. Ad d it io n a ll y,
v iew ing the ev ide nce in a neutral li g ht, w e canno t conc lud e that the jur y ’s co ncl usi on w as so cont ra ry to the preponderance of t he ev ide nce as to be manifest ly unj ustor

sh ock the
cons ci ence. See Jack

son , 116 S.W .3d at 761. Therefore, the ev ide nce present ed attr ial by the Johns ons w as leg all y and factual ly suffici ent to suppo rt the ju ry’s verdi ct. Acc ordin g ly , t he D is tr ict’ s first is sue is ov er ru led

. B. Jury

Charge By i ts sec ond i ss ue, t he D is tr ict c ontends thatthe charg e s ubmitted to the j ur y w as fata lly defective in tw o w ays, and tha t a new tri al is therefore require d

. F ir s t , the District cont ends that the j ur

y ch arg e w as improper becau se itas ked the j ur y w hether the W ar re n surv ey w as “substa ntially correct.” Th e seco nd e rror alleged b y the District w ith respe ct to t he j ur y charg e is that the tr ial cour t did not inc lud e an ins tr uct ion on the law reg ardin g a s eaw ard mov ement of a b oundar y sh oreli ne. Tex as Rul e of Ci v il Procedu re 278 req uires the tri al cour t to su bmiti nst ru cti ons and defini ti ons to the jur

y as are necess ar

y to enabl e the j ur

y to re nder

a v erdict. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 278. T h e go a l o f

t h e c h a rg e is t o su b m itt o t h e ju ry t h e is s u e s fo r d e c is io n lo gi c a ll y, si mply , c lea rl y , fair ly , c or re ctl y , and co mplet ely. Hy undai Motor C o. v . R odr igu ez , 995 S. W .2d 6 61, 6 64 ( Tex . 199 9)

. Fai lure to submi t a q uest ion i s n ot de emed g ro unds for
re v ersi ng the jud g ment unl ess i ts submi ss ion , i n s ubst anti all y co rrectw ordin g , has been
re q uest ed i n w ri ti ng by

the par ty co mplai nin g of the j udg ment. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 278. As l ongT h e ju r y c h a rg e i n s tru c te d th e ju ry t o a n s w e r “ye s ” o r “n o ” to q u e s ti o n n u m b e r o n e , a n d th e n to 11 answerque st i on n um bert wo onl yi ft he a nswer t o quest i on num ber one was “ no. ” Q uest i on n um bert wo r ead:

D o y ou f i nd f r om a pr epond er ance oft he e vi dence t hat t he west er n bo undar y l i ne o ft he N ov em ber194 6 pa t ent sur v ey pr epar ed by Jam es Jar boe i s at or t o t he e ast of t he n at ur al shor el i ne i n t he a r ea o ft he “ Johnson pr oper t y ” i n di sput e? Because t he j ur y answer ed “ y es” t o qu est i on n um berone , no answerwas gi v en t o t hi s secon d qu est i on.

“S ub s t an t i al ” i s sy no ny m ou s w i t h “rea l ” and “t rue ”; “co rr ec t ” wi t h “ac c ura t e” an d “ex ac t

. ” M ERR I AM 12 W EBST ER ’ S C OLL EGI AT E D I C T I O N A R Y 260, 11 74 (10th ed

. 19 96 ). 13 as the c harg e i s l eg all y co rrect , t ri al cour

ts are afford e d b ro a d di sc re ti on, s ubj ectto
re v ersal only

on a court’ s abuse of that d is creti on. Tex

. Dep ’ t of Hum an Ser

vs . v . E. B. , 802 S.W .2d 6 47, 6 49 ( Tex . 199 0) ; Hagins v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc. , 1 2 8 S

. W

. 3 d 3 8 3 , 3 8 7 (T e x. App .–T exarkana 20 04, no pe t.). Ev en if the trial court ab used its discretion, we reverse onl y w here the er ro r in the j ur y ch arg e i s s how n to be har mf ul. Boa tland of Housto n, In c.
v. Bai ley, 609 S .W .2d 7 43, 7 49-5 0 (Te x
. 198 0). More over, a jury charge error is rev ersible onl y i f it probabl y

ca used the rendi ti on of an improper jud g ment or probabl y

prev ented the appel lan t from proper ly present ing the cas e on appeal

. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 44. 1(a). 1. “Substantial ly

Correct” Qu es ti on n um be r

o ne o f t he j ur

y c ha rg e read a s f ollow s : “ D o y ou fi nd from a preponderance of the ev ide nce that the s ur v ey prepared by

H ar ry W ar re n i n J uly

of 2003 is a s ubst anti all y

co rrectdes cr ipt ion of the n atural shoreli ne?” The j ur y ans w ered i n the 11 aff ir mati v e. At t ri al, the Di str ict obj ect ed to the inc lus ion of thi s q uest ion , c lai ming that“ the modifier ‘ subs tanti all y ’ all ow ed the jur y compl etel y ung uid ed dis creti on about how cl ose the W a rr e n s u rve y

had to be to the act ual na tural sho reline in orde r to be ‘subst ant ially’ correct.” Th e District now conte nds th at th e inclusion of this question was error becau se “the word ‘substan tially ’ could b e interpret ed b y the jury as requiring accuracy to w ithin inc hes, feet, or

hundreds of yar d s. ” The J ohnso ns, on t he ot her hand, co ntend that the phrase “s ubst anti all y

co rrect ” has an ordin ar y meani ng of “t ru ly

or real ly accurate” and 12 th a t the j ur

y co uld not hav e been ask ed to define the b oundar y to any more demandi ng s t a n d a rd o f

a c c u ra c y.14

In a boundar

y di sput e, t he ul ti mate obj ectof the t ri er of fact i s t o det er mine the “ tr ue locatio n of

the line in disp ute .” Mo rt gage Inv. C o. of

El Pas o v . Bauer , 493 S.W .2d 3 39, 342 (Tex . Ci v . App.–El Paso 1973 , w ri t ref’d n. r. e.) , over ruled on o ther gr ounds , Martin v. Am er m an , 133 S.W .3d 262 , 268 (Tex. 2004 ). M oreo v er, [w]h en t hi s ca nn otbe do ne w i th re as on ab l e c er ta i nty d ue t o th e l ap s e of t i me or the o bliterat ion o f

t h e e viden ce of

the original locate r, it i s not on ly per mis sib le, but, out of neces si ty , req uired th at t he c our ts re sor t t o any ev ide nce tendi ng to est abl is h the pla ce of the or ig ina l footsteps of the sur v ey or w hic h meet the req uirement t hat i t i s t he bes t ev ide nce of w hic h the cas e i s s usc epti ble

. Bauer , 493 S.W .2d a t 342

. In ot her w ords, w here “ ex act ness [i s] difficul t of att ain ment, [i t] shou ld notbe insisted upo n, to the de struction of rig ht.” State v

. Hum bleOi

l & Ref . C o. , 1 8 7 S. W .2 d 93 , 1 0 7 (T e x. Civ. A p p
. – W a co 19 4 5 , writref ’d w .o .m .) (cit in g Ham ilton v. Me nif ee , 11 T ex. 718, 74 9 (185 4)). Al thoug h the par

ti es do notdi re ct us to, nor can w e find, any Tex as cas e i nter preti ng t h e p h ra s e “s u b s t a n t ia ll y co rr e c t ” as u s e d in a b o u n d a ry d is p u t e ju ry c h a rg e , co u rt s h a ve clarif ied th e ph rase in oth er conte xts. In fact, a s n o t e d a bove, T exas Rule of Civ il Procedu re 278 prov ide s t hat a tri al cour t’ s fai lure to submi t an is sue shal l not b e g ro unds for rev ersal of

the jud gmen t unle ss the issue w as previously ten dere d by the app ellantin “s ubst anti all y

co rrect ” w ordin g
. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 278 . In t ha t c on te xt, t he Te x as S up rem e Cou rthas st ated that: Subs tanti all y

co rrect

. . . does not mean that itm u st be abs olu tel y co rrect , nor does i t mean one t hat i s merely su ff ic ien t t o c all the matt er to the atte ntion of

the court w ill suf

f ice. It me ans one t

hat i n s ubst ance and i

n the m ain is correct, an d tha t is not aff irm atively inco rrect

. Place ncio v. Allied Indu s. Int’ l, Inc. , 7 2 4 S. W .2 d 20 , 2 1 (T e x. 19 8 7 ) (ci ti n g Modica v. How ard , 161 S.W .2d 10 9 3 , 1 094 (Tex. Civ . App .–B eau mo nt 19 42, no w rit)) (emp hasis added)

. If the phra se “s ubst anti all y correct ” w ere g iv en th e s ame meani ng i n the present cont ext, q uest ion number one of the j ur

y ch arg e w oul d be suffici ent t o det er mine the “ tr ue loc ati on” of the b oundar y i n di sput e. See B auer , 493 S.W .2d a t 342

.15

W e conclu de that the trial court did not abu se its discretion b y including in the jury charg e a q uest ion of w hether the W ar re n s ur

v ey w as “s ubst anti all y

ac curate.” 2. In st ru ct io n on Ef fe cto f Seaw ard M ovemen t of Sh orelin e B ou nd ary The Di str ict al so chal len g es the t ri al cour t’ s d eci si on not to i ncl ude an ins tr uct ion on the law regarding the movem entof shoreli n e b o u n d a rie s. In the ir R equeste d Jury Ques ti on N o. 1, t h e D ist rict i ncl uded t he foll ow ing se ntenc e: “Y ou are i nst ru cte d tha t a
s e a wa rd m o ve m e n to f

a sh o re li n e is p re s u m e d t o b e a rt if ic ia l u n le s s itis p ro ve n t o h a ve bee n gradual, n atu ral, and impe rcepti b le .” The trial court decline d to includ e this instructio n in the jury

charge. Th e District now conte nds th at th is decision was an abu se of dis creti on, c lai ming thatw it hout the i nst ru cti on, t he j ur y w a s f re e t o f ind an ar ti fici al
seaw ard mov ement of the sh oreli ne and sti ll find i n fav or of the J ohnso ns. I n respon se, t h e Jo h n s o n s st a t e t h a tt h e in c lu s io n o f t h e Di s t ri c t ’s p ro p o s e d in s t ru c t io n wo u ld h a ve imp ermissibly “ com me nte d on the weig ht of the ev iden ce.” See Associate d Carriages, Inc. v. Int’ l Bank of Com m erce , 37 S.W .3d 69, 75 (Tex. App. –Sa n Ant onio 200 0, pe t. de nied ). T h e Jo h n s o n s a ls o co n t e n d t h a tt h e in s t r u c t io n wa s u n n e c e s s a ry a n d wo u ld h a ve improper ly

“ ti lt [e d ]” o r “n udg e[d]” the jur y
. See Wal- Ma rt

Sto re s, Inc . v

. Johnso n , 106 S.W .3d 718 , 723 -24 (Te x . 200 3). W it hout pass ing on t he v ali dity of the J ohnso ns’ co ntent ion s, w e not e tha t t he Di str ict’ s prop osed in str uct ion w as not an accurate desc ri pti on of the law pertai nin g to the
mo v em entof

shoreline bou nda ries. T he suprem e court has state d tha t “[t]he g ene ral rule is that a riparian or li ttora l ow ner acquires or loses title to th e land g ra d u a ll y or imp ercep tibly add ed o r taken to or f rom h is fa st ban k or shore.” York , 532 S.W .2d a t 952 (emp hasis ad ded ). The Distri ct’s propo sed inst ruction , howev er, state d t h a ta seaward
mov ement i s p re sumed to be ar ti fici al unl ess i t i s “ gra d ual , nat ural, and impercept ibl e” (e mphasi s a dded)

. The differenc e is not neg li g ibl e. Had the Di str ict’ s p ro posed i nst ru cti on bee n includ ed, the jury could have fo und thatthere was a g ra d u a l a n d na tural sea w ard16

m o ve m e n to f

t h e sh o re li n e , a n d ye tif t h e m o ve m e n twa s p e rc e p t ib le , t h e ju ry wo u ld h a ve inc or re ctl y

co ncl uded t hat t he boun dar y di d notmov e w it h the sh oreli ne. W e c oncl ude t hat t he tr ial co urt di d not abus e i ts d is creti on i n i ts formula ti on of q uest ion number one of t he jur y charg e becau se the D is tr ict fail ed to su bmiti ts re q uest ed ins tr uct ion in subs tanti all y co rrectw ordin g
. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 278. The D is tr ict’ s s econd is sue is therefore ov er ru led

. C. Verdi ct Support for the Judgment The Dis tr ict asser

ts, by i ts thi rd i ss ue, t hat t he j ur y v erdict di d notsu ppor t t he judgme nt issue d by the trial court. Spe cif ically , the Distri ct cont end s t hatthe trial court improper ly

i ncl uded i n i ts ju d gm e n t a preci se desc ri pti on of the boundar ies of the Johns ons’ proper

ty adopt ed from t he W ar re n sur v ey , ev en thoug h the j ur y merely found that the W ar re n s ur

v e y was “subs tanti all y

co rrect .” I n ac cordance w it h our co ncl usi on abov e that the “s ubst anti all y co rrect ” w ordin g w as suffici ent t o es tabl is h the tr ue l ocat ion of the boun dar

y i n di sput e, w e find that the jur y v erdict prov ide d s uff ic ien t s uppor t for the court’s f inal judgm entprecisely def ining that bo und ary . Th e District’s third issue is
ov er ru led

. D. Voir Dire Ex amina tion By i ts fourth is sue, the Dis trict c lai ms t hat i t w as unfair ly preju dic ed by

q uest ion s ask ed at vo i r

d i re b y t h e J o h n s o n s ’ t r i a l c o u n s e l

. T h e fo l l o w i n g e x c h a n g e b e tw e e n t he attor ney s a nd th e tr ial co urt i ll ust ra tes the dis pute: [J o h n s o n s’ co unsel ]: H ow w oul d i t mak e y ou feel if l and had been in y our fam ily f iv e y ears, te n y ears, 50 or 60 like the Joh nson s – [D is tr ict’ s c oun sel ]: Ex cus e me, y our H onor
. I’ m g oin g to

– [ J o h n s o n s ’ c o u n s e l] : – a n d so m e b o d y – [D is tr ict’ s c oun sel ]: Ex cus e me, couns el. I ’m s or ry to int er ru pt. I am g oin g to ob ject t o this ques ti on as aski ng the ju ry to pla ce themse lv es in a pos it ion o f

o ne s ide of the c ase and as k – i mprop er present ing the cas e.D ur i ng t hi s bench conf er ence, t he t r i al cour t re v er sed i t s ear l i er ru l i ng and ov er r ul ed t he o bj ect i ons 13 m a d e b y th e D is tr ic t’s c o u n s e l a s to th e q u e s tio n s a s k e d b y th e J o h n s o n s ’ c o u n s e l. 17 THE C O UR T: I hav en’ t real ly heard the full q uest ion as to w here he is g oin g w it h i t. I’ ll su sta in as to that re g ard. Rep hrase y our q uest ion , ple ase, M r. C ast er li ne [J ohnso ns’ co unsel ]. [J ohnso ns’ co unsel ]: H ow w oul d i t mak e y ou feel if so meone c ame up t o y o u a n d s a i d y o u t h i n k t h a t i s y o u r l a n d ? I t ’ s m y l a n d

. G e to ff. How w ould it make y ou feel? [District’s cou nsel]: Your Hono r, tha t is the question , and tha tis wh a tI ’m

obj ect ing to. THE C OU RT: O kay

. I w il l sus tai n tha t. [Joh nso ns’ co unse l]: May w e ap proa ch, your Honor? T HE C O UR T : Yo u m a y. (O ff- the-re cor

d di sc ussion at the b ench) [ ] 13 [Joh nso ns’ co unse l]: Let m e start here on the first row
. How w ould it make y ou f eel, sir, if

land in your fa mily for y ears w as sud den ly in jeo pardy ? S omeone t old y ou, h ey , t hat i s my l and. I am g oin g to t ake it aw ay from y ou. T e ll me how thatw oul d make y ou feel. The Di str ict s tates thatthe tr ial co urt abu sed it s d isc re ti on i n per mitt ing the Johns ons’ co unsel to ask thes e q uest ion s, cit ing two c ases w here c our ts found itto be improper for couns el at c los ing arg ument t o as k a j uror to pla ce hims elf i n the pos it ion of the p lai nti ff

. See F

am br ough v . Wagley, 169 S.W .2d 478, 480-8 2 ( Tex . 194 3) ; S. Pac. C o.
v. Hay es , 391 S.W .2d 463 , 468 -69 (Te x . Civ . App .–Corp us Christi 1965 , w rit ref ’d n.r.e. ). T he District claims tha t “there is no app aren t reaso n for a pplying a dif feren t rule to the v oir dire ex aminat ion of the j ur y panel .” W e di sag re e. Th e Te x a s S u p re me C o u rt h a s re c o g n i z e d t h a t “ t r i a l c o u rt s s h o u l d a l l o w broad lat it ude t o c ounse l” at voird ire ex aminat ion “ to di sc ov er any bi as or preju dic e by

the pot ent ial jurors so that pe remp tory challen ges may be intelligently exer c is e d.” Hy undai Mo tor C o. v . Va squez , 189 S.W .3d 743, 749 (Tex . 2006) ( int er nal q uotat ion s o mitt ed) ; see18

als o Gr een v . Li gon , 190 S.W .2d 7 42 ( Tex . C iv . Ap p.–F ort W orth 19 45, w rit ref’d n. r. e.) (s tati ng that“ our

co urts hav e been v er

y li beral in per mitt ing a broad rang e of in q uir ies on
v oir di re to enabl e c ounse l to i ntel li g entl y us e the ir

peremptor

y ch allen ges ”). The s cope of such ex aminat ion rest s larg ely in the sound disc re ti on of the tr ial co urt. Ba bc ock v
. N w. Me m ’ l Hos p. , 767 S.W .2d 705 , 709 (Te x
. 198 9). T o obt ain a reversal, an ap pellan t mu st show that the trial court abu sed its disc re t io n a n d t hatthe error w as calcula ted to cause and probabl y

di d c ause the rendi ti on of an i mprope r ju dg ment. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 4 4.1; Bab cock , 767 S.W .2d a t 709

. In Hy undai Motor C o. , t he s upreme co urt emphas iz ed th at t he tr ial co u rti s in the bestposition to det ermin e w het her a voir dire question is proper: The Tex as Con sti tuti on g uarantees a tr ial by a fair and i mpart ial j ur y , and our courts use v oir dire to achieve tha t goal. Voir dire inquiries tha t e xp lore external biase s and unfair prejudice s f urthe r t h e e f fort, bu t tho se tha t test jurors’ possib le v erdicts based on case-sp ecif ic relevant evidence d e t ra ct f rom it. T he distinctio n be tw een the two in some cases is a f ine on e. T hus, w e v est trial judges w ith the discretio n t o d e c ide w het her an inquiry cons ti tutes the former

or the latter ; as appel lat e c our ts, w e s h o u ld defer to thei r jud g ment. 189 S. W .3d a t 760

. Here, the Johnso ns cont end t hat t hei r couns el’ s v oir di re q uest ion s w ere i ntended to s oli ci t t he pot enti al jurors’ hone st opi nio ns and v alu es re g ardin g the subj ectmatte r of the d is pute. A v oir

di re ex aminat ion need not b e c onfined t o matt ers w hic h mi g ht be g ro unds for c hal len g e for caus e. Gr eenm an v. City of F

or t Worth , 308 S.W .2d 5 53, 5 54 (Tex . C iv . Ap p.–F ort W orth 19 57, w ri t ref’d n. r. e.)

. Defer ri ng to th e t rial co urt’ s s uper ior ability to de t e rm ine th e reaso nab lene ss of a v oir dire q uest ion un der the circumsta nces, see Hy undai Mo tor

C o. , 189 S.W .3d at 755, w e cannot say that the tr ial co urt abu sed it s dis creti on here. Acc ordin g ly , t he D is tr ict’ s four th i ss ue i s o v er ru led

. E. Testimony

of Dale Ow ens By i ts fifth is sue, the Di str ict c ontends tha t th e t rial co urt i mprop er ly per mitt ed th e John sons to call Dale Ow ens, w ho h ad n ot be en p rev iously disclosed to the Distri ct, as aT he Di st r i ct al so con t ends t hat t he Johnsons m ade a pr e- t r i al t act i cal deci si on t o cl assi fy O wens 14 as a r ebut t al wi t ness so t hat t heywoul d no t nee d t o di scl ose h i s i dent i t y
. T hi s woul d be an i m per m i ssi bl e en d ru n a ro u n d th e p ro c e d u ra l ru l e re q u i rin g d i s c l o s u re
. See Al var ado v. Far

ah Mf g. C o. , 830 S. W

. 2d 911, 917 ( T ex. 1992)

. O t hert han t he Di st r i ct ’ s bal d al l egat i ons, howev er , t he r ecor d i s dev oi d of anyi ndi cat i on t hat t he Johnson s i n f act di d m ake such a pr e- t r i al t act i cal deci si on. 19 rebu ttal w itness a t trial. T exas Rule of

Civ il Procedu re 193 .6(a) provides tha t a party w ho fails to time ly
m a ke , a m e n d, or

su ppl ement a dis cov er y respon se maynot int ro duce in ev ide nce the undi sc los ed mater ial or uni denti fied w it ness unl ess the cour t finds that : (1 ) there w as g ood
caus e for the fai lure to ti mely make, amend, or

su ppl ement t he di sc ov er y respon se; or

( 2) the failure to time ly

m ake, a me nd, o r sup plem entt he discovery resp onse w ill notunfairly
sur pr is e or

unfair ly preju dic e the othe r par ti es. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 1 93.6( a)

. The burden of show ing g ood c ause, or l ack of unfair su rp ri se or

unfair preju dic e, is on th e par ty se eki ng to i ntroduce in ev ide nce the undis cl osed mater ial or uni denti fied w it ness
. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 193 .6(b). Furthe r, a f inding of g ood cause or lack of unfair surprise or unfair prejudice must be s uppor

ted b y the re cord. Id. T he Distr ictconte nds th at it w as un fairly surprised an d prejud iced by Ow ens’s tes ti mony re g ardin g his pi ck ing bl ack ber ri es as a c hil d on the p ro tr usi ons of land extendi ng in to Ara n sa s B a y. Th e Dist ric t’ s tria l co u n se l, h o wever, in obje ct in g to Owen s’s te st if ying, 14 admitted t o the tr ial courtthat Ow ens w as “j ustanother hist or ic al w it ness ” w hose tes ti mony
w as “j usta cumul ati on of [the Johnson s’ ] case in chief.” The admis si on of ev ide nce that is merely cu mulat iv e, an d not dis posi ti v e of the cas e, i s n ot rev ersi ble ev en i f in er ro r. See Gee v. Lib er

ty Mu t. Fi reIns . C o. , 765 S.W .2d 394 , 396 (Tex. 1989 ) ( statin g tha t “[t]his cou rt
w ill ordina rily

not f ind reversible error for errone ous r u lings on a dm issibility of ev iden ce whe re t h e ev ide nce in q uest ion i s c umulat iv e and not c ontroll ing on a mater ial i ss ue dis posi ti v e of the cas e” ). Al thoug h the D is tr ict’ s c ounse l ass erts on appe al that he w as misquot ed in calling Owens’s te stimo ny a “cumu lation ,” the District has notmad e a request to t his C our

t or to the t ri al cour

t that the re por

ter ’s re cord be c or re cte d. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 34. 6(e)(2) (requiring the trial court to settle disput es regarding alleged inaccuracie s in20

repo rter’s record), 34.6 (e)(3) ( providing tha t the app ellate court ma y subm it to the trial court any post-ap pea l dispute s as to alleged ina ccuracies in repo rter’s record). In an y ca se, our

rev iew of the record revea ls thatOw ens’ s t est imony w as ind eed
cum ulative of

the prior evidence int ro d u c ed b y the Joh nson s. Ow ens’ te stimo ny simp ly bol ste re d the Jo hnsons’ t h e o ry t hat t he protr usi ons of land as show n i n the 1946 pho tograph w ere na tural be cause blackbe rries had grow n the re. W arren, th e Joh nson s’
ex per t w it ness i n the ir

ca se in chi ef, tes ti fied th at he had int er v iew ed Owe n s a nd th at “[ Ow ens] tol d me t hat t his l and had al w ay s b een t here, t hat i t ev en had bla ck ber ri es on i t. T hey use[d ] to com e do w n an d pick blackb erries on t h a tp ie c e o f land. ” T he District obj ect ed to W ar re n’s te st imony reg ardin g Ow ens’ s s tatementas hearsay , butthat obj ect ion w as ov er ru led by the tr ial co urt. Furt her , the tri al cour t’ s d eci si on to ov er ru le that obje ction is notchallen ged by the Distri ct on ap pea l. W e con clude t hatO w ens’s testim ony was m erely cum ulative o f t he John sons’ case in chi ef. Therefore, ev en if w e w ere to ag re e w it h the Di str ict that the Johns ons faile d to
me et th eir burde n un der rule of civ il proce dure 193 .6, a ny error comm itted bythe trial court in per mitt ing Ow ens’ s t est imon y was h a rml ess
. See T E X R. C IV
. P. 193.6; Gee , 765 S.W .2d a t 396

. The Di str ict’ s fifth i ss ue i s o v er ru led

. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 44. 1(a)(1). F. District’s Claim of Title by Limitations The Di str ict’ s s ixth i ss ue on appeal conc er ns the tr ial co urt’ s d eci si on notto inc lud e q uest ion s i n the j ur

y ch arg e as to the D is tr ict’ s c lai m of a dv erse poss ess ion to t he proper ty in dis pute under

both the three- y ear

and fiv e- y ear

st atute s of

l im it ati ons. See T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN . §§ 16 .02 4, 16 .02 5 (Verno n 20 02). T e xa s Rule of

Civ il Procedu re 278 provi des a substa ntive, non -discretiona ry direct iv e to tr ial co urts re qui rin g them to s ubmitreq uest ed q uest ion s t o the j ur y i f the ple adi ng s and any ev ide nce suppo rt them. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 278; El baor v. Sm it h , 845 S.W .2d 2 40, 2 43 (Te x
. 199 3). T hatis, a trial co urt ma y ref use to subm it an issue o nly ifT h e D is tr ic t’s R e q u e s te d J u r y Q u e s tio n N o . 2 a ls o in c lu d e d a d e f in itio n o f “ tit le ” a s “ a r e g u la r c h a in 15 oft r ansf er s of

r eal pr oper t y f r om orund er t he St at e of T exas” and a def i ni t i on o f“ peacea bl e po ssessi on” as
“ possessi on o fre al p rop ert y t hat i s cont i nuous and i s not i nt er r upt ed b y an adv er se sui t t o r ecov er t he p ro p e rty. ” 21 no ev ide nce ex is ts to w ar ra nt it s submi ss ion

. El baor , 8 4 5 S. W .2 d at24 3 (cit in g Brow n v. Goldstein , 685 S.W .2d 6 40, 6 41 ( Tex

. 1985) ). Fai lure to submi t a q uest ion i s n ot de emed gro u n d s fo r re vers in g t h e j u d gm e n t u n le ss its su b m iss io n , in su b st a n ti a lly co rre ctw o rd in g, has been re q uest ed in w ri ti ng by the par ty co mplai nin g of the j udg ment. Id

. A c lai m that the e v ide nce w as leg a lly o r fa ctuall y i nsuffici ent t o w ar ra nt t he s ubmis si on of a q uest ion maybe made for t he first ti me after the v erdict, re g ardle ss of whe ther the submi ss ion of
suc h q uest ion w as re q uest ed by the compl ain ant. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 279. Here, t he D is tr ict s ubmitted t he foll ow ing R eq uest ed J ur y Ques ti on N o. 2: Do y ou f ind that, for

m ore than three y ears b efore M arch 30, 2 001, the Nav ig ati on D is tr ict hel d the proper ty i n di sput e under

ti tl e and the N av ig ati on Di stric t, o r one or

more persons l easi ng from i t, w ere i n peac eabl e and adv erse poss ess ion of any por ti on of the proper

ty i n di sput e? The Di str ict al so submi tted the fol low ing R eq uest ed J ur y Ques ti on N o. 3: Do y ou find that, for more than fiv e y ears b efore M arch 30, 2 001, the Nav ig ati on Di str ict cl aimed the proper ty in q uest ion under a dul y reg is tered deed an d tha t t he N av ig ati on D is tr ict or one or more persons l easi ng from the Navigati on D is tr ict, w ere i n peac eabl e and adv erse poss ess ion of any por ti on of the proper

ty and used or

enj oy ed i t? Both jur y q uest ion s re q uest ed by the Di str ict inc lud ed a defini ti on of “adv erse poss ess ion ”
as “a n actual and v is ibl e appropr iat ion of real proper

ty , c ommenced and c onti nued un der
a c lai m of ri g ht t hat i s i ncons is tent w it h and is hos ti le to t he c lai m of another person. ” 15 To e st abl is h i ts enti tl ement t o a j ur y q uest ion as to the t hree- y ear st atute of limit a t io ns, th e District w as required to prese nt evidence thatit possesse d the land in dis pute peace abl y

and adv ersel y

under titl e or col or

of ti tl e for at l eastthree y ears. T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN . § 16.024. To est abl is h its entitl ement to a jur y q uest ion as to t he fiv e- y ear

st atute , t he D is tr ict w as re q uired to presentev ide nce t hat i t c ult iv ated, used , or enjoyed the land p e a c e a b ly a nd a dversely und er a duly registered de ed while pay ing appl ic abl e tax es, for a t l eastfiv e y ears. Id. § 16 .025.T he Di s t r i c t a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t “ [ a ] f t e r J a n u a r y 1 , 2 0 0 0 , wh e n t h e J o h n s o n s ’ l e a s e wi t h Al by 16 t erm i na t ed , t he Di st r i ct was cha r gi ng r ent di r ect l y t o t he b oat owner s f or t he u se of t he b oat sl i ps t hat t he D i st r i ct had bui l t

. ” T he Di st r i ct ur ge s t hat t hi s was suff i ci ent ev i dence t o est abl i sh t hei r ent i t l em ent t o t he subm i ssi on o fa j ur y que st i on o n ad v er se po ssessi on, ci t i ng M c S h a n v . P i tts , 55 4 S

. W

. 2d 75 9, 76 3 (T ex
. C i v. App. –San Ant oni o 19 77, no wr i t ) , f or t he p r oposi t i on t hat an adv er se po s s es s i on cl ai m ant can m eet t he e x c lu s iv ity e le m e n t i f h is te n a n t o c c u p ie d th e d is p u te d la n d . W ith o u t d e te r m in in g w h e th e r th is a lle g a tio n is i n f act suff i ci ent t o est abl i sh excl usi v e po ssessi on, we no t e t hat t he d ur at i on o ft i m e du r i ng whi ch t he Di st r i ct cl ai m s t o ha v e be en “ di r ect l y ” char gi ng r ent t o bo at owner s was t oo b ri ef t o sust ai n a def ense underei t her st a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s — o n l y 1 5 m o n t h s p a s s e d b e t we e n J a n u a r y 1 , 2 0 0 0 a n d M a r c h 3 0 , 2 0 0 1 , t h e d a t e t he J o h n s o n s fi l e d s u i t. See T EX
. C IV
. P RAC

. & R EM
. C OD E A NN
. §§ 16

. 02 4, 16

. 02 5 (V ern on S up p. 20 07 ). 22 Our rev iew of the record rev eals no ev iden ce indica ting that th e District ex clusiv ely
occ upi ed the proper

ty cl aimed by the Johns ons. The Di str ict notes that “[f]rom abo ut 19 92 to 2000, the Di str ict w as charg ing rent t o the Jo hnson s’ tena nt for the por ti on of the mari na proper ty thatl ay w it hin the patentbounda ri es. ” H ow ev er , jo in t o r common p oss ess ion 16 by the adv erse poss ess ion cl aimantand the o w ner defeats th e r e quisi te q ual ity of
ex cl usi v eness
. Tur

ner v. Mull

ins , 162 S.W .3d 3 56, 3 67 ( Tex . Ap p.–F ort W orth 20 05, n o pet.) ; W est End API, Ltd. v. R othpletz , 732 S.W .2d 371 (Tex. App. –Dallas 19 87, w rit ref ’d
n.r .e.) ; see Rick

v. Gr ubbs , 214 S.W .2d 9 25, 9 27 ( Tex . 194 8)

. Mo re ov er , proof that the owner’s ten ant is in posse ssion atthe sam e time as the claim antis not suf f icient to sustain
a c lai m of adv erse poss ess ion

. Sol is v. La Br is a Land & C attle C o. , 361 S.W .2d 6 31, 6 32 (T e x. Ap p .– Sa n An to n io 19 6 2 , n o w rit ) (ci ti n g Rick , 214 S.W .2d at 927 ). The al leg ati ons that the D is tr ict charg ed rent t o ten ants of the J ohnso ns w as ins uff ic ien t t o es tabl is h ex cl usi v e pos ses si on by the Di str ict, w hic h i s a req uired el ement under both st atute s o f li mita ti ons. See T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN . §§ 16.024, 16.025. W e the re fo re c o n clu d e tha t t he tr ial co urt di d noter r in decl ini ng to inc lud e question s in the jury charge as to th e District’s claim of adverse posse ssion un der tho se sta tutes

. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 278; see als o El baor , 845 S.W .2d at 243 (h old ing that a tr ial
cour t may refuse to submi t an is sue in a j ur y ch arg e i f there is no ev ide nce to w ar ra nt i ts submi ss ion ). The D is tr ict’ s s ixth i ss ue i s o v er ru led

.23 III . C ONCL US I ON Hav ing ov er ru led the Di str ict’ s s ix i ss ues, w e aff ir m the jud g ment of the tr ial co urt.

_________

_________

_____ DO RI C ON TRERAS G AR ZA, J u s t i c e Me moran dum Opi nio n del iv ered and filed thi s t he 29t h day

of Apr il , 200 8.