The Electronic

Transmission

of Election

Materials

The Electronic

Transmission of

Election Materials

Author:

Ralph C. Keikkila

P.O.Box 1230

Pioneer, California 95666-1230

Managed and Edited by:

William C. Kimberling

National Clearinghouse on Election Administration

Published by:

National Clearinghouse on Election Administration

Federal Election Commission

Washington, D.C. 20463

September 1995
Introduction by the

Clearinghouse

This report is another in the series on Innovations in Election Administration being published

by the FEC's National Clearinghouse on Election

Administration.

The purpose of this series is to acquaint State

and local election officials with innovative election procedures and technologies that have been

successfully implemented by their colleagues

around the country.

Our reports on these innovations do not

necessarily constitute an endorsement by

the Federal Election Commission either of

any specific procedures described or of any

vendors or suppliers that might be listed

within the report. Moreover, the views and

opinions expressed in these reports are

those of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the Federal Election Commission or any division thereof.

We welcome your comments on these reports

as well as any suggestions you may have for additional topics. You may mail these to us at:

The National Clearinghouse on

Election Administration

Federal Election Commission

999 E. Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20463

or else contact us

Toll free 800/424-9530

Direct on 202/219-3670

By FAX on 202/219-8500.

l i
Introduction

The purpose of this report is to examine the

issues and identify alternative means by which

election materials might be electronically transmitted through current technology in a practicable, affordable, and acceptable manner.

For years, voters and election administrators

alike have had to endure the problem of voters

voting when they are away from their voting jurisdiction. While millions of voters successfully

vote by absentee ballot, some voters are disenfranchised because of difficulties with requesting, receiving, and returning a voted ballot by

mail within the time allowed by law.

Absentee voting is generally a three step process:

• The voter mails an application for an absentee

ballot to the election official with all necessary

identifying information. (If the information is

incomplete, the voter may be required to resubmit information before receiving the absentee ballot or must complete the information and

return it with the voted ballot).

• The election official verifies the voter's eligibility, determines the ballot to which the voter

is entitled, establishes a file for the voter, and

mails the appropriate absent voter ballot. (If

the voter is not registered, the election official

may, if law permits, mail a voter registration

with the absentee ballot).

• The voter votes and mails the ballot to the election official who then validates the signature

and prepares the ballot for tallying (With regard to validation, most jurisdictions compare

the voter's signature on the envelope containing the absentee ballot with the signature on

the absentee ballot application or, better still,

with the signature on the voter's registration

form. With regard to preparing the ballot for

tallying, some jurisdictions have to remake absentee ballots into a machine readable format).

Mail transit times for these three operations

often cause voted ballots to be received after the

deadline. And if there is any problem with the

absentee ballot application, the likelihood of the

voter being able to vote is further diminished.

While most voters applying for an absentee ballot from within the United States do not have a

problem receiving and returning their ballots,

those outside the country or in the military have

had numerous problems. Occasionally, these

problems have been solved by the Federal blank

ballot. But electronic technology may provide a

more satisfying solution.

During the Gulf War, for example, many military personnel were suddenly transported to the

Middle East; and it was not possible for them to

use standard absentee voting procedures to vote

in the 1990 general federal election. The Department of Defense Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) and election authorities in the

States and territories therefore implemented a

system to transmit facsimiles of absentee voting

materials in order to ensure the enfranchisement

of these personnel.
While this served only a small number of voters, 1,675 according to the Federal Voting Assistance Program, there is some interest in extending this approach to other voters and for

all elections.

This report is based in large part on responses

to a survey of State and local jurisdictions who

have had experience with the electronic transmission of election materials.
Background

Federal Voting Assistance

Program

The deployment of military personnel for Operation Desert Shield during the 1990 general

federal election was the initial motivation for electronically transmitting voter materials to voters.

The program, conducted by the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) in the Department of

Defense, worked effectively for a small number

(1675) of voters over a long-period, two months, of

time. In the 1992 presidential general election, 699

transmissions were re-transmitted to local election

officials in forty-nine (49) states.

For these operations, the FVAP employed a private contractor serving as a central data collection

and transmission center, in the United States, to

receive data from local election offices and to retransmit the material overseas. The same contractor received data from overseas and retransmitted

the data to local election officials in the States. This

provided the expertise and staffing in data communications that may not be available to local

election officials for a round-the-clock operation.

Since this initial effort by the FVAP in 1990,

several States have enacted legislation to provide

this service — and in at least one instance, to

expand the service to other than military and

overseas electors. See Appendix C, "Electronic

Transmission of Election Materials as an Alternative Voting Technique" prepared by FVAP, for

more information on these operations.

The State of Indiana

The State of Indiana Election Code provides

that, "The county election board may transmit

and receive absent ballots by FAX machine to

voters covered under the Uniformed and

Overseas Absentee Voting Act (42 U.S.C. 1973ff)

under the following circumstances:

(1) if an emergency is declared by the President

of the United States, the Congress of the

United States, or the presidential designee

under the Uniformed and Overseas Absentee

Voting Act (42 U.S.C. 1973ff).

(2) if otherwise mandated to do so under federal

law."

In November 1994, members of the Indiana National Guard were deployed to the crash site of

American Eagle flight 4184 in Newton County.

County Election Boards with assistance from the

State Election Board acting under the provisions

shown above were able to improvise applications

and procedures as they went along. This action was

triggered by a emergency declaration by Ms. Phyllis

J. Taylor, Director, Federal Voting Assistance

Program.

The members of the National Guard were thus

allowed to vote, although there were some problems and frustrations owing to the limited time

and faxing services available at the receiving end

of the process.
Other Jurisdictions

It is difficult to determine exactly how many

other jurisdictions have transmitted voter materials electronically. The FVAP indicated that fortynine states or territories have participated in transmitting election materials. Yet, the responsibility

for maintaining voter registration lists and for providing voters the opportunity to vote absentee rests

with over 8,000 local election jurisdictions throughout the United States. We were, unfortunately,

unable to determine how many of these local jurisdictions currently transmit election materials

electronically.
Benefits and Costs

Benefits

The principal benefit of transmitting election

materials electronically is, of course, speed. Instead of relying on national or international mail

services, voters and election officials can communicate more or less instantaneously thereby ensuring that distant voters have an opportunity

to cast their votes in time to be counted. This is

especially important in remote corners of the

globe where faxes or computers may be more

readily available than mail services.

Moreover, in contrast to (say) the federal blank

ballot which contains only federal offices, electronic transmission would ensure that the distant voters would receive all the choices on the

ballot to which they are entitled under State law.

And finally, some proponents believe that expanding the electronic transmission of election

materials might:

• facilitate voting by the disabled (especially by

providing the visually impaired with a means

of casting a truly secret ballot)

• facilitate voting by persons in transit on

election day, and

• increase voter participation generally.

Costs

Unfortunately, respondents to our questionnaire

were unable to provide any detailed information

on the costs they incurred in electronically transmitting election materials. Moreover, costs will naturally vary depending on the volume of material and

the number of voters to which transmissions must

be sent and received. And too, costs would vary according to exactly how the process is designed to

operate — whether directly from the election official to the voter or through an intermediary, and

whether directly from the voter to the election

official or through an intermediary.

Election Administrator Costs

Although exact cost figures are unavailable, it

is possible to identify certain administrative cost

factors.

In their report "FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, OPERATION: OVERSEAS",

for example, the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners described their procedure as follows:

"1. Obtain a separate fax machine for this prGgram. Keep it in a secure room where there is

access by authorized personnel only.

2. Designate one or two key people to fax out the

ballot and receive the returned faxed ballot.

Since transmission may take as long as 15

minutes to fax out and 15 minutes on the return, make sure employees are alert until

transmission is complete.

3. Lock room where fax machine is located when

unattended to prevent access by unauthorized

persons.
4. Place each returned faxed ballot in a special

envelope and secure with ballot application

until election day."

Such a straightforward procedure suggests

that minimum costs would include a fax machine,

telephone line, locks to ensure a secure room,

long-distance calls, including overseas calls, of

up to 15 minutes duration, and staff to monitor

the equipment.

Different or more elaborate procedures might

incur additional costs. And in large jurisdictions

it might be necessary to have several fax machines (or computers) on a rotary phone line to

ensure timely transmittal of material — especially if the service were expanded to include absentee voters other than military personnel.

Election officials who are contemplating an expanded and routine system for electronically

transmitting election materials may therefore

want to consider that such a system would include most of the costs of processing a mailed

absentee ballot (except for postage) as well as

some or all of the following cost factors:

• a fax machine (or computer) and supplies

• dedicated telephone service

• long-distance telephone service

• copying faxed materials to more permanent

media

• remaking faxed voted ballot into machine readable format

• additional staff, overtime and possible night

shift pay

• computer network subscription fees.

the election official (without an intermediary free

service provider) then voters would have to bear

the long distance communications costs. And if

the system were available to (say) disabled voters or all voters temporarily away from the jurisdiction, then such voters would have to own or

otherwise gain access to the requisite fax machine

or computer.

Diminishing Returns

While no monetary value can be placed on any

individual's vote, there may be a point of diminishing returns on trying to facilitate every

individual's right to vote. The procedures currently in place for absentee voting work effectively for the vast majority of the millions of persons who are away from their polls on election

day. It might be prohibitively costly to facilitate

those relatively few voters who fail to act in a

timely manner or who, through no fault of their

own, are thrust into circumstances that make

their ability to vote very difficult. There is no

getting around the fact that the cost to the taxpayer of electronically transmitting election materials would increase dramatically — possibly

into hundreds of dollars per voter.

Voter Costs

Depending on how it is designed and who is

entitled to employ it, a system for electronically

transmitting election materials may entail some

costs to the voter. If, for example, the system requires direct communications from the voter to
Important Issues

in Electronically

Transmitting

Election Materials

In addition to the costs, there are a number of

other important issues that need to be addressed

when designing any system for electronically

transmitting election materials. These issues include:

• Who should be entitled to the service?

• What materials should be transmitted?

• When should materials be transmittable?

• How should materials be transmitted?

Who Should be Entitled to

Electronic Transmission Services?

The electronic transmission of election materials was originally intended for members of the military who were temporarily engaged in a special

mission. But some have suggested an expansion of

the service to include such other categories of

voters as:

• all overseas members of the military

D all members of the military

• persons with disabilities (especially the

visually impaired)

• all overseas civilians

• all persons who qualify as absentee voters.

But with the addition of each category, the

numbers as well as the problems compound.

The extension of electronic transmission services to all overseas members of the military

would seem to cause the fewest problems. This is

because transmission facilities (whether fax machines or computers) are likely to be readily available to the voter through the military command.

Indeed, the same could be said of nearly all members of the military stationed at home as well as

abroad, although there seems less of a justification

for extending electronic transmission services to

those stationed within the United States.

The extension of electronic transmission services to persons with disabilities is more problematic. The problem lies in the availability of

the equipment to the voter. Electronic transmission does, however, hold some potential for solving a problem for at least some persons who are

visually impaired or blind: namely, the ability to

cast a ballot in complete privacy. It may be feasible, for example, to transmit a ballot to a blind

person and have the ballot printed in braille from

the blind voter's computer. While only about 20%

of the blind are able to read braille this might be

one way to ensure the privacy of the vote to at

least to those blind persons who have or can gain

access to computers and braille printers. Another

option is the possibility of developing an audio

ballot for the blind and others with reading problems with such services being provided at a central location (the central election office) of the

jurisdiction.
Civilians residing or visiting abroad generally

have a more difficult problem with postal services

than overseas military voters. It might therefore

seem reasonable to extend electronic transmission services to them. Yet, by the same token, they

are likely to have a more difficult time gaining

access to the necessary equipment. Although it

is conceivable that U.S. embassies, consulates,

and corporations might make their facilities and

equipment available for the purpose, there are

many overseas Americans, especially those in

remote locations, who would find it impractical

to reach such facilities.

Finally, it has been suggested that all persons

who qualify as absentee voters should be extended electronic transmission services. But such

sweeping coverage might well create problems

at both ends of the transmission process. The

burden on the election office (and the possible

need for 24-hour service and additional equipment) would make this proposition both expensive and challenging. At the same time, voters

might have difficulties gaining access to the appropriate election office.

In deciding who should be entitled to electronic

transmission services, it is important to keep in

mind both the numbers of individuals involved

and the availability of the necessary equipment

to voters. Moreover, in order to avoid establishing a special class of voters (those who have access to or who can afford to own the necessary

equipment), election administrators will have to

continue providing election services to absentee

voters by traditional means. They would therefore be operating at least two absentee voter systems and procedures rather than one.

What Materials Should be

Transmitted?

By the Election Official to the Voter

There are basically four types of documents that

might be transmitted by election officials to voters:

D ballot information

• a blank voter registration application

• a blank absentee ballot application, and

• an unvoted absentee ballot.

Of these four items, transmitting ballot information electronically seems to present the fewest difficulties. In fact, in 1992, the State of California made

their statewide Voter Information Pamphlet available

on the Internet to any voter who had a computer and

an Internet server subscription. Making county or

more local ballot information available in the

same way would require a well coordinated effort to ensure easy access to the information appropriate to each voter. It might be possible, however, to provide ballot information by contest on

a subscription computer network. The information for the contests could group candidates and

issues by State and by local election jurisdictions

within states. When the voters receive their ballots they could look up information for the contests on their ballot, provided, of course, that they

have access to the network.

There are at least two problems in transmitting blank voter registration applications to prospective voters. The first of these is that, regardless of how the registration application is returned, it is unlikely to be on the same paper stock

and size as other registration applications. It will

therefore not file easily. Nor is this as trivial a

concern as it sounds when the physical files contain thousands of documents. Moreover, some fax

machines produce copies on a paper stock that

degenerates fairly rapidly. This creates a problem

in light of the federal law that requires the retention of documents requisite to voting for a period of

22 months past their effectiveness. Voter registration applications might remain valid for decades

— well past the lifetime of some fax paper. Yet photocopying such documents would inevitably lose any

original signature.

Transmitting absentee ballot applications (if

these are required) presents fewer problems than

voter registration applications since the files of

these documents need be retained for only 22

months — well within the lifetime of any fax paper.
The idea of transmitting unvoted ballots, however, raises a different kind of problem. For regardless of how the ballot is returned, it would

be clearly distinguishable from other ballots and

may therefore threaten the secrecy of the voter's

ballot. This is all the more true in the case of

faxed ballots which would contain the date and

time of the outgoing transmission which could

be checked against the transmission log.

By the Voter to the Election Official

There are only three types of documents that

might be transmitted by the voter to the election

official:

• a completed voter registration application

• a completed absentee ballot application or request, and

D a voted ballot.

In addition to the above cited problems associated with transmitting these documents from the

election official to the voter, the idea of the voter

transmitting any of these documents to the election official raises the same important problem

in each case. Each of these documents requires

the signature of the voter, and a transmitted signature is not an original signature that may be

required by State law, by investigative authorities, or by the courts.

Furthermore, the transmission of a voted ballot would certainly preclude its secrecy at least

at the receiving end and perhaps even at the sending end. The only suggested solution to this problem is the use of a Waiver of Secrecy Form — if

such a procedure would be acceptable under State

law and to the courts.

How Should Materials Be

Transmitted?

The type of equipment that might be used in

transmitting election materials varies widely. The

equipment could range from a simple fax machine

for transmitting fax-to-fax up to a mainframe

computer transmitting to personal computers or

public subscription computer networks.

None of the respondents to our survey indicated using anything other than fax machines to

date. Yet there is the possibility of using a fax

modem in a personal computer to transmit election materials. Fax machines or modems should

be compatible with CCITT Group 3 facsimile

machines.

One advantage of a fax modem on a computer is

that transmission can be faster — with transmission speeds of 14,400 baud compared to 300 baud

for older inexpensive fax machines. However, telephone line quality in many areas, while acceptable

for voice, may not successfully transmit and receive

at these higher transmission speeds. And this

consideration is especially important in overseas

communications.

When a fax is received by a computer with a fax

modem the material can be printed on a computer

printer using plain or xerographic quality paper,

rather than thermal paper as many fax machines

use. Thermal paper can be obliterated with heat

and the printing deteriorates rather rapidly over

time, therefore it is necessary to copy the fax onto

plain or xerographic quality paper to provide a more

permanent record.

From Where and To Where

Should Election Materials Be

Transmitted?

There are two possible arrangements for electronically transmitting election materials:

• to and from the voter's local election office, and

• to and from a national intermediary office.

A majority respondents to our survey favored

having election materials transmitted from local

election offices, directly to the voter's personal

facility or to a facility designated by the voter.

Most felt that the fewer hands through which the

materials must pass, the easier and more secure

the process would be. And too, election officials

9
feel more confident when they exercise direct control over a process for which they are, after all,

legally responsible.

But the direct transmission of materials to and

from local election offices requires that all local

election offices (both registration and voting offices when these duties are divided) be equipped

with the necessary fax machine or computer. And

this may not be the case any time soon. Large

jurisdictions might need additional equipment

dedicated solely to this purpose 24 hours a day.

Smaller jurisdictions may have only one computer

which they use for maintaining voter records,

voice mail, faxing, transmission of files, and tallying ballots and would therefore need to take

special precautions to isolate these functions.

Finally, if voters are to communicate directly

with their local election offices, a directory of local offices would need to be placed on worldwide

computer subscription networks in order to make

the information directly accessible to voters with

computers. Voters that do not have computer access to the network would have to obtain the information through their military command, U.S.

embassies, or through private businesses that

would be willing to provide the lookup service.

An alternative to transmitting election materials directly to and from local election offices is

to work through a national intermediary office

(NIO).

A national intermediary office would operate

in the manner pioneered by the FVAP where a

private contractor acted as the intermediary. Basically, the process would work like this example

involving an absentee ballot:

1. The NIO receives the absentee ballot request

from a voter

2. The NIO retransmits the requests to appropriate local election jurisdiction.

3. The local election jurisdiction verifies the voter's

eligibility, establishes a file for the voter, and

transmits the absentee ballot to the NIO. If the

voter is not registered, the election official may

transmit, if law permits, a voter registration

application with the absentee ballot.

4. The local election jurisdiction transmits the

unvoted absentee ballot (along with any related

ballot information) to the NIO.

5. The NIO retransmits the materials and ballot

to voter.

6. The voter votes the ballot and transmits it to

the NIO.

7. The NIO retransmits the voted ballot to the

appropriate local election jurisdiction.

8. The local election jurisdiction validates the

voter's signature and prepares the ballot for

tallying.

9. The local election jurisdiction remakes the faxed

voted ballot into a machine readable format.

10. The ballot is tallied along with other absentee

ballots.

Such a procedures offers several advantages

such as:

• The NIO could provide expertise, staffing and

equipment not available to local election officials.

• Only one phone number, that of the NIO, is

needed, for any voter to perform the task.

• The NIO can provide secure communication

lines that may not otherwise be available.

• Local election officials would only have to

transmit election materials to one location.

D Local election officials would not need to deal

with the problem of contacting people in all the

different time zones around the world.

There are, however, some disadvantages to this

process which include:

• It eliminates direct communication between

the voter and the local election official.

10
• All transmitted ballots for local jurisdictions

throughout the United States, unvoted and

voted, are placed in control of a single entity.

• In the event of a challenged election or recount,

evidence may be required from the NIO to

prove that voted ballots received by the NIO

are identical to those that were received by the

local election official.

• A serious bottleneck could be created if this

service were extended to more and more categories of absentee voters.

When or During What Time

Frames Should Materials Be

Transmittable?

The time frames for electronically transmitting

election materials would have to be established

in State law and would likely resemble those established for other absentee voting procedures.

In most cases, materials should be transmittable

as soon as they are available. And it is a fair question whether faxed requests for voter registration forms should be acceptable at all times.

11

Technical Problems in

Electronically

Transmitting Election

Materials

No matter what decisions are made regarding

the issues raised in the previous chapter, there

are certain technical problems that underlie any

system for electronically transmitting election

materials. For some of these problems there is

no easy solution; but those considering systems

for electronically transmitting election materials

should nevertheless be alert to them.

Interference with Election

Material Transmissions

There are two sources of potential interference

with the electronic transmission of election materials. The first of these is the communication

disruptions that may result from telephone service locally and especially telephone service

abroad. These must simply be worked around and

may cause unexpected delays and retransmission

requests.

The second source of potential interference

arises inevitably from widely advertising either

a central fax number or else the election official's

fax number (especially if this is done on a publicly accessible network). Either pranksters or

those with malicious intent would be capable of

keeping the fax line(s) busy with "junk mail",

thereby preventing or delaying the receipt or

transmission of election materials.

Ensuring the Compatibility of

the Systems used to Transmit

and Receive Materials.

If a fax machine is installed on a dedicated telephone there should be few problems with compatibility within in the United States, although there

is no guarantee overseas. If a fax machine is connected to an answering machine it may not be able to

receive transmissions from all other fax machines.

If a personal computer with a fax modem is

also being used for voice mail, than those calling

fax machines that do not initiate a CNG tone,

will not be recognized as a fax and the receiving

machine will not allow transmission to proceed.

Many of the less expensive fax machines do not

initiate the CNG calling tone.

Voter Identification

Signature comparison is currently the only viable method of determining voter identification.

But unless an original signature is provided, it is

fairly easy to copy a person's signature from any

document (using copying or scanning equipment),

"cutting and pasting" the copied signature to an

election document, and then transmitting the

document by fax. It would be impossible for the

local election official to detect the fraud.

13
Yet, if the election official must wait for the

original signature before tallying the ballot or processing an application or request, much of the

benefit of electronic transmission would be lost.

Interference With the Voter

Although the electronic transmission of election materials might solve the problem of timeliness in absentee voting, it does not solve the enduring potential of interference with the voter

casting such a ballot — whether electronically or

by mail. Such interference might take the form

of bribery, coercion, or any other undue influence

over the voter which, by its nature, is beyond the

control or observation of election authorities. And

as with traditional absentee, voting, the potential for such interference expands with the extent to which the service is offered.

14
Alternatives to

Electronically

Transmitting

Election Materials

Those who are uncomfortable with the idea of

electronically transmitting election materials

may want to consider alternative approaches to

solving the "timeliness" problem.

One approach is to accept and honor any signed

request for an absentee ballot by any qualified

voter (rather than, as some States do, require that

the request be on a prescribed request form).

Another approach is to allow voters who are

temporarily residing outside their jurisdiction, or

disabled voters who are unable to go to the polls,

to register as absentee voters and automatically

send them an absentee ballot request form at

least 60 days before the upcoming election.

Yet another approach, in response to an absentee ballot request from a qualified resident

who is not registered, is to enclose a voter registration application along with the absentee ballot and to honor both if received before the close

of polls (or whatever other deadline State law may

establish.

Still another approach is to employ a private

delivery service such as DHL, FEDEX, UPS or

others for delivering materials to overseas and

especially to third world countries where the local mail and telephone systems are somewhat unreliable. For delivery in the United States and

possessions, the U.S. Postal Services First-Class

or Express delivery services should also be considered.

Finally, many States have extended the deadline for receiving absentee ballots from overseas

to up to 15 days past the date of the election.

15

Conclusion

Experience has demonstrated that faxing election materials, as has been provided by the FVAP

for emergency military operations, can be beneficial for small volumes of voters. Expanding this

method of operation to all military voters, to all

overseas voters, to disabled (especially visually

impaired) voters, or to all absentee voters is far

more problematic.

It may be that we need to await further technological developments to resolve the current issues and problems in the electronic transmission

of election materials. To that end, it might be useful to have a study to determine the feasibility of

developing a ballot transmission system that

would:

• Allow election administrators to transmit ballots in a digital format, and to record when and

to whom ballot was sent.

• Provide an audio ballot that could be "read

aloud" by a personal computer with a sound

card and text-to-voice program, for use by the

blind or others unable to read.

• Allow the voters to record their votes, off-line,

in a digital, transmittable format on a personal

computer and then transmit the voted digital

ballot to the election official.

• Allow the transmission, when received by the

local election jurisdiction, to be recorded and

no further transmissions being accepted from

that voter.

Allow the election official, using a translator

program, to reformat the transmitted ballot

into a format for tallying with the existing tally

system.

Identify methods that might be used to ensure

the identity of the voter and the security of the

transmission.

17

Appendix 1

19
The following was provided by Ms. Phyllis Taylor, Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program,

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington,

DC 20301-1155.

January 4, 1995

ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION OF

ELECTION MATERIALS AS AN

ALTERNATIVE VOTING TECHNIQUE

Historical Background

Operation Desert Shield

1990 Results

During a two month period in 1990, 1675 ballots were transmitted to Service personnel serving in the Middle East. Forty-nine states accepted

the Federal Post Card Application request for registration and ballot and 43 states sent ballots by

fax. A total of 33 states accepted return, voted

ballots by fax.

Electronic Transmission in 1993 & 1994

As a result of the success of this alternative procedure during Operation Desert Shield, state officials and legislators have been motivated to change

election laws and administrative procedures to allow for electronic transmission on a non-emergency

basis. This procedure was first used in a Presidential election in the 1992 election and again during

the 1994 Congressional election.

Technical Background

The Concept

The basic concept of electronic transmission or

faxing of election materials calls for the secure,

high-speed delivery of election materials to and

from the voter and local election officials.

Under this system, the voter may use the

service to:

• submit applications for registration and absentee ballot requests to the local election official in

the voter's county, city, or town of voting

residence.

• receive blank ballots from the local election

official

• submit voted ballots to the local election official

The local election official may in turn use the

system to:

• receive applications for registration and absentee ballot requests from the voter

• send blank ballots to the voter

• receive the voted ballot from the voter

Processing of Transmissions

The FVAP administers the Electronic Transmission System (ETS) which provides the central control point for transmission of all materials. Using a

secure 800 or Defense Switched Network (DSN)

20
number, both the voter and the local election official are able to transmit materials through the system at no cost to either of them. Upon receipt of

these materials, the processing center routes the

transmission to its appropriate destination.

Each transaction processed for either a voter

or a local election official is automatically recorded on a transaction record. The documents

from the voter and the local election offices are

electronically stored in the system, thereby providing an audit trail to protect the integrity of

the voting.

Current Trends

Progress since 1990

The ETS has been in continuous operation

since 1990 and, since then, many states have

implemented permanent, legislative and/or administrative changes in their codes to provide for

this alternative method of transmitting election

materials.

Presently, 33 states, American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam and the Virgin Islands

allow the application for registration and/or ballot to be sent by fax. Sixteen states, the District

of Columbia and the Virgin Islands allow blank

ballots to be sent via fax to the voter, and eight

states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin

Islands allow the voted ballot to be returned to

the local election official by fax.

• 57% of overseas civilian citizens found the system easy to use

• 100% of federally-employed citizens overseas

found it easy to use

• 77% of members of the armed forces found it

easy to use

A similar survey of local election officials found:

• 66% of those who used the system cited a round

trip transit time of one day or less

• An average of 91% of those using the system

for some aspect of the process rated the system easy to use

In the future, the FVAP will continue to work

with the states and the U.S. Congress in attempting to make the electronic transmission of election materials an effective, viable alternative for

citizens voting under the UOCAVA.

1992 Results

In the 1992 Presidential election year, electronic transmissions were routed to 699 local election officials in 49 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, including Nepal, Mozambique, Swaziland, Russia and

Czech Republic.

An FVAP-conducted survey of citizens voting

under the UOCAVA who utilized the system in

the 1992 Presidential election concluded:

21

Other titles in our Innovations series include:

• Vol 1: The Voting Authority Card

• Vol 2: Optical Scanning Technology for Purposes Other Than Ballot Counting

• Vol 3: Election Signature Retreival Systems

• Vol 4: Using NCOA Files for Verifying Voter Registration Lists

D Vol 5: Agency Voter Registration Programs

• Vol 6: Motor Voter Registration Programs

• Vol 7: Mail Registration Programs

• Vol 8: Election Document Retention in an Age of High Technology

• Vol 9: Early Voting

• Vol 10: Ballot Security and Accountability

• Vol 11: All-Mail-Ballot Elections
For information about other

Innovations in Election Administration

contact

National Clearinghouse on Election Administration

Federal Election Commission

999 E. Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20463

Toll Free 800/424-9530

Direct 202/219-3670

FAX 202/219-8500

Cut Here

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20463

Official Business

Penalty for Private

Use, $300

Bulk Rate Mail

Postage and Fees Paid

Federal Election Commission

Permit Number G-31