Reversed and Rendered and Substitute Opinion filed November 6, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00194-CV

PINNACLE PREMIER PROPERTIES, INC. AND PINNACLE REALTY

ADVISORS, INC., Appellants

V.

GHISLAIN BRETON, CATHERINE DENICOURT AND DAVID ANDREIS, 

Appellees

On Appeal from the 165th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2014-02397

S U B S T I T U T E O P I N I O N

We issued our original opinion in this case on October 9, 2014. Appellees

filed a motion for rehearing. We overrule the motion for rehearing, withdraw our 

previous opinion, and issue this substitute opinion.

In one issue in this interlocutory appeal, appellants Pinnacle Properties, Inc. 

and Pinnacle Realty Advisors, Inc. (collectively “Pinnacle”) complain that the 
2

district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin Pinnacle from pursuing two eviction 

proceedings that were pending in justice court.1 Although a district court has 

jurisdiction to enjoin the exercise of a justice court’s jurisdiction in an eviction 

proceeding when certain conditions are met, we conclude the district court erred in 

granting the temporary injunction because (1) the issues of title and possession 

were not intertwined and thus the justice court has exclusive jurisdiction over the 

issue of possession, and (2) appellees have an adequate remedy at law if their 

wrongful foreclosure claim is meritorious.

Background

The facts are largely undisputed. Melba and Howard Johnson executed a 

deed of trust (which was duly recorded in Harris County) on the subject property, 

at the time a vacant lot in the Houston Heights, to secure payment of a $77,500 

note signed by Pinnacle Realty Advisors, Inc. and Melba. Four years later, the 

Johnsons sold the property to Gold Quest Equity, LLC. One month later, Gold 

Quest sold the property to KAVAC, LLC. KAVAC subdivided the property into 

two lots, built houses on the lots, and sold one home to appellees Ghislain Breton 

and Catherine Denicourt and one home to appellee David Andreis.2 For 

unexplained reasons, the note was never paid off. 

Melba defaulted under the note. After sending foreclosure notices to the 

Johnsons, Pinnacle Realty Advisors assigned the note to Pinnacle Premiere 

Properties, which purchased the property at a foreclosure sale.3 Pinnacle Premiere 

 

1

Pinnacle brings this appeal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 

51.014(a)(4), which allows an appeal from a trial court’s interlocutory order granting or refusing 

a temporary injunction.

2

The lots with the homes apparently now are worth over $1,000,000 each.

3 Appellees dispute that the foreclosure was conducted properly or that Pinnacle Realty 

Advisors was the holder of the note purportedly assigned to Pinnacle Premiere Properties. 

Appellees assert that Pinnacle Realty Advisors had assigned the note to Post Oak Bank and it 
3

Properties sent notices to vacate the property to Melba “and All Occupants.” 

Appellees contend this was the first time they became aware of the foreclosures. 

Pinnacle Premiere Properties then filed eviction (forcible detainer) proceedings in 

justice court.

After Pinnacle Premiere Properties filed its lawsuits, appellees filed the 

underlying lawsuit, asserting claims for trespass to try title and wrongful 

foreclosure and a suit to quiet title, and seeking an injunction preventing Pinnacle 

from proceeding with the eviction suits in justice court.4 The district court signed a 

temporary restraining order and then a temporary injunction order preventing 

Pinnacle from proceeding with the eviction suits.

Discussion

In one issue, Premiere contends the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in 

granting the temporary injunction. Appellees argue this is not a true jurisdictional 

challenge; rather, it is a challenge to the district court’s grant of the temporary 

injunction, which we generally review for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 

Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993) (“The decision to grant or 

deny a temporary writ of injunction lies in the sound discretion of the trial court, 

and the court’s grant or denial is subject to reversal only for a clear abuse of that 

discretion.”). We agree that Premiere’s complaint is viewed more properly as a 

challenge to the district court’s grant of the injunction, but conclude that the trial 

court erred in granting the injunctive relief.

 

was never reassigned to Pinnacle Realty Advisors. We note this allegation is relevant only to 

appellees’ wrongful foreclosure claim, discussed below. At the temporary injunction hearing, 

James Murnane, the owner of Pinnacle, testified he “pledged” or “transferred” the note to Post 

Oak Bank as collateral for a credit line. Murnane testified that Post Oak “gave [him] back the 

original note,” but he did not remember how that was done. He said, “I believe I picked it up 

from them.” It is unclear from the record whether the note was ever reassigned to Pinnacle. 

4 Appellees nonsuited their trespass to try title claim after this appeal was filed.
4

I. Although there are some jurisdictional issues involved in our 

analysis, this appeal is properly characterized as a challenge to 

the district court’s order granting the temporary injunction.

Jurisdiction to hear a forcible detainer action is expressly given to the justice 

court of the precinct where the property is located. Maxwell v. U.S. Bank Nat’l 

Ass’n, No. 14-12-00209-CV, 2013 WL 3580621, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] July 11, 2013, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.). A justice court has exclusive 

jurisdiction to decide the issue of immediate possession, which may not be 

infringed upon as long as the justice court merely determines possession. Rice v. 

Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 713 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). Although a justice 

court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear a forcible detainer action, a district court 

may enjoin the exercise of the justice court’s jurisdiction in a forcible detainer 

action when there is a showing that the justice court is without jurisdiction to 

proceed in the cause or the defendant has no adequate remedy at law. McGlothlin 

v. Kliebert, 672 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Tex. 1984). 

We generally review a district court’s grant of such an injunction for an 

abuse of discretion. See id. Although an abuse of discretion does not occur when 

the trial court heard conflicting evidence and substantive, probative evidence 

reasonably supports the trial court’s decision, we will apply a de novo standard of 

review when the issue turns on a pure question of law.5See Tenet Health Ltd. v. 

Zamora, 13 S.W.3d 464, 468-69 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d 

w.o.j.) (citing State v. Heal, 917 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1996)); see also Sharma v. 

Vinmar Int’l, Ltd., 231 S.W.3d 405, 419 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, 

 

5 When consideration of evidence is required, we view it in the light most favorable to the 

trial court’s order, indulging every reasonable inference in favor of the trial court’s 

determination. LasikPlus of Tex., P.C. v. Mattioli, 418 S.W.3d 210, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
5

no pet.) (“[A]s the trial court functions as the fact finder in a temporary injunction 

hearing, an abuse of discretion does not exist where the trial court bases its 

decision on conflicting evidence.”). We review questions of law without deference 

to a lower court’s conclusion. See Heal, 917 S.W.2d at 9; Burris v. Metro. Transit 

Auth. of Harris Cnty., 266 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, 

no pet.). When, as here, no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed, the trial 

court’s determination of whether to grant or deny a temporary injunction must be 

upheld on any legal theory supported by the record.6LasikPlus of Tex., P.C. v. 

Mattioli, 418 S.W.3d 210, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). 

Appellees argue that Pinnacle’s “failure to brief an abuse of discretion 

review” resulted in a failure to carry its burden to show an abuse of discretion. We 

disagree. As discussed, we review questions of law de novo and not for an abuse 

of discretion. In this case, the relevant facts are not disputed, but we are presented 

with questions of law regarding the effect of the tenant-at-sufferance clause in the 

deed of trust, discussed below, and whether appellees, under the undisputed facts,

had an adequate remedy at law through their wrongful foreclosure claim. See 

Glapion v. AH4R I TX, LLC, No. 14-13-00705-CV, 2014 WL 2158161, at *1 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (acknowledging 

whether justice court could exercise jurisdiction over question regarding 

possession of property is a question of law subject to de novo review); see also 

8100 N. Freeway, Ltd. v. City of Houston, 363 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“A trial court abuses its discretion when it . . . 

 

6

The trial court made “findings” in the temporary injunction order but did not sign 

separate findings of fact and conclusions of law. A trial court may, but need not, file findings of 

fact and conclusions of law with respect to an interlocutory order. Tex. R. App. P. 28.1(c). 

When no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed other than those in the order granting 

temporary injunction, the trial court’s judgment must be upheld on any legal theory supported by 

the record. Boatman v. Lites, 888 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1994, no writ).
6

misapplies the law to the established facts of the case.”). Pinnacle cited the proper 

case law for us to determine as a matter of law whether the trial court erred in 

granting the injunction. See Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 588 (Tex. 2008) 

(“[W]e liberally construe issues presented to obtain a just, fair, and equitable 

adjudication of the rights of the litigants.”). With these standards in mind, we turn 

to Pinnacle’s challenge to the district court’s order granting the temporary 

injunction.

II. Defects in the foreclosure process are not relevant to possession 

when, as here, the parties to be evicted are subject to a tenant-atsufferance clause in the deed of trust.

Although a justice court has subject matter jurisdiction over forcible 

detainers, the justice court lacks jurisdiction to resolve title disputes. Maxwell, 

2013 WL 3580621, at *2; Black v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 318 S.W.3d 414, 417 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). Thus, a forcible detainer only 

addresses who has the right to possess the property, not who has title to it.7 

Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, at *2; Salaymeh v. Plaza Centro, LLC, 264 S.W.3d 

431, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 

510.3(e). As a result, when the right to possession cannot be determined without 

resolving a title dispute, the justice court does not have jurisdiction. Maxwell, 

2013 WL 3580621, at *2; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709.

Of course, the mere existence of a title dispute does not deprive the justice 

court of jurisdiction. Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, at *2. If the title issue does not 

control the right to possession, it is of no moment. Id.; Black, 318 S.W.3d at 417. 

 

7 Because a forcible detainer action is not exclusive, but cumulative, of any other remedy 

that a party may have in the courts of this state, the displaced party is entitled to bring a separate 

suit in the district court to determine the question of title. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. Forcible 

detainer actions in justice courts may be brought and prosecuted concurrently with suits to try 

title in district court. Id.
7

Instead, the issue is whether “the question of title is so intertwined with the issue of 

possession, th[at] possession may not be adjudicated without first determining 

title.” Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, at *2 (quoting Villalon v. Bank One, 176 

S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)).

The deed of trust in this case contained the following tenant-at-sufferance 

clause: 

Borrower or any person holding possession of the Property through 

Borrower shall immediately surrender possession of the Property to 

the purchaser at [the foreclosure] sale. If possession is not 

surrendered, Borrower or such person shall be a tenant at sufferance 

and may be removed by writ of possession or other court proceeding.

Tenant-at-sufferance clauses separate the issue of possession from the issue 

of title. Id. at *3. Under these provisions, a foreclosure sale transforms the 

borrower into a tenant at sufferance who must immediately relinquish possession 

to the foreclosure-sale purchaser. Id.

Appellees articulate a title dispute, but it is based entirely on their contention 

that the foreclosure was improper, i.e., both that the foreclosure was conducted 

improperly and that Pinnacle previously had assigned the note to another bank.8 

However, because the deed of trust contained a valid tenant-at-sufferance clause, 

appellees do not allege a title dispute that is intertwined with the right of 

immediate possession.9 See Glapion, 2014 WL 2158161, at *2; Maxwell, 2013 

 

8 Although appellees have asserted a suit to quiet title, it too is based on the allegation 

that Pinnacle claims an interest in the property based on an invalid Substitute Trustee’s Deed that 

“was not obtained in compliance with the requirements necessary to a proper foreclosure action 

under Texas law.” We need not address in this appeal whether the foreclosure was conducted

properly. See Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, at *3 (noting defects in foreclosure process may not 

be considered in forcible detainer action because they are irrelevant).

9 One indication that a justice court is called on to adjudicate title to real estate in a 

forcible detainer case—and, thus, exceed its jurisdiction—is when a landlord tenant relationship 

is lacking. Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.).
8

WL 3580621, at *3. When the party to be evicted is subject to a tenant-atsufferance clause and the party seeking possession purchased the property at a 

foreclosure sale and gave proper notice requiring the occupants to vacate the 

premises, defects in the foreclosure process are not relevant to possession. 

Glapion, 2014 WL 2158161, at *2; Williams v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 

925, 927 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). Of course, the displaced party can 

still dispute the purchaser’s title, but it must bring a separate suit to do so. 

Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, at *3.

Appellees argue they are not subject to the tenant-at-sufferance clause 

because they are not parties to the deed of trust. However, we have held that a 

deed of trust’s tenant-at-sufferance clause binds subsequent occupants whose 

interests are junior to the deed of trust. Id. at *4; see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. 

Farhi, No. 05-07-01539-CV, 2009 WL 2414484, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 

7, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding intervening purchaser of property was subject 

to tenant-at-sufferance clause in deed of trust). Appellees argue that Maxwell was 

wrongly decided as to this issue and “[l]ittle analysis was conducted to reach this 

conclusion.” To the contrary, we thoroughly explained our reasoning in Maxwell. 

Although such subsequent occupants may not have agreed to the tenant-atsufferance clause, the grantor cannot convey more than he has. Maxwell, 2013 WL 

3580621, at *4. Thus, a grantor subject to a tenant-at-sufferance clause cannot 

convey an interest in the property free of the clause. Id. In this regard, both the 

party who agreed to the deed of trust initially and any subsequent occupants 

become tenants-at-sufferance following foreclosure. Id.

The facts in Farhi are similar to those presented here. Farhi executed a note 

and deed of trust on the subject property, and U.S. Bank subsequently foreclosed 

on the property, served a notice to vacate the property, and filed a forcible detainer 
9

suit in justice court. Farhi, 2009 WL 2414484, at *1. The justice court awarded 

possession to the bank, but Rowe, claiming to be an occupant of the property, 

appealed to the county court at law, which, after a trial de novo, awarded 

possession to Rowe. Id. During the trial in the county court, Rowe presented 

evidence that the property had been conveyed to him by Farhi after the deed of 

trust was executed but before the foreclosure. Id. at *3. Our sister court held that 

Rowe’s rights were subject to the deed of trust executed by Farhi because Rowe 

was an intervening purchaser of the property. Id. This was based on the fact that 

“[w]hen a mortgagor executes a deed of trust[,] the legal and equitable estates in 

the property are severed. The mortgagor retains the legal title and the mortgagee 

holds the equitable title.” Id. An intervening purchaser of the legal interest is 

granted legal title that is superior to the mortgage but subject to the mortgagee’s 

rights. Id.

The deed of trust in Farhi included a tenant-at-sufferance clause that was 

identical to the one presented here. See id. at *4. The court held that the deed of 

trust established a landlord-tenant relationship that made Rowe a tenant-atsufferance upon foreclosure because Rowe’s rights were subject to the terms of the 

deed of trust, just as Farhi’s had been. Id. Accordingly, Rowe, as a tenant-atsufferance, was not entitled to possession of the property after the foreclosure. Id.

This case is no different. The appellees purchased the properties subject to 

the deed of trust, which contained the above-referenced tenant-at-sufferance 

clause. E.g., id. 

We conclude that appellees are subject to the tenant-at-sufferance clause in 

the deed of trust. Accordingly, the questions of possession and title are not 

intertwined, and the justice court had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of 

possession. See Glapion, 2014 WL 2158161, at *2; Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, 
10

at *3. 

III. Appellees have an adequate remedy at law.

Appellees argue they do not have an adequate remedy at law because real 

estate is unique. However, the cases they cite for this proposition all involved 

injunctions to stop foreclosures.10 Here, the foreclosure has already occurred, and 

appellees’ available remedies for wrongful foreclosure are money damages or 

rescission of the sale. Diversified, Inc. v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n, 762 S.W.2d 620, 

623 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (“[F]ollowing a wrongful 

foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to a power of sale contained within a deed of 

trust, the mortgagor . . . may elect to: (1) set aside the void trustee’s deed; or 

(2) recover damages in the amount of the value of the property less 

indebtedness.”). Thus, under the undisputed facts, as a matter of law, appellees 

have an adequate remedy at law through rescission of the sale if their wrongful 

foreclosure claim is meritorious.

Appellees also testified they could not pay their mortgages in addition to 

rent for temporary residences. They did not present evidence, however, regarding 

why money damages could not properly account for any losses resulting from 

having to relocate. They further argue that Andreis, a foreign national, must have 

proof of home ownership to maintain his United States residency. At the time of 

the temporary injunction hearing, Andreis was working overseas, and a tenant was 

living in his home. Andreis testified that he travels abroad often for work and that 

owning a home “helps” show the United States Citizenship and Immigration

 

10 See Lavigne v. Holder, 186 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.)

(“[E]very piece of real estate is unique, and foreclosure can be an irreparable injury for which 

there is no adequate remedy at law.”); Guardian Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Williams, 731 S.W.2d 

107, 109 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ); El Paso Dev. Co. v. Berryman, 729 

S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no writ); Greater Houston Bank v. Conte, 

641 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ). 
11

Services that he intends to “keep his residency” in the United States. However, 

after the foreclosure, Pinnacle became the record owner of the property. There is 

no evidence that proceeding with an eviction would alter Andreis’s immigration 

status. Obviously, if he prevails on the wrongful foreclosure claim, Andreis would 

be able to rescind the sale and reinstate his home ownership status.

We conclude as a matter of law that the trial court erred in granting the 

temporary injunction because, based on the undisputed facts, the alleged title 

dispute is not intertwined with the right of immediate possession and appellees 

have an adequate remedy at law through their wrongful foreclosure claim. See

McGlothlin, 672 S.W.2d at 232; Glapion, 2014 WL 2158161, at *2. 

Conclusion

We conclude the trial court erred in enjoining appellants from pursuing the 

eviction proceedings in justice court. The justice court had exclusive jurisdiction 

in this case over the question of possession because the issues of title and 

possession were not intertwined, and appellees have an adequate remedy at law if 

their wrongful foreclosure claim is meritorious. We sustain Pinnacle’s issue 

complaining of the trial court’s order granting injunctive relief. We reverse the 

trial court’s order and render judgment denying appellees’ request for a temporary 

injunction. 

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Donovan.