QUALITY OF SERVICE 

PROVIDED TO RAIL SHIPPERS 

Federal Railroad Administration 

Report Number: CR-2011-045 

Date Issued: February 15, 2011 
 

 

 

 

Memorandum
 U.S. Department of 

Transportation 

Office of the Secretary 

of Transportation 

Office of Inspector General 

Subject: Date: INFORMATION: Report on the Audit of February 15, 2011 

the Quality of Service Provided Rail Shippers 

Report No. CR-2011-045 

From: Mitchell Behm Reply to 

Attn. of: JA-50 Assistant Inspector General for Rail, Maritime, and 

Economic Analysis 

To: Federal Railroad Administrator 

Railroads in the U.S. transport a wide range of goods, from raw materials to 

consumer goods. However, for a number of years, commodity shippers have had 

concerns about the quality of the service that railroads provide them. They have 

complained about a lack of railcars when and where they needed them, delivery of 

significantly less tonnage than contracted for, and disruptions in services. In 2006, 

these complaints began to draw greater attention, with Congress and regulatory 

agencies holding a number of hearings on the issues. Congress then directed the 

Office of Inspector General (OIG) to examine service disruptions since 2004, and 

in particular, incidents in which rail carriers failed to make timely shipments of 

commodities such as coal, wheat, ethanol, and lumber.1 

The objectives of this audit were to: (1) assess the availability of service 

guarantees from freight railroads to shippers of coal, wheat, lumber, and ethanol 

since 2004; (2) assess the quality of service provided to these shippers during the 

same time period; and (3) identify the causes of deficiencies in service to shippers 

during this time. 

We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. We reviewed internally-held railroad information and 

publically-available data; interviewed Class I railroad2

 representatives, shippers of 

coal, wheat, ethanol and lumber, and independent railroad experts; and, met with 

staff of the Surface Transportation Board (STB). Consistent with the 

1 This requirement was included in Conference Report 110-446, accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act 

of 2008 (P.L. 110-161). 2 Class I railroads are the largest railroads in the U.S. 
 

 

 

 

2 

congressional request, we limited our scope to data from 2004 through 2009. 

Exhibit A provides more information on our scope and methodology. We are 

making no recommendations since the issues pertaining to freight transportation 

discussed in the report fall under the purview of the STB, an independent entity 

outside the Department of Transportation. 

RESULTS IN BRIEF 

Rail service guarantees in general have become more difficult for commodity 

shippers to obtain, especially through contracts. While tariff-based service 

options3

 can provide some service guarantees, they are predetermined by the 

railroads, and only contracts can provide shippers with negotiated guarantees. 

However, the share of shipments moving under contracts has declined since 2004 

for all the commodities we examined. Moreover, when new contracts were 

negotiated, they generally offered fewer service guarantees than the expired 

contracts they replaced. As a result, commodity shippers have fewer overall 

protections against service problems than in the past. The decline in service 

guarantees may have occurred because railroads experienced adverse 

consequences from providing them during the most recent economic expansion. 

In addition, according to documents prepared for investors and railroad experts, 

some railroads view contracts as limits on their flexibility to adjust their customer 

mix in order to maximize profits as demand fluctuates. 

The quality of freight rail service has varied considerably since 2004, but the 

railroads make only limited information about the quality of their service available 

to the public. Service quality4

 was relatively low in 2004 and 2005, and then 

improved gradually for some railroads in 2006 and 2007, and dramatically for all 

railroads in 2008 and 2009. We identified this pattern using data on railroads' 

internal performance measures, and statements by shippers and railroad 

representatives. Public data on railroad performance, however, is very limited and 

includes only indirect measures of railroad service quality. Furthermore, no public 

records are kept on significant service disruptions that result in poor service 

quality. As a result of these factors, publically-available data is insufficient to 

monitor service quality. 

Demand levels, derailments, and weather events have all driven the fluctuations in 

rail service quality since 2004. However, dramatic changes in demand for rail 

service had the greatest impact. Specifically, a surge in demand in 2004 

contributed heavily to poor service. Conversely, a drop in demand during the 

3 A railroad tariff is a publication that shows the service terms set by the carrier. At a minimum, tariff-based shipping 

must be provided by a freight railroad upon "reasonable request" with "reasonable dispatch." . 4 We relied on many measures, such as on-time percentages and numbers of railcars past expected delivery dates, and 

many interviews to gauge service quality. 
 

 

3 

recession of 2008 and 2009 allowed railroads to make significant improvements in 

the quality of their services. Derailments in the Powder River Basin of Montana 

and Wyoming caused service problems throughout the country in 2005 and 2006, 

but especially in western states. Most weather events cause localized service 

disruptions, but in 2005, a series of extreme events, including Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita, hampered rail service delivery in several parts of the country. Given 

demand’s significant role in determining quality, the quality of service provided to 

commodity shippers can be expected to reemerge as an issue when high demand 

returns. 

This report contains no recommendations. 

BACKGROUND 

Most freight rail tonnage in the United States is moved by four railroads— 

Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) and Union Pacific (UP), which service the 

western half of the country, and CSXT and Norfolk Southern (NS), which service 

the east. In 2007, these railroads transported 90 percent of the ton-miles5

 moved 

by U.S. railroads, and in 2009, they accounted for 90 percent of U.S. railroad 

revenues. We focused our audit on the services these railroads provided. 

The number and nature of commodity shippers served by railroads vary widely by 

commodity. Wheat shippers number in the thousands and range considerably in 

size. While most are grain elevator operators, some are large wheat processors or 

exporters. Electric utilities, who bargain with railroads over shipping 

arrangements for coal, are relatively few in number. For example, according to 

BNSF officials, ten customers account for 60 percent of its coal business. Lumber 

shippers are either lumber producers or brokers supplying large sales outlets. 

Shippers of different commodities use rail to differing extents. For example, 

wheat, coal, and ethanol productions are located far from major markets, and the 

shipment of those commodities depends almost entirely on rail. Coal, because of 

its bulk, is transported primarily by long, large-volume trains. Increasingly, wheat 

also moves in large single-commodity trains. Because shipment sizes and 

distances to markets tend to be smaller for forest products than for coal and wheat, 

trucks sometimes provide a competitive shipping alternative to rail for lumber. 

Various rail service options exist for commercial shippers, and each makes 

different provisions for service guarantees. Under tariffs, railroads are only 

required to provide "reasonable" service. They publically post tariff rates for 

interested shippers to see, and a shipper that chooses the option accepts the posted 

tariff by tendering its goods to the railroad for transport. The STB interprets and 

A ton-mile is the movement of one ton of cargo the distance of one mile. 5 
4 

enforces this "reasonable" standard of service. A contract, on the other hand, may 

result from negotiations between a shipper and a railroad, and may incorporate a 

specific service guarantee with a penalty that applies if the terms of the guarantee 

are not met. Only a contract offers a shipper the possibility of a negotiated service 

guarantee. The railroads also make special rate offerings available to wheat and 

lumber shippers, the terms of which, like tariffs, they publically post and which 

may include some service guarantees that they have predetermined. In recent 

years, some railroads have also developed special rate offerings for coal shippers 

that include commitments, such as to ship minimum volumes. 

Shippers of different commodities need different types of service guarantees. 

Wheat merchants often attempt to obtain guarantees that railcars will arrive at their 

facilities for loading within promised timeframes, and railroads offer such 

guarantees through special rate offerings or contracts. Wheat millers attempt to 

obtain service guarantees through rail contracts to ensure a dependable supply of 

wheat to their processing facilities. However, no more than 30 percent of wheat 

shipments moved under contract from 2004 through 2009, the smallest share of 

any commodity we examined. 

Lumber shippers also tend to be most concerned with service reliability, with 

respect to both availability of equipment for loading and predictability of delivery. 

Railroads provide these guarantees to lumber shippers through special rate 

offerings, and may also agree to them in contracts. Since 2004, the majority of 

lumber shipments have been transported under contracts. 

Coal shippers usually seek guarantees covering transit time or cycle time (the time 

it takes for a train to make the trip from a mine to a utility and back) and monthly 

volumes delivered. Cycle times are of concern primarily to shippers that use their 

own train sets, while all utilities need to receive sufficiently large monthly 

deliveries of coal in order to avoid suspension of operations or having to turn to 

more expensive fuel sources. Generally, coal shippers negotiate these guarantees 

into contracts, the option under which the vast majority of coal moves. 

It is unclear what service guarantees ethanol shippers would demand if they could 

obtain them. We found no evidence that railroads have ever extended service 

guarantees to ethanol shippers, even though a substantial share of ethanol moves 

under contracts. 
 

5 

SHIPPERS HAVE DIFFICULTIES OBTAINING GUARANTEES OF 

SERVICE QUALITY 

Today, commodity shippers experience considerable difficulty obtaining service 

guarantees from the railroads. Those seeking to negotiate service guarantees into 

contracts encounter the most difficulty. During our study period, railroads have 

been increasingly reluctant to provide service guarantees, which may be a result of 

their having experienced adverse consequences from providing them during the 

most recent economic expansion. In addition, some railroads see contracts as 

preventing them from having the flexibility they need to adjust their customer mix 

in order to maximize profits as demand levels change. 

A number of coal and lumber shippers, as well as some wheat shippers, have 

spoken about the difficulty of obtaining service guarantees beyond the minimum 

standard available under tariffs. Both lumber and wheat shippers have reported 

reductions in the guarantees provided under special rate offerings. The problem of 

obtaining service guarantees is most acute, however, for shippers seeking to 

negotiate contracts. 

Since 2004, the share of shipments moving under contracts has declined for all 

four of the commodities we examined, as shown in Figure 1 on the next page. 

Grain shippers have reported that most carriers were replacing contract with tariffs 

during the study period. Many coal and lumber shippers we interviewed stated 

that, despite their efforts, they have not obtained contracts with their servicing 

railroads in recent years. In fact, some of these shippers claimed that railroad 

representatives refused to discuss contracts with them. Our interviews with 

railroad officials produced mixed evidence on their use of contracts. For example, 

representatives from one railroad indicated that they had encouraged some 

customers to use tariffs or special rate offerings instead of contracts during at least 

part of our study period. However, representatives from other railroads informed 

us that their willingness to contract with commodity shippers had not changed 

since 2004. 
6 

Figure 1: Share of Shipments by Contract, Fiscal Years 2004 

through 2008 

Coal Shipments Wheat Shipments 

90% 60%

80% 50%

70% 40%

60% 30%

50% 20%

40% 10%

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Lumber Shipments Ethanol Shipments 

90% 90%

80% 80%

70% 70%

60% 60%

50% 50%

40% 40%

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Source: STB data 

A number of lumber and coal shippers reported a relative lack or total absence of 

service guarantees in recent contracts. Other coal shippers informed us that 

railroads tie contract service terms to those available under tariffs or special rate 

offerings. Since the terms of tariff-based service can change with only 20 days 

notice, such contracts do not offer fixed guarantees. In coal contracts, railroads 

now tend to only guarantee volumes to be delivered, and have largely discontinued 

guarantees of cycle or transit times. One railroad representative characterized new 

contracts as less punitive to the railroads. Indeed, that railroad's new contracts 

only allow commodity shippers the option of walking away from the agreement if 

the railroad fails to perform. Previously, the railroad had to make payments to 

shippers when it did not meet service guarantees. A representative of another 

railroad stated that the service guarantees now available from his railroad under 

contracts are the same as the guarantees under tariffs--"reasonable dispatch." 
7 

Coal and lumber shippers that engaged in contract negotiations during our study 

period characterized the negotiations as "one-sided," with the railroads setting 

contract terms. Some of these shippers were recently approached by railroad 

representatives about entering into contracts, but found the railroads to be fairly 

inflexible in negotiating terms. Since 2004, three of the four railroads in our study 

have introduced "signature-less," or unilateral contracts that eliminate the 

negotiation process. The railroads alone determine the terms of these contracts, 

and consider shippers to have accepted the terms when they tender goods for 

shipment. 

Railroads may have become wary of providing service guarantees, in part because 

during the most recent economic boom they experienced several adverse 

consequences as a result of negotiated guarantees. First, railroads had to pay 

penalties for poor performance contained in service guarantees as traffic levels 

bumped up against capacity constraints. Second, contractual commitments to 

commodity shippers limited the amount of higher-profit traffic the railroads could 

take on when demand surged. As early as 2004, the fact books that one railroad 

produced for investment analysts addressed this concern, stating that the railroad 

intended to maintain flexibility to adjust its customer mix in order to maximize 

yield by moving some customers from contracts to tariffs. 

FREIGHT RAIL SERVICE QUALITY HAS VARIED SINCE 2004, 

BUT PUBLIC INFORMATION ON IT IS LIMITED 

The quality of freight rail service was relatively low in 2004 and 2005, improved 

gradually for some railroads in 2006 and 2007, and jumped to high levels for all 

railroads during 2008 and 2009. The publically-available data on railroad 

performance, however, only measures railroad service quality indirectly. 

Furthermore, no public records are kept on significant service disruptions that may 

result in poor service quality. 

Freight Rail Service Quality Varied Greatly from 2004 through 2009 

During our study period, the quality of service for freight rail shippers varied 

greatly. The most direct indicators of this quality are the railroads' own internallyheld performance measures, which the railroads provided to us. Many of those 

performance measures map directly to the service aspects that shippers are most 

concerned about. For example, the list of performance measures tracked includes: 

on-time percentages; numbers of cars past their expected placement dates; cycle 

times; and transit times. Some railroads also compile indices gauging customer 

satisfaction. 

The railroads' various internal performance measures tell a relatively consistent 

story. Most indicate that service quality was poor in 2004 and 2005. It appears to 
 

 

8 

have recovered gradually for some railroads through 2007, then leaped to 

comparatively high levels for all railroads in 2008 through 2009. Our interviews 

with commodity shippers and railroad representatives generally confirmed the 

pattern depicted by the railroads' measures. Shippers highlighted 2004 and 2005 

as years of notable problems, and characterized 2008 and 2009 as years in which 

they received good service. Representatives of some railroads provided similar 

assessments, with some adding that service gradually improved during 2006 and 

2007. 

Railroads Make Little Information on Service Quality Available to the 

Public 

While railroads' internal performance measures can provide direct indicators of 

service quality, public information is limited since published measures of railroad 

performance relate only indirectly to service quality. The most relevant of the 

publically-available information measures average train speeds and average time 

spent at terminals (dwell times)—measures that primarily gauge network 

performance. Higher train speeds imply that a rail network's traffic moves 

smoothly, and trains spend less time in terminals when railroad operations are 

well-coordinated. If the rail network and operations are not functioning well, it is 

unlikely that shippers are receiving good service. Consequently, low average train 

speeds and high average terminal dwell times imply that service quality is most 

likely poor. However, high average train speeds and low average terminal dwell 

times do not necessarily imply that shippers are receiving good service. 

Figures 2 and 3 chart the courses of these two measures for BSNF over our study 

period. The two measures tell different stories. Both indicate that BNSF's 

network experienced difficulties in 2004. However, in 2005, terminal dwell times 

dropped sharply, but train speeds remained low until late 2008. Many factors 

affect these measures, making it difficult to use the data to monitor service quality. 

Monitoring is further hampered by an absence of public data on significant service 

disruptions, which can adversely affect railroad performance6

. 

6	 Other studies have reached the same conclusion. See "A Study of Competition in the U.S. Freight Railroad Industry 

and Analysis of Proposals That Might Enhance Competition," prepared for STB by Laurits R. Christensen 

Associates, Inc., Madison, WI, November 2008, and "Rail Transportation of Coal to Power Plants: Reliability 

Issues," Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, September 26, 2007. 
9 

Figure 2: Average Train Speed - BNSF, January 2003 through 

December 2009 

30

MPH

23

20

18

15

25

28

Source: Association of American Railroads (AAR) data compiled by STB 

Figure 3: Average Terminal Dwell - BNSF, January 2003 through 

December 2009 

15

18

20

23

25

28

30

33

35

Hours

Source: AAR data compiled by STB 
 

 

10 

DEMAND FOR SERVICE, DERAILMENTS, AND WEATHER 

EVENTS DROVE FLUCTUATIONS IN SERVICE QUALITY FROM 

2004 THROUGH 2009 

Since 2004, dramatic changes in demand for freight rail service have largely 

caused the fluctuations in the quality of service reported by shippers. Both rail 

representatives and shippers cited demand as an important determinant of service 

quality. Derailments in the Powder River Basin of Montana and Wyoming 

negatively affected service throughout the country in 2005 and 2006, but most 

seriously in western states. Extreme weather further hampered service in many 

locations in 2005. 

Both Railroads and Shippers Cited Level of Demand as an Important 

Determinant of Service Quality 

During the study period, striking changes in demand for freight rail service 

brought about the fluctuations in service quality that shippers experienced. 

Figure 4 graphs revenue ton-miles–the ton-miles of cargo transported for which 

railroads receive payment–for Class I railroads for this period.7

 Revenue tonmiles started to rise in 2003, jumped in 2004, and continued to climb into 2008, 

when they reached record highs as demand grew dramatically. This increase in 

demand was driven primarily by growth in traffic volumes in the western half of 

the country. From the last quarter of 2008 through 2009, demand for rail service 

fell sharply across the country as the economy went into recession, leading to a 

comparable reduction in revenue ton-miles. 

7 While there are seven Class I railroads, we focused on the four that accounted for 90 percent of Class I railroad 

revenue ton-miles in 2007. 
11 

Figure 4: Revenue Ton Miles - Class I Railroads, January 2000 

through December 2009 

Source: AAR data 

320

340

360

380

400

420

440

460

TonMiles(In Billions)

The surge in demand in 2004 contributed significantly to poor service in the early 

years of the study period. Representatives from several railroads explained that 

railroads cannot respond quickly to unexpected, substantial growth in demand. 

They need a minimum of 6 to 9 months to train additional crews, a longer time to 

purchase rolling stock, and even longer to upgrade infrastructure. 

None of the railroad personnel we interviewed anticipated the demand surge. One 

independent expert stated that railroads remained in cost-cutting mode well into 

2004. Indeed, not until March 2004 did Class I railroad employment begin to 

reverse the downward trend it had exhibited since the late 1990s. An STB 

representative noted that during the early years of the surge, railroad crews were 

"timing out," meaning that they reached the limit of their legally-allowed hours of 

service before other crews became available to replace them. Representatives of 

one railroad noted that they normally plan for 2 to 4 percent in annual growth, but 

as early as 2003, demand increased by nearly 12 percent and continued to grow 

through 2007, forcing the railroad to catch up. The representative of another 

railroad informed us that the railroad used every switching terminal in its system 

to handle demand before it peaked. An independent rail expert concurred with 

these assessments, noting that from 2004 through 2007, the railroad network was 

"stressed due to excessive demand versus available capacity," and that this stress 

had a negative impact on service. 

Both shippers and railroad representatives we spoke with cited a drop-off in 

demand as the reason that railroads could improve service quality in 2008 and 

2009. None of the shippers we interviewed indicated that they had any service 

problems in 2008 or 2009. One railroad representative stated that it is "easy to run 

the railroad" under such low demand. 
12 

Derailments in the Powder River Basin and Extreme Weather Also 

Affected Rail Service Quality 

Derailments in the Powder River Basin (PRB) of Wyoming and Montana 

significantly affected coal deliveries from 2005 through 2006. According to the 

Energy Information Administration, the PRB is one of the United States' most 

important coal-producing areas. While PRB coal primarily supplies utilities in the 

western half of the country, it is also shipped to power plants in the east. In May 

2005, two major derailments occurred in the PRB. Remedying the conditions 

underlying these derailments required replacing the ballast under 90 miles of track, 

a significant and disruptive undertaking that lasted into 2007. Every coal shipper 

we interviewed reported that these events affected its service, and both western 

railroads admitted to service problems in their coal networks after the derailments 

occurred. 

Weather also significantly disrupted rail service during the study period. Usually, 

the effects of weather events are felt in relatively localized areas. In 2005, 

however, a series of major events–Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and flooding on 

the west coast and in Kansas–tore up or washed out track in several parts of the 

country. These weather-related disruptions exacerbated existing service problems. 

CONCLUSION 

Commodity shippers currently receive far fewer protections in the form of service 

guarantees from freight railroads than in the past. This reduction in service 

guarantees is significant since service quality can vary considerably, particularly 

with levels of track congestion. Fewer service guarantees means that commodity 

shippers are more at risk for experiencing service problems, a risk that will 

increase with higher demand as the economy revives. Furthermore, railroads offer 

little data to the public that allows for evaluation of the quality of their services, 

making it extremely difficult for any government agency to monitor service 

quality and identify emerging problems. 
 

13 

EXHIBIT A. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

The objectives of this audit were to: (1) assess the availability of service 

guarantees from freight railroads to shippers of coal, wheat, lumber, and ethanol 

since 2004; (2) assess the quality of service provided to these shippers during the 

same period; and (3) identify the causes of any deficiencies in service to shippers 

during this time. 

To obtain information to address these objectives, we interviewed: representatives 

of the four largest railroads; representatives of shipper trade organizations for coal, 

wheat, lumber, and ethanol; representatives of individual shippers; independent 

rail experts; and, STB staff. Representatives of the major railroads provided us 

with presentations that, for the most part, were prepared in response to our 

questions. We reviewed testimonies from all relevant hearings held since 2004 by 

congressional committees, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and STB. 

We also reviewed documentation of all other relevant STB proceedings and the 

minutes of meetings held by the Rail Energy Transportation Advisory Committee, 

an adjunct to STB. We reviewed relevant studies and audits. 

To obtain further information on the types of service guarantees that freight 

railroads provided to shippers, we collected data from the railroads on the share of 

contracts versus tariffs where available, and similar data from STB. We obtained 

additional information on the quality of service provided to shippers by collecting 

data on service quality measures from the major railroads and the Association of 

American Railroads (AAR) data compiled by STB on railroad performance. In 

support of our investigation of the causes of rail service deficiencies, we obtained 

data on: the types and geographical distribution of complaints received by STB; 

rail traffic volumes from AAR; and data on railroad employment from STB. 

We conducted our work from November 2008 through January 2011 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. 

Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology 
 

14 

EXHIBIT B. ACTIVITIES VISITED OR CONTACTED 

Railroad Experts 

William Wilson, Professor, North Dakota State University 

Carl Martland, Professor (Retired), Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Randy Resor, Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation 

Government Agencies 

Energy Information Administration 

Federal Railroad Administration 

Surface Transportation Board 

Trade Associations 

 Edison Electric Institute 

National Grain and Feed Association 

Forest Products Association of Canada 

American Forest & Paper Association 

National Rural Electric Cooperative Association 

American Public Power Association 

Renewable Fuels Association 

Rail Shippers 

Confidential interviews of fifteen coal utilities 

Confidential interviews of four lumber and forest products shippers 

Railroads 

Norfolk Southern 

Exhibit B. Activities Visited or Contacted 
15 

CSX Transportation 

Burlington Northern Santa Fe 

Union Pacific 

Exhibit B. Activities Visited or Contacted 
 

16 

EXHIBIT C. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT 

Name 	 Title 

Betty Krier Supervisory Economist/ Program 

Director 

Keith Klindworth Economist 

Sandra Menjivar Analyst 

Susan Neill Writer/Editor 

Exhibit C. Major Contributors to This Report 
Figure 1: Share of Shipments by 

Contract, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2008

Coal Shipments

Year Share (%)

2004 77

2005 79

2006 77

2007 77

2008 75

Wheat Shipments

Year Share (%)

2004 30

2005 27

2006 27

2007 22

2008 21

Lumber Shipments

Year Share (%)

2004 74

2005 72

2006 68

2007 67

2008 65

Ethanol Shipments

Year Share (%)

2004 83

2005 78

2006 49

2007 48

2008 47

Source: STB Data
Figure 2: Average Train 

Speed - BNSF, January 

2003 through December 

2009

Date MPH

Jan 2003 26.34

May 2003 25.16

Sept 2003 24.75

Jan 2004 24.44

May 2004 22.48

Sept 2004 22.90

Jan 2005 23.43

May 2005 24.03

Sept 2005 22.98

Jan 2006 23.53

May 2006 22.50

Sept 2006 23.40

Jan 2007 23.18

May 2007 23.30

Sept 2007 23.15

Jan 2008 24.38

May 2008 23.84

Sept 2008 24.05

Jan 2009 26.04

May 2009 27.30

Sept 2009 27.40

Source: Association of American Railroads 

(AAR) data compiled by STB
Figure 3: Average 

Terminal Dwell - BNSF, 

January 2003 through 

December 2009

Date Hours

Jan 2003 28.78

May 2003 28.60

Sept 2003 29.33

Jan 2004 28.76

May 2004 31.75

Sept 2004 29.60

Jan 2005 25.25

May 2005 24.03

Sept 2005 22.98

Jan 2006 23.53

May 2006 22.50

Sept 2006 23.40

Jan 2007 23.18

May 2007 23.30

Sept 2007 23.15

Jan 2008 24.53

May 2008 24.68

Sept 2008 23.15

Jan 2009 25.30

May 2009 22.30

Sept 2009 23.05

Source: AAR data compiled by STB
Figure 4: Revenue Ton 

Miles - Class I Railroads, 

January 2000 through 

December 2009

Quarter Ton Miles 

Q1 2000 364,063,621,000

Q3 2000 376,029,673,000

Q1 2001 370,383,313,000

Q3 2001 367,728,975,000

Q1 2002 364,915,982,000

Q3 2002 371,861,694,000

Q1 2003 368,389,879,000

Q3 2003 387,603,472,000

Q1 2004 395,609,191,000

Q3 2004 417,287,746,000

Q1 2005 416,723,258,000

Q3 2005 420,956,404,000

Q1 2006 429,821,938,000

Q3 2006 443,578,785,000

Q1 2007 421,798,001,000

Q3 2007 444,282,069,000

Q1 2008 442,522,998,000

Q3 2008 450,620,164,000

Q1 2009 378,299,141,000

Q3 2009 387,472,518,000

Source: AAR Data