Reversed and Rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed October 1 6 , 2014

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 13

- 00600

- CV

ROBERT P. LESLIE , Appellant

V.
JEFFREY R. HILL AND ANTHONY T. HILL , Appellee s

On Appeal from the 127th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2012

- 13069

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Robert P. Leslie appeals from the trial court’s order confirm ing
the arbitration award against appellees Jeff rey R. Hill and Anthony T. Hill, but
refus ing to sign a final judgm ent based on the confirmed award. Because the
arbitration statutes do not contemplate a trial court confirming an arbitration award without also signing a final judgment based on that award, we reverse the trial
court’ s order and render judgment confirmin g the arbitration award

.B ACKGROUND
On October 17, 2007, Leslie and the Hills entered into an Agreement and Assignment of Membership Interest in Conquest Marketing and Investments, LLC (d.b.a. Conquest Beverage Group, L.L.C.) (the Agreement) , in which the Hills agreed to buy the majority interest in Conquest

. Section 15(p) of the Agreement provide s: Binding Arbitration . The parties hereto agree that all disputes arising out of or related to the terms and conditions of this Agreement and/or the Concurrent A greements or to the performance, breach or termination thereof, shall be settled by binding arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association conducted pursuant to the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. T he arbitration shall take place in either New Orleans or Metairie, Louisiana. Judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. In Section 15(i) of the Agreement, Leslie and the Hills agr eed that if a dispute

arose , the prevailing party would recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred as a result of that dispute.
At a time not disclosed in the record, a dispute arose regarding the Hills’ failure to make the required payments to L eslie . Leslie initiated an arbitration proceeding, alleging that the Hills had breached the Agreement

. The arbitrator
found in favor of Leslie and awarded him damages, prejudgment interest, and “an amount equal to 40% of the sums due, including accrued i nterest,

. . . at the time those sums are finally paid, represe nting the reasonable attorneys[’] fees incurred by [Leslie] to enforce [the Hills’] obligations.”
Leslie filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award in Harris County
district court and s ubsequently filed a motion to confirm the award. Uncertain whether Texas law allowed a trial court to confirm an arbitration award containing

2an award of prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees, the trial court denied Leslie’s
motion. Leslie filed a sec ond motion t o confirm the arbitration award, which the trial court denied because it concluded Texas law did not allow recovery of attorneys’ fees that included accrued interest.

Leslie then filed a third motion to confirm the award. The Hills responded that the trial court should not confirm the arbitration award, but instead should vacate the award because it contained a gross mistake. The trial court signed an order stating: “the Court does not find that there is any gross mistake in the
Arbitration Award. However, because the Arbitration Award is in contravention t o Texas law, the Court cannot enter a final judgment on the Arbit ration Award.”
The trial court subsequently signed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. The trial court concl uded: “without a basis to deny the confirmation of the Arbitration Award, the Award was confirmed.” It further concluded that “because
the Arb i tration Award does not allow this Court to sign a Final Judgment that is sufficiently definite as required by Te xas law, this Court refused to sign Leslie’s [proposed] Final Judgment.” This appeal followed

. A NALYSIS In two issues, Leslie challenges the trial court’s refusal to render a final judgment based on the confirmed arbitration award. The Hills , for their part, ask
this C ourt to affirm the trial court’s order in its entir ety and affirmatively disclaim any challenge to the trial court’s order or to the arbitration award itself. We
address Leslie’s i ssues on appeal toge ther.

We review de novo a trial court’ s decision to confirm or vacate an
arbitration awar d

. Broemer v. Houston Lawyer Referral Serv

. , 407 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). Texas and federal law favor
arbitration and
, as a result, judicial review is extraordinari ly narrow. See E. Tex.

3Salt Water Disposal Co. v. Werline , 307 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. 2010). An arbitration award has the same effect as the judgment of a court of last resort, and a court reviewing the award may not substitute its judgment fo r that of th e arbitrators merely because it would have reached a different result. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Hennig Prod

. Co., Inc. , 164 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). In addition, a reviewing court may not set
aside an arbitration award for a mere mistake of fact or law. Id. Indeed, any error of law made by an arbitrator may not be reviewed by a court confirming an
arbitration award. Id. at 443.

The arbitration clause in the Agreement does not specif y whether th e Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) or the Texas General Arbitration Act (TGAA) govern s in the event of a dispute between the parties

. See 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. ; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.001
, et seq. (West 2011)

. The FAA applies to any

contract that involv es interstate commerce, reaching to the full extent of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
See id. § 2 (1999); Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Brown , 261 S.W.3d 394, 399 (Tex. App.

C Houston [14th Dist .] 2008, no pet.). On the other hand, “federal procedure does not apply in Texas courts, even when Texas courts apply the [FAA].” Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps , 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). In their briefing, the parties reference o nly the TGAA in discussing
whether the trial court has discretion not to render judgment on an arbitration award after confirming it

. W e need not determine which arbitration act governs that question because the result is the same under each act

. The TGAA provides that a trial court “ shall confirm ” an arbitration award unless a party opposing confirmation offers grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting the award. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.0 87. Under the

4TGAA, “ [ t ] he fact that the relie f granted by the arbitrators could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not a ground for vacating or refusing to
confirm the award. ” I d. § 171.090. Finally, s ection 171.092 of the T GAA provides that when a trial court grants “an ord er that confirms, modifies, or corrects an award, the court shall enter a judgment or decree conforming to the
order.” Id. at § 171. 092 (emphasis added) ; see Tex . Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.016 ( West 2013 ) (construing “shall” as imposing a duty) ; Albertson’s I nc. v. Sinclair
, 984 S.W.2d 958, 961 (Tex. 1999) (stating courts generally construe the word “shall” as mandatory) . The statute further provides that the “judgment or decree may be enforced in the same manner as any other judgment or decree.” Tex. Civ.
P rac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.0 92.
Similarly, the FAA provides that when a party moves for an order confirming an arbitration award, “the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected .

. . .” 9 U.S.C. § 9. If the court issues an order granting confirmation, t he party files the motion and order “with the clerk for the entry of judgment thereon,” and the resulting “ judgment so entered shall have
the same force and effect

. . . as, and be subject to all the provisions of l aw relating to, a judgment in an action; and it may be enforced as if it had been rendered in an
action in the court in which it is entered.” Id. § 13; see also Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. , 207 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The [ FAA ] r equires the court to enter judgment upon a confirmed arbitration award, without reviewing either the merits of the award or the legal basis upon which it was reached.”).
Here, the trial court concluded the Hills had not presented any grounds on
which the arbitration award could be vacated, modified, or corrected
, and it
therefore signed an order confirming the award. The trial court refused to sign a final judgment conforming to the confirmed award , however, because it concluded

5the award contravened Texas law.

We hold this refusal was error because n either the TGAA nor the FAA give a trial court any discretion to refuse to render a final judgment after confirming an
arbitration award

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.0 92 (providing
that when trial court grants “an order that confirms

. . . an award, the court shall enter a judgment or decree conforming to the order”) ; Chiron Corp. , 207 F.3d at
1133 (stating FAA requires entry of judgment upon confirmation of arbitration
award )

. Even if t he trial court were correct that the arbitrator awarded relief that
could not have been awarded under Texas law in a non

- arbitration case , that does not provide a basis for refusing to render judgment on the confirmed award. See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Cod e Ann. § 171.0 90; see also Chiron Corp. , 207 F.3d at 1133 ( stating FAA requires entry of judgment upon confirmed arbitration award without reviewing merits of award or legal basis supporting it ) ; Barton v. Fashion Glass and Mirror, Ltd. , 321 S.W.3d 641, 64 6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) ( reasoning that arbitrator can grant relief that trial court cannot because its authority is derived from arbitration agreement)

. Because the trial

court erred when it refused to sign a final judgment incor porating the confirmed
arbitration award , we sustain Leslie’s consolidated issues on appeal

. C ONCLUSION Having sustained Leslie’s consolidated issues on appeal, we reverse the part of the trial court’s June 18, 2013 order refusing to sign a final judgment on the
confirmed arbitration award
, and we render judgment incorporating the confirmed
arbitration award in i t s entirety. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.3.

/s/ J. Brett Busby Justice Panel consists of Justi ces McCally, Busby, and Donovan.

6