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S. Hrg. 111–1105 

CLOSING THE GAPS IN AIR CARGO SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

NOVEMBER 16, 2010 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

CHRISTOPHER A. COIONS, Delaware 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

JASON M. YANUSSI, Professional Staff Member 

ELYSE F. GREENWALD, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ROBERT L. STRAYER, Minority Director for Homeland Security Affairs 

LUKE P. BELLOCCHI, Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 13 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 16 

Senator Burris .................................................................................................. 18 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 21 

Senator Ensign ................................................................................................. 23 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 31 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 33 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 2010 

Hon. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................. 5 

Hon. Alan D. Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................. 7 

ALPHABETICAL ORDER OF WITNESSES

Bersin, Hon. Alan D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Joint prepared statement with Mr. Pistole .................................................... 36 

Pistole, Hon. John S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Joint prepared statement with Mr. Bersin ..................................................... 36 

APPENDIX 

Responses to post-hearing questions submitted for the Record from Mr. Pistole and Mr. Bersin .............................................................................................. 48 

(1) 

CLOSING THE GAPS IN AIR CARGO SECURITY 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:20 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Levin, Carper, Burris, Collins, 

Brown, and Ensign. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good afternoon. The hearing will come to 

order. Our subject today is air cargo security. 

Beginning with the attacks against America on September 11, 

2001, our terrorist enemies have consistently sought to use airplanes as weapons of mass destruction, and more generally, they 

have seen in our aviation system a strategic choke point of international transit and commerce that could be brought to a halt, or 

at least stopped, through terrorist attacks. We have seen shoe 

bombers, liquid bombers, and underwear bombers. Again and 

again, terrorists have sought different ways to blow up an airplane. 

In the most recent attempt, of course, terrorists hid bombs inside 

the toner cartridges of printers and sent them to the United States 

as air cargo. This plot, as the others before it, was thwarted, in this 

case largely because of extraordinary intelligence, and here we give 

thanks and credit to our friends and allies in Saudi Arabia. But 

there was in this an element of good fortune or luck, and luck, of 

course, is not a strategy to defend our Nation from a threat of terrorists. 

As this most recent plot demonstrates, good intelligence and 

strong foreign partnerships are critically important. But I think the 

point that remains with us, and it is that phrase that echoes from 

the 9/11 Commission Report, the Kean-Hamilton Report, in which 

they said September 11, 2001, occurred because of a failure of 

imagination, our failure to imagine that people could possibly try 

to do what the terrorists did to us on September 11, 2001. Every 

time one of these events happens, it compels us to figure out how 

we can better anticipate terrorists’ next move, not just react to the 

last one. 

Former Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator and Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Admiral James Loy recently said in an op-ed in the 

2 

Washington Post that after the September 11, 2001 hijackings, we 

hardened cockpit doors. Then the terrorists tried a shoe bomb, and 

now we remove our shoes for inspection at airports. Then the terrorists tried liquid explosives hidden in sports drinks, targeting 

seven planes flying over the Atlantic Ocean, and we cracked down 

on liquids that could be brought on board. Then the underwear 

bomber came close to bringing down a plane over Detroit, and now 

we have gone to full body imaging. And, of course, I support every 

one of those steps we have taken. Now terrorists are going after a 

weak spot in cargo inspections, and we will respond to that, as well 

we should, but they, our enemies, will keep looking for new 

vulnerabilities, and we have to continue to try to think as they 

would and raise our defenses before they strike. 

We were lucky, as I have said, that none of these attempts succeeded, but they will continue to probe our weaknesses, attempting 

to detect our flaws and then defending against them, and we have 

to make sure that not only does our luck not run out, but that we 

are prepared to stop whatever they try. 

Here are some of the questions that I would like to ask our witnesses today. Clearly, both the gathering of intelligence and acting 

on it is crucial, and I want to ask how we can improve our intelligence beyond even where it is now. Intelligence is always important in a war, never more important than in the particular war 

with Islamist extremist terrorists that we are fighting today for all 

the reasons that I have just talked about. 

Threats of terrorism come from within the United States or from 

abroad. Our ability to deter, detect, or intercept that foreign threat 

here is limited by our own sovereignty. We have to depend on our 

foreign partners to implement strong security programs, and I 

want to ask both of you what we are doing to strengthen those relationships and implement international security programs. Obviously, we have limited direct control over incoming passenger 

flights and cargo flights. 

While our government has achieved 100 percent screening of air 

cargo on domestic passenger flights, which is a significant accomplishment consistent with the 9/11 legislation we adopted, only 

about 60 percent of cargo on passenger flights coming into the 

United States from abroad is screened, and there is a kind of 

patchwork system of cargo shipments on all-cargo aircraft. So naturally, I want to ask how we can improve that and convince our foreign countries to expand and accelerate their screening of cargo 

coming either on passenger flights or all-cargo flights to the United 

States. 

Right now, we require air carriers coming from Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America to provide cargo manifest information 

after the plane has taken off, 4 hours before it is due to arrive. Can 

we move that time line up? Is there additional or different information that may be helpful in identifying high-risk cargo? 

And finally, how are we preparing to identify the next gap terrorists will likely try to exploit? Do we have an institutional way, as 

difficult and unprecedented as this enemy is in threatening our 

homeland security, to try to think ahead of them? 

Our witnesses today are, of course, ideally positioned by the offices they hold now and by their experience to help us answer these 

3 

questions—TSA Administrator John Pistole and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Commissioner Alan Bersin. I thank both of 

you for being here and look forward to your testimony. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, your 

testimony, particularly when you were quoting Admiral Loy, shows 

us that the terrorists remain unflagging in their determination to 

exploit vulnerabilities in the security systems developed since September 11, 2001. 

In the past 12 months, the United States has narrowly avoided 

two terrorist plots directed against aviation. The first was averted 

by sheer luck and the quick action of the passengers and crew in 

the skies above Detroit on Christmas Day. The second, which we 

just discussed, was disrupted due to intelligence shared by our allies and the hard work of Federal law enforcement, intelligence, 

and homeland security officials and several international partners, 

and I want to commend the two leaders who are before us today, 

who I know worked around the clock once they were informed of 

this threat. 

In these two failed attacks, we see the fanaticism and patience 

of our enemies. Though thwarted, these plots should prompt us to 

reexamine whether our priorities are correct and our resources 

properly deployed. 

Today, the Committee examines the most recent attempted attack. We all are aware that last month, terrorists exploited weaknesses in the air cargo security system and succeeded in putting 

explosives inside printer cartridges bound for this country. The 

bombs ultimately found their way into the cargo bays of airplanes, 

including at least one passenger plane. If detonated, the results 

could have been catastrophic. 

This is the nature of the terrorist threat that we face. It is dynamic. It is ever changing. The Chairman reminds us of the caution of the 9/11 Commission that we cannot suffer again from a 

failure of imagination. As we strengthen our security systems, the 

terrorists counter with a different kind of threat aimed at a different target using different means. 

The potential to plant an explosive somewhere in the millions of 

pieces of air cargo shipped around the world daily is clearly a vulnerability. The Department of Homeland Security must use this 

near miss to redouble its work with other countries, airline carriers, and shippers to tighten the security network. We must move 

quickly to shore up our defenses without interfering with the legitimate flow of commerce, and, of course, that is always the challenge 

that we face. Al-Qaeda is, after all, seeking to destroy our economy 

and way of life, as well as to kill our people. We must not allow 

either goal to be accomplished. DHS should analyze how government can best focus its limited screening resources on the highest 

risk cargo. 

The successes in the risk-based screening of maritime cargo could 

provide a road map for risk-based screening of air cargo. Currently, 

maritime cargo manifest information must be submitted to DHS at 

least 24 hours before a cargo container headed to the United States 

4 

is even loaded on a ship overseas. Using this information and other 

intelligence, the DHS targets high-risk cargo for inspection prior to 

the ship’s departure to this country. 

In sharp contrast, air cargo manifest information is required to 

be submitted only 4 hours before the cargo arrives in the United 

States. That is a major difference, and it means that the information is often transmitted to DHS while the aircraft is in the air, 

providing no opportunity to conduct further inspections of flagged 

cargo before departure. In some ways, that reminds me of the problem with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, where he was flagged and 

was going to be stopped, but only after he arrived in the United 

States. It seems to me we have a similar problem in the case of 

our air cargo. 

Indeed, Customs and Border Protection has acknowledged that 

based on the shipping information about the two packages from 

Yemen, the agency would have flagged them as high risk upon arrival in the United States. But our whole concept is to push out our 

borders so that screening, that flagging of dangerous cargo occurs 

not when the cargo arrives in our country, but before it is even put 

on board a vessel or an aircraft bound for this country. 

Now, I recognize that the tempo of the air cargo supply chain is 

different from maritime cargo, but regardless of the mode, we have 

an obligation to examine vulnerabilities in our supply chains and 

to manage risk to those systems. 

There are also opportunities to make better use of the private 

sector in securing air cargo overseas where screening efforts are 

now more limited. Instead of attempting to screen almost all cargo 

at the airport, it could be screened at a warehouse where the package is sealed, long before it arrives at an airport, and kept secure 

until it is delivered to the air carrier. That is just one idea that 

would avoid the potential delays of trying to do everything immediately prior to loading packages on aircraft. 

I mentioned that DHS must constantly reevaluate the allocation 

of its security resources and priorities. In that vein, I still remain 

concerned about the intrusiveness and effectiveness of the Advanced Imaging Technology and the potential negative health effects. As Mr. Pistole knows, this is an issue that I have mentioned 

to him many times as well as to Secretary Napolitano in multiple 

letters to the Administration. 

I believe the Department should independently evaluate the 

health effects of that technology and should consider software that 

is in use at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam that respects travelers’ 

privacy by automatically identifying objects that may be threats, 

but by using featureless images of travelers. And to date, the Department’s responses to my inquiries have been inadequate. Now, 

I know that Mr. Pistole was on his way to view this technology 

when the plot from Yemen was uncovered, and I want to acknowledge that. 

Obviously, our government’s first priority is to protect our people 

against terrorism, and the public will accept a certain level of intrusion and inconvenience. But DHS should be using technology 

and techniques that are as safe and as effective as possible that 

minimize privacy concerns whenever possible. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

5 

1The joint prepared statement of Mr. Pistole and Mr. Bersin appears in the Appendix on page 

36. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

Administrator Pistole, it is an honor to have you back with us, 

and we welcome your statement now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE,1 ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member 

Collins, Senator Levin, and Senator Brown. It is good to be here 

today along with Commissioner Alan Bersin of Customs and Border 

Protection to address the Committee on the role of TSA and CBP 

in the area of air cargo security. I appreciate the Committee’s leadership and ongoing efforts to ensure the security of air cargo and 

passenger aviation for the American people. 

Three weeks ago, as we have noted, we, and I use the collective 

‘‘we’’ in the broadest sense—Senator Collins mentioned the intelligence, law enforcement, aviation security, and private sector communities along with homeland security communities—disrupted 

this attack when the individuals we believe to be al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) concealed and shipped explosive devices 

hidden in toner cartridges. 

The two packages were shipped from Yemen destined for the 

United States, and the episode for us began on the night of October 

28, Thursday night, around 10:30 when I received a call from John 

Brennan, the White House Coordinator for Homeland Security and 

Counterterrorism, regarding specific credible intelligence that we 

know is so rare in this business as to exact packages that should 

be identified and assessed. So, of course, we worked through the 

night and over the next few days, staying in close contact with our 

colleagues throughout the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement 

communities and our international counterparts and, of course, the 

private sector, including cargo shippers such as FedEx and UPS. 

As a first step, I immediately grounded all air cargo packages 

coming from Yemen. After the initial response, we took additional 

steps in conjunction with CBP. For example, we—CBP, TSA, and 

our private sector partners—quickly identified and located all other 

U.S.-bound packages from Yemen that were in transit, and CBP, 

working with the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) located and 

identified those packages and ensured they were not a risk, such 

as the other two toner packages. And then with the community, we 

refined the targeting tools we used to provide additional focus on 

current threats. 

I sent out a team of TSA security inspectors to Sana’a to work 

with the Yemeni authorities to provide cargo screening guidance, 

expertise, and actual explosive trace detection equipment to the 

Yemeni government. I leveraged a previously planned speech that 

I had to the Aviation Security World Conference in Frankfurt, Germany, from where I was supposed to go from Amsterdam, but I 

took that part out, and I gave that speech and met with counterparts from Europe and elsewhere around the world. While there, 

I met with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) DiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:13 Dec 06, 2011 Jkt 063867 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\63867.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
6 

rector General, Giovanni Bisignani, a world recognized expert in 

the area, along with the head of aviation security for the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 

From there, I went to Yemen 5 days after we became aware of 

the plot to meet with the TSA team, the U.S. country team, including Ambassador Gerald Feierstein, and Yemeni authorities, including the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Transport, and 

other Yemeni government officials. 

Several days later, on November 2, Secretary Napolitano spoke 

with leaders of the international shipping industry, including UPS, 

DHL, FedEx, and TNT, as well as IATA and Director General 

Bisignani about enhancing air cargo security without unduly disrupting the critical air cargo supply chain. 

And then on November 8, we announced that air cargo from 

Yemen and Somalia would be banned from flights to the United 

States for the immediate future. We also indicated that no highrisk cargo would be allowed on passenger aircraft inbound to the 

United States, and, of course, toner and ink cartridges weighing 16 

ounces or more, around 500 milligrams, would be prohibited on domestic passenger flights and international passenger flights inbound to the United States. Also, all high-risk cargo would receive 

additional and enhanced screening, including inbound international 

mail packages—we worked with the Postmaster General on some 

of the issues to implement that—which must be screened individually and certified to have come from an established postal shipper. 

So these are just some of the steps we have taken, and those steps 

will continue. 

I would note that since August 2010, we have required, as was 

noted, 100 percent screening of all air cargo transported on domestic air carriers departing from U.S. airports. We have worked, as 

Senator Collins outlined, in large part through the Certified Cargo 

Screening Program, where we have over 1,100 private companies 

here in the United States to do screening away from the airport. 

Actually, just over 51 percent now of all air cargo flying out of the 

United States or leaving domestically is done through these private 

screening facilities that we certify, we inspect, and ensure that 

they are—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Excuse me for interrupting. Is that for 

passenger planes and cargo planes? 

Mr. PISTOLE. It is right now for passenger planes, and we are 

looking at the possibilities with cargo, recognizing that FedEx and 

UPS, of course, the two large ones here, have their own screening 

regimen and do a very good job independent of what we would do, 

which is obviously in their best interest, also. 

This very practical security program keeps commerce moving 

without creating screening bottlenecks at the airports, and we are 

looking at that as a worldwide model for implementation. It is just 

an issue of capacity development. 

There are a number of different issues that we are addressing, 

which I can get into in more detail in response to questions, perhaps. I would just note that since June 2009, CBP and TSA have 

met extensively on leveraging CBP’s Automated Targeting System 

(ATS) to better target high-risk cargo on international inbound passenger flights, and these efforts complement our continued diploVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:13 Dec 06, 2011 Jkt 063867 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\63867.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
7 

1The joint prepared statement of Mr. Pistole and Mr. Bersin appears in the Appendix on page 

36. 

matic work with our international counterparts to improve screening on these flights. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to working with the Committee as we pursue these collective 

efforts. I would be glad to take your questions afterward. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Administrator Pistole. 

Commissioner Bersin, thanks for being here, and we welcome 

your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. ALAN D. BERSIN,1 COMMISSIONER, U.S. 

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BERSIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, Senators Levin, and Brown. I join Administrator Pistole in acknowledging and appreciating this Committee’s leadership and 

support in exploring the gaps and the deficits that we have so that 

we can more effectively confront terrorism. 

I would like to address in this statement three dimensions of 

CBP’s work. First is the air cargo processing that we currently engage in. The second is, building on Administrator Pistole’s testimony, CBP’s response to the October 29, 2010, event. And then 

last, the partnership with TSA and the way ahead and the steps 

that we are contemplating taking together. 

First, with regard to air cargo, it arrives in this country in two 

ways, on commercial passenger flights in the hold, in the belly of 

our cargo jets, or within specifically designated cargo-only aircraft. 

In fiscal year 2010, CBP processed nearly 334,000 such flights and 

inspected and screened over 57 million regular and express air 

waybill records. This is a massive part of our international trade 

policy and economy. 

Currently, as pointed out by Senator Collins, our systems and 

processes are designed to identify high-risk cargo for inspection 

after their arrival in the United States. They are not designed to 

identify dangerous cargo prior to takeoff, as is our regime in the 

maritime context. 

Under the Trade Act of 2002, carriers currently must provide 

cargo manifest data 4 hours prior to arrival of the aircraft or at 

wheels up for flights arriving from embarkation points less than 4 

hours from the continental United States. Upon receipt of the advance manifest data, CBP processes the information through its 

Automated Targeting System. The system, as you know, identifies 

potential threats related to terrorism, narcotics, hazardous materials, and other areas of concern to the agency and to the Nation. 

ATS is the primary platform used by the Department of Homeland Security to match travelers and goods against screening information and specific intelligence that may be received. It is used by 

our air cargo advance targeting units at local airports to conduct 

risk assessments. It is also used by our National Targeting CenterCargo located in Virginia, which conducts high-level sweeps for 

shipments of concern based on intelligence and specific targeting 

rules that are written to reflect present and prospective threats 

8 

that we perceive through intelligence or otherwise. These rules 

identify risk factors that are present in the manifest data that we 

receive from the carriers. Each of these risk factors receives a 

quantitative value, or a score, and if the shipment exceeds a predetermined score or threshold for national security concern, we 

place the shipment on hold. We conduct an examination upon arrival. 

Once the cargo arrives in the United States, CBP conducts examinations of all such identified high-risk air cargo or other cargo 

identified as high-risk by the local advance targeting units. These 

examinations must include a non-intrusive inspection if equipment 

is available, or a physical inspection of the shipment, as well as a 

mandatory radiation scan. 

We also partner at CBP with the trade community to enhance 

supply chain security through the Customs-Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program. Under C-TPAT, importers 

and shippers adopt minimum security standards, which they must 

adhere to throughout their security chain. In exchange, CBP treats 

these shipments as lower risk and provides fewer inspections. 

As Administrator Pistole indicated, when we became aware of 

the threat on October 29, we responded immediately by identifying 

all air cargo shipments from Yemen destined for the United States, 

aside from the two that were the subject of the inquiries in the 

United Arab Emirates and in the United Kingdom. In effect, what 

we asked right away was, what more could be coming toward us? 

Who could have been sending it to us? And how quickly can we 

mitigate or neutralize that risk? We ascertained the location of 

each shipment, and we held them for inspection. We then completed inspections using X-ray systems, explosive detection canines, 

and explosive trace detection equipment. 

As we can go into further in questions and answers, there were 

38 shipments in total, and we discovered and identified those shipments within hours of receiving the threat information. Within 

days, we had located all of those 38 shipments among the millions 

of packages that arrived in the country, and within a week, we had 

actually satisfied ourselves and cleared those cargoes as a result of 

techniques of scanning that were applied to them. 

So where do we go in the days and the months ahead with the 

help and guidance of experts, including those on this Committee? 

We have, ever since the December 25, 2009, incident involving 

Abdulmutallab, seen a partnership between CBP and TSA that has 

produced valuable results for our Nation and for the homeland security. We need to do the same now with regard to air cargo. What 

we believe is that this cooperation is the best source of the progress 

we can make quickly. 

Currently, CBP is providing assistance to TSA to fulfill the mandates set forth in the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to 

screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft. We 

are also collaborating to explore the potential of utilizing CBP’s 

Automated Targeting System as a risk targeting tool in the air 

cargo context that can be shared between CBP and TSA. This will 

allow us to leverage data and information already collected to meet 

TSA’s mission to secure international inbound air cargo. 

9 

We also acknowledge the importance of partnering with the private sector so that they can lend us considerable assistance in securing the supply chain. We also recognize that we must receive information in advance of what we are currently receiving, and we 

are working with TSA in determining the parameters and, importantly, consulting with our private sector partners to get their 

views as to how they can most expeditiously provide that information. It is clear that our receipt of manifest data 4 hours prior to 

arrival does little to help prevent dangerous cargo from being loaded aboard. 

Let me abbreviate the statement so we can get on to the dialogue 

of questions and answers. We believe that we have the foundation 

in place to implement a more effective system, and we believe that 

working with TSA and with other agencies in the U.S. Government, we can strengthen this system and do it relatively quickly. 

But we should do it cautiously and deliberately, and I look forward 

to working, as I am sure Secretary Napolitano and Administrator 

Pistole do, with this Committee and its staff in reaching a satisfactory outcome and building the next level of security into our air 

cargo system. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Commissioner. 

We will go to the questioning now. We will have 7-minute rounds 

for each of the Senators. 

Administrator Pistole, we are focused here on air cargo security, 

but obviously more broadly on the question of aviation security, 

and I want to ask you a question related to TSA that is very much 

in the news, which is the so-called pat-down procedures that follow 

and are associated with the use of the whole body imaging scanners, which I recall because we held hearings on this subject after 

the Christmas Day bombing attempt and most of us were calling 

for you to go to the whole body scanners, either the Amsterdam variety or what you have done. 

I wanted to give you an opportunity before the Committee to explain the pat-down procedures that have troubled people and why 

you think that they are justified. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There is an ever-evolving nature of the terrorist plot that has been well described here 

this afternoon. The challenge for TSA and the whole U.S. Government and our allies around the world is to develop the best techniques and tactics enabled by the best technology to detect those 

plots. As we have heard the various plots outlined here this afternoon, it is clear that we have to be one step ahead of the terrorists, 

and obviously, we are not always in that situation, as evidenced by 

the last three plots that could have been successful. 

So it really comes down to a balance of partnership on the one 

hand, working with the traveling public, and the security and safety issues on the other hand, and what is a proper mix. So what we 

try to do is be sensitive to people’s concerns about privacy, while 

ensuring that everybody on every flight has been properly 

screened. We recognize—I particularly recognize—that reasonable 

people can disagree as to what that proper balance or blend is between privacy and security and safety. 

10 

That being the case, I think everybody who gets on a flight wants 

to ensure and be assured that everybody else around them has 

been properly screened, and by the way, everybody else on that 

flight wants to make sure that I have been properly screened or 

you have been properly screened. So how do we reach that balance? 

That is the challenge that we go through. 

I believe the advanced imaging technology is the best technology 

we have today to detect the non-metallic device that is well designed, well concealed, such as we saw on Christmas Day. What I 

am concerned about, and I know many share this concern, is an individual who opts out of the advanced imaging technology. Let us 

say Abdulmutallab had done that, if that had been the case in 

Schiphol, if he had opted out thinking, well, I am not going to receive a thorough pat-down so I can get on that flight. If that had 

been successful on Christmas Day, I think we might be having a 

different dialogue here this afternoon and in the public. 

What I want to assure and reassure the public is that we are 

concerned about your safety, your security, and your privacy. Let 

us work together in partnership to ensure that we can have the 

best way forward. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me just take this a moment or two 

more. Just make clear, if you will, to the Committee and public 

who may be listening or watching, how does someone get subjected 

to a pat-down procedure? 

Mr. PISTOLE. There is a very small number or percentage that 

would actually have the pat-down, and it would really occur almost 

exclusively in situations where somebody has opted out of the advanced imaging technology or they have alerted on that because 

there is something still in their pockets, or they may be trying to 

carry some contraband on the plane. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In other words, either they have chosen 

not to go through the scanner or they have gone through and there 

is some alert? 

Mr. PISTOLE. There is an alert, or through the walk-through 

metal detector there is an alert, and so there is some basis for 

doing it. And even with that, it is a very small percentage of all 

the passengers. So very few people, even though the public out 

there may not know because it is a new technique. 

The other thing is I have been in Europe several times in the 

last few months and have observed the pat-downs being done in 

many airports, and it is very similar. Our pat-down approach is 

very similar to what is being utilized in Europe, and as we know, 

it is even much more thorough in other parts of the world. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. And, of course, you have a same-gender TSA employee doing the pat-down. This is a difficult balance 

because obviously this has to be a more intimate and intrusive investigation because of the choice that has been made earlier or 

what the machine has shown, but I presume they are instructed in 

a way that will determine whether somebody is potentially dangerous, but also in doing so try to do minimal harm to their privacy. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Correct. They go through training, and the clearest 

outcome of that training is to be professional and to give clear guidance and a lot of clarity as to what they are going to do in terms 

11 

of the actual pat-down and to make sure that the passenger understands that and responds to that. There has been a lot of publicity 

out there about a certain individual who recently tried to travel but 

did not want to have that pat-down. I think if people get away from 

just the passenger, they would hear that what the security officer 

was saying was very cool, calm, professional, and that is what we 

expect out of our security officers, to do this in a way that is professional. 

Again, the bottom line is if you have two planes that are getting 

ready to depart and on one, you say everybody has been thoroughly 

screened on this plane, and you can either go on that plane or we 

have another plane where we have not done a thorough screening 

because people did not feel comfortable with that, I think most of, 

if not all of, the traveling public would say, I want to go on that 

plane that has been thoroughly screened. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, I agree with you. I think you are 

doing the right thing. I think perhaps the reaction to the pat-down 

procedures got ahead of TSA’s or the Department’s description of 

what you were doing and why you were doing it. But if, God forbid, 

that bomb on Abdulmutallab’s body had gone off on the plane over 

Detroit, Congress and, I dare say, the public would have been demanding not just the body imaging equipment, but pat-downs, and 

I understand the privacy sensitivities, of course. 

It is awkward. It is unusual. On the other hand, we get on those 

planes, and we want to have the confidence that nobody on the 

plane has evaded security in a way that will allow them to blow 

up the plane and kill everybody else on it. 

So this is, unfortunately, the world in which we live. It was not 

our choice, but we have to do everything we can to protect the traveling public. I think that what you are doing here with the patdown procedures is difficult, it is sensitive, but it is necessary for 

the homeland security of the American people. 

My time is up. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pistole, let me start with a fundamental question. But for 

the intelligence tip that was provided by our ally, would our current security systems have detected these package bombs? 

Mr. PISTOLE. My professional opinion, no. 

Senator COLLINS. And so that raises the issue of what can we do 

to make sure that in the future, if there is another attempt to exploit the gaps in air cargo security, we have closed those gaps because in many ways, we were lucky that we had an ally with extremely specific intelligence information that allowed us to target 

these packages before harm was done. What is the single biggest 

change that you think we should be making? 

Mr. PISTOLE. We have high confidence in the known shippers and 

that supply chain, those who do business in the shipping industry. 

There are over 8 billion, almost 9 billion pounds of cargo that come 

into the United States every year, about two-thirds on cargo 

planes, such as UPS and FedEx, and the other third, over 2.6 billion, on passenger planes. We have high confidence, again, in those 

international shippers with established records. 

The challenge becomes those locations, such as these individual 

packages out of Yemen or other hot spots around the world where 

12 

there is not a known relationship with the carrier or the shipper, 

and screening those packages in the same way that we would require here in the United States. There are several challenges there. 

One is just the capacity of some countries. For example, Yemen, 

when I visited there a couple weeks ago, had an X-ray machine 

that they use for cargo. But they were not using explosive trace detection or a 100 percent physical inspection of packages, which we 

are requiring now. So there are a number of issues and challenges 

there. 

Senator COLLINS. And with Yemen, I would be worried about the 

people doing the screening and whether they share our goals. 

Mr. PISTOLE. You raise a very good point. So what I was describing was the physical screening, but the insider threat—— 

Senator COLLINS. Exactly. 

Mr. PISTOLE [continuing]. What type of vetting and validating of 

those individuals is being done, and that is obviously uneven 

around the globe. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Bersin, I mentioned in my statement, and 

you talked about it, as well, that we have a pretty well defined system for the screening of cargo that comes by the maritime system. 

And in that case, 24 hours before the cargo is even loaded on the 

ship overseas, we have a manifest that is combined with other information to allow us to identify the cargo and target that which 

may be of high risk. 

Why can we not do that with the air cargo? What are the obstacles? I mean, frankly, a system that says we want to know 4 hours 

before it arrives at our shores provides very little protection. The 

flight may be already en route. 

Mr. BERSIN. Senator Collins, as Mr. Pistole said, one method of 

dealing with this is to segment the traffic between cargo and shippers we know from shippers and cargo about which we do not know 

enough or we have adverse information. 

The other method of doing this is the risk management that we 

have applied, and I think effectively so, in the maritime context, 

and the three elements are, as you suggest, first, receiving information sufficiently in advance so that we can apply our targeting 

rules and actually attempt to identify the high-risk cargo. And 

then, of course, the third issue is then scan or screen using appropriate technology. 

But, in effect, we should be looking at those same techniques in 

the aviation cargo context, and in fact, we have begun that process. 

We will want to customize it, given the nature of the trade, the differences between the maritime and aviation context. But the broad 

categories, Senator, are ones that give us good guidance. 

Senator COLLINS. Are you looking at increasing the amount of 

time before cargo is shipped to our country where you receive a 

listing of the cargo? The 4 hours strikes me as something that you 

could change immediately. For example, in response to the Times 

Square bomber attempt, TSA acted immediately to change the update rule on the targeted individuals. Are you looking at the 4-hour 

rule? 

Mr. BERSIN. Yes, Senator, we are, and we are working not only 

with TSA and other government partners, but with the private sector shippers, the airlines and the cargo carriers, to reach a deterVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:13 Dec 06, 2011 Jkt 063867 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\63867.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
13 

mination about how we can advance that deadline for providing information to CBP, and we expect that we will be coming up with 

a revised recommendation in the near future. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Pistole. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I would just add that it is a pragmatic issue. I 

could issue a security directive today and say 8 hours or 24 hours 

or whatever it would be. The question is, are the carriers capable 

of implementing that directive today? That is what Commissioner 

Bersin is referring to in terms of working with them. What can 

they do electronically? A number of the smaller carriers around the 

world are not fully electronic in terms of their communications, so 

how do we actually implement that? So clearly, the intent is there. 

It is how do we make it happen. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

We will call on, in order of appearance, Senator Levin, Senator 

Brown, and Senator Burris. Senator Levin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to just pursue Senator Collins’ question again. Right now, 

the rule is you have to have your manifest 4 hours before the arrival of an airplane, is that correct? 

Mr. BERSIN. Yes, for those destinations that are less than 4 

hours from our shores, it is upon wheels up. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, what are the practical problems with increasing that? 

Mr. BERSIN. The first is the electronic systems in place to get the 

information to us, but we can work on that over time as we have 

in the passenger context. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, that is the same whether it is 4 hours, 6 

hours, or 8 hours, is it not? It has to be an electronic system to get 

you the information—— 

Mr. BERSIN. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator LEVIN. So you could do 8 hours with the same problem, 

same challenge. 

Mr. BERSIN. We could, and we are trying to work out with the 

carriers the best system that would actually provide us with the information in an effective advance period. But also—— 

Senator LEVIN. Well, that is not a practical problem. What is the 

next problem which is not practical, allegedly? 

Mr. BERSIN. Well, the problem of making sure that we are getting it as quickly as we can and then getting information back to 

the carrier, putting a hold on certain high-risk cargo that would be 

identified by our targeting rules. 

Senator LEVIN. Why would 8 hours or 12 hours not help you do 

that? 

Mr. BERSIN. It would help us. 

Senator LEVIN. So that is not a practical reason not to increase—— 

Mr. BERSIN. No. 

Senator LEVIN [continuing]. Four hours to 8 hours or 12 hours. 

I mean, we were told a minute ago there are practical problems. 

I have not heard one yet. 

14 

Mr. BERSIN. The practical problems, I think, that Mr. Pistole alluded to, and they are, indeed, obstacles, not ones that we will not 

be able to work with the private sector to overcome, but there are 

airlines, as we have seen in the passenger data area, that simply 

do not have the capacity to electronically transmit that data to us. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, that is true whether it is 6 hours, 8 hours, 

or 12 hours. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So, if I could jump in, part of it, Senator, is that 

the carriers themselves do not have that manifest data. Sometimes 

it is only 2 to 3 hours before wheels up. 

Senator LEVIN. I am saying, if it is required that it be 8 hours 

or 12 hours, then they will have the manifest data—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. So that is true—— 

Senator LEVIN. That is not a practical problem. That is just saying you have to have the manifest data 8 hours, 12 hours, or whatever it is prior to wheels up. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So if there is a last-minute shipment or something, 

that means—— 

Senator LEVIN. Tough luck. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. Basically, they are out of luck then, so—— 

Senator LEVIN. That is true now, too, is it not? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No, not necessarily. 

Senator LEVIN. One hour before arrival? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, but if it is 4 hours—— 

Senator LEVIN. Well, last minute shipments, that is tough. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. What are the other problems, practical problems 

with 8 hours or 12 hours? 

Mr. PISTOLE. The small carriers around the world. We are not 

talking about UPS, FedEx—in fact, we are working with them to 

provide immediate notification when they receive the manifest, 

whatever the time line. It may be a couple of days. 

Senator LEVIN. That is not a practical problem, either. 

Mr. PISTOLE. No, I am saying that is a solution. 

Senator LEVIN. I have not heard a practical problem yet. I am 

struggling to hear a practical problem for not just saying, directive, 

it is 8 hours, it is 12 hours, whatever. Why can you not do that 

right now? 

Mr. PISTOLE. For much of the world, we could do that. For small 

carriers that would be dealing with a number of the high-risk packages, let us say, from Central Asia someplace, their system, as I 

understand, and we could get subsequent experts in here to talk 

about that in a little more detail, would not have the capacity to 

provide that information to CBP more than 4 hours in advance at 

this time. 

Senator LEVIN. Why? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I would have to defer to experts. 

Senator LEVIN. The greater the number of hours prior to arrival, 

it seems to me, the easier it is to get the information if you are 

not electronically hooked up, not the harder. You have more time. 

I do not get it, folks. I mean, I do not see the urgency in your testimony here. It is such an obvious question that I am a little bit 

dumfounded that we do not have a direct answer. 

15 

You say there are practical problems, but we have not heard one 

yet. 

Mr. BERSIN. I think the practical problem is going from the status quo to where we want to be. I do not think anyone is saying 

that we should not move there. 

Senator LEVIN. That is not a practical problem. That is a matter 

of issuing a directive saying it is now 8 hours or it is now 12 hours. 

Mr. BERSIN. Well, the practical problem is that the trade will tell 

you that it has not been done because it has been perceived that 

it would unduly interfere with the commerce in the world. When 

we come to a situation like this, there is an urgency, and in fact, 

we overcome a lot of the practical problems that were keeping the 

situation from being handled that way in the past. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, I have to tell you, I read your comment, Mr. 

Pistole, about the length of time—you say that security cannot 

bring business to a standstill. I do not think anyone is suggesting 

that business be brought to a standstill. The question is, is it reasonable to tell people, you have to have your package and your documents in 12 hours before a plane lands. That does not bring it to 

a standstill. That just slows it down by 8 hours. 

The question is, will the public or the world accept a delay of 8 

hours in getting something to where it has to go in order to have 

greater security? My answer is, I think, kind of like Senator 

Lieberman’s points on the pat-down. Yes. This is easier than patdowns. This is just slowing it down. It does not bring it to a standstill. 

I was a little worried about your comment, Mr. Pistole, about a 

delicate balance. The flow of global commerce is key to economic recovery. I agree with that. But security cannot bring business to a 

standstill. I do not think anyone is suggesting that. It is a straw 

man, it seems to me, that you are raising, and rather than telling 

us, yes, you do not see any practical reason, either, and we are 

going to get it done, it is sort of that, well, we are trying to overcome practical problems, which you have not been able to identify, 

at least to me. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, I agree, Senator, at least in terms of your risk 

management and assessment construct. The issue comes down to, 

if we would impose, for example, on all cargo worldwide the same 

mandates we have here, the estimates I have seen are that the cost 

of doing that would actually exceed the revenue from that cargo. 

Senator LEVIN. Are you saying that increasing 4 hours to 8 

hours—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. No, different issue. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, I think you ought to get your experts to 

provide for the record what those practical problems are. My time 

is up, but if you do not mind, Mr. Chairman, my suggestion is that 

he provide the Committee for the record what those problems are. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I accept your suggestion and I make that 

formal request of our two witnesses, as soon as you can. Thank 

you. Senator Brown. 

16 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be back. 

Thank you for putting this together, and thank you to the witnesses for appearing. 

My concerns are pretty simple. I want to know what tools and 

resources you need to better do your job so we can ensure, God forbid, that this does not happen again in terms of the extreme possibility of what could have happened. Also, as someone who flies and 

has family members who fly, I want to make sure that when I or 

my family or friends or anyone in this country gets on a plane, that 

the cargo underneath is screened. So how common is it to have a 

full flight of passengers and have some extra room on a passenger 

plane and have that cargo then fill that free available space? How 

common is that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, if the issue is whether it is screened or not, 

100 percent of that cargo on passenger flights originating in the 

United States is screened regardless of when it is put on. 

Senator BROWN. Originating in the United States. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator BROWN. But what if it is a tail-to-tail transfer and it is 

coming in from Yemen or another country? Where are we with 

that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. The 9/11 Commission Act required 100 percent 

screening of international inbound cargo on passenger flights. The 

bottom line is we are not there yet because either the host countries or civil aviation authorities have not put in the same procedures that we have, and there are estimates anywhere from twothirds or perhaps 80 percent of all of that cargo is presently being 

screened. The one take-away, though, is we say 100 percent of the 

high-risk cargo is screened, and we do not define that publicly because we do not want to provide a blueprint, obviously, to how to 

get out of that. But we look at the known shipper issue; how does 

that work? So it is a good point. 

Senator BROWN. So for toner cartridges from Yemen, does an 

alarm go off? I mean, we have plenty of toner cartridges here and 

why would we be importing them? Did that not raise a red flag? 

Mr. PISTOLE. It absolutely did, both by the shipper, who had 

identified it as a suspect package—part of the challenge—— 

Senator BROWN. How did it even get on the plane, then? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Because of different protocols, for example, in 

Sana’a, Yemen, even though the shipper had been identified—that 

is why it was segregated in Dubai. So in addition to the specific 

credible intelligence, they had identified it as a suspect package. 

You are absolutely right. 

Senator BROWN. And when you asked for the cooperation of the 

various cargo carriers, did you get the cooperation of all of them? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely. 

Senator BROWN. There were no questions asked? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. They have been very capable partners and looking for solutions that make sense as opposed to us just issuing an 

edict or rule, security directive, that says you will do this now. We 

work very closely with them to do this. 

Senator BROWN. So is there going to be an updated or improved 

screening and inspection plan when it comes to those tail-to-tail 

17 

transfers? Is there something you are proposing or working on to 

deal with that gap? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. So the key is how do we work with our international partners, and we do that in several ways. One is through 

the International Civil Aviation Organization, which is part of the 

United Nations. A hundred and ninety countries signed off on an 

aviation security declaration last month in Montreal. And then 

working through the International Air Transit Association, and 

what they are doing is trying to leverage their resources in a way 

that, frankly, builds capacity in some of these areas of the world 

that need additional screening protocols or actual explosive trace 

detection equipment, canines, or whatever it may be. 

Senator BROWN. I have been to other countries, and you see the 

cargo, and it is just there. It is laying around and anyone can get 

access to it. I think it is going to take a real commitment to ensure 

that our aviation partners—when I say partners, I mean people 

who fly to the United States and deliver goods to the United 

States—take their jobs seriously. 

And I recognize the comments of the two previous questioners regarding the timing. Is there a way to ensure speed and accuracy 

when it comes to X-raying and inspecting? Do we have the technology to make sure that we do not slow things down to a crawl 

and we can continue on with our superior delivery of product 

throughout the world? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I say, generally, yes, and that is when it comes 

down to the known shippers, the trusted partners throughout the 

global supply chain. The problematic ones are those individual 

shippers that we do not have any history on—we do not have any 

intelligence about who this person is or what they are shipping. 

But as you indicated, when somebody ships toner or a computer 

printer from Yemen to Chicago, that is a red flag. So that is exactly 

the type of information CBP is getting through that 4-hour window 

and what we are seeking to get additional time on. 

Senator BROWN. And how much air cargo is actually being 

screened today? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, so 100 percent in the United States on U.S. 

passenger flights—— 

Senator BROWN. How is it done? Is it through X-rays or through 

dogs, the whole gamut? 

Mr. PISTOLE. We do it through a series of over 1,100 certified 

cargo security screeners, facilities around the country away from 

airports. They use a variety of those, but clearly X-ray, perhaps advanced technology X-ray, explosive trace detection or physical inspection if necessary. They screen it and then transport it, usually 

just a few miles, in a secure fashion to the airport to put on the 

cargo flights and passenger flights. 

Senator BROWN. So in conclusion, I just want to try to solve the 

problem. I want to try to figure out what you need to get that job 

done, and whether you come over to the office again, either one of 

you, and deliver that or we have a private meeting or however it 

works, I would like to, Mr. Chairman, just know what they need. 

I mean, we have identified, by the grace of God, that we have been 

very lucky. But at some point, we are not going to be that lucky, 

and I want to be able to say to my friends, family, and anyone I 

18 

meet in Massachusetts that I gave you the tools so they are not 

looking at any one of us because this is not about party politics. 

This is about the safety of our citizenry and also the ability to keep 

commerce moving. So if you could maybe post testimony at some 

point or reach out, that would be a big help. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good idea, Senator Brown, and we will 

arrange for that. 

Senator Burris, from the beginning of your service in the Senate 

to this, apparently your last week with us, you have been a most 

faithful Member of this Committee, probably attending more hearings than anybody else, except Senator Collins and me, so thank 

you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is because of 

the interest in this Committee, and even this topic here has really 

caught my interest because I might not be on point on all my quick 

questions, but I have several concerns about TSA as I travel across 

this country. 

Maybe, Administrator Pistole, you can answer this. How do you 

tell what a high-risk package is? What is the criteria for a highrisk package? 

Mr. PISTOLE. We do not define it publicly because we do not want 

to provide the blueprint for—— 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you. We tell everything else. I mean, we 

let it be known that the Saudis gave us the secret to this. We have 

to stop putting everything out in the—I am sorry. Go ahead. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. Yes. So it is generally outside 

the known shipper, trusted shipper arena, and just generally, individuals who are shipping packages with no history, perhaps from 

some hot area such as Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and places like 

that. But it is all intelligence driven. What intelligence do we know 

about the shipper? Did the person positively identify himself when 

he came in to drop off the package? Was the package physically inspected? What do we know about the cargo carrier where the package was dropped off? How thorough are they? How thorough is the 

airport at the cargo facility? So a lot of criteria and indicia go into 

figuring out what is a high-risk package. 

Senator BURRIS. Because those packages were headed to synagogues allegedly in Chicago. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Correct. 

Senator BURRIS. That is another major concern. 

Let me shift gears just a little bit. On the pat-downs, we have 

some airports that are staffed by contract screeners, is that correct? 

They are not all TSA employees? 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is correct. There are 17 airports out of the 453 

that are staffed by contractors, not TSA employees. 

Senator BURRIS. Now, how do you deal with those pat-downs in 

these airports? Do we have jurisdiction over those individuals? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely, Senator. They have to follow the same 

protocols and standard operating procedures that we put out for all 

TSA employees. 

Senator BURRIS. Have they gone through the same training? 

19 

Mr. PISTOLE. They go through the same training. They are identical to the Transportation Security Administration officers and behavior detection officers and all the TSA employees other than they 

are working for contractors. 

Senator BURRIS. Why are there contract employees in Kansas 

City? You all could not find enough TSA people to hire? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Congress decided that there should be the option either to have federalized airports or to have private security done, 

and so there are some Members of Congress who feel very strongly 

about that and want to have additional airports that have private 

security as opposed to TSA. 

Senator BURRIS. So you said that is written into TSA law—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator BURRIS [continuing]. That they can be private contractors? 

Mr. PISTOLE. It is called the Screening Partnership Program 

(SPP). 

Senator BURRIS. Mr. Chairman, I do not have much longer in the 

Senate, but we ought to look at these private contractors. I am concerned about the number of private contractors, not only at TSA, 

but at the other government agencies, and then I am wondering if 

one of the passengers feels that they have been over-screened, just 

what the liability there would be. 

Would patting down have caught the underwear bomber, in your 

estimation? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator BURRIS. Not the machine, but the patting down? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator BURRIS. Because allegedly, it was in a diaper type of arrangement. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator BURRIS. So they are going that deep in terms of patting 

down individuals? 

Mr. PISTOLE. The pat-downs are based on the latest intelligence 

and the information that we have, and—— 

Senator BURRIS. But there was no intelligence on that gentleman 

that was on the flight to Detroit. He was on the plane. 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is right. That is why we changed the policy. 

Senator BURRIS. Have our personnel received adequate training? 

Mr. Chairman, do we know what will happen with the litigation 

coming out of this? The Pilots Association and the Flight Attendants Association are getting ready to bring some type of action, as 

I understand, because of the excessive patting down of flight attendants and of pilots. Is that the case? 

Mr. PISTOLE. That has been the case. Pilots have, of course, not 

generally gone through the advanced imaging technology because 

they are allowed to keep their shoes on, and that is a different 

issue. But I have had a number of conversations with representatives of pilots’ associations, and we are actively exploring options 

as it involves pilots because we are using a risk-based approach. 

It just begs the question, if you have somebody who is in charge 

of the aircraft that can put the aircraft down, as could be the case, 

then why do we have the screening for them? So actually, in the 

near future, I will be announcing some new policies on that. 

20 

Senator BURRIS. That would help. There is also a question, Mr. 

Pistole, about the degree of X-rays that these individuals have to 

go through in the course of their day-to-day work and what that 

will do to their physical health, if they go through the X-ray machine rather than the excessive pat-down. 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is one of the concerns that I think has been 

raised. What I rely on is the scientific literature and the studies 

that have been done using these specific machines, including the 

Food and Drug Administration, National Institute of Science and 

Technology, and Johns Hopkins University. They have all done 

independent assessments of the advanced imaging technology machines, the amount of radiation, and I have seen several analogies, 

but one that sticks in my mind is going through one of these machines is similar to receiving about 2 minutes of radiation that you 

would receive at 35,000 feet on a normal flight. So it is very minimal, well within the established scientific standards for safety, and 

we are always trying to update that through independent 

validators and others who have opinions about that. 

Senator BURRIS. And how about the protection of the TSA personnel? I mean, if the male officer is accused of grabbing a lady’s 

breast or the female officer is getting too close to a male’s genitals, 

how are they protected now? 

Mr. PISTOLE. It’s always same gender security officers who would 

do that pat-down, and then people can request a private area. 

Senator BURRIS. Will there be a witness there with that patdown? 

Mr. PISTOLE. They are welcome to have a witness there present. 

Senator BURRIS. So can the TSA employee request a witness employee to be there with her or him when he is patting him down 

or she is patting her down? Can they have personnel with them 

there to protect them? 

Mr. PISTOLE. It is not our current policy, but unless it goes into 

a private screening area, the closed circuit television (CCTV) would 

capture virtually all of that because every checkpoint has CCTV 

enabled. 

Senator BURRIS. I see my time is up, but I am also concerned 

about our TSA personnel, and I listen to these people. Please take 

care of the TSA personnel. Some of them do not have health insurance. Some of them are working part-time. I am listening to these 

complaints, and as a new Administrator, I am counting on you to 

take care of those people who are going to take care of us getting 

on these airplanes because we cannot have disgruntled—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely. 

Senator BURRIS [continuing]. TSA personnel trying to protect us 

on these flights. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I could not agree with you more, Senator. I appreciate your support. Thank you, sir. 

Senator BURRIS. God bless you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Thanks very much, Senator 

Burris. 

Senator Carper has been the senior Senator from Delaware since 

Senator Biden became Vice President. With the seating of Senator 

Coons yesterday, he becomes not only senior in service, but the oldest member of the Delaware delegation—— [Laughter.] 

21 

And we are going to treat you with a lot more respect. [Laughter.] 

Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I think. 

While Senator Burris is still here, I just want to second the emotion that was expressed by our Chairman about his service here in 

the U.S. Senate. He is not only a faithful attendant and participant 

in full Committee hearings, but he is a terrific Subcommittee Member, and I have been privileged to welcome him to our Subcommittee hearings for the last 2 years. He is almost always 

present, at least for part of the hearings, asks thoughtful questions, 

and he is just a joy to serve with, so we are going to miss you, my 

friend. I just want to put that on the record. 

Mr. Pistole, how are you doing in your new job? How long have 

you been in your new job? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Since July 1, Senator, and I am doing very well, 

thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Any surprises? 

Mr. PISTOLE. A lot of challenges, a lot of moving parts, but I have 

been impressed with the quality of the workforce. The Senior Leadership Team is outstanding. The interagency work is outstanding. 

And it is a vital mission that people are very focused on. Thank 

you. 

Senator CARPER. So is there anything that we in the Legislative 

Branch ought to be doing more of or less of to help you and the 

folks who are serving under you? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. I know there have been several issues that have been teed up. I would defer to the legislative 

affairs folks in terms of getting that to staff and working on that, 

but thank you. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Uncovering this most recent air cargo 

plot and the failure of other attempted attacks over the years tells 

me that it has become increasingly difficult since September 11, 

2001, for terrorists to exploit the vulnerabilities to our aviation system. At the same time, however, some aspects of our response to 

the foiled attacks are at least a little bit worrisome. 

The ban on cargo from Yemen and Somalia and the limits on, for 

example, printer cartridges may be necessary, but they are a specific response to a specific failed attack, as you know. They follow 

similar rules put in place over the years related to liquids, electronics, and other matters. 

Recognizing that terrorists are still targeting aviation and are 

constantly adapting and changing their methods, what are we 

doing to make sure that we are just as nimble as they are and are 

not spending too much time responding to the last disaster? In my 

old days as a Naval flight officer, we always talked about fighting 

the last war, and we have tried to learn to fight the current war 

or the next war as time goes by. What are we doing about making 

sure we are not spending too much time responding to the last disaster? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. My whole approach since I 

took over as TSA Administrator in July is to use a risk-based, inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:13 Dec 06, 2011 Jkt 063867 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\63867.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
22 

telligence-driven approach to make sure that we are informed by 

prior actions and attempted attacks but not dwelling on those. We 

want to make sure there are no other printer cartridges out there 

because if they made two, maybe they made more, and maybe they 

are already in the United States getting ready to be sent someplace. So we have to be informed by that just as we have to be informed about box cutters on flights or liquids that could be explosives or shoe bombs or underwear bombs. 

So we have to be informed by all those, but we do not want to 

be limited, and we have to be forward-looking to make sure we are 

not acquiring, for example, the technology today that deals with 

yesterday’s threats, but we are trying to anticipate, informed by 

the intelligence from not only the U.S. community, but around the 

world, where we should be going, and I think we are doing that. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Mr. Bersin, do you want to share a 

thought or two with us? 

Mr. BERSIN. Just to add to the Administrator’s comments, it 

seems to me that we need to develop a deeper partnership with the 

private sector, that, in fact, given the number of parcels that we 

deal with—last year, as I indicated in the opening statement, we 

dealt with 334,000 flights and 57 million packages—we have to recognize that we cannot do this without the help of the commercial 

airlines that carry the cargo, as we have enlisted their support in 

the passenger context, and with the express carriers, that we need 

to make the grand bargain with them that would give them earlier 

release on cargo that is assured and help us deal with that smaller 

percentage that we do not have sufficient information on to make 

a good judgment. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks. Administrator Pistole, TSA has been 

receiving a fair amount of negative attention in recent days due to 

the discomfort, as we have heard, of some airline passengers with 

the screening methods that are used at airports, specifically the 

full body scanners and the pat-downs. You had some considerable 

discussion on this already, and I missed part of that. I do not want 

to get into a specific discussion on how the two procedures are 

right now, but I do want to talk about a program with TSA that 

could possibly limit the number of passengers submitted to more 

intensive screening. 

My staff and I have learned a lot in recent months about TSA’s 

Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program, which uses, as you know, agency personnel trained in behavior detection methods to identify passengers who might pose a high 

risk. I think before your confirmation hearing, we actually talked 

about this a little bit, several months ago. But legislation that Senator Brown and I have introduced aims to build on and expand this 

program. 

Can you just take a couple of minutes and discuss with us behavior detection training and perhaps the increased use of intelligence 

about transportation security threats, how they might be better 

used to target our efforts at airports. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. I think the use of behavior detection officers is a key component in our overall layers of security, 

not a fail-safe or single point of failure in any respect, but it is one 

of those multiple layers that we use to help to identify somebody 

23 

who may be acting suspiciously or something that is not quite 

right. I am a big proponent, given my almost 27 years in the FBI, 

especially having seen behavior detection work in terms of interviews and somebody who is lying and things like that. I think it 

is a valuable resource. 

The question is, how do we show outcomes if we have not identified a putative terrorist, an Abdulmutallab-type? We identified him 

because he was sweating or he was acting nervously in response 

to questions or he saw a canine over here and so he decided to go 

this way, or when he saw somebody standing in line being swabbed 

for explosives, using trace detection on his hands, then he backed 

out of the line. So there are any number of indicators that can be 

helpful. 

As we know, the Israelis do quite a bit in terms of how they 

screen passengers, and behavior detection is one of those keys. I 

am a strong proponent of it, and I am looking to expand the program. Thank you for your support. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks so much. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Carper. 

Senator Ensign, welcome. We invite your questions now. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ENSIGN 

Senator ENSIGN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I know this hearing is basically on air cargo but folks 

have been getting into a few other areas, so let me ask about the 

enhanced imaging. There have been reports in the media that have 

said certain religious groups want to be exempted because of religious, obviously, reasons. Can you address that? Are you going to 

allow certain groups to be exempted from that because of religious 

beliefs? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, Senator, we try to be sensitive to each individual and groups that have particular sensitivities, as to whether 

it is headwear or certain garb or sensitivities about being viewed 

or touched and everything. So we try to be sensitive to those issues. 

At the same time, the bottom line is we have to ensure that each 

person getting on each flight has been properly screened, and so we 

have options, such as if somebody does not want to go through the 

advanced imaging technology, it is optional. They would just do the 

walk-through metal detector and have a pat-down that would identify any possible items. They can request private screening, so if 

they do not want to be screened in public, they can go to a private 

area, have a witness with them. 

And so we try to address those concerns in every way possible, 

recognizing, again, in the final analysis, everybody on that flight 

wants to be assured with the highest level of confidence that everybody else on that flight has been properly screened, including me, 

you, and everybody. 

Senator ENSIGN. I realize this is a difficult question for you, but 

are you going to make no exceptions? I know you are trying to reasonably accommodate, but—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator ENSIGN [continuing]. Within those reasonable accommodations, let us just say that my religion does not allow me to be 

24 

touched by somebody else, does not allow me to go through that 

screening. So what happens in those cases? 

Mr. PISTOLE. A very small percentage of people will continue to 

receive pat-downs. So if somebody comes to the airport—— 

Senator ENSIGN. They have to at least go through the pat-down, 

if not the screening? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. Unless there is an alarm in the walk-through 

metal detector or they opt out of the advanced imaging technology, 

they in all likelihood would never receive a pat-down. The patdown is only for a very small percentage of people. 

Senator ENSIGN. No. Maybe I am not particularly clear in my 

question. 

Mr. PISTOLE. OK. 

Senator ENSIGN. What if somebody is getting a random screening. I just got randomly screened at the airport. For whatever reason, my number seems to come up quite often. But if that happens 

and the option is either the imaging or the pat-down, and I do not 

want either of them because of religious reasons, what happens to 

me? 

Mr. PISTOLE. While we respect that person’s beliefs, that person 

is not going to get on an airplane. 

Senator ENSIGN. And there will be no exceptions—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. 

Senator ENSIGN [continuing]. Just because of religion. That was 

the answer that I was looking for. 

I want to go back a little bit to cargo, and I know this was addressed just a little earlier. When it comes to when you have cargo 

planes then going to passenger planes, that seems to me the biggest potential concern because it is not as big of a target to take 

down a FedEx plane or a UPS plane as it would be a passenger 

plane. I think, in all reality, we all recognize that, and from what 

I understand, you are working on all cargo being eventually 

screened. Since we screen going out but we are not screening all 

cargo coming in, when will we get to that point? 

What is the schedule? 

Mr. PISTOLE. There are two aspects, Senator. One is all cargo 

going on passenger planes, and there are various estimates between two-thirds and 80 percent that is coming internationally into 

the United States that is screened. I do not have a way of validating that or verifying that, so that is really self-reporting from 

airlines and cargo companies. 

The all-cargo is largely unregulated. Now, what we have done 

since the most recent events in Yemen with the printer cartridges 

is issue rules that limit cargo with a final destination in the United 

States as to what that may be, so we differentiate between known 

shippers and high-risk shippers, those individuals and things coming from certain areas and things like that. So those are the two 

areas. 

In terms of the time frame, we are—— 

Senator ENSIGN. I know you are going as fast as you can. 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is the bottom line, and it really comes down 

to building capacity in certain parts of the world that currently do 

not have that 100 percent capacity like we have here. 

25 

Senator ENSIGN. I see. And I understand that you are dealing 

with some of the most difficult issues on security that you could 

possibly have because the terrorists are always looking for ways 

to—as soon as we come up with one security system, they come up 

with another. Could you address the use of dogs and the bombsniffing capabilities? Dogs have very sensitive noses, but at the 

same time, there are ways to get around those, depending on how 

you wrap the packages and various things like that. Just kind of 

explain a little bit, without letting terrorists know exactly what we 

are doing—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator ENSIGN [continuing]. About the role that canines versus 

other types of detection techniques are being used. 

Mr. PISTOLE. The bomb-sniffing dogs, the canines, do play an important role in the overall screening here in the United States. It 

is uneven around the world, of course. We are the leaders here. 

There are really two types. One can detect the actual explosives in 

this box. Then there is vapor wake. If somebody has been carrying 

a bomb like the July 7 bombers in 2005 in London, in their 

backpacks before they got on the London Tube, dogs trained in 

vapor wake would actually be able to pick up that scent after they 

have walked by, as long as the air has not been too disturbed and 

things like that. Those are the two main approaches. 

The challenge is to have enough dogs in enough locations worldwide to make a meaningful difference, especially in those high-risk 

areas. We need not only a trained dog, but a trained handler. It 

is a terrific technology enhancer for us. It is really the question of 

scalability. 

Senator ENSIGN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Ensign. 

Last week, I was in Afghanistan to visit our troops, and I saw 

a remarkable demonstration of a bomb-sniffing dog there. These 

dogs are really extraordinary and saving lives every day. 

Senator ENSIGN. Well, it is only because of the outstanding veterinary care that they get from my profession. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without question. [Laughter.] 

I had no idea I was being set up to set you up. [Laughter.] 

Gentlemen, I have a few more questions, if I might. Going on the 

basis of public reports at this public hearing, it appears that the 

two bombs shipped from Yemen last month were screened and 

cleared perhaps more than once. And I wanted to ask you, as a result, is TSA or CBP, but I will focus on TSA, reviewing and reevaluating what types of screening it uses or certifies in light of 

that tough reality? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Mr. Chairman, you have hit on a key point in terms 

of the specific screening that was done in those two instances in 

Dubai and the United Kingdom and then how that informs our actions and our judgments. We have reviewed the forensics and the 

screening that has been described to us, so we are doing that. And 

as you note, because of the sensitivities of that, I would defer to 

a closed hearing in terms of discussing those details. But yes, we 

are informed by and taking actions that are consistent with what 

we found. 

26 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. This is consistent with what 

Senator Brown asked before. In this coming budgetary round, if 

you feel you need more funding support for research and development or grant programs to develop better technology for screening, 

please do not hesitate to ask us. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And in response to what 

Senator Collins mentioned earlier in terms of the automated target 

recognition, if I could just use that—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, please do. 

Mr. PISTOLE. We are aggressively testing that currently here at 

our Transportation Security Integration Facility at Reagan National Airport, just south of the airport. We are cautiously optimistic as far as that being the next generation of advanced imaging 

technology, and the nice thing is that it is basically a software 

modification to our existing hardware. The issue is the high rate 

of false-positives that we have seen. So we are trying to work 

through that, and I am not ready to request funding for that until 

we ensure that those false-positives are lowered and it is an effective tool because if there are high false-positives, the result is patdowns. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So we are trying to get away from that construct 

to say, yes, this is the best technology. It clearly addresses the privacy issue. It actually creates efficiencies for us. We do not need 

a separate screener in a separate room for privacy issues. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So, yes, thank you. We are exploring that. 

I would say the biggest issue is on security inspectors worldwide, 

and that is where we are working with, obviously, the Department 

of Homeland Security, the Office of Management and Budget, and 

the Administration, to move forward in that area. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Which means to try to convince and influence other countries to do a better job at screening cargo coming 

into the United States. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Exactly. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So I just want to get on record, and I 

think it probably is clear, that this next generation of imaging systems, in the original imaging portion of its process, is more protective of privacy. 

Mr. PISTOLE. It is basically a stick figure. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE. It is either a stick figure or a blob, so yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But if an alarm goes off there—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN [continuing]. It still requires a pat-down. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, although specific. So with the Automated Target Recognition, it will show a box, for example, in the area of the 

body where there is an anomaly. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE. And so it can be targeted for that area. So it may 

be someplace else. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So it may limit the area of the pat-down. 

Mr. PISTOLE. It might. 

27 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But, as you said, your concern now is that 

there may be a higher rate of false-positives so that in the end, 

there would actually be more pat-downs. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I hope you will keep us posted on that. 

I know that on November 8, the TSA issued the Security Directives and Emergency Amendments, and they were designed to reduce the risk to the aviation network by limiting the ability to 

transport ink or toner and also preventing all shipments from 

Yemen and Somalia for at least the next month. And I know that 

one way—trying to balance what we talked about before about the 

time by which you get the manifests to balance the interest in security against the interruption of commerce is, of course, to have 

higher standards, as we do in the movement of cargo coming from 

certain countries. 

But the question obviously arises, and we have watched this with 

people, too, what do we do if the terrorists understand that and 

then start to move their cargo through interim points in Europe or 

Asia? Mr. Bersin, that is for you. 

Mr. BERSIN. Yes. I think in terms of the risk management there, 

you pointed out that, unlike the passenger context, packages do not 

carry those characteristics except insofar as we get advance information. What we need to do is actually get more specific information earlier so that our targeting rules can adapt. But you are exactly right. The high-risk packages could as easily come from Europe as they could from the Persian Gulf, as they did in this particular case. We need to adjust the targeting rules to be able to 

pick up high-risk cargo from wherever it comes toward the homeland. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And are we intending to do that? 

Mr. BERSIN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. And, of course, that, too, puts an emphasis on good intelligence. There is obviously nothing better than 

having the kind of information that we had in this case to target 

and move those packages out. 

Is there anything being done on that? I will go back to a question 

I asked at the beginning of the hearing. I know we have worked 

very hard in the post-September 11, 2001, reform of our intelligence apparatus, and we are doing much better than we have before, both in gathering information and in sharing it. Is there anything from the perspective of your two agencies that you have 

asked of the intelligence community—obviously, be more general 

than specific here—that relates to cargo, for instance, information 

related to cargo? Is there something different about intelligence 

gathering that you are looking for? 

Mr. BERSIN. Without being specific, Senator, the answer is yes 

with regard to informing the targeting rules that we use out of the 

National Targeting Center. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me ask this. If I understand this intricate world, CBP actually gets more information generally about 

inbound air cargo than TSA does. 

Mr. BERSIN. Under the 2002 Act and the regulations CBP has 

imposed on the 4-hour requirement—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

28 

Mr. BERSIN [continuing]. The information comes to the Targeting 

Center. But I think it is fair to say, and it is one of the great developments, that, in fact, we have been fairly seamless and will become even more seamless in terms of that information being able 

to inform TSA activities. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, that was my question. Are you cooperating and sharing information between CBP and TSA. 

Mr. BERSIN. Absolutely, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You are getting what you need? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely right. Great relationship. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. A final question, just broader. It 

goes back to something else I asked at the beginning, which is how 

do we—this is the imagination, the evil imagination. Institutionally, is there somewhere now within your two agencies, within 

DHS or the intelligence community, and if not, should there be, 

where we are trying to think like the terrorists? 

Obviously, this is very difficult in an open society like ours, in 

a globally connected world both in terms of ease of movement of 

people and cargo, but still, the record is as I stated. We do seem 

to respond to the last attack, understandably. Of course, I am 

grateful that we do. But is there some way we can gear the system 

so that we get ahead of what they are going to try to do to us next? 

Mr. BERSIN. Just the nature of the targeting enterprise requires 

that you attempt to do that. It typically is better informed when 

there is intelligence. But, in thinking about the risks and the gaps 

that exist now, something we have not talked about at great length 

here but that we need to explore downstream, would be international mail, for example. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. BERSIN. It is not subject to much of the kinds of safeguards 

and risk management techniques that we have. So to that extent, 

yes, we try to keep ahead, recognizing the difficulty of that challenge. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Are there people in CBP or TSA who are 

charged specifically with doing that? 

Mr. BERSIN. As I say, in the targeting exercise—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In the targeting area, OK. 

Mr. BERSIN [continuing]. We have people doing that all the time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Pistole. 

Mr. PISTOLE. And I would simply add, Mr. Chairman, that there 

are people within the TSA Office of Intelligence and our explosives 

group, and I would share a paper with you in a closed setting, who 

are basically red celling the whole issue of what is the next target, 

and this is done by our explosive experts informed by intelligence 

and working within the entire community. So the National 

Counterterrorism Center, the Office, the Bureau, the Agency, and 

the National Security Agency, everybody is saying, what is the next 

possibility and then what do we do with that to inform the judgments and actions of our folks. I think you would find that paper 

interesting. It is just several pages. It says, what if and how can 

they do that, given what we know, how they are using pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), how they used acetone peroxide (TATP) 

on December 25, lead azide most recently, so all those things, taking that, what is the next type of device we are looking for? 

29 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very reassuring to me, and I hope 

it is reassuring to anybody who is hearing it. That is exactly the 

kind of thing I was hoping to hear, that we are doing the kind of, 

the military says red teaming, appropriately, you are saying red 

celling, but it is the same basic idea. 

I thank both of you for your testimony. I thank you for what you 

are doing. Well, first, I would ask you to respond as soon as you 

can to the few questions that we asked for more information. Perhaps when we come back after Thanksgiving—we do not know exactly how long we will be here—it would be helpful to do a closed 

meeting with the two of you. 

Do either of you want to say anything before we adjourn the 

hearing? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I would just like to take the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to appeal to the American people traveling next week for 

Thanksgiving, with all the people going home to see family and 

friends, to really look at this as a partnership—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE [continuing]. Between you and the U.S. Government, particularly TSA. Those security officers are there to work 

with you to ensure that everybody on that flight has been properly 

screened. Everybody wants that assurance. So just try to be patient 

and work with our folks. They are there to protect you and your 

loved ones, and let us make it a partnership. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well said. Thank you for saying that. 

We will keep the record of the hearing open for 15 days for additional questions and answers and statements. 

Without anything else to say, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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