DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Contents/Abbreviations 

Office of Inspector General 

Homeland Security Information Network 

Could Support Information Sharing 

More Effectively

Homeland Security Information Network Could 

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Office of Information Technology 

OIG-06-38 June 2006
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

 

Homeland 

Security

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the department. 

This report assesses how well the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) supports 

information sharing across federal, state, and local entities to prevent and deter terrorist activities; 

and, prepare for and respond to emergencies and natural or man-made disasters. It is based on 

interviews with employees and officials of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the Office of 

Operations Coordination, as well as other relevant agencies and organizations, direct observations, 

and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this 

report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Contents/Abbreviations 

Homeland Security Information Network Could 

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 Executive Summary....................................................................................................................... 3 

 Background.................................................................................................................................... 4 

 Results of Audit .............................................................................................................................. 9 

 HSIN Planning and Development Efforts Have Had Limited Effectiveness ....................... 9 

 

 HSIN Needs To Support Information Sharing More Effectively ........................................ 20 

 Other Major Challenges....................................................................................................... 30 

 Recommendations........................................................................................................................ 34 

 

 Management Comments and OIG Evaluation ............................................................................. 35 

Appendices 

 Appendix A: Scope and Methodology..................................................................................... 37 

Appendix B: Management Response to Draft Report ...............................................................39 

 Appendix C: Major Contributors to this Report ...................................................................... 43 

 Appendix D: Report Distribution...............................................................................................44 

Abbreviations 

 DHS Department of Homeland Security 

 DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

 GAO Government Accountability Office 

 HSIN Homeland Security Information Network 

 HSOC Homeland Security Operations Center 

 IT Information Technology 

 JRIES Joint Regional Information Exchange System 

 LEO Law Enforcement Online 

 OIG Office of Inspector General 

 RISSNET Regional Information Sharing System Network 
Contents/Abbreviations 

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Figures 

Figure 1 HSIN Structure.........................................................................................................5 

Figure 2 JRIES/HSIN Timeline .............................................................................................7 

Figure 3 Federal Situational Awareness Information and Intelligence Sharing Systems ....11 

Figure 4 The Intelligence Sharing Model as Applied to HSIN............................................17 

Figure 5 Documents Posted to HSIN-Secret........................................................................25 

Figure 6 HSIN Logons .........................................................................................................27 

Figure 7 HSIN Postings........................................................................................................28 

Figure 8 Comparison of Total Postings by Selected User Groups in January 2006 ............29 

Figure 9 HSIN Challenges ...................................................................................................30 
 

 

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Executive Summary 

State and local personnel have opportunities and capabilities not possessed by 

federal agencies to gather information on suspicious activities and terrorist 

threats. By working together, the various levels of government can maximize 

the benefits of information gathering and analysis to prevent and respond to 

terrorist attacks. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned responsibility 

to DHS to coordinate the federal government’s communications relating to 

homeland security with state and local government authorities, the private 

sector, and the public. As part of this responsibility, the Act assigned the 

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate within DHS, in 

conjunction with its chief information officer, responsibility to establish a 

secure communications and information technology (IT) infrastructure that 

allows federal, state, and local governments, and other specified groups to 

access, receive, and analyze data, and to disseminate information acquired by 

DHS as appropriate.1

 To meet this mandate, DHS is implementing the 

Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). 

As part of our ongoing responsibility to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, 

and economy of departmental programs and operations, we conducted a 

review of HSIN. The objectives of this review were to (1) identify DHS’ 

plans and activities for sharing information with state and local governments; 

(2) determine how well HSIN supports these plans and activities; and, (3) 

identify challenges to information sharing among federal, state, and local 

government agencies. The scope and methodology of this review are 

discussed in Appendix A. 

 

Due to time pressures, DHS did not complete a number of the steps essential 

to effective system planning and implementation, hindering the success of the 

HSIN system. Specifically, DHS did not clearly define HSIN’s relationship to 

existing collaboration systems and also did not obtain and address 

requirements from all HSIN user communities in developing the system. In 

addition, DHS did not adequately evaluate each of its three major HSIN 

releases prior to their implementation. Further, the department has not 

provided adequate user guidance, including clear information sharing 

processes, training, and reference materials. Without establishing a baseline 

and developing specific performance measures, DHS has no effective way to 

track or assess information sharing using HSIN. 

1

 The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate no longer exists under the current DHS organization. 

Under the new DHS structure created as a result of the Secretary’s 2005 Second Stage Review, former functions of the 

directorate were divided among the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Preparedness, and Operations Coordination. 
 

 

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As a result of these system planning and implementation issues, HSIN is not 

effectively supporting state and local information sharing. Although users 

generally like the web portal technology because of its user-friendliness and 

flexibility, those we interviewed said they are not committed to the system 

approach. Users are confused and frustrated, without clear guidance on 

HSIN’s role or how to use the system to share information effectively. 

Because some lack trust in the system’s ability to safeguard sensitive 

information, and because the system does not provide them with useful 

situational awareness and classified information, users do not regularly use 

HSIN. Instead, users resort to pre-existing means such as related systems and 

telephone calls to share information, which only perpetuates the ad hoc, stovepiped information-sharing environment that HSIN was intended to correct. 

Resources, legislative constraints, privacy, and cultural challenges–often 

beyond the control of HSIN program management–also pose obstacles to 

HSIN’s success. 

To ensure effectiveness of the HSIN system and information sharing 

approach, we are recommending that the Director, Office of Operations 

Coordination, Department of Homeland Security: 

1. Clarify and communicate HSIN’s mission and vision to users, its relation 

to other systems, and its integration with related federal systems. 

2. Define the intelligence data flow model for HSIN and provide clear 

guidance to system users on what information is needed, what DHS does 

with the information, and what information DHS will provide. 

3. Provide detailed, stakeholder-specific standard operating procedures, user 

manuals, and training based on the business processes needed to support 

homeland security information sharing. 

4. Ensure crosscutting representation and participation among the various 

stakeholder communities to determine business and system requirements, 

and encourage community of interest advisory board and working group 

participation. 

5. Identify baseline and performance metrics for HSIN, and begin to measure 

effectiveness of information sharing using the performance data compiled. 

Background 

HSIN is a secure, unclassified, web-based communications system that serves 

as DHS’ primary nation-wide information sharing and collaboration network. 

HSIN offers real-time chat and instant messaging capability, as well as a 

document library that contains reports from multiple federal, state, and local 

sources. HSIN supplies suspicious incident and pre-incident information, 

mapping and imagery tools, 24x7 situational awareness, and analysis of 
 

 

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terrorist threats, tactics, and weapons, too. The network provides connectivity 

between DHS’ Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), critical private 

industry and federal, state, and local organizations responsible for or involved 

in combating terrorism, responding to critical incidents, and managing special 

events. The HSOC, which provides oversight responsibility for HSIN, is the 

primary national-level center for real-time threat monitoring, domestic 

incident management, and information sharing. 

Across the various levels of government, a number of communities share 

information through HSIN, including law enforcement, emergency 

management, fire departments, homeland security, counter-terrorism, and the 

National Guard. As shown in Figure 1, HSIN is comprised of a group of 

portals organized along the lines of the various community groups. Users 

within the communities access HSIN directly through the internet; there are 

no special software requirements. All users have access to the counterterrorism portal. However, access to the remaining portals is limited to the 

members of each corresponding community, with access provided to 

nonmembers on an as needed basis. 

Law 

Enforcement

Critical 

Sectors

International

Secret

Level

Critical

Infrastructure

Law 

Enforcement 

Analysis

Counter

Terrorism

Emergency 

Management

Intelligence

(DHS’ Internal

Network)

HSIN Structure

Critical 

Infrastructure 

Warning 

Network

Law 

Enforcement

Critical 

Sectors

International

Secret

Level

Critical

Infrastructure

Law 

Enforcement 

Analysis

Counter

Terrorism

Emergency 

Management

Intelligence

(DHS’ Internal

Network)

HSIN Structure

Critical 

Infrastructure 

Warning 

Network

Figure 1: HSIN Structure 

The current HSIN portals include: 
 

 

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• HSIN Counter-Terrorism – the common portal for all federal, state, 

and local government agencies to share information relating to 

counterterrorism and incident management. 

• Law Enforcement Analysis – the portal for all major law enforcement 

intelligence centers. 

• HSIN Law Enforcement – the portal for all departments that manage 

law enforcement sensitive data. 

• HSIN Critical Sectors – the portal designed to enhance the protection, 

preparedness, and crisis communication and coordination capabilities 

of the nation’s 17 critical infrastructures. 

• HSIN International – the portal for information sharing and 

collaboration with foreign components during major crises. 

• HSIN-Secret – the portal used to support classified information 

sharing among all state emergency operation centers and selected 

police departments. 

• HSIN Critical Infrastructure Warning Network – a government 

network within HSIN that provides mission-critical, survivable 

connectivity and communications. 

• HSIN Critical Infrastructure – a regionally coordinated portal used by 

the private and public sectors for local, regional, and national 

information sharing and all hazards alerts and warnings. 

• HSIN Intelligence – an internal DHS intelligence and analysis 

network. 

• HSIN Emergency Management – the portal that provides connectivity 

among federal, state, territorial, and local government emergency 

managers during major incidents. 

HSIN was created as an extension of a pre-existing system, the Joint Regional 

Information Exchange System (JRIES). Figure 2 provides a timeline, key 

milestones, and system ownership for JRIES and HSIN from inception until 

the present. 
 

 

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DHS Expands 

JRIES and 

Renames as 

HSIN

JRIES/HSIN Timeline

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

JRIES

DIA

JRIES

DHS

HSIN

DHS

HSIN State and Local Pilot

DHS

JRIES Pilot

JRIES 

Transferred 

to DHS

DHS Moves HSIN to Portal 

Technology and Starts 

State HSIN Pilots

Key 

Milestones:

System 

and 

Owner:

DHS Expands 

JRIES and 

Renames as 

HSIN

JRIES/HSIN Timeline

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

JRIES

DIA

JRIES

DHS

HSIN

DHS

HSIN State and Local Pilot

DHS

JRIES Pilot

JRIES 

Transferred 

to DHS

DHS Moves HSIN to Portal 

Technology and Starts 

State HSIN Pilots

Key 

Milestones:

System 

and 

Owner:

Figure 2: JRIES/HSIN Timeline 

JRIES began in December 2002 as a grassroots pilot system to connect the 

California Anti-Terrorism Information Center, the New York Police 

Department, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These groups 

designed JRIES, which was first deployed in February 2003, to facilitate the 

exchange of suspicious activity reports, register events potentially related to 

terrorist activity, and foster real-time intelligence and law enforcement 

collaboration in a secure environment across federal, state, and local 

jurisdictions. JRIES used “Groove” software to enable multiple groups to 

share the information securely.2 A JRIES executive board, comprised of 

representatives from the participating groups, provided guidance and structure 

to help manage the system. JRIES proved useful during the northeast 

blackout in 2003 when information posted on the system allowed users across 

the country to quickly learn that the event was not related to terrorism. The 

system provided a very simple and efficient way for the law enforcement 

community to obtain situational awareness concurrently, without the need for 

hundreds of phone calls. 

Although DIA originally operated and maintained JRIES, DIA transferred 

program management of the system to DHS in September 2003, due to 

funding constraints. DIA was concerned that managing JRIES to support 

domestic intelligence activities conflicted with its military intelligence role. 

As of February 2004, approximately 100 organizations–with more than 1,000 

 

2

 Groove Virtual Office is a Microsoft application that has five main capabilities: synchronization, offline use, firewall 

traversal, always-on encryption, and bandwidth optimization(Groove2,5). The application also tracks contacts, alerts 

users to new activities, and provides a series of personal communications mechanisms(Groove2,5). 
 

 

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law enforcement and intelligence analysts from federal, state, and local 

government agencies–were using JRIES. 

After acquiring JRIES, DHS recognized that the system’s utility could be 

expanded beyond its existing counter-terrorism intelligence and threat 

awareness mission because JRIES met DHS’ requirements for senior 

executive communications, crisis planning and management, and coordination 

and communications with first responder, emergency management, and 

military organizations. As such, in February 2004, DHS announced the 

expansion of JRIES as its primary communication, collaboration, situational 

awareness, and information-sharing system. The DHS Secretary renamed 

JRIES as HSIN in order to reflect the system’s broader scope. By December 

2004, DHS had deployed HSIN to all 50 states, 53 major urban areas, five 

U.S. territories, the District of Columbia, and several international partners. 

DHS extended HSIN access beyond the law enforcement community to 

include state homeland security advisors, governors’ offices, emergency 

managers, first responders, the National Guard, and an international 

component. DHS equipped each location with two laptops installed with the 

Groove software. 

In March 2005, because of the lack of scalability to accommodate a large 

increase in users, DHS decided to move HSIN away from the Groove 

software and to develop a series of web-based portals as replacements. 

Nonetheless, DHS continues to operate both the Groove software and a portal 

to support the law enforcement community. 

DHS has expanded the role of HSIN through a state and local initiative. The 

goals of this initiative are to identify and address requirements of state and 

local communities of interest, as well as to provide robust training to promote 

effective use of the network. As of January 2006, eight states had deployed 

HSIN throughout their respective departments and agencies. Declaring HSIN 

the primary system for operational information sharing and collaboration, the 

DHS Secretary asked that the department’s senior managers as well as 

headquarters and field personnel support the ongoing growth and utilization of 

HSIN. 

Prior to DHS’ implementation and expansion of HSIN, reports by various 

nonprofit, industry, audit, and congressional organizations documented 

problems with homeland security information sharing and the need for a 

single, effective collaboration system. Specifically, in August 2003, the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported the results of its survey, 

which showed that federal, state, and city government officials did not 

routinely share information on terrorist threats, methods, or techniques. GAO 

stated that the information that was shared was not perceived as timely, 
 

 

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accurate, or relevant.3 Further, in two key reports, the Markle Foundation 

stressed the importance of creating a decentralized network of information 

sharing and analysis to address the challenge of homeland security.4 

Subsequent to HSIN’s implementation, other reports revealed problems with 

the system. For example, in a September 2004 report, GAO identified 34 

networks that supported homeland security functions–six of the 34 were used 

to share information with state and local governments, while four shared 

information with the private sector.5 Further, citing significant problems with 

HSIN development and deployment, the U.S. House Committee on Homeland 

Security Democratic Staff reported in 2006 that DHS had failed in its promise 

to create a single, effective network for sharing intelligence with state and 

local officials.6 The staff reported that police agencies were not sharing 

sensitive information and that there was a lack of JRIES executive board 

cooperation with the HSIN program. 

Results of Audit 

HSIN Planning and Development Efforts 

Have Had Limited Effectiveness 

Due to time constraints, DHS did not follow a number of the steps essential to 

effective HSIN system planning and development. Specifically, DHS did not 

clearly define and communicate HSIN’s role, particularly in relation to other 

systems in use for similar purposes. Further, DHS efforts to obtain input and 

address requirements from all HSIN user communities were inadequate. Also, 

the department did not develop clear and complete information sharing 

policies and procedures or provide system users with sufficient training and 

reference materials. Further, DHS has yet to develop metrics for assessing 

HSIN performance in supporting information sharing. Although DHS has 

taken actions to address some of these issues, more remains to be done. 

3 Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be Strengthened (GAO-03-760, August 2003). 4 Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age, A Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, October 7, 

2002. 

Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security, The Second Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, 

December 2, 2003. 

5 Major Federal Networks that Support Homeland Security Functions (GAO-04-375, September 2004). 6 Leaving the Nation at Risk: 33 Unfulfilled Promises From the Department of Homeland Security, An Investigative 

Report by the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Staff, 2006. 
 

 

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Accelerated Deployment

Given concerns about ensuring connectivity and communications across the 

various levels of government in a heightened counter-terrorism environment, 

the HSIN system was implemented according to an accelerated schedule. As 

previously stated, DIA quickly built the original JRIES system after the 

attacks of September 11, 2001, to support information sharing between 

federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies. After 

assuming ownership of the system in 2003, however, DHS quickly expanded 

the system to provide access to users beyond this limited group. The HSIN 

strategy was to implement a tool for nation-wide connectivity right away in 

case of major emergencies or terrorist incidents and address operational 

problems and details later. 

In 2004, as DHS was implementing HSIN, pressure to complete the system 

persisted. For example, White House officials issued warnings that terrorists 

were threatening to disrupt the 2004 presidential elections. Correspondingly, 

due to intelligence about possible bomb attacks on specific financial 

institutions, DHS raised the threat level to code orange for parts of the 

banking sector. Such pressures created an environment that was not 

conducive to thorough system planning and implementation; DHS began 

expansion of the system in February 2004, and by December of that same year 

had established connectivity to all 50 states, major cities, and five U.S. 

territories. The rush to implement the system resulted in inadequate definition 

of HSIN’s role with respect to other systems, insufficient identification of user 

requirements, ad-hoc system rollouts, a lack of user guidance, and inadequate 

performance measures. 

Some members of the law enforcement intelligence community raised 

concerns early on that DHS was expanding HSIN access and capability too 

quickly. Specifically, in an April 2004 issue paper, the JRIES executive board 

stated that DHS was proceeding at a rapid rate in implementing the system 

without providing user training on standard operating procedures, laws, 

regulations, and governance policies related to information sharing and HSIN. 

The board contended that this rapid deployment increased the risk of system 

misuse, security breaches, privacy violations, and user confusion as well as 

dissatisfaction. The board pointed out that DHS’ newness as a department 

and its lack of established relationships also hampered its ability to quickly 

gain the trust and commitment of states and major cities to the HSIN 

approach. The board ultimately stopped participating in the HSIN program 

for such reasons. 
 

 

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Relationship to Existing Information Sharing Systems Not Clearly Defined

According to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS is responsible for 

establishing an IT infrastructure, i.e., system, for sharing homeland security 

information with its federal, state, local, and private partners. According to 

the Act, such DHS efforts are to avoid duplication and consider existing 

systems. According to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130, 

establishing a roadmap that outlines the goals, objectives, and strategies of a 

system, as well as how the system will fit within the context of the 

overarching IT environment, is a key means of avoiding duplication. 

DHS intended HSIN to be the primary tool to help unify the counter-terrorist 

effort. However, prior to HSIN development, DHS did not assess the current 

IT environment or the relationship of HSIN to other existing federal systems 

that served similar missions. Without doing so, DHS could not make 

comparisons to identify potential areas of duplication or opportunities for 

sharing information between HSIN and the other existing systems. In Figure 

3, we identify a number of systems that other federal, state, and local officials 

use to share situational awareness and intelligence information. Several of 

these systems have functions and capabilities comparable to those of HSIN. 

Situational Awareness

Information and Intelligence Sharing

HSIN-E

M

HSIN-C

T

HSIN-L

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HS NI -S

HS NI -L

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State and Local View of Federal Systems

DOJ DOD

Situational Awareness

Information and Intelligence Sharing

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State and Local View of Federal Systems

DOJ DOD

Figure 3: Federal Situational Awareness Information and Intelligence Sharing Systems 

The Department of Justice, for example, has operated the Regional 

Information Sharing Systems (RISS) program for approximately 25 years to 

facilitate the exchange of critical information across federal, state, and local 

law enforcement agencies. Law Enforcement Online (LEO) is another 
 

 

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internet-based system that, like HSIN, law enforcement agencies use for 

information sharing. In its original HSIN press release in February 2004, 

DHS stated that RISSNET and LEO together address a much wider spectrum 

of criminal activity than does HSIN. As these systems expanded to include 

counter-terrorism and HSIN shifted to an all-crimes approach, the distinctions 

among the systems have diminished. 

In addition to not conducting an assessment of HSIN’s relationship to other 

existing systems, prior to HSIN expansion, DHS did not identify, document, 

or communicate to user communities how the system would support 

information sharing among federal, state, and local users. Specifically, DHS 

did not define the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders, what 

information would be shared through HSIN, and how the information would 

be processed, analyzed, and further disseminated. 

It was not until almost two years after HSIN expansion began that DHS made 

efforts to clarify its systems relationships and its mission role. In August 

2005, DHS assessed the Federal Protective Services Secure Portal System, a 

DHS system which supports secure communications and collaboration. This 

system, used across the law enforcement community, manages information to 

help ensure the safety and security of federal buildings, protection officers, 

and visitors. Although HSIN’s mission is broader, DHS’ internal analysis 

revealed that it significantly overlaps the mission of the Federal Protective 

Services Secure Portal System in supporting the law enforcement community. 

The analysis concluded that the two systems should be migrated to a common 

service portal. 

It was not until August 2005 that DHS drafted a concept of operations for 

HSIN. However, the concept of operations document does not identify or 

classify the major categories of HSIN users. The document does not provide 

details on the variations in work processes corresponding to the different user 

communities or how they might apply the system to carry out their different 

responsibilities. Further, DHS posted the concept of operations to the HSIN 

portals without notifying system users. Therefore, infrequent HSIN users 

were unaware of the document’s existence. Senior DHS officials stated that 

when they surveyed users they discovered few had read the document. 

DHS has taken steps to improve understanding of HSIN. For example, a 

Frequently Asked Questions document, created in early fiscal year 2006, helps 

clarify the HSIN vision. The document describes HSIN, incentives to using 

the system, how it compares to other systems, and how it regulates as well as 

safeguards information. Further, DHS has made progress in establishing 

interoperability between HSIN and similar federal systems. For example, it 

has begun to allow products to be posted and shared between HSIN and 
 

 

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RISSNET and LEO, and is working with Department of Justice 

representatives to achieve complete interoperability in 2006. DHS has begun 

to coordinate with other intelligence and emergency management officials on 

ways to achieve interoperability, too. 

Ad Hoc System Development and Deployment 

As a result of its accelerated schedule, DHS did not complete a 

comprehensive collection or analysis of user requirements prior to HSIN 

implementation. Consequently, successive rollouts of the HSIN versions were 

not well planned or adequately evaluated prior to each release. 

Identification of User Requirements

Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11 directs agencies to reduce 

project risk by involving stakeholders in the design of IT assets.7

 Involving 

users in requirements helps ensure a better understanding of system users, 

their technological environments, and the types of content they desire. Where 

users are not involved in system development, there is no way to ensure that 

the system will provide for their needed functions. 

Despite these guidelines, DHS did not sufficiently involve users in the initial 

design of HSIN. According to a DHS official, the department did not 

complete an analysis to understand who would potentially benefit from the 

system. Instead, DHS expanded the system to additional homeland security, 

emergency management, and other user groups without clearly understanding 

their needs. In so doing, DHS also did not understand how allowing one 

group of users access to the system could adversely affect other participants. 

In general, DHS did not sufficiently gather requirements from the various 

system user groups. Instead, DHS developed HSIN using the same 

requirements obtained for JRIES, its predecessor. The JRIES requirements 

did not address the needs of the broader HSIN user base, but were the limited 

input of a functional working group of 25 law enforcement officials. 

Requirements for subsequent HSIN releases were also not well defined. DHS 

relied solely upon requirements obtained from the law enforcement 

community when it moved the system from the Groove software to a series of 

portals in March 2005. DHS designed all of the portals to be identical in 

terms of applications and services, and assumed that they later could be 

tailored to meet specific community needs. Other communities, comprised of 

various officials such as firefighters, the National Guard, state homeland 

 

7

 Circular A-11, Part 7, Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition, and Management of Capital Assets, Executive Office of the 

President, Office of Management and Budget, June 2005. 
 

 

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security advisors, and emergency managers, carry out significantly different 

functions and require different system functionality, information, and 

reporting capabilities than those considered. 

As such, the emergency management portal did not share information with 

existing state emergency management systems. In addition, the emergency 

management portal was based off of law enforcement requirements such as 

“requests for information” and “for your information” postings, and 

emergency managers stated they do not use these features. HSIN program 

managers had hoped to work with Federal Emergency Management Agency 

officials to make the emergency portal useful, but the agency did not provide 

user requirements; ultimately, it did not want to take ownership of the portal. 

Further, state homeland security advisors said that HSIN postings are too 

detailed and do not provide the strategic level of information they need to 

perform their duties. Instead, state homeland security advisors obtain the 

information they need from other sources. 

Our review of two separate listings of HSIN system requirements and user 

change requests revealed DHS deficiencies in tracking individual user 

community needs as well. We determined that the documentation did not 

group the requirements by the different user communities. Further, according 

to one official, the change requests that DHS provided were derived from a 

limited set of users at the HSOC and not from the broader HSIN user base. 

DHS has begun to reach out to the broader user community to gather 

requirements input. In November 2005, DHS held a working group meeting 

in Jacksonville, Florida, to gather system user input and lessons learned DHS 

plans to hold similar quarterly symposiums with users in the future to discuss 

issues and gather recommendations for improvement. Additionally, in 

January 2006, DHS created the HSIN Advisory Committee to provide 

recommendations on the system requirements of users within the various 

communities of interest. At the request of the DHS chief information officer, 

the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysisreviewed intelligence information 

sharing requirements, independent of technology. DHS officials stated that, 

while not a true system requirements document, the final report from this 

review will contain a combination of system and business requirements to 

support intelligence data flows. 

Numerous Ad-Hoc System Rollouts

Effective system development processes include evaluating systems prior to 

implementation to ensure that they successfully meet user requirements. 

However, according to a DHS comparison of HSIN to a related portal system, 

DHS did not evaluate adequately each of its three major HSIN releases prior 
 

 

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to their implementation.8 Technical problems that went undetected given the 

lack of pre-deployment test and evaluation hindered system performance. 

For example, DHS implemented one release of the system without first 

obtaining the legal approvals necessary for posting information contained in 

the HSIN document library. The library included daily and periodic reports 

from multiple sources such as the Homeland Security Operations Morning 

Brief and the DHS Cyber Report, constituting a critical resource and selling 

point of HSIN. Lacking a pre-deployment review that would have identified 

this issue early on, DHS had to shut down the entire document library for 

three to four months until the needed approvals could be obtained. 

Similarly, DHS did not assess in advance the impact that HSIN expansion to 

an increased number of users would have on system performance. According 

to a DHS official, the additional users logging onto HSIN impacted the 

system’s speed. Because system processing became so slow, new and 

infrequent users stopped using the system. It was at this point that DHS 

switched to the web portal technology after realizing that the Groove software 

was not able to meet the requirements of additional HSIN users. 

DHS’ rollout of HSIN to counties was problematic, too. The county rollout 

was an effort to connect DHS to major city police chiefs, sheriffs, and first 

responders in all 3,086 counties nation-wide. However, DHS did not 

adequately assess the impact that connecting directly to the counties would 

have on other system stakeholders. DHS also had not involved the states in 

this decision to connect to the counties. After beginning the rollout, DHS 

received criticism from state officials who felt that the states had been 

bypassed. At this point, DHS shifted the scope of the HSIN deployment from 

a county-level back to a state-level rollout. 

State and local officials expressed gratitude towards DHS for shifting to the 

state level. Both DHS and state and local officials have since begun working 

on interoperability, information sharing protocols, and registration and vetting 

procedures. In some states, DHS is working to integrate HSIN with state 

systems, while in others it is creating new portals for the states. Further, the 

HSOC has begun to reach out to the other DHS components to encourage 

them to use the system. In January 2006, the DHS Secretary sent a memo to 

all department components affirming HSIN as the primary system for 

information sharing and collaboration within DHS and with its security 

partners. 

8 Comparative Analysis of Homeland Security Information Network and the Federal Protective Service Secure Portal 

System in Consideration of the Department of Homeland Security Enterprise Portal, Department of Homeland Security, 

Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, August 19, 2005. 
 

 

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User Guidance Needs Improvement 

According to federal regulations, agencies should provide users with the 

skills, knowledge, and training needed to manage information resources 

effectively. However, DHS has not provided HSIN users with adequate 

guidance, training, or reference materials on what or how information should 

be shared using HSIN. 

Information Sharing Processes Need To Be Defined

According to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130, agencies 

should simplify or redesign work processes before implementing new 

technology.9 Such efforts, including defining and documenting business 

processes, can demonstrate to users how the system can be used to improve 

their work activities. However, DHS implemented HSIN without defining the 

sharing process for homeland security information. As previously discussed, 

the goal was to establish nation-wide HSIN connectivity first, and then decide 

on the information to be shared. Without a data flow process, DHS is unable 

to provide clear guidance on the information sharing process. As a result, 

users are not sure what information should be shared or in what format. 

As of November 2005–almost two years after assuming responsibility for 

HSIN–DHS still had not modeled the information sharing process. The 

results of a DHS HSIN User Working Group documented this need, 

specifically requesting guidance on the types of information to be shared, the 

processes for sharing, how the information shared is used, and what users can 

expect from DHS in return. In the absence of adequate DHS guidance, states 

such as Virginia, Maryland, and Texas have begun to define information 

sharing processes and procedures on their own, potentially resulting in 

duplication of effort and lack of standardization. 

DHS officials stated that defining the information sharing process is one of 

their foremost challenges and that two efforts are under the way to address 

this issue. First, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis is working to 

map out how federal, state, and local entities share information in both the 

classified and unclassified domains. Second, the DHS Information Sharing 

and Collaboration Office plans to work with the HSOC director, and in 

coordination with federal, state, and local governments and the private sector, 

to develop guidance for sharing information via HSIN. Such guidance will 

include document labeling and handling policies, information sharing 

regulations, and database standards for HSIN, as well as other systems to 

 

9

 Revision of OMB Circular No. A-130, Transmittal 4, Management of Federal Information Resources, November 28, 

2000. 
 

 

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which HSIN may be connected. As of March 2006, DHS was still working to 

develop these materials. 

One model that DHS might reference in defining its own information sharing 

process is the intelligence model included in the National Criminal 

Intelligence Sharing Plan. This plan was developed by the Global Justice 

Information Sharing Initiative Intelligence Working Group in coordination 

with the Department of Justice and in response to information sharing needs 

expressed at the International Association Chiefs of Police Criminal 

Intelligence Sharing Summit.10 Other intelligence models share the same 

basic principles and phases. As such, although this model focuses on sharing 

law enforcement intelligence, we believe that it can be adapted and applied to 

the broader HSIN user communities. The circle in Figure 4 depicts the law 

enforcement intelligence sharing process; we have indicated in the boxes the 

areas DHS needs to address to be in line with this model. 

Did Not 

Clearly 

Define What 

Happens to 

Submitted 

Information

No Performance 

Measures to 

Review Value of 

Information

No Stakeholder 

Analysis of Relevant 

HSIN Customers

Did Not 

Clearly 

Define What 

Information 

to Submit

Planning and 

Direction

Collection

Processing/ 

Collation Analysis

Dissemination

Did Not Clearly 

Define What 

Analysis DHS 

Will Provide

Did Not Clearly 

Define What 

Technology to Use 

to Share Information

Reevaluation

Intelligence 

Sharing 

Process

Did Not 

Clearly 

Define What 

Happens to 

Submitted 

Information

No Performance 

Measures to 

Review Value of 

Information

No Stakeholder 

Analysis of Relevant 

HSIN Customers

Did Not 

Clearly 

Define What 

Information 

to Submit

Planning and 

Direction

Collection

Processing/ 

Collation Analysis

Dissemination

Did Not Clearly 

Define What 

Analysis DHS 

Will Provide

Did Not Clearly 

Define What 

Technology to Use 

to Share Information

Reevaluation

Intelligence 

Sharing 

Process

Figure 4: The Intelligence Sharing Model as Applied to HSIN 

 

10 The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan provides law enforcement agencies with the ability to gather, analyze, 

protect, and share credible and timely information and intelligence to identify, investigate, prevent, deter, and defeat 

criminal and terrorist activities, both domestically and internationally, as well as to protect the security of our homeland 

and preserve the rights and freedoms of all Americans. 
 

 

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 User Training and Support 

According to the Clinger-Cohen Act, agencies are responsible for ensuring 

that IT users receive the training and guidance that they need to do their 

jobs.11 However, DHS did not provide adequate formal training to support 

users in the initial system release. A former HSIN program manager stated 

that providing sufficient user training was perhaps the biggest challenge that 

DHS faced. Further, a DHS official stated that the department implemented 

HSIN without providing sufficient business context as to why and how the 

system should be used to support operations in specific communities, such as 

emergency management, law enforcement, or state homeland security offices. 

In the winter of 2004, DHS followed up with additional training in efforts to 

provide better business context for system use. However, this did not solve 

the problem because DHS switched from the Groove software to portal 

technology right after providing the training. To further complicate matters, 

DHS did not conduct extensive training on HSIN and its new portal 

technology, but instead provided instruction on an ad hoc basis. Generally, 

users in the field expressed the need for more HSIN training, especially how 

to perform intelligence work on the portal. A number of users were not aware 

of critical HSIN features, such as “request for information” tabs, document 

libraries, and chat capability. 

In 2005, DHS made several efforts to improve its HSIN training. For 

example, DHS provided computer-based training, which was accessible 

directly through the HSIN portals, on how to use the system. Additionally, in 

the ongoing state and local HSIN rollout, DHS is offering new classroom 

training on a state-by-state basis. Users in one state provided excellent 

feedback to us on this training. 

In addition to the lack of training, reference materials to support HSIN users 

need to be improved. DHS released user manuals for several HSIN portals in 

2005. The manuals are clear with respect to system capabilities, however they 

do not provide users with scenario-based instruction on how to apply HSIN to 

the business process. For example, one user manual provides instructions on 

how to add a new record to the HSIN database, but does not indicate what 

types of incidents to report and in what format. A quick reference guide, 

which DHS created to assist users of one state portal, similarly lacks guidance 

on HSIN use in the business context. 

 

11 Clinger-Cohen Act (formerly the Information Technology Reform Act of 1996), Public Law 104-106, Division E, 

Section 5125, February 10, 1996. 
 

 

Homeland Security Information Network Could 

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DHS, in an effort to describe what information to report, coordinated with the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation to develop a Terrorism Threat Reporting 

Guide for use by its state and local partners. However, users found the guide 

too detailed and difficult to reference in conducting their day-to-day 

operations. The guide is merely a list of types of suspicious activities and is 

not tailored to meet the needs of specific user communities. Further, even 

though the guide is posted on HSIN, it does not mention the use of HSIN as a 

reporting mechanism, but instead directs officials to report suspicious 

activities via telephone or email. The general feedback that DHS has received 

from the law enforcement community regarding the guide is that it needs to be 

simplified to a laminated card that a police officer can easily reference on the 

street. However, DHS officials have countered that funding and time 

limitations prevent them from creating such additional products. In the 

absence of DHS support, one state has produced a laminated reference card on 

its own. 

Need For Performance Metrics 

According to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 agencies 

must establish performance goals as well as metrics that assess relevant 

outputs, service levels, and outcomes of each program activity.12 Given 

HSIN’s portal technology, DHS should be able to track performance by using 

a number of measures such as system logons and postings. Such measures 

would provide a good indication of both system use and the volume of 

information shared. However, DHS has not developed these performance 

measures. Instead, DHS assesses HSIN performance based on the number of 

active user accounts, which is not a good indicator of the quantity of the 

information shared using the system. Also, DHS measures performance by 

talking to stakeholders informally to gather anecdotal information on HSIN 

use. Such anecdotes may be helpful if systematically gathered and assessed to 

identify system capabilities that could be enhanced. 

DHS officials agree that performance metrics are necessary and have begun to 

pursue ways to address this need. Specifically, in September 2005, a DHS 

Information Sharing and Collaboration office laid out a three-phased approach 

to creating performance metrics for DHS information sharing. The office has 

completed the assessment and planning phase and has begun phase two, 

metric design and pilot. Further, in conjunction with multiple stakeholders, 

the HSOC also is working to determine what needs to be measured as well as 

to establish a performance baseline for HSIN. 

12 The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Public Law 103-62. 
 

 

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HSIN Needs To Support Information Sharing More Effectively 

Largely due to the planning and implementation issues previously discussed, 

users are not fully committed to the HSIN approach. Although users we 

interviewed generally like the technology, they are somewhat confused about 

the HSIN’s role and do not trust the system’s ability to safeguard sensitive 

information. In addition, the system does not provide them with useful 

situational awareness and classified information. As a result, users do not 

regularly use the system but instead resort to pre-existing methods for sharing 

counter-terrorism information. 

HSIN Does Not Fully Meet User Needs 

State and local users we interviewed provided mixed feedback regarding 

HSIN. Although they generally like the web portal technology, they have 

several suggestions on how to improve the system’s technical capabilities to 

meet their needs. Users also do not fully understand HSIN’s role and how the 

information shared on the system is used. Some users in the law enforcement 

community, in particular, told us that they do not trust the system to share 

sensitive intelligence information. Further, situational awareness information 

that could help states and cities determine how to respond to threats when 

major incidents occur is not readily available. The HSIN-Secret portal, meant 

to function as a temporary channel to deliver classified information, does not 

provide valuable content. 

Mixed Feedback on the HSIN Web Portal Technology

State and local users we interviewed generally like the HSIN technology. 

They stated that the web page design is user friendly and find it easy to search 

the document library for topics of interest. They appreciate the web 

technology because, unlike some other systems, it does not require 

cumbersome software installations at a desktop. Similarly, the portal 

technology helps ensure that all users always have access to the latest version 

of the HSIN software. Further, because logging onto HSIN only requires an 

internet connection, users can access the system from any location and from 

any computer at any time. 

HSIN’s flexibility and easy set up has made it particularly useful for 

communications and collaboration during special events. For example, in 

2004, DHS created portals and adapted the system to support the Group of 

Eight Summit in Atlanta, the Academy Awards ceremony in Los Angeles, and 
 

 

Homeland Security Information Network Could 

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the Republican National Convention in New York City.13 More recently, 

HSIN proved to be highly useful in supporting emergency response to the 

Hurricane Katrina disaster in the Gulf States in 2005. When other means of 

communications became unavailable, first responders were able to track over 

22,000 emergency 911 calls via the HSIN-Katrina portal. DHS set up this 

portal within hours of the hurricane, sustaining critical communications and 

ultimately helping locate victims and saving lives. 

 

State and local users nonetheless had several suggestions on how to improve 

HSIN. For example, several users said that the search functionality was not 

reliable or effective in locating documents or information they needed to 

perform their work. Some users could not access “Jabber” for online 

collaborations.14 Others were especially frustrated by the lack of a directory 

of HSIN participants when such functionality had existed on the predecessor 

system. Without an HSIN participant list, users could not determine who had 

access to the system or easily identify officials with whom they needed to 

collaborate in other government agencies. Further, users wanted the HSIN 

logon function to be improved so that they would not have to sign on to each 

portal separately. 

DHS is taking steps to address a number of these HSIN user issues. For 

example, the department is making efforts to better communicate the 

availability of the online “Jabber” collaboration tool. DHS plans to include a 

global directory in the next version of HSIN. DHS also has begun work to 

provide a single sign-on capability for HSIN. 

HSIN’s Role Needs Clarification

In addition to requesting technical improvements, users are confused about 

HSIN’s role with respect to information sharing. For example, they do not 

understand the purpose of HSIN in relation to other systems with similar 

functionality and are not clear about which system to use to support their 

work. We previously identified some of these systems, such as LEO, 

RISSNET, and the Federal Protective Services Secure Portal System. 

Multiple HSIN rollouts without adequate communications served to increase 

user confusion. For example, because DHS did not adequately announce the 

switch from the Groove technology to the portal system, some users were 

unaware of system changes and added features. Some users, for instance, told 

us that they did not know of the existence of the Jabber collaboration tool, 

made available when the HSIN portals were released. Although DHS officials 

 

13 The annual Group of Eight Summit brings together leaders of the world’s richest nations: Canada, France, Germany, 

Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 14 Jabber is a scalable, secure, real-time instant messaging application. 
 

 

Homeland Security Information Network Could 

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stated that they often post information on the portals to communicate system 

changes, users who do not regularly access HSIN do not receive such 

notifications. 

In the absence of clear DHS direction, users are unsure of how to use HSIN. 

Several state officials said that they did not get clear answers when they asked 

what type of information to share on the system. Other officials expressed 

uncertainty about whether DHS wanted raw data or completed analyses posted 

to the portals. Local officials stated that DHS should provide standard criteria 

on how each stakeholder should report information. For example, users stated 

that a template, providing the format and the basic information that they need 

to share, would be useful. 

Users told us that they became frustrated when they received feedback from 

DHS that the information they supplied was not useful. They said that HSIN 

program management had not provided clear guidance on what constituted a 

link to terrorism. In the absence of clear guidance, users therefore posted 

information on crimes that they believed were precursors to terrorist activities. 

However, DHS periodically responded by removing the information from the 

portals or adding “no terrorism nexus” to the postings, without providing clear 

justification for doing so. DHS has since moved to an “all crimes approach” 

to information sharing, meaning that any information posted by state and local 

officials on HSIN will be accepted. However, users said that there also has 

been no documented guidance to advise users of this policy change so that 

they will know what information can be shared. 

Finally, state and local officials told us they do not understand what DHS does 

with the information that they supply and therefore lack incentive to provide 

information via HSIN. One user characterized DHS as a “black hole” into 

which they funnel information, but from which they receive no response. 

Users would like to receive DHS feedback and analysis on information that 

they provide, as well as notice about postings concerning potential threats that 

have been resolved. 

Lack of Trust

Some parts of the law enforcement community do not trust HSIN to share 

their sensitive case information. Although a primary function of HSIN is to 

provide law enforcement with an information-sharing tool, as DHS expanded 

the system to other communities, including state homeland security advisors, 

law enforcement users became concerned that their sensitive information 

would not be adequately safeguarded. Specifically, law enforcement officials 

we interviewed were worried that posting their information to a wide audience 

could result in cases being leaked or compromised, intelligence sources 
 

 

Homeland Security Information Network Could 

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divulged, or personal private data shared with users who do not have a need to 

know. 

This privacy issue was a major point of contention. Law enforcement 

questioned whether HSIN is compliant with Title 28, Code of Federal 

Regulations, Part 23, which provides guidelines for law enforcement agencies 

that operate federally funded, multi-jurisdictional criminal intelligence 

systems. The regulation mandates that law enforcement systems safeguard 

the privacy and constitutional rights of individuals. The regulation defines the 

types of criminal information that can be stored on law enforcement systems, 

and how long the information can be maintained. Law enforcement officials 

were not confident that these requirements were met, given the manner in 

which HSIN was managed. 

This erosion in trust as the system was expanded led to conflicts between the 

JRIES executive board, comprised primarily of law enforcement officials, and 

HSIN program management. In May 2005, concerned with the direction that 

DHS had taken with JRIES/HSIN without soliciting its input, the JRIES 

executive board voted to discontinue its relationship with the HSOC. The 

consensus of the board was that the HSOC had "hi-jacked" the system, 

federalizing what it believed to be a successful, cooperative federal, state, and 

local project. After departing, the JRIES executive board continued to 

promote its initial information-sharing concept as JRIES II, a separate system 

apart from HSIN. The new JRIES II was designed to restore the capability for 

secure intelligence sharing within the trusted law enforcement community. 

The JRIES executive board began by marketing JRIES II to ten key states and 

major municipalities. 

 

HSIN program management has taken steps to resolve this trust issue. 

Specifically, the program management obtained a Department of Justice 

ruling that HSIN is compliant with Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 

23. Also, HSIN program management obtained Department of Justice 

concurrence that state homeland security advisors can access law enforcement 

sensitive information since they serve in homeland security roles that have 

law enforcement responsibilities. Nevertheless, law enforcement officials in 

the field told us that they were reluctant to allow HSIN users from outside 

their community to see their sensitive case information. Law enforcement 

officials said that information sharing among law enforcement personnel is 

based on trust. Once that trust is lost, it takes time to rebuild. 

HSIN is Not Providing the Information Needed

 

State and local users said that HSIN does not provide them with the timely 

and relevant information that they need to support their counter-terrorism 
 

 

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missions. They stated that HSIN does not provide them the situational 

awareness they need to manage or respond to emergency operations or 

terrorist-related events. For example, users stated that during the 2005 

London bombings, they needed timely information such as whether the 

attacks were suicide attacks so that state and local transportation security 

would know what to look for in their own jurisdictions. However, the 

information provided on HSIN was no more useful or timely than information 

available via public news sources. Users were able to get better or quicker 

information by calling personal contacts at law enforcement agencies with 

connections to the London police, than by using the system. State and local 

users understand that at times, DHS may not have additional information to 

post apart from what is already available to the public. However, even though 

DHS might not have additional information, users said they would prefer that 

DHS provide periodic HSIN updates to this effect, rather than provide no 

information at all. 

The lack of good situational awareness can lead states and cities to either 

over-react to reported threats–and potentially waste resources–or 

under-react and leave themselves vulnerable. For example, the United States 

Conference of Mayors published the results of a 145-city survey and stated 

that deploying resources to respond to terrorist alerts can increase costs 

nation-wide by about $70 million per week. Such expenditures are wasted 

when the reported threats turn out to be invalid. During the blackouts in the 

Northeastern United States, cities and states in other parts of the country 

learned right away through JRIES that the power failures were not terroristrelated. Therefore, these other cities and states did not have to unnecessarily 

expend additional funds to increase security. Conversely, where officials 

under-react, their localities may be unprepared and potentially vulnerable to 

incidents that actually do occur. 

HSIN-Secret Does Not Contain Useful Products

State and local officials said that the HSIN-Secret portal does not provide 

valuable content. HSIN-Secret is meant to function as a temporary channel to 

deliver secret-level, classified information to state and local officials until the 

Homeland Secure Data Network is completed. However, users said that very 

few documents are available on the classified web site. Figure 5 indicates the 

number of documents posted to the HSIN-Secret portal since it was created. 

In general, there have been an average of about 27 logons per month, from a 

total of 366 account holders across all 50 states. 
 

 

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0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Docum ents posted

Dec-04

Jan-05

Feb-05

Mar-05

Apr-05

May-05

Jun-05

Jul-05

Aug-05

Sep-05

Oct-05

Nov-05

Dec-05

Jan-06

Months

Documents Posted to HSIN-Secret

Figure 5: Documents Posted to HSIN-Secret 

In addition to the lack of useful content, HSIN-Secret also faces several 

technical challenges. HSIN-Secret connectivity was established in state 

emergency operation centers because they had the infrastructure to support it; 

however, state and local officials believed that state fusion centers are the 

more appropriate locations for HSIN-Secret connection because the state 

individuals that primarily require access to the system often are located at the 

fusion centers rather than the emergency operations centers.15 Further, HSINSecret at several state emergency operation centers does not function at all, 

due to outdated encryption keys that do not allow users to access the system. 

State and Local Officials Do Not Rely on HSIN 

As a result of their frustrations with HSIN, state and local officials do not 

regularly use the system and instead resort to prior systems and methods to 

share counter-terrorism information. Data provided by HSIN program 

management demonstrates that user logons and postings are limited, and that 

users do not rely upon the system as the nation’s primary information sharing 

and collaboration network as DHS intended. 

Users Resort to Prior Ways of Sharing

Because HSIN does not fully meet their needs, state and local officials said 

that they resort to systems and methods they previously used to share 

information. For example, law enforcement users said that they often use 

other existing systems, such as LEO, RISSNET, and the Federal Protective 

 

15 Fusion centers are two or more agencies collaborating to provide resources, expertise, and/or information to maximize 

the ability to detect, prevent, apprehend, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. 
 

 

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Services-Secure Portal System. As previously discussed, some members of 

the JRIES executive board use JRIES II as an alternative to the HSIN portal. 

Private systems, such as the “NC4” managed by the National Center for Crisis 

and Continuity Coordination, provide real-time information to state and local 

subscribers. The system provides warnings, alerts, and situational awareness 

on a fee for service basis. In some instances, agencies such as the U.S. Secret 

Service are creating their own portals for information sharing among a limited 

user group. Such practices perpetuate the ad hoc, stove-piped informationsharing environment that HSIN was intended to correct. 

 

State and local law enforcement officials said that they continue to depend 

upon personal contacts and telephone calls to related organizations to 

exchange intelligence on potential threats, too. These users recognize, 

however, that phone calls are not the most efficient means of obtaining 

situational awareness information and coordinating incident response 

activities. For example, because they did not receive useful or timely updates 

through HSIN, law enforcement officials relied heavily upon telephone calls 

to share information related to the reports in October 2005 that terrorists were 

threatening to detonate a truck bomb inside the Baltimore tunnel. One official 

received 96 telephone inquiries in a single day about the incident. Another 

official said that during the Hurricane Katrina response in 2005, first 

responder organizations were inundated with phone calls, many of which were 

not successful due to the heavy call volume. 

 User Communities Make Limited Use of HSIN

In concert with a continued reliance on alternative means to share information, 

state and local user communities are making limited use of HSIN. Although 

law enforcement is a principal HSIN customer, officials at state fusion centers 

and police counter-terrorism units said that they do not use the system 

regularly to share intelligence information. For example, officials at nine of 

the 11 state and city emergency operation centers that we visited stated that 

they only log on to the system occasionally. Further, some emergency 

operation centers have a very limited number of user accounts, while others 

are not connected to HSIN at all. 

Limited Logons

Data provided by HSIN program management indicates that the number of 

daily logons to HSIN is limited. Although the total number of HSIN user 

accounts has increased since the system was deployed, use of three of the 

primary HSIN portals–the law enforcement, emergency management, and 

counter-terrorism portals–has remained consistently low. Figure 6 shows the 

average percentage of account holders who logged onto HSIN daily in 
 

 

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December 2005. That month was the latest time period for which HSIN 

program management was able to provide usage data. 

Counter 

Terrorism

HSIN Logons 

December 2005

% of Users 

Logging On Daily

Law 

Enforcement

Emergency 

Management

6% 2% 2%

= Users Not Participating

= Users Participating

Total # of Users 3011 4233 9477

Counter 

Terrorism

HSIN Logons 

December 2005

% of Users 

Logging On Daily

Law 

Enforcement

Emergency 

Management

6% 2% 2%

= Users Not Participating

= Users Participating

Total # of Users 3011 4233 9477

Figure 6: HSIN Logons 

Although the total number of accounts for the law enforcement portal has 

grown over the past year, only a small percentage of account holders log onto 

the system daily. As Figure 6 indicates, of the approximately 3,000 account 

holders on the law enforcement portal, an average of only six percent logged 

on daily in December 2005.16 The peak average daily logons for any given 

month in the year 2005 was 12 percent. 

Further, of the approximately 4,000 accounts on the emergency portal, an 

average of only two percent logged on daily in December 2005. Average 

daily usage reached its highest monthly level, 11 percent, in September 2005, 

due to inquiries during the Hurricane Katrina response. Usage of the counterterrorism portal was similar: of the approximately 9,500 account holders on 

this portal, an average of only about two percent logged on daily. Again, 

usage peaked in September 2005 due to Hurricane Katrina; the highest level 

of average daily logons for that time was three percent. 

 

16 Percentages were obtained by dividing the total number of daily system logons by the total number of account holders. 

This percentage represents the maximum average number of users who logged on per day. 
 

 

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Limited Postings

We examined the average number times that users posted documents and 

information to HSIN each month as a means of measuring use of the system. 

According to data we received from HSIN program management officials, the 

number of postings to the law enforcement, emergency management, and 

counter-terrorism portals has remained fairly constant for the past six months. 

Figure 7 shows the average monthly percentage of users posting information 

to three major HSIN portals in December 2005. 

Counter 

Terrorism

HSIN Postings 

December 2005

% of Users 

Posting Monthly

Law 

Enforcement

Emergency 

Management

6% 1% 1%

Total # of Users

= Users Not Participating

= Users Participating

3011 4233 9477

Counter 

Terrorism

HSIN Postings 

December 2005

% of Users 

Posting Monthly

Law 

Enforcement

Emergency 

Management

6% 1% 1%

Total # of Users

= Users Not Participating

= Users Participating

3011 4233 9477

Figure 7: HSIN Postings 

As indicated, the average percentages of daily postings for the three 

communities in the month of December were comparable to the logon levels 

previously discussed. HSIN program management officials have expressed 

dissatisfaction with the levels of information sharing on the system over the 

past year. However, they have not established performance goals to indicate 

what they believe would be an acceptable number of postings each month. 

In another effort to determine the extent to which users are utilizing the 

system to share information, we compared the numbers of users and their 

percent of total postings on three major HSIN portals to the number of users 

and their percent of postings on the legacy JRIES system. (See Figure 8.) In 

January 2006, the number of total postings by users of the three HSIN portals 
 

 

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and the legacy JRIES combined was 851. For that month, the percentage of 

total HSIN postings for the 157 users of the legacy JRIES system was over 50 

percent–greater than the percentage of total postings by approximately 18,000 

users on the three major HSIN portals combined. In other words, a relatively 

small number of users on the legacy JRIES system accounted for the majority 

of the total HSIN postings for the given month. 

EM 

6%

CT 

13%

LE 

28%

Legacy 

JRIES 

54% 

18,000 

Users

157 

Users

Comparison of Total Postings by 

Selected User Groups in January 2006

Total Postings = 851

EM 

6%

CT 

13%

LE 

28%

Legacy 

JRIES 

54% 

18,000 

Users

157 

Users

Comparison of Total Postings by 

Selected User Groups in January 2006

Total Postings = 851

Figure 8: Comparison of Total Postings by Selected User Groups in January 2006 

HSIN program management officials plan to migrate users from the legacy 

JRIES system to the HSIN portals, which are more flexible because they can 

be accessed anywhere via the internet and also can accommodate a greater 

number of users across various community groups. In line with this plan, 

program managers report that since the HSIN portals were created in 2005, 

the legacy JRIES system has had a declining number of account holders and 

decreased use. Despite this trend, posting activity on the legacy JRIES system 

remains strong when compared to postings on the three main HSIN portals. 

Continued postings on the legacy JRIES system results in additional effort 

because, to ensure that needed information is accessible to the broader user 

community, DHS must copy the legacy JRIES data onto the HSIN portals. 

 
 

 

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Other Major Challenges 

DHS faces multiple challenges in successfully implementing HSIN to support 

homeland security information sharing. In addition to the technical system 

issues discussed above, promoting the use of HSIN for information sharing 

across federal, state, and local governments, including law enforcement, 

intelligence, and emergency management communities, is a complex, multifaceted undertaking that has proven problematic. Figure 9 groups the various 

challenges related to HSIN implementation into four broad categories: 

resources, legislation, privacy, and culture. 

HSIN 

Challenges

Funds

People

New 

vs. old 

laws Federal 

to state 

jurisdiction

Reluctance 

to sharing

Traditional 

sharing 

patterns

Civil 

liberties

HSIN 

Challenges

Funds

People

New 

vs. old 

laws Federal 

to state 

jurisdiction

Reluctance 

to sharing

Traditional 

sharing 

patterns

Civil 

liberties

 Figure 9: HSIN Challenges 

Acknowledging and addressing these challenges will not only improve the 

quality and quantity of information shared using HSIN, but also help efforts to 

deter terrorism and respond to incidents overall. However, because these 

challenges are often beyond the control of HSIN program management to 

resolve, DHS cannot address them alone. Devising solutions to successfully 

overcome these concerns will require coordination and collaboration across 

the range of government, community, and organizational stakeholder groups. 
 

 

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Resources 

Resource limitations have hindered the ability of organizations at all levels of 

government to effectively share information and will undoubtedly continue to 

pose challenges in the future. DHS officials cited a lack of sufficient 

personnel as a reason for being unable to provide vital support to HSIN users, 

especially during its initial release. For example, since implementing HSIN, 

DHS has participated in information sharing conferences, suspicious activities 

forums, and large advisory meetings along with the range of system 

stakeholders. However, because DHS did not have adequate personnel to 

develop professional relationships with individuals in the various user 

communities, department officials stated that their initial contacts were limited 

and short-lived. Establishing longstanding and dependable relationships with 

users is an important factor in gaining and sustaining their support and trust. 

State officials expressed concern that they do not have enough personnel to 

monitor all of the federal systems available to them. For example, a state 

emergency management official said that, at one point, a single employee had 

to monitor 19 different systems. Intelligence analysts in another state said 

they could not concurrently monitor both the JRIES and HSIN portals so their 

supervisor told them just to monitor the JRIES portal. State officials are 

concerned that DHS is planning to monitor their usage of HSIN to help 

determine future allocations of grant funds to states. 

State officials added that a lack of funding limits their ability to sustain 

operations at state-run facilities, such as intelligence fusion and analysis 

centers. To illustrate, some state officials said that states are dependent upon 

federal funds to enable them to fully operate such intelligence centers and 

actively participate in information sharing with federal agencies. In addition, 

states that do not have sufficient resources to establish their own web presence 

for sharing information welcome the HSIN state portal pilot program, under 

which the HSOC funds and manages the system and its operations. State 

officials are concerned, however, that the Homeland Secure Data Network, 

the eventual replacement for the HSIN-Secret portal, may not be provided to 

states with federal funding. Some states may not be able to afford 

participating on the portal at their own expense. 

Legislation 

Legislative requirements also have created challenges to effective information 

sharing. Federal legislation over the past several years has established new 

goals and authorities for information sharing beyond those initially assigned to 

DHS. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS the responsibility to 
 

 

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coordinate and share information related to threats of domestic terrorism with 

other federal agencies, state and local governments and private sector entities. 

In 2004, however, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act

established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence external to 

DHS. The act mandated the establishment of an information-sharing 

environment under the direction of a newly designated program manager to 

facilitate sharing of terrorism-related data nation-wide. Establishing this new 

information-sharing environment will involve developing policies, 

procedures, and technologies to link the resources of federal, state, local, and 

private sector entities to facilitate communication and collaboration. The new 

program manager plans to build on the collective capabilities of HSIN and 

other federal systems to establish the mandated environment. However, at the 

time of this audit, it was not clear what HSIN’s role will be in this context. 

Identifying that role, and ensuring the success of the new information-sharing 

environment, will require close coordination and collaboration by all of the 

federal stakeholders involved. 

State laws, which differ from state to state, may conflict with federal 

collaboration initiatives and, in some cases, prevent effective information 

sharing. For example, DHS has little authority to require that state and local 

governments or other user communities use HSIN for information sharing. As 

such, department officials often find themselves in a consultation mode with 

the states. Alternatively, state laws, which may be very restrictive, can limit 

the ability of state and local user communities to share information through 

HSIN. Law enforcement communities, for example, are governed by laws 

that prohibit sharing certain types of sensitive information. 

In the past several months, DHS has taken steps to collaborate with the 

individual states to better understand their respective legislative environments. 

DHS began reaching out to several states as part of the HSIN state portal pilot 

program, which should give the department the opportunity to assess each 

state’s information-sharing laws. HSIN program managers also are working 

with the states to develop memorandums of agreement that will define how 

the states will cooperate with DHS to effectively share information. These 

efforts have been well received by state representatives and should increase 

the likelihood of successful information exchange between the department and 

its state and local counterparts. 

Privacy 

Privacy considerations cannot be ignored in the context of information 

sharing. Specifically, maintaining the appropriate balance between the need 

to share information and the need to respect the privacy and other legal rights 

of U.S. citizens can be a difficult and time-consuming effort. Due to privacy 
 

 

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concerns, civil liberties organizations have challenged information-sharing 

initiatives in the past and could pose similar challenges for the HSIN program. 

In 2003, the American Civil Liberties Union raised concerns about the 

Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange system, an effort to link 

government and commercial databases to enable federal and state law 

enforcement to analyze information as a means of identifying potential 

patterns of suspicious activity by individuals. As a result of the privacy 

concerns raised, as well as the costs involved, many state law enforcement 

communities stopped using the Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information 

Exchange system. 

By not appropriately considering privacy concerns, HSIN could face a similar 

outcome before realizing its full potential. As required by the Homeland 

Security Act, and in efforts to assuage civil liberty concerns, DHS performed a 

privacy impact assessment of HSIN portals before deploying them. As a 

result of the privacy impact assessment, DHS had to shut down the HSIN 

document library, which contained reports from nation-wide sources, 

significantly hampering system usefulness. In addition, DHS is currently 

creating another database that will need a privacy impact assessment prior to 

implementation. This database is to provide intelligence analysis capability 

similar to that of the abandoned Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information 

Exchange system. Besides the privacy impact assessment, clear standards and 

effective controls will be necessary to ensure and to demonstrate to concerned 

consumer groups, that the information gathered through HSIN does not 

violate the rights of American citizens. 

Culture 

A culture that is not receptive to knowledge sharing is one of the foremost 

hurdles to widespread adoption of collaboration software. Such cultural 

issues have limited HSIN’s use and, therefore, its effectiveness. 

HSIN users comprise diverse communities, including state and local 

government officials, emergency managers, law enforcers, intelligence 

analysts, and other emergency responders. All have different missions, needs, 

processes, and cultures. Because of these differences, the various user groups 

often are reluctant to share information beyond the bounds of their respective 

communities. Traditionally, for example, law enforcement has operated in a 

culture where protecting information is of paramount concern. Shifting from 

this “need to know” culture to a “need to share” culture has proven difficult. 

As discussed previously, a lack of trust in the law enforcement community has 

led to low use of HSIN to share sensitive information. DHS officials 

anticipated when they first released HSIN that culture might become an issue, 
 

 

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but they did not have the time or resources to build the trusted relationships 

necessary to overcome this issue. 

Despite the availability of HSIN, some state and local users continue to share 

information with agencies other than DHS with whom they developed trusted 

relationships in the past. For example, local law enforcement communities 

have developed close associations with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

network of Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which investigate and respond to 

reports of terrorist-related activities and incidents in their areas. Law 

enforcement officials told us that, although they have access to HSIN, they 

typically share information on suspicious activities with their Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces contacts and expect them to pass the information to DHS. These 

officials explained they prefer to notify the Joint Terrorism Task Force first 

instead of DHS, because they know that the task forces will send personnel to 

the field to investigate. Conversely, it is unclear to these officials what DHS 

does with information on suspicious activities. 

Identifying and understanding such user community goals and requirements 

are a first step to understanding cultural differences and building collaborative 

relationships. Frequent communication, guidance on how shared information 

will be used and protected, effective feedback, and mechanisms for resolving 

issues in a timely manner can also serve to overcome differences and instill 

trust and understanding. 

 

Recommendations 

To ensure effectiveness of the HSIN system and information sharing 

approach, we recommend that the Director, Office of Operations 

Coordination, Department of Homeland Security: 

1. Clarify and communicate HSIN’s mission and vision to users, its relation 

to other systems, and its integration with related federal systems. 

2. Define the intelligence data flow model for HSIN and provide clear 

guidance to system users on what information is needed, what DHS does 

with the information, and what information DHS will provide. 

3. Provide detailed, stakeholder-specific standard operating procedures, user 

manuals, and training based on the business processes needed to support 

homeland security information sharing. 

4. Ensure crosscutting representation and participation among the various 

stakeholder communities in determining business and system 

requirements, and encourage community of interest advisory board and 

working group participation. 
 

 

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5. Identify baseline and performance metrics for HSIN, and begin to measure 

effectiveness of information sharing using the performance data compiled. 

Management Comments and OIG Evaluation 

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the Acting 

Director, Office of Operations Coordination. We have included a copy of the 

comments in their entirety at Appendix B. 

In the comments, the Acting Director concurred with our recommendations in 

their entirety. The Acting Director further said that the recommendations are 

solid, and when implemented, will improve the effectiveness of the HSIN 

system and information sharing. The Acting Director added that there are two 

primary reasons why HSIN is not more effectively supporting information 

sharing. First, the HSIN program lacks many aspects of a typical federal 

program due to the expedited effort to roll out the program. Second, 

according to the Acting Director, the Secretary has directed that a 

coordinating body within DHS, consisting of the Under Secretary for Policy, 

the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, the Director of 

Operations, and the Chief Information Officer, coordinate an accelerated 

information sharing enterprise. This effort hindered HSIN implementation. 

In response to recommendation 1, the Acting Director acknowledged the need 

to clarify and communicate HSIN’s mission and vision to users, its relations 

to other systems, and its integration with related federal systems. Specifically, 

the Acting Director said that the Office of Operations Coordination has 

engaged external partners to improve coordination and clarify the purpose of 

existing information systems. Additionally, the Acting Director indicated that 

there is a need for customer satisfaction performance metrics to determine 

progress toward meeting communication objectives successfully. 

In response to recommendation 2, the Acting Director of Operations indicated 

that the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis is working to define 

an intelligence data flow model for HSIN and provide clear guidance to 

system users on what information is needed, what DHS does with the 

information, and what information DHS will provide. The Assistance 

Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis will define and publish the intelligence 

data flow for the Homeland Security community. Further, the Office of 

Operations Coordination will partner with Intelligence and Analysis to ensure 

that the entire user community understands the data flow model and uses it 

effectively to both supply and consume information that fuels this information 

sharing system. 
 

 

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To address recommendation 3, the Acting Director is exploring plans to 

reorganize the program management function of HSIN into a program office 

dedicated to supporting all aspects of the HSIN program including providing 

detailed, stakeholder-specific standard operating procedures, user manuals, 

and training based on the business processes needed to support homeland 

security information sharing. Further, the HSIN Program Management Office 

will have a dedicated program manager to engage all HSIN stakeholder 

groups to assess deficiencies in training materials and standard operating 

procedures to optimize operational effectiveness. 

In response to recommendation 4 regarding ensuring crosscutting 

representation and participation among the various stakeholder communities 

to determine business and system requirements, the Acting Director 

established a governance program for HSIN, called the HSIN Advisory 

Council. This Council provides a forum for user communities to provide 

feedback on ways to improve information sharing among all communities of 

interest. 

Finally, to address recommendation 5, the Acting Director said that a Program 

Management Office would be established to partner with HSIN user 

communities to identify and implement robust performance metrics.
 

Appendix A 

Scope and Methodology 

 

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As background for this audit, we researched and reviewed IT laws, 

regulations, and other federal guidance applicable to DHS’ responsibility for 

coordinating terrorist-related information sharing with state and local 

governments. We reviewed prior GAO and DHS OIG reports related to 

homeland security information sharing. We searched the internet to obtain 

testimony, published reports, documents, and news articles regarding DHS’ 

information sharing approach and the use of the JRIES and HSIN systems. 

Additionally, we met with organizations that had researched terrorist-related 

information sharing, including GAO, the Congressional Research Service, and 

the National Governors Association. Using this information, we designed a 

data collection approach, which consisted of focused interviews and 

documentation analysis. We developed a series of questions and discussion 

topics to facilitate our interviews. 

We interviewed DHS management officials and staff to obtain an 

understanding of DHS’ approach to sharing terrorism-related information 

using HSIN. These officials discussed their roles, responsibilities, and 

activities related to planning and implementing HSIN. We collected and 

reviewed numerous documents from DHS officials about their plans and 

current initiatives for HSIN, too. 

We visited seven state capitals and five major cities where we interviewed 

various employees including political appointees, senior managers, and 

intelligence analysts. We focused on the systems they used, the business 

processes, communication with DHS, and training. We obtained information 

on how HSIN is being used in the field and if DHS is providing the necessary 

tools and guidance to the state and local governments. Where possible, we 

obtained reports and other materials to support the comments and information 

they provided during the interviews. 

Specifically, we visited: 

• State homeland security advisors, to learn about the role of HSIN in the 

state-wide strategy for homeland security. 

• State police, to gain an understanding of how they utilize HSIN to process 

terrorism-related information. 

• State emergency management agencies, to understand how HSIN is used 

at the state level for emergency management and situational awareness. 

• State fusion centers, to learn about their role in coordinating intelligence 

gathering and analysis for states and facilitating with the HSOC. 

• State national guards, to understand how they are using HSIN in their 

operations. 
 

Appendix A 

Scope and Methodology 

 

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• Major city police departments, to learn how HSIN supports terrorismrelated intelligence information sharing and analysis in large cities. 

• Major city emergency management agencies, to understand how HSIN is 

used at the city-level for emergency management situational awareness. 

• Major city fire departments, to learn about the role of HSIN in passing 

terrorism-related information with fire departments. 

Additionally, we met with two external groups that have completed work on 

terrorism-related information sharing. To gain a perspective on the roles of 

related IT systems, we met with the Western State Information Network and 

discussed its system’s role in the terrorism-related information sharing process 

in relation to HSIN. Further, officials from the U.S. Department of Justice 

Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils described their role in facilitating 

information sharing with state and local governments as well as how they 

interact with various federal, state, and local entities. 

We limited our audit of HSIN to a specific set of portals, focusing on the law 

enforcement, law enforcement analysis, emergency management, secret, 

special events, and the national capital region portals. Due to time and scope 

limitations, we did not review the critical infrastructure, private sector, or 

international portals. Throughout the course of this audit, we provided regular 

updates to the DHS management on progress and discussed key issues 

identified by the stakeholders. 

We conducted our review from September 2005 to January 2006 at locations 

in Harrisburg (PA); Sacramento (CA); Los Angeles (CA); Las Vegas (NV); 

New York City (NY); Albany (NY); Boston (MA); Austin (TX); Springfield 

(IL); Chicago (IL); Reisterstown (MD); Richmond (VA); Chantilly (VA); and, 

the Washington (DC) metropolitan area. We performed our work pursuant to 

the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

The principal OIG points of contact for the audit are Frank Deffer, Assistant 

Inspector General for Information Technology Audits, and Sondra McCauley, 

Director, Information Management. Major OIG contributors to the audit are 

identified in Appendix C. 
 

Appendix B 

Management Response to Draft Report 

 

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Appendix B 

Management Response to Draft Report 

 

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Appendix B 

Management Response to Draft Report 

 

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Appendix B 

Management Response to Draft Report 

 

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Appendix B 

Management Response to Draft Report 

 

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Appendix B 

Management Response to Draft Report 

 

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Appendix B 

Management Response to Draft Report 

 

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Appendix B 

Management Response to Draft Report 

 

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Appendix C 

Major Contributors to this Report 

 

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Information Management Division

Sondra McCauley, Director 

Richard Harsche, Audit Manager 

Steve Ressler, Auditor 

Steven Staats, Auditor 

William Matthews, Referencer
Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

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Department of Homeland Security

 Secretary 

 Deputy Secretary 

 Chief of Staff 

 Director, Office of Operations Coordination 

 Director, Homeland Security Operations Center 

 Program Manager, Homeland Security Information Network 

 Office of State and Local Government Coordination 

 Office of Information Sharing and Collaboration 

 Assistant Secretary, Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

 Under Secretary for Preparedness 

 Chief Information Officer 

 Chief Information Security Officer 

 Preparedness Directorate, Audit Liaison 

 Executive Secretariat 

 General Counsel 

 Assistant Secretary for Policy 

 DHS Legislative Affairs 

 DHS Public Affairs 

 DHS GAO OIG Audit Liaison 

 

 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress

Appropriate Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

 
Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

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Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG 

web site at www.dhs.gov/oig.

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind 

of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or 

operations, call the OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to DHS Office of 

Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, Attention: Office of Investigations– 

Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, Washington, DC 20528; fax 

the complaint to (202) 254-4292; or email DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov. The 

OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.