• OCS Study 

 MMS 2001-032 

Long-Term Consequences of the 

Exxon Valdez Oil Spill for Coastal 

Communities of Southcentral Alaska 
OCS STUDY 

MMS 2001-032 

Technical Report No. 163 Cooperative Agreement No. 14-35-0001-30788

Long-Term Consequences of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 

for Coastal Communities of Southcentral Alaska 

by 

James A. Fall, Rita Miraglia, William Simeone, Charles J. Utermohle, and Robert J. Wolfe 

Final Report for: 

Sociocultural Consequences of Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Activities: 

Data Analysis and Integration 

Submitted to: 

Minerals Management Service 

United States Department of the Interior 

Alaska OCS Region 

Social and Economic Studies Unit 

949 E. 36th Avenue 

Anchorage, Alaska 99508-4302 

Submitted by: 

Division of Subsistence 

Alaska Department of Fish and Game 

333 Raspberry Road 

Anchorage, Alaska 99518 

April 15, 2001 
Notice

This report has been reviewed by the Minerals Management Service and approved for publication. 

Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the 

Service, nor does mention of trade names or commercial products constitute endorsement or 

recommendation for use. 

Alaska OCS Environmental Studies Program 

Long-Term Consequences of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill for Coastal Communities of 

Southcentral Alaska 

Division of Subsistence 

Alaska Department of Fish and Game 

333 Raspberry Road 

Anchorage, Alaska 99518 

Note: this report is also available as Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of 

Subsistence Technical Paper No. 264. 

ADA PUBLICATIONS STATEMENT 

The Alaska Department of Fish and Game operates all of its public programs and activities free 

from discrimination on the basis of sex, color, race, religion, national origin, age, marital status, 

pregnancy, parenthood, or disability. For information on alternative formats available for this and 

other department publications, please contact the department ADA Coordinator at (voice) 907-

465-4120, (TDD) 1-800-478-3548 or (fax) 907-586-6595. Any person who believes she or he has 

been discriminated against should write to: 

Alaska Department of Fish and Game 

PO Box 25526 

Juneau, AK 99802-5526 

or 

O.E.O. 

U.S. Department of the Interior 

Washington, D.C. 20240 
i 

Table of Contents 

List of Tables ............................................................................................................................................iv 

List of Figures ............................................................................................................................................vi 

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations Used in the Text..................................................................................xv 

Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................................xvii 

I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1 

 The Study Background ........................................................................................................................... 1 

 Disparate Claims .................................................................................................................................... 2 

 Study Communities................................................................................................................................. 4 

 Major Studies of the Sociocultural Effects of the Oil Spill....................................................................... 6 

 The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council..................................................................................... 6 

 Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Subsistence...................................................... 9 

 The "Oiled Mayors Study" .............................................................................................................. 11 

 MMS Social Indicators Project ....................................................................................................... 11 

 Study of Chronic Psychological Stress in Cordova and Valdez ..................................................... 11 

 Litigation Studies ............................................................................................................................ 12 

 Other Studies ................................................................................................................................. 13 

 Major Components of the Study ........................................................................................................... 13 

 Organization of the Report.................................................................................................................... 16 

II. Adaptation, Culture, and Human Groups in the Pacific Gulf: Theoretical Issues.................................. 17 

 Adaptation and Culture ......................................................................................................................... 17 

 Human Groups in the Pacific Gulf ........................................................................................................ 18 

 Cultural Groups .............................................................................................................................. 19 

 Household-Level Groups................................................................................................................ 21 

 Communities .................................................................................................................................. 22 

 Types of Adaptive Responses .............................................................................................................. 25 

 The Mix of Subsistence and Commercial-Wage Sectors in Villages............................................. 28 

 Sharing Among Households in Villages ......................................................................................... 28 

 Cultural and Economic Revitalization in Villages ........................................................................... 28

 Migration......................................................................................................................................... 29 

 Windfall Monetary Awards ............................................................................................................. 29 

III. The Alutiiq of the Pacific Gulf at Historic Contact ................................................................................. 31 

 The Sugpiat (Alutiiq)....................................................................................................................... 31 

 Regional Groups ............................................................................................................................ 32 

 Population ..................................................................................................................................... .32 

 Settlement Patterns........................................................................................................................ 33 

 Political and Social Organization.................................................................................................... 33 

 The Economy ................................................................................................................................. 35 

 Ceremonies and Religion............................................................................................................... 38 

IV. Historic Transformations in the Pacific Gulf.......................................................................................... 41 

 Demographic Change, 1780 - 1997 ............................................................................................... 41 

 Social, Religious, and Political Change, 1784-1989....................................................................... 45 

 Economic Change.......................................................................................................................... 49 

 Commercial Fisheries, 1975-1995 ................................................................................................. 52 

V. The Pacific Gulf on the Eve of the Oil Spill........................................................................................... 61 

 Some Key Changes to the Natural Environment............................................................................ 61 

 Demographic Trends During the Late 20th Century........................................................................ 62 

 Transportation ................................................................................................................................ 60 

 The Subsistence Sector of the Local Economy ............................................................................. 70 

 The Pacific Gulf Economy: Patterns Before the Spill ............................................................. 70 
ii 

 Resources Used and Harvest Levels ...................................................................................... 73 

 Participation Rates................................................................................................................... 76 

 Seasonality of Harvests ........................................................................................................... 79 

 Harvest Areas .......................................................................................................................... 81 

 Harvest Composition ............................................................................................................... 84 

 Kinship Organization of Harvesting and Processing................................................................ 86 

 Sharing of Wild Foods ............................................................................................................. 89 

 Cultural Knowledge and Values............................................................................................... 95 

 Summary: The Subsistence Sector of the Local Economy .................................................... 98 

 Cash Sector of the Local Economy.............................................................................................. 102 

 General Features of Cash Employment ................................................................................ 102 

 Commercial Fishing and Processing..................................................................................... 103 

 Cost of Food .......................................................................................................................... 110 

 Social and Political Organization.................................................................................................. 111 

 Kinship and Division of Labor ................................................................................................ 111 

 Marriage and Ethnicity ........................................................................................................... 111 

 Political Organization, Regional Groups, and Organizations................................................. 114 

 Fish and Wildlife Management .............................................................................................. 118 

 Expressive Culture ....................................................................................................................... 120 

 Religion.................................................................................................................................. 120 

 Music, Dance, and Oral Traditions ........................................................................................ 120

 Language ..................................................................................................................................... 122 

 Use of Alaska Native Language ............................................................................................ 122

 Status of Alaska Native Languages According to U.S. Census Data.................................... 122 

 Alaska Native Language Center Assessments ..................................................................... 124 

 Assessment of Knowledge of Alutiiq in Four Villages............................................................ 126 

 Ethnographic Data from Division of Subsistence Research.................................................. 128 

 Conclusions Regarding Native Language Use in Alutiiq Villages.......................................... 128 

 Discussion: Community Types in the Pacific Gulf....................................................................... 130 

 Demographic Features .......................................................................................................... 130 

 Cultural Composition ............................................................................................................. 132 

 Traditional Foodways............................................................................................................. 132 

 Human-Nature Relationships: The Outdoor Sport Tradition................................................. 136 

 Subsistence Sector Characteristics....................................................................................... 137

 Wage-Market Sector Characteristics..................................................................................... 139 

 Summary and Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 147 

VI. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Effects, Litigation, and Restoration........................................................ 149 

 Overview of the Oil Spill and Cleanup ................................................................................................ 149 

 The Cleanup Response...................................................................................................................... 152 

 Assessments of Natural Resource Damages..................................................................................... 157 

 Contrasting Assessments of Environmental Injury....................................................................... 157 

 The Official List of Injured Resources and Services .................................................................... 160 

 Management Responses to the Oil Spill............................................................................................. 162 

 Effects on Commercial Fisheries: Prince William Sound Finfish ................................................ 162 

 Effects on Commercial Fisheries: Cook Inlet Finfish .................................................................. 164 

 Effects on Commercial Fisheries: Kodiak Finfish........................................................................ 165 

 Effects on Commercial Fisheries: Chignik Area Finfish.............................................................. 165 

 Effects on Commercial Shellfish .................................................................................................. 166 

 Effects on Subsistence Fisheries................................................................................................. 166 

 Effects on Hunting Opportunities ................................................................................................. 168 

 Subsistence Food Contamination and Food Safety ........................................................................... 169 

 Emergency Food Programs................................................................................................................ 177 

 Wild Resources: Prince William Sound ...................................................................................... 177 

 Wild Resources: Kodiak Island Borough..................................................................................... 181 

 Groceries: Prince William Sound ................................................................................................ 182 
iii 

 Litigation of the Oil Spill ...................................................................................................................... 183 

 Restoration and the Oil Spill Trustee Council ..................................................................................... 188 

 The Criminal Settlement Subsistence Restoration Program .............................................................. 194 

 The Habitat Protection Program ......................................................................................................... 195 

 Summary: Conditions Caused by the Oil Spill ................................................................................... 204 

VII. Economic and Sociocultural Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on Resident Human Groups - I ... 207 

 Wild Food Harvest and Use Patterns, the First Post-Spill Year ......................................................... 208 

 Explanations for Subsistence Declines, First Post-Spill Year............................................................. 220 

 Subsistence Harvests and Uses, Recovery after the First Post-Spill Year......................................... 224 

 Explanations for Subsistence Harvest Patterns After the First Post-Spill Year .................................. 227 

 Participation in Subsistence Uses ...................................................................................................... 238 

 Sharing of Wild Foods ........................................................................................................................ 241 

 Qualitative Household Assessments of Recovery, 1989-1998........................................................... 243 

 Harvest Effort...................................................................................................................................... 248 

 Households Employment in the Wage-Commercial Sector, Post-Spill Effects .................................. 254 

 Young Adults’ Involvement in Subsistence Activities.......................................................................... 260 

 Are Young Adults Learning Enough Subsistence Skills?............................................................. 260 

 Spirit Camps................................................................................................................................. 264 

 Elders’ Influence ................................................................................................................................. 265 

 Status of Traditional Way of Life......................................................................................................... 269 

VIII. Economic and Sociocultural Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on Resident Human Groups – II . 273 

 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 273 

 Productivity by Household Type.......................................................................................................... 274 

 Sharing by Household Type................................................................................................................ 277 

 Monetary Income by Household Type ................................................................................................ 280 

 Degree of Stability in Factors of Production ....................................................................................... 284 

 Economic and Cultural Revitalization ................................................................................................. 288 

 

IX. The Legacy of the Oil Spill for Pacific Gulf Communities ................................................................... 291 

 The Social Construction of a Disaster ................................................................................................ 291 

 A Calamity for the Alutiiq..................................................................................................................... 293 

 Adaptations to a Disaster.................................................................................................................... 294 

 Impacts on the Rural Food Supply............................................................................................... 295 

 Impacts on Food Safety ............................................................................................................... 296 

 Activation of Traditional Support Networks .................................................................................. 297 

 Replacement of Lost Subsistence Harvests ................................................................................ 297 

 Impacts on Employment and Wage Income ................................................................................ 298 

 Economic and Cultural Revitalization........................................................................................... 299 

 Impacts on Demographic Trends................................................................................................. 301 

 Dispossession of Native Lands .................................................................................................... 301 

 The Survival of Alutiiq Communities ............................................................................................ 303 

X. References Cited................................................................................................................................ 307 
iv 

List of Tables 

Table I-1. Some Major Hypotheses about the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill's Sociocultural Effects ................. 7 

Table I-2. Study Communities and Coverage by Major Post Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Study ................... 10 

Table I-3. Project Tasks, Deliveries, Repositories of Products, and Citations ....................................... 14 

Table IV-1. Russian Census Figures 1792 - 1833 from Khlebnikov (1994) ............................................. 43 

Table V-1. Game Transplants in the Study Area in the 20th Century...................................................... 62 

Table V-2. Population of Communities in the Area Affected by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1960........... 64 

Table V-3. Population of Communities in the Area Affected by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1970........... 65 

Table V-4. Population of Communities in the Area Affected by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1980........... 66 

Table V-5. Population of Communities in the Area Affected by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1990........... 67 

Table V-6. Some Characteristics of Subsistence Uses in the Exxon Valdez Study 

Communities Before the 1989 Oil Spill .................................................................................. 75 

Table V-7. Involvement in Commercial Fishing, Cordova, 1985 and 1988 ........................................... 105 

Table V-8. Involvement in Commercial Fishing, Tatitlek, Late 1980s ................................................... 105 

Table V-9. Involvement in Commercial Fishing, Nanwalek and Port Graham, 1987 ............................ 105 

Table V-10. Limited Entry Salmon Permits Held by Residents of Kodiak Island Borough 

Villages, 1984/1985.............................................................................................................. 108 

Table V-11. Chignik Area Participation in Commercial Fisheries, 1984.................................................. 109 

Table V-12. Involvement in Commercial Fishing, Chignik Area Communities, 1984 .............................. 109 

Table V-13. Political Institutions in Communities of the EVOS Study Area............................................. 116 

Table V-14. Alaska Native Village Corporations, Regional Corporations, and Not-for-Profit 

Regional Organizations........................................................................................................ 117 

Table V-15. Percentage of Population Five Years of Age or Older Using an Alaska Native 

Language at Home............................................................................................................... 125 

Table V-16. Number and Percentage of Speakers of Alutiiq................................................................... 126 

Table V-17. Community Groups by Demographic, Cultural, and Socioeconomic Characteristics, 

Gulf of Alaska, Circa 1991-93.............................................................................................. 131 

Table V-18. Indigenous Foods Index: Percent of Households Using Wild food Types.......................... 134 

Table V-19. Core Foods Index (Wild Foods Used by the Majority of Community Households), 

Gulf of Alaska, Circa 1991-93 (Percent of Households Using the Resource Category)...... 141 
v 

Table V-20. Household Incomes (Per Capita) (Monetary Incomes plus Wild Food 

Replacement Values) by Native or Non-Native Households and Community 

Type, Gulf of Alaska, Mean 1991-93 ................................................................................... 143 

Table VI-1. Oil Spill Employment Characteristics of 15 Alaska Native Communities............................. 153 

Table VI-2. Oil Spill Employment Characteristics of 15 Alaska Native Communities 

by Subregion, 1989 .............................................................................................................. 154 

Table VI-3. Resources and Services Injured by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1996 ................................. 161 

Table VI-4. Resources and Services Injured by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1999 ................................. 161 

Table VI-5. Participation in Emergency Food Relief Programs, Alaska Native Communities 

of the EVOS Region, 1989................................................................................................... 179 

Table VI-6. Civil Settlement Subsistence Restoration Projects .............................................................. 192 

Table VI-7. Subsistence Restoration Projects Supported with Criminal Settlement Funds.................... 196 

Table VI-8. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council Habitat Protection Program, July 2000.................. 197 

Table VII-1. Changes in Characteristics of Subsistence Uses by Subregion, 

Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill Averages.............................................................. 209 

Table VII-2. Subsistence Harvests in Pounds Usable Weight per Person, 

Oil Spill Area Alaska Native Villages.................................................................................... 211 

Table VII-3. Average Number of Resources Used per Household, Oil Spill Region Study 

Communities ........................................................................................................................ 212 

Table VII-4. Average Number of Resources Attempted to Harvest per Household, 

Oil Spill Region Communities............................................................................................... 213 

Table VII-5. Average Number of Resources Harvested per Household, 

Oil Spill Region Study Communities .................................................................................... 214 

Table VII-6. Evaluation of Adequacy of Subsistence Food Safety Information 

by Community Type and Study Year.................................................................................... 239 

Table VII-7. Households’ Assessments of Availability of Resources to Harvest, 1997/98 ...................... 240 

Table VII-8. Individual Participation in Subsistence Activities: Tatitlek ................................................... 241 
vi 

List of Figures 

Figure I-1. Location of Study Communities within the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS) Area 

Boundary............................................................................................................................. 5 

Figure II-1. Human Groups Historically Present in the Pacific Gulf of Alaska (Taxonomic 

Categories Used in Analysis) ............................................................................................ 20 

Figure II-2. Community Types by Preliminary Socioeconomic and Demographic Features ............... 23 

Figure II-3. A Model of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill's Impacts on Subsistence, Culture, 

and People ........................................................................................................................ 26 

Figure II-4. Alaska Native Households or Community Responses and Outcomes 

to External Oil Spill Factors in Pacific Gulf Alutiiq Villages................................................ 27 

Figure III-1. Kodiak Island Toyon (Chief) named Nangquk, baptized Nikita, from 

Three Saints Bay (Mikhail Tikhanov 1817) ....................................................................... 33 

Figure III-2. Aleut Hunting (Mikhail Tikhanov 1817) ............................................................................. 35 

Figure III-3. Koniag Alutiiq ceremonial coat made from the neck skins of cormorants and 

decorated with red and white tassels of dyed skin and gut and white fur trim 

(Chaussonnet 1988: 209).................................................................................................. 36 

Figure III-4. Aleut of Kodiak Island in festival dress enacting the hunt

(Mikhail Tikhanov 1817).................................................................................................... 37 

Figure III-5. Tamaima, an Inhabitant of Kodiak Island (Mikhail Tikhanov 1817)................................... 39 

Figure IV-1. Population Trends in the Pacific Gulf Region, Historic Contact (circa 1780) 

and 1910-1997 .................................................................................................................. 42 

Figure IV-2. Population of Pacific Gulf Region, by Cultural Group, 1997.............................................. 42 

Figure IV-3. Commercial Fisheries Dominance, Gulf of Alaska Communities, 

1976, 1986, 1994 .............................................................................................................. 54 

Figure IV-4. Diversification of Commercial Fisheries, Pacific Gulf Villages, Cordova, 

and Kodiak City, 1976, 1986, and 1994 ............................................................................ 54 

Figure IV-5. Diversification of Commercial Fisheries, Kenai Area, Seldovia, and Valdez, 

1976, 1986, and 1994 ....................................................................................................... 55 

Figure IV-6. Commercial Fish Sales by Permit Holders, Kodiak City, Cordova, and 

Kenai Area, 1975-95 ......................................................................................................... 55 

Figure IV-7. Commercial Fish Sales by Permit Holders, Pacific Coast Villages, 1975-95.................... 56 

Figure IV-8. Commercial Fish Sales by Permit Holders, Seldovia and Valdez, 1975-95...................... 56 

Figure IV-9. Number of Commercial Fishing Permits Fished, Kodiak City, Cordova, 

and Kenai Area, 1975-95 .................................................................................................. 57 
vii 

Figure IV-10. Number of Commercial Fishing Permits Fished, Pacific Gulf Villages, 

1975-95 ............................................................................................................................. 57 

Figure IV-11. Number of Commercial Fishing Permits Fished, Pacific Gulf Villages, 

1975-95 ............................................................................................................................. 58 

Figure V-1. Population of Alaska Native Villages of Oil Spill Area, 1960 - 1997.................................. 63 

Figure V-2. Percentage Change in Population 1960 - 1990 ................................................................ 68 

Figure V-3. Residents of Ivanof Bay on the Alaska Peninsula help unload supplies from 

a small plane. In the 1980s and 1990s, villages of the study area depended 

upon air transportation to obtain goods and services. ...................................................... 69 

Figure V-4. Wild Food Harvests by Community and Region ............................................................... 71 

Figure V-5. Number of Resources Used by 50 Percent or More of Alaska Native 

Households, 1980 ............................................................................................................. 74

Figure V-6. Estimated Subsistence Harvests by Subregion, 1980s .................................................... 76 

Figure V-7. Participation in Subsistence Uses, Spill Area Communities, 1980s.................................. 79 

Figure V-8. Seasonal Cycle of Subsistence Harvest Activities by Residents of Chenega Bay 

and Tatitlek, Prince William Sound, 1980s ....................................................................... 80 

Figure V-9. Subsistence Harvest Areas Of Communities and Outer Extent of Exxon Valdez 

Oil Spill .............................................................................................................................. 83 

Figure V-10. Composition of Subsistence Harvests by Region, 1980s ................................................. 85 

Figure V-11. Beach seining for subsistence salmon, Kametolook River, Perryville, 

Alaska Peninsula............................................................................................................... 90 

Figure V-12. Cleaning and brining subsistence salmon prior to smoking and freezing, 

Ivanof Bay ......................................................................................................................... 90 

Figure V-13. Preparing wood for smoking salmon, Chignik, Alaska Peninsula..................................... 91 

Figure V-14. Digging butter clams at Chignik Lagoon, Alaska Peninsula.............................................. 91 

Figure V-15. Subsistence harvest of cockles, Ivanof Bay, Alaska Peninsula ........................................ 92 

Figure V-16. Median Household Incomes, 1980.................................................................................. 102 

Figure V-17. Cost of Groceries in Cordova Compared to Anchorage, 1986 and 1989 ....................... 110 

Figure V-18. Percentage of Hunters Who are Male by Community Type, Region, 

and Study Year................................................................................................................ 112 

Figure V-19. Percentage of Hunters by Sex, Villages by Subregion.................................................... 112 

Figure V-20. Percentage of Fishers by Sex, Villages by Subregion .................................................... 113 

Figure V-21. Percentage of Plant Gatherers by Sex, Villages by Subregion ....................................... 113 
viii 

Figure V-22. Exogamy by Generation and Place: of Native Marriages, Percent between 

Native and Non-Native Spouses ..................................................................................... 115 

Figure V-23. Exogamy by Generation and Community (of Native Marriages, 

Percent between Native and Non-Natives) ..................................................................... 115 

Figure V-24. Percentage of Population Speaking an Alaska Native Language at Home, 

by Native Corporation Region, 1990 ............................................................................... 123 

Figure V-25. Percentage of Population Speaking an Alaska Native Language at Home, 

Communities of the EVOS Area, 1990............................................................................ 123 

Figure V-26. Indigenous Foods Index: Mean Percent of Households Using Six Species 

(Chitons, Clams, Deer, Gull Eggs, Harbor Seal, Octopus) ............................................. 135 

Figure V-27. Indigenous Foods Index by Cultural Composition of Community ................................... 135 

Figure V-28. Relationship of Angling and Sport Fishing Licenses, Gulf of Alaska Communities, 

Circa 1991-93.................................................................................................................. 138 

Figure V-29. Sport License Index by Cultural Composition of Community.......................................... 138 

Figure V-30. Wild Food Harvest Levels by Cultural Composition of Communities, 

Gulf of Alaska Area, Circa 1991-93................................................................................. 140 

Figure V-31. Wild Foods Harvests of Community by Per Capita Income in Community, 

Gulf of Alaska Area, Circa 1991-93................................................................................. 140 

Figure V-32. Per Capita Income of Native or Non-Native Households by Community Type, 

Gulf of Alaska, Mean 1991-93......................................................................................... 143 

Figure V-33. Wild Food Harvests (Lbs per Capita) of Native and Non-Native Households by 

Community Type, Gulf of Alaska, Mean 1991-93 ........................................................... 145 

Figure V-34. Household Income and Wild Food Value of Native or Non-Native Households 

by Community Type, Gulf of Alaska, Mean 1991-93....................................................... 145 

Figure V-35. Household Incomes and Wild Food Values of Native and Non-Native 

Households by Community Type, Gulf of Alaska, Mean 1991-93................................... 146 

Figure VI-1. Progression of Oil through Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska 

for the First 56 Days after the Grounding of the Exxon Valdez....................................... 150 

Figure VI-2. Allocations to Subsistence Restoration Projects, Oil Spill Restoration 

Work Plans (Civil Settlement Funds) .............................................................................. 191 

Figure VI-3. Percentage of EVOS Trustee Council Restoration Workplan Allocated 

to Subsistence Restoration Projects and Other Projects ................................................ 193 

Figure VI-4. Percentage of Restoration Funds Allocated for Monitoring, Research, 

and General Restoration by Category, FY92 to FY02..................................................... 193 

Figure VII-1. Changes in Subsistence Harvests, Spill Year (1989) Compared 

to Pre-Spill Averages, by Sub-Region............................................................................. 210 
ix 

Figure VII-2. Changes in Subsistence Harvest after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 

15 Study Communities of the Oil Spill Area .................................................................... 210 

Figure VII-3. Changes in Average Number of Resources Used per Household, 

Post-Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill Averages ................................................ 215 

Figure VII-4. Changes in Average Number of Subsistence Resources Used per 

Household, Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill Averages, 

by Subregion ................................................................................................................... 215 

Figure VII-5. Changes in Average Number of Resources Attempted to Harvest per 

Household, Post-Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill Averages ............................. 216 

Figure VII-6. Changes in Average Number of Subsistence Resources Attempted to 

Harvest per Household, Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill 

Averages, by Subregion .................................................................................................. 216 

Figure VII-7. Changes in Average Number of Resources Harvested per Household, 

Post-Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill Averages ................................................ 217 

Figure VII-8. Changes in Average Number of Subsistence Resources Harvested per 

Household, Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill Averages 

by Subregion ................................................................................................................... 217 

Figure VII-9. Changes in Average Number of Resources Received per Household, 

Post-Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill Averages ................................................ 218 

Figure VII-10. Changes in Average Number of Subsistence Resources Received per 

Household, Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill Averages, 

by Subregion ................................................................................................................... 218 

Figure VII-11. Changes In Average Number of Resources Gave Away per Household, 

Post-Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill Averages ................................................ 219 

Figure VII-12. Changes in Average Number of Subsistence Resources Given Away per 

Household, Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill Averages, 

by Subregion ................................................................................................................... 219 

Figure VII-13. Percentage of Households Reporting Lower Overall Subsistence Harvests 

in the Year Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill............................................................. 221 

Figure VII-14. Percentage of Households Reporting a Decline in Any Subsistence 

Resource Harvest in the Year Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill............................... 221 

Figure VII-15. Percentage of Households Reporting Lower Overall Subsistence Uses 

in the Year Following the Oil Spill and Reasons for the Decline ..................................... 222 

Figure VII-16. Household Evaluations of Subsistence Uses in 1989..................................................... 222 

Figure VII-17. Changes in Subsistence Activities by Exposure Status, 1988 and 1989 

Compared ....................................................................................................................... 225 

Figure VII-18. Subsistence Harvests in 10 Oil Spill Area Communities, Pre-Spill and 

Post-Spill Averages......................................................................................................... 225
x 

Figure VII-19. Subsistence Harvests in Four Oil Spill Regions.............................................................. 226 

Figure VII-20. Average Number of Resources Used per Household, Four Oil Spill Subregions ........... 226 

Figure VII-21. Average Number of Resources Attempted to Harvest per Household, 

Four Oil Spill Subregions................................................................................................. 228 

Figure VII-22. Average Number of Resources Received per Household, Four Oil Spill 

Subregions ...................................................................................................................... 228 

Figure VII-23. Changes in Oil Spill-Related Reasons for Reduced Subsistence Uses, 

Selected Communities of the Oil Spill Region................................................................. 229 

Figure VII-24. Household Assessments of Overall Subsistence Uses Compared to Before 

the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1989, 1993, and 1998 (Seven Communities 

Combined)....................................................................................................................... 229 

Figure VII-25. Percentage of Households that Use Seals for Subsistence that Believe 

Seals are Safe for Children to Eat, by Community Type (1992 or 1994) ........................ 233 

Figure VII-26. Reasons Why Seals Not Safe to Eat, through 1994 ....................................................... 233 

Figure VII-27. Are Seals Safe for Children to Eat? Responses in 1998 ................................................ 234 

Figure VII-28. Reasons for Uncertainty about the Safety of Eating Seal, 1998 ..................................... 234 

Figure VII-29. Percentage of Households Using Clams that Believe that Clams are Safe 

for Children to Eat by Community Type (1992 or 1994).................................................. 235 

Figure VII-30. Reasons for Believing Clams Unsafe to Eat, Latest Study Year through 1994 .............. 235 

Figure VII-31. Percentage of Respondents Who Believe Clams are Safe for Children to Eat .............. 236 

Figure VII-32. Are Clams Safe for Children to Eat? Percentage of Respondents Saying 

"No" Due to EVOS Contamination .................................................................................. 236 

Figure VII-33. Are Clams Safe for Children to Eat? Percentage of Respondents Saying 

"No" Due to PSP ............................................................................................................. 237

Figure VII-34. Were You Adequately Informed about the Safety of Subsistence Foods? 

Percentage of Respondents Answering "Yes." ............................................................... 237 

Figure VII-35. Reasons Given for Not Being Adequately Informed about the Safety 

of Subsistence Foods after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill ................................................... 239 

Figure VII-36. Percentage of Households Providing Oil Spill and Non-Oil Spill Reasons 

for Declines in Availability of Resources, 1997/98 .......................................................... 240 

Figure VII-37. Percentage of Tatitlek Residents Who Participated in Any Subsistence 

Harvest Activity................................................................................................................ 242 

Figure VII-38. Has There Been Less Sharing of Wild Resources Since the Exxon Valdez 

Oil Spill? Percentage of Respondents Answering "Yes"................................................. 242 
xi 

Figure VII-39. Households' Assessments of Overall Levels of Subsistence Uses in 1990/91 

Compared to the Previous Year, 1989 (the Year of the Oil Spill), 

by Subregion ................................................................................................................... 244 

Figure VII-40. Households' Assessments of Overall Levels of Subsistence Uses in 

1990/91 Compared to Before the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, by Subregion......................... 244 

Figure VII-41. Percentage of Households Reporting Lower Subsistence Uses in the 

Study Year than Before the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (Any Reason).................................. 245 

Figure VII-42. Percentage of Households Reporting Lower Overall Uses of Wild 

Resources Due to the Oil Spill ........................................................................................ 245 

Figure VII-43. Percentage of Households with Reduction in Any Subsistence Resource 

Due to Oil Spill Reasons ................................................................................................. 247 

Figure VII-44. Chenega Bay: Percentage Change in Subsistence Harvest Compared 

to Percentage of Households Reporting Lowered Uses ................................................. 247 

Figure VII-45. Nanwalek: Percentage Change in Subsistence Harvest Compared 

to Percentage of Households Reporting Lowered Uses ................................................. 249 

Figure VII-46. Assessment of Effort to Harvest Resource Categories in 1997/98 

Compared to 10 Years Ago (All Communities Combined).............................................. 249 

Figure VII-47. Per Capita Earned Income by Source, 1989................................................................... 256 

Figure VII-48. Percentage of Earned Income from Oil Spill Cleanup Jobs, 1989.................................. 256 

Figure VII-49. Per Capita Earned Income, by Source, Nanwalek and Port Graham ............................. 257 

Figure VII-50. Per Capita Earned Income by Source, Chenega Bay and Tatitlek ................................. 257 

Figure VII-51. Per Capita Earned Income by Source, Karluk, Larsen Bay, and Ouzinkie ..................... 258 

Figure VII-52. Per Capita Earned Income by Source, 1990/91.............................................................. 258 

Figure VII-53. Percentage of Earned Income from Oil Spill Cleanup Jobs, Study 

Communities, 1989/90 and 1990/91 ............................................................................... 259 

Figure VII-54. Per Capita Income by Source, Cordova.......................................................................... 259 

Figure VII-55. Are young Adults Learning Enough Subsistence Skills? Percentage Saying 

“Yes” in 1991/92 and 1997/98......................................................................................... 261 

Figure VII-56. Households’ Assessments of Whether Young Adults Are Learning 

Adequate Subsistence Skills, 1997/98............................................................................ 261 

Figure VII-57. Reasons Why Young Adults Are Not Learning Enough Subsistence Skills, 

1997/98 ........................................................................................................................... 262 

Figure VII-58. How Effective Are Spirit Camps in Teaching Subsistence Skills? 

Responses in 1998 ......................................................................................................... 262 
xii 

Figure VII-59. How Has Elders’ Influence Changed Since 19989? All Communities 

Combined, Study Years 1991, 1992, & 1993.................................................................. 266 

Figure VII-60. Has Elders’ Influence Changed since 1989? Responses for Study Year 1993 

by Community Category.................................................................................................. 266 

Figure VII-61. Assessment of Influence of Elders in Teaching Subsistence Skills 

and Values Compared to Before the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1998................................. 267 

Figure VII-62. Changes in Elders’ Influence in Teaching Skills and Values Since the EVOS: 

Percent Saying Influence has Decreased ....................................................................... 267 

Figure VII-63. Changes in Elders’ Influence in Teaching Skills and Values Since the EVOS: 

Percent Saying Influence has Increased......................................................................... 268 

Figure VII-64. Was the Traditional Way of Life Affected by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill? 

 (asked in 1998) .............................................................................................................. 268 

Figure VII-65. Has the Traditional Way of Life Recovered Since the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill? 

 (Asked in 1998) .............................................................................................................. 271 

Figure VII-66. What Should Be Done to Help the Traditional Way of Life Recover? 

(All Communities Combined) .......................................................................................... 271 

Figure VIII-1. Frequency of Native Household Types, Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest the 

Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993 ....................................................................................... 275 

Figure VIII-2. Wild Food Harvests by Native Household Type, Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest 

the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993 ................................................................................. 275 

Figure VIII-3. Wild Food Received by Native Household Type, Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest 

the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993 ................................................................................. 278 

Figure VIII-4. Wild Food Species Received (but Not Harvested) by Native Household Type, 

Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993................................... 278 

Figure VIII-5. Diversity of Wild Foods Harvested by Native Household Type, 

 Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993.................................. 281 

Figure VIII-6. Wild Food Used by Native Household Type, Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest 

the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993 ................................................................................. 281 

Figure VIII-7. Wild Food Given by Native Household Type, Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest 

the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993 ................................................................................. 282 

Figure VIII-8. Household Income by Native Household Type, Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest 

the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993 ................................................................................. 282 

Figure VIII-9. Wage Incomes by Native Household Type, Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest 

the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993 ................................................................................. 283 

Figure VIII-10. Entitlement Income by Native Household Type, Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest 

the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993 ................................................................................. 283 
xiii 

Figure VIII-11. Correlations Between Factors of Production of Alaska Native Households 

in Chenega Bay, Tatitlek, Port Graham, and Nanwalek for Three Study Years ............. 286 
xv 

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations Used in the Text 

AAC Alaska Administrative Code 

ADCRA Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs 

ADF&G Alaska Department of Fish and Game 

ACFEC Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission 

ADEC Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (also DEC) 

ADHSS Alaska Department of Health and Social Services 

ADOL Alaska Department of Labor 

AKP Alaska Peninsula 

ANCSA Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 

ANILCA Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 

BIA Bureau of Indian Affairs 

CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 

CRRC Chugach Regional Resources Commission 

CWF Columbia Ward Fisheries 

DEC Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (also ADEC) 

Division The Division of Subsistence of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game 

EVOS Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 

EVOSTC Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council 

FDA Food and Drug Administration (also USFDA) 

FY Fiscal year 

FFY Federal fiscal year 

IAI Impact Assessment, Inc. 

IHS Indian Health Service 

KANA Kodiak Area Native Association 

MMS Minerals Management Service 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
xvi 

NANA Northwest Alaska Native Association 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NRDA Natural Resources Damage Assessment 

OCS Outer Continental Shelf 

OPA Oil Pollution Act 

OSHTF Oil Spill Health Task Force 

PAH Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons 

PSP Paralytic Shellfish Poisoning 

RurALCAP Rural Alaska Community Action Program 

PWS Prince William Sound 

SERVS Ship Escort Response Vessel System 

SETAC Society of Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 

SEQ Social Effects Questionnaire 

SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 

TEK Traditional Ecological Knowledge 

TM Technical Memorandum 

TAPAA Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act 

USFDA US Food and Drug Administration (also FDA) 

USFWS United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
xv 

Acknowledgments 

First of all, we would like to thank the hundreds of people in the communities of the study area 

who consented to be interviewed as part of this project. We also thank the tribal governments for 

approving our research plans. Especially, we thank the communities of Tatitlek, Chenega Bay, 

Nanwalek, Port Graham, Ouzinkie, and Old Harbor for their support of the production of the 

ethnographies and oral history “jukeboxes” that provided much of the information upon which this 

report is based. 

Many current and former employees of the Division of Subsistence helped conduct the fieldwork 

and analysis that are the basis for this report. These include Louis Brown, Janet Cohen, Lisa 

Hutchinson-Scarbrough, Gretchen Jennings, Lisa Tomrdle Ka’aihue, Pippa Coiley Kenner, Jessie 

Mallery, Craig Mishler, Amy Paige, Ron Stanek, Lee Stratton, and Vicki Vanek. We especially 

wish to acknowledge the contributions of the late Mary Ellen Fogarty. 

Staff at the University of Alaska Fairbanks Oral History Program assisted with the planning and 

production of the oral history “jukeboxes” that were a central product of this research. We thank 

Bill Schneider, Dave Krupa, Bill Burke, Mary Ann Larson, and Jarrod Decker. We also gratefully 

acknowledge the assistance from the Tatitlek School. 

Many colleagues helped us review information and ideas for this final report. These include 

Joanna Endter-Wada, Doug Levine, Taylor Brelsford, Nancy Davis, Steve Braund, Patricia 

Partnow, and Aron Crowell. Don Callaway (National Park Service), Rachel Mason (National Park 

Service, formerly U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), and Harry Luton (Minerals Management 

Service) served as “project inspectors” for MMS for the entire duration of the project. We thank 

them for their many helpful and insightful comments and suggestions. MMS staff in Anchorage 

who helped set up and administer the cooperative agreement and provided comments on this 

report and other products included Michael Baffrey, Ed Glazier, and Cleve Cowles. 

This final report draws heavily from our prior research efforts in the EVOS area. The Exxon 

Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council and the US Fish and Wildlife Service helped fund some of these 

earlier rounds of household interviews. 

Finally, we thank the Minerals Management Service for its support of this research through a 

cooperative agreement with the Alaska Department of Fish and Game. 
1 

Chapter One: Introduction 

THE STUDY BACKGROUND 

Industrial disasters are a potential, perhaps inevitable, consequence of natural resource 

development. In Alaska, development of oil fields on the arctic North Slope has produced wealth for a 

broad spectrum of groups during the late 20th century. Beneficiaries include oil companies, subsidiary 

businesses, state and local governments, and the citizens of Alaska as a whole through a stimulated 

state economy and annual dividends from state-invested oil royalties. Yet injury has accompanied 

wealth. In 1989, an industrial failure produced one of the worst environmental disasters in American 

history. The wreck of the tanker Exxon Valdez on March 24, 1989, spilled 11 million gallons of crude oil 

into the Pacific Gulf of Alaska. The disaster occurred eight hundred miles to the south of the oil fields, 

near the terminus of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline at Valdez. The spill contaminated over 1,200 miles of 

coastline from Prince William Sound to Kupreanof Point on the Alaska Peninsula. The oil caused 

massive injuries to the natural environment, including populations of fish, marine mammals, and birds. It 

disrupted human uses of these natural resources. Exxon was assessed $1.15 billion by the federal US 

District Court for these damages (EVOSTC 1999:8). 

The Exxon Valdez oil spill (EVOS) had profound implications for human communities in the spill 

area. The oil spill posed an unexpected threat of uncertain dimensions for cities, towns, and villages of 

the Pacific Gulf region. The Alutiiq villages of the Pacific Gulf appeared particularly threatened, because 

the culture, economy, and way of life of small Alaska Native villages are directly tied to healthy, 

productive ecosystems (Wolfe and Walker 1987). The people of the Pacific Gulf were forced to respond 

to a series of external challenges triggered by the disaster – drifting oil, oiled coastlines, disrupted 

fisheries, contaminated wild foods, damaged fish stocks, and protracted litigation. In the aftermath of the 

spill, they also had to respond to changing economic and political conditions, some a direct result of 

EVOS and others independent of the spill itself but part of the broader context in which spill response 

took place. Some challenges and responses lasted for years, and some continue 10 years and more 

after the Exxon Valdez hit Bligh Reef. 

This report explores these immediate and longer-term effects on human communities in the 

Pacific Gulf. The report was prepared by the Division of Subsistence of the Alaska Department of Fish 

and Game (ADF&G) under a cooperative agreement with the US Department of the Interior, Minerals 

Management Service (MMS) (Cooperative Agreement No. 14-35-0001-30788) entitled “Sociocultural 

Consequences of Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Activities: Data Analysis/Integration.” Detailed 

information on the impacts of the EVOS was collected under two previous agreements between MMS and 

ADF&G (Cooperative Agreements 14-35-0001-30539 and 30622). Basic descriptive and univariate 

analysis drawing from these data sets was presented in Fall and Utermohle (1995). The general purpose 

of the new cooperative agreement was to conduct a comparative analysis that collected new 
2 

ethnographic materials and integrated existing quantitative and qualitative data across communities, 

cultural groups, local socioeconomic systems, and households. The project consisted of seven 

interrelated tasks, as described below. The cooperative agreement was amended in 1998 to support the 

addition of data from a new round of systematic household interviews in eight communities of the EVOS 

area, funded by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (EVOSTC) (Fall and Utermohle 1999). 

While a number of communities are examined, the report focuses on the responses of Alutiiq 

villages in the spill area. The purpose is to describe how human communities responded to the spill. 

Most of the information derives directly from residents in the spill area, provided through several 

systematic face-to-face household surveys in Pacific Gulf communities and through ethnographic 

research. As shown in the following pages, the findings strongly indicate that in most communities, 

families actively adapted to the industrial disaster in ways that protected the well being of family 

members, and that preserved traditional cultural elements in the community’s way of life. Most Alutiiq 

villages appear to have endured the disaster through the hard choices and work of extended families and 

tribal governments. This outcome is a testament to the durability of traditional ways of living that support 

contemporary Alaska Native communities. The report also describes the changing natural, social, 

economic, and political landscapes of the post-spill era that continue to challenge the adaptability of this 

traditional way of life. It is hoped the experiences and knowledge shared by the Pacific Gulf communities 

in this report may help others to deal with potential future disasters and the inevitable changes that 

continued development of natural resources will bring. 

DISPARATE CLAIMS 

Despite the magnitude of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, there exist disparate claims concerning its 

effects on human communities. A primary goal of this report is to examine these claims, which need to 

be acknowledged at the outset because they have contributed to alternative ”social constructions” of the 

EVOS. As interpretations of the meaning of the spill and its aftermath, social constructions develop 

through discourse involving industry (oil, fishing, and tourism, for example), governments (federal, state, 

and tribal), scientists (who themselves may be employed by competing interests), the media, and the 

public. In turn, social constructions shape responses to the event. (We return to these themes in 

Chapter Nine.) 

Early claims about the effects of the spill were commonly subjective and not grounded in any 

systematic information. In some cases, claims about effects were offered in the service of particular 

vested interests. Consider, for example, these two summaries of the effects of the spill on Chenega Bay 

and Tatitlek, the two Alutiiq villages closest to the spill in Prince William Sound. 

The first is a subjective assessment from a journalist, depicting a cultural group allegedly isolated 

from a “cash economy” being destructively thrust into the late 20th century by the spill and clean-up. 
3 

Chenega Bay, Alaska -- This is the way it was: The smell of roasting seal drifted 

through the village. Clams were piled high in buckets. Hunters proudly described their 

conquests. Children listened quietly as elders passed down their knowledge. Money 

was sparse, but not needed. The land and sea provided. 

This is the way it is: Seals are scarce, and there are odd sores on some of the 

shellfish. Hunting has all but ceased. Food comes by airplane from grocery stores 

hundreds of miles away. And money, while more abundant, has become vital. 

What happened in between was the Exxon Valdez. . . Together, the oil spill and 

its aftermath have turned Chenega Bay’s subsistence economy into a cash one -- there is 

more money to buy things, less nature to live off -- altering everything from the village’s 

social fabric to its dinner menus (Woestendiek 1991). 

The second assessment is by two anthropologists under contract as experts to the Exxon 

Corporation in post-spill litigation. It portrays the spill as a relatively minor event in a long series of 

assaults on an already vastly altered culture. 

. . . Put into the context of socioeconomic change and adjustments to past social 

disasters that the Alutiiq people have experienced, the Exxon Valdez oil spill was not a 

determinant event. Its chief distinguishing characteristic is that blame could be attached 

and lawsuits filed, causing problems that the oil spill itself never could have caused. The 

spill could thus become the scapegoat for many of the changes in the Alutiiq environment 

(physical and cultural) that have occurred in the twentieth century (Wooley 1995:148-149; 

cf. Wooley and Bohannon 1994:28). 

These two disparate statements establish a vast gulf of interpretation. The journalistic view is 

simplistic, romanticized, and, presumably, written to what sells to a reading public. The second view is 

litigious positioning which, if accepted in court, could possibly relieve Exxon Corporation of certain 

damage claims filed by the Alaska Native people of the spill area. Each of these assessments contains 

assumptions about the condition of communities before the spill and dimensions of sociocultural and 

economic change already underway at that time. 

Compare these two assessments with a third statement about effects on the community of 

Tatitlek, provided by the president of the Tatitlek tribal government, made during the first year of the spill: 

Mussels, clams, starfish -- things are dying off and floating up on the beaches. The tides 

come and go out, come in and go out. The scientists do their research one-day, and 

everything looks fine. But what about the tide coming in? There’s frustration, uncertainty 

and fear -- a fear of what the future’s going to bring. We go from fear to anger to 

frustration with this thing. It’s going to be with us for a long time (G. Kompkoff, President, 

Tatitlek Village Council, in Alaska Oil Spill Commission 1990:70). 

The issues presented by Kompkoff are of importance to residents of the village nearest the spill, who 

depend on wild foods for survival, and raise important questions. What exactly did the oil do to the 

natural environment? Are local observations about mussels, clams, and starfish related to oil 

contamination? How dynamic are effects? Can yesterday’s scientific observations about food safety be 
4 

trusted as a guide to today’s conditions? How long will the uncertainty last? Kompkoff reports frustration, 

fear, and anger in Tatitlek the year following the spill. 

The image of the incoming tide provides a metaphor for what appears to be from a historical 

perspective a relentless surge of forces bearing on Tatitlek, and other communities of the Pacific Gulf, 

day after day. In the years following the oil spill, what did this ebb and flow bring communities? Threats? 

Challenges? New possibilities? The goal of this report is to describe what did transpire after the oil spill 

in Pacific Gulf communities. Grounded in the systematic reports of community residents and 

ethnographic and survey research, the report seeks to provide a well-supported assessment of the effects 

of the spill and its aftermath on communities, placed in the historical context of continuity and change in 

the Pacific Gulf region. 

STUDY COMMUNITIES 

Coincidentally, the final definitive map of the oil spill area as produced by the EVOSTC in 1993 is 

almost coterminous with the traditional territory of the Alutiiq people, stretching from the Copper River 

Delta in the east for about 600 miles along Prince William Sound, the outer Kenai Peninsula Coast, lower 

Cook Inlet, the Kodiak Archipelago, and the Alaska Peninsula to Kupreanof Point (Fig. I-1). (There are a 

few Alutiiq communities on the Bristol Bay coast of the Alaska Peninsula that are not in the spill area.) 

Additionally, to the east of Prince William Sound itself, the Copper River delta was home to the Eyak. 

Tlingit territory stretched from southeast Alaska as far as the Bering River, just to the east of the Copper 

River. Descendents of these latter two groups, as well as Alutiiq, live in Cordova today. In Cook Inlet, 

traditional Dena’ina Athabaskan territory included the Kenai Peninsula as far south as Seldovia. 

At the time of the spill, there were 15 Alaska Native communities within the region traditionally 

inhabited by Alutiiq-speaking people and also within the spill area. Alutiiq, also called Sugpiaq, 

Sugcestun, Pacific Yup'ik, or "Aleut," is a language of the Aleut-Eskimo linguistic family most closely 

related to Central Yup'ik (Woodbury 1984:53). The Alutiiq way of life has always been oriented towards 

the shorelines and the sea, focusing on such subsistence activities as salmon and other fishing, marine 

mammal hunting, and marine invertebrate gathering (Clark 1984:195-196). The Alutiiq people were 

among the first in Alaska to be subjected to European and American exploration, colonization, and 

attempts at economic and cultural subjugation. Despite over 200 years of contact, the Alutiiq 

communities have maintained a way of life based upon subsistence uses of fish and wildlife resources 

and other Alaska Native cultural traditions (e.g., Davis 1984, Fall 1999b). (More detail on the traditional 

culture and history of the study area appears in Chapters Three and Four.) 

Although some of the contemporary Alutiiq communities have become established in their 

present locations relatively recently, most of these communities' families have lived in this region for many 

generations. Tatitlek is the oldest inhabited community of Prince William Sound, while Chenega Bay is 

the newest. Chenega Bay was founded on Evans Island in 1983 by former residents of the old village of 
5 

Figure I-1. Location of Study Communities within Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS) Area Boundary. 
6 

Chenega, which had been destroyed by a tsunami following the great earthquake of Good Friday 1964. 

(The EVOS also occurred on Good Friday, 25 years later.) The Alutiiq families of Port Graham and 

Nanwalek on the southern tip of Cook Inlet are descended from inhabitants of several small villages in 

this area (such as Yalik and Nuka Bay). Nanwalek itself was the site of the first permanent Russian 

settlement on Alaska's mainland, called Alexandrovsk (founded in 1785), while the present community of 

Port Graham originated in 1912 with the construction of commercial fish processing facilities there 

(Stanek 1985:41,45-46). Old Harbor on Kodiak Island was established by early Russian traders in 1794, 

while Ouzinkie was founded in the 19th century as a retirement community for employees of the RussianAmerican Company. Larsen Bay and Karluk are the sites of ancient Alutiiq settlements. Akhiok has been 

occupied since at least the 19th century. Port Lions, like Chenega Bay, owes its origin to the 1964 

earthquake, when the village of Afognak was destroyed. By 1965, survivors had resettled at Port Lions. 

On the Alaska Peninsula, Chignik Bay and Chignik Lagoon are the sites of prehistoric settlements. The 

community of Chignik Lake was founded in the 1950s by Alutiiq families who had formerly used the area 

seasonally; they originally came from local villages such as Chignik Lagoon, Kanatak, and Ilnik. Similar 

to Chenega Bay and Port Lions, Perryville's founding was the consequence of a natural disaster. The 

community was settled in 1912 by families whose villages of Katmai and Douglas were destroyed in a 

volcanic eruption. Finally, Ivanof Bay was founded in 1965 by families originally from Perryville and 

Chignik Lake. 

MAJOR STUDIES OF THE SOCIOCULTURAL EFFECTS OF THE OIL SPILL 

Table I-1 lists several summary statements about oil spill effects on subsistence uses in the years 

immediately following the spill stemming from some of the major studies. These are treated in this report 

as research questions for examination. There are several emphases and points of view within this corpus 

of research. 

The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (EVOSTC)

The EVOSTC consists of representatives of three federal and three state agencies. It 

administers funds from the settlement of claims by the United States and the State of Alaska against 

Exxon for natural resource injuries caused by the spill (see Chapter Six). Because of its powerful role as 

a source of funding backed by the federal and state governments, the Trustee Council’s summaries of 

spill injuries approximate “official” positions on the spill’s effects and the status of recovery. According to 

the restoration plan adopted in 1994, the Trustee Council’s restoration program takes “an ecosystem 

approach” which “includes the entire community of organisms that interact with each other and their 

physical surroundings, including people and their relationship with other organisms” (EVOSTC 1993a:10). 
7 

Table I-1: Some Major Hypotheses about the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill’s Sociocultural 

Effects 

Division of Subsistence Hypothesis: Uncertainty about the Safety of Subsistence Foods 

“The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill provides a prime example of the consequences of a major 

environmental and industrial disaster for the traditional subsistence-based ways of life of 

Alaska’s rural communities. . . In the year after the spill, subsistence harvests in 10 communities 

in the spill area decreased by as much as 77% compared to pre-spill averages. The range of 

resources used for subsistence declined by half. In addition, the average number of resources 

that households attempted to harvest and that they received from other households dropped 

substantially, indicating reduced subsistence harvest efforts and effects on traditional sharing 

patterns. . . The primary reason that interviewed households gave for reductions in subsistence 

harvests was concern that resources had been contaminated by the oil. This concern undermined 

people’s confidence in their own abilities to discern if foods were safe to eat using traditional 

knowledge. . . Subsistence harvests and uses rebounded in the second and third postspill year. . . 

[But] . . . concerns about the long-term health risks associated with subsistence foods, as well as 

concerns about spill effects on the resource populations upon which subsistence uses depend, 

persisted. Although evidence was found of recovery of subsistence uses after the severe 

reductions of 1989, this evidence must be qualified in that many households returned to using 

subsistence foods, despite misgivings, because of economic and cultural reasons” (Fall and Field 

1996:834-835). 

Alaska Native Class Hypothesis: “A Culture and People Damaged”

“The oil spill ripped the fabric of the Alutiiq community by damaging the core elements: first 

the natural resources (the material foundation of Alutiiq culture) and with it, the subsistence 

harvest. Damage to subsistence harvests in turn had detrimental implications for kinship, the 

institutional foundation. This upheaval also damaged the third core element of the subsistence 

system, the individual people, by taking away the means by which they derive order and 

meaning from their lives and introducing uncertainty and confusion” (Braund & Associates 

1993:106). 

Wooley and Bohannon [Exxon experts] Hypothesis: The Oil Spill as “C-Day” and 

“Scapegoat” 

“. . . put into the context of socioeconomic change and adjustments to past social disasters that 

the Alutiiq people have experienced, the Exxon Valdez oil spill was not a determinant event. Its 

chief distinguishing characteristic is that blame could be attached and lawsuits filed, causing 

problems that the oil spill itself never could have caused. The spill could thus become the 

scapegoat for many of the changes in the Alutiiq environment (physical and cultural) that have 

occurred in the twentieth century” (Wooley 1995:148-149; cf. Wooley and Bohannon 1994:28). 

[continued] 
8 

Table I-1: [continued] Some Major Hypotheses about the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill’s 

Sociocultural Effects 

Social Indicators (J. Jorgensen) Hypothesis: Culturally-Mediated Responses to the Spill

“Without question, native subsistence economies in 1989, immediately prior to the spill, were 

different from native subsistence economies of 1889 and 1789 and 1689 in the technology, the 

speed and risks with which resource could be harvested, and the proportion that wild foods 

contributed to the diets. But in 1989, as in the three centuries that preceded it, subsistence 

economies were directly linked to procuring food and shelter for the maintenance of life. . . I 

will demonstrate how native customs were invoked as a response to the spill and how nonnatives 

responded to the spill as well. The differences were marked. The differences are cultural 

(Jorgensen 1995b:4). . . Immediately after the spill and continuing into early 1990, non-Natives 

increased their harvests and uses of wild resources. Natives decreased their harvest and relied 

upon preserved foods harvested before the spill. By the winter of 1991, non-Natives had reduced 

their harvests and the amounts of wild foods that they ate. Natives had begun to resume more 

fully their harvesting activities. The proportions of wild foods in their diets remained below the 

proportions in 1989” (Jorgensen 1995a:8). 

“Oiled Mayors Study” Hypothesis: A “Dose-Response” Relationship

“A progressive ‘dose-response’ relationship was found between exposure to the oil spill and 

subsequent cleanup efforts and the following variables: reported declines in traditional social 

relations with family members, friends, neighbors and coworkers; a decline in subsistence 

production and distribution activities; perceived increases in the amount of and problems 

associated with drinking, drug abuse, and domestic violence; a decline in perceived health status 

and an increase in the number of medical conditions verified by a physician; and increased postspill rates of generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and depression. 

Alaskan Natives, women, and 18-44 year olds in the high- and low-exposed groups were 

particularly at risk for the three psychiatric disorders following the oil spill. The results suggest 

that the oil spill’s impact on the psychosocial environment was as significant as its impact on the 

physical environment “ (Palinkas et al. 1993:10). 

Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council Hypothesis: An Injured Natural Resource Service

“Subsistence harvests of fish and wildlife in most of these [15 predominantly Alaska Native 

communities in the oil spill area] declined substantially following the oil spill. The reasons for 

the declines include reduced availability of fish and wildlife to harvest, concern about possible 

health effects of eating contaminated or injured fish and wildlife, and disruption of lifestyles due 

to clean-up and other activities. . . Subsistence users say that maintaining their subsistence 

culture depends on uninterrupted use of fish and wildlife resources. The more time users spend 

away from subsistence activities, the less likely that they will return to these practices. 

Continuing injury to natural resources used for subsistence may affect ways of life of entire 

communities. There is particular concern that the oil spill disrupted opportunities for young 

people to learn subsistence culture, and that this knowledge may be lost to them in the future” 

[EVOSTC 1996a:20). 
9 

The Trustee Council views injuries to subsistence uses as an extension of injuries to natural resources. 

Consequently, restoration of subsistence uses is approached indirectly through restoration of the natural 

resources themselves. There is in this approach an implicit denial that addressing the sociocultural 

effects of the spill directly has a place in an “ecological approach” to oil spill restoration. 

Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Subsistence

The Division of Subsistence, ADF&G, had conducted baseline research in each of the Alaska 

Native communities before the oil spill, including at least one comprehensive household survey. (See Fall 

[1990] for a description of the Division’s research procedures.) After the spill, systematic research 

continued to document subsistence activities and other economic and demographic characteristics in 

selected study communities. Study communities and study years are reported in Table I-2. This work 

was funded by ADF&G, the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USWFS), MMS, and the EVOSTC. Major 

summaries of the findings from these studies include Fall (1991a, 1992, 1995a, 1996, 1999a, 1999c), Fall 

et al. (1995), Fall and Field (1996), Fall et al. (1996), Fall and Utermohle (1995, 1999), Mishler and Cohen 

(forthcoming), and Stanek (forthcoming). 

The ADF&G studies demonstrated substantial measurable impacts on subsistence harvests, 

participation, and sharing, among other things, that appear linked initially to a loss of confidence in the 

safety of subsistence foods, with implications for the mixed subsistence-cash economies and ways of life 

in the communities. Findings of this research are discussed in detail in Chapter Six. Some of the major 

study findings included the following: 

• In the year after the spill, subsistence harvests declined from 9 percent to 77 percent in 10 

Alaska Native communities of Prince William Sound, lower Cook Inlet, and the Kodiak 

Island Borough. Sharing of resources was reduced, and the transmission of skills and 

knowledge about natural resources was disrupted. 

• Initially, the primary reason for this decline was subsistence users’ fear that oil 

contamination had rendered the resources unsafe to eat. The primary reason for lower 

harvests and uses later shifted to perceived declines in populations of subsistence 

resources. 

• Subsistence harvest levels and participation in subsistence activities rebounded somewhat 

after the first two post-spill years. There was a geographic pattern to post-spill changes in 

subsistence harvests and uses, with recovery taking place first in communities most distant 

from Prince William Sound. 

• Effects of the spill which persisted at least into 1994 included concerns about the long-term 

human health effects of using resources from the spill area; a loss of confidence in 
10 

Table I-2. Study Communities and Coverage by Major Post Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Study

1

Population "Oiled Social Chronic

Community2 1990 1995 Mayors" Indicators Stress Standard Survey Instrument Social Effects Questionnaire

Prince William Sound

Chenega Bay 94 96 X 1984/85, 1985/86, 1989/90, 

1990/91, 1991/92, 1992/93, 

1993/94, 1997/98

1991/92, 1992/93, 1993/94

Cordova 2,110 2,568 X X X 1985, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993, 

1997/98

1991, 1992, 1993

Tatitlek 119 124 X X 1987/88, 1988/89, 1989/90, 

1990/91, 1991/92, 1993/94, 

1997/98

1991/92, 1993/94

Valdez 4,068 4,469 X X X 1991, 1992, 1993 1991, 1992, 1993

Cook Inlet

Kenai 6,327 7,006 X X 1982, 1991, 1992, 1993 1991, 1992, 1993

Nanwalek 158 162 X 1987, 1989, 1990/91, 1991/92, 

1992/93, 1993/94, 1997/98

1991/92, 1992/93, 1993/94

Port Graham 166 170 X 1987, 1989, 1990/91, 1991/92, 

1992/93, 1993/94, 1997/98

1991/92, 1992/93, 1993/94

Seldovia 459 415 X X 1982, 1991/92, 1992/93, 1993/94 1991/92, 1992/93, 1993/94

Kodiak Island Borough

Akhiok 77 80 X 1982, 1986, 1989, 1992/93

Karluk 71 58 X X 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990/91, 

1991/92

1991/92

Kodiak City 6,365 7,620 X X 1982, 1991, 1992, 1993 1991, 1992, 1993

Larsen Bay 147 130 X 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990/91, 

1991/92, 1992/93, 1993/94, 

1997/98

1991/92, 1992/93, 1993/94

Old Harbor 284 310 X X 1982, 1986, 1989, 1991/92, 

1997/98

1991/92

Ouzinkie 209 259 X 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990/91, 

1991/92, 1992/93, 1993/94, 

1997/98

1991/92, 1992/93, 1993/94

Port Lions 222 233 X 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993/94

Alaska Peninsula

Chignik 188 141 X X 1984, 1989, 1991/92 1991/92

Chignik Lagoon 53 65 X 1984, 1989

Chignik Lake 133 154 X 1984, 1989, 1991/92 1991/92

Ivanof Bay 35 28 1984, 1989

Perryville 108 104 1984, 1989

Arctic

Kaktovik 224 210 X 1985/86, 1986/87, 1992/93

Kivalina 317 349 X 1982/83, 1983/84, 1992 1992

Kotzebue 2,751 2,947 X 1986, 1991 1991

Nuiqsuit 354 410 X 1985/86, 1993 1993

1

 Major references for these studies: "Oil Mayors": IAI 1990abcd; Social Indicators: Jorgensen 1995b; Chronic Stress: 

 Picou and Gill 1996; ADF&G: Fall and Utermohle 1995, 1999.

2 ADF&G studies for Kodiak in 1982 and 1991 included the road system outside the city limits "Seldovia" population = 

 "Alaska Native Village statistical area," including the city limits and areas connnected by road to the incorporated area.

ADF&G (with study years)

Major Study Coverage
11 

individuals' abilities to judge if resources were safe to eat; scarcity of certain injured subsistence 

resources such as harbor seals, marine invertebrates, and waterfowl; increased costs 

associated with subsistence harvests; and reduced opportunities for young people to learn the 

subsistence way of life. 

The “Oiled Mayors Study”

This study was funded by the Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs (ADCRA) 

through a grant to the “oiled mayors subcommittee” of the Alaska Conference of Mayors. The contract to 

conduct the research was awarded through a competitive process to Impact Assessment, Inc. The study 

was conducted from December 1989 through November 1990 in 22 communities throughout the spill 

area. The goal was “to investigate the types and range of social, economic, and psychological impacts 

resulting from the oil spill and cleanup” (Russell et al. 1996:869). Major summaries of this study’s findings 

include Impact Assessment, Inc. 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1990d; Palinkas et al. 1992, 1993; and Russell et 

al. 1996. ADCRA prepared and distributed a brochure presenting the major study findings (ADCRA n.d.). 

MMS Social Indicators Project

The MMS-sponsored “social indicators project” was implemented in coastal communities of 

northern and western Alaska in 1986. It included the administration of questionnaires, key respondent 

protocols, and ethnographic research. In 1989, the social indicators project was extended to include 

twelve communities, including nine in the spill area, for two post-spill waves of research. Study findings 

are reported in an eight-volume final report published by MMS and in several journal articles (e.g., 

Jorgensen 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b). A primary finding of the post-spill Social Indicators research 

was that there were marked differences between Native and non-Native responses to the spill that can be 

accounted for by pre-spill cultural differences. 

Study of Chronic Psychological Stress in Cordova and Valdez

This study was funded by the National Science Foundation, with supplemental funding from 

Earthwatch and the Center for Field Research. The principal investigators were J. Steven Picou 

(University of South Alabama) and Duane Gill (Mississippi State University). The goal of the research 

was to evaluate the long-term psychological impact of the spill in terms of community structure and 

resource-based stress responses. Study communities were Cordova, Valdez, and Petersburg (control). 

Major publications include articles by Picou and Gill (1996), by Dyer et al. (1992) and by Dyer (1993). 

This research continues to date. Some of the major findings include the following: 
12 

• Residents of communities of the EVOS area displayed higher levels of stress than residents 

of communities outside the area 

• Within the EVOS region, residents of “renewable resource communities” (e.g., Cordova) 

displayed higher levels of stress than residents of “nonrenewable resource communities” 

(e.g., Valdez). 

• People who worked in commercial fishing occupations displayed higher levels of spillrelated stress than those who worked in other occupations. 

Litigation Studies 

The attorneys for the Alaska Native Class in the litigation against Exxon hired an Anchoragebased anthropological consulting firm, Stephen Braund and Associates, to compile information about the 

sociocultural effects of the spill on Alaska Native people. The final report was based on summaries of 

other studies as well as interviews in spill area communities. As with the MMS Social indicators Study, the 

Alaska Native Class experts approached the spill’s effects on subsistence uses within a broad 

sociocultural context. The Alaska Native Class attorneys also employed an environmental consulting firm 

to develop an overview of natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) studies to identify impacts to 

subsistence (ICF Technology Incorporated 1993). The final report described the following impacts: 

• uncertainty concerning the availability and wholesomeness of key subsistence resources; 

• reduced availability of many subsistence species; and 

• reduced efficiency in subsistence harvesting activities because resources of smaller individual 

size were harvested in reduced amounts during each harvest effort. 

The report concluded that the persistence of oil in the environment, such as in mussel beds, would likely 

continue to harm resources and retard biological recovery. In addition to reduced subsistence harvests, 

the study suggested that these biological impacts could be linked to non-natural resource aspects of 

subsistence use, including nutrition, sharing, cultural knowledge, and social organization. 

The defendant in the litigation, Exxon, employed anthropologists as experts to assess 

sociocultural aspects of the EVOS (Wooley 1995; Wooley and Bohannon 1994). Because of the ongoing 

litigation, the experts did not conduct fieldwork. They concluded that the spill had no important long-term 

implications for the culture and way of life of the communities of the spill area, to a large extent because 

the culture of these communities had already changed so much from “traditional” patterns. According to 

this view, the spill might become a “C [Change] Day” which could be cited as the cause of changes 

asserted to have been occurring for decades. As such, the spill could become a “scapegoat” for certain 

sociocultural changes suffered by Alaska Native communities. 
13 

Other Studies

In the first few months following the spill, the Alaska Native non-profit organization for the 

Chugach Region (then called The North Pacific Rim, later renamed Chugachmiut), employed an 

independent Anchorage-based anthropologist to conduct research on its behalf. Although several draft 

reports were produced, only a brief summary overview of this work has been published (Davis 1996). 

The article stresses the endurance and “resilience” of Alutiiq communities in the face of natural and manmade disasters. It also asserts that litigation prevented a full understanding of how the Alutiiq 

communities responded to, and recovered from, the EVOS. Araji (1992) was a study of effects of the 

EVOS on Homer, a Kenai Peninsula community not part of this research. 

MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 

ADF&G prepared the design for this project in response to a request for a proposal from MMS 

(Fall, Utermohle, and Wolfe 1995:2). The study’s major goals were (1) to analyze and integrate 

subsistence, economic, and sociocultural time-series data from two previous cooperative agreements 

between MMS and ADF&G (Cooperative Agreements No. 30539 and No. 30622); (2) to provide 

comparative data analysis within and among Alaska’s OCS planning areas; (3) to provide unique 

information about socioeconomic change at the household and community levels for EVOS-affected 

communities; (4) to cooperate with state and federal agencies and community and regional organizations 

in assessing the occurrence and implications of documented sociocultural change; and (5) to implement 

effective communication of study results to local communities and regional organizations. 

Seven tasks and a set of associated deliverables were formulated to meet these goals. The 

relationship between the tasks and deliverables, along with the repository for products, is depicted in 

Table I-3. Following is an overview of each project task. 

Task 1 was the creation of an SPSS metafile of community survey information previously 

collected by ADF&G data and organized under two earlier cooperative agreements (14-

35-001-30539 and 14-35-0001-30622). The three phases were 1) defining the content of 

the household-level database, 2) creating the database using summary variables, and 3) 

compiling three different compositions of the household-level data sets to be used as 

input for analysis in Task 3, the time series analysis. As noted earlier, the cooperative 

agreement was amended to support the addition of data from another round of household 

interviews conducted in 1998 as part of an EVOS restoration project. Comprehensive 

metafiles were submitted to MMS in April 1999 as Technical Memorandum-1 (TM-1). 
14 

Table I-3. Project Tasks, Deliverables, Repositories of Products, and Citations

Task # Task Name Deliverable1 Repository Citation

1 Creation of SPSS 

metafile of community 

survey data 

TM-1. ADF&G SPSS Metafiles ADF&G

2 Literature review TM-2. Annotated Bibliograpy and 

Integrative Overview

ADF&G

3 Time-series analysis of 

ADF&G datasets

TM-3. Time Series Analysis; also 

Included in final report (see Task 7)

ADF&G

4 Ethnographic case 

studies

TM-4. Valdez Report ADF&G Fogarty et al. 2000

TM-5. Tatitlek/Chenega Bay 

Ethnography

ADF&G Simeone and 

Miraglia 2000

TM-6. Cordova Report ADF&G Kenner 2000

TM-7. Old Harbor/Ouzinkie 

Ethnography

ADF&G Mishler 2001

TM-8. Nanwalek/Port Graham 

Ethnography

ADF&G Stanek 2000

5 Oral histories TM-10. Pre-Fieldwork Plan for Oral 

History and Ethnography Tasks

ADF&G

TM-9. Post-Fieldwork Summary of 

Oral History Task

ADF&G

Chenega Bay Jukebox ADF&G

Tatitlek Jukebox ADF&G

Nanwalek/Port Graham Jukebox ADF&G

6 Creation of GIS 

database and map 

products

GIS database2

; map products in 

jukeboxes, ethnographies, and final 

report

ADF&G

7 Final report OCS Study MMS 2001-032 MMS Fall et al. 2001 (this 

report)

1

 TM = Technical Memorandum; the numbering system here differs from that in the project proposal 

and cooperative agreement. 2 GIS Database was largely developed through a cooperative agreement with the 

US Fish and Wildlife Service.
15 

Task 2 consisted of a review of literature addressing EVOS and other socioeconomic 

studies as they relate to understanding the relationships among such factors as 

subsistence activities, local cash economies, and the welfare of the communities in the 

spill area. The goal of the literature review was to identify a set of hypotheses about the 

long-term consequences of the spill which could be examined through analysis of the 

data base developed under Task 1, and/or that could be further investigated through key 

respondent interviews, other ethnographic research, and other investigations. This effort 

resulted in an annotated bibliography. A technical memorandum (TM-2) included findings 

from the literature review task. 

Task 3 was a time-series analysis of the ADF&G data sets, using the database 

developed under Task 1 and guided by the hypotheses identified under Task 2. 

Theoretical background for this task is further described in Chapter Two. TM-3 included 

results of the time-series analysis, which are also discussed in this report. 

Task 4 consisted of ethnographic case studies and key respondent interviews. Five 

ethnographic case studies were conducted: Valdez (TM-4) (Fogerty et al. 2000), 

represents “non-subsistence-based” economies and societies; the couplets TatitlekChenega Bay (TM-5) (Simeone and Miraglia 2000), Port Graham-Nanwalek (TM-8) 

(Stanek 2000), and Ouzinkie-Old Harbor (TM-7) (Mishler 2001) represent mixed 

subsistence economies and Alaska Native communities; and Cordova (TM-6) (Kenner 

2000), represents rural communities or “hubs,” larger, more culturally-heterogeneous 

commercial fishing based settlements. Development of the ethnographies was guided by 

a topical outline and a series of workshops that identified key respondent topics. 

Task 5 consisted of the planning, development, and distribution of a series of oral 

histories from Alaska Naïve elders and other knowledgeable people. The project used 

techniques developed by the University of Alaska’s Project Jukebox, an interactive, multimedia computer system that preserves oral histories and associated photographs, maps, 

and texts. The content and themes of the oral histories were developed in two 

workshops and in meetings in the study communities. TM-10 describes the procedures 

for coordination of this effort and TM-9 is a post-fieldwork overview of the Jukebox 

production and contents. The four communities for which three jukeboxes were 

produced were Tatitlek, Chenega Bay, Nanwalek, and Port Graham. The latter two 

communities were combined in a single product. 
16 

Task 6 was the creation of a geographic information system (GIS) database to support 

the development of the ethnographic case studies and the final report. This task was 

supplemented through another cooperative agreement with the USFWS. 

Task 7 was the production of this report, which is intended to be a comprehensive, 

integrative, and comparative analysis drawing upon all of the project’s quantitative and 

qualitative data sets, ethnographic case studies, oral histories, and secondary source 

materials. 

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 

Because it deals with continuity and change in sociocultural systems, the report is organized 

chronologically. The following chapter provides a theoretical basis for the overall analysis. Chapter 

Three describes the Pacific Gulf region at “historic contact” between Alutiiq and Euroamerican groups. 

Major historical processes in the Pacific Gulf up to the oil spill are described in Chapter Four, including 

changes in demography, economy, religion, education, political systems, and natural resources. Chapter 

Five provides a “snap shot” of the Pacific Gulf region on the “eve” of the oil spill, and Chapter Six 

describes the oil spill itself. Chapters Seven and Eight describe the responses of households and 

communities to the oil spill, including economic, cultural, and political processes. The analysis covers the 

first ten years following the spill. Chapter Nine provides an assessment of these changes in light of the 

larger research question of how the oil spill fits into the history of sociocultural continuity and change in 

the Pacific Gulf region. 
17 

Chapter Two: Adaptation, Culture, and Human Groups 

in the Pacific Gulf: Theoretical Issues 

“Theories about disasters are inherently about communities, that is, 

community continuity and change” (Torry 1979:43). 

This chapter provides the theoretical underpinnings of this report. It describes the primary 

theoretical constructs and research questions that serve as the focus of inquiry. The theory underlying 

this analysis derives from sociocultural anthropology. Major theoretical constructs include adaptation, 

culture, social groups (including households, indigenous cultural groups, and community types), 

socioeconomic systems, and human adaptive responses. Each of these constructs is defined below with 

related research questions. 

ADAPTATION AND CULTURE 

Common to most anthropological theory is the concept of human adaptation. This construct is 

central to the following analysis of the oil spill in the Pacific Gulf of Alaska. Compared with other animal 

populations, human groups have evolved a capacity to flexibly adapt to a wide range of environments and 

environmental challenges. By environment we mean not just natural (physical) environments, but also 

social environments impinging upon human groups, including other groups, ideas, technologies, and 

sociopolitical systems. The adaptability of human groups primarily derives from “culture,” which is defined 

in this report as patterned ideas, activities, and technologies that are learned and shared within and 

across human groups. Cultural patterns that enable human groups to survive and prosper may display 

great continuity through time. They are the traditions that are passed on across generations. While 

cultural patterns commonly show persistence and continuity, humans continually adjust culturally 

patterned ideas, activities, and technologies in response to new challenges from the natural and social 

environments. Culture change is the rule in human groups, because over time, new environmental 

challenges stimulate innovation and change. Changes in culture that promote survival and prosperity of 

human groups are called positive adaptations in anthropological theory. Positive adaptations are 

measured by the social reproduction of a human group. Maladaptive responses to environmental 

challenges are measured by the difficulties of human groups to reproduce and prosper. 

One central research question explored in this report is, how did human groups adapt to the 

Exxon Valdez Oil Spill? Note that this is a very different question from “what were the impacts of the spill 

on human groups”, or “what were the damages?” The construct of “impacts” (a metaphor from physics) 

evokes images of something striking something and leaving residual effects. For human groups, the 

question of “what were the impacts” is overly simplistic, as it omits the essential active response of 

impacted human systems. Accordingly, the central research question of this study is “how did human 
18 

groups adapt to the industrial disaster,” recognizing that human groups actively respond to disasters, 

making changes from the routine to deal with external environmental threats. 

As stated above, the primary channels of adaptive change for human groups are usually cultural, 

including changes made in activities of families, networks of families, communities, networks of 

communities, and other social organizations. There are a number of types of cultural responses – 

technological (such as employing booms, skimmers, pressure hoses, and dispersants), demographic 

(moving people in, out, and around the spill area), economic (adjusting production and distribution of 

goods and services), organizational (activating and creating social entities for communication and 

coordination), legal (instituting suits for compensation of injuries), and so forth. The relative success of 

responses like these can be measured afterward by the extent to which particular human groups have 

endured, socially reproduced, and prospered. 

A second general research question explored in this report is, were responses to the spill 

primarily short-term changes, or long-term changes for human groups? Another way to pose this 

question is this: has the spill significantly altered the course of history for human groups in the Pacific Gulf 

of Alaska? As illustrated by some early post-spill appraisals in Chapter One, there have been some 

divergent opinions on this question, from the spill as a major shaper of cultural traditions in Native villages 

(Woestendiek 1991), to the spill as a minor, non-determinant event in the history of the Pacific Gulf 

groups (Wooley 1995; Wooley and Bohannon 1994). If human groups are pre-adapted to flexibly deal 

with novel environmental challenges, one might predict that responses might be short-term – response 

mechanisms were activated, applied, and deactivated, with life patterns returning to normal after the spill. 

On the other hand, substantial adjustments in cultural patterns may be required to deal with extreme 

environmental changes. Reponses to substantially altered ecological and social environments may 

evoke permanent changes within human groups. At times, human groups fail to adapt to severe 

challenges, such as virulent introduced diseases, the arrival of militant oppressors, or the severe 

degradation of a local ecological system. After a struggle to cope, human groups can diminish and 

disappear. In the case of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, what in fact did happen? To what extent have the 

histories of human groups in the Pacific Gulf been changed because of the oil spill? 

HUMAN GROUPS IN THE PACIFIC GULF 

A central theoretical construct is that of a “human group.” Adaptations to disasters generally are 

collaborative efforts involving multiple persons. Humans adapt as members of human groups and more 

rarely as individuals separate from human groups. Social roles are activated within human groups. 

Persons do their parts in a group response. A variety of human groups responded to the Exxon Valdez

oil spill, including business corporations (such as Exxon Corporation and Alyeska Corporation) and 

government entities (such as the U.S. Coast Guard, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, 

and the Oil Spill Trustee Council). Business and governmental bodies were major players in spill 
19 

response and restoration. They shaped the social construction of the oil spill, what it meant, and what 

were considered appropriate responses. These groups allocated millions of dollars in spill response and 

coordinated the activities of thousands of people. 

Within this massive social response were the individual and collective actions of the residents of 

the Pacific Gulf of Alaska. This report will focus on this latter group – the human groups resident in the 

spill area -- and their part in the responses to the spill event. The study will focus on three types of 

resident groups: cultural groups, household-level groups, and communities. The taxonomy of human 

groups used in the analysis is presented in Fig. II-1. Each type is briefly described below. 

Cultural Groups

The Alutiiq of the Pacific Gulf provide the focus for this report. The central research question is, 

how did the Alutiiq adapt to the oil spill? The Alutiiq are one of three Alaska Native groups in the Gulf of 

Alaska, alongside the Eyak (who primarily reside in Cordova with some Alutiiq and Tlingit residents) and 

the Dena’ina (who primarily reside in the Cook Inlet communities of Tyonek, Knik, Eklutna, Seldovia, and 

Kenai) (see Fig. II-1). The Eyak and Dena’ina, as cultural groups, are not a focus of the report. 

As used in this report, Alutiiq should be understood to be a social construct identifying a human 

group tied together by culture and history. The term, “Alutiiq” identifies the principal cultural group 

indigenous to the Pacific Gulf. Alutiiqs are persons whose ancestors predate historic contact in the 

Pacific Gulf region. Alutiiq also refers to the regional Eskimoan dialect historically spoken by the 

indigenous population within the Pacific Gulf (see Chapters Three and Five). Like many regional 

designations for Native American groups used by cultural anthropologists, the name identifies an 

indigenous population dispersed among several villages who under ordinary circumstances are not 

organized into a single social unit. It describes a group of persons unified by commonalities of culture 

and historic circumstance. During the late 1990s, the Alutiiq used several terms of self-reference, 

including “Aleut,” “Alutiiq,” “Sugpiat,” and the more general term, “Alaska Native” (see Chapter Three). 

During the late 20th century, there were certain benefits for being identified by these social terms, 

including political, educational, health, and economic entitlements through tribal affiliation and 

shareholder status in Native corporations. Above the level of family, the Alutiiq were organized into 22 

federally-recognized tribes, three regional non-profit organizations, and four regional profit organizations 

(see Chapter Five). 

As shown in Fig. II-1, the main non-Native cultural groups historically or currently residing in the 

spill area include the Russians (circa 1780s to 1867) and Euroamericans (after 1867). A few other 

cultural groups also have been residents, including the Chinese (as cannery workers during the late 19th

century), Filipinos (after the early 20th century), Hispanics (during the late 20th century), and a few others. 

Non-Native groups migrated into the Pacific Gulf region in several separate waves. Chapter Four 
20 

Figure II-1. Human Groups Historically Present in the Pacific Gulf of Alaska

(Taxonomic Categories Used in Analysis)

Cultural Groups

Alaska Native Non-Native

Alutiiq Eyak Dena'ina Russian Euro-American Other

(Koniag, 

Unixkugmiut,

1st wave

(circa 1867-90s)

2nd wave

(circa 1940s)

3rd wave

(circa 1970s-80s)

Filipino Hispanic

Chugach, 

Peninsula)

Community Groups

Villages Towns Cities

Near Spill Mid-Distant Distant Kodiak City Cordova Seldovia Valdez Kenai

(PWS-LCI)* (Kodiak Island) (Alaska Penin.)

Chenga Bay Ahkiok Chignik Bay

Tatitlek Karluk Chignik Lagoon

Pt Graham Larsen Bay Chignik Lake

Nanwalek Old Harbor Ivanof Bay

Ouzinkie Perryville

Port Lions

* Prince William Sound-Lower Cook Inlet

Household-Level Groups

Extended Family A Extended Family B Extended Family C Etc.

Household

No. 1

Household

No. 2

Household

No. 3

Household

No. 4

Household

No. 5

Household

No. 6

Household

No. 7

Household

No. 8

Household

No. 9
21 

identifies three distinct waves of Euroamerican migrants – early territorial (circa 1867-90s), World War II 

(circa 1940s), and oil boom (circa 1970s-80s). The new immigrants brought new cultural patterns, 

including new languages, economic systems, religious practices, and political structures. By the late 20th

century, most non-Natives resided in the towns and cities of the Pacific Gulf (Kodiak City, Valdez, 

Seward, Cordova, Seldovia, and Whittier), demographically separate from the Alutiiq villages. 

The term, “Euroamerican” identifies the largest cultural group currently residing in the Pacific Gulf. 

Euroamericans are persons with ancestral ties to Europe (principally northern Europe and Scandinavia) 

arriving in the Pacific Gulf region during the American period (after 1867). Like the term, “Alutiiq,” it 

describes a group of persons unified by commonalities of culture and historic circumstance. 

Euroamericans in the Pacific Gulf did not use this term for self-reference during the late 20th century. 

Most Euroamericans referred to themselves as “Alaskans” or “Americans” or “Whites,” or nothing at all (as 

discussed in Chapter Four, other terms like “Americanski,” “Yankee,” or “Boston Men” were used in the 

late 19th century, though these terms are not common today). “Non-Native” was a term only occasionally 

used by Euroamericans to distinguish themselves from the indigenous population. 

Through historic human migration, there has been a layering of cultural traditions in the Pacific 

Gulf. Cultural groups have been mutually influenced, through borrowing, syncretism, domination, and 

replacement of ideas and practice. But even into the late 20th century, Alaska Natives and non-Natives in 

the Pacific Gulf had maintained separate identities, relatively separate settlement patterns, and distinctive 

ways of life. This report will examine how the Alutiiq responded to the oil spill as a distinct cultural group 

in the Pacific Gulf. 

Household-Level Groups

The second type of group analyzed in this report is the “household.” A household is defined in 

this report as a residency unit. A household is all persons reported to be living within a dwelling. The 

household was a fundamental social unit in the Pacific Gulf. Households typically comprised a group of 

persons closely tied by kinship. It was typically a commensal unit -- its members regularly consumed 

from a common store of food and used a common set of material possessions. Functionally, primary 

activities of the household were marriage relations and child rearing, including the socialization of children 

into family traditions. The household was a fundamental unit for the social reproduction of the larger 

cultural group. As will be shown in later chapters, another primary activity of households was economic. 

Households were major economic firms in the production, distribution, and consumption of wild foods in 

Alaska Native villages. This economic organization of the subsistence sector is termed a “domestic 

mode” of production and distribution, in reference to its family-based organization. 

In economic and social activities, households were frequently linked together to form multihousehold, extended family groups, as shown in Fig. II-1 (see also Chapter Five). Bilateral kinship 

relationships were commonly used to link households into larger networks. The extended family group 

was most common in Alutiiq villages, where multi-generational families were prevalent. The extended 
22 

family group was the central social unit for Alaska Native villages during the 20th century, with greater 

practical importance for many Alaska Natives than any other tribal, corporate, national, or religious 

affiliation. A person’s primary roles in life were established by the needs of one’s extended family. A 

primary goal in life was the social reproduction and prosperity of one’s extended family group (cf. 

Jorgensen 1996a:20, 1996c:20-21). 

Extended family networks were less common in predominately non-Native towns and cities. 

Extended family groups were least frequent among newcomers in towns and cities. A lack of family roots 

in a community worked against establishing inter-generation kinship networks. Households of 

newcomers displayed greater autonomy and individuation than households linked within extended family 

networks. 

A focal research question for this report was, how did households adapt to the oil spill? For 

residents of the spill area, adaptive responses to the industrial disaster were frequently mediated through 

the household and extended family groups. A set of research questions emerges from this line of inquiry. 

Were certain households more or less vulnerable to disruptions created by the oil spill? Did certain types 

of households benefit economically from the spill more than other types? How did customary social 

support mechanisms for providing for dependent households perform during the spill? Did the 

households of elders and single mothers with young dependent children continue to receive support from 

other households during the crisis? 

Communities

“Communities” are the third type of human group analyzed in this report. Communities are 

defined here as named settlements with organized local governments (municipal, tribal, or both). For this 

study, households were surveyed in 20 communities in the oil spill area, listed previously in Table I-2. 

(Due to budget limitations, some communities in or near the spill area were not surveyed, including 

Whittier, Seward, and other Cook Inlet communities such as Homer, Ninilchik, Tyonek, and Anchorage.) 

A primary research question was, to what extent were household responses to the oil spill similar or 

different between communities, and why? We anticipated that there would be clear, measurable 

differences between communities in household-level responses to the spill, and that these would be 

linked to type of community and geographic location. 

 As a theoretical proposition, we posited three distinct types of communities in the Pacific Gulf as 

fundamental for understanding the response of households to the oil spill – “villages,” “towns,” and “cities” 

(see Figs. II-1 and II-2). A focal research question for this report was, to what extent were household 

responses to the spill different in “villages”, “towns”, and “cities”? As shown in Figures II-1 and II-2, 

two surveyed communities (Valdez and Kenai) were classified as “cities,” three surveyed communities 

(Kodiak City, Cordova, and Seldovia) were classified as “towns,” and fifteen surveyed communities were 

classified as “villages.” Nearest the spill center were Chenega Bay, Tatitlek, Port Graham, and Nanwalek 

(Prince William Sound-Lower Cook Inlet). Mid-distant from the spill center were Ahkiok, Karluk,
23 

Figure II-2. Community Types by Preliminary

Socioeconomic and Demographic Features

Villages: 

15 Places*

Towns: 

Kodiak City, 

Cordova, 

Seldovia

Cities: Valdez, 

Kenai City**

Demographic Characteristics

Population Size low mid-large mid-large

Growth Through In-Migration low high high

Economic System

Wage-Market Sector Development low moderate high

Commercial Fishery Development low-high high low

Subsistence Sector Development high moderate low

Wild Food Production (Per Capita) high moderate low

Wild Food Distribution high moderate low

Domestic Mode of Production high moderate low

Sociocultural Characteristics

Predominant Cultural Group Native non-Native non-Native

Significant Native Population yes yes no

Extended Kinship-Tribal Organization high moderate low

* Prince William Sound-Lower Cook Inlet (4): Chenega Bay, Tatitlek, Port Graham, Nanwalek

 Kodiak Island (6): Akhiok, Karluk, Larsen Bay, Old Harbor, Ouzinkie, Port Lions

 Alaska Peninsula (5): Chignik Bay, Chignik Lake, Chignik Lagoon, Ivanoff Bay, Perryville

** Unsurveyed places included Seward and Whittier
24 

Larsen Bay, Old Harbor, Ouzinkie, and Port Lions (Kodiak Island). Most distant from the spill center were 

Chignik Bay, Chignik Lagoon, Chignik Lake, Ivanof Bay, and Perryville (Alaska Peninsula). 

Community types represent fundamental cleavage planes in the society of the Pacific Gulf during 

the 20th century. We expected that the typology would prove useful for describing, understanding, and 

explaining patterns of spill responses by households. As a starting point for analysis, we identified a 

preliminary set of demographic, economic, and sociocultural features that characterized a given 

community type, shown as Figure II-2. As a theoretical proposition, we expected that “cities” would 

display several linked features – high growth from non-Native in-migration, a predominant Euroamerican 

culture (with minority Alaska Native enclaves), an industrial-capital economy, a highly developed 

commercial-wage sector, low wild food production and distribution, and a low salience of extended 

kinship and tribal organizations. We expected “villages” would display a different set of features – low 

growth from non-Native in-migration, a predominant Alaska Native culture (with minority non-Native 

enclaves), a mixed subsistence-cash economy, a poorly developed commercial-wage sector, high wild 

food production and distribution, and a high salience of extended kinship and tribal organizations. The 

contrasting features of “city” and “village” parallel “urban – rural” and “non-Native – Native” distinctions 

found in the late 20th century Alaska. 

We anticipated that communities in the spill area might prove more complex than two contrasting 

types. As shown in Figure II-2, we expected that there might be a third grouping of communities, which 

we labeled “towns.” We were less certain about features of “towns,” except that along the range of 

attributes identified above, they might fall somewhere between “village” and “city.” We expected that 

“towns” might display this set of features – moderate-to-high growth from non-Native in-migration, a 

predominant Euroamerican culture (with minority Alaska Native enclaves), a mixed subsistence-cash 

economy, a moderately-developed commercial-wage sector, moderate wild food production and 

distribution, and a low-to-moderate salience of extended kinship and tribal organizations. The features of 

“towns” may characterize small-to-moderate sized non-Native places with highly developed commercial 

fishing industries as a core of the commercial-wage sector. This commercial fishing focus might be a 

defining aspect of “towns” in the Pacific Gulf. A research question was, is there a group of communities 

(“towns”), which are measurably different from “villages” and “cities”? (see Chapter Five for an analysis of 

this question). As a preliminary model, the taxonomy in Figure II-2 calls for tests with empirical data. In 

this report, we examined whether there were statistical differences between the community types and 

whether features were clustered as expected in the model. 

The model in Figure II-2 anticipates the potential effects of geography. There are regional 

differences between rural villages tied to geography, that is, ecological, historical, and cultural differences 

linked to place. The proximity of the community to the spill center also was likely related to spill response. 

A research question was, to what extent were household responses to the oil spill related to a village’s 

geographic proximity to the spill center? 
25 

TYPES OF ADAPTIVE RESPONSES 

Flexible adjustment to short-term resource perturbations is known to be a common feature of 

hunter-gatherer economic systems. In northern areas, natural ecological systems commonly display 

seasonal variations in wild resource availability and procurement conditions. Seasons of scarcity 

sometimes follow seasons of plenty. Depending on the ecological niche of a hunter-gatherer society, wild 

food production can display considerable year-to-year variation. Peak herring runs may be followed by 

several years of low runs; a particularly stormy year may disrupt marine mammal hunting; and so forth. 

Similarly, in contemporary hunter-gatherer systems, commercial-wage sectors commonly display 

substantial insecurity. Employment may be seasonal (summer commercial fishing, winter fur trapping) or 

periodic (construction projects fueled by occasional government capital budgets). Families in 

subsistence-based villages have developed strategies for dealing with short-term changes caused by 

natural and economic variation. This flexibility is one reason for the durability of mixed, subsistence-cash 

economies as an economic system. 

Since flexibility is a common feature of subsistence-based economies, one might anticipate that 

family groups in Alaska Native villages may be pre-adapted for dealing with perturbations associated with 

an industrial accident like the oil spill. Families might be expected to adapt to disruptions caused by an oil 

spill using approaches already developed for dealing with change from other ecological and economic 

sources. It can be hypothesized that families in subsistence-based villages have survived because of 

long experience with dynamic natural systems. In this sense, the apparent vulnerability of resourcedependent villages to natural resource disruptions may actually be a source of resilience. 

Figure II-3 depicts a model of spill effects on subsistence uses and other sociocultural factors, 

proposed by analysts employed by the Alaska Native Class in litigation to recover damages from the oil 

spill (Stephen R. Braund and Associates 1993:66). The model traces the links between “real and 

perceived” changes in the natural environment and changes in subsistence activities (hunting, fishing, 

processing, and sharing). The declines in subsistence activities are associated with other sociocultural 

effects experienced by families and communities (decline in transfer of knowledge, decline in satisfaction 

of eating, decline in integrity of place, and so forth). The model is useful for illustrating linkages between 

subsistence activities and other parts of community life, and how changes in the natural environment 

ripple through the community in a cause-effect chain. Figure II-3 is incomplete, however, because it fails 

to address the commercial-wage sector of the village economy. It also leaves out the ways that human 

groups adaptively respond to environmental disruptions by adjusting activities. 

Figure II-4 depicts a second model of spill effects that illustrates these additional components, 

elaborating Figure II-3. This model is advanced as part of the current study. It lists a number of external, 

spill-related challenges facing households and Alutiiq communities in the spill area, including food safety 
26 

Fig. II-3. A Model of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill's Impacts on Subsistence, Culture, and People

Exxon Valdez Oil Spill

Real and perceived decline in quality of

environment and resource quality and quantity

Increased uncertainty about:

1. Resource quality and quantity

2. Environmental knowledge

3. The future

Decline in Subsistence Production

Decline in Culturally Significant

Subsistence Activities, including:

Decline in Decline in Decline in Decline in Decline in Decline in Decline in Decline in

Subsistence Cooperative Processing Sharing Transfer of Satisfaction Integrity of Autonomy

Participation Hunting and Knowledge of Eating Place

Fishing

Damage to People and Culture

Source: Stephen R. Braund and Associates 1993:66
27 

Figure II-4. Alaska Native Household or Community Responses and Outcomes

to External Oil Spill Factors in Pacific Gulf Alutiiq Villages

External SpillRelated Factor

Household or 

Community 

Response

Outcomes

Spill Cleanup 

Organized by 

Government and 

Industry

Household 

Members 

Employed in 

Cleanup

Increased Purchase 

of Commercial 

Foods (Short-Term)

Uncertain Health 

Risks from 

Contaminated 

Subsistence Areas

Households 

Reduce 

Subsistence 

Activities

Reduction in 

Consumption of Wild 

Foods (Short-Term)

Preservation of 

Health of Family 

Members

Reduced Stores of 

Wild Foods

Households 

Adjust Traditional 

Food Sharing 

Networks

Dependent HHs 

Receive More Wild 

Foods Than Less 

Dependent HHs

Preservation of 

Most Dependent 

Households

Continuity of 

Alutiiq 

Villages

Perceived Threats 

to Alutiiq Culture 

by Subsistence 

Losses and Legal 

Decisions

Community Grant 

Proposals to 

Capture 

Restoration 

Funding

Community-Based 

Projects in Local 

Villages

Economic and 

Cultural 

Revitalization in 

Alutiiq Villages

Court Awards 

Restoration Funds 

for Public Losses

Forests on 

Traditional Lands 

Remain Uncut

Potential 

Productivity of Land 

Maintained

Sale of Native 

Lands by 

Shareholders' 

Corporation

More Secure Annual 

Incomes to 

Households

Householders Use 

Income to Stay in 

Alutiiq Villages

Court Awards 

Compensation for 

Individual Losses

Individuals File 

Claims for 

Compensation

Windfall Personal 

Incomes to 

Individual 

Shareholders or 

Claimants

Income Used for 

Outmigration by 

Individual Tribal 

Members

Erosion of 

Alutiiq 

Villages

Loss of Ownership 

and Control of 

Traditional Lands by 

the Alutiiq

Loss of Geopolitical 

Base by the Alutiiq
28 

questions, employment opportunities in spill cleanup, court decisions, and restoration project money. 

Groups (households, community governments, and Native corporations) are depicted as responding to 

these spill-related factors through adjustments in their uses of labor, land, and capital resources. Such 

responses may have multiple outcomes for the Alutiiq. One potential effect is short-term change in the 

relative productivity of the subsistence sector vis-a-vis the commercial-wage sector in a community, 

illustrated in Figure II-4. That is, families reduce subsistence harvests while increasing wage employment 

activities, or vice versa. Other changes can be in demography, political institutions, community 

infrastructures, expressive culture, and so forth. The model in Figure II-4 is a more complete model than 

Figure II-3 because it illustrates the adaptive responses of human groups to environmental change, and 

how measurable effects emerge from those responses. 

We will end this theoretical overview by identifying a few potential adaptive responses to an 

industrial disaster like an oil spill, illustrated in Figure II-4: 

The Mix of Subsistence and Commercial-Wage Sectors in Villages. In the short-term, village 

households can respond to potential contamination of wild foods from an oil spill by decreasing the 

production and consumption of wild foods (activities comprising the subsistence sector of the 

village economy), increasing activity in wage employment (activities comprising the commercialwage sector of the village economy), and substituting imported commercial foods for locally 

produced wild foods. This response is examined in Chapter Seven. This household strategy may 

be feasible if employment opportunities are available, such as employment associated with spill 

response, but it may not be feasible if there are no such opportunities. In the longer term, village 

households can once again increase production-sharing-consumption of wild foods in the 

subsistence sector following a disaster to pre-spill levels, if resources are not degraded and 

government regulations do not create obstacles or disincentives. 

Sharing Among Households in Villages. In the short-term, village households may utilize traditional 

social support systems to provide for the most dependent households during a food crisis (this 

response is examined in Chapter Eight). Limited supplies of shared wild foods may be directed to 

the most-dependent households in a village during a crisis, while sharing of wild foods may 

decrease overall. 

Cultural and Economic Revitalization in Villages. An environmental crisis may stimulate the 

revitalization of the culture and economy in a village, if monetary resources channeled into a 

community are used by local governments to integrate and expand the cultural group, rather than 

divide or individualize members (this response is examined in Chapters Six and Eight). If used 

effectively, restoration and settlement money hold the potential for revitalizing the Alutiiq culture 

and the general welfare of people within a community. 
29 

Migration. Households may choose to respond to disasters by moving to areas with more 

favorable prospects (this is discussed in Chapter Four in relation to historic epidemics, Chapter 

Five in response to the 1964 earthquake and tsunami; and Chapter Nine in relation to the Exxon 

Valdez oil spill). The degree of mobility may be related in part to the capacity and desire by 

individuals to maintain ties with a particular place or cultural group, weighed against the health, 

social, and economic problems created by a disaster. Disasters may trigger out-migration by 

households in particular communities under certain circumstances, leading to the eventual decline 

of cultural groups. 

Monetary Awards. Monetary awards to individuals from settlement or restoration funds (see 

Chapter Six) may support or erode cultural groups and local villages, depending upon the social 

cohesiveness of kindred groups prior to the award. The effect of money on the cultural group and 

community depends on how it is used by members of extended family groups. 

Each of these responses is advanced as a theoretical proposition to be examined in the following 

chapters. In summary, this report will discuss the range and nature of short- and long-term adaptations to 

the oil spill by three types of human groups in the Pacific Gulf – cultural groups, household-level groups, 

and communities. The report will explore whether and to what degree Alutiiq villages were successful in 

adapting to spill-related challenges. The report will assess the extent to which the responses benefited 

group members and allowed for social groups to continue with traditional lifeways intact. The analysis 

will be placed in the context of historic change in the Pacific Gulf. To fully understand the human 

responses to the oil spill, one must first consider the social history preceding the disaster. We begin this 

historic narrative by describing the Alutiiq society and culture prior to the arrival of Russian and 

Euroamerican colonists. 
31 

Chapter Three: The Alutiiq of the Pacific Gulf At Historic Contact 

THE SUGPIAT (ALUTIIQ) 

At the time of direct historic contact in the 1760s, the people living on the east side of the Alaska 

Peninsula, Kodiak Island, the lower Kenai Peninsula, and Prince William Sound called themselves 

Sugpiat or “the real people.” Disregarding aboriginal self-designations, the invading Russians developed 

their own terms for the Native population. All Sugpiat were called “Aleut,” from Aliutor, a Siberian word 

used to refer to people living on the coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula (Pullar 1996:19). The native 

inhabitants of Kodiak Island and the Alaska Peninsula were called “Koniag” or “Koniag Aleut,” while 

Prince William Sound and Kenai Peninsula people became known as “Chugach” or “Chugach Aleut”. 

Through time the terms Koniag and Chugach took hold and were widely used by Native people and 

anthropologists. 

Case III-1. Word Origins. 

“Koniag” is an Unangan (Aleut) word for the people of Kodiak Island, while 

“Chugach” is of unknown derivation. Following the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 

Act in 1971, two regional corporations in the Pacific Gulf area were called Koniag 

Incorporated and Chugach Alaska Incorporated. 

 While similarities do exist between Aleutian Island Aleuts, who call themselves Unangan, and the 

Sugpiat, there are notable differences in culture and language. The Sugpiat, for example, speak 

Sugcestun, a language closely related to Yup’ik, an Eskimo language spoken by people in southwest 

Alaska and St. Lawrence Island. In recognition of this fact, anthropologists call the Sugpiat Pacific 

Eskimo or Pacific Yup’ik (Oswalt 1967). However, the Sugpiat do not consider themselves Eskimo and 

do not want to be called Eskimo. Recently some Sugpiat have started to call themselves Alutiiq, which is 

simply the word for “Aleut” in Sugcestun, while others want to use Sugpiat, which they consider is more 

appropriate (Pullar 1996:19). We will use the term Alutiiq to refer to the indigenous people and language 

of the Pacific Gulf region. 

Case III-2. Identifiers. 

The Russians recognized differences between groups of Native people. In using the 

word “Aleut” the Russians were not referring to a specific people as much as a 

distinctive set of cultural identifiers that revolved around the hunting of sea mammals. 

Such identifiers included baidarkies or kayaks, gut skin clothing, the distinctive bent 

wood sunshade, and particular hunting weapons such as the throwing board and dart. 

As a consequence, by the beginning of the 19th century, Alutiiq people were given a 

collective identity by the Russians based on their ability to hunt sea mammals (Simeone 

1992; cf. Pullar 1996:19). 
32 

REGIONAL GROUPS 

During the 18th century, the Alutiiq people were loosely organized within at least four named 

regional groups: the Qikertarmiut of Kodiak Island, the Aglegmiut of the Alaska Peninsula, the 

Unegkurmiut of the Kenai Peninsula, and the Paluwigmiut of Prince William Sound (Haggarty et al. 

1991:76). It is likely the Alutiiq identified more closely with smaller, local groups or “societies” rather than 

broadly defined regional groups (Townsend 1980:129). In Prince William Sound there may have been 

eight societies, each with a territory (cf. de Laguna 1956; Hassan 1978). The Kodiak archipelago may 

have been home to three or more societies, one on Shuyak Island, another on Afognak, and a third on 

the main island (Townsend 1980), but the evidence is inconclusive. The Sugpiat living on the outside 

coast of the Kenai Peninsula may have formed a single society (Betts et al. 1991:21). 

POPULATION 

The size of the pre-colonial aboriginal population is difficult to estimate because of the 

devastation wrought by European contact (see Chapter Four). But population densities were relatively 

high for hunter-gatherer groups and conservative estimates suggest a pre-colonial population for the 

entire region of at least 9,000 to 10,000 people living in about 100 villages (Oswalt 1967:5-9; Haggarty et 

al. 1991:76; Clark 1984:187). Others believe the population was much higher and estimate that there 

were at least 10,000, and possibly 20,000 people living on Kodiak Island alone when the Russians 

established the first settlement in 1784 (Jordan and Knecht 1985; Pullar and Knecht 1990; Crowell 

1988:134). The pre-colonial population of Prince William Sound has been estimated from anywhere 

between 400 and 1,000 (Oswalt 1964:5-9; Haggarty et al. 1991). 

Early Russian counts also vary. Shelikhov estimated there might have been 50,000 people on 

Kodiak Island in 1784. Khlebinkov (1994:6), who served in Russian America from 1818 to 1832, disputes 

this claim. Citing Baranov's census figure of 5,696 persons collected in 1792, only six years after 

Shelikov, Khlebnikov writes that it was impossible that “eight-ninths” of the population could “have been 

exterminated in so short time under any circumstances.” But Khlebnikov does concede that the 

population declined because of “various misfortunes and conditions” (1994:7). By 1833, the Native 

population residing on Kodiak and adjacent islands reportedly had declined to 2,510 (Wrangell quoted in 

Khlebnikov 1994:358). 

Case III-3. Sources of Mortality. 

Khlebnikov (1994:8) lists “unfortunate events which led to the destruction of the 

Kad’iak Aleuts.” These include Kodiak people killed in various fights between the 

Russian American Company and the Tlingit, Alutiiqs who drowned on various company 

hunting expeditions, 135 Alutiiqs who died from paralytic shellfish poisoning while 

traveling from Sitka, and an “extreme” epidemic in 1799. 
33 

SETTLEMENT PATTERNS 

Pre-colonial Alutiiq settlement patterns were linked to the seasonal availability of wild resources in 

various locations. Permanent winter communities were typically located near large shellfish beds and 

areas with a diversity of subsistence resources (Haggarty et al. 1991). They also were situated so that 

residents could observe approaching visitors at a distance. Seasonal summer fish camps were located 

near salmon streams. Hunting camps were used in spring and fall. 

Winter villages were relatively large on Kodiak Island and the Alaska Peninsula, while in Prince 

William Sound they appear to have been smaller. Along the Karluk River, on the west side of Kodiak 

Island, archaeologists have uncovered a high density of sites that include winter villages composed of up 

to 20 multifamily dwellings, interspersed with outlying small settlements and spring and fall hunting camps 

(Crowell 1988:134). 

Winter dwellings were more substantial and permanent than summer houses, which were built 

essentially to provide shelter while people were fishing and preparing salmon. Once the salmon season 

was over, people took their accumulated stock of prepared fish and moved back to the winter village. 

Koniag winter houses were semi-subterranean structures with a driftwood frame covered with sod. The 

Chugach inhabited winter houses of plank construction. Both types of houses were similarly laid out with 

a large common room and central hearth surrounded by smaller rooms used for sleeping. Winter homes 

were often large multifamily dwellings housing up to 20 people (Birket-Smith 1953). 

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 

Alutiiq society in the 18th century was stratified 

into two groups: free people and slaves (Townsend 

1980; Birket-Smith 1953; Gedeon 1989). Slaves were 

captured in raids or obtained through trade and 

considered the property of the owner. Free people 

were ranked within a status hierarchy rooted in a 

bilateral kinship system. Those people claiming the 

highest ranks were leaders (aŋa·yuqaq) of a local group 

and their immediate kinsmen who formed a kind of 

nobility or aristocracy. More distant relatives were 

considered to be commoners of lower rank. 

Commoners augmented by slaves did most of the 

physical 

Fig. III-1. Kodiak Island Toyon [Chief] named Nangquk, baptized 

Nikita, from Three Saints Bay. (Mikhail Tikhanov 1817) 
34 

labor (Birket-Smith1953:92). Rank and leadership were inherited. On Kodiak Island, for instance, the 

aŋa·yuqaq position was inherited from a father, an uncle, or a father-in-law (Gedeon 1989:40). Status 

and authority were based on an individual’s personal qualities and the ability to accumulate and 

redistribute wealth to kinsmen and neighbors. By being generous, men substantiated their status and 

attracted a group of kinsmen who were willing to work for the kindred. A large set of followers reinforced 

a person’s claim to rank and authority. 

Leaders and their families were distinguished by wealth. On Kodiak Island wealth consisted of a 

wide variety of clothing, hunting equipment, stocks of food, and various forms of personal adornment 

including pieces of amber, dentalium shells, plates of abalone shell, and “considerable quantities” of glass 

beads (Gedeon 1989:42). The primary occasions for the redistribution of wealth were during the fall and 

winter feasts held in the kashim (community hall) built by the leader (Gedeon 1989:40). 

Although leaders might exert considerable influence within a group of kinsmen, they held little 

coercive power (Gedeon 1989:40-41). Eloquence was an important criteria for successful leadership. A 

leader might talk his followers into a course of action, but he could not threaten them with sanctions if 

they disregarded his will. Another aspect of leadership was the possession of some sort of spiritual 

strength or expression. One of the most important responsibilities of a leader was to organize and deploy 

the labor of kinsmen for certain group efforts. For example, leaders organized and led hunting parties 

and were instrumental in organizing trade expeditions. They also occasionally mobilized kinsmen for 

raids to obtain wealth or exact revenge. However, individuals were not bound to follow the leader. 

Kinship was the principal integrating factor in this ranked society. A tightly knit group united 

through bonds of kinship and often living in the same house, was the primary social unit. Birket-Smith 

(1953:158), the principal ethnographer for the Chugach, argued that descent was bilateral, as was 

common kinship among Yup’ik and Inuit groups to the north. There was no evidence to indicate a pattern 

of unilineal descent or the existence of clans, as was common in Southeast Alaska, the Pacific Northwest, 

and Athabaskan groups. 

The extended-family household was the primary economic unit. Within this unit, the extraction 

and processing of subsistence resources was divided on the basis of rank and gender (Birket-Smith 

1953:92). As noted above, people of rank did little or no physical labor themselves, but directed kinsmen 

when possible. Slaves were never the principal source of labor, but augmented the work force of 

kinsmen (Townsend 1980:149). The free male inhabitants of a household usually worked together on 

hunting and fishing trips away from the winter village. In the village they worked together to build houses, 

or to manufacture implements from stone, wood, and bone. The woman’s domain was centered on the 

house. She raised children, tended the fire and stone lamps, gathered plants and shellfish, cooked, 

prepared skins and bark for garments and boats, fabricated thread out of sinew, and made baskets. 
35 

THE ECONOMY 

 

The foundation of the aboriginal economy was the harvesting of wild fish, animals, and plants 

primarily for local consumption and secondarily for trade. The Alutiiq region had a diverse abundance of 

wild resources. The principal animal resources were sea mammals, marine fish, and shellfish. People 

also harvested a number of land mammals, birds, and plants. 

At least twenty species of sea mammals are found in the Gulf of Alaska, waters including baleen 

and toothed whales, dolphins, sea otters, sea lions, and harbor seals. All were hunted, and supplied 

protein and calories, oil for heat and light, and skins for clothing and boats, though harbor seal and sea 

lion were probably taken in the largest numbers. 

Fig. III-2. Aleut Hunting (Mikhail Tikhanov 1817) 

Land mammals were distributed widely but unevenly over the region. There were on average 

about thirty species of land mammals in Prince William Sound and the main land areas of the Kenai 

Peninsula and Alaska Peninsula. But the Kodiak archipelago, geographically separate from the 

mainland, contained only seven resident land mammals (Haggarty et al. 1991). Kodiak Island’s only large 

land mammal was the brown bear. Mountain goats and black bear were found only in Prince William 

Sound and on the Kenai Peninsula. Caribou and moose were found only on the Alaska and Kenai 

peninsulas. Brown bear and land otters were relatively ubiquitous throughout. Snowshoe hare and 

beaver were resident in all areas except Kodiak Island. 

Fish, particularly salmon, provided another important food source. Over 287 species of fish are 

found in the Gulf of Alaska. Most abundant are the five species of salmon. Archaeological evidence 

indicates that salmon were most important in the Kodiak archipelago, especially in the area of western 

Kodiak Island (Haggarty et al. 1991). The Karluk River, for example, is estimated to have had an annual 

run of 10,000,000 salmon in the pre-colonial period (Haggarty et al. 1991:70). There were also important 
36 

annual runs of chum and pink salmon in Prince William Sound. Relatively smaller anadromous fish runs, 

again mostly of chum and pink salmon, occurred along the Alaska and Kenai peninsulas. 

Other kinds of fish caught by Alutiiq people included halibut, which is rich in protein but low in fat 

content. Herring were caught in large quantities and their oily flesh and eggs provided an important 

source of fat. Cod and rockfish were other important fish. 

Shellfish and other intertidal invertebrates were important sources of food. Most members of the 

community could efficiently harvest them in large quantities. Shellfish types included chitons, barnacles, 

limpets, cockles, clams, mussels, snails, and octopus (Haggarty et al. 1991). 

More than 180 species of birds frequent 

the Alutiiq region including sea birds, shore 

birds, and land birds. Birds were a seasonal 

source of food and skins for clothing (Fig. III-3). 

Archaeological studies have identified the 

remains of more than 40 species of birds at 

sites on Kodiak Island and the Alaska Peninsula 

(Haggarty et al. 1991:68). Pre-colonial bird 

populations were larger prior to the introduction 

of foxes, rats, and cats by Euroamericans. 

Fig. III-3. Koniag Alutiiq ceremonial coat made from the 

neck skins of cormorants and decorated with red and white 

tassels of dyed skin and gut and white fur trim 

(Chaussonnet 1988:209) 

 Spring tended to be the leanest time of 

the year. Most of the food prepared and stored 

the previous summer and fall had been 

consumed in the winter feasts and migratory herring, birds, and salmon had yet to arrive. Late winter and 

early spring were devoted to hunting harbor seal and sea lion. The extreme low tides of spring were 

particularly advantageous for harvesting shellfish. As the season advanced, people hunted returning 

migratory birds, collected bird’s eggs, and gathered early plants. Some men hunted small whales. By 

late spring herring and herring roe-on-kelp were harvested in Prince William Sound. In some places 

people were able to take advantage of early salmon runs. Halibut and cod were taken in calm weather 

throughout most of the year. By high summer salmon fishing was the dominant activity. On the cusp of 

summer and fall men shifted their focus to hunting mountain goats in Prince William Sound and the Kenai 

Peninsula and caribou on the Alaska Peninsula. Women picked berries throughout the region during late 

summer and early fall. By late fall and early winter men resumed hunting seals, sea lions, and small 

whales. Harvesting decreased during the period of winter ceremonies but people continued to harvest 

intertidal species and in Prince William Sound men took black bear in their dens. 
37 

Trade along the Pacific coast was common in the pre-colonial period. Trade items included sea 

mammal oil, ivory, puffin beaks, skins (caribou, marmot, ground squirrel, and sea otter), amber, copper, 

dentalium shells, abalone shells, boats, goat horn spoons, clothing, and slaves (Burch 1988:237). 

Aboriginal trade was stimulated by the appearance of manufactured goods from Europe, which preceded 

direct contact with Euroamericans and arrived through trade connections linking Alaska and Siberia (ibid). 

Case III-4. Trade at Yakutat, 1788. 

“Among the other trade goods which the people [Tlingits] brought for exchange with the galiot 

were two boys about twelve years old. One of them was a Koniag captured by the Kenais [i.e., 

the Dena’ina of Cook Inlet] before Kyktak island was occupied by the company; he was sold to 

the Chuiugach, then to the Ugalakhmiuts [Eyaks?] and finally became the property of the 

Koliuzh [Tlingit]. His name is Noiak-Koin” (Shelikhov 1981:96). 

Fig. III-4. Aleut of Kodiak Island in festival dress enacting the hunt. (Mikhail Tikhanov 1817) 
38 

CEREMONIES AND RELIGION 

As in other northern hunter-gatherer societies, Alutiiq spirituality was directed primarily at 

ensuring good relations between humans and animals for continued good hunting. Its social forms were 

personal and individual (such as taboos and proscriptions placed upon the hunter) as well as collective 

and public (as in the annual winter feasts). The spiritual world was highly animistic and most features of 

observable nature were thought to possess a spiritual essence. Within this vital world people warily 

negotiated their way by enlisting spiritual allies and observing a multitude of taboos or rules that guided 

their behavior in everyday life. Dire consequences could befall the person who broke customary 

proscriptions. 

Case III-5. Kodiak Island Ceremonies, 1803. 

According to the Russian, G. I. Davydov (1977:107), the dance he attended represented 

“hunters setting off to catch animals” -- probably a ceremony to honor animals so that 

they would return the following year. As he entered the kashim, Davydov was 

overwhelmed by the hot stuffy atmosphere created by about 60 men and women. Near 

a large lighted torch in the middle of the kashim sat two men with drums of animal 

bladders stretched around a hoop with a handle. On either side of the ‘‘stage stood two 

young girls wearing cloaks, and all bedecked in finery, such as long bone through their 

nose and beads in their lower lip and ears, and on their heads they wore a great many 

eagle feathers.” Two men carried puffin beak rattles and small baidarka paddles 

decorated with fish and sea mammal designs. From the ceiling, “were suspended 

various crossed darts and attached to them were: (1) a baidarka; (2) pelts representing 

various animals; (3) some hunting weapons and decoys... which help the Americans to 

lure seals.” During the performance the men beat the drums and kept time by beating 

the rattles with their paddles. The young girls “held on to their capes and simply rocked 

from side to side. The chief was constantly shouting something like this: Here is the 

shore! Let us leap to it! The animals will come to he who has not yet killed!”.... 

Whenever the chief said ‘here are animals!’ then all would cry out in different voices, 

imitating the various animals....” 

Religion infused everyday life and most ceremonies were at once spiritual, social, and political in 

nature. Ritual observances that attended chiefly succession, preparation for war, or other important 

events took place throughout the year, as occasion demanded. As winter approached ritual activity 

intensified and village chiefs hosted winter hunt ceremonies, memorial rituals, public displays of 

shamanistic healing, lavish feasts, and gift exchanges (Crowell 1992:19). 
39 

Fig. III-5. Tamaima, an Inhabitant of Kodiak Island (Mikhail Tikhanov 1817). 
41

Chapter Four: Historic Transformations in The Pacific Gulf

Of those European countries to reach the Gulf of Alaska in the 18th century only the Russians

were in a position to establish a colony. After a brief but fierce struggle with the Koniag, the Russians 

established their first permanent settlement at Three Saints Bay in 1784, and by 1800 had penetrated

every corner of Alutiiq territory. In 1867 Russia sold Alaska to the United States and a new wave of

foreigners arrived to work the fur trade. American interests later expanded to include the exploitation of

salmon, timber, and minerals such as gold and copper. World War II brought a third wave of migrants,

many of whom stayed on to work in the national defense industry created by the Cold War, or in the

expanding commercial fishing industry. In 1959 Alaska became a state and oil was discovered on the

North Slope ten years later. This stimulated a fourth wave of migration. Some came to work in the oil

industry, but most were drawn by jobs generated by a booming state economy fueled by government

spending of oil revenues. Along with new economic strategies, each group of newcomers brought

sociopolitical arrangements and an understanding of the environment different from that of the Alutiiq

people.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE, 1780 - 1997

By demographic measures, the Alutiiq have been losing ground since historic contact (Table IV1). Over the past two centuries, Euroamericans have expanded into the Pacific Gulf at the expense of

the Alutiiq. The number of Alutiiq diminished, the proportion of Alutiiq in the regional population declined, 

and the total number of Alutiiq now is substantially less compared with populations two centuries before. 

These points are illustrated in Figs. IV-1 and IV-2.

As noted in Chapter Three, estimates vary as to the size of the pre-colonial Alutiiq population. 

But whatever the exact number, by the middle of the 19th century disease and exploitation by profiteers

had decimated the Alutiiq population. Epidemics on Kodiak Island began in 1804, and occurred again in

1819-20 and 1827-28 (Fortuine 1989:204-208). The most devastating event was the smallpox epidemic

of 1836-1839, which killed over 700 Alutiiq people on Kodiak Island alone (Tikhmenev 1978:198)

reducing the already dwindling population by a third. Smallpox also ravaged populations in Prince

William Sound and lower Cook Inlet wiping out entire villages (Fortuine 1989:234). Russian American

Company records suggest that the smallpox epidemic in Prince William Sound was so severe that only

four villages survived: Tatitlek, Kiniklik, Chenega, and a settlement on Montague Island.

The dramatic effects of epidemic disease are described in two first hand accounts, presented

here as Case Studies IV-1 and IV-2. The first was recorded by a man named Ianovskii who was Chief

Manager of the Russian American Company. Ianovskii witnessed the terrible effects of an influenza

epidemic that occurred on Kodiak Island in 1819-20. The second account was printed in an ecclesiastical 

journal called the American Orthodox Messenger and reports the effects of a diphtheria epidemic in

Prince William Sound occurring in 1906.
42

Figure IV-1. Population Trends in the Pacific Gulf Region,

Historic Contact (circa 1780), and 1910-1997

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

1780 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1997

Number of People.

Valdez-Seward

Kodiak City

Other Communities

Post-Contact

Population

Crash World War II

Development

Post-Oil

Development

Figure IV-2. Population of Pacific Gulf Region,

by Cultural Group, 1997

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

Villages (15 Places) Towns (Kodiak, Cordova,

Seldovia)

Cities (Valdez, Seward) Pacific Gulf Region

Number of People.

Non-Natives

Alaska Natives

Villages,

Alaska Native - 82%

Towns,

Alaska Native - 11%

Cities,

Alaska Native - 10%

Region,

Alaska Native - 17%

2,068 people

15,372 people

8,178 people

21,029 people
43

Table IV-1. Russian Census Figures 1792 - 1833 from Khlebnikov (1994)

Date Kodiak Island Prince William Sound Alaska Peninsula Totals

1792 5,696a423 814 6,933

1796 6,206 766 n/a 6,972

1800 5,464 714 209b6,387

1806 3,944cn/a n/a 3,944

1817 3,311 941 887b5,139

1821 2,605 1,513e838d4,956

1825 2,917 1,563e131 4,611

1833 2,510 n/a n/a 2,510

a. May have included only adults.

b. Kodiak Islanders on the Alaska Peninsula.

c. Includes Kodiak Islanders living in Sitka.

d. It is uncertain if these are Kodiak Islanders whom the Russians moved to the Alaska Peninsula.

e. The increase in population may have been due to Koniag or Unangan hunters being moved into

 Prince William Sound.

Case IV-1. Influenza Epidemic on Kodiak Island, 1819-20

I can imagine nothing more somber and terrifying than the spectacle which

greeted me when I visited the Aleut [Alutiiq] kazim! This is a large barn or barracks

with board partitions, in which the Aleuts live with their families. In it were almost one 

hundred people. I visited them all, talking to them, questioning them, advising them, 

cheering them up and comforting them. Some were lying already dying, their bodies

growing cold, next to those still alive; others were already dead, on whose cold breasts

hungry children crawled, crying and trying to find food for themselves, but in vain! My

heart contracted with pity, struck with horror, when I saw this melancholy picture of

death. No artist could convey in sufficient colors this picture for the illumination of

those who are wallowing in luxury, forgetful of death...(Fortuine 1989:201).
44

Case IV-2. Epidemic in Prince William Sound during the 20th century

In the first decade of this century several epidemics struck Prince William

Sound. In 1906 epidemics of diphtheria from an unidentified pathogen in which eleven 

people, adults and children, died in Tatitlek within two weeks. Chenega was called the

“kingdom of death.” Twenty-two people died within two weeks, the survivors were

described as “thin and exhausted, lifeless people with violent fits of coughing, with

burnt-out faces, sunken cheeks and eyes, with wildly beating hearts.” Five people were 

still sick, the rest like “shadows” or “wax figures.” The priest gave out what medicine

he had and called the people to a meeting where they elected a toyon, starosta, and a

brotherhood chairman. He publicly thanked a young man who dug graves and brought

wood and water during the epidemic. When the priest returned to Tatitlek one more

person had died and others were dying. Kiniklik was spared, but the inhabitants asked

the priest to bless the water for use in healing if they should get sick (Serafin 1907).

A second factor in the collapse of the aboriginal population was the Russian policy of forced

relocation in which groups of Native men and women were moved about in order to satisfy the labor

needs of the colony. Whole regions were emptied of people so that in 1871, an observer traveling along

the coast of the Alaska Peninsula described a “desolate coastline with little sign of current human

habitation” (Morseth 1998:48). By the late 1880s, however, Alutiiq people began to leave the centers of

Russian occupation and resettle in other areas. For example, historic census records for Prince William 

Sound indicate that people moved to the villages of Tatitlek, Chenega, and Kiniklik from the old Russian

center at Nuchek. As the old centers of non-Native influence were abandoned, new ones emerged, such 

as Valdez, Cordova, and Seward. By 1910, the populations of all three towns had surpassed that of the

villages. The towns grew in response to the developing new economy that was not oriented toward the

trade in furs but the extraction of mineral resources and fish. This pattern continued throughout the rest

of the 20th century as non-Native towns grew in size while the Alutiiq villages remained essentially static. 

By 1997, there were about 4,176 Alaska Natives living in the Alutiiq region. Most were Alutiiq, but some

(particularly those living in Valdez and Seward) were members of other groups (Inupiat, Yup’ik,

Athabaskan, Eyak, and Tlingit).

In terms of population size, the Alutiiq have suffered substantial setbacks over time. There were

less than half as many Alutiiq living in the Pacific Gulf in 1997 than in 1784. In 1997, the population of the 

Gulf of Alaska region was 21,029, twice that at contact if the lower pre-colonial population figures are

accepted. The great majority of the population (83 percent) was not Alaska Native. There is also a

seasonal influx of non-Natives into the region during the summer, including commercial fishermen,

processors, recreational fishers, hunters and tourists.

The spatial dispersion of people and cultures in the region has not been uniform (Figs. IV-1 and

IV-2). In 1997, most non-Natives resided in just four places: Kodiak City, Valdez, Cordova, and Seward. 

The fifteen other communities of the Pacific Gulf region were predominately Alutiiq, ten of which had
45

populations that were comprised of about 80 percent Alaska Native. Thus in terms of geographic

dispersion and use, the Alutiiq still occupied much of the Pacific Gulf in 1997.

The centralization of the non-Native population in four large towns and cities, and the

preponderance of Alutiiq villages as settlements in the region, is strongly related to the different

socioeconomic systems currently found in the Pacific Gulf. The number of people and cultural affiliations 

in a community are directly associated with the community’s type of socioeconomic system, as described

in subsequent sections.

SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE, 1784-1989

Several factors contributed to changes in Alutiiq sociopolitical organization during the period of

Russian occupation. Loss of life through disease was the most dramatic. After the smallpox epidemic of 

1839 the Russians consolidated the remaining Koniag population on Kodiak Island (see Case IV-3). This 

disrupted kin networks, individual social ties, and political alliances characteristic of pre-colonial Alutiiq

society (cf. Knecht and Jordan 1985). In 1863 the Russian historian P.A. Tikhmenev (1978:347) wrote

that “[f]rom this time on they began to change in every way, and thus the Kad’iak natives of today differ

greatly from those of twenty-five years ago.”

Case IV-3. Consolidation of the Koniag Population

To better administer the survivors of the smallpox epidemic of 1836-39, the Russians,

in 1840, consolidated the 65 Koniag villages into seven settlements located near

Russian establishments. These included Saint Paul (the present town of Kodiak), Three 

Saints Bay (present day Old Harbor), Orlov (the village of Eagle Harbor abandoned in

the early 20th century), Karluk, Afognak (destroyed in the 1964 earthquake and

relocated as Port Lions), Woody Island, and Ukamok (Hrdlicka 1944:19; Tikhmenev

1978:200). Such consolidation was not carried out in Prince William Sound.

The forced relocation and displacement of large numbers of Native people, especially men

transported across the colony to hunt sea otters, disturbed established family relations and kin networks. 

It also had the unintended effect of creating new ties that stimulated the formation of a Creole population

(Federova 1975:12). The Alutiiq then became a specific segment of a colonial society based on a layered 

system of Russians, Creoles, and Natives in which each group’s rights and obligations were legally

defined.

Throughout the life of the colony the number of Russians was always small. Few Russian

women migrated to Alaska and most Russian men did not stay after their tenure was over, but some had 

liaisons with Native women that produced offspring. In 1822 there were 553 Creoles in the colony. By

1863 the official count was 1,989, and this did not include all persons of mixed descent (Morseth

1998:42). In Russian America a person’s status was inherited and passed through the paternal line
46

(Morseth 1998:41). The colonial administration viewed the bicultural and bilingual Creoles as a bridge

between Russia and Alaska. Creoles also represented a potential pool of skilled, educated labor to

maintain and administer the colony, so were given an opportunity for a free education in Russia, provided 

they worked for the company for a stipulated period of time (Partnow 1993:127). Not all Creoles followed 

this path, however, and by the end of the Russian period Creoles as a group occupied an ambiguous 

position in colonial society. Some held positions of authority and lived outside the Native community

while others were indistinguishable from Natives (Morseth 1998:42).

The arrival of the Americans meant the end of the Russian system of social and ethnic categories 

based on language and culture. Common American parlance combined Creoles and Alutiiqs under the

term, “Native.” Americans also referred to Creoles with the pejorative “half breed” and called Alutiiqs

“Indians.” The treaty that conveyed Russian possessions in Alaska to the United States noted only two

categories of persons in the old colony, “Inhabitants,” Russians that remained in the territory, and

“uncivilized tribes.” The “Inhabitants,” if they chose to remain in the territory, were admitted to the

enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States while the uncivilized tribes were to be subject to 

such laws as the United States might adopt in regard to the aboriginal tribes of Alaska (Federova

1975:18).

The designation “uncivilized” derived from 19th century ideas about social evolution and

“savagism,” a wild state of nature occupied by Native Americans with both admirable (“noble savage”)

and despicable (“savagery”) characteristics (Pearce 1967). Because they apparently lacked the basic

attributes of civilization, such as organized religion, private property, and formal government, Alaska

Natives, like the Indians of the lower 48 states, were considered to have a lower form of social life than

Euroamericans. Some Alaska Natives, specifically the Aleuts of the Aleutian Islands, were considered

“corrupted” from their natural state by their association with the Russians, who were viewed as villains

committing unspeakable atrocities toward Alaska Natives (Torres 1990:232; see Case IV-4.)

Case IV-4. American Perceptions of Alutiiqs and Russians 

According to U.S. Army Lt. Eli Huggins (1981) stationed in Kodiak in 1868, Kodiak

Native people were known as “Aleyuts” and lived in about 20 villages separated from

Russian and Creole communities. Huggins thought Kodiak Aleuts were distinct from

Aleutian Island Aleuts because of their spirited and warlike character which manifested

itself in the considerable resistance they offered the Russians. They were, in Huggin’s

view, a conquered people subjected to Russian atrocities that were “not exceeded by

anything in the history of the Spanish conquest.”

At the same time, the Alutiiq came to divide the social world into two groups: Russian and nonRussian. To all the latter they applied the term “Americanski,” regardless of nationality (Morseth1998:48). 

Creoles were considered “Russians” and, because they spoke Russian, were typically recruited into the
47

Russian Orthodox Church as lay readers. Creoles appear to have been more versatile in their

interactions with the emergent Euroamerican society than their Alutiiq kinsmen (Partnow 1993:169, 171).

At the top of the new social order were Euroamericans who in ever increasing numbers came to

exploit and develop the wealth of a new American territory. Entrepreneurs, company men, and

adventurers were drawn by gold on interior rivers, copper in Prince William Sound and the Wrangell 

Mountains, and stupendous fisheries in the Gulf of Alaska. The new migration stimulated the creation

and growth of new non-Native centers at Seward, Valdez, and Cordova while the old Russian settlement

of Kodiak continued as a commercial center.

The predominant social policy toward the “uncivilized” Alutiiq was pacification and eventual

assimilation into the American social order. Sheldon Jackson, a Presbyterian missionary who served as

General Agent for Education in Alaska from 1885 until 1906, articulated the policy of assimilation most

explicitly. Jackson believed that contact with commercial whalers and fur traders had disrupted the old

Native culture and aboriginal economy. Starvation, disease, and alcohol were spreading (Oswalt

1963:16-17). The solution, in Jackson’s view, was conversion to Protestant Christianity and the

education of Native children in boarding schools away from the influence of parents. To activate his

program, Jackson divided Alaska up among several American Christian denominations. He

conspicuously ignored the Russian Orthodox Church in this, and allotted Kodiak Island to the Baptists. 

Up until then Orthodox priests had sometimes campaigned against the ill treatment of Native people by

Americans (Davis 1979), but now they burst into activity, establishing Russian schools and publishing

materials in Native languages. The priests were particularly vocal in their concerns about Orthodox

children who were forced into non-Orthodox boarding schools or orphanages (Kan 1988).

Many Alutiiqs had been baptized into the Russian Orthodox Church before the end of the Russian 

era. It was during the early American period that Orthodoxy became firmly established as an Alaska

Native church in parts of Alaska. Despite the absence of resident priests in many villages, and possibly

as a reaction to Protestant attempts to convert them, Alutiiq people became more faithful. Because of the 

absence of priests, Alaska Natives had the opportunity to form the Church to suit their own particular

needs (Rathburn 1981). In Prince William Sound the presence of Orthodox Brotherhoods in each of the

communities may have also solidified support for the Church. The aim of these brotherhoods was to

maintain Church property, assist members during illness, provide food when needed, and to see to the

moral improvement of the villagers (Hassen 1978:168).

The Native application of Orthodoxy was not confined to an ecclesiastical realm, but also

influenced economic, political, and social areas of Alutiiq life (e.g., Stanek 2000, Simeone and Miraglia

2000, Mishler 2001). In some villages, the Russian Orthodox catechist wielded considerable power in the 

lives of residents. This influence declined somewhat during the 20th century but even in the late 20th

century many village social activities were closely connected with the Orthodox Church, and it was the

only institution entirely sustained by local funds (Davis 1970:129). The major social events of the year

coincided with important religious holidays like Christmas and Easter.
48

As stated above, the sale of Alaska to the United States opened the region to immigrants. Many

early immigrants were men from northern European countries, especially Sweden and Finland, attracted

by the similarity in environment and an opportunity to make a living fishing and trapping. Many with

Scandinavian roots migrated to Kodiak Island and the Alaska Peninsula and married Creole and Alutiiq

women, adding to the cultural mix of the area. Applying knowledge from the Old World, new migrants

helped to commercialize the area’s cod and herring fisheries. Many also trapped mink, fox, and marten

during the winter for commercial export. One source (Porter 1893:79) suggests Scandinavians were

motivated to marry Alutiiq women in order to dodge federal regulations against non-Natives hunting and

trapping fur-bearing animals, especially sea otters. Non-Native husbands of Native women were allowed 

to accompany Natives on hunting expeditions (Mishler 2001:19).

World War II brought a second major wave of immigrants to the Pacific Gulf region. Kodiak, for

instance, grew into an incorporated city following the influx of military personnel and by 1943 11,000

troops were based there (Mishler 2001).

The new immigrants arrived with new values about the environment, including sport-hunting 

concepts like fair chase, trophies, and hunt management. The non-Native population of Alaska doubled

between 1939 and 1950, and the number of resident hunting licenses more than tripled from about 9,000 

in 1946 to 31,500 in 1955 (Sherwood 1981:143). Sports hunters had been drawn to Alaska since the turn 

of the century, but the war-era expansion of Alaska’s road system and the increased population

associated with military bases located near Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Kodiak substantially increased

pressure on fish and big game resources. Introducing new species for sport hunting opportunities was in 

vogue during this period. Sitka black-tailed deer were introduced into Prince William Sound and Kodiak

Island at the urging of the Cordova Chamber of Commerce and elk were introduced to Kodiak Island. By

the end of World War II, deer had become a staple food for all the communities of Prince William Sound 

and most of those of Kodiak Island.

Alaska’s growing population brought political pressure for greater local control of territorial

resources. But when statehood was achieved in 1959 the partitioning of lands between state, federal,

and private owners led to increasingly complex and contested regulatory regimes and resource use

patterns in the Pacific Gulf.

During the early 20th century, Alaska Natives organized to publicly reject the overt policy of

assimilation that had contributed to the loss of traditional lands and cultural practices. Native groups

initiated a movement aimed at the recognition of aboriginal rights and the revitalization of Alaska Native

cultures. In the years leading up to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), Native people

throughout Alaska struggled to gain recognition and respect in American society as distinct cultural

groups with tribal rights. This involved overcoming the 19th century stigma ascribed to “uncivilized” Native 

society and culture.

Through the passage of ANCSA in 1971, Alaska Native people were empowered with new

institutions and assets. In exchange for extinguishing aboriginal claims on 321 million acres and

aboriginal hunting and fishing rights, Alaska Natives were compensated $962.5 million and received
49

formal title to 44 million acres of land historically occupied and used by Native peoples. For the first time

in the 20th century, economic arrangements afforded considerable value to identifying oneself as Native. 

Thirteen regional and over 200 village corporations were formed under ANCSA and engaged in both for

profit and non-profit ventures. The Alutiiq were organized into three regional corporations: Chugach

Alaska Inc. included Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet; Koniag Inc. included the Kodiak

Archipelago; and the Bristol Bay Native Corporation included Alutiiq villages on the Alaska Peninsula.

At the time, ANCSA was considered a landmark approach to satisfying Native land claims and

ANCSA stimulated the formation of a variety of Alaska Native institutions that have worked toward the

development of commercial enterprises and social programs. But the results have produced a mixture of 

successes and failures, depending upon the region, community, and type of program in question.

Historic social wounds continued to affect many Alutiiq communities during the 20th century

(Pullar 1991:23). In the early 1980s several movements began to address these problems by advocating 

the development of a strong sense of identity based on traditional Alutiiq values. The revitalization

movement led to the development of cultural and language programs in many schools, the documentation 

of local histories, compilation of elders’ teachings, construction of local museums, and the creation of

Alutiiq dance groups. A striking example of one Alutiiq community’s persistence and commitment to

cultural survival was the reestablishment of the village of Chenega at a new site (called Chenega Bay)

twenty years after the old village was destroyed by the tsunami resulting from 1964 Alaska earthquake. 

Because ANCSA provided inadequate protections for customary and traditional fishing and

hunting patterns of Alaska Natives, subsistence subsequently emerged as a central focus of political

activity. In an effort to protect subsistence uses, Congress included subsistence provisions in the Alaska

National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) of 1980. Under Title VIII of ANILCA, the state was

allowed to manage fish and game on federal lands in Alaska as long as it provided for the subsistence

practices of rural Alaska residents. In 1989, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that a rural subsistence

preference violated the state’s constitutional provisions for common use of wild resources. The state

subsequently granted subsistence rights to all Alaska residents on state and privately owned lands. The

federal government consequently assumed management of subsistence uses by rural residents on

federally owned lands in Alaska. Generally speaking, Alaska Native subsistence interests were not

specifically recognized or protected under state and federal law. When the Native Class sued to recover

damages after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the judge ruled that under Alaska State law Alaska Native’s

losses were not qualitatively different than those of the general public (Bryner 1995).

ECONOMIC CHANGE

Several concurrent transformations characterized the economic history of the Pacific Gulf during

the Russian and American periods. First, various wild resources became both subsistence products and

export commodities. Wild resource production continued for small-volume exchange and consumption

within the region (“subsistence use”), but some wild resources were harvested for export and sale outside 
50

the region (“commercial use”). Second, the organization of production and distribution was transformed

from predominately kin based groups (“domestic mode”) to a more diversified system which included a

variety of organizations not based on kinship, such as trading companies with bonded laborers, capitalholding corporations with employees, processing-trading companies purchasing products from

independent small-holder fishermen and trappers, and various other employer-employee wage form 

arrangements. Third, the geographic locus of control over economic enterprise shifted from local to nonlocal centers of operations, such as cities in Russia and the western United States. By the late 20th

century, the result of these transformations was an amalgam of modes of economic production within the 

Pacific Gulf region. Industrial capitalism, based in Alaska’s larger population centers, was the dominant

mode and exerted major economic influence in the Pacific Gulf. Concurrently, a mixed subsistence-cash 

economy predominated in rural villages and featured a relatively disjointed complex of subsistence and

commercial-wage sectors.

During the early Russian period, the colonial administration attempted to exercise strict control

over Native economic life, exacting tribute and quotas from Native workers who were forced to labor for

trading companies. But economic control varied by locale and Native group. It was most pronounced at

the trade centers, such as Kodiak and the Aleutians. The Chugach in Prince William Sound, on the other 

hand, were considered more independent than the Koniag or Aleuts and subject to less direct economic

control (Federova 1975:17; Haggerty et al. 1991). The colonial administration found it easier to transport

Koniag and Aleut workers to Prince William Sound and southeast Alaska, as they were more inured to

company disciplines, instead of attempting to round up and supervise local Chugach hunters.

The Russians made extensive use of indigenous technology, finding baidarkas and throwing

boards and darts more efficient than wooden skiffs and firearms for harvesting sea otters. They also

instituted a system in which influential men were appointed as toyons, a Siberian word used to designate 

the leading men of a community. The toyon organized hunting parties, encouraged men to hunt on the

company’s behalf, and ensured that all furs were turned over to the Russian America Company once the

hunt was finished (VanStone 1967: 55; Hassen 1978: 134). The toyon system continued into the 

American period, though the position became an elected office.

With the purchase of Alaska by the United States, the Alutiiq were “let go”, as one elder from

Tatitlek put it, and relieved of their economic obligations to the Russian trading monopoly. This left the

Alutiiq free to find a place as participants in the new capitalist system. However, Alutiiq skill, knowledge,

and labor were no longer essential in the emergent industries and the Alutiiq had to contend with fastmoving, increasingly industrialized businesses from outside the territory that quickly commercialized a

wide variety of resources for export, irrespective of aboriginal or Russian conventions. Hardship,

overwork, and death by starvation were not uncommon results.

Initially, the new commerce retained the Russian focus on furs. Sea otter pelts remained the

major export. Alutiiq hunters were encouraged to hunt for American trading companies, such as the

Alaska Commercial Company, under a credit-in-goods arrangement. At the height of the trade, credit

was loose and hunters sometimes avoided paying off credit and sold furs to independent traders for cash. 
51

By 1867 sea otter populations were already in decline in the Gulf of Alaska because of overhunting. Federal management opened the fur resources of the region to the demands of the competitive

commercial market, and between 1870 and 1890 well over 4,000 sea otters were killed each year

(Morseth 1998:63). By the 1890s, the decline in sea otters forced trading companies to cut costs by

closing stores and tightening credit. Alutiiq hunters in the sea otter industry had to find new ways to earn 

money for purchasing imported goods. An alternative was found in the developing commercial fishing

industry.

Large-scale commercial fishing began in Alaska in the 1880s. Investment from Seattle and San

Francisco based canneries enabled commercial fishing and processing to become the dominant

commercial sector of the regional economy. Between 1884 and 1890, Alaska canning production more

than doubled each year (Morseth 1998:87). By 1897, 40 percent came from the Kodiak and Chignik

districts, while approximately 20 percent came from Bristol Bay (Morseth 1998:88). Intense competition

led canneries to maintain high levels of production by using mechanized procedures and disciplined wage 

labor (Grinnell 1901). The Alutiiq were encouraged by the canneries to sell fish, either from company

boats or as independent small-holder crews. Some Alutiiq were employed building boats or working in

cannery stores. Canneries preferred to hire Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, and Mexicans who were

considered more disciplined and reliable than the Alutiiq, whose “season-regulated way of life had no

place in a society increasingly dominated by assembly line speedup” (Hinckley 1972:126; see Case IV-5).

Case IV-5. Alutiiqs as Industrial Workers 

“After making sufficient wages to supply their personal wants and getting a few dollars

ahead, the desire for hunting and fishing seizes them and they are apt to leave the

cannery when they are most wanted. To prevent this, contracts are signed and payment

made upon completion of the contract... Indians [Alutiiqs] are doubtless

improvident...nature has provided for them without much labor...white men and

Chinese must work to get something to eat, while the waters and the forests furnish

Indians with all they want...The Indian is perfectly capable and can probably work as

well as the Chinese if he could only be made to understand the exact conditions.”

(Moser 1899:25)

Alutiiq hunters preferred sea otter hunting and fur trapping to commercial fisheries but by the

1890s canneries began to hire Alutiiq fishermen as the sea otter trade declined. Some Alutiiq families

gained access to commercial fisheries by marrying Scandinavians and other foreigners who arrived with

experience and capital to work in the industry. After about 1900, commercial salmon fishing on company

boats or private skiffs became more fully integrated into the seasonal round of most Alutiiq families. By

the 1930s, the normative pattern for the Alutiiq was intense commercial fishing activity in the summer,

followed by subsistence hunting and fishing in the winter supplemented by trapping and hunting seals for

bounty. Subsistence continued as an essential and reliable sector of the village economic system

throughout this period.
52

Production technology in the commercial fisheries became increasingly capital intensive and the

industry was dominated by large capital holding companies based in Seattle and San Francisco. 

However, there were niches in the fishery for small independent fishermen who had enough money to

purchase a fishing boat and gear. Salmon were caught with gill nets and seines, although fish traps

owned and operated by the canneries caught the largest volume of fish. Most Alutiiq men participated in 

the fishery as “company men” operating boats and gear that were owned by the cannery. Alutiiq women

worked in the canneries. After World War II, local fishermen demanded more autonomy from the

canneries. Since the canneries owned the traps, which caught most of the fish, they essentially

controlled the fishery. After statehood was achieved in 1959 state regulation required the fish traps be

dismantled thus loosening the companies’ hold on production and making it possible for the subsequent

expansion of the fleet of independent catcher-sellers (Strickland n. d.: 70).

In 1975, the State of Alaska restricted access to the commercial salmon fishery by introducing

limited entry permits. In order to qualify for a commercial fishing permit, a fisherman had to demonstrate, 

among other things, a sustained record of fishing over time. Initially limited entry created the potential for 

economic disparities between families. For example, while some Alutiiq did obtain limited entry permits

those who had worked as crewmembers and who had no personal record of selling fish were unable to

enter the fishery as permit holders. Furthermore, many Alutiiq fishermen were not fully informed about

the new system and its intricacies and failed to apply for licenses.

COMMERCIAL FISHERIES, 1975-1995

Commercial fisheries have been an important part of the commercial-wage sector of Pacific Gulf 

communities during the late 20th century. Markets and fish resources have been dynamic during this

period, and local commercial fisheries have adjusted to them. Trends in commercial fisheries from 1975-

95 are presented in this section, using statistical information from the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry

Commission (ACFEC).

As shown in Figure IV-3, Kodiak City was the dominant commercial fishing community in the

Pacific Gulf and the relative rankings of local fisheries did not change substantially from 1975-1995. By

weight, of the Pacific Gulf commercial fish harvest in 1976, 75 percent was harvested by Kodiak City, 17

percent by Cordova-Seldovia, and 8 percent by Alutiiq villages. For the 1994 harvest, 73 percent was

taken by Kodiak City, 19 percent by Cordova-Seldovia, 7 percent by Native villages, and 2 percent by

Valdez. Kodiak City clearly stands out as the major center for commercial fishing in the Pacific Gulf – it

was among the top ten ports for commercial fish landings in the United States during the late 20th century. 

Kodiak City was the preferred location for many fish buyer-processors and for a relatively large local

commercial fishing fleet. Cordova and Seldovia, two predominately non-Native towns, were the next

largest fishing ports as measured by volume of catch with commercial fishing as the major sector of these 

town’s economies. In terms of volume, commercial fisheries were much smaller in the Alutiiq villages
53

Figure IV-3. Commercial Fisheries Dominance,

Gulf of Alaska Communities, 1976, 1986, 1994

0

50,000,000

100,000,000

150,000,000

200,000,000

250,000,000

300,000,000

350,000,000

400,000,000

1976 1986 1994

Commercial Fish Catch (Lbs)

Kodiak City

Cordova-Seldovia

Valdez

Native Villages

Figure IV-4. Diversification of Commercial Fisheries,

Pacific Gulf Villages, Cordova, and Kodiak City, 1976, 1986, and 1994

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1976 1986 1994 1976 1986 1994 1976 1986 1994 1976 1986 1994 1976 1986 1994

Catch Composition. 

Other Fish

Herring

Invertebrates

Halibut

Salmon

Chenega-Tatitlek- NanwalekPt GrahamAlaska Peninsula Kodiak Villages Cordova Kodiak City

Villages
54

where small-scale operations predominate. Valdez became a participant in commercial fisheries during

this period, but oil transport was and remains the primary economic engine of this community.

The commercial fishing industry was substantially more diversified in Kodiak City compared with

most other communities (see Figs. IV-4 and IV-5). In Kodiak City, “other fish” (primarily pollock) was the

major fish category harvested in 1994, while salmon comprised only about 10 percent of the catch by

weight. Seldovia’s fisheries were also relatively diversified. By contrast, other Pacific Gulf communities

were primarily involved in the harvest of salmon. Kodiak City fishermen heavily harvested king and

Dungeness crab in 1976, before crab populations crashed and pollock fisheries were developed.

Kodiak City and Alaska Peninsula fisheries were by far the most lucrative fisheries, while those of 

the Alutiiq villages in Lower Cook Inlet-Prince William Sound were much less profitable as revealed by the 

mean annual commercial fisheries sales per permit during recent years (see Figs. IV-6 to IV-8). There

were considerable differences between Alutiiq villages in terms of the earnings provided to families from

the commercial fishing sector during this period. In general, commercial fishing provided robust earnings 

in Alaska Peninsula villages, moderate earnings in Kodiak villages, and relatively low earnings in villages

in Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet. There appeared to be a decline in fish sales per permit

following a peak in 1988-89 for Alaska Peninsula, Cordova, and Kenai fisheries. Sales per permit were

highest at Kodiak City during the late 1980s and early 1990s when groundfish dominated this fishery.

In terms of participation by fishermen, there were notable differences between communities. In

Kodiak City, permits fished increased from about 400 in 1975 to about 900 in 1983. The number of

permits fished fluctuated between about 700 to 800 permits between 1983 and 1992, then permits

declined considerably from 1993-95 to about 550 permits (Fig. IV-9). The total commercial harvest for

Kodiak City did not increase during the period of rapid permit growth -- harvests fluctuated between about 

100-150 million lbs from 1975-1985. But landings increased rapidly during 1986 and 1992, from 150

million pounds to a peak of about 325 million pounds. This doubling of volume occurred in association

with a major change in the species composition of the commercial harvest and roughly parallels

substantial growth in the community's population during the same time period. By the end of the 20th

century, the Kodiak Island commercial fisheries were highly significant in terms of catch volume and exvessel value (total and per permit), and relatively diversified in harvested species. As stated above, by

comparison, the commercial fisheries of most Alutiiq villages were relatively insignificant in terms of

volume and ex-vessel value (total and per permit), and relatively narrow in diversification of species

harvested. The fisheries at Cordova and Seldovia were moderate in size and value compared with

Kodiak City and less diversified. 

Participation trends varied across Alutiiq villages as well. Participation in commercial fishing

declined in Alutiiq villages in Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet, from about 40 permits fished

annually during the 1980s to somewhat less than 20 permits fished annually during the 1990s (Fig. IV10). This was the Pacific Gulf fishery showing the lowest fish sales per permit fished (about $10,000-

$30,000 annually) (Fig. IV-7). By contrast, local participation appeared relatively stable in Alutiiq villages

of the Alaska Peninsula (about 50-60 permits fished annually) and in Alutiiq villages of the Kodiak area
55

Figure IV-5. Diversification of Commercial Fisheries,

Kenai Area, Seldovia, and Valdez, 1976, 1986, and 1994

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1976 1986 1994 1976 1986 1994 1976 1986 1994

Composition of Catch.

Other Fish

Herring

Invertebrates

Halibut

Salmon

Kenai Area Seldovia Valdez

Figure IV-6. Commercial Fish Sales by Permit Holders, Kodiak City, Cordova, and Kenai Area, 

1975-95

$0

$20,000,000

$40,000,000

$60,000,000

$80,000,000

$100,000,000

$120,000,000

$140,000,000

$160,000,000

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

Commercial Fish Sales.

Kodiak City Cordova Kenai Area
56

Figure IV-7. Commercial Fish Sales by Permit Holders, Pacific Gulf Villages, 1975-95

$0

$2,000,000

$4,000,000

$6,000,000

$8,000,000

$10,000,000

$12,000,000

$14,000,000

$16,000,000

$18,000,000

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

Commercial Fish Sales.

Chenega-TatitlekNanwalek-Pt Graham

Kodiak Villages

Alaska Peninsula

Figure IV-8. Commercial Fish Sales by Permit Holders, Seldovia and Valdez, 1975-95

$0

$1,000,000

$2,000,000

$3,000,000

$4,000,000

$5,000,000

$6,000,000

$7,000,000

$8,000,000

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

Commercial Fish Sales.

Seldovia Valdez
57

Figure IV-9. Number of Commercial Fishing Permits Fished,

Kodiak City, Cordova, and Kenai Area, 1975-95

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

Number of Permits.

Kodiak City Cordova Kenai Area

Figure IV-10. Number of Commercial Fishing Permits Fished,

Pacific Gulf Villages, 1975-95

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

Number of Permits.

Chenega-Tatitlek- Nanwalek-Pt Graham Kodiak Villages Alaska Peninsula
58

 (about 100-110 permits fished annually) (Fig. IV-11). These fisheries demonstrated more consistent and 

relatively good returns per permit during this period (Fig. IV-7). There was a slight downturn in the

number of participants in commercial fishing during the 1990s in other areas -- Kodiak City (across most

fisheries -- halibut, crab, pollock, salmon), Cordova (declines in herring and halibut), Kenai area (declines 

in halibut and salmon), Seldovia (declines in halibut and salmon), and Valdez (declines in halibut) (Figs.

IV-9 and IV-11).

A number of factors contributed to this decline in Prince Williams Sound including the introduction 

of limited entry regulation, increasing availability of farmed salmon from Peru and British Columbia,

increasing competition and the capital intensive nature of the fisheries (Stratton and Chisum 1986:101). 

Fishing has become technologically dependent on radar, sonar, winches, factory ships, and safety

equipment. Competition in the worldwide market requires fishermen to catch more fish, which requires

better boats and equipment, which in turn requires loans, insurance, and better equipment to satisfy the

insurance. Unable to make the required investments village people sell their permits, often to non-village 

residents. Villagers have also been frustrated over what they see as poor management of the fisheries,

and in particular management strategies that force fishermen to compete for the resource in close

proximity in small bays and estuaries.

In summary this chapter has outlined some of the historical transformations that have shaped

contemporary Alutiiq society, economy, and culture. The legacy of Russian colonialism survives mainly in 

Figure IV-11. Number of Commercial Fishing Permits Fished,

Pacific Gulf Villages, 1975-95

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

Number of Permits.

Seldovia Valdez Chenega-Tatitlek- Nanwalek-Pt Graham Kodiak Villages Alaska Peninsula
59

the Russian Orthodox religion, which is a central feature of contemporary Alutiiq culture. More broadly

the Russian colonial period marks the first phase in the systematic exploitation of Alaska’s resources by

non-Natives, and the subjugation the Alutiiq people. The purchase of Alaska by the Untied States

ushered in a second phase of colonial exploitation, but America’s legacy is necessarily more complex. 

Where the Russians had focused solely on fur, the Americans turned a wide range of animal and mineral 

resources into commodities. The American drive to exploit Alaska’s resources eventually led the state

and federal governments to address the aboriginal claims of the Alaska Native people. In return for

relinquishing their claims to the land, Alaska Natives received monetary compensation and land. The

effects of Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act have been mixed and have not solved the social or

economic problems of small villages. The Act has provided the larger Native community with some

economic and political influence and has led to a sense of empowerment. But ANCSA did not resolve the 

issue of subsistence, which is one of the most pressing issues facing Alaska Natives today. In part, Title 

VIII of ANILCA protected subsistence rights and the current federal management programs do provide

Native people with a venue for participating in the management of wild resources on federal lands, but not 

on state or private lands. However, the sole right to manage those resources rests with the federal and

state governments.

Today the economic transformations ushered in by Russian and American colonialism have

continued in Alutiiq villages. While commercial fishing remained a central economic sector in most Pacific 

Gulf communities during the late 20th century there was a notable decline in commercial fishing in Alutiiq

villages. As an alternative some Alutiiq fishermen explored occupations as hunting and fishing guides in

developing tourist industries. But during the late 20th century, monetary income in Alutiiq villages was

increasingly obtained through employment in public sector jobs. This marks the most recent

transformation in the Alutiiq economy, from the relative autonomy of self-employed fishermen and

trappers, to a life more deeply imbedded in capitalism.
61

Chapter Five: Pacific Gulf Communities on the Eve of the Oil Spill

After two centuries of historic transformation – one under the Russian and one under American

dominion – the human groups of Alaska’s Pacific Gulf presented a composite of cultural traditions and

settlement types. The main cultural groups were Euroamerican and Alutiiq, with other smaller enclaves of 

Alaska Natives (Eyak and Dena'ina), Filipinos, and Hispanics. Most Alaska Native families traced long

historic roots in the region. Most Euroamericans were new arrivals, though within each town there was a

core of old non-Native families with substantial roots. The population was spread among three distinct

types of communities – villages, towns, and cities. This chapter presents a “snap shot” description of

these communities as it was on “the eve” of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The materials presented here are 

primarily drawn from observations made during the late 1970s through late 1980s, particularly from

studies conducted by ADF&G, Division of Subsistence. Some data from the 1990s are used selectively

when they are relatively complete and illustrative of patterns and trends occurring in the 1980s, especially

for comparative purposes. The chapter sets the stage for the detailed description of the oil spill, provided 

in Chapter Six. 

SOME KEY CHANGES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

By the 1980s, important changes had taken place in the availability of natural resources of the

Pacific Gulf, some related to natural events and others due to human activities. Regarding the latter,

Table V-1 lists big game transplants, which took place in the study area in the 20th century. Of these, deer 

transplants to Prince William Sound and Kodiak and the moose transplant to the Copper River Delta have 

been the most successful in providing a reliable new wildlife population for hunting by local residents. 

Indeed, state and/or federal management authorities have recognized “customary and traditional uses” of 

all three populations, citing evidence of the integration of use of these populations in local subsistence

patterns. Also, natural extensions of the ranges of certain species have taken place in the 20th century. 

Perhaps most notable are the extension of the range of moose to the southwest along the Alaska 

Peninsula and the expansion in the range and numbers of sea otters, which some local residents blame

for scarcities of marine invertebrates such as clams and crab (e.g., Stratton 1989:107).

Regarding fish, the primary change was the development of enhanced or new runs of salmon,

primarily pink salmon in Prince William Sound, but also runs in the Kodiak area and Cook Inlet. These

stocks have been enhanced primarily for commercial harvest. Certain other fisheries stocks, such as king 

crab around Kodiak and in lower Cook Inlet, were depleted by the late 1970s and early 1980s, at least in

part, by commercial exploitation.

Community residents also report that certain resources were depleted following the 1964

earthquake as lands subsided in some areas and rose in others. For example, some Prince William 

Sound clam beds were destroyed by uplift after the earthquake (Stratton 1989:105-107).
62

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS DURING THE LATE 20TH CENTURY

In 1960, the year of the first federal census after Alaska achieved statehood, there were fifteen

Alaska Native villages in the Pacific Gulf with a total population of 1,716 (Fig. V-1). Most (90.6 percent) of 

this village population was Alaska Native. The total population of the Pacific Gulf was approximately

12,815 people in 1960. Most (79.6 percent) was non-Native; 21.4 percent was Alaska Native. Of the

region’s Alaska Native population, somewhat more than half (56.6 percent) lived in villages (Table V-2).

By 1970, three of the fifteen villages had been destroyed by natural disasters -- Afognak,

Chenega, and Kaguyak. All three were devastated by tsunamis following the 1964 earthquake. As stated 

in Chapter Two, one response of human groups to environmental disasters is to migrate to other locations 

with more favorable prospects. This is what survivors chose to do in this case. Afognak community was 

replaced by Port Lions in 1965. Kaguyak residents relocated in Akhiok and Old Harbor. It took twenty

years of work, including a diaspora in Tatitlek, Cordova, and Anchorage, but finally, a core of Chenega

families founded Chenega Bay on Evans Island and returned to western Prince William Sound in 1984. 

Another new village was founded on the Alaska Peninsula in 1965 when several families from Perryville

and Chignik Lake resettled at Ivanof Bay.

Table V-1. Game Transplants in the Study Area in the 20th Century

Species Year1

Location

Deer 1916 Prince William Sound

Deer 1924 Kodiak Island Archipelago

Elk 1929 Afognak and nearby islands

Moose 1949 Copper River Delta

Mountain goat 1952 Kodiak Island

Sheep 1964 Kodiak Island

1

 Year of first transplant. In many cases, subsequent transplants occurred.

Source: Burris and McKnight 1973
63

Figure V-I. Population of Alaska Native Villages of Oil Spill Area, 1960 - 

1997

1555 1569 1644 1675 1702

161 126

297 361 366

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

1960 1970 1980 1990 1997

Number of People

Alaska Native Other

The population of the Pacific Gulf grew by 12.6 percent between 1960 and 1970, about a third of 

the growth rate of Alaska as a whole (33.8 percent) during the same period (Fig. V-2; Table V-3). The

village population declined by 1.2 percent over the same period. The Gulf’s Alaska Native population

grew slightly (6.9 percent) over this ten-year period, much below the rate of growth for statewide Alaska

Native population (19.0 percent). These modest growth trends continued during the 1970s. The Pacific

Gulf population grew by 24.3 percent and the area’s Alaska Native population increased by 16.1 percent

by 1980, both figures being below the state average for the period (Table V-4, Fig. V-2). The village

population grew more slowly, increasing 14.5 percent.

For the post-oil development period of 1980 to 1990, growth rates accelerated. There was a

notable 30.8 percent in the Pacific Gulf, almost matching the state’s 36.9 percent increase (Table V-5, Fig. 

V-2). The region’s population reached 23,453 people. However, during the same period, the population

of the fifteen villages was relatively stable, growing by only 4.9 percent. The area’s Alaska Native

population grew by 19.2 percent, much below statewide Alaska Native population increase of 34.6

percent.

By the 1990 census, there were fifteen Alaska Native villages in the Pacific Gulf, the same as in

1960. Their population was 2,036, with 82.3 percent of this Alaska Native (Table V-5). This was a modest 

increase of 18.6 percent over 1960 and 4.9 percent over 1980, when the total population was 1,941 (84.7 

percent Alaska Native) (Table V-2, Fig. V-2). Meanwhile, the population of Alaska increased by 143.2

percent between 1960 and 1990 and 36.9 percent between 1980 and 1990 (ADOL 1998:23).
64

Table V-2. Population of Communities in the Area Affected by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1960

Total Alaska Native Percentage,

Community Population Population1Alaska Native

Small, Predominately Alaska Native Communities

Akhiok 84 83 98.3% 

Chenega 60 58 96.4% 

Chignik Bay 99 80 80.7% 

Chignik Lagoon 108 92 85.4% 

Chignik Lake 107 105 98.3% 

Kaguyak 36 20 55.9% 

Karluk 129 125 96.9% 

Larsen Bay 72 60 83.5% 

Nanwalek (English Bay) 78 71 91.4% 

Old Harbor 193 179 92.8% 

Ouzinkie 214 191 89.4% 

Perryville 111 106 95.7% 

Port Graham 139 137 98.7% 

Port Lions (Afognak) 190 154 81.1% 

Tatitlek 96 93 96.4% 

Subtotal 1,716 1,555 90.6% 

Other Communities: "Rural" 2

Cordova (city only) 1,128 186 16.5% 

Kodiak36,256 494 7.9% 

Seldovia 460 145 31.6% 

Subtotal 7,844 826 10.5% 

Subtotal, "Rural" 9,560 2,380 24.9% 

Other Communities, "Non-rural"

Seward (city only) 1,891 250 13.2% 

Valdez 555 87 15.6% 

Whittier 809 31 3.8% 

Subtotal, "Non-rural" 3,255 367 11.3% 

Totals 12,815 2,747 21.4% 

1

 Place-specific data on Native population not available. Estimates based on

1970 percentage of population Native (Table V-3). Chenega based on Tatitlek.

2

 Listed are communities and areas classified as "rural" by the Alaska Joint Board of 

of Fisheries and Game in 1989 and thereby eligible for subsistence uses.

3 Kodiak Island Census Area excluding the villages

Source: Rollins 1978
65

Table V-3. Population of Communities in the Area Affected by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1970

Total Alaska Native Percentage,

Community Population Population Alaska Native

Small, Predominately Alaska Native Communities

Akhiok 115 113 98.3% 

Chenega Bay 0 0 

Chignik Bay 83 67 80.7% 

Chignik Lagoon278 67 85.4% 

Chignik Lake 117 115 98.3% 

Ivanof Bay 48 46 95.8% 

Kaguyak 59 33 55.9% 

Karluk 98 95 96.9% 

Larsen Bay 109 91 83.5% 

Nanwalek 58 53 91.4% 

Old Harbor 290 269 92.8% 

Ouzinkie 160 143 89.4% 

Perryville 94 90 95.7% 

Port Graham 107 96 89.7% 

Port Lions 227 184 81.1% 

Tatitlek 111 107 96.4% 

Subtotal 1,754 1,569 89.4% 

Other Communities: "Rural" 1

Cordova31,164 192 16.5% 

Kodiak48,410 665 7.9% 

Seldovia 437 138 31.6% 

Subtotal 10,011 995 9.9% 

Subtotal, "Rural" 11,765 2,564 21.8% 

Other Communities, "Non-rural"

Seward51,587 210 13.2% 

Valdez 1,005 157 15.6% 

Whittier 130 5 3.8% 

Subtotal, "Non-rural" 2,722 372 13.7% 

Totals 14,487 2,936 20.3% 

1

 Listed are communities and areas classified as "rural" by the Alaska Joint Board of 

of Fisheries and Game in 1989 and thereby eligible for subsistence uses.

2

 Chignik Lagoon missing for 1970 census. Estimate here is midpoint between 1960

and 1980 for total population; assume percent Native same as 1980.

3 Cordova city limits only

4

 For total population, Kodiak Island Borough excluding the six villages. Native

population is Kodiak City (657) and Woody Island (8).

5

 Includes city of Seward, Grouse Creek Group, and balance of Seward CSA.

for total population. City of Seward only for Native population.

Source: Rollins 1978
66

Table V-4. Population of Communities in the Area Affected by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1980

Total Alaska Native Percentage,

Community Population Population Alaska Native

Small, Predominately Alaska Native Communities

Akhiok 105 101 96.2% 

Chenega Bay 0 0 

Chignik Bay 178 95 53.4% 

Chignik Lagoon 48 41 85.4% 

Chignik Lake 138 123 89.1% 

Ivanof Bay 40 37 92.5% 

Karluk 96 96 100.0% 

Larsen Bay1144 120 83.3% 

Nanwalek 124 98 79.0% 

Old Harbor 340 315 92.6% 

Ouzinkie 173 163 94.2% 

Perryville 111 103 92.8% 

Port Graham 161 141 87.6% 

Port Lions 215 158 73.5% 

Tatitlek 68 53 77.9% 

Subtotal 1,941 1,644 84.7% 

Other Communities: "Rural" 2

Cordova32,241 286 12.8% 

Kodiak47,472 931 12.5% 

Seldovia 479 117 24.4% 

Subtotal 10,192 1,334 13.1% 

Subtotal, "Rural" 12,133 2,978 24.5% 

Other Communities, "Non-rural"

Seward52,524 238 9.4% 

Valdez 3,079 175 5.7% 

Whittier 198 17 8.6% 

Subtotal, "Non-rural" 5,801 430 7.4% 

Totals 17,934 3,408 19.0% 

1

 Larsen Bay excludes 24 in group quarters (cannery)

2

 Listed are communities and areas classified as "rural" by the Alaska Joint Board of 

of Fisheries and Game in 1989 and thereby eligible for subsistence uses.

3 Cordova Census subarea for total; city only for Native.

4

 Kodiak Island Borough excluding the six small villages 

5

 Includes city of Seward, Grouse Creek Group, and balance of Seward CSA.

for total population. City of Seward only for Native population.

Source: Bureau of the Census 1982, 1984; Alaska Department of Labor 1991
67

Table V-5. Population of Communities in the Area Affected by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1990

Total Alaska Native Percentage,

Community Population Population Alaska Native

Small, Predominately Alaska Native Communities

Akhiok 77 72 93.5% 

Chenega Bay 94 65 69.1% 

Chignik Bay1160 85 53.1% 

Chignik Lagoon 53 30 56.6% 

Chignik Lake 133 122 91.7% 

Ivanof Bay 35 33 94.3% 

Karluk 71 65 91.5% 

Larsen Bay 147 124 84.4% 

Nanwalek 158 144 91.1% 

Old Harbor 284 252 88.7% 

Ouzinkie 209 178 85.2% 

Perryville 108 102 94.4% 

Port Lions 222 150 67.6% 

Port Graham 166 150 90.4% 

Tatitlek 119 103 86.6% 

Subtotal 2,036 1,675 82.3% 

Other Communities: "Rural" 2

Cordova32,579 272 10.5% 

Kodiak410,274 1,251 12.2% 

Seldovia 316 48 15.2% 

Subtotal 13,169 1,571 11.9% 

Subtotal, "Rural" 15,205 3,246 21.3% 

Other Communities, "Non-rural"

Seward53,937 547 13.9% 

Valdez 4,068 239 5.9% 

Whittier 243 30 12.3% 

Subtotal, "Non-rural" 8,248 816 9.9% 

Totals 23,453 4,062 17.3% 

1

 Excludes 28 in group quarters in Chignik Bay

2

 Listed are communities and areas classified as "rural" by the Alaska Joint Board of 

of Fisheries and Game in 1989 and thereby eligible for subsistence uses.

3 Cordova Census subarea

4

 Kodiak Island Borough excluding the six small villages and the Coast Guard Station

5

 Includes city of Seward, Grouse Creek Group, and balance of Seward CSA.

Source: Alaska Department of Labor 1991
68

Figure V-2. Percentage Change in Population 1960 - 1990

33.8%

12.6%

-1.2%

19.0%

6.9%

0.9%

32.8%

24.3%

14.5%

26.7%

16.1%

4.8%

36.9%

30.8%

4.9%

34.6%

19.2%

1.9%

143.2%

83.0%

18.6%

102.8%

47.9%

7.7%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

160%

Alaska Spill Area 15 Villages Alaska Spill Area 15 Villages

Total Population Alaska Native Population

Percentage Change

1960 - 1970 1970 - 1980 1980 - 1990 1960 - 1990

By 1990, less than half of the Pacific Gulf Alaska Native population lived in villages (41.2 percent), 

while 58.8 percent lived in towns or cities with a non-Native majority. Of all Alaska Natives, 79.9 percent

lived in communities considered “rural” under state/federal law, and 20.1 percent lived in non-rural areas

(Table V-5).

The following summarizes demographic trends from 1960 to 1990 for the study area:

• While the population of spill area communities increased 83.0 percent over the 30-year period, the 

growth rate was only 58.0 percent of the statewide growth during the period (a 143.2 percent

increase);

• Although the number of Alaska Native villages was the same at the beginning and the end of the

period (15), the population of these villages grew only 18.6 percent, just 22.4 percent of the area’s 

growth rate and just 13.0 percent of the growth rate of the state;

• Growth of the overall Alaska Native population of the spill area (47.9 percent increase from 1960

to 1990) also failed to keep pace with the statewide rate of growth of the Native population (102.8

percent increase);

• The percentage of the study area’s population composed of Alaska Natives dropped steadily, from 

21.4 percent in 1960 to 17.3 percent in 1990, due to the population growth in the towns;

• The Alaska Native population of the villages of the spill area grew more slowly than that of the area 

and the state, just 7.7 percent from 1960 to 1990;

• The percentage of the population of the Alaska Native villages made up of Alaska Natives

remained very high, but dropped over the 30-year period, from 90.6 percent in 1960 to 82.3 percent 

in 1990; and,
69

• The percentage of the area’s Alaska Native population living in villages dropped from a majority

(56.6 percent) to a minority (41.2 percent) over the 30-year period.

TRANSPORTATION

As continues to be the case, all of the villages in the spill area in the 1980s were off the state’s

road system. Port Lions was serviced by the Alaska Marine Highway, as was Chignik Bay a few times a

year. The primary means of transportation to each village was by small plane, with all villages but

Chenega Bay having landing strips (Fig. V-3). Poor and rapidly changing weather made travel to all of

these villages problematic at times. The costs of goods and services were substantially higher than those 

of communities along Alaska's road system.

Figure V-3. Residents of Ivanof Bay on the Alaska Peninsula help unload supplies from a small plane. In 

the 1980s and 1990s, villages of the study area depended upon air transportation to obtain goods and 

services.
70

THE SUBSISTENCE SECTOR OF THE LOCAL ECONOMY

The Pacific Gulf Economy: Patterns Before the Spill

Two general types of economic systems predominated in Alaska during the late 1980s (Wolfe 

and Walker 1987). A subsistence-based mixed economy characterized small villages, while an industrial 

capital economy characterized urban centers like Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau. One distinguishing 

feature of subsistence-based mixed economies is moderate-to-high use of wild foods (Wolfe and Walker 

1987). Wild food production and distribution is called a subsistence sector of the village economy, which

exists alongside of, and is integrated with, a commercial-wage sector.

To assess the relative strength of the subsistence sector of Pacific Gulf communities, per capita 

wild food productivity in Gulf of Alaska communities can be compared with other communities and regions 

of Alaska.1 The annual wild food harvests (pounds per capita) of Gulf of Alaska villages and towns (18

communities) were compared with the harvests of 139 other communities in Alaska, grouped into eight

regions (see Fig. V-4). The number of communities in each regional group is indicated along the

horizontal axis. For instance, there were 17 communities in the "urban" group, 35 communities in the

"road" group, and so forth. Each community is treated as a separate data point in analysis. The range of 

per capita harvests per community in each region is displayed by the vertical bracket, and the mean per

capita harvest for all communities in each region is shown by the dark horizontal bar. The box along each 

vertical bracket shows the 95 percent confidence interval about the mean harvest among communities in

the set. Ninety-five percent of communities in the region fall within this range.

As shown in Figure V-4, per capita community wild food harvest levels in Alaska communities

form a continuum. However, there is a statistically significant break in the continuum between urbanized

communities (the lowest harvesting group) and all other community groups in the state. In the urban

group, per capita wild food harvests range from lows of about 16 pounds (Fairbanks) and 19 pounds

(Anchorage) to highs of about 94 pounds (Homer) and 110 pounds (Hope) on the Kenai Peninsula. The

mean urban community harvest falls at 63 pounds per capita and the 95 percent confidence interval is 47 

to 78 pounds for the set of urban communities. Valdez is at the high end of the urban group of

communities, producing wild food harvests of 88 pounds (1991), 103 pounds (1992), and 79 pounds

(1993). Kenai is in the middle-to-high end of the urban group, with wild food harvests of 40 pounds

(1982), 75 pounds (1991), 74 pounds (1992), and 84 pounds (1993). The urban group is statistically

different from all other regional groups (sig. = .05), using the Bonferroni test for difference of means. This 

statistical break provides quantitative support for the urban categorization of these 17 places by the

Alaska Joint Board of Fisheries and Game under the state's subsistence statute. Wild foods do not 

 

1

 Subsistence harvests are reported here in pounds usable (dressed) weight per capita. Factors used to convert whole fish,

mammals, invertebrates, and birds into usable pounds are reported in the Division’s Community Profile Database (ADF&G 2001). 

Fall (1990) provides an overview of a typical Division “baseline” study that is designed to collect harvest data. Subsistence harvest 

estimates include harvests taking place under subsistence, personal use, general, and sport regulations, and also include resources 

removed from commercial catches for home use. Resources purchased in stores or at markets are not included.
71

Figure V-4. Wild Food Harvests by Community and Region

(Ranges and 95% Confidence Intervals)

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

 Urban 

(17)

Road Interior

(35)

 Southeast 

(29)

Gulf of Alaska

(18)

 Southwest 

(16)

 Interior 

(11)

 Arctic 

(11)

 Western 

(20)

Harvests (Pounds per capita)
72

provide a substantial part of the food supply for most urban residents in Alaska. In Anchorage, the

wild food harvest of 16 pounds per person provides about 10 percent of the Recommended Dietary

Allowance (RDA) for protein and about 1 percent of the RDA for energy (kilocalories) for the population. 

Accordingly, the local socioeconomic systems of communities in the urban group cannot be said to

display a developed subsistence sector. Most wild food harvests in urbanized places are conducted

under sport regulations. A relatively well-developed sport tradition is reflected in the levels of harvests in

the urban Alaska places.

Mean annual per capita wild food harvests for the other groups are as follows: Road Interior (185 

pounds), Southeast (253 pounds), Pacific Gulf (298 pounds), Southwest (351 pounds), Other Interior (479 

pounds), Arctic (652 pounds), and Western (705 pounds). The harvests of these rural regional groups

display features of a cline (that is, a gradual change in the trait within rural communities over a

geographical area). Group 2 (Road Interior) is not statistically different from Groups 3 and 4 (Southeast

and Pacific Gulf), but is statistically distinct from Groups 5 to 8. Group 3 (Southeast) is not statistically 

different from Groups 2, 4, and 5, but is statistically distinct from Groups 6 to 8, and so forth. Along this

continuum, wild food harvests in communities of the Pacific Gulf (298 pounds per capita) fall somewhat

below the mean of all rural communities in the data set, which is 366 pounds (a pound of food per day). 

On average, Pacific Gulf subsistence harvest volumes are about 100 pounds per capita higher than

harvests by rural communities along the road network (Athabaskan, Euroamerican), and about 50 pounds 

per capita higher than southeast region communities (Tlingit, Haida, Euroamerican); however, because of 

the variation within each region’s communities, statistically these groups are not distinct. Pacific Gulf

harvests are about 50 pounds per capita lower than Southwest Alaska communities (Aleut and coastal

Yup'ik); again this difference is not significant statistically. The subsistence sectors of the Gulf of Alaska

communities are significantly lower than that of the Yup'ik, Inupiat, and Athabaskan communities off the

road network in the Interior, Arctic, and Western regions. Harvests in the Pacific Gulf are 175 pounds to

400 pounds per capita lower on average than communities in the Interior, Arctic, and Western regions.

Wolfe and Walker (1987) attributed these regional harvest differences to historic differences in

degree of settlement entry by non-Native groups, presence of transportation systems (for people and

goods), relative strength of the commercial-wage sectors in a community, and restrictiveness of fishing

and hunting regulations. Overall, this current analysis suggests that the subsistence sectors of Pacific

Gulf communities were moderate in size relative to other rural Alaska communities. They were neither at 

the low end or the high end, but fall somewhat in the middle of harvests of rural Alaska regions. In terms 

of wild food dependencies, the analysis also shows that Pacific Gulf communities in aggregate were

statistically distinct from urban places in Alaska, including Valdez and Kenai.

The subsistence sector of rural communities can be described with respect to several features:

resources used, harvest levels, participation rates, seasonality of harvests, harvest areas, harvest

composition, kinship organization of production, distribution, and the expression of cultural values such as 
73

sharing and nonwaste. Each feature is described for Pacific Gulf communities, in order to characterize

the subsistence-based economies as they existed just prior to the oil spill.

Resources Used and Harvest Levels

Subsistence hunting, fishing, and gathering were of great economic, social, and cultural

significance in Alutiiq villages prior to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Before the EVOS, opportunities to

harvest and distribute natural resources in the subsistence sector of the local economies of these

communities were generally more reliable than opportunities to earn money in the commercial-wage 

sector, since jobs tended to be seasonal and varied greatly in availability from year to year.

Case V-1 provides excerpts from a set of “community subsistence profiles” prepared by The

North Pacific Rim (later renamed Chugachmiut), the non-profit Native regional organization for the

“Chugach Region” (Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet), based on research in the late 1970s. 

The profiles are consistent with division research beginning in the early 1980s. They illustrate differences 

between the villages and the larger communities that were borne out in division studies. For example, the 

community data on the range of resources used as summarized in Figure V-5 in Case V-1 should be

compared with the following harvest and use data summarized from division studies. 

Table V-5 summarizes information about subsistence uses in the study communities in the 

1980s, based upon Division of Subsistence research. The same seven general categories of subsistence 

resources are available in the four regions, although there are some differences in the specific resources. 

These seven general categories include: (1) salmon (five species); (2) other fish such as halibut, Pacific

cod, rockfish, herring, and Dolly Varden; (3) marine invertebrates such as clams, chitons, crabs, and

octopus; (4) land mammals such as deer in Prince William Sound and the Kodiak Island area, black bear 

and mountain goats in Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet, moose in Lower Cook Inlet and the

Alaska Peninsula, and caribou on the Alaska Peninsula; (5) marine mammals (primarily harbor seals and 

Steller sea lions); (6) birds (including ptarmigan, grouse, waterfowl, and sea birds and their eggs); and (7) 

wild plants.

In the 1980s, subsistence harvests in the study villages were relatively large and diverse. For

example, in the study years just before the spill (1987/88 and 1988/89), households in Tatitlek on average 

used 19.1 different kinds of wild resources (Table V-6). In 1987, households in Nanwalek used an

average of 25.0 kinds of wild foods and neighboring Port Graham households averaged 21.5 kinds. 

Subsistence harvests in these communities ranged from about 200 pounds per person per year to over

600 pounds per capita annually. As shown in Figure V-6, subregional estimates of subsistence harvests 

in the 1980s were 254 pounds per person in Lower Cook Inlet, 287 pounds per person in Alaska 

Peninsula communities, 392 pounds per person in Kodiak Island villages, and 437 pounds per person in

the two Prince William Sound villages, for a regional average harvest of 352 pounds per person per year. 

[Note that these averages exclude the towns of Cordova, Seldovia, and Kodiak.] That subsistence

harvests provided a large portion of each community's food supply is shown by comparing these harvest
74

Case V-1. Chugach Region Community Subsistence Profiles 1980

English Bay [Nanwalek]. “Subsistence is an integral part of the lifestyle of English Bay people. One 

could not begin to characterize village life without discussing the essential relationship between the

people of English Bay and the natural resources around them. Harvesting fish, clams, berries, ducks 

and other game are year round activities crucial tot heir physical, mental and economic well-being.”

Eyak. “Although different industries have encouraged the growth of a cash-based economy, the

lifestyle of and the diet of people in the Eyak-Cordova area still strongly reflect the heritage of a

traditional relationship between human beings and the natural resources. Because of the apparent

lessening dependence directly on the resources there are those observers who would maintain that

subsistence is no longer a reality in the Prince William Sound. Yes such activities as drying fish,

smoking fish, seal-hunting and berry-picking have persisted over the years, without any direct

relationship to the size of income. Traditional and customary uses of the resources continue.”

Port Graham. “Residents of Port Graham continue to harvest and use natural resources, turning to 

the land and mountains for their subsistence foods throughout the year. Culturally and economically, 

subsistence activities and resources play a significant role in the lives of everyone in Port Graham.”

Seward. “Subsistence in Seward is an entity that is difficult to define. Many local residents use the 

fish resources every year.”

Tatitlek. “Natural resources are the cornerstone of the village economy, as the residents rely on

commercial fishing and subsistence activities for their sustenance. Although the village has seen

some significant changes over the years, the essential dependence of the Tatitlek people on the

resources, culturally and economically, and their use of the resources, remains largely intact.”

Valdez. “Valdez, among the Chugach Region communities, has the least apparent relationship to the 

natural resources. In spite of the many changes the town has undergone, and the influx of outsiders 

into the area, a segment of the community continues to utilize the natural resources, and many

express concerns about the availability of the resources in the future.”

Figure V-5. Number of Resources Used by 50 Percent or 

More of Alaska Native Households, 1980

42

21 22

6

32

6

0

10

20

30

40

50

English Bay Eyak Port Graham Seward Tatitlek Valdez

Source: The North Pacific Rim 1981
75

Table V-6. Some Characteristics of Subsistence Uses in the Exxon Valdez Study Communities Before the 1989 Oil Spill

Pre-spill Annual Average

Mean Number

of Specific Kinds

Per Capita of Resources Percentage of Households that:

Harvest, Used per Used Attempted Harvested Received Gave Away

Community Pounds Household Resources a Harvest Resources Resources Resources

Predominantly Alaska Native Communities:

Chenega Bay 346.6 18.8 100.0% 97.0% 97.0% 96.8% 87.5%

Tatitlek 483.4 19.1 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 97.7%

Prince William 

Sound 436.5 19.0 100.0% 98.9% 98.9% 98.9% 94.1%

Nanwalek 288.8 25.0 97.0% 93.9% 93.9% 93.9% 93.9%

Port Graham 227.2 21.5 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 98.1% 81.5%

Lower Cook Inlet 254.3 22.9 98.8% 97.6% 97.6% 96.5% 86.3%

Akhiok 325.9 12.6 95.4% 90.7% 90.7% 56.5% 66.2%

Karluk 618.1 17.0 100.0% 95.1% 95.1% 97.3% 84.3%

Larsen Bay 309.5 15.4 98.5% 88.3% 86.8% 91.2% 72.2%

Old Harbor 456.3 15.2 100.0% 98.7% 98.7% 83.0% 78.7%

Ouzinkie 389.3 18.3 97.2% 94.2% 94.2% 85.3% 66.9%

Port Lions 307.2 14.0 99.2% 94.1% 94.1% 84.9% 75.9%

Kodiak Island 

Borough 392.1 15.4 98.7% 94.5% 94.3% 83.8% 74.4%

Chignik Bay 187.9 12.5 100.0% 84.2% 84.2% 94.7% 78.9%

Chignik Lagoon 220.2 10.4 100.0% 88.2% 88.2% 82.4% 70.6%

Chignik Lake 279.0 16.2 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.7% 82.6%

Ivanof Bay 455.6 18.5 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 83.3%

Perryville 391.2 21.2 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Alaska Peninsula 287.0 15.7 100.0% 94.1% 94.1% 94.3% 83.5%

All Native 

Communities 352.0 16.9 99.0% 95.2% 95.0% 87.5% 78.3%

Other Communities:

Cordova 199.9 12.6 98.7% 92.4% 90.0% 91.8% 83.1%

Kodiak 147.8 11.9 100.0% NA 96.1% 90.3% 79.4%

1

 For Nanwalek and Port Graham, data pertain to 1987; for Chignik Bay, Chignik Lagoon, Chignik Lake, Ivanof Bay, and Perryville, data are

for 1984; for Chenega Bay, data are the mean of values for two study years, 1984/85 and 1985/86; for Tatitlek, data are the mean of

 values for two study years, 1987/88 and 1988/89; for Akhiok, Karluk, Larsen Bay, Old Harbor, Ouzinkie, and Port Lions, data are 

the mean for two study years, 1982/83 and 1986; for Cordova, data are mean for 1985 and 1988; for Kodiak, the study year is 1982/83.

Sources: ADF&G 2001; KANA 1983; Fall et al. 1995; Schroeder et al. 1987; Fall et al. 1996; Stanek, forthcoming a
76

levels with average purchases of meat, fish and poultry in the United States. In the late 1970s, the

average family in the western United States purchased about 222 pounds per person of meat, fish, and

poultry. Subsistence harvests in the study communities nearly matched or exceeded this average. 

These subsistence harvests were also much higher than those of more populated, urbanized areas of

Alaska (Wolfe and Walker 1987).

Case V-2 illustrates food preferences in the Alaska Peninsula community of Perryville in the

1980s. The diversity of wild foods used in this example matches Division findings from a systematic

survey conducted in Perryville and the other four Alaska Peninsula villages in 1984 (Morris 1987). As

Case V-3 (Akhiok) and Case V-4 (Old Harbor) show, however, the diets of village residents in the 1980s

contained a variety of purchased foods as well, and “favorites” were not always “traditional.”

Participation Rates

As shown in Figure V-7 (see also Table V-6), virtually every household in each community of the

spill area used subsistence resources in the pre-spill study years of the 1980s. A very large percentage,

almost always 90 percent or more, engaged in subsistence activities and were successful harvesters. A

large majority of community residents were involved in exchanges of subsistence resources, either

receiving resources, giving them away, or both.

Figure V-6. Estimated Subsistence Harvests by Subregion, 1980s

437

254

392

287

352

200

148

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

Prince

William

Sound

Lower Cook

Inlet

Kodiak

Island

Borough

Villages

Alaska

Peninsula

All 15

Villages

Cordova Kodiak City

Pounds Usable Weight per Person
77

Case V-2. Favorite Foods in Perryville, 1985

“The most unusual, and diverse, meal the author had during the whole sequence of field 

visits [in 1984 and 1985] was the first meal on the second trip to Perryville. E.S. first 

served moose meat stew, followed by duck soup, then baked salmon. Something from

the land, sky, and sea. Food bought in a store, such as spare ribs, beef stew, rice, and

mashed potatoes also were eaten during the visits to Perryville. Homemade bread was a 

local item of pride. In an informal discussion of their favorite foods, nine persons cited 

subsistence foods – no one mentioned store-bought items. The range of favorites was

extensive, with four people selecting caribou and two agutuk. Also included were

steamed clams with seal grease, sea urchins, dried fish, ptarmigan, octopus, sea lion

flippers, and berries. In a follow-up discussion about what was eaten the night before,

many of the foods mentioned had been purchased; for example, one family had lima

beans and ham hocks, and another, TV dinners. But answers in May included bear

meat, caribou bones, and seal.”

Source: Davis 1986:34-35

Case V-3. Continuity and Change in Foods at Old Harbor, 1985

“On March 27, 1964, the menus for 12 Old Harbor households (representing 104

persons) showed that four homes (36 persons) were preparing non-Native foods and

eight households (68 persons) were preparing subsistence foods. The menus included

roast duck, seaweed and wild spuds, sea lion, salted fish, salt fish soup, and clam

chowder. During the field trip in March 1985 for this study, a small sample of 13

different meals served in 7 households (38 persons) indicated that local foods continue

to be enjoyed, but the diversity has increased considerably with the introduction of

purchased items. The local foods included fish patties, halibut, fried bread, piroke, and

black bass; other meals had chicken, spaghetti, macaroni, hot dogs, pork chops, and

hamburgers.”

Source: Davis 1986:195.
78

Case V-4. Increasing Availability of Purchased Foods at Akhiok, 1985

“Asking about favorite foods revealed diverse preferences among the residents of

Akhiok. The subsistence favorites balanced choices purchased at the store, which

included Chinese and Japanese dishes. The local foods named went from “Everything

that comes from nature” to dried salmon, clams, seals, birds, and oomidak with seal oil. 

No land animal was identified as a preferred food. Data on 12 meals in 6 household

(25% of the village) provided the following lists:

Subsistence Foods:

No. of No. of

Item Households People

Ptarmigan 2 8

Octopus 1 5

Canned Salmon 1 5

Purchased foods (the base for 8 meals):

Chicken 2 6

Spam & cheese 1 7

Roast beef 1 5

Pork chops 1 6

Macaroni 1 1

Beans 1 1

Hamburger 1 4

“The above data contrasts markedly with the food eaten by the researcher in

Akhiok on April 29 through May 2, 1979. At that time, the following foods were 

served: clams, pickled salmon, sea lion soup, smoked silver salmon, venison

steak, fish pie, dried sea lion meat, and salmon loaf. In 1985 there was only

one serving of subsistence foods – canned red salmon, and fried bread for a

snack. Although the two experiences are not exactly comparable, the

differences indicate that purchased foods were much more available, and

consumed, in March 1985 than in May 1979.”

Source: Davis 1986:168
79

Seasonality of Harvests

In the 1980s, each community followed a patterned seasonal round of subsistence harvest 

activities that was shaped largely by the cycle of resource availability. Figure V-8 depicts the seasonal

cycle of subsistence harvesting for the Prince William Sound communities of Chenega Bay and Tatitlek. 

Here, the cycle of subsistence harvests began in the spring (March, April, May). This was a period of

renewed activities, when herring, herring spawn, clams, birds, eggs, and other resources were harvested. 

Summer was traditionally the busiest time of year, when people harvested and preserved large quantities 

of salmon for winter use. Autumn was also important for salmon fishing, as well as for land mammal

hunting, marine mammal hunting, waterfowl hunting, and marine invertebrate gathering. Case V-5 

illustrates the flexibility inherent in the seasonal round, as well as the traditional knowledge embedded in

subsistence hunting. Subsistence activities in winter included marine mammal hunting, land mammal

hunting, and trapping (Stratton and Chisum 1986:60; Stratton 1990:69). The skills and knowledge 

needed to hunt marine mammals, as well as the dangers involved, are illustrated in Case V-6.

Figure V-7. Participation in Subsistence Uses,Spill Area 

Communities, 1980s

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Prince William

Sound

Lower Cook

Inlet

Kodiak Island

Borough

Villages

Alaska

Peninsula

All 15 Villages Cordova Kodiak City

Percentage of Households

Using Attempting Harvest Harvesting Receiving Giving
80

Figure V-8. Seasonal Cycle of Subsistence Harvest Activities by Residents of Chenega Bay and Tatitlek, Prince William Sound, 1980s 

% of HHs *

Attempting to Harvest

Resource Chenega Tatitlek April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb March

Herring 16.1% 30.6% 

Chitons 35.5% 19.6% 

Harbor seal 67.8% 55.3% 

Clams 51.5% 31.4% 

Halibut 80.7% 57.5% 

Herring Spawn 9.7% 71.5% 

Smelt 25.8% 4.5% 

Black bear 35.5% 9.6% 

Seabird eggs 12.9% 39.2% 

Cockles 29.0% 37.9% 

Dolly Varden 12.9% 2.6% 

Pacific Cod 19.4% 27.4% 

King salmon 32.3% 50.6% 

Sockeye 45.1% 62.8% 

Shrimp 25.8% 26.1% 

Wild Plants 90.4% 97.7% 

Pink salmon 71.0% 72.6% 

Chum salmon 54.8% 69.4% 

Coho salmon 54.8% 57.3% 

Deer 74.2% 75.3% 

Crabs 9.7% 12.8% 

Octopus 25.8% 47.5% 

Goat 25.8% 14.1% 

Ducks 64.5% 57.0% 

Sea lion 51.7% 26.9% 

Rockfish 54.8% 47.0% 

 = Usual Harvest (when most harvest occurs) = Occasional Harvest (when some harvest may occur)

* Average of pre-spill years

SOURCE: Fall et al. 1996
81

With mostly minor modifications, a similar seasonal pattern to that of Prince William Sound was

followed by the communities of lower Cook Inlet, the Kodiak Island Borough, and the Alaska Peninsula. 

An important difference was the large numbers of caribou on the Alaska Peninsula, which were harvested 

from August through April (Morris 1987:86-92; Schroeder et al. 1987:404-405,474-479,582-583).

Case V–5. Duck Hunting on Kodiak Island 

At the same time that men go out to hunt deer and elk, they usually take along a shotgun 

and hunt ducks. On a day when deer don’t show themselves, hunters will turn their

attention to sea ducks, which winter over in the protected waters of the Kodiak

archipelago. One favorite place to stalk and shoot ducks is on the flats. Flats are level

areas dotted with small fresh water ponds, and the tall reeds make good cover for the

hunters if they crouch down. Surprisingly, stormy weather is prime time for duck

hunting. This is because ducks take shelter during a storm and hole up in small lagoons 

or along creeks where they can be out of the wind. Hunters know these lagoons very

well and are willing to brave the elements to get to them. Some areas can be reached

more easily on a 4-wheeler than in a skiff. In the fall time TS and his son, “J.R.”,

always go up to their old family place at Barabara Cove, in upper Kizhuyak Bay, about

fifteen water miles from Ouzinkie. They are often joined there by T’s brothers, M, and 

P, who also have their own cabins. For many generations this has been their family’s

traditional deer and duck hunting camp. 

Source: Mishler 2001:148

By the 1980s, the former seasonal pattern of dispersing to summer and/or winter camps

continued for only a few communities and families. The greatest seasonal movements took place on the

Alaska Peninsula, where the entire population of Ivanof Bay and about half of Perryville and Chignik Lake 

moved to summer camps on Chignik Lagoon or Chignik Bay for subsistence and commercial fishing.

Harvest Areas

Most often, subsistence hunting, fishing, and gathering occurred within definable village harvest

areas, which sometimes correspond closely to the territories of ancestral Alutiiq regional groups (Fig. V9). For example, the contemporary core harvest areas used by Tatitlek within Prince William Sound were 

much like those used by the Tititlarmiut regional group from which Tatitlek families are descended

(Stratton 1990:87). As subsistence activities occurred, hunting and fishing skills, and knowledge about

local weather patterns, reliable harvest areas, and safe camping locations, were taught across

generations. The use of a wide array of mammal, bird, fish, marine invertebrate, and plant species reflect 

the detailed knowledge of local harvest areas that has developed and been transmitted over generations

of subsistence activities.
82

Case V–6. Hunting Sea Lions at Old Harbor

R had to go to Kodiak at the last minute, so S picked me up at the Sitkalidak Lodge about 7:45 a.m., and 

we walked down to the small boat harbor to launch R’s tiny skiff, a 14-foot Boston Whaler. We got to 

the Cape about 8:15 a.m., quite a long ride. As we rounded a big rock outcropping we saw about a half 

dozen sea lions perched up high sunning themselves. Then on the beach there were 70-80 of them in a 

good-sized herd.

As we approached, S expressed concern for the swells, saying he was reluctant to go in too close for fear 

of being swamped by the swells. So he hooted like a bull sea lion, took aim on an animal and showed

me which one he was aiming at so that I could focus my video camera on it. He fired one shot with his 

rifle, a .243 Winchester bolt action with scope, but missed. The noise caused the whole herd to

stampede into the sea, and we had them charging right towards us. The bulls came very close to the

skiff with their heads out of the water, and S was quite nervous about them attacking us, but mainly they 

just circled around.

S, who only has one good eye, got off a second shot at a young one, but missed that one also. Every

time he stood up to take a shot, they would dive. He wanted me to shoot, but I had no confidence in my 

ability to handle the gun, and reminded him that only Natives could shoot marine mammals. We moved 

farther around the Cape to locate another haul out but couldn't find any more animals. So we returned to 

the first location, but none of the animals had hauled out again, so S suggested picking off one of those 

sitting up on the rocks. Yet to get a good steady shot, he felt we needed to get out of the skiff and stand 

on one of the rocks. We located one and motored slowly up to it, and I jumped out with the camcorder 

and the rifle, while he tied up the skiff.

I climbed up high and positioned the camera, while S lay in a small crevice in the prone position to get 

his shot off. He picked a young one that was just below a giant bull perched on top of the rock and

squeezed off a shot, which hit. S thought he had missed the sea lion, but I assured him I saw it fall as I

looked through the camera viewfinder, and we pulled up close to the rock to see if we could find it in the 

water, but couldn't. I was ready to give up, but S finally spotted it sitting on a little ledge, where it was 

neatly camouflaged. Its skin was almost the identical color of the rocks around it. It was only

distinguishable by its rounded features.

S said he didn't want to leave the skiff to go after it and suggested I climb up and roll it down to him. I 

said "O.K." but recommended we land on the back side of the rock where it was more level and easier to 

get out. So I jumped out on the backside and climbed around to the front side of the rock to find the

dead sea lion, but on the way I ran into two more big sea lions which I had to avoid. After jumping

across tide pools and steep crevices I found the animal but had great difficulty trying to move it. I

finally found that moving the head worked best, and since I had gravity on my side, I told S to pull the 

boat up into a certain spot, so I could slide it down to him. It took virtually all of my strength, but I

finally did get it to flop right on the front deck of the whaler. We motored over to Table Island to gut

out the animal, but S was also more interested in picking up a seal. He spotted several on the backside 

of the beach in the water but couldn't get a good shot off. He also took up a position where he could

watch both sides of the beach at once. He says this beach used to be covered with seals, but there were 

none there today. We ate sandwiches and drank coffee that S had thoughtfully brought along, and then 

S gutted out the sea lion--a young female. We loaded the sea lion back on the skiff and headed for

Midway Bay and Big Creek, which flows into it, to look for the beach seiners. 

Source: Mishler 2001:160-162
83
84

Subsistence harvest areas are also documented in Alutiiq place names. Stanek (1985:122)

depicts the distribution of Alutiiq place names in the vicinity of Nanwalek and Port Graham. He notes

that, “The distribution of Native names provides an index of the extent of environmental knowledge and

traditional land use by area residents living today” (Stanek 1985:124). This set of names includes

mountains, islands, bays, historic village sites, hunting camps, fish camps, seal and sea lion haul-outs, 

clam beds, and bear denning sites. Also, names of landmarks along shorelines and trails provide

guidance for travel and reference points for locating campsites, travel routes, and subsistence harvest

areas.

Within the hunting and fishing areas of particular communities, subsistence hunters and fishers

recognized a system of usufruct land and water use rights. There was sometimes a village-level 

acknowledgment of rights to use particular drainages or fishing sites. Stanek (1985:123) describes the

system in place at Nanwalek and Port Graham in the 1970s and 1980s:

At the individual level, fishermen at Port Graham had subsistence and commercial set netting

sites that were recognized as “belonging” to each individual. Among hunters, a similar but less 

site-specific system applied. A bear hunter and his partners who annually hunted a general

area could usually depend on other hunters not using that area. This was particularly true if the 

hunter had a cabin or camp in the area. Similarly, hunters from Port Graham did not use the

English Bay River drainage for bear or moose hunting unless a close relative and hunting

partner from English Bay hunted there also. This latter situation existed to a small degree with

most resource uses. Therefore, in the generalized outer boundaries of community use areas,

no difference occurred with regard to the limits of the areas used by Port Graham and English

Bay residents. However, significant differences did exist with regard to the number of residents 

from one village or the other using certain areas.

Harvest Composition

Figure V-10 illustrates the composition of subsistence harvests in the villages of four subregions

in the 1980s by seven major resource categories based upon usable weight. In all regions, the

composition was relatively balanced in that in no one resource category contributed more than half of the

total useable pounds (the exception was that salmon contributed 55 percent of the Alaska Peninsula

harvest). Overall, fish made up the largest portion of each region’s harvest -- 47 percent in Prince William 

Sound, 63 percent in the Alaska Peninsula communities, 63 percent in the Kodiak Island Borough, and 76 

percent in Lower Cook Inlet. Salmon contributed the largest portion of the total harvest in each

subregion. Of all subregions, Prince William Sound had the largest marine mammal harvest (26 percent). 

Land mammal harvests were highest on the Alaska Peninsula (26 percent). Marine and intertidal

resources contributed the vast majority of the subsistence harvests in every region.
85

FIGURE V-10. COMPOSITION OF SUBSISTENCE HARVESTS BY REGION, 1980s

Salmon Land Mammals Birds & Eggs Wild Plants

Other Fish Marine Mammals Marine Invertebrates

Source: ADF&G 2001

KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH

48%

15%

14%

13%

1%

8% 1%

ALASKA PENINSULA

55%

8%

26%

3%1%3% 4%

LOWER COOK INLET

40%

36%

3%

7%

1%

7%

6%

PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND

31%

16%

19%

26%

1%

5% 2%
86

Kinship Organization of Harvesting and Processing

Kinship shaped the composition of subsistence harvesting and processing groups in Alutiiq

villages in the 1980s. Extended families typically worked together to harvest and process wild foods. 

These family activities provided the context in which young people learned the skills and values linked

with the subsistence traditions of their communities. Case V-7 describes processing of subsistence

salmon at Old Harbor. Case V-8 and Case V-9 illustrate how kinship was a critical factor in subsistence

salmon fishing and processing in Nanwalek and Port Graham in the early 1980s. Case V-10 shows the

key role that women play in both processing and harvesting wild foods. Figures V-11 through V-15 are

photographs of subsistence harvesting and processing activities in several Alaska Peninsula villages in

the early 1990s. Participation in subsistence uses and harvesting was virtually universal in Alutiiq villages 

before the spill. Almost every household used wild foods, and the vast majority attempted to harvest and 

successfully harvested subsistence resources (Table V-6). 

Case V–7. Processing Salmon in Old Harbor 

I wandered down to the beach near the lodge and found a whole bunch of people

splitting fish--mostly [family] C but others as well. They offered free fish to everybody

who came by, including me, and talked about "feeding the whole village." After

watching for a few minutes I asked permission to go get my video camera and they said 

O.K.

The weather was sunny and calm, and it was a joyous activity to observe with dogs and 

four wheelers running all over. The fish cutters paid hardly any attention to me or the

camera and kept up a lively chatter that included several personal experience stories and 

discussions of various methods of preserving and putting up their fish. 

Most people worked on their hands and knees in front of a huge pile of silver salmon

which someone had brought back from Big Creek. Some Alutiiq was spoken by the

elders. I used my tripod and captured 30 minutes of delicious footage. OC, speaking of 

subsistence off camera, said, "It ain't nothing but a lot of hard work." Learned that MH 

and WB are sisters to HC. M was putting fish heads into a white 5-gallon bucket.

A and JZ's skiff came in. A disappeared someplace, but J said they just came back from 

Big Creek and got nothing because the fish had all moved up the creek overnight. This 

foiled George's plans to take me up there this afternoon and illustrates the importance of 

timing.

Source: Mishler 2001:171
87

Case Example V-8. Two Lower Cook Inlet Village Salmon Fishing Groups, early 1980s

These two extended families harvested and processed salmon separately but consolidated during 

other social and work activities. The male household head in A-3 is a “distant cousin” of the

female in B-1. In Kinship Group A, the father, two sons, and one daughter in HH A-2 harvested 

the salmon. Family members gathered at the smokehouse owned by A-2 to process the fish;

women mostly accomplished this. In Kinship Group B, the man in household B-1 harvested

most of the fish himself in two or three days of fishing. All the households helped with the

processing, although the mother in household 3 was in charge, deciding how much fish was

made into various products. The men in Households A-2, B-2, and B-3 worked together as

crewmembers on the commercial seine boats of households A-2 or B-5. They socialized by

playing cards, watching TV, taking steam baths, or sharing meals. During these social functions, 

they shared salmon products. [Adopted from Stanek 1985:135-138.]
88

Case Example V-9. An Extended Family at Port Graham that 

Cooperated in Subsistence Salmon Fishing and Processing, early 1980s

This case involved 37 extended family members in 10 households. Four of the ten

households fished commercially. For subsistence fishing, members of all ten households 

fished together, and shared the harvests, processing tasks, and salmon products. Setting

and tending nets was usually the job of young men. The elder woman in Household 1

directed the distribution of the harvest to extended family households. She assisted her

children in the other households in processing the catch. This woman also directed her

children who commercial fished to provide salmon to those family members who were

unable to harvest for themselves. [Adopted from Stanek 1985:131-133.]
89

Case V–10. Women and Subsistence in Port Graham

“Subsistence happened year-round, it wasn’t just in the summer and fall. I remember

the beach below my grandmother’s house. We went down and picked taugtaaq

(cockles) there and then mussels (amyak), "old maids," we called them. We baked

those in the oven - a kind of clam - soft shell clam. And we would get snails and

bidarkies and lady slippers even ciilerpak (bullhead) in the tidal waters fairly decent

sized ones and egalukii (cook) them. Sometimes there were so many cockles down

there she would string them up in the ciqlluaq (smokehouse) and smoke them before

she would cook them. She’d have them hooked by hanging from string, and put a little 

smoke on them and cook them. In her ciqlluaq she had several stomachs hanging there 

with various things in them. She had oil in them, berries stored in them, she had

cockles and clams in uguq (oil) in the aqsaquq (seal stomach container). Then she

would make a cheese made out of salmon eggs. She would press all the water out of it

and let it drip and all the casings from the fish eggs would float to the top and she would 

keep pressing it. 

“Our women did lots of subsistence, our men did too but the men would be gone during 

the summer months, the majority of them. So it was up to the women to put up the

basic part of the subsistence food, and it was all because we didn’t have electricity. It

(fish) was either dried or salted, so a lot of fish were dried during the summer months,

and all us kids were involved in that. I remember spending days and days with my

grandmother carrying fish home and helping her clean it up and drying it. We dried it

under the docks too. We would hang lots of it.”

Source: Stanek 2000: 59 and 57

Sharing of Wild Foods

Most harvesters shared portions of their subsistence takes with other households. Such sharing

most frequently took place along lines of kinship. In a case study from Nanwalek (a typical example), one 

harbor seal was shared among 25 people within an extended family of eight households (Stanek

1985:170-171). Two additional examples are provided in Cases V-11 and V-12. In addition to sharing

with relatives, subsistence foods were regularly shared with the elderly and other persons in need.
90

Figure V-11. Beach seining for subsistence salmon, Kametolook River, Perryville, Alaska Peninsula

Figure V-12. Cleaning and brining subsistence salmon prior to smoking and freezing, Ivanof Bay
91

Figure V-13. Preparing wood for smoking salmon, Chignik, Alaska Peninsula

Figure V-14. Digging butter clams at Chignik Lagoon, Alaska Peninsula
92

Figure V-15. Subsistence harvest of Cockles, Ivanof Bay, Alaska Peninsula
93

Case Example V-11. An Example of the Distribution of Harbor Seal at Port 

Graham, early 1980s

In this case example of the sharing of subsistence resources, two Port Graham hunting

partners (Households 3 and 15), who were also brothers-in-law, distributed seals to 16

households with 45 people in three communities (Port Graham, Nanwalek, and Seldovia). 

Because they are highly valued for their taste and nutritive qualities, seal meat and fat

were the most widely distributed of any resource in these Lower Cook Inlet communities. 

This case probably illustrates the maximum observed size of a sharing network. The two 

hunters shot and field-dressed each seal, cutting it into smaller pieces for distribution. 

Each seal was distributed to three or four other households (in addition to those of the

hunters) in the extended family. When another was taken, it was distributed to a different 

subgroup within the network. Note that all the households in this example were linked by 

kinship except Household 1. This household had no immediate kin in the villages and

was provided for by these and other hunters. [Adopted from Stanek 1985:170-173.]
94

Case Example V-12. An Example of the Distribution of Black Bear at Nanwalek, 

early 1980s

Distribution of bear meat and fat follows lines of kinship. In this example, sharing of a

bear harvested by a hunter in Household 1 involved 25 people in 7 households. Bear

products are in high demand in Nanwalek and Port Graham; they are considered about

equal to harbor seal in food value. Bear meat is cooked in roasts and stews. Bear fat is

considered the best for baking and cooking after it has been rendered into lard. There

were about 14 hunters in the two villages who regularly hunted bears in the 1980s. 

Sharing among hunters’ families and friends is extensive. Some hunters tried to harvest

several bears per season in order to meet their household’s needs as well as provide for

other community members. Initial sharing took place primarily between hunting

partners, with secondary distribution to friends and relatives. Because a single bear does 

not provide a great deal of meat, distribution of one animal could not involve many

households. Hunters distributed subsequent bears to people who had asked for meat or

fat and did not receive some from previous bears. [Adopted from Stanek 1985:180-182.]
95

Cultural Knowledge and Values

In the sphere of subsistence, activities are guided by a complex system of knowledge, beliefs,

and values. An example of the ideational systems embedded within subsistence uses are the

contemporary names of many subsistence products. Alutiiq terms are used to designate many resources 

or food products, even though English was the primary language used in most communities by the 1980s. 

For example, "oodiks" (Alutiiq uutuk) was the name frequently used for sea urchins, and snails were

commonly called “ipuk” in a few villages. At Nanwalek and Port Graham, bottom-dwelling animals such

as crab, which are found in shallow waters of bays and intertidal areas, are called uyangtaaq. These

intertidal animals are conceptually placed in this single-named category because they can be harvested

by people of various ages and abilities at times of the year when other resources are scarce or when poor 

weather prevents extensive travel. Traditional food items commonly retain Alutiiq names. For example,

tamuuq, uumatak, and ataneq are products made from dry salmon that are staples in each community's 

diet. Piinaq are dried fish eggs (Stanek 1985:141). The nutritional and cultural significance of dried

salmon and halibut is so great that at Nanwalek and Port Graham these foods are called "our bread"

(Stanek 1982:20-21). Case V-13 provides parallel examples for the Kodiak Alutiiq communities.

As illustrated in Case V-14, community residents blend the old and the new in preparing

traditional foods. Case V-15 illustrates the particular value residents of Kodiak Island Borough villages

place on their “brand” of duck soup. As shown in Case V-16, traditional foods have medicinal as well as 

nutritional values for the Alutiiq.

The cultural importance of subsistence in the 1980s was evinced by the traditional knowledge

about animals, plants, geography, and weather that was communicated during subsistence activities. For 

example, young women at Tatitlek learned how to identify ripe herring eggs and the appropriate kelp to

harvest them on as they accompanied their mothers and grandmothers in the spring to herring spawning 

areas (Stratton 1990:101-103). A key element in the resettlement of Chenega Bay in 1984 was the

teaching of hunting and fishing areas to younger men who had been absent for two decades; the teaching 

was conducted by older, former residents of Chenega (Stratton and Chisum 1986:111-116). Local place

names, in either Alutiiq or of non-Native language origin, often do not appear on maps and must be

learned during subsistence activities. Local names are generally concentrated at prime subsistence use

areas (Stanek 1985:122).

Special knowledge and traditions apply to certain subsistence pursuits, such as the hunting of

brown bears. Traditions such as described in Case V-17 link Alutiiq hunters to their cultural heritage and

are taught to promote respectful harvest and use of wild resources.
96

Case V–13. Local Fish Recipes in Ouzinkie and Old Harbor

1) Pirok. Fresh or salt salmon pirok is a traditional Alutiiq food that may be thought of 

as a fish pie, but pirok can also made by substituting corned beef in place of salmon. 

Roll out a sheet of pie crust dough, insert it in a large baking pan, and add a layer of

cooked white rice, a layer of stir-fried vegetables (which can include carrots, onions,

green pepper, cabbage, and rutabagas), a layer of fresh sockeye salmon, another layer of 

vegetables, another layer of cooked white rice, and optionally a layer of something else, 

like hard boiled eggs. Cover ingredients with a top crust of more pie dough and bake in 

a 350-degree oven for about an hour and 15 minutes. TS cuts the outline of a threebarred Russian Orthodox cross into the top crust before baking. One of T’s piroks made 

on May 14, 1997, fed fourteen people with lots leftover.

2) Piroshkis. Stuff large dinner rolls with cooked or canned salmon and rice or corned 

beef and rice. Fried vegetables are optional. Herman says the old way of making these, 

as learned from his father, was to use a heavy piecrust dough rather than yeast-leavened 

bread. Piroshkis are a lot like piroq.

3) Fish hash. Chop up any kind of fish and pan-fry it with cooked potatoes.

4) Boiled salmon. Boil water with onions and bacon and lots of Johnny’s Seafood

Seasoning. Then add potatoes, and when the potatoes are almost done, toss in the

salmon steaks. They will be done in just 3 or 4 minutes. The broth is really good too.

5) Boiled fish heads and roe (A’s favorite).

6) Sikiaq (half-smoked salmon). Put some fresh salmon fillets in a salt brine for an hour 

or two. After removing the salmon from the brine, cold smoke the fish for one to three 

days, using a mild wood, like cottonwood. Top the fish with sliced onions, margarine

or butter, and bacon, cover, and bake slowly for about 30-40 minutes in a low oven.

7) Halibut chowder. Toss chunks of fresh halibut into a big pot of boiling water and

thicken with carrots, macaroni, rice, potatoes, and onions. Season with Johnny’s

Seafood Seasoning.

Source: Mishler 2001:181-182

Case V-14. Traditional Alutiiq Foods with a Modern Twist

The blending of the old and the new is illustrated in the choice of foods available at an

impromptu “potluck” supper attended by Kizzia (1991: 4) at Nanwalek in the late

1980s. Among the choices were “salmon pie,” “Shake and Bake tomcod,” and

“bidarkie salad.” In each case, a wild food product had been prepared along with more 

modern ingredients such as piecrust and rice, a pre-packaged seasoning mix, and some

imported greens.
97

Case V–15. Duck Soup in Kodiak Island Villages

To make a good duck soup you have to have fresh sea ducks, because what makes the

soup so good is the duck's fresh blood. Duck soup with lots of blood in it tastes a lot

like a broth made from harbor seal meat. Freshwater ducks can be used for soup, but

they do not have much blood in them. Saltwater ducks include all of the scoters,

harlequins, oldsquaws, and mergansers. Freshwater ducks include mallards,

buffleheads, goldeneyes (both Barrow’s and common), widgeons, gadwalls, greenwinged teals, and scaups (aka bluebills) 

Source: Mishler 2001:152-153

Case V–16. Ptarmigan as Food and Medicine in Old Harbor

In addition to ducks, Alutiiqs also enjoy eating other birds, some of which have

medicinal as well as nutritional value. When I asked WE Sr. (1997) what his favorite

Native food is, he responded:

I like ptarmigan because I guess it’s almost impossible to get, but that’s my favorite, is

ptarmigan. Because that’s what I was raised on, and my belief is that ptarmigan is a

good medicine. We had no doctors. My Mom was the doctor. Dr. Mom, they called 

her. But that’s what we use if you had a fever or anything, we’d always have

ptarmigan, boil it and just drink the water, and this ptarmigan has all the herbs, and all

the good stuff that comes out of meat, in the ptarmigan. Every time you have ptarmigan 

juice like that, boil the daylights out of it, and drink that and you’ll get well, believe me. 

I believe in that. . . . Well, we take what we can get, you know. I even ate seagulls back 

when we couldn’t get anything else. And the reason why we had that, we had no

money to buy shells, so we’d take salt salmon and put it on a hook, and the seagull

would eat the salt salmon, and we’d get our meat that way, from the seagull.

Source: Mishler 2001:154-155
98

Case V-17. Ritual Treatment of Bears

Bears taken for subsistence use continued to be handled in a special manner in several

of the study communities into the 1980s. In the Alaska Peninsula communities of

Chignik Lake, Perryville, and Ivanof Bay, a set of rules governed hunters’ behavior

before, during, and after the hunt. For example, traditional hunters left the hide and

skull of the bear at the harvest site, orienting the skull to the south or southeast. “That’s 

for thanking their brothers and family and ancestors that they got a bear.” Successful 

bear hunters poke out the eyes and push them up the nostrils “so the bear won’t see or

smell us;” drive a sharp stick into each ear “so the bear won’t hear us;” cut the jaw “so

the bear won’t bite;” and cut the tendons on the bear’s paws “so the bear will not hold

you and maul you.” Into the 1960s, young men were formally initiated into brown bear 

hunting at Chignik Lake; similar traditions have been recorded for Kodiak communities 

before subsistence bear hunting was virtually eliminated by regulations. Somewhat

similar sets of cultural rules governed black bear hunting at Nanwalek and Port Graham, 

and were recorded by Birket-Smith (1953:37-38) for Chugach of Prince William Sound 

as well. These traditions likely preserve those practiced in all Alutiiq communities at

one time and are part of a more widespread complex of traditions associated with bear

hunting in the circumpolar north.

Source: Fall and Hutchinson-Scarbrough 1996

Summary: The Subsistence Sector of the Local Economy

The vitality of the subsistence sector of the local economy of the villages of the North Pacific Gulf 

region in the 1980s is demonstrated by the links community residents made between the harvest and use 

of wild resources and their cultural identity. The following examples derive from testimony to the Alaska

Native Review Commission in 1983 (Berger 1985).

I don’t know how anybody can place [a] value on my Nativeness, who can place the value on

my thinking, my spirituality. I don’t think anybody can. Only myself, and I think each and every

one of us need to remember that we are Native and that we need to value that and protect it . . . 

through protection of our lands and our lifestyle. [Port Graham]

Everybody is subsistence here in the village. [Nanwalek]

The Native people have way of life that has always been successful. [Tatitlek]

In testimony before the Commission, village residents also recognized the economic importance of

subsistence harvests as a source of food in communities where jobs are scarce and cash incomes low.

Our economic stability in villages is very bad. The unemployment is extremely high. There’s no 

place else in the United States – and maybe in the world – where you’re going to find such
99

unemployment statistics as you will in villages. We depend on the food that we get for

ourselves. [Larsen Bay] (quoted in Berger 1985:58).

As Case V-18 shows, Native people were aware of and concerned about tremendous changes

that had occurred. However, traditional uses of fish and wildlife continued. Case V-19 presents excerpts 

from an interview conducted by students with an elder from Tatitlek, which highlights the personal,

historic, and economic importance of subsistence foods.

Case V-18. Perceptions of Change Despite Persistence of Traditions 

“A young couple in [an Alaska Peninsula] community commented that, ‘Our culture is

really Americanized.’ Interestingly, this household, which consisted of a husband, wife, 

and three small children, harvested 1,220 pounds of wild foods [in 1989], including

halibut, gray cod, cockles, bidarkies, octopus, sea urchins, brown bear, caribou,

ptarmigan, and gull eggs. They used 25 different kinds of subsistence foods, and shared 

eight kinds of resources they harvested with others. The husband described how he had 

produced 30 jars of brown bear fat from an animal he had taken that year, stating that

his household preferred brown bear oil over seal oil for use with dry fish. The wife

described how she braided seal intestines, stuffing them with fat. ‘It’s pretty gross to 

work with,’ she said, ‘But it tastes good. It’s the best I ever tasted in a food. It tastes

better than steak to me.' This example illustrates the strength of many cultural traditions 

in [Alaska Peninsula Alutiiq] communities today, even while self-perceptions may

focus on cultural changes in the communities.”

Source: Fall et al. 1995:221

As Case V-20 from Cordova illustrates, the meaning of subsistence was more ambiguous among 

non-Native people and among Alaska Natives living in the larger communities. In the late 1970s,

McNeary (1978: 41) concluded that “the overall level of involvement in [subsistence] hunting and fishing

activities does not appear to differ greatly for Cordova Natives and non-Natives at the present time.” He

noted “important values involved in hunting and fishing besides the purely economic” for both subpopulations. For the non-Native majority in Cordova,

The opportunities to enjoy the outdoors, to hunt and fish, to eat fresh foods such as salmon or

crab, and the pleasures of distributing wild foods or receiving them from friends are very

important in making the quality of life in Cordova what it is. These activities, plus the

atmosphere of small town living, seem to be the main reasons why people choose to live in

Cordova rather than in more urban areas (McNeary 1978:41)
100

Case V–19. The Importance of Subsistence

In an interview with high school students, Mike Totemoff, a village elder from Tatitlek, 

was asked, “How important is subsistence to the village life style?” He answered:

I’ll tell you - we don’t have no means of employment - going to the store to buy these

$5.95 steaks when you feel like it - cannot go to the store any time you feel like it, when 

you don’t have an income or a job, you know. The way people subsisted here in

Tatitlek, far as I know, I am 60 years old now, and they have always lived off the land,

always hunted and fished everything we got. We had no refrigerators, no freezers, we

hunted when the season was due, the fish were here, we took them when the bears were 

here, we took them when the animals were here, we took them, its seasonal.

We need that to live with, you know, that is the way we were brought up, that’s our life 

style. [We] cannot go to the grocery store, super market any time we feel like. Wish

we could, if there were jobs available again, but in order to subsidize for the cash flow

all this that was needed to buy all this stuff we got to go out and kill our own animals

and kill our own meat and stuff, you know. So it's lot cheaper and better and we enjoy

that, I enjoy it you know, because I am doing [it], go for a lot of the elders and every

body else who needs meat. My dad he used to out and kill and load up the boat with

deer from Montague and Columbia. Load up them little sea lions you know, baby sea

lions, load up the whole boat up and bring it down to the beach and everyone would

come down with a knife and take a sea lion. That’s subsistence use.

Mike added:

That’s one of the most important issues ever hit Natives of Alaska, subsistence. It’s

very, very important that we fight. I depend on it all of the time. I eat seal meat and

ducks, deer meat, bear. [It] was our subsistence way of lifestyle before. In early spring

when the bears came out, in the fall we ate goat, then the deer started swimming out to

the islands in the last 30 years or so, so we started eating deer, so that’s how we do now.

Q: Do you enjoy hunting and fishing or would you rather get your food in a different

way?

Mike: Oh no, I enjoy hunting and fishing, it’s my lifestyle, and I like it, that’s what I

do.

Source: Simeone and Miraglia 2000:63, 88
101

Regarding the significance of subsistence uses to the Alaska Native population in Cordova, McNeary

(1978:41) concluded that all of the factors pertaining to non-Natives applied,

With the addition of the psychological (and political) importance of freely using a land which they 

have inherited from their ancestors, and the great importance of traditional foods, particularly for 

the older people. For many of these foods, such as seal meat and oil, herring eggs, or chitons, 

there is no equivalent available in the grocery store. Such foods are keenly appreciated by the

more traditional Natives, not merely because they please the taste-buds, but because they

provide an immediate and powerful link to one’s childhood and to past tradition.

Case V-20. Ambiguous Meanings in Cordova

“The word “subsistence” evokes a variety of responses in Cordova. I soon

learned to avoid using the term as I found that the statement that I was “studying

subsistence” often brought a response of hostility or, more frequently, incredulity. A

few Whites consider themselves “subsistence” users on the basis of their heavy use of

wild food. Others, however, feel that such use should be considered “income

supplement” because of the general cash orientation of Cordova’s economy. Given the

opportunities for financial success in Cordova, many non-Natives seem to view

economic dependence on wild food less as a “subsistence life-style” than as a lowerclass life-style, a sign of failure in a cash economy which is seen as the only possible

reference point. From this point of view, “subsistence rights” translate as “welfare

hand-out” and are resented by people who fear that their own hunting rights could be

jeopardized because of their non-Native ethnic origin or relative financial success.

“Most Natives are commercial fishermen, and a few see themselves as primarily

involved in a cash economy, with little interest in “subsistence.” Others are quick to

point out, however, that commercial fishing offers only seasonal employment and

uncertain income, so that use of wild resources gives an important margin of security. 

Moreover, the feeling is there, though it is often kept under the surface, that Natives

should be able to continue all traditional subsistence activities unimpeded. As one man 

confided, in objecting to certain ADF&G regulations, “What are the people going to

do? They are not going to starve!” Starvation, of course, is less of a problem than

frustration with bureaucratic regulations which sometimes appear to be just one more of 

life’s difficulties like bad weather or poor fish runs.”

Source: McNeary 1978:42
102

CASH SECTOR OF THE LOCAL ECONOMY

General Features of Cash Employment

There were several general features of the cash sector of the local economy of the study

communities in the 1980s. For one, employment tended to be seasonal. For example, in the newly

reestablished community of Chenega Bay (Stratton and Chisum 1986:58),

With employment primarily dependent on local construction and commercial fishing, most work was 

seasonal. Averaged across the employed population, 25 employed people worked 4.9 months per

person per year in 1985-86, compared with an average of 6.4 months in the previous year (1984-

85).

Another key aspect of the local economies was that they were dominated by commercial fishing.

Describing the local economy of the late 1970s, Braund and Behnke (1980:209) noted that “commercial

fishing and the Port Graham cannery provide the bulk of the year’s cash for the majority of Port Graham 

and English Bay residents.” Characteristics of commercial fishing in the study communities are described 

in the next section. We return to a discussion of the relative contribution of earned income, other income 

such as entitlements and transfer payments, and subsistence harvests in a later section of this chapter.

Generally, cash incomes were lower in villages than in the towns and cities. Figure V-16 reports 

data from the 1980 census (pertaining to 1979), reporting median household income for the villages,

towns, and cities in the study area.

Figure V-16. Median Household Incomes, 1980

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

Ivanof Bay

Chignik Lagoon

Tatitlek

Karluk

Akhiok

Perryville

Nanwalek

Chignik Lake

Larsen Bay

Port Graham

Ouzinkie

Chignik

Old Harbor

Seldovia

Cordova

ValdezKodiak

Kenai

Source: US Census, as reported in Community Profile Database (ADF&G 2001)
103

Case V-21 is a profile of the local economy of Nanwalek (English Bay) pertaining to 1979. The

seasonality of employment is emphasized, as is the significance and reliability of the subsistence sector

of the local economy in comparison with the cash sector. A contrasting example is provided in Case V22, a profile of the Alaska Native population of Valdez, also pertaining to 1979. The summary stresses

higher cash incomes and more employment opportunities than found in the villages, reflecting the growth

of Valdez’ economy in the 1970s with the construction and operation of the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline.

Case V-21. A Profile of the Cash Economy of Nanwalek, 1979

“A statistical profile of English Bay’s [Nanwalek] income and employment

situation would seem to underscore the importance of subsistence living as an economy

for that village. Over half of the households report an annual income under $10,000,

and some 80% of the households are under $15,000. Community reliance on local

resources allows English Bay to remain economically viable despite relatively low cash

availability.

“What cash flow there is goes largely to oil, electricity, groceries and fishing

equipment. The average household in English Bay spent $1,000 on subsistence

equipment in 1979. This included gas, fishing gear, ammunition and other essentials. 

Groceries account for roughly $465 a month of the average family’s budget. 

Considering the large families, and paying Homer prices plus airfare, this does not go

far.

“In type of employment as well, English Bay’s fundamental orientation to

subsistence patterns is telling. The majority of the households contain members 

engaged in seasonal work, often in fishing related areas, and approximately five out of

six of the households have some members who list their occupation in the trades-craft 

designation of employment. The trades-crafts classification included fishing, 

construction, and logging employment, among other occupations. These three were the

primary kinds of employment in English Bay, however. It is noteworthy that the

predominant occupations are all of a seasonal nature.

“With this type of employment structure, it is not surprising that almost half of

the households have some members who are unemployed.”

Source: The North Pacific Rim 1981:1-2

Commercial Fishing and Processing

Prince William Sound Communities

In 1985, people with Cordova addresses held 609 commercial fishing permits. These included

417 for salmon, 114 for herring roe-on-kelp, 57 for herring, and 21 for crab. Cordova residents held

almost half (49.5 percent) of all limited entry salmon permits for the Prince William Sound Management
104

Area, including 36.7 percent of the set gillnet permits, 52.3 percent of the draft gillnet permits, and 45.4

percent of the seine permits. However, according to key respondents, these figures inflate the

percentage of Prince William Sound salmon permits held by Cordova residents in that an unspecified

number of permit holders reside outside Cordova for more than half the year, but maintain a Cordova

address and Alaska residency to avoid higher permit fees for nonresidents (Stratton 1989:44-45).

Case V-22. The Contrasting Economic Picture for Alaska Natives in Valdez, 1979

“Valdez stands in stark contrast to the other villages and towns surveyed in the Chugach 

region, particularly with regard to income and employment. For example, only a small

proportion of Native households, less than 5%, have an annual income of less than

$10,000. Moreover, two-thirds of the households have some members who are

employed full-time, which is distinctly different from the rest of the villages in the

region. Perhaps the only blemish on this rather urban pattern is the 38.2% rate for

household with unemployment. However, this unemployment is also different, for it is

not tied to seasonal work, which is rather low – only 19% of the households – in

Valdez.”

Source: The North Pacific Rim 1981:52.

Nevertheless, the significance of commercial fishing in Cordova in 1980s cannot be overstated. 

As noted by Stratton (1989:39), 

Much of Cordova’s employment, and the cash economy in Cordova, is integrally enmeshed in

the commercial fishing industry. Many small businesses serve support functions for commercial 

fishermen. Consequently, employment is largely seasonal in nature, concentrating around the

spring and summer herring and salmon fisheries.

Data from systematic household surveys conducted by the Division pertaining to 1985 and 1988

underscore this conclusion (Table V-7). In both study years, over half of Cordova’s households had

members who were directly employed in commercial fishing, as were 40.7 percent of all employed 

individuals in 1985 and 35.2 percent in 1988. Commercial fishing supplied 29.6 percent of all jobs in the

community in 1985, and 17.6 percent in 1988. In 1988, 55.2 percent of all cash income in Cordova

derived directly from commercial fishing. In addition to commercial harvesting itself, processing of

commercial catches held an important place in Cordova’s local economy in the 1980s.

According to Stratton (1990:20), “monetary employment for Tatitlek residents was largely

seasonal and dominated by commercial fishing” in 1987 and 1988. As shown in Table V-8, the majority

of Tatitlek’s households were involved in commercial fishing in the late 1980s (73.7 percent in 1987/88

and 66.7 percent in 1988/89). Fishing generated most of the community’s cash income during that period 

(59.1 percent in 1987/88 and 64.1 percent in 1988/89). In early 1989, Tatitlek residents held seven
105

limited entry permits: five salmon gillnet and two salmon purse seine permits. Also, three village residents 

participated in other commercial fisheries, such as halibut and crab. Thirteen people worked as crew on

commercial fishing vessels (Stratton 1990:24). Commercial fishing supplied about a third of the jobs in

Tatitlek in the late 1980s (Table V-8).

At Chenega Bay, the other predominantly Alaska Native community of Prince William Sound, a

trend towards less involvement in commercial fishing had developed by the mid 1980s.

Three village residents held three commercial fishery limited entry permits: one salmon seine

permit and two salmon drift-gillnet permits. Two additional gillnet permits had been sold

between the 1985 and 1986 salmon seasons. All of the permits were for Area E (Prince William 

Sound and Copper River). An additional two people indicated that they were employed as crew 

members on commercial boats, down from 14 in 1985. The loss of permits, combined with

construction work available in the village, contributed to this change (Stratton and Chisum

1986:58).

This contrasted with the pattern that existed in Chenega prior to the 1964 tsunami (Stratton and Chisum 

1986:15), when commercial fishing was as important as in Tatitlek.

Commercial fishing was the mainstay of the cash sector of Chenega’s economy in the 1960s. 

All 14 households represented by the historic survey respondents reported involvement in the

salmon seine fishery . . . Two canneries on Evans Island provided employment or at least one 

Table V-7. Involvement in Commercial Fishing, Cordova 1985 and 1988

Percentage of: 1985 1988

Households 50.8% 54.6%

Income NA 55.2%

Individuals 40.7% 35.2%

Jobs 29.6% 27.6%

Source: ADF&G 2001

Table V-8. Involvement in Commercial Fishing, Tatitlek, Late 1980s

Percentage of: 1987/88 1988/89

Households 73.7% 66.7%

Income 59.1% 64.1%

Individuals 46.2% 38.6%

Jobs 34.0% 32.1%

Source: ADF&G 2001
106

member of half the household during the summer, typically women. . . Commercial salmon

fishing with set and gill nets, and commercial harvesting of razor clams were other sources of

employment.

According to the respondents, much of the cash economy operated on a credit basis. 

Groceries and fuel were charged at the cannery stores, and later subtracted from commercial 

salmon harvests. Cash was not often exchanged except when village residents traveled to

Cordova to sell furs and pick up supplies.

Lower Cook Inlet Communities

In 1980, Port Graham residents held 39 commercial fishing permits, including 21 limited entry 

salmon permits. In the same year, residents of Nanwalek held 11 commercial fishing permits, including 8 

limited entry permits for salmon (Stanek 1985:89). Regarding the role of commercial fishing in the local

economy of Port Graham and Nanwalek in the early 1980s, Stanek (1985:88) noted that,

Local commercial fishermen employed people mostly as crewmembers of salmon seine and

draft boats or at set net sites. A few residents also participated in the commercial halibut fishery 

or as crew members in commercial crabbing. Several people worked during the winter months 

as crewmembers on large crab boats in the Bering Sea or Kodiak area.

However, Stanek (1985:88) also observed that,

While the commercial fishing industry, excluding cannery operations, was a primary source of

cash income, it too provided little income per household. Although commercial fishing

generated approximately $373,600 gross ex-vessel value in 1982 for both communities, this

was only $7,472 per permit, or $4,612 per household.

Further details on commercial fishing and the local economy of Port Graham and Nanwalek were 

obtained in a systematic household survey conducted by the Division pertaining to 1987 (Table V-9). 

About half the households in both communities (54.8 percent in Nanwalek, 48.1 percent in Port Graham)

had members employed in commercial fisheries in 1987. About a quarter of all employed individuals in

each community worked as commercial fishers. In each village, commercial fishing provided just over 20 

percent of all jobs held by residents. However, commercial fishing provided more income and a larger

percentage of the total income in Port Graham (52.5 percent of all income) than in Nanwalek (19.2

percent).

Regarding other jobs in the two Lower Cook Inlet villages in the early 1980s, Stanek (1985:88,90) 

noted that,

Cash employment opportunities have expanded in the two communities in recent years. More

local wage jobs are available and more local control is exerted over these opportunities. . .

Although there is a variety of work, most jobs are low paying or short-term and seasonal. . .

Generally employment opportunities in both communities were doled out by the village council. 

Jobs were divided among workers from several households in order to give more than one 

household the chance to earn some cash to pay small bills, buy heating fuel, make small boat

repairs, and buy small equipment items for hunting and fishing (Stanek 1985:88,90).
107

Case V-23 is a further illustration of how short-term jobs provided small amounts of cash for Nanwalek 

and Port Graham residents in the early 1980s.

Case V-23. Short Term Jobs in Port Graham and Nanwalek, early 1980s

“During the study period, a variety of short-term community improvement

projects employed local residents. In the spring and summer of 1982, a HUD housing

project employed approximately eight Port Graham people as laborers and journeymen

craftsmen to build 20 new homes. Initially, all workers for the project came from

outside Alaska. A few of them left their positions and jobs opened for local hire in the

spring of 1982. Concurrently, this same project in English Bay [now Nanwalek]

employed four to six local people from time to time as laborers.

“Installation of water, sewer, electrical, and telephone service lines provided an

additional number of short-term laborer jobs, as did funding for cleanup and

landscaping around new facilities. The construction of school extensions and the

upgrading of insulation and weatherization of older homes provided employment for

two to six people as laborers throughout the summer of 1984.

Source: Stanek 1985:90

Kodiak Island Borough Communities

Division of Subsistence household surveys did not collect systematic employment data for Kodiak 

Borough communities prior to 1989. Davis (1986) provides Information about commercial fishing in the

six Borough villages for 1984 and 1985 (Table V-10). With the exception of Old Harbor, Davis detected a 

trend of diminishing involvement by Alaska Natives in the commercial salmon fishery. At Akhiok,

competition with boats “from the northern part of the island” was blamed for low catches and income

(Davis 1986:171). At Larsen Bay, residents were selling their limited entry permits. For purse seining,

the problem appeared to be a lack of financial means or business acumen to acquire larger, more modern 

Table V-9. Involvement in Commercial Fishing, Nanwalek and Port Graham, 1987

Percentage of: Nanwalek Port Graham

Households 54.8% 48.1%

Income 19.2% 52.5%

Individuals 26.5% 26.7%

Jobs 21.1% 21.8%

Source: ADF&G 2001
108

boats. One former purse seiner said, “You have to be a lawyer to own a boat “ (Davis 1986:154-155). 

Davis (1986:154) observed that:

There was a definite feeling among the villagers that “Natives are being squeezed out of

fishing.” The cost of boats, loans, insurance, and occasionally personal complications such as

divorce proceedings make it difficult for local fisherman to continue in the profession. They find 

it almost impossible to remain economically viable. Under the many constraints and expenses

of continuing to fish, the local, regular jobs appear more attractive. In talking with permit owners 

in Larsen Bay, as in four other Kodiak villages, it seemed that in their view the heyday of salmon 

and crab fishing is over.

Chignik Area

Rates of involvement in commercial fishing were particularly high among households in the five

Chignik Area communities during the 1980s. As shown in Table V-11, 82.1 percent of the households in

the five communities combined had members employed in commercial fisheries in 1984, including 80

percent or more of all households in each community but Ivanof Bay (66.7 percent). Participation in

commercial salmon fishing predominated, with 79.6 of all households involved. In 1984, there was much 

less involvement among Chignik Area households in other commercial fisheries, such as herring (19.4

percent involved), halibut (14.0 percent), and crab (5.9 percent). Commercial fishing provided about half

or more of all the jobs in the five communities, and virtually every household with employment had at

least one member with a commercial fishing job (Table V-12).

Table V-10. Limited Entry Salmon Permits Held by Residents 

of Kodiak Island Borough Villages, 1984/1985

Total 

households

Total 

permit 

holders

Purse 

Seine

Beach 

Seine Set Net

Akhiok 24 4 2 0 2

Karluk123 3 1 2

Larsen Bay 46 6 6

Old Harbor 93 29

Ouzinkie 68 12

Port Lions 77 19 19

1 Three purse seine permits had recently been sold; their former owners left Karluk.

The remaining permit, owned by a 70-year old man with no boat "had not been fished 

for some time" (Davis 1986:130).

Source: Davis 1986
109

Regarding other jobs in the Chignik Area, Schroeder et al. (1987:402) note:

Other than commercial fishing activities, there are few economic opportunities for residents of

the Chignik subregion. Each village has a limited number of jobs associated with village council 

work, health care, support for the local school through the Lake and Peninsula School District,

the U.S. Postal Service, and the state-maintained roads and runways. In Chignik, Perryville,

and Ivanof Bay there are small, locally owned and operated stores that usually provide one or

two individuals limited employment. Occasionally, seasonal jobs based on special projects,

such as school construction, become available. Seasonal employment is intermeshed with

commercial fishing activities and subsistence enterprises to provide for the families of the

subregion.

Table V-11. Chignik Area Participation in Commercial Fisheries, 1984

Fishery

Chignik 

Bay

Chignik 

Lagoon

Chignik 

Lake Ivanof Bay Perryville

ALL FIVE 

COMMUNITIES

Salmon 84.2% 82.4% 82.6% 50.0% 80.0% 79.6% 

Crab 15.8% 11.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.9% 

Herring 15.8% 41.2% 17.4% 0.0% 15.0% 19.4% 

Halibut 0.0% 29.4% 0.0% 33.3% 25.0% 14.0% 

Any Fishery 84.2% 88.2% 82.6% 66.7% 80.0% 82.1% 

1 n = 28 households in Chignik Bay, 22 in Chignik Lagoon, 31 in Chignik Lake, 10 in

Ivanof Bay, and 27 in Perryville. Total = 118 households.

Source: Morris 1987:59

Percentage of Households Participating1

Table V-12. Involvement in Commercial Fishing, Chignik Area Communities, 1984

Percentage of: Chignik

Chignik 

Lagoon

Chignik 

Lake Ivanof Bay Perryville

Employed Households 88.9% 93.8% 90.5% 80.0% 94.1%

Income1

Employed Individuals 56.4% 70.8% 76.9% 66.7% 72.7%

Jobs 47.8% 53.1% 60.6% 44.4% 58.5%

1

 Data on income not collected for these communities for 1984.

Source: ADF&G 2001
110

Cost of Food

In addition to seasonal employment, a narrow range of available jobs, and relatively low cash

income, another feature of the local economy of the villages and towns of the Pacific Gulf region in the

1980s was a high cost of food in comparison with Alaska cities and towns on the road system. As

described in Case V-24, the cost of groceries in Cordova was about 25 percent higher than Anchorage. 

Although cost of food data are not available for the villages, it is clear from general descriptions that

expenses were even higher than in Cordova due to transportation costs and poor distribution systems. In 

the 1980s, several villages (e.g., as Chenega Bay and Tatitlek) did not have stores ( Stratton 1990:30).

Case V-24. The Cost of Groceries in Cordova

“To put Cordova expenditures in perspective, researchers conducted a 104-item market basket

survey in mid-February 1989 in both full-service grocery stories in Cordova and in an Anchorage 

grocery store. As had been true in the February 1986 Market Basket Survey, the two Cordova

stores had totals on the survey that were close, 3.1 percent or $8.47 apart, on a tally of over $250. 

For comparison, the two Cordova grocery stores’ prices were averaged. . . Cordova food prices

overall were 25 percent higher than Anchorage, very similar to the market basket survey with an 

almost identical list in 1986. The one major difference between the two years was in dairy

prices. The smaller differences recorded in 1989 are attributable to a State of Alaska price

subsidy of dairy products in 1989 that lowered fresh dairy prices from earlier levels. Aside from 

dairy items, fresh fruits and vegetables displayed the largest differential in both years, 37.9

percent in 1989, and 33.7 percent in 1986.”

Figure V-17. Cost of Groceries in Cordova Compared to 

Anchorage

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Dairy Meat & Fish Fresh Fruits

and

Vegetables

Canned and

Frozen Fruits

and

Vegetables

Misc. and

Staples

Total

Difference in Cost, Percent Higher in Cordova 

Compared to Anchorage

1986 1989

Source: Stratton 1992:19.
111

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Kinship and Division of Labor

All descriptions of social organization in the Alaska Native villages of the study area for the 1970s 

and 1980s stress the role of kinship. Villages were essentially a set of interrelated extended families

(e.g., Davis 1986; Stanek 1985, 2000; Mishler 2001:83-92). As discussed earlier in this chapter,

subsistence hunting and fishing were organized around kinship relations, as was the sharing of

subsistence harvests.

Regarding the organization of subsistence activities, there was a marked sexual division of labor

in the communities of the study area, especially regarding hunting. Figure V-18 illustrates the percentage 

of the population in Alaska Native villages of the EVOS area, cities and towns of the EVOS area, and four 

Arctic communities (Kotzebue, Kivalina, Nuiqsuit, and Kaktovik) who hunted who were male.1 In every

community, hunting is primarily, but not exclusively, a male activity. A general rule is that about 80

percent or more of all hunters are male. This percentage did not vary much by year, type of community,

or region, although a slightly higher percentage of hunters in Arctic communities (about 25 percent) were

female. Figure V-19 compares villages by subregion for the last year in which a survey took place. There 

was little difference among oil spill region villages in the Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet

subregion on the one hand, and the Kodiak and Alaska Peninsula subregion on the other.

For subsistence fishing (Fig. V-20), in all the communities in all years, most fishers (about 60 to

65 percent) were men. In comparison with hunting, there were more women who subsistence fished. 

There was very little difference among subregions in the ratio of male/female subsistence fishers.

In most communities and subregions, plant gatherers were about evenly split between males and 

females, with the balance slightly in favor of males (Fig. V-21). This finding is perhaps surprising given

the general association of berry gathering with women. However, the “plant gathering” activity included

wood collection, which may account for the relatively high level of male involvement.

Marriage and Ethnicity

Data on marriage and ethnicity provide one measure of a source of culture change. In surveyed

villages in the spill area (13 places), the percentage of exogamous marriages (marriages between Native

and non-Native spouses) has increased over the past two generations (Fig. V-22). For "Alaska Native"

marriages (where at least one spouse is Native), 25 percent were exogamous (between Native and nonNative spouses) for persons over 50 years of age, and 39 percent were exogamous for persons younger

than 50 years of age. In predominately non-Native towns and cities (Cordova, Kodiak,

 

1

 Pre-spill data on individual participation in subsistence activities are rare. Therefore, this analysis includes information for 1991, 

1992, and 1993. Given the similarities between the EVOS area villages and the arctic communities in this analysis, there is no

reason to believe that the pattern in the early 1990s was markedly different from that prior to 1989.
112

Figure V-18. Percentage of Hunters Who are Male by 

Community Type, Region, and Study Year

86.5% 85.4% 86.8% 83.7% 83.5%

79.6%

75.4%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Oil Spill

Villages1991

Oil Spill

Villages 1992

Oil Spill

Villages 1993

Oil Spill Cities

& Towns 1991

Oil Spill Cities

& Towns 1992

Oil Spill Cities

& Towns 1993

Arctic

Communities

Percentage of All People Who Hunted

Figure V-19. Percentage of Hunters by Sex, Villages by 

Subregion

87.5% 86.1%

75.4%

80.7%

12.5% 13.9%

24.6%

19.3%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

PWS & LCI Kodiak & AKP Arctic All

Percentage of All Persons Who Hunted

Male Female
113

Figure V-20. Percentage of Fishers by Sex, Villages by 

Subregion

61.3% 64.5% 61.5% 62.6%

38.7% 35.5% 38.5% 37.4%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

PWS & LCI Kodiak & AKP Arctic All

Percentage of All Persons Who Fished

Male Female

Figure V-21. Percentage of Plant Gatherers by Sex, Villages 

by Subregion

53.1% 52.9% 51.3% 52.3%

46.9% 47.1% 48.7% 47.7%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

PWS & LCI Kodiak & AKP Arctic All

Percentage of All Persons Who Gathered 

Plants

Male Female
114

Kenai, Valdez), almost all marriages in surveyed Alaska Native households were exogamous (90 percent

to 92 percent), and this is the case across both generations. The degree of exogamy was considerably

less for communities in the arctic area (Kaktovik, Kivalina, Kotzebue, and Nuiqsut), where only 15 percent 

of all marriages were exogamous, compared with 35 percent in the spill area communities. In this set of 

communities, exogamous marriages have increased from 2 percent for persons over 50 years of age to

20 percent for persons less than 50 years of age.

The aggregate summaries mask variation between communities, as depicted in Figure V-23. For 

spill area villages, the percentage of exogamous marriages for persons less than 50 years of age ranged 

from a low of 9 percent at Chignik Lake to a high of 73 percent at Chignik Bay, two neighboring

communities. In the arctic grouping, the percentage of exogamous marriages for people under 50 years

of age ranged from a low of 7 percent in Kivalina (a “village”) to a high of 33 percent in Kotzebue (a

regional center or “town”).

Political Organization, Regional Groups, and Organizations

In the 1980s, the communities of the Pacific Gulf area were politically dispersed. (See Case V25.) For most of the 1980s, there were two boroughs: the Kenai Peninsula Borough (including Seward,

Nanwalek, Port Graham, and Seldovia, among others), incorporated in 1964; and the Kodiak Island

Borough (Kodiak, Akhiok, Karluk, Larsen Bay, Old Harbor, Ouzinkie, and Port Lions), incorporated in

1963. The Lake and Peninsula Borough, including the Alaska Peninsula villages of Chignik, Chignik

Lagoon, Chignik Lake, Ivanof Bay, and Perryville, among others), was incorporated in 1989. The

communities of Prince William Sound were outside organized boroughs. 

Of the 21 communities, 12 had formed municipal governments and incorporated under state

rules. These were Cordova (incorporated in 1909), Valdez (1901), Whittier (1969), Seward (1912),

Seldovia (1945), Kodiak (1940), Akhiok (1972), Larsen Bay (1974), Old Harbor (1966), Ouzinkie (1967),

Port Lions (1966), and Chignik (1983). The remaining nine communities (Tatitlek, Chenega Bay,

Nanwalek, Port Graham, Karluk, Chignik Lagoon, Chignik Lake, Ivanof Bay, and Perryville) were

organized only under tribal governments. As illustrated in Case V-26, the addition of municipal

governments created some new opportunities, but perhaps at the expense of former, more autonomous

institutions.

A list of federally acknowledged tribes published by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1993 and

periodically updated includes 20 tribal governments in the communities of the EVOS area (Table V-13). 

Additionally, there were non-profit organizations in Valdez (Valdez Native Tribe, formerly the Valdez

Native Association) and Seward (Qutekcak Native Tribe; formerly the Mt. Marathon Native Association)

that had not been formally recognized as tribes by the federal government.

The Native communities were divided into four for-profit regional corporations as organized under 

ANCSA. These were: Chugach Alaska Inc. (Prince William Sound, Nanwalek, Port Graham), Cook Inlet 
115

Figure V-22. Exogamy by Generation and Place: of Native Marriages, Percent between Native 

and Non-Native Spouses

25%

90%

2%

39%

92%

20%

35%

91%

15%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Spill Area Villages (13 communities) Spill Area Towns & Cities (Cordova, Kenai,

Kodiak, Valdez)

Arctic Area Villages & Towns (Kaktovik,

Kivalina, Kotzebue, Nuiqsut)

Percent of Native Marriages

Age >50 Age <50 All

Figure V-23. Exogamy by Generation and Community (of Native Marriages, Percent between 

Native and Non-Natives)

0%0%

20%

21%

14%

0%

25%

45%

25%25%

0%0%0%

75%

0%

100%100%

0%0%0%

9%

8%

17%

22%

27%

33%33%

35%

23%

50%

47%

63%

73%

67%

80%

100%

89%

100%

7%

10%

15%

33%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Chignik Lake

Akhiok

Tatitlek

Ouzinkie

Old Harbor

Karluk

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Chenega Bay

Larsen Bay

Port Lions

Chignik Bay

Kenai

Seldovia

Valdez

Kodiak City & Road

Cordova

Kivalina

Nuiqsut

Kaktovik

Kotzebue

Percent of Native Marriages

Age >50 Age <50
116

Table V-13. Political Institutions in Communities of the EVOS Study Area

Community

Municipal 

Incorporation Borough1Tribal Government2

Current Villages:

Akhiok 1972 Kodiak Island Borough Native Village of Akhiok

Chenega Bay No None Native Village of Chenega

Chignik 1983 Lake & Peninsula Native Village of Chignik

Chignik Lagoon No Lake & Peninsula Native Village of Chignik Lagoon

Chignik Lake No Lake & Peninsula Chignik Lake Village

Ivanof Bay No Lake & Peninsula Ivanof Bay Village

Karluk No Kodiak Island Borough Native Village of Karluk

Larsen Bay 1974 Kodiak Island Borough Native Village of Larsen Bay

Nanwalek No Kenai Peninsula Borough Native Village of Nanwalek

Old Harbor 1966 Kodiak Island Borough Village of Old Harbor

Ouzinkie 1967 Kodiak Island Borough Native Village of Ouzinkie

Perryville No Lake & Peninsula Native Village of Perryville

Port Graham No Kenai Peninsula Borough Native Village of Port Graham

Port Lions 1966 Kodiak Island Borough Native Village of Port Lions

Tatitlek No None Native Village of Tatitlek

Former Villages:3

Afognak No Kodiak Island Borough Village of Afognak

Kaguyak No Kodiak Island Borough Kaguyak Village

Kanatak No Lake & Peninsula Native Village of Kanatak

Towns and Cities:

Cordova 1909 None Native Village of Eyak

Kodiak City 1940 Kodiak Island Borough Lesnoi Village (aka Woody Island)

Shoonaq' Tribe of Kodiak

Seldovia 1945 Kenai Peninsula Borough Seldovia Village Tribe

Seward 1912 Kenai Peninsula Borough Qutekcak Native Tribe4

Valdez 1901 None Valdez Native Tribe4 

Whittier 1969 None None

1

 Years of Borough incorporation: Kenai, 1964; Kodiak, 1963; Lake & Peninsula 1989.

2

 Name listed under tribal government might not be the name of the council.

3

 Former villages with tribal organizations. Afognak relocated at Port Lions, Kaguyak at Akhiok 

and Old Harbor; Kanatak at Pilot Point and other communities.

4 Presently not recognized as a tribe by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Source: RurALCAP 2000; Alaska Department of Labor 1998; BIA 2001
117

Table V-14. Alaska Native Village Corporations, Regional Corporations, 

and Not-for-Profit Regional Organizations

Name of Organization

Location of 

Headquarters Primary Village(s) Regional Affiliate

Village Corporations:1

Afognak Native Corporation Kodiak Port Lions Koniag

Akhiok-Kaguyak Inc. Anchorage Akhiok, Old Harbor Koniag

Anton Larsen, Inc. Kodiak Kodiak Koniag

Ayakulik, Incorporated Akhiok Akhiok Koniag

Bay View Incorporated Anchorage Ivanof Bay BBNC

Bells Flats Natives, Incoporated Soldotna Kodiak Koniag

Chenega Corporation Anchorage Chenega Bay Chugach

Chignik Lagoon Native Corporation Kodiak Chignik Lagoon BBNC

Chignik River Limited Chignik Lake Chignik Lake BBNC

English Bay Corporation Homer Nanwalek Chugach

Eyak Corporation Cordova Cordova Chugach

Far West, Inc. Kodiak Chignik BBNC

Lesnoi, Inc. Anchorage Kodiak Koniag

Litnik, Inc. Kodiak Kodiak Koniag

Natives of Kodiak, Inc. Kodiak Kodiak Koniag

Oceanside Corporation Anchorage Perryville BBNC

Old Harbor Native Corporation Old Harbor Old Harbor Koniag

Ouzinkie Native Corporation Ouzinkie Ouzinkie Koniag

Port Graham Corporation Port Graham Port Graham Chugach

Tatitlek Corporation Cordova Tatitlek Chugach

Uganik Natives Kodiak Koniag

Uyak, Inc. Kodiak Kodiak Koniag

Regional Corporations:

Bristol Bay Native Corporation (BBNC) Anchorage

Cook Inlet Region, Incorporated Anchorage

Chugach Alaska Corporation Anchorage

Koniag, Incorporated Kodiak

Not-for-Profit Regional Organizations:

Bristol Bay Native Association Dillingham

Chugach Regional Resources Commission Anchorage

Chugachmiut Anchorage

Kodiak Area Native Association Kodiak

1

 Village corporations for Karluk and Larsen Bay merged with Koniag, the regional corporation.

Source: RurALCAP 2000, Koniag 2001
118

Region Inc. (Seldovia), Koniag Inc., and Bristol Bay Native Corporation (Alaska Peninsula). They were

also serviced by four Native non-profit regional organizations: The North Pacific Rim for the Chugach

Region (renamed Chugachmiut in 1992); the Cook Inlet Tribal Council for Seldovia; the Kodiak Area

Native Association; and the Bristol Bay Native Association.

There were 15 village corporations organized under ANCSA (Table V-13, Table V-14). Several 

former village corporations in the Kodiak area merged with the regional corporation.

Case V-25. A Plethora of Political Organizations in Akhiok

“Politically, Akhiok surely must be the most complex small village in the study

area. In the 1970s, there were three village corporations. Two of these, Akhiok and

Kaguyak, merged in 1979. Later this entity joined with Koniag, Inc., but since has demerged and today is once again a combined, separate corporation. The third

corporation is for Ayakulik, one of the nine appealed Koniag villages; it has remained

throughout a distinct corporate entity. In addition to these village corporations, Akhiok

has both a city and a tribal council.”

Source: Davis 1986:166.

Fish and Wildlife Management

The structure of fish and wildlife management in the spill region was at least as complicated as

political organization. The spill region was divided into four commercial fisheries management areas by

ADF&G, two in the southcentral region headquartered in Anchorage (Prince William Sound and Lower

Cook Inlet) and two in the Westward Region headquartered in Kodiak (Kodiak and Chignik). 

Management of subsistence fisheries was the responsibility of biologists within the Commercial Fisheries 

Division stationed in Cordova, Homer, Anchorage, Kodiak, and Chignik (seasonally). There were four

game management units, each with its own area manager within ADF&G: GMU 6 (Prince William Sound; 

Cordova); GMU 15 (Kenai Peninsula; Kenai and Homer); GMU 8 (Kodiak Island Archipelago; Kodiak);

and GMU 9 (Alaska Peninsula; King Salmon). 

Under the federal subsistence management program (developed since 1990), the area was

served by three regional subsistence advisory councils (Southcentral, Kodiak-Aleutians, and Bristol Bay).

Federal land management units included a national forest (Chugach National Forest); five national wildlife 

refuges (Kenai Peninsula, Kodiak, Alaska Peninsula, Becharof, and Alaska Maritime); and three national

parks (Kenai Fiords, Katmai, and Aniakchak). Harbor seals and sea lions were managed by the federal

National Marine Fisheries Service. Sea otter management was the responsibility of the US Fish and

Wildlife Service.
119

Case V-26. Changing Political Institutions in Old Harbor

“In former times, before the Great Alaska earthquake of 1964, but after Russian Contact,

traditional village government in the Old Harbor area revolved around the chief, or Toyuk, and

his council: the Sukashiq, his assistant or second chief(s); the church lay reader; the Staristaq or 

church warden; and the village elders. According to those I interviewed, this system was

successful because of the emphasis placed upon an existing cooperative network within the

village, which encouraged information sharing among the people, thus allowing for a greater

involvement with actual village operation.

“Information was conveyed through a series of meetings in which the entire community

was expected to participate. Old Harbor continued with this form of government until 1964,

when they elected a mayor and began operating with both a Tribal and City Council. However,

it is important to note that the “Tribal Council,” established by the tribal constitution to assure

federal recognition of the Native Village of Old Harbor by the US Secretary of the Interior,

differs in composition from the “traditional council” that, more informally, advised the Toyuq in 

the early days. That “traditional council” consisted of the Sukashiq, the Church Lay Reader, the

Staristaq, and the Elders. By contrast, the new Council comprises seven members of the village, 

elected to terms of specific length by all the tribal members.”

Mulcahy in Mishler 2001:69

“After the Great Alaskan Earthquake of 1964, traditional and church-focused government 

like that just described for Old Harbor gave way to new institutions which were induced by

forces outside of the villages, namely state and federal agencies. In both Old Harbor and

Ouzinkie, tribal governments continued, but at some point chiefs were replaced with tribal

councils.

“The shift from chiefs to council presidents may have been fairly cosmetic, but at the

same time there were also some deeper structural changes which fragmented political power and 

weakened the tribal councils. This fragmentation occurred when tribal councils were supplanted 

by state-chartered local governments with mayors and city councils. . . The advantages to city

governments were that they qualified communities to receive state funds for public works and

capital improvements. . . 

“Following the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act in 1971, yet another

layer of leadership and power was added in the form of village profit-making corporations.

“With most of the political power concentrated in the corporations and the cities, some

residents have sarcastically said that the major function of tribal councils is the operation of

bingo games.”

Mishler 2001:77-78
120

In the 1980s, several communities within the spill area had some successes in using state and 

federal subsistence statutes to improve subsistence hunting and fishing opportunities. For example, in

1980, working through the Alaska Board of Fisheries, Nanwalek and Port Graham achieved major

changes to subsistence salmon fishing seasons in their traditional areas, and seasonal limits on

subsistence catches were eliminated. In 1987, Tatitlek and Chenega Bay obtained similar changes in

Prince William Sound. The Alaska Board of Game recognized subsistence uses of mountain goats by the 

Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet villages, and modified seasons and permitting requirements

accordingly. On the other hand, many features of the fish and wildlife management system remained

problematic for the villages. Some examples included individual bag and possession limits for some

species of wildlife and for halibut, prohibitions against rod and reel subsistence fishing, and a prohibition

against taking bird eggs and migratory waterfowl during traditional harvest seasons in the late winter and

spring.

EXPRESSIVE CULTURE

Religion

In every village, a Russian Orthodox Church with a distinctive onion-shaped dome was a

prominent feature of the physical profile. The Russian Orthodox faith structured an annual cycle of

holidays and observances, including Christmas, New Year, Easter, and name days (see Mishler 2001,

Simeone and Miraglia 2000, and Stanek 2000 for descriptions of these celebrations). In a few

communities (Tatitlek, for example), evangelical Protestant denominations had made some converts, but

overall, Russian Orthodoxy remained identified as the “traditional” or “Native” church. Contemporary

customs and holiday celebrations associated with Russian Orthodoxy in the villages are a syncretism of

Christian and Alaska Native traditions (e.g., Stanek 2000:80 – 84).

Music, Dance, and Oral Traditions

In the 1980s, no Alaska Native dance groups were active in any of the study area’s communities. 

Regarding Nanwalek and Port Graham, Stanek (2000:86) noted that elders recalled that as children, they

observed traditional Alutiiq dances that mimicked seals, gulls, and other animals. However, from the

1940s through the 1980s these dances were not performed in public due to ridicule from outsiders. 

Villagers occasionally performed the dances outside the villages while inebriated, resulting in further

embarrassment being associated with them.

Nevertheless, a strong musical tradition developed and prospered in many of the villages, linked

to new instruments such as guitars, accordions, and fiddles. Mishler (2001:113-116) provides a number
121

of examples (see also Stanek 2000:87). A rock and roll group known as “The English Bay Band” was

quite popular in Nanwalek and developed a positive regional reputation in the 1970s and 1980s.

Efforts were underway in the 1980s to collect and preserve rapidly disappearing oral traditions,

especially those told in the Alutiiq language. A primary example is the series of “Fireweed” and

“Alexandrovsk” books developed by students at Nanwalek and Port Graham (Port Graham School 1981, 

1982, 1983; English Bay School 1980, 1981; see also Johnson 1984). Other examples include the

“Ukulaha” series in Ouzinkie (Ouzinkie High School 1981, 1982) and the “Elwani/Iluani” series in Kodiak

(Kodiak Aleutian Regional High School 1976-1982; sections reprinted in Vick 1983).

Case V-27. Popular Music in Ouzinkie, 1940s to 1960s

Martha Anderson [of Ouzinkie] says that during her youth: “dancing was a big

thing. My brother Nick [Katelnikoff] Jr. was an accordion player, and we also had

violins, mandolins, and guitars. Dances were generally held on Friday nights. Saturday

nights were reserved for Russian Orthodox observances.”

Dances were held all winter long and were very popular. Fred and Esther Chernikoff 

recalled five different dance halls: 1) Marzan’s dance hall and liquor store, which

flourished in the 1930s, 2) Arthur Levine’s dance hall, which was the old school house, 

actively used in the 1940s, 3) Frank Hammerly’s dance hall, also active in the 1940s at

the same time as Arthur Levine’s, 4) Ed Opheim’s Pool Hall, which was used as a

dance hall for two years during the late 1940s but relied on recorded jukebox music, and 

5) Tim Panamarioff Sr.’s dance hall, later sold to Tommy Renshaw, which was active in 

the 1950s. According to Reed Oswalt, “Tim built this dance hall, and it was built on a

swamp in the middle of the town, and our house where we stayed was about 150 yards

from the dance hall, but when he’d have a dance, between the noise and everything, it

would make the whole area bounce [laughs], so it had quite a bit of resilience to it. It

served a pretty good purpose.”

Source: Misher 2001:112
122 

LANGUAGE 

Use of Alaska Native Language

Retention of use of an Alaska Native language in a community may be one indicator of the 

strength of traditional culture and values. Language retention also reflects the history of communities in 

terms of economic development, demography, and the degree of influence of the western educational 

system. (For discussions of the history of Alaska Native languages, see Krauss 1980 and Miyoaka 

1980.) 

In North America, Native American languages in general are in serious decline, and have been 

for much of the 20th Century (and much earlier in some areas). Perhaps 400 or more languages were 

spoken in North America before contact with Europeans beginning around 1500. Presently, data are 

available on 309 Native North American languages, the remainder having become extinct before 

adequate documentation took place. Of these 309 languages, as classified by Goddard (1996:3), 120 

(38.8 percent) had become extinct as of 1995, and an additional 72 (23.3 percent) were spoken “by only a 

few of the oldest people.” Only 46 languages (14.9 percent) were still spoken “by a significant number of 

children,” with only two of Alaska’s 20 Native languages (Central Yup’ik and Siberian Yup’ik) falling in this 

category. The final category, languages spoken by adults but by no or very few children, contained 91 

languages (29.4 percent of North American Native languages), including Alutiiq (“Pacific Yup’ik”). 

Status of Alaska Native Languages According to U.S. Census Data

The U.S. Census includes a question about languages spoken in the home. It reports language 

use as “English only” or names other languages used. (The latter categories do not imply exclusive use 

of a language other than English.) It should be noted that the census measures “use” and not knowledge 

of a language other than English. A large decline in the percentage of the population using a language 

may not necessarily reflect a similar level of decline in knowledge of that language. For example, children 

with knowledge of a language may continue to use it while their parents are alive, but discontinue that 

usage when the older generation passes away. Nevertheless, the census data provide a useful index for 

comparison between communities and over time. 

Figure V-24 illustrates the percentage of the state’s population speaking an Alaska Native 

language at home in 1990. Data are depicted by the 12 Alaska Native regions as defined by ANCSA. 

For the entire Alaska population, 5.4 percent spoke an Alaska Native language. For the Alaska Native 

population itself, 36.0 percent spoke an indigenous language. The highest percentage of Alaska Native 

language speakers resided in northern and western Alaska. In only two regions, Calista and Arctic Slope, 

did a majority of the Alaska Native population speak a Native language at home, although 40 percent or 

more did so in three other regions (NANA, Bering Straits, and Bristol Bay). In the two Native regions 
123 

Figure V-24. Percentage of Population Speaking an Alaska Native Language at 

Home, by Native Corporation Region, 1990

1.0%

1.5%

1.9%

2.3%

2.5%

3.0%

5.7%

27.7%

36.3%

40.8%

52.1%

65.4%

5.4%

15.8%

9.5%

11.3%

13.1%

22.1%

22.3%

32.8%

43.3%

49.4%

48.3%

73.6%

77.1%

36.0%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Cook Inlet

Koniag

Sealaska

Aleut

Doyon

Chugach

Ahtna

Bristol Bay

Bering

Straits

NANA

Arctic Slope

Calista

Alaska

Total Population AK. Native Population

Figure V-25. Percentage of Population Speaking an Alaska Native Language at 

Home, Communities of the EVOS Area, 1990

0.0%0.0%

0.9%0.9%

1.0%1.1%

3.1%

5.5%

5.6%

6.4%

6.8%

7.4%

9.9%

10.3%

11.4%

13.8%

16.9%

24.8%

31.6%

40.6%

51.8%

3.1%

17.4%

0.0%0.0%

4.2%

16.3%

9.2%

8.6%

20.6%

12.5%

6.5%

7.4%

7.7%

7.4%

15.9%

16.0%

13.7%

21.8%

18.7%

26.0%

39.2%

48.2%

57.6%

16.8%

21.9%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Ivanof Bay

Seldovia

Whittier

Valdez

Cordova

Kodiak

Seward

Chignik city

Larsen Bay

Tatitlek

Karluk

Akhiok

Chignik Lagoon

Port Lions

Ouzinkie

Chenega

Old Harbor

Perryville

Chignik Lake

Port Graham

English Bay

All

15 Villages

Total Population AK. Native Population
124 

encompassing most of the EVOS area, Chugach and Koniag, the percentage of the Native population 

using a Native language at home was 22.3 percent and 9.5 percent, respectively, both below the statewide percentage. 

Table V-15 and Figure V-24 provide more detail on Native language use in the communities of 

the EVOS area. Although only 3.1 percent of the total population of the area spoke a Native language at 

home in 1990, 16.8 percent of the overall Alaska Native population and 21.9 percent of the Alaska Native 

population of the 15 predominantly Alaska Native communities did so. Focusing on the Alaska Native 

population, only in Nanwalek, did a majority (57.6 percent) speak an Native language at home. In 1990, a 

Native language was spoken in the home by a quarter or more of the Native population in three other 

communities: Port Graham (48.2 percent), Chignik Lake (39.2 percent), and Perryville (26.0 percent). It 

should be noted that the relatively high percentage of home use of Native languages among the Native 

population of Seward (20.6 percent) and Valdez (16.3 percent) likely reflects emigration of Native 

language speakers from other parts of the state rather than use of the indigenous Alutiiq language. 

Figure V-20 compares US census data in 1980 and 1990 for the 15 predominately Alaska Native 

communities in the EVOS area. In most communities, there was a decline in Alaska Native language use 

over the decade. For the 15 communities combined, there was a decline from 31.7 percent of the Native 

population using an Alaska Native language in 1980 to 21.9 percent in 1990. Over half the Native 

population of Ivanof Bay, Nanwalek, Perryville, Port Graham, and Tatitlek used an Alaska Native 

language at home in 1980, but by 1990, this was true only at Nanwalek. [The disappearance of the use 

of Alutiiq at Ivanof Bay between 1980 and 1990 is likely because the two elders who are the parents of 

many of the adults in this small village moved to Anchorage.] 

Alaska Native Language Center Assessments

In order to assess the current status and potential future of Alaska Native languages, the Alaska 

Native Language Center (ANLC) classified communities in three categories regarding knowledge of 

Native languages by children: 1) all or most of children are learning the language; 2) some children are 

learning the language; and 3) few or no children are learning the language. The assessments are 

generally consistent with the US Census data. Areas with the most people using Alaska Native 

languages in the home, such as the Calista Region, contain the most communities in the first or second 

category of language knowledge by children. 

In 1974, the ANLC placed all but two of the Alutiiq communities in the third category (few or no 

children learning the language). Port Graham was in the second category (some children learning the 

language) and Nanwalek was in the first (most children learning the language). Correspondingly, Krauss 

(1980:44) wrote of the situation in the 1970s: 
125 

Table V-15. Percentage of Population Five Years of Age or Older 

 Using an Alaska Native Language at Home

1980 Data1

1990 Data

Percent Speaking Total Language Spoken at Home Percent Speaking

Alaska Native Alaska Native Alaska Native Alaska Native

Community Language at Home Population English-only Language Language

Akhiok 5.3% 68 63 5 7.4%

Chenega NA 55 43 12 21.8%

Chignik 3.6% 72 63 9 12.5%

Chignik Lagoon NA 44 37 7 15.9%

Chignik Lake 16.3% 79 48 31 39.2%

Ivanof Bay 93.2% 26 26 0 0.0%

Karluk 16.7% 65 60 5 7.7%

Larsen Bay 35.0% 124 116 8 6.5%

Nanwalek 88.6% 125 53 72 57.6%

Old Harbor 19.8% 225 183 42 18.7%

Ouzinkie 5.0% 153 132 21 13.7%

Perryville 67.4% 96 71 25 26.0%

Port Graham 69.1% 112 58 54 48.2%

Port Lions 18.4% 119 100 19 16.0%

Tatitlek 52.5% 81 75 6 7.4%

Subtotal 31.7% 1,444 1,128 316 21.9%

Cordova city 217 197 20 9.2%

Kodiak city 708 647 61 8.6%

Seldovia city 37 37 0 0.0%

Seward city 379 301 78 20.6%

Valdez city 203 170 33 16.3%

Whittier city 48 46 2 4.2%

Subtotal 1,592 1,398 194 12.2%

Total 3,036 2,526 510 16.8%

Alaska 74,438 47,658 26,780 36.0%

1 Source only distinguishes English, Spanish, and other; assume "other" = Alaska Native Language except

Chignik Lagoon, where a non-English-speaking, non-Native family resides. It is not possible to determine 

Native language use in the larger communities using this source. The 1980 percentage is for the entire 

population of the community due to the limitations with the source. However, a very large majority in each 

community in 1980 was Alaska Native.

Sources: Bureau of the Census 1980, 1990
126 

Of 3,000 Alutiiqs, about 1,000 still speak the language. The youngest speakers of the Koniag 

dialects are in their twenties, but the Chugach dialect is spoken by some children in English Bay 

and to a lesser extent Port Graham. The youngest children of even these communities, 

however, are becoming dominant in English, so it is doubtful that the language will survive 

indefinitely. 

When the ANLC revised these classifications in 1982, all the Alutiiq communities were in the third 

category (few or no children learning the language). Port Graham dropped one notch and Nanwalek two 

(Krauss 1974, 1982). This implies an abrupt shift in language use at Nanwalek and a very uncertain 

future for the survival of Alutiiq as a living language. 

Assessment of Knowledge of Alutiiq in Four Villages

In 1995, Hallamaa (1997) assessed the status of knowledge of the Alutiiq language in Nanwalek, 

Port Graham, Chenega Bay, and Tatitlek. The assessment was based on a census of each community in 

which knowledgeable individuals assessed each person’s ability to speak or understand the language. 

He also drew on an earlier study in Nanwalek done by Sammallahit in 1980. Table V-16 summarizes 

Hallamaa’s data on the number of speakers of Alutiiq in each community. His findings are generally 

consistent with those of the Alaska Native Language Center and US Census data. In none of the four 

communities were any children fluent speakers of the language. The greatest number of speakers as 

well as the youngest speakers resided in Nanwalek and Port Graham. 

Table V-16. Number and Percentage of Speakers of Alutiiq

Nanwalek 

1980

Nanwalek 

1995

Port 

Graham 

1995

Chenega 

Bay 1995

Tatitlek 

1995

Fluent Speakers Number 51 35 47 6 5

Percent 50.0% 23.6% 31.8% 10.3% 5.8%

Youngest 14 29 32 55 67

Other Speakers Number 6 7 10 3 6

Percent 5.9% 4.7% 6.8% 5.2% 7.0%

Youngest 12 18 24 53 50

Total Speakers Number 57 42 57 9 11

Percent 55.9% 28.4% 38.5% 15.5% 12.8%

Youngest 12 18 24 53 50

Note: modified from source to include Alaska Native population only

Source: Hallamaa 1997
127 

Hallamaa (1997:211-215) also discusses factors that have led to the decline in the use and 

knowledge of the Alutiiq language throughout its range. These include the arrival of large numbers of 

English speakers (usually for economic reasons), employment by Native people in the cash economy, 

formal education which repressed Native language use, boarding schools, mass media, and the creation 

of corporations under ANCSA, the operation of which emphasize proficiency in English. In Nanwalek, the 

last “stronghold” of Alutiiq, a major blow was the sending of children to boarding schools in the late 1950s 

and 1960s. There, as had happened in earlier education contexts for other villages, these children were 

ridiculed for speaking Alutiiq. When they returned home and raised children of their own, they spoke to 

them in English only so the children would not suffer the humiliation that their parents had. A key 

respondent quoted in Hallamaa (1997:212) explained: 

There are many reasons why the kids don’t speak Sugtestun in our community anymore. From 

my own and other people’s personal experiences the reasons are simple. Many times we were 

made fun of for speaking our language or just being Native. This happened when we were 

trying to fit in different communities, like when we were going to high school or maybe even on a 

shopping trip. Most of that time we were young and defenseless, and when that happened we 

had to swallow a lot of anger and hurt. Many times I was embarrassed about being a Native or I 

really didn’t want to be a Native. Then we grew up to be adults and most of us got married and 

had kids. We didn’t want to hurt our children like we had been hurt and made fun of or 

punished when we spoke our native language. 

According to the same key respondent in Nanwalek (Hallamaa 1997:216), reasons for the decline 

in the use of Alutiiq and for the difficulties for improving its status include: 

1. No matter how much we teach the Sugtestun language, we are still being bombarded with 

English, via school, TV and radio. 

2. We have no immersion [programs] either at the school or in the village. 

3. We don’t have a large number of Sugtestun speakers left in the village to propagate the 

language. 

4. The village does not acknowledge the Sugtestun language being lost as a problem because of 

too many other problems and diversions, like alcohol and drugs and trying to run local 

government and Native corporations. 

5. We have lukewarm support and lip service from the school districts. Our language is more of 

a filler/elective type of class. 

Hallamaa (1997:216-217) suggests that the only solution to the revitalization and long-term survival of the 

language is a “total immersion program.” 1

 

1

 In June 2000, the Nanwalek Council submitted a grant proposal to the Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs 

$24,000 from the EVOS Criminal Settlement (see Chapter Six) to begin a “Sugtestun language immersion program”. Funding was 

approved in August 2000. 
128 

Ethnographic Data Division of Subsistence Research

In doing household surveys, the Division of Subsistence needed Alaska Native language 

translators in Port Graham and Old Harbor, where elders lived who preferred to be interviewed in Alutiiq. 

In the Division’s experience, in only Nanwalek and Port Graham in the 1990s were there more than a 

handful of households where Alutiiq was spoken on a regular basis in the home. 

Although fluency and use of Alutiiq is low and in continuing decline, words from the Alutiiq 

language survive in common use in many of the study communities in at least two important domains. 

The first is kinship, where the terms upa (“grandfather”) and uma (“grandmother”) are used. The use of 

these terms may be reinforced by their similarity to those used by speakers Central Yup’ik, with whom 

Alutiiq people interact in Anchorage and some of whom have married into Alutiiq communities. Another 

relationship that is denoted by an Alutiiq term is the “namesake” – alukuq. The child chosen to receive 

the name is perceived to resemble the other older person. 

Even more important is the retention of Alutiiq words in the realm of subsistence uses. Examples 

were provided in the section above on “Cultural Knowledge and Values,” above. Knowledge of Alutiiq 

place names was important in connection with subsistence activities in a few communities, most 

importantly Nanwalek and Port Graham (Stanek 1985:121-122). 

Conclusions Regarding Native Language use in Alutiiq Villages

There were a number of factors working against survival of the Alutiiq language in the 1980s and 

1990s. These included: 

• relatively few speakers 

• intermarriage with non-Alutiiq speakers 

• mass media 

• repression in educational system 

• little to no current role in education 

• no written tradition 

• few or no contexts for its use (i.e., economic, religious, or political) 

• low assessment of importance of preserving the language relative to other issues 

It is likely that some minimum knowledge will persist as a marker of cultural identity, especially as long as 

people use traditional foods. It is also likely that some marginal knowledge will be maintained through 

bilingual programs and preservation of oral traditions in written form. 

By the late 1980s, the almost inevitable loss of the Alutiiq language raised a number of questions. 

Would critical cultural information still be transmitted between the oldest and youngest generations? Was 
129 

a key marker of Alutiiq identity being lost? Would the loss of the language place more importance on 

maintaining and expressing other markers of cultural and ethnic identity, such as subsistence practices, 

political institutions, crafts, expressive culture, and social networks? Finally, would the aftermath of the 

Exxon Valdez oil spill create or reinforce conditions that could undermine or discourage nascent efforts to 

preserve the use of Alutiiq? 

In general, resource development and social disasters may very well create conditions similar to 

those that undermined use of Alutiiq in the first place, such as loss of local control over key institutions 

(economic, educational, political), loss of contexts for using the Native language, and development of 

economic and social incentives to become English dominant. However, if in the aftermath of a disaster, 

conditions develop that support revitalization movements, these could reinvigorate language use. In such 

case, timing is critical, in that the status of language knowledge when revitalization occurs will have a 

strong influence on the potential for success. 
130

DISCUSSION: COMMUNITY TYPES IN THE PACIFIC GULF

In Chapter Two, we asserted the existence of three types of communities in the Pacific Gulf –

“villages,” “towns,” and “cities." The distinction between “village” (“rural,” “bush”) and “city” (“urban”)

represented a fundamental social division in Alaskan society in the late 20th century. The distinction is

essential for understanding spill responses by households and communities. Villages in the Pacific Gulf

were affected by the spill in ways substantially different from cities. As shown earlier in Fig. II-1, there

were 15 villages and two cities (Valdez and Kenai) in the Pacific Gulf that were surveyed as part of this

study. In addition, there were three “towns” – Kodiak City, Cordova, and Seldovia – whose status as a

community type distinct from “cities” was less certain. Building upon the characteristics of communities

reviewed in the previous sections of this chapter, this section presents a more detailed analysis of the

cluster of linked features that distinguished village, town, and city, which underlies the remainder of the

analysis of this report. The section presents quantitative support for the socioeconomic, demographic,

and cultural differences between community types. In subsequent chapters, the responses within the

villages nearest to the spill are described in greater detail.

As shown in Table V-17, there was a cluster of demographic, cultural, and socioeconomic traits

that clearly distinguished villages from cities (Valdez and Kenai) in the Gulf of Alaska, with towns (Kodiak 

City, Cordova, and Seldovia) falling intermediate between the two community types. Each trait is

measured using data from the household surveys of this study for the years 1991-93.1 The mean values 

are presented for villages in three geographic groups (Prince William Sound/Lower Cook Inlet, Kodiak

Island, and the Alaska Peninsula), while the individual community values are presented for the three

towns and two cities.

Demographic Features

The villages of the Gulf of Alaska were small (mean sizes between 126 and 176 people),

compared with the towns (414 for Seldovia, 2,467 for Cordova; 12,492 for Kodiak City) and the cities

(4,184 for Valdez, 23,289 for Kenai). As noted previously, villages have shown comparatively little 

population growth since the middle of the 20th century. Between 1950 and 1997, the four Prince William 

Sound communities grew by only 59 percent and Kodiak villages by only 57 percent, while the two Alaska 

Peninsula villages in Table V-17 decreased by 16 percent. By contrast, during this time period, the

population at Valdez increased by 655 percent and at Kenai by 716 percent. Growth in two towns was

intermediate – Cordova (112 percent) and Kodiak City (295 percent). Seldovia’s population decreased by 

5 percent. As discussed previously, the great population growth in cities and towns primarily has been

fueled by in-migration by persons from outside Alaska. They also have grown in part from an out-flow of 

 

1

 Data for 1991, 1992, and 1993 are used for this analysis because of limited quantitative data on harvests for home use for the

towns and cities for the 1980s.
131

Table V-17. Community Groups by Demographic, Cultural, and

Socioeconomic Characteristics, Gulf of Alaska, Circa 1991-93

"Villages" "Towns" "Cities"

PWS-LCI 

Chenega 

Bay, 

Tatitlek, Port 

Graham, 

Nanwalek

Kodiak Is. 

Akhiok, 

Karluk, Larsen 

Bay, Old 

Harbor, 

Ouzinkie, Port 

Lions

Alaska 

Peninsula

Chignik 

Bay, 

Chignik 

Lake Seldovia Cordova

Kodiak 

City Valdez Kenai

Demographic Characteristics

Community Size (Mean 

Population of Group) 138 176 126 414 2,467 12,492 4,184 23,289

Population Growth 

(Change 1950-97) 59% 57% -16% -5% 112% 295% 655% 716%

Cultural Characteristics

HHs with Heads Born 

Outside Alaska 11% 13% 29% 54% 79% 75% 77% 89%

Alaska Natives in 

Population 88% 83% 72% 30% 15% 11% 8% 6%

Indigenous Foods Index 

(HHs Using Food Types) 66% 59% 56% 28% 26% 23% 10% 10%

Sport License Index 

(Licensed Residents) 10% 14% 10% 28% 41% 32% 41% 48%

Socioeconomic Characteristics

Subsistence Sector

Wild Food Production (Lbs 

Per Capita) 297 323 400 178 160 150 90 77

Core Foods (Wild Foods 

Used by Majority of HHs) 14 12 12 7 8 5 2 4

Wild Food Distribution 

Index (Percent of Food 

Types Received by HHs)

19% 15% 17% 9% 9% 8% 5% 4%

Wage-Market Sector

Per Capita Monetary 

Income $8,655 $9,948 $11,889 $15,205 $17,901 $21,354 $24,885 $18,283

Percent Adults with Year 

Round Employment 26% 21% 14% 41% 48% 52% 67% 63%

Months Employed of 

Working Adults 7.3 7.2 7.5 9.0 9.7 10.0 10.3 10.0

Per Capita Income from 

Commercial Fisheries $674 $2,382 $4,470 $3,704 $4,066 $4,005 $418 $467

Source: ADF&G 2001 and Household Surveys, Division of Subsistence, ADF&G
132

persons from the villages to the towns and cities. The slower growth in the villages is a result of increase 

from natural births and modest levels of in-migration, tempered by an out-migration of villagers to the

larger towns and cities. Demographic history lays the roots of many of the cultural and socioeconomic

distinctions found between villages, towns, and cities described in the next sections.

Cultural Composition

The cultural composition of Pacific Gulf communities is directly linked to the birth origins of the

population. In the villages, by far the largest majority of household heads were born in Alaska, principally

within the region, and most from a heritage that included one or more Alaska Native parents. In the

villages of Prince William Sound-Lower Cook Inlet and Kodiak Island, only between 11 to 13 percent of

household heads surveyed during the 1991-93 were born outside of Alaska (see Table V-17). In these

areas, between 83 to 88 percent of household heads identified themselves as Alaska Native. There was

somewhat more in-migration of outsiders into the villages of the Alaska Peninsula. In Chignik Bay and

Chignik Lake, 29 percent of household heads were born outside of Alaska villages and 72 percent of

household heads self-identified as Alaska Natives. Overall, the populations of the villages in the Pacific

Gulf region were primarily Alutiiq, with families strongly influenced by a mix of Alutiiq, Russian, and

Euroamerican cultural traditions.

By contrast, the origin of most residents in the towns and cities in the Pacific Gulf was outside of 

Alaska. By a large majority, household heads were born outside of Alaska – Kodiak City (75 percent),

Valdez (77 percent), Cordova (79 percent), and Kenai (89 percent). In the two cities, only a small

segment of the population identified themselves as Alaska Natives – Kenai (6 percent) and Valdez (8

percent). In the towns of Kodiak and Cordova, Alaska Natives made up between 11 to 15 percent of the

population, twice that of the cities, but still a small minority of the community. In Seldovia, about 54

percent of households were born outside of Alaska, and Alaska Natives comprised 30 percent of the

population. Overall, the population of the towns and cities in the Pacific Gulf region was primarily nonNative. In consequence, the current cultural patterns in the towns and cities have been greatly shaped by 

the Euroamerican cultural traditions brought to the communities from outside the state.

Traditional Foodways

In the Pacific Gulf, villages differed from cities culturally. There were different sets of culturally

based beliefs and values in villages compared with the cities, due to the different culture histories of their

populations. Two belief systems are used here to illustrate cultural differences between villages and

cities – foodways and orientation to the natural environment. 

Food habits are rooted in cultural traditions. Which animals and plants are recognized as edible

is learned within families as part of evolving cultural traditions within a community. Similarly, which food 
133

items are preferred and used as a matter of taste and health are bound up with the customary food uses 

of families and the larger community. People commonly prefer the foods that have been used as part of 

the cuisines of their immediate family and community. In the late 20th century, cities and villages differed

substantially in what their residents recognized as edible and valued as food. As food procurement and

use are primary aspects of the human experience, these cultural patterns find expression in the

socioeconomic system of the community, as shown below.

In Table V-17, we have used survey information to demonstrate the culturally based differences

in food preferences between village, town, and city in the Pacific Gulf. A variable was created called an

Indigenous Food Index, defined as the mean percentage of households using six types of wild foods –

chitons, gull eggs, harbor seals, octopus, clams, and deer or caribou (Table V-18). These were selected 

as examples of wild resources widely available to Gulf of Alaska communities (a more complete count of 

all types of wild foods is used as a Core Food Index in a later section). The recognition of some of these 

items as food differs among cultural traditions. Chitons, gull eggs, and harbor seals are recognized as

food in Alutiiq cultural traditions, but not generally recognized as such in Euroamerican food traditions. 

While Euroamerican cuisines include octopus, clams, and wild game (deer or caribou), their use is low.

The percentages of households that used each of these six food items during the previous survey 

year are shown by community in Table V-18. The Indigenous Foods Index represents the mean of these 

six values. As shown in Figure V-26, Valdez and Kenai each scored lowest (a score of ten) on the

Indigenous Foods Index. In these cities, chitons, gull eggs, octopus, and harbor seals were rarely used

as food. Clams and deer were more commonly used, but still by a minority of households. Pacific Gulf

villages were substantially higher than the cities on the Indigenous Foods Index. Greater than half of the

households used the six traditional foods in the villages of Prince William Sound, Lower Cook Inlet, and

Kodiak Island. Use was also high, though more variable, among villages of the Alaska Peninsula. There 

is an exceptionally strong statistical relationship between the cultural composition of a community

(percentage of Alaska Natives) and the Indigenous Foods Index (Fig. V-27). The use of traditional wild

foods is directly related to the presence of Alaska Natives in the community’s population.

By this cultural measure, the towns of Kodiak City, Cordova, and Seldovia fall between the cities

and the villages -- between 23 to 28 percent of households used the six indigenous food items. The three 

towns scored twice as high as the cities, but substantially below the villages. Two towns (Kodiak City and 

Cordova) fall above the regression line in Figure V-27, suggesting that a greater proportion of households 

use the six traditional foods than expected by the towns’ cultural composition. This is because a

substantial proportion of households use deer, clams, and octopus (foods used in both Euroamerican and 

Alutiiq cuisines). Chitons, gull eggs, and harbor seals were used by only a small portion of households in 

Kodiak City and Cordova. This indicates that families from Euroamerican traditions in Kodiak City and

Cordova use certain wild foods more than their counterparts in the city, due to acculturative trends in the

towns towards a village diet, although acculturation has not been sufficient to move chitons, gull eggs,

and harbor seals onto many dinner plates in town.
134

Table V-18 Indigenous Foods Index:

Percent of Households Using Wild Food Types

Chiton

Gull 

Eggs Seal Octopus Clams

Deer or 

Caribou

Index 

(Mean)

Cities

Valdez 1993 0 3 6 6 20 23 10

Whittier 1990 1 1 6 10 16 27 10

Kenai 1993 0 0 1 1 46 12 10

Towns

Kodiak City 1993 4 3 1 22 37 70 23

Cordova 1993 0 2 9 15 62 66 26

Seldovia 1993 26 2 8 29 83 20 28

Villages (PWS-LCI)

Chenega Bay 1993 48 0 57 61 65 83 52

Tatitlek 1993 25 55 95 65 60 95 66

Port Graham 1993 96 17 78 73 100 16 73

Nanwalek 1993 97 27 85 70 91 6 74

Villages (Kodiak Is)

Port Lions 1993 31 13 18 29 91 80 44

Karluk 1991 62 0 39 62 69 100 55

Ouzinkie 1993 59 44 38 46 79 89 59

Larsen Bay 1993 53 15 33 80 88 90 60

Old Harbor 1991 57 33 60 48 88 93 63

Akhiok 1992 67 58 63 67 88 88 72

Villages (Alaska Peninsula)

Chignik Lagoon 1989 27 0 7 20 67 73 32

Chignik Bay 1991 33 3 33 60 63 87 47

Sand Point 1992 58 27 18 72 25 51 42

Perryville 1989 93 63 63 52 59 67 66

Chignik Lake 1991 75 38 71 79 100 100 77

Ivanof Bay 1989 100 86 86 71 86 100 88
135

Figure V-26. Indigenous Foods Index:

Mean Percent of Households Using Six Species

(Chitons, Clams, Deer, Gull Eggs, Harbor Seal, Octopus) 

10 10 10

23 26 28

52

66

73 74

44

55 59 60 63

72

32

47

42

66

77

88

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Valdez 1993

Whittier 1990

Kenai 1993

Kodiak City 1993

Cordova 1993

Seldovia 1993

Chenega Bay 1993

Tatitlek 1993

Port Graham 1993

Nanwalek 1993

Port Lions 1993

Karluk 1991

Ouzinkie 1993

Larsen Bay 1993

Old Harbor 1991

Akhiok 1992

Chignik Lagoon 1989

Chignik Bay 1991

Sand Point 1992

Perryville 1989

Chignik Lake 1991

Ivanof Bay 1989

Percent of Households

Urbanized

Places

Rural

Towns

Rural Villages

PWS-LCI Area

Rural Villages

Kodiak Island

Rural Villages

Alaska Peninsula

Figure V-27. Indigenous Foods Index

by Cultural Composition of Community

y = 0.6258x + 0.1041

R

2

 = 0.9099

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Cultural Composition (Percent Alaska Native)

Indigenous Foods Index

(Percent HHs Using Food Types)

Kenai

Valdez

Cordova

Kodiak City

Cities

Towns

Seldovia

Chignik Bay

Port Lions

Villages

(Pacific Gulf)
136

Federal and state regulations influence but do not determine traditional patterns of food use in the 

Pacific Gulf communities. Harvest rules for chitons, octopus, clams, deer, and caribou were equivalent

for all classes of users, so they cannot be a reason for the differences in use of these food items. Under 

federal and state regulations, it was illegal to gather gull eggs for food at the time of this research. 

Despite this legal prohibition, gull eggs were gathered and distributed by families in the villages, showing

that the cultural value of eating gull eggs in the villages was stronger than the perceived risks from

violating regulations. In the towns and cities where there was a greater enforcement presence, regulatory

prohibitions may have restricted some families from choosing to gather eggs. Under federal regulations,

anyone may eat harbor seal, but only coastal Alaska Natives may hunt them. It is doubtful that this

regulation played a significant role in restricting consumption of harbor seals in the towns and cities, as

these products circulated and were available. Marine mammal products were not consumed primarily

because Euroamerican tastes do not value them as food.

Human-Nature Relationships: The Outdoor Sport Tradition

Another example of the cultural divide between village and city in the Pacific Gulf was in regards

to human-nature relationships. Like foodways, a person’s perceived relationship with the natural world is 

rooted in the cultural traditions of families and communities. One basic cultural difference pertained to the 

prevalence of the “outdoor sport hunting and fishing tradition” within a community’s population. The

outdoor sport tradition of late 20th century America is a cultural complex of beliefs, values, and activities

traceable to European cultural roots. Within this tradition, “sport” is a central value of hunting and fishing,

with the harvest and use of wild foods additional (and often secondary) values. Hunting and fishing are

primarily conducted by members of this tradition as valued breaks from a normal routine of work. 

Principles of “fair chase” are followed, which are commonly embedded in regulatory restrictions of

equipment, seasons, and bag limits. Animals are referred to as “game,” consistent with the sport ethic. 

In the Pacific Gulf, sport hunting and fishing were part of a growing recreational industry, employing

retailers, outfitters, and guides. In state regulation, harvesting for sport values was one of four legally

recognized uses of wild resources, alongside commercial (harvests for market sale), subsistence

(harvests for “customary and traditional” uses as food, clothing, sharing, and noncommercial exchanges), 

and nonconsumptive uses (wildlife viewing).

Subsistence traditions of the Alutiiq differed in most respects from sport traditions. Within 

subsistence traditions, the primary value of harvesting was for food, not sport. Hunting and fishing were

part of a normal routine of work, rather than breaks from employment. “Fair chase” did not guide harvest 

activities, but traditional principles of efficiency, economy of effort, and respect towards animals. Harvests 

were typically for sharing and exchange among segments of the community.
137

In Pacific Gulf cities, the cultural sport tradition was prevalent, while in villages, subsistence

traditions prevailed. This is shown by the Sport License Index in Table V-17. The Sport License Index is 

the percentage of residents holding a State of Alaska sport-fishing license. State regulations required

persons older than 16 years of age to obtain a sport fishing license if fishing with a rod and reel. The

index is calculated by dividing the number of persons in a community with the number of sport licenses

sold in a community (using 1995 license files as the index year). As such, the Sport License Index may

be used as a general estimate of the extent to which the anglers in a community are fishing under sport

values. As shown in Table V-17, Pacific Gulf cities and towns score about three to four times higher than 

villages on the Sport License Index. The largest proportion of residents with sport fishing licenses is

found in Kenai City (48 percent), followed by Valdez (41 percent) and Cordova (41 percent). The town of 

Kodiak City is somewhat lower with 32 percent of residents holding a sport fishing license. By contrast,

the Sport License Index is lowest in the villages. On average only from 10 percent to 14 percent of village 

residents obtained sport fishing licenses.

The use of sport fishing licenses reflects a cultural value orientation rather than the use of rod and 

reels, as shown in Figure V-28. There was no relationship between the prevalence of sport licenses and 

the prevalence of rod and reel fishing in a community. Based on household survey information, fishing

with rod and reel was extremely common in all surveyed Pacific Gulf communities – Prince William 

Sound-Lower Cook Inlet villages (71 percent of households used rod and reel), Kodiak Island villages (60 

percent), Alaska Peninsula villages (45 percent), Seldovia (72 percent), Cordova (69 percent), Kodiak

City (66 percent), Kenai Area (74 percent), and Valdez (66 percent). Yet, unlike city and town residents, 

few anglers in Pacific Gulf villages obtained sport fishing licenses. This was the case even though there

were license vendors in almost all the communities, and state regulations required persons fishing with a 

rod and reel to obtain a sport fishing license. Licenses were not being boycotted in Pacific Gulf villages. 

Rather, they were viewed as inappropriate. Because most villagers perceived their fishing with rod and

reel as subsistence, it was believed unnecessary to obtain a sport fishing license. Sport fishing licenses

and sport fishing regulations were viewed as applying to sport fishers, who lived elsewhere than the

villages. This cultural view held sway even though contrary to state regulatory requirements. The

prevalence of the two belief complexes (sport and subsistence) was strongly associated with the cultural

composition of a community, as shown in Figure V-29. As the percentage of Alaska Natives in a

community increased, the percentage with sport fishing licenses decreased.

Subsistence Sector Characteristics

The socioeconomic systems of villages and cities in the Pacific Gulf differed substantially,

alongside the cultural differences described above. As stated in Chapter Two, the production and

distribution of wild foods was a well-developed economic sector in villages, but comparatively weak in

cities. This is shown by measures of wild food production and distribution in Table V-17. Wild food
138

Figure V-28. Relationship of Angling and Sport Fishing

Licenses, Gulf Of Alaska Communities, Circa 1991-93

y = 0.2154x + 0.5924

R

2

 = 0.0473

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

Population with Sport Fishing Licenses

Households Fishing with Rod and Reel

Valdez

Kenai Cordova

Nanwalek

Kodiak

Port Graham

Seldovia

Larsen Bay

No Significant Relationship

Karluk Old Harbor Port Lions

Chenega Bay Ouzinkie

Chignik Bay

Tatitlek

Akhiok Chignik Lake

Figure V-29. Sport License Index

by Cultural Composition of Community

y = -0.365x + 0.4235

R

2

 = 0.7952

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Cultural Composition (Percent Alaska Native)

Percent of Population with Sport Fishing 

Licenses

Valdez

Kenai

Kodiak City

Cordova

Seldovia

Cities

Towns

Chignik 

Villages

Larsen Bay

Nanwalek
139

harvests in villages (between about 297 pounds to 400 pounds per capita) were substantially greater than 

wild food harvests in the two cities (Kenai, 77 pounds, and Valdez, 90 pounds). Larger wild food harvests 

were associated with the subsistence values of Alaska Native cultures, while smaller volumes were

associated with the predominant outdoors sport tradition in cities. The three towns fell intermediate

between village and city (Kodiak City, 150 pounds; Cordova, 160 pounds; Seldovia, 178 pounds). 

Harvest levels were strongly related to the cultural composition of a community, as shown in Figure V-30 

(see also Wolfe and Walker 1987).

Villages harvested a much greater diversity of species for food compared with cities, as shown by

a Core Foods Index in Table V-17. This index provides a count of the number of wild foods used by the

majority of households (>50 percent) in a community. As such, it measures a “community” trait displayed 

by the majority of households. The number of core foods in the cities was about a third the number in

villages (Table V-19). The core village diet contained about 14 wild food types in Prince William SoundLower Cook Inlet villages, about 12 food types in Kodiak Island villages, and about 17 food types in

Alaska Peninsula villages. By comparison, there were only two core foods in Valdez: only halibut and

coho salmon were used by a majority of households. In Kenai there were only three core foods – halibut, 

coho, and sockeye (moose typically is not a core food – 36 percent used it in 1991 and 43 percent in

1992). Towns were intermediate between village and city. In Kodiak City, there were five core wild foods 

– halibut, coho, sockeye, deer, and king crab. In Cordova there were eight – halibut, coho, sockeye,

deer, chinook, moose, red rockfish, and razor clams. In Seldovia there were seven. This is a relatively

narrow set of wild foods, compared with the range of food possibilities within the local environment. As

Euroamericans have moved to the Gulf of Alaska, immigrant families have selectively adopted some wild 

food types that are traditional for the region. Still, the diversity of food types was substantially lower in the 

cities and towns compared with the wild foods in the core diets of the villages.

A final measure of the subsistence sector is the Wild Food Distribution Index, which is the

percentage of food types received by households through noncommercial distribution networks. In

villages, a substantially larger number of wild food types are distributed among households than in cities

(Table V-17). About 15 to 19 percent of available food types were reported received by village

households during the survey period, while in the cities, only 4 to 5 percent of wild foods were distributed. 

At 8 to 9 percent, the towns of Cordova, Kodiak City, and Seldovia were intermediate between village and 

city. In Pacific Gulf villages the distribution of substantial numbers of wild foods is part of the mixed,

subsistence-cash economic system, through which households receive basic food provisions. In cities, 

the sharing of a few wild foods is part of the predominant sport harvesting tradition. 

Wage-Market Sector Characteristics

The socioeconomic systems of villages and cities in the Pacific Gulf differed substantially in terms 

of the strength of the wage-market sector, as shown by three measures in Table V-17. The wage-market 
140

Figure V-30. Wild Food Harvest Levels by

Cultural Composition of Communities,

Gulf of Alaska Area, Circa 1991-93

y = 252.88x + 111.48

R

2

 = 0.668

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Percent Alaska Native

Wild Food Harvests (Lbs per Person)

Cities (Valdez, 

Kenai Area)

Towns 

(Cordova, 

Kodiak)

Other Villages 

(Pacific Gulf)

Seldovia

Chignik Bay

Port Lions

Figure V-31. Wild Food Harvests of Community by

Per Capita Income in Community,

Gulf of Alaska Area, Circa 1991-93

y = -0.0141x + 448.04

R

2

 = 0.5462

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

$5,000 $7,500 $10,000 $12,500 $15,000 $17,500 $20,000 $22,500 $25,000

Per Capita Income

Wild Food Harvests (Lbs per Person)

Valdez Kenai

Kodiak

Cordova

Seldovia

Chignik Bay

Port Lions

Ouzinkie

Other 

Villages

Cities

Towns
141

Table V-19. Core Foods Index (Wild Foods Used by the Majority of Community Households),

Gulf of Alaska, Circa 1991-93 (Percent of Households Using the Resource Category)

"Villages" "Towns" "Cities"

PWS-Lower Cook Inlet Kodiak Island Alaska Peninsula

Wild Food Type

NanwalekPort GrahamTatitlekChenega BayAhkiokOld HarborLarsen BayKarlukOuzinkiePort LionsIvanof BayPerryvilleChignik LakeChignik LagoonChignik BaySeldoviaCordovaKodiak CityKenaiValdez

Halibut 100 96 90 91 75 95 83 92 84 93 100 96 92 100 90 85 94 86 72 71

Coho Salmon 100 88 95 74 88 88 80 92 90 93 86 82 63 60 63 60 86 76 55 51

Sockeye Salmon 94 84 95 96 79 76 88 92 80 93 86 74 79 93 87 57 82 71 67

Butter Clams 85 84 63 86 83 69 79 91 71 83 67 50 79

Deer 95 83 75 93 90 100 89 80 50 66 70

Chinook Salmon 85 94 70 55 77 57 58 80 53 82 78

Octopus 70 73 65 61 58 80 62 71 52 79 60

Pink Salmon 91 94 80 61 88 83 61 56 86 78

Black Chitons 97 96 67 57 53 62 59 100 93 75

Harbor Seal 85 78 95 57 71 60 86 63 71

Moose 67 55 74 58 60 50 67 52

Pacific Cod (Grey) 67 50 50 51 53 86 63 60

Tanner Crab 76 80 71 67 67 80 52

Chum Salmon 78 60 65 96 57 71 52

Sea Urchin 50 62 50 100 89 71

Caribou 100 67 100 73 87

Dolly Varden 79 63 77 86 56

Dungeness Crab 52 100 52 63 77

Ptarmigan 100 93 83 53

Cockles 63 100 70 71

Gull Eggs 55 67 86 63

Eulachon 100 78 63

Mallard 74 86 60

Red Rockfish 55 74 53

Sea Lion 58 50 67

Emperor Geese 100 53

Brown Bear 100 52

Littleneck Clams 83 66

Bull Kelp 82 57

Steelhead 68 54

Pacific Tom Cod 64 55

King Crab 63 51

Goldeneye 50 51

Red Chitons 86

Black Bear 82

Pinkneck Clams 71

Herring 70

Shrimp 61

Razor Clams 59

Snails 58

Landlocked Salmon 57

Rainbow Trout 57

Porcupine 57

Teal 57

Black Scoter 55

Index Total 17 14 14 10 15 15 12 10 9 8 28 19 17 12 11 7 8 5 4 2

Source: ADF&G 2001
142

sector was not well developed in Pacific Gulf villages. Per capita monetary incomes were low – Prince

William Sound-Lower Cook Inlet ($8,655), Kodiak Island villages ($9,948), and Alaska Peninsula villages

($11,889). Only a small percentage of adults held year-round employment (14 to 26 percent). Working 

adults were employed an average of 7.2 to 7.5 months. By comparison, incomes in the cities were about 

twice that of the villages – Valdez ($24,885) and Kenai ($18,283). Most adults held year-round jobs (63

to 67 percent). Working adults were employed an average of 10.0 to 10.3 months, about a third longer

than in Pacific Gulf villages. As stated in Chapter Two, the socioeconomic systems in Valdez and Kenai

were examples of industrial capitalism, the predominant socioeconomic system in the United States. In

this type of economic system, production and distribution of goods and services are primarily commercial

activities. The strength of a community’s economy is measured by the strength of wage-market activities. 

The socioeconomic systems of Pacific Gulf villages were variants of a mixed, subsistence-cash economy, 

where production and distribution of goods and services are produced through two, loosely integrated

sectors. The wage-market sector is typically weak, and households commonly are supported by

combining activities in both economic sectors. There was a significant inverse statistical relationship

between income and wild food harvest levels for Pacific Gulf communities, as shown in Figure V-31. 

Communities with lower per capita incomes displayed higher per capita wild food harvests, illustrating the 

connection between the strength of the two sectors. In the cities and towns with higher per capita

incomes, households had lower per capita harvests of wild foods.

In the three towns (Cordova, Kodiak City, and Seldovia), about 41 to 52 percent of adults

reported year-round employment, a value intermediate between village and city. On two other economic

measures, towns were more similar to cities than to villages, indicating the stronger wage-market sectors 

compared with villages. Per capita incomes and months employed by working adults in the towns

resembled those for the cities – Kodiak City ($21,354, 10.0 months), Cordova ($17,901, 9.7 months), and 

Seldovia ($15,205, 9 months). During the mid-1990s, the availability of employment was substantially

better in Pacific Gulf towns than in villages. The strength of the wage sector was a reason for the greater 

population growth of towns compared with the villages.

One important difference between town and city in the Pacific Gulf was the strength of the

commercial fishing industry. The per capita incomes from commercial fisheries in the towns (Cordova,

$4,066; Kodiak City, $4,005; and Seldovia, $3,794) were substantially greater than in the cities (Valdez,

$418; Kenai, $467). Employment in Valdez and Kenai was more closely linked to other industries than

commercial fisheries. There were substantial differences between villages in the strength of the

commercial fishing industry, with the greatest income earned in Alaska Peninsula villages ($4,470) and

the least in Prince William Sound-Lower Cook Inlet villages ($674), with Kodiak Island villages

intermediate ($2,382) (see also Chapter Four).

Income differences between Alaska Native households and non-Native households, by

community type, are shown in Figure V-32 (see also Table V-20). Income is broken out into three

categories – wage income, other earned income, and entitlements – using the means for the 1991-93 
143

Figure V-32. Per Capita Income of Native or Non-Native Households

by Community Type, Gulf of Alaska, Mean 1991-93

$0

$5,000

$10,000

$15,000

$20,000

$25,000

Village (12

Places)

Town

(Cordova,

Kodiak)

City (Valdez,

Kenai)

Village (12

Places)

Town

(Cordova,

Kodiak)

City (Valdez,

Kenai)

Per Capita Income

Other Earned Income

Entitlements

Wage Income

Native Households Non-Native Households

$9,773 

$20,476 

$18,605 

$17,824 

$19,206 

$22,031 

Table V-20. Household Incomes (Per Capita)

(Monetary Incomes plus Wild Food Replacement Values)

by Native or Non-Native Households,

and Community Type, Gulf of Alaska, Mean 1991-93

Native Households Non-Native Households

Village

(12 Places)

Town 

(Cordova, 

Kodiak)

City 

(Valdez, 

Kenai)

Village

(12 Places)

Town 

(Cordova, 

Kodiak)

City 

(Valdez, 

Kenai)

Wage Income $5,887 $16,371 $15,560 $15,727 $15,876 $19,393

Other Earned Income $3,369 $3,812 $2,345 $1,898 $3,213 $2,329

Entitlements $517 $293 $700 $199 $117 $308

Monetary Income $9,773 $20,476 $18,605 $17,824 $19,206 $22,031

Wild Foods @ $20/lb* $7,100 $4,420 $3,940 $4,660 $3,040 $1,700

Total Estimated Income $16,873 $24,896 $22,545 $22,484 $22,246 $23,731

Wild Foods @ $118/lb** $41,890 $26,078 $23,246 $27,494 $17,936 $10,030

Total Estimated Income $51,663 $46,554 $41,851 $45,318 $37,142 $32,061

* Replacement cost of nutritional value of wild foods, based on civil settlement (Duffield 1997)

** Consumer surplus value of wild foods, based on hedonic (implicit price) method (Duffield 1997)
144

survey years. Mean per capita incomes for Alaska Native households were $9,773 (village), $20,476

(town), and $18,605 (city) (Fig. V-32). Mean per capita incomes for non-Native households were $17,824 

(village), $19,206 (town), and $22,031 (city). 2

In all community types, wage employment (including self employment in commercial fisheries)

provided the most income to households. Because of the limited employment opportunities, per capita

wage incomes were lowest for Alaska Native households in Pacific Gulf villages. Wage incomes of

Alaska Native households in towns ($16,371) and cities ($15,560) were twice wage incomes in villages

($5,887). Per capita wage incomes of non-Native households in villages ($15,727) were also

substantially larger than for Native households ($5,887). This shows that higher-paying jobs in the

villages were disproportionately held by non-Natives. In the towns of Cordova and Kodiak, wage incomes 

were similar for non-Native households ($15,876) and Native households ($16,371). In the cities of

Valdez and Kenai, non-Native households had larger wage incomes ($19,393) than Native households

($15,560).

“Other earned income” primarily derived from dividend payments and retirement income. Mean

per capita incomes from these sources were fairly consistent across all community types for Native and

non-Native households. This is because the primary source of income in this category was the Alaska

Permanent Fund Dividend payment, which was equally distributed to each Alaskan with at least one year

of residency. In Pacific Gulf villages, where wage employment opportunities were limited, dividend

incomes represented 37 percent of earned income of Native households, a significant source of annual

income. A comparison of other earned income of Native and non-Native households in Table V-20 

suggests that Alaska Native shareholders received only modest dividend payments from village and

regional Native corporations during 1991-93.

“Entitlements” contributed only a small portion of household income in Pacific Gulf communities. 

Entitlements included Aid to Family with Dependent Children, Supplemental Security Income (disability

support), food stamps, and Medicare. For Alaska Native households, mean per capita entitlement

income ranged from $293 to $700, about 1.4 percent to 3.8 percent of total household income (Table V20). For non-Native households, mean per capita entitlement income ranged from $117 to $308, about

0.6 percent to 1.4 percent of total household income.

In addition to monetary incomes, wild food harvests contributed income-in-kind to Native and nonNative households. Subsistence harvests by Native and non-Native households are compared for village, 

town, and city in Figure V-33. On average, Native households produced larger harvests of wild foods

than non-Native households, a situation consistent across village, town, and city. Wild food harvests

were largest in the villages. Non-Native village households produced more wild foods than Native

households in the towns and cities.

 

2

 The analysis reported in Figures V-32 to V-35 and Table 20, includes in the “village” category Chenega Bay, Tatitlek, Nanwalek, 

Port Graham, Akhiok, Karluk, Larsen Bay, Old Harbor, Ouzinkie, Port Lions, Chignik, and Chignik Lake. As a small “town” with a

stable population, Seldovia was not included in this analysis.
145

Figure V-33. Wild Food Harvests (Lbs per Capita)

of Native and Non-Native Households

by Community Type, Gulf of Alaska, Mean 1991-93

355

221

197

342

233

152

85

151

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Village (12 Places) Town (Cordova, Kodiak) City (Valdez, Kenai) Region (16 Places)

Wild Food Harvest (Lbs per Capita)

Native Households Non-Native Households

Figure V-34. Household Income and Wild Food Value*

of Native or Non-Native Households

by Community Type, Gulf of Alaska, Mean 1991-93

$0

$5,000

$10,000

$15,000

$20,000

$25,000

$30,000

Village (12

Places)

Town

(Cordova,

Kodiak)

City (Valdez,

Kenai)

Village (12

Places)

Town

(Cordova,

Kodiak)

City (Valdez,

Kenai)

Per Capita Income

Wild Food Harvests

Entitlements

Other Earned Income

Wage Income

Native Households Non-Native Households

* Valued at $20 per lb

$16,873 

$24,896 

$22,545 $22,484 $22,246 

$23,731 
146

Figures V-34 and V-35 provide estimates of the monetary value of wild food harvests in villages,

towns, and cities, for comparison with household monetary incomes. In Figure V-34, the value of wild

food harvests was estimated at $20 per pound. This was the value accepted in the Native class civil

settlement for lost subsistence foods, calculated with a simple replacement cost methodology (Duffield

1997). It represents a monetary estimate of the nutritional value of wild foods to households. It does not 

include estimates of other social and cultural values of subsistence activities. At $20 per pound,

subsistence activities provide more income to Native households in villages than other income sources. 

For Native households in Pacific Gulf villages, the mean per capita value of the wild food harvest ($7,100) 

was larger than the income from wages ($5,887) and other earned income ($3,369). Native households 

in towns had higher incomes than non-Native households in the cities, if the value of wild foods is

included. While the incomes of Native households in villages increased by including wild foods, incomes 

in villages were still lower than in towns and cities.

In Figure V-35, the value of wild food harvests was estimated at $118 per pound. This derives

from a hedonic (implicit price) method developed by Duffield (1997). In this method, the value of

subsistence harvests was estimated by the opportunity cost of foregone wages by living in a village

instead of an urban area. It represents an estimate of the consumer surplus to households derived from 

the procurement and use of wild foods. It may be considered a measure of the contribution of wild foods 

to the overall well being of households living in a particular place. The court did not accept this estimate

in the civil settlement because it included social and cultural values (Duffield 1997). At $118 per pound,

Figure V-35. Household Incomes and Wild Food Values*

of Native or Non-Native Households

by Community Type, Gulf of Alaska, Mean 1991-93

$0

$10,000

$20,000

$30,000

$40,000

$50,000

$60,000

Village (12

Places)

Town

(Cordova,

Kodiak)

City (Valdez,

Kenai)

Village (12

Places)

Town

(Cordova,

Kodiak)

City (Valdez,

Kenai)

Per Capita Income

Wild Food Harvests

Entitlements

Other Earned Income

Wage Income

Native Households Non-Native Households

$51,663

$46,554 

$41,851 

$45,318

$37,142 

$32,061 

* Valued at $118 per lb
147

Native households in the villages had higher incomes than Native households in the towns and cities. 

Native households in the villages also had substantially higher incomes than non-Native households in

the towns and cities.

While $20 per pound may underestimate the value of wild food harvest and use to villagers

relative to wage incomes, $118 per pound probably overestimates its economic value. If Native

householders were substantially better off in villages compared with towns and cities, one might expect to 

see this reflected in differential migration of people into the villages. That is not what is seen over time. 

Instead, village populations in the Pacific Gulf tend to show only modest growth over time, with differential 

out-migration to the towns and cities. Nevertheless, by including subsistence production in calculations,

the economic incomes of Native households show greater parity with non-Native households. Further,

the great economic importance of subsistence products for Native households in villages is also

demonstrated. 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has summarized some key characteristics of the three types of communities of the

Pacific Gulf in the 1980s (villages, town, and cities). These contrasting community types were the result of 

demographic, economic, and political processes at work in the 19th and especially the 20th century. In

terms of demographic trends, the Alaska Native communities (the villages) overall had exhibited stable

populations, or a rate of growth below that of Alaska’s Native population overall and of the towns and

cities of the Pacific Gulf region. By the end of the 1980s, the majority of Alaska Natives in the region did

not live in villages. Intermarriage with non-Natives was the norm in the towns and cites and was

becoming more common in some of the villages.

The subsistence sectors of the local economies of the villages were strong, as evidenced by

harvest levels that were in the mid-range of those of other rural Alaska communities, and higher than

those of cities and towns. Harvests were diverse and there was virtually universal participation in the use, 

harvest, and exchange of wild foods. Subsistence uses were filled with cultural meanings, linking people

to the land and their history, and to each other as kinship structured harvesting, processing, and sharing. 

Nevertheless, there was a sense of change expressed by some village residents in the 1980s that

subsistence traditions were being lost with the importation of purchased foods.

In contrast to the strength of the subsistence sector, the cash sectors of the local economies of

the villages and a lesser extent the towns was less developed. Employment was seasonal, the variety of 

jobs low, and incomes below those found in Alaska’s urban areas. Commercial fishing was a significant 

part of the cash sectors of the economies in most villages and town. Here, too, there was a sense of

change. In some communities, local residents were selling their limited entry commercial fishing permits. 

Part-time and seasonal wage jobs supported by government programs were increasing in importance as

a source of cash.
148

Social and political organizations were complex within Pacific Gulf communities. Political power

was dispersed among tribal councils, municipal governments, and borough governments. These entities 

were involved in economic enterprise and social programs, with village corporations, for-profit regional

corporations, and not-for-profit regional service organizations. Alongside these formal organizations,

kinship remained the primary organizing principle of daily life in the villages. Some cultural systems have 

changed substantially over the 20th century. Few if any children spoke the Alutiiq language in the villages. 

There were few Native dance groups, and knowledge of Native songs was fading. Oral traditions were

being lost. On the other hand, Russian Orthodoxy as a “Native” faith, a syncretism of Christianity and

Alutiiq traditions, continued to shape an annual cycle of observances and celebrations. And social,

political, and cultural revitalization was a growing trend among the Alutiiq of the Pacific Gulf during the

last part of the 20th century. These features of the communities of the Pacific Gulf in the 1980s,

themselves dynamic, set the stage for changes set in motion by the Exxon Valdez oil spill of March 1989, 

the subject of the next several chapters.
149

Chapter Six: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill:

Effects, Litigation, and Restoration

OVERVIEW OF THE OIL SPILL AND CLEANUP 

The oil tanker Exxon Valdez grounded on Bligh Reef in eastern Prince William Sound on March

24, 1989, spilling 11 million gallons of crude oil (258,000 barrels). Winds, tides, and currents carried the

oil to the west and south, contaminating about 1,200 miles of shoreline, and killing or injuring birds, sea

mammals, and other marine life (U.S. Coast Guard 1993; ADF&G 1989a:8-10,21).1 Although not visible

directly from Tatitlek, Bligh Reef is only about six miles from the village. Most of the beaches and waters 

used by residents of Chenega Bay since the re-establishment of the village lay directly in the path of the

spill. Residents of the other Prince William Sound communities of Tatitlek, Cordova, Valdez, and Whittier 

also used these areas (Stratton and Chisum 1986; Stratton 1990; Stratton 1992; Seitz et al. 1994).

Until about mid-April, much of the response effort in Prince William Sound focused on protecting

three salmon hatcheries from the spilled oil. By April 5, fishing boats from Valdez and Cordova had

deployed about 66,000 feet of oil containment boom around the Armin F. Koernig Hatchery at Sawmill Bay 

on Evans Island near Chenega Bay village (Alaska Oil Spill Commission 1990:65). The people of

Chenega Bay played a central role in this effort (Piper 1993:96). Booms were also placed to protect

hatcheries at Main Bay and Esther Island, as well as Eshamy Bay, a critical natural spawning area for

salmon (ADF&G 1989a:9; U.S. Coast Guard 1993:58-61).

Figure VI-1 illustrates the movement of EVOS oil, sheen, and mousse for the first 56 days after

the spill. The leading edge of the oil began to leave Prince William Sound to the west about seven days 

after the spill. Tar balls and mousse began washing shore along the outer coast of the Kenai Peninsula,

including the Kenai Fiords National Park, at about this time. Tides and prevailing currents carried the spill 

up into Cook Inlet and Kachemak Bay by about April 15. Soon afterwards, local fishermen and loggers

worked together to build and deploy boom to protect key bays and coves. There was increasing

frustration with the perceived slow response of Exxon, especially after storms washed up sheen and

emulsified oil along the outer Kenai coast, on Homer Spit, and near Seldovia (Davidson 1990:255-259).

Oil from the Exxon Valdez began washing up on beaches of the Kodiak Archipelago on April 17,

about three weeks after the spill (Endter-Wada et al. 1993:663). Exxon established a major base of

operations for the cleanup in Kodiak City by late April (Endter-Wada et al. 1993:666). The patchy and

 

1 For detailed descriptions of the spill and subsequent cleanup activities, the reader should consult, among other sources, the

Alaska Oil Spill Commission’s (1990) final report, the final report of the federal on-scene coordinator (U.S. Coast Guard 1993), and 

the final report of the State of Alaska’s response to the spill (Piper 1993). For accounts of the oil spill, the cleanup, and their

aftermath for a general readership, see Davidson (1990), Keeble (1991), Wheelright (1994), and Lord (1992). The chapter on

“Native Subsistence” in the latter is based largely on Fall (1991b).
150

Source: US Coast Guard 1993:124
151

dispersed nature of the spilled oil in the Kodiak Island area created particularly frustrating and

disheartening conditions for local residents engaged in the cleanup.

Some [Kodiak] residents expressed despair and fatigue as areas that had already been cleaned 

were hit again with “mousse” (emulsified oil) or had oil percolate up from below. “It’s like taking 

ground again and again in a battle,” remarked one resident. Others likened cleanup operations 

to a guerrilla war, where puffs of smoke come up and then disappear, only to reappear

somewhere else. Indeed, the oil-spill headquarters operated like command posts. Said one

National Park Service employee, “We keep hoping for some kind of closure, some sign that this 

is all the damage that we have and we can deal with it. But we can’t. The oil disappears one

day when the waves clean a beach only to wash up on another beach the next day” (EndterWada et al. 1993:689).

On April 18, light oiling was spotted at Cape Douglas, the northeastern-most tip of the Alaska

Peninsula, within the Katmai National Park. Six days later, oil arrived at Kukak Bay, 50 miles to the south, 

and then moved on to Missark Bay and Kashvik Bay (Hanable 1990:77). Effects on wildlife along the

Alaska Peninsula coast were observed. Officials of the National Park Service counted six dead birds per 

100 feet within a six-mile section of the Katmai National Park coast on May 2. Fourteen brown bears were 

spotted feeding on the oiled carcasses (Hanable 1990:80). By this time, about 320 miles of the park's

coastline had been impacted, with many miles heavily oiled; some beaches "smelled like a refinery with oil 

rolling in the surf and smearing the sand" (Hanable 1990:80,82-3).

As of May 19, surveys by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation had documented 

700 miles of oiled coastline. By this date, 16,007 dead birds and 690 dead sea otters had been recovered 

(ADF&G 1989a:21). By May 18, the leading edge of the oil spill had reached Wide Bay within the Alaska 

Peninsula National Wildlife Refuge (Alaska Oil Spill Commission 1990:62). Wide Bay is the northern-most 

section of the Alaska Peninsula coast used for subsistence purposes by residents of the Alaska Peninsula 

study communities. Even earlier, on May 5, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) had reported

"small patches of mousse south of Chignik in Castle Bay" (USFWS 1989a:1). On May 9, the USFWS 

reported "scattered patches of sheen and mousse from Chignik south to Stepovak Bay" (USFWS 

1989b:1).

By this chronology, oil from the Exxon Valdez spill had reached the northern edge of the Chignik 

commercial fisheries management area at least by late May and early June (Barrett and Monkiewicz

1989:1). As the spill proceeded southwest, it fouled additional beaches in the wildlife refuge and along the 

shores of the Aniakchak National Monument. Of Aniakchak's 68 miles of coastline, two-thirds showed

signs of oiling (Hanable 1990:82). By August 10, the outer edge of the spill was at Stepovak Bay,

southwest of the village of Ivanof Bay, over 600 miles from Bligh Reef (ADF&G 1989a:20-21).

The degree to which shorelines were oiled varied both within and between regions. The Shoreline 

Cleanup Assessment Team (SCAT) survey of September 1989 classified 26.5 percent of the oiled

shoreline of Prince William Sound as "heavily oiled," 20.7 percent of the oiling as “moderate,” 34.2 percent

as “light,” and 18.6 percent as “very light.” In contrast, only 7.9 percent of the oiled shorelines outside of 
152

Prince William Sound was classified as heavily or moderately oiled, 14.6 percent as lightly oiled, and the

remainder (77.5 percent) was classified as very lightly oiled (U.S. Coast Guard 1993:125).2 

THE CLEANUP RESPONSE

On about April 12, the spill response work in the sound shifted from protection of hatcheries to

cleaning oil from waters and beaches. The cleanup was fully underway by the middle of May (ADF&G

1989a:13; State of Alaska 1989:15). Eventually about 11,000 workers, as well as hundreds of boats and

aircraft, were employed on the cleanup in 1989 (Alaska Oil Spill Commission 1990:63). Oil cleanup

methods included hot and cold water washing with high pressure hosing, removing and bagging oiled

debris and wildlife by hand or with rakes for later pick up, and wiping rocks with rags. A chemical cleaning 

agent called COREXIT 9580 was used to treat some beaches. Another method used was bioremediation, 

the spreading of fertilizer to enhance the growth of oil-eating bacteria on the beaches (State of Alaska

1989:17-19).

As reported in Table VI-1, the majority of adults in Chenega Bay, Tatitlek, Nanwalek, Port

Graham, Karluk, Larsen Bay, and Ouzinkie participated in the cleanup, as did over 20 percent in Akhiok,

Old Harbor, Port Lions, and Perryville. Of all adults in the 15 Alaska Native villages in the spill area, 42.9 

percent had oil spill cleanup jobs in 1989; 54.7 percent of all adults who worked in 1989 had cleanup jobs. 

By subregion, 77.3 percent of all households in the Prince William Sound villages of Chenega Bay and

Tatitlek had at least one member who worked in the cleanup, as did 81.4 percent of the Lower Cook Inlet 

households (Nanwalek and Port Graham), 61.5 percent of the households in the six villages of the Kodiak 

Island Borough, and 20.6 percent of the Alaska Peninsula households. Overall, about half the income

earned from jobs in 1989 in the 15 villages came from oil spill employment; this ranged from a low of

about 12 percent in the Alaska Peninsula communities to almost 75 percent among Lower Cook Inlet

communities (Table VI-2). 

Exxon estimated that it spent $2 billion on the cleanup in 1989. Cleanup efforts took place in 

Prince William Sound, lower Cook Inlet, the Kodiak Islands, and portions of the Alaska Peninsula. As

noted by Piper (1993:114), “the towns and villages of the oil spill region were turned upside down by the

staging, logistics, and politics of the response,” as thousands of newcomers arrived looking for work,

placing severe strains on facilities and services. The acute fiscal, social, and political effects of the

cleanup are discussed in Impact Assessment Inc. [IAI] (1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1990d; see also IAI 1998). 

 

2 Oil impact categories were as follows: heavy or wide = a band greater than six meters in width and greater than 50 percent oil 

cover; medium = a band greater than six meters in width and less than 50 percent oil cover, or a band three to six meters in width 

and greater than 10 percent oil cover; light or narrow = a band less than three meters in width and less than 10 percent oil cover; 

and very light = less than 10 percent oil cover regardless of width (Dewhurst et al. 1990:11).
153

Table VI-1. Oil Spill Employment Characteristics of 15 Alaska Native Communities, 1989

Characteristics Chenega Port Larsen Old Port Chignik Chignik Chignik Ivanof PerryBay Tatitlek Nanwalek Graham Akhiok Karluk Bay Harbor Ouzinkie Lions Bay Lagoon Lake Bay ville

ADULTS

Total 44 68 84 114 27 38 86 174 146 141 72 28 64 19 73

Employed Adults 39 55 70 95 21 30 75 124 122 106 59 21 47 13 51

Employed in Oil Spill (OS) Jobs

Number of Adults 26 34 62 71 13 22 56 45 87 61 8 2 1 1 17

% of All Adults 57.9% 50.9% 73.5% 62.2% 47.6% 58.1% 65.3% 25.6% 59.5% 43.4% 10.8% 7.1% 2.1% 5.3% 23.4%

% of Employed Adults 66.7% 62.8% 89.3% 74.7% 62.5% 72.0% 75.4% 35.9% 71.0% 57.9% 13.2% 9.5% 2.9% 7.7% 34.1%

Number of Oil Spill Jobs 30 43 78 81 13 23 61 45 89 71 8 2 1 1 18

Percentage of All Jobs 40.0% 48.6% 70.8% 58.2% 35.7% 41.3% 44.2% 22.3% 39.8% 32.5% 7.7% 5.3% 1.4% 4.3% 21.9%

HOUSEHOLDS (HHs)

Total Number of HHs 21 28 41 61 13 17 39 93 69 67 39 15 28 7 31

Number of Employed HHs 21 28 40 56 13 17 36 85 61 52 39 15 25 7 26

Number with OS Employment 16 22 39 44 12 13 31 37 51 39 8 2 1 1 13

% of All HHs 77.8% 77.3% 93.94 72.92 90.0% 78.6% 79.4% 39.6% 74.3% 58.3% 20.0% 13.3% 4.8% 14.3% 40.7%

% of Employed HHs 77.8% 77.3% 96.88 79.55 90.0% 78.6% 87.1% 43.2% 83.9% 75.0% 20.0% 13.3% 5.3% 14.3% 47.8%

INCOME

% of All Income from 

 OS Employment 61.7% 44.1% 67.5% 59.5% 33.0% 40.5% 52.4% 21.2% 50.4% 34.7% 7.9% 8.3% 0.1% 1.5% 17.9%

% of Earned Income

 from OS Employment 66.7% 60.7% 79.2% 70.5% 49.9% 57.2% 67.9% 40.9% 64.1% 48.5% 9.9% 9.5% 0.2% 1.9% 22.7%

Income from OS Employment

Average Household $47,453 $31,265 $31,414 $20,931 $15,413 $14,057 $23,849 $8,936 $25,479 $19,167 $3,106 $6,000 $52 $571 $10,317

Per Capita $13,558 $7,906 $8,228 $7,911 $3,584 $3,280 $7,113 $2,979 $8,034 $6,571 $1,007 $2,195 $13 $125 $2,758

Source: Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Subsistence, Household Survey, 1990.

Kodiak Island Borough Subregion Alaska Peninsula Subregion

Prince William 

Sound Subregion

Lower Cook Inlet 

Subregion
154

Table VI-2. Oil Spill Employment Characteristics of 15 Alaska Native Communities by Subregion, 1989

Characteristics

Prince William 

Sound

Lower Cook 

Inlet

Kodiak Island 

Borough

Alaska 

Peninsula All Subregions

ADULTS

Total 112 199 613 257 1,180

Employed Adults 93 165 478 190 926

Employed in Oil Spill (OS) Jobs

Number of Adults 60 133 284 29 507

% of All Adults 53.8% 67.0% 46.3% 11.4% 42.9%

% of Employed Adults 64.5% 80.8% 59.4% 15.4% 54.7%

Number of Oil Spill Jobs 74 160 301 31 565

Percentage of All Jobs 44.6% 63.7% 34.6% 9.0% 34.7%

HOUSEHOLDS (HHs)

Total Number of HHs 49 102 298 120 569

Number of Employed HHs 49 96 264 113 521

Number with OS Employment 38 83 183 25 329

% of All HHs 77.3% 81.4% 61.5% 20.6% 57.8%

% of Employed HHs 77.3% 86.7% 69.4% 22.0% 63.1%

INCOME

% of All Income from 

 OS Employment 52.0% 63.3% 37.3% 9.4% 37.3%

% of Earned Income

 from OS Employment 63.7% 74.6% 54.5% 11.9% 49.8%

Income from Oil Spill Employment

Average Household $38,203 $25,145 $17,593 $4,470 $17,954

Per Capita $10,161 $8,067 $5,503 $1,273 $5,445

Source: Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Subsistence, Household Survey, 1990.

Subregions
155

City officials at Chignik Bay organized early oil spill response efforts in the Chignik area, but by May,

VECO, an oil field service company, had assumed responsibility for the program (Impact Assessment Inc. 

1990c:111-113). Six fishing vessels were chartered by Exxon as "test boats" used by ADF&G

Commercial Fisheries Division for monitoring the Chignik Management Area for oil impacts (Barrett and

Monkiewicz 1989:1,15). Four of these boats were from Chignik and the other two were from Kodiak, but 

none belonged to a year-round resident of the Chignik area.

Cleanup efforts along the Alaska Peninsula began in May of 1989, reached full-scale by mid July, 

and continued until September. Exxon/VECO chartered approximately 12 vessels from Chignik, five of

which belonged to full-time residents of the area. Local residents were hired as beach cleanup workers

(Aklin 1990; Anderson 1990). In addition, the National Park Service operated its own Exxon-funded 

cleanup program that focused on national park lands to the northeast of the study communities. Over

95,000 bags of oil-soaked debris were removed from national park lands on the Alaska Peninsula. About 

8,400 dead birds were counted in these same areas (Hanable 1990:82).

The first year of cleanup ended on September 15, 1989. At that time, the State of Alaska

concluded that spill response was not complete: 

There is still oil on the water and on beaches, and it is moving into new areas every day. 

Moreover, most of the 200 miles of heavily oiled shoreline in Prince William Sound has

substantial amounts of oil still deep in the sand and gravel. It continues to leech to the

surface and bleed into the water . . . The job [of cleaning up the spill] is not over (State of 

Alaska 1989:19).

In total, about 1,244 miles of shoreline had been contaminated by the spill, including 311 miles in 

Prince William Sound, 100 miles on the Kenai Peninsula, and over 833 miles on the Kodiak Island

archipelago and Alaska Peninsula.3 In Prince William Sound, 199 miles of shoreline had been "treated"

during the first year's cleanup efforts, but even these were not necessarily "clean" or "environmentally

stable." In 1989, of the 258,000 barrels of oil that had been spilled, 32,500 barrels had been recovered,

77,100 had evaporated, and 114,000 barrels remained in Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska

(State of Alaska 1989:25; EVOSTC 1992:2).

From March through May 1990, several residents of the Perryville and Chignik area villages were 

involved in a winter beach cleanup effort. This state-funded monitoring program was set up for local

residents to locate and clean up oil on the beaches and to assist the state in determining if it would be

safe to open up the local fishing grounds for the summer of 1990 commercial fisheries. Early in the winter 

cleanup, local crews had gathered numerous 30-gallon garbage bags full of tar balls found on the region's 

beaches including those on the Pacific side near Perryville (Hulen 1990).

 

3 These estimates from the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) represent "actual oiled miles." 

Discrepancies exist between these estimates and others provided by ADEC, Exxon, and the U.S Coast Guard, because other

estimates report the total length of oiled shoreline "segments," portions of which were unoiled (State of Alaska 1989:25). For

example, the Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Team (SCAT) Survey in September 1989 identified 3,245.1 miles of oiled shoreline, 

including 789.6 miles in Prince William Sound and 2,455.5 miles in "western Alaska" (the remainder of the spill area) (U.S. Coast

Guard 1993:125).
156

Although Exxon did not initially commit to a second year of cleanup activities, a scaled down

version did take place in 1990, concentrating on more site-specific goals. The 1991 effort was even more 

limited, with almost all work taking place in Prince William Sound. State and federal officials declared the 

cleanup complete on June 12, 1992, although they acknowledged that oiled beaches remained. The

continued presence of oil in the western sound, including oiled mussel beds, was an important issue for

the residents of Chenega Bay. They linked their concerns about subsistence foods safety to this

continued presence of oil. In 1994, using EVOS Trustee Council funds (see below), scientists and

residents of Chenega Bay removed and replaced contaminated sediments beneath 12 oiled mussel beds 

(EVOSTC 1996b:6). The Trustee Council also authorized spending up to $1.9 million in 1997 to remove

surface and subsurface oil from the southwest sound near Chenega Bay.

From April 26 to August 13, 1990, one year after the Chignik area beaches were first impacted by

oil, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service conducted shoreline assessments along the Alaska Peninsula,

including the Chignik area. The objective of the survey was to determine the extent of oil on refuge

coastlines, and its impacts on wildlife and habitat (Dewhurst et al. 1990:1). The largest remaining

quantities of oil were observed in the Becharof Refuge, north of the areas used by the study communities 

for subsistence harvests. Under one percent of the shoreline of the Ugashik Unit of the Alaska Peninsula 

refuge was classified as having "very light impacts," with the remaining 99 percent classified as having no 

observable shoreline oil. Shoreline oil observed along the Chignik Unit of this refuge, where most

subsistence harvests occur, was also classified as having less than one percent of very light impact

coverage, but infrequent patches of oil were still noted throughout the area as far south as Ivanof Bay

(Dewhurst et al. 1990:12,14). The assessment also documented various kinds of oil films and sheens 

throughout the study area, but the study could not show that these were related to the Exxon Valdez oil

spill (Dewhurst et al. 1990:17). Exxon's cleanup and treatment activities in 1990 did not occur south of

Puale Bay (Dewhurst et al. 1990:28).

Local residents continued to provide new reports of the presence of oil contaminants into 1991. 

For example, in March of 1991, two years after the oil spill, Ivanof Bay residents reported finding pools of 

oil along Humpback Bay, the nearest bay east of their village (Holmes 1991). Humpback Bay is used by

Ivanof Bay and Perryville residents as a primary shellfish collecting and marine mammal hunting area

when weather allows for travel. Ivanof Bay residents were concerned that oil floating in the ocean was

being carried by winter storms to these beaches, and oiling or re-oiling them. These effects of the spill

continued to concern some local residents two years after the event.
157

ASSESSMENTS OF NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES

Contrasting Assessments of Environmental Injury

Once released into the marine environment, crude oil is subject to a variety of weathering

processes, such as evaporation and the actions of wind, waves, and bacteria, which affect the toxicity of

the oil. A common form of partially weathered oil is mousse, an emulsion of water and oil that may

eventually form thick layers on the water's surface or wash on shore to coat beaches and organisms. Oil 

may adhere to suspended particles in the water and sink. It may also solidify into tarballs or asphalt 

(Steiner and Byers 1990:14; Lord 1992:12-14).

Certain wildlife populations were severely impacted by the spill by direct contact with the oil. 

According to a summary of some of the findings of scientific studies of the spill's effects on fish and

wildlife, about 3,500 - 5,500 sea otters, 200 harbor seals, and 375,000 - 435,000 birds (such as murres,

eagles, and sea ducks) died as a direct result of the spill (EVOSTC 1992:20-26). 

The immediate and long-term effects on other wildlife were less clear, however. For example,

sea lions swam near oiled areas, and some were observed with oiled pelts, but no sea lion deaths were

known to have been caused by the spill. Deer feeding on kelp on beaches in winter likely ingested oiled

kelp. However, intensive searches found no evidence of deer dying from ingestion of oil. Analysis of 38

deer found dead in winter habitat found that starvation was the cause of the mortality. A second beach

survey in the spring of 1990 also determined that the major source of deer mortality was starvation and

“obvious oil-related mortality was not observed” (Lewis 1993a:7). Black bears might also have been

exposed to oil when they fed on beach grasses or sedges, dug for clams, or scavenged for birds, but no

studies of possible injuries to black bear populations were conducted (ADF&G 1989a:28-30; EVOSTC

1992:19-30; Lewis 1993a).

Within a week of the grounding of the Exxon Valdez, planning began on scientific studies to

determine the spill’s long-term biological effects (ADF&G 1989a:10). Over 100 "Natural Resource

Damage Assessment Studies" (NRDA) were undertaken by government, university, and private-sector 

researchers. These were coordinated through the EVOS Trustee Council, with representation from three 

state and three federal agencies (Fraker 1993). Because of the litigation-sensitive nature of the studies,

their findings were deemed confidential and results were not immediately available to the public (Gertler

1992). Some preliminary results were first released by the federal government in March 1991 (USFWS 

1991). The Trustee Council in its Oil Spill Restoration Framework and 1992 Draft Work Plan included a

more complete summary of damage assessment study findings in April 1992. In early 1993, the Alaska

Department of Fish and Game published overviews of some of the scientific studies and their findings in

its magazine, Alaska's Wildlife (ADF&G 1993). In February 1993, the Trustee Council, the University of

Alaska Sea Grant College Program, and the Alaska Chapter of the American Fisheries Society sponsored 

a four-day Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Symposium in Anchorage during which the results of many of the

damage assessment projects were presented and discussed (EVOSTC 1993a, 1994; Rice et al. 1996). 
158

The Exxon Corporation also conducted damage assessment studies. As with the governmentfunded projects, these were considered “litigation sensitive.” There was no coordination of the

government and Exxon studies, and the results of the Exxon-funded research were not available for public 

review until 1993. Exxon scientists and contractors chose not to present their findings along with the

government and other scientists in the Oil Spill Symposium in Anchorage in February 1993. Instead, the

results of the Exxon studies were presented in April 1993 in Atlanta, Georgia, at the meeting of the

American Society of Testing and Materials (Wells et al. 1995). For a critical review and comparison of the 

government-sponsored and Exxon-funded damage assessment studies, see Ott (1994).

No consensus has emerged regarding the extent and nature of the injuries to the natural

environment caused by the EVOS, and many important studies were never funded or finalized. The

original NRDA studies sponsored by the state and federal governments following EVOS focused on

gathering information that could assist in building the litigation against Exxon. For this reason, studies that 

did not show promise of proving damage at a population level were abandoned early on. Two examples

are shrimp and Dungeness crab, both of which were in decline in Prince William Sound before the oil spill. 

The Dungeness crab study never got off the ground, because researchers were not able to find enough

individuals to allow them to draw any meaningful conclusions. Some species important to subsistence

were not studied, because it was thought it would be difficult to assign a dollar value to any injuries. For

example, while subsistence users reported a near total absence of octopus in the intertidal areas of Prince 

William Sound, there was no NRDA study of octopus. Observations of subsistence harvesters eventually

led the EVOS Trustee Council to fund such a study in 1995. Some species that were probably injured

have never been studied for oil spill effects. The most notable of these is the Dall porpoise. Subsistence 

users, commercial fishermen and recreation/tourism industry workers have all reported sharply reduced

sightings of Dall porpoise since the spill.

While there have been a wide range of opinions expressed about the effects of the oil spill on

natural resources and the state of recovery, most fall into one of the following four general points of view.

1) The State and Federal Governments as Represented by the EVOS Trustee Council

According to the Trustee Council, the ecosystem was damaged by the oil spill, and is recovering

slowly. The goal of restoration is to help return the system to its precise pre-spill state. These

efforts are hampered by lack of a pre-spill baseline for many species. In lieu of this, comparisons

are made between oiled and unoiled areas, using the unoiled areas as a model for pre-spill 

conditions. (See below for more discussion of the Restoration Process and see Wiens [1996] and

Holloway [1996] for critical reviews of the EVOS Trustee Council science program.)
159

2) Industry, as Represented by Exxon

From this viewpoint, the oil did no real damage, and may even have provided additional food to the 

ecosystem. Exxon contends that the observed declines are natural fluctuations in resource

populations. Exxon studies found no declines in resource species. It has been alleged that Exxon 

researchers focused on the prime habitat areas for the species it studied, thereby skewing results. 

One report to Exxon shareholders proudly proclaimed that a study had found "none of the species 

normally present were missing" (Matthews 1990:7). Exxon asserts that crude oil is a “natural

product,” and was present in Prince William Sound (through natural seeps) before the spill. For a

critique of Exxon’s studies and conclusions, see Ott (1994).

3) An Environmentalist Perspective, Expressed in Wheelwright, "Degrees of Disaster” (1994)

According to Wheelwright’s argument, the ecosystem was changed by the spill, but change is not

necessarily “injury” or “damage,” nor is it necessarily “bad.” Prince William Sound probably will not 

return to the precise state it was in prior to the spill, nor should that be a goal for postspill

restoration. Instead, the ecosystem itself will find a new equilibrium. The ecosystem is resilient and 

will come back from virtually anything humans do to it. It will change, but it will not be destroyed. 

Wheelwright also contends it would have been better to simply leave the oil alone and let nature

take its course. For a critique of Wheelwright’s arguments, see Green and Peterson (1994).

The view that for restoration it is best to let nature take its course is also embraced by

some environmental groups. While they portray the damage from the spill as nothing short of

catastrophic devastation, they agree that only nature can heal it, and humans should leave it alone. 

Given that any restorative action is at best futile, and at worst damaging, certain environmental

interests have opposed spending the settlement money on research or restoration. They see

habitat protection as the only worthwhile use for the money. For example, a representative of the

Alaska Center for the Environment wrote: 

The importance of habitat acquisition is clear. There is very little that we can do directly to 

“restore” the spill impacted ecosystem. Dr. Robert Spies, Chief Scientist for the Trustees, 

has publicly suggested that nature is doing the primary job of restoration. What we must 

do to facilitate the recovery of the environment, therefore, is protect the ecosystem from 

further negative impacts from activities such as logging and road building. . . Unless the

Trustees embark immediately on an aggressive campaign to use the $500 million [in

available civil settlement funds] primarily for acquisition of habitat on private parcels. . .

the opportunity to leave a grand and lasting legacy in the wake of this environmental

tragedy will be lost, and the Settlement will be a failure (Phipps 1992).

So far, habitat protection has meant either habitat acquisition -- mostly the purchase of Alaska

Native owned lands, which are then returned to state and federal government ownership and
160

management – or acquisition of easements and other development rights to these lands (see

below). 

4) Alaska Natives of the Spill Region, as Expressed by Respondents to ADF&G Social Effects 

Surveys and in Testimony to the EVOS Trustee Council

For many Alaska Natives, the spill caused profound changes to the environment, many of them

stark and clear. Many also suspected that the environment had changed in ways that cannot be

seen or detected in laboratory tests. This view of continuing injury had profound effects on the

outlook for the future that people expressed in a number of communities, and remained an

important long-term impact of the spill (see Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight). Consequently,

some Alaska Native subsistence users remained concerned over the possible long-term health

effects of using resources contaminated by oil. There was a loss of confidence on the part of

subsistence hunters and fishermen in their own abilities to determine if traditional foods were safe

to eat. Residents of a number of impacted communities expressed the fear that animals that came 

into contact with the oil were altered in ways not detected by western science. In addition, people

reported the scarcity of some resources, and observed abnormalities in resource species. There is 

a cultural proscription among the Alutiiq against the harvesting or eating of animals that appear sick 

or abnormal. In sum, a view persisted in the Prince William Sound communities, and to a lesser

extent in the other communities in the oil spill impact area, that the natural environment had

changed in ways that still posed a potential threat to their health and their way of life. 

The Official List of Injured Resources and Services

In its 1994 Restoration Plan, the EVOS Trustee Council classified injured natural resource

populations in four categories: recovered, recovering, not recovered, and recovery unknown (Table VI-3). 

The Plan also listed four “lost or reduced natural resource services,” including subsistence. The Trustee

Council periodically updates this list, taking into account the results of the restoration program.

In March 1999, ten years after the EVOS, the Trustee Council added river otters to the

“recovered” category (for a total of two recovered resources (Table VI-4). Upgraded from the “not

recovered category” to the “recovering” category were marbled murrlets, Pacific herring, and sea otters. 

Black oysercatchers and clams moved from “recovery unknown” to “recovering.” The common loon was

listed as “not recovering” rather than “recovery unknown.” Also in March 1999, all human services

(humans uses) were described as “recovering” but not fully recovered (EVOSTC 1999:10).
161

Table VI-3. Resources and Services Injured by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1996

Injured Resources Lost or 

Recovered Recovering Not Recovered Recovery Unknown Reduced Services

Bald eagle Archaeological resources Cormorants (3 species) Black oystercatcher Commercial fishing

Common murre Harbor seal Clams Passive uses

Intertidal communities Harlequin duck Common loon Recreation and Tourism

Mussels Killer whale (AB pod) Cutthroat trout (including sport fishing,

Pink Salmon Marbled murrelet Designated wilderness sport hunting, and other

Sediments Pacific herring areas recreational uses)

Sockeye salmon Pigeon guillemot Dolly Varden Subsistence

Subtidal communities Sea otter Kittlitz's murrelet

(in oiled w. PWS) River otter

Rockfish

Source: EVOSTC 1996a:23

Table VI-4. Resources and Services Injured by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1999

Injured Resources1Lost or 

Recovered Recovering Not Recovered Recovery Unknown Reduced Services2

Bald eagle Archaeological resources Common loon Cutthroat trout Commercial fishing

River otter Black oystercatcher Cormorants (3 species) Designated wilderness Passive uses

Clams Harbor seal areas Recreation and Tourism

Common murre Harlequin duck Dolly Varden (including sport fishing,

Intertidal communities Killer whale (AB pod) Kittlitz's murrelet sport hunting, and other

Marbled murrelet Pigeon guillemot Rockfish recreational uses)

Mussels Subsistence

Pacific herring

Pink Salmon

Sea otter

Sediments

Sockeye salmon

Subtidal communities

1

 Resources in bold indicates change in status

2

 Human services are considered "recovering" until the resources they depend on are fully recovered.

Source: EVOSTC 1999:13
162

MANAGEMENT RESPONSES TO THE OIL SPILL

Resource management agency responses to the oil spill are perceived by many to have added to 

the sense of injury, disruption, and uncertainty. Agency responses are very much part of the context that

informed public assessments of the immediate and lasting effects of the oil spill. 

Effects on Commercial Fisheries: Prince William Sound Finfish4

The first commercial fisheries to be affected by the Exxon Valdez oil spill were the spring herring 

fisheries of Prince William Sound. On April 3, the ADF&G announced that the PWS spring herring

seasons, including the spawn-on-kelp fishery, would not open. Among the factors taken into consideration 

were the oiling of major herring spawning areas such as the Naked Island group, Green Island, and

Montague Island. At the time, considerable oil remained in the sound, making additional impacts on these 

and other beaches likely. Schools of herring returning to other portions of PWS such as Valdez Arm and

Tatitlek Narrows were observed near the grounded tanker itself or near oil sheens. Evidence suggested

that exposure of herring, herring eggs, and herring larvae to crude oil could result in mortalities,

morphological abnormalities, and genetic defects (Rice et al. 1987, as cited in Brady et al. 1991:5). 

Consequently, "taking into account all the potential effects to Prince William Sound herring stocks, it was 

the conclusion of the Department [of Fish and Game] that a harvestable surplus could not be

demonstrated for any of the spring herring fisheries" (Brady et al. 1991:4-5).

In 1989, the other commercial fisheries in the Prince William Sound Management Area and other 

areas were conducted in accordance with a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between ADF&G and 

the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). The MOU was developed in collaboration

with fishermen and processors to reduce the likelihood of fishing gear and fish being fouled by oil and to

prevent oil-adulterated fish from being delivered to processors (Brady et al. 1991:6-7). In part, the MOU

(Brady et al. 1991:47-53) stated that:

A fishing area will remain closed if there is an indication of oil in any quantity in the area or 

the proximity of the area (including beaches), such that there is an appreciable likelihood 

that gear will be fouled, fish harvest adulterated, or such that the conduct of an orderly

fishery could not take place.

Consequently, ADF&G conducted test fisheries before allowing openings in each management district. 

DEC inspected catches from the test fisheries for signs of oil. If oil contamination of fish or gear was

 

4 For an overview of effects of the spill on commercial fisheries, see Piper (1993:99-106). See also the draft Exxon Valdez Oil

Spill Restoration Plan for a summary table depicting commercial fisheries closures in 1989 (EVOSTC 1993b:B-27 to B-29).
163

deemed likely to occur, these areas remained closed to commercial fishing. This procedure generally

became known as the “zero tolerance policy” (Piper 1993:99-106).

On June 14, a revised management outlook issued by ADF&G announced that, consistent with

the MOU, commercial salmon fishing in the Eshamy District (which had already been closed since May 19 

due to the presence of oil), the Southwestern District, and the Montague District would be closed for the

remainder of the 1989 season. Because of the major impacts to much of the shorelines in the latter two

areas, and the continued presence of oil, sheen, and tar balls in PWS, "it was determined that through the 

course of the 1989 season continued oiling presented an appreciable likelihood that gear will be fouled or 

the fish harvest adulterated if fisheries were conducted in the Southwestern and Montague Districts"

(Brady et al. 1991:7-8). 

A pre-fishery evaluation took place in the Copper River and Bering River districts, to the east of

the spill. Because these evaluations found that these districts were not impacted by oil, commercial

fisheries proceeded as normal (Brady et al. 1991:9-10).

As noted above, due to the presence of oil, the Eshamy District was closed to commercial salmon 

fishing on May 19, 1989. The only part of the district generally open to commercial fishing that remained

free of oil was a portion of Main Bay that was protected by oil booms to protect hatchery stocks. A limited 

commercial harvest of surplus chum salmon, utilizing a single purse seine, took place within this boomedoff area (Brady et al. 1991:17-18).

In the Coghill and Unakwik districts, test fisheries in mid-June detected no oil contamination. 

Subsequently, commercial openings for sockeye and chum salmon proceeded (Brady et al. 1991:15). 

Additional test fisheries conducted from June 15 to July 11 in the purse seine districts of Southeastern,

Eastern, Northern, Coghill, Northwestern, and outside waters of the Montague district found no evidence

of oil contamination. Commercial openings began in late June, although certain waters in the Northern

District were closed to prevent fishing near oiled beaches on Naked and Perry islands. However, on July

28 and July 29, the department investigated reports of oil sheens and contaminated fishing gear in the

Esther Subdistrict and at Payday Point in Unakwik Inlet. Consequently, on July 30, the open waters of the 

Unakwik Inlet were closed. An expanded seafood inspection program resulted for fisheries conducted in

the rest of PWS. Delays in deliveries occurred and "the overall atmosphere among the fishing fleet at this 

time was one of distrust and anger stemming from the uncertainties that the oil spill had forced onto their 

livelihoods" (Brady et al. 1991:24). Efforts were increased to monitor water quality and detect sheens and 

tar balls. A total of 12 field-announced openings took place in August as surveillance by ADF&G and DEC 

continued. Although numerous reports of sheens were received, these were largely bilge oil and diesel

from tenders and fishing boats. Generally, Unakwik Inlet, the Esther subdistrict, and the waters inbetween were open to commercial fishing during this period (Brady et al. 1991:25-27).

Due to the presence of oil spilled from the Exxon Valdez, commercial fishing for bottomfish and

smelt in the PWS Management Area was closed by emergency order on April 30, 1989. Bottomfish

includes any marine fish except halibut, osmerids, herring, and salmonids (5 AAC 39.975[21]). The
164

commercial sablefish (black cod) fishery in this area had been closed before its scheduled opening date of 

April 1 (ADF&G 1989b).

A statewide 24-hour halibut opening occurred on May 15, in Areas 2C, 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B,

including Prince William Sound. A longline survey found that the major halibut fishing grounds were free

of oil. Halibut caught and tested as part of this survey, including fish taken in PWS, were determined to be 

uncontaminated. Nevertheless, fishermen were urged to use caution due to the presence of patches of

oil. An intensive program to monitor the fishing areas and to inspect the catch was developed (U.S.

Department of Commerce 1989; Varanasi 1989). No problems with oil contamination were encountered

during this fishery (ADF&G 1989a:21). 

Effects on Commercial Fisheries: Cook Inlet Finfish

With the exception of one minor opening in Chinitna Bay, the Cook Inlet draft gillnet commercial

salmon fishery, the second-largest sockeye salmon fishery in Alaska after Bristol Bay, was closed in 1989 

due to the EVOS. As noted by the area biologist, “For the first time in thirty years, the Upper Cook Inlet

salmon fishery was conducted without the presence of a drift gill net fleet” (Ruesch 1990:3; see also

EVOSTC 1993a:B-28). As described by Piper (1993:102),

As oil streamed out of Prince William Sound and splattered the outer Kenai coast, tar balls,

debris, and weathered oil swung up with the prevailing currents and were sucked into the

tiderips of Cook Inlet. The oil was hard to locate and hard to track in the silty, swirling waters

whose tides flood to 25 to 30 feet, and whose currents run as fast as many rivers.

Mousse and other oiled debris tended to concentrate in the tidal rips, which are the most important harvest 

areas for the drift gillnet fleet. EVOS oil had much less impact on the Upper Cook Inlet set gillnet fishery, 

with a single period closure due to the presence of oil patties on the beach from Cohoe to Clam Gulch in 

July (Ruesch 1990:3).

There were numerous commercial finfish closures in the Lower Cook Inlet Management Area in

1989 due to the presence of oil. These included groundfish, smelt, herring, and pink salmon (Schroeder

and Morrison 1990; EVOSTC 1993a:B-28). The small fish processing plant in Port Graham, owned by the 

village Native corporation, shut down in 1989 because of these commercial closures (Piper 1993:102).
165

Effects on Commercial Fisheries: Kodiak Finfish

In the Kodiak Management Area, 34 of 56 management units were closed for the duration of the

1989 herring sac roe fishing season due to the presence of oil from the EVOS. Commercial salmon

fishing was almost entirely eliminated. Initially, the opening date was postponed from June 9 to June 19, 

but then only the setnet fishery in the Alitak District was opened. This fishery operated for 114 days. The 

only other commercial salmon opening in the Kodiak Area in 1989 was a two-day seine opening in Karluk 

Lagoon in mid-September (EVOSTC 1993b:B-29; Piper 1993:105). As noted by Piper (1993:105),

While Prince William Sound fisheries managers had to cope with an ocean of oil, in Kodiak the

problem was smaller in volume but almost more difficult to deal with. The oil came in large

slugs and isolated windrows; it hit some places hard while leaving other neighboring areas

alone; the concept of micromanaging fisheries cove by cove was therefore even tougher to

handle. Further, long distances, open ocean shorelines, and bad weather made any prospect of 

tight oil-fisheries management a logistical challenge and a question of safety.

Effects on Commercial Fisheries: Chignik Area Finfish

In accordance with the MOU with DEC, ADF&G developed an oil spill monitoring program for the

Chignik Management Area that operated between June 11 and September 22, 1989 (Barrett and

Monkiewicz 1989). In addition, ADEC staff maintained a fish inspection facility at Chignik Bay.

In the Chignik Management Area, the sockeye salmon commercial fishery opened on June 12, 

but in conformance with the MOU, portions of the management area remained closed because of oil

contaminated waters and beaches near Kilokak rocks, about 75 miles northeast of Chignik Bay. Further

observations of oil and sheen caused a closure of most of the management area except the western

portion of the Chignik Bay District. On June 26, mousse was observed within Chignik Bay. Consequently, 

the commercial fishery was closed. When opened again by emergency order on June 30, the commercial 

fishery was restricted to Chignik Lagoon. With the exception of Anchorage Bay, which was open to

commercial fishing for periods beginning on August 9, the remainder of the Chignik Bay District, as well as 

the other districts in the Chignik Management Area (Eastern, Central, Western, and Perryville) were

closed to commercial salmon fishing for the rest of 1989 "due to the close proximity of oil contaminated

waters or beaches" (Thompson and Fox 1990:7-11, 156-169). In the open areas, commercial fishing was 

restricted to hours of daylight only, rather than the usual 24 hour openings.

On June 26, ADF&G received a report from the Columbia Ward Fisheries (CWF) of a delivery of 

oil contaminated fish to a tender in Chignik Lagoon. ADF&G determined that the deck and net of a fishing 

vessel were contaminated "with a petroleum product" and there was "a very strong odor associated with

the contamination" (Thompson and Fox 1990:162). Both vessels were directed to report to the ADEC for 

inspection. After ADF&G detected a heavy sheen within the lagoon, the commercial period scheduled for 

July 27 was canceled. Although the lagoon was reopened on August 2, another emergency closure

occurred on August 5 when "oil contamination in the form of mousse" was detected within Chignik
166

Lagoon. According to the emergency order, "the presence of mousse in waters traditionally fished by local 

lagoon fishermen indicates that there is an appreciable likelihood of contaminating gear or product"

(Thompson and Fox 1990:163). Additional closures of scheduled fishing periods in the lagoon occurred in 

August. Openings occurred in early August "to prevent potentially damaging over-escapement levels of

sockeye salmon" (Thompson and Fox 1990:10). Again, on August 16, the fishery was closed when a

minimum of 30 fresh mousse patties were detected on the ocean spit (Thompson and Fox 1990:166). 

Commercial openings in the lagoon began again on August 19 and continued until the end of September

(Thompson and Fox 1990:11, 167-169).

Most of the pink and chum salmon in the Chignik Management Area are harvested in the Eastern, 

Central, Western, and Perryville districts. Because of oil contamination in these districts, they were closed 

in 1989 and consequently, commercial harvests of these species were extremely low (Thompson and Fox 

1990:13). Commercial fishing for coho salmon was also confined to the Chignik Bay District, which

generally produces the largest harvests of this species in the management area. Harvests of cohos were 

also below average in 1989 (Thompson and Fox 1990:15-16).

Overall, 1.26 million salmon were harvested in the Chignik Management Area in 1989, less than

one-half of the 1980-88 average of 2.85 million fish. For the most part, this was due to the curtailment of 

commercial chum and pink harvests due to the presence of oil. Consequently, the ex-vessel value of the 

1989 harvest was about 24 percent below the 1980-88 average (Thompson and Fox 1990:2-3).

Effects on Commercial Shellfish

Several commercial shellfish fisheries in Prince William Sound were closed or interrupted in 1989 

because of concerns about oil contamination due to the Exxon Valdez spill. These included brown king

crab, pot shrimp (on April 3), and trawl shrimp. The commercial Dungeness crab fishery in the Northern

District was also closed due to the presence of oil (Donaldson 1990:7,16,26,34). In addition, the ADF&G 

issued a news release stating that no permits for commercial fishing of miscellaneous shellfish would be

issued "until the oil danger has passed and fishing for these species is justified" (ADF&G 1989c). In

Lower Cook Inlet, there were closures to the shrimp and miscellaneous shellfish fisheries (EVOSTC

1993b:B-28).

Effects on Subsistence Fisheries

In the PWS Management Area, regulations in effect in 1989 allowed the taking of herring spawn

on kelp for subsistence purposes only during the open commercial herring spawn on kelp season (5 AAC 

01.610[d]). As noted above, the commercial season was closed in 1989 due to oil spill concerns. 

Consequently, the subsistence fishery remained closed as well.

On May 9, 1989, ADF&G received two requests for emergency regulatory changes to the

subsistence salmon fishing regulations of PWS. The first, from The North Pacific Rim, the regional Native 
167

non-profit organization, asked that several portions of the Southwestern District that had been boomed off 

or were otherwise free of oiling be opened to subsistence fishing. These areas, including Jack Pot Bay

and Eshamy Bay, were normally closed to commercial and subsistence fishing to protect milling salmon. 

Second, the letter asked that villagers from Tatitlek be allowed to fish with 150 fathoms of gill net gear in

the Copper River Flats District to allow efficient harvesting of salmon in an area unaffected by the spill

(Vining 1989). Normally, subsistence gear was limited to 50 fathoms in this area and seasonal limits were 

only 15 fish for a one-person household and 30 fish for a two-person household, with 10 fish for each

additional household member (5 AAC 01.645[b]; Stratton 1992:49). The village of Tatitlek also asked that 

the Copper River Flats be open to special regulations because, 

Normally, Tatitlek residents harvest red, pink and dog salmon off of the tip of Bligh Island. 

However, now that this area is contaminated with oil, we desperately need an alternative

option (Kompkoff 1989a).

In response, ADF&G took two emergency actions. The first, an emergency order (ADF&G

1989d), opened Eshamy Lagoon, Jackpot Bay Lagoon, Sawmill Bay, and Crab Bay to subsistence salmon 

fishing as of June 6. At the same time, the remainder of the Southwest District and Green Island were

closed to subsistence fishing through September 30 "due to oiling of beaches, the risk of harvesting

adulterated subsistence fish, and possible gear fouling." Citing substantial oiling of the beaches in the

areas normally fished by residents of Chenega Bay, the emergency order stated that,

Conduct of normal subsistence salmon harvests in waters adjacent to oiled beaches, or

with oil on the surface is likely to result in adulterated product. . . The oiling of beaches in 

the Southwest District and Green Island have resulted in a loss of subsistence fishing

opportunities in the traditional subsistence fishing areas and the opening of alternative

harvest areas is justified. The alternative areas opened to harvest, namely Eshamy

Lagoon, Jackpot Bay lagoon, and Sawmill and Crab Bays have not been oiled and are

safe for the taking of salmon for subsistence use (ADF&G 1989d).

The second emergency action involved a finding of emergency and adoption of an emergency

regulation (ADF&G 1989e). These enabled residents of Tatitlek and Ellamar to use nets up to 150

fathoms in length in the Copper River District and to pool their household seasonal limits. In part, the

justification for this finding of emergency stated that,

Normal subsistence activities by the communities of Tatitlek and Ellamar in Prince William 

Sound have been seriously disrupted since the Exxon Valdez oil spill. For the last two

months, residents have foregone harvest of most of their usual subsistence foods,

including herring, herring spawn on kelp, clams, halibut, and seals due to their concerns

about possible oil contamination of these resources (ADF&G 1989e).

There were no subsistence fishing regulatory actions in the other management areas. ADF&G

considered a subsistence fishery closure for the Kodiak Management Area. However, managers rejected 

this action for several reasons. First, because of the patchy nature of the presence of EVOS oil around 

the Kodiak Archipelago, subsistence fishermen had the flexibility to shift their harvest efforts to clean
168

areas. Second, subsistence fishermen were generally using smaller gear than is involved in the

commercial fishery, allowing for more control and monitoring should oil be encountered. Third, it was

known that some people were subsistence fishing and it was felt that this opportunity should not be taken 

away from those who chose to take advantage of it.

Effects on Hunting Opportunities

In 1989, no state hunting seasons were modified as a consequence of the oil spill,5 although

resource managers and resource users raised concerns about some wildlife populations. As stated

above, deer are known to feed on kelp from beaches, and subsistence hunters raised concerns about the 

possibility that the meat might become contaminated as a consequence. There was also concern on the

part of resource managers about mortality to the deer themselves from contact with the oil. 

Sitka black-tailed deer in the area traditionally winter on the forest beach fringe and are

likely to ingest oiled kelp. It is known from studies of domestic cattle that cattle will ingest 

oil-contaminated food and die from toxic effects (ADF&G 1989a:30).

On July 27, the ADF&G issued a news bulletin that announced that deer seasons would open as 

normal in GMU 6 (Prince William Sound) on August 1. Quoting the state epidemiologist, the

announcement stated, "Human health risks related to the oil spill from ingesting deer meat are

negligible."6 The announcement also noted that deep snow and high deer populations had caused

significant winter deer mortality, and added, "People may choose to avoid hunting in the most heavily oiled 

areas of the spill." Named specifically were Naked, Knight, Eleanor, Ingot, Disc, Latouche, Elrington, and 

Evans islands (ADF&G 1989f). These were the major hunting areas of the people of Chenega Bay

(Stratton and Chisum 1986:79) and some (such as Naked and Eleanor islands) were used by Tatitlek

hunters as well (ADF&G 1990a).

In one of the first publications on the oil spill and its potential impacts, the ADF&G (1989a)

expressed similar concerns about oil-induced mortalities and contamination regarding bears.

Black bear in the Prince William Sound area and the Kenai Peninsula and brown bear on 

the Alaska Peninsula are opportunistic feeders. When they emerge from winter denning, 

they will eat beach grasses and sedge, which might be contaminated with oil. They will

also dig for clams in the intertidal area and will scavenge for birds. Canadian studies

have shown that the toxic effects of crude oil can kill polar bears (ADF&G 1989a:30).

 

5 In August, 1991, the ADF&G, by emergency order, delayed the opening of the harlequin duck season in GMU 6 (Prince William 

Sound) for one month (opening October 1 instead of September 1). Reasons for the postponement included a significant failure of 

harlequin ducks of the western sound to reproduce, a marked reduction in harlequin duck numbers compared to historic levels, and 

the poor body condition of harlequins which had wintered in the western sound (ADF&G 1991a). Potential causes of the

reproductive failure included oil exposure from contaminated intertidal foods such as blue mussels, and human disturbance during 

oil spill cleanup activities (Patten 1993:153).

6 It should be noted that no specific information about deer harvested in the oil spill area and possible contamination was available 

in the summer of 1989. As discussed below, the first results of tests on deer muscle and liver samples for oil contamination were 

not released until June 1990. 
169

On April 24, 1989, the ADF&G issued a "Prince William Sound Black Bear Hunter Advisory"

(ADF&G 1989g). The bulletin suggested that black bear hunters might consider hunting areas other than 

western PWS, in part because the large numbers of people and activities connected with the oil spill

cleanup "will make bear hunting less enjoyable and much more difficult." Another reason cited by the

ADF&G for not hunting bears in this part of PWS was that "there is a concern that black bears will ingest

oil, harming themselves or affecting the palatability of the bear meat."7 The advisory stated that biologists 

would investigate the effects of the oil on bears, including "whether their meat will be tainted" and

communicate the findings to the public when they became available. However, as noted above, no

studies of the effects of the spill on black bears were done.8

SUBSISTENCE FOOD CONTAMINATION AND FOOD SAFETY9

The residents of Tatitlek, the community closest to Bligh Reef, first learned about the Exxon 

Valdez oil spill on the morning of March 24 during a network newscast from New York City (Alaska Oil

Spill Commission 1990:70). The next day, they were startled to see clouds of dark smoke rising from the 

other side of Bligh Island, the result of a test burn about which they had not been informed (Davidson

1990:283). For the people of Tatitlek, one of the first signs that something terrible and extremely

unsettling might be happening to the fish and wildlife of Prince William Sound as a result of the spill was a 

report of a dead starfish that washed up on the beach near the village. Starfish are not eaten, but they,

like other creatures, may act as signs of unseen danger. At Chenega Bay in June 1989, elders observed 

gray cod pooling up in shallow water at the boat harbor. The only other time they could recall such odd

behavior was on Good Friday, 1964, the day a tidal wave destroyed their village and killed one-third of its 

population. This, too, they believed, was a sign of danger. As the effects of the spill spread, reports and 

sightings of dead and dying birds, sea otters, and other wildlife were commonplace. As the residents of

the villages in the path of the oil traveled to traditional harvest areas or worked on the spill cleanup, they

witnessed these damages first-hand. This led to many uncertainties and questions about the effects of

the oil.

As noted above, the effects of the spill were discontinuous; some beaches were heavily oiled,

others were not. Some animals, such as sea otters and sea ducks, were very vulnerable to oiling. On the 

other hand, salmon and deer showed no outer signs of exposure to oil. They did not appear to be dying, 

but were they safe to use? Were there linkages between the injuries that villagers observed and what

 

7 It is important to note that subsistence hunters from Chenega Bay and Tatitlek did not have any practical alternatives to hunting 

in the sound, because of economic and cultural reasons.

8 Studies of coastal brown bears from the Katmai National Park (Alaska Peninsula) found evidence of the death of one yearling

from ingesting oil; of a sample of 27 bears, four (15 percent) showed elevated hydrocarbon levels in their blood or bile. The study 

concluded that exposure to oil was not great in this population and survival of bears was not greatly affected by the spill (Lewis

1993b:8-9).

9 An earlier version of much of this section appeared in Fall (1991b). The subsistence foods testing program is also discussed by 

Walker and Field (1991), Fall (1993), and Fall and Field (1996). The most comprehensive review appears in Field et al (1999).
170

they could not see? Further, if resources had been only moderately contaminated, what might be the

long-term health effects for those people who use large quantities of such foods?

Thus, the major questions that subsistence harvesters raised following the spill became: Are

subsistence foods harvested in the oil spill area safe to eat? If some beaches, waters, and animals were 

oiled and clearly inedible, were any safe to use? If there were no immediate effects of eating resources

with very low levels of contamination, what might the health risks be for communities that use very large

quantities of these foods every year? As a Chenega Bay resident explained in April 1990, 

We saw too much oil, and we didn't want nothing to do with [fish]. I guess if you didn't see the oil 

you wouldn't mind. We don't want to eat them until we find out what's really going on. 

Another person from this village succinctly stated the general concern by saying, “It feels like the

environment is unclean right now.”

When the people in Tatitlek first raised the subsistence food safety issue, the DEC responded that 

the best way to know if foods are free from oil is to smell and taste them. This "organoleptic" test is the

primary method used by DEC's laboratory in Palmer for checking the quality of commercial seafoods. A

health bulletin issued by the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services on May 5, 1989 (ADHSS

1989a) contained similar advice. In part, the message read as follows:

Great concern exists about the potential impact of the oil upon fish and other seafood. 

The best tests available at this time are the smell and taste of the fish. If the fish smell or 

taste of petroleum, they should not be eaten. If they don't, it is almost certainly safe to

eat. It is probable that living clams, mussels, and shellfish from intertidal areas are also

safe, if the same standards are applied. . . We are unable to provide absolute

assurances at this time and are working to have better information as our highest priority.

Residents of the villages responded to this advice with skepticism and disbelief. It contradicted what they

were seeing -- animals dying after exposure to oil in their traditional subsistence use areas. Subsistence

harvests in Tatitlek, Chenega Bay, Nanwalek (English Bay), Port Graham and Ouzinkie, virtually came to

an end soon after the spill. And in every Alaska Native village as far as Perryville and Ivanof Bay, 500

miles away on the Alaska Peninsula, people noticed unusual behaviors in animals10 or suspect conditions 

in some subsistence foods. Clearly, the oil spill had created conditions that were unfamiliar to the hunters 

and fishermen of these villages. They questioned their skills at understanding their environment and

making informed decisions. Consequently, in many cases villagers discarded traditional foods or

refrained from harvesting entirely for fear that the resources had been poisoned.

 

10 For example, hunters in Prince William Sound in 1989 noted unusual behaviors in harbor seals, such as certain animals not

attempting to escape when hunted. The seals appeared sick and lethargic. It was later revealed (in 1991) that scientific studies

found "debilitating lesions" in the brain tissues of many oiled harbor seals. As a result of exposure to aromatic hydrocarbons, nerve 

axons had swelled and degenerated, interfering with nerve transmissions. Such brain damage made it difficult for seals to perform 

such everyday behaviors as swimming, diving, feeding, and fleeing predators (including people). The researchers concluded that

this "explains the unusual behavior of seals immediately after the spill. . . ." (Lowry and Frost 1993:20).
171

When the subsistence harvests stopped, pleas for assistance began. Spring is a particularly

critical time for subsistence harvests in Tatitlek and Chenega Bay. Supplies of foods prepared the year

before become scarce, and cash is in short supply. Normally, harvests of herring spawn on kelp, birds,

marine mammals, and fish replenish stores of food in April. But normal harvests did not occur in 1989

and a potential shortage of subsistence foods was at hand. For example, Tatitlek contacted Alaska Native 

groups in Southeast Alaska. They said that because of concerns about the safety of subsistence

resources and disruptions in normal work patterns caused by the spill, subsistence foods were in short

supply. In the message, the village leaders (Tatitlek 1989) wrote:

We have dead starfish, mussels, and shellfish under our community dock in the same

vicinity as the herring spawn is taking place. . . Please help us. . . We need seal, sea

lion, octopus, herring (spawn and roe), halibut, cockles, clams, bidarka [chitons], ducks,

red snapper, shrimp, crab, and deer.

Subsequently, in programs in part facilitated by Exxon, supplies of subsistence foods were shipped to both 

villages from several other Alaska Native communities (see below).

The villages were not alone in raising questions about the immediate and long-term health effects 

of using subsistence foods from the oil spill area. During a conference call organized by the federal

Centers for Disease Control on April 11, 1989, the Indian Health Service raised various health-related 

issues. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 

the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, and the Alaska Department of Health and

Social Services participated in the discussion. The summary of this conference on "Food Safety/Health

Effects" of the oil spill (Centers for Disease Control 1989) stated that:

The Alaskan Oil Spill has the potential for causing acute and chronic health effects. 

Potential human health impacts include those associated with exposure to contaminants

through the food chain, stress associated with loss of lifestyle, and possible economic

impact, and hazards associated with cleanup operations.

Regarding food safety, this group identified several issues, including:

Potential bioaccumulation of oil contaminants in food sources consumed by humans,

particularly subsistence populations, and possible short- and long-term affects (sic) of

these contaminants. . . [And the] need for a determination of when harvesting of seafood 

can safely be resumed.

The group recommended the development of a "system involving both organoleptic and chemical

analytical testing to ensure food safety."

Little specific information was readily available to respond to any of these questions. A literature

search conducted by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (the chief scientific

advisors to the U.S. Coast Guard's federal on-scene coordinator during the spill response), found that "no 

information base has been developed on human health effects resulting from the consumption of oil-
172

contaminated seafood" (Walker and Field 1991:443). A major summary of data on oil spills by the

National Research Council in 1985 (quoted in Walker and Field 1991:443) concluded that: 

At present, there is no demonstrated relationship that chronic exposures through eating

petroleum-derived PAH (polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons) contaminated seafood are

related to the incidence of cancer or other diseases in humans.

However, the summary went on to qualify this statement as follows:

Exceptions to these conclusions may arise in localized areas, as in the case of isolated

fishing villages where seafood constitutes a major portion of the annual diet. No data are 

available, however, for these cases.

Of course, communities such as Tatitlek and Chenega Bay (and the other Alaska Native communities of

the spill area), whose residents consume hundreds of pounds of marine resources annually, are clearly

examples of such villages where, at the time of the oil spill, the long-term health effects of eating oilcontaminated food were unknown, according to the best information available.

Subsequently, the primary response to the issue of subsistence foods contamination was directed 

by the federal Indian Health Service (IHS), which formed an "Oil Spill Health Task Force" (OSHTF)

(Nighswander 1999). This ad hoc group began meeting biweekly at the Alaska Native Medical Center in

Anchorage within a month of the spill. In addition to IHS, regular participants in the OSHTF included the

Division of Subsistence of ADF&G, the ADHSS, DEC, NOAA, Exxon, and two regional Native service

organizations, the North Pacific Rim11 for the Chugach villages ("the Rim") and the Kodiak Area Native

Association (KANA). The OSHTF coordinated and reviewed research on subsistence foods safety,

developed a consensus on health issues, and communicated the findings of the studies to the villages.

In 1989, two studies of fish and shellfish were designed to address the question of subsistence

food safety after the oil spill (Field 1999). The first to get underway was a "pilot study" developed by the

Division of Subsistence. The field portion of this project took place in May 1989. The second was funded 

by Exxon and took place under the terms of an MOU with NOAA from July to September 1989. In both

projects, samples of fish and marine invertebrates were taken from important subsistence harvest areas

after consultation with village experts and Native organizations. In combination, the studies covered sites 

in Prince William Sound, Lower Cook Inlet, and the Kodiak Island area. Sampling sites were selected

primarily because of their value as subsistence harvest areas, and no attempt was made to chose a

representative sample of oiled and unoiled locations. Village assistants were usually part of the sampling 

crews. Division researchers and NOAA personnel also participated in the Exxon-funded project.

The samples were tested for signs of oil contamination. The tests were designed to measure

levels of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in the bile and edible tissues of the samples. PAHs are 

among the toxic components of petroleum and some are known carcinogens. The FDA performed the

 

11 This organization adopted a new name, "Chugachmiut," in 1992.
173

tests for the pilot study, and NOAA's Northwest Fisheries Center analyzed samples from the Exxonfunded project.

No results were available from these projects until late August 1989, when the FDA's findings

from the pilot study were released (USFDA 1989, OSHTF 1989a, ADHSS 1989b,c). The FDA found that 

10 "organoleptically clean" samples of fish and shellfish had no PAHs or very low levels as measured in

parts per billion. According to the FDA, eating foods containing PAHs at those levels did not represent a

health risk. But two samples of shellfish taken at Windy Bay, a heavily oiled site at the southwestern tip of 

the Kenai Peninsula used by the villages of Port Graham and Nanwalek and deemed oiled by local

assistants in the field, had higher PAH values than usually found in areas not contaminated by oil. 

Insufficient tissue from these samples was available to perform the more detailed tests required for a

health risk assessment.

As part of the second study, the Northwest Fisheries Center conducted 365 tests to measure the

levels of PAHs in the bile and edible tissues of the samples (Varanasi et al. 1990, Brown et al. 1999, Hom 

et al. 1999). These tests were highly sensitive, measuring PAH levels down to less than one part per

billion. The results of the first round of tests were available by late August, shortly after the results of the

division's pilot study. At the request of the state epidemiologist, NOAA then assembled an "expert panel

of toxicologists" which met in Seattle on September 14 to review the findings (OSHTF 1989b; ADHSS

1989c,d). The panel concluded that the levels of PAHs found in fish were low and of no health concern. 

Most shellfish tested were also safe, but some, such as those collected from the contaminated beaches at 

Windy Bay, had unacceptably high levels of oil contamination and were unsafe to eat. The expert

committee concluded that shellfish "should not be collected from obviously oil-contaminated areas."

After receiving the panel's report, the OSHTF reviewed the findings and developed plans to inform

the villages of the results. Meetings took place in 10 communities in PWS (Chenega Bay and Tatitlek),

Lower Cook Inlet (Nanwalek and Port Graham), and the Kodiak Island Borough (Ouzinkie, Port Lions,

Kodiak, Old Harbor, Larsen Bay, and Karluk) in September and October 1989. Due to poor weather, the 

OSHTF team could not get to Akhiok and the meeting there was canceled.

Also, the state's Section of Epidemiology reported these findings in a health bulletin issued on

September 22, 1989 (ADHSS 1989c). In part, the bulletin advised the public that:

Results of studies to date, combined with available scientific knowledge, provide powerful 

evidence that Alaskan finfish are and will continue to be safe to eat. Levels of aromatic

hydrocarbons found to date in finfish are very low and are similar to levels in

uncontaminated fish.

Because only a small number of crustaceans (crabs) and mollusks (clams and mussels)

have been tested, our recommendations about their safety are more tentative and

cautious. Specimens of mollusks taken from heavily oil-contaminated beaches have

shown high levels of aromatic hydrocarbons. Shellfish tested from "clean beaches" have 

shown the presence of aromatic hydrocarbons in higher concentrations than found in

uncontaminated areas but at levels that do not represent a serious health hazard. If

mollusks are consumed, they should not be collected from areas that are obviously

contaminated with oil.
174

Findings from a second and third round of tests performed at the NOAA laboratory on samples collected

in August and September were consistent with those of the first round of tests, according to the

conclusions of a second meeting of the expert panel in February 1990 (OSHTF 1990a, 1990b; Varanasi et 

al. 1990.)

While information of this nature was released by government agencies, many questions remained 

unanswered in the spill area villages. These concerns surfaced, for example, during the community

meetings in September and October 1989 (see above). Villagers asked why more samples had not been 

tested from more areas, and posed the question of how users could be sure that resources were safe

based upon the limited number of samples and sites examined so far. Oil was still present in substantial

quantities in some subsistence use areas. Conditions on a beach that tested clean could change with the 

next tide. Also, little or no information was then available about other resources, such as deer, bears,

waterfowl, and marine mammals. Village residents pointed out that health bulletins and news releases

often did not reach families in their communities. People were still uninformed of agency

recommendations. Many were afraid. Another issue was that the FDA had established no guideline

thresholds regarding what levels of PAHs were safe to consume. As noted by Walker and Field

(1991:445), for many villagers, "any level of contamination was considered to be unsafe."12 Some

community representatives wondered why a subsistence foods testing project was being funded by Exxon 

rather than the state government, suggesting a conflict of interest (Kompkoff 1989b).

Some village residents expressed dissatisfaction over perceived inconsistencies in subsistence

food safety advice (U.S. Coast Guard 1993:419; Nighswander 1999:35; Fall et al. 1999:247). For

example, some believed that more concern was being directed towards commercial seafood

contamination through the state’s “zero tolerance policy” (see above) than towards subsistence fisheries. 

If commercial finfish fisheries had been closed because of the threat of contaminated fish, why were the

villagers being told that finfish were safe to eat?13 

Another source of distrust about the safety of subsistence foods had to do with perceived changes 

in health advice. As noted above, early health bulletins had recommended the organoleptic test as a

reliable means of detecting oil contamination. However, in the community meetings in September and

October 1989, differences between PAHs with low and high molecular weights were discussed. The team 

from the OSHTF explained that “light” (i.e., low molecular weight) PAHs can be detected by smell and

taste. These PAHs may cause acute effects such as nausea if ingested. They are highly volatile,

meaning that they weather relatively rapidly and disappear from the environment. The “heavy” (high

molecular weight) PAHs are more persistent and largely undetectable by human senses. It was revealed 

 

12 At the request of the IHS, the FDA prepared an advisory opinion on the safety of subsistence foods from the spill area, which

was available in August 1990 (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 1990). The report concluded that the risks associated with using 

finfish and shellfish from the spill area, including the oil-contaminated marine invertebrates that had been tested as part of the

OSHTF project, were low. The Task Force continued to advise that subsistence users avoid using shellfish from oiled areas

because while the risk of getting cancer from eating shellfish from these beaches was low, it was an avoidable risk.
175

that long-term exposure to these components of the oil could have chronic health effects, including

cancer. Consequently, as the oil weathered and the light PAHs dissipated, the heavy PAHs would be left 

behind, rendering the organoleptic test no longer at all useful for detecting exposure to oil (ADF&G 1990b, 

1990c). This meant that subsistence users would need to be aware of the oiling and cleanup status of

particular beaches in order to be confident of the safety of using marine invertebrates. For some villagers, 

this additional information was contradictory to earlier advice, and cast doubt on the effort to provide them 

with reliable information. Reports in the news media at the time also suggested that health advice had

“changed” (Hulen 1989).

Subsequently, both Exxon and the State (through the Division of Subsistence) continued sampling 

and testing programs in 1990. The Northwest Fisheries Center agreed to conduct the hydrocarbon

analyses for both programs. The division added collection sites near Alaska Peninsula communities. 

Generally, the purpose of these programs was to monitor conditions near each village to assess whether 

the earlier health advice remained valid. Results from these studies became available during the spring

and summer of 1990. Findings continued to be consistent with those of the previous summer. Tests were 

also run on samples of marine mammals, ducks, and deer. Results for some of the marine mammals

were available by June 1990, and the remainder by October 1990. Although indications of exposure to oil 

were found for some samples, PAH levels were well below those considered to represent a health risk 

(ADF&G 1990b, 1990d, 1991b). These findings were released primarily through a series of newsletters

and a video tape produced for the OSHTF by the Division of Subsistence (ADF&G 1990b). A limited

sampling program took place in 1991 as well, which focused on sites that had previously produced

samples with elevated hydrocarbon levels. 14

In summary, in the year following the grounding of the Exxon Valdez, subsistence resource users, 

government agencies, and scientists raised questions about the potential effects of the oil on fish and

wildlife and the consequent implications of these effects on the health of those people who consume these 

resources. Site-specific and resource-specific information to answer these questions was in short supply. 

In 1989, the first limited information available to subsistence harvesters to respond to questions about

possible oil contamination of wild foods was released in late August. More complete results of the studies 

of fish and shellfish did not appear until February 1990, and test results concerning marine mammals,

birds, and deer were not available until June 1990 or later. Findings from these studies, and the

corresponding health advice, were consistent: most resources taken from the oil spill area were safe to

eat, but people should avoid harvesting at contaminated areas and carefully inspect their harvests for

signs of oil. But into the second year after the spill, household interviews found that many respondents

still had doubts about the safety of subsistence foods (cf. Smythe 1990). In response, as noted above, the 

food-testing program continued in 1990 and 1991. In FFY 1993 through FFY 1995, the EVOSTC funded

 

13 As Piper (1993:107) notes, the commercial fisheries closures primarily had to do with concerns about oiling fishing gear, which 

could subsequently oil the catch itself. 

14 The detailed findings of these subsequent studies will not be discussed here. They are reviewed in detail in a final report

prepared by the Northwest Fisheries Center (Varanasi et al. 1993) and in Field et al. (1999).
176

subsistence restoration projects to continue to provide information to subsistence users to address the

long-term impacts of the spill. This included limited collection and testing of subsistence resources,

including fish, marine invertebrates, ducks, and harbor seals. The study results were consistent with

earlier findings (Miraglia 1995, Miraglia and Chartrand 1997, Shemet and Miraglia 1998). 

In 1989, the prevailing uncertainties and fears about the safety of using subsistence foods from

the oil spill area were based on a number of factors, as noted below. 

• Thousands of miles of coastline, much of which had been used for subsistence harvesting, had been 

oiled.

• Deaths of marine mammals, birds, and other wildlife due to the direct effects of the oil were observed 

or reported.

• Unusual behaviors and other abnormalities in wildlife, which subsistence users suspected were

caused by sub-lethal effects of exposure to oil, were observed or reported.

• Subsistence users were dubious that resources that exhibited no obvious signs of oiling through

inspection, smell, or taste were free from hydrocarbon contamination and safe to eat.

• Local commercial fisheries were closed due to the concerns of resource managers that fish and

fishing gear would be contaminated by oil.

• Advisory bulletins from state health officials advised caution in using seafood with obvious signs of

oiling or that were taken from oiled areas.

• Advisory bulletins issued by ADF&G suggested that hunters might choose to avoid hunting deer and

black bear in the Prince William Sound area due to the potential effects of oiling on these animals,

their populations, and their habitats.

• Health officials provided no firm assurances that consuming resources from the spill area in the large 

quantities traditionally used in these communities would result in no adverse long-term health affects, 

because of the lack of government standards concerning the safe levels of hydrocarbons in foods.

• Health officials discussed potential effects of eating seafoods from the oil spill areas in terms of

degrees of increased levels of risk. The view in the villages was that any increased level of risk to

health was unacceptable. Before the spill, subsistence foods were viewed as safe and clean. After

the spill, a risk had been added to what for village residents had been formerly an unquestionably

reliable and safe source of food.

• No studies were provided in 1989 showing the potential long-term effects of exposure to low levels of 

hydrocarbons in foods in human populations heavily dependent upon seafoods.

• Specific laboratory findings about oil contamination levels in subsistence resources from traditional

harvest areas in the spill area were not available until late summer and early fall of 1989.

• Laboratory tests provided limited coverage in terms of the number of samples tested, harvest areas

sampled, and types of resources sampled.
177

• The involvement of Exxon in the foods sampling and testing program raised questions about potential 

conflicts of interest and the reliability of the findings and health advisories.

• The legal embargo on the results of scientific damage assessment projects, which were deemed

“litigation sensitive,” raised questions about whether subsistence users were being informed of the full 

picture of resource injuries and health risks.

These points were also stressed in an overview of “lessons learned” prepared by former members 

of the OSHTF ten years after the spill (Fall et al. 1999). In summing up the experiences of the OSHTF,

participants stressed, among other things, the need to develop a risk communication process that builds

trust and credibility (Nighswander and Peacock 1999). Further,

From the perspective of risk communication, two key themes stand out. The first is the

importance of a collaborative, multidisciplinary approach from the earliest stages of response. 

The second is the necessity of an effective, interactive communication process that develops a

credible message and delivers it well and is flexible and reflexive enough to adapt as its

audience responds. Crosscutting both of these themes is the importance of sound science,

local knowledge and observations, a public process above suspicion, and sensitivity to the

cultural context in which the issues are defined and the message is received. These lessons

must be applied to each stage of the process, from contingency planning, to spill response, to

long-term restoration (Fall et al. 1999:267).

In retrospect, the former chairman of the OSHTF (Nighswander 1999:49) noted that:

For state and federal agencies, nonprofit groups, and private industry with vested interests in the 

safety of the subsistence food and the commercial values of seafood in general, the favorable

food analyses were a relief. This information was also reassuring to many villagers. But for the 

outspoken few and the many with lingering doubts, only time will tell. Perhaps only when the

environment looks safe to them, and the beaches, birds and fish appear as they did before the

spill, will they conclude that their food is safe to eat.

The persistence of concerns about subsistence food safety and the effects of these concerns on

subsistence uses are discussed in Chapter Seven.

EMERGENCY FOOD PROGRAMS

Wild Resources: Prince William Sound

Soon after the spill, several emergency food relief programs developed to try to supply residents

of certain oil spill communities with subsistence foods. Table VI-5 reports the percentage of households in 

10 Alaska Native villages that received emergency foods. (These programs did not operate on the Alaska 

Peninsula.) The first program began in May at Tyonek, a Dena’ina Athabaskan Indian community on the

western shore of upper Cook Inlet. The people of Tyonek volunteered to provide king salmon from their

subsistence harvests to Nanwalek (English Bay), Port Graham, Chenega Bay, and Tatitlek. The Russian 

Orthodox Church facilitated this program, and funds for supplies and transportation were provided by the
178

Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs and Exxon (Ramage 1989, Taylor 1991). 

According to a summary provided by Exxon (Taylor 1991), approximately 7,000 pounds of king salmon

from Tyonek's subsistence harvest were sent to the four communities. According to division survey

results, 88.8 percent of Chenega Bay households and 77.2 percent in Tatitlek received chinook salmon

through this program, and the estimated total received and kept was about 2,550 pounds (Fall et al.

1996:122-123).

A second offer of assistance came from the Southeast Alaska community of Angoon, the majority 

of whose residents are Tlingit Indians. The City of Angoon had received a Summer Youth Employment

Grant from the Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs to help the young people of the

community to learn subsistence harvesting and processing skills. The program operated from June

through August 1989. The community offered to share some of the harvests from this program with

families in oil spill-impacted communities. As with the Tyonek program, Exxon provided funds for supplies 

and for shipping the foods to Nanwalek, Port Graham, Chenega Bay, and Tatitlek (Adams 1989). Exxon

estimated that 16,000 pounds of halibut, seaweed, harbor seal, and deer were distributed as part of this

program (Taylor 1991). Eleven percent of households in Chenega Bay and 40.9 percent in Tatitlek

reported that they received and kept foods through the Angoon program. The estimated total received

from Angoon was 95 pounds for Chenega Bay and Tatitlek combined. This estimate does not include

halibut, for which respondents were unable to provide estimates (Fall et al. 1996:122-123).

Chugach Alaska Corporation, the regional Native corporation, through its Chugach Fisheries fish

processing facility in Cordova, initiated a third program. Again with financial assistance from Exxon,

40,000 pounds of sockeye, chum, and coho salmon harvested from the Copper River District (which was 

outside the spill area) reportedly were distributed to the villages of Tatitlek, Chenega Bay, Nanwalek, and

Port Graham (Ramage 1989, Taylor 1991). According to survey results, most households in Chenega

Bay (83.3 percent) and Tatitlek (86.3 percent) received salmon through this program. By their report, an

estimated total of about 4,200 pounds of fish was received and kept in the two communities (Table 40).

There was some dissatisfaction among Tatitlek households about the distribution of the Copper River 

salmon, with some households reporting that they did not receive a fair share while other households had 

been “greedy” and taken more than they needed.

A fourth food-sharing program was organized by the Eyak Village Council in Cordova. This

program provided king salmon heads donated from local fish processors; 16.6 percent of households in

Chenega Bay and 27.2 percent in Tatitlek reported receiving the product through this program (Fall et al.

1996:122-123).
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In summary, most households in Chenega Bay (94.4 percent) and Tatitlek (90.9 percent) received 

some subsistence foods in 1989 as part of the emergency food relief programs (Fall et al. 1996:122-123). 

On average, Chenega Bay households reported that they received and kept about 105 pounds of

subsistence foods from food relief programs. Most of this was chum, coho, and sockeye salmon received 

through the Chugach Fisheries program, and king salmon received from Tyonek. Smaller amounts of

king salmon were received from the Eyak program, and halibut and harbor seal were received from

Angoon.

There are marked differences between estimates of the amount of food shipped through food

relief programs and the amounts reported as actually used by Chenega Bay and Tatitlek households. An 

incident occurring in October 1989 cast doubt on the safety of using the foods and led to households’

discarding imported subsistence foods. While in Chenega Bay, one of the co-authors of this report

learned that about two days earlier, a boat from Valdez had unloaded boxes of seafood on the dock,

including pollock, Dungeness crab, razor clams, and shrimp. Believing this to be another shipment of food 

from Exxon, several village residents removed seafood from the boxes, and then distributed it to others. 

Table VI-5. Participation in Emergency Food Relief Programs, Alaska Native Communities 

of the EVOS Region, 19891

Percentage of Households Mean Pounds Total Pounds Received,

Community2Receiving Any Wild Food Received per HH Community

Chenega Bay 94.4% 110.2 2,315

Tatitlek 90.9% 176.6 4,945

Nanwalek 91.2% 80.8 3,153

Port Graham 93.8% 132.4 8,078

Akhiok 100.0% 70.6 918

Karluk 97.0% 285.5 11,704

Larsen Bay 100.0% 77.1 1,312

Old Harbor 93.8% 60.6 5,635

Ouzinkie 80.0% 76.7 5,291

Port Lions 91.7% 61.8 4,141

1

 Includes wild foods only. Totals include amounts housesholds reported they received and kept.

2 Alaska Peninsula villages were not included in any emergency food programs.

 Chenega Bay had 13, Tatitlek 19, Nanwalek 5, and Port Graham 25 instances where the pounds 

 of a resource received were not available. Numbers presented therefore represent minimums.

Source: Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Subsistence Household Surveys, 1990.
180

Several people reported having discarded the crab and clams they had received from this shipment,

saying the food did not appear usable. The crab had been frozen raw. When the ADF&G researcher

inspected the shipping boxes, she noted that they were marked with the warning “Not for human

consumption.” One of the Chenega Bay men accompanying her stated that he had heard that sea otters 

at the rescue center in Valdez were being fed uncooked crab. Upon learning that a similar shipment had 

arrived at Tatitlek, a Chenega Bay village council member called the Tatitlek council president to warn him 

about the crab. The few people interviewed in Chenega Bay who had eaten the crab did not report getting 

sick. Upon phoning the seafood company, which had packaged the shipment, the division researcher

confirmed that the crab had been special ordered by Exxon to feed sea otters at the Valdez rescue center.

When interviewed later in the month by the same researcher, some people in Tatitlek reported

that they had become ill from eating food from the similar shipment sent to their village. As in Chenega

Bay, few people had seen the boxes with the warning because the food had been divided among

households almost as soon as it arrived. Symptoms reported after eating the crab and pollock included 

diarrhea, nausea, headaches, and a rash. In late October, the Tatitlek council president tried to contact

Exxon about his concern that people were getting ill from eating foods from these shipments, but got no

replies. He reported the following to the Oil Spill Heath Task Force:

. . . [D]uring the second week of October, a shipment of seafoods was sent to Tatitlek by

Exxon. In this shipment were various amounts of geoduck, prawns, Dungeness crab,

pollock and razor clams. After the food was distributed, and some of it eaten, it was

noticed that the boxes containing Dungeness crab were marked “Unsafe for Human

Consumption.” The people who had eaten some of the crab reported that they had gotten 

sick or had suffered some allergic reactions to eating the crab. People who had eaten

some of the other food have reported diarrea [sic] and headaches. I have attempted to

contact Exxon for an explanation, but have been unsuccessful so far (Kompkoff 1989c).

Later, the former village health aid received a call from a Russian Orthodox priest, who had

contacted Exxon on the village’s behalf. Exxon had told him that they would pick up what was remaining

of recent shipments of seafoods even though the food was of “top quality.” It was uncertain whether the

priest was aware of the uncooked crab, the warning label, and the purpose of particular shipments as feed 

for sea otters, or whether he had informed Exxon of the nature of the concern.15 

As a result of this incident, people in both communities were worried about eating resources from 

the shipments associated with the sea otter food, and discarded them. The word had gotten around that

all the seafood coming in was “animal food.” When interviewed in April 1990, just a few households in the 

two villages reported receiving and keeping any resources from the shipments of “sea otter food.” The

sea otter food incident compounded distrust of wild resource safety. Wild foods received from other

emergency food programs were discarded, and some people became suspicious of marine invertebrates 

in general. For others, the incident confirmed their distrust of any subsistence foods.

 

15 A brief summary of this incident also appears in Wheelwright (1994:249).
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In addition to the sea otter food incident, other factors account for the differences between

Exxon’s estimates of the amount of wild foods provided through emergency programs and village

respondent’s own estimates. Recipients of foods from these programs reported extensive freezer burn on 

some fish; much had to be cut away before they could be used. Because the fish had been frozen,

villagers found it difficult to process the fish in traditional ways, such as smoking and drying. Because

much of the fish was received late in the year, the weather was not favorable for using these traditional

methods of preservation. It is possible that portions of these shipments that were deemed usable were

redistributed by Chenega Bay and Tatitlek residents to friends and relatives in Cordova and elsewhere.

Exxon did not acknowledge a spill impact in Cordova and did not include the community in the food relief 

program.

Wild Resources: Kodiak Island Borough16

Following the EVOS, the Kodiak Island Borough "oiled mayors" asserted that given concerns

about contamination and time spent in oil spill cleanup, subsistence users would not be able to put up

enough salmon for the coming winter. After a variety of negotiations between the mayors, Exxon, the

Borough, KANA, and ADF&G, an emergency subsistence salmon fishery at Karluk was opened. In

September, a resident of Karluk organized a traditional beach seining operation for Karluk Lagoon. 

Volunteers were recruited by KANA and flown in from Port Lions and Larsen Bay to assist the Karluk crew. 

Observers from both DEC and ADF&G monitored the fishery and no visible signs of oil were found on the 

fish. 

The mayors had requested that 90,000 pounds of subsistence fish be caught, but 68,000 pounds 

was actually harvested. About 30,357 pounds was delivered to Eagle Fisheries, where it was frozen. The 

rest, 37,936 pounds, was delivered to Alaska Pacific Seafoods where it was processed and canned. 

After processing, it took a month for Exxon, the Borough, and KANA to decide on a distribution

system. Eventually it was decided that elderly residents of the villages would be given priority in the

distribution process. Within the Kodiak City area, subsistence permit holders (by family size) would be

given priority, followed by other individuals in need. Distribution began on October 17, 1989, and fish were 

delivered to the communities frozen in 50-pound boxes and in 24-pound cases (48 half-pound cans). 

During the first round, fish were delivered via an Exxon-chartered vessel. Some distribution

mistakes were made and in a few cases the boat had to go back to communities to pass out more fish. 

Only Ouzinkie was equipped with a community freezer facility capable of handling the frozen fish

deliveries. 

In Port Lions, where the entire village council was out of town, the distribution task fell to the

senior citizen cook. With no community freezer and many seniors lacking freezers, the fish were

 

16 This account is based on a more detailed overview that appears in Mishler and Cohen (forthcoming).
182

distributed to any household with the freezer capacity to store them. This turned what was intended to be 

exclusively a senior citizen distribution into a general distribution in the village. 

Another round of Exxon's fish distribution program took place during the third week in October

and, according to the local Exxon representative, was to be a general distribution to the villages, based on 

size. During the third and final round, the remainder of the fish was distributed to Kodiak City residents

using a Borough sign-up list that included subsistence permit holders. Some were given as charity to the 

Kodiak Women's Resource and Crisis Center and to the Salvation Army.

In the Kodiak communities, the formal distribution programs replaced some of the salmon that

people would normally have harvested themselves, offsetting the potential scarcity of protein for people

who count on their summer salmon harvest to get them through the winter. However, the programs did

not address the variety of ways in which people usually put up their salmon, including smoking and drying. 

Nor were any other foods distributed to make up for the other fish, shellfish, and game that people were

afraid to harvest after seeing the oil on the beaches and in the water. These programs also could not

accommodate the cultural significance of traditional subsistence harvesting, processing, exchange, and

distribution activities.

The 1989 harvest survey questionnaire administered by the division included questions about the 

amounts of fish households received and kept through the formal sharing programs (Table VI-5). As in

the Prince William Sound communities, the quantities reported through the survey were lower than those

reported by Exxon. Discarding of fish due to poor preservation may account for some of this difference.

In Ouzinkie, residents received fish through two separate formal distribution programs; the Exxon 

Subsistence Fish program and an Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs (DCRA) grant. 

Village leaders in Ouzinkie were suspicious of the fish caught in Karluk through Exxon’s program, fearing 

they might be contaminated. They applied for and received a grant from DCRA and through that grant

received frozen coho and sockeye salmon caught in Washington State. 

Groceries: Prince William Sound

Beginning in April 1989, Exxon made several deliveries of grocery items to Chenega Bay and

Tatitlek (Fall et al. 1996:69-72; Meidinger 1999:106-107). According to the company’s community liaison

manager, 

These deliveries were initiated because Exxon’s cleanup efforts disrupted the normal

supply system to these villages. In addition, of course, most of the able-bodied residents 

were working on the spill and may not have had time to do their normal subsistence 

gathering (Taylor 1991).

By Exxon’s calculations, about 70,000 pounds of groceries (including food and other household supplies;

this appears to be total weight, including packaging) were delivered to 20 Chenega Bay households, for an 

average of 3,500 pounds per household and 800 pounds per person. About 70,100 pounds were
183

delivered to 29 Tatitlek households, for an average of 2,200 pounds per household and 670 pounds per

person (Taylor 1991).17 During a visit to Tatitlek in August 1989, division staff learned that at least three 

households in Tatitlek were sending portions of these groceries to needy friends and relatives in Cordova, 

since, according to Reynolds (1993:207-208), Exxon had declined to provide groceries to residents of

Cordova, alleging that Cordova Alaska Native residents had not been affected by the oil spill.

Exxon reported that it also provided groceries periodically to Nanwalek and Port Graham from

supply boats. No records are available concerning these deliveries (Taylor 1991).

LITIGATION OF THE OIL SPILL

Litigation has been a fundamental part of the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. According to 

some research, litigation has been a major source of stress for persons attempting to recover from

damages inflicted by the spill (e.g., Picou and Gill 1996). Other researchers maintain that litigation

“mania” clouded or obstructed objective assessment of the effects of the spill and subsequent recovery

(e.g., Davis 1996, Wooley 1995). Besides creating stress and affecting research, litigation has

underscored the legal vulnerability of Alaska Natives in claiming compensation for damages to

subsistence inflicted by the spill. Litigation highlighted the opinion that, although Alaska Native people

may use natural resources for subsistence, ANCSA terminated their right to act as legal trustee for those

resources.

Two kinds of law addressed the oil spill: federal statutes enacted to govern such events and

maritime torts under which compensation may be available after statutory remedies have been exhausted. 

Of the three federal statutes addressed in this paper only the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act

(TAPAA) was enacted especially for oil spills occurring in the vicinity of the pipeline. As written, TAPAA

provided strict liability for injuries resulting from accidents associated with the construction of the TransAlaska Pipeline and the transportation of oil once the pipeline was completed. TAPAA authorized

recovery for three classes of damages: 1) cleanup costs, which go to state and federal agencies involved 

in cleanup, 2) damages sustained by private persons for property damage and economic loss and, 3)

natural resource damages which include compensation to the public for non-reparable damages such as 

permanent loss of wildlife and fisheries.

At its inception TAPAA was organized into two sections: the Right-of-Way section that covers oil

spills which happen along the pipeline right-of-way, an

d the Transport section that covers spills once the oil has left the pipeline and is being transported 

by ship. While it was obvious that all claims for private and ecological damages would be brought under

the Transportation section it was unclear as to what damages were compensable. Unlike the Right-ofWay section, which recognized and provided for damages to subsistence resources, the Transport

 

17 In a later estimate, Exxon’s Native liaison reported that “in total, Exxon provided over 114,000 pounds of commercial food to

Chenega and Tatitlek and distributed about 115,000 pounds of subsistence foods to all of the villages affected by the spill”

(Meidinger 1999:107).
184

Section made no mention of compensation for damages to subsistence resources used by Alaska

Natives. And, while TAPAA provided compensation for damages inflicted on the ecosystem, it was open 

as to who had the authority to assert such a claim. Almost immediately this authority was assumed by

State and Federal agencies.

In January 1990, Judge Holland, the presiding judge in the case, directed the TAPAA

administrator to solicit, receive and independently evaluate submitted claims for damages compensable

under the TAPAA fund. In January of 1992 the TAPAA administrator denied Native subsistence claims to 

the fund arguing that the fund was limited to making awards for tangible economic losses only. To assess 

such damages it was necessary for plaintiffs to supply “individual filings and individual substantiation of

claimed damage” and not aggregate data based on community harvests. In rejecting this approach the

fund’s administrator wrote, “While subsistence certainly has communal aspects, as argued by the

appellants, it also has individual components. The approach argued by the appellants may be good

sociology, but the approach is merely one approach and more importantly, the approach is contrary to

binding law.” Also rejected were claims made by Native community and regional organizations that they

sustained economic loss because of the spill.

In addition to TAPAA, two other federal statues covered spilled oil. These were the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act, more commonly known as the Clean Water Act, and the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, or CERCLA. The Clean Water Act aims

primarily at reimbursing the federal government for removal and cleanup of oil spills exceeding ship owner 

or operator liability. The act established a maximum liability on the part of the owner or operator of the

vessel at $150 per gross ton of vessel, which was 31 million dollars in the case of the Exxon Valdez. This 

liability cap could be lifted upon proof of gross negligence or willful misconduct on the part of the owners

or operators. Compensation to private parties is not covered in this act.

CERCLA provides that in addition to cost recovery for response and cleanup actions, natural

resource trustees may recover damages for injury to natural resources belonging to, managed by, held in 

trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the federal government, any state or local government, 

any foreign government, or any Indian Tribe. Alaska Natives, however, did not fall within this group

because they were considered to have relinquished their right to act as a trustee through ANCSA. It

should be noted that the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 altered this situation by permitting “recovery by an 

Indian tribe trustee for the loss of natural resources or the use of such resources and for damages for loss 

of subsistence use of natural resources without regard of ownership.”

In March of 1991 Federal and State governments filed a natural resource damage suit against

Exxon Corporation and the owner companies of the pipeline. Both the State and the Federal governments 

stipulated that only they were entitled to act on behalf of the public as trustees of natural resources and to

sue under the Clean Water Act and CERCLA. Almost immediately plaintiffs and defendants reached a

one billion dollar settlement that hinged, in part, on a criminal plea bargain for Exxon. A Federal judge

threw out the plea bargain and the Alaska legislature rejected the settlement. Alaska Native plaintiffs sued 

to block the settlement claiming they were excluded from negotiations.
185

Alaska Natives had brought suit against the state and federal governments asserting their right to 

act as trustee for the purposes of “claiming, recovering, and using natural damage recoveries for the

benefit of natural resources used by Natives for subsistence.” But in September of 1991 the Natives,

along with commercial fishermen, private landowners, cannery workers and other claimants dropped their 

suits against the State and Federal governments. For their part, Alaska Natives withdrew and waived any

claim, right, or obligation to act as a trustee regarding natural resource damages. Native claimants

reserved the right to pursue private claims other than claims for natural resource damage.

On September 30, 1992, Governor Hickel announced that the State of Alaska and the Federal

Government had settled with Exxon and the owner companies of the Trans-Alaska pipeline. The

agreement stipulated that any money collected from Exxon for natural resource damages would be

collected exclusively by the governments, but private third parties could pursue claims for all damages. 

The State agreed to share research on damages inflicted by the oil spill with third party plaintiffs and to

restore the natural resources injured by the oil spill, including those resources used for subsistence.

Eliminated from statutory solutions, Alaska Native plaintiffs turned to common law. In the case of 

the Exxon Valdez remedies for damages were brought under maritime tort, which fall under the Admiralty

Extension Act, and thus lie within federal jurisdiction. Private claims are limited by established case law

and in this instance that was Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint. This is the most prohibitive case for 

private parties attempting to recover for loss of subsistence resources or business profits without showing 

physical damage to property interests. In Robins Dry Dock the court held that there could be no recovery

for private individuals who have suffered indirect economic loss. Exceptions to this rule are Oppen v.

Aetna Ins. Co. and Burgess v. M/V Tomano. In both cases commercial fishermen were allowed indirect

damages because they could demonstrate a special relationship with marine resources and consequently

suffered “damages different in kind...from that sustained by the public generally.”

Extensive litigation began in the weeks after the spill when 150 individual and class action lawsuits 

were filed against Exxon Corp. A sample of the cases filed in federal court included North Pacific Rim v.

Exxon Corp. (a class action filed on the behalf of Native villagers in the Chugach region), Thome v. Exxon 

Corp. (class action by commercial fishermen), McCudden v. Exxon Shipping (class action on behalf of

herring fisheries), and Cesari v. Exxon Corp. (class action on behalf of all persons “adversely affected”). 

Cordova District Fishermen United, longshoremen, and fish processing companies brought suit in State 

court. Eventually nearly all 150 lawsuits were consolidated into two class action suits, one covering

commercial fishermen and the other covering Alaska Natives. Only the Alaska Native lawsuit is discussed 

here.

Initially, Alaska Natives pursued claims against Exxon for damages to their subsistence lifestyle or 

culture. These were eventually separated into claims for non-economic and economic damages. We will 

discuss the economic damages first.

Exxon attempted to obtain a summary judgment against the Native economic claims based on

two points. First, it was argued that the Native class did not, nor intend to provide individualized proof of

any loss. Exxon argued that because individuals within the class differed in terms of their harvest and
186

consumption of wild resources it was impossible to fairly assess damages based on community harvest

data. Plaintiff’s attorneys argued that any claims relating to the damage of subsistence foods are

communal in nature and can only be understood as such. Second, Exxon argued that plaintiffs looked to 

recover economic damages, which were unrelated to any physical injury or to property, which was a

requirement of Robins Dry Dock. In this regard Exxon pointed out that plaintiff’s allegations of injury were 

not tied to an injury of property that they owned but to a way of life. 

Judge Holland refused Exxon’s request for summary judgment. On the matter of individual proof 

of claim, Holland concurred that individuals must provide an account of their losses “because only those

who suffered loses may share in the recovery.” However, he noted that the law provides that proof of

individual loss does not have to be provided immediately but only at the appropriate time. On the matter

of whether the Native economic claim fit under the rules of Robins Dry Dock, Holland disagreed with

Exxon. He wrote that while the court has refused to expand Oppen to include any group other than

commercial fishermen, it need not expand it to include subsistence harvesters because Native

subsistence harvesters fit within the Oppen exception. The court concluded, “whereas the spill reduced

the commercial fishermen’s profits because they could not sell the resource to a third party, it directly

reduced the subsistence harvesters’ immediate ability to consume that resource.” As a result, Exxon

settled the Native economic claim out of court for $20 million. The money was not distributed to the

plaintiffs but used to maintain the Native’s stake within the general class action against Exxon.

In regard to their non-economic claims, the Native class faired less well. Exxon asked and was

granted summary judgment against the Native claim for compensatory damages for injury to “culture” or

the “subsistence way of life.” Exxon argued, and Holland agreed, that such “non-economic claims” are

precluded by the rule of Robins Dry Dock. Exxon contended that the law allows claims only for private

individuals who have suffered a direct physical harm, and also asserted that in this case Oppen did not

apply because Native subsistence harvesters were not commercial fishermen but more “closely

analogous to sports fishermen or others deprived of a non-commercial right to fish as a result of the oil

spill.”

Plaintiffs asserted that the oil spill caused damages to Alaska Native culture or the subsistence

way of life “going beyond the economic losses resulting from the loss of the subsistence harvest.” They

argued that Alaska Native claims are recognizable under maritime nuisance law where a private individual 

can show a special injury, different in kind from that suffered by the general public. In essence, Alaska

Natives argued that their subsistence culture was different in kind from that of non-Native Alaskans who

practiced subsistence. Holland disagreed. He stated that while cultural differences do indeed exist

between Alaska Natives and non-Natives this difference does not mean that Alaska Natives suffered

damages different than non-Natives under the law. Judge Holland wrote (US District Court 1994:6):

All Alaskan’s have the right to lead subsistence lifestyles, not just Alaska Natives. All Alaskans, 

and not just Alaska Natives, have the right to obtain and share wild food, enjoy uncontaminated 

nature, and cultivate traditional, cultural, spiritual, and psychological benefits in pristine natural

surroundings. Neither length of time in which Alaska Natives have practiced a subsistence
187

lifestyle nor the manner in which it is practiced makes the Alaska Native subsistence lifestyle

unique. These attributes of the Alaska Native lifestyle only make it different in degree from the

same subsistence lifestyle available to all Alaskans.

In sum, Holland ruled that Natives could not sue on the basis of nuisance theory and could not claim a

subsistence injury because this injury was not unique to the Native class.18

Holland went on to say that Exxon has already paid and will likely pay more and these funds are in 

trust arrangements designed to restore, augment and rehabilitate the natural resources damaged by the

spill, and that Alaska Natives “should derive direct benefit from this effort.” Furthermore, Alaska Native

culture has changed and, if the Alaska Native subsistence lifestyle was lost, it was lost before the

grounding of the Exxon Valdez. In conclusion Holland noted, “[d]evelopment of the Prudhoe Bay oil

fields...” were “in all probability, a much greater and certainly longer lasting incursion into Native Culture

than the Exxon Valdez oil spill, yet the Inupiat have thrived.”

The trial for the class action suit pursued by commercial fishermen, Native people, businesses,

and landowners moved in three phases. Decisions resulting from phase one determined that Exxon and

Captain Hazelwood were liable for punitive damages because they had acted recklessly. Phase two

decisions determined the actual damages, in this case for the 10,000 commercial fishermen who were

awarded $287 million, a sum substantially lower than the $895 million claimed. Of the award, $58.8

million went to fishermen from Prince William Sound; $48.8 million was awarded to Cook Inlet fishermen; 

$45.1 million went to Kodiak fishermen; and fishermen from the Chignik Area received $5 million. The jury 

also made a $9.4 million award to cover the decline in the price of commercial fishing permits. At the

conclusion of phase three of the trial, on September 16, 1994, the jury awarded $5 billion in punitive

damages. If distributed, the award would equal approximately $357,000 per person. Lawyers involved in 

the suit will receive between 15 and 33 percent of the award. 

Two years after the award Judge Holland filed the judgment that, in addition to approving the

punitive award, $19.6 million in compensatory damages should be awarded beyond the amount already

paid to commercial fishermen. Filing the judgment meant that the appeals process, which was expected

to take about five years, could begin, and Exxon had to post a bond for the amount of the punitive

damages, including interest (5.9% per annum) totaling 6.75 billion dollars. 

As Wooley (1995:143) remarks, the presence of lawyers may have served to intensify impacts of 

the spill and masked uniquely Native responses. However, without litigation it is unlikely that Exxon would 

have done many of the things it did to compensate people. Litigation also led to changes in oil spill

legislation so that in the event of another oil spill Native people will be more adequately represented. But, 

as Fall and Utermohle (1995) point out, the view persisted that “the cultural importance of subsistence to

 

18 Jorgensen (1995a:6) observes that Judge Holland’s findings about Alaska Native culture in the EVOS area were likely 

influenced by submissions to the court and depositions by anthropological experts employed by Exxon (e.g., Bohannan 1993a,

1993b). (See also Chapter One.) Two of these experts summarized their perspective in a submission to an anthropological 

journal (Wooley and Bohannan 1994) that also was part of the court record, and was later modified for publication (Wooley 1995). 

In a summary of findings of the Social Indicators research undertaken for MMS, Jorgensen (1995a) describes significant

differences in responses by Natives and non-Natives to the EVOS that he attributes to cultural differences.
188

the Alaska Native communities of the spill area and injury that these cultures suffered had not yet been

acknowledged by the judicial process.” In September of 1996 the Native Class appealed Holland’s ruling

to the federal 9

th Circuit Court of Appeals. In 1997, the Court rejected the appeal, agreeing with Holland 

that the Natives’ economic claim had been settled and that there was no basis in law for awarding

damages for cultural claims. Like Holland, the appeals court concluded that the non-economic injury

suffered by Alaska Natives was perhaps different in degree from that suffered by other Alaskans, but it

was not different in kind.

The 9

th Circuit Court of Appeals heard arguments in Exxon’s appeal of the $5 billion punitive

damage award in Seattle on May 4, 1999. Exxon argued that the damage award was excessive, served

no public purpose, and “cannot be justified because punitive damages are not intended to make private

plaintiffs rich” (Phillips 1999). In October 2000, the US Supreme Court rejected Exxon’s argument that the 

punitive award should be set aside due to alleged irregularities during jury deliberations. Because Exxon

was pursuing appeals on other grounds as well, a company spokesman said that the company was “not

even close” to paying anything to plaintiffs (Associated Press 2000).

RESTORATION AND THE OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL19

In October 1991, the United States District Court approved a settlement of the civil claims of the

State of Alaska and the United States against Exxon for natural resource damages caused by the spill. 

Under this agreement, Exxon agreed to pay $900 million over a ten-year period. Most of these funds were 

deposited in a restoration fund administered by a six-member Trustee Council. The Trustee Council is

composed of three federal and three state representatives. Under the terms of the court approved

Memorandum of Agreement, these restoration funds, called “civil settlement funds” in this report, must be 

used,

For the purposes of restoring, replacing, enhancing, or acquiring the equivalent of natural 

resources injured as a result of the Oil Spill and the reduced or lost services provided by 

such resources (EVOSTC 1994:3-4; emphasis in the original).

A “service” is defined in this context as a human use of natural resources. Subsistence is one of several 

reduced or lost services for which restoration projects may be funded by the Trustee Council.

In 1994, the Trustee Council adopted a Restoration Plan to guide its restoration program. The

plan is organized by an “ecosystem approach” defined by two policies (p.12):

1. Restoration should contribute to a healthy, productive and biologically diverse ecosystem

within the spill area that supports the services necessary for the people who live in the area,

and,

 

19 The section on the subsistence restoration planning process is based largely on Fall (1995b).
189

2. Restoration will take an ecosystem approach to better understand what factors control the

populations of injured resources.

The Restoration Plan also describes five categories of restoration activities. These are:

1. General Restoration, such as “manipulation of the environment,” “management of human

use,” or “reduction of marine pollution,”

2. Habitat Protection and Acquisition, including purchase of private land or interests in land such 

as conservation easements, mineral rights, or timber rights (see below for a review of the

status of this program),

3. Monitoring and Research, such as gathering information about the recovery status and

conditions of resources and services,

4. Restoration Reserve, annual payments into an account to fund restoration actions past 2001, 

when the final Exxon payment takes place, and

5. Public Information, Science Management, and Administration, such as preparing work plans,

providing scientific review, public involvement, and operating the restoration program.

The Restoration Plan contains the following “recovery objective” for subsistence uses:

Subsistence will have recovered when injured resources used for subsistence are healthy 

and productive and exist at prespill levels, and when people are confident that the

resources are safe to eat. One indication that recovery has occurred is when the cultural 

values provided by gathering, preparing, and sharing food are reintegrated into

community life (EVOSTC 1994:55).

The Restoration Plan also notes that,

Subsistence users say that maintaining their subsistence culture depends on

uninterrupted use of resources used for subsistence. The more time users spend away

from subsistence activities, the less likely they will return to the activities. Continuing

injury to natural resources used for subsistence may affect the way of life of entire

communities (EVOSTC 1994:54).

In 1994, the Trustee Council funded a Subsistence Restoration Planning and Implementation

Project to design a coordinated approach to subsistence resource restoration and to implement a planning 

process to develop subsistence restoration project proposals for the Trustee Council work plans for

federal Fiscal Year 95 (FY 95), FY 96, and beyond. A further goal was to ensure the participation of

subsistence users in these and other planning efforts. Such projects could propose to directly restore

resources used for subsistence, provide alternative natural resources, or restore access or people's use of 

the resource. The project was to develop guidelines for project content, solicit project ideas and priorities 

through a public process, evaluate project proposals, and present a set of project proposals to the Trustee 

Council for funding consideration from the Restoration Fund.

The planning team’s efforts to develop a “comprehensive approach” to subsistence restoration 

encountered obstacles. A comprehensive approach would have fully and openly addressed spill issues
190

and effects as they relate to the resource base, technology, and the sociocultural context which supports

subsistence activities, including resource exchange, enculturation of the young, traditional knowledge, and 

cultural values. As the planning effort was getting underway, the Trustee Council was developing its draft 

Restoration Plan (EVOSTC 1993b). The draft plan (p.12) listed the following policies to guide projects

designed to restore or enhance an injured service:

1. must have a sufficient relationship to an injured resource,

2. must benefit the same user group that was injured, and

3. should be compatible with the character and public uses of the area.

Requirement (1) proved to be a primary guide as well as a limiting factor in the subsistence

restoration planning project. Following several meetings with Trustee Council staff and attorneys, the

planning team concluded that a comprehensive approach to subsistence restoration that addressed the

environmental, social, and cultural dimensions of the subsistence way of life would not be possible. 

Consequently, the team decided to emphasize to communities the need to link project proposals to natural 

resource recovery. The planning team strove to demonstrate connections between subsistence

restoration project ideas and natural resource recovery that might not be readily apparent. For example,

the Trustee Council funded an elders/youth conference because one goal of the conference was to

discuss ways in which subsistence users could support natural resource restoration and conservation. As 

a result, projects such as the elders/youth conference, a harbor seal hunting documentary, and a harbor

seal/sea otter restoration project received funding support from the civil settlement money.

As illustrated in Figure VI-2, the concentrated subsistence restoration planning effort had a

measurable impact on funding for subsistence restoration. Funding for subsistence restoration projects

increased from nothing in Fiscal Year [FY] 92 and $300,000 in FY 93, to about $1 million in FY 95 and

peaked at over $1.4 million in FY98. Additionally, the portion of these funds going to projects or portions 

of projects directed by or proposed by local communities or Alaska Native organizations jumped

substantially; about $1 million of the $1.2 million allocated in FY 96 went to such projects, as did about

$1.15 million of $1.32 million in FY97 and $1.16 million of $1.45 million in FY97. Table VI-6 lists the

projects that were funded in the Trustee Council’s “subsistence restoration category” from FY92 through

FY01, and projected to be funded through the duration of the restoration program in FY02.

As depicted in Figure VI-3, the percentage of funds awarded by the Trustee Council targeted

towards subsistence restoration grew from nothing in FY92 to about 13.2 percent in FY00, but remained

relatively small part of the overall restoration program. Of all funds allocated by the Trustee Council for

monitoring, research, and general restoration from FY92 through FY02, 7.3 percent were in the

subsistence restoration category, ranking fifth among the 18 categories used by the Trustee Council to

track and report uses of the Restoration Fund (Fig. VI-4).

Additional aspects of the subsistence restoration process that were long-term consequences of

the spill were a community involvement project and a traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) project. As
191

part of the former, “community facilitators” were hired through a contract with the Chugach Regional

Resources Commission (CRRC), an Alaska Native regional organization, to assist communities in

participating in the restoration process. Facilitators were hired to represent the communities of Cordova, 

Valdez, Tatitlek, Chenega Bay, Seward, Seldovia, Nanwalek, and Port Graham. In addition, there was

one facilitator for the Kodiak Island Borough communities and another for the five Alaska Peninsula

villages in the spill area.

The TEK project was designed to encourage the use of TEK in restoration science. The Trustee 

Council adopted “Protocols for Including Indigenous Knowledge in the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Restoration

Process” (EVOSTC 2000:Appendix C) and hired a “TEK specialist” through CRRC to assist researchers in 

developing a TEK component to their projects. The Division prepared a “TEK Handbook” (Miraglia 1998) 

as part of this effort. Most restoration projects did not develop a TEK component, but there were some

notable exceptions. Project 009 included interviews with local residents as part of an effort to understand 

the effects of the oil spill on octopus. Project 247 collected substantial indigenous knowledge about coho 

salmon in an effort to restore runs in the Kametolook River. 

Figure VI-2. Allocations to Subsistence Restoration Projects, Oil 

Spill Restoration Work Plans (Civil Settlement Funds)

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00

Thousands of Dollars.

Local Communities and AK Native Organizations Government agencies and other organizations

Source: Fall 1995 and EVOSTC 2000
192

Table VI-6. Civil Settlement Subsistence Restoration Projects

Total

# Name1 Communities Allocation FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02

009D Survey of Octopuses in 

Intertidal Habitats

PWS & LCI $314.2 X X X

052 Community Involvement and 

Use of Traditional 

Knowledge

All $930.2 X X X X X

052A Community Involvement All $722.8 X X X

052B Traditional Knowledge All $192.1 X X X

127 Tatitlek Coho Salmon 

Release

Tatitlek $68.0 X X X X X X

131 Clam Restoration PWS & LCI $1,439.9 X X X X X

138 Elders/Youth Conference All $75.1 X

210 Area Youth Watch PWS & LCI $876.1 X X X X X X X

214 Harbor Seal Documentary Tatitlek $80.5 X X

220 Eastern PWS Salmon 

Habitat Restoration

Cordova $118.6 X X X

222 Chenega Bay Salmon 

Habitat Enhancement

Chenega Bay $3.8 X

225 Port Graham Pink Salmon 

Project

Port Graham $385.7 X X X X

244 Community Harbor Seal 

Sampling/Management

All $437.6 X X X X X

245 Community-Based Harbor 

Seal Biosampling

All $127.2 X X X

247 Kametolook River Coho 

Salmon

Perryville $126.8 X X X X X X

256B Solf Lake Salmon Stocking Chenega Bay $497.8 X X X X X X X

263 Port Graham Salmon Stream 

Enhancement

Port Graham $230.4 X X X X

272 Chenega Chinook Release 

Program

Chenega Bay $202.6 X X X X X

273 Surf Scoter Life History and 

Ecology

PWS $567.2 X X X

274 Herring/Nearshore 

Documentary

Tatitlek $87.8 X

279 Food Safety Testing All $676.8 X X X

286 Elders/Youth Conference All $100.1 X X

401 Spot Shrimp Population Valdez $255.0 X X X X

428 Subsistence Restoration 

Planning

All $151.4 X X

481 Documentary on Intertidal 

Resources

Chenega Bay, 

Ouzinkie

$120.4 X X

482 Optimization of Test Kits for 

PSP and ASP

Kodiak Island $55.6 X

610 Kodiak Island Youth Area 

Watch

Kodiak Island $185.4 X X X

471 Updating the Status of 

Services

PWS, LCI, 

Kodiak

$203.7 X X

1 All included in the Subsisence Restoration category except 471, which was included in Public Information/Science 

Management/Administration

Source: EVOS TC 2000:B16-B21

Fiscal Years (federal)
193

Figure VI-3. Percentage of EVOS Trustee Council Restoration Workplan Allocated to 

Subsistence Restoration Projects and Other Projects

0.0%

3.3% 3.0%

5.3% 7.0% 8.4%

10.7% 10.9%

13.2%

100.0%

96.7% 97.0%

94.7% 93.0% 91.6%

89.3% 89.1%

86.8%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00

subsistence other

Figure VI-4. Percentage of Restoration Funds Allocated for Monitoring, Research, and 

General Restoration by Category, FY92 to FY02

19.3%

18.9%

14.4%

11.8%

7.3%

6.7%

4.7%

4.7%

3.1%

2.2%

2.1%

1.6%

1.4%

0.7%

0.5%

0.4%

0.1%0.1%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Sound Ecological

Assessment (SEA)

Nearshore

Ecosystem

Seabird/Forage Fish

Pink Salmon

Subsistence

Sockeye Salmon

Marine Mammals

Herring

Habitat Improvement

Ecosystem

Synthesis

Project Management

Archaelogical

Resources

Other Fish

Data Management

Reduction of Marine

Pollution

Public Information

Research Facilities

Recreation

N = $123,196,400

Source: EVOSTC 2000:Appendix B
194

Understanding the restoration process as part of the long-term consequences of the spill is

important for several reasons. The Trustee Council is a prime example of a powerful new bureaucracy

that emerged after the spill, which competes with community residents, among others, to define the

meaning of the event. For the Trustee Council, the spill was, primarily, a “natural disaster,” in the sense

that it defines the spill’s effects in terms of the natural environment and injured populations of plants and

animals. The effects on human communities and to people can only be approached through restoration of 

the natural environment. Residents of the spill area view the spill effects more broadly, more

“ecologically,” with social, cultural, and psychological impacts that are not being directly addressed by the 

restoration process, or by the courts. Residents have therefore proposed funding for projects that test the 

boundaries of what the Trustee Council considers acceptable under the settlement agreement between 

Exxon and the state and federal governments. Thus, the restoration process is essentially a process of

negotiating two interpretations of the spill, and as such has been both a source of frustration and a source 

of support for people concerned with the sociocultural consequences of the spill. Projects funded through 

this process also provided a source of cash to communities that may be used to support the cash sectors 

of local economies and provide technology and infrastructure for the subsistence sector (see Chapter 9).

THE CRIMINAL SETTLEMENT SUBSISTENCE RESTORATION PROGRAM

In 1991, under a criminal plea agreement, Exxon agreed to pay restitution of $50 million to the

United States and $50 million to the State of Alaska. These funds are managed separately by the

respective governments and are not under the authority of the Trustee Council. The Alaska Legislature

authorized DCRA to award grants from a $5 million appropriation from these criminal settlement funds to

unincorporated rural communities in the oil spill area in order to restore, replace, or enhance subsistence

resources or services damaged or lost as a result of the spill (Section 11, Chapter 79, SLA 1993). There 

are nine such communities: Tatitlek, Chenega Bay, Port Graham, Nanwalek, Karluk, Chignik Lagoon,

Chignik Lake, Perryville, and Ivanof Bay. The legislation requires that selection of grant recipients shall be 

made after consultation with the state members of the Trustee Council. Project ideas developed through

the Trustee Council-funded subsistence restoration planning process (see above) but not incorporated in

the Trustee Council’s FY 95 Work Plan could be eligible for funding through the grants. State of Alaska

attorneys advised the planning team that while a link to injured natural resources was still necessary for

projects funded from the criminal settlement, this link did not need to be as direct as for civil settlement

funding. Consequently, projects that addressed aspects of subsistence activities such as disruption of the 

transmission of traditional knowledge and skills, and development of alternative resources or harvest

areas, had a better chance of funding from the criminal settlement money. The Alaska Legislature made 

an additional appropriation of $1,219,611 to this program in January 1999..

Through July 2000, 32 projects from all nine eligible communities had been funded with a total

commitment of $5,628,325 (Table VI-7). These projects covered most of the spill area. They also
195

supported a diversity of projects, including natural resource enhancement and management, mariculture,

cultural education, cultural preservation, and fish processing facilities. 

THE HABITAT PROTECTION PROGRAM

As noted above, “habitat protection” is one of the components of the Trustee Council’s “ecological 

approach” to oil spill restoration. This entails purchasing land or development rights to that land from

private land owners. Much of the privately-owned land in the spill area belongs to Alaska Native regional

and village corporations formed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). Lands

acquired through this program are managed by state or federal agencies as part of conservation system

units, such as the Chugach National Forest and the Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge. 

Table VI-8 summarizes land acquisitions under the habitat protection program through early 1999. 

The large majority of lands acquired through this program have been obtained from Native corporations.

The habitat protection program is not without controversy. For some, sale of Native lands simply

means the irrevocable loss of control of the traditional territory of their communities. Some fear that

access to these lands for subsistence activities is at stake, while others see these agreements as

acceptable ways to obtain revenues for shareholders while protecting natural resources used for

subsistence. Disagreements within corporations and communities about the wisdom of these sales have

resulted in factionalism and stress in some communities, and could result in long-term demographic

change. Other issues pertain to how the money obtained from these sales is distributed and managed. 

Options include individual dividends, development of community facilities and infrastructure, group

investments for long-term cash income, or a combination of these alternatives. These choices could

shape the balance of the mixed subsistence/cash economies of the Native communities of the spill area. 

These topics are discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight.

A major facet of the EVOS Trustee Council’s restoration program is habitat protection. This

program has a larger share of the civil settlement dollars allocated to it than any other part of the

restoration effort. According to the EVOS Trustee Council Status Report, $392 million is committed to

habitat protection, including “large parcel and small parcel habitat protection programs (past expenditures, 

outstanding offers, estimated future commitments and parcel evaluation costs)” (EVOSTC 1998b: 28). In 

addition, the Trustees have decided to commit $55 million of the estimated $170 million that will be in the 

restoration reserve (a fund set aside from the civil fund to pay for restoration actions needed after Exxon

makes its final payment in 2001) to be spent on additional habitat protection beginning in 2002 (EVOSTC 

1999: 1, 10).
196

Table VI-7. Subsistence Restoration Projects Supported with Criminal Settlement Funds

 

Project and Project Type Community Approved1Awarded2Award

Fish Stock Enhancement

Chignik River Weir (supplement) Chignik Lagoon 5/10/96 5/10/96 $28,000

Chignik River Weir (supplement) Chignik Lagoon 8/13/99 9/15/99 $154,844

Chignik River Weir Operation Extension Chignik Lagoon 8/2/95 8/8/95 $120,750

English Bay River Sockeye Rehabilitation Nanwalek 11/3/94 11/29/94 $424,200

English Bay River Sockeye Salmon Nanwalek 8/13/99 9/15/99 $145,000

Sockeye Salmon Rearing Pens Nanwalek 5/16/98 7/10/98 $109,500

Kametolook River Coho Enhancement5Perryville 4/3/96 5/2/96 $16,763

Pink Salmon Enhancement Port Graham 8/13/99 9/15/99 $145,000

Port Graham River Coho Rehabilitation Port Graham 8/2/95 8/8/95 $438,800

Salmon Incubation Facility Port Graham 5/16/98 7/14/98 $139,600

Subsistence Facilities (Infrastructure)

Chenega Bay Subsistence Support7 Chenega Bay 11/3/94 11/29/94 $85,000

Fish and Game Processing Building Chenega Bay 8/13/99 9/15/99 $260,000

Education and Processing Center Chignik Lagoon 4/3/96 4/17/96 $500,000

Education and Processing Center Chignik Lake 4/3/96 4/17/96 $500,000

Processing Center Ivanof Bay 4/3/96 4/17/96 $150,000

Processing Center Perryville 4/3/96 4/17/96 $150,000

Floating Skiff Dock Port Graham 5/16/98 7/14/98 $82,500

Floating Skiff Dock (supplement) Port Graham 8/13/99 9/6/99 $20,000

Fish and Game Processing Equipment Tatitlek 8/13/99 9/15/99 $10,000

Fish and Game Processing Facility Tatitlek 11/3/94 11/23/94 $187,000

Cultural Education

Subsistence Education Program AKP Villages4

4/3/96 4/17/96 $50,000

Archaeology Display Equipment Chignik Lake 11/23/99 11/24/99 $71,000

Kodiak Youth Spirit Camp Karluk64/3/96 5/2/96 $250,000

Spirit Camp9Nanwalek 8/13/99 9/15/99 $24,000

Subsistence Education Center Perryville 3/31/95 4/20/95 $125,000

Sub. Stewardship & OS Recovery Gathering Tatitlek 3/22/00 3/22/00 $20,000

Nuchek Spirit Camp Tatitlek3

11/3/94 3/7/95 $228,000

Subsistence Management Education Program Tatitlek 4/29/99 $12,000

Local Mariculture Development

Chenega Mariculture Chenega Bay 11/3/94 6/7/95 $337,300

Tatitlek Mariculture Tatitlek 11/3/94 11/23/94 $387,600

Tatitlek Mariculture, Capital Outlay Tatitlek 11/3/94 11/23/94 $606,000

Complete Mariculture Facility Tatitlek 6/1/99 6/24/99 $51,987

Total Awarded, as of 7/00 $5,628,325

Balance of $6,219,611 Available, 7/008

$591,286

1

 Date of State Trustee Council members' consultation and endorsement.

2

 Date of award of grant by commissioner of the Department of Community and Regional Affairs.

3

 Grant administered by Chugach Heritage Foundation. Participation by all Chugach 

 Region communities.

4

 To be developed by the Lake and Peninsula Borough for the five Chignik Area communities.

5 Preliminary award, pending Trustee Council decision to fund remainder from the civil award;

 estimated total cost of $78,226.

6 Grant administered by the Kodiak Area Native Association. Participation by all Kodiak 

 Island Borough communities.

7

 Original award of $100,000 later reduced to $85,000

8 Original appropriation was $5,000,000. In January 1999, the Alaska Legislature made an additional 

 appropriation of $1,219,611 to the program.

9 At the request of the Nanwalek Village Council, the State Trustrees approved reassigning 

 these funds to a Sugtestun Language Immersion Program on August 8, 2000.

Source: Gliva 2000
197

Table VI-8. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council Habitat Protection Program, July 2000

Price

Program Date Size (acres) Type of Sale Trustee Council Total

Large Parcel Program (acquisitions complete)

Afognak Joint Venture6

Apr-98 41,350 surface title $74,133,824 $74,133,824

400 conservation easements

Akhiok-Kaguyak May-95 73,525 surface title $36,000,000 $46,000,000

42,448 conservation easements

Chenega Jun-97 37,236 surface title $24,000,000 $34,000,000

22,284 conservation easements

English Bay1

Feb-97 32,537 surface title $14,128,074 $15,371,420

Eyak2

Jul-97 55,357 surface title $45,100,000 $45,100,000

6,667 conservation easements

13,401 timber easements

Kachemak Bay State

Park inholdings3

Aug-93 23,800 surface title $7,500,000 $22,000,000

Koniag4

Nov-95 59,674 surface title $19,500,000 $26,500,000

55,402 conservation easements 

thru 2001

$2,000,000 $2,000,000

Old Harbor May-95 28,609 surface title $11,250,000 $14,500,000

3,000 conservation easements

65,000 preserved as "private 

wildlife refuge"

Orca Narrows (Eyak Corp.) Jan-95 2,052 timber rights $3,450,000 $3,450,000

Seal Bay/Tonki Cape Nov-93 41,549 surface title $39,549,333 $39,549,333

Shuyak Island5

Dec-95 26,665 surface title $42,000,000 $42,000,000

Tatitlek 1996&97 32,284 surface title $24,550,000 $34,550,000

37,530 conservation easements

Totals 700,770 343,161,231 399,154,577

Small Parcel Program 01/01/99 8,257 fee simple purchase $21,700,000

45 parcels (completed acquisition or offers pending)

1

 2,901 acres of English Bay package still waiting to close

2

 Approximate acreage. Closing completed but transfer pending approval by shareholders on parts of package.

3 Acquired "private inholdings" from the Seldovia Native Corporation.

4

 Continuing negotiations with Koniag concern fee title to 55,402 acres along the Karluk and Sturgeon rivers protected 

under temporary easement which expires in December 2001. Under negotiation was an extention of the easement 

until December 2011,after which Koniag could choose to sell the land or extend the easement for another 

ten years (EVOSTC 2000:1,7).

5 Purchased from the Kodiak Island Borough; $6 million of the sale was committed to expand the Fishery Industrial 

Technology Center.

6 Made up of several Native corporations with holdings on Afognak Island.

Source: EVOSTC 1996b:23-24; 1996c:1-2; 1999; 2000; and web site (EVOSTC n.d.)
198

The goal of the habitat protection program is to protect the habitat of resources injured in the spill 

from further degradation by development, including logging and mining. There are two components of the 

habitat protection program; the large parcel program involving blocks of land in excess of 1,000 acres, and 

the small parcel program involving blocks of land smaller than 1,000 acres (EVOSTC 1998b:19).

In practice, the large parcel program has involved the transfer of lands from Native ownership to

federal or state ownership. Lands purchased in fee simple with funds from the civil and criminal Exxon

settlements are conveyed to the state or federal agency managing adjacent lands. Negotiations have

been conducted with the regional and village corporations in the oil spill impact area. The Trustee Council 

has a policy of considering large parcel land packages only if they include a significant proportion of fee

simple land sales (Barnes 1999). The village corporations of both Chenega Bay and Tatitlek have

enacted land deals with the Trustee Council.

In February 1997, Chenega Corporation signed an agreement with the Trustee Council covering

59,520 acres. Chenega Corporation sold about half of its land holdings in fee simple. They sold

conservation easements in perpetuity on much of the remaining land, including nearly all of Chenega

Island. In compensation, the corporation received $34 million, $10 million of which came from Exxon’s

criminal settlement with the federal government, with the balance coming from the civil settlement funds

(EVOS Trustee Council 1997). Some of the money was distributed to shareholders in an initial

disbursement in January 1997, rumored to be between $30,000 and $47,000 per 100 shares (Miraglia

1997). Some $14 million of the proceeds were placed in an irrevocable trust that will provide shareholder 

dividends in perpetuity (Chenega Corporation Board of Directors 1999: G-4). Chenega Corporation

retained the northern third of LaTouche Island, its holdings on Evans Island, and the site of the former

village on Chenega Island, with no easements or restrictions.

In the spring of 1998, Tatitlek Corporation and the EVOS Trustee Council reached agreement on

a habitat protection package. The corporation received $34,550,000, with $10 million from Exxon’s

criminal settlement with the federal government, the balance from the civil settlement, in exchange for a

combination of conservation easements, timber easements, and fee simple land transfer on 68,914 acres. 

Roughly half of the acreage was transferred in fee simple (EVOS Trustee Council 1998a: 7).

Each of these land agreements contains a clause reserving subsistence rights for community

residents on the lands sold in fee simple to the United States. The clause from the Chenega agreement is 

summarized as follows:

Reserved for the residents of Chenega Bay is a subsistence access easement, which

authorizes the residents to enter upon and travel across the land conveyed for the

purposes of engaging in subsistence. The reservation of this right does NOT [emphasis

in original] mean that Chenega Bay residents have exclusive rights to use the land for

subsistence; it DOES mean that, if Congress amends Title VIII of ANILCA, the residents 

of Chenega Bay have the right in perpetuity to use the land for subsistence in the manner 

that currently exists under Title VIII (Lisowski 1998: 2).
199

The habitat acquisition process has its critics within the Alaska Native community. Among them 

are most of the EVOS “community facilitators.” The community facilitators expressed their concerns in a

letter addressed to the Trustee Council Executive Director in January 1997:

As you know, many of us are opposed to the Habitat Acquisition Program. The reasons 

for this are many, but the main concerns are: a) Tribal Governments are not consulted in 

this process. The creation of for-profit corporations who are tasked with making a profit

for their shareholders has created this belief that Tribal Government[s] have no say in this 

process since the contract is negotiated between the Trustee Council and the

corporations. The philosophies of tribal governments and for profit corporations are at

odds due to the profit making nature of the corporations. The Trustee Council must take 

this “tribal philosophy” into consideration when negotiating land sales through the habitat

acquisition program; b) the land sales are based upon a vote by the corporation

shareholders, many of whom do not live in the villages or have any ties to the village, so

are more readily apt to vote for such a proposal [than] those of us who live here and

depend on these resources for our livelihood; c) many of the village councils in the oil spill 

affected area are establishing traditional natural resource management programs to

manage the resources utilizing traditional knowledge and western science. We feel that

the habitat acquisition program is a slap in the face of these efforts in that this is a

statement that we do not have the knowledge or capability to manage these resources

wisely, so the federal/state government must purchase these lands back so that they can 

managed properly. It seems to be quite ironic, since we, as traditional managers, were

not the ones who created the oil spill. The real tie to restoration, in our opinion, is

ensuring that these natural resources upon which we depend are managed at the local

level, thus providing meaningful employment opportunities in the communities and

providing a sense of contributing to the restoration process (Community Involvement

Facilitators, et al. 1997)

As is pointed out in the letter (b), shareholders in the village corporations are not all community

residents and conversely, not all community residents are shareholders. Under ANCSA, each eligible

Alaska Native who was living in 1971 was issued one hundred shares in the regional and village

corporation in which they enrolled. Shares were not issued to anyone born after December 18, 1971, the 

day Congress passed ANCSA (Berger 1985: 25). Individuals born since 1971 can only obtain shares

through inheritance, or pursuant to a court decree of separation, divorce or child support (ANCSA 1971). 

These limitations on transfer of stock were extended in 1991. Therefore, unless he or she had inherited

stock in the village corporation, an Alaska Native resident of a village born after 1971 would not have any

shares, and would not have a say in village corporation transactions. This also means that proceeds from 

the land sales are unequally distributed. For example, less than half of Chenega Corporation

shareholders were residents of Chenega Bay at the time of the Chenega land sale, and not all residents of 

Chenega Bay were shareholders. This issue divided those who wanted to keep the land from those who 

wanted to sell. It also divided shareholders from the younger members of their own families who do not

own shares because they were born after 1971.

In Chenega Bay, the land sale was a particularly contentious issue. For example, community 

members reported that some people were fired from their jobs because of their vocal opposition to the

land sale (Miraglia 1996).
200

Some Chenega Bay residents have asserted that the land sale was carried out without proper

consultation with the tribal government, the Chenega Bay IRA Council (Miraglia 1997). This assertion is

based, in part on ANSCA section 3.(j), which defines a “Village Corporation” as:

...an Alaska Native Village Corporation organized under the laws of the State of Alaska

as a business for profit or nonprofit corporation to hold, invest, manage and/or distribute

lands, property, funds, and other rights and assets for and on behalf of a Native Village in 

accordance with the terms of this act (ANCSA 1971: 3).

These residents contend that the phrase “for and on behalf of” indicates the intention of Congress that the 

village corporation be responsive and responsible to the village government, and therefore should not

have sold village lands without the approval of the village government. They also point to the 1991

amendments to ANCSA, in which Alaska Land Bank provisions are automatically extended to include

lands conveyed under ANCSA. Section (d)(3) states that:

Action by a trustee: (A) Except as provided in this paragraph and in section 14(c)(3) of

the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act no trustee, receiver, or custodian vested

pursuant to applicable Federal or State law with a right, title or interest of a Native

individual or Native Corporation shall; (I) assign or lease to a third party; (ii) commence

development or use of, or; (iii) convey to a third party, and right, title, or interests in land,

subject to the exemptions described in paragraph (1) (United States 1990:2-3).

Chenega Bay residents who opposed the land sale asserted that the trust role of the Federal government 

in relation to Native lands did not end with ANCSA. They charged that the Federal government’s pursuit

of the purchase of lands conveyed under ANCSA was a violation of their trust responsibilities and was

prohibited under Alaska Land Bank provisions (Miraglia 1999).

A community leader in Chenega Bay who was opposed to the land sale said the primary reason

so many shareholders were for the land sale was that their finances were in bad shape and they were

being told they would still have use of the land after selling it. She said they seemed to think they would

get a lot of money and not really lose anything. She said the land deal was being sold to shareholders

with the line, “You will never need money again.” According to this respondent, the corporation was told

that the Trustee Council would fund a Chenega Bay Cultural Center if they agreed to the land sale, and

funding for additional beach cleanup was also made contingent on support for the land sale (Miraglia 

1996).

This individual was concerned that once the land was gone, Chenega would become part of a

new “Valdez-Cordova borough,” in the process losing much of its power to make decisions affecting the

daily lives of community residents. She feared, for example, the Chenega Bay School and its budget

could fall under the control of the borough government. In her opinion, the only reason Chenega had a

voice at all in the oil spill and its aftermath was because of the residents' status as land owners. She saw 

a landless Chenega as voiceless and powerless. She feared a future in which the U.S. Forest Service

could change the rules with regard to subsistence uses of the National Forests (much of the land sold by

Chenega Corporation in fee simple has been made part of the Chugach National Forest). If this
201

happened, in her view, Chenega would have no say. This person was of the opinion that some recent

immigrants to Chenega came to take advantage of the post-spill boom and to take part in any settlement. 

She partly blamed this group of people for the land sale (Miraglia 1996).

A resident who supported the land sale stated that it was done to preserve the land and stop the

logging. In his view, logging would have been detrimental to tourism, and would have had an adverse

effect on wildlife. This person felt that the opening of the road to Whittier would open the western side of 

the Sound to tourism, and he wanted the community to be in a position to take advantage of related

opportunities. By selling the land rather than logging it, he stated, the value of the land for tourism is

preserved, and shareholders obtain the capital needed to get a start in the tourism industry. He pointed

out that under the terms of the land deal, community residents retain the right to subsistence hunt and fish 

on the lands they sold. He said that preservation of subsistence is better with the lands sold than it would 

have been if those lands had been logged. He believed that regardless of land ownership, the voice of the 

village would still be heard, saying, “Even if we had a million acres of land, if what we were saying went

against the rest of society would they listen to us then? If what we have to say is pertinent, we will be

heard, whether we own land or not” (Miraglia 1996).

A third resident said he believed that the sale of Chenega Corporation lands, and the “invasion” of 

the community by outsiders will have more of an effect on the community than the spilled oil. In his view, 

the full impact of the land sale cannot yet be fully understood. He thought that the younger generation, the 

children of the shareholders who do not themselves own shares in the corporation, will return to the village 

because they will not have the free income their parents are receiving. He pointed out that the money

Chenega Corporation received from the EVOS Trustee Council and the federal government in exchange

for the land deal, $34 million, amounted to roughly $0.5 million per shareholder. He said, “The

government offered so much money, shareholders felt they couldn’t refuse the offer.” This respondent

said that the influx of cash will have a significant impact on the community, but he did not think the loss of 

ownership of the land is significant. He said, “They [the land managers] are too far away to make a

difference. I’ll still do whatever I would have done anyway” (Miraglia 1998b).

As of May 1999, the population of Chenega Bay was down roughly one-third from what it was prior 

to the oil spill. Following the tsunami, the diaspora, the re-establishment of the village, the oil spill, and all 

the subsequent uncertainties, the land sale further reduced residents’ connection to the land and

community. It also provided disaffected residents with the money they needed to move away. None of 

these factors can be viewed in isolation; the effect is cumulative.

Tatitlek has been established at the present location for a much longer period of time, and the

Chief and Village Council have worked hard to provide local employment and economic development. So 

far, most residents have remained in Tatitlek.

It is asserted by some that a shareholder in one of the village corporations died shortly after

receiving the initial dividend resulting from the sale of land by his corporation. He reportedly died following 

a protracted spending and drinking binge. One community resident referred to this as “the first

corporation murder” (Miraglia 1997).
202

In the mid-1990s, the EVOSTC offered to buy many Native-owned lands within the boundaries of 

the Kenai Fjords National Park as part of a habitat protection program (Stanek 2000). In deciding what to 

do with their park inholdings, the communities of Nanwalek and Port Graham took very different actions. 

Many residents of both villages whose ancestors once lived along the outer Kenai Peninsula coast

maintained a strong affiliation with these areas, and some people were interested in using and perhaps

occupying their traditional homelands. Others thought the area too remote and preferred money to spend 

as they wished. The expressed policy of the Port Graham Corporation, for example, was to allow

settlement of many of its lands along the outer coast in Windy Bay and Rocky Bay (Norman 1997). This 

would enable people who once lived in those areas to have either permanent or seasonal habitations and 

to pursue subsistence activities. According to Norman, many people in Port Graham still remember the

days and ways of living in Windy Bay, Port Chatham, and Dogfish Bay, and wish to pass on knowledge of 

those areas to their children. In addition, by opening a logging road from Port Graham to Windy Bay and 

Rocky Bay, easier access would be gained to an outer coast harbor for people who wish to travel by boat 

to more distant locations such as Nuka Bay, Yalik Bay, and other former settlement locations. As of mid2000, the Port Graham Corporation had not sold its lands to the EVOS habitat program, and no

negotiations were in progress. 

Exactly how the lands still owned by Port Graham will be used remains to be seen. However, in 

the words of the late Walter Meganack Sr. (1982), “we always considered that area (the fjords) as a

reserve for our future subsistence needs.” For many residents of the study communities, the concept of

land ownership and selling the lands used for subsistence purposes runs contrary of traditional beliefs. 

Mary Malchoff (1997) noted that, “people never needed to own the land they lived on, they moved about

and settled in areas they needed to use. Today young people need land as collateral to get going.” 

However, there persists the concept of “the land being there for the harvest of resources,” that the Kenai 

Fjords lands will be there for future generations, and young people will have to learn what to do with it.

In contrast, the English Bay Corporation Board decided to sell over 32,000 acres of its park

inholdings for $15 million as part of the EVOS program. In the Board’s estimation, the park in-holdings 

were too distant and remote for any reasonable access by their shareholders, and the area should remain 

pristine and undeveloped (J. Kvasnikoff 1998). In addition, Corporation president Don Emmal (1997:3)

stated that, “Our lands must provide for our people forever,” and the step taken to do so was the

placement of $500,000 from the sale in a cultural and archeological trust fund. The fund’s purpose is to

establish and operate a cultural resource program with the National Park Service to promote cultural

resource protection, studies and interpretation of the history and artifacts within the park, and to train and 

employ Nanwalek youth in these activities. The remainder of the funds were to be distributed to

corporation shareholders. 

Although all the English Bay Corporation lands were sold fee simple, shareholders maintained

subsistence rights to 6,068 acres in the vicinity of Beauty Bay and the North Arm of Nuka Bay. Rights of 

access to archaeological sites and artifacts have been retained for all English Bay in-holdings (U.S.

Department of the Interior 1997). The Kenai Fjords National Park itself is closed to subsistence hunting
203

and fishing, however private lands are subject to state regulations. Unique in this agreement is the

reservation of trespass rights for shareholders, as noted in the following:

...a shareholder of EBC [sic; English Bay Corporation] and such shareholder’s immediate 

family which shareholder or immediate family maintains a primary, permanent abode on

the Kenai Peninsula and such elsewhere and has permission of EBC to engage in

subsistence uses on the granted lands to assist his or her immediate family meeting their 

nutritional and other essential needs or for the teaching or cultural knowledge to or by

their immediate family;...(DOI 1997:Warranty Deed page 3)

Mishler (2001:200-204) contrasts the impacts of the “buyback” program in two Kodiak Island

villages, Old Harbor and Akhiok. In May 1995 the Trustee Council purchased 31,609 acres of land from 

the Old Harbor Corporation for $14.5 million. These lands became part of the Kodiak National Wildlife 

Refuge. Mishler (2001:201) notes that:

The urgency of this settlement was undoubtedly prompted by the downturn of commercial fish

prices in the early 1990s. Old Harbor’s economy is focused on commercial and subsistence

fishing, and the board of directors of the Old Harbor Native Corporation is controlled by active

and retired commercial fishing captains. The settlement and the subsequent distribution of

corporation dividend has cushioned the loss of fishing income and has allowed boat owners to

continue making payments on their vessels.

The Old Harbor Native Corporation has kept most of its large buyback monies in Seattle 

real estate investments, paying out modest dividends to its shareholders (under $10,000/year).

According to Mishler (2001:201), the Old Harbor Corporation’s decision about how to invest and

distribute the proceeds from the land sales encountered little dissension among shareholders, in direct

contrast to what happened at Akhiok. The Akhiok-Kaguyak Corporation sold 118,674 acres and received 

$42 million. The corporation president favored investing in a trust fund of stocks and bonds, but other

shareholders wanted large dividend payments instead. They voted out the corporation president and went 

to court to win a large payout. The suit was settled out of court. Before being forced out of office, the

president managed to create a trust fund with a portion of the sale funds. Mishler (2001:201) notes:

This trust fund now pays shareholders about $500/month and the corporation also pays them

about $500/month. Akhiok-Kaguyak shareholders have improved their standard of living by

investing in new satellite dishes, 4-wheelers, boats, and outboard motors, but they are still

feuding. As a result of these payouts, one Akhiok family has moved to Anchorage and its

members have become seasonal residents, returning in the summers.

The Trustee Council’s small parcel program also has had important economic effects in some

villages. Case VI-1 describes these effects in Old Harbor.
204

Case VI-1. The Small Parcel Program in Old Harbor

The Trustee Council’s small parcel buyback program was targeted at individual

Native allotments, many of which are also in the Refuge. Between March 1996 and

1998, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service purchased 28 Native allotments, mostly from

elders, and it has plans to buy several more. The funding for the small parcel program

has come from a variety of sources, including the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill criminal

restitution funds, the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill civil restoration funds, and Congressional

appropriations from the Land and Water Conservation Fund. The parcels are largely

located along the coasts of Kiliuda Bay, Sitkalidak Strait, and Three Saints Bay. 

The total acreage purchased for these 28 parcels is 2,923 acres, for an average

size of 104.4 acres each, and the total amount paid to allotment holders is $3.49 million, 

an average of $124,704 per parcel (Jerry 1998). According to an earlier estimate (Davis 

1986:193), this is still only a fraction of the 215 parcels and 13,316 acres originally filed 

for by Old Harbor residents. This means that the majority of those with allotment

parcels are still holding on to them.

The impact of this much cash, all tax free, has been quite noticeable. . . Some

people have purchased new cars (referred to as “allotment cars”), new trucks, new boats, 

and new houses with their allotment money, while others have invested in large satellite 

dishes that bring in hundreds of TV channels. All of these acquisitions are an indirect

result of the oil spill. . . 

Unlike the situation in Akhiok, this flow of cash into Old Harbor has not created 

much additional tension and conflict because most of the sold allotments belonged to

elders, people who were used to getting by all of their lives on very low incomes, and

everyone is happy to see the elders treated well. Some allotments were jointly held by

the heirs of the original allotment holders and accordingly subdivided the money within 

the family. And, very importantly, some of the allotment money has stayed in the

community. Several villagers now benefit from jobs installing and maintaining satellite 

dishes and cable TV. 

Source: Mishler 2001:205

SUMMARY: CONDITIONS CAUSED BY THE SPILL

Over its three phases of response, cleanup, and restoration, the EVOS created new 

environmental, economic, and political conditions. Some of these were, in retrospect, short-lived, while

others have persisted and appear to have become part of the natural and sociopolitical landscape.

As described above, the spill initially created an atmosphere of confusion, crisis, and uncertainty. 

No one could say what the long-term effects of the 11 million gallons of oil would be on the natural

environment. Studies to determine these effects were cloaked in secrecy and clouded by litigation. The 

result was competing claims that were still not resolved ten years after the event.
205

The combination of natural resource injuries and uncertainty created doubt and distrust for the

many families whose food supply and way of life depend upon subsistence fishing, hunting, and gathering. 

Both industry and government were unprepared to provide answers to those whose observations and

traditional knowledge urged caution about the safety of eating subsistence foods. Thus confidence in

subsistence resources and the ability to enact associated social and cultural processes were undermined.

The spill also brought short and long-term changes to the local economies of Pacific Gulf

communities. The future of commercial fishing was threatened. But large amounts of cash entered the

local economy in 1989 through cleanup jobs. Of more lasting consequence, the restoration phase brought 

money into communities through research and enhancement programs, and projects to enhance

community infrastructure and educational and cultural institutions. The habitat protection program also

resulted in Native corporations receiving large restoration fund payments. 

Additionally, the political environment changed. The restoration program created a powerful new

entity, the EVOS Trustee Council, with which local communities interacted and negotiated. One

consequence was pressure to sell Native land. This led to social disruptions and the potential loss of

political and economic influence. Another consequence was opportunity to tap into restoration funds for a 

variety of natural resource and sociocultural programs. This was difficult once the court rejected the

Native claim against Exxon for cultural damages. Alaska Native communities needed to convince state

and federal bureaucracies that they should be part of the “ecological approach” to restoration within their

own homelands. The next two chapters will describe how the communities and households of the spill

region adapted to these conditions and uncertainties.
207

Chapter Seven: Economic and Sociocultural Effects of the

Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on Resident Human Groups - I

The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill set in motion the wheels of industry and government at the highest

levels. Huge and costly programs were instituted for cleanup, restoration, and damage settlement, as

described in Chapter Six. At the same time, the oil spill set in motion activities at a local, more personal

level. Resident human groups near the spill area were compelled to action by the industrial failure. It

was near the spill area itself that human groups were most directly and immediately affected by the

drifting oil, oiled coastlines, disrupted fisheries, and contaminated foods.

In the next two chapters, the responses of resident human groups in the spill area are described. 

The primary focus of this chapter is on how household-level groups adapted to events and conditions

triggered by the oil spill. Caught in an unfolding disaster, families nearest the spill area had to make

quick, personal decisions regarding where to be, what to do, and what to eat. These decisions potentially

held long-lasting consequences for the health and well-being of family members. No one was specifically

prepared for these decisions. There had been no preparatory training in how families and villages should 

respond to an oil spill. Forced by circumstance, families and local governments made hard choices about 

how to deal with unforeseen and difficult events. As will be shown in the next two chapters, overall,

residents actively responded to the industrial disaster in ways that protected the well-being of family

members and that preserved traditional social and cultural elements of community life.

Chapters Seven and Eight examine responses related to several important spheres of community 

life – wild food harvests, commercial-wage employment, sharing of wild foods, child socialization, and

roles of elders. Responses are described over the course of events, from the first frantic spill year

through ten successive post-spill years of uncertainty, litigation, recovery, and restoration. The

magnitude and kind of response relate to the proximity of communities to the spill center. While some

comparative information on towns and cities are provided, the chapter focuses on households in the

Alutiiq villages of the Pacific Gulf. Information in this chapter is generally presented at the community

level. That is, the measured effects are averaged across all households in a community. In the next

chapter, more details about certain effects are provided by type of households and type of communities. 

Certain findings on changes in wild food harvests and uses have been discussed in detail elsewhere (Fall 

and Field 1996; Fall and Utermohle 1995; Fall and Utermohle 1999; Fall 1999a, 1999c). Because of this, 

this chapter synthesizes key findings, primarily with a series of figures and tables. As discussed in

Chapter One, systematic interviewing took place in a sample of communities for the first five post-spill 

years (1989 through 1993), summarized in Fall and Utermohle (1995). Another round of interviews

occurred in eight communities in September 1998 for what we have called in this report “the tenth postspill year” (Fall and Utermohle 1999).
208

WILD FOOD HARVEST AND USE PATTERNS, THE FIRST POST-SPILL YEAR

“No one’s eating anything out of the ocean anymore”

-- Ouzinkie, June 1989

The production, distribution, and consumption of wild foods by household-level groups were

defining characteristics of the mixed subsistence-cash economy of Alutiiq villages prior to the oil spill (see 

Chapter Five). Wild foods provided a major portion of the nutritional requirements of Pacific Gulf

communities. The annual mean harvest in villages (about 316 pounds per person) supplied about 204

percent of protein requirements and 29 percent of energy (kcal) requirements. As described in Chapter

Five, this part of the village economy (the “subsistence sector”) exists alongside of and is integrated with

the production of goods and services for income (the “commercial-wage sector”). Production and

distribution of wild foods for local consumption were the domain of households and extended household

groups (called a “domestic mode” of economic organization, because household groups are the main

economic firms). Through impacts on the economic activities of household-level groups, the oil spill had

direct effects on the subsistence sector of the village economy.

The Exxon Valdez oil spill had profound impacts on how households produced, distributed, and

shared wild foods in Alutiiq villages nearest the spill (Fall and Field 1996; Fall and Utermohle 1995; Fall

and Utermohle 1999; Fall 1999a). During the year following the spill, the volume of wild food harvests in

ten Alutiiq villages of Prince William Sound, Lower Cook Inlet, and Kodiak Island declined substantially. 

Counting all wild foods, subsistence harvests declined 56.9 percent in Prince William Sound, 48.3 percent 

in Lower Cook Inlet, and 49.9 percent on Kodiak Island (Fig. VII-1, Table VII-1). By community, harvests 

declined from 77 percent (Ouzinkie) to 9 percent (Akhiok) (Fig. VII-2). In the spill area excluding the

Alaska Peninsula, subsistence harvest quantities declined by more than half (51.1 percent) compared

with pre-spill levels. The magnitude of effects on wild food harvests was related to the distance of the

village from the spill center. By virtue of distance and timing over the course of 1989, wild food

production was not measurably affected in Alutiiq villages of the Alaska Peninsula more distant from the

spill center. During the first post-spill year, subsistence harvests were relatively stable in four of the five

Alaska Peninsula villages and increased in the fifth village (Chignik Lake) because of an increased

caribou harvest. Overall, wild food harvests were 20.7 percent greater over pre-spill levels in Alaska

Peninsula villages. Even here, however, there were disruptions to particular activities such as marine

invertebrate gathering, salmon fishing, and bird hunting. Resources suspected of contamination were

discarded (Fall et al. 1995:213).

Changes in the average number of subsistence resources used, harvested, received, and shared 

mirrored those of harvest quantities in the first post-spill year both at the community level and the

subregional level (Tables VII-2 through VII-5; Figures VII-3 through VII-12). During the year after the spill, 

a more narrow range of resources was used by households (Fig. VII-3 and VII-4). Households attempted 

to harvest a smaller set of species (Fig. VII-5 and VII-6). The numbers of different kinds of wild foods
209

Table VII-1. Changes in Characteristics of Subsistence Uses by

Subregion, Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill Averages

Characteristic Pre-Spill Post-Spill

Region Average Year Change

Per Capita harvests (pounds)

Prince William Sound 436.5 188.3 -56.9%

Lower Cook Inlet 254.3 131.4 -48.3%

Kodiak Island Borough 392.1 196.3 -49.9%

Alaska Peninsula (AKP) 287.0 346.4 20.7%

All Regions 352.0 218.2 -38.0%

All Regions, except AKP 370.5 181.1 -51.1%

Average number of resources used per household

Prince William Sound 19.0 9.0 -52.6%

Lower Cook Inlet 22.9 12.2 -46.7%

Kodiak Island Borough 15.4 11.2 -27.3%

Alaska Peninsula (AKP) 15.7 17.6 12.1%

All Regions 16.9 12.5 -26.0%

All Regions, except AKP 17.2 11.2 -34.9%

Average number of resources attempted to harvest per household

Prince William Sound 12.5 5.7 -54.4%

Lower Cook Inlet 16.1 9.2 -42.9%

Kodiak Island Borough 11.8 7.9 -33.1%

Alaska Peninsula (AKP) 10.3 12.3 19.4%

All Regions 12.3 8.9 -27.6%

All Regions, except AKP 12.7 8.0 -37.0%

Average number of resources harvested per household

Prince William Sound 11.5 5.2 -55.0%

Lower Cook Inlet 15.4 8.6 -44.2%

Kodiak Island Borough 11.5 7.6 -33.7%

Alaska Peninsula (AKP) 9.8 11.4 16.9%

All Regions 11.8 8.4 -29.0%

All Regions, except AKP 12.3 7.6 -38.3%

Average number of resources received per household

Prince William Sound 11.3 4.8 -57.5%

Lower Cook Inlet 12.3 6.6 -46.3%

Kodiak Island Borough 6.6 5.5 -16.7%

Alaska Peninsula (AKP) 9.1 9.8 7.7%

All Regions 8.3 6.5 -21.7%

All Regions, except AKP 8.1 5.6 -30.9%

Average number of resources given away per household

Prince William Sound 9.1 4.0 -56.2%

Lower Cook Inlet 8.1 5.5 -31.8%

Kodiak Island Borough 4.5 4.3 -4.2%

Alaska Peninsula (AKP) 5.8 6.7 17.0%

All Regions 5.6 5.0 -10.8%

All Regions, except AKP 5.6 4.6 -18.6%

Source: ADF&G 2001 and Division of Subsistence, ADF&G, Household Surveys
210

Figure VII-1. Changes in Subsistence Harvests, Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-spill 

Averages, by Sub-Region

-56.9%

-48.3% -49.9%

20.7%

-38.0%

-51.1%

-70%

-60%

-50%

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

Prince William

Sound

Lower Cook Inlet

Kodiak Island

Borough

Alaska Peninsula

All Regions

All Regions, except

AKP

Change in Subsistence Harvests.

Source: ADF&G 2001

 Figure VII-2. Changes in Subsistence Harvests after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 15 Study 

Communities of the Oil Spill Area

-57% -56%

-51% -47%

-52%

-32%

-59%

-40%

-9%

9%

-6%

60%

5%

-1%

-77%

-100%

-80%

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

CHENEGA BAY

TATITLEK

NANWALEK

PORT GRAHAM

OUZINKIE

PORT LIONS

LARSEN BAY

KARLUK

OLD HARBOR

AKHIOK

CHIGNIK BAY

CHIGNIK LAGOON

CHIGNIK LAKE

IVANOF BAY

PERRYVILLE

Percent Change Compared to Pre-spill Average.

Increased caribou harvests account for 57% of this 

change.

Source: ADF&G 2001
211

Table VII-2. Subsistence Harvests in Pounds Usable Weight per Person, Oil Spill Area Alaska Native Villages1

Pre-spill Harvests,

 Lbs. per Capita

Prespill 1989

Community

Year 

One2

Year 

Two3Value4

(Spill 

Year) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1998

Chenega Bay 316.4 375.1 346.6 148.3 139.2 343.9 412.5 274.8 576.9

Tatitlek 352.5 643.5 483.4 214.8 152.7 346.0 308.0 270.1 406.4

Prince William Sound 341.2 543.1 436.5 188.3 147.5 345.1 357.1 272.5 478.1

Nanwalek 284.7 284.7 140.9 181.3 258.8 279.0 304.9 253.9

Port Graham 228.8 228.8 122.2 214.0 280.4 272.8 212.1 253.4

Lower Cook Inlet 254.3 254.3 131.4 196.7 269.6 275.9 253.6 253.7

Akhiok 519.5 162.4 325.9 297.7 305.5 313.3 321.1 321.1 321.1

Karluk 863.1 385.2 618.1 254.9 401.5 268.7 268.7 268.7 268.7

Larsen Bay 403.5 210.7 309.5 212.0 344.5 294.6 353.2 451.0 370.5

Old Harbor 489.4 425.4 456.3 272.3 331.6 390.9 300.4

Ouzinkie 376.1 404.8 389.3 88.9 205.2 209.4 347.1 218.2 264.0

Port Lions 279.8 333.9 307.2 146.7 192.9 239.1 285.3 331.5 331.5

Kodiak Island Borough 441.2 343.5 392.1 196.3 280.8 285.7 328.7 315.4 308.3

Chignik Bay 187.9 187.9 208.9 281.1 353.4

Chignik Lagoon 220.3 220.3 211.4 211.4 211.4

Chignik Lake 279.0 279.0 453.0 447.6 442.3

Ivanof Bay 455.7 455.7 489.9 489.9 489.9

Perryville 391.1 391.1 394.4 394.4 394.4

Alaska Peninsula 287.0 287.0 346.4 366.5 386.6

All Communities 371.8 332.1 352.0 218.2 271.1 312.9

All Communities, w/o

 Alaska Peninsula5

395.9 345.0 370.5 181.1 243.4 289.9 320.3 297.1 312.4

1 Because not all communities were surveyed in every study year, missing values were interpolated based upon the trend for 

 known values and held constant for years subsequent to the final study year. 

2 Equals 1984/85 for Chenega Bay, 1987/88 for Tatitlek, 1982/83 for Kodiak Island Borough, and 1984 for Alaska Peninsula.

3 Equals 1985/86 for Chenega Bay, 1988/89 for Tatitlek, and 1986 for Kodiak Island Borough. Otherwise, Year One values 

used to calculate regional average.

4 Equals average of previous estimates if two pre-spill study years available; otherwise, equals single pre-spill estimate.

5 Because post-spill changes were small in Alaska Peninsula villages and no surveys were done there after 1991, this row 

may best depict spill effects.

Post-spill Harvests, Lbs. per Capita
212

Table VII-3. Average Number of Resources Used per Household, Oil Spill Region Study Communities1

Pre-spill Average

 No. Used per HH

Prespill 1989

Community

Year 

One2

Year 

Two3Value4

(Spill 

Year) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1998

Chenega Bay 16.9 20.6 18.8 7.2 9.8 13.2 17.7 15.0 21.3

Tatitlek 17.9 20.5 19.1 10.3 12.5 17.3 17.2 17.1 16.9

Prince William Sound 17.6 20.5 19.0 9.0 11.3 15.5 17.4 16.0 18.8

Nanwalek 25.0 25.0 13.7 22.4 21.2 22.9 22.7 21.5

Port Graham 21.5 21.5 11.2 17.4 22.0 22.1 19.4 16.5

Lower Cook Inlet 22.9 22.9 12.2 19.5 21.6 22.4 20.6 18.3

Akhiok 18.5 7.9 12.6 18.0 17.3 16.7 16.0 16.0 16.0

Karluk 20.9 13.2 17.0 10.9 13.2 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5

Larsen Bay 18.1 13.2 15.4 12.7 16.5 15.4 14.1 14.7 8.6

Old Harbor 18.3 12.8 15.2 13.6 15.2 16.7 17.1 17.4 17.7

Ouzinkie 20.4 16.0 18.3 7.6 13.9 15.2 15.8 12.7 15.1

Port Lions 15.7 12.3 14.0 9.4 11.0 12.5 14.1 15.6 15.6

Kodiak Island Borough 18.2 12.8 15.4 11.2 14.1 14.9 15.3 15.2 15.0

Chignik Bay 12.5 12.5 14.6 14.7 14.7

Chignik Lagoon 10.7 10.7 13.6 13.6 13.6

Chignik Lake 16.0 16.0 19.0 20.2 21.4

Ivanof Bay 18.8 18.8 26.9 26.9 26.9

Perryville 21.6 21.6 19.9 19.9 19.9

Alaska Peninsula 15.7 15.7 17.6 17.9 18.2

All Communities 18.5 16.9 12.5 15.6 16.9

All Communities, w/o

 Alaska Peninsula5

19.1 15.4 17.2 11.2 15.0 16.5 17.2 16.4 16.2

1

 Because not all communities were surveyed in every study year, missing values were interpolated based upon the trend

 for known values and held constant for years subsequent to the final study year. 

2

 Equals 1984/85 for Chenega Bay, 1987/88 for Tatitlek, 1982/83 for Kodiak Island Borough, and 1984 for Alaska Peninsula.

3

 Equals 1985/86 for Chenega Bay, 1988/89 for Tatitlek, and 1986 for Kodiak Island Borough. Otherwise, Year One 

values used to calculate regional average.

4

 Equals average of previous estimates if two pre-spill study years available; otherwise, equals single pre-spill estimate.

5

 Because post-spill changes were small in Alaska Peninsula villages and no surveys were done there after 1991,

 this row may best depict spill effects.

 Resources Used per Household

Post-spill: Average Number of
213

Table VII-4. Average Number of Resources Attempted to Harvest per Household, Oil Spill Region Communities1

Pre-Spill Average

 No. Attempted per HH

Prespill 1989

Community

Year 

One2

Year 

Two3Value4

(Spill 

Year) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1998

Chenega Bay 12.6 15.4 14.1 5.1 6.2 9.6 10.4 10.2 18.2

Tatitlek 11.1 12.3 11.7 6.2 8.4 13.1 12.6 12.2 13.3

Prince William Sound 11.6 13.5 12.5 5.7 7.5 11.5 11.5 11.2 15.5

Nanwalek 18.0 18.0 18.0 10.5 15.4 14.9 17.7 16.8 16.0

Port Graham 14.9 14.9 14.9 8.3 12.1 14.7 14.8 11.6 10.1

Lower Cook Inlet 16.1 16.1 16.1 9.2 13.5 14.8 15.6 13.5 12.3

Akhiok 18.0 6.8 11.8 14.2 13.4 12.6 11.8 11.8 11.8

Karluk 15.3 8.0 11.6 8.3 9.2 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5

Larsen Bay 11.9 7.3 9.4 7.9 10.4 9.8 10.1 9.4 6.8

Old Harbor 16.3 9.8 12.7 9.5 10.0 10.6 10.9 11.1 11.3

Ouzinkie 15.3 12.7 14.0 5.7 9.5 11.1 11.1 8.8 11.6

Port Lions 11.4 9.6 10.5 6.8 7.6 8.3 8.9 9.6 9.6

Kodiak Island Borough 14.3 9.5 11.8 7.9 9.5 10.1 10.4 10.0 10.3

Chignik Bay 8.4 8.4 8.4 10.9 10.1 9.4

Chignik Lagoon 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.8 7.8 7.8

Chignik Lake 9.4 9.4 9.4 13.1 12.8 12.7

Ivanof Bay 15.2 15.2 15.2 22.3 22.3 22.3

Perryville 14.1 14.1 14.1 13.4 13.4 13.4

Alaska Peninsula 10.3 10.3 10.3 12.3 12.0 11.7

All Communities 13.7 11.0 12.3 8.9 10.6 11.4

All Communities, w/o

 Alaska Peninsula 14.5 11.1 12.7 8.0 10.2 11.4 11.7 10.9 11.3

1

 Because not all communities were surveyed in every study year, missing values were interpolated based upon the trend for known 

 values and held constant for years subsequent to the final study year. 

2

 Equals 1984/85 for Chenega Bay, 1987/88 for Tatitlek, 1982/83 for Kodiak Island Borough, and 1984 for Alaska Peninsula.

3

 Equals 1985/86 for Chenega Bay, 1988/89 for Tatitlek, and 1986 for Kodiak Island Borough. Otherwise, Year One values used to 

calculate regional average.

4

 Equals average of previous estimates if two pre-spill study years available; otherwise, equals single pre-spill estimate.

5

 Because post-spill changes were small in Alaska Peninsula villages and no surveys were done there after 1991, this row may

 best depict spill effects.

Post-spill: Average Number of

Resources Attempted per Household
214

Table VII-5. Average Number of Resources Received per Household, Oil Spill Region Study Comunnities1

Pre-Spill Average

 No. Received per HH

Prespill 1989

Community

Year 

One2

Year 

Two3Value4

(Spill 

Year) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1998

Chenega Bay 10.4 9.2 9.8 3.5 5.4 8.0 13.0 10.3 15.1

Tatitlek 11.7 12.7 12.2 5.8 7.1 11.9 12.0 12.1 9.8

Prince William Sound 11.2 11.4 11.3 4.8 6.4 10.1 12.5 11.2 12.1

Nanwalek 15.1 15.1 15.1 6.9 13.1 12.8 14.1 13.5 14.3

Port Graham 10.6 10.6 10.6 6.4 9.3 13.4 14.0 13.0 10.3

Lower Cook Inlet 12.3 12.3 12.3 6.6 10.9 13.1 14.0 13.2 11.8

Akhiok 1.7 1.7 1.7 8.6 8.3 8.0 7.8 7.8 7.8

Karluk 6.6 6.6 6.6 5.4 8.4 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7

Larsen Bay 8.4 8.4 8.4 6.6 10.5 8.8 7.0 8.9 4.0

Old Harbor 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.4 9.1 10.7 9.8 9.0 8.3

Ouzinkie 7.9 7.9 7.9 3.2 6.7 7.4 7.9 6.8 7.3

Port Lions 5.6 5.6 5.6 3.8 4.2 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.1

Kodiak Island Borough 6.6 6.6 6.6 5.5 7.5 7.8 7.5 7.4 6.6

Chignik Bay 7.1 7.1 7.1 6.8 7.8 8.7

Chignik Lagoon 5.2 5.2 5.2 8.2 8.2 8.2

Chignik Lake 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.6 12.3 14.1

Ivanof Bay 9.0 9.0 9.0 16.0 16.0 16.0

Perryville 13.4 13.4 13.4 12.1 12.1 12.1

Alaska Peninsula 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.8 10.5 11.2

All Communities 8.3 8.3 8.3 6.5 8.7 9.8

All Communities, w/o

 Alaska Peninsula5

8.1 8.1 8.1 5.6 8.1 9.3 9.6 9.1 8.4

1

 Because not all communities were surveyed in every study year, missing values were interpolated based upon the trend for 

 known values and held constant for years subsequent to the final study year. 

2

 Equals 1984/85 for Chenega Bay, 1987/88 for Tatitlek, and 1984 for Alaska Peninsula. Data not collected for 

Kodiak Island Borough for Year One (1982/83).

3

 Equals 1985/86 for Chenega Bay, 1988/89 for Tatitlek, and 1986 for Kodiak Island Borough. Otherwise, Year One 

values used to calculate regional average.

4

 Equals average of previous estimates if two pre-spill study years available; otherwise, equals single pre-spill estimate.

5

 Because post-spill changes were small in Alaska Peninsula villages and no surveys were done there after 1991,

 this row may best depict spill effects.

Resources Received per Household

Post-spill: Average Number of
215

Figure VII-3. Changes in Average Number of Resources Used per 

Household, Post-Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill Averages

-62%

-46% -45% -48%

-58%

-33%

-18%

-36%

-11%

43%

17%

27%

19%

-8%

43%

-80%

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

Chenega Bay

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Ouzinkie

Port Lions

Larsen Bay

Karluk

Old Harbor

Akhiok

Chignik Bay

Chignik

Lagoon

Chignik Lake

Perryville

Ivanof Bay

% Change in 1989 Compared to Pre-Spill Average.

Source: ADF&G 2001

Figure VII- 4. Changes in Average Number of Subsistence Resources Used per 

Household, Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-spill Averages, by Subregion

-52.6%

-46.7%

-27.3%

12.1%

-26.0%

-34.9%

-70%

-60%

-50%

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

Prince

William

Sound

Lower

Cook Inlet

Kodiak

Island

Borough

Alaska

Peninsula

All

Regions

All

Regions,

except

AKP

Change in Number of Resources Used.

Source: ADF&G 2001
216

Figure VII-5. Changes in Average Number of Resources Attempted to 

Harvest per Household, Post-Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill 

Averages

-64%

-47% -45% -49%

-59%

-35%

-16% -21% -25%

20%

30%

13%

39%

-5%

47%

-80%

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

Chenega Bay

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Ouzinkie

Port Lions

Larsen Bay

Karluk

Old Harbor

Akhiok

Chignik Bay

Chignik Lagoon

Chignik Lake

Perryville

Ivanof Bay

Percent Change in 1989 Compared to Pre-Spill 

Average.

Source: ADF&G 2001

Figure VII-6. Changes in Average Number of Subsistence Resources 

Attempted to Harvest per Household, Spill Year (1989) Compared to 

Pre-spill Averages, by Subregion

-54.4%

-42.9%

-33.1%

19.4%

-27.6%

-37.0%

-70%

-50%

-30%

-10%

10%

30%

Prince

William

Sound

Lower

Cook Inlet

Kodiak

Island

Borough

Alaska

Peninsula

All

Regions

All

Regions,

except

AKP

Changes in Number of Resources Attempted to 

Harvest.

Source: ADF&G 2001
217

Figure VII-7. Changes in Average Number of Resources Harvested 

per Household, Post-Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill 

Averages

-64%

-48% -42% -46%

-60%

-36%

-17%

-28% -27%

18% 21%

12%

39%

-7%

43%

-80%

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

Chenega Bay

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Ouzinkie

Port Lions

Larsen Bay

Karluk

Old Harbor

Akhiok

Chignik Bay

Chignik Lagoon

Chignik Lake

Perryville

Ivanof Bay

Percent Change in 1989 Compared to Pre-Spill 

Average.

Source: ADF&G 2001

Figure VII-8. Changes in Average Number of Subsistence Resources Harvested 

per Household, Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-spill Averages, by Subregion

-55.0%

-44.2%

-33.7%

-29.0%

-38.3%

16.9%

-70%

-60%

-50%

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

Prince

William

Sound

Lower

Cook Inlet

Kodiak

Island

Borough

Alaska

Peninsula

All

Regions

All

Regions,

except

AKP

Change in Number of Resources Harvested.

Source: ADF&G 2001
218

Figure VII-9. Changes in Average Number of Resources Received 

per Household, Post-Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill 

Averages

-64%

-52% -54%

-40%

-59%

-32%

-21% -18%

1% 0%

60%

8%

-7%

86%

-90%

-70%

-50%

-30%

-10%

10%

30%

50%

70%

90%

110%

Chenega Bay

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Ouzinkie

Port Lions

Larsen Bay

Karluk

Old Harbor

Akhiok

Chignik Bay

Chignik Lagoon

Chignik Lake

Perryville

Ivanof Bay

Percent Change in 1989 Compared to Pre-Spill 

Average.

Note: reliable data not available for 

Akhiok.

Source: ADF&G 2001

Figure VII-10. Changes in Average Number of Subsistence 

Resources Received per Household, Spill Year (1989) Compared to 

Pre-spill Averages, by Subregion

-57.5%

-46.3%

-16.7%

7.7%

-21.7%

-30.9%

-70%

-60%

-50%

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

Prince

William

Sound

Lower

Cook Inlet

Kodiak

Island

Borough

Alaska

Peninsula

All

Regions

All

Regions,

except

AKP

Change in Number of Resources Received.

Source: ADF&G 2001
219

Figure VII-11. Changes in Average Number of Resources Gave Away 

per Household, Post-Spill Year (1989) Compared to Pre-Spill 

Averages

-54% -56%

-34% -30%

-43%

-26%

69%

40%

-9%

-30%

34% 38%

17%

79%

-80%

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Ouzinkie

Port Lions

Larsen Bay

Karluk

Old Harbor

Akhiok

Chignik Bay

Chignik Lagoon

Chignik Lake

Perryville

Ivanof Bay

% Change in 1989 Compared to Pre-Spill Average.

Note: reliable data for Akhiok for pre-spill value are not available.

Source: ADF&G 2001

Figure VII-12. Changes in Average Number of Subsistence 

Resources Given Away per Household, Spill Year (1989) Compared 

to Pre-spill Averages, by Subregion

-56.2%

-31.8%

-4.2%

-10.8%

-18.6%

17.0%

-70%

-60%

-50%

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

Prince

William

Sound

Lower Cook

Inlet

Kodiak

Island

Borough

Alaska

Peninsula 

All Regions

All Regions,

except AKP

Change in Number of Resources Given Away.

Source: ADF&G 2001
220

harvested by households was substantially less (Fig. VII-7 and VII-8). And the giving and receiving of

wild foods among households were markedly reduced (Figs. VII-9 through VII-12).

EXPLANATIONS FOR SUBSISTENCE DECLINES, FIRST POST-SPILL YEAR

The marked declines in production, distribution, and consumption of wild foods were primarily due 

to oil spill factors. As shown in Figure VII-13, a large majority of households (over 60 percent) in

Chenega Bay, Tatitlek, Nanwalek, Port Graham, and Ouzinkie said their subsistence food harvests fell

because of the oil spill. About half the households in Port Lions, Larsen Bay, Karluk, Chignik Lagoon,

and Ivanof Bay provided this same assessment. Figure VII-14 provides household assessments of

whether there was a decline in any subsistence use in 1989 and whether the cause was spill-related. 

Notable again is the strong attribution of cause, especially in communities close to the spill. 

In Alutiiq villages nearest the spill, concern about wild food contamination by oil was by far the

most prevalent explanation given by surveyed households for the marked declines in subsistence

activities. This was also true for all subregions. Figure VII-15 illustrates the frequency of various

explanations offered for changes in overall subsistence resource harvests in 1989. In Lower Cook Inlet,

many households also identified oil spill cleanup work as a reason for lower subsistence harvests and

uses during 1989. Some households also voiced concerns about reduced populations of wildlife due to

oil-induced mortality and reported that they did not hunt as a conservation measure. Case VII-1 provides 

a sampling of statements made by village residents regarding their concerns about subsistence food

contamination and damages to resource populations in 1989.

Figure VII-16 displays the geographic pattern of subsistence resource contamination concerns in

1989. For both subsistence harvests overall and any particular resource, contamination concerns in 1989 

were expressed most frequently in the Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet villages nearest the

spill. About two-thirds of all households in these areas reportedly had lower overall subsistence uses,

and over three-quarters of all households reduced uses of at least one wild food resource due to food

safety issues. The level of concern about food safety was intermediate for households in Alutiiq villages

on Kodiak Island, located farther from the spill. Households in Alutiiq villages of the Alaska Peninsula

reported the lowest level of food safety concerns, as well as the fewest negative effects on wild food

uses.

These findings are consistent with findings from other studies that documented qualitative reports 

of declines in subsistence uses in the year after the oil spill. The “Oiled Mayors” study, for instance, 

found that declines in subsistence activities were related to the degree of exposure of the respondent to

the spill and cleanup activities, supporting the dose-response hypothesis (Impact Assessment, Inc.

1990d: 17,50-60). As shown in Figure VII-17, respondents in the “high-exposed” group reported

substantial reductions in time spent in subsistence activities, sharing of resources, the number of people

involved in subsistence, and involvement of children in subsistence. Respondents in the “low-exposed” 
221

Figure VII-13. Percentage of Households Reporting Lower Overall 

Subsistence Harvests in the Year Following the Exxon Valdez Oil 

Spill

94.1%

80.0%

90.9%

80.9%

62.1%

51.7%

50.0%50.0%

19.0%

30.0%

16.1%

46.7%

19.0%

14.8%

50.0%

0.0%

5.0%

6.1%

10.6%

20.7%

10.3%

20.0%

14.3%

21.4%

10.0%

6.5%

6.7%

4.8%

29.6%

16.7%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Ouzinkie

Port Lions

Larsen Bay

Karluk

Old Harbor

Akhiok

Chignik Bay

Chignik Lagoon

Chignik Lake

Perryville

Ivanof Bay

Percentage of Households.

Decline Due to Oil Spill Reasons Decline Due to Other Reasons

Source: Division of Subsistence, ADF&G, Household Surveys

Figure VII-14. Percentage of Households Reporting a Decline in Any 

Subsistence Resource Harvest in the Year Following the Exxon 

Valdez Oil Spill

100.0%100.0%

93.9%

95.7%

65.5%

72.4%

66.7%

50.0%

33.3%

30.0%

38.7%

46.7%

42.9%

37.0%

66.7%

23.5%

20.0%

45.5%

57.4%

27.6%

41.4%

43.3%

21.4%

54.8%

40.0%

41.9%

40.0%

28.6%

63.0%

16.7%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Ouzinkie

Port Lions

Larsen Bay

Karluk

Old Harbor

Akhiok

Chignik Bay

Chignik Lagoon

Chignik Lake

Perryville

Ivanof Bay

Percentage of Households.

Decline Due to Oil Spill Reasons Decline Due to Other Reasons

Source: ADF&G, Division of Subsistence, Household Surveys
222

Figure VII-15. Percentage of Households Reporting Lower Overall Subsistence Uses 

in the Year Following the Oil Spill and Reasons for the Decline

86.8%

92.3%

56.0%

35.6%

61.4%

84.2%

84.0%

39.8%

22.8%

49.0%

65.8%

63.0%

22.9%

13.9%

33.2%

10.5%

0.0%0.0%

6.9%

2.8%

10.5%

60.5%

15.1%

3.9%

21.2%

10.5%

34.6%

1.8%

6.9%

10.9%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Prince William Sound Lower Cook Inlet Kodiak Island Alaska Peninsula Entire Region

Decline in Overall Harvest Decline Due to Oil Spill

Decline Due to Contamination Concern Decline Due to Scarce Resources

Decline Because Too Busy Working on Spill Cleanup Decline Due to Other Oil Spill Reasons

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence, Household Surveys

Figure VII-16. Household Evaluations of Subsistence Uses in 1989

87% 84%

66%

97% 97%

93% 92%

84%

63%

100%

94%

78%

56%

40%

23%

84%

51%

30%

36%

23%

14%

71%

42%

23%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Overall Uses of

Resources, Any

Reason

Overall Uses of

Resources, Any

Oil Spill Reason

Overall Uses of

Resources,

Contamination

Concerns

At Least One

Resource, Any

Reason

At Least One

Resource, Any

Oil Spill Reason

At Least One

Resource,

Contamination

Concerns

Category and Reason for Lowered Uses (Source: ADF&G Household Surveys)

% of HHs Reporting Lowered Uses.

Prince William Sound Lower Cook Inlet Kodiak Island Borough Alaska Peninsula
223

Case VII-1. Some Explanations for Lower Subsistence Uses in 1989

Oil Contamination

This winter there was a lot of fish we caught that we were leery of, mainly because of oil contamination. 

The fish were looking different. Sometimes we threw them away or didn't eat them. Some red rockfish

looked like they had oil on them. Some smelled like oil. Others looked odd inside. [Chenega Bay]

We usually put up more fish than this year [but] we were afraid that if the fish hadn't been tested, we

could be harmed by the fish. . . We were totally against people eating stuff that hadn't been tested. 

[Tatitlek]

Normally at Ivanof Bay I would put up silvers for smoked fish and pinks for dried fish. [It was] a

depressing year! People seemed scared of the ocean and people had a way below normal interest in

seafood. My kids were deprived of their local seafood diet because [we had a] lack of trust in the ocean. 

[Ivanof Bay]

I usually get butter clams but I stopped after the spill. They say shellfish are the most dangerous because 

of the spill. [Chenega Bay]

I can't go out and get what I want off my beach just to eat without worrying if it is contaminated or I'll get 

poisoned. . . That's why I don't eat nothing off the beach. I don't eat clams no more. [Ouzinkie]

We won't touch clams after that oil was floating around. Not our family anyway. [Chignik Lake]

I didn't go to the same places [as usual] to hunt because of oil on the beach. I've seen deer eating kelp. I 

don't want to shoot [a] deer and find out it has been eating oil. [Tatitlek]

I didn't eat no ducks this year. I didn't want to take a chance on the oil, until they find if it is safe to eat. 

Then I'll go duck hunting. [Chenega Bay]

It was bad. From my personal experience on the oil spill clean up, I saw so many marine mammals

swimming in the oil, with their noses and eyes sticking out of the oil. Their eyes didn't look right. . . I saw 

a sea lion trapped in oil. It made me so sad to see that. And out here, the sea lions crowded on the Bligh 

Reef buoy. I saw too much of oiled marine mammals to hunt them. [Tatitlek]

I was offered sea lion, but I didn't accept it because I was leery of the place it was taken from. I just didn't 

feel comfortable eating it because of the high impact of oil in the harvest area. [Chenega Bay]

Scarcities, Immediate and Potential

People thought there were fewer birds, so we shouldn't harvest to protect the population. We saw lots of 

birds wiped out by the spill. . . There are areas around here like that. People know they are around, but 

not in great numbers, so they are left alone. [Chenega Bay]

I didn't hunt this year as much as last year. I was worried about contamination. Many deer died last

summer. Deer not as plentiful as before. Fishermen saw deer swimming from island to island. My heart 

wasn't in hunting them. I didn't want to hunt them out. [Chenega Bay]

Baby salmon fry that will soon leave the rivers will be the ones most affected. The true test will be when

they return to the rivers in a few years to spawn. I fear for the future of my people. [Perryville]
224

group reported moderate levels of decline. Respondents in the “control” communities (Petersburg and

Angoon) reported relatively little change. The Oiled Mayors study also found differences between

communities that generally corresponded with the geographic relationships found in this report. For

example, a higher percentage of respondents in Chenega Bay, Nanwalek, Tatitlek, Larsen Bay, and

Karluk reported less time involved with subsistence than in Chignik Bay or Akhiok (Impact Assessment

Inc. 1990d:54).

In summary, the experiences of the first year following the spill left the people of the Pacific Gulf

villages with serious questions about the future of subsistence resources and their way of life. The

following three quotations from a community near the spill, mid-distant from it, and at the periphery of the 

extent of oiling reveal the extent and the depth of the injury that people suffered.

We're hungry for Native food. I never thought I would be craving for octopus. But I got a liking 

for it and now when I want it there isn't any. [Chenega Bay]

The other years at least we had no worries about contamination from oil spills and such. We 

were able to rely on our seafoods and other resources. How are our seafoods [now]? I've only

heard rumors that they may be OK, and yet our monitors are still finding oil tarballs on our

beaches. [Nanwalek] 

If everything went dead as a result of this oil spill or others, it would greatly affect the way we

live here since we primarily live off the land. The worst part about the spill is it makes me

uncertain as to how it will affect the resources in the next few years, like whether the salmon

that were fry [in 1989] will return as adults either diseased, in fewer numbers, or if they'll come

back at all. [Ivanof Bay]

SUBSISTENCE HARVESTS AND USES, RECOVERY AFTER THE FIRST POST-SPILL YEAR

During the second through tenth post-spill years, subsistence harvests and uses recovered

gradually in terms of volume, diversity of foods, household participation, and sharing. This is illustrated in 

Fig. VII-18, showing harvests in ten Alutiiq villages in Prince William Sound, Lower Cook Inlet, and Kodiak 

Island. In these communities, wild food harvests had dropped by about half in 1989, the spill year. From 

1989 to 1992, wild food harvests gradually increased from 181 pounds to 320 pounds per person. This

has remained the approximate harvest level to date; the wild food harvest was 312 pounds per person in

1998, almost ten years after the spill. 

Compared with pre-spill harvest levels, wild food harvests are lower on average for the ten Alutiiq 

villages as a whole. As shown in Figure VII-19, this is due largely to lower harvest levels in the Kodiak

villages – 308 pounds per person in 1998 compared with 392 pounds per person in the pre-spill year. By

1998, estimated wild food harvest volumes in Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet were very close 

to pre-spill estimates.

Fig. VII-19 illustrates that wild food harvests diminished for two years in Prince William Sound

villages (Chenega Bay and Tatitlek). Harvest volumes in the second post-spill year (1990) were even

lower than the spill year (1989). Recovery has been slower in the two Prince William Sound villages as
225

Figure VII-17. Changes in Subsistence Activities by Exposure Status, 1988 and 1989 

Compared

78.3%

71.2%

64.2%

56.1% 54.3%

46.9%

36.2%

31.8% 34.2%

25.3% 26.2%

16.3%

8.5%

3.1%

6.8%

2.5% 4.8%

1.5%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Time spent in

subsistence activities

Time spent with other

households in

subsistence activities

Amount of subsistence

foods given away

Amount of subsistence

foods received

Number of household

members engaged in

subsistence harvests

Opportunities for children

to learn subsistence skills

Percentage Reporting Lower.

High-Exposed Low-Exposed Control

Source: Impact Assessment Inc. 1990d:51

 Figure VII-18. Subsistence Harvests in 10 Oil Spill Area 

Communities, Pre-Spill and Post-Spill Averages

396

345

181

243

290

320

297

312

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

Pre-spill,

Year One

Pre-spill,

Year Two

1989 (Spill

Year)

1990 1991 1992 1993 1998

Pounds Usable Weight per Person.

Includes Chenega Bay, Tatitlek, Nanwalek, Port Graham, Akhiok, Karluk, Larsen 

Bay, Old Harbor, Ouzinkie, and Port Lions. Source: ADF&G 2001
226

Figure VII- 19 . Subsistence Harvests in Four Oil Spill Regions

436.5

254.3

392.1

287.0

188.3

131.4

196.3

345.2

147.5

196.7

280.8

365.8

345.1

269.6

285.7

386.6

357.1

275.9

328.7

272.5

253.6

315.4

478.1

253.7

308.3

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

Prince William Sound Lower Cook Inlet Kodiak Island Borough Alaska Peninsula

Pounds Usable Weight per Person.

Pre-spill Average 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1998

Source: ADF&G 2001

Figure VII-20. Average Number of Resources Used per Household, 

Four Oil Spill Subregions

15.4 15.7

9.0

12.2

11.2

17.6

11.3

19.5

14.1

17.9

15.5

21.6

14.9

18.2

17.4

22.4

15.2

16.0

20.6

14.9

18.8 18.3

15.0

22.9

19.0

0

5

10

15

20

25

Prince William Sound Lower Cook Inlet Kodiak Island Alaska Peninsula

Pre-spill 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1998

Source: ADF&G, Division of Subsistence, 

Household Surveys
227

well. This was also true of other indices of subsistence activities, as illustrated in Figures VII-20 through

VII-22. (See also Tables VII-2 through VI-5). Also of note was the change in harvest composition, with

higher harvests of fish and lower harvests of seals and shellfish (Seitz and Miraglia 1995:21; Fall and

Utermohle 1999:32,34), reflecting scarcities and lingering food safety concerns.

EXPLANATIONS FOR SUBSISTENCE HARVEST PATTERNS AFTER THE FIRST POST-SPILL YEAR

Concerns about contaminated wild foods lessened after the first post-spill year. After this,

scarcities in particular wild resource stocks and populations increased as explanations for lowered 

subsistence uses. This explanatory shift is illustrated in Figure VII-23, which compares five communities 

for 1989 and 1993. As an example, 75 percent of Chenega Bay households with spill-related wild food

reductions reported food safety as the reason for lowered subsistence uses in 1989 (with only 9 percent

reporting resource scarcity); whereas, by 1993, 78 percent reported resource scarcity as a cause, with

only 11 percent reporting food contamination.

Figure VII-24 illustrates similar changes in evaluations through 1998 for seven Alutiiq villages. 

Explanations of declines in subsistence uses connected to oil contamination declined from 43.4 percent

of households in 1989 to 7.9 percent by 1993 and 4.1 percent by 1998. Explanations related to scarcity 

grew in frequency from 1.5 percent to 33.3 percent between 1989 and 1993, but dropped to 12.4 percent

of households by 1998.

As illustrated by the comments in Case VII-2, some households increased their wild food harvests 

in years subsequent to the spill despite lingering doubts about food safety. Subsistence activities were

renewed for economic, nutritional, and cultural reasons in these cases. Case VII-3 provides statements

made by village residents after the first spill year about below normal levels of subsistence uses, as well

as reasons for returning to harvesting and eating wild foods.

Case VII-2. In the years after the spill, 

some people used subsistence foods despite their misgivings:

In 1989, we had nothing [i.e,. no subsistence foods]. In 1990, we were scared and

confused. We didn’t know if we should eat them or not. This year [1991], we’re going 

to go for it. We don’t care if we die or not. We live mainly on subsistence anyway. 

[Nanwalek]

We were given some seal taken by another person from the village returning from

Cordova. It was delightful to get that piece. But you wondered whether you wanted to 

eat it or not. But you did anyway. Because at that point you are hungry for it and you 

know it. You just think it is going to be OK and you eat it. [Chenega Bay]
228

Figure VII-21. Average Number of Resources Attempted to Harvest 

per Household, Four Oil Spill Subregions

16.1

11.8

10.3

5.7

9.2

7.9

12.3

7.5

13.5

9.5

12.0

11.5

14.8

10.1

11.5 11.7

15.6

10.4

11.2

13.5

10.0

15.5

12.3

10.3

12.5

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Prince William Sound Lower Cook Inlet Kodiak Island Alaska Peninsula

Pre-spill 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1998

Source: ADF&G, Division of Subsistence Household Surveys

Figure VII-22. Average Number of Resources Received per 

Household, Four Oil Spill Subregions

12.3

6.6

9.1

4.8

6.6

5.5

9.8

6.4

10.9

7.5

10.5 10.1

13.1

7.8

11.2

12.5

14.0

7.5

11.2

13.2

7.4

12.1 11.8

6.6

11.3

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Prince William Sound Lower Cook Inlet Kodiak Island Alaska Peninsula

Pre-spill 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1998

Source: ADF&G, Division of Subsistence Household 

Surveys
229

 Figure VII-23. Changes in Oil Spill-Related Reasons for Reduced 

Subsistence Uses, Selected Communities of the Oil Spill Region

81%

75% 77% 76%

72%

0%

11%

33% 33%

30%

6%

19%

0% 0% 0%

78% 75%

83%

70%

94%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Tatitlek 1989

Chenega Bay 1989

Nanwalek 1989

Port Graham 1989

Ouzinkie 1989

Tatitlek 1993

Chenega Bay 1993

Nanwalek 1993

Port Graham 1993

Ouzinkie 1993

Percentage of Households with Spill-Caused Reductions in 

Subsistence Uses.

Lower Due to Contamination Concern Lower Due to Reduced Populations

Source: ADF&G Household Surveys

Figure VII-24. Household Assessments of Overall Subsistence Uses 

Compared to Before the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1989, 1993, and 1998 

(Seven Communities Combined)

74.9%

1.5%

60.4%

43.4%

62.1%

33.3%

36.8%

7.9%

41.0%

12.4%

20.8%

4.1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Lower, Any Reason Lower, Resource

Scarcity

Lower, Any Oil Spill

Reason

Lower, Oil

Contamination

1989 1993 1998

Source: ADF&G, Division of Subsistence Household Surveys
230

CASE VII-3. REASONS FOR CHANGES IN SUBSISTENCE USES

AFTER THE FIRST POST-SPILL YEAR

Reasons for Continuing Low Harvests and Uses

I usually fish a lot, but I don't want to eat the fish from around here and then find out later that

there was something wrong with them and I shouldn't have. [Chenega Bay, April 1991]

I think it was worse in 1989, but last summer [1990], I was still scared to eat [salmon]. You

wonder if you could get poisoned or sick. [Port Graham, April 1991]

I'm still not sure about them [shellfish]. I used to eat a lot more. That was my upbringing. 

[Ouzinkie, April 1991]

[Harvests of shellfish] were even worse than the year before. It was very poor compared to

normal. I tried to get octopus but couldn't find any. I could get three a night before the spill. I

had to walk ten miles and still didn't find any. I'd still find a few last year, but this year absolutely 

nothing. I know it is because of the oil spill. They either died or the smell of the oil ruined their

homes. That's one of our best foods in the winter. [Tatitlek, April 1991]

You don't just pick clams anyplace anymore. The clams in the area, I'm afraid to use. We went

to Port Ashton, to get as far away from oil as possible, and not go too far away. We're not gonna 

eat clams from the oiled areas. They have the highest level of hydrocarbons of all of them. I still 

hunger for clams, shrimp, crab, octopus, gumboots. Nothing in this world will replace them. To

finally be living in my ancestors' area and be able to teach my kids, but now it's all gone. We still 

try, but you can't replace them. [Chenega Bay 1993]

It was even worse than last year. We are leery of collecting [gull] eggs. There are fewer eggs,

and fewer ducks than before the oil spill. The sky is usually black with ducks during herring 

season, but not this year. [Tatitlek 1991]

I think they [shellfish] are very scarce. You really have to look to get any shellfish or bidarkies. 

You can't go down the beach like we used to. [Port Graham, April 1991]

There aren't as many [birds] since the oil spill. It seemed like it took months before we even seen 

any around. [Ouzinkie, April 1991]

The seals are quite a ways down [in population]. There's hardly any seal you find around here

after the oil spill. We used to get them in Dogfish Bay. Now there's nothing. There's only a few

sea otters. Sea lions are disappearing too. [Nanwalek, April 1991]

I'm real leery of eating seals. I like the liver, kidney, and intestines. That's where the toxins are. 

[Chenega Bay, April 1992]

Seals are very scarce. When you go out on a boat, you seldom see seals or sea lions like before. 

Man, the water is just dead. . . Now we have to go thirty miles by boat to find seals. We used to 

get them less than two miles away from the village. [Chenega Bay, April 1992]

We don't see the animals. We used to have eagles perched out here [on Evans Island], and

grouse and porcupine. [Elrington Passage] is dead. You don't see the little brown ducks. . . 

They're gone. [There are] few seagulls and seals. [Chenega Bay 1993]

[continued on next page]
231

CASE VII-3, CONTINUED

Reasons for Resuming Uses of Subsistence Foods

We caught a lot more salmon this last year [than 1989]. We got away from the fear of oil. We were

getting some information about contamination of fish, that they were not really affected, and we had a

little more time for [fishing]. [Port Graham, 1991]

We just started going out [for shellfish] during the past few months. We did not harvest any during 1989. 

We are starting to trust the shellfish again. We changed our minds because there were samples tested

and the results came back good, saying things were OK. [Nanwalek 1991]

I harvested no birds at all in the year after the spill, but my harvests are back to normal now because I

can see what's going on with them and I got hungry for them. [Ouzinkie 1991]

We harvested more salmon [in 1990-91 than in 1989] because we believe that fish are safe to eat again. 

We have more confidence [in the safety of shellfish] since the spill is over. [Karluk 1991]

Our [deer harvest] was less than usual, even less than 1989. There were less deer to hunt. We were

afraid to eat them, worried about oil. We ate them anyway, because otherwise we wouldn't have anything 

to eat. We say, "At least if we die from it, we all die together." [Tatitlek, April 1991]

We started craving for it [seal meat]. We could only go so long without it. We get tired of eating beef and 

chicken. We wouldn't touch [seal] that first year after the spill. [Now] subsistence food is on our table at

least twice a week. [Tatitlek, April 1991]

There was a big increase [in harvests] in 1990 over 1989. We had a great need and were willing to take

the risk of contamination because we needed the food and nutrition. [Port Graham, April 1991] 
232

Villagers’ concerns about food contamination can be evaluated in more detail by examining

responses to questions about the safety of eating particular items. As illustrated in Figure VII-25, 80.2

percent of the oil spill area respondents to the social effects question “Are Seals Safe for Children to

Eat?” answered in the affirmative during the last round of interviews in their community. Confidence in

the safety of eating seal was lowest in Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet communities nearest

the spill (72.8 percent), higher in Kodiak Island communities (87.1 percent), and highest in Alaska

Peninsula communities (100 percent). As shown in Figure VII-26, in the third through the fifth post-spill 

years, the oil spill was the major reason for distrust of the safety of eating seals.

This question was repeated in eight study communities in 1998 (Fig. VII-27). A large majority of

respondents in all communities expressed confidence that seals were safe to eat, while about 14 percent 

overall said “no” or were not sure. In contrast to earlier findings, by 1998 the oil spill was no longer the

prevailing explanation for uncertainty about the safety of eating seal (Figure VII-28). Only 3.5 percent of

respondents cited the spill as a reason for children not to eat seals; 10.4 percent gave other reasons,

largely having to do with general ocean pollution.

Assessments of the safety of eating clams show some interesting similarities and contrasts to the 

assessments of seals. In the last round of social effects surveys, about 75 percent of households said

clams were safe for children to eat (Fig. VII-29). As with seals, confidence in the safety of clams was

lowest in the Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet villages (59 percent). For those who distrusted 

clams, oil contamination was the dominant explanation (Fig. VII-30). 

By 1998, reported confidence in the safety of clams had improved in Chenega Bay and Tatitlek,

the Alutiiq villages nearest the spill (Fig. VII-31). Oil contamination had declined markedly as a cause of

suspicion in all the villages (Fig. VII-32). However, distrust of clams had increased in Kodiak Island

communities as a result of concerns about paralytic shellfish poisoning (PSP) (Fig. VII-33). Two highly

publicized cases of PSP had occurred on Kodiak Island during this period – a woman at Old Harbor and a 

man at Karluk had consumed tainted clams – and annual warnings about PSP were issued by the Alaska 

Department of Environmental Conservation.

These findings clearly show why households nearest the spill reduced their subsistence harvests

during the first and second post-spill years. Families nearest the spill made hard choices to reduce wild

food harvests because of an over-riding desire to protect the health of family and community members. 

At the time of the spill, there was considerable uncertainty in the public about the toxicity of crude oil and

the health risks to humans exposed to crude oil through the food chain. Refined petroleum products 

used in Alutiiq villages, such as boat fuel and stove oil, were generally known by local residents to be 

highly toxic. However, the level of toxicity of crude oil was not generally known (see Chapter Six). Given 

the high level of uncertainty, families made a conservative choice to forego wild food uses rather than risk 

potentially serious health problems. As discussed below, this line of action was feasible because of

short-term employment options for households in oil spill cleanup and response programs.
233

Figure VII-25. Percentage of Households that Use Seals for 

Subsistence that Believe Seals are Safe for Children to Eat, by 

Community Type (1992 or 1994)

72.8%

87.1%

100.0%

80.2%

95.7%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Prince William

Sound and Cook

Inlet

Kodiak Island Alaska Peninsula All Oil Spill Region

Communities

Arctic Communities

Source: ADF&G 

Division of Subsistence 

SEQ Surveys

Figure VII-26 . Reasons Why Seals Not 

Safe to Eat, through 1994

63%

30%

7%

Oil Spill

Other

No Reason
234

Figure VII-27. Are Seals Safe for Children to Eat? Responses in 

1998

71.4%

86.7%

93.3%

72.4%

90.2%

81.3%

91.9%

86.4%

86.1%

7.1%

4.4%

0.0%0.0%

2.4%

12.5%

2.7%

2.3%

3.6%

21.4%

8.9%

6.7%

27.6%

7.3%

6.3%

5.4%

11.4%

10.3%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Cordova

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

ALL COMMUNITIES

Safe Unsafe Not Sure

Source: ADF&G SEQ Household Surveys

Figure VII-28. Reasons for Uncertainty about the Safety of Eating 

Seal, 1998

7.1%

5.4%

0.0%

3.4%

2.4%

6.3%

2.7%

2.3%

3.5%

21.5%

10.8%

6.7%

24.2%

7.4%

12.5%

5.4%

11.3%

10.4%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Cordova

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

ALL COMMUNITIES

Percentage of Valid Responses.

EVOS Contamination Other Reasons

Note: "other reasons" includes those 

households that did not cite EVOS 

contamination, including those who have no 

reason for their uncertainity.

Source: ADF&G, Division of Subsistence, SEQ 

Household Surveys
235

Figure VII-29. Percentage of Households Using Clams that Believe 

that Clams are Safe for Children to Eat by Community Type (1992 or 

1994)

59.2%

80.9%

74.3% 74.9% 74.5%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

PWS and LCI

Villages 

Other PWS and LCI All PWS and CI

Communities

Kodiak and AKP

Communities

All Oil Spill

Communities

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence SEQ Household Surveys

Figure VII-30. Reasons for Believing Clams Unsafe to Eat, Latest 

Study Year through 1994

76.5%

50.0%

65.5%

13.7%

41.3%

5.9%

8.3%

6.9%

41.2%

23.5%

22.9%

41.6%

31.0%

43.1%

36.7%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

PWS and LCI

Villages

Other PWS and LCI All PWS and CI

Communities

Kodiak and AKP

Communities

All Oil Spill

Communities

% of Households Believing Clams Unsafe.

Spill PSP Other Source: ADF&G, Division of 

Subsistence, SEQ Household Surveys
236

Figure VII-31. Percentage of Respondents Who Believe Clams are 

Safe for Children to Eat

20.0%

78.1%

81.5%

65.4%

83.3%

56.0%

44.2%

44.4%

33.3%

76.3%

85.7%

53.3%

69.4%

69.6%

40.0%

79.2%

94.9%

60.0%

71.2%

61.7%

72.7%

60.0%

78.8%

22.7%

10.7%

39.5%

2.2%

43.9%

84.6%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega

Bay

Cordova Larsen Bay Nanwalek Old Harbor Ouzinkie Port

Graham

Tatitlek

1991 1992 1993 1998

Source: ADF&G Division of 

Subsistence, SEQ Household 

Surveys

Figure VII-32. Are Clams Safe for Children to Eat? 

Percentage of Respondents Saying "No" Due to EVOS 

Contamination

33.3%

2.1%

5.6%

11.5%11.6%

7.4%

7.1%

8.0%

4.3%

10.4%

50.0%

2.6%

13.3%

17.4%

2.9%

12.2%

8.4%

15.5%

53.3%

11.0%

9.1%

23.3%

19.1%

2.6%

3.8%

11.7%

13.6%

20.0%

3.0%

0.0%

17.9%

4.9%

22.7%

0.0%

10.9%

4.7%

9.2%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

Chenega Bay

Cordova

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

All Communities

All, w/out Cordova

1991 1992 1993 1998

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence SEQ Household Surveys
237

Figure VII-33. Are Clams Safe for Children to Eat? 

Percentage of Respondents Saying "No" Due to PSP

0%0%0%0%

9%

0%0%

16%

1%

4%

0%0%

3%

0%0%

10%

2%

4%

7%

4%

0%

3%

0%0%0%

2%

3%

2%

8%

8%

75%

49%

64%

29%

65%

19%

46%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Cordova

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

All Communities

All, w/out Cordova

1991 1992 1993 1998

Source: ADF&G Division of 

Subsistence SEQ Household 

Surveys

Figure VII-34. Were You Adequately Informed about the Safety of 

Subsistence Foods? Percentage of Respondents Answering "Yes." 21.4% 37.5% 41.4% 59.0% 50.0%62.1% 36.1% 64.0% 37.9%51.6% 66.7% 61.5% 81.4% 53.6%

59.1%

19.0%

33.3%

53.3%

31.9%

39.4%

48.4%

71.4%

39.6%

49.4%

57.1%

28.6%

54.5%

33.3%

75.0%

39.6%

39.3%

36.2%

60.0%

25.0%

50.0%

40.6%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Tatitlek

Cordova

Valdez

Port Graham

Nanwalek

Seldovia

Kenai

Ouzinkie

Kodiak

Larsen Bay

Karluk

Old Harbor

Chignik Bay

Chignik Lake

1991 1992 1993

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence 

SEQ Household Surveys
238

During the first post-spill year, information on food safety derived in part from local observations

by community members. In Chenega Bay, one hunter butchered a seal with an abnormal liver – it was

soft and runny, rather than firm. Another resident observed that the arm of a starfish fell apart when the

animal was pulled from the rocks. A blind sea lion was observed in September 1990. Reports circulated 

about dead eagles, sea gulls, and a black bear. These were considered unusual occurrences (Evanoff

1990). Such observations of abnormalities fed into the corpus of information regarding potential health

risks of consuming wild foods harvested from the spill area. 

Many households were concerned that food safety information issued by public agencies was

incomplete or non-authoritative (Fig. VII-34, Table VII-6). Among households who reported they were not 

adequately informed about food safety, 46 percent said that they did not trust the information they

received (Fig. VII-35). Although most did not give a specific reason for this distrust, some respondents

explained that they were uncomfortable with Exxon’s involvement in providing the food safety

assessments. Others said that the advice that fish, birds, and marine mammals visibly free of oil were

safe to eat contradicted local observations of resource abnormalities in the natural environment. Many

respondents (41.9 percent) said that public information they received was inadequate because it was

unclear or not sufficiently definitive. Related responses included the belief that the information was

incomplete (29.1 percent) or was based on an inadequate number of tests (16.4 percent). Other reasons 

included suspicion that information was deliberately withheld (16.4 percent) and that the information had

not been provided in a timely manner (27.3 percent). Forty percent of those who claimed to be

inadequately informed said that they had received no information at all.

As stated above, as wild food harvests began a course of recovery, resource scarcities replaced

oil contamination as the prevailing explanation of lower subsistence uses by households (Figures VII-23 

and VII-24). By 1998, large numbers of respondents reported depressed populations of a variety of fish 

and wildlife (Table VII-7). Many continued to point to the oil spill as a source of these declines, as shown 

in Figure VII-36. (See Fall and Utermohle 1999:62-68 for more discussion of respondents’ assessments 

of natural resource population status in 1998.)

PARTICIPATION IN SUBSISTENCE USES

Participation in subsistence activities rebounded after the immediate post-spill declines in relation 

to time and distance from Prince William Sound. Except for the Alaska Peninsula, the average number of 

kinds of resources targeted for harvest in 1993/94 remained slightly below pre-spill levels in each area. 

By 1998, this index of participation in subsistence activities was about the same as before the spill in

Prince William Sound and Kodiak Island, but somewhat lower in the Lower Cook Inlet communities.

Tatitlek is the only community with pre-spill data on individual participation in subsistence

activities. As shown in Table VII-8, there was a marginal decline in the percentage of community
239

Table VII-6. Evaluation of Adequacy of Subsistence Food

 Safety Information by Community Type and Study Year

Community Type

1991 1992 1993

Prince William Sound and 

Lower Cook Inlet Villages 46.8% 31.7% 40.2%

Kodiak Island Borough 

Villages 62.8% 46.9% 31.4%

Alaska Peninsula 56.0%

Mid-Sized Communities 

(Towns) 49.2% 44.6% 44.2%

Large Communities (Cities) 62.2% 64.7% 65.7%

All Communities 55.1% 55.2% 55.1%

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence SEQ Household Surveys

Were You Adequately Informed

 about the Safety of Subsistence Foods?

Percentage of Households Answering "Yes"

Figure VII-35. Reasons Given for Not Being Adequately Informed 

about the Safety of Subsistence Foods after the Exxon Valdez Oil 

Spill

10.9%

16.4%

16.4%

27.3%

29.1%

40.0%

41.8%

45.5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

Other

Information was withheld

Not enough tests

Untimely

Incomplete information

No information received

Lack of clear or definitive advice

Didn't trust information

Percentage of Households

Responses in 1994 or last year 

community interviewed. N = 55 

households, the number giving a 

reason why they felt inadequately 

informed. Source: SEQ Surveys
240

Table VII-7. Households' Assessments of Availability of Resources to Harvest, 1997/98

Chenega 

Bay Cordova Tatitlek Nanwalek

Port 

Graham Larsen Bay Old Harbor Ouzinkie

Chum Salmon 25.0% 53.8% 50.0% 60.0% 33.3% 63.6% 48.3% 61.5% 

Coho Salmon 85.7% 70.2% 45.5% 53.6% 45.7% 45.5% 45.2% 45.2% 

Chinook Salmon 12.5% 43.5% 44.4% 77.8% 38.5% 41.7% 26.1% 24.3% 

Pink Salmon 0.0% 51.9% 41.7% 37.9% 36.8% 14.3% 41.9% 9.8% 

Sockeye Salmon 44.4% 39.2% 50.0% 75.9% 34.2% 40.0% 42.9% 22.0% 

Herring 100.0% 91.8% 55.7% 63.2% 63.9% 33.3% 68.0% 62.5% 

Rockfish 60.0% 45.6% 28.6% 58.3% 13.3% 22.2% 40.0% 78.1% 

Halibut 28.6% 51.3% 41.7% 37.9% 32.4% 11.1% 35.5% 45.0% 

Deer 16.7% 8.0% 22.2% * * 30.8% 15.4% 30.2% 

Moose * * * 31.8% 10.3% * * *

Harbor Seal 100.0% 75.8% 72.7% 88.9% 62.2% 20.0% 84.6% 78.6% 

Sea Lion 85.7% 48.4% 55.6% 66.7% 48.6% 57.1% 96.0% 77.5% 

Sea Ducks 66.7% 52.8% 40.0% 80.8% 37.0% 22.2% 63.0% 74.4% 

Dungeness Crab 66.7% 87.7% 62.5% 92.3% 76.9% 50.0% 72.0% 92.3% 

Chitons 33.3% 83.3% 25.0% 85.7% 57.9% 33.3% 40.7% 47.5% 

Clams 85.7% 86.3% 66.7% 81.5% 67.5% 58.3% 54.5% 92.1% 

Octopus 85.7% 36.8% 45.5% 44.0% 25.0% 27.3% 35.0% 45.9% 

Sea Urchins 50.0% 64.7% 42.9% 84.6% 41.9% 40.0% 53.8% 73.5% 

Wild Plants 11.1% 3.8% 18.2% 17.9% 7.9% 0.0% 6.1% 2.2% 

* Not asked in this community

Source: Fall and Utermohle 1999

Percentage Reporting Less Available to Harvest (Percent of Valid Responses)

Figure VII-36. Percentage of Households Providing Oil Spill and Non-Oil Spill Reasons 

for Declines in Availability of Resources, 1997/98

65.9%

52.3%

44.6%

44.0%43.9%

39.4%

35.4%

34.7%

34.4%

29.7%

27.8%

26.4%

26.1%

24.8%

23.4%

21.0%

6.3%

2.1%

0.0%

17.2%

20.8%

33.8%

12.2%

14.3%

23.8%

8.2%

48.9%

24.8%

19.7%

32.7%

11.3%

18.7%

14.1%

14.4%

22.1%

6.6%

3.2%

19.2%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Herring

Harbor Seal

Clams

Sea Ducks

Chitons

Sea Lion

Pink Salmon

Dungness Crab

Sea Urchins

Chum Salmon

Coho Salmon

Octopus

Rockfish

Sockeye Salmon

Chinook Salmon

Halibut

Deer

Wild Plants

Moose

Spill-related Reason Other Reason

Source: ADF&G Division of 

Subsistence Household 

Surveys
241

residents who hunted, fished, or engaged in any subsistence activity during the first year after the spill. 

Participation rates increased notably in 1991/92 and 1993/94. The decline in the percentage of Tatitlek

residents involved in any subsistence activities in 1997/98 is largely the result of an unexplained decline

in involvement in plant gathering (Fig. VII-37). Rates of involvement in fishing and hunting at Tatitlek

were higher in 1997/98 than before the spill.

SHARING OF WILD FOODS

Sharing of subsistence resources is a key cultural value in all the study communities. As noted

above, sharing declined immediately after the spill and then gradually recovered, as shown by the

average number of resources received and given per household. As shown in Figure VII-38, in the view

of many households, sharing in 1991, 1992, and 1993 occurred at levels below those prior to the spill. In 

1998, survey respondents were again asked to assess sharing of subsistence resources in the study year 

(in this case 1997/98) with levels before the oil spill. In no study community did a majority of households 

say that sharing was lower in 1997/98 than before the oil spill. However, in all but one community

(Chenega Bay), 25 percent or more of the households said that sharing was indeed down from before the 

spill. For the combined population of all study communities, 28.1 percent stated that sharing was down

from ten years ago. The rest said sharing was higher (24.2 percent) or about the same (47.8 percent).

It is difficult to discern any clear pattern in assessments of sharing across communities in

comparing the 1997/98 results with those of other years. Chenega Bay is most notable in the sharp

decline in the percentage of households for whom sharing is lower than before the spill. There was also a 

sharp decline in Tatitlek compared to 1993. On the other hand, percentages have held steady in several

other communities (Nanwalek, Old Harbor, Ouzinkie, Port Graham), and were higher in Larsen Bay in

1997/98 than in either 1992 or 1993.

Most respondents gave economic or personal reasons for increased sharing (see discussion in

Fall and Utermohle 1999). These included such factors as a change in family size, income, or

employment, or more interest or effort. Economic, personal, and environmental factors were most

Table VII-8. Individual Participation in Subsistence Activities: Tatitlek

1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1993/94 1997/98

Hunting 26.3% 29.0% 21.8% 20.0% 40.8% 33.3% 29.2%

Fishing 42.1% 44.7% 41.4% 34.7% 52.6% 58.0% 58.3%

Trapping 7.9% 4.0% 1.2% 5.3% 1.3% 2.9% 4.2%

Gathering Plants 63.2% 55.3% 59.8% 53.3% 81.6% 87.0% 39.6%

Any Activity 79.0% 72.4% 65.5% 62.7% 84.2% 91.3% 68.8%

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence Household Surveys
242

Figure VII-37. Percentage of Tatitlek Residents Who Participated in 

Any Subsistence Harvest Activity

79.0%

72.4%

65.5% 62.7%

84.2%

91.3%

68.8%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1993/94 1997/98

Percentage of Population.

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence Household Surveys

Figure VII-38. Has There Been Less Sharing of Wild Resources Since 

the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill? Percentage of Respondents Answering 

"Yes."

57.1%

43.8%

28.3%

25.6%

32.6%

48.1%

16.1%

27.2%

36.0%

27.8%

38.2%

15.4%

38.5%

14.8%

5.0%

43.8%

33.3%

21.6%

40.4%

67.9%

11.5%

26.7%

42.9%

36.6%

14.8%

45.5%

72.7%

35.4%

17.9%

28.6%

40.7%

22.4%

12.2%

23.4%

24.3%

14.8%

10.0%

41.7%

25.7%

34.1%

44.8%

28.9%

37.5%

30.8%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Tatitlek

Cordova

Valdez

Port Graham

Nanwalek

Seldovia

Kenai

Ouzinkie

Kodiak

Larsen Bay

Karluk

Old Harbor

Chignik Bay

Chignik Lake

1991 1992 1993 1998

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence SEQ 

Household Surveys
243

frequently offered as reasons for decreased sharing. The latter includes lower harvests due to resource

scarcity. Case VII-4 provides some representative comments. Only two households (one in Nanwalek

and one Ouzinkie) said that sharing had decreased due to oil contamination.

Case VII-4. Why is there less sharing now than 10 years ago?

Sample responses in 1998:

We don’t get that much now. We used to receive more. People aren’t stingy; it’s just

hard to get the foods. [Port Graham]

Everything was more plentiful then. We get just enough for ourselves now. [Old

Harbor]

Because I’m working full time and don’t have the opportunity to share and visit with my 

elders like I did in the past. I still share, but not as much as I used to when I had more 

leisure time. [Cordova]

QUALITATIVE HOUSEHOLD ASSESSMENTS OF RECOVERY, 1989 – 1998

Post-spill recovery of subsistence uses can also be examined at the household level using the

qualitative assessments provided by harvest survey respondents. At the subregional level, households’

assessments for 1990/91 (the second post-spill year) were consistent with estimated changes in

subsistence harvest levels: most respondents in the Lower Cook Inlet and Kodiak villages reported that

harvests increased compared to the previous year, but Prince William Sound respondents generally

reported further declines (Fig. VII-39).

Also consistent with the quantified harvest data, most households in the Prince William Sound

and Lower Cook Inlet communities (96.9 percent and 85.2 percent, respectively) said that subsistence

uses in 1990/91 remained below pre-spill levels (Fig. VII-40). In the Kodiak Island communities, about

half the respondents said subsistence uses remained lower, reflecting the more rapid rebounding in that

subregion than in Prince William Sound.

As shown in Figure VII-41, by 1998 the percentage of households reporting lower subsistence

uses than before the spill was notably lower than in the first two post spill years. The drop in Chenega

Bay and Tatitlek was especially notable, compared even with 1993/94, probably reflecting the relatively

high subsistence harvests that took place in both communities in 1997/98 (Fall and Utermohle 1999). 

While in none of the eight study communities in 1998 did a majority report lower overall subsistence uses 

than before the spill, a substantial percentage in many of them (a third or more in all communities but

Chenega Bay and Tatitlek) said that compared ten years ago, subsistence harvests were down.
244

Figure VII-39. Households' Assessments of Overall Levels of 

Subsistence Uses in 1990/91 Compared to the Previous Year, 1989 

(the Year of the Oil Spill), by Subregion

0.0%

53.0% 52.0%

9.4%

22.2% 20.4%

90.6%

24.7% 27.5%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Prince William Sound Lower Cook Inlet Kodiak Island

Percentage of Households.

Higher The Same Lower

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence 

Household Surveys

Figure VII-40. Households' Assessments of Overall Levels of 

Subsistence Uses in 1990/91 Compared to Before the Exxon Valdez 

Oil Spill, by Subregion

0.0%

7.4% 9.8%

3.1%

7.4%

40.2%

96.9%

85.2%

50.0%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Prince William Sound Lower Cook Inlet Kodiak Island

Percentage of Households.

Higher

The Same

Lower

Source: ADF&G 

Division of 

Subsistence 

Household 

Surveys
245

Figure VII-42. Percentage of Households Reporting Lower Overall 

Uses of Wild Resources Due to the Oil Spill

94.1%

80.0%

90.9%

80.9%

62.1%

51.7%

50.0%50.0%

19.0%

30.0%

16.1%

19.0%

75.0%

94.1%

26.0%

42.9%

27.9%

22.7%

5.3%

10.7%

0.0%

14.3%

17.1%

37.9%

17.5%

20.0%

11.8%

24.3%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Chenega Bay

Tatitlek

Cordova

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Ouzinkie

Port Lions

Larsen Bay

Karluk

Old Harbor

Akhiok

Chignik Bay

Chignik Lake

Percentage of Households.

1989 1993 1998

Figure VII-41. Percentage of Households Reporting Lower 

Subsistence Uses in the Study Year than Before the Exxon Valdez 

Oil Spill (Any Reason)

94.1%

70.0%

97.0%

40.5%

82.8%

91.5%

85.0%

100.0%

46.4%

91.4%

48.0%

80.4%

93.3%

100.0%

37.1%

24.1%

57.7%

52.8%

38.5%

50.0%

85.7%

91.7%

46.6%

50.0%

67.9%

54.5%

48.8%

100.0%

22.2%

32.5%

35.3%

55.2%

35.1%

46.7%

47.5%

21.4%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Chenega

Bay

Cordova Larsen Bay Nanwalek Old Harbor Ouzinkie Port

Graham

Tatitlek

1989 1990 1991 1993 1998

Source: 

ADF&G 

Household 

Surveys
246

However, as shown in Figure VII-42, over time, fewer households in all communities (with the

exception of Old Harbor, where the spill was never the prevailing explanation of changes) have pointed to 

the spill as a cause of lower overall subsistence uses. Particularly notable has been the decline at

Chenega Bay and Tatitlek, where by 1998, no households and just 14.3 percent of households,

respectively, blamed the spill for an overall decline in subsistence uses.

On the other hand, as shown in Figure VII-43, oil spill reasons persisted as explanations of

changes in uses of particular subsistence resources at a relatively high level. Indeed, in 1998 more than

half of the respondents in Tatitlek, Nanwalek, Port Graham, Old Harbor, and Ouzinkie, and 57.4 percent

of respondents in the combined seven villages, cited the oil spill as a reason for lower uses of at least one 

kind of subsistence food. Case VII-5 provides some examples of these spill-related reasons for lower

uses, as well as some spill-related reasons for increased subsistence uses.

Case VII-5. Spill Related reasons for Changes in Subsistence Uses, 1998

Reasons for lower uses:

My kids are gone. There is no work here for them. It all ties in together and is due to

the spill. [Cordova]

We have a diminished effort to go out and get it. The spill made us hesitant to harvest

animals that may have been affected by the spill. [Cordova]

We don’t trust anything since the oil spill. [Nanwalek]

Because lots of sea things are less. [Nanwalek]

Some are damaged, like clams, and some we can’t get enough of, like seals. [Old

Harbor]

In part it was oil spill related to some kinds of animals, but some were just hard to get or 

there was no time or no transportation to get them. [Ouzinkie]

There are less animals and fear of toxins. [Ouzinkie]

Reasons for higher uses:

Because the threat to subsistence of almost losing it gives me more of an urgency to

harvest. [Port Graham]

There’s more people to feed and cash reserves are much less. [Cordova]
247

Figure VII-43. Percentage of Households with Reduction in Any 

Subsistence Resource Due to Oil Spill Reasons

94.4%

100.0%

93.9%

93.8%

64.5%

31.1%

61.3%

68.8%

100.0%

94.1%

75.9%

57.4%

10.7%

37.5%

54.4%

33.3%

57.4%

75.8%

74.2%

28.7%

51.3%

64.5%

57.4%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Chenega Bay

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

ALL COMMUNITIES

1989 1993 1998

Source: ADF&G Division of 

Subsistence Household 

Surveys

Figure VII-44. Chenega Bay: Percentage Change in Subsistence 

Harvest Compared to Percentage of Households Reporting Lowered 

Uses

-100%

-50%

0%

50%

100%

150%

200%

1989 1990 1991 1993

Change in Harvest over Previous Year Households Reported Lower Overall Uses

Source: ADF&G Division of 

Subsistence Household Surveys
248

It is important to note that the perception of declining subsistence harvests and uses lingered in

several villages despite rebounding uses and harvests. Although assessments generally matched the

pattern of recovery in the second post spill year, this was not the case in subsequent years. In Figure VII 

44 and Figure VII-45, the percentage of households reporting lower uses is depicted as a negative value, 

to correspond with the direction of the harvest estimate if lower. The goal of these figures is to compare

the consistency of the direction assessments of subsistence with the direction and dimension of changes 

in estimated subsistence harvests.

In Chenega Bay (Fig. VII-44), in 1989 subsistence harvests dropped by more than half, and 

virtually all households reported that their harvests were down. In 1990, harvest dropped slightly from the 

year before and again most households reported a decline. The results for 1991 were contradictory. 

Compared to 1990, harvests were up 150 percent, but half the households said they believed their uses

were even lower than in 1990. In 1993, harvests diminished compared to 1992 and once again, most

households said that their uses were lower than the year before.

Results in Nanwalek were even more inconsistent over time (Fig. VI-45). As in Chenega Bay,

assessments matched changes in harvest estimates in 1989: harvests were down 50 percent and most

households said their subsistence uses had declined. But over the next three study years for which

assessment data are available, despite consistent increases in subsistence harvests year by year, a

growing percentage of households said that their uses were down compared to the year before.

Reasons for these discrepancies are unclear. First, it should be noted that the assessments are

reported in terms of household activity, while the changes in harvests are based on community totals. A

few key households with large harvests can substantially influence community totals despite lower than

average harvests by most families. Arguing against this explanation is the increased average number of

resources used, attempted to harvest, and received in these communities, all suggesting a communitywide increase in subsistence uses over time. Another, more likely, explanation is that the perception of

declines in subsistence harvests and uses since the spill is a consequence of a general view of

continuing injury, rather than a focus on the volume of harvests themselves. Another explanation is that

perceptions of lower uses reflect assessments of a greater effort in time and money needed to achieve

desired levels of harvests than before the spill, a topic discussed in the next section.

HARVEST EFFORT1

Earlier summaries of post-spill subsistence activities noted that key harvesters were reporting that 

they were expending more effort, in terms of time, distance traveled, and money, to achieve subsistence

harvests than before the spill (e.g., Seitz and Miraglia 1995). Respondents reported that more effort was 

 

1

 This section is based primarily on Fall and Utermohle 1999:43-50
249

Figure VII-46. Assessment of Effort to Harvest Resource 

Categories in 1997/98 Compared to 10 Years Ago (All 

Communities Combined)

41.3%41.3%

27.3%

36.3%

32.1%

34.9%

30.1%

30.7%

31.8%

48.0%

23.6%

43.6%

27.5%

55.6%

26.7%

23.7%

24.7%

40.1%

26.3%

41.8%

12.4%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Salmon

Other Fish

Land Mammals

Marine Mammals

Birds&Eggs

Marine Invertebrates

Wild Plants

More Same Less

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence Household Surveys

Figure VII-45. Nanwalek: Percentage Change in Subsistence 

Harvest Compared to Percentage of Households Reporting Lowered 

Uses

-100%

-80%

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

1989 1990 1991 1993

Change in Harvest over Previous Year Households Reported Lower Overall Uses

Source: ADF&G Division 

of Subsistence Household 

Surveys
250

needed because certain resources, such as marine mammals, birds, and marine invertebrates, were

scarce. Until 1998, interviews did not systematically investigate assessments of harvest effort.

Analysis of changes in subsistence harvest effort is complex because of the multiple factors that

may affect it. Some key factors, such demography, may have no relationship to natural resource status. 

For example, as households grow, harvesters may invest more effort to support their families. The

converse is also true: as households mature and children establish their own homes, aging parents may

spend less time in subsistence activities and come to depend on the harvests of their offspring. Case VII6 gives some examples from responses to questions about effort in the survey conducted in eight spill

area communities in 1998 (Fall and Utermohle 1999:44-50). 

Case VII-6. Reasons for Changing Subsistence Harvest Effort, 1998

The first set explains increased effort.

My household grew larger and our needs increased. [Old Harbor]

There are now more people in the family to feed. [Cordova]

I was a single man in 1988 and a married man in 1998. [Cordova]

I have a boat now to do it with. I troll more than we did ten years ago and it starts

earlier for you, year round. [Port Graham]

I’m married and have kids. We need more food. I have to subsist because there’s no

jobs around here. [Nanwalek]

This second set explains decreased effort.

I’m getting old. I’m getting smarter. I know where they [deer] go. I have the means. I 

have fewer kids. [Chenega Bay]

I’m making less money and have to do other jobs to make money [so there’s] less

fishing. [Cordova]

My son provides, so I don’t go hunting that much any more. [Cordova]

Less effort because the household is smaller. The younger generation is going after it

more. [Port Graham]

As shown in some of the examples in Case VII-6, some economic factors may contribute to more 

or less subsistence effort depending upon other circumstances. For example, subsistence harvesting 

requires money. In some cases, increased household income may lead to higher subsistence harvests

as households invest in better equipment and are able to afford supplies such as gasoline and
251

ammunition. On the other hand, jobs may take time away from subsistence activities, resulting in less

effort and more reliance on purchased foods. Here are some examples of both from respondents’

explanations of why their effort has changed.

Even changes to the status of natural resource populations may have opposite effects on harvest 

effort. On the one hand, scarce resources and consequently diminishing success may discourage some

hunters from attempting further harvests (less effort). On the other hand, other hunters faced with

diminishing returns may invest more effort to achieve their accustomed level of harvest. Increasing

resource populations can result in less effort as harvesters may achieve their desired harvest levels with

less time and money, or in more effort if harvesters take advantage of such increases to harvest more to 

share or to substitute for other resources. Some examples appear in Case VII-7.

Case VII-7. Resource Abundance as a Cause of More and Less Effort, 1998

I have to spend more time for less resources. [Cordova]

I’m spending more time because the resource is less abundant and there are more locals 

fishing. [Cordova]

There’s more effort now because there are fewer fish. I have to go to new areas like

Windy Bay. [Port Graham]

A lot more effort [to hunt seals]. When I was growing up there used to be seals right

here in front of the village. [Old Harbor]

There’s not as many halibut available, so I don’t try to make the effort. [Cordova]

There’s less seals available, so I put in less effort. [Chenega Bay]

They [seals] are getting more scarce and it’s hard to find them [so hunting less].

[Nanwalek]

Figure VII-46 reveals a mixed assessment of effort in 1998 compared to 10 years before,

depending upon the resource category. Consistent with data on the composition of the subsistence

harvest, the most households in the eight communities combined reported increased effort to harvest

salmon (41.3 percent) and other fish (41.3 percent). At the community level, the largest percentage of

households in Chenega Bay, Cordova, and Tatitlek reported more effort to harvest salmon in 1998 than

ten years before, with 30 percent or less of the households in each community saying that salmon harvest 

effort had decreased. The most households in Chenega Bay, Cordova, Nanwalek, Larsen Bay, Old

Harbor, and Ouzinkie said their effort to harvest fish other than salmon had increased over ten years ago. 

Only in Port Graham did the most households say effort had decreased (Fall and Utermohle 1999:46).
252

Salmon enhancement efforts have taken place near Tatitlek and Chenega Bay and while

respondents gave high ratings to these projects (Fall and Utermohle 1999:71), just two households in

Chenega Bay and none in Tatitlek attributed increased harvest effort to a greater availability of salmon. 

More common were personal reasons such as “I put up more because I want more” [Chenega Bay] and

reasons related to scarcity such as “I had to travel farther, spend more on gasoline and equipment, and

face more competition” [Tatitlek]. Regarding other fish, explanations for increased effort focused on

scarcity and increased competition. A Cordova resident said, “I am spending more time [fishing] because 

the resource is less abundant and there are more locals fishing.” A Chenega Bay resident remarked,

“There’s increased tourism and increased competition.” A Tatitlek man explained, “Gas is expensive and 

we needed more because we had to travel further.”

In contrast to the Prince William Sound communities, in both Nanwalek and Port Graham in 1998 

assessments were split regarding salmon harvest effort, with about as many households in each

community saying effort to harvest salmon had increased as saying that effort had decreased. Very few

households said that effort was similar to ten years ago. Accounting for increased effort in part are

salmon enhancement projects: 

Some species are more abundant. The hatchery has caused more of a return of pink

salmon. And we’re spending more time because the boys are going out fishing more. 

[Port Graham]

At a workshop in January 1999 held to review the findings of the 1998 interviews (Fall and Utermohle

1999:18), Port Graham and Nanwalek participants suggested that decreased salmon harvest effort for

some households was due to demographic factors such as smaller household size and older key

harvesters.

Looking specifically at assessments of effort to harvest marine mammals in 1998, in all

communities combined there was a split pattern, with about as many households reporting increased

effort as reporting decreased effort (Fall and Utermohle 1999:48). It appears that particular communities 

and hunters have responded to marine mammal scarcities in different ways. For example, in Port

Graham, most hunters have reduced efforts, probably because of diminishing returns, while in 

neighboring Nanwalek, most hunters have responded to scarcities by increasing their effort to harvest

marine mammals. Scarcities have evidently discouraged hunters in Ouzinkie, while Old Harbor hunters

have tried harder to locate and harvest marine mammals. Case VII-8 presents some explanations for

changes in harvest effort for marine mammals. (See additional examples in Case VII-7. )

Consistent with declining harvests of marine invertebrates in several study communities, a

plurality of households in the eight communities combined in 1998 reported less effort to harvest shellfish 

than ten years before (41.5 percent) (Fig. VII-46). At the community level, declines in shellfish harvest

effort were particularly notable at Tatitlek (36.4 percent of households with lower effort), Cordova (43.4

percent), Port Graham (54.5 percent), and Ouzinkie (71.4 percent). Surprisingly, given the drop in

harvest levels and concerns about PSP, 70.0 percent households in Larsen Bay said their harvest effort
253

for marine invertebrates had not changed, and most households in Old Harbor (63.0 percent) and

Nanwalek (70.8 percent) reported increased effort (Fall and Utermohle 1999:48). 

Explanations for decreased effort to harvest shellfish in 1998 focused on scarcity of marine

invertebrate populations and safety issues related to PSP and other sources of contamination. Regarding 

increased effort to harvest shellfish, explanations were varied, but focused on scarcity, competition, and a 

continued desire to use these traditional resources. Case VII-9 provides examples.

Case VII-8. Reasons for Changes in Marine Mammal Hunting, 1998

Reasons for decreased hunting:

The oil spill damaged the seals. [Chenega Bay]

There weren’t that many seals and I am afraid of the effect the oil had on them. [Port

Graham]

They just didn’t recover from the oil spill. [Tatitlek]

They are getting more scarce and it is hard to find them. [Nanwalek]

You hardly ever see a seal around to shoot, so I don’t try anymore. [Ouzinkie]

Reasons for increased hunting:

Some of the animals have moved out someplace and the cost of living has gone up. 

[Nanwalek]

I have to travel further, and then you’re not sure you will catch anything. [Ouzinkie]

We need more seal oil. Everyone goes farther out to get it. [Port Graham]

More young boys are going after them from here in the village. [Old Harbor]

I wanted the challenge and someone offered to teach me to hunt. [Nanwalek]

It’s more expensive to go to town for meat. It’s cheaper to go out here and hunt seals. 

[Chenega Bay]
254

Case VII-9. Reasons for Decreased & Increased Harvest Effort for Shellfish, 1998

Reasons for decreased effort to harvest shellfish

I don’t even try anymore because there’s nothing left. [Cordova]

There’s less desire [to use] because of concern about the oil spill and other

contaminants. It seems like it was just last year that the spill happened. [Nanwalek]

Due to the PSP poisoning warning. [Nanwalek]

Some of the animals that were commonly on my table have ceased to be there due to

health concerns over eating some species. [Ouzinkie]

Because of sea otters, because they’re protected. [Cordova]

They are not safe to eat. Besides, there are fewer of them. [Ouzinkie]

Reasons for increased effort to harvest shellfish:

There’s less resource because of oil murder. [Chenega Bay]

We have to go farther to get more. There are fewer around the beach. Have to go to

Dogfish Bay also. [Nanwalek]

Kids like this seafood. It’s harder to find and we have to travel farther. [Nanwalek]

There’s less resource available and I’m looking for more places to find them. We need

more because we grew up on it. There’s a lot of competition. [Cordova]

I teach and I want my kids to eat these foods. [Port Graham]

I have more time available now. I’ve had to buy octopus more. I go farther away to

harvest than my normal spots. I have more of a need for it because of a craving for it. 

[Port Graham]

HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYMENT IN THE WAGE-COMMERCIAL SECTOR, POST-SPILL EFFECTS

As an economic strategy, it was feasible for households in Alutiiq villages nearest the oil spill to

reduce wild food harvests in the oil spill year. It was economically feasible because households were

able to divert household labor into the wage-market sector. This economic strategy is a common one in

mixed subsistence-cash economies. In Alaska Native villages, households may respond to short-term 

contractions in the subsistence sector by expanding activities in the local wage-market sector. A common 
255

way to accomplish this is to transfer the labor of household members between economic sectors. Income 

from expanded employment of household members in the wage-market sector is used to purchase store

foods, which serve as replacements for wild foods in short supply. It is a household strategy that

predates the oil spill.

As a general economic strategy during the oil spill crisis, households in Alutiiq villages diverted

household labor into the wage-market sector as a way to deal with immediate shortfalls in wild foods from 

the subsistence sector. Doing this was possible because of the large number of short-term employment

opportunities for local, unskilled labor created by spill cleanup efforts. The spill cleanup created jobs for

about 11,000 workers in 1989 (see Chapter Six). By taking oil spill cleanup work, households earned an 

unusually large amount of monetary income the year of the spill – a single-year “windfall” cash infusion

into households of many spill area communities. In communities of Prince William Sound, Lower Cook

Inlet, and Kodiak Island, oil spill cleanup jobs accounted for between 40 percent and 80 percent of the

earned income in 1989, outstripping commercial fishing, the traditional major source of cash (Fig. VII-47, 

Fig. VII-48). (See also Table VI-1 and VI-2 in Chapter Six.)

As a household strategy to deal with reduced wild food harvests, work in the commercial-wage 

sector was a short-term solution. Income-earning opportunities in spill-cleanup programs were generally

short-lived. Few cleanup jobs were available near Nanwalek and Port Graham after 1989, where

household monetary incomes fell back to low pre-spill levels (Fig. VII-49). The same pattern is evident in 

Tatitlek (Fig. VII-50). The pattern is similar in the Kodiak Island Borough communities of Karluk, Larsen

Bay, and Ouzinkie (Fig. VII-51). The volatility in household earnings from oil spill employment is

illustrated further in Figures VII-52 and VII-53, which compare earnings by employment type in 1989 and

1990/91. In every community, spill-related income was much reduced in the second post-spill year. Only

in Chenega Bay did oil spill cleanup employment continue to make significant contributions after the first

year (in 1990 and 1991) (see Fig. VII-50). While increased employment was short-lived for households

everywhere but Chenega Bay, household subsistence harvests remained depressed for a longer period

of time.

Household incomes from commercial fishing also appear to have declined in communities

nearest the spill, based on household surveys (Figs. VII-49 to VII-51). These declines appear to be most 

prevalent in Alutiiq villages with small-scale commercial fisheries with the lowest historic earnings per

permit (see Chapter Four). Figure VII-54 also suggests a major decline in commercial fishing income in 

Cordova in 1991 in comparison with 1985 and 1988. These trends were evident before the oil spill (see

Chapter Four).

While cleanup work dried up as a source of income for households from one to three years after

the spill, a new type of employment in spill restoration emerged in some spill area communities. Oil spill

restoration programs offered a new potential source of monetary income for some households. (See

Figure VI-2 in Chapter Six, as well as Table VI-6 and Table VI-7.) As discussed in Chapter Eight, oil spill 

restoration work offered an additional potential benefit through the development of economic
256

Figure VII-47. Per Capita Earned Income by Source, 1989

$0

$5,000

$10,000

$15,000

$20,000

$25,000

Chenega Bay

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Akhiok

Karluk

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

Port Lions

Chignik Bay

Chignik Lagoon

Chignik Lake

Ivanof Bay

Perryville

Per Capita Income.

Commercial Fishing Oil Spill Cleanup Other Earned

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence Household Surveys

Figure VII-48. Percentage of Earned Income from Oil Spill Cleanup 

Jobs, 1989

67%

61%

79%

71%

50%

57%

68%

41%

64%

49%

10% 9%

0% 2%

23%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Chenega Bay

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Akhiok

Karluk

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

Port Lions

Chignik Bay

Chignik Lagoon

Chignik Lake

Ivanof Bay

Perryville

Percentage of Earned Income.

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence Household 
257

Figure VII-49. Per Capita Earned Income, by Source, Nanwalek and 

Port Graham

$0

$2,000

$4,000

$6,000

$8,000

$10,000

$12,000

Nanwalek 1987Nanwalek 1989Nanwalek 1990Nanwalek 1991Nanwalek 1992Nanwalek 1993

Port Graham 1987Port Graham 1989Port Graham 1990Port Graham 1991Port Graham 1992Port Graham 1993

Per Capita Income.

Commercial Fishing Oil Spill Cleanup Other Earned

ADF&G Division of Subsistence Household Surveys

Figure VII-50. Per Capita Earned Income by Source, Chenega Bay 

and Tatitlek

$0

$5,000

$10,000

$15,000

$20,000

$25,000

Chenega Bay 1989Chenega Bay 1990Chenega Bay 1991Chenega Bay 1992Chenega Bay 1993

Tatitlek 1987Tatitlek 1988Tatitlek 1989Tatitlek 1990Tatitlek 1991Tatitlek 1993

Per Capita Income.

Commercial Fishing Oil Spill Cleanup Other Earned

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence Household Surveys
258

Figure VII-51. Per Capita Earned Income by Source, Karluk, Larsen 

Bay, and Ouzinkie

$0

$2,000

$4,000

$6,000

$8,000

$10,000

$12,000

$14,000

Karluk 1989

Karluk 1990/91Karluk 1991/92

Larsen Bay 1989

Larsen Bay 1990/91Larsen Bay 1991/92Larsen Bay 1992/93Larsen Bay 1993/94

Ouzinkie 1989

Ouzinkie 1990/91Ouzinkie 1991/92Ouzinkie 1992/93Ouzinkie 1993/94

Per Capita Income.

Commercial Fishing Oil Spill Clean-Up Other Earned

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence Household 

Figure VII-52. Per Capita Earned Income by Source, 1990/91

$0

$2,000

$4,000

$6,000

$8,000

$10,000

$12,000

$14,000

Chenega

Bay

Tatitlek Nanwalek Port

Graham

Karluk Larsen Bay Ouzinkie

Per Capita Income.

Commercial Fishing Oil Spill Clean-Up Other Earned

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence Household Surveys
259

Figure VII-53. Percentage of Earned Income from Oil Spill Cleanup 

Jobs, Study Communities, 1989/90 and 1990/91

79.2%

70.5%

67.9% 66.7% 64.1%

60.7%

57.2%

0.0% 2.0%

15.3%

45.6%

7.5%

29.1% 27.1%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Nanwalek Port Graham Larsen Bay Chenega

Bay

Ouzinkie Tatitlek Karluk

1989/90 1990/91 Source: ADF&G Division of 

Subsistence Household 

Surveys

Figure VII-54. Per Capita Income by Source, Cordova

$0

$5,000

$10,000

$15,000

$20,000

$25,000

$30,000

1988 1991 1992 1993

Per Capita Income.

Commercial Fishing Other Earned Other Income

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence 

Household Surveys
260

infrastructure. Examples include capital improvement projects funded through the criminal settlement

subsistence restoration program, resource enhancement and community involvement projects funded by

the EVOSTC, and purchases of land and use rights from Native Corporations through the EVOSTC’s

habitat protection program. Land sales have produced both short-term payments as well as investments 

for long-term dividends (e.g., Mishler 1999, Mishler 2001). A major question is how these new sources of 

cash might support or erode features of mixed subsistence-cash economies. We return to this question

in Chapter Eight.

YOUNG ADULTS’ INVOLVEMENT IN SUBSISTENCE ACTIVITIES

Are Young Adults Learning Enough Subsistence Skills?

The EVOS Trustee Council overview on the status of subsistence services in 1996, about seven

years after the spill (EVOSTC 1996a:20), stated that, “There is particular concern that the oil spill

disrupted opportunities for young people to learn subsistence culture, and that this knowledge may be lost 

to them in the future.” When interviewed in 1992 with the SEQ, most respondents in all the study

communities but Old Harbor said that young adults were not learning enough subsistence skills. For the

eight communities that were restudied in 1998, only 38.8 percent of households in the combined

communities in 1992 had said yes, young adults were learning the necessary skills (Fig.VII-55).

In 1998, the same question was asked to detect any changes in assessments of the passing on

of subsistence skills to young people (Fall and Utermohle 1999:83-86). As shown in Figure VII-56, in only 

three communities (Chenega Bay, Larsen Bay, and Old Harbor) did a majority answer “yes” to this

question. Overall, just under half (48.0 percent) said yes, although just over half (50.5 percent) of the

seven smaller communities (excluding Cordova), said yes. However, in every community but Ouzinkie, a 

higher percentage of respondents answered positively in 1998 than had in 1992 (Fig. VII-55). The most

significant change was in Chenega Bay, where in 1998, 66.7 percent of the respondents said young

adults were learning subsistence skills. No one in Chenega Bay had said this was the case in 1992.

When asked why young adults are not learning subsistence skills, the most frequent response

was that they have no interest in learning about subsistence activities (43.7 percent) (Fig. VII-57; Fall and 

Utermohle 1999: Appendix Table V-159). Also, 24.0 percent said that children were not learning enough

because the role of subsistence in the community had declined, and 22.9 percent said that there was a

lack of adults available to teach young people. Another common response was had to do with time: 10.4 

percent said young adults have too many other interests competing with subsistence activities, and 9.1

percent asserted that young people just do not have the time to learn. Very few respondents cited

restrictions on subsistence hunting and fishing or scarcity of subsistence resources as reasons for the

failure of young adults to learn these skills. Case VII-10 provides some respondents’ comments in 1998

on why, in their view, young adults were not learning subsistence skills adequately. Case VII-10 also 
261

Figure VII-55. Are Young Adults Learning Enough 

Subsistence Skills? Percentage Saying "Yes" in 1991/92 

and 1997/98

0.0%

37.9%

29.4%

27.6%

43.9%

34.3%

61.0%

48.3%

38.8%

66.7%

47.0%

33.3%

36.0%

48.6%

61.9%

64.3%

36.2%

48.0%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Cordova

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

All Communities

% of Respondents Providing an Opinion.

1991/92 1997/98

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence SEQ Household Surveys

Figure VII-56. Households' Assessments of Whether Young Adults Are 

Learning Adequate Subsistence Skills, 1997/98

66.7%

47.0%

33.3%

36.0%

48.6%

61.9%

64.3%

36.2%

48.0%

50.5%

33.3%

53.0%

66.7%

64.0%

51.4%

38.1%

35.7%

63.8%

52.0%

49.5%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Cordova

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

All Communities

All, except Cordova

Yes No

Source: ADF&G SEQ Household Surveys
262

Figure VII-58. How Effective Are Spirit

Camps in Teaching Subsistence Skills? 

Responses in 1998

Not Good 

at All

1%

Not So 

Good

7%

Good

41%

Very Good

51%

Figure VII-57. Reasons Why Young Adults Are Not Learning 

Enough Subsistence Skills, 1997/98

1.1%

2.1%

9.1%

10.4%

22.9%

24.0%

43.7%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

Subsistence Resources Scarce

Subsistence Uses Impeded

No Time

Too Much Else to Do

Lack of Teachers

Change in Community Way of Life

Kids Have No Interest

Percentage Of Respondents Who Said Youth Are Not Learning Enough Skills

Source: ADF&G Division of 

Subsistence SEQ Household 

Surveys
263

provides examples of comments from those respondents who took the opposite view, that young adults

were learning what they need to know about subsistence.

Case VII-10. Differing Opinions on How Well Young Adults

are Learning about Subsistence, 1998

Reasons for Stating that Young Adults Are Not Learning Adequate Subsistence Skills:

Younger kids don’t seem to care much. They just watch TV. [Chenega Bay]

I think the fast food generation is prevalent. Quick and easy is more convenient for

them than the effort and time to cook something up. [Cordova]

Nobody is teaching them and there are so many things that take up their time, and they

have other means of gathering food: processing food to them is opening a package and 

throwing it in the microwave. [Cordova]

Adults aren’t teaching them, and fulfilling their cultural responsibility. Too many other 

attractions: TV, basketball, volleyball, work responsibility. [Port Graham]

It is important to learn, and if there isn’t anything to hunt, how can you teach them the

skills? [Port Graham]

They have lost interest because people are afraid to eat some of the food. [Larsen Bay]

Parents are more occupied with employment, more monetary way of life than

subsistence now. Children used to have to participate with parents in hunting and

gathering to survive. Ever since the passing of ANCSA [Alaska Native Claims

Settlement Act], Natives have started giving up traditional ways of life due to more

money flowing into the communities. [Ouzinkie]

Reasons for Stating That Young Adults are Learning Adequate Subsistence Skills:

Even young children want to learn. They want to cut and salt fish. These are skills

being passed along by many parents. [Old Harbor]

Young people are responding to elders. [Old Harbor]

Quite a few young men know a lot. Young girls are willing to be taught if they don’t

know already, such skills as splitting fish. [Old Harbor]

They are learning more because of emphasis on subsistence after the oil spill. [Port

Graham]

Adults need to keep teaching them. They shouldn’t give up on them. [Tatitlek]
264

Spirit Camps

Two spirit camps took place in the summer of 1998 in the general vicinity of the spill area

communities. The first, run by the Chugach Heritage Foundation, took place at Nuciiq (Nuchek) in Prince 

William Sound and served youth from the Chugach region. This camp operated in 1999 and 2000 as

well. The second took place at Sitkalidak Island near Old Harbor (Kodiak Island) and served youth from 

the Kodiak Island Borough.

Among those respondents in 1998 who were informed about the spirit camp programs there was 

generally a very positive evaluation: the vast majority said spirit camp performance was either “very

good” (50.3 percent) or “good” (40.9 percent) (Fig. VII-58). A large majority of households in every

community rated spirit camp performance as either “very good” or “good.” Most respondents who rated

spirit camps highly cited reasons such as “the children are learning important skills” and “there is good

interaction between elders and youth.” Case VII-11 provides selected comments to illustrate the range of 

evaluations of spirit camps offered by the survey respondents in 1998.

Case VII-11. Some Comments on Spirit Camps, 1998

It’s an opportunity for kids, even though moms and dads are busy. They are put in

groups and taught by elders. Very good. [Cordova]

It’s a concentrated effort to pass skills on in a good environment. [Cordova]

Because they have hands-on training from skilled people. [Cordova]

I hear they’re doing great out there. The kids look like they’re happy out there and

learn a lot from the elders. [Cordova]

They teach by doing. [Old Harbor]

I talked to one of the children who went. He really learned something there. [Ouzinkie]

Kids are learning more because they want to at these camps. They show more interest

at these camps than at home. [Ouzinkie]

Really excellent. An isolated area to teach them; kids have not much choice but to

listen. No TV. No McDonalds. [Tatitlek]

Spirit camps are good as a first look, but they should progress to adults showing and

teaching. It’s not the final say. [Port Graham]

The intent is good. However, if the skills aren’t practiced [then is not worthwhile]. 

[Port Graham]
265

ELDERS’ INFLUENCE2

In the years after the EVOS, many residents of spill area communities reported that the traditional 

role of elders in teaching traditional skills and values had been disrupted by the event and its aftermath. 

Over the three years of systematic interviews with the SEQ (1991/92 through 1993/94), the pattern of

responses for the entire sample did not change significantly. About 35 percent to 40 percent of all

respondents said that elders’ influence had either decreased or stayed the same; a smaller percentage

each year, about 20 to 25 percent, said elders’ influence had increased (Fig. VII-59).

However, there were differences in responses by community type. Figure VII-60 reports

responses to the SEQ query in 1994, “Over the last five years, do you think the influence of elders in the

community has decreased, stayed the same, or increased?” Respondents in the villages of the spill area 

(especially Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet) were much more likely to say that elders’

influence had declined, with mid-sized communities of the spill area also showing this tendency, but to a

lesser degree. In contrast, respondents in the villages of the Arctic area and the larger communities of

Kenai and Valdez were less likely to say that elders’ influence had declined and more likely to say that it

had increased

In 1998, about ten years after the spill, the largest percentage of respondents in all the eight

study communities but Cordova and Tatitlek reported that elders were playing less of a role in the

traditional way of life than they had ten years before (Fig. VII-61). For all eight communities combined,

41.2 percent of respondents said elders’ influence had declined, but in the seven smaller communities 

(excluding Cordova), a majority of 51.4 percent reported a declining influence of elders. Interestingly,

quite a few respondents in the Prince William Sound communities of Chenega Bay (36.4 percent) and

Tatitlek (40.0 percent), and a plurality in Cordova (46.0 percent), stated that the influence of elders had

increased compared to ten years before. It is worth noting that a spirit camp has taken place at Nuciiq for 

several years, and an elders/youth conference was held in Cordova in 1998. These programs may

account at least in part for the perception in Prince William Sound communities that elders were playing

more of a role in helping to pass on the traditional way of life in 1998 than over the previous ten years. 

Correspondingly, fewer households in Chenega Bay, Cordova, and Tatitlek in 1997/98 said that

elders’ influences had declined compared to before the spill than had in 1993/94; such a change was not

detectable in the other communities, with the possible exception of Old Harbor (Fig. VII-62). More

households in Chenega Bay, Cordova, Tatitlek, and Old Harbor said that elders’ influence had increased

than in any previous study year, and this resulted in an overall increase in the combined eight study

communities (Fig. VII-63).

Respondents offered various explanations regarding why elders’ influence has declined over the

last ten years (Fall and Utermohle 1999: Appendix Table V-158). Most often cited were “cultural”

reasons, such as a perceived change in values or the role of subsistence activities (25.8 percent of all

 

2

 This section is based primarily on Fall and Utermohle 1999:88-93
266

Figure VII-59. How Has Elders' Influence Changed Since 1989? 

All Communities Combined, Study Years 1991, 1992, & 1993

38.3% 39.5% 39.8% 37.8% 37.6% 37.3%

24.0% 22.9% 22.8%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

1991 1992 1993

Decreased Stayed the Same Increased

ADF&G SEQ Household Surveys

Figure VII-60. Has Elders' Influence Changed since 1989? 

Responses for Study Year 1993 by Community Category

51.1%

40.0%

30.4%

41.5%

32.4%

39.8%

33.7%

51.4%

46.4%

33.5%

33.3%

37.3%

15.2%

8.6%

23.2%

25.0%

34.2%

22.8%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

PWS & CI Kodiak & AKP Arctic Mid-Sized Kenai & Valdez All

Communities

Decreased Stayed the Same Increased

Source: ADF&G SEQ Household Surveys
267

Figure VII-62. Changes in Elders' Influence in Teaching Skills and 

Values since the EVOS: Percent Saying Influence has Decreased 

35.7%

51.9%

56.3%

58.6%

58.1%

42.9%

52.5%

58.6%

52.4%

53.4%

41.2%

56.3%

55.2%

54.5%

51.9%

47.7%

54.9%

51.8%

76.9%

45.3%

30.0%

44.4%

52.4%

44.4%

37.2%

45.5%

46.0%

47.8%

34.1%

20.0%

55.2%

59.0%

60.0%

38.5%

63.6%

41.2%

51.2%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Cordova

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

ALL COMMUNITIES

All, without Cordova

1991 1992 1993 1998

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence SEQ Household Surveys

Figure VII-61. Assessment of Influence of Elders in Teaching 

Subsistence Skills and Values Compared to before the Exxon Valdez 

Oil Spill, 1998

45.5%

34.1%

20.0%

55.2%

59.0%

60.0%

38.5%

63.6%

41.2%

51.4%

18.2%

19.9%

40.0%

27.6%

28.2%

35.0%

28.2%

25.0%

23.4%

28.4%

36.4%

46.0%

40.0%

17.2%

12.8%

5.0%

33.3%

11.4%

35.4%

20.3%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Cordova

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

ALL COMMUNITIES

All, without Cordova

Decreased The Same Increased

Source: ADF&G SEQ Household Surveys
268

Figure VII-63. Change in Elders' Influence in Teaching Skills and 

Values Since the EVOS: Percent Saying Influence has Increased

14.3%

17.7%

18.8%

17.2%

7.0%

8.6%

12.5%

6.9%

15.7%

11.3%

23.5%

18.8%

17.2%

20.5%

0.0%

13.6%

17.5%

14.8%

0.0%

25.3%

30.0%

7.4%

21.4%

3.7%

11.6%

21.8%

12.5%

36.4%

46.0%

40.0%

17.2%

12.8%

5.0%

33.3%

11.4%

35.4%

20.3%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Cordova

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

ALL COMMUNITIES

All, without Cordova

1991 1992 1993 1998

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence SEQ Household Surveys

Figure VII-64. Was the Traditional Way of Life Affected by the Exxon 

Valdez Oil Spill? (asked in 1998)

100.0%

81.8%

100.0% 100.0%

86.5%

80.0% 77.8%

94.7%

83.9%

0.0%

18.2%

0.0% 0.0%

13.5%

20.0% 22.2%

5.3%

16.1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Cordova

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

ALL COMMUNITIES

Affected Not Affected Source: ADF&G Household Surveys
269

respondents who said that elders’ roles had diminished), and “social/political reasons,” such as

decreased interactions between youth and elders (25.8 percent). Others offered a more general

observation that elders were just less active in teaching subsistence skills (19.7 percent), some said

elders’ influence declined because of the death of key individuals (16.4 percent), and some cited

economic reasons, such as people being too busy with jobs to pass on skills (11.2 percent). Case VII-12 

provides examples of the range of comments regarding a decline in the role of elders in subsistence. 

For those respondents who reported that elders’ influence in teaching subsistence skills and

values has increased over the last ten years, explanations were evenly split between those associated

with an enhanced role for or appreciation of the cultural importance of subsistence (56.6 percent) and

increased interactions between elders and youth (56.6 percent) (Fall and Utermohle 1999: Appendix

Table V-156). Also, 45.6 percent noted increasing activity of elders in subsistence and teaching. Case

VII-12 provides some examples of respondents’ explanations of this increased role.

STATUS OF TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE3

Based on the interviews conducted in 1998, the large majority of households in eight spill area

communities (83.9 percent) believed that the traditional way of life had been injured by the Exxon Valdez

oil spill (Fig. VII-64; Fall and Utermohle 1999: Appendix Table V-162). This included 78 percent or more

of the households in all eight communities, and 100 percent in Chenega Bay, Tatitlek, and Nanwalek. 

Of those households stating that the oil spill affected the traditional way of life, 66.7 percent in

1998 believed that recovery of the traditional way of life 10 years after the spill was incomplete, while 17.4 

percent believed recovery was complete, and 13.7 percent were not sure (Fig. VII-65). In every

community, by far the most households said that the traditional way of life had not yet recovered.

In 1998, respondents in the eight study communities were asked, “What should be done to help

the traditional way of life recover?” Representative suggestions appear as Case VII-13. The most

respondents (15.7 percent) pointed to supporting traditional skills and values through such efforts as spirit 

camps, elders/youth conferences, and other education efforts (Fig. VII-66; Fall and Utermohle 1999:

Appendix Table V-163). Another common response was to continue or initiate efforts to restore injured

populations (12.3 percent). But 12.3 percent were pessimistic, saying that nothing can be done, and 7.7

percent more just said that what is needed is more time to recover and to heal. 

 

3

 This section is based primarily on Fall and Utermohle 1999:93-95
270

Case VII-12. Reasons Why Elders’ Influence Has Changed, 1998

Why has the Influence of Elders Decreased?

Some Representative Responses, 1998

The culture is changing to a monetary system

and more competition. Young people want

money now. [Cordova]

The demands of lifestyles have changed. The

kids don’t hang around with elders like they used 

to, [because of] TV and sports. [Cordova]

There’s less elders. A lot have passed on. 

[Cordova]

There’s a change in community attitudes;

increased depression, anxiety, and alcohol

abuse. It’s not cool any more. There’s a

generation gap and adults are doing it

[subsistence] less. People have more money

from corporation dividends and this is adversely

affecting [the role of elders]. [Ouzinkie]

They are not teaching anymore. Everything is

just history now. [Nanwalek]

Kids “know” more in a different way, “know-it-all 

kids.” Kids have more lack of respect for elders, 

less respect for elders. The spill played a role

because of the money, [which] caused less

caring. Kids are learning from other sources. It

used to be the elders’ role to teach. [Nanwalek]

Younger ones do not seem to respect elders. It

used to be “the law” if elders said something. 

[Old Harbor]

Because the wild foods aren’t here the way the 

foods used to be, so elders can’t show younger

people how to do things with subsistence. [Port

Graham]

Why Has the Influence of Elders Increased?

Some Representative Responses, 1998

There’s different activities provided now during

cultural week, native dance, drum making; more

involvement in functions and more awareness

and pride in culture. There’s a class at the high

school. I’m not sure where and who to attribute

the increase, though, if it was due to the oil spill,

more cultural awareness, or what. [Cordova]

Because of the growth of the Native village of

Eyak tribal government, there’s more

awareness. [Cordova]

From my perspective, I think people are more

aware of our unique history and knowledge and

there is more effort to translate that to our

children. As a young mother, I strive to pass

that on to my children. I have always relied on

and searched out their help of my elders, but I

think I do that more than then ever before. 

[Cordova]

Because people are getting scared of losing

their traditional ways or values that elders were

taught. [Nanwalek]

Alutiiq consciousness is on the rise. People feel 

the need to pass on knowledge to the younger

people. [Old Harbor]

It’s harder to get subsistence foods now, so the

younger generation is looking to the elders for

help. [Ouzinkie]

They are finally realizing they are Aleuts. Kids

are starting to communicate about their past. 

They reach out to elders for information and

help. [Port Graham]

The subsistence skills are being lost, so elders 

are putting in more of an effort. [Tatitlek]
271

Figure VII-65. Has the Traditional Way of Life Recovered since the 

Exxon Valdez Oil Spill? (asked in 1998)

28.6%

12.4%

10.0%

18.5%

34.4%

18.8%

42.9%

22.2%

17.4%

57.1%

72.5%

80.0%

48.1%

53.1%

62.5%

53.6%

63.9%

66.7%

14.3%

15.0%

10.0%

22.2%

12.5%

6.3%

0.0%

13.9%

13.7%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chenega Bay

Cordova

Tatitlek

Nanwalek

Port Graham

Larsen Bay

Old Harbor

Ouzinkie

ALL COMMUNITIES

% of Those Saying there was an EVOS Effect.

Recovered Not Recovered Not Sure

Source: ADF&G Division of Subsistence Household Surveys

Figure VII-66. What Should Be Done to Help the Traditional Way of 

Life Recover? (All Communities Combined)

12.3%

4.3%

2.9%

5.0%

3.0%

7.0%

3.5%

15.7%

12.3%

7.7%

1.6%

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%

Restore Resource Populations

Respond to Social Disruptions

Create Jobs

Get Rid of the Oil

Continue Impact Studies

Take Legal and Politcal Action

Stop Dividend Payments

More Education and Spirit Camps

Nothing Can Be Done

More Time

Involve Elders More

Percentage of Households for Whom the Traditional Way of Life Has Not Recovered

Source: ADF&G Division of 

Subsistence Household 

Surveys
272

Case VII-13. What Can Be Done to Help

the Traditional Way of Life Recover?

Responses in 1998

A lot of it is economics. Because of the oil spill and the effects of that on the food chain, people 

had to work to keep their families going, therefore leaving the subsistence or traditional way of

life and not passing it on to their children. This could take several generations to recover,

provided we haven’t already lost our traditional and cultural way of life. [Cordova]

The resources must recover before the traditional way of life can be brought back. [Nanwalek]

The tribal people must be included in the ecological equation. They’ve tried to help the plants

and animals but not the people. [Cordova]

It’s never going to recover. It can’t happen. Everybody’s got a pocketful of money now. You

can’t go back. [Chenega Bay]

Awareness has gone up. People are now trying to learn about the traditional way of life. 

[Cordova]

The spill helped focus on how easily the traditional way of life can be lost. This is a positive

result of the spill, to make people aware. [Port Graham]

Our lives will never be the same. Partly, simply because times have changed. We have to

identify the most highly valued parts of our traditions to save in a changing world. [Cordova]

If they could erase everything that happened during the spill. [Nanwalek]

More time may help. I think eventually everything will go back to normal. [Larsen Bay]

Unsure. Spirit camp will probably help with the revival of traditions. People try to keep up the

customs, but it takes more than just a handful of people. More involvement is required by a

wider group of people. [Old Harbor]

The kids of today have to go out with their parents more. [Ouzinkie]

More spirit camps that teach children the basics -- hunting, edible plants, building shelters, and

processing foods. [Ouzinkie]

For all animals to be non-toxic so you can start eating them again and for the animals that died

or migrated to be replaced so we can hunt them like we did before. [Ouzinkie]

Time will heal subsistence. [Ouzinkie]

Nothing can help. What’s lost is lost. [Ouzinkie]

Give the resources time to recover from the spill and look at preventing future pollution to save

natural resources. [Port Graham]

Parents need to take the time to teach skills and language to them. Parents need to teach them 

more instead of leaving it to someone else. [Port Graham]

Source: Fall and Utermohle 1999:93-95
273 

Chapter Eight: Economic and Sociocultural Effects of the Exxon Valdez

Oil Spill on Resident Human Groups - II 

INTRODUCTION 

The previous chapter described the general pattern of responses to the oil spill by households in 

Alutiiq villages. The responses were characterized as “averages” among all community households 

across a number of measures (wild food harvests, sharing of wild foods, employment, and so forth). 

While averages are useful for depicting central tendencies within human groups, they can mask the ways 

that segments of a community responded to the spill crisis. One may expect that not all households were 

affected equally by the spill, because we know that households are not situated equally in a community. 

How did particular types of households respond to the spill? Were some households affected differently 

than others? How did the production and distribution of wild foods within kinship networks play out? Was 

there a cascade effect from high producing households down through the community to more dependent 

households? Or were dependent households insulated from spill effects by traditional social support 

mechanisms within a village? 

This chapter explores these types of questions by analyzing effects among types of households. 

The analysis attempts to shed light on how the domestic mode of organization in the subsistence sector 

performed to deal with the problems created by an oil spill. The findings will suggest that the oil spill 

caused no breakdown in the social organization of subsistence production and distribution in Alutiiq 

villages. Nor did the spill and its aftermath appear to produce any lasting structural changes in the 

domestic mode organization. On the contrary, the information reported by surveyed households suggests 

that the customary and traditional organization of the kinship-based subsistence sector adapted to the 

crisis as it unfolded. Reductions in wild food harvests represented not a failure of the subsistence 

economy, but short-term contractions of activity in the subsistence sector by productive households for 

health reasons identified in Chapter Seven. The limited supply of wild foods produced during the first 

spill year was disproportionately channeled to the most dependent households in the village – the elderly, 

young single mothers, and the infirm. During the crisis, the structural configuration of the domestic mode 

was maintained. In the post-spill recovery, using pre-spill domestic mode structures, households once 

again expanded activities in the subsistence sector. This was possible because wild food resources had 

not been permanently degraded by contaminants. 

Finally, this chapter discusses an economic and cultural revitalization within Alutiiq villages in 

response to the spill. As stated in Chapter Six, Alutiiq leaders lobbied hard to obtain a share of damage 

award settlements for public losses. After an initial struggle, the Alutiiq were successful in redirecting 

some of the settlement money into projects that might directly benefit villages. This chapter will discuss 

how the money was invested in projects designed to counter potential long-lasting economic, social, and 

cultural damages to the villages. The “investment” of damage settlements into community-based 
274 

programs was directed toward revitalizing the local economy and traditional cultures of Alutiiq villages 

nearest the oil spill. 

PRODUCTIVITY BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 

The assessment of impacts on types of households was guided by two underlying questions. 

First, was household economic productivity related to a general household developmental cycle in 

Alutiiq villages? Second, were the economic responses of households to the Exxon Valdez oil spill 

different depending upon the place of the household in the developmental cycle? These questions derive 

from the theoretical understanding that the domestic mode of production characterizes the subsistence 

sector in mixed economies. That is, the organization of production and distribution of wild foods is 

primarily within domestic family groups organized through the kinship system. We expect that mature 

households in the household developmental cycle will be the high producers and distributors of wild 

foods. We expect that certain types of households will be low producers and high receivers of wild foods 

-- that is, younger (less well established) households and households with fewer factors of production 

(labor force, skills, social obligations), such as retired elders, single mothers with young dependent 

children, and persons with disabling conditions. 

In an event like the Exxon Valdez oil spill, we would predict that the greatest direct impacts on 

wild food production and distribution within a village will be through responses of the higher 

producing households. Economic effects within lower producing households would be secondarily 

manifested through decreased distributions of wild foods from high producers, rather than decreased food 

production by these households directly. 

To examine these relationships, we analyzed the spill responses of Alaska Native households in 

the four Alutiiq villages closest to the spill -- Tatitlek, Chenega Bay, Port Graham, and Nanwalek. Alaska 

Native households were placed into five developmental household categories, shown in Figure VIII-1. 

Into the “least” developed household type we grouped three kinds of households -- single mothers 

with young dependent children (less than 16 yrs of age), retired elders (60 yrs or more and producing less 

than 50 pounds of wild food per capita), and inactive single-person households (producing less than 50 

pounds of wild food per capita). These households are thought to lack certain factors of production, such 

as labor, skills, good health, or social responsibilities for producing wild foods. Therefore, as households 

with incomplete factors of production, they are at the low end of the developmental scale. In addition to 

this, three household categories were defined by age of the oldest household head – “developing” 

households (20 yrs - 39 yrs), “mature” households (40 yrs - 59 yrs), and “active elder” households (60 yrs 

or more and producing more than 50 pounds of wild food per capita). Other things being equal, as a 

household group matures in age (as measured by the age of the household head), one might expect that 

the labor pool, level of skills, and number of social obligations of the household in the community also 

increase. Finally, a fifth household category was created – “active single-person” households -- usually 
275 

 Figure VIII-1. Frequency of Native Household Types,

Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Pre-Spill 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Percent of Households.

Single Mothers-Retired

Elders-Inactive Singles

Developing (20 yrs-30

yrs)

Mature (40 yrs-50 yrs)

Active Elder (60 yrs+)

Active Single

Figure VIII-2. Wild Food Harvests by Native Household Type,

Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

Pre-Spill 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Harvest (Lbs per Person)

Single Mothers-Retired

Elders-Inactive Singles

Developing (20 yrs-30

yrs)

Mature (40 yrs-50 yrs)

Active Elder (60 yrs+)

Active Single

Total
276 

men living alone (presumably bachelors, widowers, divorced men, or husbands separated from spouses) 

producing more than 50 pounds per capita. This household type falls outside the "normal" household 

developmental cycle, and may maintain kinship links and social obligations with members of other 

households in the community, such as parents, siblings, and children. 

The frequencies of each household type in the four villages by year are shown in Figure VIII-1. 

There were relatively stable frequencies of the household types within the four communities during the oil 

spill period. As shown in Figure VIII-1, the category of single mothers-retired elders-inactive singles 

constituted about 7 percent – 14 percent of households in a village during any survey year. Developing 

households (20 yrs - 30 yrs) comprised about 30 percent of households, mature households (40 yrs - 59 

yrs) comprised about 35 percent – 40 percent of households, and active elder households (60 yrs or 

more) comprised about 7 percent – 10 percent of households. Active single-person households 

comprised about 10 percent – 15 percent of households. (In this analysis, the pre-spill years were as 

follows -- Chenega Bay, 1985; Tatitlek, 1988; Port Graham, 1987; and Nanwalek, 1987. The survey 

years 1989 through 1993 include all four communities, except for 1992, which includes only three 

communities -- Tatitlek was not surveyed that year.) 

The first theoretical assertion seems to be supported by Figure VIII-2 -- on average, production of 

wild foods appears to be associated with household developmental type. In all years the single mothersretired elders-inactive singles stand apart at the bottom in terms of subsistence productivity -- on average, 

this household type does not produce wild foods for itself in large quantities (less than 100 pounds per 

person most years). In all years, developing households (20-30 yrs) ranked next in terms of subsistence 

productivity. Excluding two spill impact years (1989 and 1990), developing households were producing 

on average between 200-299 pounds per person. The next two household categories were very close 

in productivity and relative ranking -- mature households (40-59 yrs) and active elder households (60+ 

yrs), producing on non-spill years between 300-450 pounds per person. The active single-person 

household type stands apart as the most productive at the per capita level most years. It should be noted 

that these are mean harvests by households in a group. Within each group there was substantial 

variation in wild food production levels. As shown in a correlation analysis discussed below (see Figure 

VIII-11), household maturity at most accounted for about 28 percent of the variability in size of a 

household’s subsistence harvest. Much of the additional unexplained variability is related to other factors, 

such as the place of households within particular multi-household extended kinship groups in the village, 

which were not measured by the household surveys. While there is this variation, the mean productivity 

of wild foods by households appears clearly related to a normative development of kinship-based 

household groups as they mature over time. 

Overall, household responses to the 1989 oil spill are clearly evident in the graph. Mean 

household productivity of wild foods was depressed in 1989 and 1990, the first and second years 

following the oil spill. Wild food outputs by Alutiiq households in this sample were 60 percent lower 

in 1989 and 52 percent lower in 1990 compared with the pre-spill level. Wild food harvests rebounded in 
277 

1991 (only 9 percent lower than pre-spill levels). From 1991-93, outputs have ranged between 300-399 

pounds per person. 

Were the subsistence harvests of certain types of households differentially affected by the spill? 

As shown in Figure VIII-2, the direct impacts of the oil spill on household subsistence productivity appear 

to have been relatively equivalent for all household types, with the exception of the lowest-producing 

household group. Four of the five household types show reductions in wild food productivity the first postspill year (1989) -- developing households (-52 percent), mature households (-59 percent), active elder 

households (-51 percent), and active single-person households (-69 percent). The exception to this 

pattern was the lowest-producing type, which displays little change in wild food productivity. Their 

harvests were low before the spill and continued to be low after the spill. The oil spill had little direct 

impact on subsistence production by the most dependent households in the community. 

The relative change in harvests was quite consistent across productive household types, 

indicating that households throughout the maturational cycle responded to the oil spill by reducing wild 

food production. At the same time, the absolute change in harvest volumes was greatest for the mature 

households (40-59 yrs) and active elder households (falling about 200 pounds per capita) compared with 

harvests by developing households (20-39 yrs), which fell about 100 pounds per capita. The oil spill had 

the greatest direct impacts on the total volume of wild foods produced and distributed within a village 

through the wild food reductions of the older, more mature households in the community. The wild food 

harvests of active single persons showed the greatest changes in absolute magnitudes. 

There were slight differences among household types in restoration of wild food harvests after the 

first post-spill year. The developing households (-29 percent) and active elder households (-28 percent) 

show some signs of rebounding food production in the second post-spill year, and are at or above prespill levels by the third post-spill year (+15 percent and +8 percent, respectively). By comparison, the 

mature households have remained at a lower level of productivity compared with pre-spill levels (-59 

percent, -55 percent, -22 percent, -31 percent, -41 percent). There is no ready explanation as to why this 

might be the case. The harvests of the active single-person households rebounded by the third post-spill 

year. The harvests of this group show the most variability between years. The wild food harvests of 

single mothers-retired elders-inactive singles remained low. 

SHARING BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 

One would expect that changes in wild food harvests by household types would be associated 

with comparable changes in the sharing of wild foods. To examine this question, trends in sharing by 

household types in the four Alutiiq villages nearest the spill were analyzed, shown in Figures VIII-3 and 

VIII-4. Figure VIII-3 depicts the percentage of all types of species harvested that were received by a 

household during a year’s period. It shows that all household types (with the exception of active singleperson households) received about 20 percent – 25 percent of the species harvested in the community 
278 

Figure VIII-3. Wild Foods Received by Native Household Type,

Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Pre-Spill 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Percent of Species Received

Single Mothers-Retired

Elders-Inactive Singles

Developing (20 yrs-30

yrs)

Mature (40 yrs-50 yrs)

Active Elder (60 yrs+)

Active Single

Total

Figure VIII-4. Wild Food Species Received (but Not Harvested) by 

Native Household Type, Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest the Oil Spill, 

Pre-Spill Year to 1993

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Pre-Spill 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Percent of All Species

Single Mothers-Retired

Elders-Inactive Singles

Developing (20 yrs-30

yrs)

Mature (40 yrs-50 yrs)

Active Elder (60 yrs+)

Active Single

Total
279 

during the pre-spill year. Active single-person households received less, about 15 percent of all species. 

This number measures the variety of wild foods received during a year. The quantity (pounds) of wild 

foods shared was not asked on household surveys. 

As discussed in the previous chapter, sharing of wild resources between households declined 

during the first post-spill year. Overall, the percentage of species received by households through 

sharing declined by 42 percent the year of the spill in this sample of households (Fig. VIII-3). However, 

the reduction in sharing was not experienced equally among all household types. The impacts of reduced 

sharing appear to have been least on low-producing households, who are most dependent on sharing 

from other households for their use of wild foods. This is shown in Fig. VIII-3 for the year 1989. The 

percentage of species received by the household group of single mothers-retired elders-inactive singles 

declined by only 17 percent the year of the spill, compared with the 42 percent decline for all households. 

This is also illustrated in Figure VIII-4, which depicts the percent of wild food species received by a 

household that also were not harvested by a household. Single mothers-retired elders-inactive singles 

stand above all other household types by this measure, indicating that sharing is a more important route 

for obtaining wild foods by this household type compared with other households. 

While food production levels and species diversity declined the year of the spill, this analysis of 

sharing patterns suggests that sharing of wild foods continued to be directed toward the neediest 

households in the community. Deficits of shared food were disproportionately absorbed by the other, 

less-needy household types. These patterns show how the traditional family support system functioned 

in the village during the spill crisis. Though food production was low overall, productive households 

continued to take care of the community's most dependent households (retired elders, single mothers 

with young dependent children, and inactive singles) by differentially distributing to them the wild food 

stocks that could be shared. This differential support is also shown in 1990, the second post-spill year -- 

sharing levels had rebounded to pre-spill levels (and above) for this most-dependent group of 

households, but had not yet rebounded to pre-spill level for any other household type. 

Households reported that sharing was less during the oil spill – households shared less because 

there were fewer wild foods to share (see Chapter Seven). This was true for the village as a whole. 

However, at a more detailed level, we see that traditional systems of distributing wild foods did not 

breakdown, but were adjusted following traditional rules that prioritize types of distribution. Sharing with 

the elderly and with those who cannot harvest for themselves are high-order social values in Alutiiq 

culture. Based on the evidence, households were guided by these customary rules in the distribution of 

limited supplies of wild foods. Households did not hoard or become stingy vis a vis the elderly, single 

mothers with young children, and dependent singles. The kinship network did not fracture and fragment 

into smaller, self-interested units when wild foods became scarce. The most vulnerable segment of the 

extended kindred and of the tribal group continued to receive foods during the oil spill crisis. Sharing was 

reduced to other household types, presumably because they had greater economic options, such as 

working in spill activities and purchasing commercial foods. This sharing pattern during an economic 
280 

downturn reflects the activation of a traditional social support system within the village. There was no 

social breakdown of traditional social support systems during the emergency. 

Figures VIII-5 to VIII-7 provide additional details on the wild food distribution system within the 

four Alutiiq villages nearest the spill. They show that patterns of distribution of wild foods are related to 

the household development cycle, as is productivity. The diversity of species harvested (Fig. VIII-5) and 

given away (Fig. VIII-7) increases with a household's development level. The diversity of species used 

also increases with the household's developmental stage (Fig. VIII-6). Though needy households receive 

a greater diversity of species than other household types, other more-productive household types utilize a 

greater diversity of species. This shows that not all types of species are shared, or reported as shared, 

among households. It appears that a core set of species is shared. About 20 percent of all potentially 

harvestable species get shared according to what the low-producing households report. Other species 

are utilized by the households that produce them, and these other species are not reported as shared by 

surveyed households. 

MONETARY INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 

 

Household members near the spill commonly worked in cleanup programs (see Chapter Seven). 

Such workers earned monetary income used in part to purchase store foods as replacements for forgone 

subsistence harvests during the spill year. We would anticipate that households that were high producers 

in the subsistence sector might also be high earners in the wage sector, because the factors of 

production are similar in each sector -- mature workforce, skills, and social obligations. One prediction 

would be that income earned during the oil cleanup phase would be statistically related to a household's 

place in the developmental cycle. 

How household earnings in the wage sector changed in response to the spill, by household type, 

is shown in Figs. VIII-8 to VIII-10. Fig. VIII-8 shows total household income, including earned income 

from wages, dividends, and retirement and unearned income from entitlements. It is difficult to say that 

predicted relationships between income and household development type are supported by Figure VIII-8. 

The relationships between household income and household developmental stage look to be more 

complex than the relationships between wild food production and household type. Incomes of active 

single person households on average are consistently very low, related primarily to a household labor 

pool of one adult. Thus, the household type with the highest per capita harvests (Fig. VIII-2) displays the 

lowest monetary incomes (Fig. VIII-8). The single mother-retired elder-inactive singles household type 

displays lower incomes than all other household types on all years. This relationship is expected. 

Households with incomplete labor pools are likely to display low productivity in both subsistence and 

commercial-wage sectors. 

The relative rankings of the other three household types by income are not consistent across 

years. Developing households on average earn as much or more monetary income as 
281 

Figure VIII-5. Diversity of Wild Foods Harvested by Native Household 

Type, Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 

1993

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Pre-Spill 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Percent of Species Harvested

Single Mothers-Retired

Elders-Inactive Singles

Developing (20 yrs-30

yrs)

Mature (40 yrs-50 yrs)

Active Elder (60 yrs+)

Active Single

Total

Figure VIII-6. Wild Foods Used by Native Household Type,

Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

Pre-Spill 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Percent of Species Used

Single Mothers-Retired

Elders-Inactive Singles

Developing (20 yrs-30

yrs)

Mature (40 yrs-50 yrs)

Active Elder (60 yrs+)

Active Single

Total
282 

Figure VIII-7. Wild Foods Given by Native Household Type,

Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Pre-Spill 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Percent of Species Given

Single Mothers-Retired

Elders-Inactive Singles

Developing (20 yrs-30

yrs)

Mature (40 yrs-50 yrs)

Active Elder (60 yrs+)

Active Single

Total

Figure VIII-8. Household Income by Native Household Type,

Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993

$0

$10,000

$20,000

$30,000

$40,000

$50,000

$60,000

$70,000

$80,000

$90,000

$100,000

Pre-Spill 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Income (Earned and Unearned)

Single Mothers-Retired

Elders-Inactive Singles

Developing (20 yrs-30

yrs)

Mature (40 yrs-50 yrs)

Active Elder (60 yrs+)

Active Single

Total
283 

Figure VIII-9. Wage Incomes by Native Household Type,

Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993

$0

$10,000

$20,000

$30,000

$40,000

$50,000

$60,000

$70,000

$80,000

$90,000

Pre-Spill 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Income ($) from Wages

Single Mothers-Retired

Elders-Inactive Singles

Developing (20 yrs-30

yrs)

Mature (40 yrs-50 yrs)

Active Elder (60 yrs+)

Active Single

Total

Figure VIII-10. Entitlement Income by Native Household Type,

Four Alutiiq Villages Nearest the Oil Spill, Pre-Spill Year to 1993

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

$3,000

$3,500

Pre-Spill 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Income ($) from Entitlements

Single Mothers-Retired

Elders-Inactive Singles

Developing (20 yrs-30

yrs)

Mature (40 yrs-50 yrs)

Active Elder (60 yrs+)

Active Single

Total
284 

mature households. The developmental cycle would not predict this to be the case. These findings 

suggest that in Alutiiq villages, young adults compete as well as older adults in the commercial wage 

sector. This may be due to more extensive educational backgrounds of younger adults, as discussed 

later. Incomes of active elder households move up and down between years. It is hard to advance any 

single explanation for this pattern. 

Overall, incomes increased during the oil spill year for all household types (Fig. VIII-8). This was 

due to an increase in wage incomes, as shown in Figure VIII-9. Members from all household types were 

successful at obtaining employment above normal levels for the village during the spill year. There was a 

substantial demand for labor so that even household types with the lowest incomes prior to the spill 

(single mothers with young dependent children and retired elders) found some work, although not at 

levels of other households. Entitlement income fell during the spill year for most household types (Fig. 

VIII-10). Entitlements are unearned income to households with special social needs, including Aid to 

Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental Security Income (disability payments), Food Stamps, 

and Medicare. One unpredicted finding was that active elder households (household heads 60 years and 

older) earned the most income during the oil cleanup phase, compared with all other household types. 

The ability of elders to extract income from spill employment is notable. Survey information was not 

sufficiently specific to identify why elders earned so much. Perhaps the source of some of the income 

surge was leasing of boats. Elder households might own more boats relative to other household types. 

DEGREE OF STABILITY IN FACTORS OF PRODUCTION 

The above analyses suggest that a relatively stable social structure in Alutiiq villages underlay the 

highly changeable economic activities of households during the oil spill crisis. That is, during the postspill period, the economic activities of households exhibited large changes in wild food production, wild 

food distribution, and commercial-wage employment. These changes were triggered by the threats of 

contaminated foods and the social imperative to intervene in the pollution of the Pacific Gulf coastline. 

Yet these changes in household functions are properly viewed as perturbations of household activities 

within a local social structure that remained relatively stable throughout the environmental crisis. The 

network of kinship-based groups underlying the mixed subsistence-cash economy continued to operate 

during the oil spill, though the mix of subsistence and cash activities of households shifted from year to 

year in response to the crisis. The ability of the households to quickly respond to new contingencies 

triggered by the oil spill crisis was rooted in flexibility of the kinship-based production system – flexible in 

the sense that under the traditional system, there is capacity for household groups to make the kinds of 

short-term economic adjustments in labor and resource allocations that were required by the disaster. 

To examine the extent of structural stability within the domestic mode system, the following 

analysis describes the basic relationships between certain household factors of production and 

distribution before and during the early post-spill period. If the same relationships are evident in the 
285 

patterning of factors across time, it suggests there was consistency in the social organization of 

production and distribution during the disaster. 

 In this analysis, we examined relationships (in this case, statistical correlations) between several 

household-level factors in the economic sphere. In particular, the analysis examined the relationship 

between a household's wild food harvest level, wage earnings, and the distribution of wild foods. These 

are central aspects of the economic sphere in Alutiiq villages -- wage earnings are part of the wage 

sector, wild food harvests are part of the subsistence production sector, and wild food distribution is part 

of the subsistence distribution system. Households participate in both economic sectors to varying 

degrees. Kinship-based groups are the principal “economic firms” and consumption groups within the 

subsistence sector. For analysis, Alaska Native households within four Alutiiq villages in Prince 

William Sound-Lower Cook Inlet (Chenega Bay, Tatitlek, Port Graham, and Nanwalek) were combined, 

and relationships were examined for all years with information – pre-spill, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 

1993. The correlations for three years are shown in Figure VIII-11 (pre-spill, 1989, and 1991). The 

arrows suggest the causal direction of correlation, if one exists. 

Looking at the four Alutiiq villages nearest the spill, the analysis shows that the household's 

maturational type was significantly associated with household wild food harvest levels prior to the spill 

(Fig. VIII-11). As a household matures in the normal developmental cycle, households tend to harvest 

more wild foods in the subsistence sector of the village economy. The maturity of the household was the 

factor most highly correlated with wild food production, among factors examined. Household maturity 

was not associated with household wage income. As a household matures with age, it does not tend to 

earn more income in the wage sector. This may be due to young persons having access to jobs and 

higher incomes because of better schooling than was available to older persons. 

There were also strong and consistent associations between household wild food harvest levels 

and the distribution system of wild foods in Alutiiq villages nearest the spill (Fig. VIII-11). Within the 

villages, households that harvest greater quantities of wild food also tend to give away more types of wild 

foods to other households. Conversely, households that produce smaller quantities of wild foods also 

tend to distribute smaller numbers of wild food types. In this manner, the food production system and the 

food distribution system are directly related. Overall, high-producing households are high-giving 

households, as well as producing for their own consumption. In fact, giving is more strongly associated 

with harvest volume than is using, suggesting that high production is motivated as much by "giving" as by 

"acquisition." There appears to be reciprocity in the food distribution system. This is shown by the 

moderately strong associations between giving and receiving. The more a household gives, the more the 

household also receives. Over the course of a year, a gift given appears to generate other gifts received. 

Households that harvest a greater diversity of wild food types also use a greater diversity of wild foods 

within their own household. This shows that wild food production is production for use within the 

producing household, as well as production for distribution to other households. 
286 

Figure VIII-11. Correlations Between Factors of Production

of Alaska Native Households in Chenega Bay, Tatitlek,

Port Graham, and Nanwalek for Three Study Years

Pre-Spill Year

Level of Not measured

Education

Resources

Household .210* Household Used .669**

Size Wage Income ($)

Resources

-.167 ns Given

.460** .356**

.637**

.550** Resources

Household Household .695** Received

Maturity .350** Wild Food Harvest .782**

(Lbs per Person) .595** Resources

Harvested

1989 (1st Post-Spill Year)

Level of .243*

Education

Resources

Household .279** Household Used .799**

Size Wage Income ($)

Resources

-.064 ns Given

.384** .472**

.748**

.498** Resources

Household Household .827** Received

Maturity .342** Wild Food Harvest .854**

(Lbs per Person) .525** Resources .403**

Harvested

1991 (3rd Post-Spill Year)

Level of .340**

Education

Resources

Household .305** Household Used .785**

Size Wage Income ($)

Resources

-.216* Given

.278** .309**

.617**

.505** Resources

Household Household .825** Received

Maturity .532** Wild Food Harvest .777**

(Lbs per Person) .517** Resources

Harvested

** Sig < .01; * Sig < .05
287 

There was no statistically significant association between household wage income and household 

wild food harvests. One could not predict a household's wild food harvest level by knowing the 

household's earned income. Nor could one predict a household's earned income by knowing the 

household's wild food harvest level. Subsistence-wage relationships at the household-level differ from 

subsistence-wage relationships at the community-level, as shown earlier in Figure V-24. At the 

community level there were negative relationships between mean incomes and wild food outputs (see 

also Wolfe and Walker 1987). 

While there was no relationship between wage income and wild food harvests at the household 

level, there were associations between wage income and other household factors. Two factors were 

consistently related to household wage income -- level of education of household members and number 

of people in a household. There were moderately strong positive relationships between education and 

wage income -- as a household's education level increases (measured as the highest educational 

attainment by a household member), so does the household's earned income from wages and selfemployment. Similarly, as household size increases, so does household earned income. This appears to 

be because the number of adult workers holding jobs increases with household size. Wage income and 

number of adults in a household show an even stronger association than do household size and wage 

income. Therefore, pooled income by adult workers increases a household's wage income. 

The relative stability of the structure of the mixed economy, measured at the household level, is 

suggested by comparing this patterning of factors in the pre-spill year with the patterns in 1989 (the first 

post-spill year) and 1991 (the third post-spill year) (Fig. VIII-11). While there are small changes in the 

magnitude of correlations between factors, the basic pattern of factors of production and distribution is 

essentially the same across all years. The best predictors for subsistence food production are the age 

and composition of household members, consistently across all the years. Consistently across the survey 

period, high-producing households distribute the most subsistence products. The relationships between 

wage income, education, and household size are consistent, as is the lack of relationship between the 

wage and subsistence sectors. 

By these measures, there was stability in the basic organization of the factors of production and 

distribution during the oil spill crisis in the villages of Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet. This is 

evidence that, at the local level of extended household networks, there was no collapse triggered by the 

strains of the spill. While the spill created major local disruptions of food procurement and employment 

patterns, the spill did not transform the pattern of relationships in the subsistence sector. The traditional 

extended kinship networks adapted to the short-term crisis of food production and distribution at the local 

level without major dislocations in the underlying structure of production and distribution. 
288 

ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL REVITALIZATION 

One development from the spill has been economic and cultural revitalization within Alutiiq 

villages. Financial support for revitalization has come about through programs instituted by the villages 

using damage award settlements (see Tables VI-2 and VI-3). As stated in Chapter Six, Alutiiq tribal 

leaders lobbied vigorously to obtain a share of damage award settlements for villages as a class separate 

from the general public. Without this effort, there is doubt that a significant share of the settlement 

awards would have been directed toward Alutiiq villages in the spill area. In the first year of damage 

awards (the 1992 fiscal year), none of the civil settlement money went to community-based projects (see 

Fig. VI-2). It was only after an early period of lobbying by Alutiiq tribal leaders of the Oil Spill Trustee 

Council and other state and federal entities that the Alutiiq were successful in redirecting a portion of the 

settlement money into community-based projects designed to directly benefit villages. (Additional 

discussion of this topic can be found in the ethnographies prepared for this project, including Simeone 

and Miraglia [2000], Stanek [2000], and Mishler [2001]). 

A major obstacle for the Alutiiq villages to overcome was the narrow conceptualization of injuries 

and injured parties within the federal and state legal systems. The legal system basically recognized two 

types of injuries -- individualized injuries to private parties (such as individual commercial fishers, owners 

of private land, or businesses) and shared injuries to the general public. Injuries to community-based 

tribal groups had no separate, legally recognized status. Tribal interests were viewed as a part of general 

public interests. As such, tribes would benefit as members of the general public from projects designed 

to restore the natural environment. As stated in Chapter Six, the Alutiiq villages pushed for recognition of 

the special injuries sustained by tribal members because of their historic socioeconomic and cultural 

dependencies on the injured natural environment. Eventually this position was conceded by the EVOS 

Trustee Council, who administered the civil settlement money, and by the Alaska legislature, who 

approved projects supported by the criminal settlement money. 

The types of community-based projects instituted by Alutiiq villages with settlement awards have 

been designed to counter injuries perceived to be shared by the tribal group. Injuries to the natural 

environment lead to reductions in the subsistence activities of local, extended families, which in turn held 

the potential for eroding the transmission of cultural knowledge within the tribal group. Consequently, 

restoration projects were designed to restore the injured natural environment, bolster subsistence 

activities, and promote the flow of cultural knowledge so as to counter the injuries. The communitybased, subsistence restoration projects that evolved, paid from settlement awards, are listed in Tables VI6 and VI-7. 

Up until fiscal year 2001, close to $15 million of settlement awards had been directed toward 

community-based projects in Alutiiq villages. Of this, about $9.2 million had come from the civil 

settlement (Table VI-6) and $5.6 million had come from the criminal settlement (Table VI-7). The 

projects fall into seven general types. 
289 

(1) Fish stock enhancement of local salmon species represented the largest number of projects 

(19 projects). Salmon enhancement was designed to increase the returns of wild stocks to the 

waters of community members. As a shared resource, the increased stocks benefited extended 

family networks harvesting for subsistence uses, as well as families with commercial fishers 

who harvested salmon for sale. 

(2) Subsistence and educational facilities (11 projects) were designed to build public facilities of 

use to families for processing wild foods harvested for subsistence uses, or for launching boats 

used for subsistence activities (skiff docks). These projects were investments into an 

infrastructure benefiting subsistence users in the community. 

(3) Cultural education projects (14 projects) were designed to promote the communication of 

customary and traditional knowledge about subsistence and the natural environment. This 

diverse set of projects included elder-youth conferences, hands-on youth area watch education 

programs, spirit camps, and documentary films on the importance of seal hunting and herring 

fishing to local communities. 

(4) Wild food safety projects augmented tests of wild foods for contamination by hydrocarbons 

and paralytic shellfish poisoning. The purpose was to provide contaminant information to 

subsistence users so that they might make more informed choices about harvesting and using 

wild foods. 

(5) Local mariculture development projects (Chenega Bay and Tatitlek) were designed to 

provide small-scale shellfish industries in each community. The project was designed to 

generate income for local family members and an additional source of food to augment local 

shellfish areas impacted by oiling and paralytic shellfish poisoning. 

(6) Other Wild Resource Assessments were funded for harbor seal, octopus, shrimp, and surf 

scoter. These were resources of interest to local subsistence users for food or indicators of the 

health of the local ecosystem. The funding for harbor seal helped to launch the Alaska Native 

Harbor Seal Commission, a hunter association that has evolved into the main political entity 

representing subsistence users of harbor seals. The commission signed a formal comanagement agreement with the National Marine Fisheries Service in 1999. 

(7) Finally, Local Participation in Restoration projects funded an increased involvement of local 

village representatives in the restoration planning process. 

While diverse, all projects have shared a community focus. They have been designed to benefit 

the injured community as a whole, rather than private parties affected by the spill. Successful projects 

were viewed to have outcomes that enhanced the subsistence economy and cultural values common to 

villages in the spill area. The “investment” of damage settlements into community-based programs has 

had the effect of revitalizing the local economy and traditional cultures of Alutiiq villages nearest the oil 
290 

spill. This revitalization may not have developed at this pace had the oil spill not have occurred. The 

projects represent a conscious effort on the part of Alutiiq tribal leaders to redirect the public energy and 

resources generated by the oil spill calamity into something dynamic and positive for the Alutiiq villages. 
291 

Chapter Nine: The Legacy of the Oil Spill for Pacific Gulf Communities 

This chapter returns to this study’s original questions. How did human groups adapt to the Exxon 

Valdez Oil Spill, particularly the Alutiiq villages nearest the spill? Were responses to the spill primarily 

short-term, or do they portend longer-term changes for communities? In this chapter, the findings of 

Chapters Six through Eight regarding the responses of surveyed households and communities to the spill 

are summarized and placed into the wider context of the history and culture change in the Pacific Gulf 

region as presented in Chapters Three through Five. 

The findings of this research can be used to assess alternative social constructions of the oil spill 

event identified in Chapter One. Social constructions draw upon a shared experience. Meanings of 

events are constructed through communication, frequently through contentious discourse between 

interests holding different levels of power, including governments, industry, fishing groups, and tribes. 

Social constructions mold the public meanings ascribed to the spill, which in turn can drive responses to 

the event. Because of their influential nature, the chapter begins with social constructions of the spill, 

followed by a summation of the adaptive responses of the Alutiiq to the spill and their short- and long-term 

consequences. 

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF A DISASTER 

For most segments of the public, the Exxon Valdez oil spill was a relatively distant event indirectly 

experienced through the communication of government, the media, scientists, industry, and others. Few 

question the magnitude of the Exxon Valdez oil spill – the 11 million gallons of crude oil spilled over 1,200 

miles of coastline ranks it among the major oil spills on record. However, beyond these basic facts, there 

has been extensive discord about how to characterize the size and significance of the effects of the spill 

on the natural environment, economy, public health, society, and culture (see Chapters One and Six). 

Characterizing effects have been at the center of scientific inquiry, public assessment, and litigated 

claims. These efforts involved billions of dollars. Much of the effort has been directly linked to selfinterests of various parties, and the efforts will likely continue long after this report is released. 

Divergent assessments of spill impacts were advanced by industry, government, and tribal 

groups in litigation (Chapter One, Table I-1 and Chapter Six). Social scientists under contract with Exxon 

Corporation asserted that the spill had made few major impacts on Alutiiq villages, but would become a 

“scapegoat” for a variety of preexisting economic and sociocultural problems in the region (Wooley and 

Bohannon 1994; Wooley 1995; Table I-1). By contrast, the Alaska Native class asserted that the spill’s 

reduction of subsistence activities had lead to substantial economic and cultural losses by tribal groups 

(Table I-1). The state and federal governments asserted that injuries to the natural environment inflicted 

costs on the general public with interests in the Pacific Gulf for a variety of public purposes. As 

described in Chapter Six, for compensation to private Native claims deemed allowable under law, the 

federal district court ruled against Exxon in regards to economic damages. The court found that 
292 

substantial economic losses from reduced subsistence harvests had been sustained by the Alaska Native 

class and awarded $20.0 million in compensation (see Chapter Six). Other private damages to 

commercial fishers and other private parties were still under litigation. For injuries to the natural 

environment affecting the public, Exxon Corporation was assessed a record $900 million in damages. 

The court rejected the claim that cultural losses to the Alaska Native class had resulted from the oil spill 

(see Chapter Six). 

Beyond these litigated claims and court rulings, in public discourse there has emerged a 

generally held assessment of the magnitude of effects of the spill: the oil spill was a “disaster”, but not a 

“catastrophe,” “cataclysm,” or arguably, even a “calamity.” The choice of the term “disaster” to 

characterize the event has been part of an emergent social construction of the meaning of the oil spill in 

public discourse. In the nuances of English, a “disaster” is an occurrence inflicting great (or fairly 

widespread) destruction coupled with distress, hardship, or loss of life. The destruction caused by the 

Exxon Valdez oil spill was “environmental,” and not “human,” in the sense that the spill did not directly kill 

humans (such as the industrial disasters at Bhopal or Chernobyl) (see Enter-Wada et al. 1996). In the 

case of the oil spill, the natural environment of Prince William Sound suffered the direct destruction and 

loss of life, as witnessed by the counts of dead animals and miles of contaminated coastlines. These 

visible counts became emblematic for more complex and hidden injuries generally believed to have been 

triggered by the spilled oil and its movement through the natural environment (see Table VI-1 for the 

“official” list of injured resources). The environmental destruction produced distress and hardship to 

various individuals and groups who held interests in the natural systems, especially commercial fishing 

interests, subsistence harvesters, recreational users, and non-consumptive environmentalists. Distress 

and hardship were subsequent to the injuries to natural systems. 

In the social construction of the oil spill in public discourse, it is instructive to note how the oil spill 

has not been generally characterized. The oil spill has not been characterized as a “catastrophe,” a term 

which stresses a tragic outcome with irreparable loss. While the injuries have been great, and tragic to 

some users (such as the Alutiiq), they have not been considered irreparable in public discourse. In fact, 

the legal settlements of public claims between the petroleum industry and state and federal governments 

have been expressly directed to pay for activities which are alleged to restore, replace, or enhance 

injured natural systems (see Chapter Six for a description of this approach, which has not been without 

disputation). 

Nor has the oil spill been characterized a “cataclysm,” which connotes a sudden upheaval that 

brings about major change, like a revolution (social change). Within the Alaska body politic, the spill has 

triggered no social revolution in its wake – oil still flows from the pipeline, oil revenues still fuel the 

economy of urban Alaska, state government still strongly promotes the development of oil and gas on the 

North Slope, and so forth. The petroleum industry has not faced a revolutionizing public backlash in 

Alaska, such as the scaling back of domestic starts of nuclear power facilities following the radioactive 

releases at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania (PBS/WGBH 1999). While not “cataclysmic” in general 
293 

parlance, the spill was clearly a “cataclysm” for some individuals. In the spill area, the spill became a 

turning point in the lives of many. Some individuals moved. Friendships failed. Trusts were irrevocably 

broken. However, in public discourse these upheavals are conceptually “boxed” as personalistic, 

representing individual tragedies rather than transformations of whole communities. The exception to this 

statement may be Chenega Bay. As discussed below, for the people of Chenega Bay, the spill may yet 

prove to be “cataclysmic,” if that Alutiiq village does not survive the post-spill recovery period. But by and 

large, for the general public, and probably even for the majority of persons in the spill area, the spill was 

not so life changing as to warrant the appellation, “cataclysmic.” 

It is less clear to what extent the “disaster” was a “calamity” in the general social construction of 

the spill. For some segments of the public, the spill was clearly a calamity, particularly for the Alutiiq 

villages nearest the spill, as described below, and commercial fishers in communities such as Cordova 

(Reynolds 1993; Picou and Gill 1996; Kenner 2000). For most others outside the margins of the spill, it 

was not. Beyond the general consensus that the spill was a “disaster” (and a “calamity” for certain 

groups), there is considerably less consensus on other characterizations. As stated above, there remain 

multiple assessments communicated within a number of social arenas. In the damage awards, the courts 

have had their say regarding who and what was injured and to what extent. Petroleum companies make 

their case in court and in reports to shareholders who vote and set prices of stocks. Regulators have 

expressed their view through new regulation, such as requirements for improved systems of petroleum 

transport. In biological journals, the natural scientists present findings on impacted environmental 

systems. Such assessments are additional social constructions of the spill event. They are sets of 

meanings constructed around the spill, communicated within social groups who are variously empowered 

to embrace and/or reject them, and used as a basis for action by human groups. 

A CALAMITY FOR THE ALUTIIQ 

For the Alutiiq nearest the spill, the Exxon Valdez oil spill was a heartfelt calamity. “Calamity” 

emphasizes the people’s feelings about the spill -- the great distress, grief, and sense of loss from the 

disaster. The greatest distress was felt within the Alutiiq communities of Tatitlek and Chenega Bay, 

whose traditional homelands were substantially covered by crude oil (of Prince William Sound coastline, 

27 percent was “heavily oiled” and 21 percent “moderately oiled”) (see Chapter Six). In Tatitlek and 

Chenega Bay the spill year triggered an upheaval of community life. Nearly all adults worked in the 

massive first-year cleanup effort, a disheartening experience likened to a long, slogging military operation 

with few clear victories. Of the spilled oil, most remained unrecovered in the environment (see Chapter 

Seven). For Tatitlek and Chenega, the immediate tragedy continued longer than for any other segment 

of the public. As subsistence users, the Alutiiq of Tatitlek and Chenega resumed fishing, hunting, and 

gathering in traditional areas where unrecovered oil continued to be released into the local ecosystem. 

Since the spill, over the past decade, crude oil has become a part of the traditional ecology of the Alutiiq 
294 

of Prince William Sound (see Chapter Seven). The Alutiiq believe the persistent oil continues to poison 

the waters, plants, and animals of their traditional homeland. This is what makes the oil spill a continuing 

calamity for them. 

The Alutiiq of Tatitlek and Chenega were the segment of the public most vulnerable to an oil spill 

(see Chapters Three to Five). Their communities were highly dependent upon wild resources for food. 

The yearly patterning of family life was organized to a large extent around the seasonal harvest, 

distribution, and use of wild foods. Self-identities related to hunting, fishing, and processing. Cultural 

survival was tied to the continued use of a wide variety of traditional foods. The spill directly threatened 

the foundation of this way of life. The distress of the Alutiiq was the fear of a potentially great and 

irreparable loss – the fear of losing the very roots of village life because of an industrial accident. There 

were no other people as economically, socially, and psychologically vulnerable to the threats of 

environmental contamination in Prince William Sound as the Alutiiq. 

The level of the distress, grief, and sense of loss from the disaster diminished relative to the 

distance from the spill center. The experiences in other Alutiiq villages in Lower Cook Inlet and Kodiak 

Island were buffered by distance and the degree of oiling of traditional village areas (see Chapter Six). In 

addition, the degree of distress was related to the cultural and economic dependencies of affected 

communities on the damaged natural environment. Although Valdez was nearest the oil spill, the spill 

was not experienced as a calamity in Valdez because of the cultural orientation of the urbanized populace 

and their marginal dependence on the natural ecosystem (see Chapter Five). As stated by Fogarty et al. 

(2000:56), “in talking about the oil spill, Valdez residents tend to compare it with the construction of the 

Alyeska oil pipeline and terminal... it seems that in Valdez, the oil spill’s effect on the community is 

generally perceived as a social disruption, while in the rest of the sound it is generally viewed as a 

disaster.” As shown by Picou and Gill (1996), the level of stress documented for Valdez residents was 

lower than for neighboring Cordova, a community substantially more dependent on commercial fishing. 

ADAPTATIONS TO A DISASTER 

Based on the findings of this report, the spill was a “determinative” event for those Pacific Gulf 

communities near its center, contrary to the assertions of industry’s scientists. It was a clearly a 

“calamity” for nearby Alutiiq communities. The spill destabilized subsistence activities and associated 

social and cultural practices, as summarized below. However, the spill was not destructive of Alutiiq 

society or culture, contrary to claims of the Native class. It has been a catalyst for certain economic and 

cultural changes in the spill area, but these changes appear to be principally in terms of degree, rather 

than kind. The spill has provided the impetus for the elaboration and acceleration of sociocultural, 

economic, and sociopolitical trajectories already underway in the Pacific Gulf. Many of these changes 

may be beneficial to the Alutiiq as a distinct group, while others portend less certain outcomes at this 

point in history. 
295 

Impacts on the Rural Food Supply

The oil spill severely impacted the rural food supply. This effect varied regionally, with the 

greatest impacts in areas nearest the spill (see Chapter Seven). In the Alutiiq villages of Chenega Bay 

and Tatitlek, the two communities nearest the spill, wild food harvest and use were substantially reduced 

for two post-spill years. In the Alutiiq villages of Lower Cook Inlet and Kodiak Island, wild food harvest 

and use were depressed for a single year. In Alaska Peninsula villages, no measurable reductions in the 

rural food supply occurred. The impacts on wild food harvests in Valdez and Cordova are uncertain 

because of the lack of pre-spill or post-spill measures; however, they are thought to have been less due 

to the substantially less reliance on wild foods in Valdez, and the geographic separation of Cordova’s 

subsistence harvest areas from the spill area. 

The decision to reduce wild food harvest and use was quick and uniform across all types of 

households in affected communities (see Chapter Eight), indicating the response of existing, traditional 

sociocultural systems in Alutiiq villages. Wild food production and distribution were reduced to protect the 

public health from contaminated food products. This conservative course of action across all types of 

families was consistent with customary health practices of Alaska Native groups. In Alutiiq tradition, 

people are advised not to consume animals that appear ill or display abnormalities, so as to avoid 

becoming ill. The impact on the rural food supply entailed substantial costs to families -- it was 

economically expensive (the court awarded $20.0 million in compensation) and exceedingly distressing to 

give up traditional foods because harvest areas were contaminated with oil. 

The impacts on the total volume of the rural wild food harvest were short-term effects, rather than 

long-term changes in spill area communities. Over the course of the recovery period, wild food harvest 

volumes increased to near pre-spill levels in most communities (see Chapter Seven). Alutiiq households 

have resumed the harvest and use of wild foods. However, ten years after the spill, harvesters report 

lower harvests of certain species in the Prince William Sound area due to local depletions, including 

herring, octopus, clams, harbor seal, and birds. Such depletions may be related to the oil spill (see 

Chapter Seven). Subsistence users in Prince William Sound remain angry about crude oil entrained in 

beaches within customary subsistence use areas. Harvest areas with visible signs of oil are avoided by 

harvesters because of continued concerns about health impacts. 

It is doubtful that the short-term depression of wild food harvest and use resulted in long-term 

sociocultural losses for Alutiiq communities. Short-term contractions in the production and distribution of 

particular resources are not likely to result in the loss of cultural knowledge, skills, or values within 

families. Such losses would become of greater concern if contamination by the spill had necessitated 

longer-term reductions in wild food harvest and use (see section below on Cultural Revitalization). 

Families have experience dealing with annual variation in harvest productivity of particular species, as 

variability is characteristic of subsistence economic systems. However, the magnitude of impacts across 
296 

a broad breadth of species was extraordinary during the disaster year. While the threat to health was 

massive, families utilized customary mechanisms to adapt to the crisis. 

There is no evidence that the traditional organization of the subsistence sector was eroded by the 

spill (see Chapter Eight). Extended family networks continued to exercise substantial autonomy in the 

subsistence realm. State and federal governments played an advisory role, but did not interfere with local 

decisions regarding the rural food supply made by extended family networks (see Chapter Six). The 

government’s de facto relegation of subsistence production decisions to the local family level empowered 

traditional social systems to deal with this aspect of the spill crisis. It is doubtful that government 

agencies could have been organized to make any better decisions regarding the safety of the rural food 

supply than were made by the extended families at the local level. 

Impacts on Food Safety

The oil spill created new problems in public health assessment – to what extent were wild foods 

harvested in the oil spill area contaminated, and to what extent were contaminated food products 

unhealthful to consumers? Both government and industry were unprepared to provide information when 

it was needed early in the spill. Provision of information answering basic health questions lagged about 

six months to a year behind the time that decisions were made by families (see Chapter Six). The ad hoc 

interagency group of experts (OSHTF) formed to assess the health risks and benefits of consuming wild 

foods harvested from the spill area wedded expertise in scientific toxicology (NMFS Northwest Fisheries 

Center in Seattle), medicine (medical panelists convened by the state and federal agencies), and 

subsistence users. The inclusion of subsistence users in the health assessment program improved its 

responsiveness to consumers. Contaminant testing covered a longer time period and more areas and 

species because of the insistence of Alutiiq representatives. Many samples were collected by Alutiiq 

subsistence experts in traditional harvest areas. The OSHTF was coordinated by the federal Indian 

Health Service because the greatest risks were to Alaska Natives, the largest direct consumers of wild 

foods, with representation from tribal groups (North Pacific Rim and Kodiak Area Native Association), 

industry (Exxon Company), state government (Governor’s Office, Health and Social Services, ADF&G, 

and Environmental Conservation), and the federal government (Indian Health Service and NOAA). The 

OSHTF developed a relatively narrow charge -- to provide information to consumers of wild foods, so that 

choices by subsistence users might be informed by medical and scientific assessments. 

In balance, health assessment information was both palliative and frustrating to subsistence 

consumers (see Chapter Six). Over time, the medical advice and weight of information from tests 

assessed the health risk as low, if consumers used prudence in harvesting and using wild foods. This 

was based on three main features of the spill: the low toxicity of weathered crude oil relative to other 

industrial contaminants; the patchy oiling of subsistence harvest areas (unoiled and oiled areas existed); 

and the metabolic capabilities of major food species (vertebrates like fish and marine mammals) to protect 
297 

their edible flesh from hydrocarbon accumulation (however, many invertebrate species do not). By the 

third year, the assessments of Alutiiq subsistence users in Prince William Sound appeared to be in 

general consonance with the OSHTF’s assessment of food safety, as indicated by the recovering 

subsistence food harvests in the spill area and the opinions about food safety by surveyed households 

(see Chapter Seven). However, throughout the process subsistence users expressed substantial 

frustrations with the ambiguities inherent in scientific health assessments. The assessment program 

revealed that federal guidelines for exposure to most hydrocarbons did not exist. Tests of sampled wild 

foods were indicative, but never fully representative of conditions in all harvest areas or for all wild food 

types. Assurances regarding food safety could never be definitive, but only based on expert opinion with 

the information at hand. 

Concerns over contamination appear to be one longer-term change for Pacific Gulf communities. 

There appears to be an erosion in the confidence of the health benefits of consuming wild foods directly 

due to the oil spill. Contamination of food chains from industrial sources appears to be an emerging issue 

in Canada and Alaska (Jensen, Adare, and Shearer 1997). The health assessments of the Exxon Valdez

oil spill appear to have preceded by a few years a growth in the number of studies assessing 

contaminants in other Alaska areas (Alaska Office of the Governor, Arctic Contaminants Database 2000). 

Activation of Traditional Support Networks

The oil spill impacted traditional distribution networks of wild foods in villages nearest the spill. 

Because of smaller amounts of wild foods harvested within affected villages, the amounts and diversity of 

wild foods distributed among households within villages were reduced (see Chapter Seven). Like 

harvests, sharing was depressed for two years in areas nearest the spill and one year in Kodiak Island 

communities. While sharing was reduced across all types of households due to limited wild food 

supplies, sharing was reduced least to the households of elders, single mothers with dependent children, 

and inactive single-person households (see Chapter Eight). Sharing of wild foods also rebounded more 

quickly for these types of households during the second post-spill year. In this manner, the most 

vulnerable segments of the communities received the greatest support during the oil spill crisis through 

the traditional subsistence distribution system. Rather than breaking down during the spill, traditional 

sharing networks operated during the disaster to channel the limited wild foods in the community to the 

most dependent households. 

Replacement of Lost Subsistence Harvests

To replace the rural food supply lost during the oil spill and cleanup period, families purchased 

greater quantities of imported commercial foods. Short-term shifts in the contribution of wild foods and 

commercial foods in local diets are probably not uncommon in rural villages. The spill emergency 
298 

activated this customary approach used by families to replace shortfalls in wild foods. Larger-than-normal 

monetary incomes earned by residents in oil spill cleanup during the first post-spill year (see Chapter 

Seven) were used to purchase additional commercial foods. Without the larger household incomes from 

cleanup employment, this food replacement strategy may not have been possible. 

In addition, several emergency food programs provided assistance to households in some Alutiiq 

villages in the Prince William Sound and Kodiak Island areas (see Chapter Six). Exxon Corporation 

reportedly delivered groceries to households in Tatitlek, Chenega Bay, Nanwalek, and Port Graham 

during the first year (up to 800 pounds per person) (see Chapter Six). Several efforts by government, 

industry, and Alaska Native villages to ship wild foods into the spill area were attempted as food 

replacement programs (see Chapter Six). Of apparently substantial amounts of wild foods shipped into 

Chenega Bay and Tatitlek, most was discarded by recipient families because of concerns over product 

quality. Only about 30 lbs per person of wild foods were actually used in Chenega Bay (see Chapter Six). 

The experience suggests that wild food replacement programs may fail unless product quality can be 

guaranteed throughout handling, shipment, and distribution. Emergency monetary awards or food 

vouchers from government to households would likely have accomplished the same purpose in situations 

where income from employment was unavailable. 

Impacts on Employment and Wage Income

As a short-term response, resident households in the spill area increased their level of wage 

employment by working in oil spill response activities. Based on household surveys, there was a single 

year’s increase in employment for most communities (see Chapter Seven). During the oil spill year, 

household incomes showed a marked increase in Alutiiq villages, due to the higher wages and greater 

labor demands created by the emergency. Higher incomes were reported across all types of households 

during the spill year (see Chapter Eight). When the spill cleanup phase ended, household employment 

and incomes returned to pre-spill levels. 

This employment response by households can be understood as a readjustment of household 

labor between two economic sectors of the village economy. Households decreased the production and 

distribution of wild foods and redirected labor into spill cleanup employment. In the domestic mode of 

production, labor is organized within domestic family groups. It is the norm for households to maintain a 

foot in the two economic sectors during an annual cycle, flexibly combining monetary employment and 

wild food harvesting activities. The wage sector of village economies historically has been insecure and, 

at times, volatile due to economic factors external to the community, such as changing markets for 

exported fish and furs, or the changing availability of federal and state grants (see Chapter Four). Over 

time, households have had considerable experience redirecting labor to one or the other sector, 

depending upon prospects during the current year. In this regard, the village households’ rapid 
299 

contraction of subsistence sector activities and expansion of wage sector employment during the spill 

year was the application of a common economic strategy by domestic family groups. 

Over the longer term, the wage sector of the village economies in the spill area have seen some 

modest gains following the spill. These are related to increased local employment opportunities resulting 

from restoration grants and spill response infrastructure (see Chapter Eight). There is also the potential 

for additional capitalization in local industries, should households invest settlement awards and corporate 

earnings from land sales into the village’s wage and subsistence sectors. Investment into small-scale 

recreational services is one possibility, as tourism was increasing on Kodiak Island and in Prince William 

Sound during the late 20th century. The capturing of spill response money through community-based 

project grants was part of an established economic strategy of village governments. Toward the end of 

the late 20th century, federal and state funds funneled through municipal and tribal governments have 

been a major source of money supporting employment in rural villages. The identification and acquisition 

of grant money from federal and state sources to produce local wage employment was one primary 

function of village governments. That the Alutiiq villages responded to spill settlement awards as a 

potential source of funds to create local jobs was a continuation of this longer-term economic strategy. 

Economic and Cultural Revitalization 

One outcome of the oil spill has been the intensification of economic and cultural revitalization as 

a social movement within Alutiiq communities. Revitalization emerges from the development and 

implementation of community-based programs instituted by the villages using damage award settlements 

(see Table VI-2 and VI-3 and Chapter Eight). In their damage claims, the Native class feared that the oil 

spill presaged broad cultural losses for affected villages because customary subsistence activities had 

been disrupted. This concern motivated tribal leaders to work towards developing programs to counter 

this potential for long-term economic and cultural erosions. The fruit of these efforts has been substantial 

– close to $15 million of settlement awards had been directed toward community-based projects in Alutiiq 

communities during the restoration period (see Chapter Six). Over the ten-year recovery period, the effort 

to revitalize the economy and culture of injured villages has included the development and 

implementation of a diverse set of community-based programs, including fish stock enhancement, 

investment in public subsistence facilities, cultural education conferences, spirit camps, local mariculture 

industries, political organization of harbor seal hunters, and contaminated foods testing. 

That revitalization efforts followed the oil spill disaster is not an unexpected social outcome. 

Threats to survival of social groups often can trigger revitalization efforts. In the Pacific Gulf, the tragic 

loss of commonplace subsistence activities, and the prospects for future losses, undoubtedly raised local 

customs, traditions, and cultural values to a new level of personal and public awareness for Alutiiq 

villagers. Litigated claims and settlement fund lobbying undoubtedly forced village leaders to articulate 

these threatened customs, traditions, and cultural values in new ways and within new public forums. The 
300 

ruling in federal court that cultural values in villages were no different in kind from the values held by the 

general public (see Chapter Six) fell like an unjust blow on the Native class, who knew otherwise. 

Reactions of anger and a sense of great social injustice upwelled in Alutiiq villages following the ruling. 

The perceived threats to the local culture fueled an energetic and active response within affected villages. 

The external threats triggered a unified effort to protect and preserve the local group. The channeling of 

restoration money into projects to benefit the villages as a distinct type of social entity was an 

understandable response. 

Community-based programs were rapidly developed and implemented in Alutiiq villages. The 

rapidity of response was due to existing institutionalization of community-based programming as village 

revitalization. Economic, cultural, and political revitalization was already established as a social 

movement, predating the oil spill (see Chapter Four). The landmark of Native land claims in 1971 led to 

proliferation of new Alaska Native institutions, charged with promoting the economic, social, and cultural 

development of indigenous groups in rural areas. The protection of subsistence practices of Alaska 

Native peoples was a focal political issue in this social movement. Development of local infrastructure, 

industries, and jobs that helped stabilize rural villages were other goals. The efforts to reclaim and 

revitalize indigenous languages, culture histories, and expressive culture (crafts, art, and dance) were yet 

others. The rediscovery and re-exercise of tribal powers was a political focus. All these represented 

efforts within a single, growing movement in the late 20th century. Through social revitalization, Alaska 

Native peoples were expressly countering the assimilationist policies of the late 19th-and-early-20th

century Alaska. The oil spill did not create the revitalization movement in the Pacific Gulf. However, the 

oil spill clearly intensified the movement through the increased flow of money into community-based 

programs. 

Economic and cultural revitalization was not an inevitable outcome of the oil spill, however. The 

reinvestment of money into the subsistence economy and local culture represents considered choices by 

leaders and the broader-base membership of the tribal group for responding to the oil spill crisis. The 

choices involve naming Alutiiq culture as entailing things of distinction and value, and directing group 

actions in ways that were thought to support it. It is too early to assess whether the types of communitybased programs instituted with restoration money in fact accomplish their purposes. Will salmon runs 

return in larger volume because of enhancement programs, and will the runs support continued 

subsistence harvests? Will newly completed public subsistence processing facilities in villages be used in 

ways that enhance the customary subsistence practices of extended families in the villages? Will the 

Alaska Native Harbor Seal Commission, as a new sociopolitical organization, strengthen the customary 

patterns of use of harbor seals Alutiiq hunters? Will elder-youth conferences result in a greater 

intergenerational transmission of local knowledge? These may be answered in time. But for now, it is 

clear that the collective effort to develop and implement such community-based programs as a response 

to the external threats posed by the spill, has intensified efforts toward economic and cultural 

revitalization as a general social movement within Alutiiq communities. 
301 

Impacts on Demographic Trends

There has been no apparent out-migration of residents from the Pacific Gulf after the spill, as 

sometimes follows disasters. The damage to the natural environment and the distress to the people have 

not been such to trigger an exodus from the region. Nor has there resulted any apparent permanent 

influx of persons. Thousands of newcomers surged into the region for work during the cleanup period, 

primarily through Valdez. The normal life of towns and villages was temporarily “turned upside down” by 

the surge, straining facilities and services, and placing severe stress on local governments in staging, 

logistics, and political control (see Chapter Six). However, the demographic surge subsided with winter 

curtailment of the cleanup effort. Cleanup workers returned to their respective homes, rather than stay in 

the region. Like a classic boom-and-bust cycle, few workers apparently remained after the bust. 

If anything, ongoing demographic trends in the Pacific Gulf were reinforced during the post-spill 

period of restoration. Valdez captured the largest number of new permanent jobs resulting from the spill 

(about 75-100 high-paying, year-round jobs with the new Ship Escort Response Vessel System 

(SERVS)), jobs which solidify or expand its already growing population (Kenner 2000:20). Management 

of SERVS has awarded to TCC, a consortium of the Tatitlek Corporation, Chenega Corporation, and 

Chugach Alaska Corporation, with a hiring preference for Alaska Natives. These jobs have drawn a few 

residents away from Tatitlek and Chenega Bay, continuing the ongoing direction of flow of people from 

village to town and city. While some productive subsistence harvesters in Tatitlek have taken work in 

Valdez in the SERVS, surveys provide no evidence that these relocations have transformed subsistence 

harvest patterns in Tatitlek. 

Major demographic trends in the Pacific Gulf appear to have been unaffected by the oil spill. The 

growth of the region’s population continues through in-migration by people from outside the state, 

attracted in waves by developing employment opportunities (see Chapter Four and Chapter Five). 

Valdez, Kodiak City, and Seward continue to absorb most of the new arrivals. The Alutiiq villages, with 

only modest growth, are increasingly becoming a smaller proportion of the region’s population. Many 

Alutiiq continue to be drawn to the larger towns and cities because of more stable employment in 

comparison with the villages. 

Dispossession of Native Lands 

The dispossession of Alaska Natives from traditional homelands, a long-term trend in U.S.-tribal 

political relations, was accelerated by the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The separation of Alaska Natives from 

land holdings was a major, unexpected consequence of the oil spill (see Chapter Six; see also Simeone 

and Miraglia 2000, Stanek 2000, and Mishler 2001). By the tenth anniversary of the spill, the title to an 

estimated 452,586 acres of Native land had been sold to the state and/or federal government as part of 
302 

the habitat protection program of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. Conservation easements on 

an additional 167,731 acres had been purchased, as well as timber rights on an additional 15,453 acres. 

Tribal groups selling major portions of their traditional lands for spill restoration money included Tatitlek, 

Chenega Bay, and Eyak (Cordova) in Prince William Sound; Nanwalek and Seldovia in Lower Cook Inlet; 

and Ahkiok, Old Harbor, and Koniag Corporation on Kodiak Island. The sales of title in fee simple 

represented about half the Native lands for these Native groups. While this group of land sales probably 

would not have occurred except for the oil spill, the stage had been set for the further alienation of Native 

lands by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act in 1971, itself strongly linked to oil development (the 

transport of North Slope crude oil over disputed lands forced the United States to settle land claims with 

Alaska Natives) (Case 1984). 

As part of a series of sociopolitical events, the oil spill restoration program indirectly has 

accelerated historic assimilation processes in Pacific Gulf tribes. Historically, assimilationist policies of 

the United States government, typically with support from state governments, have used the 

dispossession of Native groups from traditional lands as a central tool for terminating recognition of tribes 

and severing special relationships with Native Americans as tribal peoples. In the case of Alaska, U.S. 

Congress chose not to recognize rights to tribal lands through treaties, the principal vehicles governing 

U.S.-tribal relations elsewhere in the United States (Case 1984:14-20; Berger 1985:20-21). “Indian 

country” in Alaska has not been recognized in federal courts, except in a few special instances (such as 

the Metlakatla Reserve). Under ANCSA, claims to most traditional lands were sold to the federal and 

state governments. The political position of indigenous groups in Alaska was substantially weakened 

when settlement money and Native lands were awarded to Native corporations, rather than to Native 

tribal governments. Because the conveyed Native land holdings became assets held by corporations 

charged with making money for shareholders, ANCSA presaged future losses of Native lands through 

sales (Berger 1985:73-95). Following the oil spill, the habitat protection program within the restoration 

process made the potential sale of lands a reality on a large scale. 

Based on the evidence of this study (see Chapter Six), it would be difficult to attribute the sales of 

Native lands to any single economic or sociopolitical strategy. There were balances of multiple factors 

weighed within Native communities. In the mixed economies of villages, Alaska Natives require some 

regular income flow to survive. Commercial fishing, a historic village mainstay, was in decline during the 

past decade in the Pacific Gulf region, depressed by the growth of international fish farming (see Chapter 

Four). Many families were moving out of commercial fishing, as it could no longer generate sufficient 

profit (see Mishler 2001:186; Stanek 2000:93). For the Native regional and village corporations 

established under ANCSA, turning corporate holdings into income for shareholders was difficult. For 

example, Chugach Alaska Corporation (the regional corporation for the Prince William Sound and Lower 

Cook Inlet villages), declared bankruptcy in 1991 primarily because of poor investments in fisheries and 

timber (Loshbaugh 1999). By the mid-1980s, Koniag Inc. (the regional corporation for the Kodiak Native 

communities ) “was near financial ruin” due to court battles and massive losses from fisheries investments 
303 

(Brown 1999). As the president of the Tatitlek village council observed, corporations have a fiduciary 

responsibility to place key decisions concerning their financial interests before their shareholders 

(Simeone and Miraglia 2000:145). And shareholders faced difficult choices. If Native lands in Prince 

William Sound, Cook Inlet, or the Kodiak Archipelago were logged, sustainable subsistence harvests or 

potential tourism values might be compromised. For many shareholders, land sales to public 

conservation units became part of a two-pronged strategy: corporate investment of the land-sales money 

might provide a way to generate future income for shareholders while preserving habitat values of local 

lands, both of importance to the future survival of Alutiiq communities (Stanek 2000:78). In the short 

term, the sales would help provide income to Native families. Future income to families would depend on 

returns to corporate investments. Whether individuals and communities will benefit or lose from this 

economic strategy remains an open question. 

The political and cultural survival of indigenous peoples are strongly linked to control of land. 

Political power is buttressed by a secure geopolitical base. There is no doubt that Alaska Native tribes in 

the Pacific Gulf are politically weakened by the loss of lands. In regards to the traditional lands sold 

following the oil spill, future control over access will be held by state or federal land managers, not by an 

Alaska Native corporation. Tribal members will be required to request permission of state or federal 

governments to access traditional lands. Access for subsistence uses will be granted based on the 

relatively weak protections of rural subsistence uses in ANILCA, and not based on the recognition of 

Alaska Native rights to fish and hunt. Decisions concerning future use of traditional lands, such as for 

tourism development, will be made by state or federal entities, and not by an Alaska Native corporation. 

As major landholders, Alaska Native groups were more likely to have status and influence in high-level 

decisions -- interests accorded by land ownership are a basis for gaining a “seat at the table” in 

government and industry deliberations. The loss of lands means the loss of this geopolitical status. In 

this way, the sales of Alaska Native lands have continued the historic erosion of power and influence of 

the Pacific Gulf Alutiiq as tribal peoples in the political sphere.1

The Survival of Alutiiq Communities

All Alutiiq communities survived the oil spill itself, but all communities may not survive the period 

of restoration and litigation. As stated in Chapter Two, the hallmark of success of human adaptative 

responses is the continuance of the social group as a recognizable entity. By this measure, the Alutiiq 

have been a struggling, and yet perdurable people over two centuries of post-contact colonialism. A 

Pacific Gulf population has maintained its distinctiveness as Alutiiq while the region absorbed waves of 

Russians, Scandinavians, and Euroamericans. As the 21st century dawned, the cultural revitalization of 

distinctive marks of Alutiiq self-identify (such as traditional subsistence foods, religious orthodoxy, 

 

1

 It must be noted that the role of Alaska Native people and tribes in oil spill restoration was enhanced by the federal Oil Pollution 

Act of 1990. Section 1006 of the act contains provisions for the designation of “Indian Tribe Trustees” for the purpose of natural 

resource damage assessments and for developing and implementing restoration plans.
304 

language, and dance), were self-conscious expressions of a will to survive as a distinct people. Overall, 

the oil spill disaster appears not to have undermined this struggle to survive as a distinct peoples, and 

may have supported it through the funding of revitalization programs. 

However, it is far from clear whether Alutiiq villages will be strengthened or weakened by the 

windfall money from the oil spill restoration land buybacks and litigation. The wellspring of Alutiiq identify 

is the small culturally homogeneous village, where much of the local society is ordered through extended 

kinship networks and supported by distinctive mixed, subsistence-cash economic systems. Beneath the 

inconstant outside winds of change, village life is bulwarked through kinship networks and kinship-based 

obligations. Yet, what happens to village life when winds blow up a blizzard of money? 

Windfall money from land buybacks and litigation may disintegrate Alutiiq communities to the 

extent it is used by Alutiiq families to move from the village to the towns and cities. Money allows people 

to move from family problems in the village, such as alcoholism, abuse, or failed relationships. Money 

allows the purchase of second homes in towns and cities, drawing families away from the village home. 

Money allows for individuals to travel, to attend school, to seek employment elsewhere. When a village’s 

population of children diminishes below a critical threshold, the public school closes, and families with 

children must relocate to find schools. As a village infrastructure withers, jobs leave, and the village dies. 

And if the villages die, then the Alutiiq may also disappear as a distinct people. The Alutiiq may be 

swallowed up within the dominant Euroamerican culture of places like Anchorage, Valdez, and Kodiak 

City. 

There are signs that this may be happening in Chenega Bay, as the village’s population had 

diminished from about 93 persons (1996) to 69 persons (1999), based on Alaska Permanent Fund 

Dividend mailing addresses tracked by the Alaska Department of Labor (2000:138). Subjective reports 

indicated that the village might be failing. Following the catastrophic tsunami of the Great Alaska 

Earthquake in 1964, the families of old Chenega were scattered for two decades. After a protracted 

effort, the new village of Chenega Bay was reborn in 1984. Only five years later, it was hit by the oil spill 

disaster. Among affected communities, its traditional use area suffered the greatest amount of oiling. As 

the community with the shallowest roots in the Pacific Gulf, its population may not weather the stresses of 

the second disaster. The village corporation sold half its lands for oil restoration money. One estimate 

places the value of the sale at half a million dollars to each Chenega shareholder. The restoration’s 

monetary windfall might be used by individual shareholders to fund a second diaspora of Chenega’s 

people. If so, the Alutiiq community of Chenega Bay may not survive the oil spill disaster. 

On the other hand, the monetary windfall from land sales and litigation might be used by families 

to strengthen villages and village life. Villages will be strengthened if families invest the money locally, 

upgrading homes, augmenting subsistence equipment, and supporting members of local kinship 

networks. There are signs that some families intend to use the windfall to capitalize in tourist-related 

business, as guides, innkeepers, and merchants. Greater security in the cash sector of the local 

economy would help support the village and village life. It is likely that some families in communities will 
305 

use the money for both ends. Some families will use the money to move, while others will use the money 

to stay. It is too soon to assess the long-term consequences of these choices for the survival of the 

Alutiiq as a distinct cultural group. 

In retrospect, the Exxon Valdez oil spill was an unprecedented industrial disaster in the Pacific 

Gulf portending large and uncertain threats to Pacific Gulf communities. As shown in this research, the 

Alutiiq adapted at several levels to the spill, its cleanup, restoration, and litigation. At the family level, 

responses served to reduce risks to public health, preserve the economic survival of family groups, and 

support vulnerable segments of the community. At a tribal level (that is, the community level above the 

family), the Alutiiq have worked toward preserving and enhancing the economy and culture of the local 

community and its subsistence use areas. These adaptations by the Alutiiq at the local level occurred 

within the context of massive responses by state and federal agencies and Exxon Corporation. Some 

developed as part of these responses, and some independent of them. 

The spill has been a catalyst for change in the Pacific Gulf region. New conditions have followed 

in the wake of the spill. Seeps from oil-entrained beach gravels make crude oil a continuing presence in 

the local ecology of Prince William Sound. The contaminated areas impel the Alutiiq to employ a new 

cautiousness in harvesting and using wild foods from their traditional homeland. The feelings of the 

Alutiiq people about the spill are merged with these new damages inflicted on their traditional homelands. 

A few new features in villages have appeared following the spill, such as boat docks, fish enhancement 

and mariculture ventures, and subsistence processing facilities, purchased with settlement money. 

Extended families continue traditional lifestyles, blending age-old subsistence practices with the ebb and 

flow of local commercial prospects. New income streams to families appear to be flowing from Native 

corporation decisions to sell Native lands. And other new income streams may open pending settlement 

of litigation. 

For the Alutiiq nearest the spill, the disaster was a calamity, but never a “debacle”. There was no 

sudden collapse beneath the strain of new, overwhelming forces. At the local level, the spill was 

temporarily destabilizing in Alutiiq villages and other communities in the Pacific Gulf region. But the spill 

did not disorganize or disintegrate the traditional society or culture of the Alutiiq. On the contrary, in the 

short term, the traditional social order of the Alutiiq proved itself fit for handling most major elements of 

the crisis affecting households at the local level. And the future of Alutiiq villages and their cultural 

distinctiveness likely will be built upon the new ecological and socioeconomic conditions emerging since 

the spill disaster. 
307

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The Department of the Interior Mission

As the Nation's principal conservation agency, the Department of the Interior has responsibility

for most of our nationally owned public lands and natural resources. This includes fostering

sound use of our land and water resources; protecting our fish, wildlife, and biological diversity;

preserving the environmental and cultural values of our national parks and historical places; and

providing for the enjoyment of life through outdoor recreation. The Department assesses our

energy and mineral resources and works to ensure that their development is in the best

interests of all our people by encouraging stewardship and citizen participation in their care.

The Department also has a major responsibility for American Indian reservation communities

and for people who live in island territories under U.S. administration.

The Minerals Management Service Mission

As a bureau of the Department of the Interior, the Minerals Management Service's (MMS)

primary responsibilities are to manage the mineral resources located on the Nation's Outer

Continental Shelf (OCS), collect revenue from the Federal OCS and onshore Federal and Indian

lands, and distribute those revenues.

Moreover, in working to meet its responsibilities, the Offshore Minerals Management

Program administers the OCS competitive leasing program and oversees the safe and

environmentally sound exploration and production of our Nation's offshore natural gas, oil and

other mineral resources. The MMS Royalty Management Program meets its

responsibilities by ensuring the efficient, timely and accurate collection and disbursement of

revenue from mineral leasing and production due to Indian tribes and allottees, States and the

U.S. Treasury.

The MMS strives to fulfill its responsibilities through the general guiding principles of: (1) being

responsive to the public's concerns and interests by maintaining a dialogue with all potentially

affected parties and (2) carrying out its programs with an emphasis on working to enhance the

quality of life for all Americans by lending MMS assistance and expertise to economic

development and environmental protection.