History of the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security

of the

United States Department of State
History of the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security

of the

United States Department of State
United States Department of State

Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Printed October 2011

Global Publishing Solutions

First Edition
CHIEFS OF SECURITY AT THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1917 - 2011

Office of the Chief Special Agent

Joseph M. “Bill” Nye 1917 – 1920

Robert C. Bannerman 1920 – 1940

Thomas F. Fitch 1940 – 1947

Security Office

Robert L. Bannerman 1945 – 1947

Division of Security

Donald L. Nicholson 1948 – 1952

John W. Ford 1952

Office of Security (SY)

John W. Ford 1952 – 1953

Dennis A. Flinn 1953 – 1956

E. Tomlin Bailey 1956 – 1958

William O. Boswell 1958 – 1962

John F. Reilly 1962 – 1963

G. Marvin Gentile 1964 – 1974

Victor H. Dikeos 1974 – 1978

Karl D. Ackerman 1978 – 1982

Marvin L. Garrett, Jr. 1982 – 1983

David C. Fields 1984 – 1985

Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)

Assistant Secretary of State

Robert E. Lamb 1985 – 1989

Sheldon J. Krys 1989 – 1992

Anthony C. E. Quainton 1992 – 1995

Eric J. Boswell 1996 – 1998

David G. Carpenter 1998 – 2002

Francis X. Taylor 2002 – 2005

Richard J. Griffin 2005 – 2007

Gregory B. Starr (Acting) 2007 – 2008

Eric J. Boswell 2008 –

Director, Diplomatic Security Service

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

David C. Fields 1985 – 1986

Louis E. Schwartz, Jr. 1986 – 1988

Clark M. Dittmer 1988 – 1993

Mark E. Mulvey 1993 – 1996

Gregorie Bujac 1996 – 1998

Peter E. Bergin 1998 – 2003

Joe D. Morton 2003 – 2007

Gregory B. Starr 2007 – 2009

Patrick Donovan 2009

Jeffrey W. Culver 2009 – 2011 

SERVICE BADGES

Service Badges used by Special Agents (1917-present), 

and by DS Diplomatic Couriers and DS Security Engineers (present)

ATA Antiterrorism Assistance Program

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CSA Chief Special Agent (1917-1947)

DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security (1985 - Present)

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBO Foreign Buildings Office

FSO Foreign Service Officer

FY Fiscal Year

INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research

KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Soviet Intelligence)

MEBCO Moscow Embassy Building Control Office

MSG Marine Security Guards

MTT Mobile Training Teams

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NOB New Office Building

NSC National Security Council

NYPD New York City Police Department

OC Office of Communications

OC/S Office of Communications’ Division of Security

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OSAC Overseas Security Advisory Council

RSO Regional Security Officer

S/CT Office of Counter-Terrorism

SCA Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs

SEO Security Engineering Officer

SEP Security Enhancement Program (1983-1984)

SO(T) Security Officer (Technical)

SY Office of Security (1947-1985)

UN United Nations

SELECTED LISTING OF ACRONYMS

ix

PREFACE DEFINING DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs was commuting from his residence to the 

U.S. Embassy in Kabul on February 14, 1979, when four men abducted him. A man dressed as a policeman 

stopped the Ambassador’s car and said that he had orders to search it. Aiming a gun at the chauffeur’s 

head, the “policeman” ordered the chauffeur to 

remain still while he and three men got into the 

car. At gunpoint, the chauffeur drove to the Kabul 

Hotel, arriving at about 8:50 a.m. The kidnappers 

ordered Dubs out of the car and took him to a 

second floor room. The chauffeur was instructed to 

go to the U.S. Embassy and inform the Americans 

of the situation. A large number of Afghan 

police, military, and fire department personnel 

quickly surrounded the hotel. Three Foreign 

Service Officers (FSOs) from the U.S. Embassy 

arrived, as did four Soviet officials. During the 

next four hours, U.S. officials repeatedly urged 

Afghan officials to exercise restraint to ensure the 

Ambassador’s safety. According to FSOs on site, 

the four Soviet officials held repeated discussions 

with Afghan authorities and appeared to serve as 

advisors. At 12:50 p.m. Afghan forces stormed the 

second-floor room, and Ambassador Dubs was 

killed during the ensuing gunfire.1

PREFACE

DEFINING DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

8

Figure 1: Special Agent Frank Madden (center, white suit) 

looks on as U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson waves to 

well-wishers in front of the U.S. Embassy in Vienna on 

June 30, 1952. Source: U.S. Information Service.
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History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The abduction and death of Ambassador Dubs 

highlighted the importance of diplomatic security 

and prompted U.S. Department of State officials 

to reexamine the security measures that they had 

in place. The United States has always had some 

form of diplomatic security, yet the threats to U.S. 

diplomacy and the measures that the Department of 

State has employed to counter them have changed 

considerably over time. This history explores how 

diplomatic security at the Department of State has 

evolved from the American Revolution to the postCold War era.

Broadly defined, diplomatic security is the set 

of measures enacted to ensure that the diplomatic 

representatives of a nation-state, kingdom, or other 

political entity are able to conduct that entity’s 

foreign affairs in a confidential, safe manner. Security 

is a basic function of diplomacy, and specific 

components of diplomatic security include preserving 

the confidentiality of diplomatic documents and 

communications, protecting diplomatic personnel, 

ensuring the integrity of diplomatic personnel 

through background investigations, and safeguarding 

diplomatic posts overseas and diplomatic facilities at 

home.

This history focuses on how the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security (DS) and each of its predecessors 

(the Office of Security, the Security Office, and the 

Office of the Chief Special Agent) emerged and 

changed over the course of nearly a century. The work also describes how and why several security-related 

functions became centralized into a security office. Until recently, the personnel and resources devoted to the 

Department’s security office have been small in relation to the enormous task confronting the Department’s 

security professionals. As a result, individuals figure prominently in this history and their contributions are 

highlighted when possible.

Figure 2: A security detail of DS Special Agents, positioned 

left and right immediately behind U.S. Secretary of State 

Hillary Rodham Clinton, provides protection during her 

2009 mission to Indonesia. Source: © Associated Press.

Figure 3: During a training session, two DS Special Agents 

from a Mobile Security Deployments team demonstrate to 

U.S. embassy staff how to counteract an aggressive wrist 

grab. Source: Private collection.
xi

PREFACE DEFINING DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

Practices, procedures, and responsibilities often 

arise well before a bureaucracy designates a person 

or office to specialize in that task. Historians of 

cryptology have shown that rulers and diplomats 

used codes and ciphers in communications long 

before a national, city-state, or royal government 

devoted an entity or person exclusively to the 

creation of codes or the encryption / decryption of 

communications. Past generations of U.S. diplomats, 

including the first diplomat Benjamin Franklin, 

gave serious consideration to diplomatic security, 

yet, how they conceived the threats they faced and 

the countermeasures they devised were determined 

by the available technology and the milieu in which 

they lived. Some measures have changed so markedly 

that they now seem minimally related to security, yet 

the contribution of such “forgotten” measures to the 

history of diplomatic security is unmistakable. For 

example, from 1800 to 1916, Despatch Agents were 

the Department’s foremost security personnel, but 

their work has changed significantly so that they are 

no longer viewed as security personnel.

Rather than trying to discuss each of the many 

security-related measures enacted by the Department 

of State, this history concentrates upon the broader 

context of threats and crises confronting the 

Department during a particular era, as well as the 

measures that fell eventually under the purview of DS. 

The work examines such measures as codes, couriers, 

espionage countermeasures, physical security, and 

protective details. Other measures are discussed when 

they are relevant for a particular era. Investigation 

of passport and visa fraud, for example, was critical 

during World War I, World War II, and the 1990s, 

Figure 4: Diplomatic Courier Philip F. Vandivier boards 

an airplane with two diplomatic pouches at the Frankfurt 

Regional Courier Facility in 1951. Source: Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security Files.

Figure 5: An array of fraudulent documents seized as 

evidence in DS operations. In 2008, DS conducted 

thousands of investigations into passport and visa fraud 

culminating in 2,448 arrests. Passport and visa fraud is 

often committed in connection with other crimes such as 

international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and alien 

smuggling. Source: Department of State.
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History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

but is discussed little beyond those junctures despite 

remaining a key responsibility for DS and its 

predecessors throughout the twentieth century.

The chapters are organized chronologically and 

by what might be described as “security frameworks.” 

Each chapter details how a unique set of diplomatic 

threats upset the existing security framework and how 

Department officials devised new countermeasures 

to respond to the new threats, often building upon 

existing measures or innovating new ones. The rise 

of a new framework frequently resulted from a 

specific event. In chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, the 

events respectively are World War I, World War II, 

the Amerasia affair, McCarthyism, public disclosure 

of a “bug” network in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, 

and the 1983 suicide bomber attack on the U.S. 

Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. In other chapters, the 

new frameworks resulted from broader national or 

international developments. For chapters 6, 8, and 9, 

the developments respectively are the rise of terrorism, 

the creation of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 

and the resurgence of terrorism as the predominant 

threat to U.S. diplomacy. Also discussed in Chapters 

7, 8, and 9, the computer revolution of the late 

twentieth century fostered new threats and new facets 

of diplomatic security. The conclusion offers several 

observations about the nature of diplomatic security 

and, along with the epilogue, examines diplomatic 

security since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001 on the World Trade Center.

Finally, the history of diplomatic security offers a unique window into U.S. diplomacy and the Department 

of State. Often overlooked by many histories of U.S. diplomacy, the functional operations and organizational 

structure of the Department have profoundly affected the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. For example, an aging 

communications network hampered U.S. diplomacy during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. This history also 

Figure 6: A DS Computer Investigations and Forensics 

branch chief (center) observes as two DS Special Agents 

prepare equipment to make forensic images of digital 

evidence. Such evidence is used for visa and passport fraud 

cases, other criminal cases, and counter-intelligence. Source: 

Department of State.

Figure 7: DS Mobile Security Deployments (MSD) agents 

(foreground) coordinate with a DS protective security detail 

(rear) for the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State at an 

overseas location. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

Files.
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PREFACE DEFINING DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

offers new insights to familiar episodes. For example, 

contrary to popular understanding, U.S. Senator 

Joseph McCarthy did not fabricate his figures about 

the number of Communists in the Department of 

State. McCarthy derived his numbers from materials 

presented to Congress by the Office of Security (SY); 

however, McCarthy repackaged the information in 

such a way that it took SY officials weeks to determine 

the source.

z Acknowledgments å

The Office of the Historian thanks the nearly 30 

retired and current Special Agents, Security Engineers, 

and specialists from the Bureaus of Diplomatic 

Security and Information Resource Management 

who generously gave their time for oral history 

interviews. Without them, this book would not have 

been possible. They are: Jim Bacigalupo, John Bagnal, 

Mike Beckner, Peter Bergin, Al Bigler, Robert Booth, 

Greg Bujac, Fred Burton, Michael Considine, Andy 

Corsun, “Courier X,” Bill DeCourcey, Bill D’Urso, 

David Fields, Richard Gannon, Steve Gleason, 

Gordon Harvey, George Herrmann, Al Herto, Steve 

Jacobs, John Kaufman, Bruce Matthews, Scott 

McGwire, Patti Morton, David McCabe, Michael 

Parks, Casper Pelczynski, Dennis Pluchinsky, John 

Rendeiro, Paul Sorenson, Robert Surprise, Charlie 

Wisecarver, and John Wolf.

The Office of the Historian has accrued many 

other debts during the process of researching and 

writing this history and expresses its gratitude to 

those individuals. Assistant Secretary of State for 

Diplomatic Security Francis X. Taylor merits special 

thanks because he proposed and commissioned 

Figure 8: A DS weapons-of-mass-destruction specialist 

(front left, bending over) trains foreign law enforcement 

officials at the International Law Enforcement Academy in 

Gaborone, Botswana. Source: ILEA Gaborone.

Figure 9: Special Agents Joseph Rosetti and James 

McDermott (center rear and right) provide protection for 

King Hussein of Jordan (center, light suit) during his 1959 

visit to the United States. Source: Aviation News Pictures.
xiv

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

this history. The Office of the Historian thanks the 

staffs of the Ralph J. Bunche Library, the Office of 

Information Programs and Services, the National 

Archives, and the Library of Congress for their 

assistance in locating relevant materials. In the Office 

of the Historian, Amy Garrett, Mark Hove, and 

Jennifer O’Neal conducted the initial research and 

wrote the first drafts on topics that appear in the 

chapters. Mark Hove is the author of this book, other 

than the Epilogue. He conducted a second round of 

research, organized and wrote the chapters, completed 

multiple revisions and supplemental research, and 

selected the illustrations. Eric Boswell, Greg Bujac, 

Jeffrey Culver, Robert Downen, David Nickles, 

Greg Starr, and Susan Tully read the entire work and 

offered many valuable comments and suggestions. 

Others who contributed in ways large and small 

include Bill Armor, Jim Bacigalupo, Paul Claussen, 

Evan Duncan, George Herrmann, Doug Kraft, and 

Chris Tudda. Grace Moe and Robert Downen of the 

DS Public Affairs Office merit special thanks for their 

invaluable help in writing the 2001-2010 Epilogue, 

as well as in editing the entire text, locating additional 

illustrations, and bringing this work to final book 

form.

Endnotes

1 U.S. Department of State, Office of Security, The 

Kidnapping and Death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs, February 

14, 1979, Kabul, Afghanistan (Washington DC: Department 

of State, 1980).

Figures 10 and 11: One of the many listening devices 

planted in U.S. diplomatic facilities in Communist bloc 

cities to conduct espionage against American diplomats. 

Technical Security Engineers discovered the device in the 

residence of the Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Prague, 

Czechoslovakia, in 1954. The lower image is the detail of 

the device located within the grey rectangular box to the left, 

in the above figure. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

Files.

Figure 12: A controlled explosion of a vehicle during 

a DS training exercise. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security Files.
xv

PREFACE – DEFINING DIPLOMATIC SECURITY ix

INTRODUCTION – THE FOUNDATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY xvii

CHAPTER 1 – SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS 

Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933 1

CHAPTER 2 – THE VITAL FUNCTION 

World War II and Diplomatic Security 33

CHAPTER 3 – CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE 

Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950 71 

CHAPTER 4 – McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR 

Diplomatic Security in the 1950s 121 

CHAPTER 5 – SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS 

Diplomatic Security in the 1960s 161

CHAPTER 6 – THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 

Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978 197 

CHAPTER 7 – ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION 

Enhancing Security, 1979-1985 255 

CHAPTER 8 – ALL UNDER ONE ROOF 

A Bureau for Diplomatic Security, 1986-1992 299

CHAPTER 9 – A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY 

DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992-2000 333

EPILOGUE – NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW CHALLENGES, 

NEW RESPONSIBILITIES, 2001-2010 373

CONCLUSION – A MONUMENTAL BUT ESSENTIAL TASK 391

APPENDIX 405

Statement by the White House on the Omnibus Diplomatic 

Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986: 

September 19, 1986

Public Law 99-399: Omnibus Diplomatic Security 

and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 [excerpt]

INDEX 413

CONTENTS

8

xvii

INTRODUCTION THE FOUNDATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

Diplomatic security is as old as diplomacy itself. Initially, diplomatic security was primarily the 

secure conveyance of government communications using couriers and codes. The Persian, Babylonian, 

Egyptian, Chinese, Greek, Roman, Aztec, and Incan empires developed courier services to carry imperial 

messages. The Greeks and Romans also developed 

ciphers to preserve confidentiality of diplomatic 

messages.1

 By the Renaissance (1500s), codes had 

emerged, and Spanish, French, English, Vatican, and 

Venetian foreign ministers routinely used ciphers 

and codes when writing to their diplomats abroad. 

The European monarchies also developed courier 

networks to carry messages. Courier work was seen 

as a training ground for diplomats because couriers 

had to exercise discretion, know the local language, 

and employ disguises to avoid detection.2

 

Colonial-era leaders in North America 

were acutely aware of the need to protect their 

correspondence. As tensions escalated between Great 

Britain and its American colonies in the 1760s, the 

Sons of Liberty communicated with each other by 

dropping letters at secretly designated coffee houses or 

taverns, where sympathetic postmen or ship captains 

would pick up and deliver the letters. During the 

American Revolution, the small fleet of sympathetic 

INTRODUCTION

THE FOUNDATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

8

Figure 1: Henry Laurens, U.S. Commissioner to the 

Netherlands. Laurens and his papers were captured by 

the British while en route to Europe. His papers provided 

evidence of Dutch aid to the American Revolution and led 

Great Britain to declare war on the Netherlands. Portrait 

by Pierre Eugène du Simitière, 1783. Source: Library of 

Congress, Prints and Photographs Division. 
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History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

captains evolved into a proto-courier system, carrying U.S. diplomats or their correspondence across the Atlantic 

Ocean. The perils of trans-oceanic travel (bad weather, shipwreck, espionage, loss at sea) often delayed the delivery 

of diplomatic letters. Even in good weather, a letter took six to eight weeks to cross the Atlantic.3

 

One of the most serious breaches of diplomatic security during the Revolution occurred in 1780 when the 

British captured Henry Laurens, U.S. commissioner to the Netherlands. Before his capture, Laurens burned and 

sank many of his papers, but he did not sufficiently weigh down the final pouch. A British captain retrieved the 

pouch from the water and forwarded the papers to the British Cabinet. One of the documents was a draft treaty 

between the American colonies and the Netherlands. As a result, England declared war on the Netherlands, which 

then allied with France and the United States. Laurens, meanwhile, was imprisoned in the Tower of London.4

 

Revolutionary diplomats regularly used ciphers and codes, many of which were their own creations. From 

1776 to 1789, U.S. diplomats used 17 ciphers, 10 cipher-codes, and 23 codes. A common code involved two 

correspondents using the same book to encode a message in which each word was replaced by a number. The first 

digit(s) was for the page of the book, the second for the line of the page, and the third digit(s) for the position of 

the word in the line.5

Espionage plagued American Revolutionary diplomats. In 1776, the British planted Dr. Edward Bancroft 

as a spy on the staff of Benjamin Franklin, the U.S. Minister to France, and Bancroft operated undetected for 

years. The French Foreign Minister, the Comte de 

Vergennes, acquired the ciphers for several U.S. 

diplomats. In 1777, British Minister to Prussia Hugh 

Elliot learned that the American emissary to Prussia, 

Arthur Lee, kept a journal locked in his desk. While 

Elliot dined with Lee one evening, Elliot’s men stole 

Lee’s journal and copied it.6

 

Diplomatic Security and the 

Early Republic (1783-1840)

After the Revolution, serving under the Articles 

of Confederation, Secretary for Foreign Affairs John 

Jay (1784-1789) instituted the first formal diplomatic 

security measures for the new American government. 

As head of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Jay 

organized documents and segregated “confidential” 

and “non-confidential” papers with the assistance of 

two clerks. He also insisted that all correspondence 

Figure 2: The American Commissioners sign the Treaty 

of Paris in 1782. U.S. diplomats John Jay, John Adams, 

Benjamin Franklin, Henry Laurens, and William Temple 

Franklin (left to right) were plagued by European espionage. 

The British planted a spy on Franklin’s staff; the French had 

the codes for Jay’s, Laurens’, and Adams’ correspondence; 

and the Spanish read Jay’s correspondence. Sketch by 

Benjamin West. Source: National Archives and Records 

Administration. 
xix

INTRODUCTION THE FOUNDATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

go to his office before being presented to the Congress 

of the Confederation. Jay complained to Thomas 

Jefferson that “little secrecy is to be expected” from 

Congress because members talked freely to the public 

about confidential matters.7

 

After the 1787 Constitutional Convention, 

Jay asserted in Federalist Paper #64 that diplomatic 

security was a key reason to ratify the draft 

Constitution of the United States. Writing as 

“Publius,” Jay said that diplomatic negotiations 

required “perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch” 

and many foreign diplomats would be uneasy about 

disclosing sensitive information to a large body such 

as Congress. By placing the conduct of foreign affairs 

with the President (in the executive branch), the 

Constitution allowed diplomats to confide sensitive 

matters to the President and his representatives, such 

as the Secretary of State.

8

 

 After ratification of the Constitution in 1789, 

the new United States Department of State used 

several ciphers, codes, and cipher-codes. During the 

1790s, it received more than 5,000 lines of code from 

its diplomats overseas. Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy 

Adams, and James Monroe each developed a 1,600- 

or 1,700-element cipher-code for the Department’s 

use. Monroe’s 1,700-element cipher-code, known as 

the Monroe cipher, was first employed during 1803 

negotiations for the Louisiana Purchase. By 1815, the Monroe cipher was the Department’s standard code.9

 

During the Early Republic period (1789-1840), the Department of State developed two methods for secure 

overseas transport for its correspondence: bearers of dispatch and forwarding agents. Used for a single, one-way 

trip, bearers of dispatch were often lawyers or merchants who carried letters or documents to or from Washington. 

Bearers—they were not called “couriers”—received a special passport and were reimbursed for expenses. The 

Department most often relied on forwarding agents. Starting in 1794, the Collectors of Customs in New York, 

Baltimore, and Philadelphia served as the Department’s forwarding agents. Forwarding agents learned of arriving 

Figure 3: John Jay, Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1784-

1789). In many ways, Jay is the “father of diplomatic 

security.” He instituted practices that laid the foundation 

for diplomatic security at the Department of State. Such 

practices included separating confidential and nonconfidential papers and insisting upon discretion for 

confidential subjects. In Federalist Paper #64, he advocated 

ratification of the 1789 Constitution because it offered 

better diplomatic security for U.S. foreign affairs. Painting 

by A. Conrad, 1948. Source: National Archives and 

Records Administration.
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History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

and departing ships, spoke with ship captains and officers, and sent letters and packages on appropriate ships. The 

captain stored the letters in his cabin in a locked chest. When the ship arrived at its destination, the captain would 

send word, and a legation or consulate officer would pick up the item. Letters or packages from posts overseas 

were relayed by the forwarding agent to the Department. By 1801, the New York Collector of Customs was the 

Department’s primary forwarding agent.10 

During the Quasi War between revolutionary France and the United States (1798-1800), George Logan, 

a Pennsylvania Quaker, prompted passage of the first diplomatic security statute. Distressed by the war, Logan 

travelled to Paris and personally negotiated with French officials. After his return, Logan met with President John 

Adams, and Adams admitted that Logan’s information encouraged him to send a diplomat to France, leading to a 

peace treaty. Despite Logan’s success and good intentions, officials asked whether U.S. diplomacy would be secure 

if U.S. citizens, on their own initiative, conducted negotiations on behalf of the United States. Adams proposed 

that U.S. diplomacy be reserved to persons designated by the President. Congress agreed and passed the 1799 

Logan Act, which made unauthorized diplomatic initiatives by private citizens a “high misdemeanor punishable 

by fine and imprisonment.”11 

One of the more serious security threats to the Department occurred during the War of 1812. As British 

troops neared Washington in August 1814, Secretary of State James Monroe ordered all Department records and 

other important government documents (including the Declaration of Independence) removed from the city. 

Department of State Commission Clerk Stephen Pleasanton hid the records in a gristmill two miles upstream 

from Georgetown and later moved them to a vacant house in Leesburg, Virginia. The records remained in 

Leesburg for several weeks until the British left Chesapeake Bay.12 

After the War of 1812, the Department 

expanded its diplomatic security measures. By 1815, 

Secretary Monroe differentiated between clerks who 

did “confidential” tasks and those who did “nonconfidential” work. By 1820, the Department locked 

its doors at night and employed two night watchmen. 

In 1819, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams 

fired a Department employee for failing to observe 

security procedures, the first time an employee was 

dismissed for such an offense. Adams did so after 

President Monroe warned him that clerk John B. 

Colvin could not be trusted and that he (Monroe) 

had kept Colvin on “non-confidential” work during 

his term as Secretary. Later, Secretary of State Louis 

Figure 4: The Northeast Executive Office Building, home of 

the Department of State from 1819 to 1866. After the War 

of 1812, the Department employed two night watchmen 

to lock the building and guard the premises during the 

evening. Drawn by C. Burton. Source: National Archives 

and Records Administration.
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INTRODUCTION THE FOUNDATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

McLane (1833-1834) instructed Department staff 

that they should consider all Departmental business 

and documents strictly confidential.13 

In 1830, the Department hired “despatch 

agents,” who assumed the forwarding agent’s duties 

and several other security-related tasks. The first 

despatch agent was William B. Taylor, who had his 

office in New York, the leading U.S. port. In 1832, 

the Department appointed John Miller, a book dealer 

in London, as its second despatch agent. Each man 

received an annual salary of $500.14 

A brief explanation of the workings of the 

Department’s mail system reveals the critical security 

role of despatch agents. The Chief Clerk collected all 

outgoing mail and ensured that the proper amount 

of postage was affixed (governments required postage 

for diplomatic letters).15 The U.S. Post Office hauled 

the canvas bags of Department letters by horse-drawn 

wagon to the New York Despatch Agent’s office. 

For packages, the U.S. Government contracted U.S. Express and, after 1847, the Adams Express Company to 

transport parcels at least once, often twice a week.16 In New York, the despatch agent sorted the correspondence 

by geographic region and re-bagged it in bags labeled “U.S. Government.” Correspondence marked “confidential” 

was placed in leather pouches or carpetbags. After routing bags and pouches onto appropriate ships, the despatch 

agent logged each letter and parcel, gave it a number, and noted its arrival date, departure date, the ship, and the 

captain. Most Department mail headed to Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America went to Liverpool, where the 

London Despatch Agent sorted it by geographic sub-region, re-bagged it, and routed it on U.S. or British ships. 

Despatch agents forwarded incoming items to Washington and investigated problems such as lost pouches.17 

In retrospect, the despatch agent system offered an innovative, secure, effective means to transport 

diplomatic mail within a relatively closed system, separate from regular mail. Unlike the Europeans who 

could rely upon couriers because their countries were in close proximity to each other, U.S. officials relied on 

trans-oceanic transport for nearly all diplomatic correspondence. Only despatch agents, ship captains, and 

authorized legation or consulate staff handled correspondence between Washington and its posts. At sea, 

diplomatic mail was often locked in a chest in the captain’s quarters. The system also saved money; expenses 

for a bearer of dispatch ranged from $294 for a trip to Paris, to $3630 to travel to Lima; but expenses for 

Figure 5: Receipt from Adams Express Company. The 

receipt shows D. B. Taylor, the Department’s Despatch Agent 

in New York, forwarding a package via Adams Express to 

the Department on October 20, 1859. The fine print is 

Adams Express’s disclaimer of any responsibility for damages 

or losses that may occur during shipping During the 1830s 

and 1840s, shipping for Department packages was by 

horse-drawn wagon, but shifted to railroad around 1858. 

Source: Department of State Files, National Archives and 

Records Administration.
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History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

6 months of postage for the despatch agent system ranged from $6 to $60. The despatch agent system’s 

effectiveness and economy delayed creation of a U.S. courier network for another century.18 

Security Imperatives from Steam Power

During the 1840s and 1850s, three 

innovations—steamships, railroads, and the 

Panama route—prompted the Department to add 

several security procedures. Steamships regularized 

shipping schedules and cut the time for Atlantic 

crossings from five weeks to two, fostering more 

frequent exchanges of diplomatic correspondence 

between Washington and its 31 legations and 282 

consulates.19 Despatch agents entrusted diplomatic 

pouches to the purser instead of the captain because 

the purser managed the steamship’s “secure room” 

or “strong room,” in which the pouches were 

stored and locked.20 With the 1848 acquisition of 

California and Oregon, the Department used the 

Panama route for diplomatic mail to Asia and South 

America’s west coast.21 By 1858, the Department 

was using locks on pouches and lead seals on bags, and the Post Office, U.S. Express, and Adams Express were 

hauling pouches and parcels by railroad. A lead seal was a length of two, intertwined iron wires wrapped in 

a loop around the top of the canvas mailbag and secured with lead solder.22 

Loyalty and Security during the Civil War

The Civil War presented new diplomatic security issues. During the war’s first days, the few Union troops in 

Washington could not protect the foreign diplomatic corps. Diplomats scrambled to obtain their national flags 

to fly over their legations for protection from military attack. Few diplomats possessed their nations’ flags; in 

fact, the Prussian Minister resorted to painting “The Prussian Legation” in large letters over his mission’s doorway. 

Secretary of State William H. Seward worried about the loyalty of Department employees. He asked all employees 

one question: Did they favor Union or Secession? Those who favored secession were dismissed, and those who 

professed loyalty to the Union were retained.23 In April 1865, as the Confederacy’s surrender neared, John Wilkes 

Booth and his conspirators plotted to kill Secretary of State Seward in addition to President Abraham Lincoln. 

While Booth went to Ford’s Theater and fatally shot Lincoln, former Confederate soldier Lewis Powell forced his 

Figure 6: Lithograph “U.S.M. Steam Ship Baltic,” Currier 

& Ives, 1852. The Baltic and its sister ship, the Atlantic, 

were among several steamships that Despatch Agents 

regularly used to carry U.S. diplomatic mail and pouches to 

and from Europe. Source: Library of Congress, Prints and 

Photographs Division.
xxiii

INTRODUCTION THE FOUNDATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

way into Seward’s home and slashed the Secretary several times with a Bowie knife. Seward was recovering from a 

carriage accident, and the braces and bandages on his head and neck saved his life. Powell was captured two days 

later, tried, and hanged; meanwhile, an Army detail protected Seward.24 

Post-Civil War Technological Imperatives

After the Civil War, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish upgraded diplomatic security at the Department. 

Four watchmen, instead of two, guarded the Department after business hours. Pouches and mailbags were 

routinely secured with padlocks and lead seals. Secretary Fish issued foreign affairs manuals that outlined security 

practices and mandated adherence. Papers of a “reserved or secret character” had to be “conspicuously marked” 

as “Confidential,” correspondence had to be numbered, and all drafts and extra copies had to be destroyed. Fish 

made the Chief of Mission at every U.S. diplomatic post responsible for any security failures.25 

The Department adopted the telegraph for 

communications but struggled with telegraphic 

security. On November 23, 1866, to inaugurate the 

first sustainable, trans-Atlantic line, Secretary of State 

Seward sent the first coded U.S. diplomatic telegram, 

using the Monroe cipher. Telegraph companies 

stipulated that a coded message using number groups 

(as Monroe’s cipher did) had to spell out the numbers 

(e.g. 387 was “three eight seven”), so Seward’s 780-

word cable expanded to 3,772 words. Also, the AngloAmerican Telegraph Company, which owned the line, 

charged double ($5 per word) for coded messages. 

Seward’s telegram cost $19,540.40, more than three 

times his salary. Seward then compounded the fiasco 

by sending his message to Paris in code and releasing 

it to the press. This enabled the French, if they were 

so inclined, to break the U.S. code. Moreover, the 

Department had used Monroe’s cipher for so long (60 

years) that the British already had broken it, lost their 

key, and retraced most of their work.26 

The “first telegram” fiasco led the Department 

to improve telegraphic security. Seward ordered a 

replacement code for the Monroe cipher, and the new 

Figure 7: William Henry Seward, Secretary of State (1861-

1869). As part of the same conspiracy in which John Wilkes 

Booth shot President Abraham Lincoln at Ford’s Theater, 

conspirator Lewis Powell tried to assassinate Seward at his 

home. Afterwards the Army assigned a protective detail to 

ensure the Secretary’s security. Source: Library of Congress, 

Prints and Photographs Division. 
xxiv

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

code was in use six months later. Several cables in 

the new code, however, arrived as one, long string of 

letters, and the “conundrums,” as they were called, 

took weeks to decode.27 In the 1870s, the adoption 

of the five letter/digit group as the telegraph industry’s 

standard “word” provided the basis for the Red Code, 

which was introduced in February 1876. Designed 

by John H. Haswell, Chief of the Bureau of Indexes 

and Archives, the Red Code favored economy over 

security. Its codebook—the cover of which was 

red—had nearly 1,200 pages. Secretary of State Fish 

mandated that every codebook be numbered and the 

person to whom a codebook was assigned be held 

responsible for its security and return.28 

In 1898, Secretary of State John Sherman 

offered Haswell $3000 to develop a new code; and a 

year later, Haswell produced the “Blue Code,” again 

named for the codebook’s cover. Haswell added 

nearly 2,600 words and phrases to the codebook; and 

in 1900, Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey 

A. Adee appended a one- and two-letter coding for 

dates. Two copies of the Blue Code, however, were 

soon stolen from U.S. posts in St. Petersburg (1905) 

and Bucharest (1907). As a result, the Department 

issued the Green Code in 1910 and demoted the Blue 

Code to unclassified messages.29 

Security on the Eve of 

World War I

The United States’ growing wealth and power 

expanded the extent of its diplomatic relations, which 

increased the Department’s need for diplomatic 

security. The United States began assigning military 

attachés to posts in the 1880s, raising its legations to 

Figure 8: Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State (1869-1877). 

Secretary Fish enacted several new security practices including 

handing out the first “foreign service” manual that detailed 

security procedures. Fish also required Chiefs of Mission to 

bear full responsibility for security failures at post. Source: 

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division. 

Figure 9: This illustration of Anglo-American Telegraph 

Company lines indicates how quickly telegraph traffic 

expanded between the United States and Europe between 

1866 and 1900. Telegraph companies charged double for 

coded messages and did not adopt the five-character group 

as a standard “word” until the 1870s. The five-character 

group provided the basis for the Department’s early telegraph 

codes. The termini for the Anglo-American lines were 

Valentia Island, Ireland, and St. John’s, Newfoundland. 

Source: Department of State Files, National Archives and 

Records Administration. 
xxv

INTRODUCTION THE FOUNDATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

embassies in 1893, and doubled Department staff 

(80 to 178) between 1896 and 1909,. The amount 

of diplomatic mail and classified documents grew 

exponentially. The Chief of the Bureau of Indexes 

and Archives reported in 1897 that handling and 

sorting of mail, as well as coding and decoding of 

telegrams, kept him and ten clerks so busy that they 

could do little else. The London despatch agent and 

his staff picked up and sent off pouches and parcels 

multiple times per week at four ports: Liverpool, 

Southampton, Plymouth, and Falmouth.30 By 1906, 

chiefs of mission and consuls pleaded with Washington 

to hire qualified clerks to handle the growing cable 

traffic, and several admitted to assigning code work to 

their wives or foreign national employees.31 

The Department enhanced security measures 

to address the situation. By 1909, Department 

employees presented cards issued by the Chief Clerk 

or their bureau chief to gain access to the building.32

Between 1900 and 1909, the United States negotiated 

bilateral agreements with 26 countries for free exchange 

of diplomatic pouches without interference.33

Department officials separated the pouch room from 

the mailroom and restricted access to it. Pouch workers 

registered each pouch and recorded its contents. In 

an early tracking system, the Chief Mail Clerk cabled 

the New York despatch agent about arriving pouches, 

and the despatch agent, in turn, notified the post of a 

forthcoming pouch.34 A missing pouch prompted an 

immediate inquiry, as did instances of missing items.35

The Chief Mail Clerk locked the pouch room at day’s 

end and gave the key to the night watchman. Only 

those with written authorization from the Chief Clerk 

or division chief could obtain the key.36 

Figure 10: An encoded Department of State instruction, 

likely in Blue Code, from Secretary of State John Hay to 

U.S. Ambassador to Germany Andrew D. White. Source: 

Department of State Files, National Archives and Records 

Administration. 

Figure 11: Portion of a map of telegraph lines, circa 1910. 

The number of lines from the United States to Great Britain 

had expanded markedly beyond Anglo-American’s first line 

in 1866. By this time, the Department had a 24-hour-aday telegraph office with five to six code clerks. In addition 

to St. John’s, the other major relay station shown here is 

Canso, Nova Scotia. Source: Department of State Files, 

National Archives and Records Administration.
xxvi

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

 The physical structure of telegraph networks 

undercut U.S. security efforts. Coded U.S. messages 

to and from Europe passed over British lines, and 

Department code clerks long knew that the British 

intercepted cables and had a bureau for breaking 

codes. The White House and the Department shared 

the same telegraph line, enabling a curious code clerk 

to monitor the President’s cables. Department code 

clerk Herbert O. Yardley did just that, claiming that 

he broke the President’s code in two hours.37 Between 

1905 and 1912, the Department doubled its number 

of code clerks from three to six, and its new telegraph 

office operated 24 hours every day. Department 

code clerks handled 1,000 telegrams per month, onehalf of which were coded. The clerks worked with 

multiple codes, including the Secretary of State’s code, because not all posts had received the Green Code or even 

the Blue Code.38 

Conclusion

The United States has always had some form 

of diplomatic security. Although no single office 

or person was designated to enforce security before 

World War I, early U.S. diplomats like John Jay were 

acutely aware of the need to protect U.S. diplomacy. 

They drew upon past precedents to devise practices 

that laid the foundations of diplomatic security in 

the U.S. Department of State. Although diplomatic 

security was associated mostly with communications 

security (correspondence and telegrams), Department 

officials prior to the twentieth century created early 

forms of document classification and conducted 

employee clearances and counter-espionage efforts. 

Technological innovations like the steamship and 

telegraph, events like World War I, and the emerging 

Figure 12: The Mauretania was one of the great steamships 

of the 1910s that carried Department of State pouches 

across the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. Despatch Agents had the 

ship’s purser sign for the pouches. The purser then placed 

the pouches in a “strong room,” which he kept locked. 

Source: Library of Congress, Detroit Publishing Company 

Photograph Collection. 

Figure 13: The White House telegraph operator, 1909. 

Before World War I, the White House and the Department 

of State shared the same telegraph line. Herbert O. Yardley, 

a young code clerk for the Department, listened in on the 

President’s cables and later claimed that he cracked the 

President’s code in two hours. Source: Library of Congress, 

Prints and Photographs Division.
xxvii

INTRODUCTION THE FOUNDATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

U.S. presence in international affairs pushed the Department to enact more security procedures and also regularized 

security as a function of Department operations. By the start of the First World War, Department officials had 

better security measures in place than their predecessors but felt less secure. 

Endnotes

1 Ciphers, codes, and cipher-codes have notable differences. For a cipher, a person substitutes each letter of the text with a 

different letter. For example, each letter might be replaced by the letter three positions earlier in the alphabet; therefore, 

“qorzb” would equal “truce.” For a code, groups of letters, numbers, and/or symbols replace words or phrases; hence, “36” 

might equal “King Phillip II of Spain.” A cipher-code combines the two systems.

2 Herodotus, The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories (New York: Pantheon Books, 2007), Robert B. Strassler, ed., 642, 381 

(Book Eight, Paragraph 98, and Book Five, Paragraph 35). Ralph E. Weber, United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 

1775-1938 (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1979), 6-17. E. John B. Allen, Post and Courier Service in the Diplomacy 

of Early Modern Europe (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 1-2, 22-40. William H. Bruce, Secret Messengers: How 

Governments Correspond (College Park, Md: Bruce International Press, 1995), 27-46. David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The 

Story of Secret Writing (New York: Scribner, 1996 [1967]), 95-98.

3 William Smith, “The Colonial Post Office,” American Historical Review 21/2 (January 1916): 273-275. Wesley Everett 

Rich, The History of the United States Post Office to the Year 1829 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1924), 

42-48. Richard B. Kielbowicz, News in the Mail (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1989), 21. Richard B. Morris, The 

Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence (New York: Harper and Row, 1970 [1965]), 439. Herbert 

E. Klinghofer, “Matthew Ridley’s Diary during the Peace Negotiations of 1782,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 

20/1 (January 1963): 107.

4 David F. Trask, with David M. Baehler and Evan M. Duncan, A Short History of the U.S. Department of State, 1781-

1981 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1981), 4. Letter, Henry Laurens to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, 

14 September 1780, The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States 6 volumes (Washington D.C.: 

United States Government Printing Office [USGPO], 1889), Francis Wharton, ed., IV: 56 (hereafter cited as 

RDC). Letter, Henry Laurens to the President of Congress, 20 December 1781, RDC, V:67. Samuel Flagg Bemis, 

The Diplomacy of the American Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967 [1935]), 160. Morris, The 

Peacemakers, 202. 

5 Weber, United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 23-29, 107. Weber, “Dictionary Codes” Masked Dispatches: 

Cryptograms and Cryptology in American History, 1775-1900, Second edition (Fort Meade, Md.: National Security 

Agency, 2002 [1998]), 53-56. 

6 Morris, The Peacemakers, 10, 36, 211. Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 66, 115, 115n. 

7 Jay Caesar Guggenheim, “The Development of the Executive Departments, 1775-1789,” in Essays in the Constitutional 

History of the United States in the Formative Period, 1775-1789 (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1970 [1889], J. 

Franklin Jameson, ed., p. 165. Letter, Jay to Jefferson, 24 April 1787, The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, 

1763-1825, 4 volumes (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1891), Henry P. Johnston, ed., III: 243. 

8 Italics in original. Publius [John Jay], “The Federalist No. 64,” The Federalist Papers (New York: Penguin Books, 1961), 

Clinton Rossiter, ed., p. 392. 

9 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the term “cipher” and “code” were used interchangeably. Weber, United States 

Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 124-145, 151, 154-155. Weber, “Jefferson-Patterson Ciphers,” and “A Classic American 

Diplomatic Code,” in Masked Dispatches, 69-75 and 81-89. 
xxviii

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

10 David Gelston, Jonathan Thompson, and Samuel Swartwout successively served as the New York Collector of Customs 

until 1830. Weber, United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 59. Meredith B. Colket, Jr., “Early Despatch Agents,” 

American Foreign Service Journal 18 / 10 (October 1941): 556-557, 592. 

11 Frederick B. Tolles, “Unofficial Ambassador: George Logan’s Mission to France, 1798,” William and Mary Quarterly, 

3rd series, 7/1 (January 1950): 22-23. Several U.S. citizens have engaged in talks that critics have cited as violations 

of the Logan Act. One example is Jane Fonda’s 1972 talks with North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi. See Michael V. 

Seitzinger, Conducting Foreign Relations Without Authority: The Logan Act, 1 February 2006, http://www.fas.org/sgp/

crs/misc/RL33265.pdf, accessed 14 August 2009. 

12 Letter, Stephen Pleasanton to William H. Winder, 7 August 1848, Appendix Document #10 in E. D. Ingraham, Sketch 

of the Events Which Preceded the Capture of Washington by the British on the Twenty-fourth of August 1814 (Philadelphia: 

Carey and Hart, 1849). Pleasanton later moved to the Department of the Treasury and served as the Fifth Auditor 

of the Treasury, his duties of which included oversight of the U.S. lighthouses. See Dr. Robert Browning, “The Fifth 

Auditor of the Treasury’s Lighthouses,” Lighthouse Evolution and Typology, 22 July 2008, http://www.uscg.mil/history/

weblighthouses/LHevolution.asp, accessed 14 August 2009. Memorandum, James Monroe, Secretary of State, to the 

Speaker of the House of Representatives, 14 November 1814, in American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and 

Executive, of the Congress of the United States (Washington D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1834), Walter Lowrie and Walter 

S. Franklin, eds., Volume II: 252. 

13 Diary, 10 April 1824, John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, comprising portions of his diary from 

1795 to 1848, 12 volumes (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1969 [1874]), Charles Francis Adams, ed., VI: 288. 

Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State: A History of Its Organization, Procedure, and Personnel (New York: 

Macmillan, 1949), 55. Diary, 2 September 1820, John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, V: 173. White, The Jeffersonians: 

A Study in Administrative History, 1801-1829 (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 187, 190, 202. Weber, United States 

Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 214. 

14 Colket, “Early Despatch Agents,” 556-557. 

15 Daybook for Foreign Intercourse Expenses, 1833-1889, Volumes I, II, and III, passim, Records of the Department 

of State, Record Group 59 – Entry 296, National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland. 

Hereafter cited as RG 59 - Entry #, NA. For postage paid, see Daybook Entries for 13 July 1853, I: 2 and 14 July 

1853, I: 3. Passim, Ledger for Contingent Expenses of Foreign Intercourse, 1795-1801, 1809-1820, and 1833-1861, 

5 volumes, RG 59 – Entry 299, NA. Daybook Entry, 21 March 1834, Daybook for Foreign Intercourse Expenses, 

1833-1889, III: 17; and Entries 1 and 7 March 1854, Daybook for Foreign Intercourse Expenses, 1833-1889, I: 23. 

16 Daybook for Foreign Intercourse Expenses, 1833-1889, III: passim. Letters and Accounts of Despatch Agents in New 

York and Boston, 1840-1860, 5 volumes, III: passim. See Adams Express Invoice, 20 October 1859 (figure 6). 

17 See passim, Register of Packages forwarded to the Despatch Agent in New York, February 1831 – September 1833, RG 

59 – Entry 284, NA. Daybook for Contingent Expenses, 1833-1889, III: passim. Register of Despatches Received and 

Forwarded to/for the Department of State, 1846-1853, I and II: passim, Records of the Office of Budget and Planning, 

RG 59 – Entry 285, NA,. 

18 Frank Staff, The Transatlantic Mail (London: Adlard Coles, 1956), 41. Weber, United States Diplomatic Codes and 

Ciphers, 193-194, 196. For bearer of dispatch expenses, see Entry “S. Draper,” on page “France” and Entry “Wm. B. 

Hodgson,” on page “Peru,” both Volume I, List of Bearers of Dispatches, 1816-1851, RG 59 – Entry 53, NA. For 

postage, see Entry 13 October 1841, Daybook for Foreign Intercourse Expenses, 1833-1889, III: 181. 

19 Register of Despatches Received and Forwarded to/ from the Department, 1846-1853, Volumes I and II: passim, RG 

59 – Entry 285. Entries for 16 April 1858, 2 November 1858, and 2 April 1860, Daybook of Contingent Expenses, 

1833-1889, I: 107, 115, 133. Staff, The Transatlantic Mails, 59-61, 72, 78, 86-90. Francis E. Hyde, Cunard and 
xxix

INTRODUCTION THE FOUNDATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

the North Atlantic, 1840-1973 (Atlantic Highlands: Macmillan, 1975). William Barnes and John Heath Morgan, The 

Foreign Service of the United States: Origins, Development, and Functions (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1961), 

127, 129.

20 Letter, James A. Hill, New York Despatch Agent, to William L. Marcy, Secretary of State, 12 May 1856; Memorandum 

“Report of Despatches Received from the Department of State and Forwarded by Nathaniel D. Hubbard, Despatch Agent 

in Boston for One Quarter ending July 31, 1857,” attached to Note, Hubbard to John Appleton, Assistant Secretary of 

State, 31 July 1857; Report of Despatches Received from the Department of State and Forwarded... Quarter ending 30 

June 1859; and Report of Despatches Received from the Department of State and Forwarded... Quarter ending 30 June 

1860; all Box 1, Letters and Accounts for Despatch Agents in New York and Boston, 1840-1860, Office of Budget and 

Planning and Its Predecessors, RG 59 – Entry 247, NA. 

21 Aspinwall is now called Colón. John Haskell Kemble, The Panama Route, 1848-1869 (Berkeley: University of California 

Press, 1943), 2, 148, 189, 203-204. 

22 For locks and lead seals, see Register of Despatches Received and Forwarded to/ from the Department, 1846-1853, 2 

volumes, I and II: passim. Entries for 2 November 1858 and 2 April 1860, Daybook for Foreign Intercourse Expenses, 

1833-1889, I: 115, 133. For use of railroad, see Letter, Samuel R. Glen, U.S. Despatch Agent Boston, to William L. 

Marcy, Secretary of State, 6 December 1855; Letter, Glen to Marcy, 2 March 1856; and Letter, James A. Hill, U.S. 

Despatch Agent New York, to Marcy, 13 June 1856; all Box 1, Letters and Accounts for Despatch Agents in New York 

and Boston, 1840-1860, RG 59 – Entry 247, NA. 

23 Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington, as Senator and Secretary of State: A Memoir of his Life, with Selections 

from His Letters, 1846-1861, 2 volumes, (New York: Derby and Miller, 1891), II: 553, 520. Stuart, The Department 

of State, 131. 

24 John M. Taylor, William Henry Seward: Lincoln’s Right Hand (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 272, 289.

25 Entries for December 1869, March 1871, 30 December 1874, 21 December 1885, 13 December 1889, and passim, 

Daybook for Foreign Intercourse Expenses, 1833-1889, RG 59 – Entry 296, NA, p. 39,56, 122, 338, 378. Register 

of the Department of State, September 25, 1872 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1872), 7. Department of State, Personal 

Instructions to the Diplomatic Agents of the United States in Foreign Countries (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1885); and 

Instructions to the Diplomatic Officers of the United States (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1897). 

26 Weber, United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 216-217; David Paull Nickles, Under the Wire: How the Telegraph 

Changed Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 181-182, 169-170. Weber, “Seward’s Other 

Folly,” Masked Dispatches, 121-148. 

27 Register of the Department of State, 1872, 6, 9. Weber, United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 219-220. Weber, 

“1867 State Department Code,” Masked Dispatches, 149-153; and “John H. Haswell: Codemaker,” Masked Dispatches, 

192. Department of State, Personal Instructions to Diplomatic Agents...(1885), 19, 44. Department of State, Instructions 

to Diplomatic Officers ... (1897), 37, 141-142. Nickles, Under the Wire, 173-174, 178-179. 

28 Weber, “The Red Code of the Department of State, 1876,” Masked Dispatches, 197-210. Weber, United States Codes and 

Ciphers, 240-242. 

29 Letter, Haughton Howe to Alvey A. Adee, 25 November 1887; Letter, Henry Harvey to Howe, 28 November 1887, 

enclosed with Letter, Howe to Adee, 6 December 1887; and Memorandum, Adee to Renick, 2 February 1895; all Folder 

1, Box 1094, Decimal File 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. Weber, “The Red Code of the Department of State, 1876,” Masked 

Dispatches, 207-208. Weber, “The Blue Code of the Department of State, 1899,” Masked Dispatches, 215-223. Nickles, 

Under the Wire, 170-172. Weber, United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 245-247. 
xxx

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

30 Warren Frederick Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779-1939: A Study in Administrative History

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 72-74, 80-81. Department of State, Outline of the Organization and 

Work of the Department of State (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1911), 7. Report of the Bureau of Indexes and Archives, 

Pendleton King, Chief of Bureau, to Edward I. Renick, Chief Clerk, 19 March 1897, Report of the Chief Clerk of the 

Department of State to the Secretary of State, 27 March 1897, RG 59 – Entry 321, NA. Frank Gurney, “Fifty Years in 

the Despatch Agency,” American Foreign Service Journal 12 (1935): 402. Letter, Benjamin Franklin Stevens, London 

Despatch Agent, to Isaac P. Roosa, New York Despatch Agent, 9 July 1895; Letter, Stevens to Roosa, 4 July 1895; Letter, 

A. B. Proal, London Despatch Agency, to Roosa, 25 March 1897; and Letter, Frederick C. Penfield, London Despatch 

Agency, to Roosa, 10 May 1897; all Bound Volume “Letters,” Box 1, Papers of Isaac P. Roosa, 1864-1928, Records of the 

U.S. Despatch Agents, RG 59 – Entry 360, NA. 

31 Letter, Robert Bacon, Acting Secretary of State, to Diplomatic Officers of the United States, 27 November 1908, File 

#16682, MA 862, Microfilm Roll #971; Letter, Thomas C. Dawson, U.S. Minister to Colombia, to Elihu Root, Secretary 

of State, 15 December 1908, MA 862, Roll #9761; and Letter, Root to the Diplomatic Officers of the United States, 16 

January 1909, File #17530, MA 826, Roll #997; all Numerical Files 1906-10, RG 59, NA. 

32 Rachel West, O.S.F., The Department of State on the Eve of the First World War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 

1978), 75. Memorandum, Wilbur J. Carr, Chief Clerk, to Lieutenant Ulysses S. Grant III, Superintendent of the State, 

War, Navy Building, 17 November 1909; and Memorandum, Acting Chief Clerk to Grant III, 4 September 1909; both 

Folder – Unmarked [#14], Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 1909-1910, Records of the Chief 

Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA. 

33 The 26 countries were Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 

El Salvador, France, Germany, Great Britain, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, 

Portugal, Russia, and Venezuela. The Department would soon add Costa Rica, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, the 

Netherlands, and the Ottoman Empire to the list. Memorandum, Charles A. Sidman, Mail Clerk, to William Phillips, 

Third Assistant Secretary of State, 31 August 1909, Folder – Unmarked [#4], Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of 

the Chief Clerk 1909-1910, Records of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA. 

34 Memorandum, Sidman to Phillips, 9 September 1909, attached to Memorandum, Phillips to Carr, 13 October 1909, 

Folder – Unmarked [#14]; and Departmental Notice “Register of Pouches,” William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State, 

to the Diplomatic and Consular Officers of the United States having Pouch Service with the Department of State, 7 

February 1914, 051.01/26a, Folder – Unmarked [#3]; both Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 

1909-1910, Records of the Office of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA. Memorandum, McNeir to Roosa, 13 

June 1912, 051.01/20c; and Instruction, Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State, to the Diplomatic and Consular Officers 

of the United States Having an Official Pouch Service, 14 June 1912, 051.01/20e; both Folder 1, Box 351, Decimal File 

1910-1929, RG 59, NA. 

35 Memorandum, McNeir to Roosa, 13 June 1912; Folder 1, Box 351, Decimal File 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, 

McNeir to Roosa, 20 January 1912; Telegram, Robert Bacon, U.S. Ambassador to France, to Secretary of State, 20 January 

1912; Roosa to McNeir, 24 January 1912; all Folder 2, Box 361, Decimal File 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, 

James F. Stutesman, U.S. Minister to Bolivia, to Charles A. Sidman, Mail Clerk, 8 November 1909; Memorandum, 

McNeir, to Roosa, 9 December 1909; Memorandum, McNeir to Roosa, 20 January 1910; and Memorandum, McNeir to 

Roosa, 16 December 1910; all Folder – Unmarked [#3], Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 1909-

1910, Records of the Office of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA. 

36 Memorandum, Sidman to Phillips 9 September 1909; and Memorandum, Carr [?] to Captain John H. Poole, 

Superintendent of the State, War, and Navy Building, 29 May 1909; both Folder – Unmarked [#14], Box 1, Miscellaneous 

Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 1909-1910, Records of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA. 
xxxi

INTRODUCTION THE FOUNDATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

37 Weber, Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 246-247. Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1931), 21-23, 29-30. 

38 Department of State, Outline of the Organization and Work of the Department of State, 80-81. Weber, Diplomatic Codes 

and Ciphers, 246-247. Memorandum, Ben G. Davis, Chief Clerk, to David A. Salmon, Chief of Indexes and Archives, 2 

March 1923, 051.62/174, Folder 5, Box 363, Decimal File 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Yardley, The American Black Chamber, 

18, 27-28.

1

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

World War I created a diplomatic security crisis for the United States. Under Secretary of State Joseph C. 

Grew afterwards would describe the era before the war as “diplomatic serenity – a fool’s paradise.” In retrospect, 

Grew’s observation indicates more the degree to which World War I altered how U.S. officials perceived diplomatic 

security than the actual state of pre-war security.1

 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 

Department had developed an effective set of security measures; however, those measures were developed during a 

long era of trans-Atlantic peace (there had been no major multi-national wars since Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo 

in 1814). Moreover, those measures were developed for a nation that was a regional power, not a world power 

exercising influence in multiple parts of the world. World War I fundamentally altered international politics, 

global economics, and diplomatic relations and thrust the United States onto the world stage as a key world 

power. Consequently, U.S. policymakers and diplomats developed a profound sense of insecurity regarding the 

content of U.S. Government information. The sharp contrast between the pre- and post-World War I eras led 

U.S. diplomats like Grew to cast the pre-war era in near-idyllic, carefree terms, when in fact the Department had 

developed several diplomatic security measures to counter acknowledged threats. 

The Department’s growing anxiety about diplomatic security resulted more from its recognition that U.S. 

communications, documents, and diplomats had become more alluring targets for intelligence and espionage by 

rivals, not a loss of naiveté. This recognition stemmed from three changes to U.S. diplomacy. First, U.S. officials 

recognized that the United States had become a world power instead of just a strong regional power. Second, because 

the United States was more extensively involved in world affairs, U.S. officials realized that they were generating 

much more classified information than they had previously; moreover, information that they had previously deemed 

unclassified now seemed “confidential.” Third, as a world power, the United States was expanding its diplomatic 

representation across the globe, creating a greater need for improved communications and greater opportunities for 

security breaches. This transformation was so extensive that it led some to assert mistakenly that diplomatic security 

did not exist in the Department before World War I, or to underrate the Department’s pre-war security measures.2

 

CHAPTER 1

SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS 

8

Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933
2

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

During the war, Department officials grew anxious about the threats to U.S. diplomacy. Espionage and 

subversion were common, and nations did not always observe diplomatic immunities and privileges. To meet 

this challenge, the Department created Special Agents, the Department’s first formal security officers. Led first 

by Chief Special Agent Joseph M. “Bill” Nye, and afterwards by his successor Robert C. Bannerman, the Special 

Agents built upon existing security measures and enabled the Department to undertake several new security 

initiatives such as passport fraud investigations. 

As the urgency of war faded into the peace of the 1920s, the Department followed competing impulses 

regarding security. Still concerned about the diplomatic threats, Department officials wanted to retain, even enact 

stricter security measures; yet, they also wanted to cut expenses and revert (somewhat nostalgically) to pre-war 

practices. For example, the Department retained its war-time creations of Special Agents and couriers, but both 

suffered extensive reductions during the 1920s. Despite the competing impulses, senior Department officials 

generally pursued greater security efforts. 

z A Crisis of Diplomatic Security å

The diplomatic security crisis that the Department of State confronted with the onset of World War I 

resulted from two inter-related but distinct sources: the belligerents’ lack of observance of customary diplomatic 

immunities, and their aggressive espionage and sabotage efforts.3

 German officials required that all outgoing 

international telegrams and telephone calls (including diplomatic ones) be in German, and many outgoing 

telegraphic messages were censored by German authorities.4

 Censorship of coded telegrams, however, was a global 

phenomenon; British cable companies, as well as the South American Telegraph Company, refused to carry coded 

messages. U.S. diplomatic pouches faced similar troubles. The First Secretary of the U.S. Legation in Belgium 

had to cross enemy lines to go to Antwerp so he could communicate with Washington, and the U.S. Embassy in 

St. Petersburg had to address its pouches to the U.S. Embassy in London because Russian authorities refused to 

permit the transportation of pouches addressed directly to the Department of State. The U.S. Consul in Bremen 

reported that German authorities were opening and inspecting all sealed envelopes at the border, forcing him to 

ship his official correspondence to the U.S. Embassy in Berlin for safe transmittal to Washington.5

 

In the first days of war, U.S. and other foreign diplomats in Germany feared for their personal safety. 

Joseph C. Grew, who was Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin at that time, recalled that British, Russian, 

French and neutral U.S. diplomats (the latter were mistaken for being British), were verbally threatened, spat upon, 

and assaulted by German mobs, who targeted the diplomats of nations that had declared war and allied against 

Germany. A “big and hostile crowd” of Germans broke the windows of the British Embassy in Berlin and then 

kept a threatening vigil outside the Embassy. German mobs also attacked trains carrying foreign diplomats, forcing 

some diplomats to travel with the curtains drawn to avoid detection and shootings. When American diplomats 

were harassed, the Kaiser and other senior German officials made significant efforts to demonstrate German-U.S. 
3

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

friendship in an effort to prevent further attacks 

on U.S. diplomats and consuls, which might cause 

the United States to end its neutrality and join the 

Allied nations against Germany. German newspapers 

published “long and prominent appeals” to the public 

not to confuse the Americans with the British, who 

had declared war against Germany.6

 

The war prompted U.S. posts in Europe to 

implement new measures to ensure the security of 

U.S. personnel and diplomatic pouches. As a result 

of German attacks against British citizens, U.S. 

diplomats and citizens in Germany wore American 

flags on their lapels to avoid any confusion that they 

might be British. The U.S. Embassy in London 

employed two couriers, Thomas Smith and Henry 

Eustis, clerks at the U.S. Embassies in London and 

Berlin respectively, to serve as couriers for U.S. 

diplomatic pouches between U.S. Embassy London 

and the U.S. Embassies in Berlin and Vienna. As 

clerk-couriers, Smith and Eustis made regular trips 

for the first year or so of the war, although their usage 

tapered to an irregular, “as necessary” basis by 1916.7

The U.S. Embassy in St. Petersburg employed bearers 

of dispatch when it could, to transport confidential 

correspondence to Washington. In Belgium, the U.S., 

Spanish, and Dutch Embassies joined together and 

paid a Dutch courier to take their pouches to Amsterdam in order to get them to their respective governments.8

 In 

London, U.S. Despatch Agent office clerks escorted all incoming and outgoing pouches to and from the ports of 

Liverpool, Southampton, Plymouth, and Falmouth. Between 1914 and 1920, U.S. Despatch Agent Office clerk 

Frank Gurney escorted 8,860 pouches and traveled more than 176,577 miles.9

 

In several ways, the Department of State was unprepared for the exigencies of a world war. For example, the 

barrage of telegraphic communications created confusion in the Department’s telegraph office. The Department 

quickly insisted that U.S. posts had to number and date all telegrams to the Department. U.S. posts overseas 

compounded the confusion by using whatever encryption code they had available. As a result, the Department 

Figure 1: Political Cartoon “For Ways That Are Dark,” 

W. A. Rogers, appeared in the New York Herald,

January 16, 1916. The cartoon shows German Ambassador 

Johann von Bernstorff paying Military Attaché Franz von 

Papen to undertake sabotage in the United States, while he goes 

to the White House to pass a message of respect for neutrality. 

After linking von Papen to several sabotage efforts, the United 

States demanded von Papen’s recall in 1915. Source: Library 

of Congress, Cabinet of American Illustration.
4

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

received telegrams in a variety of encryption codes, 

including Red, Special Red, Blue, Green, and Special 

Green, as well as an array of commercial codes.10 

President Woodrow Wilson declared that the 

United States would remain neutral in the war, but 

the German Embassy in Washington did not observe 

U.S. neutrality and carried out several propaganda 

and sabotage efforts against Allied targets. The U.S. 

Embassy in Berlin discovered vouchers showing that 

the German Embassy in Washington was funding 

several propaganda efforts in the United States. 

Military Attaché Captain Franz von Papen helped 

organize a ring to provide false passports for Germanand Austrian-Americans wishing to go to Europe to 

fight for the Central Powers, as well as for German 

spies conducting espionage in Great Britain, France, 

and Russia. With the involvement of von Papen 

and Naval Attaché Captain Karl Boy-Ed, German sabotage efforts between March and September 1915 led to 

explosions in ten U.S. factories that produced munitions for the Allied powers. During nearly the same period, 

thirteen ships (mostly British) that departed U.S. ports with supplies exploded en route. The German military 

attachés were also involved in plots to blow up the international railway bridge at Vanceboro, Maine, and the 

Welland Canal linking Lake Erie and Lake Ontario. The United States demanded von Papen’s recall in 1915, but 

Boy-Ed continued organizing such activities until his recall in 1917.11 

The espionage and propaganda activities of Austrian Ambassador Dr. Constantin Theodore Dumba prompted 

the United States to demand his recall in 1915 as well. In August 1915, British agents arrested U.S. war correspondent 

James F. J. Archibald and found papers in his possession that revealed that he was a bearer of dispatch for the 

German and Austrian Governments. Archibald also possessed documents showing that Ambassador Dumba had 

actively funded propaganda efforts for the Central Powers in the United States, and had incited labor unrest in U.S. 

factories. U.S. officials were angry about not only Dumba’s espionage, but also the fact that he had employed a 

U.S. citizen. Employing an American as a bearer of dispatch implicitly made that U.S. citizen an agent of a foreign 

government and a target for the enemies of that government. It threatened to make other U.S. citizens combatants 

in the war, and cast doubt upon U.S. neutrality. Secretary of State Robert Lansing confronted Dumba, charging 

that “you have cast suspicion on every American going to Germany.” Lansing immediately demanded Dumba’s 

recall in an effort to deter other foreign diplomats in Washington from employing Americans as secret couriers.12

Figure 2: Dr. Constantin Theodore Dumba, AustriaHungary’s Ambassador to the United States. Dumba hired 

a U.S. citizen to serve as a bearer of dispatch for AustriaHungary and funded propaganda activities to incite labor 

unrest in U.S. factories. The United States demanded 

Dumba’s recall in 1915. Source: Library of Congress, 

George Grantham Bain Collection. 
5

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

The magnitude of the sabotage, espionage, and diplomatic security activities overwhelmed U.S. Government 

agencies, and many German and Austrian activities were discovered with British assistance or by sheer luck. U.S. 

Ambassador to Germany James W. Gerard mistakenly opened a package that arrived by diplomatic pouch and 

discovered the vouchers documenting German funding of propaganda efforts in the United States. One German 

agent turned himself in to the British secret service, and his confession exposed the Welland Canal plot and the 

passport fraud ring. British agents arrested James Archibald, leading to Dumba’s demise; and British and French 

agents assisted with uncovering the plot to sabotage the Vanceboro Bridge. The New York City bomb squad 

decided to check out a person who was acting suspiciously and uncovered several sabotage plots. The U.S. Secret 

Service uncovered other German sabotage plans when the German Commercial Attaché absent-mindedly left his 

briefcase on a New York elevated train (the attaché managed the German Embassy’s finances).13 

The German Embassy’s success in exploiting passport fraud resulted in part because mandatory use of 

passports was a new phenomenon. Prior to 1914, U.S. citizens did not need to carry passports for travel to 

most European countries. With the outbreak of war in 1914, U.S. chiefs of mission in Europe issued emergency 

passports upon request, and passports were soon limited to U.S. citizens and to those declaring their intent to 

become U.S. citizens.14 On December 21, 1914, the Department tightened passport application requirements, 

compelling applicants to provide three photographs, as well as a birth certificate, certificate of naturalization, or 

an old passport. Passport applicants also needed to declare which countries they intended to visit and the general 

purpose of their travels; moreover, the passport was valid only for the countries declared.15 

The 1915 discovery of the passport fraud ring and the German Embassy’s ties to it prompted U.S. officials 

to impose further passport restrictions. Passports could no longer be issued to those who declared their intent to 

become a U.S. citizen if their country of origin was at war or if the person was planning to visit a belligerent country. 

President Wilson, through Executive Order No. 2285, required all U.S. citizens to apply for a U.S. passport at 

a court of record near their residence, and applicants had to swear an oath of allegiance to the United States. 

Wilson also required that all foreigners leaving the United States must have passports issued by the governments 

of their respective countries. The Department of State then requested the chiefs of foreign diplomatic missions 

in Washington to supply blank or expired passports to the Department so that U.S. officials could recognize valid 

passports from their countries.16

z Creating a Diplomatic “Secret Service” å

Secretary of State Robert Lansing recognized the security crisis confronting the Department and instituted 

several measures to address it. He implemented a strict building pass system that applied to all Department 

visitors, including Congressmen, reporters, and delivery and service personnel. Lansing and other senior officials 

believed that some regular visitors to the Department (notably reporters) were paid by the Germans, were “too 

indiscreet,” or were “too indifferent” to national security considerations to merit access to the building. While the 
6

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

earlier pass system consisted of a written authorization by the Chief Clerk or a division chief, Lansing’s new system 

required a photograph to be affixed to the pass. Visitors were not allowed beyond the guard or watchman’s station 

unless they received verbal permission from the person whom the visitor requested to see. Moreover, persons 

unfamiliar to the Department officials were escorted to and from the specified office, and refused access to other 

parts of the building.17 

Lansing also moved to create an inter-agency 

“secret service” located in the Department of 

State. Many German and Austrian acts of fraud, 

propaganda, sabotage, and espionage cut across or 

fell between the jurisdictions of various U.S. law 

enforcement agencies. Secretary of the Treasury 

William McAdoo admitted that the Secret Service, 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Post 

Office Inspection Service were often “crossing wires 

with [one] another in running down crimes and 

conducting investigations” of espionage, fraud, and 

sabotage. To rectify this, Lansing proposed creating 

an office under the Department of State’s Office of 

the Counselor to review investigation reports from 

several law enforcement agencies. In proposing this 

to President Wilson, Lansing contended that given 

the serious diplomatic consequences involved with 

both the act and the investigation, the Department of 

State should oversee the response and actions of other 

agencies. Lansing envisioned the proposed office to be 

a clearinghouse of information, and he hoped that the 

Departments of Justice and Treasury, and the Postal 

Service would detail agents to this Bureau of Secret 

Intelligence to gather information on belligerent 

activity in the United States.18 

Lansing’s proposal drew a mixed response, and 

he later admitted that inter-agency rivalries and 

“mutual jealousies” undermined it. Secretary of 

the Treasury McAdoo strongly supported Lansing’s 

Figure 4: Leland Harrison. Harrison headed Lansing’s 

“Secret Intelligence Bureau,” which collected intelligence 

relating to espionage against U.S. interests in Washington 

and oversaw the surveillance of the German Embassy in 

Washington. Source: Library of Congress, National Photo 

Company Collection. 

Figure 3: Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Lansing created 

a “secret service” for the Department of State, and the men 

were called Special Agents. Lansing’s secret service was the 

forerunner of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Source: 

Library of Congress, National Photo Company Collection. 
7

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

intelligence bureau, and sent a letter endorsing it to the President, the Attorney General, and the Postmaster 

General.19 Postmaster General Albert Burleson was reluctant to release any of his investigators for the new project, 

but later agreed to send some men to the Department of State on a temporary assignment. Attorney General 

Thomas Gregory outright refused to contribute any resources to the effort. In mid-1917, McAdoo pleaded with 

Wilson to endorse Lansing’s intelligence office, but Wilson stalled.20 

Frustrated by the delay, Lansing created the “Secret Intelligence Bureau” on April 4, 1916. He pulled 

Leland Harrison from the Latin American Division, where Harrison was serving as Deputy Chief of Division, and 

tasked him with the “collection and examination of all information of a secret nature.” Admitting that the new 

bureau was “extra-legal,” Lansing placed Harrison 

under the direction of Frank L. Polk, Counselor of 

the Department of State. Harrison submitted regular 

reports to Lansing on intelligence he had received 

during the previous 24 hours.21 He obtained that 

information from the War and Navy intelligence 

offices, the Secret Service, and other U.S. Government 

agencies, as well as Allied intelligence agents, most 

notably the British. Harrison and Edward Bell, 

who was Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in London, 

regularly corresponded and shared information, and 

Bell appears to have maintained regular contacts with 

British intelligence and secret services.22 

Harrison worked most closely with the Secret 

Service and oversaw the clandestine surveillance of 

the German Embassy, located near Thomas Circle 

in Washington DC. On May 14, 1915, through an 

executive order, President Wilson authorized the Secret 

Service to conduct surveillance on German diplomatic 

personnel at the German Embassy and at the German 

consulate office in New York City.23 This surveillance, 

as well as passport investigations, prompted the Secret 

Service to detail a squad of agents to the Department 

of State, and the squad reported to Harrison.24 In 

1916, Lansing ordered the Secret Service to tap the 

German Embassy’s telephone and telegraph lines, 

Figure 5: The German Embassy in Washington, D.C., 

1915. Located at 1425-1427 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, 

the Embassy was under surveillance by the Secret Service 

and the Department of State. The leader of the Secret 

Service squad conducting the surveillance was J. M. Nye, 

the first Chief Special Agent for the Department of State. 

Source: Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs 

Division. 
8

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

and the squad set up its listening post a couple of 

blocks from the German Embassy. At 8 o’clock each 

morning, the Secret Service squad leader, Joseph 

M. Nye, submitted--probably through Harrison--a 

daily memorandum to the Secretary of State, which 

detailed the squad’s findings for the previous 24 hours. 

Harrison’s group also had obtained several German 

codebooks, which made deciphering the German 

codes a “simple matter.” Early on January 31, 1917, 

as a result of the Secret Service squad’s wire-tapping 

of German Embassy line, Nye informed Lansing that 

during his (Lansing’s) 4 p.m. meeting with German 

Ambassador Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, 

the Ambassador would tell him that Germany had 

renewed unrestricted submarine warfare. Bernstorff 

did, and unrestricted submarine warfare was one 

of the actions that would lead the United States to 

declare war on Germany a couple of months later.25 

Just after Nye’s intelligence report, Lansing 

appointed Nye as “Special Assistant to the Secretary” 

in February 1917, making Nye the Department 

of State’s first formal security officer.26 Having 

collaborated with Nye for several months, Harrison 

recruited him to be the Department’s first “special 

agent.” Good-natured and extroverted, Nye had 

previously served on the protective details for 

Presidents Taft and Wilson, and had conducted 

several counterfeiting and forgery investigations.27 

Gaining the title Chief Special Agent a few weeks after his appointment, Nye spent most of his first 

year at the Department as Special Assistant to the Secretary protecting foreign dignitaries. His first duty 

assignment was to escort the German Ambassador Count von Bernstorff everywhere until the diplomat’s 

departure several weeks later. Nye and the Special Agents he hired spent much of the remainder of 1917 

making travel arrangements for and protecting the Belgian, French, British, Italian, Japanese, Russian, and 

Serbian War Missions that visited the United States. The Special Agents also protected the Governor-General 

Figure 6: Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, the 

German Ambassador to the United States. As a Secret 

Service Agent, Joseph M. Nye headed the squad that tapped 

into Bernstorff’s telegraph and telephone line. Nye’s first task 

as Chief Special Agent was to escort Bernstorff everywhere 

until he departed for Germany after the United States 

entered World War I in 1917. Source: Library of Congress, 

George Grantham Bain Collection. 
9

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

of Canada and several members of British, Danish, 

and Japanese royal families when they visited in 

1918.28 

When Nye recruited men for his Special Agent 

force, he turned to Post Office Inspectors, who were 

among the nation’s leading, most broadly trained 

security professionals in the country. Nye’s first 

three recruits—James O’Connell, Robert S. Sharp, 

and Robert C. Bannerman—were all former Postal 

Inspectors. Postal Inspectors already possessed 

the flexibility and investigative skills that Nye, 

Lansing, and the Department of State sought.29

Postal Inspectors investigated cases of fraud, theft, 

and transportation of illegal items (including 

explosives, weapons, banned substances), as well as 

internal investigations of malfeasance or corruption 

against Postmasters and other senior postal officials. 

Inspectors had to determine whether the culprit 

was an insider or someone manipulating the system 

from outside. They interviewed and determined the 

credibility of witnesses, suspects, and perpetrators, as 

well as conducted reference and background checks of 

employees and applicants to the federal government. 

They inspected facilities, enforced procedures and 

regulations, and handled both “confidential” and 

public information. The Postal Inspector background 

undoubtedly helped set the foundational orientation 

and jack-of-all-trades flexibility that characterized 

the Department of State’s Special Agents for several 

decades.30

Nye and the Special Agents soon organized and opened two offices: one in the Department, and one in 

New York City. Nye, his secretary Nettie Bagby, and an assistant staffed the main office in the Department. 

Meanwhile, the New York Field Office comprised most of the staff (the other seven agents) and was under the 

supervision of Special Agent Robert Sharp. Nye drew his operating funds from a confidential account of the 

Figure 7: Joseph M. Nye, the Department of State’s first Chief 

Special Agent, 1917-1920. Source: Library of Congress, 

Prints and Photographs Division, Biographical File. 

Figure 8: Chief Special Agent Nye’s business card. Source: 

Department of State Records, National Archives and 

Records Administration. 
10

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Secretary of State’s office. A few agents were “dollar-a-year” men (lawyers, businessmen, and other professionals) 

who volunteered for the job; however, most had Postal Inspector backgrounds. The Chief Special Agent operated 

in a public manner, with Department personnel openly referring to Special Agents as “the force;” and the Chief 

Special Agent and his secretary were listed under the Office of the Under Secretary of State Frank Polk in the 

Department’s published register.31 

z Security during World War I å

Lansing created the Special Agent force just as the Wilson Administration was moving to declare war 

against Germany and Austria-Hungary, and it was one of several wartime measures that Lansing implemented 

to improve diplomatic security. Lansing also ended the practice of Department officials speaking independently 

to reporters, and made such potential breaches of 

confidentiality punishable offenses. He limited press 

interviews to himself and other senior Department 

staff, and created the Bureau of Information to 

handle press inquires. To distinguish confidential 

telegrams from unclassified messages, all telegrams 

that arrived in code were printed out on paper that 

had a yellow bar running down the right edge of the 

paper. The Department began to place invoices in 

pouches to indicate when items were missing or lost. 

The Department also instructed posts to use two seals 

on envelopes, one center-left and one center-right, 

instead of placing a single seal in the center.32 

In March 1918, the Department issued the 

new Grey Code to replace the Green Code; however, 

communications security did not necessarily improve. 

Less than a year later, the Department received word 

that at least one British Legation had a copy of the 

Grey Code. Also, as had occurred with previous 

codes, the Department’s distribution of the code 

was uneven. Some posts had not received the Grey 

Code, others still had only the Blue Code, and others 

did not even have the Red Code, prompting this last 

group to turn to commercial codes. With multiple 

Figure 9: American War Poster “Don’t Talk” (ca. 1918). 

A World War I poster to encourage better security practices 

against espionage. The head / “spider” is Kaiser Wilhelm 

II of Germany. Source: Library of Congress, Prints and 

Photographs Division. 
11

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

codes as well as special holocryptic variations in use, 

it was not uncommon for a post to receive a message 

that it could not decode. The Department resorted to 

noting on the plain-text copy of the telegram which 

code had been used to encipher it, in part so they 

knew which code to use when responding to post.33

The United States’ entry into World War I 

led the Department to add couriers to its mail and 

pouch system. Upon the suggestion of Harrison and 

Commander Edward McCauley, Jr. of the Office of 

Naval Intelligence, the Department of State asked the 

Department of the Navy to assign nine Marines for 

courier duty in October 1917. The Marines received 

special passports and wore civilian clothes. They 

were split between three routes in Europe, with the 

Navy and State Departments later adding a fourth 

route for East Asia (Manila, Tokyo, Tientsin, Peking, 

and Shanghai). For the three European routes, five 

Marines operated the route from Bergen, Norway, 

to Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Helsingfors 

(Helsinki), Petrograd (St. Petersburg), and Jassy (Iasi, 

Romania). Three Marines carried pouches between 

London and The Hague, and one Marine carried 

pouches between Paris and Rome. On February 26, 

1918, the Departments of State and Navy agreed 

to add six more Marines to the courier routes.34 In 

August 1918, the Department of State initiated 

regular courier service between Mexico City and Laredo, Texas, primarily due to the theft of a Spanish diplomatic 

pouch and other issues that resulted from the Mexican Revolution, which had begun in 1910.35 

The Marine couriers supplemented the Despatch Agent network; they were never viewed as a replacement 

for it. Secretary of State Elihu Root had suggested such an enhancement of the Despatch Agent network ten 

years earlier (in 1907); however, the 25-plus bilateral agreements for reciprocal exchange of diplomatic pouches 

(negotiated between 1900 and 1912) apparently postponed the need to pursue the suggestion further.36 With 

the war creating a more urgent need in 1917, the Marine couriers were conceived strictly as a means of moving 

Figure 10: The Zimmerman Telegram. In the 1917 

telegram, the German Imperial government promised 

Mexico that it would receive its lost territories of California, 

Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico if it declared war on the 

United States. Contributing to the United States’ decision 

to enter World War I, the telegram used five-digit groups 

like the United States’ Blue and Green Codes. The United 

States received the telegram and a decoded version from the 

British shortly after Nye was hired as Chief Special Agent. 

Source: Department of State Records, National Archives 

and Records Administration. 
12

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

diplomatic pouches to a point where the pouches 

could effectively and safely enter the Despatch Agent 

network. For example, with the Scandinavia-Russia 

route, the London Despatch Agent Office transported 

pouches to the U.S. Consul in Aberdeen, Scotland, 

where the British steamer Vulture carried the pouches 

to Bergen, Norway. In Bergen, the U.S. Consul 

received and assigned the pouches to the couriers on 

the Scandinavian-Russian route, and arranged for 

the return of pouches back to London. Similarly 

on the other routes, Marine couriers brought U.S. 

pouches to London or to Paris, where they entered 

the Despatch Agent system.37 

The supplementary nature of the Marine couriers 

indicates a “dotted line” in tracing the origins of the 

U.S. diplomatic courier service. The courier service 

had multiple predecessors. Moreover, it arose largely 

from two sources: technological innovation and 

altered perceptions regarding classified information. 

The trans-oceanic shipment of the vast majority of 

U.S. diplomatic correspondence had made bearers 

of dispatch cost-prohibitive during the nineteenth century, leading the Department to create the Despatch 

Agent network. The turn-of-the-century negotiation of bilateral agreements for the free, unimpeded exchange 

of diplomatic pouches further obstructed the creation of a U.S. courier service, even though steamships had 

substantially reduced the costs of trans-Atlantic transport. For economy-minded Department officials who 

operated in an era when many, including Congress, viewed diplomats as an extravagance, the cost of having a 

person accompany diplomatic pouches seemed a luxury.38 

While innovations in steam power and ship design reduced the costs of trans-Atlantic shipments, World War 

I transformed how U.S. officials perceived the classified nature of U.S. Government information, setting the stage 

for a courier system. With the war’s first shots in August 1914, the interruption of transportation (road, rail, and 

shipping) networks prompted the Department of State to employ two embassy clerks to serve as couriers between 

London and Berlin. The U.S. entry into the war in 1917—and the accompanying concern that interception of 

confidential U.S. documents threatened to reveal U.S. or Allied vulnerabilities, or bestow advantages to U.S. enemies 

or rivals—led the Department to add Marine couriers to facilitate the transport of U.S. pouches through war zones. 

Figure 11: Ambassador Amos J. Peaslee. As a U.S. Army 

Captain, Peaslee, at the direction of General John J. “Black 

Jack” Pershing, formed a courier service for the U.S. 

Expeditionary Forces in Europe during World War I. The 

military couriers later served President Wilson and the U.S. 

delegation at the Versailles peace negotiations during 1919 

but was then disbanded. The U.S. Army courier service 

was one of several entities that served as forerunners of 

the Department’s courier service. Peaslee later joined the 

Department and served as U.S. Ambassador to Australia 

(1953-1956). Source: Department of State Records 

National Archives and Records Administration. 
13

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

The arrival of large numbers of U.S. troops on French soil in 1918 only intensified concerns about the 

disclosure of U.S. Government and military information, which in turn, demanded quick, reliable, and secure 

communications. U.S. Army officials created their own courier service. In March 1918, General John J. “Black 

Jack” Pershing, frustrated by the slow transit of correspondence between Paris and Washington, authorized U.S. 

Army Captain Amos Jenkins Peaslee to organize a military courier service. Separate from the Marine couriers 

used by the Department of State, Peaslee’s courier service was staffed with seven U.S. Army officers and four 

enlisted men, and used the Hotel Crillon in Paris as its headquarters. Within three weeks, transit times for U.S. 

correspondence between Paris and Washington dropped from roughly five weeks to less than two weeks. How 

much the U.S. Embassy in Paris or other Department posts used the military courier service is unclear; however, 

Peaslee’s service was very successful.39 

The duties of Nye and the Special Agents expanded during the war. Besides protection of visiting foreign 

dignitaries, Nye made the travel arrangements (rail, hotel, and car reservations) for the Secretary of State. Special 

Agent Robert C. Bannerman accompanied Colonel Edward M. House, who served as President Wilson’s special 

envoy, on many trips.40 Special Agents in New York and Washington conducted surveillance on domestic groups 

deemed “disloyal,” such as the Non Partisan League,41 and investigated the activities of two groups in particular: 

Hindu nationalists and Irish revolutionaries. In an effort to weaken the British, the Germans funded and encouraged 

nationalist groups in India and Ireland to overthrow British colonial rule.42 In the case of Hindu groups, Nye and his 

Special Agents helped to build a case against thirty Hindus who were charged with “fomenting a revolution against 

a friendly power” (Great Britain). The Hindus were accused of distributing provocative literature, trafficking arms 

to India, and inciting colonial subjects from Asia and 

Africa to rise against British rule.43 In regard to Irish 

revolutionaries, Department of State Special Agents 

learned that German agents stationed in Mexico had 

recruited and paid Irishmen to conduct sabotage in 

the United States. The Chief Special Agent’s office 

determined that the Irish saboteurs had devised plots 

to burn parts of Seattle, as well as ammunitions 

stores, elevators, wood-yards, shipyards, and airplane 

factories in other U.S. cities.44 

z Security after the Great War å

When the armistice went into effect on the 

eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh 

month (November 11, 1918), World War I ended; 

Figure 12: U.S. Army Couriers. Among the early forerunners 

of today’s Diplomatic Couriers, U.S. Army Officers served 

as couriers for U.S. Expeditionary Forces in France during 

the First World War and for President Wilson and the U.S. 

delegation during the Versailles peace negotiations in 1919. 

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
14

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

however, the Department of State’s war-time anxieties about security did not. The Department’s persistent 

concerns resulted from three changes: an intensified recognition among Department officials of the 

need for security, the United States’ shift from an emerging power to a world power, and the expansion 

of U.S. diplomatic representation abroad. Although the Department had implemented many security 

measures before the war, those measures were 

applied to the diplomacy of a nation that viewed 

itself as an emerging power. After the war, U.S. 

officials perceived their nation as a world power, 

whose diplomats needed to maintain security 

and discretion concerning the serious issues, 

discussions, and negotiations in which the United 

States was now engaged. Moreover, this new 

status, plus the expansion of U.S. diplomatic posts 

abroad, required U.S. diplomats to handle and 

transmit much more classified information than 

they had done previously. 

This dramatic shift led some Department 

officers to deprecate pre-war security measures; 

however, they overlooked the fact that the postwar espionage threat was much greater because the 

United States had now become a more appealing 

target. For example, humorist James Thurber, who 

served as a code clerk for the U.S. peace mission 

in France, dismissed the Department’s pre-war 

telegraphic codes as “quaint transparencies ... 

intended to save words and cut costs, not to fool 

anybody.”45 Thurber’s dismissal of pre-war codes 

mistakenly presumed that pre-war U.S. diplomatic 

messages contained confidential information 

roughly equivalent in scope, degree, and amount 

to postwar telegraphic messages. This was not 

the case because the United States was not then 

involved in the range of issues and discussions that 

it was afterwards, nor was it considered within the 

Figure 13: Illustration for Deciphering a Joint Department 

of State-Navy Code, likely Code A-1 or B-1. After World 

War I, the Department of State worked jointly with the 

U.S. Navy to develop better telegraph codes. Perhaps 

more important, the Department began to change its codes 

quarterly to deter espionage. Source: Department of State 

Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
15

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

inner circle of great powers. The U.S. telegraphic code did not have to be unbreakable; it only had to serve 

as a deterrent sufficient to exceed the value of return, and the value of return from U.S. diplomacy before 

World War I was generally small. 

The United States’ changed status and Department officials’ continuing security anxieties led the Department 

to maintain, even expand security during the 1920s. After the war, Department officials insisted upon maintaining 

security at a war-time level. For example, they mandated the use of lock boxes to transport confidential documents 

between offices in the Department. However, Department officials were also concerned about the cost and 

effectiveness of security measures. In the early 1920s, Department officials made budget cuts to security-related 

programs; yet they reinstated the programs within a year or two because it became clear that Departmental 

security was being compromised.46 

The Department of State gave extensive attention to security in 1919 when President Wilson and the U.S. 

Commission to Negotiate Peace joined the Allies at Versailles, France, to negotiate postwar arrangements. With 

the assistance of the U.S. Army Signal Corps, the Department erected a special telegraph cable devoted exclusively 

to U.S. diplomatic messages from the U.S. Embassy in Paris to the port of Le Havre, where it connected to the 

transatlantic cable system. U.S. Navy personnel staffed the telegraph office at the U.S. Embassy in Paris, and the 

Navy was responsible for providing special codes for the President and U.S. officials at the peace conference. In 

addition, Wilson and the Commission used Major Peaslee’s 14 Army couriers,47 and the Department of State 

assigned them diplomatic passports.48 

The Department also strove to improve its telegraphic codes and enhance the security of its telegraphic 

messages. Shortly after the introduction of the Grey Code, the Department worked with the Departments of 

Navy and War to create a common telegraph code. 

During the decade of the 1920s, the Department, with Navy assistance, issued four new codes: A-1, B-1, 

C-1, and D-1, each replacing its predecessor after two to three years. Department officials regularly altered each 

code, sending new code tables to its posts quarterly. The Department used separate codes for each of the various 

peace conferences, such as the 1922 Lausanne conference. Posts also declared their code rooms “restricted,” 

limiting access to U.S. diplomatic officers and barring access by foreign nationals.49 The Red and Blue Codes 

were declared obsolete, and the Green Code was acknowledged to be known to several governments. In fact, as 

an indication of changed expectations of code security, one Chief of Mission in 1925 considered the Grey Code 

(issued in 1918) too old to be safe for confidential messages.50 

The Departments of State and War further cooperated to create the United States’ own signal intelligence 

office, commonly referred to as the “Black Chamber.” In 1918, at the end of the War, Secretary Lansing and 

Special Assistant Harrison decided to retain a cryptology office that focused upon solving other governments’ 

telegraphic codes. They turned to Herbert O. Yardley, who as a Department of State code clerk had broken 

President Wilson’s code in less than 2 hours. During the war, Yardley had worked at the U.S. Army’s MI-8 
16

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

(Military Intelligence) office, which had solved approximately 50 codes of 8 different governments. In 1919, 

Yardley set up the office in New York City. The office immediately proved its value by deciphering the Japanese 

diplomatic code and reading that Government’s messages to its delegation at the Washington Naval Conference 

of 1921-1922. Yardley’s code breakers informed U.S. negotiators that the Japanese Government would accept a 

10 to 6 ratio of U.S. and Japanese battleships, enabling U.S. diplomats to continue pressing for that ratio when 

Japanese representatives rejected it and tried to stall.51

After the war, the Department cut its courier service only to revive it again, an action which exemplified 

the Department’s conflicted mindset over seeking greater security and ensuring fiscal economy. During 1919, 

the Department utilized two courier services: the Army couriers for the U.S. delegation at the Versailles peace 

conference, and the Department’s Marine Corps couriers for the other posts in Europe. When negotiations in 

Versailles concluded in August 1919, the Department of War disbanded the Army courier service; meanwhile, the 

Department moved its three Marine couriers and their headquarters from London to Paris. Given that the Marine 

couriers supplemented the Despatch Agent system, the Department reexamined the necessity of the couriers because 

the Marine courier service was “very much confused.” At an approximate cost of $146,000 per year, the service was 

deemed rather expensive.52 On June 30, 1921, under the new Republican administration of President Warren G. 

Harding, the Department discontinued courier service in Europe because its cost exceeded reduced appropriations. 

The courier service for East Asia survived eight months longer, but it too was cut for budgetary reasons.53 

The Department revived the courier service one year later (1922), and its revival resulted from security concerns 

about the diplomatic correspondence from the new U.S. Legations in Eastern Europe. By 1922, U.S. diplomats 

were complaining about the lack of security when using the postal systems of Central and Eastern Europe, and 

the problem resulted because Department officials had not made a key postwar adjustment.54 Prior to the war, the 

United States had trusted the German and Austrian imperial postal services (the British postal service was the only 

other system the Americans trusted). After the war, with the creation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Latvia, 

Estonia, and Lithuania from the collapsed Austria-Hungarian and Russian Empires, U.S. diplomats reverted 

to pre-war practice and tried to use the nascent postal systems of the new nation-states. Compounding the 

problem was the fact that the United States had upgraded its Consulates in the new capital cities to Legations. 

The upgrade, combined with the United States’ changed status as a world power, generated a very different set 

of correspondence from the posts, usually involving more classified information. The subsequent complaints of 

tampered mail and pouches created a new, postwar security dilemma that the Department resolved by reviving 

the courier service.

The Department of State retained the Chief Special Agent and his staff. Nye continued to make domestic 

travel arrangements for the Secretary of State. Moreover, the number of foreign dignitaries visiting the United 

States increased after the war, with visits by Edward, the Prince of Wales (later King Edward VIII) and then 

King Albert I and Queen Elisabeth of Belgium in 1919. Chief Special Agent Nye logged 8,837 railroad miles 
17

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

escorting the King Albert I and Queen Elizabeth 

on their tour of the United States. King Albert not 

only referred to Nye as “Beel,” but also awarded 

him the Order of Leopold. Nye also organized and 

headed the protective details for such dignitaries as 

Prime Minister Robert Borden of Canada, President 

Epitácio Pessoa of Brazil, President Baltasar Brum 

of Uruguay, Prince Axel of Denmark, and Prince 

Ferdinand of Savoy. In 1921, the Chief Special 

Agent’s office provided protective security for the 

delegations to the Washington Naval Conference.55

During this assignment, Special Agents ushered the 

distinguished foreign diplomats through customs, 

arranged their transportation and schedule, and 

at times, provided appropriate entertainment. If 

threats to the visiting foreign dignitaries required 

it, the Chief Special Agent would create aliases for 

them. For example, Prince and Princess Asaka of 

Japan traveled as Count and Countess Asa during 

their 1925 visit to America.56 

Special Agents also navigated between the 

barriers imposed by Jim Crow segregation and the 

diplomatic privileges and courtesies required for 

diplomats and foreign dignitaries when diplomats 

from Liberia and other African nations visited the 

United States. Special Agents recognized that black diplomats would visit, attend, and patronize black venues, 

and that they might have to explain the status of and required courtesies for black diplomats to white officials and 

businessmen. Evidence suggests that despite having to accommodate for Jim Crow laws, Special Agents provided 

protection and services for visiting Liberian diplomats equivalent to that for European and Asian diplomats.57 

To protect foreign dignitaries, the Chief Special Agent often enlisted the assistance of local law enforcement, 

Post Office Inspectors, and/or the Secret Service. For the 1919 visit of the Prince of Wales, Nye called upon Post 

Office Inspectors to help. When Prince Chichibu, second son of the Japanese Emperor, visited Chicago, the 

Chief Special Agent requested a police escort, citing a potential threat from the large local Korean population. 

Similarly, when the Cuban President visited in 1927, he received local police protection while in Miami.58 

Figure 14: Robert C. Bannerman. Bannerman replaced 

Nye as Chief Special Agent in 1920, and served in that 

position for 20 years until 1940. It was Bannerman who 

expanded the Office of the Chief Special Agent’s duties to 

include many tasks still held by the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security today: background investigations, passport fraud, 

oversight of couriers, protection of foreign dignitaries, and 

internal investigations. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security Files. 
18

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

During the immediate two years after the war, the Chief Special Agent’s office followed a trajectory similar 

to the courier service: it endured budget and personnel cuts, but gained responsibilities. In 1920, Nye resigned 

as Chief Special Agent and accepted a position as executive assistant to the president of Guaranty Trust Company, 

one of the major banks in New York, where he worked to improve measures to deter fraud. Robert C. Bannerman 

replaced Nye as Chief Special Agent in 1920. In the same year, the Department cut its personnel, and eight of 

the ten Special Agents lost their commissions, including Robert Sharp, head of the New York Field Office. On 

August 30, 1921, the Secretary of State issued Department Order No. 223 which moved the Chief Special Agent 

from the Secretary of State’s office to the Under Secretary of State’s office, receiving the designation “U-3.” As 

Assistant to the Under Secretary, Bannerman maintained liaisons with the FBI, the Military Intelligence Division 

(MID), the Secret Service, the Shipping Board, and the Departments of Navy, War, Justice, and Labor.59 

The Chief Special Agent office’s rapidly growing responsibilities forced the Department to rehire many of its 

Special Agents in 1921, just one year after cutting their positions. Sharp returned as Special Agent-in-Charge in 

New York; and with a staff numbering 25 people, several Special Agents were again tracking radicals and suspected 

foreign agents. Special Agents also conducted internal affairs investigations of Department employees who may 

have leaked information to the press or engaged in criminal activity. Chief Special Agent Bannerman investigated 

the disappearance of several thousand dollars from diplomatic pouches, and determined that the Chief Clerk 

of the Mail Room was committing the thefts.60 Special Agents conducted background investigations for new 

Department of State employees. While some travel was involved in the investigations, the Special Agents worked 

closely with Post Office Inspectors, who completed the background investigations in the various hometowns and 

former cities of residence of the prospective Department employees.61 

One of the Chief Special Agent’s more unusual investigations involved the illicit importation of liquor by 

the British Embassy, just after Congress and the states had passed Prohibition. The Eighteenth Amendment to 

the Constitution, or Volstead Act (effective in January 1920), forbade the manufacture, sale, transportation, and 

importation of “intoxicating liquors” in and into the United States. In 1921, British diplomats in Washington 

arranged for the British shipping company Joseph Travers & Sons to send 83 cases of liquor, on the pretext that 

the spirits would be used for official embassy functions. Although alcohol technically could still be consumed 

within foreign embassies or legations in the United States, private consumption outside of embassy premises was 

subject to the Volstead Act. Based upon his office’s investigation, Bannerman concluded that the 83 cases were 

imported by British Embassy for personal use by Embassy staff. Intercepted correspondence revealed that 18 

British Embassy employees had pooled their money for payment, and that the staff hoped to place bigger orders 

in the future. Some employees even wanted to place standing monthly orders, and the Embassy staff patted 

themselves on the back for their ingenuity. The Chief Special Agent’s office concluded that this was a clear attempt 

to circumvent the laws of the United States, but despite the incriminating evidence, the Department decided not 

to prosecute the British in the interest of maintaining good bilateral relations.62 
19

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

The Office of the Chief Special Agent also investigated passport and visa fraud. Bannerman and his Special 

Agents devoted particular attention to anarchists, Bolsheviks, and other radical Left groups that used fraudulent 

passports to enter the United States. During World War I, Congress made it a felony to knowingly assist 

anarchists entering the United States, and later banned and required the deportation of anarchists and persons 

who promoted anarchism. After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, U.S. officials denied passports to U.S. 

Communists who wished to travel to Russia for instruction or training (Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson 

relaxed this proscription in 1931). With the new visa and passport laws, the Chief Special Agent’s office gained 

a tool to deport foreign agents engaged in espionage, sabotage, or other illegal activities, and as a result, passport 

and visa fraud investigations became a cornerstone responsibility for the Chief Special Agent’s office throughout 

the 1920s and 1930s.63 

During their investigations of Bolsheviks, Special Agents paid particular attention to the activities of the 

Amtorg Trading Corporation, which they strongly suspected was a cover for Soviet espionage. Created in 1924 

by the Soviet Union, Amtorg Trading ostensibly promoted trade between that country and the United States. 

The Department issued a visa to Amtorg employee Boris I. Kraevaky, but the Chief Special Agent later sought to 

revoke it because Kraevaky appeared to be involved in activities other than international trade. Special Agents 

tracked Amtorg’s exports to the Soviet Union, particularly metals such as copper, zinc, aluminum, and manganese, 

as well as the company’s purchases of Ford tractors, John Deere agricultural implements, and wheat (more than 

$13 million between May and December 1924 alone). Special Agents also investigated Amtorg’s contacts within 

U.S. companies such as Chase National Bank, and took interest in Amtorg’s unusually large budget for “employee 

education,” which was likely for indoctrination of Communist ideology and Soviet activities.64

By 1924, Chief Special Agent Bannerman’s scope of security-related duties extended to restructuring the 

Department’s struggling courier service, which was now manned by civilians rather than Marines. European 

posts complained of not receiving pouches or receiving pouches less often than they had before the war with the 

Despatch Agent system. For European posts served by the couriers, it took a minimum of 42 days for a post to 

send a despatch and receive a reply. Some posts such as the U.S. Embassy at The Hague asked if they could opt 

out of the courier service and return to the Despatch Agent system. They argued that they could receive mail 

and Department instructions far more quickly and frequently from the Despatch Agents than they could from 

the couriers. Occasionally a pouch went into a foreign postal service, which prompted one exasperated Chief of 

Mission to scold the Department: “After all of the proofs and experiences and knowledge we have gained” during 

the war, “for our pouches to pass through [foreign] hands – one is struck almost speechless. What is the matter 

with us?”65 

The Department’s small three-person courier service was overwhelmed and overworked. The couriers 

carried an average of 50 pouches, with the number and size of the pouches continually increasing. Couriers 

many times faced angry rail conductors and station officials who feared the many pouches would damage 
20

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

compartments, or the couriers had to bribe 

customs officials to let them cross a border. At 

times, the couriers had their compartments so 

stuffed with pouches that they had no place to sleep 

during the train trip to the next stop. By January 

1925, European railroad officials refused to allow 

couriers to carry more than one pouch into their 

compartment, which meant that the other pouches 

were stored unattended and unsecured with 

baggage.66 

The fact that Department couriers carried 

pouches for Army and Naval Attachés, as well 

as the Department of Commerce, compounded 

the problem. Department of Commerce mails 

comprised 35 percent of all pouches; whereas, the 

War and Navy Departments constituted 11 percent 

and 9 percent respectively. When Department of 

State officials asked the Department of Commerce 

to pay $17,500 for their share of courier expenses, 

Commerce officials replied (as did their Navy and War Department counterparts) that they had no funds for 

such an expense.67

The three couriers spent extended time on the road. Each courier traveled the entire circuit: Paris-ZurichVienna-Budapest-Belgrade-Sofia-Constantinople-Sofia-Bucharest-Sofia-Belgrade-Budapest-Vienna-PragueBerlin-Warsaw-Riga-Berlin-Prague-Vienna-Zurich-Paris. The circuit was two routes: the Southern route took 

20 days (Paris to Constantinople and back) and the Northern route took 11 days (Vienna to Riga and back). 

The courier then had two days of rest in Paris before making the Paris-London-The Hague-Brussels-Paris route. 

He rested four days, only to begin the circuit again. All three couriers met in Vienna to exchange pouches – one 

returning from Riga on the Northern Route, one returning from Constantinople on the Southern route, and 

the third arriving from Paris. Carrying pouches destined for posts on both routes, the Paris courier gave the 

Constantinople courier the pouches for Northern route posts and then headed south with the remaining pouches. 

The Constantinople courier took his newly received pouches and headed north, giving the Washington-bound 

pouches that he had collected on the Southern route to the Riga courier. The Riga courier, now having all pouches 

destined for Washington from the North and South portions of the route, headed for Paris to place the pouches 

in the Despatch Agent system.68

Figure 15: Department of State Diplomatic Courier Bill 

Croasdale hands pouch to Vice Consul I. Raymond Baine, 

who is on the Orient Express railcar, in Milan, Italy, in 

1957. With the creation of several new nations in Central 

and Eastern Europe after World War I, the Department 

needed couriers to supplement the Despatch Agent network. 

The Orient Express was one of the rail lines that the threeman courier service used. Source: Department of State 

Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
21

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

Perhaps due to Bannerman’s Postal Inspector background, Department officials asked him to study the 

courier service and then make recommendations, most of which the Department later adopted. Under Secretary 

of State Joseph Grew sent Bannerman to Europe to inspect the courier service in 1925, and Bannerman traveled 

the entire circuit, observing travel and rail station conditions, size and weight of pouches, rail connections, and 

possibilities for delays.69 He decided to separate the two routes, which ended the Vienna exchange and ultimately 

reduced the despatch/reply time by nearly two weeks. The Northern route became Paris-Brussels-The HagueBerlin-Riga-Warsaw-Prague-Berlin-Copenhagen-Hamberg-Amsterdam-The Hague-Brussels-Paris. The Southern 

Route remained much the same, but Bannerman suggested different rail lines and sequence, reducing travel time 

and possibilities for delays. Bannerman also made clear that the Commerce Department had “confused” the 

courier service for a “fast freight service;” Department officials successfully pressed Commerce officials to limit their 

pouches to strictly confidential materials, a change that reduced the volume and weight of pouches substantially.70

Bannerman additionally recommended creating an “Aegean” route, which would operate between Paris, Rome, 

Tirana and Athens, as well as courier service for Mexico City, although neither apparently was implemented. 

Bannerman continued to review and fine-tune the courier service in the years after his recommendations were 

adopted in October 1925.71 

Bannerman’s reforms of the courier service symbolized two important developments in U.S. diplomatic 

security. First, the Department of State’s approach to security was increasingly characterized by specialization, 

which contrasted with the British Foreign Office’s tendency toward flexibility. The British employed a “hub and 

spokes” courier system, with a few courier routes to major cities (e.g. Paris and Berlin) and several, short “feeder” 

routes transited by local couriers (likely post officers or clerks) to broaden the coverage of the service. When 

British couriers were not on their routes, they did code work for the Foreign Office. The Department of State, 

meanwhile, compartmentalized the courier function, incorporating more posts into large courier routes, and 

avoiding the use of local couriers. Furthermore, U.S. couriers were a separate entity from the code clerks and 

Special Agents.72 

The second development was the expansion of U.S. diplomatic representation overseas, which tilted the 

Department’s struggle to balance security with cost efficiency strongly toward security. The Department focused 

upon improving its communications with its posts, which included increasing security and reducing transit time 

for correspondence. Bannerman expanded the Despatch Agent network by negotiating a contract with the Dollar 

Steamship Company to provide pouch services for U.S. Embassies and Consulates in Asia. Managed by the 

Despatch Agent in San Francisco, the new pouch service connected posts in Tokyo, Yokohama, Peking, Shanghai, 

Hong Kong, Singapore, Penang, and Colombo.73 The Department also worked to improve mail service to U.S. 

Consulates in Suva, Nairobi, and Cairo.74 The U.S. Post Office also gave the Department free airmail service 

for small confidential pouches to and from some Latin American posts. The Department further expanded the 

Despatch Agent network by adding weekly pouch service for the new U.S. Legations in Ottawa and Dublin.75 
22

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Bannerman, however, did express concern 

about the security of the Despatch Agent network; 

specifically, he questioned the employment of British 

citizens at the London Despatch Agent office. In fact, 

many of the London office’s employees, including 

Despatch Agent Charles J. Petherick, were British 

citizens. Bannerman admitted in 1928 that as “a 

matter of principle, our most confidential mail to 

London should be handled by none but Americans.” 

He acknowledged Petherick’s faithful service 

(Petherick had 60 years of service to the Department), 

and confessed that Petherick was “the best informed 

and most efficient transportation officer of any I 

met abroad.” However, Bannerman recommended 

that an American should be appointed as Despatch 

Agent in London upon Petherick’s resignation or 

death. Petherick died in 1929, just eight weeks after 

Bannerman made his recommendation, and the 

Department appointed U.S. Consular officer John 

H. E. McAndrews as the U.S. Despatch Agent in 

London.76 

The 1929 Stock Market Crash and the subsequent 

Great Depression forced the Department of State 

to slash budgets, which significantly affected its 

correspondence, communications, and security. The 

Depression prompted the Department to cut some couriers; and in 1933, it abolished most of the few remaining 

overseas courier services, despite protests from its overseas posts. With a note of nostalgia, Leslie Weisenberg of 

the U.S. Embassy in Paris lamented that “the swan song has been sung and the curtain rung down on the courier 

service.” The Department’s financial crunch was so severe that even when the French Government offered to 

transport diplomatic pouches free of charge from Le Havre to Paris, the U.S. Embassy could not afford the taxi 

fare needed to retrieve the pouches at the railroad station where the French promised to hold them. U.S. posts in 

Germany experienced similar cutbacks.77 

Yardley’s “Black Chamber” also came to a grinding halt because of Depression-era budget cuts, despite 

deciphering more than 45,000 telegrams between 1917 and 1929. In 1929, the Department of State withdrew 

Figure 16: Herbert O. Yardley. A former code clerk for the 

Department of State, Yardley founded a counter-intelligence 

code breaking office. Yardley later wrote about his experience 

in The American Black Chamber. His controversial book 

prompted Congress to pass Public Law 37, which makes it 

a felony to publish classified information related to U.S. 

encryption codes. Source: National Security Agency. 
23

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

its funding of Yardley’s office. Unable to survive on Department of War funding alone, Yardley and his colleagues 

closed their office. Finding the whole enterprise of the Black Chamber distasteful, Secretary of State Henry L. 

Stimson either saw little need for counterintelligence, or perhaps believed that the Department of State should not 

become involved in counterintelligence lest it might compromise its fundamental mission of diplomacy. Stimson 

viewed himself “dealing as a gentleman with the gentlemen,” and it was on this occasion that Stimson issued his 

oft-repeated pronouncement: “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.”78 

Yardley, struggling to support his family during the Depression, wrote his book The American Black 

Chamber and had it published in 1931. He described the clandestine work of the Department’s now defunct 

cryptographic office, and revealed that gentlemen did read each other’s mail. His book was an instant success 

around the world. In Japan, The American Black Chamber created a controversy as well as an embarrassing 

situation for the United States because Yardley exposed the extent to which the United States had intercepted 

and deciphered confidential Japanese Government messages. Yardley proposed writing a second book, focusing 

exclusively upon his work with Japanese codes. The Departments of State, Justice, and War worked to block 

this second work, and attorneys from the Department of Justice pressured Yardley’s publisher to stop the project. 

Secretary of State Cordell Hull and other State Department officials urged Congress in 1933 to pass a law to 

prevent future disclosures. Congress moved quickly and passed Public Law (PL.) 37. Signed by President 

Franklin D. Roosevelt in June 1933, P.L. 37 made it a felony for a former U.S. Government employee to publish 

or to share confidential information pertaining to past or present diplomatic codes and confidential diplomatic 

correspondence.79 Effectively blacklisted from future U.S. Government work involving confidential material, 

Yardley worked for foreign governments during the remainder of the Depression. He trained and organized 

cryptological bureaus for the Chinese from 1938 to 1940, and the Canadians from 1940 to 1941; the latter job 

ended when the Canadians and the British discovered his true identity. Returning to the United States, Yardley 

joined the Office of Price Administration in 1942, but never did code work again.80 

z Conclusion å

Yardley’s book, in some ways, was the most significant security breach of the era, and the Department of State’s 

reaction demonstrates how sensitive Department officials had become to security since the start of World War I. 

Combined with the United States’ rise as a world power, the expansion of the number of U.S. diplomats abroad, 

as well as an increase in the quantity, quality, and frequency of information considered confidential, World War 

I had transformed the Department’s perception and approach to security. The question for Department officials 

throughout the period was not whether to employ security, but rather how much security they should employ. The 

immediate postwar desire to return to pre-war practices was fleeting, and senior Department officers implemented 

additional security measures and procedures throughout the 1920s. Although the Great Depression forced the 

Department to make cuts in security-oriented programs, those cuts reflected the depth of the Depression, not the 
24

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Department’s indifference to security. By 1933, the balance between security and cost efficiency tilted clearly in 

favor of security. World War II would further press Department of State officials to expand the number of security 

measures, and extend security to other aspects of U.S. diplomacy as well. 

Endnotes

1 Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 2 volumes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 

1952), Walter Johnson, ed., I: 131.

2 David Paull Nickles ably describes the extensive nature by which the telegraph altered diplomacy by 1914, and how foreign 

ministers and diplomats did not sufficiently appreciate the depth of the telegraph’s impact. Nickles, Under the Wire: How 

the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003). Charles S. Campbell relates well 

the “transformation” of the United States from a continental power to a second tier international power. Campbell, The 

Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 1865-1900 (New York: Harper and Row, 1976). For a description of the 

Department on the eve of World War I, see Rachel West, O.S.F., The Department of State on the Eve of the First World War

(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1978). 

3 The effort to codify diplomatic immunities and privileges was a post-World War I development. See J. Craig Barker, The 

Protection of Diplomatic Personnel (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 53-61. 

4 Diary entries for 1 and 3 August 1914, in Grew, Turbulent Era, 133, 135. 

5 Major William F. Friedman, U.S. Delegation to the International Radiotelegraph Conference of Washington, 1927: Report 

on the History of the Use of Codes and Code Language, the International Telegraph Regulations pertaining thereto, 

and the Bearing of this History on the Cortina Report (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office 

[USGPO], 1928), 59. Note, Division of Western European Affairs, n.d. [6 August 1914], 119.2/94; Telegram, Thaddeus 

A. Thomson, U.S. Minister to Colombia, to Secretary of State, 17 August 1914, 119.2/100; Telegram, Walter Hines Page, 

U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, to Secretary of State, 20 August 1914, 119.2/101; all Folder 1, Box 1077, Decimal File 

1910-29, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Hereafter 

cited as DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. For crossing enemy lines in Belgium, see Note “European War – Telegraphic Bureau of 

the State Department,” Division of Western European Affairs, 25 August 1914, Folder 1, Box 1077, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, 

NA. Telegram 276 “Pouch Service,” William Thomas Fee, U.S. Consul at Bremen, to Secretary of State, 15 October 1914, 

051.62/9, Folder 4, Box 363, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

6 Diary entries for 2-11 August 1914, in Grew, Turbulent Era, 135-149. 

7 Jack Grover asserts that the two couriers in 1914 were the foundation of the Department of State’s courier service and 

operated continuously until 1917. The two clerks, however, only operated as couriers temporarily and probably ceased 

carrying pouches in 1915 or 1916. By early 1917, with pouch service erratic, the U.S. Embassy in Vienna requested 

a permanent weekly courier, but this did not occur until late 1917. Telegram 1717, Frederic Courtland Penfield, U.S. 

Ambassador to Austria-Hungary (Pleasant A. Stovall, U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland), to Secretary of State, 21 February 

1917, 051.51/25, Folder 2, Box 361, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. See Jack Grover, “None is Swifter Than These,” Foreign 

Service Journal 31/2 (February 1954): 25-26; and “A Brief History of the U.S. Diplomatic Courier Service,” Foreign Service 

Newsletter Number 80 (October 1953): 15-16. 

8 Diary entry 5 August 1914, in Grew, Turbulent Era, 138. Telegram 954, Walter Hines Page, U.S. Ambassador to the 

Court of St. James, to Secretary of State, 31 October 1914, 121.67/5, and Telegram, Lansing to U.S. Embassy London, 

3 November 1914, 121.67/5, both attached to Memorandum, William Walker Smith, Acting Chief for Division of 

Western European Affairs, to William Phillips, Third Assistant Secretary of State, 2 November 1914, Folder 3, Box 1164, 

DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Letter, Brand Whitlock, U.S. Minister to Belgium, to Henry van Dyke, U.S. Minister to 
25

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

the Netherlands, 17 January 1916, enclosed with Despatch #437, Marshall Langhorne, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to 

the Netherlands, to Secretary of State, 21 March 1916, 121.67/55, Folder 3, Box 1164, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. 

Telegram 3732, James W. Gerard, U.S. Ambassador to Germany, to Secretary of State, 10 April 1916, 051.62/32; and 

Memorandum, Roosa to Ben G. Davis, Chief Clerk, 19 September 1916, 051.61/32; both Folder 3, Box 363, DF 1910-

29, RG 59, NA. 

9 Memorandum, C. J. Petherick, Deputy U.S. Despatch Agent – London, to Secretary of State, 17 July 1916, Folder 5, Box 

359, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Frank Gurney, “Fifty Years in the Despatch Agency,” American Foreign Service Journal 12 

(1935): 402. Memorandum, Newton Crane, U.S. Despatch Agent – London, to William Phillips, Third Assistant Secretary 

of State, 16 June 1916, 051.41/16; and Memorandum, Crane to Phillips, 17 July 1916, 051.41/19; both Folder 5, Box 359, 

DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

10 The use of the term “Special” with the encryption code suggests that there was a variation to the code or perhaps a rule 

from the codebook’s Holocryptic appendix had been used. Instruction, Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, to U.S. Embassy 

in Constantinople, 5 November 1914, 119.2/123a; and Telegram 100 “Telegrams,” E. Carleton Baker, U.S. Consul at 

Chungking, China, to Secretary of State, 18 September 1914, 119.2/121, attached to Memorandum, Clarence E. Sisler, 

Clerk, to Herbert C. Hengstler, Chief of Consular Bureau, 6 November 1914; both Folder 1, Box 1077, DF 1910-29, RG 

59, NA. 

11 Telegram 2866, Page to Secretary of State, 25 September 1915, 051.62/174, attached to Memorandum, Ben G. Davis, Chief 

Clerk, to David A. Salmon, Chief of Bureau of Indexes and Archives, 2 March 1923, Folder 5, Box 363, DF 1910-29, RG 59, 

NA. Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, Secretary of State (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1935), 73-78. Office of 

the National Counterintelligence Executive, A Counterintelligence Reader: An American Revolution into the New Millennium, 

Volume I: The American Revolution to World War II, Frank J. Rafalko, ed., pp. 89-102, http://www.ncix.gov/issues/CI_Reader/

index.html, accessed 14 August 2009. Hereafter cited as NCIX, A Counterintelligence Reader, volume: page(s). 

12 Telegram 2722, Page to Secretary of State, 31 August 1915; and Translation of Letter, Dr. Constantin Theodor Dumba, 

Austrian Ambassador to the United States, to Baron István Burián, Foreign Minister, 20 August 1915, enclosed with 

Despatch 2112, Page to Secretary of State, 3 September 1915; both Foreign Relations of the United States 1915 Supplement

(Washington D.C.: USGPO 1928): 932 and 936-937. Hereafter cited as FRUS 1915 Supplement, page(s). Lansing, War 

Memoirs, 63-66 (quotation is located on page 66). 

13 Telegram 2866, Page to Secretary of State, 25 September 1915, 051.62/174. Telegram 2722, Page to Secretary of State, 31 

August 1915. NCIX, A Counterintelligence Reader, I: 91-92, 94, 96. Lansing, War Memoirs, 71. 

14 Circular Telegram, William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State, to Ambassadors and Ministers in European Countries, 1 

August 1914, 300.11/8a; Robert Lansing, Acting Secretary of State, to Ambassadors and Ministers in European Countries, 

12 September 1914, 138.4/27a; both FRUS 1914 Supplement, 722-723. President Wilson formalized passport regulations 

in a November 1914 executive order. See Executive Order (unnumbered) “Rules Governing the Granting and Issuing of 

Passports in the United States,” President Woodrow Wilson, 13 November 1914, FRUS 1914 Supplement, 724-727. 

15 Department of State Circulars “New Passport Regulations,” Bryan to U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 21 December 

1914, FRUS 1914 Supplement, 728-731. President Wilson formalized these rules in January 1915. See Executive Order 

2119-A “Rules Governing the Granting and Issuing of Passports in the United States,” Wilson, 12 January 1915, enclosed 

with General Consular Instruction No. 383 “Termination, Extension, and Amendment of Passports, and Advice to 

Americans Traveling Abroad,” Bryan to U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Officers (including Consular Agents), 8 February 

1915, FRUS 1915 Supplement, 902-904. 

16 Executive Order No. 2285, Wilson, 15 December 1915; Executive Order No. 2286-A, Wilson, 17 December 1915; and 

Memorandum, Lansing to the Diplomatic Representatives of Foreign Governments, 23 December 1915; all FRUS 1915 

Supplement, 911, 912-913, and 913-914. 
26

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

17 Lansing, War Memoirs, 320-321. 

18 Letter, William McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, to the President, 16 April 1917, Box 522, Woodrow Wilson 

Correspondence, William McAdoo Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. Hereafter cited as McAdoo Papers, 

LOC. Letter, Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, to Wilson, 20 November 1915, reprinted in NCIX, A Counterintelligence 

Reader, Vol. I, Chapter 3, p. 104. 

19 Lansing, War Memoirs, 84. Letter, McAdoo to Wilson, 16 April 1917, Folder – McAdoo to W. Wilson, April 16, 1917, Box 

522, McAdoo Papers, LOC. 

20 Letter, McAdoo to Wilson, 5 July 1917; Letter, McAdoo to Wilson, 17 April 1917; McAdoo to Wilson 6 July 1917; 

McAdoo to Wilson 9 July 1917; Wilson to McAdoo, 19 November 1917; and McAdoo to Wilson 22 November 1917; all 

Boxes 522-523, Woodrow Wilson Correspondence, McAdoo Papers, LOC. Folder titles correspond to date of letter. 

21 Lansing, War Memoirs, 318-319, 84. Entries for 4 April and 17 April 1916, Lansing’s Appointment Book, Box 66, Robert 

Lansing Papers, LOC. Register of the Department of State, October 21, 1915 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1915), 18, 86. 

Register of the Department of State, December 15, 1916 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1916), 21. Tab “Problem 3: Discussion 

of Centralization of Security Functions within the Department,” page 2, in Report “Study by Reorganization Task Force 

on Security of the Department of State, March 23, 1949,” [No Folder], Box 13, Security Files 1932-63, Records of the 

Division of A/SY/Evaluations, RG 59 – Lot 96D584, NA. David H. McCabe, “Mister Lansing’s Secret Service,” SY Focus

III/4 (October 1977): 4. Interview with Robert L. Bannerman, in “Diplomatic Security: 75th Anniversary Program is on 

Tap for November 4,” State Magazine, Number 391 (November 1991): 46 (hereafter cited “Robert L. Bannerman,” State 

Magazine, 391: page). 

22 Lansing, War Memoirs, 318-319, 325. There are numerous letters between Harrison and Bell on security-related matters. 

See Correspondence of Leland Harrison with Edward Bell, 14 December 1916 – 8 July 1918, RG 59 – Entry 348; Leland 

Harrison’s General Correspondence, 1915-1918, RG 59-Entry 346; and the Classified Case Files of Edward Bell, 1917-

1919, RG 59 – Entry 350; all NA. 

23 Agent Frank Burke led the ten-man team in New York City. See NCIX, A Counterintelligence Reader, I: 94. In Washington, 

the German Embassy was located at 1439 Massachusetts Avenue NW, and the Ambassador’s residence was next door at 1435 

Massachusetts. Register of the Department of State, December 15, 1916, 182. 

24 Although Lansing called it the “Bureau of Secret Intelligence,” Harrison’s group was never a formal bureau. It, instead, 

comprised a few people in the Office of the Counselor. 

25 Although Robert L. Bannerman claims the Chief Special Agent’s office provided Lansing with the intelligence of the German 

Ambassador’s message, Nye and the Secret Service squad conducted the surveillance of the German Embassy and provided 

the information to Secretary Lansing. Nye did not join the Department until after this incident. “Robert L. Bannerman,” 

State Magazine, 391 (November 1991): 46. Robert L. Bannerman, “Early History of the Office of the Chief Special 

Agent, Department of State,” n.d. [August? 1991], and “Robert Candlish Bannerman and Early History of the Office of 

the Chief Special Agent, Department of State,” n.d. [August? 1991], both enclosed in “The Robert C. [sic] Bannerman 

Interview,” conducted by George Payne, 20 August 1991, Folder – Diplomatic Security History, Box Archives H-N, Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security Training Center, Dunn Loring, Virginia. Hereafter cited as DS TRACEN. Although this is marked 

as the “Robert C. Bannerman interview,” Payne interviewed Robert L. Bannerman (ereafter cited as “The Robert [L.] 

Bannerman Interview”). NCIX, A Counterintelligence Reader, 94. Lansing, War Memoirs, 325. 

26 Robert L. Bannerman claims that it was the Chief Special Agent who tapped the German Embassy’s lines; however, Bannerman 

may have blurred Nye’s time as a Secret Service Agent working at the Department of State and Nye’s tenure as the Chief 

Special Agent. The fact that Leland Harrison recruited and recommended Nye to Secretary Lansing suggests that Nye, as 

head of the Secret Service squad, reported to Harrison and Polk during the squad’s temporary detail to the Department of 

State during 1916 and early 1917. See “Robert L. Bannerman,” State Magazine 391: 46; and Lansing, War Memoirs, 84. 
27

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

27 Lansing, War Memoirs, 84. Robert [L.] Bannerman Interview, 20 August 1991. McCabe, “Mister Lansing’s Secret Service,” 

SY Focus III/4: 5. 

28 Lansing, War Memoirs, 84-85. McCabe, “Mister Lansing’s Secret Service,” SY Focus III/4: 5. Memorandum, Robert C. 

Bannerman, Chief Special Agent, to Robert Woods Bliss, Third Assistant Secretary of State, 6 October 1921, Folder – 75th

Anniversary Historical Info, Large Box, Records of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s 75Th Anniversary Celebration, DS 

TRACEN. Hereafter cited as 75th Anniversary Records. 

29 The War Department also turned to Post Office Inspectors to build an investigative unit. See Telegram, Nye to S. H. 

Morse, Post Office Inspector, San Francisco, n.d. [1918?], Folder – M, Box 1, Special Agent Nye’s Personal File, General 

Correspondence of the Chief Special Agent, 1918-1920, Records of the Office of the Counselor/Under Secretary/Chief 

Special Agent, RG 59 – Entry 545, NA. Hereafter cited as Nye’s Personal File. McCabe, “Mister Lansing’s Secret Service,” 

SY Focus III/4: 5. 

30 For a description of responsibilities and duties of Postal Inspectors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see 

Daniel C. Roper, The United States Post Office: Its Past Record, Present Condition, and Potential Relation to the New World Era

(New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1917), 225-243. 

31 No evidence was found to support the claim that Nye paid his agent by personal check. Robert L. Bannerman, “A Brief 

History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent, Department of State,” n.d. [August? 1991], enclosed in “The Robert C. 

[sic] Bannerman Interview,” conducted by George Payne, 20 August 1991. Memorandum, Robert S. Sharp, Special Agent 

in Charge, New York Field Office, to Nye, 4 May 1918, Folder – (A), Box 1, Nye’s Personal File. McCabe, “Mister Lansing’s 

Secret Service,” SY Focus III/4: 5. Department of State Personnel and Organization, December 31, 1921 (Washington D.C.: 

USGPO, 1922), 23. Nye was not listed in the 1918 Register of the Department of State and the Department did not publish 

a register in 1919, 1920, or 1921. Memorandum “List of Special Agents of Department of State,” Office of the Chief Special 

Agent, 8 April 1920, Folder – Special Agents’ Commissions, Correspondence relating to, Box 1, File of Chief Special Agent 

Robert C. Bannerman, Correspondence with Special Agents, 1918-1921, Office of the Counselor, Under Secretary, and 

Chief Special Agent, RG 59-Entry 546, NA. Hereafter cited as Robert C. Bannerman File. 

32 Letter, Lansing to Edward Smith, May 14, 1917, Volume 27, Papers of Robert Lansing , LOC. For coded telegrams with the 

yellow bar, see passim, Folders 3 and 4, Box 1044, and Folder 1, Box 1045, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. For pouch invoices, 

see Despatch, George A. Bricklin, U.S. Consul, Bordeaux, France, to Secretary of State, 15 July 1918, 116.4/67, Folder 2, 

Box 1075, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. For the change in placement of seals, see Despatch 310, Bricklin to Secretary of 

State, 17 April 1918, 116.4/49, Folder 2, Box 1075, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. 

33 Ralph E. Weber, United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 1775-1938 (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1979), 247. For 

an example of uneven distribution of codes, see Telegram, Russell, U.S. Legation in Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 

3 July 1918, 119.2/455, Folder 2, Box 1078, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. For telegrams in a multiple codes, see passim, 

Folders 1 and 2, Box 1078, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Telegram 3594, Osborne, Chargé d’Affaires to Denmark, to Secretary 

of State, 8 February 1919, Folder 1, Box 1079, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. 

34 The creation of the “Diplomatic Courier Service” and its expansion in February 1918 pre-dates the origins as 

described by Jack Grover. Neither General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing nor Captain Amos Jenkins Peaslee, said 

by some to be the founder of the courier service, appears to have been involved in the formation of this courier 

service. Memorandum, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acting Secretary of the Navy, to Secretary of State, 22 October 

1917, 121.67/112; Telegram, Lansing (Frederick A. Sterling, Chief of Division of Western European Affairs) to 

U.S. Embassy Rome, 27 September 1917, 121.67/106, attached to Telegram 1097, Thomas Nelson Page, U.S. 

Ambassador to Italy, to Secretary of State, 24 September 1917, 121.67/106; Telegram, Lansing to U.S. Embassy 

London, 24 October 1917, 121.67/109a; and Memorandum, Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, to Secretary 

of State, 20 February 1918, 121.67/135; all Folder 4, Box 1164, DF 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. Sergeant Leo J. Daugherty 

III, USMCR, “‘These Fine Smart Detachments’: A History of the United States Marine Corps and the Department 
28

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

of State, 1799-2004,” unpublished manuscript, 2004, pp. 113-114. Henry S. Waterman, “The American Courier,” 

American Foreign Service Journal (/3 (March 1931): 120-121. Jack Grover, “None is Swifter Than These,” Foreign 

Service Journal 31/2 (February 1954): 25. 

35 Telegram 1353, Henry P. Fletcher, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, to Leland Harrison, 7 August 1918, 121.67/174; Telegram 

1467, Fletcher to Secretary of State, 31 August 1918, 121.67/179; and Telegram 1651, Fletcher to Harrison, 30 October 

1918, 121.67/200; all Folder 1, Box 1165, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. For the East Asia route, see Memorandum, Edward 

Bell, Chief of Division of Current Information, 9 March 1922 (memorandum seen by Fred Morris Dearing, Assistant 

Secretary of State, and Margaret M. Hanna, Assistant to the Second Assistant Secretary of State), 121.67/512, Folder 2, Box 

1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

36 Letter, Charles Denby, Chief Clerk, to R. Newton Crane, U.S. Despatch Agent – London, 21 February 1907, enclosed with 

Letter, Newton to Sterling, 5 October 1916, 111.8/40, Folder 3, Box 1047, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

37 The Department instructed the U.S. Despatch Agent’s Office to use only U.S. vessels in transporting U.S. diplomatic 

pouches; however, Despatch Agent R. Newton Crane made clear that such an instruction was impractical given the 

Department’s desire for speedy receipt of information. For the question of using only U.S. vessels for pouches, see Telegram, 

Lansing (Sterling) to U.S. Embassy London, 22 October 1917, 051.41/48a; and Letter, Crane to Secretary of State, 18 

April 1918, 051.41/64; both Folder 1, Box 360, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Henry S. Waterman, “The American Courier,” 

American Foreign Service Journal (/3 (March 1931): 120-121. Memorandum, Roosevelt to Secretary of State, 22 October 

1917, 121.67/112. Telegram, Lansing (Sterling) to U.S. Embassy London, 24 October 1917, 121.67/109a. Memorandum, 

Daniels to Secretary of State, 20 February 1918, 121.67/135. 

38 In 1899, Samuel Clemens, under the pen name Mark Twain, wrote an essay that sought to convince U.S. leaders that 

diplomatic expenses were a necessity for a rising power such as the United States. See Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens), 

“Diplomatic Pay and Clothes,” Forum, March 1899, pp. 24-32. See also The Complete Works of Mark Twain, http://www.

mtwain.com/Diplomatic_Pay_And_Clothes/0.html, accessed 14 August 2009. 

39 A History of the United States Diplomatic Courier Service: America’s Couriers to the World, pamphlet prepared for the 75th

anniversary of the courier service, Office of the Historian Files (hereafter cited as HO Files). Jack Grover, “A Brief History 

of the U.S. Diplomatic Courier Service,” 15-16. Daugherty, “Those Fine Smart Detachments,” 116-119. 

40 Letter, Nye to Robert S. Sharp, Special Agent-in-charge – New York, 11 July 1918, Folder – Sharp, Robert S. Special Agent 

[3]; Letter, Nye to Sharp, 10 October 1918, Folder – Sharp, Robert S., Special Agent [3]; and Memorandum of Confidential 

Expenditures, Robert S. Sharp, Special Agent-in-Charge – New York, 1 November 1918, Folder – Sharp, Robert S., Special 

Agent [1]; all Box 2, Files of Chief Special Agent Robert C. Bannerman, Correspondence with Special Agents, 1918-1921, 

Records of the Office of the Counselor/Under Secretary/ Chief Special Agent, RG 59 – Entry 546, NA (hereafter cited as 

Files of CSA Bannerman). Robert [L.] Bannerman Interview, “Robert Candlish Bannerman and Early History of the Office 

of the Chief Special Agent,” p. 1. 

41 Memorandum, Bannerman, Acting Chief Special Agent, to Polk, 9 January 1919, Fold – (P) [1], Box 2, Special Agent Nye’s 

Personal File, General Correspondence of the Chief Special Agent, 1918-1920, Records of the Counselor / Under Secretary 

/ and Chief Special Agent, RG 59 – Entry 545, NA (hereafter cited as Nye’s Personal File). Letter, Sharp to Bannerman, 29 

May 1918, attached to Confidential Memorandum, Sharp to Bannerman, 27 May 1918, Folder – Sharp, Robert S., Special 

Agent [2], Box 2, Files of CSA Bannerman. 

42 For example, see Letter, Edward Bell, U.S. Embassy London, to Harrison, 1 January 1918; Letter “Decypher,” Department 

of State to ZNG Officers, Sloterdyk, near Amsterdam, 26 July 1916; Letter #275 “Decypher,” Department of State to ZNG 

Officers, Sloterdyk, 16 May 1916; Letter “Decypher,” Department of State to H. Eisenhuth, Copenhagen, 9 May 1916; 

Telegram 5887, Lansing (Harrison) to Bell, 23 November 1916; all Folder – #110 [2], Box 4, Classified Case Files of Edward 

Bell, 1917-1919, RG 59-Entry 350, NA. 
29

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

43 Newspaper Clipping “Huns Back Hindu Plot: Secret Papers Involve Japanese and Chinese Statesmen,” Washington Post, 29 

February 1918, Folder – Indian Conspiracy #4, Box 5, Leland Harrison’s General Correspondence, 1915-1918, Papers of the 

Office of the Counselor and Chief Special Agent, RG 59-Entry 346, NA (hereafter cited as Harrison’s General Correspondence). 

44 Letter, Harrison to Department of Justice, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and Military Intelligence Section (MIS) [Army], 

October 31, 1917, Folder – Gehrman, Delmar, etc. including Espionage [2]. Box 4, Harrison’s General Correspondence. 

45 Grew, Turbulent Era, I: 131. James G. Thurber was referring to the Red Code, which was still in use in 1919. Thurber, 

“Exhibit X,” Foreign Service Journal, 35/7 (July 1958): 19. 

46 William Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953), 113-114. For lock box use, see Memorandum, E. J. 

Ayers, Chief Clerk and Administrative Assistant, to Division Chiefs, 1 April 1927, 116.6/69, folder 2, Box 1076, DF 1910-

29, RG 59, NA. David Kahn, The Reader of Gentleman’s Mail: Herbert O. Yardley and the Birth of American Codebreaking

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 98. 

47 The Army officers were: Maj. Amos Peaslee, 1st Lt. Joseph P. Sims; 1st Lt. Chester C. Darling, 1st Lt. Phillip Bekegriart, 1st

Lt. Lon Homeir, 2nd Lt. H. J. Bailey, Capt. Edward P. Palmer, 1st Lt. Arthur D. Alexander, 1st Lt. Howard Osteriman, 1st Lt. 

Kenneth Patterson, 1st Lt. John J. Whitemore, 1st Lt., Samuel S. Reckefus, 1st Lt. Robert S. Hillyer, and 2nd Lt. Silas B. Egly. 

48 Telegram 51, Gordon Auchincloss, Assistant to the Counselor, to Frank L. Polk, Counselor of the Department, 5 November 

1918, 119.2/807, Folder 1, Box 1080; Telegram 6186, Sharp to Secretary of State, 7 December 1918, 121.67/210, Folder 

1, Box 1165; and Telegram 6594, Pole to U.S. Embassy Paris, 11 December 1918, attached to Telegram 6186, William G. 

Sharp, U.S. Ambassador to France, to Secretary of State, 7 December 1918, 121.67/210, Folder 1, Box 1165; all DF 1910-

29, RG 59, NA. Telegram 2260, Joseph E. Willard, U.S. Ambassador to Spain, to Secretary of State, 27 December 1918, 

121.67/216; and Telegram 6229, William G. Sharp, U.S. Ambassador to Spain, to Secretary of State, 11 December 1918, 

121.67/211; both Folder 1, Box 1165, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Grover, “None is Swifter Than These,” Foreign Service 

Journal, 31/2: 26. Grover, “A Brief history of the U.S. Diplomatic Courier Service,” Foreign Service Newsletter 80 (October 

1953): 16. 

49 Memorandum “Instructions for Navy-State Department Cipher,” n.d. (March 1921), enclosed with Memorandum, 

Henry P. Fletcher, Acting Secretary of State, n.d. (March 1921), Folder 4, Box 1093, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Weber, 

United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 247-251. For the quarterly change in code tables, see Despatch 2468, Edwin 

V. Morgan, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, to Secretary of State, 12 December 1925, 119.25, Folder 4, Box 1093; and 

Memorandum, Robert C. Bannerman, Chief Special Agent, to E. J. Ayers, Chief Clerk and Administrative Assistant, 5 

December 1928, 051.41/607 1⁄2, Folder 4, Box 360; both DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. For separate codes, see Note “Codes 

for Lausanne Conference,” Department of State to U.S. Legation Switzerland, 16 December 1922, 119.25/542, Folder 

3, Box 1093, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, David A Salmon, Chief of Bureau of Indexes and Archives, to 

Fred Morris Dearing, Assistant Secretary of State, 4 November 1921, 119.25/485, attached to Note, Dearing to Salmon, 

4 November 1921, Folder 5, Box 1093, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Despatch 194, Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, United 

States High Commissioner at Constantinople, to Secretary of State, 11 May 1921, 119.25/449, Folder 5, Box 1093, DF 

1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

50 Instruction, Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State (Henry P. Fletcher, Under Secretary of State), to Elbridge Gerry 

Greene, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to Bulgaria, 7 September 1921, 119.25/359; and Despatch 928, C. Van H. Engert, 

Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to El Salvador, to Secretary of State, 7 September 1925, 119.25/630; both Folder 4, Box 1092, 

DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

51 Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1931), 21-22. Kahn, The Reader of 

Gentlemen’s Mail, 50-51, 73-74. For Yardley’s work at MI-8, see Kahn, The Reader of Gentlemen’s Mail, 50, 28-49; and 

Yardley, American Black Chamber, 37-230. 
30

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

52 Telegram 1239, Hugh Campbell Wallace, U.S. Ambassador to France, to Secretary of State, 7 August 1919, 121.67/286; and 

Telegram 9039, Lansing (Albert B. Ruddock, Bureau of Western European Affairs) to U.S. Embassy Paris, 18 August 1919, 

121.67/286; both Folder 3, Box 1165, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Statement of William R. Sands, Gunnery Sergeant, U.S. 

Marine Corps,” Sands, attached to Memorandum, Theodore Roosevelt, Acting Secretary of the Navy, to Secretary of State, 

26 March 1921, 121.67/435; and Memorandum, Ward A. Fitzsimmons, Assistant Chief of Bureau of Accounts, to Wilbur J. 

Carr, Director of the Consular Service, 18 November 1919, and Memorandum, Carr to William Phillips, Second Assistant 

Secretary of State, 19 November 1919, both attached to Memorandum, Philips to Clinton E. MacEachran, Assistant to the 

Under Secretary of State, 20 November 1919, 121.67/434; all Folder 1, Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

53 For discontinuing the courier service, see Instruction #859, Robert Woods Bliss, Third Assistant Secretary of State, to Hugh 

C. Wallace, U.S. Ambassador to France, 3 June 1921, attached to Despatch 2347, Wallace to Secretary of State, 15 April 

1921, 121.67/441, Folder 1; and Memorandum, Edward Bell, Chief of Division of Current Information, 9 March 1922, 

121.67/512, Folder 2; both Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

54 For reviving the courier service, see Despatch 2470, Myron T. Herrick, U.S. Ambassador to France, to Secretary of State, 20 

October 1922, 121.67/551, attached to Memorandum, William McNeir, Chief of Bureau of Accounts, to Worthington E. 

Stewart, Acting Chief of Diplomatic Bureau, 4 November 1922, Folder 2; and Memorandum, Stewart to Bliss, 16 January 

1923, 121.67/569, Folder 3; both Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. For complaints about the national mail services 

in Central and Eastern Europe, see Telegram 586, Hugh Robert Wilson, Counselor of U.S. Embassy Berlin, to Secretary of 

State, 16 June 1921, 051.62/69; and Telegram 601, Wilson to Secretary of State, 27 June 1921, 051.62/70; both Folder 4, 

Box 363, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Despatch 1316, H. Percival Dodge, Minister to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and 

Slovenes [Yugoslavia], to Secretary of State, 17 April 1922, 121.67/518, Folder 2, Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

55 Memorandum “Warren Commission Recommendation and Our Protective Services for Visiting Dignitaries,” G. Marvin 

Gentile, Director of the Office of Security, to William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, 22 October 

1964, Folder – Policy File 1964, Box 5, Protective Security Policy Files 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA. Memorandum 

“Railroads and Mileage Traveled by the King of the Belgians’ Special Train,” Nye, [November?] 1919; and Telegram, Nye to 

Lansing, 17 October 1919; both Folder – King Albert and Queen Elizabeth of Belgium Visit of 1919, Box 2, Files of Chief 

Special Agent Bannerman, Correspondence with Special Agents 1918-1921, RG 59-Entry 354, NA. 

56 “Bill Nye Resigns Post,” New York Times, 13 May 1920, p. 9. “Joseph M. Nye, 79, Aide to Presidents,” New York Times, 18 

May 1948, p. 23. Frank C. Higgins, Special Agent, to Sharp, 5 November 1925, Folder – Prince and Princess Asaka of Japan 

1925; and Memorandum “Visit to the United States of Prince and Princess Asaka of Japan, traveling incognito as Count 

and Countess Asa,” W. A. Kenyon, Post Office Inspector, to Robert C. Bannerman, Chief Special Agent, 4 December 1925; 

both Folder – Prince and Princess Asaka of Japan 1925, Box 1, Special Agent Correspondence Concerning Visits of Foreign 

Dignitaries, 1918-1927, RG 59-Entry 354, NA. 

57 For Special Agent protection and services for black diplomats, see documents related to the visit of Liberian diplomat Edwin 

Barclay in 1925, passim, Folder – Barclay, Edwin, Secretary of State of Liberia, Visit of 1925, Box 2, Box 2, Files of Chief 

Special Agent Bannerman, RG 59 – Entry 546, NA. 

58 Memorandum “Warren Commission Recommendation and Our Protective Services for Visiting Dignitaries,” Gentile to 

Crockett, 22 October 1964. Memorandum “Visit to the United States of Prince and Princess Asaka of Japan, traveling 

incognito as Count and Countess Asa,” Kenyon to Bannerman, 4 December 1925. 

59 “Bill Nye Resigns Post,” New York Times, 13 May 1920, p. 9. “Joseph M. Nye, 79, Aide to Presidents,” New York Times, 18 

May 1948, p. 23. TAB 2 “History of Security Organization” of Report “Study by Reorganization Task Force on Security 

of the Department of State,” 23 March 1949, [No folder], Box 13, A/SY/Evaluations – Security Files, 1932-1963, RG 59, 

NA. “Memorandum “U-2: Liaison,” [Robert C. Bannerman?], n.d. [1925], Folder #205, Box 10, Classified Records of 

the Office of the Counselor, 1916-1927, RG 59-Entry 344, NA. Memorandum “List of Special Agents of Department of 

State,” Bannerman [?], 8 April 1920. 
31

CHAPTER 1 SPECIAL AGENTS, SPECIAL THREATS: Creating the Office of the Chief Special Agent, 1914-1933

60 TAB 2 “History of Security Organization” of Report “Study by Reorganization Task Force on Security of the Department of 

State,” 23 March 1949. Letter, Sharp to Bannerman, 28 December 1923, Folder #209, Box 12, Classified Records of the Office 

of the Counselor, RG 59-Entry 344, NA. For leaks to the press, see Memorandum, Bannerman to William H. Beck, Assistant 

to the Secretary of State, 25 April 1922, 116.8/40, Folder 3, Box 1076, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. For the theft investigation 

centered upon Robert S. Clayton, Chief Clerk of the Mail Room, see Memorandum, Bannerman, n.d. [June 1925], 111.36; 

Memorandum “Real Estate Transactions of Robert S. Clayton,” Bannerman, n.d. [June 1925; Memorandum “Report of Clayton 

Case,” Bannerman to J. Butler Wright, Assistant Secretary of State, 17 June 1925, 111.36, attached to Memorandum, Wright to 

Joseph C. Grew, Undersecretary of State, 13 June 1925; all Folder 1, Box 1044, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

61 For examples, see Telegram, Barclay (Bannerman) to Postmaster, Yankton, South Dakota, 21 June 1926; Telegram, Barclay 

(Bannerman), to Postmaster, San Antonio, Texas, 8 March 1926; Telegram, Barclay (Bannerman) to Postmaster, Portland, 

Maine, 5 October 1926; Telegram, Barclay (Bannerman) to Postmaster Mobile Alabama, 22 August 1927; Telegram, Barclay 

(Bannerman), to Postmaster, Austin, Minnesota, 28 October 1927; all Folder #208, Box 12, Classified Records of the Office 

of the Counselor, RG 59-Entry 344, NA. 

62 Report, Robert C. Bannerman, 5 December 1921; and Letter, S. C. Lawrence, British Embassy Washington, 14 October 

1921; both Folder #207 [1], Box 10, Classified Records of the Office of the Counselor, 1916-1927 RG 59-Entry 344, NA. 

63 Memorandum, Robert S. Sharp, Special Agent-in-Charge – New York Field Office, to Hall Kinsey, Acting Chief Special Agent, 13 

July 1925, attached to Memorandum, Sharp to Kinsey, 21 July 1925, Folder – Wiseman, Sir William – Report on Activities, Box 2, 

Files of Chief Special Agent Bannerman, RG 59 – Entry 546, NA. Oral History Interview, Robert L. Bannerman, State Magazine

Number 349 (November 1991), 46. For the new visa and passport laws, see 39 Stat. 894, 40 Stat. 1012, and 41 Stat. 1008. 

64 LeRoy A. Mullen, Special Agent, to Robert S. Sharp, Special Agent in Charge, New York Field Office, 8 December 1926; 

Mullen to Sharp, 29 October 1926; and Mullen to Sharp, 9 November 1926; all Folder #210, Box 12, Classified Records of 

the Office of the Counselor, RG 59-Entry 344, NA. “A History of Security in the Department of State,” n.d. [April, 1954], 

Folder – Security Booklet 1-E, Box 11, Miscellaneous DF 1953-56, Records of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, 

RG 59-Lot 57D254, NA. 

65 Report on the Courier Service, Robert C. Bannerman, Chief Special Agent, to J. Butler Wright, Assistant Secretary of State 

for Administration, 2 April 1924, 121.67/603, Folder 3, Box 1166; Telegram 14, Johnson, U.S. Minister to Bulgaria, to 

Secretary of State, 4 May 1923, 121.67/567, Folder 3, Box 1166; Telegram 10, Louis A. Sussdorff, Chargé d’Affaires ad 

interim to The Netherlands, to Secretary of State, 1 February 1923, Folder 2, Box 1166; Despatch 150, William Phillips, 

U.S. Ambassador to Belgium, 24 October 1922, 121.67/553, Folder 2, Box 1166; Telegram 181, Henry P. Fletcher, U.S. 

Ambassador to Italy, to Secretary of State, 28 December 1925, 051.65/26, Folder 2, Box 364; and Memorandum “Excerpt 

from Letter of Mr. Grant-Smith to Mr. Harrison, dated 22 October 1924,” n.d. [November? 1924], 121.67/615, Folder 3, 

Box 1166; all DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

66 Despatch 4662, Whitehouse to Secretary of State, 12 December 1924, 051.51/88, Folder 3, Box 361; Memorandum, J. W. 

Janicki, Department of State Courier, to G. Harlan Miller, Secretary of U.S. Embassy Paris, 28 November 1924, enclosed 

with Despatch 4662, Whitehouse to Secretary of State, 12 December 1924, 051.51/88; Memorandum, F. R. Eldridge, 

Liaison Officer of Department of Commerce, to Carr and Bannerman, 15 January 1925, 051.51/89, Folder 3, Box 361; and 

Memorandum, Belin to J. Butler Wright, Assistant Secretary of State, 12 January 1925, attached to Telegram 7, Fletcher to 

Secretary of State, 6 January 1925, 121.67/611, Folder 3, Box 1166; all DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

67 Memorandum, Hengstler to Carr, 12 March 1926, FW 121.67/644, Folder 4; Memorandum, Edwin C. Wilson, Assistant 

to the Assistant Secretary for Administration, 22 July 1925, 121.67/651, Folder 4; and Letter, G. Harlan Miller, Second 

Secretary at U.S. Embassy Paris, to F. Lamott “Mott” Belin, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, 

26 December 1924, 121.67/616, Folder 3; all Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

68 Memorandum “Comments on Mr. Bannerman’s Two Memoranda,” Sheldon Whitehouse, Counselor of the U.S. Embassy 

Paris, n.d. [May 1924], enclosed with Letter, Whitehouse to F. Lamott Belin, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, 
32

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

24 May 1924, 121.67/605; and Report on the Courier Service, Bannerman, 2 April 1924, 121.67/603. Memorandum, 

Bannerman to Wright, 23 April 1924, 121.67/604; both Folder 3, Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

69 Letter, Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, to Bannerman, 8 July 1925, 121.67/645f; Letter, Bannerman to Whitehouse, 

8 July 1925, 121.67/645a 1⁄2 ; and Memorandum, Bannerman to Whitehouse, 25 September 1925, 121.67/645a; all Folder 

4, Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

70 For Bannerman’s changes to the courier service, see Memorandum, Bannerman to Belin, 19 June 1924, 121.67/606, Folder 

3; and Memorandum, Bannerman to Whitehouse, 25 September 1925, 121.67/654a, Folder 4; both Box 1166, DF 1910-

29, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, Bannerman to Wright, 2 April 1924, 121.67/603. Memorandum, Bannerman to Wright, 

23 April 1924, 121.67/604. For the Department of Commerce reducing mails, see Memorandum, Hengstler to Carr, 12 

March 1926, FW 121.67/644, folder 4, Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

71 Memorandum, Bannerman to Belin, 5 December 1924, 121.67/614, Folder 3, Box 1166; Memorandum, Bannerman to 

Edwin C. Wilson, 1 December 1925, 121.67/674, Folder 4, Box 1166; and Memorandum, Bannerman to Hengstler, 7 

February 1927, 051.60c/14, Folder 1, Box 363; all DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

72 For the British courier system, see Despatch 1160, Frederick A. Sterling, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to Great Britain, to 

Secretary of State, 7 April 1925, 121.67/630, Folder 4, Box 1166, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Oral History Interview, Bruce 

Matthews, 17 February 2006, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 7. 

73 Memorandum, Bannerman to Hengstler, 8 December 1924, 051.01/91, attached to Memorandum, Belin to Hengstler, 10 

December 1924, 051.01/91, Folder 2; and Letter, Bannerman to Joseph F. Roberts, U.S. Despatch Agent – San Francisco, 

12 January 1927, attached to Memorandum, J. Brent Clarke, Chief Clerk of Mail Room, to Hengstler, 6 January 1927, 

051/135, Folder 4; both Box 351, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

74 For Nairobi and Cairo, see Despatch 129 “Routeing [sic] of Official Mail for East Africa,” Avra M. Warren, U.S. Consul to 

Kenya Colony, 21 May 1925, attached to Memorandum, Bannerman to Hengstler, 29, June 1925, 051.48t/4; Memorandum, 

Bannerman to Hengstler, 12 March 1925, 051.48t/3; and Instruction, Wright to Warren, 20 March 1925, 051.48t/3; all Folder 

2, Box 361, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, Bannerman to Belin, 5 December 1924, 121.67/614. For Suva, see 

Memorandum, Bannerman to Henry A. Havens, Assistant Chief of Division of Foreign Service Administration, 25 October 

1927, 051.62m/2, attached to Memorandum, Havens to Clarke, 25 October 1927, Folder 1, Box 364, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

75 Memorandum “Personal Mail in Air Mail Sacks,” Wilbur J. Carr, Assistant Secretary of State, to Certain American Diplomatic 

and Consular Officers, 17 January 1931, 051.04/29A, attached to Memorandum “Enclosures,” G. Howland Shaw to American 

Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 9 December 1943, 124.0664/229C, Folder – 124.0664/221-12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-

44, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, Bannerman to Hengstler, 28 June 1927, 051.42/-; Despatch 47, H. Dorsey Newsom, Chargé 

d’Affaires ad interim to Canada, to Secretary of State, 15 August 1927, 051.42/4; and Despatch 5, Frederick A. Sterling, U.S. 

Minister to Ireland, to Secretary of State, 9 August 1927, 051.41d/-, Folder 4, Box 360, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

76 J. B. Gilder, “Sixty Years of Service,” New York Times, 6 June 1928. Gurney, “Fifty Years in the Despatch Agency,” American 

Foreign Service Journal, 12 (1935): 400. Memorandum, Bannerman to Ayers, 5 December 1928, 051.41/607 1⁄2 , Folder 4, 

Box 360, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, William R. Castle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for European and 

Near Eastern Affairs, 2 July 1928, 051.41/603 3⁄4 , Folder 4, Box 360, DF 1910-29, RG 59, NA. 

77 Letter, Leslie Weisenberg, U.S. Embassy Paris to Hengstler, 21 July 1933, 121.67, Box 336, DF 1930-1939, RG 59, NA. 

Despatch 1190 from Stuttgart, August 23, 1933, DF 1930-1939, 121.67, Box 336, RG 59, NA. 

78 Stimson quoted in Kahn, The Codebreakers, 360. 

79 Letter, Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, to Senator Key Pittman, Chairman of Committee on Foreign Relations, 119.25, Box 

263, DF 1930-1939, RG 59, NA. Kahn, The Reader of Gentlemen’s Mail, 158-172. 

80 Kahn, The Reader of Gentlemen’s Mail, 187-225. 
33

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

The experiences of the World War II era (1933-1945) expanded and solidified diplomatic security as 

a vital function of the Department of State. From the first days of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency, the 

Department faced grave threats to U.S. diplomacy, primarily from Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan. 

As a result, the Department broadened its definition of security and expanded the number of entities monitoring 

and enforcing security. The Department’s new, expanded security apparatus under President Roosevelt, however, 

was disjointed. Security responsibilities were dispersed across multiple offices with overlapping jurisdictions. 

Moreover, the Office of the Chief Special Agent, which had handled security since World War I, often was not 

involved in many of the new security measures. By the end of World War II, the Department was implementing 

security in a more extensive, formalized manner that touched and altered every level of the Department’s 

operations. In fact, many security measures first implemented during World War II—such as coded ID badges, 

formal document classification procedures, and a courier network—are today accepted as part of the Department’s 

normal, daily routine. 

Moscow and Berlin

When Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the Presidency in March 1933, the Department of State faced 

diplomatic security threats from Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1930s, the regimes of 

both nations respectively targeted the U.S. Embassies in Berlin and Moscow for espionage. Security problems 

at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow began immediately after Roosevelt signed the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreement of 

November 16, 1933, which established formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet 

Union. U.S. officials opened the Embassy in Moscow in December, but as diplomat George F. Kennan later 

recalled, they lacked basic security necessities such as codes and safes during the first few months. The Embassy’s 

communications with Washington were sent across open telegraph lines. Ambassador William C. Bullitt requested 

and obtained a group of Marines to serve as guards, but the Soviet NKVD (the Soviet intelligence service that was 

CHAPTER 2

THE VITAL FUNCTION

8

World War II and Diplomatic Security
34

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

the forerunner of the KGB) soon provided “girlfriends” for the Marines.1 One of the Embassy’s code clerks, 

Tyler G. Kent, had a Russian mistress, and the chauffeur for the U.S. military attaché was discovered to be a 

NKVD officer.2

 

U.S. Embassy officers knew of the Soviet espionage but did little to stop it. Sergei, the caretaker of Spaso 

House (the Ambassador’s residence), kept his basement apartment in the residence locked, and apparently no 

one obtained a key from him until 1952. During that time, Sergei had assisted in “bugging” (installing listening 

devices) the U.S. Embassy from his apartment. In July 1937, when the Embassy’s electrician discovered a 

microphone in the ceiling above the Ambassador’s desk, several junior Embassy officers were upset and tried to 

locate other bugs. Ambassador Joseph Davies, who had succeeded William Bullitt, dismissed the affair: “I cooled 

off [‘the youngsters’] and ‘kidded’ them about their ‘international sleuthing’.” “My position was,” he wrote in his 

diary, that “if the Soviets had a Dictaphone installed so much the better – the sooner they would find that we were 

friends, not enemies.”3

 

When Military Attaché Major Ivan D. Yeaton arrived in Moscow in 1939, he was “appalled” by the extent to 

which security at the Embassy had been compromised. Two or three ballerinas from the Moscow Ballet had free 

run of the Embassy, and the NKVD “generously provided” female companions for parties at the Embassy. In 1940, 

Yeaton, who knew that the Department was preparing 

to change its telegraph codes, quietly asked the FBI to 

send an agent to run a security inspection. Disguised as 

a courier, the FBI agent arrived, recorded his findings, 

and submitted his report. Besides the many Soviet 

employees and visitors that freely roamed throughout 

the Embassy, the FBI agent found that the code room 

was left unattended with the door propped open for 45 

minutes one evening. He also found he code room’s 

safes left open and codebooks and classified messages 

left setting on the table. The agent’s inspection and 

report prompted a quick upgrade of security, and some 

embassy officers were brought back to Washington. 

Not until 1944, did an electrician undertake a 

comprehensive search for listening devices, and then 

he discovered 120 hidden microphones during his 

first sweep of the building. One Embassy officer 

confessed that Soviet microphones “kept turning 

up...any and everywhere.”4

 

Figure 1: U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Joseph E. 

Davies. He dismissed discoveries of hidden listening devices 

in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He believed that it was 

better that the Soviets know “that we were friends, not 

enemies.” In 1944, a U.S. Government electrician found 

144 “bugs” in the Embassy. Source: Library of Congress, 

National Photo Company Collection.
35

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

Nazi Germany proved equally effective in their espionage against the U.S. Embassy in Berlin. One German 

secret agent remarked, “Routine security precautions in the [U.S.] Embassy [in Berlin] were very poorly observed 

by U.S. personnel.” Long-time employees Rudolf Kranz (a.k.a. “Karl”) and Heinz Prause were covert German 

agents who worked in the Naval Attaché’s office. They obtained the Attaché’s codebook and exact details of 

the Navy’s shipbuilding program. U.S. Embassy personnel left their safes open and left classified documents 

on their desks during lunch, enabling German agents to steal documents, make copies or photographs, and 

then return them. The typewriter carbons of classified documents were simply tossed into the trash, providing 

another source of information for German agents. In addition, the Naval Attaché’s conference room was bugged 

just before the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Since at least 1936, Nazi intelligence had tapped the telephone lines 

of the U.S. Embassies in Berlin and Warsaw, the U.S. residences in Berlin, and the apartments of U.S. news 

correspondents. One German telephone eavesdropper was “amazed that U.S. embassy staff spoke so openly 

on the telephone” and that U.S. correspondents “freely talked about...what they had learned from officials and 

colleagues.” Much of Germany’s espionage was not discovered until 1945, when Department officials asked 

Security Officer Robert L. Bannerman, the son of Chief Special Agent Robert C. Bannerman, to investigate the 

matter. After much analysis and investigation, Bannerman identified Kranz as an espionage agent, leading to 

Kranz’s arrest. Bannerman also pointed to others as possible suspects, which U.S. authorities in Germany found 

to be “for the most part correct.”5

 

Nazi censors, as well as Nazi enforcement of 

German mail regulations that prompted the opening 

of U.S. diplomatic mail on occasion, aggravated an 

already difficult situation for the transport of U.S. 

diplomatic pouches. The Department initially 

reverted to using the Despatch Agent network in 

1919; however, the opening of many new U.S. 

diplomatic posts after World War I, combined with 

the Department’s efforts to maintain fiscal economy 

during the 1920s and early 1930s, created a more 

haphazard, less secure system than had existed prior 

to World War I. As a means to improve security, 

the Department added couriers to carry diplomatic 

pouches to and from the new posts in Central and 

Eastern Europe, but the Department undercut that 

security when it began shipping pouches directly to 

Le Havre, France – bypassing the London Despatch 

Figure 2: President Franklin D. Roosevelt (left) confers with 

Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who served as Secretary from 

1933 to 1944. Unhappy that the Department had cut the 

courier service, Roosevelt supported an appropriation to fund 

three couriers in Europe. During World War II, couriers 

became the Department’s primary carriers of diplomatic 

pouches. Source: Library of Congress, New York WorldTelegram and the Sun Newspaper Photograph Collection.
36

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Office – and having the French postal service carry them to Paris. Due to budget constraints caused by the 

Great Depression, the Department shut down its courier service, but, the volume of mail handled annually by 

the Department’s Mail Section had grown considerably. By 1936, the Mail Section handled more than 2000 

pouches containing military and naval intelligence alone, in addition to the nearly 6000 other diplomatic pouches, 

quantities that exceeded the capabilities of the Despatch Agent network. Other U.S. posts overseas also relied 

upon trusted foreign postal services, which were the British and German services.6

 

During the 1930s, security of U.S. diplomatic correspondence declined, and several Foreign Service Officers 

(FSOs) and Department employees echoed complaints that Chief Special Agent Robert C. Bannerman had sought 

to correct in the mid-1920s. The personnel at U.S. posts confused the revived courier service with a “freight 

hauling” service. There was “no distinction” being made between “Confidential” and non-confidential materials, 

and some posts sent local national employees to the train station to pick up the diplomatic pouches. There were 

thefts of pouches containing confidential U.S. documents. Courier Warren M. Hamilton noted that even the 

most sensitive U.S. diplomatic letters (those containing the Department’s telegraph codes) were left unattended 

in a French post office for several hours, and then shipped across the Atlantic on ships of foreign registry. The 

U.S. Legation to Belgrade complained that sending U.S. diplomatic correspondence through the Yugoslav postal 

service meant that it was subject to search by Yugoslav authorities at all times.7

 

With security of U.S. diplomatic mail in doubt, President Roosevelt worked to restart the Department of 

State’s courier service. He was displeased when he learned that the Department had cut the courier service, and 

he told Congress that he supported renewed funding for couriers. In 1935, Congress appropriated $24,000 to the 

Department, permitting the operation of three couriers out of Paris and a limited service in Asia. For fiscal year 

1939, Congress raised the appropriation to $35,000.8

 

The reinitiating of the courier service led to changes in the routes. The Department created a new route in 

northeast Asia; from its base in Peiping (now Beijing), the route ran between Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking, and 

Shanghai, with Tokyo added later. In Europe, the Southern Route added Rome and Athens to its destinations, 

and the circuit consisted of Paris-Rome-Athens-Istanbul-Sofia-Belgrade-Budapest-Vienna, then stopping at 

Zurich or Geneva before returning to Paris. The U.S. Legation in Bucharest sent a Foreign Service Officer or 

trusted American clerk to carry its pouch and meet the courier in Sofia. Meanwhile, an FSO or clerk travelled 

from Tirana and met the courier at the Hotel Oriente in Bari, Bulgaria, in order to exchange that Legation’s 

pouches. When Austria was absorbed into Germany in the 1938 Anschluss, Vienna was dropped from the route. 

An Iberian Route was added, which travelled from Paris to Barcelona to Madrid to Lisbon, and back to Paris. 

The courier handling this route was likely the same courier who made the Paris to London trip. The Northern 

Route appears to have remained largely the same, following the circuit of Paris-Berlin-Riga-Moscow-TallinnHelsinki-Paris.9
37

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

Neutrality Legislation and 

New Duties 

As tensions escalated in Europe and Asia, the 

United States strove to remain neutral, and the 1934 

book Merchants of Death intensified the U.S. public’s 

desire for neutrality. The work claimed that arms 

manufacturers and dealers had unduly influenced the 

U.S. Government’s decision to enter World War I. A 

Congressional committee led by Senator Gerald P. 

Nye (R-ND) investigated the book’s claims but found 

little evidence to support them.10 The “merchants of 

death” thesis, however, became popular just as Italy 

was preparing to wage war against Ethiopia in 1935. 

Public sentiment pressed Congress to ensure that 

the United States remained neutral, and Congress 

responded by passing the Neutrality Act of 1935, 

which imposed an embargo upon the sale of arms to 

nations at war. Congress strengthened the Neutrality 

Act in 1936 by banning U.S. citizens from making 

loans or extending credit to belligerents. President 

Roosevelt, in his 1937 “Quarantine” speech, then 

declared that the United States should use its “moral 

influence” to stop war.11

The Department of State became the cabinet 

agency tasked to enforce and secure U.S. neutrality. As 

Spain descended into civil war in 1936, with German 

Führer Adolph Hitler and Italian Prime Minister 

Benito Mussolini aiding the Spanish Nationalists led 

by General Francisco Franco, the Department created 

the Office of Arms and Munitions Control to enforce 

the Neutrality Acts. The office was charged with 

registering manufacturers, exporters, and importers 

of arms, ammunition, and war materiel, as well as 

licensing the exportation and importation of war 

Figure 3: Senator Gerald R. Nye of North Dakota. Nye 

chaired Senate hearings in 1935 that investigated charges 

made by the book Merchants of Death. The book claimed 

that arms manufacturers pressured the U.S. Government 

to enter World War I. The issue led to munitions controls 

that tried to stop arms sales from subverting U.S. foreign 

policy. Source: Library of Congress, George Grantham 

Bain Collection. 

Figure 4: “Homage to the International Brigades: The 

Popular Front of Madrid, The Popular Front of the World.” 

The Department of State learned that many U.S. volunteers 

for the Abraham Lincoln and other brigades in the Spanish 

Civil War were asked to turn over their passports to their 

regiment commanders. Some passports were shipped to 

Moscow, and false U.S. passports began to appear in 

Europe. The Department redesigned the U.S. passport in 

1937 to stop passport fraud and catch Soviet spies. Source: 

Library of Congress, Spanish Civil War Posters Collection. 
38

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

materiel. The Secretary of State also chaired the 

National Munitions Control Board.12 The control 

of munitions was conceived in terms similar to the 

control of passports and visas. Like persons who 

provided false passports to saboteurs and spies, foreign 

agents and U.S. subversives engaged in the arms trade 

could subvert U.S. diplomacy and jeopardize U.S. 

internal security. Arms traders, therefore, were seen 

to pose a security risk to the United States, much 

like German saboteurs, anarchists, and Communist 

agents had done a generation earlier during World 

War I.13 

The Office of the Chief Special Agent was 

pulled into the neutrality debates when Americans 

ignored or flouted the U.S. ban on travel to 

belligerent countries. During the Spanish Civil 

War (1936-1939), Americans volunteered for the 

Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, and Loyalist 

International Brigades in order to aid the Republicans 

in their struggle against Franco and the Fascists. Prohibited by the Neutrality Acts from travelling to Spain, U.S. 

volunteers applied for passports saying that they were travelling to France, Belgium, England, or other countries, 

even though their true destination was Spain. By 1937, the Department of State required that young men of 

military age present affidavits attesting that they were not going to Spain.14 

Passport fraud resulting from U.S. citizens fighting in Spain prompted the Department of State to change 

the design of U.S. passports in 1937. When U.S. volunteers arrived in Spain, they were told to give their passports 

to their regiment leaders “for safekeeping.” As a result, more than 2,000 U.S. passports were shipped to Moscow 

because some regiment leaders who had joined the Republican cause were Soviet agents or collaborators. U.S. 

officials soon learned of the thefts and redesigned the U.S. passport. The Department issued free replacements to 

U.S. citizens as a means of identifying fraud and catching Communist agents. However, U.S. volunteers who had lost 

their passports returned to the United States with only certificates of identity. Special Agent Robert L. Bannerman, 

who worked in the New York Field Office, recalled staying up until 4 a.m. three times a week interviewing the 

returning volunteers in order to determine if they were truly U.S. citizens.15 

False U.S. passports appeared in Denmark, Brazil, and the Soviet Union, and investigations by the Chief 

Special Agent’s office exposed a Soviet spy network. Department of State Special Agents learned that many U.S. 

Figure 5: American volunteers of the Abraham Lincoln 

Brigade, returning from Spain, aboard the S.S. President 

Harding, February 4, 1939. American volunteers joined 

the Spanish Republicans in fighting General Francisco 

Franco and the Fascists during the Spanish Civil War 

(1936-1939). The Department of State required male 

passport applicants to sign an affidavit saying that they 

would not go to Spain, but American volunteers often put 

Great Britain or France as their destination to hide their 

decision to go and fight in Spain. © Associated Press Images 

(AP Photo/Fred H. Mann). 
39

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

volunteers for the Spanish Civil War had made their 

travel arrangements through World Tourists, Inc., a 

Communist front company (all of its corporate officers 

were Communist Party members). World Tourists 

had also provided travel arrangements for the Amtorg 

Corporation, a Communist front organization that 

the Chief Special Agent’s office had investigated a 

decade earlier. In 1939, U.S. authorities seized the 

records of World Tourists. The Department of Justice 

indicted the company and its head, Jacob Golos, 

for passport fraud, and issued an second indictment 

against Golos for failing to register as a foreign agent. 

Earl Browder, leader of the U.S. Communist Party, 

was also indicted and convicted of passport fraud as 

a result of the World Tourist investigation. Browder 

served fourteen months in jail before Roosevelt 

pardoned him as a gesture of wartime friendship to 

the Soviet Union.16 

 Another set of passport fraud investigations 

conducted by the Chief Special Agent’s Office exposed 

Nazi espionage in the United States. Guenther 

Gustave Rumrich called the U.S. Passport Bureau in Manhattan, identified himself as “Mr. Weston, Under 

Secretary of State,” and requested that 50 blank passports be delivered to his hotel. As Sumner Welles was Under 

Secretary of State at the time, Special Agents and FBI agents trailed the delivery of the blank passports and arrested 

Rumrich. A deserter from the U.S. Army, Rumrich had received $290 from the Nazi German government, and 

in exchange, he sent U.S. Government weather reports, the Army-Navy Register (a periodical), and a list of Army 

and Navy publications to the Germans. All of these items, however, were publicly available, free of charge, and 

could have been easily obtained by German Embassy officers. Rumrich may not have been the most effective spy, 

but the investigation of his activities uncovered three other German agents--Erich Glaser, Otto Herman Voss, and 

Johanna Hoffman. All four were tried in 1938, and received prison terms of two years (Rumrich and Hoffman), 

four years (Glaser), and six years (Voss).17 

With only six Special Agents in 1939, the Office of the Chief Special Agent achieved an impressive track 

record in passport fraud cases. Each Special Agent juggled between 30 and 40 cases at once. Special Agent 

Robert L. Bannerman recalled that even under the severely limited budget, he conducted passport and visa fraud 

Figure 6: Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party of 

the United States, attending the final rally of his 1936 

Presidential campaign, at Madison Square Garden. The 

Office of the Chief Special Agent conducted a passport 

fraud investigation of the Communist-front business 

World Tourists that ultimately led to the indictment and 

imprisonment of Browder in 1940. Browder served 14 

months in jail. © Associated Press Images.
40

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

investigations, personnel case investigations, special inquiries made on behalf of consular officers abroad, liaisons 

with all federal agencies in New York, and arrangements and protection for visiting dignitaries and heads of state.18

Other diplomatic security threats remained undetected. The NKVD, the Soviet intelligence service, had 221 

agents operating in the United States. Within the upper ranks of the U.S. Government, these agents included 

Alger Hiss; Laurence Duggan, Chief of the Division of American Republics at the Department of State; Harry 

Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to the President; and 

Duncan Chaplin Lee, personal assistant to General William Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services 

(OSS). In 1939, Whittaker Chambers, an editor for Time magazine and a former Soviet agent, told FBI chief J. 

Edgar Hoover and Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle about the Soviets’ espionage efforts, and even gave 

them the names of Hiss, White, and Currie. Berle wrote a memorandum about Chambers’ allegations to an 

uninterested President Roosevelt, but then set the matter aside.19 

Communications Security in Wartime

The escalating hostilities in Asia and Europe during the late 1930s emphasized the need for greater security. 

The July 1937 clash between Japanese and Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing quickly expanded 

to war in East Asia. In 1938, Hitler moved German forces into Austria and created a crisis over the Sudetenland, 

which led to the 1939 occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany. Then, after signing a non-aggression pact 

with the Soviet Union in 1939, Hitler launched an air and land attack on Poland on September 1, prompting 

Great Britain and France to declare war on Germany. While the United States operated under the Neutrality 

Acts, Hitler’s armies stormed through Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg in the 

spring of 1940. The rapid fall of France in June 1940 shocked the American public and pushed the United States 

toward active assistance of the Allied cause (Britain, France, and other West European countries) against the Axis 

Powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. President Roosevelt began rearming U.S. military forces, and convinced 

Congress to amend neutrality legislation in order to allow a “cash and carry” program to supply Great Britain. The 

U.S. Government authorized the sale of U.S. destroyers to Great Britain in return for base leases in the western 

Atlantic, and, in the spring of 1941, provided wholesale economic assistance to the Allied cause through the Lend 

Lease Act.20 

With the onset of war in Europe and Asia, the Department’s patchwork diplomatic pouch system collapsed, 

forcing Department officials to adopt alternatives. The rise of German and Japanese submarine attacks on 

commercial shipping, and the problems created by wartime hostilities in Europe and Asia (e.g. detention of two 

U.S. couriers in German-occupied Norway) wrecked pouch transport system. The Department expanded its 

courier staff in Paris and created a courier office in Berlin. After the fall of France, the Department considered 

shifting the port of entry for its European pouches to Genoa, but since Italy was an Axis power, this probably 

did not occur. The Department still used Despatch Agents but as the war progressed, more and more of the 
41

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

pouches moved to military transports and airplanes. 

President Roosevelt approved the use of military 

officers as couriers where and when necessary, and the 

Department frequently depended upon the Army’s 

Courier Service, as well as U.S. military transports 

and airplanes. The Department opened regional 

courier centers in Cairo, Algiers, and Naples, and 

where possible, rebuilt the courier network in Asia.21

Department officials also instituted new wartime 

procedures for diplomatic correspondence. The 

Department began requiring all materials intended 

for the diplomatic pouch to be submitted unsealed, 

and addressed to a career officer of the Foreign Service 

or a commissioned attaché. Pouches could be opened 

or closed only by a Chief of Mission or an officially 

designated career officer. Couriers also bore increased 

responsibility for safeguarding their pouches; the 

Foreign Service Administration instructed them “to 

keep their pouches always in their possession, at table, 

on deck, in bed, in the bath.”22 

With the increased speed, capacity, and 

reliability of airmail service, the Department of 

State began utilizing airplanes for the transport of 

its diplomatic correspondence on a large scale. In 

cooperation with the Civil Aeronautics Authorities 

and Pan American Airways, the Department arranged 

for airmail pouch service. In June 1941, using Miami 

as a hub, Department officials developed three airmail 

routes to Latin American posts, and within a year 

the number of routes was expanded to five.23 With 

weight and space being key factors in air transport, 

the Department turned to 35mm or 16mm microfilm 

as a means to reduce the volume of its reports, 

newspapers, periodicals, and correspondence.24 

Figure 7: The Department of State’s Diplomatic Pouch and 

Mail Room, 1939. As the image suggests, the sheer volume 

of Department correspondence had outgrown the Despatch 

Agent system created in the 1830s. German and Japanese 

submarine warfare added further problems to the pouch 

system, leading the Department to experiment with air mail 

routes, military couriers, and airgrams. The experience 

of World War II would lead to the creation of a formal 

Diplomatic Courier service. Source: Department of State 

Records, National Archives and Records Administration.

Figure 8: A U.S. Army courier delivers letters to the V-mail 

room at the Pentagon (1943). During World War II, 

the Department of State often used military couriers and 

airplanes to transport its diplomatic mail and pouches to 

posts overseas. Source: Library of Congress, Office of War 

Information Photograph Collection, U.S. Army Signal 

Corps.
42

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

With regular airmail 

transport, the Department 

pioneered the use of 

airgrams. Airgrams were 

prepared on standard 

forms in a telegraphic style 

but were transported by 

airplanes. More extensive 

in content than telegrams, 

airgrams arrived at their 

destination faster than 

ocean transport; moreover, 

they significantly reduced 

traffic on telegraph and 

telephone lines. Airgrams 

also cut departmental 

costs (telegraph and 

telephone charges) and 

ensured a more secure 

transmission of classified 

correspondence. Using the 

Department’s new airmail 

routes, Washington could 

send an airgram as late as 

8:30 p.m., and it would reach Mexico City, Havana, Guatemala City, Port-au-Prince, Ciudad Trujillo 

(Santo Domingo), or any part of Canada by the next day. An airgram sent from Washington could reach 

the rest of Central America, Caracas, Bogotá, or Lima within 48 hours; Santiago or Rio de Janeiro 

in 72 hours; and Buenos Aires in 96 hours. In all cases, the pace of diplomatic communications 

accelerated.25 

However, trans-Atlantic air transport raised new security considerations. The Office of Naval Intelligence 

expressed concern when several Department of State pouches were found floating off the coast of Lisbon, following 

the crash of a Pan American flight. Upon an internal review, the Foreign Service Administration proposed that 

couriers be required to carry knives in order to cut small holes in canvas pouches if they needed to ditch their load 

in deep water.26 

Figure 9: Map of the Department of State’s first courier/airmail routes, 1941. The map 

shows the three routes that were developed in 1941, and Miami (top center) served as 

the hub. Source: Map enclosed with Letter, Edwin C. Wilson, U.S. Ambassador to 

Panama, to Claude G. Bowers, U.S. Ambassador to Chile, 17 July 1941, General Records 

of the U.S. Embassy Santiago, Chile, Record Group 84, National Archives and Records 

Administration. 
43

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

Communications between the Department and U.S. posts in Axis and Axis-occupied territories posed 

special security challenges. When France fell to the invading Nazi German armies in June 1940, U.S. Ambassador 

to France William Bullitt telegraphed Washington that he could no longer receive coded messages because the 

Embassy, following emergency procedures, had destroyed its codes and equipment. He asked the Department to 

use commercial radio channels to send confidential messages, and to cloak the information within a common and 

seemingly innocuous personal message from a girl to a family member that would be repeated several times during 

a day.27 The Embassy had local telephone and mail service, but lacked telephone, telegraph, or mail service to places 

outside German-occupied areas. German officials initially refused to permit courier service, but later allowed it 

to Lisbon, Portugal, only to block the Paris-to-Lisbon courier route in October 1940. The German chargé to the 

Figure 10: Airgram Time and Destination Chart. With creation of airmail routes in 1941, the exchange of communications 

between the Department and its posts in Latin America increased in speed and frequency. The chart details the minimum time 

required for airgrams to reach the various diplomatic destinations in the Western Hemispheric. Source: Department of State 

Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
44

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

United States explained that this restriction should 

not be considered punitive because it applied to all 

diplomats, neutral or otherwise, in areas experiencing 

military operations.28 

By October 1940, the Nazis relented amid 

numerous complaints about the lack of courier service 

and inaugurated daily courier service from Paris to 

Vichy. U.S. officials refused to use the new service 

because Nazi officials demanded that all messages 

carried by courier be written in German or French. 

U.S. diplomats chose to “stick to our own devices,” 

which meant using private individuals to smuggle 

correspondence out of German-controlled France. By 

November 1940, Nazi German officials had banned 

all diplomatic correspondence from crossing French 

frontiers, unless it was sent through the daily courier 

service. In February 1941, the Nazis enforced this 

prohibition, which led the Department to strongly 

discourage the use of private messengers, citing the 

risk they faced of possible arrest by Nazi authorities.29

In retaliation, U.S. officials considered blocking 

German courier service from the United States and 

Latin America, but the Bureau of American Republic 

Affairs (ARA) argued that this would have the desired 

effect, and the idea was tabled. The Department 

decided to move the U.S. Embassy to Vichy, closing 

the Embassy in Paris in 1941. However, even 

the closed Embassy created problems, because the U.S. diplomatic staff at Vichy sent “interzone cards” to the 

custodian of the Embassy, inquiring about official and personal matters. The First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy 

at Vichy strictly forbade sending interzone cards, citing “serious personal risk” to the custodian and his possible 

“internment” by German authorities.30 

The security problems encountered by U.S. diplomats in Paris were not unique. U.S. diplomats in Oslo, 

Amsterdam, Brussels, Copenhagen, and Luxembourg also faced delays and restrictions. The Department warned 

diplomatic and consular officers that telephone lines should be used with “very great caution,” and in January 

Figure 11: Nazi German troops march through the Arc 

de Triomphe on Champs Elysees, Paris, on June 14,1940. 

When the Germans occupied Paris, Nazi authorities 

blocked all courier service for the U.S. Embassy, telling 

U.S. officials that all documents had to be written in 

German. U.S. Embassy officers refused to comply, and Nazi 

authorities later allowed U.S. courier service to and from 

Lisbon, Portugal. Nazi authorities generally impeded U.S. 

diplomatic communications in occupied nations during 

World War II. Source: © Associated Press Images.
45

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

1943, it curtailed long-distance calls, except when the matter was especially urgent.31 Every post had concerns 

about wiretapping, and Admiral François Darlan, head of the Vichy Government, warned the U.S. Embassy that 

its telephones were under close surveillance. Chief Electrician’s Mate Albert E. Dunn of the U.S. Navy spent 

much of the early 1940s traveling from post to post, checking telephone and telegraph lines to ensure that the 

Nazis or their agents had not wiretapped U.S. embassy lines.32 

Compared with France and Western Europe, the experience of U.S. diplomats in Fascist Italy under Benito 

Mussolini was relatively trouble-free. Although U.S. Consuls in Italy reported that Italian authorities occasionally 

impeded their correspondence, the U.S. Embassy usually could send its messages without difficulty, regardless of 

whether the communications were in code or not. U.S. investigators also did not uncover any wiretaps in Rome. 

The difference between Rome and the occupied capitals of Paris, Oslo, and Luxembourg was how German officials 

defined the city: by the Nazis’ reckoning, Paris, Oslo, and Luxembourg were combat zones; whereas, Rome was 

an Axis capital.33 

Securing Codes and 

Code Rooms

The amount of telegraph traffic and the number 

of messages requiring coding and decoding constituted 

a serious concern for Department officials, particularly 

after British officials discovered a spy at the U.S. 

Embassy in London. In the spring of 1940, Tyler 

Kent, a U.S. code clerk, passed embassy telegrams to 

a British fascist group, which in turn relayed them 

to Germany. British officials arrested Kent’s British 

contacts on May 20. After obtaining Department 

of State approval, British police searched Kent’s 

rooms and found copies of over 1,500 documents, 

as well as keys to the index bureau and code room. 

The Department fired Kent and stripped him of 

his diplomatic immunity. The British government 

tried Kent for violating the Official Secrets Act and 

sentenced him to seven years imprisonment. Kent’s 

espionage disrupted U.S. diplomatic communications 

for nearly six weeks until special U.S. couriers were 

able to distribute new codes.34

Figure 12: The Code Room, 1939. In this rare image,

Department of State code clerks are encoding and decoding 

messages, but all of the codebooks (the thick light-cover 

book) are closed. The image was taken to illustrate 

overcrowding in the State, Navy, War Building (now the 

Eisenhower Executive Office Building). With the Brown 

Code in use, the image illustrates that the basic process of 

encoding and decoding cables had changed little since the 

introduction of the Red Code in the 1870s. After World 

War II, the Department would create an office of cryptology 

and work closely with the National Security Agency that 

was created after the war. Source: Department of State 

Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
46

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Likely prompted by the Tyler Kent case, the 

Department of State surveyed the security of its 

communications and codes in early 1941. It asked 

each post to report how many officers were involved 

in code work, and how many hours they spent doing 

it. The Department also wanted to know what security 

measures its posts took to protect coded messages and 

codes. The results surprised Washington officials. 

Posts such as Athens, Cairo, and Berlin handled their 

traffic easily, while London, Bucharest, Vichy, and 

Tangiers were overwhelmed, with numerous overtime 

hours and in the case of London, code clerks working 

“trying” shifts.35

U.S. embassies and legations in Europe generally 

implemented effective security measures for their 

codes and coded messages. Except for U.S. posts in 

Spain, most embassies and legations had a separate, 

locked room for communications equipment, and 

only the code clerks, the Chief of Mission, and the Deputy Chief of Mission had access. Guards or night 

watchmen guarded the code rooms.36 Coded messages did not leave the room, officers had to read them there, 

and papers were burned immediately after use. The codes—Brown Code for Strictly Confidential messages 

and Grey Code for the Confidential messages—were kept in safes in the code room. The Chief of Mission 

and one code clerk were the only members of the post who had access to the combination or key to the safe 

in the code room.37 

Physical and Personnel Security at Embassies

The heightened danger of espionage prompted U.S. officials to increase post security and impose stricter 

measures at U.S. missions overseas. Posts employed embassy guards and night watchmen primarily to prevent theft 

and ensure the security of the post’s records and the code room. In Latin America, embassy guards were usually 

private U.S. citizens hired by the Department and assigned to a particular embassy.38 Their salary (about $1200 

plus $500 for housing) was one-half that of Foreign Service Officers and less than most foreign national clerks. 

Most often, U.S. embassies, legations, and consulates relied upon locally employed nationals as guards and night 

watchmen. Depending on location, local guards received compensation that was one-tenth to one-quarter the 

pay received by U.S. citizen guards, making local guards and night watchmen among the lowest paid employees at 

Figure 13: Tyler Kent, Metropolitan Police [London] 

booking photograph, 1941. As a code clerk at the U.S. 

Embassy in London, Kent gathered U.S. documents 

and passed them to a British fascist group, which passed 

them to Berlin. British authorities later found over 1500 

documents, as well as keys to the U.S. Embassy code room. 

U.S. officials waived Kent’s diplomatic immunity and 

allowed the British to prosecute him. Kent was sentenced to 

seven years in prison. Source: Wikipedia. 
47

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

the embassy. High turnover was common, and many 

held the position as a second job.39 

After the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the 

demographics of U.S. embassy guards changed 

significantly. In Latin America, due to the draft and 

the personnel demands of the War Department, U.S. 

citizen guards generally were retired Coast Guardsmen 

or retired law enforcement. Many embassies and 

legations also made arrangements with local police 

or military forces to provide 24-hour or evening and 

weekend security.40 Outside the Western Hemisphere, 

depending upon location, U.S. embassies frequently 

depended upon U.S. military personnel for guards. 

Marines assumed guard duty at the U.S. Embassy in 

London; meanwhile, the Army provided guards for 

the U.S. Embassies in Tehran, Cairo, and Rome. In 

some cases, such as Rome, the shortage of guards 

sometimes required Foreign Service Officers to cover 

guard shifts in the evening.41

The Department’s shift to U.S. military personnel 

as guards was partly the result of Department officials’ 

concerns regarding their reliance on local nationals as 

guards and employees, and the pressure Axis agents may place on local nationals. In the final months of 1939, the 

Department learned of at least three instances of “espionage activities” at U.S. consulates. In Italy, the Department 

was aware that the Gestapo and other German government agents had increased their activities, and that U.S. 

diplomats were under surveillance. The Department therefore insisted that all U.S. officials should refrain from 

carrying secret or confidential documents when crossing international borders, and that they should “never 

(repeat never) carry” documents that were received or sent in code. Other Department concerns ranged from the 

physical protection of post employees to foreign national employees issuing fraudulent visas. The Department 

took preventative measures, prosecuted employees committing security breaches when they could, and released or 

transferred questionable employees.42

The actions taken by the U.S. Embassy in France reveals some of the preventative measures that U.S. posts 

took regarding foreign national employees. In October 1940, the First Secretary of the Embassy, H. Freeman 

Matthews, reported that an embassy code clerk had taken a “keen interest in the contents of my telegrams.” 

Figure 14: A French Family Fleeing Paris, 1940. Many 

Europeans fled their homes as Nazi German armies invaded 

their homelands. The massive displacement of people, 

particularly Jewish refugees fleeing likely imprisonment in 

Nazi concentration camps, overwhelmed U.S. Consulates 

with passport and visa applications. Tatiana Stcherbina, 

a clerk at the U.S. Visa Office in Paris, then in Bordeaux, 

was summarily fired for forging log entries in order to allow 

twelve Jewish refugees to obtain U.S. visas. Four of the 

refugees were young children. The Department of State 

revoked the visas and ordered that the twelve refugees be 

deported back to Europe. Source: Department of State, 

Office of the Historian Files. 
48

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The clerk also had a friendship with a French Foreign Office official who had worked in the French military’s 

censorship office before German occupation. Matthews requested Washington to send another code clerk so that 

he could transfer the suspected clerk to Vichy or Marseilles where he would work on less sensitive materials.43

Later, after the U.S. Embassy was moved to Vichy, Matthews strongly warned Embassy staff that the Germans 

might send agents provocateur disguised as Gaullist or British sympathizers into the Embassy. He explained 

that the Germans and the Vichy French might try to build a case against the U.S. Embassy by showing that the 

Embassy was aiding British subjects or French men of military age to escape France and join the Allied forces. 

Such a case, Matthews feared, could lead to the arrest, detention, or expulsion of Embassy personnel.44 One local 

member of the Embassy’s staff, Nicolas Goliewsky, who had been a Consulate employee for 19 years, had already 

been interned at a concentration camp in Compiègne on such charges.45 

Visa fraud also merited serious concern within the Department. Amidst heightened security threats, U.S. 

Embassies in Europe faced an escalating workload in visa cases as thousands of people, particularly those of Jewish 

descent, sought entrance into the United States to escape Nazi persecution. U.S. immigration laws were tight, 

and efforts to pressure U.S. visa office employees were not unusual. One such case involved Tatiana Stcherbina, a 

foreign national clerk for 16 years in the U.S. Embassy in Paris. After the war began in Europe in 1939, the U.S. 

Embassy in Paris transferred its visa office to the U.S. Consulate in Bordeaux. Stcherbina later reported that after 

being transferred to Bordeaux, Jewish refugees began approaching her at work, on the street, and even at home 

“with all kinds of offers.” Although she initially refused their entreaties, Stcherbina relented when Maxmiliano 

Birnbaum offered her several thousand French francs to falsify documents to move twelve people to the top of the 

visa wait list. The visas would enable twelve Polish and Russian Jews, four of whom were children, to travel to the 

United States and avoid being sent to German concentration camps. Between March 1939 and February 1940, 

she forged log entries, allowing the twelve to move to the head of the queue. 

In April 1940, when U.S. Consulate officials confronted Stcherbina with the forged entries, she cited several 

reasons for her actions. As the head of household and sole breadwinner, Stcherbina faced financial difficulties, 

partially as a result of high medical bills incurred by her mother and her only son, and partially due to low 

wages the U.S. Foreign Service paid its foreign-born employees. Moreover, the U.S. Embassy had contributed 

to Stcherbina’s difficulties when it transferred its visa section to Bordeaux on four days notice, but refused to 

provide financial assistance to Stcherbina and other Foreign Service nationals for the move. When Stcherbina 

complained, the lead U.S. official said the short notice and moving expenses were her own affair. To relieve her 

extreme indebtedness, Stcherbina had accepted Birnbaum’s entreaties and money, but insisted that this was the 

first time she had forged entries and documents.46 

Department officials brought the case to a close and summarily fired Stcherbina. Despite her nearly two 

decades of loyal service to the United States, the Department’s case review officer remarked that “a person of her 

background must have had a natural sympathy for aliens of the refugee class and it is not inconceivable that she 
49

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

could have been prevailed upon to enter the conspiracy.” The review officer, however, omitted from his report 

Stcherbina’s claim that Birnbaum was trying to get a visa for a young boy in order to prevent him from being sent 

to a concentration camp.47 “If this affair teaches us anything,” the officer insisted, “it should be that immigrant 

waiting lists should be carefully maintained under the close supervision of an American consular officer of career 

at each office.” His superior concurred, and the Department sent out warning notices on the twelve fraudulent 

visas, which meant that the twelve would be denied entry into the United States and deported back to Europe. 

Washington officials also determined that Stcherbina’s supervisors, Consul Henry S. Waterman and Vice Consul 

Taylor W. Gannett, shared the responsibility for the fraudulent visas, and a notation was likely made in their 

personnel files.48 

Security Developments 

in Washington

The Chief Special Agent’s office underwent 

changes in leadership and personnel during the period 

as well. On February 27, 1940, Robert C. Bannerman, 

who had served as the Chief Special Agent for nearly 

20 years, died. Thomas F. Fitch, a former Post Office 

Inspector and the Special Agent-in-Charge of the New 

York Field Office, assumed leadership of the office. 

The workload of the office had increased considerably 

during the 1930s, largely due to the sharp increase in 

passport and visa fraud cases. During his first year as 

Chief Special Agent, Fitch doubled his staff from 7 to 

17, and then doubled it again during his second year. 

Fitch posted five agents in the Washington D.C. office 

for the first time since 1927.49

Between 1938 and1941, the Department 

also increased security at the State, War, and Navy 

Building, near the White House. General Service 

Administration security guards manned the watches 

and controlled access to buildings on evenings, 

weekends, and holidays. The rapid increase in 

Department personnel after 1939 prompted the 

Department officials to institute a building pass 

Figure 15: The German Embassy in Washington, D.C., 

flies the Nazi swastika on July 4, 1941. Early in the war, 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a directive defining 

the areas of responsibilities for combating espionage. The 

FBI was charged with investigating foreign agents in the 

United States (e.g., the German Embassy above) and U.S. 

posts overseas. Even today, crimes occurring at U.S. posts 

overseas are equivalent to occurring on U.S. soil and are 

referred to the FBI. Source: Library of Congress, New York 

World-Telegram and the Sun Newspaper Photograph 

Collection. 
50

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

system in August 1941. The color-coded passes had a black-and-white photograph and were laminated to prevent 

tampering or alteration. Gold passes, printed by the Wilson Magazine Camera Company of Philadelphia, granted 

unlimited access to any building and allowed holders to transport official papers between buildings. Second-level 

passes admitted bearers to all buildings during regular business hours only. A third group of passes were largely for 

visitors. The visitor’s pass was restricted to prescribed hours and locations, and had to be surrendered upon leaving 

the building. Department employees and FSOs also had to surrender their pass when they left Department 

employment, and one’s final paycheck was not disbursed until the pass was surrendered.50

During these same years, three developments expanded the scope of security concerns and increased 

the number of U.S. Government entities involved in security. First, the Roosevelt Administration tried to 

prevent the confused, overlapping law enforcement jurisdictions that had occurred during World War I. 

In June 1939, shortly before the war began in Europe, President Roosevelt directed that all investigations 

of espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage be 

“controlled and handled” by the FBI, the Office of 

Naval Intelligence (ONI), and the Army’s Military 

Intelligence Division (MID). The three entities had 

reached agreement on a definition and delineation 

of their areas of responsibility. The FBI would 

handle domestic investigations of U.S. civilians, 

which included Department of State employees. 

ONI would oversee personnel, property, and areas 

under the Navy’s control, and MID would do the 

personnel, property, and areas under control of the 

War Department.51

President Roosevelt’s directive further defined 

the FBI’s responsibilities to include investigations of 

foreign agents and activities at U.S. posts overseas. 

The FBI was tasked to monitor and investigate 

subversive and covert agents operating within 

the United States, and was required to keep the 

Department of State informed. The FBI also would 

assume responsibility for an investigation if the 

Department requested it, which included munitions 

trafficking cases. In addition, the FBI’s authority 

included investigations of activities that occurred 

Figure 16: Martin Dies, U.S. Congressional Representative 

from Texas. Dies chaired the Dies Committee, which 

investigated ties of U.S. Government employees to 

Communist-front organizations. The Dies Committee 

investigation led to the 1939 Hatch Act. The Hatch Act 

forbade any U.S. Government employee from being a 

member of an organization that advocates the overthrow 

of the U.S. Government. Source: Library of Congress, 

Congressional Portrait Collection. 
51

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

at U.S. posts overseas. Since the buildings and compounds of U.S. embassies, legations, and consulates are 

considered U.S. soil, most investigations involving activities or crimes by Department of State employees were 

to be referred to the FBI. 

 The second development that expanded the scope of security concerns was the Department’s monitoring 

the activities of foreign nationals and U.S. citizens. The monitoring had begun as an effort to control the sale 

and trafficking of munitions. In 1938, the Office of Arms and Munitions Control was renamed the Office 

of Controls, but in October 1941, it was incorporated into the Office of Foreign Activity Correlation (FC). 

Focused upon intelligence and surveillance, FC monitored several groups: arms traffickers, Nazi and Fascist 

agents, Nazi and Fascist party members, Germans and Austrians travelling and relocating to Latin America, 

foreign military attachés, Japanese immigrants, and Nisei, who were U.S.-born children of Japanese immigrants. 

FC also monitored U.S. citizens travelling to the Soviet Union, as well as those deemed subversives, saboteurs, 

or disloyal. In addition, FC monitored the transfer and movement of German, Austrian, and Japanese finances, 

capital, and patents. FC worked closely with the Passport, Visa, Chief Special Agent, and Commercial Affairs 

Offices of the Department, as well as the FBI, ONI, MID, the Treasury Department, Immigration, and the Office 

of Censorship. FC devoted much of its efforts to maintaining information on Germans and to creating a readily 

accessible information register for other agencies and offices.52 

The third development that broadened the range of security concerns was institution of loyalty tests and 

programs. During the 1930s, Congressional queries about the loyalty of federal employees prompted the House 

of Representatives, in 1938, to create the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, popularly known as the 

Dies Committee. Named after Representative Martin Dies of Texas, the Dies Committee revealed that several 

federal employees had ties to Communist front organizations. Consequently, Congress passed the 1939 Hatch Act, 

which forbade any federal employee from being a member of a group or organization that advocated the overthrow 

of the U.S. Government.53 In 1940, the Civil Service Commission excluded members of the Communist Party, 

the German-American Bund, or any other communist or Nazi organization from U.S. Government employment. 

Then, in 1941, Congress appropriated $100,000 to the FBI for investigations of federal employees alleged to be 

members of such organizations, and required that the heads of relevant agencies be notified of the investigators’ 

findings. In April 1942, Attorney General Francis Biddle created an interdepartmental committee to review the 

reports and address any security concerns. 54 

FBI investigators determined that many complaints and charges raised during the Congressional inquiries 

were false, but criticism of the FBI’s investigations emerged. Biddle’s interdepartmental committee determined 

that the FBI’s efforts were “utterly disproportionate to the resources expended.” Of the nearly 44,000 people ruled 

ineligible for federal employment between July 1, 1940, and March 31, 1947, 714 individuals (or 1.6 percent) 

were deemed Communists and 599 persons (1.4 percent) were members of Nazi, Fascist, or Japanese groups (the 

latter likely referring to ultra-militaristic Japanese groups). Biddle’s committee also found that the whole process 
52

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

was too susceptible to causing “broad personal injury” on false grounds. The committee concluded that future 

loyalty investigations should be restricted to issues “clearly pertinent to the vital problem of internal security.” 

Although Biddle’s committee raised important questions, it was only the opening round of a larger, longer debate 

over the backgrounds and past associations of U.S. Government employees, particularly those employed at the 

Department of State.55 

Diplomatic Detentions during Wartime

When the United States entered World War II after the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, 

the Department of State implemented new protective security measures that accentuated its move toward greater 

security. On December 8, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull requested that Chief Special Agent Fitch assign 

a protective detail to him (Hull). Although Hull’s protective detail consisted of one Special Agent, it marked 

the beginning of the Secretary of State’s protective detail that continues to this day. In early 1942, the Assistant 

Secretary of State for Administration was formally designated and assumed the responsibilities as the Department’s 

Security Officer.56 

As the German and Japanese armies invaded 

and occupied several nations, the United States 

had to close diplomatic and consular posts, and the 

closing procedure involved several security measures. 

Department regulations governed this contingency, 

yet many procedures required time, advance notice, 

and respect for diplomatic immunities and privileges. 

If time and travel routes permitted, U.S. Embassy 

officers were to ship confidential files to Washington 

or, if conditions permitted, seal and store files in a 

commercial storage facility. If neither option was 

possible, files were to be burned. As a post neared 

its final hours, U.S. officers had to destroy, burn, 

or damage beyond repair, all seals, stamps, codes, 

cryptographic devices, confidential files, passports, 

visas, certificates of naturalization, and certificates of 

registration and identity. Officers also had to ship 

the first pages of all blank passports to Washington, 

as well as a list of all documents they had destroyed. 

Diplomatic officers were to hand-carry the sensitive 

Figure 17: Secretary of State Cordell Hull escorts Japanese 

Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura (left) and Japanese 

Special Envoy to the United States Saburo Kurusu (right) 

to the White House for a meeting on November 17, 

1941. Three weeks later, Japanese forces attacked Pearl 

Harbor. The day after the attack, Hull requested that he 

be assigned a protective detail by the State Department’s 

Chief Special Agent. The detail consisted of one Special 

Agent, and marked the beginning of the Secretary of 

State’s protective detail that continues to this day. Source: 

© Associated Press.
53

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

Grey Code and M-138 coding devices home. The Department gave all locally employed nationals 30 days leave 

and terminated employment at the end of the period. Departing U.S. officials would then transfer embassy or 

consulate affairs, and any sealed items, to the diplomatic representative of the nation that had agreed to serve as 

the protecting power for the United States. During World War II, that nation was Switzerland.57 

Time was the critical element in closing a post, and the case of the U.S. Legation in Bangkok, Thailand, is 

an example of what can occur when a post lacked adequate notice and time. Legation officials had anticipated a 

Japanese attack on Bangkok, but the rapid capitulation of Thailand to Japanese forces caught the Legation off-guard. 

When the Japanese occupied Bangkok, diplomatic protocol and privileges faded. On December 8, 1941, the 

Thai Foreign Minister informed the U.S. Minister that 

Thailand had signed an agreement with the Japanese, 

allowing Japanese forces to pass through the country to 

attack the British in the latter’s colonies of Burma and 

Malaysia. That day, U.S. Legation, Consulate, and 

military attaché personnel raced to burn all codes and 

confidential documents, and destroy all seals, stamps, 

and coding equipment.58 This proved fortuitous 

because the following day, Japanese soldiers appeared 

at the gates of the U.S. Legation compound and denied 

entry and exit of all persons and communications. On 

December 10, Japanese soldiers cut the Legation’s 

telephone lines, entered the compound, pulled out 

all telephones and the central switchboard, and 

removed the radios.59 Japanese officials then confined 

Legation personnel, as well as the U.S. citizens who 

had gathered there, to the compound; however, 

three American clerks were taken to an internment 

camp. Japanese officials allowed the U.S. Minister 

to communicate and conduct affairs through the 

Swiss Consul, but Japanese and Thai officials closely 

scrutinized all correspondence. After 6 months, the 

Japanese repatriated U.S. officials, and Japanese and 

Thai authorities seized the U.S. compound for military 

purposes. The Swiss Consul, meanwhile, took custody 

of the Legation’s and Consulate’s archives.60 

Figure 18: Robert L. Bannerman (image ca. 1980). In 

1941, Special Agent Bannerman coordinated the detention 

of more than 1000 Axis diplomats until U.S. officials could 

negotiate an exchange with the Axis powers. Bannerman 

made arrangements with resorts in the Appalachian 

Mountains to house Axis diplomats assigned to Washington. 

He also coordinated housing and other services for Axis 

diplomats from Central America and northern South 

America, and for Japanese diplomats and officials serving 

in Hawaii. For the Japanese officials from Hawaii, 

Bannerman housed them at a dude ranch in Arizona. 

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 
54

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

In the United States, responsibility for the 

detention of Axis diplomats fell upon the Office of 

the Chief Special Agent. Special Agent Robert L. 

Bannerman recalled that the Department of State 

“had no precedents to work from;” indeed, the 1941 

detention of Axis diplomats differed sharply from what 

had occurred during World War I, when Chief Special 

Agent Joseph Nye personally escorted the German 

Ambassador until his departure. In the months 

preceding U.S. entry into the war, the Department 

began preparing for the scenario of detaining Axis 

diplomats. In April 1941, the Division of European 

Affairs determined that the U.S. Government would 

take custody of German diplomats in order to protect 

them from local authorities and harsh treatment. Germany’s diplomats would be guarded in their home or interned 

at a hotel, the German Embassy would be closed, and its interests turned over to a protecting power, namely 

Switzerland. At the end of May 1941, Department officials instructed the U.S. Embassy in Berlin to tell German 

officials that in the event of breaking of relations, German diplomats in the United States would be protected and 

allowed “every reasonable facility in order to liquidate their personal affairs.” A similar instruction was sent to the 

U.S. Embassy in Rome a few days later.61

After Pearl Harbor, U.S. officials initially allowed Axis diplomats to stay in their homes and have unrestrained 

access to the Swiss Legation, but later transferred them to resorts in the Appalachian Mountains until the Department 

of State could arrange for an exchange of diplomats 

between the United States and the Axis powers. The 

Germans had transferred U.S. diplomats to a hotel 

at Bad Nauheim, yet, reports of Japan’s less than 

hospitable treatment of U.S. diplomats soon reached 

the Department. Although “his patience was sorely 

tried,” Secretary Cordell Hull declared that he would 

not “be drawn into a contest in which he would have to 

out stink a skunk;” and “there was a limit below which 

the United States Government would not stoop” in 

its treatment of enemy diplomats. The Secret Service 

objected to Axis diplomats staying in Washington, 

Figure 20: The Homestead Hotel, Hot Springs, West 

Virginia. Japanese diplomats were detained in the 

Homestead Hotel. The Office of the Chief Special Agent 

oversaw the detention until the Japanese diplomats were 

exchanged in 1942. Source: Library of Congress, Prints 

and Photographs Division. 

Figure 19: The Greenbrier Hotel, White Sulphur Springs, 

West Virginia. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 

the U.S. Government interned the German and Italian 

diplomats, and the diplomats of their allies, the Bulgarians, 

Rumanians, and Hungarians, at the Greenbrier Hotel. 

The Office of the Chief Special Agent oversaw the detention 

of Axis diplomats. Source: Library of Congress, Detroit 

Publishing Company Photograph Collection. 
55

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

particularly when British Prime Minister Winston 

Churchill was scheduled to arrive on December 22. 

President Roosevelt ordered the Department to “get 

the Germans out of Washington.” Special Agent 

Bannerman, working with Stanley Woodward of 

the Division of Protocol, moved the Germans to the 

Greenbrier Hotel in White Sulphur Springs, West 

Virginia, and the Japanese to the Homestead Hotel in 

Hot Springs, Virginia. The hotels were chosen because 

they were large, accessible, secluded, possessed full 

services, and were largely empty due to the winter offseason. Diplomats from Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and 

Rumania were allowed to stay in Washington, even 

though their countries had allied with Germany. On 

January 9, 1942, the U.S. Attorney General objected 

to their continued presence in the nation’s capital, and 

they were then taken to the Greenbrier Hotel to join 

their German counterparts.62

The Department paid all expenses for the 

detainees and the Chief Special Agent’s office, namely 

Bannerman, assumed management and coordination of the detention effort, which numbered about 1,000 Axis 

diplomats and their families. At the Homestead and Greenbrier Hotels, the Chief Special Agent’s office arranged for 

the Immigration Border Patrol to guard the hotels. In early 1942, Axis diplomats in Central and northern South 

America were transported to New Orleans. The Chief Special Agent’s office obtained hotels in Virginia, North 

Carolina, and Ohio, as well as two Immigration Service camps in Texas and one camp in New Mexico, to house Axis 

diplomats from Latin America until arrangements were made for transport to their home countries. Ultimately, 

the Department of State arrange for an exchange of Axis diplomats for U.S. diplomats. The exchanges occurred in 

Portugal (for U.S. diplomats in Europe) and Mozambique (for U.S. diplomats in Asia).63

The Chief Special Agent’s office also participated in interning some individuals of Japanese ancestry who had 

been taken into custody in Hawaii, bringing the total number of persons for whom the Chief Special Agent’s office 

oversaw custody to about 25,000 people. In 1942, the Office of the Chief Special Agent received word that the Navy 

was bringing all the official Japanese from Honolulu to San Diego, and the office was to detain them in an “isolated” 

location. Bannerman arranged for the Japanese internees to stay at a dude ranch, located 30 miles north of Dragoon, 

Arizona, and he placed Special Agent Wells Bailey in charge. While holding the Japanese officials there for a period 

Figure 21: U.S. Officials Process Two Japanese Diplomats. 

Besides Axis diplomats in Washington, D.C., the Office of 

the Chief Special Agent was responsible for detaining and 

housing Japanese consular and other officials from Hawaii. 

Special Agent Robert L. Bannerman arranged for the 

Japanese officials to stay at a dude ranch near Dragoon, 

Arizona, and placed Special Agent Wells Bailey in charge 

of the operation. In total, the Chief Special Agent’s 

office oversaw the custody of approximately 25,000 Axis 

diplomats and officials until the U.S. Government arranged 

an exchange with the Axis powers. Source: Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security Files. 
56

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

of seven months, Arizona state officials inquired--without success--about who was being held at the dude ranch. 

Although Bannerman did not specifically identify the individuals, they may have been consular, government, and 

business officials assigned to Honolulu.64 

Stricter Information Controls: Classification, 

Clearances, and Security Procedures

During World War II, the U.S. Government standardized the classification of documents and information 

to ensure control of sensitive material. On September 28, 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) instituted 

a new classification system that had three categories: “Secret,” “Confidential,” and “Restricted.” Documents 

classified as “Secret” had information that “might endanger national security” or “cause serious injury to the Nation 

or any government activity.” A “Confidential” marking prevented disclosure of information that “would impair 

the effectiveness of governmental activity in the prosecution of the war.” “Restricted” had a more amorphous 

definition. It applied to documents that did not meet the requirements for Secret and Confidential, but contained 

information that, if disclosed, would affect “the 

expeditious accomplishment of a particular project.” 

The “Restricted” classification also reflected the need 

for certain documents to have a wider distribution 

in order to accomplish the task required. With the 

new classification system, OWI warned against overclassifying materials. The OWI did not want to restrict 

unduly the dissemination of information to the public 

and Congress, because both required information to 

participate actively and effectively in the prosecution of 

the war and the democratic process. The OWI strongly 

implied that U.S. Government officials should err on 

the side of dissemination rather than restriction. 65 

The Department of State also employed 

supplemental special handling terms beyond the OWI’s 

classification levels. Airgrams, which the Department 

introduced on a widespread basis in 1942, employed 

the terms “Plain” (unclassified), “Confidential,” 

and “Strictly Confidential” for classification of their 

content. In April 1943, the Department substituted 

“Secret” for “Strictly Confidential,” bringing its 

classifications in line with the OWI system.66 

Figure 22: Works Progress Administration Poster “Keep 

Mum: Loose Talk Costs Lives.” During World War II, the 

U.S. Government enacted many new measures to prevent 

the loss of key or classified information to the enemy. Posters 

such as the one above reminded employees of the dangers 

of “loose talk.” The posters’ encouragement to observe 

security had an added benefit, aiding the institution of a 

new classification system. In 1942, the U.S. Government 

had instituted a new classification system for documents, the 

system currently in use. Initially, the categories were Secret, 

Confidential, and Restricted, but in 1944, the category Top 

Secret was added, and Restricted later became Sensitive but 

Unclassified (SBU). Source: Library of Congress, Work 

Projects Administration Poster Collection. 
57

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

During the war, the United States and Great Britain shared significant amounts of information, prompting 

the British and Americans to conclude the Combined Security Classification Agreement of March 13, 1944. 

Titled “Change No. 1,” this agreement amended the earlier classification system by adding a fourth level of 

classification known as “Top Secret.” Information placed in this category was to be considered “paramount” to 

national security, and it was to be used only in cases when “unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally 

grave danger to the nation.” The OWI once again cautioned against over-classifying documents, insisting that 

“Top Secret” documents “will be kept to a minimum.”67

Within eight weeks, the joint British-American information control system fell into disarray. Department 

and Foreign Service officers (“old hands” as well as newcomers) applied multiple standards in classifying 

documents. Some officers implemented a less stringent standard, resulting in secret information being 

disseminated to the public. Meanwhile, other officers classified too liberally, overburdening the couriers. 

Secretary of State Hull responded by reorganizing the classification system. He delineated five categories 

of document classification: Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, Restricted, and Unrestricted, and then defined 

the handling requirements of each. “Top Secret” and “Secret” documents required transport by diplomatic 

courier, and under no circumstances could they be sent by registered mail. “Confidential” marked items 

were to be sent via mail sacks on Army or Navy planes or American commercial airplanes. The final two 

classifications, “Restricted” and “Unrestricted,” could be transmitted like “Confidential” materials, or in mail 

sacks carried by U.S. or foreign postal services.68 

Four months later, the Department supplemented this reorganized classification system by formally 

incorporating several informal handling restrictions. These included “For the Secretary,” “For the Ambassador,” 

and “For the Chief of Mission,” as well as “For Department Use Only.”69 Again Foreign Service Officers too 

eagerly employed the latter restriction, making it difficult to share needed information with other departments 

and agencies. Secretary Hull then created the term “For Limited Distribution” as a substitute for the great 

majority of instances in which Foreign Service Officers were using “For Department Use Only.”70 

The new classification system supplemented the procedures for the processing and transmission of 

documents already in existence. Ordinarily, a telegram had to receive at least three signatures, and many 

times five, in order to clear it for transmission. Former Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs John Moors Cabot admitted that it generally took the better part of a day to get the necessary 

clearances on a telegram. For many, the process of obtaining clearances may have seemed burdensome, 

particularly when the telegram addressed a mundane, unclassified topic, and/or if the message had to be 

sent quickly. After retirement, Cabot confessed how he resolved this situation: “I would wait till almost five 

o’clock, when everyone was frantically rushing to clear his desk, and then barge into the necessary offices, 

telegram in hand. No one under these circumstances was in a mood to argue, and it was amazing how many 

initials I could get on a telegram in fifteen minutes.”71 
58

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The transport and handling of documents abroad continued to be a serious security concern for 

Department officials. The Department admonished overseas posts to take every precaution to safeguard 

classified information and to report immediately and in detail any suspicious activity, which was promptly 

investigated. In 1943, the Embassy in Tehran received four Department letters as “loose mail,” each containing 

“highly confidential” material. One had confidential codes, and another held a highly classified memorandum 

that detailed U.S. policy toward Iran and discussed potential threats to the region. More worrisome, the 

letter containing the policy memorandum had been opened and resealed. Since the Army Courier Service 

transported the Department’s mail to Tehran (via airplane), the Department of State asked the War Department 

to investigate. The ensuing investigation suggested poor handling rather than espionage.72

The Department’s anxieties over security also applied to telephone conversations. The Department 

received a report that the Germans had implanted listening devices in many hotel bedrooms in Spain and 

Portugal. In another instance, Department officials learned that the Argentine Government was well informed 

about the U.S. Embassy’s communications with Washington. After an investigation of mail transport to and 

from Buenos Aires, officials determined that the 

Argentines were “listening in” on the U.S. Embassy’s 

telephone lines.73 

By 1944, the Department of State believed that 

German and Japanese agents in neutral countries had 

intensified their efforts to obtain Allied information. 

It instructed posts to review their security measures, 

and investigate the associations of all post personnel 

“down to the lowliest members.”74 Shortly after the 

instruction, the U.S. Vice Consul in Arica, Chile, 

discovered that his janitor was selling the Consulate’s 

trash to the local chief of Investigaciones (Chile’s 

counterpart to the FBI), who was known to have 

contacts with German and Japanese agents. One 

document in the trash identified U.S. Navy codes 

but did not contain enough information to permit 

decoding of messages. The 17-year-old janitor was 

promptly fired. The Consulate later learned that the 

chief probably gave the documents to his superiors 

in order to improve his chances for promotion, 

rather than passing them to Axis agents.75 

Figure 23: A Swiss Embassy Sign announces Switzerland’s 

Role as Protecting Power. During World War II, Switzerland 

served as the protecting power of German interests in the 

United States, and for the U.S. interests in Germany, Japan, 

and nations occupied by the two Axis powers. At the end 

of World War II, when the Soviets arrested the custodians of 

U.S. Embassy buildings in Eastern Europe for being spies, 

Swiss officials viewed the custodians as their responsibility. 

The Swiss actively pressed Soviet officials to release the 

custodians and their families. © Associated Press. Source: 

Library of Congress, New York World-Telegram and the 

Sun Newspaper Photograph Collection. 
59

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

Liberation and Security Problems 

As the number of Allied military victories increased during 1944, U.S. and Allied forces began to liberate 

nations held by the Axis powers. U.S. and British forces occupied Italy in 1944; and following the June 1944 

D-Day invasion of continental Europe, they liberated Paris in August. On the eastern front, Soviet forces moved 

into Poland in July 1944 and began to occupy other countries in Eastern Europe as well.

In the wake of advancing Allied armies, the Department of State reopened posts that had been under the care 

of local custodians. During the war, the premises of U.S. posts were entrusted to one or two custodians selected 

by Department officials at the time of closure. Washington generally preferred a Foreign Service Officer; however, 

neither the Germans nor the Italians would allow a 

U.S. citizen to remain. The custodian’s task, therefore, 

passed to trusted local employees. Technically the 

custodians were employees of the protecting country 

(primarily Switzerland in Europe), but the custodians 

often lived on the property and received a salary from 

the Department of State (transferred through the 

protecting power). Custodial duties included care 

and maintenance of the property, as well as ensuring 

that local authorities did not enter the premises, use 

the facilities, or remove U.S. Government property. 

Custodians could not conduct any embassy or 

consular activity, nor allow use of the building as a 

meeting place for Americans or other persons. U.S. 

officials did not expect custodians to sacrifice their 

lives in fulfilling these duties.76 

The task of reopening a U.S. Embassy was not 

an easy one. In the case of the U.S. Embassy in Paris, 

even though the Germans had not damaged the 

building or its contents, the tasks remained difficult. 

Foreign Service Officers re-supplied the post with 

stamps, seals, blank passports and certificates, and 

other items ordered from temporary stocks at U.S. 

posts in Lisbon or Naples. All safe combinations 

had to be changed, and Washington required the 

embassy to reinvestigate local employees before 

Figure 24: George F. Kennan, U.S. Diplomat. The Soviets’ 

treatment of the custodians of U.S. Embassies in Eastern 

Europe angered Kennan. As Deputy Chief of Mission at 

the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Kennan sharply criticized 

the Soviets on the issue just two weeks before he wrote his 

famous “Long Telegram,” which shaped U.S. post-war policy 

towards the Soviet Union. Source: Library of Congress, 

New York World-Telegram and the Sun Newspaper 

Photograph Collection. 
60

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

rehiring them. The Department declared the Grey Code obsolete, and restricted use of the Brown Code to 

unclassified messages. Meanwhile, at the U.S. Embassy in Paris, the volume of telegram traffic overwhelmed 

the skeletal code room staff. Code work, except for messages designated as “Urgent,” fell more than a week 

behind, and Embassy officers pleaded for additional code clerks.77 

The problems involved in reopening a post were more acute in Eastern Europe and Berlin, particularly after 

the collapse of Germany in May 1945. Invading Soviet officials refused to recognize the custodian status of the 

United States’ 18 custodian in eastern Germany and Poland, and summarily arrested them.78 Ambassador Averell 

Harriman and Deputy Chief of Mission George F. Kennan of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow determined that 

the NKVD (Soviet Secret Police) suspected the 18 custodians of being U.S. spies and had sent them and their 

families to Soviet work camps.79 Soviet refusal to recognize standard diplomatic practices or even to acknowledge 

the issue infuriated U.S. officials. Kennan insisted that the United States had a moral responsibility to obtain the 

custodians’ release; meanwhile, others insisted that the Department had a moral obligation to reemploy those who 

had so faithfully served the United States at their own sacrifice and degradation.80 U.S. and Swiss diplomats in 

Moscow pressed Kremlin officials to release the 18 custodians and their families.81 The Swiss believed they had a 

moral responsibility to do so because Switzerland had served as the protecting power for U.S. interests during the 

war. The Soviets released the custodians, but only after many had labored in the work camps for periods of one to 

four years. While in Soviet captivity, one former custodian died, one was raped, and another taken away and not 

heard from again. The custodian of the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw was repatriated to Poland. U.S. officials brought 

him to the United States, but the Embassy lost contact with his wife and daughter when Polish Communist 

officials moved them to another city.82 

z Toward a Postwar Security Program å

As World War II drew to a close, many senior U.S. officials, including those at the Department of State, wanted 

to continue wartime security measures after the war. The Bureau of the Budget (BoB)—predecessor to the Office of 

Management and Budget—proposed creating an interdepartmental entity to coordinate government security. Reviewing 

the interagency cooperation agreement between the FBI, ONI, and MID, BoB officials concluded that coordination 

between the three was “inadequate.” The three agencies had not created a coordinating committee, had not appointed 

a chairman to oversee coordination, nor had they delegated authority to coordinate efforts. The BoB found “frequent 

triplication, overlap, friction, and some interference with the proper development of certain cases,” and that the three 

simply defined spheres “to minimize actual conflict.” The BoB refused to call the inter-agency entity a “committee,” 

arguing that the committee approach did not work, and claimed that a “security czar” was “impracticable” because he 

would encounter “insurmountable problems” with what some would view as infringements upon their authority. The 

Bureau of the Budget insisted that the U.S. Government needed a group to develop a government-wide security plan, 

and that the group should be given proper authority and responsibility to undertake such a task. In essence, the BoB-
61

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

proposed group anticipated the outlines of a bureau of 

government security.83 

In 1944, at the suggestion of Secretary Hull, the 

State-Navy-War Coordinating Committee (SNWCC) 

was formed to coordinate postwar diplomatic 

and defense issues. As part of its efforts, SNWCC 

developed a comprehensive security program for the 

Department of State.84 SNWCC proposed publishing 

departmental security rules, written in the style of U.S. 

Army and Navy regulations, and appointing “Division 

Security Officers” to enforce regulations. The 

committee believed that this would institutionalize 

security measures. The SNWCC also recommended 

that Department employees internalize security 

awareness and modify their daily behavior so that 

personal censorship became “habitual for the majority 

of people.” SNWCC envisioned a publicity campaign 

that included memoranda, instructions, cartoons, and 

slogans in order to encourage Department employees 

to follow security procedures. The committee also 

supported the Department’s decision to create 

the Division of Cryptology within the Office of 

Communications. Department officials hoped that 

an in-house, specialized group of cryptographers 

could develop more complex, less vulnerable codes.85 

z Conclusion å

As World War II approached its final stages in late 1944, security was “on everyone’s lips.” The Department of 

State, and the U.S. Government as a whole, was considering how to improve security further.86 While significant 

strides had been made in security during the war, U.S. officials found that security as a function was scattered 

across multiple offices and divisions; moreover, there had been little coordination among the various entities. 

Department officials favored centralizing diplomatic security responsibilities into a single entity. That single entity 

would appear in 1945, and it would be done through the efforts of Robert L. Bannerman, not Thomas Fitch and 

the Office of the Chief Special Agent. 

Figure 25: Captain Lee W. Parke, U.S. Navy. Captain 

Parke was the first chief of the Division of Cryptology in 

the Department of State. At the end of World War II, the 

State-Navy-War Coordinating Committee approved the 

creation of a cryptology division because it believed that an 

in-house group of specialists would provide better codes for 

the Department. Source: Department of State Records, 

National Archives and Records Administration. 
62

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Endnotes

1 NKVD stands for Narodny Kommisariat Vnutrennikh Del, and KGB for Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti. 

2 Dennis J. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998), 39. Christopher 

Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: 

HarperCollins, 1990), 226-228. Kenneth L. Stanley, “History of the Technical Penetrations of the American Embassy 

Moscow, 1932-1985,” Thesis, Joint Military Intelligence College, 1993, p. 21-23. 

3 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story, 227. Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York: W. W. 

Norton, 1973), 15. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 75. Stanley, “History of the Technical Penetrations of the 

American Embassy Moscow, 1932-1985,” pp. 22-23.

4 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story, 228. Stanley, “History of the Technical Penetrations of the American 

Embassy Moscow, 1932-1985,” pp. 24-25. 

5 Memorandum “German Espionage Penetration of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin prior to World War II,” [1946?], Folder 

– Personnel Investigations 1945-1947, Box 9, Security Files, 1932-1963, Files of the Division of A/SY/ Evaluations, 

Department of State Records, Record Group 59 – Lot File 96D584, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park Maryland. Hereafter SF 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations, RG 59-Lot 96D584, NA. Memorandum, Jacob D. Beam, 

Staff Member to U.S. Political Advisor on German Affairs, to Robert D. Murphy, Ambassador at U.S. Political Advisor for 

German Affairs, 23 June 1947, enclosed with Despatch 10311 “Wire Tapping of the Telephone Lines of the Former United 

States Embassy in Berlin,” Murphy to Secretary of State, 24 June 1947, 124.622/6-2447, Folder [1], Box 1165, Decimal 

File 1945-1949, RG 59, NA. Hereafter cited as DF 1945-49. 

6 Memorandum “Courier Service,” Warren M. Hamilton, Courier, U.S. Embassy Paris, to Robert D. Murphy, First Secretary, 

U.S. Embassy Paris, 9 September 1938, enclosed with Despatch 3244 “Courier Service,” Edwin C. Wilson, Chargé d’Affaires 

ad interim, to Secretary of State, 18 November 1938, 121.67/1183, Folder – 121.67, Box 337; and Memorandum, Wallace 

Murray, Chief of Division of Near Eastern Affairs, to Robert C. Bannerman, Chief Special Agent, 29 May 1934, 121.67/934, 

Folder – 121.67, Box 336; both DF 1930-39, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, Nathaniel P. Davis, Chief of the Division of 

Foreign Service Administration, to Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, 3 June 1940, 051.01/547 1⁄2, Folder – 

051, Box 34, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. Despatch 1190, U.S. Consulate Stuttgart to Department of State, August 23, 1933, 

121.67, Box 336, DF 1930-39, RG 59, NA. Clinton E. MacEachran, Chief Clerk and Administrative Assistant, Annual 

Report of the Chief Clerk and Administrative Assistant, Department of State, Fiscal Year 1933, (Washington DC: Department 

of State, 1933), p. 80, RG 59-Lot Files, Entry 322, NA. Jack Grover, “A Brief History of the U.S. Diplomatic Service,” 

Foreign Service Newsletter 80 (October 1953): 17. 

7 For an example of a theft of pouches, see Memorandum “Theft of Documents,” Laurence E. Salisbury, Second Secretary, U.S. 

Embassy Peiping [Bejing], 29 January 1937, attached to Despatch 1039 “Theft of Documents,” F. P. Lockhart, Counselor 

of Embassy, U.S. Embassy Peiping, to Secretary of State, 6 February 1937, 121.67/1086; Memorandum “Analysis of Effect 

of Disclosures,” Joseph E Grew, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, n.d. [9? February 1937], enclosed with Letter, Grew to Stanley 

K. Hornbeck, Chief of Division of Far Eastern Affairs, 9 February 1937, 121.67/1084 1⁄4; and Memorandum “Theft of 

Documents,” Hornbeck, 18 March 1937, attached to Despatch 1039 “Theft of Documents,” Lockhart to Secretary of 

State, 6 February 1937, 121.67/1086; all Folder – 121.67, Box 337, DF 1930-39, RG 59, NA. For other complaints, see 

Despatch 1218 “Courier Service,” William C. Bullitt, U.S. Ambassador to France, to Secretary of State, 8 November 1937, 

121.67/1123. Memorandum “Courier Service,” Hamilton to Murphy, 9 September 1938. Memorandum, Murray to 

Bannerman, 29 May 1934, 121.67/934. 

8 Telegram, Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, to Phillips, U.S. Embassy Paris, April 27, 1934, Folder – 121.67, Box 336, DF 

1930-39, RG 59, NA. Grover, “A Brief History of the U.S. Diplomatic Service,” Foreign Service Newsletter 80 (October 

1953): 17. 
63

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

9 Grover, “A Brief History of the U.S. Diplomatic Courier Service,” Foreign Service Newsletter 80 (October 1953), p. 17. 

Despatch 1241 “Southern Courier Service,” Jesse Isidor Strauss, U.S. Ambassador to France, to Secretary of State, 28 

September 1934, 121.67/948, Folder – 121.67, Box 336, DF 1930-39, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, Davis to Long, 3 June 

1940, 051.01/547 1⁄2, Folder – 051, Box 34, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

10 H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen, Merchants of Death: A Study of the International Armament Industry (New York: 

Dodd, Mead, 1934). Matthew Ware Coulter, The Senate Munitions Inquiry of the 1930s: Beyond the Merchants of Death

(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997). Richard A. Baker, “September 4, 1934: Merchants of Death,” The Hill, 14 April 2006, 

http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/Features/SenateMinute/ 092904.html. Baker is the Historian for the U.S. 

Senate. 

11 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 

85-86, 102-143. 

12 Natalia Summers, Outline of the Functions of the Offices of the Department of State, 1789-1943 (Washington DC: USGPO 

for the National Archives, 1943), 155. E. Wilder Spaulding and George Verne Blue, The Department of State of the United 

States, Revised edition (Washington DC: USGPO, 1936), 31. 

13 Summers, Outline of the Functions of the Offices of the Department of State, 155-156. Departmental Announcement 115 

“Assignment of Responsibility for Intelligence and Security Functions,” 27 August 1948; and Memorandum “Distribution 

of FC Functions,” Fischer Howe, Deputy Director for the Office of Intelligence and Research, to Charles M. Hulten, 

Director of the Office of the Executive Secretariat, Stanley T. Orear, Chief of Division of Organization and Budget, and 

Samuel D. Boykin, Director of Office of Controls, 3 September 1948; both Folder – Survey of Office of Foreign Activity 

Correlation, Box 13, SF 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations, RG 59 – Lot 96D584, NA. 

14 Robert L. Bannerman, “Robert Candlish Bannerman, Early History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent (Part B),” p. 3; 

and “September 1936 to June 1941, New York Office of the Chief Special Agent (Part C),” p. 2-3; both enclosed with “The 

Robert [L.] Bannerman Interview,” conducted by George Payne,” 20 August 1991, Folder – Diplomatic Security History, 

Box – Archives H-N, DS TRACEN. The Office of the Historian (PA/HO) has a copy of the interviews. 

15 Bannerman, “Robert Candlish Bannerman, Early History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent (Part B),” p. 3; and 

“September 1936 to June 1941, New York Office of the Chief Special Agent (Part C),” p. 2-3. 

16 Bannerman, “Robert Candlish Bannerman, Early History of the Office of Chief Special Agent,” p. 3; and “September 1936 

to June 1941, New York Office of the Chief Special Agent,” p. 2-3. “A History of Security in the Department of State,” p. 

5. John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 

1999), 84-85. 

17 Bannerman, “Robert Candlish Bannerman, Early History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent,” 3. “Espionage,” Time

XXXI/10 (7 March 1938). “Spy Business,” Time XXXII/20 (14 November 1938). “Wages of Sin,” Time XXXII/24 (12 

December 1938). Athan G. Theoharis, The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 

1998), 58. “A History of Security in the Department of State,” n.d. [April? 1954], p. 5, Folder – Security Booklet 1-E, 

Box 11, Miscellaneous Decimal Files 1953-1956, Records of the Bureaus of Security and Consular Affairs, Record Group 

59 – Lot Files, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland (hereafter cited as Misc DF 1953-56, SCA, RG 59-Lot, NA). 

Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 88-89. 

18 Oral History Interview, Robert L. Bannerman, State Magazine (November 1991), 46. 

19 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the 

KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 107, 104-106, 108. Katherine A.S. Sibley, Red Spies in America: Stolen Secrets and 

the Dawn of the Cold War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007). 

20 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 144-268. 
64

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

21 For detention of U.S. Couriers in Nazi-occupied Norway, see Despatch 656 “Attack at Kristiansand, Norway on Legation’s Couriers,” 

Raymond E. Cox, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, U.S. Legation Oslo, to Department of State, 27 May 1940, FW 121.67/1352, 

Folder – 121.65, Box 280, DF 1940-1944, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, Davis to Long, 3 June 1940, 051.01/547 1⁄2. 

22 Confidential Memorandum, Davis to Long, 12 December 1940, 121.67/1531, Folder 121.67, Box 281, DF 1940-44, RG 

59, NA. Memorandum, Davis to Long 3 June 1940, 051.01/547 1⁄2. Department Serial No. 3069 “Pouch Service,” George 

S. Messersmith, Assistant Secretary of State (Administration) to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 24 May 1939, 

121.67, Folder – 121.67, Box 337, DF 1930-39, RG 59, NA. 

23 Memorandum, Davis to Long, 3 June 1940, 051.01/547 1/2. Letter, Edwin C. Wilson to Claude G. Bowers, U.S. 

Ambassador to Chile, 17 July 1941, 1941 Volume IV: 110 – 121 Couriers, General Records of the U.S. Embassy in Santiago, 

Chile, Record Group 84, NA. Memorandum “Notice to United States Government Agencies Forwarding Telegram through 

the Department of State,” Department of State, 16 September 1942, enclosed with Memorandum “Use of Airgrams by 

Representatives of Other Government Departments and Agencies Abroad,” Long to American Diplomatic and Consular 

Officers, 23 October 1942, Folder – 124.066/Airgrams, Box 661, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

24 Memorandum Regarding Microfilms, n.d. [early December 1942], enclosed with Circular, G. Howland Shaw to American 

Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 8 December 1942, attached to Memorandum, David A. Salmon to James B. Pilcher, 19 

April 1943, Folder – 124.0064/221 – 12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

25 Memorandum “Notice to United States Government Agencies Forwarding Telegram through the Department of State,” 

Department of State, 16 September 1942. 

26 Letter, Capt. A.D. Struble, US Navy, to Secretary of State, 23 March 1943; and Letter, Davis, Foreign Service Administration, 

to U-L, 29 April 1943, 051, Box 34, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NARA. According to courier lore, couriers were physically 

handcuffed to their road bags until the Lisbon crash. Since the aircraft crashed at sea, the pouch dragged the courier under 

water because he was unable to release the handcuff quick enough. Carl E. Lovett, Jr., “The Diplomatic Courier Service,” 

SY Focus, 3/1 (February 1977): 14. 

27 Telegram 711, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 16 May 1940, 124.512/1050, Folder – 124.512/1049 – 7-644, Box 723; 

Telegram 1108, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 9 June 1940, 124.516/274, Folder 124.516/263-330, Box 726; Telegram 1138, 

Bullitt to Secretary of State, 10 June 1940, 124.516/275, Folder – 124.516/263-330, Box 726; Despatch 6711 “Further 

Destruction of Codes and Cipher Tables,” Maynard B. Barnes, First Secretary of Embassy, to Secretary of State, 8 July 1940, 

124.516/319, Folder 124.516/263-330, Box 726; Telegram 1142, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 11 June 1940, 124.516/277, 

attached to Memorandum, de Wolf (unreadable) to PA/D, EU, SD, and A-L, 12 June 1940, Folder – 124.516/263 – 330, 

Box 726; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

28 Telegram 17, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 4 July 1940, 124.51/154; Telegram 992, Matthews to Secretary of State, 1 

October 1940; and Memorandum of Conversation, James Clement Dunn with Herr Hans Thomsen, Chargé d’Affaires, 8 

October 1940, 124.51/178; all Folder 124.51/126-179, Box 722, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

29 Telegram 1384, Barnes (Paris) to Secretary of State, 24 October 1940, 124.516/334; and Telegram 818, Matthews (Vichy) 

to Secretary of State, 25 October 1940, 124.516/335; Telegram 579, Leahy (Paris via Vichy) to Secretary of State, 20 

February 1941, 124.516/345; and Memorandum, Reber to Atherton and Summers[?] (M. P. Davis), 21 February 1940, FW 

124.516/345, attached to Telegram 584, Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy Vichy France, 21 February 1940, 124.516/345; 

all Folder – 124.516/331-386, Box 726, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

30 Memorandum, Beam, 10 April 1941, FW 124.516/356; and Memorandum, Philip W. Bonsal to Lawrence Duggan, 14 

April 1941, both attached to Telegram 1266, Morris (Berlin) to Secretary of State, 4 April 1941, 124.516/356, Folder – 

124.516/331-368, Box 726, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

31 Telegram 4283, Kirk (Berlin) to Secretary of State, 10 October 1940, 124.51/177, Folder 124.51/126-179, Box 722; 

Instruction, Breckinridge Long to Certain American Diplomatic Officers, 14 June 1940, 124.02/1321A, attached to 
65

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

Memorandum, Nathaniel P. Davis to C. R., 15 June 1940, Folder – 124.02/664 – 1406B, Box 649; Instruction “International 

Telephone Conversations,” Shaw to American Diplomatic Officers, 8 September 1942, 124.06/330A, Folder – 124.06/300-

350D, Box 659; and Instruction, Shaw to All Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 26 January 1943, 124.06/359B, Folder 

– 124.06/351 – 3991⁄2, Box 660; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

32 For Darlan’s comment, see Despatch 264 “Transmitting Copy of a Strictly Confidential Office Memorandum Cautioning 

the Utmost Discretion in Conversations,” H. Freeman Matthews, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy Vichy, to Department of 

State, 27 June 1941, Folder – 124.516/369-408, Box 727, D 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For concerns about wiretapping, see 

Instruction “Wiretapping,” Breckinridge Long to Certain American Diplomatic Officers, 14 June 1940, 12402/1321A, 

Folder – 12402/664—1406B, Box 649; Despatch 6893 “Steps Taken to Prevent Wiretapping American Embassy, Paris,” 

Maynard B. Barnes, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy Paris, to Department of State, 9 September 1940, 124.512/1076, 

Folder 124.512/1049—7-644, Box 723; Telegram 294 Phillips, U.S. Embassy Rome, to Secretary of State, 1 March 1941, 

124.65/95, Folder 124.65/79—12-444, Box 764; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For Dunn’s work, see Cordell Hull, 

Secretary of State, to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, 7 November 1941, 124.65/99, Folder – 124.65/79—12-444, Box 

764; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

33 Despatch 1961 “Censorship of Correspondence of Embassy and of Consulates in Italy,” Edward L. Reed, Chargé ad Interim, 

to Secretary of State, 14 August 1940, 124.656/115, Folder – 124.656/110A-168, Box 766; and Despatch 1960 “Censorship 

of Correspondence of Embassy and Consulates in Italy,” 10 August 1940, 124.656/117, Folder – 124.656/110A-168, Box 

766; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, N[athaniel]. P. Davis to Atherton, 24 February 1940, FW 124.516/345, 

attached to Telegram 584, Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy Vichy, 21 February 1940, 124.516/34; and Telegram 876, 

Morris (Berlin) to Secretary of State, 7 March 1941; both Folder – 124-516/331-368, Box 726, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

34 David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 494-495. Andrew and Gordievsky, 

KGB: The Inside Story, 688n187. 

35 Circular Telegram, Secretary of State (B.L.) to U.S. Legation Bern, 4 February 1941, 1214.06/215B, Folder – 124.06/195A 

– 253, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. Report, W. E. DeCourcey to Shaw, Davis, Erhardt, and Salmon, 23 May 1941, 

124.06/267, attached to Note, Davis to D.C.R., 2 June 1941, Folder – 124.06/254 – 299A, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 

59, NA. For specific embassies and consulates, see Telegram 586, Johnson (London) to Secretary of State, 15 February 

1941, 124.06/232, Folder – 124.06/254 – 299A, Box 659; Memorandum “Handling of Confidential Files at Embassy, 

Vichy,” 1 March 1941, enclosed with Despatch 62 “Maintenance of Codes and Confidential Files at Vichy and Lyon,” 1 

March 1941, 124.06/251, Folder – 124.06/195A-253, Box 659; Telegram 120, Gunther (Bucharest) to Secretary of State, 

7 February 1941, 124.06/222, Folder – 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659; Memorandum, DeCourcy, 23 July 1941, FW 

124.06/244, Folder 12406/195A – 253, Box 659; Memorandum “Handling of Confidential Codes and Correspondence,” 

n.d., enclosed with Despatch 4539, Leland Morris, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim (Berlin), to Secretary of State, 27 February 

1941, 124.06/248, Folder – 195A – 253, Box 659; Despatch 4788 “Work on Codes and Confidential Files at Athens and 

Salonika,” Lincoln MacVeagh (Athens) to Secretary of State, 18 February 1941, 124.06/249, Folder – 124.06/195A- 253, 

Box 659; Despatch 2348 “Submitting Information on Manner of Handling Codes and Confidential Files,” Bert Fish (Cairo) 

to Secretary of State, 15 February 1941, 124.06/253, Folder – 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

36 N.B. These guards and watchmen were not Marine Security Guards or military personnel. The Marine Security Guard 

program did not begin until 1948, and military personnel were not used. Most guards were either contracted U.S. citizens 

(largely male) or trusted local nationals. The night watchmen were usually trusted local nationals. 

37 Report, W. E. DeCourcy to Shaw, Davis, Erhardt, and Salmon, 23 May 1941, 124.06/267, attached to Note, Davis to 

D.C.R., 2 June 1941, Folder – 124.06/254 – 299A, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For specific embassies and 

consulates, see Telegram 586, Johnson (London) to Secretary of State, 15 February 1941, 124.06/232; Memorandum 

“Handling of Confidential Files at Embassy, Vichy,” 1 March 1941; Telegram 120, Gunther (Bucharest) to Secretary of 

State, 7 February 1941, 124.06/222; Memorandum, DeCourcy, 23 July 1941, FW 124.06/244; Memorandum “Handling 

of Confidential Codes and Correspondence,” U.S. Embassy Berlin; Despatch 4788, MacVeagh (Athens) to Secretary of 
66

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

State, 18 February 1941, 124.06/249; Despatch 2348, Fish (Cairo) to Secretary of State, 15 February 1941, 124.06/253. 

38 Memorandum, G. Howland Shaw to Jeff Bridges, 3 February 1942, 124.163/143A, Folder – 124.163/118 – 196; 

Memorandum, Shaw to John Williams Hunter, 7 August 1942, 124.163, Folder – 124.163/118 196; and Travel Order 

5-2349, Shaw to William F. Ellis, 24 November 1944, Folder 124.163/197 – 12-1544; all Box 669, DF 1940-44, RG 59, 

NA. 

39 Despatch 276 “Personnel of the Legation (Combined Office) at San Salvador,” Walter Thurston, U.S. Ambassador, to 

Secretary of State, 13 April 1943, 124.163/202, Folder 124.163/197 – 12-1544, Box 669; and Telegram 1024, Dreyfus 

(Tehran) to Secretary of State, 26 October 1943, 124.911/233, Folder – 124.911/233 – 255B, Box 780; both DF 1940-44, 

RG 59, NA. 

40 Shaw to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, 26 December 1941, 124.018/8A; and Knox to Secretary of State, 8 January 

1942, 124.018/9; both Folder –124.018/1 – 10-244, Box 649, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. The Navy investigated retired 

Coast Guardsmen interested in serving as guards and provided the Department with a list of 114 names. Knox to Hull, 18 

February 1942, 124.018/10, Folder 124.018/1 – 10-244, Box 649, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For local police arrangements, 

see Despatch 847 “Reclassification of Government Employee in Ambassador’s Leased Official Residence,” Thurston to 

Secretary of State, 12 October 1943, 124.163/229, Folder – 124.163/197 – 12-1544, Box 669, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

41 U.S. Embassies in Tehran and Cairo used military personnel. See Despatch 23 “United States Army Guard Detail,” S. 

Pinkney Tuck, to Secretary of State, 21 June 1944, 124.836-6-2144, Folder – 124.836/103 – 12-1544, Box 775; Edward 

R. Stettinius, Jr., Acting Secretary of State, to Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, 30 October 1943, 124.911/233, Folder 

124.911/233 – 255B, Box 780; and Stimson to Hull, 11 November 1943, 124.911/234, Folder – 124.911/233 – 255B, Box 

780; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For FSOs taking shifts on guard duty, see Telegram 1100, Phillips to Secretary of State, 

26 July 1941, 124.65/102, attached to Memorandum, E. A. Shreve to FA, 31 July 1941, Folder – 124.65/79 – 12-444, Box 

764, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

42 Circular Instruction “Investigational Activities of Alien Clerks,” [Indecipherable] to American Diplomatic and Consular 

Officers, 4 January 1940, 124.06/195A, Folder 124.06/195A-253, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For Italy, see Hull 

to Knox, 15 March 1941, 124.65/96A, Folder 124.65/79 – 12-444, Box 764; and Telegram, Secretary of State (Adolf A. 

Berle, Jr.) to All Diplomatic Officers, 25 May 1944, 124.06/443A, Folder – 124.06/400-453C, Box 660; both DF 1940-44, 

RG 59, NA.

43 Despatch 788, H. Freeman Matthews, First Secretary of Embassy (Paris) to Secretary of State, 21 October 1940, 

124.513/1426, Folder – 124.513/1425—1452, Box 724, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

44 Despatch 264 “Transmitting copy of a Strictly Confidential Office Memorandum Cautioning the Utmost Discretion in 

Conversations,” Matthews, 27 June 1941, 124.516/376, Folder – 124.516/369-408, Box 727; and Telegram 737, Secretary 

of State (Shaw) to U.S. Embassy Vichy, 29 September 1941, 124.513/1638A, Folder – 124.513/1621—1644, Box 724; 

both DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

45 Goliewsky, after four years at the Compiegne concentration camp, was released, and even though he was 67 years old and 

“to a large extent broken physically,” the U.S. Consulate recommended re-employing him in order to provide him a “small 

pension.” See Despatch 35 “Decision Requested Relative to Employment of Former Employees,” Hugh S. Fullerton, 

Counselor of Embassy, to Secretary of State, 26 October 1944, 124.513/10-2644, Folder – 124.513/3-2144 – 11-1444, 

Box 726, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

46 Despatch 6368 “Irregularities in the Issuance of Certain Visas,” Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy (Paris) to 

Secretary of State, 15 April 1940, 124.513/1323, Folder – 124.513/1304 – 1363, Box 723, DF 1940-1944, RG 59, NA2. 

Affidavit, Tatiana Stcherbina, 17 April 1940, enclosed with Despatch 6368 “Irregularities in the Issuance of Certain Visas,” 

Murphy to Secretary of State, 15 April 1940. Also enclosed with Despatch 6368 was a summary of each of the twelve who 

obtained fraudulent visas. 
67

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

47 This suggests that Stcherbina knew more about events than she is letting on in her affidavit. 

48 Despatch 6368 “Irregularities in the Issuance of Certain Visas,” Murphy to Secretary of State, 15 April 1940. R.C.A to 

A. M. Warren, 11 May 1940; and Memorandum, A. M. Warren to F. A., 12 June 1940; both attached to Despatch 6368 

“Irregularities in the Issuance of Certain Visas,” Murphy to Secretary of State, 15 April 1940. For the U.S. response to the 

Jewish refugee crisis prior to 1941, see David Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941 (New York: 

Knopf, 1985). 

49 “Bannerman, Hull Aide, Dies at 66,” Washington Post, 28 February 1940, p. 30. Bannerman, “September 1936 to June 

1941, New York Office of the Chief Special Agent (Part C),” p. 4. Bannerman, “June 1941 to June 21, 1945 (Part D 

and E),” p. 1. “Thomas Fitch Retires from Government,” Washington Post, 22 May 1950, P. B1. “T. F. Fitch, Adviser in 

State Dept,” Washington Post, 9 March 1968, p. B2. Tab 2 “History of Security Organization,” enclosed with Study by 

Reorganization Task Force on Security of the Department of State, 23 March 1949, [No Folder], Box 13, SF 1932-1963, A/

SY/Evaluations, RG 59-Lot 96D584, NA. 

50 Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State: A History of its Organization, Procedure, and Personnel (New York, Macmillan, 

1949), 363-364. Edward Yardley, “Identification Pass System for the Department of State,” American Foreign Service Journal

18/10 (October 1941): 554-555, 582-584. 

51 Memorandum, The President to the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of War, the Attorney General, 

the Postmaster General, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Commerce, 26 June 1939; and Memorandum of 

Understanding between the War Department, Navy Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 5 June 1940; both 

attached to Draft of Interdepartmental Agreement on Security, 23 October 1944, Bureau of the Budget, 23 October 1944, 

Folder – Post-War Intelligence Plans I, Box 1, Intelligence Files 1942-1951, Records of the Bureau of Administration/Office 

of Security, RG 59-Lot, NA. For inviolability of diplomatic premises, see Eileen Denza, Diplomatic Law: A Commentary 

on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Second edition (New York: Oxford University Press for Clarendon Press, 

1998), 113-117. 

52 Summer, Outline of the Functions of the Office of the Department of State, 163. August C. Miller, Jr., “The New State 

Department,” The American Journal of International Law, 33/3 (July 1939): 516-517. Memorandum, J. W. Amshey, Office 

of Foreign Activity Correlation, to Cummings and Neal, Chief of the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, 11 October 

1946, attached to Note, Eaton[?] to Otto Otepka, Assistant Director, Office of Security, 3 May 1961, Folder – Security 

Control and Correlation Branch of FC (JWA’s Survey), Box 2, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations, RG 59 – Lot 

96D584, NA. “Survey of Division of Foreign Activity Correlation,” Fred Darnell and John Moore, 19 January 1948, [No 

Folder], Box 13, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations, RG 59 – Lot 96D584, NA. 

53 Summers, Outline of the Functions of the Offices of the Department of State, 155-156. Roger S. Abbott, “The Federal Loyalty 

Program: Background and Problems,” American Political Science Review, 42/3 (June 1948): 486-487.

54 Abbott, “The Federal Loyalty Program,” American Political Science Review, 487-489. Memorandum giving a brief account 

of the genesis of government security programs, John W. Sipes, Security Counsel, to Scott McLeod, Director, Bureau of 

Security and Consular Affairs, 12 January 1954, Box 13, Records of Security and Consular Affairs, DF 1953-60, RG 59 - 

Lot 62D146, NA. 

55 Abbott, “The Federal Loyalty Program,” American Political Science Review, 488-489, 489n14. 

56 Memorandum “Policy Statements of Press for the “O” Area,” Kevin O. Lynch to Henry G. Grignon, 21 March 1966, Folder 

– Policy, 1966, Box 5, PSPF, 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA. Tab 2 “History of Security Organization,” enclosed with 

“Study by Reorganization Task Force on Security of the Department of State,” 23 March 1949, No Folder, Box 13, SF 1932-

63, A/SY/Evaluations, RG 59 – Lot 96D584, NA. 

57 Instruction 102, G. Howland Shaw to Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., U.S. Minister to Iran, 21 May 1942, 124.91/87A, Folder 

– 124.91/80 – 12-2144, Box 780; Telegram 602, Shaw to U.S. Legation Cairo, 23 June 1942, 124.83/86A, Folder – 
68

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

124.83/85 – 12-1544, Box 773; Telegram 419, Shaw to U.S. Embassy Rome, 17 June 1941, 124.65/100A, Folder – 

124.65/79 – 12-444, Box 764; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

58 “Narrative Account of the Internment and Repatriation of the U.S. Legation at Bangkok,” U.S. Legation Bangkok, 19 

August 1942, p.2-3, attached to Memorandum, R. L. Smyth, 7 September 1942, Folder – 124.92/70-71, Box 783; Despatch 

50 “Condition and Disposition of Government Property,” Peck to Secretary of State, 24 June 1942, 124.922/343, Folder 

– 124.922/299A – 352, Box 783; and Despatch 35 “Destruction of Confidential Correspondence and Codes in the U.S. 

Legation at Bangkok,” Peck to Secretary of State, 27 January 1942, 124.926/96, Folder – 124.926/57A – 101, Box 784; all 

DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

59 “Narrative Account,” U.S. Legation Bangkok, 19 August 1942, pp. 3-5, 7-10. Telegram 518 “American Interests, Thailand,” 

Huddle, U.S. Legation in Bern, Switzerland, to Secretary of State, 11 February 1942, 124.92/60, Folder – 124.92/44 – 69, 

Box 783, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

60 “Narrative Account,” U.S. Legation Bangkok, 19 August 1942, pp. 7-10. Telegram 3161, Harrison in Bern to Secretary of 

State, 7 July 1942, 124.92/225; and Telegram 3696, Harrison in Bern to Secretary of State, 11 August 1942, 124.921/231; 

both Folder – 124.921/186 1⁄2 – 234, Box 783, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

61 Bannerman, “June 1941 to June 21, 1945 (Parts D and E),” p. 1. Memorandum “Treatment of Enemy Official Personnel 

by the United States, December 1941 – April 1942,” W. M. Franklin, May 1948, [No Folder], Box 3, Special Studies and 

Reports, Division of Historical Policy Research and its Predecessors, RG 59-Lot, NA, pp. 2-4. 

62 Memorandum “Treatment of Enemy Official Personnel by the United States, December 1941 – April 1942,” W. M. 

Franklin, May 1948, p. 11-14. Hull quoted on page 7, and Roosevelt quoted on page 14. Bannerman, “June 1941 to June 

21, 1945 (Parts D and E),” 1.

63 Bannerman, “June 1941 to June 21, 1945 (Parts D and E),” 2. Memorandum “Treatment of Enemy Official Personnel by 

the United States, December 1941 – April 1942,” W. M. Franklin, May 1948, p. 16. 

64 Bannerman, “June 1941 to June 21, 1945 (Parts D and E),” 3.

65 Memorandum, Elmer Davis (OWI) to Heads of All Departments and Agencies, 28 September 1942; and Memorandum 

“OWI Regulation No. 4,” OWI, 28 September 1942; both enclosed with Memorandum “Security Classifications and 

Routing Procedure of Diplomatic Pouch Mail,” Shaw to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 16 May 1944, Folder 

– 124.0064/221-12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

66 Memorandum, Department of State, 16 September 1942, enclosed with Memorandum, “Use of Airgrams by Representatives 

of Other Government Departments and Agencies Abroad,” Long to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 23 

October 1942, 124.066 Airgrams/10A; and Airgram, Secretary of State to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 26 

April 1943, 124.066/Airgrams/34A; both Folder – 124.066/Airgrams, Box 661, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

67 Capitalization in the original. Memorandum, Edward Klauber (OWI) to Heads of All Departments and Agencies, 13 

March 1944; and Memorandum “Change No. 1 to OWI Regulation No. 4,” OWI, 15 March 1944; both enclosed with 

Memorandum “Security Classifications and Routing Procedure of Diplomatic Pouch Mail,” Shaw to American Diplomatic 

and Consular Officers, 16 May 1944. 

68 Memorandum “Security Classifications and Routing Procedure of Diplomatic Pouch Mail,” Shaw to American Diplomatic 

and Consular Officers, 16 May 1944, Folder – 124.0064/221-12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

69 Memorandum “Use of Modifying Phrases with Security Classifications,” Shaw to American Diplomatic and Consular 

Officers, 4 August 1944, Folder – 124.0064/221-12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

70 Memorandum “Use of Phrase ‘For Department Use Only’,” Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, to American Diplomatic 

and Consular Officers, 27 December 1944, Folder – 124.0064/221-12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 
69

CHAPTER 2 THE VITAL FUNCTION: World War II and Diplomatic Security

71 John Moors Cabot, First Line of Defense: Forty Years’ Experiences of a Career Diplomat (Washington DC: Georgetown 

University for the School of Foreign Service, 1979), 18. 

72 Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, to Kildroy P. Aldrich, Chief Post Office Inspector, 4 June 1940, 124.06/205B, 

Folder – 124.06/195A-253, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. Telegram 328, Dreyfus to Secretary of State, 30 March 

1943, 124.916/154; and Memorandum “Delivery of Material from Department of State Air Pouch No. 2199,” David 

McK. Key, Assistant Liaison Officer, to Major Julius A Pate, Department of War, 14 April 1943, 124.916/154; both Folder 

– 124.916/126—12-2344, Box 782, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

73 For listening devices, see Telegram, Secretary of State (Berle) to all Diplomatic Officers, May 25, 1944, 124.06/443A, Folder 

– 124.06/400-453C, Box 660, DF 1940-1944, RG 59, NA. For the Argentine incident, see J. P. Tuck to Laurence Duggan, 

Chief of Division of the American Republics, 20 February 1940, 124.06/207, Folder – 124.06/195A-253; Memorandum, 

L. C. Frank to Long, 10 May 1940, enclosed with Tuck to Duggan; Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, to Long, 6 

May 1940, enclosed with Tuck to Duggan; and J. M Clarke to Frank, 22 May 1940, enclosed with Tuck to Duggan; all 

Folder – 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

74 Circular telegram, Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Officers, 25 May 1944, 124.06/443A; and Telegram 169, Secretary 

of State (Berle) to Chief of Mission Stockholm, 27 January 1944, 124.06/408A, attached to Memorandum, George A. 

Gordon to Berle and Dunn, 27 January 1944; both Folder – 124.06/400-453C, Box 660, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

75 Despatch 10360 “Dismissal of Abel D. Solano, Messenger-Janitor in the Consulate at Arica,” Bowers to Secretary of State, 1 

August 1944, 124.253/8-144; and Report of the Legal Attaché “César Gacitua Vergara alias ‘Cafaz’,” R.L.M., 26 July 1944, 

enclosed with Despatch 10360, Folder – 124.253/-- 8-144, Box 686, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

76 Memorandum “To Custodians of American Government Property in Germany and Occupied Territories,” George F. 

Kennan, First Secretary of U.S. Embassy Berlin, 20 October 1941, enclosed with Despatch 5940, Kennan to Secretary of 

State, 22 October 1941, 124.01/971, Folder – 124.01/954 – 12-2744, Box 648; Telegram 7306, Winant (Reber) to Dunn, 

7 September 1944, 124.511/9-744, attached to Memorandum, Frank to Kreis, 7 October 1944, Folder – 124.511/542 

– 12-2744, Box 723; Telegram 1915, Wadsworth (Rome) to Secretary of State, 8 December 1941, 124.65/106, Folder 

– 124.65/79 – 12-444; Telegram 24, Wadsworth (Rome) to Secretary of State, 17 January 1942, 124.653/538, Folder 

– 124.653/535 – 570, Box 765; Telegram, Leahy (Vichy) to Secretary of State, 8 July 1941, 124.513/1555, Folder – 

124.513/1549 – 1579, Box 724; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

77 Telegram 7306, Winant (Reber), U.S. Embassy Paris, to Secretary of State, 7 September 1944, 124.511/9-744, attached 

to Memorandum, Frank to Kreis, 7 October 1944, Folder – 124.511/542 – 12-2744, Box 723; Instruction “Reopening in 

Liberated Areas of Offices Closed on Account of the War,” 9 June 1944, 124/74A, Folder 124/61 – 8-144, Box 648; Despatch 

35 “Decision Requested Relative to Employment of Former Employees,” Hugh S. Fullerton, Counselor of Embassy Paris, 

to Secretary of State, 26 October 1944, 124.513/10-2644, Folder – 124.513/3-2144 – 11-144, Box 726; all DF 1940-44, 

RG 59, NA. For Embassy requests for more code clerks, see Telegram 212, Chapin to Secretary of State, 10 October 1944, 

124.513/10-1044, Folder – 124.513/3-2144 – 11-144, Box 726; Telegram 43, Caffery to Secretary of State, 19 October 

1944, 124.513/10-1944, Folder – 124.513/3-2144 – 11-144, Box 726; and Telegram 288, Caffery to Secretary of State, 2 

November 1944, 124.513/11-244, Folder 124.516/263-330, Box 726; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. 

78 “Report regarding Conditions Connected with the Building of the Former American Embassy in Berlin...,” Karl von Poglies, 

2 July 1947, enclosed with Despatch 10436 “Report Regarding American Embassy in Berlin...,” Murphy to Secretary of 

State, 11 July 1947, 124.623/7-1147, Folder [2], Box 1166; “Report on My Personal Experience during the Last Month of 

the War...,” Gerda M. Franksen, 7 July 1945, enclosed with Despatch 986 “Report of Personal Experience of Miss Gerda M. 

Franksen during Last Days of the War,” Murphy to Secretary of State, 20 September 1945, 124.623/9-2045, Folder [4], Box 

1165; “Report of Our Arrest by the Soviets and Our Internment in Russia,” Willy Strube, 13 January 1949, enclosed with 

Despatch 77 “Release by Soviets of German Employees of Former American Embassy Berlin,” F. A. Lane to Department of 

State, 2 March 1949, 124.623/3-249, Folder [4], Box 1165; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 
70

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

79 Telegram 3233, W. Averill Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, to Secretary of State, 11 September 1945, 

124.623/9-1145, Folder [4], Box 1165; Despatch 2359 “Regarding Former Alien Employees of American Embassy, 

Berlin...,” Kennan to Secretary of State, 11 January 1946, 124.623/1-1146, Folder [1], Box 1166; and Aide Memoire, 

U.S. Legation Bern to the Federal Political Department of Switzerland, n.d. [December 1946], attached to Memorandum, 

Francis B. Stevens, Division of Eastern European Affairs, to Miss Wolberg, 7 May 1948, FW 124.683/7[?]-1648, Folder [2], 

Box 1166; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

80 Airgram A-241, Kennan to Secretary of State, 21 September 1945, 124.623/9-2145, Folder [2], Box 1166; Airgram A-278, 

Kennan to Secretary of State, 8 October 1945, Folder [4], Box 1165; Despatch 77 “Release by Soviets of German Employees 

of Former American Embassy, Berlin,” F. A. Lane to Department of State, 2 March 1949, 124.623/3-249, Folder [4], box 

1165; and Telegram 70, Murphy to Secretary of State, 12 January 1949, 124.623/1-1249, Folder [4], Box 1165; all DF 

1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

81 George Kennan’s strong words about the Soviets’ handling of the affair were sent just a couple weeks before his famous 

“Long Telegram.” See Despatch 2359 “Regarding Former Alien Employees of American Embassy, Berlin, and Treatment 

by Soviet Police Authorities,” Kennan, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, to Secretary of State, 11 January 1946, 124.623/1-

1146, Folder [1], Box 1166, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For appeals to Soviet officials, see W[alter] B[edell] Smith, U.S. 

Ambassador to the Soviet Union, to V. M. Molotov, Foreign Minister, 1 October 1947, enclosed with Despatch 1676 

“Former German Employees of American Embassy, Berlin,” Smith to Department of State, 24 October 1947, 124.623/10-

2447; Memorandum, R. A. D. to Stevens, n.d. [29-30 October 1947], attached to Despatch 1676; and Memorandum 

“Non-Swiss Employees of the Former Swiss Legation in Berlin,” Jean Keller, Chargé d’Affaires of Swiss Embassy in Moscow, 

19 September 1947, enclosed with Despatch 1669 “Transmitting Memorandum Submitted by Jean Keller...,” Smith to 

Department of State, 30 September 1947, 124.623/9-3047; all Folder [2], Box 1166, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Instruction 

3758, Department of State (W. J. Marx) to Officer in Charge of the U.S. Mission Bern, 7 February 1947, 340.0015/1-347, 

attached to Memorandum, Stevens to Wolberg, 7 May 1948, FW 124.683/4-1648. Telegram 3812, Durbrow to Secretary 

of State, 11 October 1946, 124.623/10-1146, Folder [1], Box 1166, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

82 Aide Memoire 3053, C. H. Owsley, U.S. Minister to Switzerland, to the Federal Political Department of Switzerland, 14 

June 1948, attached to Telegram 1455, Smith, to Secretary of State, 29 June 1948, Folder [3], Box 1166; Airgram A-241, 

Kennan to Secretary of State, 21 September 1945, 124.623/9-2145, Folder [2], Box 1166; and “Report of Our Arrest by the 

Soviets and Our Internment in Russia,” Willy Strube, 13 January 1949, enclosed with Despatch 77 “Release by Soviets of 

German Employees... ,” Lane to Department of State, 2 March 1949, 124.623/3-249, Folder [4], Box 1165; all DF 1945-

49, RG 59, NA. Telegram 671, Kennan to Secretary of State, 5 March 1946, 124.623/3-546; and Telegram 250, Acheson 

(Stevens) to U.S. Embassy Warsaw, 28 March 1946, 1240623/3-546; both Folder [1], Box 1166, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

83 Report “A Proposal for the Creation of an Interdepartmental Security Coordination,” Bureau of the Budget, 2 November 

1944, enclosed with Memorandum “Draft of Interdepartmental Agreement on Security,” 23 October 1944, Folder – Post 

War Intelligence Plans I, Box 1, Intelligence Files 1942-1951, Records of the Bureau of Administration/Office of Security, 

RG 59-Lot, NA, pp. 6-8, 13-17. 

84 Chapter 15: Communications – Cryptographic Security and Coordination and Review, Records of the War Histories 

Branch, Box 2, RG 59 – Lot Files, Entry 714, NA. Cryptographic experts Commander Lee W. Parke of the U.S. Navy and 

Major James Moak of the U.S. Army had been detailed to the State Department at the Secretary’s request and were assigned 

to Assistant Secretary Shaw’s office to assist in the organization and management of the cryptographic unit and the general 

security program. 

85 Memorandum, Commander Parke to Mr. Shaw, 13 May 1944, Samuel Boykin Files, Box 1, RG 59 - Lot 53D223, NA. 

Chapter 15: Communications – Cryptographic Security and Coordination and Review, Box 2, Records of the War Histories 

Branch, RG 59 – Lot Files, Entry 714, NA. 

86 Report “A Proposal for the Creation of an Interdepartmental Security Coordination,” Bureau of the Budget, 2 November 

1944, p. 1.
71

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

After World War II, tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union gradually escalated into 

the Cold War. A global rivalry, the Cold War played out across the political, military, economic, and cultural 

relations between the world’s nation-states. Even though the two superpowers did not engage in direct military 

hostilities, several proxy wars occurred in the developing world, most notably in Korea and Vietnam. The U.S.-

Soviet rivalry reinforced and elevated the Department of State’s concerns regarding diplomatic security. As a 

result, the Department created a formal office to devise, execute, and enforce diplomatic security practices. 

The Department of State’s Security Office was the creation of Robert L. Bannerman. It would be logical 

to assume that Bannerman’s efforts occurred within the Office of the Chief Special Agent (CSA) because 

Bannerman worked as a Special Agent in the CSA during the war; however, Bannerman actually left the CSA 

and formed a new office devoted to security. Department officials opted to create a new office rather than 

restructure the CSA because they believed that the CSA did not have the experience for “the approaching new 

concept of security” needed in the post-World War II era.1

 The catalyst for hiring Bannerman to build the 

Security Office was the 1945 Amerasia spy case. Soon other charges of espionage and disloyalty intensified the 

demand for an effective security program within the Department. Also, challenges faced by U.S. Embassies 

in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe and the newly partitioned Palestine pressed the Department to expand 

its diplomatic security efforts. 

Neither Bannerman’s Security Office nor the Chief Special Agent’s Office survived the first years of the 

Cold War. Security problems, Congressional pressure, and Department reorganization led to the merger of the 

Security Office and the CSA, and Bannerman left the Department. The new Division of Security (SY) assumed 

responsibilities of both offices, but it adopted Bannerman’s program and vision. Within five years (1945-1950), 

the office that Bannerman initiated had grown from one person to 111 people, and became the foundation of the 

present-day Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 

CHAPTER 3

CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE 

8

Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950
72

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

z Stettinius’s Reorganization and Security å

 By December 1944, with World War II nearing an end, U.S. officials had begun planning for the postwar world. 

The Department of State stood poised to play an extensive role; however, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, 

Jr., recognized that “outstanding defects” had arisen in the Department’s operations. The defects were largely due 

to a reorganization of the Department that occurred earlier that year, on January 15. The rapid wartime expansion 

of the Department (from 763 personnel in 1936 to 7623 personnel in 1946) and the creation of several wartime 

offices and divisions generated a certain amount of disorganization in the Department’s bureaucracy. The January 

reorganization, also enacted by Stettinius, sought to group together offices and divisions engaged in similar function. 

The regroupings would improve operations and administration of the Department, and better incorporate new aspects 

of U.S. diplomacy, such as informational and cultural diplomacy. The January reorganization was not fully effective, in 

part because some offices and divisions, like the Office 

of the Chief Special Agent and the Office of Foreign 

Buildings Operations (FBO), were omitted. In order 

to correct such errors, centralize responsibility, and 

improve management functions, Stettinius undertook 

a second large-scale reorganization of the Department. 

The December 20, 1944 reorganization created six new 

Assistant Secretary positions to centralize responsibility 

for specific geographic and functional areas.2

 

The Office of the Chief Special Agent remained 

untouched by both reorganizations, but subtle changes 

in security did occur. The CSA still reported directly 

to the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, 

who had been the Department’s Security Officer since 

1942. In order to help the Assistant Secretary for 

Administration enforce security, Under Secretary of 

State Joseph C. Grew increased the number of Assistant 

Security Officers from one to four. The new Assistant 

Security Officers focused upon particular aspects of 

security: cryptography, distribution of telegrams, 

security overseas, and physical security of the State 

Department building. In addition, it was proposed that 

each office and division designate one person to serve as 

the unit’s security officer, but that did not occur.3

 

Figure 1: Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 1944-

1945. In the wake of the Amerasia leaks, Stettinius ordered 

the creation of a Security Officer for the Department. He 

selected Robert L. Bannerman to be the first Security Officer 

and tasked him with creating a security program for the 

Department and an office to assist him. Source: Office 

of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of 

State. 
73

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

Despite the wartime emphasis upon security, adherence to security procedures by Department employees 

had been rather lax. Classified documents were not placed in envelopes when sent around the building, “Top 

Secret” documents were not being double-wrapped, and safes were being left open overnight, practices that all had 

developed during the war. The greater frequency of security incidents was likely a product of the rapid growth of 

the Department during the war, the lack of training, and the greater amount of classified material being generated.4

Shortly after the December 1944 reorganization, Secretary Stettinius asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) to conduct a security survey of the Department, and the FBI submitted its report to the Secretary on 

March 8, 1945. The FBI recommended creating a security program that included a security manual and training 

for Department officers and employees. The FBI also urged the Secretary to remove security responsibilities from 

the Assistant Secretary for Administration and create a separate “Security Officer” who had authority over security 

procedures, the ability to conduct security inspections, and jurisdiction over the Office of the Chief Special Agent. 

Senior Department officials, however, took no action on the FBI’s recommendations for several weeks. Part of the 

reason was that Stettinius, like most officers in the Department, viewed security as a broad-based responsibility 

affecting every office and division, one that constituted a basic element of the Department’s daily operations rather 

than an issue that required its own bureaucratic structure.5

 

z The Amerasia Catalyst å

In June 1945, news outlets reported that Department of State officers had leaked highly classified documents 

to the journal Amerasia, edited by Philip Jaffe. Classified information had first appeared in a January 26, 1945, 

article on British policy in Asia in Amerasia. Kenneth Wells, the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) chief for 

Southern Asia, read the section on Thailand and “found himself reading his own words” on U.S. and British policy 

toward that nation. Soon afterwards, a team of OSS and Office of Naval Intelligence agents raided Amerasia’s 

offices and discovered dozens of classified documents, including some classified as “Top Secret.” The documents 

had originated from the Department of State, as well as from the Army, the Navy, and British intelligence services. 

A subsequent FBI investigation discovered that Foreign Service Officer John Stewart Service and Department of 

State employee Emmanuel Larsen, among others, had leaked classified documents to Jaffe.6

Public uproar over the Amerasia case occurred, in part, for two reasons. First, there had been little news 

about espionage during the war because the FBI had refrained from publicizing espionage cases in order to prevent 

“spy hysteria.” Second, the Amerasia case involved ties to an ally (the Soviet Union) rather than Nazi German 

espionage. Amerasia editor Jaffe was a Soviet sympathizer who had been actively collecting documents with the 

intention of passing them to Soviet officials. Some newspaper commentators charged that the espionage resulted 

from Communist agents in the Department of State. John Stewart Service and Emanuel Larsen, however, had 

leaked the classified documents to promote their position in an on-going dispute over U.S. China policy within 

the Department, and their personal conflict with U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick Hurley.7
74

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

On June 6, 1945, the day the FBI arrested Service, 

Larsen, Jaffe, and three others, the Department of 

State tried to dampen public interest in the case. In 

a press statement, the Department announced that 

it had learned that “information of a secret character 

was reaching unauthorized persons,” and that two 

Department employees had been arrested. The 

Department assured the public that it was working with 

the FBI and that it had “been giving special attention 

to the security of secret and confidential information.” 

The next day, Under Secretary of State Grew declared 

that the arrests were “one result of a comprehensive 

security program which is to be continued 

unrelentingly in order to stop completely the illegal 

and disloyal conveyance of confidential information to 

unauthorized persons.” Some newspapers took Grew’s 

comment to mean that there might be more spies in 

the Federal Government. FBI agents added to the 

uproar by telling the New York Times that the leak of 

classified information was “overwhelming.”8 

With a storm of criticism bursting over 

the Amerasia affair and the Department’s 

acknowledgement that it had not prosecuted earlier 

leaks of classified documents, Secretary Stettinius 

moved quickly to enact several security reforms. On June 18, he issued Departmental Order No. 1324, which 

created the position of Security Officer for the Department of State; this officer would also serve as Special Assistant 

to the Director of the Office of Controls. On June 20, the Department announced that Robert L. Bannerman 

would assume the position of Security Officer, and Frederick B. Lyon, Chief of the Division of Foreign Activity 

Correlation, would be Acting Director of the Office of Controls.9

 

Bannerman recalled later that “time was of the essence,” in assuming his new job and creating a Security 

Office; indeed, it was because neither the Department’s June 6 press release nor Grew’s June 7 comments were 

accurate. The Department did not have “a comprehensive security program,” nor had it given “special attention” 

to the security of classified information. Also, the Amerasia case had resulted from OSS chief Kenneth Wells’ 

discovery, not the Department’s “comprehensive security program,” as Grew had claimed.10 

Figure 2: John Stewart Service testifies before Congress. 

Service and Emanuel Larsen leaked classified documents to 

Philip Jaffe, who was the editor of Amerasia. The Amerasia 

case embarrassed the Department of State and led to the 

creation of the Security Office and a formal security program 

within the Department. Source: Library of Congress, New 

York World-Telegram and the Sun Collection. 
75

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

Bannerman’s Three Point 

Security Program

 Pushed by the Amerasia case, Bannerman 

and the Department rushed to create the Security 

Office. Starting literally with nothing, Bannerman 

later remarked that he and Lyon “had no funds, no 

office space, no slots for personnel, [and] no clear 

statement of authority;” furthermore, the wording 

of Departmental Order 1324 was “vague.” He was 

able to obtain space and staff from several divisions 

in the Office of Controls. He obtained four rooms 

from the Visa and Special War Programs Divisions; 

and acquired seven people from Visa, Passport, the 

Special Programs divisions, and the Chief Special 

Agent’s office. Bannerman and his new staff then spent 

several days determining how “the Department actually 

operated, what [security and] office systems were in 

effect, what was considered sensitive information, and 

how information circulated through the Department.” 

When Bannerman developed a program that exceeded 

the terms of Department Order 1324, he obtained 

permission from Assistant Secretary for Administration 

Julius Holmes to depart from the order’s restrictions.11

Bannerman’s security program consisted of three 

parts. Directed by Paul Cooper, the first part of the 

program focused on “Documentary and Physical 

Security,” specifically developing Department-wide 

security procedures for classified information, devising measures to protect the Department’s buildings in Washington, 

and training Department employees on security procedures. The second part of Bannerman’s program addressed 

personnel security. Even though the Office of the Chief Special Agent conducted a background investigation on 

each applicant (which consisted largely of checking references and verifying information), Bannerman proposed and 

received approval of a requirement that Department applicants obtain a “security determination” before employment. 

He set up a Security Evaluations staff and selected Morse Allen as its head. The third part of the program was to 

place Security Officers in several selected embassies around the world, and this effort was delayed for a year.12 

Figure 3: Robert L. Bannerman, a Special Agent for 10 

years, was named Security Officer of the Department of State 

in 1945. He developed a three-part program: background 

investigations for a security clearance, security officers at 

U.S. embassies, and Department-wide security procedures 

for classified information, with an accompanying training 

program for all Department officers and employees. His 

program became the foundation for diplomatic security 

programs currently existing in the Department. Bannerman 

left the the State Department and its Security Office in 

1947 to join the new Central Intelligence Agency, where 

he helped to create that Agency’s security program. Source: 

Central Intelligence Agency. 
76

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Bannerman’s requirement that each new Department employee obtain a security determination soon overwhelmed 

the work of the new Security Office. Beginning on August 31, 1945, shortly after Bannerman gained approval of the 

requirement, several special war agencies, including the Office of War Information (OWI), were abolished,13 and their 

employees transferred to the Department of State, with approximately 4,000 new employees transferred in the month 

of October alone. The number of new employees was very large, but two unanticipated difficulties made security 

determinations an overwhelming task. First, when Bannerman sought to obtain individuals’ security files from their 

previous agency, the soon-to-be-defunct agencies were reluctant to hand over the records. When the OWI refused to 

release its security files, Bannerman, with senior officer approval, took a work crew and a truck late one evening and 

seized them. Once having control of the files, Bannerman encountered the second difficulty: he had assumed that 

OWI and the other agencies had completed a background review similar to what the Chief Special Agent’s office had 

done for Department of State hires. Instead, Bannerman and his staff found that other agencies’ files were “limited 

in scope, poorly organized, and many were missing or non-existent.” Facing a far larger task than he had initially 

envisioned, Bannerman now was forced to send the cases of many transferred employees to the Chief Special Agent’s 

office for further investigation and various checks. In addition, Bannerman initiated the practice of checking new 

hires against the security files of the FBI, House Un-American Activities Committee (the Dies Committee), and the 

Department of State.14 

Bannerman and the new Security Office 

confronted multiple pressures that threatened to 

subvert the security check process. The sheer number 

of transfers and employees prompted Bannerman to 

form a Security Committee to review files in which 

questionable information had arisen. The committee 

comprised six people: Bannerman, and one person 

each from the Divisions of Departmental Personnel, 

Foreign Service Personnel, Passport, Foreign Activities 

Correlation, and the Chief Special Agent’s office. The 

Department also insisted that security reviews be 

completed by November 30, 1945, a deadline which 

Bannerman later confessed was “impossible.”15

Further revelations of Soviet espionage in the 

Department of State and the U.S. Government led 

Bannerman to expand the use of security checks for 

other Department employees. In September 1945, the 

defection of Soviet agent Igor Gouzenko to Canadian 

Figure 4: Igor Gouzenko (in hood) interviewed by Associated 

Press writer Saul Pett. Gouzenko, a code clerk for the Soviet 

Embassy in Ottawa, defected and gave Canadian officials 

documents that revealed a Soviet spy ring in Canada and 

that ring’s links to a Soviet spy ring in the United States. 

The documents implicated Alger Hiss of the Department of 

State. Bannerman expanded security checks to include all 

Department applicants. Source: © Associated Press. 
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CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

officials in Ottawa led to the exposure of a Soviet 

espionage network in Canada and of that network’s 

strong links to the Soviet network in the United 

States, disclosures which further implicated Alger 

Hiss and Harry Dexter White in Soviet espionage. 

Then in November 1945, Elizabeth Bentley, a courier 

for the Soviet intelligence agency, NKVD (Narodnyi 

Komissariat Vnutrennikh del—People’s Commissariat 

for State Security), went to the FBI and confessed 

her involvement with Soviet espionage, implicating 

several people including Hiss. Bentley’s information, 

in turn, led FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover to reexamine 

the revelations that Whittaker Chambers had offered 

in 1939. The FBI then prepared a two-volume report 

that detailed Soviet espionage in the United States 

that was distributed to Bannerman, among others.16

Bannerman developed a “highly confidential” liaison with the FBI, and in the process uncovered several “serious 

security cases.” Meanwhile, the revelations and sensation created by the Canadian spy ring, Bentley’s confession, 

and the FBI’s two-volume report prompted Congress again to raise questions about security at the Department of 

State. In January 1946, Bannerman expanded the requirement for security checks to include all employees joining 

the Department or Foreign Service.17

 By July 1946, Bannerman’s Security Office was “devoting practically all of its effort to the personnel problem.” 

Bannerman requested that his office be granted an additional 12 officers, 10 clerks, and 3 stenographers. He also 

reported that of the personnel transferred from the five now-abolished agencies, the Security Committee had 

disapproved the employment of 285 people and had terminated 79 others.18 There were other cases where the 

Security Office wanted action taken against the individuals, but action was not taken for reasons unknown. Adding 

to the difficulties, the Security Office and the Security Committee had to determine what criteria constituted 

grounds for termination, because they had not received a statement of policy guidance from senior Department 

officers that detailed grounds for dismissal, standards for loyalty, or procedures to follow.19 

Bannerman and the Office of the Chief Special Agent (CSA) partially resolved the back-ground 

investigation problem by creating Field Offices in 1946. Prior to World War II, Post Office Inspectors 

conducted many of the background investigations for the Department. The CSA sent a request to the Post 

Office citing the applicant’s hometown or previous city of residence, and the Post Office Inspector made 

inquiries and conducted interviews, sending the results back to CSA. By early 1943, wartime demands 

Figure 5: Elizabeth Bentley before Congress in August 1948. 

Bentley confessed to involvement in Soviet espionage and 

implicated several, including Alger Hiss of the Department 

of State. Source: © Associated Press. 
78

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

on the workforce required the Post Office to stop doing investigations for the Department. Although the 

New York Field Office had existed since 1917, Chief Special Agent Thomas A. Fitch added Special Agents 

in Washington to undertake investigations. In August 1945, the CSA had 47 agents, and they formed the 

core of the Washington Field Office that emerged in early 1946. Several other Field Offices were opened; 

and by early 1947, there were Field Offices in Chicago, Atlanta, Boston, Cincinnati, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, 

Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, Omaha, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Seattle, St. 

Louis, and St. Paul. In 1948, the Cleveland and Greensboro Field Offices were added. Of these, New York, 

Washington, Boston, and San Francisco were the largest (10-20 Special Agents each), with Chicago, St. Louis, 

and Los Angeles following (4-6 Special Agents each). The remaining Field Offices were generally staffed by a 

single Special Agent with a clerk.20 

Figure 6: Chart showing the Procedure of a Security Investigation. Bannerman’s procedure for security investigations and 

evaluations closely resembled the above chart. The differences were that the Division of Investigations (the old Chief Special 

Agent’s office) conducted the investigation, the Security Office evaluated the results, and the Security Committee chaired by 

Bannerman reviewed the case. As the chart’s arrows show, very few faced difficulties before the Security Committee. Source: 

Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
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CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

z Bannerman’s Security Committee Draws Fire å

Congress’s demands that the Department of State remove “disloyal” employees--what Director of Policy Planning 

Paul Nitze called “the elimination of the faithless”--continued. In July 1946, Congress attached the McCarran Rider 

to the Department’s appropriations bill. The rider gave the Secretary of State “absolute discretion” to terminate any 

Department employee if it was deemed “necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.” This meant an 

employee could not appeal the Secretary’s decision to the Civil Service Commission. Congress continued its pressure 

by adding the McCarran Rider to every Department of State appropriations bill for the next seven years.21

While Congressional pressure to remove subversives increased, some Foreign Service Officers criticized 

the manner in which Bannerman’s Security Office and the Security Committee was handling personnel cases. 

Bannerman learned on May 15, 1946, that a senior Department official had recommended that the “security 

control of personnel” be “decentralized.” The recommendation meant that the investigation, evaluation, and 

security risk determination stages would be in separate bureaucratic entities rather than centralized in one office. 

The criticism, combined with the passage of the McCarran Rider, prompted Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

Administration Joseph A. Panuch to ask Samuel E. Klaus on July 10 to conduct a survey on how the Security Office, 

the Chief Special Agent’s office, and the Office of Controls pursued and completed personnel investigations.22

In his report, Klaus strongly criticized not only the process, but also the personnel performing the work. 

Klaus questioned the Special Agents’ abilities and qualifications, asserting that few had a “superior education” and 

that the average agent did not know “the differences among the various schools of so-called liberal and radical 

thought.” He charged that when a case was referred to the Chief Special Agent’s office, Special Agents conducted 

a cursory review of the person, did not verify “derogatory” information, and tended to rely upon local Postmaster 

reports for distant locales. Klaus also asserted that the FBI supplied information to the Security Office that it 

would not provide to the Office of the Chief Special Agent upon a similar request, and that the FBI often did not 

provide evidence for its claims, including membership in the Communist Party. 23 Klaus additionally objected to 

the centralized procedure by which all cases involving “doubt” were forwarded to the Security Committee. The 

committee members, he said, did not review the files before rendering their decision, and instead relied upon the 

Security Office’s recommendations. In the majority of instances, Klaus asserted that “doubt” led to disapproval, 

and no minutes or records were kept of the committee’s meetings.24

The Klaus Report had the hallmarks of a pre-determined conclusion before the research was conducted, 

and several items cast doubt on his charges. First, Klaus received his assignment on July 10, and completed a 

report numbering more than 100 pages by August 3. Klaus admitted that he did not travel to the Chief Special 

Agent’s field offices, and according to Bannerman, Klaus completed his survey in just 4 days. The report’s 

length and the time spent on it strongly indicate that Klaus could not have conducted a sufficient survey 

to make several of his claims. Klaus seems not to have recognized that the investigations conducted by the 

Chief Special Agent’s and Security Offices in 1946 were more extensive than at any previous time. Moreover, 
80

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Klaus dismissed out of hand the many years of law enforcement and investigative experience that Special Agents 

possessed. He also admitted that he had no knowledge of background investigation procedure. If he had, he 

would have known that sending a request to the local Postmaster had been standard practice since 1920, and that 

the local investigations, particularly in larger cities, were conducted by the local Post Office Inspectors, who were 

not mere mailmen, as Klaus tried to suggest. Furthermore, if the Carl Marzani case was an indication, the Security 

Office and the Chief Special Agent’s office conducted better investigations than Klaus had portrayed. The two 

offices gathered enough evidence to indict Marzani for perjury (Marzani had not fully disclosed his work for the 

U.S. Communist Party). The Marzani indictment infuriated FBI Director Hoover, who lamented, “It is rather 

humiliating that a case like [Marzani’s] was made by the State Dept and not the FBI.”25

Deputy Assistant Secretary Panuch also tasked a second survey to be completed in July 1946 on physical 

security within the Department of State, and that report favored expanding Bannerman’s office. Undertaken 

by S. R. Goodrich of the Bureau of Administration’s Management Planning Division, the second survey found 

that security breaches in the Department were “too numerous to mention” and that the Department’s security 

deficiencies “prevent[ed] even a reasonable degree of security.” Goodrich advocated that the Security Office be 

expanded and made into its own separate division within the Office of Controls. Another recommendation was 

to develop an “aggressive security indoctrination program,” and a third was to appoint security officers for every 

office and division, an idea that the FBI had recommended the previous year but one the Department of State had 

not implemented. Goodrich’s report essentially advocated Bannerman’s broad three-part security plan and urged 

a large expansion of the Security Office.26

On July 25, 1946, Assistant Secretary State for Administration Donald S. Russell disbanded Bannerman’s 

Security Committee and created a new committee, formally titled the Advisory Committee on Personnel 

Security (ACOPS). Russell appointed Klaus to chair the committee, and Klaus chose the committee’s 

membership. Bannerman was not consulted about the composition of the new committee; indeed, he only 

learned that a new committee would be replacing the old security committee after the deed had occurred. 

Despite the obvious slight to Bannerman, the Security Office continued to investigate personnel and submit 

reports to Klaus’s committee.27

The case statistics of ACOPS indicate that Klaus’s charges against background investigations and the Security 

Committee were a means to discourage disapprovals and terminations for security reasons. Whereas Bannerman’s 

Security Committee had rendered decisions of disapproval or termination in 341 cases in 10 months of existence, 

Klaus’s ACOPS committee dealt with just 28 cases total in 10 months and terminated 2 people, one of whom 

was Carl Marzani, a case which Bannerman’s committee had already developed. Of the remaining 26 cases, 

Klaus’s committee allowed 12 cases to be withdrawn (due to resignation or other reasons), dismissed another 

8 cases (for lack of evidence or other reasons), and gave approvals to the remaining 6 cases.28 Moreover, Klaus 

refused to accept any FBI information unless the FBI revealed its sources, which the FBI refused to do. Then, on 
81

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

November 9, 1946, Panuch announced that all security cases had to be resolved by December 1. In intention, 

Klaus, Russell, Panuch, and Department officials were moving in a direction opposite of what the McCarran Rider 

had demanded.29 

z Security Training, Overseas Security, and the Creation of SY å

While personnel security evaluations dominated the work of the Security Office, Bannerman moved 

forward on the two other parts of his program. During the summer of 1945, Bannerman and Robert Freeman 

developed the overseas security program, which assigned specially selected and trained Security Officers to 

25 U.S. embassies abroad. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes approved the program in August 1945, and the 

Security Office soon developed a list of well-qualified 

candidates. However, the program was delayed for 

more than a year because the Department did not 

have any open slots available in which to place the 

new overseas Security Officers. In the fall of 1946, 

Bannerman learned that the Department had allotted 

hundreds of slots for media officers at overseas posts. 

He convinced the head of the Information Office to 

loan him 30 positions, but it still took several months 

for the loan to be approved.30 

For the third part of the Security Office’s 

program, Bannerman and Paul Cooper developed 

much of the Department’s training program for 

handling classified information. Bannerman was 

serving as the Department’s representative on the 

Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy 

Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), which was 

charged with developing security-training and 

awareness programs, and establishing postwar rules 

for accessing classified information, including new 

standards for handling and transmitting government 

information and definitions for categories of 

classification.31 Bannerman and Cooper worked 

with the Training Services and Management 

Planning divisions to create a reference manual of 

Figure 7: Security on the Cover of the Department of State 

Telephone Directory. Bannerman’s Security Office developed 

several means to train and communicate to Department 

employees the importance of maintaining security. Source: 

Department of State. 
82

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

security regulations, a “security handbook,” a poster series for the Department, “open” signs for safes, and 

other security related materials. Cooper and Bannerman, with the Presentation Division, produced the 

film Security of Information, which “starred” Near Eastern Affairs officer Clare H. Timberlake as the Foreign 

Service Officer who prepared a “Top Secret” memorandum, the contents of which were compromised.32

In January 1947, the Security Office, in conjunction with the Training Services and Management 

Planning Divisions, launched the first formal, Department-wide security-training program. Between 

January 14 and 21, the Security Office and the Office of Controls conducted security-training sessions 

for all 7,000 Department of State employees. In the hour-long sessions, the program sought “to impress 

upon all employees...the essential part which good security practices must play in their daily operations.” 

Employees viewed the film Security of Information, and were issued a standard security reference book as they 

left the presentation. After the week of training sessions, the Security Office reported that the effect of its 

security program “upon Departmental employees has been gratifying.”33

The security training program emphasized the individual responsibility of each employee. It advised 

participants that “the maintenance of security is a chain” and that “YOUR watchfulness in enforcing security 

regulations becomes a link in that chain.” Department personnel received instruction on how to classify documents 

according to defined categories; how to send classified information through officially designated message centers; 

and how to follow strict procedures for the reproduction, destruction, and storage of classified materials. In the 

case of storage of materials, employees were instructed that all classified documents had to be stored in safes or 

cabinets secured with a three-number combination lock. The Security Office also demanded that Department 

employees and officers adhere to building security measures, including displaying identification badges for entry. 

Furthermore, each office or division was required to designate a Security Officer to implement and oversee 

conformity with new security policies, and to maintain security check systems for the unit.34

While the training materials assured staff that Department officials did not believe there was “an espionage agent 

under every desk eagerly waiting to pounce,” the materials stressed the utmost necessity of good security practices 

and the dire consequences of security breaches. The security program strove to promote a new consciousness of 

security by continuously linking employee security requirements to the very survival of the United States. Materials 

repeatedly reminded personnel “the way you enforce security today, tomorrow and in the more distant future may 

well mean the difference between preserving and undermining the strength and prestige of our Nation.” Security 

promotional materials frequently warned staff members not to be “the weak link,” with the ultimate message that 

true security could only be attained if each employee conscientiously and continuously monitored his or her own 

activities, and if employees remained vigilant of their surroundings, including the actions of others.35 

After the January sessions, Bannerman and the Security Office continued security awareness training 

for Department and Foreign Service employees, and their training extended to other agencies in the Federal 

Government. The Security Office offered training for each entering class at the Foreign Service Institute, had 
83

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

regular participation in Foreign Service training, held talks with all Department personnel in Washington and New 

York, and conducted briefings for each new Foreign Service Officer and each Foreign Service Officer returning 

from overseas duty. Whether due to its popularity or the fact that the Security of Information was the first and/

or only training film, the White House, Coast Guard, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Secret Service, and 

Department of the Treasury all used the Security Office’s film as a security-training tool for their personnel.36 

Despite the success of his training program, Bannerman learned on February 11, 1947, that the Security 

Office would be merged into the Division of Investigations, which was a part of the Office of Controls. Eight 

months earlier, the Department created the Division of Investigations, by moving the Office of the Chief Special 

Agent with its staff of 124 people into the Office of Controls and renaming it. On February 24, the Department 

transferred the Security Office into Investigations, creating the Division of Security and Investigations. Bannerman 

had been assured that any personnel actions would be made with “joint approval,” but Bannerman and his two 

deputies, Morse Allen and Henry Thomas, received their new assignments at 6 p.m. on March 11, 1947. Allen, 

head of Evaluations, was transferred to the New York Field Office, and Thomas, Bannerman’s right hand man, 

was moved to the Miami Field Office. Bannerman was named section chief and received a 50 percent cut in 

responsibilities and in pay.37

Figure 8: Organizational Chart of the Division of Security, 1948. After the Security Office and Division of Investigations 

(old Chief Special Agent’s Office) merged, the new Division of Security resembled Bannerman’s vision for an expanded Security 

Office. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
84

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The decision to merge the Security Office into the Division of Investigations arose from several factors. 

The Division of Management Planning, influenced by Goodrich’s report, urged Panuch to separate the security 

function into its own division, so that the director of the Office of Controls (CON) could focus upon the managing 

CON’s multiple divisions. Also, Department managers wanted to improve the efficiency and performance of 

CON. Then, on January 22, 1947, Panuch left, and John E. Peurifoy replaced him as Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for Administration. One of the first memoranda Peurifoy received discussed the 2,000 case backlog in 

employee investigations.38

Although the new Division of Security and Investigations kept the Chief Special Agent’s acronym CSA, it 

adopted the Security Office’s three-part program and effectively became the large Security Office that Bannerman 

had envisioned. As suggested by the name change, the 124-person Division of Investigations had grown largely due 

to background investigations; other duties such as protecting the Secretary of State and investigating passport or visa 

fraud required few people. Bannerman’s Security Office not only had a broader vision, but his three-part program 

expanded the office’s responsibilities. In essence, the small Security Office swallowed the much larger Division of 

Investigations, and the new entity’s structure replicated the Security Office’s operation. The Investigations Division 

performed investigations of employees, and the 

concluded investigations were forwarded to the Security 

Office’s Evaluations branch for review and evaluation, 

a process which in a way brought the old Chief Special 

Agent’s office under Bannerman’s umbrella. The new 

Division of Investigations and Security still retained 

the duties of protecting the Secretary of State and 

foreign dignitaries; however, Bannerman’s three tasks: 

security investigations, the security training program, 

and the overseas security program provided the focus 

and structure for the new division. 

 After being integrated into the Division of 

Security and Investigations, Bannerman remained 

long enough to finish creating the overseas security 

program. With the loan of 30 positions from the 

Information Office finally approved, Bannerman began 

training overseas security officers in late spring or early 

summer 1947. The training program lasted two weeks 

and included physical security, personnel security, and 

organization of the Department. The Security Office 

Figure 9: Regional Security Officer Mike Lustgarten (third 

from left) and his assistant, Jim Trout (center), meet with 

Special Agents Leo Crampsey (second from right) and Frank 

Madden (right), in Vienna in 1952. The onset of the Cold 

War and key alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization led to an exponential increase in the amount 

of classified documents at an embassy and espionage threats 

to the post and its staff. Bannerman’s effort to train and 

assign Regional Security Officers at U.S. embassies around 

the world took hold immediately. Source: Department of 

State. 
85

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

held instruction at the U.S. Army’s Camp Holabird, near Baltimore. Bannerman admitted that he conducted a large 

part of the informal training himself because he believed that he “was the only one who had the concept of how a 

Security Officer should operate at an Embassy.” The program soon became more formalized, with classes in loyalty 

investigations, fingerprinting, “informants and informant exposure,” physical security, and technical security.39

On July 21, 1947, the Department issued a circular airgram to all posts describing the Foreign Service Security 

Corps, its responsibilities and duties, and the aims of the program. The trainees departed for their assignments shortly 

afterwards. These overseas security officers were given the title of Assistant Attaché rather than Security Officer, 

because it was feared that the latter might encourage the idea among foreign governments that the officers were 

engaged in intelligence activities.40 Bannerman recalled that most officers were “well received and many were effective 

immediately.” Some embassies were less enthused. New security officer Paul Green, assigned to the U.S. Embassy in 

Bucharest, had the worst experience--the Ambassador refused to allow Green to communicate with Washington, and 

would not even acknowledge that he had arrived at post. After the initial responses, Bannerman transferred to the 

new Central Intelligence Agency in November 1947 to help to create that agency’s security program.41 

Bannerman’s departure was just one of several personnel and bureaucratic changes taking place in the security 

area. At the start of 1948, Donald L. Nicholson, a former FBI Special Agent, replaced Thomas Fitch as Chief of the 

Division of Security and Investigations, and Fitch become Special Advisor to the Director of the Office of Controls. 

Fitch, who retired in early 1950, focused upon protecting the Secretary of State and foreign dignitaries, and handled 

issues related to foreign embassies in Washington. The “portal-to-portal” method was in practice, meaning that the 

agent met the Secretary at his home in the morning and escorted him throughout the day until returning home in 

the evening. There was no overnight security.42

In November 1947, the Department’s postwar drive for efficiency and economy targeted the Division of 

Foreign Activity Correlation (FC), in part because of the running question within the Department: “Just what 

do all those people do in FC?” With 69 staff members, FC, in liaison with the FBI, the OSS, and the War 

and Navy Departments reviewed security and intelligence information about individuals, groups, and incidents 

that threatened the security of the United States. The Department’s January 1948 survey of FC found that it 

duplicated or completed work similar to that of the Division of Security and Investigation.43 By February 1948, 

the Bureau of Administration decided to dissolve FC and transfer most of its duties and staff to the Security and 

Investigations Division. This occurred on August 27.44 With the addition of FC’s functions, the Division of 

Investigation and Security was renamed the Division of Security, and it received a new acronym, SY. The Division of 

Security, numbering 197 people, continued to organize itself around Bannerman’s three-part security program. SY 

focused primarily on personnel investigations, but it also operated an overseas security program and conducted the 

security-training program for the Department and the Foreign Service. Additional responsibilities included physical 

security of Department of State buildings, advice on Department security programs, recommendations on visas and 

passports, and protection of the Secretary and visiting foreign dignitaries.45 
86

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

z Determining Loyalty and Security Risk å

As Bannerman strove to build the Security Office and make security determinations for Department employees, 

Congressional and public pressure to remove alleged subversives from federal employment became even more intense. 

On November 25, 1946, after the Republicans had taken control of Congress in the off-year elections, President 

Truman signed Executive Order 9806, which established the President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty. 

An attempt to ward off a more aggressive Congressional investigation, Truman’s Temporary Commission studied the 

issue of Communist “infiltration” within the Executive branch, but commission members disagreed on the extent or 

seriousness of the problem. After approximately 10 weeks of study, the Commission’s findings resulted in Executive 

Order 9835, issued on March 12, 1947. This order created an employee loyalty program for the Executive branch 

designed to affirm “that persons employed in the Federal service be of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United 

States.” The order permitted federal agencies and offices to check current employee names against FBI records, and new 

applicant names against FBI, Dies Committee, and other records. If any derogatory information arose during a check, 

Executive Order 9835 allowed federal agencies to request a full field investigation on that employee or applicant.46

Launched in October 1947, the government-wide employee loyalty program was generally executed through the FBI, 

and a Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission, known as the President’s Loyalty Board, reviewed cases.47

Figure 10: Chart of Loyalty Security Board in the Department of State. Chaired by Conrad E. Snow, the Personnel Security 

Board replaced Samuel Klaus’ ACOPS committee in reviewing loyalty cases. Source: Department of State Records, National 

Archives and Records Administration.
87

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

With the new loyalty program slated to start in October, Secretary of State George C. Marshall abolished the 

Advisory Committee on Personnel Security, headed by Samuel Klaus in June 1947. On July 9, despite the fact that there 

would soon be a government-wide loyalty review board, Marshall replaced the now defunct ACOPS with a three-person 

committee called the Personnel Security Board. The Department of State retained its own security review committee for 

three reasons. First, as a result of the McCarran Rider passed the previous year, the Department still had a number of 

security cases under investigation and review. Second, the Department noted a dual requirement relating to personnel 

security. The President’s Executive Order 9835 focused upon an individual employee’s possible disloyalty; however, the 

McCarran Rider focused on whether an individual employee posed a “security risk,” which was a much broader set of 

considerations.48 As the Department noted in a press release explaining the new committee, “a poor security risk may be 

judged because of sexual peculiarities, alcoholism or because of an indiscreet and chronically wagging tongue; without 

any question of the individual’s loyalty to this country.” Third, the Department argued that it needed a separate review 

board because of its unique status. Because the Department was a target for espionage and possessed a large number 

of highly classified communications, Department officials insisted that it needed to retain its independent power to 

investigate and to dismiss employees as outlined in the McCarran Rider.49 The Department, in truth, did not like or want 

the McCarran Rider, but it was now using it to avoid bringing its employees under the broader loyalty board program. 

Figure 11: Chart detailing the Department of State’s procedures for loyalty and security cases. Bannerman’s original procedures 

differed little from the above process. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
88

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Chaired by Conrad E. Snow, the Personnel Security Board received criticism from the Left and the Right. 

From the Left, reporter Bert Andrews published a series of articles in the New York Herald-Tribune that decried 

the Department of State’s “witch hunt,” charging that the security checks, investigations, and hearings 

placed civil liberties under serious threat. The articles earned Andrews a Pulitzer Prize for Journalism and were 

revised into a book titled Washington Witch Hunt. From the Right, the House of Representatives’ Committee on 

Appropriations charged that the Department of State was not aggressive enough in removing Communists and 

other persons deemed to be security risks from Department employment. The Committee sent a team to the 

Office of Controls and the Division of Security and Investigations in September 1947 to investigate the issue. 

After a struggle over access, the House investigators gained unlimited access to all files. After about six weeks, 

the investigators, led by Harris Huston, charged that there were 108 cases of persons of questionable security 

still working for the Department of State. Although one House member drafted a resolution calling for a special 

committee to investigate disloyalty in the Department of State, no legislative action was taken. On June 8, 1948, 

the Personnel Security Board was renamed the Loyalty Security Board, and it continued to process and make 

determinations for both loyalty and security cases.50 

Figure 12: Screening Procedure Developed by the Department of State for Applicants under President Truman’s Loyalty 

Program. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
89

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

Congressional debate and public discussion of 

the 108 cases continued through the first half of 

1948, and it prompted Congress to pass the SmithMundt Act on January 27, 1948. The Smith-Mundt 

Act required an FBI check of all U.S. Government 

employees within 6 months. Although the law 

exempted Foreign Service Officers, who were appointed 

by the President and confirmed by the Congress, it did 

cover foreign nationals and non-Foreign Service U.S. 

citizens working at U.S. embassies abroad. Under the 

act, each post had to submit to the Department personal 

information, a set of fingerprints, and a photograph for 

each of these employees, as well as conduct a security 

investigation. Nearly every post completed the 

investigations and submitted materials in the mandated 

6 months.51 Several embassies requested expedited 

investigations, or asked to have the person assume his/

her duties before the investigation was completed, but 

the Department denied these requests.52 

The Department of State had already developed a clearly defined process for determining loyalty and security 

risk by the time the Loyalty Security Board was created. The Secretary of State delegated the responsibility, oversight, 

and decisions of this process to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. For existing Department 

employees, the procedure for security and loyalty cases was similar. If there was no derogatory information found during 

the name check with FBI records or in one’s file, the person was cleared. If such information did appear, the Division 

of Security undertook a full investigation. Special Agents would complete the investigation and turn their findings 

over to SY’s Evaluations branch, which would then render a recommendation. If the derogatory information was false 

or unsubstantiated, the person was cleared. If the information merited further review, it was sent to the Department’s 

Loyalty Security Board. The Board, which consisted of three Department officers, held a hearing with the following 

individuals present: the accused, the counsel for the accused, a court reporter, and witnesses for and against the accused. 

After the hearing, the Board would make its recommendation, and forward it to the Deputy Under Secretary of State 

for Administration. The Deputy Under Secretary would then take action, either clearing the accused or terminating 

their Department employment. In cases in which termination resulted from issues related to loyalty, the Civil Service 

Commission could conduct a post-audit of the case. However, if termination resulted for security reasons, as stipulated 

by the McCarran Rider, the employee could not appeal the decision to the Civil Service Commission.53 

Figure 13: Meeting of the subcommittee of the House of 

Representatives Un-American Activities Committee. Seated 

at the table to the left is Representative Richard Nixon 

(R-CA); the second person seated to the right of Nixon 

(black necktie) is Whittaker Chambers. Source: Library 

of Congress, New York World-Telegram and the Sun 

Collection. 
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History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

For those applying for Department employment, the process was nearly the same. For security screening, 

SY conducted an investigation of the applicant, and turned over the finding to the Evaluations Branch, 

which rendered a decision. As defined by the McCarran Rider, disapprovals could not be appealed. Loyalty 

screenings followed the same procedure as employee screening, with the Deputy Under Secretary of State 

for Administration taking action. As was the case for employees, applicants’ cases regarding loyalty could be 

appealed and post-audited by the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission.54

Many Department employees, the great majority of whom were never accused of anything, found 

accusations of disloyalty and the introduction of security background checks to be discomforting. Most 

Foreign Service Officers at the time had come from well-to-do backgrounds and had attended prestigious 

universities. They thought of themselves as members of an elite service, and found it difficult to accept the idea 

that treasonous conduct could be found among their ranks. Accusations tended to be exaggerated and inflamed 

by the press, and fears that scurrilous and untrue accusations would wreck an Foreign Service Officer’s career 

were not uncommon. In March 1948, Secretary of State George C. Marshall sought to allay these concerns 

by sending a message to employees that he was “confident” of the loyalty of Department personnel. Marshall 

insisted that any doubt of an employee’s loyalty “must be based upon reliable evidence,” not “on spiteful, 

unsupported, or irresponsible allegations.”55 

Charges of disloyalty and of security risks still on the payroll continued to haunt the Department. In 

July and August 1948, Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers testified before the House Committee on 

Un-American Activities. Chambers’ testimony soon led to Alger Hiss and his wife being called to testify before 

the Committee (Mrs. Hiss was charged with typing up classified documents that Hiss brought home). Hiss 

denied Chambers and Bentley’s accusations. The charges spilled over into the 1948 Presidential campaign, 

when Republican candidate Thomas Dewey charged President Truman with assisting “the enemies of the 

American system;” Truman won reelection anyway. Just after the election, Chambers was invited to appear 

on Meet the Press, where he again charged Hiss with being a Communist. Hiss promptly sued Chambers for 

libel. Chambers then presented new evidence in the pre-trial examination, which caught the attention of 

Bert Andrews, the Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for the New York Herald-Tribune, and Richard M. Nixon, a 

young Representative from California. On December 2, 1948, Andrews joined Nixon on a trip to Chambers’ 

farm near Westminster, Maryland. From his pumpkin patch near the house, Chambers pulled three microfilm 

reels from a pumpkin that had been cut and hollowed out. The microfilm reels contained images of classified 

State Department documents taken by Soviet agents during the late 1930s; the documents on the reels became 

known as the Pumpkin Papers. Chambers’ microfilm created a media bombshell, and at the end of 1948, 

questions regarding security, loyalty, Soviet agents, and stolen classified documents swirled even more intensely 

around the State Department.56 
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CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

z Overseas Security å

The introduction of Bannerman’s overseas security officers, or “assistant attachés,” as they were called, 

led to the development of several new security practices at U.S. posts abroad. One was a requirement that each 

embassy, legation, and consulate submit an emergency plan describing how it would respond in the case of natural 

disaster or human-instigated emergencies. These plans detailed the various aspects of the post’s response, including 

the destruction of files, codes, stamps, and equipment; evacuation procedures and routes; announcements to U.S. 

citizens in country; and operation of post communications during the event.57 Some emergency plans, such as 

those of the U.S. Embassies in Santiago and San Salvador, had to consider several scenarios including earthquakes, 

volcanoes, civil disorder, or war. The U.S. Legation in Beirut focused on public disorder and civil war; meanwhile, 

the U.S. Legations in Warsaw and Bucharest planned 

only for a World War III scenario.58

Improvements in embassy security, however, 

were hampered by a shortage of trained professionals. 

During the war, the Department had halted 

recruitment of new Foreign Service Officers, and 

created the Foreign Service Auxiliary to meet its 

personnel needs. As a result, the Department suffered 

a 10 percent decline in career officers by the mid1940s. The expansion of U.S. activities overseas and 

greater involvement of the United States in world 

affairs exceeded the Department’s capacity, particularly 

in relief work and reconstruction of war-torn areas. 

As one indicator of the Department’s expansion, the 

Department received and took action on 246 airgrams 

and telegrams in January 1942; in January 1944, the 

number was 4397. In another example, incoming 

communications traffic at the U.S. post in Tangiers 

rose 40 percent in the years immediately following the 

war, while its outgoing traffic increased by 70 percent, 

with the post constantly asking for more code clerks. 

The U.S. Congress, however, was in a budget-cutting 

mood, imposing additional difficulties for Department 

officers who were trying to balance their mandated and 

expanding tasks with the shortage of personnel.59

Figure 14: One of the “Pumpkin Papers” produced by 

Whittaker Chambers from his field near Westminster, 

Maryland. Chambers led Richard Nixon to the spot, 

and the microfilm reels held several classified Department 

of State documents. This document, dated February 15, 

1938, discusses the situation in Vienna after Hitler took 

control of Austria during the Anschluss. Source: Associated 

Press photograph in Library of Congress, New York WorldTelegram and the Sun Collection.
92

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

U.S. posts overseas felt the personnel shortages acutely. In January 1947, U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia 

Laurence Steinhardt complained that despite reopening the U.S. Embassy in Prague nearly two years earlier, the 

Department had still not sent a trained code clerk to the Embassy.60 Steinhardt’s complaint was not unusual; 

several posts faced a severe shortage of code clerks, guards, stenographers, and other personnel, and sought to 

resolve the shortage by hiring men from the U.S. Armed Forces. The U.S. Embassy in Paris “requisitioned” six 

enlisted men from the U.S. Army, and the Embassy in Vienna hired eleven. The U.S. Mission in Berlin hired 

eight Army cryptographers and, a month later, asked for six more. In Tehran, the shortage of personnel prompted 

the Chief of Mission to assign an embassy guard to the task of distributing “confidential and unclassified mail, 

preparing diplomatic pouches, and other duties ordinarily performed by a...security clerk.”61 Other posts, such 

as the U.S. Consulates in Berlin, Bremen, and Frankfurt, as well as the Political Advisor to Germany, turned 

to locals to serve as clerks, receptionists, stenographers, and charwomen. In fact, the commanding general of 

Allied-occupied Germany encouraged the hiring of non-Nazi Germans for clerical positions; however, the foreign 

nationals were not authorized to handle classified material.62 The post in Tangiers moved one stenographer to code 

work, only then to have its remaining stenographers resign in protest, leaving Tangiers begging for replacements 

and facing a future when it would not be able to communicate with Washington. Loy Henderson, the Director 

of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, considered the Tangiers situation typical. The post’s plea for 

more staff, he said, would be “helpful” in the Department’s talks with the Bureau of the Budget and members of 

Congress. However, most posts that requested additional personnel, such as the Embassies in Santiago and San 

Salvador and the U.S. Consulate in Saigon, merely received a polite “No.”63

Despite the shortage of personnel, the Department still needed to give consideration to the personal safety 

of FSOs and U.S. citizen employees overseas. The Tehran Embassy desperately needed code clerks; however, it 

specifically requested two male code clerks. When the Department assigned two women to Tehran, Embassy 

officers reminded Foggy Bottom that women occupied “a position of inferiority and inequality” in Muslim 

countries. “Even beggars, who cringe before a feeble youth,” wired the Embassy, “feel themselves licensed to 

take liberties with unescorted women in broad daylight.”64

Marriages overseas generated another security challenge for the Department-- the specter of espionage. Shortly 

after the war, the Theater Commander in Germany informed U.S. Consulates in Munich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, 

Bremen Hamburg, and Berlin that all prospective U.S. employees must be told that they could not marry a 

German, Hungarian, Rumanian, or Bulgarian citizen, and to do so “will result in immediate termination and 

repatriation.” This was a more stringent policy than that defined by Department of State regulations. Department 

regulations required employees to request permission to marry, and submit a letter of resignation that would go into 

effect if the request was denied. While the marriage request was under review, Department regulations stipulated 

that the employee was to be denied access to classified codes and papers. If the Department approved the marriage, 

the couple was transferred to another post away from the foreign national spouse’s country of origin.65
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CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

The Department’s policy regarding marriage to foreign nationals, combined with the personnel shortage 

of the immediate post-war period, led some to question the policy. For example, in Prague, the U.S. Embassy 

had only one code clerk, who requested permission to marry a Czech. The situation confronted the Embassy 

with a situation of possibly not having someone able to do code work. By 1949, however, the issue was open 

for discussion, since many people were not satisfied with a policy that either dismissed a good Foreign Service 

employee or took away a Foreign Service Officer’s security clearances because of whom they chose to marry.66

z Eastern Europe and Embassy Security å

As an Iron Curtain fell over Eastern Europe, embassy security, as one Foreign Service Officer noted, 

required far greater “vigilance than would normally be expected.”67 In this sense, Bannerman’s overseas security 

officer program proved exceedingly well timed, because the U.S. Embassies in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Sofia, 

and Bucharest found themselves on diplomatic security’s front lines. 

Difficulties with Iron Curtain governments began in early 1946, and the Embassies’ local employees 

were among the first caught up in the emerging Cold War hostilities. Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Yugoslav, 

Rumanian, and Bulgarian secret police and plain-clothes agents began arresting and questioning the local nationals 

hired by U.S. Embassies to serve as chauffeurs, clerks, charwomen, and other positions. They also detained and 

questioned people who visited the Embassies. Authorities particularly targeted those individuals who had worked 

for U.S. posts before World War II and had continued to do so afterwards. Many arrests occurred just after work 

or at night, with relatives and friends not knowing the reasons for the arrest.68 Eastern European secret police 

questioned them about U.S. Embassy activities and routines, and about the information to which they had 

access. Many of those arrested or detained endured several hours of interrogation; others were jailed for several 

weeks, and a few were tried for “anti-state activities.” 

However, Eastern Bloc agents and secret police were 

more interested in forcing the employees to spy on 

U.S. Legations and Embassies. By 1948, U.S. posts 

in Eastern Europe noted that the secret police were 

“framing” local employees; meanwhile, the employees 

feared U.S. officials would fire them because the local 

Communist governments were forcing their spouses 

to join the Communist party.69 

The harassment and intimidation by Communist 

authorities transformed routine security measures, 

such as fingerprinting, into an ordeal of fear and 

propaganda. Although the Department encouraged 

Figure 15: SY technical engineers found this listening 

device in the U.S. Embassy in Prague in 1954. During 

the early years of the Cold War, SY found many listening 

devices in U. S. Embassies in Soviet bloc countries. In 

fact, between 1948 and 1961, SY engineers discovered 

more than 95 percent of all listening devices found by all 

U.S. Government agencies. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security Files.
94

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw to explain to its local employees that fingerprinting was required of all U.S. 

Government employees and “represent[ed] no special treatment or discrimination,” the explanations likely offered 

little reassurance to Polish employees who were “already under constant pressure from the Polish secret police.” 

Furthermore, the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw expressed concern to the Department that the Polish Communist press 

would publish stories about the fingerprinting requirement that had the “facts so twisted so as to instill...fear.” 

Besides, asked the Embassy, why fingerprint employees who had never travelled to the United States, and faced 

little likelihood of ever obtaining a passport from the local Communist government?70

U.S. diplomats in Eastern Bloc countries strongly objected to the host governments’ harassment and 

intimidation, and the United States formally protested the poor treatment accorded its employees.71 On the 

occasion that local authorities detained an employee, the Embassy assisted the employee by keeping them on the 

payroll, placing him/her on authorized leave, or paying the employee’s salary to the spouse so that the family could 

survive during the employee’s detention.72 In 1948, the Department formalized its policy for protecting its Iron 

Curtain local national employees who were in extreme danger. The policy amounted to smuggling the employee, 

as well as his or her spouse and dependents, out of the country and paying the family’s expenses.73

Harassment and detention of local employees contributed heavily to the break in U.S.-Bulgarian relations 

in 1950. In Sofia, U.S. Legation officers strove to ensure the security of the Legation’s local employees. The 

suspicious deaths of three of Legation’s local employees while in detention; the arrest, detention, and intimidation 

of many others; and restrictions placed upon the U.S. Legation by the Bulgarian Communist government irritated 

the already prickly bilateral relations between the two countries. The U.S. Legation’s senior local employee, 

Mikhail Shipkov, was arrested and brutally interrogated by the Bulgarian security police. Beginning in October 

1949, in an effort to protect Shipkov, U.S. officials hid him in the Legation for more than three months. John C.

Campbell, the Officer in Charge of Balkan Affairs, told Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 

George W. Perkins that he was willing to break relations with Bulgaria’s Communist government if it meant 

getting Shipkov out of the country. Campbell believed that an aggressive, steadfast course of action regarding 

treatment of U.S. post employees would not only “enhance the prestige” of the United States, but the act of 

breaking relations with Bulgaria might “indirectly bring about better treatment of [U.S.] missions in other satellite 

states.”74 After the Bulgarians accused U.S. Minister Donald R. Heath of trying to overthrow the Bulgarian 

Government and declared him persona non grata, the United States broke relations with Bulgaria in February 

1950. However, the United States could not get Shipkov out of the country. Despite a Department of State 

affidavit, formally presented to the Bulgarian Government, citing Shipkov’s innocence, he was arrested and tried 

for espionage, then sentenced to 15 years in prison.75 The Department’s press release about the break in relations 

cited only the accusation of conspiracy against Heath, but, as Minister Heath made clear in a radio address on 

Washington DC’s CBS affiliate WTOP, the treatment of Embassy employees such as Shipkov played a central role 

in the break of U.S.-Bulgarian relations.76
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CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

U.S. citizens were not immune to similar treatment by East European police. U.S. diplomatic officials 

reported receiving increased attention from the Polish secret police (UB), which included being followed, 

receiving police escorts to and from engagements, and having their chauffeurs questioned and subjected to 

surveillance. The Polish secret police also arrested and questioned two U.S. citizens, both women who served as 

translators, and held one of them for several months.77 The UB also visited Julian Nowakowski, a U.S. citizen 

living in Warsaw and employed by the U.S. Embassy. They pressured him to become an informant, and warned 

him that “he should consider the safety of his wife and child” before declining the assignment. U.S. officials 

quickly transferred Nowakowski and his family out of Poland. By 1949, the hostile surveillance and treatment 

of U.S. Embassy personnel had increased to the point where Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallman anticipated that 

a member of the Embassy staff would soon be accused of espionage, and that the Department should prepare 

countermeasures.78 

In Eastern Europe, espionage was pervasive. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw terminated the employment of 

one Polish employee due to suspicions of his honesty and reliability. Another Polish employee admitted that his 

main job was to compromise individual Americans and the Embassy itself, in order to force the withdrawal of 

the U.S. Mission from Poland. The head of the American Section of Poland’s Foreign Ministry conceded that 

his Government not only had planted agents among Embassy employees, but also obtained copies of Embassy 

documents. “You would be surprised to learn what 

comes out of wastepaper baskets everywhere,” he told 

U.S. officials.79 The Czech police had charwomen 

collect the contents of the wastepaper baskets of the 

U.S. Embassy in Prague. In what was perhaps not a 

judicious choice, Embassy officers helped one elderly 

charwoman by giving her papers of no worth. U.S. 

officials in Prague also planned to expose the waste 

paper operation, but Washington discouraged this, 

fearing it would antagonize Czechoslovak officials, 

encourage retaliation against employees, and drive 

such activities further underground.80

Espionage and other hostile activities intensified 

against U.S. posts in Eastern Europe in the late 

1940s. Local newspapers accused U.S. missions and 

personnel of “systematically plot[ting] against the 

governments” of the “people’s democracies.” The 

U.S. Legation in Budapest feared that additional 

Figure 16: Special Agents Protect Secretary of State George C. 

Marshall during a 1948 trip to Athens, Greece. After World 

War II, U.S. Secretaries of State began travelling abroad 

often, and the security detail for the Secretary was extended to 

overseas travel as well. In this photograph, Regional Security 

Officer Ralph True (standing, second from left) looks on 

as Secretary of State and Mrs. Marshall prepare to depart 

Athens. Source: Department of State. 
96

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

attacks from the Hungarian press would soon lead the Hungarian government to order U.S. Embassy personnel 

to leave.81 FSOs found microphones hidden in the U.S. Embassy in Prague and searched for similar “bugs” in 

Budapest. Several listening devices were discovered in other Eastern Bloc countries over the next few years.82

z Partition of Palestine: A Portent of the Future å

The United Nations’ partition of Palestine in November 1947 brought security threats to U.S. posts overseas 

into high relief and foreshadowed the future of diplomatic security. With partition, tensions between Jews and 

Arabs threatened Department of State personnel and facilities. The tensions and subsequent hostilities resulted 

in the bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem, the murder of the U.S. Consul General, the kidnapping of a 

U.S. Foreign Service Officer, and the murder of one United Nations diplomat. The incidents in turn prompted 

the introduction of several security measures now common at U.S. posts abroad.

As Great Britain, the United States, Arab states, and Zionist groups debated the future of Palestine after 

the war, tensions and isolated incidents between Arabs and Jews in the British colony increased. In October 1947, 

U.S. Consul in Jerusalem Robert B. Macatee, reported, “Arab bitterness at Americans is apparent on all sides.” 

On October 13, unknown assailants bombed the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem. Although the bombing appears to 

have been more frightening than damaging, by December 1947, Macatee noted that for reasons of personal safety, 

U.S. personnel “were virtually confined in security zones maintained by British” forces. Even the routine matter of 

meeting the diplomatic courier had become “hazardous,” “require[d] a police escort,” and threatened to “become 

impractical [at] any time.” Macatee also said that travel by rail was no longer possible, and that continued service 

by Arab messengers, chauffeurs, and servants was increasingly “problematical.”83

With Great Britain preparing to end its mandate over Palestine and pull out its troops in 1948, the 

U.S. Consulate, like other foreign posts in Jerusalem, began seriously considering protection for its personnel 

and facilities. Consul General Macatee acknowledged that after the October bombing, the British Palestine 

Government had “generously singled out [the] American Consul General...for special treatment by giving us 

guards while refusing [guards to] others.” Insecurity, however, remained. Many local guards deserted their posts; 

meanwhile, British authorities struggled to maintain some semblance of general security. Since the Consulates 

of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Transjordan had private guards, Macatee proposed that the Department 

send 290 U.S. Marines to Jerusalem. That number could provide details of 8 men during the day and 12 at night, 

along with escorts for Consulate officials as they moved about the city. The Department responded that it had 

“no intention of recommending the use of Marines,” but Macatee’s proposal was leaked to the press by the British 

office and provoked a “strong reaction” from the Jerusalem public.84

Macatee’s proposal for 290 Marines prompted a series of discussions by Department officials regarding 

the protection of U.S. personnel, and the type and number of diplomatic and consular activities to provide in 

Palestine. The Department proposed sending a dozen civilian guards to Jerusalem. The limits of the civilian 
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CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

guard program became apparent, however, when one newly assigned guard arrived lacking experience and any 

knowledge of firearms. On February 6, 1948, Macatee urged the Department to “send [a] security expert to 

analyze [the] situation and make recommendations,” because the imminent departure of British troops would 

leave the Consulate in a “no-man’s land” between the Jewish and Arab quarters.85 With Macatee casting profound 

doubts upon the Consulate’s ability to operate after the British withdrawal, Assistant Secretary of State for Near 

Eastern Affairs Loy Henderson recommended to Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett that the U.S. Consulate 

in Jerusalem reduce its activities rather than close its doors. Conceding that the situation was “deteriorating,” the 

Department ordered that the Consulate move most of its operations to Haifa. By mid-April 1948, Consulate 

personnel had transferred much of its activities, personnel, and files to the Mediterranean port.86 The murder of 

Macatee’s successor, U.S. Consul General Thomas C. Wasson, by a sniper on May 22, 1948, and the subsequent 

kidnapping of a U.S. Consular official in August ended the debate over guards. Shortly afterwards, 42 Marines 

arrived to protect the Consulate in Jerusalem. Ultimately, that number was reduced to 15 Marines, with 2 

Marines on duty 24 hours a day in 1949, after a truce ended the fighting.87

The task of guarding the new U.S. Embassy to Israel, located in Tel Aviv, proved to be a logistical headache. 

In May 1948, Britain withdrew its troops from Palestine, Israel declared itself a nation-state, and Egypt, Lebanon, 

Syria, and Transjordan then attacked Israel, starting the first Arab-Israeli war. The extremely high demand for 

housing and office space in Tel Aviv forced the mission to accept a house for the Ambassador’s residence that 

was 12 kilometers away from the chancery, and Chief of Mission James G. McDonald commuted the distance 

daily.88 The 12 kilometers forced the post’s Security 

Officer to divide his 12-man civilian guard force 

between the chancery and the residence. Depending 

on the state of tensions, Tel Aviv security officials 

assigned one to three Israeli police officers to enhance 

security.89 In addition, the guards’ housing (located 

several blocks from the chancery) did not have a 

telephone, and “irregular” and “in some cases nonexistent” telephone service plagued both the chancery 

and residence. Guards used SCR-300 radios to ensure 

communications among themselves, and ordered 

walkie-talkies to maintain contact with Israeli police.90

When U.S. Marines took over guard duties in 1949, 

the guard detail still did not have a jeep. The mission’s 

severe shortage of cars raised the possibility that guards 

might need to hire taxis for transportation in the most 

Figure 17: The Body of Count Folke Bernadotte, UN 

Mediator for Palestine, Lies in State in Jerusalem, Israel, 

September 1948. The deaths of Bernadotte and of U.S. 

Consul General Thomas Wasson were part of a set of 

terrorist threats in Palestine during 1947 through 1949 

that foreshadowed diplomatic security efforts in the future. 

Source: © Associated Press. 
98

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

dire or routine circumstances. Mission officers had already employed taxis to transport classified documents and 

themselves between the chancery and the residence when McDonald moved his office to the residence for security 

reasons. Ultimately, the Security Officer admitted that, in an emergency, “the safety of both the Embassy and the 

residence . . . [was] dependent on the ability and resourcefulness of the one Marine stationed at each place.”91

The murder of Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator in Palestine, by a Jewish extremist 

group in September 1948 forced significant changes to the Tel Aviv post’s security procedures. The costly Chief 

of Mission’s residence now proved its worth. Located on a hill surrounded by a fence, the residence, said the 

security officer, was “comparatively ideal for protection.” With a “blanket threat” issued against all Americans, 

Israeli police placed three officers on constant duty outside the chancery. Mission officers were told to remain at 

mission offices “as much as possible,” and Israeli police and mission guards escorted Chief of Mission McDonald 

to and from the chancery. After a short time, at the security officer’s insistence, McDonald stopped commuting 

and set up his office in his residence. Other post officers spent nights at the residence so “their insecure abodes 

would not be identified.”92

Post communications proved an easier problem for the Department of State to resolve. Like many posts, the 

U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem had utilized commercial telegraph facilities; however, with the May 1948 withdrawal 

of British forces, officials deemed a disruption in commercial wire services “very likely.” One week before British 

troops left, the U.S. Navy flew in 30,000 pounds of radio equipment, including two radio transmitters and a 

gasoline-powered generator, as well as a team of 12 naval communications personnel. The Consulate housed 

the naval communications office next door in the Convent of the Rosary, and made agreements with the Mother 

Superior to house and feed the Navy technicians.93

The U.S. Mission Tel Aviv faced a similar situation. Shortly after opening, it wired Washington, stating that 

its only means of safe communication was the RCA (Radio Corporation of America) office. It also reported that 

its mail was “censored” and that it had no pouch or courier service. Within a week, Tel Aviv was incorporated 

into the courier route from Cairo, and soon afterwards the mission obtained radio equipment and a code room.94 

Despite the killings of Bernadotte and Wasson, the kidnapping of a U.S. consular official, and the bombing 

of the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem, Department officials sought to cut the Tel Aviv mission’s security expenses in 

order to meet “drastic budget restrictions.” Just a few weeks after the Bernadotte murder, Under Secretary Lovett 

asked the Tel Aviv mission how much longer it needed the “special temporary guard detachment;” McDonald 

informed him that the continued emergency still demanded the guards. The Department of State later proposed 

renting out part of the chancery as a means of offsetting costs, but the mission shot back that the proposal “defeats 

the entire objective [of] security.”95 When the Department balked at approving the lease for the Chief of Mission’s 

residence on the hill, McDonald informed Washington that if the Department rejected the lease, “I risk being 

forced [to] live in a tent.” The post Security Officer put it more bluntly, “it is imperative that the present residence 

be maintained. There is no other comparative house in the Tel Aviv-area that offers a similar degree of security.”96
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CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

Fiscal economies in Washington still created diplomatic security problems at the U.S. mission in 

Israel. For more than a year, Tel Aviv mission officers warned the Department that they had only two 

people who could handle classified material, and that both were working long hours and seven days a 

week. One was McDonald’s daughter, who served as his personal secretary. The other person, Bernard 

Piatek, marked, typed, and filed all of the mission’s classified materials, which made up 85 percent of the 

mission’s correspondence. He also prepared diplomatic pouches.97 The mission, on numerous occasions, 

pleaded with Washington for another secretary and file clerk who could handle classified materials, but 

the Department either denied the request due to budgetary constraints or failed to send the people.98

Mission officers soon began venting their frustration to Washington. McDonald bluntly asked Joseph 

Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, how Washington could expect 

reports if they sent no one to write them. The post’s Counselor, Charles Knox, sardonically wondered if 

“the Department [was] under a misapprehension regarding the clerical utility of the 12 guards and the 

Post Security Officer.” By September 1949, a security survey revealed that not only had the problem 

remained unresolved, but that the Tel Aviv mission, out of sheer necessity, allowed alien employees to 

handle and/or type classified materials.99

In Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, U.S. officials also faced the problem of espionage. One member of the Navy 

communications team in Jerusalem reported that his girlfriend had “requested him to give her copies [of ] all 

messages (coded and clear) received by the Consul General.” Microphones were found at U.N. headquarters 

in Tel Aviv and Haifa, and Israeli government agents approached one local employee of the Tel Aviv mission. 

The Department of State warned the Consul General in Jerusalem that two Polish consulate officials were 

possibly intelligence agents. When the Department requested the Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Cairo 

to travel to Tel Aviv and survey the mission for security breaches, the RSO found that a workman had installed 

an extra telephone in the Military Attaché’s office, and that a local tenant had installed a private radio antenna 

on the roof of the attaché’s office.100

z Marine Corps Guards: Resolving a Problem, Creating a Tradition å

Embassy guards constituted perhaps one of the most troubling and persistent problems for the Department 

of State during the immediate aftermath of World War II. Even though diplomatic protocol dictated that the host 

government bore “the ultimate responsibility” for the protection of all diplomats accredited to their nation, U.S. 

Embassies, Legations, and Consulates generally hired U.S. private citizens as embassy guards and local foreign 

nationals as night watchmen to provide basic security from theft, vandalism, espionage, and other crimes.101

Practice, however, varied from region to region. For example, in Chile and Iran, the local governments provided 

guards for U.S. Embassies.102 In and near theaters of war, U.S. Army soldiers assumed the responsibility, or in the 

case of London, the Marines did.103
100

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The problems mounted as the Department reopened Embassies, Legations, and Consulates in liberated areas 

and newly emergent nations after the war. One problem was a shortage of civilian guards. In Rome and Berlin, 

the U.S. Army, at the Department’s request, continued to provide soldiers as guards.104 Amid the rising tensions of 

the Cold War and decolonization, distrust of local guards and night watchmen grew. One SY official admitted that 

local guards “were subject to political pressure;” meanwhile, another said that night watchmen prevented theft but 

probably would stop few security breaches. One Foreign Service Officer confessed that his post’s gatekeepers and 

guards were a security problem because they were generally “uneducated” and “badly paid.”105

The characteristics of U.S. citizens serving as embassy guards raised other issues. Many were “older persons 

of limited education, experience, and physical endurance,” and the younger guards “usually lacked interest in their 

assignment and quite often accepted such employment for ulterior purposes.” Few were willing to relocate to any 

Figure 18: The Organizational Chart for the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador. Under “Miscellaneous,” John Hunter, the “Night 

Guard” (a U.S. civilian guard), is listed as overseeing the work of five messengers, two houseboys, two gardeners, and two 

charwomen, in addition to his guard duties. Civilian guards were among the lowest-paid U.S. citizens positions at an embassy. 

Difficulties and higher expectations after World War II led to the Marine Security Guard detail. Source: Department of State 

Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
101

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

post in the world, particularly given the low salary that they received (their pay was less than most Embassy clerks).106

Common private sector issues such as overtime, drunkenness, and poor performance compounded the situation. 

Despite Departmental instructions that guards receive overtime pay for all work in excess of 40 hours per week, some 

post and department officers complained when guards requested it, and in at least one instance, a guard resigned over 

the issue.107 Since many post budgets permitted only minimal overtime, officers-in-charge granted compensatory time 

(losing the guard’s services at a later date) or simply did without the security. Moreover, with postwar demobilization 

and the occupation of Germany, Army officials wanted to move their troops to other assignments.108 

By 1947, it became evident that existing arrangements for embassy guards did not meet the minimal 

needs of the Department, and Department officials decided to “overhaul” the embassy guard system. As one 

official remarked, “the proper protection required for our sensitive operations abroad” necessitated “a group of 

physically fit, well-trained and disciplined, smart appearing” guards.109 The Foreign Service Act of 1946, in 

Section 562, authorized the Secretary of the Navy to provide enlisted men from the Navy and Marine Corps “to 

serve as custodians...at an Embassy, Legation or Consulate” upon the Secretary of State’s request. Section 562 

was intended for emergencies; however, when the Army needed to pull troops from guard duty in Rome, the 

Department of State drew upon Section 562 and asked the Navy to provide Marines to replace the soldiers.110

In early 1947, Department of State officials turned to the U.S. Army to create a formal embassy guard program 

and said that they were willing to split the costs with the War Department.111 The Army was the first choice, partially 

due to the Department’s experience during World War II, but also because Secretary of State George Marshall (a 

retired General and former Army Chief of Staff) and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Carlyle Humelsine 

(a former Colonel) had Army backgrounds. Army officials were interested, and talks were progressing well by late 

1947. However, the Secretary of State’s Legal Advisor reminded Secretary Marshall that the 1946 act required the 

Department to consult with the Navy for security guards, which forestalled an agreement with the Army.112

The Marine Corps was very interested in the embassy guard program and accepted; however, it did so for 

reasons of inter-service politics and institutional survival, not from a “tradition” of protecting U.S. diplomatic 

posts. USMC Lieutenant Colonel Wade Jackson, who with his friend Humelsine negotiated the Department of 

State -Marine Corps agreement, later admitted that the Marines had accepted embassy guard duty principally as 

“a political expediency, back-scratching thing to enlist [Secretary] Marshall’s support.”113 In 1947 and 1948, the 

Marine Corps saw itself in an unfavorable position. The Truman Administration was reorganizing the military 

and created the new Department of Defense. Amid reorganization, inter-service competition for positions, roles, 

and resources intensified, as did a debate over whether to include the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a 

member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There were also proposals to cut the Marine Corps sharply, or even end it 

altogether. The Corps’ forces had declined from nearly 500,000 men in 1945 to 83,000 in 1948, and declined 

further before the Korean War broke out in 1950. Congress and the public were also concerned about the federal 

budget and inflation, and budget cuts were common. When the Department offered the “high profile” task, the 
102

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Marine Corps jumped at it. Jackson and Humelsine 

completed most of the negotiations in private 

conversations. On June 22, 1948, Under Secretary of 

State Robert Lovett formally requested 300 Marines 

to serve as embassy guards, and the Secretary of the 

Navy authorized it a month later. The understanding 

on both sides was that this was a short-term task, not 

a permanent program.114 

Anticipated as only temporary, the Marine Security 

Guard program placed 300 Marines at 26 embassies, 

but it did not end the need for civilian guards. Marines 

appeared--in civilian clothes, not dress blues--only at 

major posts in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle 

East, with posts in South Korea, Thailand, Ceylon (Sri 

Lanka), and Tangiers rounding out the list. Most posts 

had five Marines, with larger contingents at major 

U.S. embassies in Europe.115 With the arrival of the 

Marines, civilian guards stationed at those posts faced 

a number of possible futures. Some were transferred 

to posts where Marines were not assigned; others 

assumed new tasks such as supervisor of messengers or 

administrative assistant. The Legation in Beirut kept 

one civilian guard to serve as translator because none of 

the Marines spoke French.116 Several embassies that obtained Marine guards continued to employ local nationals as 

guards because Marine Security Guards only stood watch when the embassy’s offices were closed. During working 

hours, U.S. embassies still relied upon locals or had no guards on duty.117 

All parties quickly came to appreciate the benefits of the Marine Security Guard program. Within seven years, 

an SY official acknowledged that Marine Security Guards had become “accepted as a normal personnel practice” 

and that a U.S. tourist “now expects to find a capable young Marine” when contacting the mission “outside 

normal work hours.” Moreover, the Marine Corps took “great pride” in their contribution to the Department 

of State, not to mention recognizing the advantages that the increased visibility offered for the service’s prestige 

and recruiting. For Marines, embassy work was popular duty. The Department also appreciated that the Marine 

Corps paid the administration, salaries, health care, leave, and other expenses, reducing a post’s guard expenses by 

50 percent or more.118

Figure 19: Carlyle Humelsine, Assistant Secretary of State 

for Administration. Humelsine and USMC Lieutenant 

Colonel Wade Jackson negotiated the agreement that created 

the Marine Security Guard program at the Department of 

State. Source: Department of State Records, National 

Archives and Records Administration. 
103

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

Some posts, however, opposed using the Marines 

as guards, particularly those in the Near East and 

South Asia. In 1950, the Regional Security Officer 

in Cairo admitted that most Chiefs of Mission in 

the region strongly preferred “middle-aged, married, 

civilian guards.” In South Asia (India, Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and Sri Lanka), posts expressed concern 

that “the memory of the British uniform still rankles.” 

Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and other Muslim nations, 

as well as Yugoslavia, opposed the presence of foreign 

military personnel in their territory. In the case of 

Saudi Arabia, the Department told its Embassy that in 

negotiating with Saudi officials, it should “minimize” 

the men’s status as Marines and “emphasize” them as 

“civilian guards” who will be unarmed and “attired in 

civilian clothes at all times.” The Department issued 

special passports to Marine guards heading to Saudi 

Arabia, stating simply that they were on “official 

business for the Department of State,” and displaying 

photographs of the Marines in civilian clothes.119

z Couriers Replace Despatch Agents å

After World War II, the Department of State’s courier system replaced the Despatch Agent system as the 

primary carrier of the Department’s diplomatic correspondence. Following the passage of the Truman Act of 

1946, the Courier Service was moved into the division of Documents and Communications under the Assistant 

Secretary of State for Administration. Regional centers created during wartime in Cairo, Algiers, and Naples 

remained in place, while new courier centers were established in Panamá, Paris, Shanghai, and Manila. The 

courier service was comprised of 77 trained, full-time diplomatic couriers, and transported about 100,000 pounds 

of materials each year, through the early 1950s.120

As part of its information security campaign, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee’s Subcommittee 

for Security Control set forth uniform practices for the transmission of classified materials through the Department’s 

pouch system. All diplomatic pouches required a routing certificate to be displayed prominently on the outside of 

each pouch. Methods of transmission varied depending on the level of classification of the contents.121 Airborne 

pouches bearing higher classifications had to be stored securely (in a safe) in the post’s mailroom, and then 

Figure 20: A Diplomatic Courier (left) waits in the 

Department of State’s mail room in 1948 as diplomatic 

pouch contents are sorted and logged. After World War 

II, couriers replaced Despatch Agents as the Department’s 

primary carriers of important documents. The courier 

system resulted, in part, because air transport had developed 

so significantly. Source: Department of State. 
104

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

accompanied to the airport by a courier, who personally had to witness the loading of the pouches on the plane. 

Upon a pouch’s arrival at its destination city, a courier would meet it on the landing strip and enter the plane’s 

cargo compartment to collect it. The courier would then walk the pouch through customs and escort it to the safe 

mailroom of its destination post.122 

z The Hoover Commission å

In January 1949, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, commonly 

known as the Hoover Commission, issued its first report. Created in 1947 and headed by former President 

Herbert Hoover, the Commission extensively examined the organization and operations of the Executive 

Branch, including the Department of State. As part of the Hoover Commission, the Department set up a task 

force to study the Division of Security, and the resultant study, released on March 23, 1949, constituted the 

first extensive examination of the security function within the Department. The Security Task Force (which 

contained several members from SY)123 urged Department officials to centralize security tasks and responsibilities 

within the Division of Security, declaring that the Department “must have an effective security program.” The 

Figure 21: Map of Routes for the Department of State’s Courier Service. The map shows the courier routing system that 

developed after World War II and replaced the Despatch Agent system. The map, although dated 1956, shows the regional 

centers that developed in Paris, Panamá, and Manila. In many cases, these routes were similar to the shipping routes employed 

by the Despatch Agents. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
105

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

Task Force also pressed the Division of Security to 

manage more actively its overseas security program. 

The Department promptly created five Regional 

Security Officers located in London, Cairo, Manila, 

Mexico City, and Rio de Janeiro. The U.S. High 

Commissioner of Germany had its own Regional 

Security office. The Regional Security Officers were 

tasked to assist overseas security officers and the posts 

with improving security, implementing new measures, 

assisting with investigations, and submitting monthly 

security surveys of the missions in their areas.124

Although the Hoover Commission prompted 

significant reorganization in other bureaus of the 

Department, SY was little affected. The Divisions 

of Security, Visa, Passport, and Protective Services 

were grouped together into a new Office of Consular 

Services that replaced the Office of Controls, but 

retained the old acronym CON.125

The Office of Security did gain one new task: Department identification cards. The pass system instituted 

during the war had broken down, and procedures such as surrendering visitor passes upon departure were not 

implemented uniformly. Also, there was no accountability, even if a pass became mutilated, illegible, lost, or 

was retained by a departing employee.126 Shortly after the Hoover Commission, SY instituted a standardized 

identification card. The ID card contained a black-and-white photograph of the person, as well as their name, 

and other information. When entering the building after hours, employees presented their ID cards to the guard 

and signed the register book. SY maintained a record of the cards issued, and employees and officers had to return 

them when leaving or retiring from the Department.127 

z Bannerman’s Legacy å

By 1949, SY had achieved the basic organizational structure that it would have for the next two decades. The 

division consisted of three branches: Investigations, which conducted background investigations of Department 

employees and maintained liaisons with other agencies; Evaluations, which evaluated the results of the 

investigations; and Physical Security, which managed protective security of Department personnel and property in 

Washington and overseas. Physical Security also drafted and administered Department security regulations, and 

trained Department employees in these procedures. The branches and functions reflected the three-part program 

Figure 22: Guard at the Main Entrance to the U.S. 

Department of State (now the 21st Street Entrance). In 

1949, the Division of Security implemented a new photo ID 

card system, and employees had to present the card whenever 

entering the building. Visitors to the Department received 

a temporary ID with restrictions on hours and areas of the 

building they could visit. Source: Department of State 

Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
106

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

developed by Bannerman in June 1945. Like Bannerman’s Security Office, the Division of Security (SY) handled 

all security and loyalty screenings for the Department, conducting more than 7,200 investigations in Fiscal Years 

1948 and 1949, and rendering evaluations for each screening, and making recommendations. SY also retained 

the Office of the Chief Special Agent’s responsibilities for protecting the Secretary and foreign dignitaries and 

investigating passport and visa fraud cases.128 

Bannerman’s small Security Office transformed the much larger Office of the Chief Special Agent, and that 

transformation resulted, in part, from Bannerman’s fortuitous timing. The Amerasia case, Congress’ questions 

about loyalty and Soviet espionage in the Department of State, the United States’ rise as a superpower, and the 

emergence of the Cold War combined to force the Department to create and implement a formal security program. 

As the Klaus Report and subsequent Klaus Committee reveal, Departmental resistance to a comprehensive security 

program was strong, and the merger of Bannerman’s office with the Division of Investigations, and Bannerman’s 

move to the CIA resulted from it. Moreover, intense Congressional and public pressure pushed a reluctant 

Department of State to continually upgrade, expand, and professionalize its security program. Bannerman’s 

three-part program (screenings, overseas security program, and training) provided the foundation for the security 

program – and Security office—that the Department needed in 1945 and would need for the Cold War. The 

Division of Security (SY) with its multiple objectives was the expanded Security Office that Robert L. Bannerman 

had hoped to create. It was his legacy; and it is upon this foundation that later developments in diplomatic 

security, including the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, were built. 

Endnotes

1 Robert L. Bannerman, “A Brief History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent, Department of State, Part F,” p. 

2, enclosed with Oral History Interview, Robert [L.] Bannerman, conducted by George Payne, 20 August 1991, 

Folder – Diplomatic Security History, Box – Archives H-N, Bureau of Diplomatic Security Training Center, Dunn 

Loring, Virginia (hereafter cited as DS TRACEN). The cover document lists Robert C. Bannerman, but George Payne 

interviewed Robert L. Bannerman. Apparently, in preparation for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s 75th Anniversary” 

Bannerman wrote a short history/memoir of his years with the Chief Special Agent and Security Offices. Part F covers 

the post-1945 period and his time as Security Officer. 

2 Departmental Order 1218, 15 January 1944, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, Volume X/ Number 238 

(15 January 1944), pp. 45-65. Diagram of the reorganized Department appears on pp. 66-67. Departmental Order 

1301, 20 December 1944, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, Volume XI / Number 286A (17 December 1944) 

Supplement, pp. 778-813, particularly pp. 806-807, 813. Diagram of the reorganized Department appears on pp. 794-

795. Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State: A History of its Procedure and Personnel (New York: Macmillan, 1949), 

pp. 391-411. For personnel numbers, see Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular Practice, Second edition (New York: 

Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952), p. 21; and Department of State, Report on the Organization of the Department of State, 

January-June 1946 (Washington DC: Department of State, 1946), p. 11. 

3 Tab 2 “A History of Security Organization,” in “Study by Reorganization Task Force on Security of the Department of 

State,” 23 March 1949, [No Folder], Box 13, Security Files 1932-1963, Records of the Division of A/SY/Evaluations, Record 

Group 59 - Lot 96D584, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park Maryland (hereafter cited as Security 
107

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations, RG 59 – Lot 96D584, NA). Memorandum “Security System,” John C. Ross, Director of 

Office of Departmental Administration, to Joseph C. Grew, Under Secretary of State, and John G. Erhardt, Acting Assistant 

Secretary of State (Administration), 6 January 1945; Memorandum “Organization of Security in the Department,” Ross 

to Samuel D. Boykin, Executive Officer (ODA), 13 January 1945; and Memorandum “Designation of Assistant Security 

Officers in the Department,” Ross to Erhardt, 13 January 1945, attached to Memorandum, Ross to Boykin, 13 January 

1945; all Folder – Security, Box 9, Reading Files of Samuel D. Boykin, 1931-1953, RG 59-Lot 53D223, NA (hereafter cited 

as Boykin Reading Files). Office of War Information, United States Government Manual, 1945, First edition (Washington 

DC: USGPO, 1945), pp. 187, 203-204. Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular Practice, 22.

4 Memorandum “Security,” Ross to Raymond Geist, Chief of Division of Central Services, and William D. Wright, 

Associate Chief of Division of Central Services, 15 January 1945, attached to Memorandum “Security,” Ross to 

Boykin,” 15 January 1945; and Memorandum, Ross to Wright, 3 February 1945; both Folder – Security, Box 9, 

Boykin Reading Files. 

5 Report “FBI Security Survey of the Department of State,” 8 March 1945, enclosed with Memorandum, J. Edgar 

Hoover, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 9 March 

1945, Folder – Miscellaneous Security Material, 1945-1952, Box 7, Boykin Reading Files. Memorandum “FBI 

Security Survey of the Department of State – March 8, 1945,” Elmer R. Hipsley to Otto F. Otepka, Chief of Division 

of Evaluations, Office of Security, 12 May 1958, Folder – Correspondence 1960, Box 7, Security Files 1932-1963, 

A/SY/Evaluations. 

6 Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism (Chapel Hill: University of North 

Carolina Press, 1996), 3-7.

7 Klehr and Radosh, The Amerasia Spy Case, pp. 3-7, 218-219. 

8 “Arrest of State Department Employee and Foreign Service Officer,” Department of State Bulletin, 10 June 1945, p. 1088. 

Klehr and Radosh, The Amerasia Spy Case, 71-77, 218-219, 98. Quotation on page 98. Lansing Warren, “Inquiry on 

‘Leaks’ is Pushed; Grew Indicates More Arrests,” New York Times, 8 June 1945, p. 1 

9 Tab 2 “A History of Security Organization,” Study by Reorganization Task Force on Security of the Department of State, 

23 March 1949. Bannerman, “A Brief History of the Chief Special Agent, Part F,” p. 2. “Appointment of Officers,” 

Department of State Bulletin, 1 July 1945, p. 40. 

10 Warren, “Inquiry on ‘Leaks’ is Pushed,” New York Times, 8 June 1945, pp. 1, 5. Bannerman, “A Brief History of the Chief 

Special Agent, Part F,” p. 2. 

11 Bannerman, “A Brief History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent, Part F,” p. 2. 

12 Bannerman, “A Brief History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent, Part F,” pp. 2-9. 

13 In addition to the Office of War Information (OWI), President Truman abolished the Foreign Economic Administration, 

the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Army-Navy Liquidation Commission, and the Office of Inter-American Affairs 

(OIAA). The Office of Inter-American Affairs was a wartime agency created to promote and increase inter-American 

solidarity and cooperation during World War II, through public and cultural diplomacy, commercial relations, and 

educational exchanges. OIAA was separate from the Division of American Republics (ARA), which managed U.S. 

bilateral diplomatic relationships with Latin American nations. 

14 Bannerman, “A Brief History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent, Part F,” p. 5-6. Memorandum “Investigation of 

OWI and OIAA Personnel,” Bannerman [?] to Frederick B. Lyon, Director of Office of Controls, and Frank McCarthy, 

Assistant Secretary of State, 18 September 1945, Folder – Personnel Investigations 1945-1947, Box 9; and Memorandum 

“History of State Department Security,” Bannerman[?], n.d. [April? 1947], Folder – SY Organization – Plans-Position 

Descriptions, etc., 1959-1961, Box 1; both Security Files 1932-1963, A/SY/Evaluations. 
108

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

15 Memorandum “Members of the Security Screening Committee,” Bannerman to Donald S. Russell, Assistant 

Secretary of State for Administration, 13 March 1946; and Memorandum “Security Screening Committee,” 

Bannerman to Joseph Panuch, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary for Administration, and W. Pierce MacCoy, 

Chief of the Division of Departmental Personnel, 9 January 1946; both Folder – Personnel Investigations 1945-

1947, Box 9, Security Files 1932-1963, A/SY/Evaluations. Memorandum “History of State Department Security,” 

[Bannerman], n.d. [April? 1947]. 

16 See Katherine A. S. Sibley, Red Spies in America: Stolen Secrets and the Dawn of the Cold War (Lawrence: University Press 

of Kansas, 2004). 

17 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: 

HarperCollins, 1990), 369-371. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and 

the Secret History of the KGB (New York: BasicBooks, 1997), 137-138, 142-143. Edward Shils, The Torment of Secrecy: 

The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies (Glencoe IL: The Free Press, 1956), 69-70. Bannerman, 

“A Brief History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent, Part F,” p. 6. Memorandum “History of State Department 

Security,” [Bannerman], n.d.[April? 1947]. 

18 Memorandum “Anticipated Personnel,” Bannerman to Lyon and Panuch, 17 April 1946; and Memorandum, Bannerman 

to Lyon and Panuch, 15 May 1946; both Folder – Reorganization (Security Office), Box 18, Security Files 1932-1963, 

A/SY/Evaluations. Memorandum “Security Committee Disapproval and Termination Actions,” Bannerman to Panuch, 

13 July 1946, attached to Memorandum, Bannerman to Panuch, 15 July 1946, Folder – Personnel Investigations 1945-

1947, Box 9, Security Files 1932-1963, A/SY/Evaluations. 

19 Memorandum “History of State Department Security,” [Bannerman], n.d.[April? 1947]. Memorandum “The Security 

Committee,” Bannerman to Lyon and Panuch, 10 May 1946, Folder – Reorganization (Security Office), Box 18, Security 

Files 1932-1963, A/SY/Evaluations. 

20 Untitled Memorandum on the history of the Office of Security, 27 February 1947, Box 7, Boykin Reading Files. 

Organizational Chart – Office of Security, 1948, Folder – Organizational Charts 1 - E, Box 11, Miscellaneous Decimal 

Files, 1953-1956, Records of the Office of Security and Consular Affairs, RG 59-Lot 57D254, NA. 

21 Memorandum “Possible Improvements in Security Procedures,” Paul H. Nitze, Policy Planning Staff, to Secretary of 

State, 19 July 1951, 115/7-1951, Box 487, DF 1950-54, RG 59, NA. McCarran Rider quoted in Memorandum, 

Department of State to President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 9 December 1946, Box 6, Boykin 

Reading Files. 

22 Memorandum “Security Control,” Bannerman to Lyon and Panuch, 20 May 1946, Folder – Reorganization (Security 

Office); and “Klaus Report,” Samuel E. Klaus, Special Assistant to Special Assistant to the Secretary for Research and 

Intelligence, 3 August 1946, Folder – Security Program - “Klaus Report” 1946; both Box 18, Security Files 1932-63, A/

SY/Evaluations. 

23 “Klaus Report,” Klaus, 3 August 1946, pp. 10-11, 15-16. 

24 Memorandum “Security Control,” Bannerman to Panuch and Lyon, 20 May 1946, Folder – Reorganization (Security 

Office); and “Klaus Report,” Klaus, 3 August 1946, pp. 20-23. 

25 “Klaus Report,” Klaus, 3 August 1946, pp. 1-2. Memorandum “History of State Department Security,” Bannerman [?], 

n.d. [April? 1947]. Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

1998), 213. 

26 Memorandum “Physical Security in the Department of State,” Stanley R. Goodrich, Management Consultant of Division 

of Management Planning, to Panuch, 15 August 1946, Folder – S.R. Goodrich – Security Survey, 1945-1948, Box 4, 

Boykin Reading Files. 
109

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

27 Memorandum “History of State Department Security,” [Bannerman], n.d. [April? 1947]. Memorandum, John W. Sipes, 

Security Counsel, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, to McLeod, 12 January 1954, enclosed 

with Memorandum, Sipes to Loy W Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, 1 February 1955, 

Folder – Miscellaneous – March 1953-56, Box 19; “Report on the Loyalty Security Program of the Department of State,” 

n.d. [February? 1953], enclosed with Note, John F. Barnard, Management Staff, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 

State for Administration to Sipes, 16 February 1953, Folder – Loyalty Security Board, Miscellaneous 3/1952 – 3/1953, 

Box 4, p. 4-5; and Memorandum “History of Security in the Department of State,” [Division of Security?], n.d. [1948], 

Folder – Division of Security, Box 9; all Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 

28 Table A “Summary of Employee Cases Docketed with Advisory Committee on Personnel Security through June 30, 

1947,” attached to Memorandum on loyalty and security program in the Department of State, Office of Security, n.d. 

[1950], Folder – Loyalty and Security in the Department: Charts, Commentary, and History of ...,” Box 16, Security 

Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. Memorandum “History of State Department Security,” Bannerman, n.d. [April? 1947]. 

29 Memorandum “History of State Department Security,” [Bannerman], n.d. [April? 1947]. 

30 Bannerman, “A Brief History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent, Part F,” p. 3. Memorandum “Department of State 

Security Responsibilities in Mission Abroad,” Office of Security, n.d. [1950?], Folder – SY Security Missions Overseas, 

Box 1; Memorandum “Proposed Operations of Security Officers in the Foreign Service,” Bannerman and Robert B. 

Freeman, n.d. [8? July 1946], enclosed with Memorandum, Bannerman to Julian F. Harrington, Director of Office of the 

Foreign Service, and Cecil W. Gray, Chief of Division of Foreign Service Personnel, 8 July 1946, Folder – Foreign Service 

Security Program, Box 9; Memorandum “Request for 34 Temporary Positions...,” Dennis Flinn, Deputy Director of the 

Office of Controls, to Bannerman, 25 November 1946, Folder – Reorganization – FS Security, Box 9; all Security Files 

1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 

31 Department of State Press Release No. 846, 22 October 1947; and Memorandum for Information 63 “Revised Terms 

of Reference for the State War Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Security Control,” 4 November 1946; both Box 

10, Boykin Reading Files. “Minimum Standards for Handling Classified Information,” Department of State Bulletin, 

XVII/436 (9 November 1947): 917. 

32 Stanley R. Goodrich, “The New Security Program,” The American Foreign Service Journal 24/1 (January 1947): 20-21. 

Bannerman, “A Brief History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent, Part F,” p. 8. 

33 Proposed Budget Statement, February 2, 1947, Box 4; and Program of Security Indoctrination Meetings, Box 10; both 

Boykin Reading Files. 

34 Emphasis in original. Dos and Don’ts of Security, pamphlet created by Department of State for distribution to employees, 

Box 1, Program Administration Files, 1954-56, RG 59-Lot 58D368, NA. Memorandum “Office and Division Security 

Officers,” Donald S. Russell, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, to Directors of Offices and Chiefs of 

Divisions, 3 January 1947, Box 10, Boykin Reading Files. 

35 Department of State Security Handbook, Box 1, Program Administration Files, 1954-56. 

36 Memorandum “Foreign Service Security Section, CSA: Past, Present, and Anticipated Future Activities,” Bannerman to 

Thomas F. Fitch, 14 April 1947, Folder – Reorganization FS Security, Box 9, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/ Evaluations. 

SWNCC Security Advisory Board, Box 146, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, RG353-Lot 

98D468, NA. 

37 Memorandum “Physical Security in the Department of State,” Goodrich to Panuch, 15 August 1946. Memorandum 

“History of State Department Security,” Bannerman [?], n.d. [April? 1947]. 

38 Memorandum “Physical Security in the Department of State,” Goodrich to Panuch, 15 August 1945. Memorandum, 

George H. Steurt, Jr., Executive Officer, Office of Controls, and Just Lunning, Chief of Division of Management Planning, 
110

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

to Panuch, 13 December 1946, Folder – Mr. Goodrich Work Folder 1944-47, Box 4, Boykin Reading Files. Memorandum 

“Proposal for Improvement of Administration and Operations of CSA and Elimination of Current Backlog,” Lyon to 

John E. Peurifoy, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, Folder – SY/Administration 1946-1951, 

Box 1, Subject Files of the Security Division, 1946-1953, RG 59 – Lot 53D223, NA. Hereafter cited as SY Subject Files, 

1946-53. Memorandum, “A History of State Department Security,” Bannerman [?], n.d. [April [?] 1947]. 

39 Bannerman, “A Brief History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent, Part F,” pp. 3-4. Memorandum “Curriculum – 

Special Course for Security Officers – State Department,” n.d. [1948?], Folder – Reorganization – FS Security, Box 9, 

Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 

40 Bannerman says that the first overseas security officers departed in 1946; however, documents show that it was July 1947. 

Bannerman, “A Brief History of the Office of the Chief Special Agent, Part F,” p. 3-4. Airgram A-81, Robert A. Lovett, 

Acting Secretary of State (Bannerman) to U.S. Consul, Port of Spain, Trinidad, British West Indies, 21 August 1947; 

and Memorandum, Hamilton Robinson, Director of Office of Controls, to Fitch, 28 April 1947; both Folder – Foreign 

Service Security Program, Box 9, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. For embassies assigned a security officer, 

the Ambassador received a letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administration Peurifoy about 10 days before the 

circular instruction. See Letter, Peurifoy to John C. Wiley, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal, 10 July 1947, Folder – Foreign 

Service Security Program, Box 9, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 

41 At the CIA, Bannerman became the Deputy Director and then Director of Security, and headed the United States 

Intelligence Board’s Security Committee. He received many awards and commendations. Memorandum “Robert L. 

Bannerman,” n.d. [1961]; and Memorandum “Nomination of Mr. Robert L. Bannerman for Career Service Award,” 

n.d. [1961], both enclosed with Letter, Nicholas Kelley, President, National Civil Service League, to John A. McCone, 

Director, CIA, Folder 23, Box 2, General CIA Files 84-00313R, NA. Bannerman, “A Brief History of the Office of the 

Chief Special Agent, Part F,” p. 3-4. Memorandum “Department of State Security Responsibilities in Missions Abroad,” 

n.d. [1950?]. David McCabe, Telephone Conversation with Mark Hove, 15 March 2006. 

42 Interview with Samuel D. Boykin, 7 May 1991, conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy, The Association for Diplomatic 

Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/ ammem/

collections/diplomacy/index.html (hereafter cited as ADST, LOC). Memorandum, Boykin, Acting Director of Office of 

Controls, to Fitch, 14 June 1948; and Memorandum “Special Security and Protective Assignments,” Boykin (Travis L. 

Fletcher) to Peurifoy, 22 June 1950, both Box 1, SY Subject Files, 1946-53.

43 Memorandum “Proposed Program for Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, CON,” Robinson to Peurifoy, 13 May 1947, 

Box 2, SCA Decimal Files, 1945-53, RG 59-Lot 53D223, NA. Hereafter cited as SCA DF 1945-53. Memorandum “Survey 

of Division of Foreign Activity Correlation,” Frederick W. Darnell and John H. Moore, Division of Organization and Budget, 

20 January 1948; and Report “Survey of Division of Foreign Activity Correlation,” Darnell and Moore, 19 January 1948; 

both Folder – Survey of Office of Foreign Activity Correlation, Box 13, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/ Evaluations.

44 Memorandum “Dissolution of FC and Transfer of Certain of Its Functions,” Robinson to Peurifoy, 17 February 1948, 

Folder – Implementation of Security Recommendations Made by Senators Green and Lodge (Copy No. 2), Box 6, Security 

Files 1932-63, A/SY/ Evaluations. Departmental Announcement 115, “Assignment of Responsibility for Intelligence 

and Security Functions,” Department of State, 27 August 1948, Box 1, SY Subject Files. “Division of Security (SY),” 

1948 [?], Box 12, SCA DF 1945-53. See also Memorandum “Distribution of FC Functions,” Fischer Howe, Deputy to 

the Special Assistant of the Bureau of Research and Intelligence, to Charles M. Hulten, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Administration, Stanley T. Orear, Chief of Division of Organization and Budget, and Boykin, 3 September 1948, Folder 

– Survey of Office of Foreign Activity Correlation, Box 13, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 

45 Memorandum “Division of Security, Department of State,” n.d. [1948], Folder – Miscellaneous 1961-1963, Box 2; and 

Memorandum “Division of Security (SY),” n.d. [1948], Folder – FC and CSA Merger, Box 6; both Security Files 1932-

63, A/SY/Evaluations. 
111

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

46 Executive Order 9835 quoted in Statement of Loyalty Review Board contained in Federal Personnel Manual, 22 April 

1948, Box 5, Boykin Reading Files. Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes, 209-211. 

47 Memorandum, John W. Hanes, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to R. W. Scott McLeod, Administrator of 

Bureau of Security, Consular Affairs, and Personnel (SCA), 21 January 1954, Box 13, SCA DF 1953-60. 

48 Memorandum, Sipes to McLeod, 12 January 1954, p. 2-3. Memorandum on loyalty and security program in the 

Department of State, [Office of Security], n.d. [1950], pp. 3-4. Memorandum “History of Security in the Department 

of State,” Division of Security, n.d. [1948?]. “Report on the Loyalty Security Program of the Department of State,” 

[Barnard?], n.d. [February? 1953], pp. 4-6. For the differences in handling of the two types of cases, see Memorandum 

on Procedures for Determining Loyalty in the Department of State, Robinson to Hulten, 19 May 1947, Folder – Memos 

3/17/47 – 7/30/47, Box 5; and Memorandum “Coordination of Security Cases,” Robinson to Ruth B. Shipley, Chief 

of Passport Division, Albert E. Clattenburg, Jr., Chief of Special Projects Division, Hervé J. L’Heureux, Chief of Visa 

Division, Elmer T. Cummins, Chief of Munitions Division, (MD), Thomas F. Fitch, Chief of Division of Investigations 

and Security, and Jack D. Neal, Chief of Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, 18 September 1947, attached to 

Memorandum “Security Check Announcement,” Neal to James A. Donovan, Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, 

18 September 1947, Folder – FC – Security Coordination, Box 17; both Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 

Department of State Press Release 804, Box 6, Boykin Reading Files. 

49 Department of State Press Release 804, Box 6, Boykin Reading Files Departmental Announcement 765, “Security 

Principles of the Department of State, and Hearing Procedure of the Personnel Security Board,” 17 September 1947, Box 

9, Boykin Reading Files. Memorandum “President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty,” Peurifoy to Dean 

Acheson, Under Secretary of State, 21 February 1947, Box 4, Boykin Reading Files. 

50 Memorandum on loyalty and security program in the Department of State, [Office of Security], n.d. [1950?], pp. 4-6. 

Bert Andrews, Washington Witch Hunt (New York: Random House, 1948), 4, 208. Memorandum “History of Security 

in the Department of State,” [Division of Security], n.d. [1948?], p. 3. Memorandum “History of 108 Cases,” Office of 

Security, 6 April 1950, Folder – Administrative Folder, Box 5; and Memorandum “Report on Loyalty Security Performance 

– 1947-1952,” Conrad E. Snow, Chairman of the Loyalty Security Board, to Acheson, Secretary of State, 8 January 1953, 

Folder – Loyalty Security Board, Miscellaneous 3/1952 – 3/1953, Box 4; both Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 

51 Telegram 725, George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, to John C. Wiley, U.S. Ambassador to 

Iran, 30 July 1948, 124.916/7-3048, Folder [4], Box 1226; Despatch 146 “Loyalty and Security Programs: Transmitting 

Required Data concerning Mrs. Frances Juanita Milam, Locally-hired American Employee,” Albert F. Nufer, U.S. 

Ambassador to El Salvador (Dubreuil) to Secretary of State, 5 April 1949, 124.163/4-549, Folder [5], Box 1014; Telegram 

4204, McCloy to Secretary of State, 22 November 1949, 124.62/11-2249, Folder [1], Box 1164; and Telegram 3076, 

Acheson (J. A. Bush) to High Command of Germany (HICOG), 1 December 1949, 124.62/11-2249, Folder [1], Box 

1164; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

52 For expedited investigations and immediate employment during investigation, see Telegram 1198, Wiley to Secretary 

of State, 26 September 1949, 124.913/9-2449; and Telegram 1422, Wiley to Secretary of State, 4 November 1949, 

124.913/11-449; both Folder [3], Box 1225, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For denials by department, see Instruction 

A-19, Acheson (G. deLong) to U.S. Representative Tel Aviv, 8 February 1949, 124.67n3/2-149, Folder [4], Box 1187; 

Instruction A-106, Acheson (M Rule) to U.S. Embassy San Salvador, 29 June 1949, 124.163/6-2949, Folder [5], Box 

1014; and Telegram 1049, Acheson (R. Bright) to U.S. Embassy Tehran, 21 November 1949, 124.913/11-2149, Folder 

[3], Box 1225; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

53 Diagrams “Enforcing the President’s Loyalty Program,” “Screening Non-Civil Service and Foreign Service Applicants,” 

“Eliminating Security Risks,” “Composition of Loyalty and Security Board,” and “State Department Loyalty and Security 

Board,” Department of State, n.d. [1949?], Folder – Loyalty and Security in the Dept: Charts, Commentary, and History 

of ...,” Box 16, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 
112

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

54 Diagrams “Enforcing the President’s Loyalty Program,” “Screening Non-Civil Service and Foreign Service Applicants,” 

“Eliminating Security Risks,” “Composition of Loyalty and Security Board,” and “State Department Loyalty and Security 

Board,” Department of State, n.d. [1949?]. Letter, Carlisle Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration 

(Acting), to Representative Anthony Tauriello, 27 June 1950, Box 487, DF 1950-54, RG 59, NA. 

55 Statement “Loyalty of State Department Employees,” Secretary of State George C. Marshall, 10 March 1948, reprinted 

in Department of State Bulletin XVIII/455 (21 March 1948): 390. 

56 Bert Andrews offers a description of events, his role, and the trip to Chambers’ pumpkin patch. See Bert Andrews and 

Peter Andrews, A Tragedy of History (Washington DC: Luce, 1962), 170-180. The Dewey and Andrews quotes appear 

on pages 169 and 177 respectively. 

57 As an example, see Despatch 979 “Plans for Emergency Action, Berlin,” Robert Murphy (A. McIver) to Secretary of State, 

23 June 1948, 124.626/6-2348, Folder [5], Box 1167; Despatch 1238 “Emergency Security Plan, U.S. Embassy, Paris,” 

Jefferson Caffery, U.S. Ambassador to France (P. J. Hoylen) to Secretary of State, 7 October 1948, 124.516/10-748; and 

Despatch 1063 “Emergency Plan for Paris,” Caffery to Secretary of State, 3 August 1948, 124.516/8-348; both Folder 

[5], Box 1109, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

58 Despatch 574 “Plans for Emergency Action of American Embassy at Santiago, Chile,” Claude G. Bowers, U.S. Ambassador 

to Chile (E. T. Long) to Secretary of State, 1 September 1948, 124.256/9-148, Folder [5], Box 1036; Despatch 312 “Plans 

for Emergency Action,” Nufer (M. W. Williams and L. A. Squires) to Secretary of State, 22 July 1948, 124.166/7-2248, 

Folder [2], Box 1015; Despatch 136 “Emergency Plan for Public Disorder and Civil War,” Lowell C. Pinkerton, U.S. 

Minister to Lebanon (J. M. Bowie) to Secretary of State, 18 May 1948, 124.90e6/5-1848, folder [1], Box 1215; Airgram 

A-652, Edward S. Crocker, Counselor of U.S. Embassy Warsaw, to Secretary of State, 24 May 1948, 124.60c6/5-1348, 

Folder [3], Box 1147; Despatch 320 “Preliminary Observations on the Problems Involved in Formulating a Plan for 

Emergency Action,” Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, U.S. Minister to Romania (J.C. Hill) to Secretary of State, 4 June 1948, 

124.646/6-448, Folder [1], Box 1175; and Airgram A-294, Selden Chapin, U.S. Minister to Hungary, to Secretary of 

State, 10 May 1948, 124.646/4-2948, Folder [1], Box 1175; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

59 William Barnes and John Heath Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United States: Origins, Development, and Functions

(Washington DC: Historical Office of the Department of State, 1961), 240-241, 254-255. Stuart, American Diplomatic 

and Consular Practice, p. 22. Memorandum, Paul H. Alling, Diplomatic Agent to Tangier, to Loy Henderson, Director 

of Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA), and Henry S. Villard, Deputy Director of NEA, 9 October 1946, 

attached to Memorandum “Personnel Shortage In Tangier,” Henderson to Russell, 23 October 1946, 124.913/10-2346, 

Folder [2], Box 1225, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

60 Telegram 36, Laurence Steinhardt, U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, to Secretary of State, 13 January 1947, 124.60f3/1-

2347, Folder – [3], Box 1151, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. David F. Trask with David M. Baehler and Evan M. Duncan, 

A Short History of the U.S. Department of State, 1781-1981 (Washington DC: GPO; 1981), 42. 

61 Telegram 2692, Caffery (Murphy) to Secretary of State, 16 May 1945, 124.623/5-1645, Folder [4], Box 1165; Telegram 

295, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes (H. B. Day) to U. S. Political Advisor for Germany (USPOLAD) in Berlin, 13 

August 1945, 124.623/7-1645, Folder [4], Box 1165; Telegram 501, Acheson (H. B. Day) to USPOLAD Berlin, 18 

September 1945, 124.623/9-845, Folder [4], Box 1165; Telegram 214, Byrnes (H. B. Day) to AUSPOLAD Vienna, 

17 October 1945, 124.623/10-545, Folder [4], Box 1165; and Airgram A62, George V. Allen, U.S. Ambassador to Iran 

(Docher) to Secretary of State, 26 March 1947, 124.913/3-2648, Folder [2], Box 1225; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

62 Telegram 2224, Murphy (Berlin) to Secretary of State, 21 September 1946, 124.623/9-2146, Folder [1], Box 1166; 

Telegram 424, Acheson (Tewell) to U.S. Consulate Berlin, 8 September 1945, 124.623/8-3145, Folder [4], Box 1165; 

Airgram A-218, Murphy to Secretary of State, 10 October 1945, 124.623/10-1045, Folder [4], Box 1166; Personnel 

Bulletin B-12, Brigadier General Bryan L. Milburn, Chief of Staff, Office of the Military Government for Germany, 14 

December 1945, enclosed with Despatch 1633, Shults (USPOLAD) to Department of State, 8 January 1946, 124.623/1-
113

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

846, Folder [1], Box 1166; and “Security Survey of Alien Employees of the Consular Branch of the Office of the Political 

Advisor on German Affairs, Berlin,” [W. B. Lockling], 2 March 1948, enclosed with Despatch 371 “Transmission of 

Security Survey...,” Lockling to Department of State, 9 March 1948, 124.623 / 3-948, Folder [2], Box 1166; all DF 

1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

63 Memorandum, Henderson to Russell, 23 October 1946, 124.913/10-2346. Airgram A-2, Byrnes (A. L. Beall) to U.S. 

Embassy Santiago, 3 January 1947, 124.253-12-646, Folder [5], Box 1035; and Airgram A-2306, Clayton (Burris) to 

U.S. Embassy San Salvador, 23 September 1946, 124.163/9-1046, Folder [4], Box 1014; both DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

Telegram 281, Marshall to U.S. Consulate Saigon, 6 August 1947, Folder – 123-130 (1947), Box 3, Records of the Saigon 

Embassy and Consulate – Confidential File (1946-47, 1949), RG84, NA. See also, Telegram 393, Acheson (Walyce) to 

U.S. Embassy Tehran, 6 May 1946, 124.913/5-646, Folder [2], Box 1225, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

64 Airgram A-21, Murray (Ward and Spivack) to Secretary of State, 19 January 1946, 124.913/1-1946, Folder [2], Box 

1225, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

65 Memorandum, W. M. Chase to U.S. Consular Offices at Munich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin, 31 

August 1946, enclosed with Despatch 6490 “Transmitting Memorandum on European Theater Policy...,” 3 September 

1946, 124.623/9-346, Folder [1], Box 1166; and Memorandum, Hildegard Holstein, U.S. Foreign Service Clerk, U.S. 

Embassy Prague, to Christian M. Ravndal, Director General of the Foreign Service, 13 February 1948, enclosed with 

Despatch 129 “Request of Hildegard Holstein,” John H. Bruins, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, to Secretary of State, 13 

February 1948, 124.60f3/2-1348, folder [4], Box 1151; and Despatch 393 “Request to Marry a Czechoslovak National 

Made by Miss Hildegard Holstein,” Steinhardt to Secretary of State, 3 June 1948, 124.60f3/6-348, Folder [4], Box 1151; 

all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

66 Telegram 1606, Steinhardt to Secretary of State, 4 September 1946, 124.60f3/9-446, Folder [3], Box 1151; and Telegram 

37, Acheson (Day) to U.S. Embassy Tehran, 16 January 1946, 124.913/1-746, Folder [1], Box 1225; both DF 1945-49, 

RG 59, NA. Memorandum “Proposed Circular on Marriages of American Officers and Employees of the Foreign Service 

to Aliens,” 22 July 1949, Folder – S.E.A. U.S. Missions 1949-1950, Box 1, Records of the Philippine and Southeast Asia 

Division, Regional Affairs, Subject Files, 1929-1953, RG 59-Lot, NA. 

67 Despatch 181 “Administrative Staffing Standards,” H. A. Buffalo, U.S. Legation Budapest, to Department of State, 14 

March 1949, 124.646/3-1449, Folder [2], Box 1175, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

68 Telegram 166, Arthur Bliss Lane, U.S. Ambassador to Poland, to Secretary of State, 31 January 1947, 124.60c3/1-3047, 

Folder [3], Box 1145; Telegram 628, Schoenfeld, U.S. Embassy Bucharest, to Secretary of State, 124.713/8-2449, Folder 

[1], Box 1153; Telegram 482, Steinhardt to Secretary of State, 26 March 1948, 124.60f3/3-2548, Folder [4], Box 1151; 

Telegram 1567, Gallman, U.S. Ambassador to Poland, to Secretary of State, 28 November 1949, 124.60c3/11-2849, 

Folder [5], Box 1145; Airgram A-724, Ellis O. Briggs, U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, to Department of State, 

3 December 1949, 124.60f6/12-349, Folder [1], Box 1153; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For harassment of persons 

working for U.S. posts before and after the war, see Telegram 1639, James K. Penfield, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, U.S. 

Embassy Prague, to Secretary of State, 26 October 1948, 124.60f3/10-2548; and Despatch 737 “Departure from Praha 

of Vendelin Kalenda,” Penfield to Secretary of State, 30 November 1948, 124.60f3/11-3048; both Folder [4], Box 1152, 

DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

69 Despatch 550 “Intimidation by the Security Police of Polish Employees of the Embassy for Purpose of Obtaining 

Information,” Lane to Secretary of State, 25 June 1946, 124.60c/6-2546, Folder [1], Box 1142; Airgram A-265, Lane 

to Secretary of State, 15 April 1947, 124.60c3/4-1547, Folder [3], Box 1145; and Telegram 225, Jacobs, U.S. Embassy 

Prague, to Secretary of State, 17 February 1949, 124.60f3/2-1649, Folder [1], Box 1152; Telegram 1512, Chapin, U.S. 

Embassy Budapest, to Secretary of State, 22 September 1948, 124.646/9-2148, Folder [2], Box 1175; and Operations 

Memorandum “Secret Police Activity re: Penetration of Legation and...,” 14 June 1948, Chapin to Department of State, 

124.646/6-1448, Folder [1], Box 1175; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 
114

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

70 Airgram A-476, Acheson (Dodger) to U.S. Embassy Warsaw, 13 August 1949, 124.60c3/8-849; and Despatch 465 

“Fingerprinting of Local Employees,” William P. McEneaney, Attaché, U.S. Embassy Warsaw, to Department of State, 8 

July 1949, 124.60c3/7-849; both Folder [5], Box 1145, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

71 Telegram 557, Acheson (C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Chief, Division of Eastern European Affairs) to U.S. Embassy 

Warsaw, 20 June 1946, 124.60c/6-446, enclosed with Memorandum, Elbrick to Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr. Chief 

of Division of Eastern European Affairs, 15 June 1946, Folder [1], Box 1142; and Telegram 964, DF 1945-49, RG 

59, NA. 

72 Airgram A-10, James K. Penfield, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, to Secretary of State, 12 January 1949, 124.60f3/1-449; 

and Telegram 77, Lovett (Leon L. Cowles, Division of Foreign Service Personnel) to U.S. Embassy Prague, 18 January 

1949, 124.60f3/1-449, Folder [1], Box 1152, DF 19445-49, RG 59, NA. 

73 Instruction 1534, Peurifoy (Charles E. Hulick, Jr., Division of Foreign Service Planning) to Steinhardt, Ambassador to 

Czechoslovakia, 26 December 1947, 124.60f3/12-2647, Folder [2], Box 1151; Airgram A-841, Penfield to Secretary of 

State, 17 November 1948, 124.60f3/11-1748, Folder [4], Box 1151; Despatch 737 “Departure from Praha of Vendelin 

Kalenda,” Penfield to Secretary of State, 30 November 1948, 124.60f3/11-3048, Folder [4], Box 1152; and Telegram 

1417, Lovett (Cowles) to U.S. Embassy Prague, 27 October 1948, 124.60f3/10-2548; and Despatch 535 “Protection of 

Loyal Non-American Employees: Armand Lyask,” McEneaney to Department of State, 11 August 1949, 124.60c3/12-

1147, Folder [5], Box 1145; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

74 Memorandum “U.S.-Bulgarian Relations,” John C. Campbell, Officer in Charge of Balkan Affairs, and Hulick to George 

W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for European Affairs, 20 October 1949, 124.743/10-2049, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS] 

1949(Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1976) V: 354-359. 

75 Editorial Note, FRUS 1950 Volume IV: 517-518. Telegram 266, Donald R. Heath, U.S. Minister to Bulgaria, to 

Secretary of State, 21 February 1950, 611.69/2-2150, FRUS 1950 IV: 522-523. Telegram 278, Heath to Secretary of 

State, 23 February 1950, 611.69/2-2350, FRUS 1950 IV: 523-524. Editorial Note, FRUS 1950 IV: 525. 

76 Department of State Press Release “U.S. Suspends Diplomatic Relations with Bulgaria,” , Department of State Bulletin, 

XXII/557 (6 March 1950): 351-352. For Heath’s broadcast over WTOP in Washington, see Address “Flagrant 

Communist Activities in Bulgaria Produced Break,” Heath, 11 March 1950, State Department Bulletin, XXII/559 (20 

March 1950): 442-443.

77 Telegram 397, Stanton Griffis, U.S. Ambassador to Poland, to Secretary of State, 18 March 1948, 124.60c/3-1848, 

Folder [2], Box 1142; Telegram 1705, Griffis to Secretary of State, 21 October 1947, 124.60c3/10-2047, Folder [3], 

Box 1145; Despatch 1413, “Statement of Mrs. Irene Dmochowska concerning Treatment during Imprisonment,” 

Gerald Keith, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, to Secretary of State, 2 April 1947, 124.60c3/4-247, Folder [3], Box 1145; 

Despatch 1518 “Status of Application for Exit Permit for Irene Dmochowska,” Edmund J. Dorsz, First Secretary, U.S. 

Embassy Warsaw, to Secretary of State, 29 April 1947, 124.60c3/4-2947, Folder [3], Box 1145; all DF 1945-49, RG 

59, NA. 

78 Telegram 1040, Waldemar J. Gallman, U.S. Ambassador to Poland, to Secretary of State, 21 July 1949, 124.60c3/7-

2149, Folder [5], Box 1145; Telegram 456, Acheson (Fred K. Salter, Officer in Charge, Polish, Baltic and Czechoslovak 

Affairs) to U.S. Embassy Warsaw, 21 July 1949, 124.60c3/7-2149, Folder [5], Box 1145; and Telegram 1559, Gallman to 

Secretary of State, 28 November 1949, 124.60c/11-2849, Folder [2], Box 1142; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

79 Despatch 260 “Activities of Joseph Tomaszek, Former Polish Employee of Embassy,” [Edward S. Crocker], Chargé 

d’Affaires ad interim to Department of State, 21 April 1948, 124.60c3/4-2148; Telegram 429, Griffis, to Secretary of 

State, 23March 1948, 124.60c3/3-2348; and Airgram A-911, Crocker (Salter) to Secretary of State, 25 June 1948, 

124.60c3/6-2548; all Folder [4], Box 1145, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 
115

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

80 Telegram 321, Joseph E. Jacobs, U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, to Secretary of State, 11 March 1949, 124.60f3/ 

3-1149; and Telegram 333, Acheson (Harold C. Vedeler, Acting Assistant Chief of Division of Austrian Affairs) to U.S. 

Embassy Prague, 19 March 1949, 124.60f3/3-1149; both Folder [1], Box 1152, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

81 Despatch 399 “Rumanian Press Article Charging American Diplomatic Missions in Eastern Europe with Having Directed 

Plots against ‘People’s Democratic Regimes’,” Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, U.S. Ambassador to Romania, to Secretary of State, 

13 October 1949, 124.646/10-1349; and Airgram A-469 “Potential Attacks Against Personnel of U.S. Legation,” William 

P. Cochran, Jr., Counselor, U.S. Embassy Budapest, to Secretary of State, 24 June 1949, 124.646/6-2449; both Folder [2], 

Box 1175, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

82 Despatch, Joseph E., Jacobs, U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, to G. Frederick Reinhardt, Chief of Division of Eastern 

European Affairs, 7 May 1949, 124.60f3/5-749, Folder [1], Box 1152; Memorandum “Discovery of Sound Pick-Up 

Equipment,” Rollin H. White, Jr., Area Security Officer, to Merrill M. Blevins, Chief of Foreign Service and Domestic 

Security, 20 May 1949, enclosed with Despatch 343 “Transmittal of Report...,” White to Department of State, 20 May 

1949, 124.60f6/5-2049, Folder [1], Box 1153; Telegram 185, George C. Marshall, Secretary of State (Charles M. Dulin, 

Division of Security) to U.S. Legation Budapest, 20 February 1948, 124.646/2-1348, folder [1], Box 1175; Telegram 

413, Chapin to Secretary of State, 17 March 1948, 124.646/3-1648, Folder [1], Box 1175; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, 

NA. For discoveries of other listening devices in Eastern bloc nations over the next few years, see photographs from U.S. 

Embassies in Bucharest, Warsaw, and Prague, Folder – Hidden Microphones, Box Archives H – N, DS TRACEN. 

83 Telegram 455, Robert B. Macatee, U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem, to Secretary of State, 19 October 1947, FRUS, 

1947, V: 1188, 1188n.. Telegram 589, Macatee to Secretary of State, 10 December 1947, 125.4916/12-1047, Folder [5], 

Box 1340, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

84 Telegram 21, Macatee to Secretary of State, 7 January 1948, 125.4916/1-748; Telegram 45, Macatee to Secretary of State, 

13 January 1948, 125.4916/1-1348; Telegram 31, Marshall (Loy Henderson) to Macatee, 14 January 1948, 125.4916/1-

1348; and Telegram 59, Macatee to Secretary of State, 16 January 1948, 125.4916/1-1548; all Folder [5], Box 1340, DF 

1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

85 Airgram A-274, Macatee to Secretary of State, 31 December 1947, FRUS 1947, V: 1326-1327. Memorandum “Reduction 

in Activities of Consulate General Jerusalem,” Henderson to Lovett, 12 January 1948, FW 125.4916/1-748, attached 

to Telegram, Lovett to Macatee, 23 January 1948, 125.4916/1-748; and Telegram 145, Macatee to Secretary of State, 6 

February 1948, 125.4916/2-548; both Folder [5], Box 1340, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

86 Memorandum “Reduction in Activities...,” Henderson to Lovett, 12 January 1948, FW125.4916/1-748. Telegram 444, 

Thomas C. Wasson, U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem (John M. Bowie, Attaché, U.S. Consulate Jerusalem) to John 

Doerr, Division of Security, 17 April 1948, 125.4916/4-1648; Telegram 106, Marshall (Loy Henderson) to Macatee, 2 

February 1948, 125.4916/2-548; Telegram 339, Macatee to Secretary of State, 22 March 1948, 125.4916/3-2248; all 

Folder [5], Box 1340, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

87 Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 

1979), 144. Telegram 1233, James G. MacDonald, U.S. Special Representative to Israel, to Secretary of State, 28 August 

1948, 125.4916/8-2848, Folder [5], Box 1340; Airgram A-106, MacDonald (William C. Burdett, Jr., Vice Consul, U.S. 

Consulate Jerusalem) to Secretary of State, 30 August 1948, 125.4916/8-3048, Folder [5], Box 1340; Telegram 275, 

McDonald, U.S. Ambassador to Israel, to Secretary of State, 12 April 1949, 124.67n6/4-1249, Folder [1], Box 1188; 

and Despatch 73 “Physical Security Survey of the American Consulate General, Jerusalem,” William C. Burdett, Consul, 

U.S. Consulate Jerusalem, to Secretary of State, 24 October 1949, 125.4916/10-2449, Folder [5], Box 1340, p. 10; all 

DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

88 Despatch 93 “Difficulties in Securing Office Space, Facilities, and Personnel at Tel-Aviv,” Charles F. Knox, Counselor of 

U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, to Department of State, 2 November 1948, 124.67n6/11-248, Folder [1], Box 1188; Airgram 
116

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

A-38, McDonald (Knox) to Secretary of State, 25 September 1948, 124.67n1/9-2548, Folder [2], Box 1187; and 

Telegram, McDonald to Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, 24 February 

1949, 124.67n1/2-2449, Folder [2], Box 1187, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

89 Memorandum “Physical Security Survey of the U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv,” Eugene L. Padberg, Jr., Post Security Officer, 

30 September 1949, p. 11, attached to Despatch “Physical Security Survey of the American Embassy, Tel Aviv,” Richard 

Ford, Chargé ad interim, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, to Secretary of State, 30 September 1949, 125.67n6/9-3049, Folder 

[1], Box 1188; Memorandum, Eugene F. McMahon, Post Security Officer, to Knox, 29 September 1948, enclosed with 

Despatch 70 “Transmission of a Security Report...,” McMahon to Secretary of State, 2 October 1948, 124.67n6/10-248, 

Folder [1], Box 1188; and Despatch 122 “Present Status of Physical Security of Mission,” John J. McMahon, Jr. Assistant 

Chief of Building Projects Branch, Foreign Buildings Office, to Secretary of State, 6 December 1948, 124.67n6/12-648, 

Folder [1], Box 1188; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

90 Airgram A-30, McDonald (McMahon), to Neal, Office of Security (SY), 13 September 1948, 124.67n6/9-1348, Folder 

[1], Box 1188; and Telegram 72, U.S. Mission Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, 4 February 1949, 124.67n6/2-449, Folder 

[3], Box 1187; both DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Despatch 122 “Present Status Physical Security of Mission,” McMahon 

to Secretary of State, 6 December 1948, 124.67n6/12-648. 

91 Telegram 437, McDonald to Secretary of State, 8 June 1948, 124.67n2[/6-849], Folder [3], Box 1187, DF 1945-49, 

RG 59, NA. Despatch 93 “Difficulties in Securing Office Space...,” Knox to Department of State, 2 November 1948, 

124.67n6/11-248. “Physical Security Survey ...Tel Aviv,” Padberg, 30 September 1949, p. 11. 

92 Memorandum, Knox to McMahon, 29 September 1948. Airgram A-38, McDonald (Knox) to Secretary of State, 25 

September 1948, 124.67n1/9-2548. For Count Bernadotte’s mediation and assassination, see Michael J. Cohen, Truman 

and Israel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 223-224, 232-238, 243. 

93 Telegram 589, Macatee to Secretary of State, 10 December 1948, 125.4916/12-1047. Airgram A-274, Macatee to 

Secretary of State, 31 December 1947, FRUS 1947, V: 1327. Telegram 372, Marshall (Satterthwaite) to Wasson, 7 May 

1948, 125.4916/5-348; and Telegram 568, Wasson to Secretary of State, 10 May 1948, 125.4916/5-1048; Telegram 528, 

Wasson to Secretary of State, 3 May 1948, 125.4916/5-348; and Despatch 73 “Physical Security Survey ... Jerusalem,” 

Burdett to Secretary of State, 24 October 1949, 125.4916/10-2449, p. 10. 

94 Telegram 10, Knox to Secretary of State, 15 July 1948, 124.67n6/7-1548; Telegram 1036, Jefferson Patterson, Counselor 

of U.S. Embassy Cairo, to Secretary of State, 24 July 1948, 124.67n6/7-2448; Telegram 1130, McDonald to Secretary of 

State, 28 July 1948, 124.67n6/7-2848; all Folder [1], Box 1188, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Despatch 93 “Difficulties in 

Securing Office Space...,” Knox to Secretary of State, 2 November 1948, 124.67n6/11-248. 

95 Telegram 257, Lovett to U.S. Mission Tel Aviv, 17 December 1948, 124.67n3/12-1748, Folder [4]; Telegram 32, 

McDonald to Neal, 11 January 1949, 124.67n3/1-1149, Folder [4]; and Telegram 232, McDonald to Secretary of State, 

3 November 1948, 124.67n1/11-348, Folder [2]; all Box 1187, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

96 Underlining in original. Airgram A-38, McDonald (Knox) to Secretary of State, 25 September 1948, 124.67n1/9-2548, 

Folder [2], Box 1187; and Telegram, McDonald to Satterthwaite, 24 February 1949, 124.67n1/2-2449; both DF 1945-

49, RG 59, NA. 

97 Memorandum “Physical Security Survey...Tel Aviv,” Padberg, 30 September 1949. Airgram A-50, McDonald (Knox) to 

Secretary of State, 31 October 1948, 124.67n3/10-1348, Folder [4], Box 1187, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Despatch 93 

“Difficulties in Securing Office Space” Knox to Department of State, 2 November 1948, 124.67n6/11-248. 

98 For post pleas for additional personnel, see Airgram A-50, McDonald (Knox) to Secretary of State, 31 October 1948, 

124.67n3/10-1348, Folder [4], Box 1187; Telegram 341, McDonald to Satterthwaite, 28 December 1948, 124.67n3/12-

2848, Folder [4], Box 1187; Airgram A-19, McDonald to Secretary of State, 12 January 1949, 124.67n3/1-1249, Folder 

[4], Box 1187; and Telegram 275, McDonald to Satterthwaite, 14 April 1949, 124.67n6/4-1249, Folder [1], Box 1188; 
117

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For departmental denials, see Airgram A-34, Lovett to McDonald, 22 September 1948, 

124.67n3/8-2248; and Airgram A-88, Lovett to McDonald, 23 December 1948, 124.67n3/12-648; both Folder [4], Box 

1187, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. On this last denial, the Department authorized and promised to send a new secretary 

and a file clerk, but by September 1949, neither had arrived. See “Physical Security Survey...Tel Aviv,” Padberg, 30 

September 1949, p. 11-12, 14-15. 

99 Telegram 341, McDonald to Satterthwaite, 28 December 1948, 241.67n3/12-2848. Airgram A-69, Knox to Secretary 

of State, 6 December 1948, 124.67n3/12-648, Folder [4], Box 1187, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. “Physical Security 

Survey...Tel Aviv,” Padberg, 30 September 1949. 

100 Telegram 293, Burdett to Secretary of State, 13 April 1949, attached to Telegram 125, McDonald to Secretary of State, 

15 February 1949, 125.4916/2-1549, Folder [5], Box 1340, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. “Physical Security Survey...Tel 

Aviv,” Padberg, 30 September 1949, 124.67n6/9-3049. Despatch 73 “Physical Security Survey of the American Consulate 

General, Jerusalem,” Burdett to Secretary of State, 24 October 1949, 125.4916/10-2449, Folder [5], Box 1340; Instruction, 

E. D. Lott to Macatee, 7 August 1947, 125.4916/8-747, Folder [5], Box 1340; and Airgram A-401, Acheson (John P. 

Mulligan) to U.S. Embassy Cairo, 9 July 1949, 124.836/7-949, Folder [3], Box 1209; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

101 Telegram 70, Ford, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, to Arthur R. Day, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, 14 October 

1949, 124.67N/10-1449, Folder [1], Box 1187, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For U.S. civilians as guards and locals as night 

watchmen, see Airgram A-34, Lowell C. Pinkerton, U.S. Minister to Lebanon, to Secretary of State, 19 January 1948, 

124.90e2[/1-1948], Folder [2], Box 1214; Memorandum “Security Survey of Guard Facilities at American Embassy, New 

Delhi,” Howard Donovan, Counselor, U.S. Embassy New Dehli, 12 June 1948, enclosed with Despatch 674, Donovan 

to Secretary of State, 12 June 1948, 124.456/6-1248, Folder [2], Box 1079; and Airgram A-114, Wallace Murray, U.S. 

Ambassador to Iran, to Secretary of State, 21 May 1946, 124.912, Folder [3], Box 1224; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

102 For night watchmen, see “Guard Survey,” McEneaney, Embassy Security Officer, n.d., enclosed with Despatch 266 

“Transmitting Guard Survey of the Chancery [Warsaw],” McEneaney to Department of State, 22 April 1948, 124.60C3/4-

2248, Folder [4], Box 1145, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For local government providing guards, see Telegram A-151, Murray 

to Secretary of State, 21 September 1945, 124.913-2145; and Telegram 891, Murray to Secretary of State, 29 October 1945, 

124.913/10-2945; both Folder [1], Box 1225, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows. 

103 Telegram 346, James C. Dunn, U.S. Ambassador to Italy, to Secretary of State, 26 January 1948, 124.653/1-2648, Folder 

[3], Box 1180, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Leo J. Daugherty III, “ ‘These Fine Smart Detachments’: A History of the 

United States Marine Corps and the Department of State, 1799-2004,” manuscript, Part 1, p. 137.

104 Telegram 457, Murray to Secretary of State, 5 July 1945, 124.913/7-545, Folder [1], Box 1225; Memorandum, Donald 

S. Russell, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, to James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, 10 January 1947, 

124.653/1-1047, Folder [1], Box 1180; Telegram 457, Murray to Secretary of State, 5 July 1945, 124.913/7-545, Folder 

[1], Box 1225; and Memorandum “Security Survey of Guard Facilities of the Office of the Political Advisor for Germany, 

Berlin,” John F .Rieger, 5 December 1947, enclosed with Despatch 11460 “Transmittal of Security Survey at the Office of 

the Political Advisor on German Affairs,” Reiger[?] to Department of State, 18 December 1947, 124.626/12-1847, Folder 

[5], Box 1167; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

105 Memorandum “Comments Concerning Use of United States Marine Security Guard Personnel versus United States 

Citizen Guard Personnel,” William L Uanna, Chief of Division of Physical Security, to Dennis A. Flinn, Director of 

Office of Security, 10 April 1956, Folder – [Marine Security Guards], Box 14, SCA DF 1953-60 Memorandum “Security 

Survey of Guard Facilities at American Embassy, New Delhi,” Donovan, 12 June 1948, enclosed with Despatch 674, 

Donovan, to Secretary of State, 12 June 1948, 124.456/6-1248, Folder [2], Box 1079; and Despatch 528 “Questionnaire 

prepared for Mrs. Frances P. Bolton of Foreign Affairs Committee of House of Representatives,” Evan M. Wilson, First 

Secretary, U.S. Embassy Tehran, to Secretary of State, 28 October 1947, 124.916/10-2847, Folder [4], Box 1226; both 

DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.
118

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

106 Memorandum “Comments Concerning Use of United States Marine Security Guard Personnel versus United States 

Citizen Guard Personnel,” Uanna to Flinn, 10 April 1956.

107 Airgram A-243, Byrnes (Marshall S. Berry, Assistant to the Secretary of State) to U.S. Embassy San Salvador, 31 October 

1945, 124.163/10-1945, Folder [4], Box 1014, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Memorandum “Comments Concerning 

Use of United States Marine Security Guard Personnel versus United States Citizen Guard Personnel,” Uanna to Flinn, 

10 April 1956. The case of Guard William Ellis at San Salvador was particularly ugly since embassy staff and the other 

guard demonstrated that Ellis had worked more than 50 hours per week for an extended period of time. The department 

ultimately granted him 9 days and 2 hours compensation but only after he had resigned. See Despatch 786 “Overtime 

asked by Guard William Ellis between February 12, 1945 and June 30, 1945,” John F. Simmons, U.S. Ambassador to El 

Salvador, to Department of State, 29 March 1946, 124.163/3-2946; Letter of Resignation, William F. Ellis to Secretary 

of State, 9 January 1946, 124.163/1-946; William E. DeCourcy, Chief of Division of Foreign Service Personnel, to 

Ellis, 23 April 1946, 124.163/2-1446; all three Folder [4], Box 1014, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. For an example of 

drunkenness, see Despatch 310 “Thomas L. Been, FS-15 – Suspension,” Steinhardt to Secretary of State, 30 April 1948, 

124.60f3/4.3048, Folder [4], Box 1151, DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

108 Memorandum “Comments Concerning Use of United States Marine Security Guard Personnel versus United States 

Citizen Guard Personnel,” Uanna to Flinn, 10 April 1956. Telegram 36, Murphy to Secretary of State, 3 January 1947, 

124.623/1-347, Folder [2], Box 1166; Telegram 649, Steinhardt to Secretary of State, 23 April 1948, 124.60f3/4-2348, 

Folder [4], Box 1151; Telegram 203 “Assignment of American Guards to Legation at Beirut,” Bertel E. Kuniholm, Chargé 

d’Affaires ad interim, to Secretary of State, 20 July 1948, 124.90e3/7-2048, Folder [3], Box 1214; Telegram 1151, Dunn 

to Secretary of State, 16 March 1948, 124.653/3-1648, Folder [3], Box 1180; Memorandum “Security Survey of Guard 

Facilities at American Embassy, New Delhi,” Donovan, 12 June 1948, enclosed with Despatch 674, Donovan to Secretary 

of State, 12 June 1948, 124.456/6-1248, Folder [2], Box 1079; “Guard Survey,” McEneaney, Embassy Security Officer, 

n.d., enclosed with Despatch 266 “Transmitting Guard Survey of the Chancery [Warsaw],” McEneaney to Department of 

State, 22 April 1948, 124.60c3/4-2248, Folder [4], Box 1145; and Airgram A-2, Byrnes (Beall) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 

3 January 1947, 124.253/12-646, Folder [5], Box 1035; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.

109 Telegram 634, Marshall (WB) to U.S. Embassy Rome, 10 March 1948, 124.653/1-1048, Folder [3], Box 1180, DF 

1945-49, RG 59, NA. Memorandum “Comments Concerning Use of United States Marine Security Guard Personnel 

versus United States Citizen Guard Personnel,” Uanna to Flinn, 10 April 1956.

110 Daugherty, “These Fine Smart Detachments,” 139-140. Memorandum, Russell to Forrestal, 10 January 1947, 124.653/1-1047. 

111 The Armed Forces were reorganized in 1947, but the Department of Defense did not emerge until 1949. Its immediate 

predecessor was the National Military Establishment. 

112 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Marine Security Guard System at Diplomatic 

Missions Abroad: Hearings before the Defense Policy Panel and the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee, 100th

Congress, 1st session, 3 April, 23, 28, 29 July, and 5 August 1987 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1988), 38. Daugherty, 

“These Fine, Smart Detachments,” 139-140. 

113 House Committee on Armed Services, Marine Security Guard System at Diplomatic Missions Abroad, 38. 

114 House Committee on Armed Services, Marine Security Guard System at Diplomatic Missions Abroad, 38-43. Memorandum 

“Comments Concerning Use of United States Marine Security Guard Personnel versus United States Citizen Guard Personnel,” 

Uanna to Flinn, 10 April 1956. Memorandum “The Use of Marine Guards at Foreign Service Establishments,” Peurifoy to 

Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 11 February 1949, Box 9, Boykin Reading Files. For the Marine Corps’ 

difficulties after World War II, see House Committee on Armed Services, Marine Security Guard System at Diplomatic Missions 

Abroad, 38-43. U.S. Marine Corps History Division, “Historical Evolution of Marine Corps Basing and Deployment Patterns, 

1945-1985, http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/HD/Historical/Frequently_Requested/Basing_Deployment_Patterns.htm. 

U.S. Department of Defense, “James V. Forrestal,” http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/bios/ forestall.htm. 
119

CHAPTER 3 CREATING A SECURITY OFFICE: Robert L. Bannerman and Cold War, 1945-1950

115 Memorandum “The Use of Marine Guards at Foreign Service Establishments,” Peurifoy to Certain American Diplomatic 

and Consular Officers, 11 February 1949. 

116 Airgram A-326, Acheson (R. Bright) to U.S. Embassy Tehran, 22 December 1949, 124.913/12-2249, Folder [3], Box 

1225; Airgram A-153, Acheson (G. E. Bland) to U.S. Embassy Warsaw, 28 February 1949, 124.60c3/2-2849, Folder [5], 

Box 1145; Telegram 88, Acheson (R. G. Brooks) to U.S. Embassy San Salvador, 1 December 1949, 124.163/11-1449, 

Folder [5], Box 1014; Airgram A-286, G. P. Shaw to Secretary of State, 16 November 1949, 124.163/11-1449, Folder 

[5], Box 1014; and Airgram A-91, Pinkerton to Secretary of State, 14 March 1949, 124.90e3/3-1449, Folder [3], Box 

1214; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. 

117 Memorandum “The Use of Marine Guards at Foreign Service Establishments,” Peurifoy to Certain American Diplomatic 

and Consular Officers, 11 February 1949. Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows. 

118 Memorandum “Comments Concerning Use of United States Marine Security Guard Personnel versus United States 

Citizen Guard Personnel,” Uanna to Flinn, 10 April 1956, Folder – [Marine Security Guards], Box 14, SCA DF 1953-

60, RG 59-Lot Files, NA. Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling: A Case Study of Washington at Work (Amherst: University of 

Massachusetts Press, 1989), 95ff. 

119 Despatch 116 “Assignment of Marine Guards to Posts within Security Region II, Middle East and Africa,” Rollin H. 

White to Department of State, 30 January 1950, 121.1/1-3050; Airgram A-54, Webb (G. W. Rose) to U.S. Embassy 

Jidda, 26 October 1951, 121.1/10-2651; Despatch 998 “Security: Uniforms and Arms for Marine Guards,” Jacob D. 

Beam, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, to Department of State, 23 April 1952, 121.1/4-2352; all Folder [1], Box 543, DF 

1950-54, RG 59, NA. 

120 Jack Grover, “A Brief History of the U.S. Diplomatic Courier Service,” Foreign Service Newsletter, No. 80 (October 1953), 

pp. 19-20. Grover, “None Swifter than These,” Foreign Service Journal 31/2 (February 1954): 24-27, 48. 

121 Foreign Service Serial No. 768 “Transmission via Diplomatic Pouch of State, War, and Navy Material,” Department 

of State to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 25 September 1947, Box 142, Records of the State-War-Navy 

Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee for Security Control, Security Advisory Board, RG 353-Entry 540, NA. 

122 Memorandum “Operation of the 604 Procedure at Cairo,” Harris Ball to Rollie White, Regional Security Supervisor, 24 

December 1949, Box 500, DF 1950-54, RG 59, NA. 

123 One was a Special Agent, and another was Robert Freeman, who represented the Foreign Service Institute. Freeman had 

worked for Bannerman in the Security Office and helped to develop the overseas security program. Report “Study by 

Reorganization Task Force on Security of the Department of State,” 23 March 1949, [No Folder], Box 13, Security Files 

1932-63, A/SY/ Evaluations, p. 113. 

124 Report “Study by Reorganization Task Force on Security of the Department of State,” 23 March 1949, p. 113. 

Memorandum, Peurifoy to George P. Shaw, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 20 September 1949, 124.166/9-2049, 

Folder [2], Box 1015; Peurifoy to Donovan, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires ad interim for India, 22 September 1949, 124.456/9-

2249, Folder [3], Box 1079; Peurifoy to Jacobs, U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 19 September 1949, 124.60F6/9-

1949, Folder [1], Box 1153; Telegram 807, Boykin to Donald R. Nicholson, Chief of Division of Security, 16 August 

1949, 124.626/8-1249, Folder [1], Box 1168; Despatch 930 “Transmittal of Regional Security Report for the Month 

of September 1949,” Caffery to Secretary of State, 21 October 1949, 124.836/10-2149, Folder [4], Box 1209; all DF 

1945-1949, RG 59, NA. 

125 Foreign Service Newsletter, No. 34, December 1949, p. 1. Report “Study by Reorganization Task Force on Security of the 

Department of State,” 23 March 1949, pp. 12, 13. 

126 Memorandum of Conversation “Employee Identification Passes,” Otto F. Otepka, Chief of Division of Evaluations, Office 

of Security, 12 May 1960, Folder – C. Building Identification Cards, Box 2, Security Files, 1932-1963, A/SY/Evaluations.
120

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Report “A Study of Security Practices and Requirements in the Department of State,” Office of Security, 10 March 

1950, Folder – A Study of Security Practices and Requirements in the Department of State, Box 1, A/SY/Domestic Ops 

Division – Subject, Working, and Reference Files, 1960-1972, RG 59-Lot 73D214, NA. 

127 Memorandum of Conversation “Employee Identification Passes,” Otepka, 12 May 1960. Memorandum “Loss of 

Department of State Identification Passes,” E. Tomlin Bailey, Director of Office of Security, to Roderic L. O’Connor, 

Administrator of Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, 18 December 1958, attached to Memorandum “New Employee 

Identification Cards,” William J. Crockett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, to Belton O. Bryan, 

Deputy Administrator of Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, 27 March 1961, Box 2, Bureau of Security and 

Consular Affairs – Subject Files 1961-1964, RG 59-Lot 68D175, NA. 

128 Appendix A “Problem No. 1: Discussion of Possible Decentralization of Security Functions by Utilization of Services 

within the Department,” Security Task Force, 16 March 1949, enclosed in Report “Study by Reorganization Task Force 

on Security of the Department of State, 23 March 1949. For investigation statistics, see “Schedule A: Volume of Work” 

enclosed with Memorandum “Division of Security,” Division of Security, n.d. [July? 1950], Folder – Division of Security, 

Box 16, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 
121

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

The Division of Security (SY) no sooner had gained its organizational structure than Joseph 

McCarthy, the junior Senator from Wisconsin, asserted that Communists had infiltrated the Department of 

State. Behind McCarthy’s February 1950 charges and the support he received was the Republicans’ anger over 

the Truman Administration’s handling of the intensifying Cold War and domestic loyalty issues. During 1949, 

China fell to the Communists, and the Soviets successfully tested an atomic bomb; meanwhile, in early 1950 new 

revelations emerged about Soviet espionage in the United States. 

McCarthy’s accusations triggered a series of events that defined the Division of Security’s course for the next 

decade. Three consequences resulted from McCarthy’s charges. First, as Congressional committees called several 

current and former Department of State officers and advisers to testify and answer charges about their loyalty, the 

Department redoubled its efforts on background investigations of employees. Second, one Department official’s 

reluctant admission inadvertently triggered a purge of homosexuals from the Department. Third, a Congressional 

subcommittee studied physical security at U.S. posts overseas, and the subcommittee’s highly favorable report led 

to increased resources for SY and overseas security. 

While McCarthy focused public and Congressional attention on Department personnel, U.S. Government 

officials increasingly worried about the potential threats posed by basic diplomatic customs. U.S. officials 

feared that the Soviets and their allies might exploit diplomatic immunities in order to undertake espionage 

or gain an advantage over the United States. The Department of State and other federal agencies reexamined 

many diplomatic practices, including the routes of foreign couriers and the contents of diplomatic baggage. 

U.S. officials worried that Soviet Bloc diplomats would acquire advanced U.S. technology and gather public 

information about the United States and its facilities, information that U.S. officials could not reciprocally obtain 

in the Soviet Union. As the decade of the 1950s drew to a close, Cold War diplomatic security concerns were 

pervading all aspects of diplomatic practice, and in the process, SY became entrenched as a necessary office in 

the Department. 

CHAPTER 4

McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR 

8

Diplomatic Security in the 1950s
122

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

z McCarthy’s Charges å

On February 9, 1950, fears that Communists 

had penetrated the U.S. Government crystallized 

when Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) announced 

that he possessed a list of 205 members of the 

Communist Party who were “working and shaping 

policy” in the Department of State. Speaking before 

the Ohio County Women’s Republican Club in 

Wheeling, West Virginia, McCarthy accused Alger 

Hiss of having “sold out the Nation” and revived old 

charges against John Stewart Service, who had been 

arrested in the Amerasia case. Linking both men to 

the fall of China to the Communists, McCarthy said 

that although the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) had arrested Service for passing “secret State 

Department information” to the Communists, 

Service had not been dismissed from the Department. 

Instead, the Department of State named Service as 

the next U.S. Consul General in Calcutta, which 

McCarthy described as “the most important listening 

post in the Far East.” (McCarthy omitted the fact 

that a grand jury had unanimously rejected an indictment against Service.)1

 

McCarthy continued to level his accusations in a series of speeches, but the number of Communists in 

the Department of State often changed. On February 10, in Salt Lake City, he declared that “57 card-carrying 

members of the Communist Party” worked in the Department, an accusation he repeated in Reno on February 

11.2

 Also on that day, McCarthy sent a telegram to President Truman, citing the 57 Communists (whom he did 

not name), and demanded that Truman address the issue or risk having the Democratic Party labeled as a “bedfellow of International Communism.” Then on February 20, on the Senate floor, McCarthy declared that there 

were “81 loyalty risks” in the Department of State, and proceeded to describe each case.3

 

 McCarthy’s numbers—205, 57, and 81—were inconsistent, but not fictitious. The numbers were 

derived from testimony by Department of State officials and Division of Security files. An SY memorandum 

admitted in April that the “81” figure that McCarthy presented to the Senate was drawn from the “108 

Cases,” which had been derived from SY files by a team of House of Representatives researchers in 1947. 

That group found 108 employees of questionable loyalty working for the Department. The “57” figure was 

Figure 1: Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) speaking on 

his charges of Communist infiltration of the Department of 

State at the March 9, 1950, subcommittee hearing of the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee. McCarthy’s charges 

set in motion a series of changes in the Department that 

resulted in creation of a larger Office of Security (SY) with 

more resources and responsibilities. Although McCarthy 

offered different figures for the number of Communists in 

the Department, his numbers were derived from testimony 

by Department of State officials and Division of Security 

files two years earlier. Source: © Associated Press. 
123

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

also from the 108 cases; Deputy Under Secretary 

for Administration John E. Peurifoy had testified to 

Congress in March 1948 that 57 of the 108 still 

worked for the Department.4

 The number “205” 

was also derived from SY figures. In 1946, Robert L. 

Bannerman’s Security Office and the Department’s 

Screening Committee had flagged 284 “security 

risks.” Secretary of State James F. Byrnes reported 

this to Congress in July 1946, noting that the 

Department had dismissed 79 of the 284, leaving 

205 possible risks. As the Senate’s Committee 

on Foreign Relations emphasized, McCarthy’s 

“information was beyond all reasonable doubt...a 

‘dressed up’ version of material” previously presented 

to Congress. Yet McCarthy had so effectively repackaged the numbers that it was several weeks 

before Department of State officials determined 

their origins. By then, the Department and several prominent Foreign Service Officers were on the defensive, 

trying to prove their innocence. As McCarthy asserted, “I don’t answer accusations. I make them.”5

 

The context, not the accuracy of his numbers, gave McCarthy’s charges traction and credibility. In late 

1949, six months before McCarthy’s speech at Wheeling, China fell to Mao Zedong’s Communist forces. Also, 

in the autumn of 1949, the Soviets successfully tested an atomic bomb, several years ahead of what U.S. officials 

anticipated. Alger Hiss’s libel suit against Whitaker Chambers had evolved into a trial over whether Hiss committed 

perjury. Two weeks before McCarthy’s speech, a jury convicted Hiss of the perjury charge. Also, on February 11—

the same day that McCarthy wired Truman—U.S. newspapers reported that Manhattan Project scientist Klaus 

Fuchs had confessed to leaking atomic bomb secrets to the Soviets. McCarthy’s charges connected the “loss” of 

China and the Soviet atomic bomb with “subversion” in the Department of State, giving his accusations credibility 

despite the ever-changing numbers.6

 

The first consequence of McCarthy’s accusations, which received extensive press coverage, was Senate 

Resolution 231. On February 22, two days after McCarthy offered an extended exposition on each of the 81 

“security risk” cases, the Senate resolved to create a subcommittee that would “conduct a full and complete study 

and investigation as to whether persons who are disloyal to the United States are, or have been, employed by the 

Department of State.”7

 Department of State principals traveled to Capitol Hill to rebut McCarthy’s charges. 

Secretary Acheson and Deputy Under Secretary Peurifoy explained how an individual was determined to be a 

Figure 2: Former Department of State official Alger Hiss 

before the House Un-American Activities Committee on 

August 5, 1948. Hiss’ conviction for perjury in 1950 helped 

to give credibility to McCarthy’s charges that Communists 

worked in the Department of State. Source: © Associated 

Press. 
124

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

“security risk,” the process of removing security risks 

from the Department, and the effects of the 1946 

McCarran Rider. They noted that the Department had 

dismissed 202 individuals deemed to be security risks 

since 1947.8 Chief of the Division of Security Donald 

L. Nicholson also testified before Congress, and 

thoroughly described the process for determining the 

loyalty and security risk of each Department of State 

employee and applicant. Nicholson supplemented 

his testimony with charts that graphically detailed all 

of the processes.9

 

 Despite his charges, McCarthy faced initial 

embarrassments. In a Senate Committee meeting 

on March 8, McCarthy referred to Case #14 of the 

81 cases, and said the person was a security risk 

Figure 3: Chart showing the chain of command for security in the Department of State. Created around 1950, the chart 

was likely prepared for SY Chief Donald Nicholson’s testimony to Congress. Source: Department of State Records, National 

Archives and Records Administration. 

Figure 4: Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup (foreground) 

at a meeting of U.S. diplomats assigned to Asia. Jessup 

rebutted McCarthy’s charges of being a Communist and 

presented letters defending him from former Secretary 

of State George C. Marshall and General Dwight D. 

Eisenhower. Source: © Associated Press. 
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CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

because he was “a flagrant homosexual.” Committee chair Senator Millard Tydings (D-MD) asked McCarthy 

to name the person, knowing full well that Case #14 was Joseph Panuch, former Deputy Under Secretary of 

State for Administration, and that McCarthy had praised Panuch’s work just two weeks earlier. McCarthy 

stammered, the Committee descended into partisan arguing, and the meeting ended. McCarthy then raised 

the accusation of “Red” against Dorothy Kenyon, an honorary delegate to the UN Commission on the 

Status of Women, but this proved to be a bad choice. Kenyon conducted herself extremely well before the 

Committee, and McCarthy did not even show up for the hearing. McCarthy then took aim at Ambassadorat-Large Phillip C. Jessup, and this also proved embarrassing. Jessup, a highly respected diplomat, showed up 

with two letters testifying to his anti-Communism and loyalty to the United States--one from former Secretary 

of State George C. Marshall, and one from General Dwight D. Eisenhower.10 

Despite the initial embarrassments, McCarthy benefitted from the Korean War and the discovery of further 

Soviet espionage. On June 24, the North Koreans crossed the demarcation line, starting the Korean War, and 

indirectly resurrected the “loss” of China issue in U.S. politics. The war led to the implementation of National 

Security Council Report NSC-68, written largely by Paul Nitze. NSC-68 cast the U.S.-Soviet struggle as “a basic 

conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy 

of the Kremlin.” NSC-68 also asserted that the Kremlin would use “whatever means are expedient” in its effort “to 

bring the free world under its dominion by the methods of the cold war.” In addition, Klaus Fuchs’s confession 

and subsequent cooperation enabled the FBI to uncover other Soviet spies in the Manhattan Project. Fuchs 

led the FBI to his handler, Harry Gold, who in turn incriminated Sergeant David Greenglass and his wife. The 

Greenglasses, in turn, led the FBI to Julius and Ethel 

Rosenberg. Gold and the Greenglasses cooperated 

with the FBI, but the Rosenbergs did not and were 

arrested in the summer of 1950. While Korea revived 

the “Who lost China?” debate, the Fuchs-GoldGreenglass-Rosenberg revelations explained how the 

Soviets had attained the atomic bomb so quickly.11 

McCarthy continued to level accusations at 

Department of State employees, but not all of those 

he accused were as able as Kenyon and Jessup in 

countering his charges. McCarthy accused Gustavo 

Duran of having “rabid Communist beliefs” and 

taking part in “secret Soviet operations in the Spanish 

Republican Army.” A Spaniard, Duran had fought 

for the Spanish Republican Army during the Spanish 

Figure 5: Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. The arrest, 

conviction, and execution of the Rosenbergs for treason 

(giving government secrets to the Soviets) helped to lend 

credibility to McCarthy’s charges against the Department of 

State. Source: © Associated Press. 
126

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Civil War (1936-39) before becoming a U.S. citizen. He had worked for the Department from 1943 to 1946, 

but had moved to the United Nations Survey, Research, and Development Branch. Duran discredited each 

of McCarthy’s charges in a letter to Committee Chairman Tydings, and showed that some accusations were 

drawn from Spanish government propaganda, written to punish Spanish Republicans for exposing Generalissimo 

Francisco Franco’s connections to the Nazis. It took five years for Duran to clear his name.12 

McCarthy accused eminent Asian scholar and Department of State and United Nations adviser Owen 

Lattimore of being “the top espionage agent in the United States, the boss of Alger Hiss.” Lattimore initially 

rebutted McCarthy’s charges, but McCarthy and his staff, which included Roy Cohn, pursued the case. They 

employed false documents, a fraudulent affidavit, and false witnesses. McCarthy even leaked one witness’s 

testimony to the press before the man gave it, so that the claims would appear in the newspapers before they 

were easily disproved. The Senator also brought forward an ex-Communist informant, who during 3,000 hours 

of questioning by the FBI did not once mention Lattimore, but now, before the Senate Committee, he suddenly 

remembered that Lattimore was an important Soviet operative.13 

Behind the accusations was the “Who lost China?” debate. Lattimore, John Stewart Service, and John 

Carter Vincent were members of the “China hands,” who had opposed U.S. policy supporting Nationalist leader 

Chiang Kai-shek. The anger over the loss of China was soon directed against former Secretary of State Marshall, 

whom McCarthy accused of aiding the policy of Stalin and the Soviet Union, but most Republicans quickly 

rejected the accusations against Marshall. Chaired by Senator Pat McCarran (D-NV), the Senate Internal Security 

Subcommittee (SISS) investigated charges in 1951 and 1952 that Communists were trying to influence U.S. 

foreign policy. The SISS’s final report concluded that the Department of State had “lost” China, Lattimore was “a 

conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy,” and Vincent and Lattimore were “influential” in altering 

U.S. policy in 1945 in directions that aided Mao and the Chinese Communists. Vincent was forced out of the 

Department. Lattimore was indicted for perjury, and 3 years later, when the charges were dismissed, accepted a 

professorship at Leeds University in England. Service faced a grand jury that voted unanimously against indicting 

him for leaking classified documents to Amerasia, and he endured loyalty investigations in 1946, 1947, and 1949 

which cleared him each time. In 1951, the Loyalty Review Board determined that Service was a security risk, and 

he was subsequently dismissed from the Department. Of the three, only Vincent had been on McCarthy’s list of 

81 security risks.14

Even though a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report accused McCarthy of twisting, misrepresenting, 

and mischaracterizing information in case files, his charges precipitated an inquiry into who were the security 

risks in the Department of State, not whether there were security risks. In September 1952, Senator Hiram 

Bingham, chair of the President’s Loyalty Review Board, declared that the Department had “the worst record 

of any department” regarding employee loyalty investigations.15 Bingham justified his allegation by pointing to 

the fact that during his tenure on the Board, the Department of State had found no employees to be disloyal. 
127

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

Already aware of the allegation, the Department countered that it had found no disloyal employees because it had 

already implemented a stringent screening system that caught disloyal potential employees before they were hired. 

In truth, the Department, under heavy scrutiny since the 1945 Amerasia revelations, had begun screening and 

dismissing employees and applicants two years before President Truman set up the loyalty boards for the executive 

branch. Amid the height of McCarthy’s power and credibility, however, the litmus test for any loyalty program 

was its propensity to unearth “communist” infiltrators, not its competence in screening and rejecting potentially 

disloyal employees through a screening process. The Division of Security attempted to point this out and to 

explain its effective screening program, but at the time, this reassured neither Congress nor the American public.16

By 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower became President, McCarthy had turned his attention and efforts away 

from the Department of State and toward the U.S. Army. An armistice was declared in Korea, and the Rosenbergs, 

who were found guilty of treason in March 1951, were executed in June 1953. By 1954, anti-Communist 

hysteria had abated slightly, and the Senate condemned McCarthy. One lasting result of the experience was that 

investigations and evaluations were entrenched as key components of the Department’s security program.17 

Figure 6: Chart outlining the Department of State’s procedure for security and loyalty reviews. Created by the Office of Security, 

the chart explains the stages of security and loyalty reviews. As indicated by the chart, the large majority of the thousands of 

Department employees were cleared. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
128

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

z The ‘M’ Unit å

The second consequence of McCarthy’s accusations was a purge of homosexuals from the Department of 

State. On February 28, 1950, in testimony before the subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 

Deputy Under Secretary for Administration John Peurifoy tried to avoid discussing the subject of homosexuals. 

While replying to a question on dismissals, Peurifoy noted that 91 employees in the “shady category” had been 

dismissed since January 1, 1947. When pressed to define this category, Peurifoy alluded to “moral weakness.” 

He seemed too hesitant to offer specifics, and the number of dismissals was too large for the matter to be easily 

dropped. Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) pressed Peurifoy further, and the Deputy Under Secretary finally 

admitted that the category referred to homosexuals.18 

The Department was already on the defensive from McCarthy’s accusations, but Peurifoy’s admission 

that gays and lesbians were among the Department’s workforce doubled its difficulties. During the 1950s, 

gays and lesbians were viewed as having questionable morals; moreover, revelations of homosexuals in the 

Department encouraged unfavorable stereotypes of diplomats as “cookie pushers in striped pants” and effete 

graduates of elite Eastern schools. The Department 

tried to counter perceptions that Foreign Service 

Officers (FSOs) and Department employees were 

“pinks, snobs, and worse,” but such efforts proved 

largely ineffective. For the next few years, suspected 

homosexuals were purged from the Department’s 

ranks, sometimes on spurious evidence, because 

many conflated what they viewed as questionable 

morals with Communist tendencies, or feared 

that such people would be more vulnerable to 

Communist pressures.19

In 1950, the Department’s Office of Personnel 

warned Samuel D. Boykin, Director of the Office 

of Controls, to make “every effort...to prevent the 

[Foreign] Service from getting the impression that 

the Department is conducting a ‘witch hunt’” for 

homosexual employees. However, SY statistics 

reveal the extent of the purge. The Department 

fired 54 people it considered to be homosexuals 

in 1950, 119 in 1951, and 134 in 1952. The 

figures dwarf the number of dismissals for more 

Figure 7: Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration 

John Peurifoy. Testifying before a Congressional committee, 

Peurifoy’s reluctance to discuss the dismissal of homosexuals 

inadvertently drew attention to the subject. Homosexuals 

and Communism were quickly conflated, and a purge of 

gays and lesbians from the Department occurred during the 

height of McCarthyism. The Office of Security set up the M 

Unit to investigate cases of suspected homosexuals. Source: 

Department of State Files, National Archives and Records 

Administration. 
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CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

straightforward security concerns during the same years: 12 in 1950, 35 in 1951, and 70 in 1952. The 

trend continued, as 74 of the Department’s 107 dismissals resulted from homosexuality alone in the first 

months of 1953.20 

The Department insisted that its decision to classify gays and lesbians as extreme security risks was made 

“entirely apart from any moral judgment.” Department officials said that “such individuals are susceptible to 

blackmail and are exposed to other pressures because of the highly unconventional character of their personal 

relationships.” Even those perceived as homosexual were deemed security risks. The Office of Personnel believed 

that “latent tendencies can remain dormant for long periods of time – and then break through the surface without 

prior warning.” This belief, in essence, demanded that SY be more aware of an individual’s personal tendencies 

and potential future behavior than the individual was.21 

SY created the “M” (Miscellaneous) Unit to investigate charges of homosexuality. The M Unit consulted 

police and vice squad records, and briefed chiefs of mission on how to recognize homosexuality. Staffed by two fulltime agents and several part-time staff, the M Unit primarily used personal interviews and an occasional polygraph 

test (legal at the Department since 1950). In 1953, the M Unit claimed responsibility for 99 separations, and 

eliminated 27 employees in the first quarter of 1954.22 

Department officials promised that they would only investigate individuals suspected of homosexuality after 

a strong case had been developed against them, but many findings were based on highly subjective information. 

Security instructions required the M Unit to interview all male applicants and note “any unusual traits of speech, 

appearance or mannerisms” that might indicate sexual deviance. The mere act of frequenting a restaurant or bar 

known to be frequented by gays and lesbians, or of associating with known homosexuals, was enough to demand 

a more thorough investigation. One SY official argued that a close review of the ranks was necessary, due to the 

inadequate investigations and higher levels of tolerance toward homosexuality during the war. As one veteran 

courier recalled, during the McCarthy Era, “everyone was presumed to be a little light on his feet until proved 

otherwise.”23 

Department employees began to accuse their colleagues of being gay or lesbian--sometimes 

anonymously--and the flimsiest of claims could lead to investigations. For example, one female employee 

accused her supervisor of lesbian tendencies based upon her physical appearance, and the fact that her lunch 

companions included a woman with “a mannish voice” and another woman who seemed “peculiar.” When 

SY interviewed the accuser, the only corroborating evidence she could muster was that her supervisor gave 

her “a nauseous feeling.” When pressed, the employee confessed, “she really had nothing factual” to offer, 

it was merely “a suspicion.” Having identified one potential homosexual security risk, the employee soon 

implicated dozens more, basing her accusations on little other than her “feminine intuition,” as well as “the 

effeminate mannerisms of hand” and the “jelly hand shake” of some male colleagues. Although no record 

of SY’s findings on the female employee’s accusations was found, her “evidence” was far from credible. It 
130

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

was learned that her supervisor (whom she accused 

of lesbianism) had placed the employee on 90-days 

probation for unsatisfactory job performance. The 

fact that the employee could press her accusations 

so far, and that SY dedicated time investigating 

them, is indicative of the atmosphere in the 

Department.24 

SY also investigated individuals who 

fell under the broader category of exhibiting 

“moral turpitude,” “weaknesses of character,” or 

“immorality.” The Civil Service Commission 

insisted that such persons did not merit holding 

“positions of public trust.” In a letter addressed 

to the U.S. Senate and SY, one anonymous writer 

claimed to have discovered “a situation among 

government employees” that was “worse than 

homosexuality,” and “part of the communist plot 

to crack American home morale.” The accuser 

contended that one Department of State employee 

had carried on an affair with her superior, broken 

up his marriage, then filed a claim against her 

paramour and gone on to carry out liaisons 

with other married men in London and New 

York.25 The Office of Security even debated how 

to classify an unwed mother, and whether she 

should be considered a security risk based on the 

“immorality” of her condition. Otto Otepka, SY’s Chief of Evaluations, argued that such situations did 

not warrant any attention. If determined to be security risks, he wrote, pregnant women would tarnish 

the image of the Department’s security apparatus by making it appear “as a court of last resort to pass on 

the public morals.” The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security and Consular Affairs (SCA) R. W. 

Scott McLeod disagreed. If left unaddressed, he said, the issue of the uninvestigated, unwed mother might 

elicit “public criticism...that we were not adhering to the laws of society which have been in effect since 

time immemorial.” McLeod insisted that each case of single motherhood or other moral infractions be 

investigated and judged on its own merits.26 

Figure 8: Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 1949-1953. 

During the 1950s, SY provided only “portal-to-portal” 

protection for the Secretary; that is, Special Agents met the 

Secretary at his home in the morning, protected him during 

the day, and escorted him home at night. Source: U.S. 

Information Service. 
131

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

z The Green and Lodge Report å

The third consequence of McCarthy’s charges against the Department was a greater emphasis upon security 

at U.S. posts overseas. The Senate subcommittee formed in February 1950 to investigate loyalty and security 

risks in the Department of State created the Subcommittee of Two. Consisting of Senators Theodore F. Green 

(D-RI) and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (R-MA), the Subcommittee of Two was tasked with examining “the practical 

operations, enforcement, and day-to-day policing of the security program.”27 

 Senators Green and Lodge conducted the first Congressional study of overseas physical security and travelled 

overseas to inspect select posts. The Senators took their task seriously; in fact, Senator Green took “an extremely 

keen personal interest in the security program.” Green and Lodge interviewed every leading officer and division 

head in SY, several agents in the Washington and 

New York Field Offices, and most Regional Security 

Officers in Europe and the Middle East. The Senators 

flew to Paris and Bonn to meet with RSOs, and 

SY brought in RSOs from Cairo to meet with the 

Senators. Green and Lodge also dined with the U.S. 

High Commissioner John J. McCloy, and discussed 

security concerns at U.S. posts in occupied Germany. 

Green and Lodge completed their research within 5 

weeks, submitting their report to Congress and the 

press on June 15, 1950.28 

Green and Lodge returned most favorably 

impressed with the Division of Security, its overseas 

security program, and particularly Regional Security 

Officers. They recommended expanding SY, and 

increasing its resources and personnel to prevent 

Communist infiltration and espionage at U.S. 

diplomatic facilities abroad. Green and Lodge also 

requested that the Department give the Division of 

Security a higher profile: namely, SY should report 

directly to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for 

Administration, instead of the Director of the Office 

of Controls. They asserted that given the “increasing 

importance of security,” the requirement of having 

SY report to an official who answered directly to the 

Figure 9: Senator Theodore F. Green (D-RI). Senators 

Green and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., undertook the first study 

of diplomatic security. They visited field offices and travelled 

to Europe to talk with Regional Security Officers. Green 

took an “extremely keen personal interest” in improving 

security at U.S. posts overseas. Source: Library of Congress, 

Biographical File. 
132

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Secretary would provide “first hand encouragement 

from the top,” and “this is where [SY] belongs.” The 

Senators also advocated placing a trained, professional 

security officer at every major U.S. diplomatic post 

overseas, expanding the Marine Security Guard 

program by 200 Marines, and increasing the staff 

at the Washington and New York Field Offices. 

Green and Lodge further proposed increasing the 

number of RSOs so that the RSOs could conduct 

more post security inspections and make additional 

follow up visits. The Senators also cited the security 

risks that local national employees presented to U.S. 

posts. Noting that the Soviets did not rely on local 

national employees at their embassies, Green and 

Lodge suggested that the Department replace all local 

nationals with U.S. citizens.29 

Implicitly contained in the two Senators’ 

recommendations was a vision of a radically larger, 

more prominent Division of Security than the 

Department, or even SY leaders imagined. Had 

the Department enacted Green and Lodge’s 

recommendations in their entirety in 1950, it would 

have expanded SY to a Bureau of Security that 

reported directly to the Deputy Under Secretary of 

State. In their report, Lodge and Green envisioned 

Marine Security Guards at every embassy, and full-time security officers at most posts. (Their numbers were 

estimates of what they anticipated it would take to achieve this.) Expanded Regional Security Offices would 

have conducted and implemented regular security inspections and upgrades, with a technical security cohort 

working to defend posts against technical espionage and to maintain continued U.S. technological superiority in 

countermeasures. 

Department officials grasped neither the magnitude of what Lodge and Green recommended nor the depth 

of the Senators’ enthusiasm and commitment to the improvement of SY and overseas security. They overlooked 

how supportive Green and Lodge were of the Division of Security and its efforts, and did not recognize that Green 

and Lodge were willing to add the positions and money needed to implement their proposals. In August 1950, two 

Figure 10: Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (R-MA). 

Senators Lodge and Green urged Department officials to 

expand and increase security at U.S. posts overseas. They 

also indicated their willingness to provide extra funds to add 

more security officers, more equipment, and more training. 

Department officials recognized how supportive the Senators 

were. Source: © Associated Press. 
133

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

months after the report’s release, Senator Lodge told 

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration 

Carlisle H. Humelsine that he was “a trifle put out” 

that the Department had failed to implement the 

report’s recommendations. Humelsine admitted that 

he had to do some quick talking to satisfy the Senator. 

As an immediate step, Humelsine offered to change 

his title to Deputy Under Secretary for Security 

and Administration, and change the name of the 

Office of Consular Affairs to the Office of Security 

and Consular Affairs. Lodge was pleased; however, 

Humelsine only changed the name of the office, 

not his title. Department officials, instead, fixated 

on one recommendation, which they found to be 

nearly impossible to implement: replacing all FSNs 

with U.S. citizen employees. SY and Consular Affairs 

drew up a 24-page study on why replacing FSNs with 

U.S. citizens could not be done. 30

Lodge’s admonishment of Humelsine prodded 

the Bureau of Administration and the Division of 

Security to act on the Senators’ report, albeit not on 

the scale that the Senators had recommended. After 

his meeting with Lodge, Humelsine asked Boykin 

for a presentation detailing how the Department was 

going to address each recommendation for Senator 

Lodge, either before the current Congressional session ended or, at the latest, by the start of the new session in 

January 1951. SY sent the presentation to Humelsine on February 21, 1951, and in it, SY officials requested an 

additional 47 people, and $405,000. Congress, however, had already appropriated an advanced authorization of 

$193,000, allowing SY to hire another 42 people, and the Department had obtained 300 more Marine Security 

Guards from the Pentagon.31 

Green and Lodge recognized that the Department had not grasped their earnest support for improving 

security and had been sidetracked by their suggestion to replace local nationals. In April 1951, they sent 

Humelsine a letter, restating their recommendations and re-emphasizing their desire to provide more training 

to security officers and increase the number of RSOs and Special Agents. Green and Lodge notably pushed 

Figure 11: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in Saigon, 

South Vietnam. SY Special Agent Leo Crampsey (on right 

at rear) provides protection for Secretary Dulles as he meets 

with senior South Vietnamese officials in March 1956. 

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
134

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

replacing local nationals with U.S. citizens to the 

very bottom of their recommendations, qualifying 

it with the phrase “insofar as possible.” Upon 

receipt, Humelsine went down the rearranged 

recommendations list and noted on one-third of 

them that the Department lacked the funds to 

implement them. Humelsine seemed to view the 

recommendations as “faults,” and did not recognize 

nor take advantage of the Senators’ support for and 

willingness to provide additional funding.32

A year after the release of Lodge-Green Report, 

Humelsine thanked the two Senators for their 

support of the Department’s security program, and to 

an extent, Humelsine’s “thank you note” was needed. 

The two Senators had added nearly 100 people to 

the Division of Security, increasing it by nearly 50 

percent, and provided supplemental appropriations 

that funded numerous security improvements at 

posts across the world. Green and Lodge greatly 

expanded the overseas security program, entrenching 

it as a “pillar” of SY.33 

z Division to Office å

The attention that McCarthy drew to employee security at the Department and the efforts of Senators 

Green and Lodge to improve overseas security led to the elevation of the Division of Security to an Office. The 

Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, also called the McCarran-Walter Act, denied entrance to and called 

for the deportation of immigrants and naturalized citizens engaged in “subversive activities,” primarily current or 

former Communist Party members and sympathizers. The McCarran-Walter Act gave expanded powers to the 

Visa and Passport divisions, elevated them to offices, and raised the Office of Consular Affairs to the Bureau of 

Security and Consular Affairs.34 The changes, the Act’s many references to security, and attention to Departmental 

security provided SY strong backing for its request to be raised to office level. When Samuel Boykin, head 

of the Office of Consular Affairs, recommended elevating SY, Humelsine agreed. On December 23, 1952, 

the Department established the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA), and appointed Boykin as 

Acting Director.35 

Figure 12: Samuel Boykin, Director of the Office of Consular 

Affairs. Boykin recommended in 1952 that the Division of 

Security be raised to Office level, and the idea had wide 

support in the Department. Source: Department of State 

Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
135

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

Office of the Director

Direction and Administration of the Office.

Regional Security Office - New York

Executive Officer

Is charged with administrative, fiscal, and budgetary affairs of the Office and the field offices. Maintains central security files of the Department.

Field Investigation Offices

(See chart 5a)

Investigations Staff

Conducts investigations and provides security protection for official guests and other distinguished foreign visitors.

Physical Security and Foreign Operations Staff

Controls physical security for the Department and directs the entire security program for Foreign Service posts.

Review and Dissemination Staff

Reviews and evaluates investigation reports and intelligence reports regarding organizations and individuals of interest to the Department. Disseminates security intelligence.

John W. Ford Director 15 10,800Herbert F. Linneman Deputy Director 15 10,800William L. Franklin Special Asst. 13 8,960Lenora F. Hoover Secretarial Asst. 8 4,995Catherine A. Finegan Secretary 5 3,910

Richard J Moran Regional Security Supervisor 13 8,3601 Clerk 4 3,415Vacancy Security Officer 13 8,360Julius A. Spence Investigator (General) 12 7.040Frank T. Britton Security Aide 6 4,295Lofstrand, G. P. Security Aide 5 3,91013 Security Aide 4 45,195*1 Clerk 4 3,655

James S. Regan Chief, Admin. Branch 13 8,560Thores C. Forsyth Assistant Chief 12 7,240Lillian R. Wathen Admin. Asst. 9 5,310Dorothy L. Wilkinson Admin. Asst. 7 4,995Eileen N. Fletcher Budget Examiner 7 4,3301 Admin. Aide 5 3,4101 Clerk 3 2,950

Communications and Records Section

Lois F. Lee Records Analyst 6 4,0452 Supervisor 5 7,320*1 Clerk 5 3,5353 Clerk 4 10,565*10 Clerk 3 30,220*2 Clerk 2 6,060*Travis L. Fletcher Chief 14 10,600John A. Chappelear Asst. Chief 13 8,760William D. Huskey Investigator 13 8,560Gerard V. Hewelt Section Chief 13 9160Louis Mason Drury Section Chief 13 8,760Walter W. Jessop Liaison Officer 12 7,840Frank J. Madden Investigator 12 7,840John R. Hall Investigator 12 7,840F. W. Treband, Jr. Investigator 12 7,240John L. Neese, Jr. Investigator 12 7,040Omar Meary Investigator 12 7,240William R. Baker Investigator 12 7,840John W. Keogh Investigator 12 7,840John H. Westwater Investigator 12 7,240Francis A. Hackett Investigator 11 6,740James E. Place Special Agent 11 5,940Paul M. Clarke Special Agent 11 5,940John W. Cannon Special Agent 9 5,310John A. Becht Special Agent 9 5,310Roger Steinkolk Investigator 7 4,205Irene F. O’Neill Liaison Asst. 7 4,330Leona M. Anderson Liaison Asst. 7 4,455Marie G. Catucci Secretary 7 4,955Helen P. Pearce Investigator 5 3,7851 Secretary 5 3,4106 Clerk 4 20,490*3 Clerk 3 8,930*

Peter Regis Chief 14 9,600Charles M. Dulin Section Chief 13 8,760Rollie W. White Section Chief 13 8,360Michael J. Ambrose Security Officer 12 7,240Charles D. Skippon, Jr. Security Officer 12 7,240Paul Newland Security Officer 12 7,040Richard F. Kitterman Security Officer 12 7,040William H. Matney, Jr. Security Officer 12 7,040Robert J. Redding Security Officer 12 7,040Keith C. Lynch Security Officer 12 7,040Howard Shea Security Officer 11 6,940Richard C. Bond Security Officer 11 5,940W. Leroy Owens Security Officer 11 5,940James F. Moriarty Security Officer 11 5,940 2 Secretary 5 7,195 1 Clerk 5 3,410 5 Clerk 4 16,595* 1 Clerk 3 2,950

Thomas F. Hoffman Chief 14 9,600Floyd W. McCoy Section Chief 13 8,560W. Davidson Tenney Section Chief 13 8,360Philip F. Cherp Evaluator 12 7,440Robert D. Johnson Evaluator 12 7,240Harvey W. Smoot Evaluator 12 7,040William J. Bullock Evaluator 12 7,240Nels F. Erickson Evaluator 12 7,240James A. Summers Evaluator 12 7,840Earl T. Hart Evaluator 12 7,040Carl L. Bock Evaluator 12 7,240Elmer R. Hipeley Evaluator 12 7,240E. Neill Raymond Evaluator 12 7,240Joseph F. Flynn Evaluator 12 7,240John J. Doherty Evaluator 11 6,140E. Pauline Annis Evaluator 11 6,140Ralph G. Lloyd Evaluator 11 6,340Oris F. Kolb Evaluator 11 6,340John V. Hughes Evaluator 11 6,540Benjamin F. Kouck Evaluator 11 6,140Gipsy W. Lineberry Evaluator 11 5,940George E. Abraham Evaluator 11 5,940Paul J. Byrnes Evaluator 9 5,685Albert W. Moore Evaluator 9 5,810Charles Hammond Evaluator 9 5,685Elizabeth B. Smith Evaluator 9 5,810Ruth M. Olbrich Evaluator 9 5,435Melvin J. Anthony Evaluator 9 5,560Janet F. Roberts Evaluator 7 4,455R. Reed Stormer Evaluator 7 4,205Blair Whitehead Evaluator 7 4,330Josephine R. Di Blasi Evaluator 7 4,330Louis R. Nage Evaluator 5 3,4101 Secretary 6 3,9205 Clerk 5 18,175*9 Clerk 4 30,175*5 Clerk 3 16,030*

OFFICE OF SECURITY

Figure 13: Organizational chart for the Office of Security, ca. 1952. Headed by John W. Ford, SY in 1952 spent most of its effort upon investigations and evaluations; and Senator Joseph McCarthy’s charges placed further pressure upon SY to conduct more thorough background investigations. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
136

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

z Joseph Bezjian and the Great Seal å

While Green and Lodge pressed the Department to improve overseas security, the discovery of the Great Seal 

“bug” brought technical security at U.S. posts to the forefront. In their report, Green and Lodge were confident 

that the United States had not been surpassed in listening device technology. Although bugs had been found in 

U.S. Embassies in Eastern Europe during the late 1940s, none had been found in Moscow since World War II. 

Long-time diplomat George F. Kennan noted, “We had long since taught ourselves to assume that in Moscow 

most walls – at least in rooms that diplomats were apt to frequent – had ears.”36 

U.S. suspicions increased in the fall of 1951, when a British military officer overheard a conversation between 

two British diplomats in another room of the British Embassy on his radio receiver. A U.S. military officer had 

the same experience at the U.S. Embassy. Upon investigation, neither British technical security nor SY’s technical 

security team of Joseph Bezjian and John W. Ford found anything. In early 1952, the U.S. Embassy used Soviet 

workers to remodel Spaso House (the Ambassador’s 

residence) for the new Ambassador, George Kennan, 

who believed that this remodeling provided the Soviets 

with an opportunity to plant listening devices; however, 

several technical security inspections found nothing.37 

Joseph Bezjian returned to the Moscow Embassy 

in September 1952 to conduct a more extensive search 

for listening devices. Bezjian, fondly nicknamed “the 

Rug Merchant,” was one of three SO(T)s assigned 

to the Regional Security Office in Paris under the 

direction of Alex Prengel (the other two SO(T)s were 

Fred C. Snider and Hillman “Hank” S. Ford.).38

Believing that the Soviets had removed the bugs before 

the previous technical teams had arrived, Bezjian had 

his equipment shipped in separately, and posed as 

a “house guest” for 3 days. On September 12, in a 

pre-arranged plan with Ambassador Kennan, Bezjian 

listened for a signal frequency as Kennan dictated from 

a previously sent unclassified despatch, printed in a 

volume of the Department of State’s Foreign Relations 

of the United States series. Hearing a signal, Bezjian 

went to the Ambassador’s study, and isolated the bug 

in a wooden carving of the Great Seal of the United 

Figure 14: The Great Seal Bug. Director of Security John 

Reilly (right) holds the cavity resonator, and an SY Agent 

points to where the Soviet listening device (or “bug”) 

was placed in the wood carving, which hung in the U.S. 

Ambassador’s official residence in Moscow, Spaso House. SY 

technical officer Joseph Bezjian discovered the bug with the 

aid of Ambassador George F. Kennan, who read a published 

Department document while Bezjian located the origin of 

the frequency. Bezjian shipped the bug to Washington, and 

Secretary of State Dean Acheson showed it to President Harry 

Truman and explained how the bug worked. Truman ordered 

U.S. Government agencies to develop countermeasures for 

such technological espionage. Source: Department of State 

Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
137

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

States, which had been presented to the Ambassador several years earlier as a gift from the Soviet people. The carving 

consisted of front and back pieces sealed together by plaster. Bezjian opened the carving and discovered a listening 

device known as a cavity resonator. Operating on a principle similar to a soprano singing a high pitch and breaking 

a glass, human voices activate the cavity resonator, and the resonator then transmits the voices on a radio frequency. 

Bezjian removed the cavity resonator from the Great Seal, and that night, he slept with it under his pillow (to prevent 

theft), then shipped it to Washington the next day. Secretary Acheson showed the device to President Truman, who 

then directed the Naval Research Laboratory to develop equipment for detecting cavity resonators.39 

The Great Seal’s cavity resonator was not new technology, and in this sense, Senators Green and Lodge were 

correct when they said that U.S. technology had not been surpassed. However, Western technical security officers 

had not yet seen cavity resonators employed as espionage devices. Also, the cavity resonator required no electrical 

current, and therefore no wires. It also did not contain any ferrous materials, and therefore had eluded metal 

detectors. Bezjian actually found two cavities in the Great Seal. The smaller cavity held the resonator, while the 

larger cavity, the FBI later determined, had previously housed an older, battery-powered listening device.40

Security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow increased after discovery of the Great Seal bug, but the effectiveness of 

the increase was probably limited. Shortly afterwards, Kennan was declared persona non grata. When Ambassador 

Charles “Chip” E. Bohlen arrived, he demanded that Sergei, the Soviet caretaker of Spaso House, give him a key to his 

(Sergei’s) apartment. After several weeks, Sergei gave Bohlen the key (it is unclear why U.S. officials allowed Sergei to 

take so long). Embassy officers found an empty room when they opened the apartment, but it was later determined 

that Sergei had “helped to organize the bugging of the embassy” from his apartment since the 1930s. In early 1953, 

the top two floors of the chancery were renovated. Although the now-suspicious U.S. officials posted guards on 

Soviet workers during the day, Bohlen confessed that 

they did not post a night watch out of “carelessness and 

to save money.” Discoveries of technical penetration in 

Eastern bloc nations continued. This led SY officials to 

believe there were more bugs in the Moscow Embassy, 

but they continued to find none.41 

Adjusting the Marine Security 

Guard Program

Even though the Department of State and 

the Marine Corps initially anticipated that the 

Marines’ guard duty at U.S. posts overseas would 

be temporary, the Marine Security Guard (MSG) 

program instead had expanded rapidly. The LodgeFigure 15: Secretary of State Dean Rusk speaks to a 

graduating class of Marine Security Guards (MSG). 

During the 1950s, the Department and the Marine Corps 

made significant changes to the MSG training program, 

including the addition of an on-the-job component (at 

Main State) and the development of a Marine Security 

Guard Handbook. Source: Department of State Records, 

National Archives and Records Administration. 
138

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Green Report, as well as the 1950 Mutual Defense Assistance Program, required the Department to increase the 

number of Marine guards at its missions with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners. Military 

Assistance Advisory Groups in Asia and the expanding number of military attachés across the world prompted 

additional demands for Marine guards, largely because overseas military attachés and officials were generating 

significant amounts of classified documents. By the end of 1953, the initial assignment of 300 Marines had 

more than doubled, to 676.42 

As the program expanded, the MSG program suffered a number of “kinks.” Doubts about the Marines’ 

diplomatic immunity arose, but the Department determined that Marine guards merited the same immunity as 

the Ambassador and other post members. SY recognized that Marine Security Guards might have to handle Top 

Secret material during security violations, and soon upgraded the Marines’ security clearance to that level.43 Worried 

that discipline would decline among the Marines, the Marine Corps created four regional Officers in Charge to 

oversee them, locating the regional centers in Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Cairo, and Manila. The Department found 

that some posts used the Marine guards improperly. After an inspection of the Embassy in Paris, Department 

inspectors advised cutting the Marine Security Guard detail by 19 men because Embassy officers were using them 

for messengers, couriers, auto pool drivers, and receptionists.44 

Despite the benefits that all sides appreciated, the MSG program almost did not survive. Administration 

of the program was initially scattered across several Department offices, including the Offices of Personnel and 

Security, and no office wanted full responsibility for it. When Department officials met in 1951 to discuss how 

to improve the program’s management, the Division of Security was “convinced” that it should not “handle the 

administrative details.” SY reluctantly accepted the responsibility “for the sake of the program.”45 

Another reason for the MSG program’s near-disbanding emerged 3 years later, when the Department of State, 

and SY in particular, expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of training that the Marines were receiving for guard 

duty. In 1954, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Thruston Morton told the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps that the training of Marine Security Guards “leaves much to be desired.” SY’s Physical Security 

division proposed adding an on-the-job component, which would be conducted at the Department of State’s 

main building (Main State) in order to improve training. Commandant General Lemuel Shepherd dismissed 

on-the-job training as “impracticable,” but promised to revise the training program. Under Secretary of State for 

Administration Charles K. Saltzman, Morton’s superior, then sought to “clarify” Morton’s letter. He described the 

Marines’ training as “inadequate” and insisted upon including an on-the-job component in the training.46 

Apparently, the Marine Corps’ response was not what the Office of Security and the Bureau of Administration 

had hoped, and in early 1956, SY and SCA gave serious consideration to switching back to civilian guards. 

Ultimately, the Department’s decision turned on the fact that the Marine Corps was absorbing part of the 

program’s cost. An SY memorandum extensively comparing civilian and Marine guard programs suggests that 

had costs been more equal, the Department might have reverted to civilian guards.47 
139

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

 The Department of State’s explicit dissatisfaction with MSG training led to revisions to the training program 

in 1956. An on-the-job component was added, and the first Marine Security Guard Handbook was developed. 

Only single men were chosen to attend the Marine Security Guard School at Company F Headquarters in Arlington, 

Virginia. Upon arrival, Marine Corps and SY officers screened each candidate for “suitability.” Candidates were 

given four weeks of intensive training, with courses on Foreign Service organization and regulations, “Communist 

methods and techniques,” protection of dignitaries, international conferences, counterterrorism, U.S. history, 

“cranks and emergencies,” and etiquette (including table manners and seating arrangements). A comprehensive 

written examination followed, then a second screening of the candidates. The on-the-job component followed. 

Candidates manned shifts as guards-in-training (under supervision) at the Department of State’s main building, 

enabling instructors to disqualify unsuitable candidates and provide a “better security trained” guard for the field. 

The rigorous training program had a 25 to 30 percent disqualification rate. By 1956, there were over 730 Marine 

Security Guards, at more than 90 U.S. missions around the world.48 

z “Getting Tough” under McLeod å

In 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the Presidency with a commitment to achieving greater security 

in the federal government. During the campaign, he had vowed to deal directly and expediently with the issue 

of employee loyalty, and to this end, Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10450 on April 27, 1953. The order 

stated that affirming loyalty to the United States 

was not sufficient in itself to qualify a candidate 

as suitable for federal employment. The federal 

government’s loyalty program now required that “all 

persons privileged to be employed in the departments 

and agencies of the Government, shall be reliable, 

trustworthy, of good conduct and character,” and they 

should demonstrate an “unswerving loyalty to the 

United States.” E.O. 10450 opened all government 

employees for re-investigation, not just those who 

had committed a security breach. It also appeared 

to expand the grounds upon which an individual 

could be disqualified for government service, but, 

in truth, it summarized the developments in loyalty 

and security investigations that had occurred since 

1950, namely allowing the inclusion of “character” 

as a disqualifier.49 

Figure 16: R. W. Scott McLeod (left) and Robert Cartwright. 

As Director of Security and Consular Affairs, McLeod 

implemented Executive Order 10450, which enacted the 

expanded definitions of loyalty, character, and good conduct 

required for Department employment. McLeod began 

his tenure by saying that he had fired 16 “moral deviates” 

and 5 “security risks” just ten days after assuming office. 

Source: Department of State Records, National Archives 

and Records Administration. 
140

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The Eisenhower Administration named R. W. 

Scott McLeod to head the Bureau of Security and 

Consular Affairs in March 1953. A political appointee 

from the staff of Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH), 

McLeod had served as an FBI agent from 1942 to 

1949. He was also a confidant of Senator McCarthy, 

and kept an autographed picture of him on his desk. 

The new SCA Administrator immediately drew 

attention to his efforts by announcing publicly that 

he had fired 16 “moral deviates [sic]” and 5 “security 

risks” just 10 days after taking office. McLeod’s 

announcement gave the impression that the Truman 

Administration had been protecting some employees 

while the Eisenhower Administration was “getting 

tough” with such security risks.50 

Under McLeod, the process of investigations and 

evaluations operated much the same as it had for the 

past eight years. Security reports flowed into SY from 

the FBI and other agencies. Based on these reports and 

its own investigative work, SY had the final authority to 

reject prospective Department employees by refusing 

or withdrawing security clearances. Yet SY did not 

have the power to terminate for disloyalty or unethical 

security practices persons who were already employed. 

The Loyalty Security Board, which functioned outside 

of SY, continued to hold the authority to terminate 

employees under the President’s Loyalty Program.51

The new approach to security risks, as defined 

by E.O. 10450 and pursued by McLeod, allowed the 

Department of State to redeem itself in the public 

eye. Statistics from McLeod’s tenure as Administrator 

of SCA give the impression that the Department 

of State implemented a more effective security and 

loyalty evaluation program than it had previously. 

Figure 18: John W. Ford, Director of the Office of Security, 1952-

1953. Heading SY during the height of McCarthyism, Ford was 

reassigned after he admitted to Congress that the great pressure 

to complete SY’s huge case load quickly led to less than full field 

investigations for many cases, and only spot checks for those 

unlikely to handle classified information. Source: Department 

of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 

Figure 17: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 1953-1959. 

Secretary Dulles did not embrace SCA Director Scott McLeod’s 

enthusiastic application of the expanded definition of security 

risks in Executive Order 10450. Dulles opposed McLeod’s 

evaluation of Charles “Chip” Bohlen as a “security risk.” 

McLeod threatened to resign when President Eisenhower and 

Secretary Dulles refused to withdraw Bohlen’s nomination as 

U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union. The Senate also rejected 

McLeod’s evaluation, and confirmed Bohlen. Afterwards, 

Dulles promised the Senate that he would keep a close watch 

on McLeod. Source: © Associated Press.
141

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced 

that 306 employees had been separated from the 

Department for security reasons between January 20 

(when Eisenhower took office) and September 30, 

1953. Of that total, 147 Department employees 

were terminated after E.O. 10450 went into effect. 

Although E.O. 10450 did not technically apply to 

foreign nationals employed by U.S. posts overseas, 

178 FSNs were also dismissed for security concerns.52

Not everyone in the Eisenhower Administration 

or the Department of State embraced McLeod’s 

enthusiasm. Less than a month after McLeod assumed 

leadership of SCA, McLeod, Senator McCarthy, and 

Senator Bridges clashed with President Eisenhower 

and Secretary Dulles over the nomination of Charles 

Bohlen as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union. 

McLeod brought forward that Bohlen had “close 

associations with three State Department employees 

suspected of homosexuality,” one of whom was 

Bohlen’s brother-in-law Charles Thayer. Eisenhower 

strongly supported Bohlen’s nomination, and McLeod threatened to resign when the White House refused to 

withdraw the nomination. Dulles worried that McLeod would testify on television before the Senate committee, 

and McCarthy had approached McLeod about doing so, hence Dulles tried to smooth things over. Republican 

Senator Robert Taft read Bohlen’s file, but rejected the charge of “security risk.” The Senate confirmed Bohlen, 

and Dulles promised the Senate that the Department would keep a close watch on McLeod.53

The Office of Security came under heavy scrutiny again in early 1953 when John C. Montgomery, 

the Desk Officer for Finland, was found dead at his Georgetown home. Although the police determined 

Montgomery had committed suicide, circumstances surrounding his death remained mysterious. When 

the Department admitted that Montgomery suffered from mental and emotional instability, Congressman 

Fred E. Busbey of Illinois initiated hearings into the administrative practices, employee investigations, and personnel 

policies of the Department. SY Director John W. Ford and SCA Administrator McLeod testified at Busbey’s 

behest. Ford admitted that the full field investigation standard, implemented in 1948, had not reached its full 

working capacity until January 1953, and that the Department’s investigative unit was under pressure to complete a 

large number of cases. SY encouraged quick investigations, and it was customary for investigators to perform only 

Figure 19: Dennis Flinn, Director of the Office of Security, 

1953-1956. Flinn, a Foreign Service Officer, served at 

U.S. Embassy Lisbon during World War II, and at the 

Embassies in Helsinki, Stockholm, and Canberra after the 

war. Upon becoming the Director of SY, he reorganized 

the office to improve security at U.S. posts overseas. Source: 

Department of State Records, National Archives and 

Records Administration. 
142

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

a spot check on those at a GS-5 equivalent or below. Ford’s admissions raised a furor on Capitol Hill, and cost him 

his job (he was reassigned as Regional Security Officer for Central America). McLeod meanwhile was instructed to 

centralize the filing system for investigations and impose tighter control over all SY operations.54 

z Embassy Security and Reorganizing SY å

When Dennis Flinn replaced Ford as Director of SY in October 1953, he pressed for a greater emphasis on 

overseas security. Formerly a Deputy Director of the Office of Controls, Flinn recognized that, operationally, SY 

verged on a “monoculture” of security investigations. Despite the emphasis that Senators Green and Lodge had 

placed on embassy security, Flinn noted that personnel investigations were overwhelming overseas security officers, 

and making them essentially the overseas investigative arm of the U.S. Government. In fact, during the previous 

fiscal year, SY had handled 1,641 cases, involving 3,018 overseas investigations.55 Overseas security officers, Flinn 

asserted, were “not able to give even a minimum degree of attention to their basic responsibilities” of raising physical 

security standards at U.S. missions abroad. Furthermore, of SY’s four divisions—Administration, Investigations, 

Evaluations, and Foreign Operations—only Foreign Operations addressed overseas security. However, Foreign 

Operations performed little physical security work, and could have easily been renamed Overseas Investigations. 

In addition, Foreign Operations supervised the New York Regional Office, which did background investigations of 

U.S. employees to the United Nations.56 

Flinn considered this state of affairs “bad management and bad administration,” and with McLeod’s 

concurrence, Flinn reorganized SY. He separated physical security into its own division, with William Uanna 

as its division chief. He also requested and obtained 11 additional positions to improve the implementation 

of physical security overseas. Recognizing that 

technical security required a “professional level” of 

skills and years of specialized experience, technical 

security officers were designated as Security Officers 

(Technical), or SO(T)s. In early 1956, McLeod, 

on behalf of SY, requested another 15 SO(T)s to 

better inspect and maintain technical and physical 

security for U.S. posts. Flinn also improved physical 

security at the Main State building. He oversaw 

the installation of a new centrally controlled alarm 

system for the restricted areas of the building, and 

implemented procedures ensuring that incoming 

and outgoing communications were screened for 

appropriate classification. As Flinn told McLeod, 

Figure 20: William L. Uanna, Chief of the Division of 

Physical Security. When Flinn reorganized SY in order to 

place more emphasis on overseas security, he named Uanna 

as chief to carry out the expansion of security at U.S. posts 

abroad. Source: Department of State Records, National 

Archives and Records Administration. 
143

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

“purely investigative people never quite understand or appreciate the importance of physical security,” and “they 

almost always relegate security to a secondary role.” This, he believed, created “false security” because it resulted 

in an “over-emphasis being placed on investigating individuals” while physical security languished.57 

Additional factors influenced the shift towards physical security and a lessening focus on investigations. The 

Democrats’ success in the 1954 Congressional elections prompted a review of the personnel security program. 

The media, intellectuals, and wider U.S. public expressed concern that the aggressive personnel security program 

had pushed several qualified people out of government, and discouraged talented individuals from applying. 

Furthermore, several cases related to the federal employee loyalty program had made their way to the Supreme 

Court. Although some of the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions had favored a more stringent security policy, the 

Supreme Court now shifted toward favoring the civil and individual rights of U.S. Government employees. In 

addition, McCarthy’s influence effectively ended in December 1954, when his Senate colleagues censured him for 

“conduct unbecoming” a Senator.58 

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR 

Director Dennis A. Flinn 

Act. Dep. Dir. D. H. Clare, Jr. EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Executive Ofcer John H. Finlator

COMMUNICATIONS AND 

CONTROL SECTION

Chief Lois Lee

SPECIAL ASSISTANT

Special Asst. William L. Franklin

DIVISION OF 

INVESTIGATIONS 

Act. Chief John Finlator

SECURITY REVIEW 

SECTION

Act. Chief S. Pirro

EMPLOYEE SPECIAL 

CLEARANCE SECTION

Chief P. Byrne

INTELLIGENCE 

REPORTING SECTION

Chief R. Johnson

ACQUISITION AND NAME 

CHECK SECTION

Chief E. P. Annis

APPLICANT SECTION

Chief C. L. Bork

DOMESTIC 

INVESTIGATIONS 

BRANCH 

Chief J. Chappelear

FIELD OFFICES 

IN THE 

UNITED STATES

REGIONAL SECURITY 

OFFICES ABROAD

FOREIGN 

INVESTIGATIONS 

BRANCH 

Chief N. C. McManus

LIAISON 

BRANCH

Chief W. E. Jessop

SURVEYS 

BRANCH

Chief J. L. Neese

PERSONNEL 

SECURITY 

BRANCH

Chief O. F. Kolb

OPERATIONAL 

SECURITY 

BRANCH

Chief F. W. McCoy

SECURITY 

INFORMATION 

BRANCH

Act. Chief L. Owens

SPECIAL 

PROJECTS 

BRANCH

Chief K. O. Lynch

PHYSICAL 

SECURITY 

BRANCH

Chief C. D. Skippon

DIVISION OF PHYSICAL 

SECURITY

Chief William L. Uanna

TECHNICAL SECURITY 

STAFF 

Act. Chief S. Holden

DIVISION OF 

EVALUATIONS 

Chief Otto F. Otepka

RESEARCH AND FILE 

SECTION 

Chief Ayleene Hitt

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF SECURITY

Figure 21: Organizational chart for the Office of Security, 1954. The chart reflects SY Director Flinn’s reorganization, 

which sought to place more emphasis on physical security and prevent SY from being merely an investigative office. Source: 

Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
144

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

McLeod continued to call for more stringent 

reviews and investigations of Department of State 

personnel; however, he inadvertently undermined 

his ability to undertake “constant vigilance” and 

“continuing action” when he announced, in 1955, 

that full field investigations had been completed on 

all 11,000 employees of the Department of State. 

Since Congress had earmarked special funds for 

this task, and the Civil Service Commission had 

loaned several evaluators to SY for this undertaking, 

McLeod’s funding and staff levels decreased. The 

SCA Administrator found himself in the awkward 

position of having to scramble for permanent staff 

and appropriations to continue his work at the same 

level he had mustered in earlier years. McLeod 

then faced strong criticism from one survey group 

that charged that personnel security had siphoned 

resources away from other security responsibilities, 

such as protection, training, management, and physical security. Facing an increasingly critical Congress and 

U.S. public, he soon left SCA, and in 1957, he accepted assignment as Ambassador to Ireland.59 

z Courier, Hero, Smuggler, Spy å

While McCarthyism focused public attention upon the internal affairs of the Department of State, the 

Cold War prompted U.S. officials to worry that the Communists and their allies might exploit diplomatic 

immunities and customs to engage in espionage or gain an advantage over the United States. The Department 

of State and other federal agencies extensively reviewed courier routes, diplomatic baggage, and the ease with 

which Soviet bloc diplomats bought American technology and obtained U.S. Government publications. 

Cold War fears enveloped basic diplomatic courtesies and fostered anxieties as U.S. officials became aware of 

the multiple avenues that the Soviets could exploit and of how few security measures actually existed in the 

United States. 

Although the U.S. courier system was largely a post-World War II development, diplomatic couriers 

emerged as Cold War spies and Cold War security threats. In the 1950s, couriers gained something of a 

heroic mystique. Actor Cesar Romero played Steve McQuinn, a suave, resourceful U.S. diplomatic courier 

in a short-lived television series Passport to Danger. In episodes exotically titled “Tangiers,” “Monte Carlo,” 

Figure 22: SY Director Dennis Flinn (left) with Jack Minor, 

Chief of the Division of Investigations. The dots on the map 

behind Flinn show the locations of U.S. embassies that have 

Regional Security Officers. To the right of Flinn’s finger is the 

dot for the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. Flinn added more that 

25 Security Officers (Technical) [SO(T)s] as part of his effort 

to improve overseas security. Source: Department of State 

Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
145

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

and “Prague,” McQuinn experienced harrowing 

adventures and fended off enemy agents while 

delivering important documents to U.S. allies. 

Reality occasionally proved just as dramatic. In 

1955, courier Frank Irwin was aboard a Yugoslav 

airliner that crashed outside Vienna. Irwin survived, 

but suffered internal injuries and third degree 

burns over a large portion of his body. Despite his 

injuries, Irwin refused to relinquish control of his 

diplomatic pouches and declined painkillers until 

a U.S. Embassy officer arrived on the scene to take 

control of the classified materials.60 

 In 1955, SY Director Dennis Flinn learned 

that Department officials had allowed the U.S. Army 

to use the Department’s Iron Curtain courier routes 

as a training ground for its intelligence officers. In 

1947, the Department and the Army had negotiated 

an agreement that allowed six intelligence officers 

from the Army’s intelligence school in Regensburg, 

West Germany, to serve as diplomatic couriers on 

the Paris-Moscow route. Under the program, an 

intelligence officer was paired with a courier for the 

June through January “run.” The purpose was to 

give intelligence officers specializing in the Soviet 

Union an opportunity to see the country, observe 

conditions, and use the language. U.S. Embassy 

officials in Moscow agreed; however, the Department 

insisted that Regensburg couriers refrain from 

conducting intelligence activities, and that the Army 

brief its officers accordingly. After just two months 

(October 1947), the program worked so well that it 

was expanded to encompass courier routes in all Iron 

Curtain nations, and the program continued until 

February 1955.61

Figure 23: Actor Cesar Romero with Actress Betty Furness, 

1950. Romero played “Steve McQuinn,” a diplomatic 

courier, in the short-lived 1950s television series, Passport 

to Danger. Each week Romero’s character McQuinn fended 

off enemy agents in exotic locales as he delivered classified 

documents to U.S. posts overseas. Source: © Associated Press. 

Figure 24: Diplomatic Courier Ray Irwin (on stretcher) 

is brought back to the United States for medical attention. 

Irwin was on an airplane that crashed in 1955. Despite 

his injuries, Irwin kept control of his pouches and refused 

painkillers until a U.S. Embassy officer arrived to take 

possession of the pouches. Source: Department of State, 

Office of the Historian Files. 
146

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The State-Army courier arrangement fell apart over security clearances. Flinn learned that unlike official 

Department of State couriers, the Army intelligence officers serving as couriers did not obtain their clearances from 

SY. SY officials investigated the program and discovered that Army intelligence officers had committed several 

courier violations, including photographing Soviet installations, recording serial numbers of Soviet naval vessels, 

writing down license plate numbers of official Soviet vehicles, and entering “lengthy and heated discussions” with 

foreign officials and military officers. As a result of SY’s investigation, Department officials became convinced that 

the Army trainees would never divorce themselves from intelligence activities, and feared that the United States 

could lose its pouch services behind the Iron Curtain if the program became known. The Department of State 

terminated the program, and staffed all courier routes with Department-appointed and supervised couriers.62 

U.S. officials meanwhile imposed restrictions upon Soviet couriers. The Eisenhower Administration insisted 

that Soviet couriers make travel arrangements in advance and follow predetermined routes cleared by U.S. officials. 

In 1954, Soviet bloc couriers bearing passports were restricted to New York City; Dallas, Texas (air travel only); 

Syracuse, New York (air only); Laredo, Texas (rail only); and St. Albans, Vermont (rail only). Customs officials 

strongly preferred that the Soviets send unaccompanied pouches to the U.S. Government’s receiving facilities 

in New York or Georgetown. U.S. officials admitted that the pouch’s consignee could “intercept the shipment 

to him anywhere en route and take possession of it,” 

but U.S. Customs officials insisted that requiring 

Soviet pouches to be shipped in bond to New York or 

Georgetown would increase security.63 

U.S. officials also worried about the baggage of 

Communist bloc diplomats. Diplomatic courtesy 

dictated that diplomatic pouches and a diplomat’s 

baggage were not to be inspected upon entering or 

departing the nation to which he or she was assigned. 

Diplomatic custom further stipulated that there was 

no weight limit on a diplomat’s baggage, effects, or 

pouches. A diplomat’s bag could be a small suitcase, 

or large containers weighing thousands of pounds. 

Similarly, a diplomatic pouch could consist of a single 

paper envelope, a leather canvas bag, or a gigantic 

crate. Neither U.S. Customs nor the Department of 

State officials tracked the size, weight, or number of 

pouches or pieces of diplomatic baggage entering the 

country.64 

Figure 25: Diplomatic Courier Vincent Cella watches 

Department of State pouches being loaded on a plane. 

During the 1950s, U.S. officials became increasingly worried 

about the security risks posed by diplomatic pouches. They 

feared that the Soviets and their allies might smuggle 

an atomic weapon into the United States or steal U.S. 

technology. U.S. officials debated the concerns of security 

versus the long-held diplomatic privilege of the inviolability 

of pouches. Source: Department of State Records, National 

Archives and Records Administration. 
147

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

Concerns over transfers of U.S. technology to the Soviet Union generated new worries regarding diplomatic 

pouches, parcels, and baggage. SY raised concerns when Rumanian diplomatic officials purchased fifty two-way 

radios and one master radio station. The Hungarians also made several purchases of electronic equipment. The 

National Security Council (NSC) took up the matter in November 1953.65 The Department of State’s Bureau 

of Administration soon developed specific regulations for the handling and inspection of the baggage for each 

Iron Curtain nation. For example, there would be no inspection of the baggage for Soviet diplomats, a “pro 

forma” inspection of Czech bags, and a “thorough” search of the Rumanians’ baggage. Procedures varied for 

diplomatic baggage arriving in the United States unaccompanied, and all regulations and procedures were subject 

to change.66 

U.S. officials also became concerned that Communist couriers and diplomats might smuggle atomic 

materials into the United States, perhaps even detonate an atomic bomb within U.S. borders. The Government’s 

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security 

(ICIS) in 1952 pointed directly to the inviolability of 

diplomatic pouches as a potential security hazard, and 

suggested modifying diplomatic immunity regarding 

pouches and baggage, much to the opposition 

of the Department of State.67 Amidst Cold War 

tensions, the Department had sought to maintain 

a balance between ensuring security and preserving 

diplomatic immunities, customs and conventions. 

The Department determined that international law 

did not strictly prohibit the inspection of diplomatic 

baggage and pouches if suspicion of illegal activity 

existed. The Department’s Legal Adviser admitted 

that there was little legal precedent on the issue, but 

suggested that if U.S. officials suspected a pouch 

contained illegal materials, the recommended course 

would be to request that the person accompanying the 

shipment (or if the shipment was unaccompanied, an 

appropriate officer of the pertinent embassy) open the 

container in the presence of U.S. Customs officials. 

The Legal Adviser did caution against this, noting 

that there were tangible, mutual advantages for the 

United States and the Soviet Union to maintain the 

Figure 26: Diplomatic Courier Ward Christensen displays his 

many passport visas (circa 1954). Christensen subsequently 

served as chief of the Courier Service’s regional offices in 

Cairo, Manila, and Frankfurt; Regional Security Officer 

for Scandinavia; and Chief of Consular Services in Portau-Prince. While serving in Haiti, Christensen and U.S. 

Ambassador Clinton Knox were held captive by Haitian 

militants for 20 hours in 1973 before the militants exchanged 

them for political prisoners. Christensen retired from the 

Department in 1976. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

Files.
148

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

existing practice. If the United States curbed a specific immunity enjoyed by foreign diplomats on U.S. soil, 

U.S. diplomats risked losing that same immunity abroad. Moreover, compromising diplomatic immunity might 

interfere with U.S. diplomatic efforts overseas.68 

Despite the Department’s cautions, ICIS continued to press for a program to screen incoming diplomatic pouches 

for radioactive material. ICIS Subcommittee members rationalized that if U.S. officials could inspect diplomatic 

luggage or pouches without the international community’s knowledge, U.S. security would be protected and 

diplomatic relations preserved. By 1954, ICIS had obtained detection equipment and soon afterwards implemented 

a screening program. The AEC developed devices to detect sheathed plutonium and unsheathed uranium in baggage 

and shipments. The ICIS planned their first test run of the new technology at New York’s Idlewild Airport, where 

specially trained inspectors would direct the baggage of Soviet diplomats through a designated passageway. Despite 

its dislike of, even opposition to, the program, the Department did obtain assurance that it would be consulted 

should such an event occur. SCA also asked the Bureau of European Affairs for advice on appropriate courses of 

action should fissionable material be found. In previous encounters, Soviet, Czech, and Polish delegations to the 

United Nations had strongly protested the inspection of their luggage, lodged formal complaints, and threatened to 

rescind the principle of reciprocity for U.S. diplomats. Further impetus for inspection occurred in October 1955, 

when detectors discovered a Czech courier carrying radioactive material. By 1957, U.S. Customs officers regularly 

searched diplomats and their effects covertly at specified test sites outfitted with fluoroscopic equipment.69

On March 3, 1958, President Eisenhower signed NSC Action 1868, approving a pilot inspection program. 

NSC Action 1868 required the Secretary of State to devise procedures for U.S. personnel to follow when substantial 

radioactivity was detected in a diplomatic pouch or shipment. Department representatives on the ICIS, however, 

learned that the detection devices could not confirm whether the item in a diplomatic pouch was dangerous or 

innocuous. Certain luminous clocks, for example, could give out a substantial radioactive reading, but a properly 

shielded fissionable item might generate a negligible reading. Without a more solid guarantee of the presence of 

fissionable material in pouches or luggage, senior Department officials hesitated to support an action that might 

jeopardize diplomatic relations. By the end of 1958, the NSC had to reexamine and refine its definition of what 

constituted substantial radioactivity.70 

The Eisenhower Administration placed restrictions upon Soviet bloc diplomats. U.S. officials required 

that Communist diplomats request and obtain authorization before travelling in the United States, and in 1956, 

the requirement was modified to 24-hour advance notice. Such requests had to include destinations, routes, and 

overnight stays. Some areas of the United States were closed to Soviet bloc travellers altogether. As Department 

officials made clear to Rumanian diplomats, such restrictions were largely retaliatory, and only occurred because U.S. 

diplomats faced similar restrictions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.71 For example, when the Rumanian 

Government denied travel by U.S. diplomats outside of the capital city (Bucharest), the Department imposed a 

similar ban upon Rumanian diplomats in Washington and at the United Nations in New York.72 
149

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

Perhaps one of the most vexing security issues 

regarding Iron Curtain diplomats involved not 

classified, but unclassified materials. SY and other 

U.S. Government security officials were keenly 

aware of the ease with which a Soviet diplomat 

could obtain U.S. maps, diagrams, and information. 

U.S. Government publications, nautical charts, 

topographical maps, aerial photographs, and detailed 

city and industry plans were readily available upon 

request to any interested foreign national. Equally 

troubling to U.S. officials was that Communist 

diplomats often did not identify themselves, evaded 

questions about their identity, or offered misleading 

statements when obtaining information from federal, 

state, local government sources. Moreover, U.S. 

diplomats did not have comparable access to such 

charts, maps, publications, and photographs from 

their Communist host governments. The Kremlin 

even distributed a pamphlet to the Soviet public titled 

“Preservation of State Secrets,” in order to encourage 

Soviet citizens to deny unclassified information to the 

Americans.73 

In October 1956, the NSC issued NSC-5427, 

titled “Restricting Diplomatic and Official 

Representatives of Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in Connection with Strategic Intelligence.” NSC5427 banned the photographing or sketching of numerous facilities, such as military equipment, power plants, 

tunnels, seaports, hydroelectric dams, and radio stations. It also barred the Soviets from purchasing aerial 

photographs, navigational or hydrographic maps, development plans of industrial cities, or maps or charts with a 

scale larger than 1:250,000. Publicly released, the regulations sought to enlist the American public in helping to 

keep “strategic intelligence” out of Communist hands. Upon the NSC’s recommendation, the Office of Strategic 

Information in the Department of Commerce coordinated Soviet bloc requests for unclassified information from 

U.S. Government agencies. As Department of State officials admitted in a Departmental circular, they sought 

to ensure that exchanges of information and intelligence with the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc nations were 

“reciprocal in character and...result in an advantageous return to the United States.”74 

Figure 27: A Department of State Diplomatic Courier 

(right) delivers pouched items to a U.S. Embassy Paris 

officer on the airport tarmac late one evening in 1957. 

Airline travel sharply increased the speed and frequency 

with which the Department communicated with its posts. 

The courier likely left Washington, D.C., about noon and 

was perhaps delivering memoranda written and signed that 

morning. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
150

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

z Protecting Diplomats and Dignitaries å

A long-observed diplomatic custom stipulated 

that host governments were required to take 

appropriate action to protect foreign diplomats 

and visiting heads of state. The U.S. Congress 

formalized this host duty in Title 18, Section 112 

of the U.S. Code. The laws imposed strict fines, 

even imprisonment, on those found guilty of 

assaulting a visiting official, and tasked SY with 

the responsibility to protect heads of state and the 

Secretary of State. The Division of Physical Security 

initially performed the protective duties, but, in 

1953, they were transferred to the new Division 

of Protective Security. The division worked closely 

with the Protocol staff who organized the logistics 

of foreign dignitary visits.75 

The law, however, did not grant SY Special Agents 

the authority to carry firearms. The Department tried 

to remedy the discrepancy in 1954 by petitioning 

Congress, arguing that dignitaries were “entitled to 

special protection, something more than is normally accorded to private individuals.” Department officials also 

noted that while Congress had criminalized the assault of a public official, it had not conferred on SY Special 

Agents any authority or special powers to protect diplomatic officials. SY Agents regarded the authority to carry 

firearms as crucial to carrying out their protective assignments, and they pointed out that the law permitted the 

agents of other agencies to do so (e.g. the Secret Service). By 1953, SY Agents often carried their own weapons 

during protective assignments, despite the lack of liability protection.76

On June 28, 1955, Congress rectified the discrepancy and approved Public Law 104. The law stated 

that Department of State employees specially designated by the Secretary of State could “carry firearms 

for the purpose of protecting heads of foreign states, high officials of foreign government and other 

distinguished visitors to the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State, and 

official representatives of foreign governments and of the United States attending international conferences, 

or performing special missions.” By extension, the law granted official immunity to Special Agents should 

they accidentally shoot or otherwise injure an innocent bystander in the course of executing their protective 

duties.77 

Figure 28: Protecting Royal Visitors. President Dwight D. 

Eisenhower welcomes Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie (left 

foreground) to the White House in May 1954, while SY 

Special Agent John F. McDermott (left rear, partly hidden 

behind the Emperor) looks on. Source: Private collection. 
151

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

Obtaining legal permission to carry firearms was 

representative of SY’s efforts in the 1950s to formalize 

its protective details, most notably the Secretary of 

State’s protective detail. SY’s Division of Physical 

Security protected the Secretary, and Special Agents 

assigned to the Secretary’s detail attended Secret 

Service classes on dignitary protection in order to 

ensure adherence to standard procedures. SY initially 

assigned two agents to the Secretary, but Secretaries 

Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Christian A. 

Herter, and Dean Rusk often determined the size and 

extent of their protective details. Although SY Agents 

escorted the Secretary to and from home each day 

(called “portal to portal” coverage), SY’s protective 

detail did not offer 24-hour protection. Once the 

Secretary left the Department for the day, he did 

not necessarily receive protection if he made public 

appearances at night.78 

The Secretary’s travels, however, were another 

matter. In 1953, before Secretary Dulles arrived in 

New York City to deliver his address to the UN General 

Assembly, Special Agents from SY’s New York City 

Field Office conducted a technical search of Dulles’s 

quarters at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. They ensured 

that the suite contained appropriate equipment for 

storing classified material and contained no listening 

devices, and then upon his arrival, guarded the Secretary 

throughout his visit to New York. A uniformed police 

officer, assigned by SY, guarded the entrance to the 

Secretary’s suite around the clock. Standard procedure 

for Secretary Dulles’s overseas travels included one 

SY agent travelling with the Secretary, and one flying 

ahead to ensure that rooms and security were ready for 

him when he arrived.79 

Figure 30: SY Special Agents (standing) on duty prepare 

for the cornerstone laying ceremony for the Department 

of State’s new structure, now known as the Harry S 

Truman Building, located at 2201 C Street NW. Source: 

Department of State / Albert N. Abajian. 

Figure 29: SY Special Agent James McDermott (left rear, 

in light colored overcoat and felt hat) follows closely while 

protecting Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom 

in October 1957. The Queen is departing the National 

Cathedral in Washington, D.C., with Presiding Bishop 

Henry Knox Sherrill (center) and President Dwight D. 

Eisenhower (right). Source: Department of State. 
152

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

After four Puerto Rican nationalists opened fire in the House of Representatives on March 1, 1954, SY 

reassessed its protective measures for the Secretary. It heightened security at the Secretary’s office, because almost 

anyone could walk right into the Secretary of State’s office with little, if any, interference. SY limited access to 

the Secretary’s office to a single entrance, placed a security guard there to monitor individuals, and installed an 

alarm button for the guard to push at any sign of trouble. The alarm button automatically closed the door to 

the Secretary’s office. SY explored obtaining a vehicle with armor plating and bulletproof glass for the Secretary, 

elevating security at the Secretary’s residence, and adding an overnight police foot patrol outside the Secretary’s 

home. SY also maintained a two-man security detail at all of the Secretary’s appearances and public meetings.80 

When SY learned that Puerto Rican nationalists might target Dulles during his visit to that island, it recommended 

that agents guard Dulles at all public appearances and accompany him home. SY temporarily increased security 

for the Secretary to 24-hour protection in November 1956 when Dulles was hospitalized for cancer treatment. 

Because of an expressed threat of poison, SY required the nurse on duty to test all food 30 minutes prior to serving 

it to the Secretary.81 

z Conclusion å 

McCarthyism and the Cold War defined 

diplomatic security and set the course of the Office 

of Security throughout the decade of the 1950s. 

McCarthy’s Wheeling, West Virginia speech triggered 

a series of hearings, investigations, and reports of 

Communists infiltrating the Department of State. 

Department officials testified before Congress to 

rebut McCarthy’s accusations, but one official’s 

testimony prompted a purge of homosexuals from 

the Department. McCarthyism also initiated greater 

attention to overseas security. The same Congressional 

committee that conducted hearings on Communists 

in the Department also appointed the Subcommittee 

of Two to study physical security at U.S. Embassies 

overseas. Senators Green and Lodge issued a report 

that strongly urged the Department to improve and 

expand overseas security, and they were also willing 

to provide positions and funds to do so. Department 

officials, long criticized by Congress for a lack of 

Figure 31: Special Agent James M. McDermott (standing 

left, rear) provides security for Secretary of State Christian 

Herter (seated on left) during his visit with Mayor Willy 

Brandt in West Berlin on July 25, 1959. Source: Private 

collection.
153

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

security, did not fully recognize the Senators’ willingness to provide additional resources for security. Director 

Dennis Flinn restructured SY in order to provide better management and attention to overseas security. The 

discovery of the Great Seal bug in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the revamping of the Marine Security Guard 

program were further developments in a shift toward better security at U.S. posts abroad. 

The Cold War also shaped diplomatic security during the 1950s. Concerns about Soviet bloc espionage 

and exploitation of diplomatic courtesies led U.S. officials to reexamine diplomatic customs and immunities. 

U.S. Government officials studied and debated the threats posed by diplomatic pouches and baggage, and took 

measures to prevent the transfer of U.S. technology and information to the Soviet Union. Department officials 

increased and formalized protection of the Secretary of State. By the end of the decade, diplomatic security was 

viewed as vital, and SY had emerged as an essential office in the Department. The 1960s, however, would reveal 

that the Department’s improvement and expansion of measures to promote security were insufficient for the 

threats they faced. 

Endnotes

1 Speech of Joseph McCarthy, Wheeling, West Virginia,” 9 February 1950, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6546. David 

M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (New York: The Free Press, 1983), 108-114. 

2 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, 81st Congress, 2nd

Session, Senate Report 2108, (Washington DC: USGPO; 1950), 3. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, 108-114. For 

the Wheeling speech text and the 205 number, see “Speech of Joseph McCarthy, Wheeling, West Virginia,” 9 February 

1950, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6546. For the Wheeling speech text that shows the “57” number, see “Speech at 

Wheeling, West Virginia,” McCarthy, 9 February 1950, http://us.history.wisc.edu/hist102/pdocs/ mccarthy_wheeling.pdf. 

3 Telegram, McCarthy to President Harry S Truman, 11 February 1950, http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/ 

mccarthy-telegram/#documents. Senate Speech, McCarthy, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 20 February 

1950, pp. 1953-1980. Memorandum, Division of Security (SY), n.d. [April? 1950], Folder – Loyalty and Security in the 

Dept,” Box 16, Security Files 1932-1963, Records of the Division of A/SY/Evaluations, Record Group 59-Lot 96D584, 

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter cited as Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/

Evaluations, RG 59-Lot 96D584, NA). 

4 Memorandum, Division of Security, n.d. [April? 1950]. Memorandum “History of 108 Cases,” Division of Security, 6 

April 1950, Folder – Administrative Folder, Box 5; and Memorandum “Report on Loyalty Security Performance – 1947-

1952,” Conrad E. Snow, Chairman of the Loyalty Security Board, to Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, 8 January 1953, 

Folder – Loyalty Security Board, Miscellaneous 3/1952 – 3/1953, Box 4; both Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 

Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, p. 8. 

5 Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, 109, 111-112, 156 ( McCarthy quotation on page 156. Committee on Foreign 

Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Report 2108, p. 7, 14-

17. Of that report, pages 6-17 make clear the connection between McCarthy’s numbers and the figures and files of the 

Security Office and of SY. Memorandum, Division of Security, n.d. [April? 1950], p. 6. 

6 Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, 103-106. Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War, 2nd edition (Baltimore: 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 27-31. Speech at Wheeling, West Virginia,” McCarthy, 9 February 1950. 

Raymond Daniel, “Fuchs Admits Giving Soviet Atom Secrets from 1942 On, but Says He Quit Year Ago,” New York 
154

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Times, 11 February 1950, pp. 1, 2. “A Spy Fuchs Confesses Giving Secrets to Reds, Goes to Trial 28 February,” Washington 

Post, 11 February 1950, p. 1. “Fuchs’ Case Intensifies Security Drive in Britain; U.S. Waits Extent of ‘Leaks’,” Christian 

Science Monitor, 11 February 1950, p. 1. 

7 U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee 

Loyalty Investigation, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington DC: USGPO, 1950), 8 March 1950, p. 1. 

8 U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of State, 

Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary Appropriations for 1951, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington DC: USGPO, 

1950), 28 February 1950, pp. 581-608. Dismissals on p. 603. 

9 Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty 

Investigation, 5 April 1950, p. 374-391. 

10 Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, 119-125. 

11 National Security Council Report 68, National Security Council to the President, 7 April 1950, Foreign Relations of 

the United States 1950, (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1977), I: 239, 243, 263, 282. John Earl Haynes and Harvey 

Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 304-311. Oshinsky, A 

Conspiracy So Immense, 103. 

12 “Appendix 9 – Case of Gustavo Duran,” U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty 

Investigation, pp. 200-205. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, 126-127. 

13 Robert P. Newman, Owen Lattimore and the “Loss” of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 215-286. 

McCarthy quoted on p. 215. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, 149-156. 

14 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Institute of Pacific Relations, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, Senate 

Report 2050 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1952), 223-225. Newman, Owen Lattimore and the “Loss” of China, 395-396. 

Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, 125-129, 136-138, 199-200. 

15 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, Report 2108, pp. 

7. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, 113-114. Newspaper Clipping of David Lawrence, “Today in Washington: 

Stevenson’s ‘Soft’ Approach to Reds Viewed as Error,” New York Herald Tribune, 2 September 1952, Box 6, Reading 

Files of Director Samuel D. Boykin, 1931-1953, , RG 59-Lot 53D223, NA. Hereafter cited as Boykin Reading 

Files. 

16 Briefing Memorandum “Mr. Hiram Bingham’s Meeting with you at 11:00 a.m., Tuesday, April 15,” [Boykin?] to Secretary 

of State, n.d. [April 1952], Folder – , Box 6, Boykin Reading Files. Memorandum, “Possible Improvements in Security 

Procedures,” Paul H. Nitze, Policy Planning Staff, to Acheson, 19 July 1951, 115/7-1951, Folder – 115, Box 487, DF 

1950-54, RG 59, NA. 

17 Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, 129, 209. Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1998), 177-178. 

18 U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Departments of State, 

Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary Appropriations for 1951, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 28 February 1950 (Washington 

DC: USGPO, 1950), p. 603. 

19 David K. Johnson, The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government (Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 2004), 70-71. 

20 Memorandum “Homosexual Problem,” Haywood P. Martin, Director of the Office of Personnel, to Samuel D. Boykin, 

Director of the Office of Security and Consular Affairs (CON), 21 December 1950, Box 1, Subject Files of the Security 

Division 1946-52, RG 59-Lot 53D223, NA. Hereafter cited as SY Subject Files, 1946-52. Newspaper Clipping “McLeod 
155

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

Lists 107 State Dept. Firings in ’53,” Washington Post, 3 July 1953, Box 12, Decimal Files of the Office of Security and 

Consular Affairs, 1953-60, RG 59-Lot 62D146, NA (hereafter cited as SCA DF 1953-60). 

21 Memorandum ”Establishment of Loyalty Security Appeals Board” John W. Sipes, Security Counsel, to Carlisle H. 

Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, 26 June 1951 attached to Memorandum, Donald L. 

Nicholson, Chief of Division of Security, to Boykin 27 June 1951, Box 6, Boykin Reading Files, 1931-53. 

22 Johnson, The Lavender Scare, 72-75, 127-128. 

23 Johnson, The Lavender Scare, 72-75, 127-128. Letter, Boykin to Sir Robert Mackenzie, British Foreign Office, 23 August 

1951, Box 1, SY Subject Files, 1946-53. Memorandum “Review of 176 Closed Miscellaneous -M Files,” J. R. Ylitalo to 

Nicholson, 27 August 1951, Box 12, SCA DF 1953-60. John Grimes, “A Merco Memoire: 1949-1952,” The Roadbag, 

109 (July 29, 1975). 

24 Memorandum “Allegations of Lesbianism, Homosexuality and Disloyalty,” Michael J. Ambrose (SY) to C. M. Dulia 

(SY), 16 April 1953; and Memorandum. Allegations of Lesbianism, Homosexuality and Disloyalty – Interview with....”, 

Ambrose and James E. Place (SY) to Dulia, 20 April 1953; both Box 12, SCA DF 1953-1960. Johnson, The Lavender 

Scare, 119-121. 

25 Statement, “McLeod on American Employees at the United Nations,” attached to Memorandum, Gwenn to Eileen, 26 

February 1953, Box 12, SCA DF 1953-1960. Report on Rules of the Civil Service Commission, Department of State, 

Box 1, SY Subject Files, 1946-53, RG 59-Lot 53D223, NA. Letter, Anonymous, forwarded by Danpierre [?], U.S. 

Senate, to McLeod, Folder -- , Box 15, SCA DF, 1953-60. 

26 Memorandum “Unmarried Mothers,” Otto F. Otepka, Chief, Division of Evaluations, to Dennis A. Flinn, Director of 

Office of Security, 8 October 1954; Memorandum “Unwed Mothers,” Flinn to McLeod, 14 October 14, 1954; and 

Memorandum “Unmarried Mothers,” McLeod to Daniel Clare, 18 October 1954; all Box 12, SCA DF, 1953-60. 

27 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Final Report of the Above Committee of Two [a.k.a. Green-Lodge 

Report], 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 15 June 1950, Folder – SY- Lodge-Green Report 1951, Box 6, Security Files 1932-63, 

A/SY/Evaluations. 

28 Memorandum “Green-Lodge Security Report,” Division of Security, n.d. [August 1951], enclosed with Note, Bash 

to Nicholson, 22 August 1951, Folder – Implementation of Security Recommendations made by Senators Green and 

Lodge (Copy No. 1), Box 6, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/ Evaluations. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 

Subcommittee of Two, Final Report of the Above Committee of Two, 15 June 1950, p. 3-6. Letter, Jack B. Minor, Chief 

of Security Office, U.S. High Commission in Germany, to Merrill M. Blevins, Chief of Foreign Service and Domestic 

Security Branch, SY, 2 June 1950; and Letter, Boykin to Robert D. Clark, Special Agent in Charge, New York Field 

Office, 6 June 1950; both Folder - Unmarked, Box 2, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 

29 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee of Two, Final Report of the Above Committee of Two, 15 June 

1950, p. 6-14. 

30 Memorandum, Humelsine, to Boykin, 29 August 1950, attached to Memorandum, Boykin to Chapman, 14 August 1950, 

Folder – SY – Lodge-Green Report 1951, Box 6, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. Humelsine strongly implies 

that the Department put the report on the backburner. Memorandum, Boykin to Martin 16 June 1950, Unmarked 

folder, Box 2; and Staff Study “Analysis of Recommendation Made by Senators Green and Lodge for the Replacement of 

FSL Employees with U.S. Citizens,” Alex T. Prengel (SY), E. Holstein (OBF), and H. S. Nelson (PER), 20 February 1951, 

redrafted 27 February 1951 and 3 April 1951, Folder – Implementation of Security Recommendations Made by Senators 

Green and Lodge (Copy No. 2), Box 6; both Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 

31 Memorandum, Humelsine to Boykin, 29 August 1950. Memorandum “Implementation of Security Recommendations 

Made by Senators Green and Lodge,” Boykin (Prengel, Sinderson, and Norton) to Humelsine, 21 February 1951, Folder 
156

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

– Implementation of Security Recommendations Made by Senators Green and Lodge (Copy No. 3), Box 6, Security Files, 

1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 

32 Letter, Green and Lodge to Humelsine, 2 April 1951, Unmarked Folder, Box 2; and Letter, Humelsine to Green and 

Lodge, 31 July 1951, Folder – SY Lodge-Green Report 1951, Box 6; both Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/ Evaluations. 

33 Letter, Humelsine to Green and Lodge, 31 July 1951. Memorandum “State Department Security: A Brief Summary 

Covering period Since Outbreak of Korean Conflict – July 1950 to December 1952,” SY, December 1952[?], Folder – 

Security – History and Statistics re State (SY), Box 16, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 

34 Memorandum “Proposed Organizational Changes in the Office of Security and Consular Affairs,” Boykin to Humelsine, 

20 October 1952, Box 1; Memorandum “Selected Background Information on Security and Consular Affairs,” Boykin 

to McLeod, 3 March 1953, Folder – Organization, Functions and Key Personnel of the SCA,” Box 5; both SCA DF 

1945-53, RG 59-Lot 53D223, NA. “2D British Protest Made on Alien Act,” New York Times, 25 December 1952, p. 4. 

35 Tab C, Memorandum “Statement of Rationale for Making the Security Division an Office,” SCA, 20 October 1952, 

Box 1, SCA DF 1945-53, RG 59 - Lot 53D223, NA. Memorandum, “Proposed Organizational Changes in the Office 

of Security and Consular Affairs,” Boykin to Humelsine, 20 October 1952. Memorandum “Organizational Changes in 

CON,” Humelsine to Boykin, 22 December 1952, Box 3, SCA DF 1945-53. Department Circular No. 11 “Establishment 

of Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs,” 23 December 1952, Box 1, SCA DF 1945-53. 

36 Kenneth Stanley, “The Great Seal Caper,” unpublished paper, n.d. [1993]., HO Files. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-

1963, Volume II (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), 153. 

37 Stanley, “History of the Technical Penetrations of American Embassy Moscow 1932-1985,” M.S. thesis, Defense 

Intelligence College, 1993, p. 31-43.

38 John C. Wolf, “The Early Days,” unpublished essay, 9 December 2005, copy received by PA/HO. 

39 Stanley, “The Great Seal Caper,” p. 3-4. John W. Ford, “Bugging the Embassy,” Washington Post, 7 April 1985, p. F-6. 

Ford’s article was a letter to the editor. For Kennan’s account of the search, see George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963

(Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), 154-157. Stanley, “History of the Technical Penetrations of American Embassy Moscow 

1932-1985,” p. 31-43. 

40 Stanley, “History of the Technical Penetrations of American Embassy Moscow 1932-1985,” p. 42. 

41 Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), 15, 345. Stanley, “History of the 

Technical Penetrations of American Embassy Moscow 1932-1985,”p. 44-45. 

42 Memorandum “Implementation of Security Recommendations Made by Senators Green and Lodge,” Boykin to 

Humelsine, 21 February 1951. John E. Peurifoy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, to Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of 

the Navy, 21 January 1950, 121.1/1-2150; Memorandum “Diplomatic Immunity for Marine personnel assigned duty...,” 

Colonel T. J. Colley, USMC, to Martin, 12 March 1951, 121.1/3-1251; and Memorandum “Additional Marin Guards 

required in the Far Eastern Area,” R. C. Fields to DeGooyer, 12 April 1954, 121.1/4-1254; all Folder [1], Box 543, DF 

1950-54, RG 59, NA. Memorandum “Security: Marine Security Guard Statistics,” William L. Uanna (SY) to Flinn, 12 

January 1954, Folder – Marine Guard Services 1-E/4.1, Box 14, Miscellaneous Decimal Files, 1953-1956, Records of the 

Office of Security and Consular Affairs, RG 59-Lot 57D254, NA. Hereafter cited as SCA Misc DF 1953-56. 

43 Memorandum, Martin to Colley, 19 April 1951, attached to Memorandum “Diplomatic Immunity for Marine 

Personnel...,” 12 March 1951, 121.1/3-1251, Folder [1], Box 543, DF 1950-54, RG 59, NA. Memorandum “Request 

to U.S. Marine Corps to clear Marine Security Guards to handle Top Secret Material...,” Flinn to McLeod, 29 October 

1953, Folder – Marine Security Guards, Box 2, Reading Files of Administrator R. W. Scott McLeod, RG 59-Lot 56D326, 

NA. Hereafter cited as McLeod Reading Files. McLeod to Colonel Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commandant of the United 

States Marine Corps, 13 November 1953, 121.1/11-1353, Folder [1], Box 543, DF 1950-54, RG 59, NA. 
157

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

44 Memorandum, Shepherd to Humelsine, 23 August 1952, 121.1/8-2352; and Humelsine to Shepherd, 24 October 1952, 

1212.1/8-2352; both Folder [1], Box 543, DF 1950-54, RG 59, NA. Memorandum “Recommended Reductions, Marine 

Security Guard, Paris,” Flinn to McLeod, 25 May 1955, attached to McLeod to Graham A. Martin, Counselor of U.S. 

Embassy Paris, 27 May 1955, Folder – Marine Guard Services 1-E/4.1, Box 14, SCA Misc DF 1953-56. 

45 Memorandum “Transfer of Administrative Responsibilities for the Marine Security Guard Program to SY,” Nicholson to 

Steuart (CON), 12 June 1951; and Memorandum “Administrative Activities Involved in Use of Marine Corps Security 

Guards at Foreign Service Posts,” E. W. Harding, 25 May 1951; both Folder – Transfer of Adm. Responsibilities for the 

Marine Guard Program to SY, Box 1, McLeod Reading Files. 

46 Memorandum, Thurston B. Morton, Acting Deputy Under Secretary, to Shepherd, 19 May 1954, 121.1/5-1954, Folder 

[1], Box 543, DF 1950-54, RG 59, NA. Charles E. Saltzman, Under Secretary for Administration, to Shepherd, 23 July 

1954, Folder – Marine Guard Service 1-E/4.1, Box 14, Misc DF 1953-56. Shepherd to Morton, 30 June 1954, attached 

to Saltzmann to Shepherd, 23 July 1954. 

47 Memorandum “Proposed Revision of the Agreement between the Department of State and the Department of the 

Navy...,” McLeod to Secretary of State, 8 August 1955, Folder – Marine Guard Services 1-E/4.1, Box 14, SCA Misc DF 

1953-56. A copy of the revised agreement is enclosed. Memorandum “Comments Concerning Use of United States 

Marine Security and Personnel versus United States Citizen Guard Personnel,” Flinn to McLeod, 10 April 1956, Folder 

– Marine Guard Service 1-E/4.1, Box 14, SCA Misc DF 1953-56. 

48 Marine Security Guard Handbook, United States Marine Corps and Department of State, 1956, enclosed with Memorandum 

“Marine Security Guard Handbook,” Robert F. Cartwright (SCA) to Jack Minor (SY), 8 August 1956, Folder – Marine 

Security Guard Handbook 1-E/4.1, Box 13, SCA Misc DF 1953-56. Memorandum “Comments Concerning Use of 

United States Marine Security Guard Personnel versus United States Citizen Guard Personnel,” Uanna to Flinn, 10 April 

1956. Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling: A Case Study of Washington at Work (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 

1989), 95ff. Attachment D “Recommendation by the Office of Security for the Installation of a Training Program...” 

n.d. [1957?], Box 14, Decimal Files 1953-60, Office of Security and Consular Affairs, RG 59-Lot 62D146, NA. 

49 Memorandum, President Eisenhower to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 27 April 1953, Box 487, DF 

1950-54, RG 59, NA. 

50 “Ex-FBI Man Picked for Security Chief,” New York Times, 26 February 1953, p. 12; “State Dept. Cut Promised by 

Dulles,” Washington Post, 28 February 1953, p. 1; “Takes Security Post,” New York Times, 4 March 1953, p. 15; “Secretary 

Is Accused of Security Overriding,” Washington Post, 21 March 1953, p. 1. David Johnson, The Lavender Scare, 124-127. 

Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes, 290-291. 

51 Memorandum, Morton to McLeod and Wailes (A), 26 March 1954, Box 1, Security Policy Files, 1947-63, Records of the 

Bureau of Administration, Deputy Undersecretary for Administration, RG 59-Lot 96D562, NA. Memorandum “State 

Department Security: A Brief Summary Covering Period Since Outbreak of Korean Conflict – July 1950 to December 

1952,” Box 7, Boykin Reading Files, RG 59-Lot 53D223, NA. 

52 Memorandum “Application of New Security Standards,” McLeod to Executive Directors, Executive Officers and Directors 

of Executive Staffs, 23 June 1953, Box 12, SCA DF 1953-60, RG 59, NA. Draft report on Employee Loyalty, Box 1, 

McLeod Reading Files. Department of State Press Release No. 613, 5 November 1953, Box 12, SCA DF 1953-1960. 

53 Ted Morgan, Reds: McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Random House, 2003), 426-27; “Secretary is 

Accused of Security Overriding,” Washington Post, 21 March 1953, p. 1. David Johnson, The Lavender Scare, 126-127. 

54 “State Dept. Aide Found Hanged Here,” Washington Post, 25 January 1953, p. M-1. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 

Committee on Government Operations, Security and Personnel Practices and Procedures of the Department of State, Hearings 

before the Subcommittee on International Operation, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 29 and 30 April 1953 (Washington: 

USGPO, 1953) pp. 1-12. “2 Shifts Made in State Dept. Security Unit,” Washington Post, 13 October 1953, p. 15. 
158

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

55 N.B. Not all investigations result in a case, hence the discrepancy in numbers. 

56 Organizational Chart “Office of Security 5,” n.d. [1950-1952]; and Organizational Chart “Division of Security,” n.d. 

[circa 1950]; both Folder – Organizational Charts, 1-E, Box 11, SCA Misc DF 1953-56. Memorandum “Investigation 

Commitments and Responsibilities Abroad...,” Flinn to McLeod, 13 November 1953. Memorandum “Proposal for a 

Separate SY Physical Security Staff,” 12 January 1954, Box 1, Program Budget Files 1953-56, SCA, RG 59-Lot, NA. 

57 Memorandum “Proposal for a Separate SY Physical Security Staff,” 12 January 1954. Memorandum “Protection Against 

Penetration by Technical Means,” McLeod (Uanna) to the Under Secretary of State, n.d. [January? 1956], Folder – O 9-c, 

Box 36, SCA Misc DF 1953-56. Memorandum “Report of Major Accomplishments,” Uanna to Flinn, Box 1, McLeod 

Reading Files. 

58 Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes, 294-295. 

59 Principal Witness Statement of the Administrator of Security and Consular Affairs before Senate Appropriations 

Committee Fiscal Year 1956, Box 4, SCA Central Budget Files, RG 59-Entry 1518, NA. Memorandum “Supplemental 

1955 Budget Request for the Office of Security,” McLeod to the Secretary of State, Box 1, SCA Program Budget Files, 

1953-56, RG 59-Entry 1519, NA. SCA Report for 1955 Budget, McLeod to Bureau of Inspection, Box 3, SCA Central 

Budget Files, RG 59-Entry 1518, NA. 

60 Passport to Danger (1954), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0046634/. “User Comments,” Mickey Roberson, same website. 

“Passport to Danger,” www.moviesunlimited.com/musite/product.asp?sku=D62927. Carl E. Lovett, Jr., “The Diplomatic 

Courier Service,” SY Focus, 3/1 (February 1977), 14. 

61 Memorandum “Documentation of Army Intelligence Officers for State Department Courier Duty,” Flinn to McLeod, 

8 July 1955; Staff Study “Special Courier Arrangement with Army” Estes (A/OPR), Beam (EE), and Clare (SY), 26 

September 1955; Memorandum “Regensburg Couriers,” Fisher Howe, 23 August 1955; all Folder --116.3, Box 496, DF 

1955-59, RG 59, NA. 

62 Staff Study “Special Courier Arrangement with Army,” Estes A/OPR, Beam (EE) and Clare (SY), 26 September 1955. 

Memorandum “Regensburg Couriers,” Fisher Howe, 23 August 1955. 

63 Memorandum “Exceptional Entry of Soviet Couriers at San Francisco,” R. I. Owen, 31 May 1956, Folder – Diplomatic 

Baggage & Couriers – 9-A, Box 33; Memorandum “Restriction of Soviet Bloc Nations to Designation Ports of Entry,” 

McLeod to J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security, 2 April 1954, Folder – Relations US-USSR General 

1953-1956 9-A, Box 34; and Memorandum “Soviet Bloc Unaccompanied Pouch to either New York or Georgetown,” 

W. M. Chase (SCA) to Walter J. Stoessel (EE), 11 July 1955; Folder – Diplomatic Baggage & Couriers – 9-A, Box 33; all 

Misc DF 1953-56, SCA, RG 59-Lot, NA. 

64 Report to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security by the Subcommittee on Defense Against Unconventional 

Attack on the Defensive Measures to be Provided by the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department against the 

Clandestine Introduction of Unconventional War Weapons, 4 December 1952, Box 19/998, Files of the Interdepartmental 

Committee on Internal Security, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee RG353-Lot 98D468, NA. 

Hereafter cited as ICIS Files. 

65 Memorandum “Possible Purchase of 50 Two-Way Radios...,” Walworth Barbour (EE – A. W. Sherer) to Flinn, 15 January 

1954, Folder – Rumanian Diplomatic Activities in the U.S. – 9-A, Box 34; Memorandum “Export of Radio Equipment 

by Foreign Diplomatic Pouch,” Thorsten V. Kaljarvi (E – T. H. E. Nesbitt) to Robert Murphy (O), 6 April 1954, Folder 

– Rumanian Diplomatic Activities in the U.S. – 9-A, Box 34; Memorandum, “Amendment to Procedures for Customs 

Handling of Soviet Bloc Diplomatic and Official Baggage,” Livingston T. Merchant (W. J. Stoessel) to Donald B. Lourie, 

Under Secretary of State for Administration, 14 December 1953, Folder – Diplomatic Baggage & Couriers – 9-A, Box 

33; all SCA Misc DF 1953-56. 
159

CHAPTER 4 McCARTHYISM AND COLD WAR: Diplomatic Security in the 1950s

66 Memorandum, Lourie to George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury, n.d. [24 November 1953], attached to 

Memorandum “Procedures Governing Customs Handling of Incoming and outgoing Soviet Bloc Diplomatic and Official 

Baggage,” Merchant (EUR) to Lourie, 24 November 1953; and Instruction, Dulles (R.I. Owen and Barbour) to the 

United States Representative to the United Nations, 3 June 1954; both Folder – Diplomatic Baggage & Couriers – 9-A, 

Box 33, SCA Misc DF 1953-56.

67 Report “Defensive Measures to be Provided by the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department against the Clandestine 

Introduction of Unconventional War Weapons,” ICIS Subcommittee on Defense Against Unconventional Attack, 4 

December 1952; and Report “Defensive Measures by Customs Against the Introduction of Weapons,” W. A. Minor, 

Chair of ICIS Subcommittee on Defense Against Unconventional Attack, to Raymond P. Whearty, Chair of ICIS, 5 

November 1952; both Box 19, ICIS Files. 

68 Memorandum relating to the inspection by United States customs officials of outgoing baggage and effects of members 

of the Czechoslovak, Polish, and USSR Delegations to the United Nations, 5 August 1954; and Memorandum “Rules 

Governing Diplomatic Pouch,” Office of the Legal Adviser, 24 January 1951, Box 19/998, ICIS Files. 

69 Memorandum “Planned early use of device to detect fissionable material in Soviet bloc diplomatic baggage,” McLeod to 

Merchant, 6 April 1954, Box 33, SCA DF 1953-60. Memorandum relating to the inspection by United States customs 

officials of outgoing baggage and effects of members of the Czechoslovak, Polish, and USSR Delegations to the United 

Nations,” 5 August 1954, Box 19/998, ICIS Files. Memorandum, Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State, (W. 

M. Chase) to Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., United States Representative to the United Nations, 3 December 1955, enclosed 

with Memorandum “Ambassador Lodge’s Query about Consequences of Detection of Radioactive Material carried by 

a Czech Courier,” Robert F. Cartwright (SCA) to Hoover, 2 December 1955, Box 32, Box 3, SCA Misc DF 1953-

56. Memorandum “Use of Detection Devices for the Prevention of Clandestine Introduction of Atomic Weapons or 

Components into the United States,” C. A. Emerick, Deputy Commissioner of Customs, to Francis J. Gafford, Personnel 

Security Officer, 29 April 1957, Box 18/997, ICIS Files. 

70 Memorandum “Detention of a Diplomatic Shipment Indicating ‘Substantial Radioactivity’ through the use of a Detection 

Device,” Roderic L. O’Connor (SCA), to Hoover, 8 April 1958; and Memorandum “Implementation of NSC Action 

1868, Screening of Diplomatic Pouches,” Bernard J. Humes (DC/P), to Edmund J. Dorsz (SCA) 14 November 1958; 

both Box 19/998, ICIS Files, RG353, NA. 

71 Despatch 213 “Czech Travel Restrictions, Direct and Indirect,” John D. Iams, First Secretary of Embassy, to Department 

of State, 12 December 1955, Box 34; Despatch 37 “Travel Restrictions on Diplomatic Missions in Hungary,” N. Spencer 

Barnes, Counselor of Embassy, to Department of State, 2 August 1956, Folder – Hungary 9-A, Box 33; Despatch 482 

“Restrictions on Travel, Taking of Photographs, Sketchings, etc.,” J. E. Jacobs, U.S. Ambassador to Poland, to Department 

of State, 7 June 1955; and Telegram 2448, Charles Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, to Secretary of State, 

enclosed with Memorandum “Proposed Public Exposure of Soviet Impediments to Travel in Open Areas,” Warren M. 

Chase to Francis B. Stevens (EE), 11 May 1956, Box 32; all SCA Misc DF 1953-56.

72 Memorandum of Conversation “Travel Restrictions on Rumanian Official Personnel,” R. B. Hill (EE), 31 August 1956, 

Folder – Rumania 9-A, Box 34; Memorandum, Robert M. McKisson (EE) to Christian M. Ravndal, U.S. Minister to 

Hungary, 16 March 1956, Folder – Restrictions – Photography abd [sic] Sketchings 9-A, Box 34; Memorandum of 

Conversation “Soviet Automobile Travel Through Closed Areas to San Francisco,” R. I. Owen (EE), 6 June 1955, Folder – 

Access to Open Areas U.S. & U.S.S.R. 9-A, Box 32; and Memorandum of Conversation “Travel Restrictions Re-imposed 

on Rumanian Legation and UN Mission Personnel,” Hill (EE), 8 November 1956, Folder – Rumania 9-A, Box 34; all 

SCA Misc DF 1953-56. 

73 Letter, Herbert Brownell, Jr., Attorney General, to the Secretary of the Interior, 30 July 1954; Memorandum, Warren 

M. Chase (SCA) to Walter J. Stoessel (EE), 29 November 1954; and Instruction CA-7504 “Contemplated Additional 

Restrictions on Activity of Soviet Bloc Officials in the United States” with enclosures, Dulles (Owen, EE) to U.S. Embassies 
160

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Budapest, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw, 18 June 1954; all Folder – Restrictions – Photography abd [sic] 

Sketchings 9-A, Box 34, SCA Misc DF 1953-56. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to Czechoslovakia, 

to Harold C. Vedeler, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Aug. 1, 1955, enclosed with Memorandum “Prague Embassy 

Experience in Connection with Obtaining Czech Publications,” Howard Trivers (EE) to Chase (SCA), 12 August 1955, 

Box 32; and Despatch 133 “Soviet Attitude Toward Publications Procurement,” Walter N. Walsmley, Jr., MinisterCounselor, to Department of State, 21 September 1954, Box 34; both SCA Misc DF 1953-56. 

74 Press Release “Regulations of Photography and Sketching by Soviet Citizens in the United States,” Department of State, 19 

January 1955; State Department Circular “Handling Requests from Soviet Bloc Countries for United States Government 

Non-Classified Published and Unpublished Information,” n.d. [14 September 1956], enclosed with Memorandum, 

Warren M. Chase (SCA) to Fred W. Shipman (LR), 17 September 1956; and Memorandum “Nicolaie Cucu, was. 

Assistant Air Attaché, Rumanian Legation,” E. Tomlin Bailey, Director of SY, to Freers (EE), 19 November 1956, enclosed 

with Memorandum “Proposed Note to Rumanian Legation concerning Improper Activities by Members of the Legation 

Staff,” Leverich (EE) (J. L. Katz) to Chase (SY), 4 December 1956; all Box 34, SCA Misc DF 1953-56. Quote from 

Department Circular. 

75 Memorandum “Duties of Special Agents Engaged in Protection of Dignitaries during Visits to the U.S.,” SCA, Box 14, 

SCA DF 1953-60. 

76 Letter, Morton to Joseph W. Martin, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 23 March 1954; and Letter, Morton to 

Joseph M. Dodge, Director of Bureau of the Budget, 23 March 1954; both Box 14, SCA DF 1953-60. 

77 Memorandum “Warren Commission Recommendations and Our Protective Services for Visiting Dignitaries,” Gentile 

to Crockett, 22 October 1964, attached to Memorandum, Crockett to Gentile, 3 November 1964, Box 5, Protective 

Security Policy Files 1962-68, RG 59 – Lot 70D292, NA. Memorandum “Protection of Foreign Heads of State and 

Government and other High Officials while in the United States on “Unofficial” Visits,” Leo J. Harris (L/A) to Abram 

Chayes (L), 9 January 1964, Folder – Security Box 227, CFPF 1964-66, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, Carlyle E. Maw 

(L) to the Secretary, 7 May 1974, Folder – SY 4 Protection/Terrorism, Box 4, Bureau of Administration Files, 1974, RG 

59 - Lot 76D71, NA. 

78 Memorandum “Protection of the Secretary of State and Dignitaries Visiting the United States as Guests of the Department 

of State,” Flinn to McLeod, 20 April 1954; all Folder – Protection for the Secretary 1-E/4.1, Box 14, SCA DF 1953-56. 

79 Memorandum “The Secretary’s Visit to New York for the UN General Assembly,” A.H. Ellis (SY) to John Horan (SY) 

11 September 1953; and Memorandum “Secretary’s Visit to New York – October 20-21, 1953,” Flinn to McLeod, 21 

October 1953; both Folder – Protection for the Secretary 1-E/4.1, Box 14, SCA DF 1953-56. Memorandum “Protection 

of the Secretary of State and Dignitaries Visiting the United States as Guests of the Department of State,” Flinn to 

McLeod, 20 April 1954. 

80 Personal Memorandum, O’Connor to Hanes, 6 March 1954; and Memorandum “Protective Measures Necessitated by 

the Puerto Rican Nationalists Threat,” McLeod and Morton to the Secretary of State, 25 March 1954; both attached to 

Memorandum “Protection of Secretary,” McLeod to Flinn, 1 April 1954, Folder – Protection for the Secretary 1-E/4.1, 

Box 14, SCA DF 1953-56. 

81 Memorandum, R. L. O’Connor to McLeod, 29 March 1954, Folder – Protective Services, Box 487, SCA DF 1950-54, 

RG 59, NA. Memorandum “Secretary’s Illness and Threat Against Secretary,” Keith O. Lynch to Uanna, 5 November 

1956; Memorandum “Russell Maguire, American Mercury Magazine - Alleged Plot Against the President, Joseph J. Ellis, 

Jr., Secret Service Special Agent in Charge, to Chief, 5 November 1956; Memorandum “Magazine Executive Predicts 

Lives of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles May Be in Danger,” Gwenn L. Lewis, SCA, to Lynch, 6 November 

1956; and Memorandum “Memorandum of Conversation,” Lynch to Uanna, 5 November 1956; all Box 10, Protective 

Security Files for the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and other VIPS, 1949-60, RG 59 - Lot 62D204, NA. 
161

CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

The early 1960s proved to be a difficult time for the Office of Security (SY) because it faced new 

challenges and expanded responsibilities. Cold War security threats and Congress’s concern about security risks 

in the Department of State continued. The discovery of two networks of microphones in the U.S. Embassies in 

Moscow and Warsaw manifested the growing impact technology was exerting on U.S. diplomatic security. The 

sharp rise in official visits to the United States by foreign heads of state forced SY to reconsider how it conducted 

protective security details—particularly after the adoption of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 

Relations, which stated that the host country bore responsibility “to take all appropriate steps to prevent any 

attack.”1

 SY also suffered public embarrassment by 

an internal struggle over security clearances (the Otto 

Otepka case); but it garnered praise for its efforts in 

coordinating the protection of more than 20 heads of 

state for President John F. Kennedy’s funeral. 

The amalgam of spies, leaks, bugs, and protective 

details stretched and challenged SY and Departmental 

resources in ensuring diplomatic security. The Irvin 

Scarbeck case demonstrated the Communist bloc’s 

commitment to recruiting U.S. citizens as spies. The 

Otto F. Otepka case found a senior SY officer leaking 

documents to a Congressional committee, but it 

brought an end to the debate over security risks that 

had plagued the Department since the 1945 Amerasia

case. Discoveries of networks of “bugs” (listening 

devices) in the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and 

CHAPTER 5

SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS 

8

Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

Figure 1: Office of Security Special Agent James McDermott 

(center right, striped necktie) provides protection for Prime 

Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India (left, white cap). Nehru 

arrives in New York City on September 25, 1960, to attend 

the United Nations General Assembly. Indian Foreign

Minister V. Krishna Menon (center with cane) escorts the 

Prime Minister. Source: United Press International. 
162

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Warsaw, as well as shortcomings in the Department of State’s communications system during the Cuban Missile 

Crisis, forced the Department to explore and use new technologies. The Department introduced computers to 

its communications system, and drew upon British counterintelligence technology. Moreover, it added a detail 

of Navy Seabees to find existing listening devices and prevent Soviet bloc workmen from installing them in U.S. 

embassies. By 1964, beset by several challenges to diplomatic security, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Assistant 

Secretary of State for Administration William Crockett recruited G. Marvin Gentile to reorganize and guide SY 

so that it could fulfill the Department’s expanding demands for security.2

 

z Security in the Spotlight å

The U-2 affair put diplomatic security and the Office of Security (SY) in the spotlight. On May 1, 1960, 

near Sverdlovsk, the Soviets shot down a U-2 reconnaissance jet, piloted by U.S. civilian pilot Gary Powers. Soviet 

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko accused the United States of “perfidy” and “subterfuge.” The U.S. Ambassador 

to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., countercharged by detailing the work of eleven Soviet spies that 

U.S. officials had discovered during the previous seven years. The Soviets continued their condemnations of U.S. 

spying, and brought a resolution against the United States to the United Nations Security Council. Gromyko 

declared that if the United States continued its policy “of military espionage and sabotage against the Soviet Union,” 

it would place the world “on the brink of war.”3

 

Tired of the Soviets’ bluster and accusations, 

Ambassador Lodge unveiled to the Security Council 

(and the press) the Great Seal listening device that SY’s 

Joseph Bezjian had found in 1952. Lodge explained 

how the Soviets had hidden the listening device in a 

woodcarving, gifted to U.S. Ambassador Harriman 

in 1945 by the Soviets. Lodge also presented the 

bug and described how it operated. Moreover, 

Lodge announced that the United States had found 

“more than 100 concealed listening devices in [U.S.] 

embassies and residences” in recent years in Soviet bloc 

nations. Although the Soviets later denied Lodge’s 

charges as having “complete groundlessness,” the 

embarrassment and damage were done. The Soviet 

resolution against the United States was defeated 

seven votes to two, with only Poland voting with the 

Soviets.4

 

Figure 2: U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., (seated 

at left) shows the Great Seal bug to the United Nations 

Security Council on May 26, 1960. With the assistance 

of Richard Pedersen, Lodge describes how the Soviets had 

conducted espionage within the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, 

thereby silencing Soviet bluster about U-2 over-flights by the 

United States. Source: © Associated Press. 
163

CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

The public unveiling of the Great Seal device highlighted SY’s impressive success in technical security. 

Between 1948 and 1961, SY engineers discovered more than 95 percent of all listening devices found by all U.S. 

Government agencies. While SY had one technical engineer in 1948, by 1961 it had 15.5

 During the fall of 

1960, the intelligence community briefed Director of Security William O. Boswell and several senior SY officers 

on technical threats that SY engineers would face in the future. What was shown to Boswell and the others is 

not clear, but the briefing left SY officials stunned and unnerved. Immediately afterwards, Boswell sought and 

obtained approval from the Department and the Bureau of the Budget to request an additional 44 technical 

engineers and $500,000 for the research and development of technical equipment in SY’s fiscal year 1962 budget. 

Congress increased the research and development funding to $1 million, but approved only about 20 technical 

engineer positions. Nonetheless, the one briefing led to a doubling of the number of technical engineers and 

dramatically increased SY’s funding.6

 

Less than a year after Ambassador Lodge 

displayed the Great Seal, SY discovered a spy at 

the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw. Irvin C. Scarbeck 

managed travel arrangements, living quarters, and 

property for the Embassy. Married with three 

children, Scarbeck had an affair with a young Polish 

woman, and Polish intelligence blackmailed him into 

providing them with information about U.S. policy. 

The Embassy’s security officer, Special Agent Victor 

Dikeos, discovered Scarbeck’s activities. While SY 

and the FBI developed the case against Scarbeck, the 

Department extended Scarbeck’s tour in Warsaw. The 

Department then recalled him to Washington, and 

upon his arrival, Scarbeck was arrested and sentenced 

to 30 years in prison.7

 

Also in 1961, the United Nations’ Vienna 

Convention on Diplomatic Relations was signed, 

resolving several issues regarding diplomatic 

privileges that had emerged during the 1950s, most 

notably involving diplomatic pouches and baggage. 

Diplomatic legal scholar Eileen Denza describes 

the 1961 Convention as the first “comprehensive 

formulation of the rules of modern diplomatic 

Figure 3: Irvin Scarbeck. After an affair, Scarbeck was 

blackmailed by Polish intelligence into passing classified 

documents. SY Special Agent Victor Dikeos discovered

Scarbeck’s espionage, and Scarbeck was convicted, receiving 

a 30-year prison sentence. Source: Library of Congress, 

New York World-Telegram and the Sun Collection. 
164

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

law” in nearly 200 years. Among other facets 

of diplomatic representation and relations, the 

Convention defined what constituted a diplomatic 

bag, what that bag might carry, and how to proceed 

with a suspect bag. The Vienna Convention also 

defined diplomatic immunities for diplomats and 

couriers, the inviolability of mission premises, and the 

responsibilities of the host state to the mission. The 

Convention not only helped to improve diplomatic 

security, but also provided a basis for reconciling 

diplomatic disagreements over security. As the 

Convention’s preamble states, the purpose of such 

privileges and immunities (and of the Convention 

itself) was “not to benefit individuals but to ensure the 

efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic 

missions as representing States.”8

 

Also, in 1961, the Department of State instituted 

a new identification card system that coincided with 

the opening of the new wing of the Department’s 

building. The new ID cards were intended to help 

resolve the problem of nearly 2,000 ID cards that had 

been lost, misplaced, or destroyed since SY had begun 

issuing them in 1949. The new ID cards differed from 

the older ID card in that they had a color photograph 

of the officer or employee and were laminated with a 

thin plastic film.9

 

z Administrative Reforms å

During the 1960s, SY experienced several 

administrative reforms. Perhaps the most significant 

was the rotation of SY personnel between domestic 

and overseas assignments. William Boswell, who 

became Director of SY in August 1958, found 

SY divided between those who continually served 

Figure 4: Department of State messenger Raymond L. 

Butler displays one of the new ID cards instituted in 1961. 

Source: Department of State Records, National Archives 

and Records Administration. 

Figure 5: William O. Boswell, Director of the Office of 

Security, 1958-1962. Boswell instituted the practice of 

rotating Special Agents between Washington and overseas. 

He also reorganized SY in January 1962, reflecting the 

increasing demands of overseas and protective security. 

Source: Department of State Records, National Archives 

and Records Administration. 
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CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

overseas and those who constantly remained in Washington. Boswell erased the division by initiating the rotation 

of SY agents between overseas and domestic posts.10 

Also, SY’s Intelligence Reporting Branch (IRB), which had emerged in the 1950s, faced an increasing workload. 

Working with other agencies, the IRB gathered information on threats or illegal activity. The information included 

threats to the Secretary and foreign dignitaries, passport and visa fraud, activities of diplomatic representatives 

or aliens in the United States, covert or illegal activities of Department personnel, crank calls, and threats to the 

Department’s main building (Main State) or Department annexes. Although 90 percent of reports received came 

from the FBI regarding domestic threats, the IRB also worked with the Department’s Area Desks on intelligence 

or threats to U.S. posts or diplomatic personnel. By 1961, IRB processed about 30,000 reports per year.11 

In 1961, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration William J. Crockett initiated a series of reforms 

to modernize the organization and administration 

of the Department of State. Popularly known as the 

“Crockett Reforms,” these recommendations drew 

upon innovations in corporate organization, and 

sought to reduce the Department’s “highly structured, 

multi-layered bureaucracy.” Crockett later recalled 

that he wanted to create “independent operators” 

who “really had the authority to run an operation,” 

and “make that operation more effective.” One of 

Crockett’s recommendations was moving SY from 

the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA) 

to the Bureau of Administration. In his opinion, 

SY’s activities “more closely resembled” those of 

Administration offices such as Personnel, and “good 

management” suggested bringing similar offices 

together. Implementation of this recommendation, 

however, was delayed.12 

In the meantime, the new Administrator of 

the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA), 

Salvatore Bontempo, proposed a major reorganization 

of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, which 

involved turning over several SY responsibilities to 

other agencies. His proposal included transferring 

personnel investigations and evaluations to the 

Figure 6: William J. Crockett, Assistant Secretary of State 

for Administration. Drawing upon corporate models, 

Crockett modernized the Department through the “Crockett 

reforms.” He sought to make a Department that had grown 

significantly since World War II operate in a more efficient 

manner. One of his reforms was to move SY from the 

Bureau of Consular Affairs to the Bureau of Administration. 

Source: Department of State Records, National Archives 

and Records Administration.
166

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Civil Service Commission, technical security counter-measures to the FBI, and moving IRB to the Bureau of 

Intelligence and Research (INR). Whether Bontempo sought to streamline SY; concentrate the office upon 

protecting the Secretary, foreign dignitaries, and embassies; or simply to dismantle SY as a means to achieve 

bureaucratic efficiency is not clear. In November 1961, shortly after Bontempo put forward his reorganization 

plan, SCA announced that it would eliminate 25 positions from its personnel because of Congressional budget 

cuts.13 

Bontempo had little support for his proposed reorganization, and the announced personnel cuts prompted 

uproar from Congress and the public.14 Many viewed the personnel cuts as a threat to national security because it 

targeted personnel who conducted background checks and guarded embassies abroad.15 Several newspaper articles 

and editorials decried the “gutting” or “emasculation” of SY. In addition, SY’s Deputy Director, Otto Otepka, 

testified before Congress that the cuts would harm 

security. In the face of opposition, the Department 

held a press conference to defend the cuts and explain 

how they would affect security. SY Director Boswell 

assured the public that if the cuts endangered national 

security, he would resign in protest.16 The controversy 

doomed Bontempo’s proposal, he resigned, no 

personnel cuts occurred, and the Department shifted 

the budget cuts to other offices.17

With Bontempo’s departure, Boswell undertook 

his own reorganization of SY in January 1962. 

Boswell took few, if any, of Bontempo’s ideas; instead, 

he reorganized SY in a way that reflected the office’s 

expanding overseas and protective duties. The 

Divisions of Investigations and Evaluations remained 

intact, while the Division of Physical Security was 

divided into three. The Division of Foreign Operations 

focused upon overseas security, namely Regional 

Security Officers, post security, and the Marine 

Security Guard program. The Division of Technical 

Services concentrated upon technical threats (such as 

listening devices) and countermeasures, research and 

development, and training of SY officers. Finally, 

the Division of Domestic Operations centered upon 

Figure 7: Salvatore Bontempo, Administrator of the 

Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. Bontempo 

tried to give several SY responsibilities to other agencies 

and offices. His plan was shelved after intense public and 

Congressional criticism, and he quickly resigned. Source: 

Department of State Records, National Archives and 

Records Administration. 
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CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

protecting the Secretary and foreign dignitaries, as well as security at the Main State building and its annexes. In 

another change, Boswell abolished the IRB and re-constituted it as the Intelligence Processing Section (IPS) under 

SY’s Records and Services Branch. He required IPS to liaise with other agencies, passing on items of interest, but 

also cut its staff from eleven to five.18 

Just after Boswell’s reorganization, Crockett’s idea of moving SY to the Bureau of Administration became 

a reality. On August 8, 1962, SY was transferred to Administration, and its director elevated to Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State. John F. Reilly became the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, and he reported 

directly to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, William H. Orrick, Jr. As Crockett told the 

Senate’s Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS), the move demonstrated the increased importance with which the 

Department regarded the security function.19 

Figure 8: Organizational chart of the Office of Security, January 1962. The chart reflects William Boswell’s reorganization 

of SY. It shows the growing importance of protective details and technical security. Source: Department of State Records, 

National Archives and Records Administration. 
168

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

z Communications Security å

While Crockett and Boswell were reorganizing the Bureau of Administration and the Office of Security, the 

Kennedy Administration discovered a weakness in the United States’ diplomatic communications systems. In 

contrast to the pre-World War II situation, the weakness was not U.S. codes. In November 1952, President Truman 

created the National Security Agency in an effort to centralize the U.S. Government’s coded-communications and 

to improve U.S. cryptography. Although the agency officially resided within the Department of Defense, it operated 

independently and oversaw cryptography used by all government agencies, including the Department of State. 

The NSA also provided cryptographic intelligence to the Department. While NSA’s Office of Communications 

Security provided the Department of State with cryptographic equipment and the code itself, the Department 

employed its own personnel (numbering 31 in 1961) to manage its enciphering and day-to-day cryptographic 

functions.20 

In the fall of 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis revealed that the flaw in U.S. diplomatic communications 

was aging equipment and technology. As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated 

over the installation of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, the Kennedy White House learned that it could not 

communicate directly with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the Department 

of State had their own system and code for communications; meanwhile, the Department and the White House 

had a separate, different communications system 

and codes. During the crisis, cable messages from 

Moscow to Washington took several hours to reach 

the White House because telegrams from the U.S. 

Embassy in Moscow arrived at the Department and 

were decoded. However, to pass the cable on the 

White House’s separate communications system, 

the telegrams were then encoded in different code, 

sent to the White House, and then decoded again. 

As a result, the White House learned about some key 

Soviet messages from Russian radio broadcasts hours 

before the Department of State delivered them.21 

The Department’s burgeoning telegraphic traffic 

and its aging equipment compounded the problem. 

In 1930, Departmental telegraphic communications 

amounted to approximately 2.2 million words for the 

entire year. By January 1960, the Department was 

sending that quantity every two weeks. Moreover, 

Figure 9: The Department of State’s Communications 

Center as it appeared in October 1961. Although the 

Department had adopted Telex printers, much of the 

Department’s equipment relied upon World War II 

technology. Delays in receiving telegrams were common 

because Department telegram traffic had risen sharply since 

1945. Source: Department of State Records, National 

Archives and Records Administration. 
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CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

the post-WWII increases in the volume had not been matched by the adoption of improved technologies; the 

Department of State was still using World War II-era technology. This slowed the Department’s incoming and 

outgoing cable traffic. When President Kennedy announced the embargo on Cuba, several governments were 

“caught flat-footed” because the Department was unable to notify them in advance. At the same time, innovations 

in radio, television, and air travel spread news and information more quickly, exacerbating the Department’s 

problems of high volume and slow transmittal speeds.22 

As a result, and just after the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy created the Orrick Committee, 

an inter-departmental committee tasked to examine the communications network of the U.S. Government. 

Chaired by Under Secretary of State for Administration William Orrick, the Committee overhauled the federal 

Government’s communications infrastructure. It created the National Communications Service, and gave NSA 

the responsibility for creating the cryptographic system for every department in the federal Government. The 

Committee also established the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service (DTS), which created combined StateCIA communications centers in U.S. embassies overseas, with joint State-CIA management.23 In addition, 

the United States and the Soviet Union installed 

a “hotline” between the two governments, which 

became operative on August 20, 1963. The hotline, 

or “MOLINK,” consisted of two lines: a telegraph 

line routed via Washington-London-CopenhagenStockholm-Helsinki-Moscow, and a radiotelegraph 

circuit routed via Washington-Tangier-Moscow. The 

first was for messages, while the second was for service 

and coordination of operations.24 

 The Orrick Committee also prompted the 

Department to upgrade its communications. 

Department officials created the Office of 

Communications on March 21, 1963. With John 

W. Coffey as the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for Communications, the office had a Division 

of Communications Security and oversight of the 

pouch and courier service.25 Department officials 

also automated its communications, introducing 

“high-speed” computers to the Department. 

International Telephone and Telegraph received a 

2-year contract to install the Automated Terminal 

Figure 10: William Orrick, Under Secretary of State for 

Administration. Orrick chaired the Orrick Committee, 

which was formed after the U.S. Government’s 

communications systems problems during the Cuban Missile 

Crisis. Under the Orrick Committee’s oversight, U.S. 

Government communications systems were overhauled. 

Source: Department of State Records, National Archives 

and Records Administration. 
170

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Station system in a new communications facility on 

the fifth floor of Main State, one floor below the old 

“comms” center.26 As “cutting edge” technology, 

the computer installed was an 18-bit computer, 

operating at 40 kilohertz, with 52 kilobytes core 

storage. Such specifications may seem “ancient” 

compared to a 2006 personal computer, which 

has a 32-bit computer operating at 3.19 gigahertz 

with 512 megabytes physical memory with 1.69 

gigabytes virtual memory. Yet, in comparison, Wall 

Street of the 1960s was still employing ticker tape 

machines and just introducing the same computers 

as the Department to process stock transactions. The 

Department’s new Communications Center was a 

“state of the art” facility for the federal government, 

and drew numerous visitors from many other 

agencies.27 

z Black Eye: The Case of Otto Otepka å

While the new communications center brought praise to the Department, the case of Otto Otepka brought 

a partisan fight over security clearances within the Department, and embarrassed the Office of Security. The 

Kennedy Administration entered office in 1961 amidst ongoing debate between Congress and the Executive 

branch over security risks in the Department of State, a debate first sparked by the 1945 Amerasia case. Congress 

had dominated the debate, particularly Congressional Republicans led by Senator Joseph McCarthy, who had 

largely defined the terms and parameters for loyalty and risk among Department employees. The Truman and 

Eisenhower Administrations, meanwhile, had determined and refined clearance and evaluation procedures. 

The Republicans had effectively used the “Who lost China?” question against the Democrats of the Truman 

Administration, and the discovery of leaks and spies at the Department had done little to quell the uproar. The 

incoming Democratic Kennedy Administration sought to prove it was not “soft” on Communism, but it also 

believed that many people (namely Democrats) had been unfairly targeted by the partisan charges of disloyalty 

and security risks. All of these tensions came together in the Otepka case. 

In December 1960, Secretary of State-designate Dean Rusk and Attorney General-designate Robert 

Kennedy met with Otepka, the Chief of SY’s Division of Evaluations, to discuss security clearances for the new 

Administration’s political appointees. Of particular concern was Walt W. Rostow, whom President John Kennedy 

Figure 11: The Department of State’s new Communications 

Center on the fifth floor. The Cuban Missile Crisis exposed 

weaknesses in the Department’s communications system. 

The Department built a state-of-the-art communications 

center, using the latest in computer technology in the mid1960s. The new Communications Center drew visitors 

from other agencies. Source: Department of State Records, 

National Archives and Records Administration. 
171

CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

wanted to serve as his chief foreign policy planner. Rostow had been denied a security clearance three times during 

Eisenhower’s Administration. Otepka explained that it would require a full field investigation by the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for Rostow to get a clearance, and that according to E.O. 10450, if there were even 

“reasonable doubt,” the clearance would be denied.28 

The Kennedy White House proceeded to circumvent Otepka, whom it perceived as a “hard-line McCarthy 

disciple.”29 Kennedy appointed Rostow to his staff as Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National 

Security Affairs. Since the White House had its own clearance system, Rostow was able to start work immediately. 

In November 1961, Kennedy moved Rostow to the Department of State as counselor and chair of the Policy 

Planning Council, forcing the Department to honor Rostow’s White House security clearance. Then, in a 

departure from usual practice, Secretary Rusk signed 152 emergency security waivers for presidential and political 

appointees at the Department of State.30 

In many ways, Otto Fred Otepka seemed an unlikely candidate for a scandal. He began his career with the 

Civil Service Commission and moved to the Office of Security on July 15, 1953, as a personnel security officer 

under Director Scott McLeod. A year later, McLeod promoted Otepka to Chief of the Division of Evaluations, 

rapid advancement for one who had only worked in SY for a year. As division chief, Otepka improved evaluation 

techniques and became well known for following protocol on clearances and investigations. In April 1957, 

Otepka was appointed Deputy Director of the Office of Security, and over the next four years, he assumed greater 

responsibility and generally ran the daily business of SY. For his dedication, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 

presented him with the Meritorious Service Award in 1958. McLeod later stated that, “If I did not do anything 

else down there [at the Department of State], I did get the man I think is the best [security] evaluator in the 

government today.”31 

Perhaps it was Otepka’s image as a “hard-line McCarthy disciple” that worked against him, because he 

increasingly was marginalized from security evaluations and determinations of risk. Although Otepka retained 

his title, SY Director Boswell took over the responsibility for processing “sensitive cases,” and moved Otepka and 

his team to new offices on a different floor, away from the agents investigating and evaluating the high-profile 

appointees. Also, Otepka’s position was among the 25 that SCA proposed to eliminate after Bontempo released 

his reorganization proposal in late 1961. When the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS) summoned 

Otepka to testify about the proposed cutbacks and changes at SY, Otepka said that the reduction in forces would 

be detrimental to the country’s internal security.32 

At the same time, the SISS was investigating a set of security clearances that SY had granted to Kennedy 

Administration appointees. Boswell testified before the Senate subcommittee on the issue on March 8, 1962, 

and afterwards ordered Otepka to review the 152 officials who had received clearances. Otepka reported that 

32 clearances had been backdated, that is, waivers were issued before background investigations had been 

completed. Boswell turned the matter over to the Foreign Service Inspection Corps. Due to regular rotation, 
172

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Boswell accepted and was posted as Deputy Chief 

of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.33

John Reilly, a former Department of Justice 

attorney, succeeded Boswell as the head of SY on 

the recommendation of the Attorney General 

Robert Kennedy, and Reilly and Otepka soon 

clashed. Some Senators speculated that Reilly’s 

main responsibility was to get rid of Otepka, but 

Reilly denied this. Just after becoming Director, 

Reilly offered Otepka a 10-month stint to study at 

the National War College. However, when Otepka 

learned that he would not be able to return to SY 

after his studies, he declined the offer. In the weeks 

afterwards, Reilly and his special assistant overrode 

several of Otepka’s decisions regarding security 

clearances, and eventually Reilly denied Otepka 

access to SY’s central files.34 

In February 1963, Reilly and Otepka testified 

before the SISS, and the experience led Reilly to suspect 

that Otepka was assisting the SISS counsel, Julian G. 

Sourwine. As result, Reilly ordered surveillance of 

Otepka. With the assistance of Elmer Hill, Chief of the Division of Technical Security, Reilly briefly wiretapped 

Otepka’s telephone, but failed to produce any incriminating evidence. After searching Otepka’s burn bag (used for 

discarding classified papers or drafts), SY agents under Reilly’s direction found a carbon paper of a list of questions 

Otepka had prepared for Sourwine to ask Reilly. The discovery proved that Otepka was working with Sourwine to 

some degree. It was also more than a little unusual that Otepka would develop questions for the SISS to ask his own 

supervisor, without Reilly’s knowledge, particularly questions that may have put Reilly on the spot. Moreover, the fact 

that Reilly suspected Otepka immediately after appearing before the SISS suggests that the subcommittee had asked 

Reilly questions that only an SY insider would know, and/or had information that Reilly knew had not been released 

to the subcommittee. Reilly continued to monitor Otepka’s burn bag until June 18, 1963, when its contents produced 

evidence that allowed him to charge Otepka with improper declassification and mutilation of classified documents.35 

Reilly and Otepka continued to clash over Otepka’s security evaluations, resulting in Otepka’s removal from 

duties. In one case, Reilly asked Otepka to disqualify himself from a case, noting that he (Otepka) had “strong 

feelings” about the case. Otepka remained adamant in his refusal.36 In June 1963, Otepka learned that a colleague 

Figure 12: John F. Reilly, Director of the Office of Security, 

1962-1963. After testifying before the Senate Internal 

Security Subcommittee, Reilly believed that Otepka was 

passing documents to the subcommittee. Reilly relieved 

Otepka of his duties as Chief of the Division of Evaluations, 

and Otepka later admitted to the FBI that he had 

passed documents to the subcommittee counsel, Julian G. 

Sourwine. Reilly was relieved of his duties after he failed to 

disclose that he had ordered a wiretap on Otepka’s telephone. 

Source: Department of State Records, National Archives 

and Records Administration. 
173

CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

was working on the security file of a case that Reilly had taken from him. Otepka looked through the file, and 

had his secretary copy a chronology of his earlier handling of the case. Reilly confronted Otepka about this, and 

took away not only the document, but also the copy machine from the Evaluations Division. On June 27, Reilly 

relieved Otepka of his duties as Chief of the Division of Evaluations, and assigned him to revising the Office of 

Security handbook, essentially a demotion. Otepka was locked out of his office and denied access to his personal 

and office files. Nine other people, including SY evaluators and investigators associated with Otepka, also were 

transferred or demoted.37

While Reilly conducted surveillance on Otepka, Department officials learned in late 1962 or early 1963 that 

someone was leaking information to the SISS. The Department asked the FBI to investigate, and the FBI found 

that Otepka was the leak, although he was not indicted. Crockett recalled that when confronted with this finding, 

Otepka responded that he believed the Administration was creating security risks for the U.S. Government, and 

that he therefore had a duty to reveal these risks, even if it meant breaking the law and sacrificing his career.38

In signed testimony to the FBI dated August 15, Otepka acknowledged that he met with Sourwine and 

provided him documents. After Reilly had testified before the SISS in May 1963, Sourwine had called and asked 

Otepka to come to his office after working hours. During their meeting, Sourwine showed Otepka a transcript of 

Reilly’s testimony, asked him to review it, and submit his evaluation in a memorandum. Otepka wrote a 39-page 

memorandum, with multiple accompanying documents. Otepka told the FBI that he had done this to refute the 

statements that Reilly made regarding Otepka’s “personal character and performance.”39 

The SISS held hearings in early August 

regarding Otepka’s demotion. Reilly’s men denied 

their involvement in the surveillance operation, 

and Reilly denied that he had ordered a wiretap 

on Otepka’s telephone. After the Congressional 

August recess, Otepka appeared before the SISS, 

and admitted to turning over to Sourwine two 

documents on the appointment of members of a State 

Advisory Committee on the staffing of international 

organizations.40 Otepka’s testimony revealed 

discrepancies in Reilly’s testimony to the SISS earlier 

that month. 

Otepka returned to the Department in 

September, and received an official letter notifying 

him that the Department had leveled 13 charges 

against him and was seeking disciplinary action. Five 

Figure 13: SY Special Agent James McDermott (at rear, 

right) looks on as President John F. Kennedy welcomes 

Ahmed Ben Bella, Prime Minister of Algeria, to the White 

House on October 15, 1962. Source: Private collection. 
174

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

counts consisted of conduct “unbecoming” a Department officer, for providing documents to Sourwine. The 

Department also claimed that Otepka had violated Truman’s 1948 directive that ordered all files regarding loyalty 

cases to be kept confidential. The other eight counts charged that Otepka had “mutilated” or “declassified” official 

papers (the documents in his burn bag). Otepka admitted giving Sourwine documents, acknowledging the 

legitimacy of five charges, but he refuted charges that he had altered classified documents. He claimed that Reilly 

and his surveillance team had planted the burn bag items. Otepka faced dismissal, and on October 2, Otepka’s 

lawyer went public with the Department’s letter.41 

The SISS sent a 10-page memorandum to Secretary Rusk protesting Otepka’s dismissal, and asking Rusk 

to appear before the subcommittee. Rusk did so, and upheld Otepka’s dismissal. Several Senators warned 

against proceeding with the charges against Otepka, and two believed that Otepka had been charged for giving 

information to the committee. Rusk assured them that “the charges were not brought in retaliation . . . nor were 

they motivated by a departmental attempt to interfere with the work of the subcommittee.”42 

In a September 1963 speech to the American Foreign Legion, Rusk invited the Legionnaires to “come in 

and look us over in great detail.” The American Legion accepted, and formed the Special Liaison Committee. 

Emphasizing security and security risks, the committee reported that the Department had done “a credible job...in 

a conscientious effort to weed out security risks and to prohibit the entry of new ones.” The committee remained 

convinced that a few who should not have received clearances did, but the report was largely complimentary.43 

By November, Otepka and Reilly faced hearings and possible removal from the Department. On November 6, 

Reilly sent a letter to the SISS revising his testimony and confessing to wire-tapping Otepka’s telephone.44 He was 

placed on administrative leave pending further investigation.45 Otepka had petitioned for an appeal as soon as the 

Department filed charges against him, and a four-year legal struggle ensued. Secretary Rusk met with Senator James 

Eastland (D-MS) about the Otepka case in July 1964; they agreed that Otepka should follow the Departmental 

hearings process. During the meeting, Eastland called Otepka’s lawyer to ask if Otepka would accept reassignment, 

but was told that Otepka insisted on being restored to his old job. While awaiting his hearing, Otepka continued to 

work at the Department, but was ostracized. He retained his title and salary, but had a bare desk and did not receive 

Departmental instructions and reports, or even regular mail. He was given a telephone, but it never rang. It was 

common knowledge among Department personnel that no one was to speak to Otepka.46 

Otepka received his hearing in June 1967 and was found guilty. The hearing officer advised Rusk to consider 

Otepka’s claim that no standard of conduct existed for federal employees in such matters, but Rusk upheld the 

verdict. Otepka was demoted in pay grade and reassigned to the Management Analyst Office, where he stayed 

for a week. He appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which heard his testimony in May 1968, but rejected 

his appeal.47 In 1970 President Richard M. Nixon appointed Otepka to the Subversive Activities Control Board, 

an independent governmental body that heard cases against subversive organizations and individuals. The board 

heard only a few cases, and in June 1972, Otepka retired.48 
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CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

The Otepka affair created an embarrassing black eye for SY; however, the changes it wrought would later 

prove beneficial for the organization. The affair brought an end to McCarthyism and the accusations and debate 

over security risks that had haunted the Department of State. The affair led to the departure of one Director of SY 

(Reilly), false testimony by SY officials, and revelations that one SY senior officer leaked documents to Congress. 

Yet, the affair also led Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary Crockett to recruit G. Marvin Gentile from the CIA 

to head SY and rebuild the office and its morale. Over the course of his ten-year term, Gentile’s influence and 

initiatives would transform SY into a much more professional law enforcement organization. As Crockett later 

recalled, Gentile was “a breath of fresh air.”49 

z Moscow and Warsaw Networks å

SY officers had expressed concerns about Soviet espionage long before Ambassador Lodge displayed the 

Great Seal bug at the UN Security Council. In 1959, the security officer at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow admitted 

that “Soviet radio/electronic technical capabilities are quite advanced,” and that the Soviets were “keeping abreast 

of new technical developments in the United States.” He also said U.S. magazines had published wiring diagrams 

of resonant cavity devices (like the Great Seal bug); 

moreover, an affordable ($30) “transistorized postagestamp size amplifier” could be purchased by the 

public and the Soviets in the United States. Perhaps 

most disconcerting, the Moscow security officer 

acknowledged that the Department did not possess 

equipment that could detect these technical threats. 

Most discoveries of bugs in 1959 and before had 

resulted from SY officers conducting their “initial 

physical search,” with their equipment serving more 

“to trace out wiring and additional microphones.” In 

fact, two months after the Moscow security officer 

presented his conclusions, E. Tomlin Bailey, the 

Director of SY (1956-58), requested permission to 

purchase 20 British technical search kits (at a cost 

of more than $63,000) because they were “acrossthe-board superior” to U.S. equipment.50 There was 

reason for SY officers to worry; U.S. officials had 

been finding small networks of microphones in U.S. 

embassies in Communist bloc nations. In April 1956, 

Figure 14: E. Tomlin Bailey, Director of the Office of 

Security, 1956-1958. The continued discovery of bugs in 

Soviet bloc embassies led SY to undertake greater technical 

security countermeasures. Bailey obtained permission to 

buy British technical search kits because they were far better 

than the American versions. Source: Department of State 

Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
176

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

SY technical officers discovered a partially installed 

network of microphones with wires leading to the 

attic in the U.S. Embassy in Prague. The network’s 

installers had apparently gained access to the attic via 

a false brick door in a common wall with another 

building. SY technical experts discovered other sets 

of multiple microphones in Budapest and Belgrade.51

The early discoveries prompted SY to install 

its first clear, plastic, acoustic conference room 

(ACR) in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1960. 

Commonly called “bubbles,” ACRs were made of 

plastic and aluminum. First generation ACRs were 

12 feet by 15 feet, or 12 feet by 20 feet, and had 

5 inches between the interior and outer wall, with 

a door to enter and exit the secure space. After 

removing all furniture and fixtures from an existing 

room and sweeping it for bugs, SY engineers erected 

the ACR to create a secure room where Embassy 

officers could hold classified discussions without 

concerns of bugs.52 

Concerns about technical security at the U.S. 

Embassy in Moscow continued, resulting in several 

security developments in 1962 and 1963. Two more 

ACRs were installed, prompting the Department to 

add a Security Officer (Technical) [SO(T)], to the 

Embassy staff. That person was SY’s Maclyn Musser. 

The Department installed special shielding to enclose 

the Embassy’s code room.53 Also U.S. officials noticed 

that the Soviets had begun directing microwaves at the 

Embassy in 1962, perhaps starting as early as 1953, 

and Musser reported in 1963 that the microwave beam 

was 50 feet across. U.S. officials were uncertain about 

the purpose of the microwaves, but did not consider 

the microwaves a technical or health hazard.54

Figure 16: Maclyn Musser, Security Officer (Technical). 

Assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Musser discovered 

the Soviets’ microwaving of the Embassy. He also assisted 

John Bagnal and Donovan Fischer in finding a network of 

Soviet bugs. Source: SY Focus. 

Figure 15: Location, Location, Location. The advantageous 

location of the Soviet Cultural Institute provided easy 

opportunities for espionage of the U.S. Embassy. Source: 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
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CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

A tip from a Soviet defector prompted SY officials 

to return to the Moscow Embassy in 1964 and look 

for bugs. In February, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, who 

had served in the KGB’s Second Chief Directorate, 

First Department (which monitored U.S. citizens in 

the Soviet Union), defected to the United States. He 

told U.S. officials about Soviet technical surveillance 

in the Embassy and specified particular offices. With 

the information, SY sent SO(T)s John Bagnal and 

Donovan Fischer to Moscow to assist Maclyn Musser 

in searching for bugs.55 

Bagnal and Fischer’s search gives credence to 

Thomas Edison’s dictum that genius is “1 percent 

inspiration and 99 percent perspiration.” The SO(T)s

systematically demolished the 10th floor office of the 

military attaché, which was several floors above Foreign Service national employees (FSNs), and had access to the 

ceiling via the attic. Bagnal and Fischer took apart the electric and telephone receptacles, removed the wiring, 

ripped up the parquet floor, and jack hammered the plaster off the walls, burning out one jackhammer in the 

effort. In the attic, they searched through two feet of rubble. They chipped into the apex of the wall and removed 

the doorjambs. After ten days, the men were frustrated because of their lack of success.56 

They then turned to the double ring radiator, which 

was welded to the pipe that ran from the basement. In 

Moscow, the Soviet Government provided heat for the 

entire city through a central heating system. Bagnal 

and Fischer shut off the main valve in the basement. 

They returned to the attaché’s room and cut the radiator 

from the pipe. Upon doing so, they noticed a small 

hole, about 3/16 of an inch in diameter, in the wall 

behind the radiator. When they began to pick at the 

hole, the plaster began to flake off, revealing a plaster 

cast set one foot into the wall. In the cast, they found 

a microphone. They checked other rooms behind the 

radiator and found more microphones, discovering a 

total of 52 bugs in the Embassy.57 

Figure 18: John Bagnal, Security Engineer. Bagnal and 

Donovan Fischer discovered Soviet listening device networks 

in the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and Warsaw. He also 

improved technical security training for Marine Security 

Guards, and for SY and DS technical security engineers. 

Source: Private collection.

Figure 17: The U.S. Embassy in Moscow. In 1964, John 

Bagnal, Maclyn Musser, and Donovan Fischer discovered a 

network of 64 listening devices behind radiators of various 

offices. A similar network was found in the U.S. Embassy 

in Warsaw. Source: Department of State, Office of the 

Historian Files. 
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History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

After discovering the microphones, Bagnal and 

Fischer traced the cables to see where the antennae 

and listening posts were located. They found that the 

Soviets’ listening posts were in the apartment building 

across the street, which was the same direction from 

which the microwave signals emanated. They jack 

hammered into the wall and found three coaxial 

cables, which went to the attic, and were attached to 

a crude grill that was 4 feet by 16 feet in size, and laid 

6-7 inches into the concrete of the attic floor. The grill 

served as an antenna. The Embassy’s communications 

center was next to the room above which the grill was 

located.58 

The discovery of the Moscow microphone 

network raised questions about the new Embassy 

building in Warsaw. Construction of the Embassy 

building had employed Polish workers, and the first security officer was only present for the last 3 months of 

construction. Bagnal, this time with Gene Todd, went to Warsaw and looked behind the radiators. They found 

37 microphones; however, there were no microphones behind radiators in the Deputy Chief of Mission’s office. 

Inspecting the office, they found a microphone behind the baseboard, which led to a second network of 17 

microphones, bringing the total to 54 bugs at the Embassy. Bagnal later speculated that the baseboard system 

was a decoy for the radiator system--the Soviets hoped that a technical security officer would find the baseboard 

system and then quit looking.59 

The discoveries forced SY to reassess the technical security program, and SY adopted three changes. First, SY 

developed new counter-measures equipment to better detect Soviet bloc listening devices. Second, SY accelerated 

the installation of secure conference rooms “at all major and sensitive posts abroad.”60 

The discovery of a “shoe bug” then prompted SY to modify its ACRs. In 1969, Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Deputy 

Chief of Mission in Bucharest, Romania, called a classified conference, which met in the “bubble.” SY officer Lou 

Grob was monitoring the meeting from another room and heard the conversation. He immediately informed 

the Administration Officer (the RSO’s superior) that there was a bug in the ACR. After searching, they found 

something resembling Don Adams’s “shoe phone” from the 1960s television series Get Smart!--the bug was located 

in the heel of Barnes’s shoe. Barnes had had the butler take his shoes out to be modified, and someone had installed 

the bug in the process. After this incident, SY officers covered ACRs with Reynolds plastic wrap to reduce the 

radiation of low-power devices such as shoe bugs until the proper security modifications could be made.61

Figure 19: Director of the Office of Security G. Marvin 

Gentile holds one of the listening devices discovered in the 

U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1964. Source: Department 

of State. 
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CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

 As a third change to its technical security 

program, SY arranged for a group of U.S. Navy 

Seabees to be assigned to the Department. The Seabee 

detail resulted from the increasing sophistication 

of Soviet espionage. Although SY had assigned 

extra Marine guards to the Moscow and Warsaw 

construction projects, SY officials noted that Marines 

did not possess the expertise to recognize efforts by 

foreign carpenters, electricians, and plumbers to plant 

bugs. Seabees, however, as a result of their training, 

could recognize unusual or seemingly unnecessary 

changes in or aspects of the construction. One senior 

technical officer later noted that Soviet craftsmanship 

in masonry and carpentry made detecting Soviet bugs 

extremely difficult. SY had already utilized Seabees in Warsaw to repair the damage caused by the removal of 

the microphone network. With 15 “major” building and renovation projects slated for fiscal year 1966, SY 

decided to create a permanent Seabees detail. The detail would “provide surveillance through close and constant 

supervision” of projects, and in some cases, complete work in “sensitive” areas. Initially called the “Naval Mobile 

Construction Battalion FOUR, Detachment NOVEMBER,” the Seabees received as one of their first assignments 

the removal of the microphone network and the repair of the damage in the Embassy in Moscow. In the last 

quarter of fiscal year 1965, SY requested money for 

an additional 59 Seabees, and signed an agreement 

with the Navy to establish a formal Naval support 

unit for the Department of State.62 

SY divided the Seabees into two groups. One 

group of 128, plus the later 59, were assigned to 

specific construction projects, and then returned to the 

Navy upon the projects’ completion. SY contracted 

the second group of 27 Seabees on a reimbursable, 

renewable basis. Assigned to four regional technical 

centers in Frankfurt, Beirut, Panamá, and Tokyo, 

this second group assumed several tasks, including 

setting up secure conference rooms, assisting 

technical officers, providing labor and supervision for 

Figure 20: The Shoe Bug (at left). The shoe has the heel 

removed to show where the bug was hidden. SY officer Lou 

Grob was monitoring a secure acoustic conference room 

and discovered the bug in a Foreign Service Officer’s shoe. 

Source: Department of State. 

Figure 21: The 1965 Seabees Class trained by SY. This 

was likely the first SY-trained Seabees class. SY officials 

admitted that Marine Security Guards did not have the 

skills to recognize changes in construction that could hide 

listening and other espionage devices. The discoveries of 

the Moscow and Warsaw microphone networks led to the 

detailing of a permanent Seabees unit to the Department 

of State. Source: Department of State Records, National 

Archives and Records Administration. 
180

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

renovation projects in sensitive areas, and repairing 

the damage incurred while locating a bug. By 1968, 

the Seabees program was permanent, and securing 

construction projects at embassies had emerged as a 

diplomatic security priority.63

With the Moscow and Warsaw finds, several U.S. 

officials expressed outrage at the potentially damaging 

effects the bugs might have on diplomacy and U.S. 

security. However, seasoned Foreign Service Officers 

and Moscow Embassy veterans played down the 

threat. When questioned by the press, they assured 

the public that “American diplomats have always 

assumed that the embassy in Moscow was not secure 

against eavesdropping,” and held “their most sensitive 

discussions” either in “several small rooms-withinrooms installed by Americans for security reasons,” or 

outdoors. Curiously, in playing down one threat, the 

veteran FSOs revealed that the Embassy had installed 

ACRs as a technical countermeasure.64 

Some members of Congress dismissed the 

potential consequences of the technical finds, and 

maintained their focus upon personnel security. 

House Appropriations Subcommittee Chair John J. Rooney (D-NY), for example, was unimpressed with the 

discoveries of microphone networks. He belittled SY Director Gentile’s revelations, his displays of bugs, and his 

requests for resources to improve physical security. “We have been finding microphones in that building [the 

Moscow embassy] for as long as I can remember,” declared Rooney. He noted that five years earlier, SY had also 

shown him microphones, and then “took a cool million dollars” for its budget. In Rooney’s view, SY was merely 

trying “to impress us again with microphones.” Instead of asking how SY might improve physical and technical 

security, Rooney devoted more attention to how much taxpayer money was needed to repair damages incurred in 

the removal of microphone networks from the Warsaw and Moscow embassies.65 

During SY’s appropriations hearings, Rooney showed more interest in how many homosexuals SY had 

dismissed from the Department than discovered listening devices. After entering questions regarding SY’s 

budget in the public record, Rooney turned the subcommittee’s focus to what he once derisively quipped as “the 

machinations of the Mattachine Society,” an organization which lobbied for ending discrimination against gays 

Figure 22: G. Marvin Gentile, Director of the Office 

of Security, 1964-1974. Recruited by Secretary of State 

Dean Rusk and Assistant Secretary of State William 

Crockett, Gentile rebuilt SY after the Otepka affair and 

professionalized it. He implemented training programs to 

meet the increasing security demands of the Department, 

and was deemed by one senior Department official as “a 

breath of fresh air.” Source: Department of State Records, 

National Archives and Records Administration. 
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CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

and lesbians in the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1960s and early 1970s, homosexuals constituted three-fourths 

of all Department of State dismissals by SY. In some years they constituted nearly all dismissals. Amid the security 

breaches of U.S. facilities in Eastern Europe, Rooney was always more interested in the details concerning the 

highest ranking, longest employed men and women dismissed from the Foreign Service as security risks.66 

z Protecting Diplomats å

Visits by foreign dignitaries to the United States increased dramatically in the 1960s. President Kennedy 

entertained more dignitaries and heads of state during his first two years in office than Roosevelt had in his 

12 years in office or Truman had in eight years. Kennedy hosted 74 official visits in 1961 and 1962, whereas 

his predecessor Dwight Eisenhower had hosted 32 official visits in 1953 and 1954. Moreover, the assignment 

of diplomats from newly independent African and Third World nations—22 in the summer of 1961 alone—

multiplied the protective duties of SY. For the 18th General Assembly of the United Nations, SY was scheduled 

to protect 10 foreign heads of state, with the possibility of another 12 attending. Two-thirds of these leaders were 

from nations that had achieved independence during the previous 8 years.67 

Despite protecting diplomats and foreign dignitaries since the 1920s, SY did not possess the formal 

responsibility to do so. It had implicit responsibility, which was noted in the legal code authorizing security agents 

to carry firearms. However, the Secretary of State did 

not have formal authorization and direction from 

Congress to protect foreign diplomats and visiting 

dignitaries. When the 1961 Vienna Convention 

specifically required host countries to provide 

protection, SY Director William Boswell petitioned 

SCA to propose Congressional legislation that would 

specifically authorize the Secretary to assume direct 

responsibility for protecting foreign officials and 

dignitaries working and/or traveling in the United 

States. The SCA drafted the bill for the session of 

Congress that began in January 1962, but Congress 

did not pass it.68

By November 1962, SY’s Protective Services 

Branch had assumed oversight of dignitary 

protection, and had been transferred from the 

Division of Domestic Operations to the Division 

of Investigations. Under the leadership of Keith O. 

Figure 23: Special Agent Leo Crampsey (left) escorts Cuba’s 

new Premier Fidel Castro (center) during an April 1959 

visit to Washington, DC. Special Agents have protected 

royals, revolutionaries, autocrats, and democrats during 

their visits to the United States, including United Nations 

sessions in New York City. As the number of visits by foreign 

leaders steadily increased during the 1950s and 1960s, the 

task of protecting them stretched SY’s limited resources. SY 

constantly asked for more staff and collaborated with the 

FBI and local police forces to ensure sufficient protection. 

Source: Department of State. 
182

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

“Jack” Lynch, Protective Services with 10 Special Agents and 1 secretary was too short-staffed to handle the 

number of assignments given it; in fact, Protective Services had to pull 5 full-time Agents from other branches 

and divisions to meet its protective assignments. In fiscal year 1961, Protective Services provided protection for 

41 heads of state and dignitaries, as well as dignitaries attending 25 conferences. During the first 6 months of 

fiscal year 1962, the branch protected 22 heads of state and foreign dignitaries, as well as dignitaries attending 22 

conferences. SY Director Boswell admitted that agents working protective details had logged more than 4,000 

hours in uncompensated overtime.69 Given the lack of resources, Protective Services often pulled manpower from 

the Investigations Division, which in turn caused backlogs in security investigations. Accordingly, Boswell also 

called attention to the constant lack of manpower for protection, and urged SCA to increase SY’s staffing. The 

shortage of Special Agents also forced SY to collaborate with other agencies, particularly the FBI and local police, 

to meet its tasks. For example, in September 1960, the New York City Police Department detailed thousands of 

officers to assist SY in ensuring the safety of 19 heads of state, including Premiers Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel 

Castro, during the General Assembly meeting at the United Nations.70 

SY protective details, however, could not protect foreign diplomats from segregation and discrimination, 

particularly diplomats from Africa and Asia. Discriminatory practices were still common in Washington, DC 

and the surrounding area during the early 1960s. 

Ambassadors, their staffs, and families routinely were 

denied service, and African diplomats struggled to 

find suitable housing in the informally segregated 

District of Columbia. Washington’s Metropolitan 

Club granted free membership to ambassadors, but 

denied it to African and Asian diplomats. White 

supremacists “roughed up” a Ghanaian diplomat who 

traveled to Georgia to observe an election. When an 

Ethiopian diplomat “received menacing phone calls” 

and found the tires of his car “repeatedly flattened,” 

Washington police “ignored” his requests for an 

investigation.71 

With discrimination and harassment threatening 

to damage U.S. relations with newly independent 

states, the Kennedy Administration moved to rectify 

the problem. President Kennedy strongly believed 

that winning the “hearts and minds” of the Third 

World was essential to the U.S. Cold War strategy, 

Figure 24: Dr. Richard Edmund Helfa-Caulker, Sierra 

Leone’s Ambassador to the United States, accompanied by 

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennon 

Williams, presents his credentials to President John F. 

Kennedy. Many African colonies became independent 

during Kennedy’s presidency; however, discrimination 

and segregation in some locations at times jeopardized 

the physical safety of the new diplomatic emissaries from 

Africa. Kennedy tasked the Office of Protocol to address 

the situation and to work with the Office of Security to 

ensure the protection of African diplomats. Source: © 

Associated Press.
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CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

and discriminatory treatment of diplomats and dignitaries from Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and even Latin 

America, did nothing to assist the United States; in fact, it harmed U.S. efforts to win the Cold War. To counter 

discrimination against foreign dignitaries, Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles suggested creating a Special 

Protocol Service Section (SPSS) within the Department’s Office of Protocol. With Kennedy’s approval, the 

new division began work in February 1961, under the direction of Pedro Sanjuan. The new SPSS worked in 

conjunction with SY’s Protective Services to offer protection for African diplomats in the United States, and to 

ensure that their visits went smoothly, much as the Chief Special Agent had done in the 1920s.72 

To his credit, Sanjuan was acutely aware that many African diplomats were from the elite and professional 

classes in their nations, and news of discriminatory treatment could flow back to the diplomats’ home countries, 

threatening to magnify the issue into a much larger problem. In response to an incident involving Nigerian 

diplomats, Sanjuan wrote, “What affects one or more members of these groups is likely to have a strong influence 

on the opinions and attitudes of their governments,” 

and could “influence the nature of United StatesNigerian relations to a considerable degree.” Such 

incidents also affected diplomats and dignitaries of 

several other African nations, including Mali, Ghana, 

and Sierra Leone.73 

Yet SPSS was not always successful. For 

example, a restaurant on U.S. Route 40 (connecting 

Washington, DC with New York City) denied 

service to the Ambassador from the new nation-state 

of Chad, Adam Malik Sow, who was travelling to 

Washington to present his credentials to President 

Kennedy. After the incident, the Ambassador did 

not continue to Washington; he instead returned 

to Chad and quit. Kennedy ordered Sanjuan to 

“do something” about the Chadian’s humiliation; 

Sanjuan sent a “lengthy and very formal apology” 

to the Government of Chad. Secretary of State 

Rusk related another instance in which an African 

delegate to the United Nations was travelling to 

New York and his plane stopped in Miami. “When 

the passengers disembarked for lunch, the white 

passengers were taken to the airport restaurant; the 

Figure 25: Pedro Sanjuan, Office of Protocol. Sanjuan 

directed the Special Protocol Service Section, which sought 

to protect African and Asian diplomats from harassment 

and discrimination. Sanjuan lobbied local businesses

to cease discrimination against African diplomats. He 

recognized that many diplomats were from the elite classes of 

their countries, and discrimination harmed U.S. Cold War 

diplomacy. Source: Department of State Records, National 

Archives and Records Administration. 
184

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

black delegate received a folding canvas stool in a 

corner of the hanger and a sandwich wrapped with 

waxed paper. He then flew to New York, where our 

delegation asked for his vote on human rights issues. 

That same ambassador later became his country’s 

prime minister. We learned later that his chronic 

bitterness toward the United States stemmed from 

that incident.”74 

In addition to expanding protection of 

foreign diplomats, Keith Lynch, the chief of SY’s 

Protective Services, tried to upgrade the Secretary’s 

detail by providing 24-hour, round-the-clock 

protection. The upgrade required two additional 

officers, because up until that time, the Secretary 

had received only “portal to portal” protection. 

Despite Lynch’s efforts, SY only provided 24-hour 

coverage for two short periods during the early 

1960s: the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and after a 

major escalation of the war in Vietnam in 1964. 

During these periods, Rusk did not want to alarm 

his family, so SY maintained a security post in the 

Secretary’s automobile outside his residence from 

midnight until 8 o’clock in the morning.75 

SY provided constant security for the Secretary while he traveled abroad. Such protection required 

comprehensive collaboration with police and officials in those countries. However, this did not prevent untoward 

acts against the Secretary. While in the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo, Rusk was laying a wreath on a memorial 

when a man broke through the police barricade, ran toward Rusk, and tried to spit on him. The police caught him 

before he reached the Secretary. Rusk also made trips to South Vietnam, but he eventually suspended his travel 

there, citing the great amount of effort required to protect him.76 

The November 1963 assassination of President Kennedy brought federal protective services under close scrutiny. 

SY flew in more than 100 agents from its various field offices to protect the more than 25 heads of state and other 

dignitaries who came to Washington for Kennedy’s funeral. The effort also required 115 intelligence agents from 

Army Intelligence, 20 agents for the Army Criminal Investigation Unit, and 40 agents from the CIA. Keith Lynch 

and Leo E. Crampsey coordinated the protection effort. SY set up a 24-hour “nerve center,” or command center, to 

Figure 26: Special Agent William DeFossett receives 

an award in 1964 from SY Director Marvin Gentile. 

DeFossett was the first African-American Special Agent. He 

joined SY in 1962 and served until 1985. Source: Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security Files. 
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CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

assist in coordinating efforts and passing information 

from various agencies. The “unprecedented” efforts 

were the largest protective security operation that 

SY had ever undertaken, and they merited special 

recognition from Secretary Rusk.77 

In the aftermath of Kennedy’s assassination 

and funeral, SY reviewed its own protective security 

practices and procedures. While the Secret Service 

required tighter security for Presidential and Vice 

Presidential visits abroad, foreign governments 

argued that the U.S. officials failed to provide the 

same level of service to foreign dignitaries traveling in 

the United States. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for Security Gentile noted in 1964 that if Protective 

Services failed to receive the additional funding for 

more security officers, “it would be . . . difficult to 

explain a reduction in the present coverage, if harm 

came to a Presidential guest.” To further justify the 

need for additional officers, the Protective Services 

Branch illustrated the increase in the number of 

visits it covered--from 14 in 1957 to an average of 

60 in 1964. Despite the growing number of visitors, 

Protective Services had only gained one officer since 

1962. To staff each detail, Protective Services was still 

forced to enlist the assistance of temporary personnel 

from field offices and other divisions in the Office of 

Security.78

Gentile also sought revisions in the travel plans of foreign visitors. He expressed concern about heads of state 

and foreign dignitaries who often flew on commercial airliners, particularly on airlines that prevented security 

from searching passengers and luggage. To combat this security risk, Gentile proposed that heads of the other 

executive agencies place military aircraft at the disposal of visiting dignitaries. Apparently this proposal failed 

because Protective Services determined that if visitors insisted on traveling on commercial airliners, SY would only 

assume responsibility for the domestic portion of the itinerary. Thus, SY protective details began and concluded 

at U.S. ports of entry and departure.79

Figure 27: Special Agent James McDermott (right) listens 

as U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk addresses journalists 

on May 1, 1961, after his appearance before the U.S. 

Senate Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. SY tried 

to upgrade protection for the Secretary to a “24/7” detail, 

but Rusk did not want to alarm his family. SY instead 

maintained a security post in an automobile outside Rusk’s 

home from midnight to 8 a.m. Source: Washington Post. 
186

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

President Kennedy’s assassination led Congress, on August 27, 1964, to pass Public Law 493, which made 

it a federal crime to assault or injure foreign dignitaries. Moreover, the law imposed stricter fines of $5,000 and 

up to 3 years of imprisonment for assaulting dignitaries and Department of State Security Officers working on a 

protective assignment.80 

After the release of the Warren Commission Report on the Kennedy assassination, Gentile offered several 

proposals to improve security for visiting dignitaries. He recommended transporting dignitaries in armored 

limousines, creating standard written procedures to govern cooperation with local police, heightening coordination 

between federal agencies, and increasing SY personnel. Gentile also proposed creating an intelligence unit within 

SY to collect and analyze intelligence and threat information that could impact the protective assignment of a 

particular dignitary. The Intelligence Processing Section within the Records and Research Branch was already 

doing much of this, so Gentile likely was proposing expansion of intelligence processing and analysis efforts.81 On 

July 1, 1965, SY created the Protective Research Section under the Division of Protective Security, with Francis 

R. Tully as its first chief. Rather than creating an entirely new section, the Protective Research Section probably 

was staffed by moving the Intelligence Processing staff from Records and Research to Protective Security, together 

with additional staff that SY had hired. New Protective Security procedures mandated that the agent-in-charge 

of protection during a visit submit a written request for protective intelligence when the Secretary or visiting 

Figure 28: The funeral procession for President John F. Kennedy, November 25, 1963. Thirteen SY Special Agents joined the 

protective detail for nearly 50 foreign dignitaries attending Kennedy’s funeral, and SY’s efforts merited high praise and special 

recognition by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. SY Agents on duty were Keith Lynch; Harry Dovenoge; Bert Bennington; Frank 

Tully [PRS]; Bill Little; Fred Padley [L.A.F.O.]; Louis Kachulis [D.C.F.O.]; John Bacom [Chicago F.O.]; Frank Headley 

[Investigations]; Robert Cronin [D.C.F.O.]; Joseph McNulty; Bill DeCourcy [PRS]; and Herb Lampe. Source: Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security Files. 
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CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

dignitaries travelled outside the greater Washington, DC area. The Protective Research Section furnished statistics 

on threats, bombings, demonstrations, and picketing, against both United States missions abroad and foreign 

missions in the United States. It also passed specific threat information about the President or Vice President to 

the Secret Service. Information on threats against the Secretary or visiting dignitaries automatically passed to the 

Section from other protective and intelligence agencies. In 1966, SY renamed the Section the Protective Support 

Section, and later elevated it to branch level, underscoring its importance.82 

The 1965, Gentile reorganized SY. He divided the office into two large wings. One wing, “Personnel 

Security,” comprised the Divisions of Investigations, Evaluations, and Protective Security, the latter of which was 

pulled out of Investigations and elevated to division status. The other office, “Domestic and Foreign Security,” 

consisted of the Divisions of Foreign Operations, Technical Services, and Domestic Operations, the latter of 

which handled security for the Department’s buildings in the Washington metropolitan area. Gentile also 

created two small staff units. One focused upon Education and Training, and the other on Special Assignments, 

which constituted primarily investigations resulting in the termination of a Department of State employee (for 

homosexuality, espionage, and criminal acts).83 

Figure 29: Organization chart for the Office of Security, 1965. The chart shows how Director Marvin Gentile reorganized the 

office to meet the security demands for the 1960s. Again, the reorganization shows the steady growth of overseas and physical 

security in relation to investigations, which dominated SY’s work just ten years earlier. Source: Department of State Records, 

National Archives and Records Administration. 
188

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

z Conclusion å

The years between 1960 and 1965 were 

difficult for SY and diplomatic security, but the most 

notable developments for diplomatic security and 

SY resulted from four events. The Cuban Missile 

Crisis exposed the aging state of U.S. diplomatic 

communications, leading to the adoption of new 

computer technologies to provide secure, quick, 

and effective communications for the Department. 

The Otepka affair resulted in a wholesale change 

in SY’s leadership and the exposure of a senior 

SY official who was leaking classified information 

to Congress. The affair also brought an end to 

McCarthyism in the Department of State, and further 

led to the recruitment of G. Marvin Gentile, who 

professionalized and rebuilt SY. Third, SY’s discovery 

of two extensive microphone networks in the U.S. 

Embassies in Moscow and Warsaw led to the expansion 

of SY’s technical security division and the creation of a 

Seabees detachment at SY. Finally, the assassination of 

President Kennedy initiated a series of improvements 

in protective security and the expansion of SY’s 

protective details for foreign dignitaries. In addition, 

the emergence of numerous new states in Africa and 

Asia, in conjunction with the Civil Rights Movement, 

led the Kennedy Administration, largely through the 

efforts of Pedro Sanjuan, to work aggressively to end 

discrimination against foreign diplomats. 

As 1965 drew to a close, SY was expanding 

as an organization under the leadership of Marvin 

Gentile, and the Department was improving security. 

However, the security threats of the early 1970s 

would transform SY well beyond the organization 

that Boswell, Reilly, and Gentile had inherited. 

Figure 30: Protecting the Pope. SY Special Agent Owen 

McShane (rear center, glasses, at left of the U.S. flag), the 

Senior Agent in Charge of the New York Field Office, leads 

the Office of Security detail for His Holiness Pope Paul 

VI (waving) in October 1965. The Pope arrived in New 

York City to address the United Nations General Assembly 

(UNGA). UN Secretary General U Thant follows behind 

the Pope (left). One of DS’s major recurring duties today 

is to protect the many foreign dignitaries who attend the 

UNGA session in New York City every autumn. Source: 

Private collection.

Figure 31: Special Agents William DeCourcy (left, 

foreground, with briefcase) and Bert Bennington (center, 

rear) escort Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman, 

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Ambassador Henry 

Cabot Lodge upon arrival in Saigon in January 1966, 

during the Vietnam War. The group was met at the airport 

by the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister, who chats with 

Harriman. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
189

CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

Endnotes

1 Article 29, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, reprinted in Eileen Denza, Diplomatic Law: A 

Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, second edition (Oxford UK: Clarendon Press, 1998), 429. 

2 Oral History Interview, Deputy Under Secretary William J. Crockett, 20 June 1990, interviewed by Thomas Stern for the 

Foreign Affairs Oral History Project of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, p. 46. Hereafter cited as ADST. 

3 For the U-2 Incident, see Michael Beschloss, MAYDAY: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper 

and Row, 1986). Murrey Marder, “Gromyko, Lodge Hurl Spy Charges,” Washington Post, 24 May 1960, p. A1. “Lodge 

Details Records of 11 Spies for Soviet,” Washington Post, 25 May 1960, p. A23. Thomas J. Hamilton, “Gromyko Warns 

U.S. ‘Spy’ Policy May Lead to War,” New York Times, 27 May 1960, p. 1. 

4 Kathleen Teltsch, “Soviet Hid a Microphone in U.S. Seal,” New York Times, 27 May 1960, p. 1. William J. Jorden, “Spy 

Devices Used by Soviet Shown,” New York Times, 28 May 1960, p. 5. “U.S. Seal Device Denied,” New York Times, 29 

May 1960, p. 19. Hamilton, “Gromyko Warns U.S. ‘Spy’ Policy May Lead to War,” New York Times, 27 May 1960, p. 

1. Kenneth L. Stanley, “The Great Seal Caper,” p. 6, copy provided by the author, Office of the Historian (PA/HO) Files. 

5 Memorandum “Technical Security Briefing,” William O. Boswell, n.d. [July 1961], enclosed with Report of Security 

Officer/Engineer Seminar, Boswell to Regional Security Officers, Security Officers, and Security Engineers, 27 September 

1961, Folder – Education and Training Guides – Personal and Physical Security, Box 1, A/SY/Evaluations – Security 

Files 1932-1963, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 - Lot 96D584, National Archives and Records 

Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter RG 59-Lot 96D584, NA). 

6 Memorandum “Technical Security Briefing,”. Boswell, n.d. [July 1961]. 

7 Oral History Interview, David H. McCabe, 31 March 2006. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, CI 

Reader: The American Revolution to the New Millennium, Volume III, Chapter 2 “Counterintelligence in the Turbulent 

1960s and 1970s,” http://www.ncix.gov/ history/CIReaderPlain/Vol3Chap2.pdf, p. 107. 

8 Denza, Diplomatic Law, 5, 2-3. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations reprinted as Appendix 1 in Denza. For 

quotation, see Denza, Diplomatic Law, 423. 

9 Memorandum “New Employee Identification Cards,” Crockett to Belton O. Bryan, Deputy Administrator for the Bureau 

of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA), 27 March 1961, Box 2, SCA Subject Files 1961-64, RG 59 – Lot 68D175, NA. 

Memorandum of Conversation “Employee Identification Passes,” Otto F. Otepka, 12 May 1960, Folder – C. Building 

Identification Cards, Box 2, A/SY/Evaluations – Security Files, 1932-63, RG 59-Lot 96D584, NA. 

10 Oral History Interview, David McCabe, 31 March 2006. 

11 Memorandum “Intelligence Reporting Branch of SY,” John Noonan, Head [?] of Intelligence Research Branch, to Emery 

J. Adams, Division of Evaluations, 3 November 1961, Folder – SY Organization – Plans, Positions, etc. 1959-1961, Box 

1, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations. 

12 Elmer Plischke, U.S. Department of State: A Reference History (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), 456-457. Oral History 

Interview, Crockett, 20 June 1990, ADST, pp. 37-40. Quotes on p. 38. Memorandum “Responsibility for Security 

Functions,” Crockett to Roger Jones, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, 21 July 1961, Box 2, SAC Subject Files 

1961-1964, RG 59 – Lot 68D175, NA. 

13 Memorandum “Intelligence Reporting Branch of SY,” Noonan to Adams, 3 November 1961. “Security Function Transfer 

Weighed,” Washington Post [?], 25 October 1961, Clipping in Folder – Miscellaneous [1961-62], Box 2, Security Files 

1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations, RG 59 – Lot 96D584, NA. This clipping is marked from the Post, but this article did not 

appear in this edition. Statement by the Department of State in Connection with the Reduction in Force in the Office of 

Security, 27 November 1961, Box 2, SCA Subject Files 1961-64, RG 59 – Lot 68D175, NA. 
190

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

14 For examples of internal, Congressional, and public complaints, see Letter, Otto F. Otepka, Deputy Direction 

of the Office of Security, to John Ordway, Chief of the Personnel Operations Division, Department of State, 

18 December 1961; Memorandum “Security Office Personnel Cuts,” Joel H. Stearns, Special Assistant to the 

Administrator of SCA, to E. Allen Fidel, Office of Congressional Affairs, 1 December 1961; Letter, Frederick G. 

Dutton, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Affairs (Fidel), to John G. Tower, U.S. Senate, 18 December 1961; 

Letter, Dutton (Boswell) to Glenard P. Lipscomb, U.S. House of Representatives, 11 December 1961; and Letter, 

Dutton (D. Frahme) to Page Belcher, December 1961; all Folder – 1-E/1.2, Box 2, SCA-Subject Files 1961-64, 

RG 59-Lot 68D175, NA. 

15 Newspaper Clipping “State Department Staff Firings Endangering National Security: Twenty-Five Trained Men to go 

in Economy Drive,” New York Journal-American, 9 November 1961, Box 2, SCA Subject Files 1961-64, RG 59 – Lot 

68D175, NA.

16 Newspaper Clipping “State Department Confirms Cut of 20 Security Office Jobs Here,” Washington Post, 10 November 

1961; and Newspaper Clipping “U.S. Denies Cuts Affect Security,” Washington Star, 10 November 1961; both Box 2, 

SCA Subject Files 1961-64, RG 59 – Lot 68D175, NA.

17 William M. Blair, “Bontempo Quits State Department Security Post,” New York Times, 30 December 1961, p. 6. 

Murrey Marder, “State’s Insecure Security Boss Resigns,” Washington Post, 30 December 1961, p. A1. Memorandum 

“Recommendation for Improvement of SCA Organization and Administration as Requested in your Memorandum of 

August 30,” Belton Bryan, SCA/EX, to Salvatore A. Bontempo, Administrator of SCA, 6 September 1961, attached to 

Memorandum “Organizational Changes in Bureau, “ Bryan to Bontempo, 6 September 1961, Box 1, SCA Subject Files, 

1961-64, RG 59 - Lot 68D175, NA. 

18 Office Letter No. B-62/1 “Reorganization,” Boswell to All SY Headquarters Personnel, 2 January 1962, Folder – 1962 – 

January Only, Box 8; Office Letter No. B-62/2 “Reorganization,” Boswell to All SY Headquarters Personnel, 8 January 

1962, Folder – Miscellaneous [1961-62], Box 2; Organization Chart “Office of Security,” Office of Security, January 

1962, attached to Office Letter No. B-62/2 “Reorganization;” Office Letter No. C-62/3 “Reorganization,” Boswell to 

All Special Agents in Charge, 17 January 1962, Folder – Miscellaneous 1958-63, Box 11; and Memorandum “SY/RSBIntelligence Processing Section,” Ruth Ulbrich, SY, to Jackson, 19 February 1962, Folder – Miscellaneous 1961-63, Box 

2; all Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations, RG 59 – Lot 96D584, NA. 

19 Reilly was appointed as Director of SY in April 1962, but with the move to the Bureau of Administration, he was raised 

to a Deputy Assistant Secretary. Office Letter, Executive Officer to all SY employees, 8 August 1962, Folder 1, Box 

5, Protective Services Policy Files, 1962-1968, RG 59 - Lot 70D292, NA. Report to William Crockett for the Senate 

Internal Security Subcommittee, 26 August 1963, Box 2, Security Policy Files 1949-69 (Otepka Files), RG 59 - Lot 

96D563, NA, p. 64.

20 Kahn, The Codebreakers, 713. 

21 Memorandum “OC – The History,” n.d. [1970?], copy given to PA/HO by Robert Surprise. This is an extract from 

Department of State Office of Communications, Communications Organizational Handbook, 2nd edition, 1970[?]. 

Oral History Interview, Robert Surprise, 8 December 2005, interviewed by Mark Hove, p. 1. Kahn, The Codebreakers, 

711-713. 

22 Kahn, The Codebreakers, 675, 709-711, 712. Oral History Interview, William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for 

Administration, 20 June 1990, interviewed by Thomas Stern, ADST, p. 29. 

23 Kahn, The Codebreakers, 713. Oral History Interview, Robert Surprise, 8 December 2005, p. 1. “Annual Interagency 

– DTS Report,” Inter-Agency Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Group, 17 August 1987, p. 1, No folder, Box 

3, Video Teleconferencing, DCL Talks, and Hot Line Files 1970-86, A/OC/Inter-Agency Affairs, State Department 

Records, Lot 88D63. 
191

CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

24 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, 20 June 1963, No Folder, Box 2, Video Teleconferencing, 

DCL Talks, and Hot Line Files, 1970-1986, A/OC/Inter-Agency Affairs, Lot 88D63, Department of State Records. 

Kahn, The Codebreakers, 715-716. 

25 Department Notice “‘Working Organization’ of the Office of Communications (OC),” Office of Communications, 29 

May 1963, Folder – Miscellaneous 1961-63, Box 2, Security Files 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations, RG 59 – Lot 96D584, 

NA. Kahn, The Codebreakers, 713. Memorandum “OC – The History,” Office of Communications, p. 2. Oral History 

Interview, Robert Surprise, 5 December 2005, pp. 2-3. 

26 Oral History Interview, Robert Surprise, 5 December 2005, pp. 1-3. Raymond L. Wolf, Bernard Weinstein, and Denis 

F. Combs, “The ATS Story,” Signal, April 1975, 6-15. Kahn, The Codebreakers, 713. Memorandum “OC – The History,” 

Office of Communications, p. 2. 

27 For computer specifications, see Wolf, Weinstein, and Combs, “The ATS Story,” Signal, April 1975, p. 6. John F. and 

Barbara E. McMullen, “How Computers Changed Wall Street,” http://www.atariarchives.org/deli/ wall_street.php, 

accessed 31 May 2006. Oral History Interview, Robert Surprise, 5 December 2005, pp. 1-3. 

28 William J. Gill, The Ordeal of Otto Otepka (New Rochelle NY: Arlington House, 1969), 11-21, 87-99. “Clearance Once 

Denied Rostow, Brief Asserts,” Los Angeles Times, 15 October 1967, p. 8. 

29 Oral History Interview, Crockett, 20 June 1990, p. 45. 

30 Gill, The Ordeal of Otto Otepka, 112-13, 145-149. SISS Hearing, pp. 384-387.

31 Gill, The Ordeal of Otto Otepka, 12, 46, 56. 

32 Oral History Interview, Crockett, 20 June 1990, p. 45. SISS Hearing, pp. 115, 121, 129, 384-387. Gill, The Ordeal 

of Otto Otepka, 145-149. “State Department Staff Firings Endangering National Security: Twenty-Five Trained Men to 

go in Economy Drive,” New York Journal-American, 9 November 1961; “State Department Confirms Cut of 20 Security 

Office Jobs Here,” Washington Post, 10 November 1961; and “U.S. Denies Cuts Affect Security,” Washington Star, 10 

November 1961; all Box 2, SCA Subject Files 1961-64, RG 59 – Lot 68D175, NA. 

33 SISS Hearing, 384-387. Gill, The Ordeal of Otto Otepka, 145-149, 158-159. 

34 SISS Hearings, 1963-65, Part 12, pp. 898-899. SISS Hearing, Part 4, 6 March 1963, Exhibit No. 3-C, Letter, Otepka to 

John Ordway, p. 186-87. Gill, The Ordeal of Otto Otepka, 165, 155-156, 158-159. 

35 Testimony to the FBI, Otepka, 15 August 1963, Box 1, Security Policy Files 1949-1969 (Otepka Files), RG 59 – Lot 

96D563, NA. “More Testimony on Otepka Issued,” New York Times, 8 August 1965, p. 23. Memorandum “Evaluation 

of Clippings Found in Classified Trash Bag of June 18, 1963,” David I. Belisle, Terence J. Shea, and Joseph E. Rosetti, 

n.d. [19? June 1963]; and Memorandum “Statement Concerning Inspection of Classified Trash Bag on March 19, 1963,” 

Shea, n.d. [19? March 1963], attached to Memorandum “Evaluation of Clippings Found in Classified Trash Bag of June 

18, 1963,”; both Box 1, Security Policy Files 1949-69 (Otepka Files), RG 59-Lot 96D563, NA. 

36 For disagreement between Reilly and Otepka over presidential appointments, see Memorandum “Presidential Appointments,” 

Otepka to Reilly, 2 May 1962; and Memorandum Otepka to Belisle, 210 May 1963; both Folder – B. Presidential 

Appointments and Designation – Instructions and Procedure, Box 1, SY/EX – Security Policy Files, 1947-1963, RG 59-Lot 

96D562, NA. Frank J. Johnson, “The Case of Otto Otepka,” American Security Council Newsletter (30 December 1963), 4. 

37 Gill, The Ordeal of Otto Otepka, 269-73. Memorandum “Denial of my access to the Division of Evaluations,” Otepka to 

Belisle, 2 August 1963, Box 2, Security Policy Files 1949-69 (Otepka Files), A/Assistant Secretary for Personnel Security, 

RG 59-Lot 96D563, NA. “Six Pro-Otepka Men Transferred by State DePart,” St. Louis Globe Democrat, 18 March 1964, 

Box 1, Security Policy Files 1947-63, A/DUSA, RG 59-Lot 96D562, NA. 
192

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

38 FBI Testimony, Otto Otepka, August 1963, Box 1, Security Policy Files 1949-69 (Otepka Files), RG 59-Lot 96D563, 

NA. Oral History Interview, William J. Crockett, 20 June 1990.

39 Testimony to the FBI, Otepka, 15 August 1963. Oral History Interview, Crockett, 20 June 1990, p. 45. 

40 State Department Security—1963-65, The Otepka Case II, Part 3, pp. 82, 84-85, 90-91. “State Department Security 

Data Are Published by Senate Panel,” New York Times, 2 October 1966, p. 80. 

41 “Letter Gives 13 Charges Otepka Faces,” Washington Post, 3 October 1963, p. A19. 

42 Gill, The Ordeal of Otto Otepka, 301-302. Memorandum “Otepka’s Assignments and Congressional Interest in the 

Otepka Case,” G. Marvin Gentile, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, 24 March 1967, Box 3, DUSA Subject 

Files 1967, RG 59-Lot 70D403, NA. Prepared Statement of the Secretary before the Internal Security Subcommittee 

of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 21 October 1963, p. 4, Box 1, Security Policy Files 1947-63, RG 59-Lot 96D562, 

NA. “Showdown Nears In Conflict Over Otepka’s Dismissal,” Washington Post, pp. A1, A7. Transcript of Telephone 

Conversation, Rusk and Johnson, 20 July 1964, Program 11, Tape WH6407.10, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential 

Library, Austin, Texas. Hereafter cited as LBJL. 

43 The American Legion Special Liaison Committee to the U.S. Department of State (Washington DC: The American Legion, 

1964), pp. 59, 28. This booklet contains the committee’s report, as well as the relevant portion of Rusk’s speech and the 

correspondence between the Department of State and the American Legion on setting up the committee and its review. 

44 SISS, State Department Security, 1963-65, The Otepka Case II, Part 3, pp 82-91. “3 in State Dept. Change Stories on 

Trying to Tap Otepka Phone,” Washington Post, 9 November 1963, A1. “Rusk Acted to Clarify Otepka Case,” Washington 

Evening-Star, 7 January 1964, p. A-13. “More Testimony on Otepka Issued,” New York Times, 8 August 1965, p. 23. 

45 “2 U.S. Aides Resign Over Otepka Case,” New York Times, 19 November 1963, p. 21. Pamphlet, “The Case of Otto 

Otepka,” Frank J. Johnson for the American Security Council, 30 December 1963, Box 1, Security Policy Files, 1947-63, 

RG 59-Lot 96D562, NA. Senator Thomas J. Dodd and Walter H. Judd were co-editors of the council’s articles. Dodd 

was a supporter of Otepka. See Memorandum on Otepka, Marvin Gentile [?], 24 February 1967, Box 3. Deputy Under 

Secretary for Administration Subject Files 1967, RG 59-Lot 70D403, Newington. “More Testimony On Otepka Issued,” 

New York Times, 8 August 1965, p. 23. 

46 Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Rusk and Johnson, 20 July 1964, Program 11, Tape WH6407.10. Memorandum 

for the File “Otto F. Otepka,” Belisle, 23 July 1963. Newspaper Clipping, “State Department ‘Elba’ for Aide who 

Talked,” Los Angeles Times, n.d. [January 1964], Box 1, Security Policy Files 1947-63, A/DUSA, RG 59-Lot 96D562, 

NA. Memorandum “Otepka’s Assignments,” G. Marvin Gentile [?], Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, 24 February 

1967, Box 3, DUSA Subject Files 1967, RG 59-Lot 70D403, NA. 

47 “Otepka Demoted and Rebuked; Retains State Department Job,” New York Times, 12 December 1967, p. 34. “Otepka 

Will Try New Job Before Deciding on Appeal,” The New York Times, 13 December 1967, p. 26. “Otepka Reports To 

New Job, Takes Leave,” Washington Post, 14 December 1967, p. A23. “Otepka Appeals Demotion By Rusk as Security 

Aide,” New York Times, 22 December 1967, p. 8. Gill, The Ordeal of Otto Otepka, 473-77. Memo to Howard P. Mace, 

Deputy Assistant, from James T. Masterson, Chief, Appeals Examining Office, May 20, 1968, Security Policy Files, 

1949-69, Box 2, Lot 96D563, RG 59, NA.

48 Gill, The Ordeal of Otto Otepka, 453-59. Haldeman Diary, Entry – Monday, 3 March 1969, Folder: January 12, 1969-April 

30, 1969, Part I, Box 40, Haldeman Notes Staff Members and Office Files, White House Special Files, Nixon Presidential 

Materials, NA. “SACB Post for Otepka is Reported,” Washington Post, 7 March 1969, p. A4. “Otepka Named to SACB 

Post,” Washington Post, 20 March 1969, p. 1. “Right Wingers Push for Otepka,” Christian Science Monitor, 12 March 

1970, p. 18. U.S. Senate, Nomination of Otto F. Otepka, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary,

91st Congress, 15 April 1969 (Washington:D.C. USGPO, 1969). “Otepka Leaves Security Board,” New York Times, 12 

July 1972, p. 49. “Otto Otepka Has Retired from SACB,” Washington Post, 21 July 1972, p. A21. 
193

CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

49 Oral History Interview, Crockett, 20 June 1990, p. 46. Memorandum “Otepka’s Assignments,” Gentile, 24 February 

1967, Box 3, DUSA Subject Files 1967, RG 59 – Lot 70D403, NA. 

50 Memorandum “Technical Security,” Security Office, U.S. Embassy Moscow, to Director of the Office of Security [E. 

Tomlin Bailey], 10 March 1959; and Memorandum “Purchase of British Technical Search Equipment,” Bailey to John W 

Hanes, Jr., Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA), 9 June 1959; both Folder – Miscellaneous 

1959, Box 12, A/SY/Evaluations. 

51 Memorandum “Technical Penetrations – American Embassy, Prague, Czechoslovakia,” Flinn to McLeod, 11 May 1956, 

Folder – Czechoslovakia 9-A, Box 32; Memorandum “Technical Penetration Devices,” Flinn to Robert Murphy (G), 

24 July 1956, Folder – Physical Security (Building Security) 1-E/4-1, Box 14; and Memorandum “Technical Security 

Problems,” Flinn to Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State, 23 July 1956, enclosed with Flinn to Earl Sohm (U), 

23 July 1956, Folder – Physical Security (Building Security) 1-E/4-1, Box 14; all Misc DF 1953-56, SCA, NA. 

52 Memorandum “Acoustical Room,” Elmer R. Hipsley, SY/P, to Boswell and John W. Hanes, Jr., Administrator of Bureau 

of Security and Consular Affairs, 29 June 1960, Folder -- Correspondence 1960, Box 7, A/SY/Evaluations. Oral History 

Interview, Casper Pelczynski, 24 May 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 7. George J. Church, “The Art of HighTech Snooping,” Time (20 April 1987): 3. David B. Ottaway and Bill McAllister, “U.S. Embassy’s Security Probed,” 

Washington Post, 27 March 1987, p. A-19. 

53 Oral History Interview, John Bagnal, 28 November 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, pp. 1, 5, 2-3. Memorandum 

“Acoustical Room,” Hipsley to Boswell and Hanes, 29 June 1960. Stanley, “History of the Technical Penetrations of 

American Embassy Moscow 1932-1985,” p. 47. Jay Peterzell describes the protection code rooms had by the 1980s. See 

Peterzell, “The Moscow Bug Hunt,” Time, 10 July 1989, p. 1-8. 

54 R. C. Mallalieu, A Model of the Microwave Intensity Distribution within the US Embassy in Moscow, 1966 to 1977 (Laurel 

MD: The Johns Hopkins University for the Applied Physics Laboratory, 1980), 25, 55. Craig R. Whitney, “Effects of 

Soviet Rays Discounted,” New York Times, 22 November 1978, p. A-12. Marion Steinmann, “The Waves of the Future?,” 

New York Times, 7 November 1976, p. SM-20. 

55 Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA’s Master Spy Hunter (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 

167-168. Stanley, “History of the Technical Penetrations of American Embassy Moscow 1932-1985,” p. 47-48, 58. Oral 

History Interview, John Bagnal, 28 November 2005, p. 1. 

56 Oral History Interview, John Bagnal, 28 November 2005, pp. 1-2. 

57 Oral History Interview, John Bagnal, 28 November 2005, p. 2. 

58 Oral History Interview, John Bagnal, 28 November 2005, p. 2. 

59 Oral History Interview, John Bagnal, 28 November 2005, p. 3. 

60 Rusk to Senator Thomas J. Dodd, 6 September 1965, attached to Memorandum to Keith O. Lynch, 28 September 

1965, Box 5, SY/Protective Security Policy Files, 1962-68, RG-Lot 70D292, NA. House Document 80 enclosed with 

Testimony of Gentile, 23 February 1965, House of Representatives Report No. 224 Second Supplemental Appropriation 

Bill, 1965, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, pp. 125-126. Stanley, “History of the Technical Penetrations of American 

Embassy Moscow 1932-1985,” M.S. thesis, Defense Intelligence College, 1993, p. 89. 

61 Oral History Interview, Casper Pelczynski, 24 May 2005, conducted by Mark T Hove, p. 7. Oral History Interview, John 

Bagnal, 28 November 2005, p. 5, and 29 November 2005, p. 8. 

62 Rusk to Dodd, 6 September 1965. Memorandum “History and Development” Naval Support Unit of the State 

Department, n.d. [late 1960s], [copy in possession of PA/HO]. Testimony of Gentile, 19 February 1965, Hearing 

before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Departments of State, Justice...

Appropriations for 1966, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, pp. 382, 373-374, 381. Oral History Interview, Bruce 
194

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Matthews, conducted by Mark Hove, 26 April 2005. House Document 80 enclosed with Testimony of Gentile, 23 

February 1965, House of Representatives Report No. 224 Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1965, 89th Congress, 1st 

Session, 1965, pp. 125-126. 

63 Testimony of Gentile, 19 February 1965, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. 

House of Representatives, Departments of State...Appropriations for 1966, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, pp. 373-374, 

385. Testimony of Gentile, 2 March 1967, Hearings before the House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee of 

Appropriations, Departments of State, Justice, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies’ Appropriations for 

1968, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, p. 296. 

64 Max Frankels, “In Moscow, Walls Have Ears, (40)” New York Times, 5 June 1960, p. 16; and Harrison E. Salisbury, 

“‘Bugged’ Embassy in Moscow Was Viewed as Security ‘Dream,’” New York Times, 21 May 1964, p. 1. 

65 Testimony of Gentile, 19 February 1965, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House 

of Representatives, Departments of State, Justice... Appropriations for 1966, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, pp. 376-377, 

383. For Rooney’s concern about the expenses to U.S. taxpayers, see Testimony of Gentile, 19 February 1965, Hearing 

before Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Departments of State, Justice...

Appropriations for 1966, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, pp. 380-381. 

66 Testimony of Gentile, 19 February 1965, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. 

House of Representatives, Departments of State...Appropriations for 1966, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, pp. 385-387; 

Testimony of Gentile, 16 February 1966, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. 

House of Representatives, Departments of State...Appropriations for 1967, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966, pp. 278-282. 

Testimony of Gentile, 2 March 1967, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of 

Representatives, Departments of State...Appropriations for 1968, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, pp. 296-298. Testimony of 

Gentile, 20 March 1969, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 

Departments of State...Appropriations for 1970, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, pp. 269-268. For the quotation on 

the Mattachine Society, see Testimony of Gentile, 8 March 1971, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Departments of State...Appropriations for 1966, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, 

1971, pp. 371-372. 

67 Carroll Kilpatrick, “Bigwig Visits Aid in Foreign Policy,” Washington Post, 21 April 1963, p. E3. Memorandum “Visits to 

the United States of Heads of State and Heads of Government During September and October, 1963,” Keith O. Lynch, 

Chief of Protective Services Division, to Reilly, 10 September 1963, Box 5, PSFP 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA. 

Timothy P. Maga, “Battling the ‘Ugly American’ at Home: The Special Protocol Service and the New Frontier, 1961-63,” 

Diplomacy and Statecraft 3/1 (1992): 132. 

68 Memorandum “Proposed Legislation Relating to the Protection of Foreign Visiting Dignitaries for Presentation to 

the 87th Congress, Second Session,” Boswell to Bontempo, 11 August 1961, attached to Memorandum “Proposed 

Legislation Relating to the Protection of Visiting Foreign Dignitaries,” Belton O. Bryan, SCA/EX, to John W. Sipes, 

SCA, Box 2; Memorandum “Department’s Preliminary Legislative Program for the 87th Congress, Second Session,” 

Otepka to Sipes, 22 August 1961; and Proposed Bill, attached to Memorandum “Legislative Program for the 87th

Congress, Second Session,” Sipes to Boswell, 27 November 1961, Box 4; all SCA Subject Files, 1961-64, RG 59-Lot 

68D175, NA. 

69 Organization Chart, SY, 13 November 1962, enclosed with Transmittal Letter SY-9, SY, 13 November 1962; 

Memorandum “SY/DO – Protective Services Branch Schedule,” Hipsley to Boswell, 6 February 1962; and Memorandum 

“Figures for the Budget,” Keith O. Lynch, Chief of Protective Services Branch, to Murray E. Jackson, Executive Office, 

19 February 1962; all Box 5, PSPF 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA. Memorandum “Proposed Legislation Relating 

to the Protection of Foreign Visiting Dignitaries for Presentation to the 87th Congress, Second Session,” Boswell to 

Bontempo, 11 August 1961. 
195

CHAPTER 5 SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS: Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

70 Memorandum “Proposed Legislation Relating to the Protection of Foreign Visiting Dignitaries for Presentation to the 

87th Congress, Second Session,” Boswell to Bontempo, 11 August 1961. “Visiting Potentates Get First-Class Protection,” 

Washington Post, 4 August 1963, p. B4.

71 Maga, “Battling the ‘Ugly American’ at Home,” 133. Renee Romano, “No Diplomatic Immunity: African Diplomats, 

the State Department, and Civil Rights, 1961-1964,” Journal of American History 87/2 (September 2000): 551-552. 

72 Maga, “Battling the ‘Ugly American’ at Home” 126-130. Romano, “No Diplomatic Immunity,” JAH 87/2 (2000): 546-

579. For the influence of the Civil Rights struggle upon U.S. Cold War foreign policy, see Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War 

Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). Foreign Affairs 

Manual Circular No. 62B “Responsibilities Related to Special Protocol Services,” 25 May 1962, Box 5, PSPF 1962-1968, 

RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA. 

73 Romano, “No Diplomatic Immunity,” JAH 87/2: 552. 

74 Maga, “Battling the ‘Ugly American’ at Home,” 132-133. Dean Rusk, as told to Richard Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: 

Penguin Books, 1991 [1990]), Daniel S. Papp, ed., p. 382. 

75 Memorandum “Proposed Budget for the Future, Lynch to Grignon, September 1964; and Memorandum, Grignon to 

Crockett, 5 August 1964; both Box 5, PSPF 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA. 

76 Oral History Interview, William DeCourcey, 19 May 2005, conducted by Jennifer Walele and Mark Hove, p. 2-3. 

77 “Security Forces Perform Unprecedented Task,” Department of State Newsletter, 32 (December 1963): 32. 

78 Memorandum “Protection of Visiting Dignitaries,” Lynch to Robert L. Berry, 1 March 1963; and Memorandum 

“Justification for Personnel,” Lynch to LaSelle, 30 April 1964; both Box 5, PSPF 1962-68 RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA. 

79 Memorandum, Benjamin H. Read, Special Assistant to Secretary and Executive Secretary, to McGeorge Bundy, Special 

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 20 May 1964; and Memorandum “SY Policy for Protection of 

Visiting Dignitaries,” Gentile to Crockett, 26 May 1964; both Box 5, PSPF 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA. 

80 Memorandum “Office of Security Accomplishments and Goals,” SY, enclosed with Memorandum “Paper on SY 

Accomplishments and Goals for Mr. Crockett,” Gentile to Joseph Meresman, O/ES, 19 December 1966, attached to 

Memorandum “SY Accomplishments and Goals,” Gentile to Grignon, Brown, McCabe, Muhonen, Harrison, Berry, Lynch, 

Traband, Weiss, Campbell, Rosetti, 23 January 1967, Folder – Policy 1967, Box 5, PSPF 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA. 

81 Memorandum “Warren Commission Recommendations and Our Protective Services for Visiting Dignitaries,” Gentile to 

Crockett, 22 October 1964, Folder – Policy 1964; and Memorandum “Study of The Protective Functions of the Office 

of Security, Department of State,” Henri G. Grignon (O/SY) to Richard W. Barrett, (O/MP), 5 May 1965; both Box 5, 

PSPF 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA.

82 Memorandum “Establishment of the Protective Research Section,” Lynch to All PRS Personnel, 24 September 1965; 

Memorandum “Protective Intelligence,” Lynch to All Officer Personnel, 2 February 1966; Memorandum “Study of the 

Protective Functions of the Office of Security, Department of State,” Grignon to Richard W. Barrett, 5 May 1965; 

Agreement Between the Department of State and the Secret Service, 28 June 1966; Memorandum “Progress of the 

Division of Protective Security since July 1, 1964,” Lynch to Grignon, 16 December 1966, Folder – Policy 1965; and 

Memorandum “Additional Justification Increase in Staff SY/PrS,” Lynch to Muhonen, 25 August 1967, Folder – Policy 

1967; all Box 5, PSPF 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA. 

83 Organization Chart “Office of Security,” Office of Security, January 1965, copy in project files. Inspection Memorandum 

“The Security Function of the Department: SY Organization,” Stanly S. Carpenter, Marvin L. Wolfe, and Donald R. 

Woodward, Inspectors of the OIG, December 1979, Folder – A/SY 1979 Compliance, Box 2, OIG – Inspection Reports 

and Compliance Files 1977-1984, RG 59 – Lot 90D533, Suitland.

197

CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

The rise of terrorism transformed diplomatic security. Although new technologies and the growing 

demands for protection of foreign dignitaries in the United States had prompted changes in security measures 

in the early 1960s, terrorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s forced the Department of State and its Office of 

Security (SY) to reinvent their approach to diplomatic security. The kidnappings and murders of U.S. diplomats 

in Guatemala, Brazil, and Sudan, and the murders of the 1972 Israeli Olympic team and Chilean diplomat 

Orlando Letelier, compelled SY—and the U.S. Government as a whole—to expand physical and protective 

security efforts. Furthermore, terrorism brought SY more into the public eye, as Congress demanded that the 

Department improve the physical security of U.S. Embassies and the protection of U.S. and foreign diplomats. 

Two crucial aspects of the “great transformation” 

of diplomatic security merit attention.1 First, the 

transformation occurred in three phases. During the 

first phase (1967-1978), discussed in this chapter, the 

threat of terrorism forced SY and the Department to 

redefine and transform diplomatic security, laying the 

foundations for diplomatic security as it is understood 

in the present day. During the second phase (1979-

1985), the threat of terrorism accelerated the 

transformation because the 1979 mob takeover of the 

U.S. Embassy in Iran and the 1983-1984 bombings of 

the U.S. Embassies in Beirut and Kuwait exhibited new 

terrorist methods that dramatically altered how U.S. 

officials perceived the terrorist threat. Finally, the third 

phase (1992-2000) completed the transformation of

CHAPTER 6

THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION

8

Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

Figure 1: A Japanese terrorist (right, with gun) talks with 

Malaysians who brought food for the hostages on the plane. 

In the early 1970s, plane hijacking was a common form of 

terrorism. In this case (August 5, 1975), five terrorists took 

control of a Japan Airlines plane in Kuala Lumpur. The 

hostages were later released, and the plane flew on to Libya. 

Other airline hijackings found the terrorists demanding that 

the pilots fly to Havana, Cuba. Source: © Associated Press. 
198

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

diplomatic security to the forms recognized today, 

with the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in 

Kenya and Tanzania as the key events that prompted 

the final phase of transformation. 

A second crucial aspect is that during each of 

the three phases, SY expanded its responsibilities, but 

did not give up or transfer existing responsibilities. 

SY continued to conduct background investigations 

and evaluations, to protect the Secretary of State 

and foreign dignitaries, and to strengthen technical 

countermeasures against Soviet espionage. With the 

onset of terrorism, however, SY implemented new 

security measures, such as public access controls, 

armored cars, and closed-circuit television cameras. 

It established a command center, and created a threat 

analysis group to analyze threats to U.S. diplomatic 

security. 

The extent of this transformation was not 

immediately apparent during this first phase. SY, 

under the direction of Deputy Assistant Secretaries 

of State for Security G. Marvin Gentile (1964-1973) and Victor H. Dikeos (1974-1978), laid the foundations 

for what diplomatic security would become in the 1990s and 2000s. Perhaps most importantly, the two men—

particularly Dikeos—guided SY as it redefined its raison d’etre. Dikeos announced the redefinition in July 

1975: “SY’s mission has changed from the traditional concept of thwarting clandestine penetration...to a much 

broadened role of protection against any and all sorts of hazards including blatant terrorist violence.”2

 SY always 

had shouldered huge responsibilities in relation to its small size, but, as revealed by Dikeos, SY’s responsibilities 

grew immensely as terrorists targeted U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities with political acts of violence and 

destruction. 

z Diplomats as Targets å

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the targeting of diplomats and embassies by guerrillas, terrorists, and 

insurgents in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East pressured SY and the Department to redefine protection. 

Prior to 1965, protection had centered upon the Secretary of State and visiting foreign dignitaries. The idea of 

targeting a diplomat or diplomatic facility as a violent act of political expression was on the fringe of extreme 

Figure 2: Regional Security Officer Art Jones displays 

a M28 rocket that a local terrorist group intended to use 

against the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal Source: 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

possibilities. Subtle signs of a shift from general 

security (anti-crime, anti-espionage) to protection 

of U.S. overseas facilities emerged in the late 1950s 

as the number of SY personnel tasked with overseas 

security approached the number of those slated for 

investigations and evaluations. In 1953, there were 

110 officers in investigations and evaluations, but 

only 15 devoted to physical security and overseas 

operations. By 1963, the numbers had begun to even 

out, with 142 SY officers dedicated to investigations 

and evaluations, and 116 to physical and overseas 

security. The latter figure did not reflect the 758 

Marine Security Guards assigned to 95 posts across 

the world.3

 

The increased number of personnel assigned 

to physical and overseas security was due, in part, 

to the Cold War and the decolonization in Africa 

and Asia. As one of two superpowers, the United 

States expanded its diplomatic corps in order to 

ensure that it had a diplomatic post in every country 

across the globe. This occurred at a time when the 

number of new states was rapidly increasing. In 

1940, the Department of State had 58 diplomatic 

posts, but by 1970, that number had ballooned to 

117. The effort to expand diplomatic representation 

abroad gained particular urgency when the Soviets 

announced a new strategy at their Twentieth Party 

Congress in 1956 “to temper Cold War tensions and 

to compete peacefully” with the United States for the 

hearts and minds of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and 

Latin America.4

 Moreover, European decolonization 

efforts, independence movements, and the emergence 

of numerous new nation-states in the developing 

world fostered independence struggles, civil wars, 

Figure 3: Special Agents Terence Shea (left) and Al Boyd 

(right) provide protection for President Nguyen Van Thieu 

of South Vietnam (center), at Waikiki Beach in Honolulu, 

Hawaii in July 1968. Thieu was visiting Hawaii for a 

series of meetings with President Lyndon B. Johnson and 

senior Department of Defense officials to discuss a larger 

role for South Vietnamese armed forces in the war. Source: 

Private collection. 

Figure 4: A missile thrown by anti-Vietnam War 

demonstrators explodes outside the U.S. Embassy in 

Grosvenor Square, London, March 17, 1968. During 

the late 1960s, U.S. diplomatic posts became targets for 

protesters and terrorists, and the reasons for the protests and 

attacks varied by region. Long accustomed to diplomatic 

immunity and inviolability of diplomatic premises, U.S. 

diplomats and the Department struggled with the new 

development. Source: © Associated Press. 
200

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

local political tensions, guerrilla movements, and 

ethnic conflicts. Several struggles, tensions, and 

conflicts soon involved U.S. diplomats. As a result, 

SY needed more RSOs, SO(T)s, Marine Security 

Guards, and other personnel to secure the rapidly 

rising number of posts. 

By the late 1960s, a growing number of U.S. 

posts and personnel overseas were becoming targets 

of violence perpetuated by radical, revolutionary, 

and terrorist movements. Several U.S. Embassies, 

Consulates, and United States Information Service 

(USIS) installations suffered damage from protests, 

attacks, or riots. During fiscal year 1971, USIS 

installations alone reported 61 threats or acts of 

violence. Even in nations perceived as peaceful 

and safe, such as France, Norway, Chile, and the 

Netherlands, U.S. posts faced an escalating number of 

violent acts.5

 The acts ranged from a few Norwegian 

demonstrators tossing rocks and bottles at the U.S. 

Embassy’s windows in Oslo, to a bomb exploding in 

the dining room of the U.S. Consul General in Porto 

Alegre, Brazil.6

 

The motivations behind the acts depended on 

locale, issue, and the internal political and economic 

dynamics of the host countries. In Europe, attacks 

often arose from opposition to the Vietnam War. In 

the Middle East, hostility and violence resulted from 

U.S. support for Israel. During the Six-Day War (June 

5-10, 1967), Arab mobs attacked 22 U.S. Embassies and Consulates, with the damage ranging from gutted buildings 

to broken windows and damaged cars. In Latin America, U.S. actions, past and present, inspired anger and hostility. 

Such acts included not only the Vietnam War, but also such regional issues as U.S. policy towards Fidel Castro and 

the Cuban Revolution, the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, the presence of U.S. multinational 

corporations, perceived U.S. support for right-wing dictators and opposition to social and economic reforms. In 

fact, in April 1968, the senior press chief for Chile’s president admitted that it was “in” to be anti-American.7

 

Figure 5: The U.S. Binational Center in Rancagua, Chile 

suffers bomb damage on March 16, 1968. The bomb was 

a stick of dynamite set outside the door to the Center. The 

door casing lies across the shattered coffee table, as does a 

broken framed photograph of President Lyndon Johnson. 

The white marks on the walls are pockmarks from concrete 

rubble striking the wall. Terrorist threats to U.S. diplomats 

and posts were highest in Latin America between 1965 and 

1975. Source: Department of State Records, National 

Archives and Records Administration. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

The increasing number of anti-American terrorist 

incidents in Latin America led U.S. policymakers and 

SY officials to develop its initial policies and procedures 

for terrorist attacks in that region. In early 1965, SY 

organized an ad hoc inter-agency committee to study 

terrorism, and particularly the isolated attacks against 

U.S. posts and installations in the region. The result 

was a “comprehensive guidance document” that 

SY sent to all Chiefs of Mission in Latin America.8

Although implementation of the documents’ 

recommendations was subject to the decision of the 

Chief of Mission, the guidance document requested 

that all missions set up Security Watch Committees. 

SY tasked the Watch Committees to evaluate the 

state of security in their country, and to devise and 

implement measures to improve post security. For 

example, SY called for the inspection of all incoming 

packages to the Embassy. SY also supplied posts with 

special protective equipment and launched a project 

to find a substitute for glass at U.S. facilities. The Department also issued new physical security regulations for 

all Department of State, USAID, and USIS installations. Recognizing that terrorism was not restricted to Latin 

America, SY and the Ad Hoc Committee sent an expanded version of the guidance document to all missions 

across the world in 1966.9

 

By 1970, the levels and methods of violence had escalated. Rocks thrown at U.S. embassy windows in 

1965 became Molotov cocktails, car bombs, or sticks of dynamite in 1968 and 1970, and then evolved into 

fuse and timer bombs in 1972.10 In Saigon, a person drove a car to the front of the U.S. Embassy and walked 

away. A few moments later, a fuse bomb exploded, killing several embassy employees and heavily damaging 

the building. In Beirut, in 1972, terrorists parked a car across the street from the U.S. Embassy, and then 

fired rocket-propelled grenades at the chancery through two holes cut in the vehicle’s body panels.11 In Lagos, 

Nigeria, during the Biafra civil war, the limits of physical security became evident. A mob gathered and 

threw stones at the Embassy (it had been attacked twice previously). The Marine Security Guards were not 

allowed to carry weapons, so the RSO issued them baseball bats. Similar problems also existed within allied 

countries. By 1968, with anti-American sentiment high and U.S. relations with Western Europe “hav[ing] 

deteriorated to an alarming degree,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Gentile recommended 

Figure 6: Special Agents Terence Shea (left, in sunglasses) 

and John Ford (center right, with glasses) on protective detail 

with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin (center, gesturing with 

right hand) and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko 

(right of Kosygin) in New York City. The Soviet officials 

are on their way to the Glassboro Summit to discuss limits 

on anti-ballistic missile systems with U.S. President Lyndon 

Johnson in June 1967. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security Files. 
202

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

that SY relocate 26 percent of its personnel from its 

regional operations center in Frankfurt to offices in 

Washington, DC.12 

Meanwhile, 1968 – the same year that witnessed 

the murders of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert 

Kennedy—also found U.S. officials recognizing that 

terrorists and guerrillas had begun to target U.S. 

diplomats for kidnappings and murder. During 

an attempted abduction, Marxist guerrillas killed 

U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John Gordon 

Mein on the streets of Guatemala City. One year 

later, Brazilian Marxist guerillas kidnapped U.S. 

Ambassador to Brazil C. Burke Elbrick. The Nixon 

Administration pressured the Brazilian Government 

to meet the kidnappers’ demands (the release of 15 

jailed Communists), and the Brazilian Government 

did, whereupon the kidnappers released Elbrick. 

In 1970, the Tupamaros, a revolutionary Marxist 

guerilla group in Uruguay, abducted and held for 

ransom Daniel Mitrione, a U.S. police officer who 

served as an adviser to the Uruguayan police. In this 

instance, the Nixon Administration stepped back 

and did not pressure Uruguayan officials to meet the 

kidnappers’ demands. Ten days later, the Tupamaros 

killed Mitrione.13 

 Ambassador Mein’s murder sent a shock wave 

through the Department, in part, because he was the 

first U.S. Ambassador killed in the performance of 

duty.14 SY responded by initiating a “pilot project” 

for armored vehicles, but soon found that the cost 

of such vehicles prohibited each U.S. Embassy from 

purchasing one. While commercially procured 

armored vehicles had a price tag of $50,000, 

Department automobiles armored by SY personnel 

Figure 7: U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John Gordon 

Mein. Mein was killed by leftist guerrillas on the streets of 

Guatemala City. His death led SY to begin a pilot project 

for armoring cars for U.S. Ambassadors overseas. Source: 

Department of State Records, National Archives and 

Records Administration. 

Figure 8: Uruguayan Commemorative Stamp in honor of 

Daniel Mitrione issued in 1992. The Public Safety Officer for 

the U.S. Embassy in Montevideo, Mitrione was kidnapped 

and then killed on August 10, 1972, by Tupamaros guerrillas. 

The Tupamaros, like the Montoneros (Argentina) and MIR 

(Chile), adopted Guevara-type guerrilla tactics, and at times, 

threatened U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities. Source: 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
203

CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

cost $25,000, with $19,500 of that cost for 

bulletproof glass. Another option for SY, one which 

cost only $5,000, was to partially armor embassy cars, 

without bulletproof glass. SY officials chose this latter 

course, and Seabees and SO(T)s worked in teams to 

armor vehicles for select posts, with some teams able 

to armor a vehicle in less than a day.15 

The kidnapping of Ambassador Elbrick 

prompted the Department to enact extensive changes 

to physical and personnel security at U.S. posts 

overseas. In an instruction to the region’s diplomatic 

and consular posts, SY and the Bureau of InterAmerican Affairs (ARA) warned that it had become 

“all too apparent that American official personnel 

are now potential targets.” Embassies in Latin 

America convened their Security Watch Committees 

to evaluate threats and determine the necessary 

measures for security preparedness. SY augmented 

Marine Security Guard forces for several Embassies, 

such as those in Brazil and Argentina; replaced older 

vehicles of Embassy motor pools; expanded the use 

of “follow” cars for Ambassadors; and provided more 

money for mission security expenses. Embassies 

built or upgraded fences and walls at chanceries 

and Ambassadors’ residences, installed emergency 

generators, upgraded lighting, and added vault doors 

and window grills.16 

SY did not restrict its efforts to the Western Hemisphere. In Europe, it elevated protection for U.S. 

Ambassadors to Great Britain, Belgium, and West Germany, whom SY believed were the most likely to be targets 

of violence.17 SY organized a “mobile reserve” of equipment that could be shipped to any mission during “extreme 

emergencies.” SY and ARA, with a representative from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, formed a Departmental 

Working Group to study the issue of protecting U.S. personnel “on a world-wide basis.” Finally, the Department 

of State also approached the Vatican, and asked it to lend its moral authority to help protect diplomats and to 

assist in negotiations should U.S. diplomats be kidnapped.18 

Figure 9: C. Burke Elbrick, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil. 

Elbrick was kidnapped by MR8 Marxist guerrillas in 

September 1969. At the Nixon Administration’s urging, 

the government of Brazil met the guerrillas’ demands, 

and released Elbrick after four days. Elbrick’s kidnapping 

prompted SY to make many changes in security, particularly 

overseas security. Elbrick’s ordeal is told in the 1997 film, 

Four Days in September. Source: Department of State 

Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 
204

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

In the wake of Elbrick’s kidnapping, SY admitted that the abductions of and attacks on U.S. personnel 

“show[ed] no sign of abatement;” and it and other offices in the Department began to formalize procedures for 

U.S. posts to undertake in the event of a terrorist incident. Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management 

William B. Macomber, Jr., advocated developing a formal policy regarding kidnapping, but Secretary of State 

William P. Rogers preferred an “ad hoc policy on kidnappings.”19 Under the direction of Gentile, SY devised a 

four-phase plan that outlined “graduated responses” to threats against its missions and staff. The four phases were 

“Early Warning,” “Clear Existence of Threat,” “Clear Existence of Intense Threat,” and “Unacceptable Level of 

Threat.” Actions to be taken in the first phase, Early Warning, were demonstrated by the efforts taken in Ceylon 

(present-day Sri Lanka) after Elbrick’s kidnapping in Brazil. U.S. officials, in consultation with Ceylonese officials, 

reviewed the situation and deemed the threat minimal, took precautionary measures, and reviewed the situation 

periodically.20 The second phase, Clear Existence of Threat, demanded actions similar to those taken by U.S. posts 

in Latin America in the wake of Elbrick’s kidnapping. Phase Three required all dependents and non-essential 

personnel to evacuate the country, and the post to move the remaining staff into easier-to-protect buildings. 

“Unacceptable Level of Threat,” the fourth phase meant that U.S. posts should implement their emergency plans 

and evacuate the country. In 1971, a more extensive, sophisticated version of this phased plan was distributed, 

with addenda on personal safety and defensive driving.21

SY also outlined a four-stage sequence that U.S. 

posts should follow in case they required additional 

protection. The sequence advised embassies first to 

consult with the host government, which bore the 

primary responsibility for providing security for 

foreign missions. If the host country provided extra 

guards and an incident occurred (e.g., a shoot-out), it 

would be a local issue under the responsibility of the 

host government, not a diplomatic incident between 

the United States and the host nation. As a second 

stage, SY recommended that U.S. posts examine the 

possibility of hiring local, reputable, professional 

guards. If that was not possible, then, as a third 

option, U.S. security officers might be made available. 

Gentile made clear that hiring additional Marine 

Security Guards was to be a last resort, partly due to 

questions of immunity and jurisdiction. Moreover, 

since many Marines had served a tour of duty in 

Figure 10: Marine Security Guard Post 1 at the U.S. 

Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, circa 1970. The glass, 

openness, and easy access made U.S. embassies in the 1960s 

difficult to protect. Initially, upon the emergence of terrorist 

attacks by individuals and small groups, SY instituted 

several changes including a four-stage emergency plan, 

screening of visitors, access controls, more Marine Security 

Guards, and extra local guards to increase security. Source: 

Department of State, Office of the Historian Files. 
205

CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

Vietnam, the Commandant of the Marine Corps 

made clear that it was “somewhat unfair to ask that a 

twenty year-old veteran of Viet Nam, whose reflexes 

have been sharpened by combat, [to] exercise the 

restraint and cool judgment” required on protective 

security assignments.22 

Reactions by host governments to U.S. requests 

for added protection were mixed. Some governments, 

such as those of Ecuador, Tunisia, Lebanon, Ethiopia, 

and Portugal, cooperated and increased protective 

details for U.S. diplomats with their military and 

police forces.23 In Chile, with a presidential election 

campaign underway, one candidate had accused the 

government of permitting a “climate of violence” 

to prevail. The incumbent Chilean Government 

believed that obvious increases in security for U.S. 

diplomats would confirm the accusation and perhaps 

unsettle the public. Instead, officials said that the 

Ambassador’s chauffeurs could carry firearms, and that the Embassy could hire private Chilean bodyguards. 

Chilean officials, however, would increase security if intelligence identified a specific threat, and the Chilean 

Government promised to discuss the matter and review security at future intervals.24 

In its discussions with U.S. officials, the Uruguayan Foreign Ministry questioned the legal and diplomatic 

status of Marine Security Guards. U.S. officials had been quiet and careful about the presence of U.S. Marines 

at its Embassies, at times insisting that the Marines wear civilian clothes or grow their hair beyond regulation. 

Although the Uruguayans determined that the Marines merited the privileges and immunities extended to other 

U.S. Embassy employees, U.S. security concerns had raised the Uruguayans’ awareness of the Marines’ presence, 

and their anxieties over a possible clash between Marines and locals. Despite their concerns, Uruguayan officials 

assisted U.S. officials in improving the security of the chancery and Ambassador’s residence, as well as implementing 

the protective measures for the Embassy staff.25

Elbrick’s kidnapping in Brazil led SY to create two new programs. First, SY officials turned the pilot project 

for armored vehicles into the formal Protective Security Vehicle Program. This enabled SY to not only purchase 

fully protective security vehicles, but also install mobile radios in Embassy vehicles, obtain kits to armor existing 

cars, and buy automobiles equipped with “high performance features.” The vehicles went to “high risk” posts such 

as Saigon, Beirut, and Montevideo. By 1972, SY could claim success for the armored vehicle program. In Phnom 

Figure 11: A U.S. diplomat’s car burns near the U.S. Embassy 

in Nicosia, Cyprus, in August 1974 (man not identified). 

After terrorist attacks involving the Ambassador’s car (Mein 

was killed next to his car, and Elbrick was kidnapped from 

his), SY created the Protective Security Vehicle Program, 

which installed armor, bulletproof glass, radios, and “high 

performance” features in U.S. diplomatic cars. Seabees 

and SY technicians put in the improvements. Source: 

© Associated Press. 
206

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Penh, Cambodia, a bomb exploded near the Embassy’s armored vehicle, and the Chargé d’Affaires, the Chargé’s 

guard, and the chauffeur walked away unharmed.26 

The second program SY created was the Mobile Reserve and Emergency Action Teams. The Mobile 

Reserve consisted of a reserve of personnel and equipment that could be temporarily sent to a post where 

kidnapping and terrorism threats were high. SY officials organized personnel into Emergency Action Teams, 

the forerunner of Mobile Tactical Security Teams. The teams were three squads of four to five people each, 

and were assigned as emergencies dictated. Once at post, an Emergency Action Team immediately conducted 

a “detailed physical survey,” and determined the host government’s capability of protecting U.S. diplomatic 

personnel. The squad also made recommendations for enhancing post security, and provided temporary 

security services. If needed, the team could request additional Marine Guards for the Ambassador’s residence 

or other post buildings.27

z Protecting the Secretary å

Protests, threats, and violence also occurred in the United States, and such threats raised concerns among 

SY officials about whether they could provide “adequate” protection for the Secretary of State and visiting foreign 

dignitaries. In 1970, Chief of Protective Services Keith O. “Jack” Lynch cited a notable increase in the number 

of threats and demonstrations against the Secretary. The fact that local police departments, such as Washington 

and Los Angeles, would not assign officers for 24-hour protective duty unless SY also assigned an agent further 

compounded SY’s anxieties. The situation differed 

little with visiting dignitaries. When the Shah of Iran, 

Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, visited the United 

States, SY noted that he received “serious threats” 

daily, forcing the office to devote many additional 

hours investigating and analyzing the threats, and 

protecting the Shah.28 

 Several incidents in 1967, resulting from public 

opposition to the Vietnam War, exposed the need for 

more Special Agents on the Secretary of State’s detail. 

During a speech given by Secretary Dean Rusk in 

Los Angeles, 150 protesters held a demonstration 

and a mock trial that found Rusk “guilty of gross war 

crimes.” The judge of the mock trial was found to be 

active in the Maoist Progressive Labor Party. Student 

protesters at Indiana University prevented Rusk from 

Figure 12: William “Bill” DeCourcy (left, with pin on 

lapel, holding radio) protects Secretary of State Dean 

Rusk in Oslo, Norway, during a 1966 visit. During the 

1960s, large anti-war protests made ensuring the Secretary’s 

speaking engagements outside Washington difficult. In 

New York City, 1400 New York police were needed to 

control multiple anti-Vietnam War groups protesting Rusk’s 

appearance and assist with the protection of the Secretary of 

State. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

delivering his speech. In New York City, multiple student protest groups demonstrated against his appearance at a 

speaking engagement, and more than 1,400 police officers were required to control the crowd. After the February 

1968 Tet Offensive, antiwar protests further fueled SY’s concern for the Secretary’s safety, particularly at university 

campuses. The Secretary also received a substantial amount of crank mail on a regular basis, and since crank 

mail was directed more against the office than the individual, SY anticipated that such threats would continue no 

matter who served as Secretary of State.29

Despite the increasing threats, resource constraints prevented SY from providing 24-hour protection to the 

Secretary. In late 1968, SY rotated three agents for portal-to-portal protection for the Secretary. One Special Agent 

greeted the Secretary at his home, and escorted him to his office (handling the early shift). A second Special Agent 

took the late shift until the Secretary retired for the evening, and the third agent had the day off. The three agents 

were responsible for coordinating, arranging, and providing personal protection for the Secretary. The agents 

also worked to prevent any compromise of the Secretary’s classified papers, and to stop any technical espionage 

of the Secretary’s voice communications. Rusk did receive 24-hour protection when he traveled overseas. In 

comparison, President Lyndon B. Johnson had approximately 25 Secret Service agents protecting him 24 hours 

a day, and in the wake of President Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson extended that protection to Presidential 

candidates, which required an additional 21 agents.30 

The rise of terrorism led SY to expand the Secretary’s detail to 24-hour coverage during Secretary William 

Rogers’s tenure (1969-1973). An incident at Rogers’s home, in part, motivated the decision to implement a 24-

hour detail. On October 8, 1970, a car pulled into the Secretary’s driveway, and Rogers went out to see who it 

was. Although the men were well-dressed Drug Enforcement Agency agents, at least one SY agent shook his head 

in amazement that Rogers took the risk of going outside to the car. When Rogers’s personal secretary, Maggie 

Runkel, heard of the situation, she immediately contacted Protective Services and insisted that the Secretary have 

24-hour protection. Gentile ordered the 24-hour coverage to last until Rogers decided to terminate it, but Rogers 

never did.31 

With 24-hour protection, the Secretary’s detail grew in personnel and resources, and in turn, it prompted 

the formalization and standardization of procedures. Four to five Special Agents now made up the detail, 

and the number increased when the Secretary traveled abroad. SY renovated Rogers’s garage into a command 

post, where SY Agents communicated with the Washington Field Office. A Marine guard joined the SY Agent 

during the night shift. SY also required that two men be with the Secretary at all times, and occasionally more 

if Rogers attended a public event or dinner. The detail began employing a follow-up car for the Secretary’s 

motorcade. SY agents now used walkie-talkies, and in 1970, the head of the Secretary’s detail, William D’Urso, 

obtained an earpiece for his radio to coordinate protection. While the Department had leased a Cadillac from 

General Motors for the Secretary’s use, additional monies in 1971 allowed SY to purchase a Cadillac, and have 

a group of Seabees install armor plates and bulletproof glass. William DeCourcy, who preceded D’Urso as 
208

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

head of the Secretary’s detail, instituted procedures 

that required Special Agents to escort the Secretary’s 

baggage to the plane and have the baggage x-rayed 

to prevent placement of bombs.32 

Even with added protection, Secretary Rogers 

faced harrowing experiences while traveling abroad. 

On July 31, 1969, he barely escaped injury at the 

Tokyo airport when a Japanese national charged at 

him with a knife, and SY Agent Joseph McNulty 

knocked the attacker to the ground. In May 1972, 

Rogers traveled to Reykjavík, Iceland, to speak at 

the local university, against the warnings of SY’s 

advance team and the objection of Secretary’s detail 

chief William D’Urso. Iceland’s Prime Minister 

had assured Rogers of his safety. During the 

speech, large anti-war demonstrations broke out, 

and Rogers and the SY detail had to fight through 

the crowd to leave the campus. Soon afterwards, 

the local police commander informed Rogers that 

they had to leave for the airport immediately or risk 

being cut off en route by the protesters, who were 

now threatening to use Molotov cocktails. They departed before the protesters could organize, and arrived 

safely at the airport.33 

Rogers’s attendance at the inauguration of Argentine President Hector José Cámpora Demaestre in May 

1973 proved equally harrowing. A crowd of one million demonstrators formed, and plain-clothes police left 

rather than try to control the crowd. Ten motorcycle officers remained, one of whom was killed when a protester 

knocked him off his motorcycle. Fearing for Rogers’s safety, SY agents prepared to leave Buenos Aires, and hid 

the Secretary in a safe room until Argentine police backup arrived. When Argentine leaders learned of Rogers’s 

imminent departure, they doubled the forces protecting him in order to convince him to stay for the inaugural 

festivities.34 

Rogers had resisted protection during his golf outings, but this changed too. During an outing in Bermuda, 

six men with machetes emerged from the woods during a round of golf. The men were groundskeepers, but 

Rogers admitted that initially he was nervous. Afterwards he permitted SY Agents to accompany him during his 

golf outings.35 

Figure 13: Bill D’Urso (right, grey suit) and Lance Putney 

(between photographers) protect Secretary of State William P. 

Rogers during his arrival at a NATO Ministerial Meeting in 

Rome, in May 1970. The Secretary of State began to receive 

24-hour protection after Rogers, on October 8, 1970, went 

outside in the middle of the night to see who had pulled up 

in his driveway. His secretary, Maggie Runkel, demanded 

24-hour security for the Secretary. Rogers received it under 

the condition that he could revert to “portal-to-portal” 

whenever he wanted, but he never requested a relaxation 

of security. Rogers’ garage was converted into a command 

post, and a Special Agent and a Marine stood watch during 

the evening. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

z The Chicago Incident å

While the Secretary of State faced threats at home 

and abroad, foreign leaders worried about security 

threats when visiting the United States. Thailand, 

Colombia, France, Israel, Vietnam, and Mexico began 

to send advance teams to review security arrangements 

for their leaders. For SY, it became increasingly evident 

that even with intelligence provided by its Protective 

Support section, the Protective Services Division 

could not meet the protective demands of the foreign 

diplomats, heads of state, and prominent visitors with 

its available manpower.36 While the Secret Service 

received increased funding and resources during the 

late 1960s for its protective responsibilities, SY did 

not. SY’s Protective Services openly wondered if the 

President mistakenly believed that foreign dignitaries 

and the Secretary of State received the same protection 

as Presidential candidates. In fact, despite SY’s calls 

for additional resources, the office could assign only 

two qualified SY Special Agents and three Marines 

to protect visiting dignitaries. More Agents could 

be utilized if they were pulled off investigations and 

from other SY divisions. At a time when many heads of state visited the United States, SY could only protect 

those dignitaries deemed highly visible. Moreover, SY had one “fed pak”/radio-equipped vehicle for protective 

details, and agents had to rent cars if a detail required a follow-up car. SY Agent Dennis Williams recalled once 

renting the only available vehicle for a follow car at Washington National Airport: an orange Rambler station 

wagon.37 A visit by French President Georges Pompidou in early 1970 exposed the deficiency in resources and 

transformed protective security for visiting heads of state and dignitaries. Prior to his visit, Pompidou had sold 

more than 100 fighter jets to the Libyan regime of Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi, who openly espoused Arab 

nationalism, supported jihad, and defined “Zionism” and Israel as his enemy.38 The French sale of jets prompted 

protests by the U.S. Jewish community and others, who feared that French weapons would fall into the hands of 

other Arab extremists. Given the extremely strong sentiment against Pompidou—some protests numbered in the 

thousands—the Governor of New York, Nelson A. Rockefeller, and the Mayor of New York City, John Lindsay, 

refused to greet Pompidou officially or attend a dinner in his honor at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. Chicago 

Figure 14: Georges Pompidou, President of France. 

During the 1970 visit of Mr. and Mrs. Pompidou to 

Chicago, a protester spit upon Mrs. Pompidou. Furious, 

President Richard Nixon demanded that the Secret Service, 

not the Office of Security (SY), protect foreign dignitaries 

who visited the United States. The Secret Service preferred 

that SY retain the responsibility, but Nixon insisted, and 

responsibility was transferred. Later, the Secret Service 

retained protection of heads of state, but SY regained 

the duty of protecting other foreign dignitaries. Source: 

© Associated Press. 
210

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Mayor Richard Daley had planned to be away when the French President was scheduled to visit his city Only 

after a telephone call from National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger did Mayor Daley decide to stay and greet 

Pompidou. Nearly 100 members of Congress signed a petition and planned to boycott Pompidou’s speech to 

a joint session of that body.39 President Nixon was livid; H. R. Haldeman, Nixon’s Chief of Staff, remarked 

that it was the angriest he had seen Nixon since becoming President. Nixon told Kissinger, “I consider this 

unconscionable conduct towards an official guest of the United States of America, and I will not tolerate it.”40 

Events climaxed in Chicago. Someone pulled the Chicago police back from President Pompidou and his 

wife. Demonstrators closed in on the French couple, and one demonstrator spit on Madame Pompidou. She was 

so shaken by the incident that she was determined to return to Paris; meanwhile, the French President threatened 

to end his visit. As soon as Nixon heard of the incident, he told Emil “Bus” Mosbacher, Jr., the Chief of Protocol, 

to do whatever was necessary to ensure that Madame Pompidou stayed, and Mosbacher succeeded in persuading 

her. Nixon immediately altered his schedule, flew to New York, and attended the dinner in Pompidou’s honor 

at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. He apologized to Pompidou in person, and made kind, humorous remarks that 

“obviously moved” and “deeply touched” the French President.41 

The Chicago incident had diplomatic security and foreign policy consequences. Furious with the protesters, 

Nixon immediately postponed the delivery of 50 Phantom fighter jets to Israel, despite occasional skirmishes 

between Israel and its Arab neighbor states Egypt and Syria, and despite opposition from Kissinger and Israeli 

Prime Minister Golda Meir. Nixon claimed that he faced “a wave of criticism” from Congress and the press, yet 

he remained firm for 6 months. Then on September 

15, 1970, Palestinian extremists supplied by Syria 

staged an uprising in Jordan that threatened civil war 

and the demise of Jordan’s King Hussein ibn Talal 

ibn ‘Abdallah. The Jordan crisis prompted Nixon to 

release the Phantom jets to Israel.42 

In the wake of the Pompidou incident, Nixon 

immediately called for new legislation that transferred 

the responsibility of protecting foreign dignitaries 

from the Department of State to the Secret Service.43

John W. Dean, Counsel to the President, petitioned 

the Departments of State and the Treasury to develop 

legislation that reflected Nixon’s wishes. Lawyers 

from the two Departments favored revising existing 

arrangements, not a total reorganization. The Secret 

Service also sought to preserve SY’s involvement in 

Figure 15: The Chinese table tennis team visits Robert 

Mondavi and Margrit Biever at their home in California. 

After the Pompidou incident, SY was asked to protect the 

Chinese table tennis team (part of “Ping-Pong Diplomacy” 

and Nixon’s opening to the People’s Republic of China) as 

it toured the United States. Headed by Bill DeCourcy, the 

SY protection team received fulsome praise for its work, 

rebuilding its reputation. Source: © Associated Press. 
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protective details. William Dickey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, even asked the Secretary of State 

to maintain oversight over dignitary protection, with the Secret Service providing additional security protection.44

Nevertheless, the task for protecting foreign diplomats was transferred to the Secret Service and staffed by its 

Executive Protective Service (EPS).45 

Despite the transfer of protective duties, SY continued to receive protective assignments; and one assignment, 

the Chinese table tennis team, did much to rebuild SY’s reputation. Nixon and Kissinger secretly had begun to 

explore the possibility of improving U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after two decades 

of hostility, tension, and non-recognition. In April 1971, the PRC Government invited a U.S. table tennis team 

to visit. The invitation and visit led to a gradual thawing of relations and a visit by President Nixon to China in 

February 1972. In April, the Secret Service turned down a White House request to provide protection for the 

Chinese table tennis team during its visit to the United States, prompting Special Assistant to the President John 

Scali to contact SY Director Marvin Gentile. Gentile accepted the assignment, and tasked protection of the 

70-person ping-pong team to Protective Services. SY Agent William DeCourcy organized and led the protective 

detail, which was assisted by a Marine detail and Army intelligence officers. SY’s Protective Support section 

provided intelligence, and Protective Services acted as 

the liaison with local law enforcement in the cities 

the table tennis team visited. Much to DeCourcy’s 

frustration, the White House frequently tried to 

change the team’s schedule. While a few people, 

such as fundamentalist preacher Carl McIntyre, tried 

to disrupt the exhibition games, SY led a smooth 

operation that received extensive praise.46 

When Kissinger became Secretary of State in 

1973, he broke with tradition and did not accept 

the protective detail offered by SY. He preferred 

the Secret Service detail that he had while serving as 

National Security Adviser, as well as the White House 

Communications Agency capabilities he enjoyed. A 

six-month struggle ensued, during which both the 

Secret Service and SY Agents staffed Kissinger’s detail. 

SY insisted that they were responsible for the Secretary’s 

protection, and Secretary Kissinger insisted upon a 

Secret Service detail. The Secret Service eventually 

agreed to provide the protection, on the condition that 

Figure 16: Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, 1973-

1977. Secretary Kissinger is the only Secretary of State not to 

be protected by SY/DS. Kissinger preferred to retain his Secret 

Service detail, which he had while serving as the National 

Security Adviser from 1969-1973. When Kissinger became 

Secretary of State in 1973, a six-month struggle ensued over 

who would protect the Secretary. The Secret Service and SY 

agreed to an arrangement whereby the Secret Service would 

provide protection under one-year renewable contracts, 

ensuring that SY would retain the duty it had performed 

since Secretary Cordell Hull. Source: © Associated Press. 
212

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

they and the Department conclude a reimbursable, annually renewable agreement. The compromise allowed SY to 

retain “the basic responsibility for the personal protection of the Secretary,” with the Secret Service merely assisting 

on “an ad hoc basis.” Kissinger’s decision created resentment among SY agents who took pride in having protected 

every Secretary since Cordell Hull. Kissinger did request that SY protect his wife, Nancy Maginnes, and SY Agents 

were again travelling and working directly with the Secret Service detail.47 

z Munich å

The 1972 Munich hostage crisis marked a three-fold turning point for diplomatic security. On September 5,

1972, international television viewers of the Munich Olympic Games watched in rapt horror as the Palestinian 

terrorist group Black September took the Israeli Olympic team hostage, and killed one athlete and a coach. 

When the West German government attempted a rescue, a gun battle ensued and the terrorists killed their Israeli 

hostages. First, Munich brought diplomatic security to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy concerns, where 

it would remain. Second, the brutal killings implanted terrorism as one of the three fundamental axes upon 

which SY (and later DS) would operate. SY had focused on background investigations, evaluations, and overseas 

security since its founding, but Munich shifted SY’s focus to the axes of terrorism, technology, and personnel 

(investigations and evaluations were collapsed into one). Third, Munich brought the Secretary of State, the White 

House, and Congress into the policymaking process for diplomatic security. 

Upon news of Munich, SY immediately worked to elevate protection of Jewish diplomatic offices across the United 

States. SY called upon the local police forces of major cities such as Philadelphia, Chicago, Houston, Atlanta, and Los 

Angeles to assist in protecting Israeli posts, consulates, 

commercial and visa offices, as well as local synagogues. 

SY also asked local police to increase security at airports. 

In addition, SY requested police protection for West 

German, Soviet, and Arab missions and commercial 

offices. In anticipation of upcoming visits by Israeli 

dignitaries, SY coordinated with the Secret Service to 

provide heightened protection for Israeli Foreign Minister 

Abba Eban, who would attend the UN General Assembly 

meetings in New York, and Israeli Minister of Finance 

Pinhas Sapir, who would meet with the International 

Monetary Fund.48 SY also worked with the Secret Service 

and the U.S. Park Police to provide extensive protective 

arrangements for the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra’s 

visit to Washington, DC.49

Figure 17: One of the Black September terrorists steps out 

onto the balcony, where the Israeli Olympic team was being 

held hostage at the Munich Olympic Games. The hostages 

were later killed. Munich changed diplomatic security 

and U.S. counter-terrorism policy. After Munich, SY 

changed its focus to terrorism, protection, and technology, 

the Department of State created an Office of CounterTerrorism, and the Nixon Administration developed a 

negotiations policy for U.S. diplomatic hostage situations. 

Source: © Associated Press 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

As SY stepped up its protective measures, Nixon 

considered it of “the utmost importance that [the 

United States] move urgently and efficiently to attack” 

terrorism. The U.S. Government, he believed, needed 

to take further measures to protect Americans and 

foreign diplomats in the United States and to develop 

contingency plans for hijackings, kidnappings, and 

other terrorist situations. He formed an intelligence 

committee to develop cooperation between 

intelligence services of the United States and friendly 

allied governments in order to identify potential 

terrorist threats. Nixon asked Rodger P. Davies, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 

and South Asian Affairs, to head the committee.50 

Nixon also created a cabinet-level committee, 

the Committee to Combat Terrorism. He asked Secretary Rogers to chair it, and its members included Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Marvin Gentile, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, the Attorney 

General, the Director of the CIA, the Director of the FBI, and the National Security Adviser. Nixon assigned four 

tasks to the Committee: coordinate activities to prevent terrorism; evaluate preventative activities and programs 

and recommend ways to improve their implementation; devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively 

to acts of terrorism; and make recommendations for funding. The Committee also was to oversee efforts to 

prevent terrorism, including the “collection of intelligence worldwide, physical protection of U.S. personnel 

and installations abroad, and protection of foreign diplomats and diplomatic posts in the United States.” The 

Committee was additionally tasked to address potential terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, as well as terrorist threats 

against foreign diplomats and dignitaries in the United States. As the chair of the Committee, Secretary Rogers 

particularly wanted to “take every action possible to preclude” a terrorist incident against foreign diplomats in the 

United States, which could “cause immediate adverse international reactions.”51 

To carry out its tasks, the Committee created the Inter-Agency Working Group on Terrorism. Joseph F. Donelan, 

Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, headed the Working Group, which included representatives 

from SY, the FBI, the CIA, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Treasury Department. As the first 

interagency group devoted to analyzing terrorism on a regular basis, the Working Group coordinated the multiple 

agencies’ efforts to combat terrorism, evaluated existing counterterrorism measures, and recommended new measures 

and strategies. The group considered intelligence gathering to be imperative, as well as a clear delineation of jurisdiction 

and responsibilities for the various agencies so that there would not be any confusion or delay during a crisis. 

Figure 18: President Richard Nixon signs new legislation. 

As a result of Munich, Nixon demanded and oversaw the 

development of counterterrorism policy. He created the 

Office of Counter-Terrorism, and asked for and obtained 

new legislation addressing airline hijackings, improved 

airport security, and protection of foreign diplomats in the 

United States. Source: © Associated Press. 
214

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Since the FBI had the broadest law enforcement mandate, Donelan proposed designating the FBI as the 

coordinating agency for counterterrorism, but the Department of State assumed the responsibility. Ambassador 

Armin H. Meyer soon succeeded Donelan, and his title became Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator 

for Combating Terrorism. Located in the Office of the Secretary of State, Meyer’s office assumed the acronym

S/CT; and he reported directly to the Secretary.52 

Under Rogers’s direction, the Department of State initiated measures to identify and monitor possible 

terrorists within the United States and among applicants for U.S. visas. The Department required all foreign 

visitors to the United States to carry visas; however, the anti-terror measures focused on persons travelling from 

the Middle East. In a joint effort between the Department, FBI, and INS, Rogers instituted a special operation 

to identify terrorists before they entered the United States. Three days after Munich, Rogers ordered all U.S. 

posts to screen visa applicants closely. Ten days later, the order expanded into a program that, in addition to 

close screening, required posts to wire a list of all potential suspect visa applicants to Washington under a special 

code name. In Washington, SY Special Agent Paul Sorenson served as the expediting officer, and was notified 

when a person with a specific type of name requested a visa or passport. Upon such notification, Sorenson called 

Customs, the FBI, the CIA, and INS to check the name and provide a response within 24 hours. Rogers allowed 

exemptions for ambassadors, diplomatic officers, and aides, but not for celebrities. Department officials admitted 

that the program created “a bureaucratic storm of paperwork,” and a few complaints emerged from Middle Eastern 

ambassadors; however, the program continued until 

1976.53

The Nixon Administration also pressed for and 

obtained new anti-terrorism legislation. Congress 

authorized the President “to suspend airline service 

to and from any country which aids, harbors, or is 

host to hijackers and/or terrorist groups, or fails 

to take adequate precautions to guard against 

hijacking.”54 At the personal urging of Secretary 

Rogers, Congress also passed a law that made it a 

federal offense to commit serious crimes (i.e. murder, 

assault, harassment, property damage) against foreign 

diplomats and official guests of the United States. 

Originally proposed in 1971 but given urgency after 

Munich, the law also defined a perimeter of 100 feet 

around any building used by foreign governments for 

diplomatic, consular, or official purposes (the latter to 

Figure 19: Visa and passport applicants at the U.S. 

Consulate in Jakarta, Indonesia. After Munich, at the 

order of Secretary of State Rogers, SY coordinated an 

effort to screen and cross-check visa applicants with the 

FBI, INS, and Department databases in order to identify 

terrorists before they came into the United States. The 

effort was headed by Special Agent Paul Sorenson. Source: 

Department of State, Office of the Historian Files. 
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include diplomatic residences). The law stipulated that it was illegal “to intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass any 

foreign official,” as well as to bring an official or foreign government “into public odium or disrepute.”55 

The Nixon Administration also began working through the United Nations to combat the threat of terrorism 

and establish international counterterrorist measures. Secretary Rogers spoke to the UN General Assembly when 

it met one month after the Munich Olympic incident. In his remarks, Rogers noted that in the past five years, 27 

diplomats from 11 countries had been kidnapped and 3 had been killed. “The issue is not war...[or] the strivings 

of people to achieve self-determination and independence,” Rogers observed, “it is whether the vulnerable lines of 

international communication...can continue, without disruption, to bring nations and peoples together.” He called 

upon the General Assembly to draft an international 

treaty for strict punishment of perpetrators of terrorist 

acts. He recommended swift prosecution and/

or extradition of those responsible for attacking or 

kidnapping diplomats or foreign government officials, 

and called for the suspension of air service to countries 

that failed to punish hijackers or saboteurs of civil 

aircraft. Working with UN Secretary General Kurt 

Waldheim, the United States tried to get the measures 

passed; however, African delegates joined with Arab 

delegates to create a “weak” resolution “geared for little 

or no progress.”56

Also in the wake of Munich, the Nixon 

Administration developed its policy for negotiations 

with terrorists who held U.S. diplomats hostage. The 

Nixon Administration noted that the Palestinian 

terrorists had not hesitated to follow through on 

their threats to kill the Israeli athletes. As a result, 

Nixon and Kissinger had adopted a new policy that 

one former Department of State officer referred to as 

the “three noes: no negotiations with hostage-takers, 

no deals with them, and no concessions to them.” 

The policy change was not written down, reviewed 

for its implications, formalized, nor even announced. 

Furthermore, it was not the policy that the FBI 

followed within U.S. borders.57 

Figure 20: Deputy Under Secretary of State for 

Management William B. Macomber, Jr. Macomber called 

for a formal policy for diplomatic hostage situations. He 

travelled with SY Director Marvin Gentile to Haiti and 

Sudan to head negotiations during both hostage crises. He 

and Gentile only made it to Cairo before Black September 

terrorists killed Ambassadors Cleo Noel, Jr., and George 

Curtis Moore in Khartoum. Macomber also appointed 

Gladys Rogers as his Special Assistant for Women’s Affairs, 

in order to break down many gender barriers and create 

opportunities for women in the Department, including SY. 

Source: Department of State Records, National Archives 

and Records Administration. 
216

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The new policy was tested twice in early 1973, with differing results. In January, Haitian gunmen captured and 

held at gunpoint U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Clinton E. Knox. The gunmen demanded the release of 31 colleagues 

from jail, transportation out of Haiti, and $1 million in cash. Deputy Under Secretary of State Macomber, 

accompanied by SY Director Gentile, flew to Haiti, and told the Haitian President, dictator Jean Claude “Baby 

Doc” Duvalier, that the United States would neither pay ransom payments nor grant concessions to the gunmen. 

Duvalier disagreed, and successfully negotiated the release of Knox. After Knox’s kidnapping, Armin Meyer, head 

of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, drafted a Department of State instruction for all diplomatic and consular 

posts that outlined the Administration’s new hostage policy. However, no senior Department of State official, 

including Secretary of State Rogers and Deputy Under Secretary Macomber, would sign the memorandum, and 

the instruction was not sent.58 

The Foreign Service and U.S. public learned of the Nixon White House’s new policy two months later, 

during a Presidential press conference. In March 1973, eight members of Black September stormed the Saudi 

Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, and took several guests hostage, including U.S. Ambassador George 

Curtis Moore, and his recently arrived replacement, Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr. The terrorists demanded the 

release of 60 Palestinians being held in Jordan, all female Arab prisoners held by Israel, Robert Kennedy’s assassin 

Sirhan Sirhan, and the Bader-Meinhoff Gang members held in Germany. The demands were soon reduced to 

only 17 Palestinians held in Jordan. Macomber and Gentile left for Khartoum. In the meantime, Nixon told a 

reporter during a press conference that the United States would not be “giving in to blackmail demands.” Shortly 

after the President’s statement, the terrorists shot Moore and Noel. It is not clear if the terrorists heard Nixon’s 

statement, but the U.S. Embassy in Sudan reported that it was one of the reasons that the terrorists decided to kill 

the two U.S. diplomats.59 

The Nixon Administration informed all posts by airgram on April 1, 1974, that it had “adopted a policy not 

to pay ransom and to discourage other governments, companies, and individuals from making such payments.” 

It also would not yield to international blackmail. According to the instruction, the Administration sought three 

objectives in a hostage situation: release of the hostages, non-acquiescence to terrorist demands, and prosecution 

of the terrorists. As “a last resort,” the Administration would accept “the Bangkok solution,”60 which was release 

of the hostages in exchange for freedom for the terrorists.61

There was “considerable” dissent over the new policy, particularly among the middle and lower ranks of Foreign 

Service Officers who believed that their lives were being sacrificed for the sake of a policy. With opposition to the 

policy building within Department ranks, a May 1976 telegram to all missions sought to explain the Administration’s 

policy. The telegram said that 24 hostages had been seized in the last 18 months out of the “hundreds of thousands 

of Americans living or traveling abroad,” and that in spite of the existing policy, 21 of them had been released 

unharmed.62 Statistics, however, did little to assuage the ire of the Department’s rank-and-file, and on July 16, 1976, 

dissent broke out into the open. Chaired by Peter Lydon, a Foreign Service Officer who served on the Policy Planning 
217

CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

Staff, the Secretary’s Open Forum sent a letter to Secretary Kissinger, informing him of “a certain disquiet among 

Foreign Service professionals” about the no ransom/no deals policy. The primary objection was that while the Nixon 

Administration insisted on a tough policy towards terrorists, it had done little to bring the terrorists who had killed 

Moore, Noel, and other Foreign Service Officers to justice. The eight terrorists had been convicted in Sudan and 

sentenced to life imprisonment. The Sudanese court, however, reduced their sentence to 7 years, and the men were 

later transferred to Egypt, where they served their prison sentences. In addition, the Open Forum objected to the fact 

that the Nixon White House had recently welcomed the President of Sudan on an official visit to Washington—the 

same President who had released the terrorists responsible for the deaths of Moore and Noel to Egypt. The Open 

Forum insisted that U.S. policy regarding terrorist incidents be subjected to a “systematic review.”63 

The Open Forum’s objections had already 

received attention in the months following the 

Khartoum crisis. Seven months after the Khartoum 

incident (in October 1973), the Administration hired 

the Rand Corporation to examine the negotiations 

policy, as well as “the whole question of negotiating 

for the release of kidnapped diplomats,” and to 

offer recommendations. The resulting study was 

an “indictment of the hard-line policy.” The InterAgency Working Group on Terrorism accepted several 

recommendations of the Rand Corporation study, 

including having high-level U.S. government officials 

remain silent during the crisis, screening information 

(particularly biographic information) about the 

hostages to the press, and expanding the Working 

Group to add psychiatrists and police experts.64 

The Foreign Service Association also opposed 

the Administration’s hard-line policy, and it moved 

on two fronts to have the policy revised. The 

Association formed the Working Group on Terrorism 

and Extraordinary Dangers to study the events in 

Khartoum and the new policy. Second, it insisted 

that if the Nixon Administration was going to adhere 

to the no-deals policy, it needed to take a hard line 

against governments that supported terror.65 

Figure 21: Francis E Meloy, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to 

Lebanon. Meloy was conducting talks with rival groups in 

Lebanon. On the way to a meeting across the Green Line, 

Meloy’s follow-up car broke off early, and the Ambassador 

was not seen again. His body, as well as that of Economic 

Counselor Robert O. Waring, were found later in west 

Beirut. Source: Department of State Records, National 

Archives and Records Administration. 
218

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The Open Forum and the Foreign Service Association received little comfort from the top echelons of the 

Kissinger-led Department of State. Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management Lawrence S. Eagleburger 

communicated the Seventh Floor’s response to both organizations. To the Open Forum, Eagleburger reiterated 

the no ransom/no deals policy. He branded the Open Forum’s charge that the Administration had made little 

effort to bring the perpetrators to justice as “insulting and misleading,” and insisted that “everything possible 

is being done.” The Foreign Service Association received word from an aide that Kissinger considered their 

objections “out of order.” Eagleburger told both groups that with regards to the punishment of terrorists, “policy 

interests would on occasion override other considerations.”66 

When President Jimmy Carter took office in January 1977, U.S. policy toward terrorism and hostages 

changed. In early 1977, the Department of State under Secretary Cyrus Vance redefined its goals. While 

deterring terrorism and denying success to terrorists remained one goal, a new objective consisted of “protect[ing] 

and sav[ing] the lives of hostages and victims of attacks.” In 1980, when Egyptians suggested releasing the eight 

men convicted of the deaths of Moore and Noel, the Carter Administration vehemently opposed it. The Carter 

Administration’s change in policy proved permanent. Under President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), protection 

of Department of State employees and dependents remained a policy aim.67 

z A Climate of Terrorism å

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security 

Victor Dikeos acknowledged in April 1975 that the 

“indiscriminate bombings of U.S. installations,” “the 

kidnapping and murder of diplomatic personnel,” 

and other incidents had created “a climate of 

terrorism.”68 Indeed, concerns over the protection of 

U.S. personnel abroad had grown significantly within 

the Department after the abduction and killing of 

Moore and Noel in Khartoum. Other incidents 

fueling the concerns included the 1975 kidnapping 

and murder of U.S. Consul John Patrick Egan in 

Córdoba, Argentina, and the 1976 murder of U.S. 

Ambassador to Lebanon Francis E. Meloy.69 

The climate of terrorism existed domestically 

as well; on January 29, 1975, shortly after midnight, 

a bomb exploded on the third floor of Main State. 

Described as “a damn big bomb” by a Washington, 

Figure 22: Bomb damage to a third floor bathroom of Main 

State (23rd Street side), 1975. The Weather Underground, 

a splinter group of Weathermen, planted the bomb in the 

Department of State to protest President Gerald R. Ford’s 

policy towards Vietnam. One of the damaged offices was that 

of Joe H. Morton, Chief of SY’s Division of Investigations. 

Source: Department of State Records, National Archives 

and Records Administration. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

DC, police sergeant, the bomb damaged offices of 

the East Asia and Africa Bureaus of the Agency for 

International Development (AID) on the 23rd Street 

side of the building. Broken water pipes caused 

considerable water damage to the offices below on the 

second and first floors, including the office of Joe H. 

Morton, chief of SY’s Division of Investigations. The 

far-left Weather Underground (a splinter group of the 

Weathermen) claimed responsibility and was targeting 

AID, which was “an instrument for U.S. domination 

and control throughout the world, not a charitable 

agency.” In a 12-page manifesto, the Weather 

Underground charged that President Gerald R. Ford 

“continues to wage war in Vietnam and Cambodia,” 

that “US involvement in Vietnam is a chain of lies,” 

and that the Ford Administration “grossly violated” 

and was “repudiating” the Paris Peace Accords.70 

Although the Department of State was “one of 

the most closely guarded buildings” in Washington, 

DC, the bombing occurred shortly after building 

security had been relaxed. After a series of bombings 

of public buildings in 1970, the Department had 

increased the number of Federal Protective Service 

(FPS) guards at its entrances, and the FPS guards 

began inspecting all packages and briefcases entering 

the Department and restricting those who could enter the building. During the seven months prior to the 

bombing, the number of FPS guards was reduced 20 percent (from 70 to 57) as a cost-saving measure. Despite 

the bombing, some Department officials expressed concern that building security would become “too stringent:” 

“If you attempt to close the building down in a mindless sort of way[,] you make a fortress out the place.”71

The threat of terrorism abroad and at home led SY to engage in more extensive efforts to protect Department 

personnel and to deter terrorist incidents. Most terrorist attacks in the late 1960s and early 1970s involved a single 

person or a small group employing a package bomb, a car bomb, or in the case of Beirut, a rocket-propelled grenade 

to inflict fear. SY pursued measures that aimed at deterring terrorist acts by individuals or small groups. The 

measures followed two lines: personnel training and physical security. SY adjusted the training of Regional Security 

Figure 23: Russ Waller, SY’s resident locksmith, was also one 

of the leaders of the Mobile Training Teams that travelled to 

embassies and consulates to train U.S. personnel on various 

security measures. Source: SY Focus. 
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History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Officers, and by 1974, protective and preventative 

measures comprised more than one-half of seminartraining time for RSOs. In fact one day was devoted to 

“improvised explosive devices,” emergency procedures, 

and control plans. SY also circulated articles on hostage 

negotiations and hostage survival, and guidelines for 

hostage situations, to its RSOs.72 

To train Department personnel at overseas posts, 

SY developed Mobile Training Teams (MTTs). With 

Russ Waller, SY’s resident locksmith, as one of the 

program’s leaders, an MTT consisted of two SY agents 

who visited a post and conducted training for all post 

personnel. Posts were notified in advance and requested 

to schedule time (two to five days) and facilities for 

training. Training included defensive driving, reacting 

to bomb threats, residential security, personal security, 

and first aid. When possible, the teams held “hands-on” 

sessions for defensive driving and personal protection. 

Given the number of posts, MTTs conducted “tours,” 

with Tour 1 travelling to 30 posts in Latin America, 

the Middle East, and Africa. There were three teams 

to a tour, with each team visiting approximately 

10 posts per tour. By August 1976, the MTTs had 

conducted 4 tours, visited 107 posts, and trained over 

9,000 Department officers and employees. The MTTs 

conducted two more tours in 1977, and in that same 

year, SY made arrangements with the Foreign Service 

Institute to conduct mandatory three-day briefings of 

all persons assigned overseas.73 

 SY also moved to improve the physical security 

of U.S. posts overseas. It began installing shatterproof 

or bulletproof glass in U.S. embassies, consulates, and 

residences, or applying Mylar film to all windows. 

Marine Security Guards were placed in reinforced 

Figure 24: Members of one of the Mobile Training Teams. 

Front row (left to right): Frank Cunningham, Steve 

Brown, Gary Ball. Back row: Tim Kelly, Tom McDonnell, 

Bill Hawkins. Source: SY Focus. 

Figure 25: The U.S. Ambassador’s Residence in Buenos 

Aires. The residence had a “safe haven,” with a steellined room, bulletproof glass, ability to flood the rest of 

the residence with tear gas, and at least ten days of food 

and water. Source: Department of State, Office of the 

Historian Files. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

control booths. SY engineers installed alarm 

systems, better lighting, and closed-circuit television 

cameras. Many embassies built perimeter walls or 

fences, and the perimeter was extended further out 

from post buildings. SY expanded Marine Security 

Guard details at posts, increased Local Guard service 

to 24-hour protection, and hired bodyguards for 

ambassadors at high-threat embassies. Even U.S. 

embassies previously considered “safe” gained Marine 

Security Guard details, grillwork on windows, alarm 

systems, fences, and night guards or patrols.74 

 The U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires reflected 

the means and extent to which SY would go to 

protect U.S. diplomats overseas in the wake of 

Munich and Khartoum. Argentina had what the 

Committee to Combat Terrorism characterized 

as “the most virulent terrorism in Latin America.” 

Terrorist groups from the left and the right operated 

in the country, and acted against “carefully chosen” 

targets.75 RSO George “Bullets” Beckett supervised 

a protective detail of approximately 300 men, and 

part of that “small army” was a 6-man U.S. Marine 

Corps Personal Protective Security Unit (PPSU). A 

new development in response to the rise of terrorism, 

PPSUs consisted of Marines who qualified as expert 

marksmen with a variety of firearms, were trained in 

hand-to-hand combat, and were expert drivers. In 

addition to the PPSU, the Embassy’s protective security force included 16 Marine Security Guards and 270 

Argentine Federal Police officers, as well as several off-duty police officers. Two police officers guarded each 

member of the Ambassador’s family 24 hours a day. The Ambassador’s car was armor-plated, with bulletproof 

tires. The car could make a sharp turn at 60 miles per hour, and had a fire suppression system that could cover the 

engine in foam in 5 seconds. The Ambassador’s residence also contained a “safe haven.” It had a room lined with 

steel, bulletproof windows, a 10-day supply of food and water, and the ability to flood the rest of the residence 

with tear gas.76 

Figure 26: George Beckett, the Regional Security Officer 

in the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, had a “small army” 

(more than 300 men) to protect the U.S. Ambassador from 

the Montoneros and other leftist guerrilla groups engaged in 

terror in Argentina. He is shown here as an instructor at 

the SY Training Center. Source: SY Focus. 
222

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The “safe haven” in the Ambassador’s residence 

in Buenos Aires marked another development in 

diplomatic security—improved physical security. 

After Khartoum, SY received greater funds to protect 

embassies. Safe rooms, or reinforced rooms with 

strong doors, were constructed within an embassy to 

protect personnel in the case of an attack (sometimes 

it was the communications vault).77 

“Access controls” were another modification. 

Since 1959, SY had defined physical security 

construction standards for U.S. diplomatic 

buildings;78 however, in the 1970s, access controls 

modified public areas (usually lobbies, visa offices) 

to prevent access by terrorist groups, individuals, 

or package bombs. In lobbies and public areas, the 

Marine Security Guard was moved to a reinforced control booth with shatterproof or bulletproof glass. From there, 

Marine Security Guards could monitor closed circuit television cameras and alarm indicators, as well as all persons 

and deliveries coming into the building. Control doors, electrically operated by the Marine Security Guard in 

the booth, were installed to restrict access to internal areas of the chancery or consulate. Metal detectors were set 

up, and all visitors and packages were required to pass 

through them before proceeding into the building. 

Turnstile-type doors were used for exit doors in some 

buildings, preventing individuals from reentering.79 

Access controls and other efforts during this 

period were not “concerted programs” because physical 

security at U.S. embassies in the 1970s depended 

upon individual RSOs and upon the support that the 

post’s RSO received from the Ambassador, Deputy 

Chief of Mission, and the Administrative Officer. 

Often, there was only one Post Security Officer at a 

post, joined by a Marine Security Guard detail and 

locally hired guards. There was no “security” budget, 

and funds for security improvements fell under 

the control of the post’s Administration Officer, 

Figure 27: Marine Security Guard in a Control Booth. 

Under Director Victor Dikeos, SY built reinforced control 

booths with bulletproof glass for embassy entrances. The 

control booth also allowed the MSG to monitor the alarms 

systems and closed-circuit cameras around the embassy. 

Source: SY Focus. 

Figure 28: The U.S. Marine Security Guard detachment at 

the U.S. Embassy Beirut, Lebanon, joins U.S. heavyweight 

boxing champion Muhammed Ali (center) for an early 

morning jog. Ali visited Lebanon during a personal tour of 

several Arab nations in 1974. Source: © Associated Press 

/ Harry Koundakjian. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

constituted expenditures from his/her budget, and depended upon the other expenses in the Administration 

budget. Also, SY did not have enough people to install all of the alarm systems, CCTVs, access controls, and other 

equipment requested, and it needed to hire additional technical engineers. Another potential obstacle was the 

Foreign Buildings Office, because SY’s security modifications were often viewed as marring “beautiful buildings.”80

SY relied upon cooperation, liaisons, and information-sharing to meet and even anticipate security threats. 

Like Beckett had done in Argentina, many RSOs and Post Security Officers maintained contacts with local 

police forces, in part, because they provided protection for an embassy and residences, but also because local 

police provided information about the various threats to an embassy and visiting U.S. officials. Such cooperation 

represented the overseas version of what SY had long done with local police forces in the United States when 

protecting visiting foreign dignitaries. In 1976, SY developed these relationships formally, and created the 

Protective Liaison Staff. Under the leadership of William DeCourcy, the division sought to develop stronger 

working relationships and exchanges of information with other intelligence and law enforcement agencies within 

and outside the United States.81 

SY’s focus upon cooperation and information-sharing led to the creation of the Command Center and the 

Threat Analysis Group in June 1976. Although there had been an informal coordination center since 1966, 

operating under names such as “Crest Control” and 

“Division Control,” the single desk used to coordinate 

the Secretary’s detail quite simply was not going to 

suffice. As a result of the many foreign dignitaries 

visiting Washington for the 1976 Bicentennial 

celebration, John F. Perdew was asked to formalize 

SY’s “Command Center.” Perdew developed the 

idea of a 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a- week “Command 

Center” that contained a Watch Officer Group and a 

Threat Analysis Group.82 

The Watch Officer Group (WOG) consisted of 

10 watch officers rotating in pairs, each pair serving 

an 8-hour shift, and it fulfilled a number of crucial 

responsibilities. The WOG received, recorded, and 

disseminated information, intelligence, and protective 

security requests. It also assumed operations and 

alert activities for SY after working hours. The 

WOG coordinated protective security details, and 

maintained continuous telephone contact with RSOs 

Figure 29: The Command Center is manned by watch 

officer Richard Sartain. Created in 1976 under the 

guidance of John Perdew, the Command Center replaced 

the desk with a telephone used to coordinate earlier 

protective details. The Command Center and its Threat 

Analysis Group (TAG) could track threats operating across 

international boundaries, as well as provide a 24-hour 

monitoring center for posts overseas and the protective 

details of the Secretary and visiting foreign dignitaries. 

By 1980, TAG had seven analysts studying and tracking 

terrorist and other threats to U.S. diplomats, and with 

such analysts as Dennis Pluchinsky and Andy Corsun, TAG 

became one of the leading authorities on terrorism within 

the U.S. Government. Source: SY Focus. 
224

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

around the world. In addition, it provided support and communications during crisis situations. To accomplish 

these tasks, the WOG monitored the Department’s unclassified and classified communications traffic, as well as 

the Reuters, Associated Press, and United Press International news services for security-related information. The 

information was passed to the Threat Analysis Group, but it also allowed the Command Center to alert SY agents 

in the United States or overseas to a particular threat. Also, RSOs could call the 24-hour command center with 

questions, concerns, or crises, instead of calling Gentile or Dikeos, or the Foreign Operations division. The WOG 

had radio coverage of the entire Washington metropolitan area, and access to the Federal Telephone Service (FTS), 

London toll, and international telephone systems. It also had direct lines to the Department’s Operations Center 

and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In addition, the Command Center could access the National 

Crime Information Center, which contained information on wanted individuals, arrest warrants issued, criminal 

history records, and stolen property such as cars, boats, and guns. The WOG also had access to a name index of 

those involved in customs violations and terrorist activity maintained by the Treasury Department’s Enforcement 

Communications Systems.83 

The Threat Analysis Group (TAG), first headed by Concetta Conigliaro, constituted the other component 

of the Command Center. TAG was a small cohort of analysts who read departmental communications traffic 

and news stories, and spoke with post RSOs, country desk officers, and local U.S. police forces to determine the 

threat posed to a particular dignitary visiting the United States or to a particular U.S. post overseas. The analysts 

specialized by geographic region and submitted written reports of threats and threat situation at various posts or 

in various countries or cities. TAG also kept a name list of persons or groups that threatened the Secretary or a 

visiting dignitary.84 

The Command Center proved an immediate success and earned high praise, largely because SY took advantage 

of a source of information often overlooked by other agencies: local police forces. In the face of regional and 

international terrorist threats, the Command Center permitted SY to look across national boundaries, drawing 

upon information from multiple posts and sources, notably RSOs’ contacts with local police forces. One agent 

admitted that much security-related information did not go through the Department’s Operations Center because 

it was not related to political news. This enabled the Command Center, on occasion, to “ace out” the Operations 

Center, with the subsequent order to brief Operations. The coordination and threat analysis also enabled SY to 

increase protective security when and where needed.85 

z Realigned by Terrorism å

When Deputy Assistant Secretary Dikeos reorganized SY in 1975, the degree to which terrorism had 

changed SY became evident. Dikeos, an FSO who had risen through the Administration cone and had cracked 

the 1961 Scarbeck spy case, said that SY had “undergone a metamorphosis” after Munich and Khartoum. The 

office had transformed from a “small, fraternal organization” to “one of the largest single offices and corps of 
225

CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

Foreign Affairs Specialists in the department.”86 As 

a result, Dikeos’ 1975 reorganization differed sharply 

from that undertaken by Gentile ten years earlier. 

When Gentile reorganized SY in 1965, he divided 

SY into two large groupings: “Personnel Security,” 

which encompassed Investigations, Evaluations, 

and Protective Security, and “Domestic and Foreign 

Security,” which addressed technical and physical 

security overseas and in Washington. Gentile had 

also created two small staff units: Education and 

Training, and Special Assignments. The first unit 

reflected Gentile’s and SY’s view that ongoing 

training for the Department’s security professionals 

was needed to meet the threats confronting the 

Department’s operations; meanwhile, the second 

unit focused primarily on investigations resulting 

in the termination of a Department employee 

based on criminal activity, personal sex practices, or 

homosexuality.87 

For the 1975 reorganization, Dikeos expanded 

Gentile’s two groupings to five, and created the 

position of Deputy Director. Investigations and 

Evaluations divisions remained in the Personnel 

Security section. Protective Security now contained 

three divisions: DeCourcy’s Protective Liaison 

division, the Secretary’s Detail, and Foreign Dignitary 

Protection. The Operations comprised three divisions: Foreign Operations, Technical Services, and Domestic 

Operations (building security). A fourth group included divisions related to education and training, the Command 

Center, Special Assignments (investigations for crimes or incidents), and the protective detail at the United 

Nations. In addition, Dikeos upgraded the Executive Office staff (SY/EX) to a level on par with the others.88 

Dikeos soon made revisions. Protective Intelligence was added to the Protective Services divisions. The 

Command Center and Special Assignments were moved to Operations. The fourth grouping now contained the 

divisions of Education and Training, Policy, Documentary and Information Systems, and Freedom of Information 

requests.89 

Figure 30: Victor Dikeos, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for Security. Dikeos was instrumental in transforming 

SY towards its foci of terrorism, protection, and technology. 

He instituted and oversaw many efforts that served as the 

foundation for what are several divisions in DS today. He 

also reorganized SY to better address the Department of 

State’s security demands in the face of terrorism. Source: 

Department of State Records, National Archives and 

Records Administration. 
226

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Figure 31: Illustrated organizational chart for the Office of Security, 1977. Although background investigations still remained 

prominent, the chart shows SY being reshaped by the new foci of terrorism, overseas security, and protection. Note the large 

divisions of PRS (protection details) and OPS (overseas operations), as well as the CC (Command Center) and U.S. UN 

(protection at the UN), compared to organizational charts of the 1950s and 1960s. Source: SY Focus. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

Dikeos’ reorganization reflected several 

developments in SY. Perhaps most notable was the 

number of SY personnel. SY personnel had numbered 

125 in 1962, but Gentile and Dikeos recruited many 

new agents. By 1979, SY numbered more than 600 

people. There were 15 SO(T)s in 1961, but in 1977, 

there were 68 Technical Security Officers (TSOs).90

Professionalism increased as well. Gentile initiated 

professional training for SY agents, which Dikeos 

significantly expanded during his tenure. Between 1973 

and 1978, the Education and Training division under 

David McCabe grew from 3 to 17 staff members, and 

SY Special Agents started to attend classes at the Federal 

Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, 

Georgia. The Education and Training division also 

extended RSO training from 3 to 7 weeks, managed the 

MTT program, and conducted 19 different programs.91

Figure 32: Organizational Chart of the Office of Security 1979. The chart reflects more clearly how SY has been transformed 

by the shift in foci to terrorism, protection, and technology (“Info Systems”). Source: Department of State Records. 

Figure 33: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security 

Victor Dikeos (left) stands with graduates of the first Basic 

Special Agent Course in November 1974. The development 

of formal training programs allowed SY to hire college 

graduates with little or no security or law enforcement 

training, and mold them to meet specific duty requirements. 

Dikeos was instrumental in reorganizing and transforming 

SY to better address the Department’s security needs with 

the emergence of terrorism. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security Files. 
228

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The creation of training programs enabled 

SY to expand its pool of recruits from men with 

mandatory law enforcement experience to a broader 

cohort of intelligent, highly qualified, educated 

men and women. Prior to 1970, SY hired people 

with law enforcement, intelligence, or technical 

backgrounds, which minimized the need for training 

for a small office with a limited budget. After 1970, 

SY continued hiring recruits with law enforcement 

experience, but the office drew upon a broader array 

of federal law enforcement agencies such as the Sky 

Marshals, IRS, USAID, and military intelligence. 

The development of training programs now permitted 

SY to hire college graduates with little or no security 

or law enforcement training, enabling SY to mold its 

personnel more extensively. This was, as one agent 

later described it, “SY’s ‘baby boom’ wave.”92

This new wave of recruits entered SY at a 

time when the Department of State, the federal 

government, and the nation at large endeavored to 

remove gender and racial barriers to employment. 

The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 

the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 

directly encouraged, and even required, government 

agencies to employ women and minorities at all 

levels. In 1970, female Department of State employees formed the Women’s Action Organization to lobby 

the Department to improve the status of women in the Foreign and Civil Service. In 1972, Deputy Under 

Secretary for Management Macomber appointed Gladys Rogers as Special Assistant for Women’s Affairs, with 

a mandate to create opportunities for women, particularly in offices that did not employ women. SY and the 

Courier Service were identified as two such offices.93 

The breaking down of gender and racial barriers shaped the new wave of SY hires, diversifying what had been 

prior to the 1970s a nearly exclusive white, male world of SY Special Agents. Gladys Rogers was instrumental in hiring 

SY’s first female agent, Patricia “Patti” Morton. Morton had served as an FSO staff secretary (FSSO) at diplomatic 

posts in Katmandu, Nepal; Kinshasa, Zaire; and Pretoria, South Africa, and had received a commendation for her 

Figure 34: Patricia “Patti” Morton becomes the first female 

Special Agent in 1972. Morton had served as a Post Security 

Officer in Kinshasa. After Special Agent training she served 

short stints in the Washington and Boston Field Offices, and 

then was assigned as one of four RSOs in Saigon. She soon 

became the Assistant Supervisory RSO and the Coordinator 

of Emergency and Evacuation. When asked how well she 

was accepted, she said that the Marines serving at Embassy 

Saigon asserted that since they were the largest MSG detail 

at any U.S. embassy in the world, they deserved the first 

woman RSO. Morton later served as RSO at The Hague.

Source: Department of State Records, National Archives 

and Records Administration. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

security work in Kinshasa. She recalled receiving an 

unexpected letter from Rogers requesting a meeting 

during one of her home visits. Rogers enthusiastically 

encouraged Morton to consider a position as an SY 

Special Agent. Morton, despite looking forward to 

returning to her post in Singapore, felt pressured by 

the Department’s leadership and agreed to join SY 

as a Special Agent in April 1972. Six months later, 

SY hired Doris Rogers, its second female agent.94

By 1974, Special Agent Mary McAteer was assigned 

to Nancy Kissinger’s protective detail. The Courier 

Service also hired its first female courier that same 

year. Susan Shirley Carter embarked on her first 

courier trip on November 16. Lillian Godek joined 

the Courier Service two months later. Both women 

had previously served in communications and records 

management in the Department.95

The women who served in SY in the 1970s 

admitted that the transition from an all-male service 

to a coed force was less than smooth, and many 

women who entered SY in the early 1970s left after 

short periods of time. Special Agent Nancy Lestina acknowledged, “Some male agents resent a woman treading 

on their sacred territory,” and she was “warned that women have a natural fear of weapons.” From this Lestina 

concluded: “[I]f I did not faint at the sight of a pistol, I could be taken to the range to qualify, and . . . earn the 

right to carry the badge.” The women also believed that their male colleagues scrutinized their work more harshly, 

looking for faults and justifications for their dismissal. As a result, female Special Agents felt an enormous pressure 

to succeed. This often led to a high degree of competitiveness among the few women working in SY, rather than 

collaboration to overcome the bias they experienced.96 

Another emergent trend within diplomatic security—computer security—was reflected in Dikeos’ creation 

of the Documentary and Information Systems division. Although this represented primarily the renaming of 

the Records and Research unit, the use of the term “information system” indicates that the Department had 

begun to employ computers beyond using them merely for sending cables. The Department of State had two 

principal computers in the 1970s, both IBM 370/158 mainframes, located in an enclosed area of the basement. 

One computer was denoted as classified and supported the Department’s telegram distribution system and the 

Figure 35: John Otto (left) and Jim Waight (right) are the 

first Diplomatic Couriers to return to Beijing on April 26, 

1973, after a 23-year hiatus in U.S. diplomatic presence in 

China. The Diplomatic Couriers had carried their pouches 

through Islamabad for the newly opened U.S. Interest 

Section in Beijing. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

Files. 
230

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

TAGS system. The unclassified mainframe handled 

payroll work, personnel record-keeping, and other 

tasks. The two computers used key cards, and most 

jobs were submitted either as trays of cards, or as a 

reel of tape with the job’s control cards submitted 

in a tray. To submit a classified job, an FSO or 

Department employee brought a tray down to the 

window, showed their building pass to a clerk at the 

desk, asked for their point of contact in the computer 

room, and gave them the tray.  In the absence of the 

point of contact, one filled out a job form and left the 

classified job with the clerk.97 

 “Minicomputers” emerged in the mid-1970s, 

and they largely handled database management, 

which included inventory and personnel information. 

One program, operated on minicomputers, crossreferenced information about an individual agent’s 

skills, assisting the Personnel office in determining 

assignments for SY agents. Another database program 

for the “name check system” appeared in September 

1977. Large and bulky by present-day standards, a minicomputer often had its own station/terminal in the office 

and required the user to insert a 9-1/2 inch floppy disk into the drive to provide the necessary software.98 

The Department did not have a computer security program in the 1970s, although SY’s Technical Services 

division was already considering it. The Department’s two IBM mainframes were located in a large shielded enclosure 

in the basement of Main State. Security for other Department computers consisted of locking a computer up or placing 

it in a room that could be locked. Computers were not linked to networks, most software programs did not require a 

password, and viruses and worms did not exist. In the mid-1970s, an SY Technical Services engineer represented the 

Department on the intelligence community’s Computer Security Committee, which focused on setting government 

standards for protecting intelligence information processed in-computer, not the security of computers.99

z Something Old, Something New: The Moscow Embassy å

As SY and the Department began to wrestle with computer technology, the Soviets were employing new 

technologies against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The Soviets continued to breach security at the U.S. Embassy 

through the use of microwaves. A “technically unidentified Moscow signal” (referred to as TUMS) was “verifiably 

Figure 36: Graph showing MUTS-1 signal activity 

at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The graph shows that 

MUTS-1 had the most activity during the business hours 

of the Embassy. MUTS-1 and MUTS-2 prompted the 

controversy over microwaves at the Moscow Embassy, a 

controversy which included Congressional hearings. Source: 

R. C. Mallalieu, A Model of the Microwave Intensity 

Distribution within the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, 

1966-1977 (prepared for Department of State). 
231

CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

identified” in late 1962 and early 1963; however, it likely had existed since early 1953. Although TUMS’s purpose 

was unknown, measurements determined that the beam covered the entire west wall of the Embassy, but operated 

at very low levels. U.S. officials concluded that the signal constituted a security threat but not a health hazard. They 

set up room to monitor TUMS, which was emitted from an apartment building 100 yards west of the Embassy, 

but did not inform the Embassy community about the microwaves. In March 1972, a second signal, called SMUT 

(“second Moscow unidentified technical” signal) appeared. Seven times stronger than TUMS, SMUT lasted little 

more than a year and then stopped; TUMS, meanwhile, continued.100 

In May 1975, the TUMS signal suddenly stopped, but it was soon replaced by 2 signals. Two days after 

the TUMS ceased, a new signal appeared and was designated MUTS-1. The signal emitted from the roof of a 

building to the east of the U.S. Embassy; moreover, it comprised a much more filled-in spectrum than TUMS. 

Three months later, in August, MUTS-2 appeared, emanating from a building south of the Embassy.101 

MUTS-1 and MUTS-2 were still well below Soviet and U.S. safety levels; however, Department officials 

informed the Embassy community about the signals. FSOs and other Department employees expressed concern 

over the health effects of microwave radiation, and Congress held hearings on the issue. Part of the concern 

was rooted in the popular understanding of microwaves. Microwave ovens for home kitchens had recently 

appeared on the market, and concepts about what happened to foods and metal items in microwave ovens were 

transferred to the situation at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.102 Several FSOs filed health complaints, and the 

Department undertook a bio-statistical study to examine if those serving in Moscow were at a higher risk for 

cancer, birth defects, and other effects associated with radiation. The study found no connection or statistical 

association between occurrences of cancer and other health effects and the officers and employees who had served 

in the Moscow Embassy since 1953. The Department did allow FSOs and other employees to transfer or reject 

assignments to Moscow, without affecting their careers. The assurances of the study were partially undermined 

in late 1976 by the ill-timed administrative classification of the Moscow Embassy as an “unhealthy post,” a 

classification unrelated to the microwaves.103 

Facing public, Congressional, and internal outcry, the Department took action to reduce and stop the 

microwaves. It installed screens that reduced microwave radiation by nearly 90 percent over all of the Embassy’s 

windows. Department officials pressured the Soviets to stop the signals, and the Soviets agreed to reduce the 

microwave signals. 

What the Soviets intended with the microwaves was and remains unclear. Former Regional Security Officer 

to the Moscow Embassy Gordon Harvey asserted that the apparent purpose of the microwaving was not to 

harm people; the signal’s power level was significantly below the safety limits established by the Soviets, which 

were much lower than U.S. safety limits.104 Bruce Matthews, Chief of the Technical Security Division at the 

Diplomatic Security Training Center, believes that the Soviets used microwaves for a number of purposes, one of 

which was to characterize the type of office equipment that the U.S. Embassy was using.105 
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History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Besides microwaves, U.S. officials were also 

concerned about fire safety at the Moscow Embassy; 

in fact, one Department officer considered the 

Embassy a “firetrap.” The building’s age, its 

construction, overcrowding, and the accumulation 

of records and materials in the hallways, stairwells, 

and attic led Embassy and Department officials to 

issue warnings about the possibilities of a major 

fire. A fire safety inspection team made several 

recommendations, including storing or removing 

the clutter, but also, U.S. inspectors noted that 

Soviet electrical repairmen “often use inadequately 

size[d] wire” and that rewiring was needed in several 

places. When the Embassy asked SY what its 

personnel should do in case of a fire on the upper, 

classified floors (Floors 7-10), one SY official wrote 

that the policy should be to “allow the [chancery] 

building to burn to the ground” rather than allow 

Soviet firefighters on those floors.106 The comment 

became the policy. An example of the consequences 

of allowing Soviet fire fighters access to the Embassy occurred on August 5, 1976, when the Australian Embassy 

experienced a fire that required more than 100 Soviet firefighters to extinguish. Two years later, after Soviet 

workmen had repaired the fire damage, the Australians found a network of microphones and accused the 

Soviets of spying.107

During the evening of August 26, 1977, a fire broke out in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Initially, Embassy 

personnel could not find the fire, but Regional Security Officer Jerome F. Tolson, Jr., noted that in the span of 20 

minutes the fire “changed from something that could not be located” to engulfing the entire Economic section 

on the eighth floor. The fire soon spread to the ninth and tenth floors and the attic. Although policy dictated 

otherwise, Ambassador Malcolm Toon gave permission to the Soviet firefighters to enter the eighth floor, and then 

allowed the firemen to fight the fire from aerial ladders when it broke through the chancery’s roof. He denied 

the Soviets access to the tenth floor. Four unescorted Soviet firemen did enter the ninth floor (Communications 

and Records) through a window, but “became very shy” when they saw Defense Attaché personnel with an 

(unloaded) camera aimed at them.108 Chancery offices and the roof suffered extensive damage; however, the RSO 

concluded that sensitive equipment and records had not been compromised. The eighth floor and the roof/attic 

Figure 37: Technical Security Officer John Bainbridge 

crawls out from a chimney at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow 

in 1978. Bainbridge and James Frank found an antenna 

rigged inside the chimney and a tunnel at the chimney’s 

base. Big enough for a human, the tunnel led to a nearby 

building. At the time, the purpose of the antenna was 

not clear, but discovery of the typewriter bugs a few years 

later may have provided an answer. Source: Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security Files. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

were “gutted;” the ninth and tenth floors suffered heavy heat, smoke, and water damage; and the seventh floor 

had water and smoke damage. It took several months to complete repairs, much of which was done by Seabees.109

Almost a year later, in June 1978, SY Technical Security Officers discovered a Soviet listening post in the 

U.S. Embassy, involving a chimney antenna and an underground tunnel. In late May, TSOs John Bainbridge and 

Jim Frank arrived in Moscow to conduct an investigation of the South Wing of the chancery building. In one of 

the South Wing apartments, Bainbridge and Frank focused on a chimney that ran up the outside of the building. 

They opened the chimney wall, and found a dish-shaped radio antenna connected to a cable that ran down the 

length of the chimney. At the base of the chimney, the cable continued down a tunnel, large enough for a human 

to crawl through. The tunnel continued under the U.S. Embassy grounds to a Soviet apartment building next 

door. 110 

The antenna-tunnel find was an active listening post, and Soviet personnel were discovered using the tunnel. 

Bainbridge and Frank tested the antenna system, and found the cables to be “energized.” A Navy Seabee, working 

with Bainbridge and Frank, “surprised” a Soviet technician crawling through the tunnel, prompting U.S. workers 

(likely Seabees) to build a brick wall to seal the tunnel. Despite an active antenna, SY and U.S. Government 

technical engineers could not determine from what or where the antenna received signals, although they suspected 

the Central Wing of the chancery building, which housed the Ambassador’s offices, was a possibility. The antenna/

tunnel find revealed that the Soviets had severely breached the security of the U.S. Embassy. A former Office of 

Communications Security officer recalled that when he joined the Department about two years after the antenna/

tunnel find, the Department was suffering “a counter-measures crisis.”111 

By 1978, U.S. officials hoped that the new building would offer better security once it was completed. The 

United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement to exchange sites for their respective new embassies in 

1969. Officials of several U.S. Government agencies agreed to offer the Soviets a 12.5-acre site known as Mount 

Alto, just above the neighborhood of Georgetown. Meanwhile, in Moscow, U.S. officials pressed for and accepted 

a 10.5-acre site behind the existing Embassy. Contrary to folklore, the area was not in a “swamp.” The site, 

instead, was prime Moscow real estate that was walking distance from the Ambassador’s residence, and near major 

thoroughfares and several metro rail stations.112 

The exchange of embassy sites coincided with the Nixon policy of détente, but U.S. and Soviet negotiations 

over the conditions of construction proved difficult and acrimonious. U.S. officials rejected the conditions that 

the Soviets imposed on previous occasions. When the U.S. diplomats had moved into the Ulitsa Chaikovskovo 

chancery in 1953, the Soviets until that moment had prevented U.S. personnel from supervising renovations 

of the building. The Soviets had even covered the building with tarpaulins to deter U.S. observation of the 

renovations while Soviet workers finished their work inside. The 1964 discovery of a microphone network 

ensured that U.S. officials did not want to replay this situation with a new building.113 The Soviets insisted 

that they should control all phases of the construction, and use Soviet contractors, materials, and architectural 
234

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

designs. Furthermore, the United States was required 

to pay for the construction in hard currency. U.S. 

officials rejected the terms, but they also recognized 

that besides reciprocity (they did not want the Soviets 

to build their embassy in Washington unsupervised), 

it was unrealistic from both a financial and security 

standpoint to “import an army of U.S. workers into 

Moscow.” Ultimately, the Soviets agreed to give 

U.S. personnel “unrestricted access” to the Moscow 

construction site. U.S. workers would install the 

windows, doors, roofing, all mechanical and electrical 

equipment, final wiring, plumbing, and other 

systems. At the height of détente in 1972, the United 

States and the Soviet Union signed the agreement on 

construction conditions.114 

Despite the 1972 agreement, the conditions 

of construction in Moscow were what U.S. officials 

described as “moving targets.” Negotiations over 

the details stalled the construction and exchange of 

property for five more years. Eventually after Secretary 

of State Vance travelled to Moscow in 1977, both 

nations signed the Protocol of 1977, permitting the 

formal exchange of properties. The formal exchange 

of properties generated another element of contention: several buildings for the Soviet Embassy on Mount Alto 

were completed before U.S. officials had even signed an agreement to begin construction in Moscow. In short, 

there was little evidence of détente amid the negotiations over new embassies, and tensions would only continue 

during construction.115 

z Protective Security at the United Nations å

While Department officers strove to prevent Soviet breaches of security at the current and future U.S. 

Embassies in Moscow, U.S. officials wrangled over protective security at the United Nations. Although the 

Chicago incident involving French President Pompidou indicated that foreign dignitaries and diplomats were 

targets of violence within the United States, an inter-agency struggle erupted over who held responsibility for 

protection of UN diplomats. President Nixon obtained a law from Congress (Public Law 91-217) authorizing 

Figure 38: A New York City Police Officer stands near the 

United Nations building. The NYPD and the Departments 

of State (SY) and the Treasury (Secret Service) struggled 

over responsibility for protection of UN diplomats and 

dignitaries, as well as the reimbursement to the NYPD for 

their extra hours of duty in providing security. Not until 

1980 was the issue resolved. Source: © Associated Press. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

him to assign agents from the Executive Protection 

Service (EPS) to protect diplomatic missions outside 

of Washington. However, since the EPS was a unit 

of the Secret Service, the Secret Service only took 

protective assignments on a case-by-case basis. As one 

Department official later confessed, “In most cases, 

foreign countries provide us with far more protection 

abroad on a permanent as well as an emergency basis 

than we provide them in Washington...We can well 

imagine the problems we would confront in the case 

of a serious incident resulting in the death of a foreign 

diplomat in this country.”116

There was also a lack of communication and 

coordination between SY and the Secret Service. For 

example, when the Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al 

Halim Khaddam arrived at Washington National 

Airport on September 27, 1974, the Secret Service 

detail quickly escorted him away without informing the Deputy Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for 

Near Eastern Affairs, and other Department officials who were at the airport to greet and escort the Foreign Minister. 

Infuriated, the Department of State immediately sent a letter of concern to the Director of the Secret Service.117 

The Secret Service and the Department of State’s lack of communication for the Syrian foreign minister 

was minor compared to the difficulties that the Secret Service, the Department, and the New York City Police 

Department (NYPD) would have in coordinating protection for the diplomatic missions of the United Nations. 

The NYPD had constantly assisted the Department and EPS with the protection of the representatives and foreign 

dignitaries to the United Nations. Attacks on missions, offices, and ambassadors, as well as growth of the United 

Nations, necessitated the creation of “fixed posts” to ensure protective security for the missions to the international 

organization. The NYPD, however, lacked the manpower to meet the demands for diplomatic protection in 

addition to its regular duties. In fact, in 1970, patrolmen of New York City’s 19th Precinct staged a protest against 

the fixed posts near the Soviet mission. They claimed that foreign missions in the United States received better 

protection than the nation’s cities. In addition, the city of New York insisted upon being reimbursed for expenses 

it incurred while protecting UN diplomats and dignitaries.118 

Nixon Administration officials devised an interim solution in 1974. Funding for protection of the United 

Nations would come from the Department of Justice’s Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which was 

created in 1965 to direct federal funds to assist state and local police forces. The Secret Service would assume 

Figure 39: New York City police check below a manhole 

cover. In preparation for Fidel Castro’s 1979 visit to the 

United Nations General Assembly, the NYPD blocked off a 

four-block area, with steel spikes, to ensure Castro’s security. 

Protection at the UNGA still requires many DS agents and 

NYC police to protect the numerous dignitaries who attend 

each year. Source: © Associated Press /G. Paul Burnett. 
236

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

responsibility for protecting all heads of state and 

EPS would protect foreign diplomatic missions 

in Washington and New York City, and it would 

delegate funds to the NYPD for local protection of 

UN Missions. Gradually, the Department of State 

would take on the duty of protecting all “other” 

distinguished foreign visitors, when they began 

receiving additional funding. Until then, the Secret 

Service handled the protection on a case-by-case basis 

at the direction of the President.119

With an interim agreement in place, efforts 

for a more permanent solution stalled. In 1975, 

the Department of State urged Congress to support 

a House of Representatives resolution that would 

expand the EPS so that it could undertake protective 

duties. The bill did not provide appropriations for 

reimbursing the NYPD, and without that funding 

information, the bill died. Representative Robert 

E. Jones, Jr., (D-Alabama) offered another proposal: 

he suggested expanding the EPS, authorizing the 

Secretary of the Treasury to assign EPS officers to 

several metropolitan areas to protect foreign missions 

(mostly consulates), and granting reimbursements to 

state and local governments for providing protection. 

The Departments of State and the Treasury urged 

the President to veto Jones’s bill, in part because 

neither Department wanted to take responsibility for 

reimbursing New York City. The agencies also stressed 

that the increase in federal responsibility for what 

had previously been a local police function seemed 

“troubling.” The Department of State proffered 

expanding the EPS enough to assume protection 

duties in New York City, but not nationwide. 

President Gerald R. Ford vetoed the bill.120

Figure 41: Karl D. Ackerman, Director of the Office of 

Security, 1978-1982. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

Files.

Figure 40: Chief of Mission (and future President ) George 

H.W. Bush, head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, 

China (seated second from left) attends the July 29, 1975, 

farewell party for SY Special Agents Peter Bergin (a future 

Director of the Diplomatic Security Service, seated left) and 

Michael Woods (seated second from right) in the garden 

of the Liaison Office compound. An officer from the New 

Zealand Embassy is seated at right. The U.S. Liaison Office 

(USLO) was the forerunner of the U.S. Embassy, prior 

formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. 

Source: Private Collection.
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

On December 31, 1975, President Ford signed a compromise bill for protection of UN diplomats. Public 

Law 94-196 required the EPS to protect diplomatic missions in cities outside of Washington that possessed 20 or 

more full-time missions, if the situation was an extraordinary protective need for which the city required assistance, 

and occurred at an international organization of which the United States was a member. Given the criteria, the 

bill was tailored to New York City and the United Nations. The law also authorized the Department of the 

Treasury to reimburse state and local entities that provided the protection. The law limited federal reimbursement 

to $3.5 million annually, but permitted retroactive claims to July 1, 1974. Besides offering reimbursement,

P.L. 94-196 did much to resolve the UN security debate.121 

U.S. officials became acutely aware of the political and diplomatic ramifications of the death of a foreign 

diplomat when SY Special Agents stopped an assassination attempt against the former Prime Minister of Turkey. 

On July 29, 1976, former Turkish Prime Minister Bulen Ecevit was touring the United States, and scheduled to 

give a speech at New York City’s Waldorf Astoria Hotel. SY had learned that a demonstration against Turkey’s 

policy in Cyprus would occur at the hotel. SY Special Agents Bernard A. Johnson, George R. Mitchell, Fred 

Lecker, and Horace H. Mitchell were assigned to protect Ecevit. About 400 protesters pelted members of Ecevit’s 

party with eggs and tomatoes. Johnson ordered a “tight shield” around Ecevit. As they were walking toward 

the hotel entrance, Johnson noticed that a man in 

the crowd had aimed a pistol at the former Prime 

Minister. Johnson dived at the gunman before the 

man could shoot. George Mitchell saw the gun rising 

among the crowd, moved in front of Ecevit to protect 

him, and with the assistance of Lecker, hurried Ecevit 

into the hotel. Horace Mitchell pushed through the 

crowd to assist Johnson in subduing the gunman. 

He grabbed the gunman’s left arm to put it behind 

the assailant’s back, and the arm twisted off (it was 

a prosthetic). The Department of State awarded 

Johnson and George Mitchell the Award for Heroism, 

and Horace Mitchell received the Award for Valor. In 

September 1976, the Government of Turkey hosted 

Special Agents Bernard Johnson, George Mitchell, 

and Fred Lecker as official guests, welcoming them 

as heroes.122 

 The assassination of former Chilean diplomat 

Orlando Letelier created a political and diplomatic 

Figure 42: SY Special Agent Scott Tripp (third from left) 

protects Sunao Sonoda, Foreign Minister of Japan, during 

the latter’s 1979 visit. Protecting foreign dignitaries created 

inter-agency debates during the 1970s, particularly with 

the growing size of the United Nations and after the murder 

(car bomb) of former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier 

in Washington, D.C. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security Files. 
238

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

firestorm. On the morning of September 21, 1976, Letelier and his work colleague Ronni Karpen Moffitt 

were murdered when a bomb attached to the underside of their car exploded as they entered Sheridan Circle 

in Washington DC. Letelier was the former Chilean Ambassador to the United States for the government of 

President Salvador Allende, who had recently been overthrown by a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet. 

The Pinochet regime’s Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) had already carried out an assassination in 

Argentina, an attempted assassination in Italy, and numerous arrests and disappearances in Chile. The Pinochet 

regime also helped to organize Operation Condor, a joint effort by the military regimes of Chile, Argentina, 

Uruguay, Brazil, and Paraguay to target and kill Leftist leaders. Department of State officials had some vague 

knowledge of Operation Condor; however, they did not anticipate that Condor agents would undertake an 

assassination in the capital of the United States. The Letelier assassination exacerbated public and Congressional 

criticism of Secretary Kissinger’s handling of U.S. policy toward Latin America and of supposed U.S. support 

for a regime such as Pinochet’s. A lengthy investigation by the Justice Department, the FBI, and the CIA led to 

the arrest of a DINA agent, who pleaded guilty to the bombing in 1978 and implicated several senior Chilean 

officials. The Pinochet regime refused to cooperate, and cleared those implicated in a military court. In 1982, 

released correspondence definitively linked the Pinochet government to the bombing.123 

Technically Letelier did not merit protection by SY or EPS; however, the publicity and criticism of U.S. 

policy prompted the Secret Service to reenter the debate over protection of UN diplomats. In 1973, the Nixon 

and Ford Administrations had extended protection of UN diplomatic missions, in 60- to 90-day increments, 

by presidential directive. Upon entering office in 1977, the Carter White House questioned the EPS’s expenses 

for guarding U.N. missions. With an expiration date looming, and despite the Ecevit and Letelier incidents, 

the Secret Service now suggested that current EPS assignments to the United Nations might be contrary to 

Congressional intent. EPS officers, the Secret Service asserted, were only supposed to be tasked to New York for 

short periods of time, and the protection should be terminated “when the local police forces are able to handle 

the protective need.” Furthermore, the Secret Service said, EPS officers did not have the authority to “challenge” 

visitors to the mission, and had “no police function except to be present in the event of an emergency.” The 

Service then proposed that the federal government either reimburse the New York City Police Department for 

protective security expenses, or create a permanent security detail manned by SY agents.124 

The Department of State opposed the Secret Service’s interpretation and suggestion. Assistant Secretary of 

State for Administration John M. Thomas emphasized the four general conditions governing requests for protection 

by EPS: 1) an immediate and specific threat directed against the particular mission or person in that mission, 2) 

a broad and long-term threat targeting that mission, 3) a situation where an incident would damage important 

U.S. foreign policy initiatives, and 4) the principle of reciprocity. When overseas, he wrote, U.S. diplomats and 

officials received protection from foreign governments; therefore, the United States should reciprocate for foreign 

missions in New York. The Department admitted that the EPS provided minimal protection, but argued that 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

EPS protection satisfied protective and reciprocity 

demands. The Departments of State and the Treasury 

had explored the issue of reimbursing the NYPD, but 

found the cost to be prohibitive. Furthermore, SY 

opposed assigning Special Agents to the missions on 

grounds of orientation. The EPS’s main mission was 

to guard the buildings; meanwhile, SY agents guarded 

people. Moreover, SY agents were “neither hired nor 

trained to work as building guards.” The Department 

of State proposed establishing a small permanent 

EPS contingent in New York City “to fulfill the U.S. 

obligation to the diplomatic community.”125 

The issue of reimbursing the NYPD plagued 

the Carter Administration, but was partially resolved 

in 1980. In the spring of that year, the Department 

of the Treasury revised its regulations and authorized 

reimbursement to New York City for costs incurred 

during fixed post assignments and extraordinary 

protective operations. However, this regulation only 

covered costs associated with protecting UN missions 

and foreign dignitaries. It did not include costs relating to protecting diplomatic residences or foreign commercial 

offices, nor did it cover costs associated with maintaining order during demonstrations outside the UN building.126

z Organizing for Terrorism å

Unlike the Nixon Administration, the new Carter Administration viewed terrorism as a “given” and 

organized itself accordingly. With Carter’s Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, SY resumed its protection of the 

Secretary; however, Vance’s protective detail differed significantly from that for Secretary Rogers in the early 

1970s. Vance’s 37-man detail included a chief, a deputy, and three full shifts to provide 24-hour protection. 

Director of the detail, William D’Urso, upgraded communications, increased the vehicle pool to 35 cars, and 

required a dummy motorcade and a follow-up car. Besides regular in-service and firearms training, all SY Special 

Agents serving on the detail were required to re-qualify on a quarterly basis, including qualifying at the shooting 

range on handguns, Uzi sub-machine guns, and shotguns. Another change was to detail an SY Special Agent as 

the Secretary’s chauffeur. D’Urso wrote a manual to formalize the detail’s procedures and operations, and insisted 

upon advance preparation for all of Secretary Vance’s travels and appearances.127 

Figure 43: RSOs William Marsden and Robert B. 

Bannerman (son of Robert L. Bannerman and grandson 

of Robert C. Bannerman) discuss security matters. By 

the 1970s, Regional Security Officers had moved from 

working in a literal regional office to being assigned to a 

specific U.S. embassy where they oversaw security matters. 

Source: SY Focus. 
240

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The Carter Administration also restructured the 

Office for Combating Terrorism. In August 1976, 

the Office reported to the Deputy Under Secretary of 

State for Management instead of the Secretary, and 

the office’s chief was Director of M/CT and Chair 

of the Inter-Agency Working Group. The move was 

intended to “provide a more effective link between 

the policy and operational aspects of efforts to combat 

terrorism.” However, M/CT remained a small staff 

of six, although its responsibilities now included 

overseeing emergency action planning.128 

By September 1977, the Carter Administration 

abolished the Cabinet Committee to Combat 

Terrorism created by Nixon. The Committee had 

met only once (in 1972), and as a result, the InterAgency Working Group became a working group of 

the NSC’s Special Coordination Committee. The 

Carter Administration also created the Executive 

Committee on Terrorism, with its membership 

determined by the NSC. Carter’s National 

Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, selected the 

Department of State’s Director of M/CT as the 

chair for both the Working Group and the Executive 

Committee. Thus, the Department of State 

continued its lead role in the government-wide effort 

to coordinate counterterrorist efforts. 129 

In 1978 Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton 

became Director of M/CT, and he found the 

Working Group too cumbersome, with its 

representatives from 28 departments and agencies. 

Quainton reorganized the group and streamlined 

its work. He divided the Working Group into 

seven committees, which included the Research 

and Development Committee, the Foreign Security 

Figure 44: The C Street Entrance of Main State in 1961. 

The framed items are displays, and there is minimal security, 

with two civilian guards. Source: Department of State 

Records, National Archives and Records Administration. 

Figure 45: The C Street Entrance to Main State in 1971, 

after the rise of terrorism. The reception desk is moved up 

to the front door, with barriers preventing persons from 

entering into the lobby of the building. The arrangement 

was a type of access control and reflected the new attention 

given to security and the response to the emerging threats of 

the 1970s. Source: Department of State Records, National 

Archives and Records Administration. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

Policy Committee, the Domestic Crisis Management Committee, and the Foreign Crisis Management 

Committee. However, the following autumn, the Department reorganized itself too, moving M/CT to the 

office of the Deputy Secretary of State (D/CT).130 

z Conclusion å

Beginning with the kidnapping of U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Elbrick, SY and the Department of State 

responded quickly to the threats posed by terrorism, and in the process of doing so, dramatically altered security 

procedures. SY developed emergency plans for U.S. posts overseas as they faced emergency situations in the 

face of terrorist attacks. SY developed an armored car program, a mobile reserve of equipment, and Emergency 

Actions Teams to train and assist posts. Threats forced an upgrading of the Secretary of State’s protective detail. 

When a member of the crowd in Chicago spit on the wife of French President Georges Pompidou, President 

Nixon ordered improvements in the protection of foreign dignitaries when they visited the United States. 

The kidnapping and murder of Israeli Olympic team members at Munich prompted additional changes 

that began a counterterrorism effort and policy by the United States. Nixon created the Committee to Combat 

Terrorism, which evolved into the Office of Counter-Terrorism under the Secretary of State (S/CT). The Nixon 

Administration also developed a hard-line policy regarding U.S. diplomatic hostages, a policy that was challenged 

by rank-and-file in the Department of State. An inter-agency debate occurred over the protection of UN diplomats, 

a debate that was largely resolved during the Carter Administration. 

When Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Victor Dikeos declared in 1975 that “a climate of 

terrorism” existed, the office he headed (SY) was already reoriented and reshaped toward three new axes: terrorism, 

protection, and technology. Training of Special Agents, RSOs, and Department personnel focused on how to 

prevent and anticipate the various types of terrorist attacks. SY created Mobile Training Teams to train personnel at 

U.S. posts. SY also installed access controls to limit persons entering U.S. posts, and the office installed bulletproof 

glass or Mylar on windows to prevent shards from shattering windows. Protective details of ambassadors were 

increased, and safe havens were built into U.S. embassies and consulates. SY developed a liaison office to coordinate 

and build relationships with foreign law enforcement entities. John Perdew created the Command Center and 

the Threat Analysis Group to coordinate SY efforts and anticipate developing threats. With microwaves and the 

chimney antenna, the Soviets were still trying to breach security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The adoption of 

computer technologies by the Department led SY to add computer security to its calculations. 

As Dikeos reached the end of his four-year tenure as head of SY in 1978, the Office of Security and diplomatic 

security at the Department of State had undergone a great transformation as a result of terrorism. The organization 

and its efforts bore little resemblance to the security entity that existed 10 years earlier. Gentile—and particularly 

Dikeos—had initiated numerous changes to meet the new threats posed by terrorism. Yet no sooner were these 

changes made than the terrorist threat evolved into a different form, accelerating SY’s transformation. 
242

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Endnotes

1 The phrase “the great transformation” is drawn from Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic 

Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001 [1944]). 

2 “European Security Conferences: SY Style,” SY Focus 1/1 (1975): 4. 

3 “A History of Security in the Department of State,” n.d. [1954], Folder – Security Booklet 1-E, Box 11, Misc DF 1953-

56, SCA, RG 59-Lot, NA, p. 12. Memorandum, John F. Reilly, Director of the Office of Security (T. C. Forsyth), to 

William O. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, 26 August 1963, Box 2, Security Policy Files, 

1949-1969, Records of the Assistant Secretary for Personnel Security, Bureau of Administration, RG 59 - Lot 96D563, 

NA. 

4 For the statistics, see tables located on the Department of State’s website under “Frequently Asked Historical Questions,” 

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/faq/#consular. Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of AntiCommunism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 90. 

5 “List of Damages Resulting from Overseas Incidents of Riots, Mob Violence, or Other Causes since October 1965,” 

printed in Testimony of Ralph S. Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Budget Affairs, 4 October 1966, Hearing 

before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Departments of State...Appropriations for 

1967, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966, pp. 299-301. Instruction CA-237 “Trends Requiring More Vigilance Against 

Violence,” Towery (Bond, Burleson) to All Principle USIS Post, 7 February 1972, Folder – SY Security 1970 General, Box 

278, CFPF 1970-1973, RG 59, NA. For instances, see “List of Damages Resulting from Overseas Incidents...,” above; 

Telegram 9998 “Bombing at American Embassy Paris,” Arthur K. Watson, U.S. Ambassador to France, to Secretary of 

State, 25 May 1972, Folder – BG P 1/1/70, Box 9, CFPF 1970-73, RG 59, NA. 

6 Instances from “List of Damages Resulting from Overseas ...,” in Testimony of Ralph S. Roberts, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Budget, 4 October 1966, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. 

Senate, Departments of State, Justice... Appropriations for 1967, p. 299. 

7 Instances from “List of Damages Resulting from Overseas...,” in Testimony of Roberts, 4 October 1966, Hearing before 

the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Departments of State, Justice... Appropriations 

for 1967, p. 299-301. Airgram A-925 “Reaction to an Embassy Internal Circular,” Korry, U.S. Ambassador to Chile 

(McLennan), to Department of State, 16 October 1968, Folder – POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [1], Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, 

RG 59, NA. Telegram 13865, William B. Buffum, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, to Secretary of State, 22 December 1972, 

Folder – BG Beirut, Box 6, CFPF 1970-73, RG 59, NA. For Six Day War, see Report “Emergency Security Operations 

during the Mid-East Crisis,” Office of Security, n.d. (1968), Folder – Emergency Planning EP 6 E & E Program, Box 

2, A/SY/Domestic Operations Division – Subject, Working, and Reference Files, 1960-1972, RG 59-Lot 73D214, NA; 

and Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Presidio Press, 

2003), 198, 217. For press chief quote, see Telegram 3378, Korry to Secretary of State, 26 April 1968, Folder – POL 23 

Chile 1/1/67 [1], Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG 59, NA. For a study of anti-Americanism, see Alan McPherson, Yankee 

No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 

8 The document also appears to have been sent to Saigon as well. Report “The Protection of U.S. Personnel and Installations 

Against Acts of Terrorism in Latin America,” Office of Security (Inter-agency Ad Hoc Committee), 12 May 1965, NA. 

9 Rusk to Senator Thomas J. Dodd, 6 September 1965, attached with Memorandum, Henry G. Grignon, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Security, to Keith O. Lynch, Chief of the Division of Protective Security, 28 September 1965, Box 5, SY/

Protective Security Files, 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA. Airgram A-80 “Security: Package Control at Chancery 

and Annex,” Rusk (W. C. Lieblich, L/ARA) to U.S. Embassy Caracas, 23 January 1968, Folder – SY Aden 1/1/67, Box 

219, CFPF 1967-69, RG 59, NA. Airgram CA-10456 “Protection of United States Personnel and Installations Against 

Attack,” Ball (G. Marvin Gentile, Assistant Secretary for Security) to All Diplomatic and Consular Establishments, 21 
243

CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

April 1966, Box 2, A/DUSA (Rimestad), Subject Files, 1968-69, RG 59-Lot 71D274, NA; and “Guidance Document on 

the Protection of United States Personnel and Installations Against Attack,” Office of Security, 4 April 1966, NA. 

10 Telegram 39 “Terrorist Act Against Army Attaché Residence,” Ralph A. Dungan, U.S. Ambassador to Chile, to Secretary 

of State, 5 July 1967, Folder – POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [1], Box 1980; Telegram 2503, Henry A. Hoyt, U.S. Ambassador 

to Uruguay, to Secretary of State, 4 April 1967, Folder – POL 23-8 UR 1/1/67, Box 2581; Telegram 2548, Edward M. 

Korry, U.S. Ambassador to Chile, to Secretary of State, 21 February 1968, Folder – POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [1], Box 1980, 

CFPF 1967-69; Airgram A-473 “The Bomb Explosion at the American Consulate in Santiago, Chile,” Robert W. Dean, 

Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Santiago (M. Martinez), to Department of State, 16 March 1968, Folder – POL 

23 Chile 1/1/67 [1], Box 1980; all CFPF 1967-69, RG 59, NA. 

11 Testimony of William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, 9 June 1965, Hearings before the 

Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, 

the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1966, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, p. 134. Telegram 9948, 

Buffum, to Secretary of State, 21 December 1972, Folder – BG Beirut, Box 6, CFPF 1970-73, RG 59, NA. 

12 Oral History Interview, William D’Urso, 9 May 2005, conducted by Jennifer Walele and Mark Hove, pp. 1-2. 

Memorandum, Gentile to Idar Rimestad, Deputy Under Secretary of Administration, 13 February 1968, Box 1, SY/

DUSA, Subject Files, 1967, RG 59-Lot -70D403, NA. 

13 Telegram, Max V. Krebs, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Guatemala, to Secretary of State, 28 August 1968, 

Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, South and Central America; Mexico, Volume XXXI, pp. 268-269. 

Hereafter cited as FRUS 1964-68, XXXI: page(s). Telegram 151166 “Necessity for Intensifying Measures to Protect 

U.S. Personnel from Attack,” Department of State (G. A. Wiggins, J. McKinlay) to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, 

6 September 1969, Folder – SY 1 1/1/67, Box 219, CFPF 1967-69, RG 59, NA. Joseph Novitski, “Gunmen Kidnap 

U.S. Envoy in Brazil, New York Times, 5 September 1969, pp. 1, 6. Telegram 1497 “Embassy Official Kidnapped,” 

Charles W. Adair, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay, to Secretary of State, 31 July 1970; and Memorandum of Telephone 

Conversation “Situation in Montevideo,” Irving G. Tragen, Country Director of Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay of 

Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 10 August 1970; both Folder – POL 23-8 UR 7/31/70, Box 2661, CFPF 1970-73, 

RG 59, NA. David A. Korn, Assassination in Khartoum (Bloomington: Indiana University Press for the Institute for the 

Study of Diplomacy, 1993), 112. 

14 Memorandum “Transportation for the Body of Ambassador John Gordon Mein,” John P. Walsh, Acting Executive 

Secretary (Viron P. Vaky) to Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 29 August 

1968, Folder – PER Mein, John Gordon, 1/1/68, Box 180, CFPF 1967-69, RG 59, NA. 

15 Memorandum “Security of U.S. Personnel Overseas,” Charles A. Meyer, Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs 

(A. J. Ormasa, ARA/MGT/PM) to William B Macomber, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, 28 

November 1969, attached to Memorandum “Protection of Diplomatic Personnel Against Threats,” Frank G. Meyer to 

Macomber, 29 November 1969), Box 2, A/DUSA (Rimestad), Subject Files, 1968-69, RG 59-Lot-71D274, NA. George 

S. Beckett, with Jerry Shiverdecker, Special Agent: Fighting Terrorism and Other International Crimes Before 9-11 (New 

Albany MS: Coats-Loonan Press, 2003), 69. 

16 Telegram 151166 “Necessity for Intensifying Measures to Protect U.S. Personnel from Attack,” Richardson (Wiggins, 

McKinlay) to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, 6 September 1969, Folder – SY 1 1/1/67, Box 219, CFPF 1967-69, 

RG 59, NA. Memorandum “Protection of Diplomatic Personnel Against Threats,” Charles Meyer to Macomber, 29 

November 1969. 

17 Memorandum “Special Protection for Ambassadors in EUR [sic],” Martin J. Hillenbrand (EUR) to Burns and Gentile, 

9 September 1969; and Memorandum “Protective Security for Amb. Walter Annenberg, AmEmbassy, London,” Gentile 

to Stuart Cottman (O), 5 November 1969; both Box 2, A/DUSA (Rimestad), Subject Files, 1968-1969, RG 59-Lot 

71D274, NA. 
244

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

18 Memorandum “Security of U.S. Personnel Overseas,” Meyer to Macomber, 28 November 1969, attached to Memorandum 

“Protection of Diplomatic Personnel Against Threats,” Frank G. Meyer (O/A) to Macomber, n.d. [29? November 1969]. 

Telegram 58078 “Security of Diplomats,” Rogers (Robert A. Hurwitch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 

Affairs) to All ARA Posts, 18 April 1970, Folder – SY – Security 1970 General, Box 278, CFPF 1970-73, NA. Airgram CA2062 “Protection of Personnel Against Attack – Standard Phased Plan,” Rogers (Gentile, Macomber) to All ARA Diplomatic 

and Consular Posts, 15 April 1970, Folder – SY – Security 1970 General, Box 278, CFPF 1970-73, RG 59, NA. 

19 Underline in original. 1971 Budget Amendment – Salaries and Expenses: Justification of Estimate, Department of 

State, 18 May 1970, enclosed with Testimony of William B. Macomber, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, 

11 June 1970, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 

Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1971, 91st Congress, 2nd 

Session, 1970, p. 399. Action Memorandum “U.S. Policy Toward Politically Motivated Kidnapping of U.S. Officials 

Abroad,” Macomber (Hurwitch) to U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 2 April 1970; and 

Memorandum “Kidnapping of U.S. Officials/Dependents,” J. Stewart Cottman, Special Assistant to Macomber, 15 April 

1970; both Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-1: Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972 Chapter 

1: Document 40, (Washington: Department of State, Office of the Historian, 2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/ 

Nixon/e-1. Hereafter cited as FRUS 1969-1976, E-1: Chapter 1: Document #.

20 Memorandum “Categories of Threat,” SY, 15 April 1970, enclosed with Airgram CA-2062 “Protection of Personnel 

Against Attack – Standard Phased Plan,” Rogers (Gentile) to All ARA Diplomatic and Consular Posts, 15 April 1970. 

Telegram 2306 “Security of Ambassador,” Andrew V. Corry, U.S. Ambassador to Ceylon [Sri Lanka], to Secretary of State, 

13 October 1969, Folder – SY 1/1/67, Box 219, CFPF 1967-69, RG 59, NA.

21 Memorandum “Categories of Threat,” SY, 15 April 1970. By 1971, it appears that embassies tailored this more extensive 

document to fit their particular situations and threats. See Airgram A-278 “Protection of Personnel Against Attack – 

Standard Phased Plan,” Stone, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires ad interim [?] to India (F. S. York, G. E. Harvey), to Department of 

State, 26 June 1971, Folder – SY Montevideo, Box 279, CFPF 1970-73, RG 59, NA. 

22 Memorandum “Protection of United States Ambassadors at Post Abroad,” Gentile to John H. Burns, 11 September 1969, 

Box 2, A/DUSA (Rimestad), Subject Files, 1968-69, RG 59-Lot 71D274, NA. 

23 Telegram 4323 “Necessity for Intensifying Measures to Protect US Personnel from Attack,” Samuel D. Eaton, U.S. 

Chargé d’Affaires to Ecuador, to Secretary of State, 18 September 1969, Folder – SY 1/1/67; Telegram 6014 “Protection 

of American Personnel,” John A. Calhoun, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia, to Secretary of State, 13 October 1969, Folder 

– SY Santiago 1/1/67; Telegram 8009 “Increased Protection of US Personnel and Property,” Dwight J. Porter, U.S. 

Ambassador to Lebanon, to Secretary of State, 26 September 1969, Folder – SY 1/1/67; Telegram 5462, William O. 

Hall, U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, to Secretary of State, 17 December 1969, Folder – SY Aden 1/1/67; Airgram A-268 

“Protection of US. Personnel,” Ridgway B. Knight, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal (C. Thaxton, Administration Officer), 

to Department of State, 22 October 1969, Folder – SY FR 1/1/67; and Telegram 2306 “Security of Ambassador,” Andrew 

V. Corry, U.S. Ambassador to Ceylon [Sri Lanka], to Secretary of State, 13 October 1969, Folder – SY 1/1/67; all Box 

219, CFPF 1967-69, RG 59, NA. 

24 Telegram 1280 “GOC Announces Additional Protection for Diplomatic Missions,” Korry to Secretary of State, 9 April 

1970, Folder – SY Aden 1/1/70; Telegram 1438 “Arming of Ambassador’s Chilean Personal Security Guards,” Korry to 

Secretary of State, 21 April 1970, Folder – SY Santiago 1/1/70; and Airgram A-191 “Protection against Terrorism,” Korry 

(Friedman) to Department of State, 10 May 1970, Folder – SY Santiago 1/1/70; all Box 279, CFPF 1970-73, RG 59, NA. 

25 Telegram 981 “Foreign Ministry’s Query Re Embassy Marine Guards,” Adair to Secretary of State, 15 April 1971; Telegram 

1118, Adair to Secretary of State, 4 May 1971; Telegram 83950, Rogers (D. W. Cox) to U.S. Embassy Montevideo, 14 

May 1971; and Telegram 1896, Adair to Secretary of State, 28 August 1970; all Folder – BG Monrovia, Box 8, CFPF 

1970-73, RG 59, NA. For Marines being less identifiable as U.S. military, see Beckett, Special Agent, 83-84. 
245

CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

26 1971 Budget Amendment – Salaries and Expenses: Justification of Estimate, Department of State, 18 May 1970, p. 

394. Justifications Report, Office of Security, enclosed with Testimony of William B. Macomber, Jr., Deputy Under 

Secretary for Administration, 13 March 1973, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 

United States House of Representatives, Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 

Appropriations for 1974, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 1973, p. 275. 

27 Memorandum “Kidnapping of U.S. Officials Abroad,” Gentile and Hurwitch, to Macomber, 2 April 1970, FRUS 1969-

1976, E-1: Chapter 1: Document 37. 1971 Budget Amendment – Salaries and Expenses: Justification of Estimate, 

Department of State, 18 May 1970, p. 399. 

28 Memorandum “Manpower and Equipment Requirements for division of Protective Security for FY-70,” Keith O. Lynch, 

Chief of Division of Protective Services, to Gentile, 8 August 1968, Box 5, Protective Security Policy Files 1962-68, RG 

59-Lot 70D292, NA. Hereafter cited as PSPF 1962-68. 

29 Memorandum “Manpower and Equipment Requirements for Division of Protective Security for FY-70,” Lynch to Gentile, 8 

August 1968. Oral History Interview, William DeCourcy, 19 May 2005, conducted by Jennifer Walele and Mark Hove, p. 1. 

30 Oral History Interview, William DeCourcy, 19 May 2005, p. 1. Memorandum “Manpower and Equipment Requirements 

for Division of Protective Security for FY-70,” Lynch to Gentile, 8 August 1968. Memorandum “Activities of the Division 

of Protective Security Including Problems, Manpower Shortages, Conclusions and Recommendation,” Gentile to 

Macomber, 30 October 1969, attached to Memorandum “SY Request for Eleven Position Increase Plus One Additional 

Armored Limousine,” Frank Meyer to Macomber, 10 November 1969, Box 2, A/DUSA (Rimestad) – Subject Files, 1968-

69, RG 59-Lot 71D274, NA. 

31 Oral History Interview, William DeCourcy, 19 May 2005, pp. 3-4. Oral History Interview, William D’Urso, 9 May 

2005, pp. 2-3. Memorandum “Protection of Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Jr.,” Gentile to Macomber, 12 October 

1970, Box 1, A/DUSA Subject and Name Files 1970, RG 59 – Lot 72D179, NA. 

32 Oral History Interview, William DeCourcy, 19 May 2005, p. 4. Oral History Interview, William D’Urso, 9 May 2005, 

pp. 2-3. Oral History Interview, Paul Sorenson, 19 May 2005, conducted by Jennifer Walele and Mark Hove, p. 2-3. 

33 Selig S. Harrison, “Rogers Unharmed in Knifing Attempt,” Washington Post, 1 August 1969, p. A1. Memorandum “Activities 

of the Division of Protective Security Including Problems, Manpower Shortages, Conclusions and Recommendation,” 

Gentile to Macomber, 30 October 1969. Oral History Interview, William D’Urso, 9 May 2005, p. 3. 

34 Oral History Interview, William D’Urso, 9 May 2005, pp. 3-4. 

35 Oral History Interview, William D’Urso, 9 May 2005, pp. 3-4. 

36 Memorandum “Activities of the Division of Protective Security Including Problems, Manpower Shortages, Conclusions 

and Recommendations,” Gentile to Macomber, 30 October 30 1969. 

37 Memorandum “Manpower and Equipment Requirements for Division of Protective Security for FY-70,” Lynch 

to Gentile, 8 August 1968; and Memorandum “Activities of the Division of Protective Security Including Problems, 

Manpower Shortages, Conclusions and Recommendation, Gentile to Macomber, 30 October 1969. Dennis Williams, 

“Is DS Spelled Backwards SY?” DSSAA World, Volume 10 (Fall 1994): 2.

38 For Qaddafi’s declarations and ideology of this period, see Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya and the United States: Two 

Centuries of Strife (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 87-106. 

39 Tad Szulc, “Concern on Protests,” New York Times, 23 February 1970, p. 16. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: 

Little, Brown, 1979), 565. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Kissinger with Richard Daly, Mayor of Chicago, 

27 February 1970, Folder – February 19-27, 1970, Box 4, Henry A Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Nixon 

Presidential Materials Project, NA. Hereafter cited as Kissinger Telcons, NPMP. 
246

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

40 Haldeman Diary, Entries 23 and 26 February 1970, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (Santa Monica 

CA: Sony Electronic Publications [CD ROM], 1994). Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: 

Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 479-80. 

41 Oral History Interview, William DeCourcy, 19 May 2005, p. 4. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 480. Kissinger, 

White House Years, 565. Peter Kihss, “Pompidou Ending Visit, Hails Nixon’s Leadership,” New York Times, pp. 1 and 29. 

Homer Bigart, “Jews Affronted,” New York Times, pp. 1 and 28. Haldeman Diary, Entry 2 March 1970. 

42 Nixon, Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 480-483. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Kissinger and Joseph Sisco, 

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, 2 March 1970, Folder – March 2-9, 1970, Box 4, Kissinger Telcons, NPMP, 

NA. Haldeman Diary, 26 February 1970. Kissinger, White House Years, 565-566. 

43 James M. Naughton, “Secret Service May Get Task of Guarding Visiting Notables,” New York Times, 19 March 1970, p. 6. 

44 Memorandum, General Counsel of the Treasury to Director of Management and Budget, n.d. [September 1970]; and 

Memorandum, William L. Dickey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to Macomber, 22 September 1970; both 

enclosed with Information Memorandum “Proposed Legislation to Transfer Protective Security Functions to United 

States Secret Service,” J. Edward Lyerly, Office of the Legal Advisor, to Macomber, 28 September 1970, A/DUSA, Subject 

and Name Files, 1970 (Macomber), Folder – SY, Box 1, RG 59 - Lot 72D179, NA. 

45 Draft Letter, Secretary of the Treasury to John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives, n.d., enclosed 

with Memorandum “Proposed Legislation to Transfer Protective Security Functions to United States Secret Service,” 

Lyerly to Macomber, 28 September 1970. Earlier, in March 1970 the White House Police Force was renamed the 

Executive Protective Service (PL 91-217) “with increased personnel and expanded duties which included responsibility for 

protection of foreign diplomatic missions in the D.C. area.” Philip H. Melanson with Peter F. Stevens, The Secret Service: 

The Hidden History of an Enigmatic Agency, (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2002), pp. 42, 168-171. 

46 Memorandum “Protective Intelligence Estimate: Visit to the United States of Table Tennis Team of the People’s Republic 

of Chine-April 12-29, 1972,” Acting Chief of the Protective Intelligence Branch to Acting Chief of the Division of 

Investigations, 11 April 1972; and Memorandum “Visiting Chinese Ping Pong Team, Grignon to Gentile, 31 March 

1972, attached to Memorandum “Protective Intelligence Estimate,” 11 April 1972; Folder – SY-1 General, Box 4, Bureau 

of Administration files, 1972, RG 59 – Lot 75D101, NA. Oral History Interview, William DeCourcy, 19 May 2005, 

pp. 4-5. 

47 Oral History Interview, William DeCourcy, 19 May 2005, p. 4. Oral History Interview, William D’Urso, 9 May 2005, p. 

4. Letter, John M. Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, to Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of 

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 27 March 1974, Folder – SY 1 General; Letter, Director of the Secret Service 

to Thomas, 16 September 1974; both Folder – SY 1 General; and Memorandum “Protection of Mrs. Kissinger,” Carlyle 

E. Maw, Office of Legal Affairs, to the Secretary 7 May 1974, Folder – SY 4 Protection/Terrorism; all Box 4, A/DUSA 

Subject Files 1974, RG 59-Lot 76D71, NA. 

48 Memorandum “Protection Against Terrorism in the United States,” Donelan (Gentile) to Rogers, 14 September 1972; 

Memorandum “Protection Against Terrorism in the United States,” Donelan (Gentile) to Macomber, 14 September 

1972, attached to Memorandum, Donelan (Gentile) to Rogers, 14 September 1972; and Memorandum “Protection of 

Israeli Establishment in the United States,” Gentile to Donelan, 12 September 1972; all Folder – SY 4, Box 4, DUSA 

Subject Files, 1972, RG 59 - Lot 75D101, NA. 

49 Memorandum “Protection Against Terrorism in the United States,” Donelan to Macomber, 21 September 1972. 

Memorandum “Local Police Security Measures for Visit of Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra,” 28 September 1972, Folder 

– SY – General, Box 4, DUSA Subject Files, 1972, RG 59-Lot 75D101, NA. 

50 Memorandum “Action to Combat Terrorism,” Nixon to Heads of Departments and Agencies, 25 September 1972, 

attached to Letter, E. T. Klassen, Postmaster General, to Nixon, 2 October 1972, Folder – SY 4 Protection against 
247

CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

Terrorism, Box 4, DUSA Subject Files 1972, RG 59-Lot 75D101, NA. Timothy Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History 

of American Counterterrorism, New York: Basic Books, 2005, pp. 58-9. Tad Szulc, “U.S. Sets Up Intelligence Group to 

Combat Terrorism,” New York Times, 9 September 1972, p. 4. 

51 Memorandum “Action to Combat Terrorism,” Nixon to Heads of Departments and Agencies, 25 September 1972. 

Memorandum “Action to Combat Terrorism,” Nixon to Rogers, 25 September 1972, attached to Klassen to Nixon, 2 

October 1972. Both memoranda were released to the public on 25 September 1972. See Press Release, Office of the 

White House Press Secretary, 25 September 1972, Folder – SY 4, Box 4, DUSA Subject Files 1972, RG 59-Lot 75D101, 

NA. Memorandum, Rogers (Gentile) to George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury, 8 September 1972, Folder – SY 4 

Protection Against Terrorism, Box 4, DUSA Subject Files 1972, RG 59 - Lot 75D101, NA. 

52 Action Memorandum “Protection Against Terrorism in the United States,” Donelan to Macomber, 21 September 1972. 

Naftali, Blind Spot, pp. 59-60. Memorandum “Status of USG Actions Against Terrorism,” Richard T. Kennedy, NSC 

Staff, to Kissinger, 1 November 1972, FRUS 1969-1976, Volume E-1, Chapter 1, Document 114.

53 Oral History Interview, Paul Sorenson, 19 May 2005, p. 2. Memorandum “Measures to Combat Terrorism,” Rogers to 

Nixon, 21 September 1972, Folder – SY 4 Protection against Terrorism, Box 4, DUSA Subject Files 1972, RG 59-Lot 

75D101, NA. Jeremiah O’Leary, “Arabs Screened for Visas to U.S.”, Washington Star, 15 October 1972, pp. A-1, A-8. 

Oral History Interview, Paul Sorenson, 19 May 2005, interviewed by Jennifer Walele and Mark Hove. Memorandum 

“Status of USG Actions Against Terrorism,” Kennedy to Kissinger, 1 November 1972. 

54 Terrorism” GIST (Newsletter of the Bureau of Public Affairs), Number 87 (October 1972), Folder – SY 4 Protection 

Against Terrorism, Box 4, DUSA Subject Files 1972, RG 59-Lot 75D101, NA. 

55 The law and the protective security accorded foreign diplomats became an issue in Michael Moore’s 2004 film Fahrenheit 

9/11. In the scene outside the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington DC, Moore highlights the fact that Secret Service 

agents pressed him to cease and desist his filming and commentary. Moore suggests that the Saudis, due to their close 

relationship with the Bush family, had gained special “presidential” type protection from the same entity that protects the 

President. He either was unaware of or omitted the fact that Secret Service protection of foreign diplomats and foreign 

embassies is based on 30-year-old practices and laws, resulting from the rise of terrorism in the early 1970s. Memorandum 

“Evening Report,” Rogers to Nixon, 6 September 1972, FRUS 1969-76, Volume E-1, Chapter 1, Document 97. 

Memorandum “Signing of Legislation for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests...,” Theodore L. Eliot, 

Jr., Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Ronald J. Bettauer, L/UNA) to Kissinger, 19 October 1972, Folder 

– SY 4 Protection against Terrorism; Memorandum “Status of Administration’s Proposed Legislation of Protection of 

Foreign Officials,” Bettauer to Gentile, George H. W. Bush, Ambassador to the United Nations, et al., 18 January 1972, 

Folder – SY 3 Organization and Conferences; both Box 4, DUSA Subject Files 1972, RG 59-Lot 75D101, NA. Letter, 

Rogers and John N. Mitchell, Attorney General, to Spiro T. Agnew, Vice-President of the United States, 9 August 1971; 

and Memorandum, David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (J. H. Michel, L/O/SCA) 

to George P. Shultz, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 16 June 1971; both Folder – SY – Security 1970 

General, Box 278, CFPF 1970-73, RG 59, NA. 

56 Department of State Press Release No. 238 “Address by William P. Rogers to the 27th General Assembly of the United 

Nations, New York, New York, Monday, September, 25, 1972,” 26 September 1972, Folder – SY 4 Protection Against 

Terrorism, Box 4, DUSA Subject Files 1972, , RG 59-Lot 75D101, NA. Telegram 167911, Rogers (John Norton Moore, 

NEA) to Bush, 14 September 1972, FRUS 1969-76, E-1, Chapter 1, Document 100. Memorandum “Terrorism Items 

in the United Nations General Assembly,” Eliot (J. Armitage, IO/UNP) to Kissinger, 21 October 1972, FRUS 1969-76, 

E-1, Chapter 1, Document 112. Telegram 5582 “Legal Committee – Terrorism Item,” Bush to Secretary of State, 15 

December 1972, FRUS 1969-76, E-1, Chapter 1, Document 120. Quoted portions are from Telegram 5582 “Legal 

Committee- Terrorism Item.” 

57 Korn, Assassination in Khartoum, 110, 111-115. 
248

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

58 Korn, Assassination in Khartoum, 116-121. 

59 Korn, Assassination in Khartoum, 177. 

60 The term “Bangkok solution” resulted from a December 1972 incident, during which 4 members of Black September 

entered the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok and took hostages. Thai officials allowed the 4 men safe  ́passage out of Thailand 

in exchange for releasing their hostages. 

61 Enclosure 5 “Guidelines for Dealing with Terrorism with International Connections or Implications,” n.d. [January? 1975], 

and Enclosure 2, “Policy Considerations” n.d. [January? 1975], enclosed with Airgram A-775 “Revised Procedures for 

Responding to Acts of Terrorism Against Americans Abroad,” Department of State (Hoffacker, Brown) to All Diplomatic 

and Consular Posts, 5 February 1975, Folder – Policy [sic] Procedure – 1973-1977, Box 4, Office for Combatting Terrorism 

(D/CT) – General Files, 1963-1977, RG 59-Lot 80D132, Suitland. Although a revision of the April 1974 document, as 

Airgram A-775 states, many revisions were procedural and do not indicate that they were revisions of basic policy. 

62 Korn, Assassination in Khartoum, 116, 226. Telegram 7725 “U.S. Terrorism Policies,” Kissinger, Secretary of State, (R. A. 

Feary, Terrorism Coordinator) to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, 12 May 1976, Folder – Policy – General – 1975-

1977, Box 3, RG 59-Lot 80D132. 

63 Memorandum “Our Policy on Terrorism,” The Open Forum (Peter Lydon, Chair) to Secretary of State, 16 July 1976, 

Folder – Policy – General – 1975-77, Box 3, RG 59-Lot 80D132. 

64 Judith Miller, “Bargain with Terrorists?” New York Times Magazine, 18 July 1976, p. 38-39. 

65 Korn, Assassination in Khartoum, 221-226. 

66 Memorandum “USG Terrorism Policies,” Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, to 

The Open Forum (Neil Boyer, Chair), 27 August 1976, Folder – Policy General 1975-1977, Box 3, Office for Combating 

Terrorism (D/CT) – General Files 1963-77, RG 59-Lot 80D132, Suitland. Korn, Assassination in Khartoum, p. 231.

67 Memorandum “Draft of Revised Policy on Terrorism,” Richard B. Finn (S/P) to Ambassador Heck (M/CT), 11 May 

1977, Folder – Policy General 1975-1977, Box 3, D/CT – General Files, 1963-77, RG 59-Lot 80D132, Suitland. 

Telegram 074630 “Egypt Considering Release of Khartoum Terrorists,” Vance (C. E. Marthinsen) to U.S. Embassy Cairo, 

21 March 1980, enclosed with Note “Khartoum Incident – 1973: Cables – 1980 Material,” n.d., Folder – Khartoum 

Incident 1973, 1980-, Box 13, Office for Combating Terrorism (M/CT) – Country and Functional Files – 1980-1982, 

RG 59 – Lot 83D135, Suitland. Report of the Working Group on Enhancement of Security at U.S. Embassies Overseas, 

n.d. [April? 1983], Folder – Security General 1983, RG 59-Lot, NA. 

68 Testimony of Victor H. Dikeos, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, 23 April 1975, Hearings before the 

Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, Departments of State, 

Justice,... Appropriations for 1976, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, p. 442-443.

69 For a discussion of protecting U.S. citizens overseas, see Testimony of Charles Horman family and relatives of others 

missing overseas, 12 and 14 July 1977, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee 

on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, Protection of Americans Abroad, 95th Congress, 1st 

Session, 1977. 

70 J. Y. Smith, “Bomb Explosion Rips Third Floor of State Department,” Washington Post, 29 January 1975; Lance Gay and 

Brad Holt, “Weather Underground Strikes – Bomb Set Off at State Department,” Washington Star-News, 29 January 

1975; David Binder, “Six Thousand in District of Columbia Flee in Bomb Threats,” New York Times, 30 January 1975; 

and Manifesto, Weather Underground Organization, 28 January 1975; all reprinted in State Department Bombing by 

Weather Underground, Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act 

and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 31 January 

1975 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1975), pp. 7-8, 8-10, 14-15. 2-6.
249

CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

71 Gay and Holt, “Weather Underground Strikes – Bomb Set Off at State Department,” Washington Star-News, 29 January 

1975; and Richard M. Cohen and Paul Hodge, “FBI Opens Probe of State Department Bombing,” Washington Post, 30 

January 1975, both reprinted in State Department Bombing by Weather Underground, Hearing before the Subcommittee 

to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee of the 

Judiciary, U.S. Senate, pp. 9, 10-11. 

72 For example, see “Regional Security Officer Seminar, July 8-12, 1974,” n.d. [June 1974], enclosed with Memorandum, 

Vernon E. Bishop, Chief of the Division of Education and Training, to Ambassador Lewis Hoffacker, Special Assistant 

to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combating Terrorism, 18 June 1974, Folder – Courses and/or Training 1974-

1977, Box 2; and Working Paper “Training of Negotiators,” Bishop, 14 August 1974, Folder – Hostages Negotiations 

– 1974-1977, Box 3; both Office for Combatting Terrorism – General Files 1963-1977, RG 59-Lot 80D132, 

Suitland. Lieutenant John A. Culley, Office of the Chief of Detectives of the New York City Policy Department, 

“Hostage Negotiations,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (October 1974), pp. 1-5; Memorandum “Psychological 

Guidelines for Hostage Situations,” Analysis and Evaluation Unit, Department of Justice, n.d. [27 September 1974; 

and Memorandum “Psychological Impact of Terrorism,” Office of Medical Services Task Force on Counterterrorism, 

Department of Justice [?], n.d. [27 September 1974], all enclosed with Working Paper “Training of Negotiators,” 

Bishop, 14 August 1974. 

73 John F. McPoland, “Mobile Training Team (MTT),” SY Focus 1/1 (1975): 5. McPoland, “Mobile Training Team Update,” 

SY Focus 2/3 (June-August 1976): 15. Memorandum “Counterterrorism Briefing in Washington for Person Being Posted 

Overseas,” Victor H. Dikeos, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Under 

Secretary of State for Management, 16 September 1976, Folder – Courses and/or Training 1974-1977, Box 2, Office for 

Combatting Terrorism – General Files 1963-1977, RG 59-Lot 80D132, Suitland. Oral History Interview, Greg Bujac, 

16 April 2007, p. 1. 

74 Oral History Interview, John Perdew, 21 March 2006, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 5. Memorandum “Proposed S & E 

Terrorism Related Expenditures by NEA/EX,” Gentile to Walker W. Smith, 17 January 1974; Memorandum “Proposed 

S & E Terrorism Related Expenditures by ARA/MGT,” Gentile to Smith, 28 January 1974; Memorandum “Proposed 

S & E Terrorism Related Expenditures by EA/EX,” Gentile to Smith, 18 January 1974; Memorandum “Proposed S 

& E Terrorism Related Expenditures by AF/EX,” Gentile to Smith, 21 January 1974; Memorandum “Proposed S & 

E Terrorism Related Expenditures by EUR/EX,” Gentile to Walker W. Smith, 10 January 1974; all Folder – 36489-1 

Programs for Combatting Terrorism, Box 4, DS/ICI/ Counterintelligence Division – Counterintelligence Records (USIA 

and RIS) 1958-1995, RG 59 – Lot 00D249, Suitland. 

75 Memorandum “Ninety-first Meeting of the Working Group / Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism,” Robert A. 

Fearey, Chair of the Working Group / Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, to Members and Participants in the 

Working Group, 5 September 1975, Folder 38411 – S/ Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism 1975, Box 4, DS/

ICI/Counterintelligence Division – Counterintelligence Records (USIA and RIS) 1958-1995, RG 59 – Lot 00D249, 

Suitland. 

76 George S. Beckett, with Jerry Shiverdecker, Special Agent: Fighting Terrorism and Other International Crimes before 9-11

(New Albany: Coats-Loonan Press, 2003), 82-86. Oral History Interview, John Perdew, 21 March 2006, p. 5. 

77 Oral History Interview, John Perdew, 21 March 2006, p. 5. Letter, John M. Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Administration (M. K. Dalton, A/SY/OF) to Gordon H. Warren, 24 October 1974, Folder – SY 1 General, Box 4, A/

DUSA Subject Files 1974, RG 59 – Lot 76D71, NA. 

78 Memorandum “Minimum Physical Security Standards in the Construction and/or Renovation of Office Buildings,” 

Elmer R. Hipsley, Chief of the Division of Physical Security, to William O. Boswell, Director of the Office of Security, 

and Otto F. Otepka, Deputy Director, 1 December 1959, Folder – Correspondence 1959, Box 12, A/SY/Evaluations – 

Security Files 1932-63, RG 59 – Lot 96D584, NA. 
250

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

79 Philip J. Harrick, “Meeting the Challenge of Terrorism,” SY Focus 3/5 (December 1977): 20-21. Booklet “CounterTerrorism Planning: Public Access Control,” Office of Security, n.d. [1977?], Folder – 36489-2 Programs for Combatting 

Terrorism, Box 4, DS/ICI/Counterintelligence Division – Counterintelligence Records (USIA and RIS) 1958-1995, RG 

59 – Lot 00D249, Suitland. Oral History Interview, John Perdew, 21 March 2006, p. 5. 

80 Oral History Interview, Richard Gannon, 16 November 2005, p. 5. Oral History Interview, Gordon Harvey, 19 December 

2005, p. Oral History Interview, John Perdew, 21 March 2006, p. 5. Report “Summary Considerations (Meloy-Waring 

Murders), Department of State, n.d. [June 1977?], Folder – Meloy Assassination 1976, Box 6, M/CT – Alphabetical Files 

1976-1986, RG 59 – Lot 91D494, Suitland. 

81 “Reorganization of Protective Security and Counter-Terrorism Responsibilities,” SY Focus 2/5 (December 1976): 7. 

Melvin L. Harrison, “Maintaining Local Police/Military Contacts,” SY Focus 2/1 (February 1976): 11. Oral History 

Interview, Dennis Pluchinsky, 22 December 2005, pp. 1-2. Oral History Interview, William DeCourcy, 19 May 2005, 

p. 6. Philip J. Harrick, “Meeting the Challenge of Terrorism,” SY Focus 3/5 (December 1977): 21. 

82 Oral History Interview, John Perdew, 21 March 2006, pp. 5-7. Oral History Interview, Dennis Pluchinsky, 19 December 

2005, pp. 1-2. Oral History Interview, Greg Bujac, 16 April 2007, p. 1. Memorandum “Contract Programming Support 

for Counter-Terrorism Data Base,” C. L. Duignan, INR, 14 April 1977, Folder – Research – Data Bank 1976-1977, Box 

5, D/CT Office for Combatting Terrorism – General Files 1963-1977, RG 59 – Lot 80D132, Suitland. Memorandum 

“Minutes – One Hundred and Fourth Meeting of the Working Group / Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, 

Wednesday, March 24, 1976,” Fearey to Member of and Participants in Working Group, 30 March 1976, Folder – 38411 

– S/Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, 1976, Box 4, DS/ICI/Counterintelligence Division – Counterintelligence 

Records (USIA and RIS) 1958-1995, RG 59 – Lot 00D249, Suitland. Inspection Memorandum “The Security and 

Counterterrorism Function of the Department of State: Relocation of the Office of Security Watch Group,” Arnold D. 

Lee, Inspector of the Office of the Inspector General, June 1984, Folder – Security and Counter-Terrorism 2/84, Box 

6, OIG/Plans, Reports, and Analysis Division – Inspection Reports and Compliance Files 1976-1986, RG 59 – Lot 

90D533, Suitland. 

83 Alan Dunn and Michael Carter, “SY Command Center,” SY Focus 2/5 (December 1976): 3-4. Oral History Interview, 

John Perdew, 21 March 2006, pp. 5-7. Oral History Interview, Dennis Pluchinsky, 19 December 2005, pp. 1-2. Oral 

History Interview, Alan O. Bigler, 22 November 2005, p. 1. 

84 Oral History Interview, John Perdew, 21 March 2006, pp. 5-7. Oral History Interview, Dennis Pluchinsky, 19 December 

2005, pp. 1-2. Memorandum “Contract Programming Support for Counter-Terrorism Data Base,” C. L. Duignan, 

INR, 14 April 1977. Memorandum “Minutes – One Hundred and Fourth Meeting of the Working Group / Cabinet 

Committee to Combat Terrorism, Wednesday, March 24, 1976,” Fearey to Member of and Participants in Working 

Group, 30 March 1976. 

85 Philip J. Harrick, “Meeting the Challenge of Terrorism,” SY Focus 3/5 (December 1977): 22-23. Oral History Interview, 

John Perdew, 21 March 2006, pp. 5-7. Oral History Interview, Dennis Pluchinsky, 19 December 2005, pp. 1-2. 

Memorandum “Contract Programming Support for Counter-Terrorism Data Base,” C. L. Duignan, INR, 14 April 1977. 

Memorandum “Minutes – One Hundred and Fourth Meeting of the Working Group / Cabinet Committee to Combat 

Terrorism, Wednesday, March 24, 1976,” Fearey to Members of and Participants in Working Group, 30 March 1976. 

Inspection Memorandum “The Security and Counterterrorism Function of the Department of State: Relocation of the 

Office of Security Watch Group,” Lee, June 1984. 

86 Victor H. Dikeos, “Letter from the Director,” SY Focus 2/3 (June-August 1976): 2. 

87 Organization Chart “Office of Security,” Office of Security, January 1965, copy in project files. Inspection Memorandum 

“The Security Function of the Department: SY Organization,” Stanly S. Carpenter, Marvin L. Wolfe, and Donald R. 

Woodward, Inspectors of the OIG, December 1979, Folder – A/SY 1979 Compliance, Box 2, OIG – Inspection Reports 

and Compliance Files 1977-1984, RG 59 – Lot 90D533, Suitland. 
251

CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

88 Illustrated Chart “Reorganization of Protective Security and Counter-Terrorism Responsibilities,” SY Focus 2/5 (December 

1976): 7. 

89 Organization Chart “SY Organization,” December 1979, enclosed with Memorandum “The Security Function of the 

Department: SY Organization,” Carpenter, Wolfe, and Woodward, December 1979. 

90 Memorandum “The Security Function of the Department: SY Organization,” Carpenter, Wolfe, and Woodward, 

December 1979. Oral History Interview, William D’Urso, 9 May 2005, p. 1. Maclyn Musser, “Division of Technical 

Services,” SY Focus 3/5 (December 1977): 11. 

91 Tim Kelly, “A Look At Policy and Training,” SY Focus 4/2 (April 1978): 1 and 15. Oral History Interview, William 

DeCourcy, 19 May 2005, William D’Urso, 9 May 2005, p. 6. 

92 This observation emerged during interviews with former or current SY/DS agents. Dennis Williams, “Is DS Spelled 

Backwards SY?” DSSAA World, 10 (Fall 1994): 2. Terence J. Shea, “View from the SY Hiring Panel,” SY Focus 1 /2 

(December 1975): 1. “Profiles... Edward V. Hickey,” SY Focus 1/1 (April? 1975): 3-4. 

93 Draft Study, “A Brief History of Women in the Department of State,” Office of the Historian, November 2001, HO Files.

94 Oral History Interview, Patricia Morton, 25 May 2005, conducted by Amy Garrett. “Profiles: Patricia Morton,” SY 

Focus, 3/4 (October 1977): 3-9. 

95 “Something New in the Courier Service!,” The Roadbag, 25 May 1973. Carl E. Lovett, Jr., “The Diplomatic Courier 

Service,” SY Focus 3/1 (February 1977): 14. 

96 Nancy Lestina, “A Woman Agent in SY,” SY Focus 2/1 (February 1976): 5. Conversations with Anonymous (at requests 

of sources), 2005, Notes in HO Files. 

97 Raymond P. Duffy, “The Document and Information Systems Division,” SY Focus 4/1 (February 1978): 6, 8. Oral 

History Interview, George Herrmann, 31 May 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 1. 

98 Duffy, “The Document and Information Systems Division,” SY Focus 4/1 (February 1978): 6, 8. George Herrmann, 

“Something New: Miniaturized Central Stations,” SY Focus 3/2 (April 1977): 3, 9. Herrmann, “Computers Assist in 

Assignment Process,” SY Focus 2/1 (December 1975): 1, 12. 

99 Oral History Interview, George Herrmann, 31 May 2005, p. 1. 

100 R. C. Mallalieu, A Model of the Microwave Intensity Distribution within the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, 1966-1977, 

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University for Fleet Systems Department, 1980), 25-32, 34. Letter, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, 

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, to Representative Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House Committee 

on Government Operations, 12 August 1976, attached to Memorandum “USG Terrorism Policies,” Eagleburger to The 

Open Forum, 27 August 1976, Folder – Policy – General 1975-1977, Box 3, D/CT Office for Combatting Terrorism – 

General Files 1963-1977, RG 59 – Lot 80D132, Suitland. 

101 Mallalieu, A Model of the Microwave Intensity Distribution within the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, 1966-1977, 35-40. 

Letter, Eagleburger to Brooks, 12 August 1976.

102 See Marion Steinmann, “The Waves of the Future?,” New York Times Sunday Magazine, 7 November 1976, pp. 20,80, and 87. 

103 Testimony of Herbert P. Pollack, Office of Medical Services, Department of State, Hearings before the Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 27 June 1977, in U.S. Senate, Radiation Health and Safety, 95th Congress, 1st

Session, 16, 17, 27, 28, and 29 June 1977, pp. 271-283. Letter, Eagleburger to Brooks, 12 August 1976. Oral History 

Interview, Gordon Harvey, 19 December 2005, p. 4. “U.S. Agrees to a Study of Soviet Radiation Effect,” New York Times, 

2 June 1976, p. 20. “Radiation Ruled No Peril to Americans in Moscow,” New York Times, 5 January 1977, p. 16. “U.S. 

Now Lists Moscow as an ‘Unhealthy Post’,” New York Times, 13 November 1976, p. 6. 
252

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

104 Letter, Eagleburger to Brooks, 12 August 1976. Oral History Interview, Gordon Harvey, 19 December 2005, conducted 

by Mark Hove, p. 3. 

105 Letter, Eagleburger to Brooks, 12 August 1976. “Embassy Radiation is Cut in Moscow,” New York Times, 26 April 1976, 

p. 5. Bernard Gwertzman, “Soviet Dims Bean at U.S. Embassy,” New York Times, 8 July 1976, pp. 1, 10. Oral History 

Interview, Bruce Matthews, conducted by Mark Hove, 17 February 2006, p. 8. 

106 Memorandum “Questions Concerning Fire Policy at Embassy Moscow,” Mark Garrison, EUR/SOV, to Dikeos and 

Max Shimp, Safety Officer, 18 November 1976; Fire Safety Inspection Report, American Embassy, Moscow, USSR, 

Department of State Fire Safety Inspection Team, n.d. [after 10 January 1977]; and Memorandum “Fire Policy: Soviet 

Access to Our Chancery,” Arthur D. Harrenan, SY/Foreign Operations, to Philip J. Harrick, Chief of Division of Foreign 

Operations, 9 February 1977; all Folder – Fire 1977 [Moscow], Box 7, DS/ICI/Counter-intelligence Division – Soviet 

Union and ex-Soviet Bloc Counterintelligence Records, 1960-1996, RG 59-Lot 00D312, Suitland.

107 Kevin Klose, “Fire Hits American Embassy,” Washington Post, 27 August 1977, p. A-3. “Moscow Fire Destroys Australian 

Chancellery,” New York Times, 6 August 1976, p. 4. Peter Costigan, “Australians Charge Soviets Put Listening Devices in 

Embassy,” Washington Post, 15 November 1978, p. A-31. 

108 Kevin Klose, “Fire Hits American Embassy,” Washington Post, 27 August 1977, p. A-1 and A-3. Kevin Klose, Soviet 

Firemen in U.S. Embassy without Escort,” Washington Post, 28 August 1977, p. A-1 and A-20. Christopher S. Wren, 

“Fire Hits U.S. Moscow Embassy, Forcing Evacuation,” New York Times, 27 August 1977, p. 2. Letter, Jerome F. Tolson, 

Jr., Regional Security Officer of the U.S. Embassy Moscow, to Dikeos, 6 September 1977, Folder – Fire 1977 [Moscow], 

Box 7, DS/ICI/Counterintelligence Division – Soviet Union and ex-Soviet Bloc Counterintelligence Records, 1960-

1996, RG 59 – 00D312, Suitland. 

109 Wren, “Classified Material Believed Safe in U.S. Embassy Fire in Moscow,” New York Times, 28 August 1977, p. 3. 

Letter, Tolson to Dikeos, 6 September 1977. Letter, Tolson to Dikeos, 14 September 1977; Letter, Tolson to Dikeos, 

20 September 1977; Letter, Tolson to Harrick, 28 November 1977; and Memorandum “Seabee Program Inspection, 29 

November – 4 December 1977,” G. J. Roussos, Officer in Charge, to Chief Petty Officer in Charge Special Projects Seabee 

Team and Chief Petty Officer in Charge Resident Seabee Program, U.S. Embassy Moscow, 9 January 1978; all Folder – 

Fire 1977 [Moscow], Box 7, DS/ICI/Counterintelligence Division – Soviet Union and ex-Soviet Bloc Counterintelligence 

Records, 1960-1996, RG 59 – 00D312, Suitland. 

110 Dusko Doder, “U.S. Publicly Charges Soviets Spied on Mission,” Washington Post, 10 June 1978, p. A10. “U.S. Imposes 

Information Blackout on Bugging of Embassy in Moscow,” New York Times, 3 June 1978, p. 6. Robert Perry, “Moscow 

Embassy Bugging Assessed by U.S. Officials,” Washington Post, 3 June 1978, p. A8. 

111 Doder, “U.S. Publicly Charges Soviets Spied on Mission,” Washington Post, 10 June 1978, p. A-10. “U.S. Imposes 

Information Blackout on Bugging of Embassy in Moscow,” New York Times, 3 June 1978, p. 6. Perry, “Moscow Embassy 

Bugging Assessed by U.S. Officials,” Washington Post, 3 June 1978, p. A-8. Oral History Interview, Alan Herto, 19 

December 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 1. 

112 Memorandum “Inching Towards a New Embassy in Moscow,” Eaton to Spiers, 15 October 1986, p. 1-2. 

113 Memorandum “Inching Towards a New Embassy in Moscow: An Historical Perspective of Soviet-American Negotiations,” 

William Eaton to Ronald I. Spiers, Under Secretary of State for Management, 15 October 1986, enclosed with 

Memorandum “The Moscow Embassy,” Spiers to the Secretary, 15 October 1986, Folder – ASEC – Moscow Embassy 

1989, Box 3, DS Front Office – 1989 Subject Files, RG 59-Lot 90D311, Suitland. 

114 Memorandum “Inching Towards a New Embassy in Moscow,“ Eaton to Spiers, 15 October 1986, pp. 5-7. 

115 Memorandum “Inching Towards a New Embassy in Moscow,” Eaton to Spiers, 15 October 1986, pp. 7-8. Kevin Klose, 

“Cornerstone of New U.S. Embassy Set during Moscow Ceremony,” Washington Post, 15 September 1979, p. A-16. 
253

CHAPTER 6 THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: Terrorism and Diplomatic Security, 1967-1978

116 Memorandum “Terrorism,” Matt Nimet, Office of the Counselor, to Ben H. Read, Under Secretary of State for 

Management, 26 August 1977, enclosed with Memorandum “Terrorism Directed Against Foreign Diplomatic Personnel 

in the United States,” Read to Dikeos, Hansell (L), John Karkashian (M/CT), and Clark (M/MO), 31 August 1977, 

Folder – EPS [Executive Protective Service] 1976-1977, Box 3, D/CT Office for Combatting Terrorism – General Files 

1963-1977, RG 59 – Lot 80D132, Suitland. 

117 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Protection of Foreign Diplomatic Missions, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982, 

Number 97-687, p. 1. Memorandum “Meeting Foreign Dignitaries,” Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, to 

Ambassador Henry Catto, Chief of Protocol, 27 September 1974; and Letter, Ingersoll (David Korn, NEA/ARN), to 

Stuart Knight, Director of the Secret Service, 1 October 1974, attached to Memorandum “Meeting Foreign Dignitaries,” 

Ingersoll to Catto; both Folder – SY 4 Protection/Terrorism, Box 4, A/DUSA Subject Files 1974, RG 59 – Lot 76D71, 

NA. 

118 Letter, Charles W. Yost, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Samuel De Palma, Assistant Secretary of State 

for International Organization Affairs, 8 July 1970; and Abraham D. Beame, Comptroller of the City of New York, to 

President Nixon, 23 July 1970; Leaflet “Where are the Foot Patrolmen,” n.d. [July 1970] attached to Memorandum, 

Joseph F. Glennon to Yost and de Palma, 10 July 1970; Memorandum, Frank G. Meyer, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Administration, to Macomber, 22 September 1970; all Box 1, A/DUSA Subject Files 1970, RG 59 - Lot 72D179, NA.

119 Memorandum “Protection of Foreign Officials and Installations,” John M. Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Administration, to Ambassador Lewis Hoffacker, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combatting 

Terrorism, 9 August 1974; Memorandum “Discussion between State Department and Secret Service on December 4, 

1974, Relative to EPS Responsibilities...,” Acting Special Agent in Charge Wilson Livingood to Assistant Director 

Hill, 4 December 1974, enclosed with Memorandum, “Memorandum of Conversation with Secret Service,” Hoffacker 

to Thomas and Dikeos, 5 December 1974; and Memorandum “Protection of Foreign Officials and Installations (NSC 

4853), George S. Springsteen, Executive Secretary, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Council, 6 

December 1974; all Folder – SY 4 Protection/Terrorism, Box 4, A/DUSA Subject Files 1974, RG 59 – Lot 76D71, NA. 

120 Memorandum “Enrolled Bill H.R. 12. Executive Protective Services,” Jim Cannon, Executive Director of the Domestic 

Council, to President Gerald R. Ford, 28 November 1975, Folder – 11/29/75 H.R. 12, Box 33, Legislation Case Files 

1974-76, White House Records Office, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 

121 U.S. Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, Protection of Foreign Diplomatic Missions, 97th Congress, 2nd

Session, 17 December 1982, Report No. 97-687, p. 1-2. 

122 “Three who saved life of Turkish leader to be honored,” Department of State Newsletter, 191 (June 1977): 3-4. Email 

“Clarification of Roles in Ecevit Attempted Assassination,” David E. Bates to Grace Moe and Robert Downen, forwarded 

to Mark Hove, 2 October 2008. 

123 John Dinges and Saul Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), 195-214, 216-217. Dinges, 

The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: The New Press, 2004), 

156-198, 71-81, 129-134. “Trying to Try the Letelier Killers,” New York Times, 3 February, p. 18; “Letelier Assassination 

Still Hurting U.S. Ties,” New York Times, 10 July 1980, p. A2; “Chile Clears 3 in Letelier Killing,” Washington Post, 19 

September 1981, p. A27, “Letters Say Chile Aided Letelier Murder Figure,” Washington Post, 23 February 1982, p. A1. 

124 Memorandum “Executive Protective Service (EPS) Coverage in New York City,” Robert Lipshutz, Counsel to the President, 

to Thomas J. Kelley, Assistant Director of Protective Operations, Secret Service, 3 February 1977, and Memorandum 

“EPS Duties with United Nations Embassies,” Jody Powell, Spokesman for the President, to Lipshutz, 31 January 1977, 

both enclosed with Memorandum “Executive Protection Service (EPS) Coverage in New York City,” Lipshutz to Rick 

Hutcheson, the White House, 7 February 1977, Folder – EPS [Executive Protective Service] 1976-1977, Box 3, D/CT 

Office for Combatting Terrorism – General Files 1963-1977, RG 59 - Lot 80D132, Suitland. 
254

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

125 Memorandum, “Executive Protective Service (EPS) Protection in New York City,” C. Arthur Borg, Executive Secretary, 

to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 24 February 1977, enclosed with 

Memorandum “Attached Memorandum re EPS Coverage of Diplomatic Mission in New York City,” Thomas to Richard 

M. Moose, Under Secretary of State for Management, 23 February 1977, Folder – Executive Protective Service 1976-77, 

Box 3, D/CT Office for Combatting Terrorism – General Files 1963-1977, RG 59 - Lot 80D132, Suitland. 

126 U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Protection of Foreign Diplomatic Missions, 17 December 1982, 

Report 97-687, p. 3. 

127 William D. D’Urso, “Domestic Dignitary Protection,” SY Focus, 3/3 (June-August 1977): 16. Oral History Interview, 

William D’Urso, 9 May 2005, pp. 3-4, 5-6. Terence Shea, “Fait Accompli—PRS Reorganization,” SY Focus, 4/2 (April 

1978): 6, 14. 

128 Neal H. Petersen, “The Office for Combating Terrorism (M/CT),” HO files. Preliminary Report , Secretary of State’s 

Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, February 1985, Folder – Preliminary Report 2/7/1985, Mark A. Safford files, DS 

Files, Rosslyn. 

129 Petersen, “The Office for Combating Terrorism (M/CT),” HO files. Preliminary Report, Secretary of State’s Advisory 

Panel on Overseas Security, February 1985.

130 Petersen, “The Office for Combatting Terrorism (M/CT).” 
255

CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

Terrorism fundamentally changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During the 1960s and 

early 1970s, terrorists generally targeted individual diplomats for kidnapping. As hostages, the diplomats would 

later be exchanged to obtain money or arms, to secure the release of jailed colleagues, or to draw public attention 

to a cause. By the early 1970s, terrorists became more deadly, killing diplomats if and when they chose. The 

February 1979 mob takeover of the U.S. Embassy in 

Iran marked a profound shift in terrorist tactics, repeated 

in the subsequent attacks on U.S. Embassies in Pakistan, 

Libya, Lebanon, and Kuwait. Terrorists began targeting 

U.S. diplomatic buildings as symbols of the United 

States and sought to wreak as much destruction, injury, 

and death as possible. By doing so, terrorists subverted 

long-held diplomatic customs, such as the inviolability 

of embassies and reliance upon local governments to 

protect diplomats.1

 

Terrorism’s shift from individual diplomats to 

U.S. diplomatic buildings partly resulted because 

well-trained cadres sponsored by rogue states such 

as Iran, Syria, and Libya executed the attacks, 

not the individuals or small groups of a decade 

earlier. Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger 

charged that the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. 

Marine barracks in Beirut was conducted with the 

“sponsorship, knowledge, and authority of the Syrian 

CHAPTER 7

ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION

8

Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

Figure 1: The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq, circa 1975, 

demonstrates several challenges confronting the Security 

Enhancement Program (SEP). Like many embassies, 

the U.S. Embassy Baghdad had low perimeter walls, the 

walls were not solid stone or concrete, parking was allowed 

around the Embassy, and the building was an “open” design 

with large windows. The gates are also left open during 

the day, making the Embassy even more vulnerable. Other 

embassies were located in crowded city centers, making 

SEP upgrades more expensive and more difficult to install. 

Source: Department of State, Office of the Historian Files. 
256

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Government.” In this new milieu, U.S. diplomats and embassies were not just victims of terrorism, but also 

pawns in certain nations’ and groups’ larger political struggles against the United States.2

 

Terrorist attacks in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, and Kuwait accelerated the transformation of the Office of 

Security (SY). As the Department of State responded to the new methods of terrorism, SY transformed into a new 

and larger entity, one that coordinated, implemented, and oversaw the expanding number of security measures 

enforced at U.S. posts overseas. Although the Inman Panel in 1985 would recommend and define that new entity 

as the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, by early 1984, before the Inman Panel was formed, SY was already rapidly 

evolving to the Department’s central entity for diplomatic security. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security 

David C. Fields admitted that he and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Robert E. Lamb were reshaping 

SY: “We were trying to adjust the structure, garner more resources, and change procedures. SY’s role was changing.”3

z Tehran å

Iranian guerrillas attacked the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on February 14, 1979, two weeks after the Ayatollah 

Khomeini had returned to Iran from exile. During the previous year, civil unrest in Iran increased as Iranians 

directed their protests against the repressive rule of Shah Rezi Khan Pahlavi, who had ruled Iran since 1941 and 

had long identified himself as a U.S. ally. In November 1978, a widespread revolt forced the Shah to create 

a military government and ask Shahpour Bakhtiar, a moderate opposition leader, to serve as premier. Unrest 

continued, and upon Bakhtiar’s advice, the Shah relinquished power in January 1979 and fled the country. 

Hostility towards the Shah’s ally, the United States, remained, and U.S. Embassy officials feared and 

anticipated an attack against the Embassy. During January and February 1979, U.S. Ambassador William H. 

Sullivan reduced the number of U.S. personnel at 

the Embassy, and shipped most of the Embassy’s 

classified files to Washington. On February 12, the 

Iranian military unit protecting the U.S. Embassy 

was ordered back to its barracks, leaving only the 

Marine Security Guard detachment to protect the 

Embassy. At 10:30 a.m., on February 14, 75 Iranian 

guerrillas climbed over the compound’s wall, opened 

fire on the chancery, and headed to the Ambassador’s 

residence. Sullivan ordered everyone within the 

chancery to get into the communications vault on 

the second floor (the Embassy’s safehaven). He then 

called the interim Iranian Government and asked 

for assistance. In the vault, Embassy staff shredded 

Figure 2: Iranian rebels supportive of Ayatollah Khomeini 

carry the U.S. flag from the U.S. Embassy compound in 

Tehran on February 14, 1979. The gate to the compound, 

seen behind the flag, stands open. Source: © Associated 

Press. 
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CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

documents and destroyed cryptographic equipment. 

The Marine Security Guards, directed by Regional 

Security Officer (RSO) Rick May, launched a volley 

of tear gas to slow the guerrillas, and were the last to 

enter the vault. An Iranian military force arrived at 

the Embassy to repel the guerrillas, but by then the 

guerrillas had blasted out the chancery’s front door 

and shot up every door on the first floor. The episode 

lasted 2 hours, ending about 1 p.m., and no one was 

injured.4

In the wake of the February attack, SY moved 

quickly to improve physical security at the Embassy 

in Tehran. U.S. officials made major modifications 

to the chancery’s entrances: they added electronic 

surveillance cameras, remote-controlled tear-gas 

devices, and heavy steel doors with automatic alarm 

systems. During the summer of 1979, however, several 

agencies returned many boxes of classified files back to 

the Embassy, creating what one official described as a 

“paper albatross around [the Embassy’s] neck.”5

 

After President Jimmy Carter allowed the Shah 

to enter the United States for medical treatment, 

Iranian students stormed the Embassy on November 

4, 1979, and took 63 Americans as hostages. The 

security modifications provided some time for 

Embassy staff, but former hostage Victor Tomseth 

later remarked that the modifications were “meaningless” when a host government demonstrates an “absence of 

will and capacity” to protect the Embassy in a crisis. The Iranian students soon released 13 hostages; however, 

the students gained access to the large amount of classified files. The Iran Hostage Crisis lasted more than a year, 

involved a disastrous rescue attempt, and concluded with the release of the American hostages on January 20, 

1981, just minutes after Carter turned over Presidential power to Ronald Reagan. 6 

Tehran was not the only location where a mob stormed a U.S. embassy. Two weeks after the start of 

the Iran Hostage Crisis, on November 21, 1979, Pakistani demonstrators emulated the Iranian students and 

stormed the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. In the morning, approximately two busloads of Pakistanis 

Figure 3: A large crowd of Iranian students gather outside 

the gates of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 5, 

1979. The previous day, students stormed the U.S. Embassy 

and took 63 Americans hostage. Source: © Associated 

Press. 
258

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

had demonstrated in front of the Embassy 

but then left. In the afternoon, a much larger 

group returned and began throwing rocks. The 

demonstrators-turned-rioters soon broke through 

the gate and overwhelmed the security perimeters 

of the U.S. Embassy. One Marine Security Guard 

was fatally injured. David C. Fields, the Embassy’s 

Administration Officer, ordered the staff into the 

communications vault that served as the Embassy’s 

safehaven. A mob of more than 1,000 ransacked 

and looted many of the buildings on the Embassy 

compound and set fire to the chancery. After 

several hours, Fields sent a team of five to the roof 

to open the hatch, allowing the staff to climb out 

of the vault.7 

As had occurred in Iran, the Pakistan national 

government was reluctant in coming to the aid of the 

U.S. Embassy. The Pakistani army did not arrive until 

six hours after the incident started. Embassy officials 

believed that many Pakistani officials refused to take 

seriously the U.S. Embassy’s warnings about possible 

trouble in the days prior to the attack. One U.S. 

official admitted that local Pakistani police had never 

dealt with such a large and riotous crowd; furthermore, 

the Pakistani Government had few military units 

available to assist the Americans. In fact, one Pakistani Foreign Ministry official lost an ambassadorship because 

he made concerted efforts to help the Embassy staff during the crisis.8

 

Other groups emulated the Iranian students and mobbed U.S. diplomatic posts elsewhere. Shortly after 

the attack in Islamabad, a Libyan mob “sacked” the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. Just days after the seizure of U.S. 

hostages in Tehran, Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, and burned the U.S. flag.9

The Department of State’s Office of the Inspector General noted that the attacks in the four capitals exposed “the 

vulnerability of our installations to mob violence and the futility of relying on host governments” to fulfill their 

responsibility to protect diplomatic personnel and facilities.10 

Figure 4: One of the U.S. hostages, blindfolded and bound, 

is brought outside the U.S. Embassy. Source: © Associated 

Press. 
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CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

z The Security Enhancement Program (SEP) å

In response to the new threat of mob attacks, the Department immediately ordered all overseas posts to take 

three actions to improve security. First, the mission had to review and update its contingency planning to protect 

its personnel and property. Second, the Department required all posts to reduce non-essential classified file 

holdings to an absolute operational minimum. This, no doubt, resulted from the well-publicized acts of Iranian 

students piecing together shredded classified documents, and the large volume of classified documents that fell 

into students’ hands. Third, the Department instructed posts to contact their host governments and discuss 

protection of the U.S. embassy and its personnel during crisis situations.11 

As another measure, the Department centralized responsibility for post security with the Chief of Mission 

or officer-in-charge, and granted more authority to Regional Security Officers (RSOs) to implement increased 

security. When one senior mission officer rejected additional security measures even though the RSO had ample 

intelligence that the FSO could be a target, the Department told all posts, “key officers . . . are not free to 

ignore the advice” of RSOs. In another instance, a Chief of Mission tried to relinquish the decision to evacuate 

dependents to individual officers. The Department considered this unacceptable and instructed all diplomatic 

and consular posts that the Chief of Mission or acting officer-in-charge would be held accountable for all decisions 

and actions in an emergency.12 

The Department also requested and received 

from Congress a supplemental appropriation for 

an “extensive security enhancement program.” It 

obtained $6.1 million for Fiscal Year (FY) 1980 and 

$35.8 million for FY 1981, as well as other funds, 

for a total appropriation of approximately $200 

million to harden U.S. embassies. The $200 million 

supplemental signifies how much terrorism had 

changed public attitudes about security, particularly 

if one considers that in 1965, the Chairman of the 

House Appropriations Committee complained 

when Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

Security G. Marvin Gentile obtained a $1 million 

appropriation. Even so, the sizeable appropriation 

created a “big fight” within the Department; the 

Foreign Buildings Office (FBO), Operations, and 

the Office of Communications (OC) vied with SY 

for a portion of the funding. Eventually Assistant 

Figure 5: An SY Special Agent (rear left, looking to his left) 

covers Secretary of State Edmund Muskie (standing center 

behind saluting U.S. Air Force Honor Guard) while he 

attends a funeral service at Arlington National Cemetery 

for American aid workers murdered in El Salvador, in early 

January 1981. Vice President Walter Mondale (center 

right) leads the U.S. Government delegation to the service. 

Source: STATE magazine.
260

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Secretary of State for Administration Thomas A. Tracy took control of the funds, and he created the Special 

Program and Liaison Staff (A/SPL) to manage the Security Enhancement Program (SEP). George Jenkins 

was named as head of the division, and John Perdew (who had developed SY’s Command Center) served as 

his deputy.13 

The Security Enhancement Program had four objectives. It worked to harden embassies against mob attacks. 

It tried to provide security in case the host government fell short on its protection responsibilities. SEP also strove 

to ensure that U.S. personnel were not killed or taken hostage. Finally, it sought to prevent national security 

information from being compromised.14 

To implement SEP, A/SPL followed a three-stage procedure. First, it sent a team to the post to do 

a thorough security survey. The team numbered about 15 people and included an SY Special Agent, an 

architect, and officers from FBO, OC, and other foreign affairs and national security agencies. Furthermore, 

one of the team leaders was former SY chief Victor Dikeos. After the security survey, A/SPL contracted the 

security upgrades to a private company, which then completed the required enhancements. FBO supervised 

installation of the security improvements, which included upgrading and reinforcing perimeter barriers, 

erecting impediments to forced entry, and raising interior barriers. Other improvements included elements 

that had worked in Islamabad, such as strengthening the vault/communications room walls, and developing 

a space into a “safehaven” that would protect U.S. personnel for approximately 12 hours. A/SPL also 

installed access denial systems that utilized foam or tear gas, and purchased additional document destruction 

equipment.15 

As a direct result of the SEP, SY began to explore several new technologies to improve embassy security. 

“Centralized electronic storage systems” ( i.e. computers) promised a reduction of paper files, quick destruction 

in a crisis, and rapid reconstruction of post files afterwards. SY also experimented with the Aqueous Foam 

System. When activated, the system dispensed a great amount of soap foam into an area. The soap bubbles 

made everything slippery, and holding tools became very difficult. The system was easier to clean up than tear 

gas (virtually impossible to remove from furniture, drapes, and carpet). The bubbles also refracted light, causing 

individuals to lose their orientation and have difficulty seeing. SY installed Aqueous Foam systems in the U.S. 

Embassies in Ankara, Turkey, and Bogotá, Colombia; however, the system lost favor due to the high maintenance 

that it required.16 

Another project involved strengthening doors at U.S. posts. Because the doors at the Embassies in Iran and 

Pakistan were mostly glass and did little to impede the mobs, SY’s technical engineers tried to design an ideal door. 

The engineers made two determinations. First, they believed that a mob would have hand tools such as pipes, 

sledgehammers, clubs, and crowbars, but would not have fire, drills, saws, or explosives. Second, SY decided that 

the door must withstand attack for at least 15 minutes, time enough for the Marine Security Guard to notify 

everyone in the building and for the staff to retreat to the safehaven.17 
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CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

SY engineers worked with H.P. White Labs to test products. John Wolf, who developed many of the 

Department’s physical security standards, noted two doors that did not survive the testing process. A company 

that often did work for prisons tested its door prototype by having a group of prisoners try to break the door down 

in order to get the case of beer on the other side. The door passed that test; however, when H.P. White personnel, 

assisted by SY’s Franchot White and Russ Waller, tested the door with pry bars and sledgehammers, they broke it 

down in less than 30 seconds. Another company submitted a door prototype that had bullet-resistant glass in the 

top and bottom panels, a door designed primarily for gas stations and convenience stores. H.P. White hired local 

farmers to test it with a sledgehammer. With a single blow, the door fell out of its casing.18

The SEP was never intended nor designed to 

enhance security at all U.S. diplomatic posts across 

the world; rather, it focused on posts considered at 

high risk for terrorism, crime, and other threats. A/

SPL made clear distinctions between a post in Beirut, 

designated as high threat, and a post in Bermuda, 

designated as low threat. A/SPL implemented a 

5-year plan to improve security at 122 selected highrisk posts. Officials had few illusions about the effort 

needed for the SEP: enhancing security at high-risk 

embassies constituted “a long term venture” that 

would require “major funding by the Congress and 

a strong commitment by both the Congress and the 

Department of State.” Ultimately, the SEP received 

little time, funds, and commitment beyond that 

provided by SY.19 

The SEP faced several difficulties from the 

beginning. Although Congress provided funds, 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

did not create any positions for the program. The 

Department had to reallocate 35 positions from 

other offices for SEP, and SEP had to maximize 

the use of contractors and private sector resources. 

Department officials conceded that the scope and 

complexity of the SEP was far greater than any 

previous security program; furthermore, they 

Figure 6: A female Special Agent (left) is alert for threats 

in early 1984 as U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Thomas 

Pickering (foreground) and U.S. Ambassador to the 

United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick (right) view devastation 

resulting from El Salvador’s civil war. A Salvadoran Army 

major (rear center) briefs Pickering and Kirkpatrick. SY’s 

Threat Analysis Division determined the threat matrix 

for each post and designated some as “high threat.” Such 

designations enabled SY, in the early 1980s, to maximize its 

limited resources. Source: Private collection. 
262

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

confessed that their efforts were hampered by the great variation in size, location, age, vulnerability, and 

types of construction of its embassies and consulates. The Department originally told Congress that it could 

harden 25 embassies per year; however, as the surveys and work were undertaken, the figure dropped to 3 

or 4 embassies per year.20 SY and A/SPL additionally had trouble finding products to meet their security 

requirements, and they had to urge private companies to develop such products. For example, high standard 

ballistics glass (as opposed to simple bullet-resistant glass) did not exist when the SEP was initiated. The 

SEP also required A/SPL to coordinate with SY, FBO, and OC; however, a Director headed A/SPL, but 

SY, FBO, and OC each had a Deputy Assistant Secretary. A/SPL therefore lacked sufficient clout to push 

its projects through the Department’s bureaucracy. Moreover, the SEP was initiated during a transition 

of Presidential administrations; in fact, during the 1980 Presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan made the 

reduction of overhead and personnel costs in the federal government a primary goal. In its first year, the 

Reagan Administration reduced SEP’s funding by one-third, and between 1982 and 1984, the scope and 

emphasis of SEP projects were further scaled back, and expectations were downgraded.21 

SEP also faced resistance from Embassy officers in the field, and criticism from the General Accounting 

Office (GAO). The Embassy in Ankara was among the first to receive a comprehensive security survey; however, 

A/SPL confessed, “Senior officials at the post have fought [the SEP] plan from the beginning and have successfully 

delayed implementation.” Embassy officers objected to SEP modifications and requested another survey, even 

though the architect and A/SPL’s director made special trips to Ankara to resolve the impasse.22 When the 

GAO audited the SEP in 1982, it offered a harsh assessment: “State Department officials overestimated the 

number of posts they could improve each year;” furthermore, “inadequate planning, coordination, and property 

management” plagued the program.23 

Despite its difficulties, the SEP laid important foundations for future diplomatic security programs. 

Under the SEP, SY and many Department officials embraced a “total approach” towards security, an attitude 

non-existent before 1979. Also, SY and A/SPL completed extensive groundwork for obtaining better materials 

and equipment, coordinating projects, and determining the various upgrades that each post needed. Likely 

a result of A/SPL’s small staff, SY assumed leadership of the expanded security efforts overseas. SY resolved 

differences among the various agencies, and sponsored inter-agency meetings on overseas security. When the 

Office of Counterterrorism (M/CT) requested information about the status of the SEP at high-risk posts, 

it contacted SY. Moreover, the Reagan Administration reinvigorated and expanded the SEP after the 1983 

bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and the October 1983 attack on the Marine barracks near the Beirut 

airport; it did not create a new program. The SEP did not harden the number of embassies that many had 

hoped, but hopes far exceeded what was possible. Few appreciated the groundbreaking nature of A/SPL’s and 

SY’s activities.24 
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CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

z Protective Security in the United State å

As Department officials improved security at U.S. posts overseas, foreign diplomats and dignitaries grew 

anxious about the protection they received in the United States. In January 1982, two Armenian immigrants 

murdered Turkish Consul General Kemal Arikan in Los Angeles. The group, Justice Commandos of the Armenian 

Genocide, claimed responsibility for the killing, and one member was arrested. The Justice Commandos demanded 

that the Turkish Government admit responsibility for “genocide,” the deaths of more than one million Armenians 

in Turkey in 1915. After the killing, SY asked its field 

offices to work with local law enforcement to ensure 

maximum protection for Turkish establishments and 

personnel. The Department of State spokesman 

commented that the murder was “a sharp reminder 

to all nations of the need to redouble their efforts to 

stamp out the worldwide menace of terrorism.”25

The murder of Arikan resurrected latent concerns 

within the foreign diplomatic community about the 

adequacy of protective security in the United States. 

In a February 11, 1982, letter to Secretary of State 

Alexander Haig, Turkey’s Ambassador to the United 

States, Sukru Elekdag, expressed grave concerns 

about the quality of protection that U.S. officials 

were providing Turkish diplomats and missions. 

Elekdag was particularly upset because Turkish 

officials, despite their relatively scarce resources, had 

made every effort to provide maximum security to 

foreign diplomats and missions within Turkey. In 

a letter to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the 

Ambassador chided the Department for the lack of 

“effective, continuous protection,” and insisted that 

U.S. officials reciprocate Turkish efforts and provide 

more extensive protective security.26 

The Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, 

Daryl F. Gates, also wrote Secretary Haig and raised 

issues similar to those that New York City policemen 

had raised a decade earlier as to why municipal 

Figure 7: Los Angeles Police Chief Darryl Gates. When 

Turkish Consul General Kemal Arikan was killed by 

two Armenians in 1982, Gates wrote Secretary of State 

Alexander Haig, as well as the White House, asserting that 

protection of foreign diplomats in the United States was a 

federal government duty, not a local police responsibility. 

The Foreign Missions Act of 1982 granted the Department 

of State (Office of Security) greater authority to protect 

foreign dignitaries. Source: © Associated Press. 
264

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

resources should be diverted to diplomatic protection and away from metropolitan policing. Gates believed that 

protection of foreign diplomats should be a federal government responsibility, not a local one. Gates also wrote 

William P. Clark, National Security Advisor to President Reagan, and urged him to ask Reagan to find a solution. 

In the Department of State’s response to Gates, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Tracy assured 

Gates that the Department would review his proposal. Meanwhile, Secretary Haig acknowledged the opinion 

among foreign diplomats that the United States had not provided reciprocal protection for visiting dignitaries. 

Moreover, Haig admitted that if the United States failed to provide adequate, reciprocal protection, it would have 

detrimental effects on the United States’ ability to conduct diplomacy and combat terrorism.27 

Foreign diplomats and dignitaries began requesting additional protective security, even when there was not an 

imminent threat, but SY simply did not have the manpower to meet all of the requests. When the United Nations 

held a disarmament conference in June 1982, the number of dignitaries requiring protection far outweighed the 

number of SY Special Agents available for protective details. Consequently, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for Security Marvin L. Garrett, Jr., made clear that if that many SY agents were going to be utilized for protective 

services, then no one in Main State should complain about a lack of services at Main State or about emergency 

responses. To prevent such a situation, Garrett suggested that a high-level protective security review committee 

be created to address protective security requests exceeding SY’s resources. Garrett’s primary goal was to create a 

review mechanism to determine the level of threat that a foreign dignitary faced.28

The Department of State quickly moved to ensure that the necessary authority and resources were available 

to protect foreign dignitaries visiting the United States. In the summer of 1982, the Department asked members 

of the House of Representatives to introduce a bill that would extend protective security to foreign consulates 

outside of the Washington, DC, area. The bill would also grant the Secretary of State the authority to request 

extraordinary protective services for foreign consular personnel from state and local police forces, and the ability 

to pay for such services. Department officials believed that there was a chance that Congress might grant the 

Department responsibility for protection of all missions and consulates in the United States. However, they 

concluded that the cost of reimbursing local police forces for such protection would likely deter Congress from 

granting the Department this responsibility.29

After debates and hearings, Congress passed the bill, titled the Foreign Missions Act of 1982. The Act increased 

SY’s authority for protecting foreign diplomats. It also gave the Department of State authority to reimburse or 

contract protection for foreign embassies in Washington, DC, and for consular officers and personnel elsewhere 

in the United States (this became the Foreign Consulate Program).30 The Secret Service contested the authority 

by reminding Congress that in 1974, it had given specific responsibilities to the Treasury Department (the Secret 

Service) to protect diplomats within the Washington, DC, area. The Foreign Missions Amendment Act of 1983 

called for a new regulation to be issued after consultation with appropriate committees of the Congress, but the 

process soon bogged down.31
265

CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

On January 4, 1983, Congress also passed Public Law 97-418. This act expanded the authority of the U.S. 

Secret Service Uniformed Division (formerly the Executive Protective Service, and renamed on November 15, 

1977), allowing it to protect motorcades and other places associated with visits of certain foreign diplomatic 

missions. The law granted additional funds to the Department of State and local governments so that they 

could assist with protection. The law also directed the Departments of State and the Treasury to consult with the 

Secretary of the Navy regarding the use of Marine Security Guards at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.32

Although Congress created the Foreign Consulate Program in 1982, it had not granted the funds needed to 

reimburse state and local authorities. Consequently, the Department of State began drafting legislation in early 

1984 to earmark appropriations for this purpose and to transfer authority to grant such funding to the Secretary of 

State from the Secretary of the Treasury. The Department and Congress soon debated the term equal protection of the 

law versus extraordinary protection, and over compliance between SY and the Secret Service’s Uniformed Division. 

Ambassador Robert M. Sayre, who headed M/CT, made clear to Congress that while the Department agreed 

that the Constitution provided “equal protection of the law” to all persons within state and local jurisdiction, the 

Department’s request to Congress went beyond that 

obligation. The Department requested protective 

security for foreign dignitaries when there was 

reason to believe that the dignitary was threatened; 

therefore, the inclusion of the word “extraordinary” 

was necessary in the legislation.33

In March 1984, Sayre crafted a deal with 

Congress. Congress agreed that the U.S. Government 

had an obligation to provide protective security 

for foreign officials that went beyond the equal 

protection provision of the Constitution; meanwhile, 

the Department of State agreed to restrict how such 

funding would be used. The Secretary of State would 

not grant protective security services unless a specific 

threat existed against a person and/or facility. The 

Secretary also assumed responsibility for reimbursing 

New York City for protective services. On May 

23, 1984, President Reagan gave further protective 

authority to the Department when he signed 

Executive Order 12478. E.O. 12478 granted the 

Secretary the authority to reimburse state and local 

Figure 8: SY Special Agents (second from left and second 

from right) accompany Secretary of State Alexander Haig 

and Great Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 

upon her arrival in Washington, D.C,. in February 

1981. After discussions with the Department of State, 

Congress agreed that the Department needed to provide 

“extraordinary” protection because some foreign diplomats 

and dignitaries faced serious threats. On May 23, 1984, 

President Reagan signed Executive Order 12478, which 

allowed the Department of State to reimburse local and 

state police for protective security of foreign diplomats. 

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
266

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

governments for protection given to foreign missions. The changes largely resolved the protective security issues 

that had plagued the Department since the 1960s.34 

z The Moscow Embassy Again å

Security concerns also plagued the soon-to-be-constructed U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and officials worked to 

improve security at the construction site. On June 30, 1979, the United States signed a contract with the Soviet 

firm SVSI to construct the new embassy; however, U.S. officials had no intention of repeating the experience 

of the 1953 renovation, when the Soviets denied U.S. officials access to the site and placed tarpaulins over the 

structure to prevent observation of the renovation. As one Department official admitted, it was “a foregone 

conclusion...that the Soviets will attempt to install one or more clandestine listening systems.”35 

To prevent technical penetration of the new embassy, the Department, with the assistance of the Seabees 

and the Army Corps of Engineers, conducted extensive surveillance of the construction site. The Army Corps 

of Engineers provided an electrical engineer, a mechanical engineer, an architect, and a logistics scheduler to 

assist with the construction. More than 30 Seabees conducted surveillance and worked at the site; many of 

them would build the restricted areas of the embassy (e.g. the communications vault). Department officials also 

assigned an FBO project management team, at least 2 Security Engineering Officers (SEOs) from SY, and 9-10 

Marine Security Guards, the latter of which provided two guards on watch at all times at the construction site. 

The Department conducted numerous inspections of the construction, and SY set up perimeter fences, perimeter 

alarms, closed-circuit television, microwave alarms, infrared vision devices, and fiber-optic probe viewers for 

extensive surveillance during construction.36 

z Protecting U.S. Personnel Overseas å

As construction of the Moscow Embassy proceeded, U.S.-Soviet relations were strained by the killing of the 

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs. On the morning of February 14, 1979, four Afghan terrorists 

stopped the Ambassador’s car and abducted him as he was traveling from his residence to the Embassy. By 

8:50 a.m., the terrorists had taken Dubs to a second floor room in the Kabul Hotel. Afghan police, with Soviet 

advisers, surrounded and isolated the room, with snipers placed on the roofs of nearby buildings. During the 

hostage situation, Afghan officials excluded U.S. Embassy officials and kept those U.S. officers present at the hotel 

at a distance. Despite U.S. Embassy urgings to engage in “patient negotiations,” Afghan police stormed the room 

just after noon, and shots were fired. When U.S. Embassy officers were able to enter the room, they found the 

Ambassador dead from several gunshots.37 

Several questions arose from Dubs’ death, not the least of which was the role of the Soviet advisors in the 

crisis. Upon receipt of the official report from the Marxist-oriented Afghan Government, U.S. officials deemed 

it “incomplete, misleading, and inaccurate.” The Afghan Government refused to cooperate in clarifying the 
267

CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

circumstances of Dubs’ death, and U.S. officials 

could not obtain information on the identities or 

associations of the terrorists. The report also contained 

several discrepancies. It said that Afghan police 

heard gunshots before they stormed the room; U.S. 

Embassy officers at the scene denied this. Although 

four terrorists abducted the Ambassador, only three 

were killed and captured. The report did not mention 

the Soviet advisers at the scene, even though U.S. 

officials saw them playing an “operational role.” 

After the United States lodged official protests, the 

Soviet Government acknowledged the presence of 

Soviet representatives at the hotel, but claimed that 

they “had nothing to do with the decisions of Afghan 

authorities.” Many of the Department’s questions 

remain unanswered.38 

Department officials also had grown 

particularly concerned about the security of U.S. 

personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Since 

the 1976 murder of U.S. Ambassador Francis 

Meloy, the Department had kept a close watch on 

the safety of U.S. personnel in Lebanon, and had 

nearly closed the mission in mid-1976. During 

the late 1970s, the Embassy came under repeated 

fire, ranging from small arms fire to rocket attacks. 

SEP improvements scheduled for the high-risk post were repeatedly revised, and incurred significant delays. 

In a September 1982 review, John Perdew of A/SPL observed, “Given the war conditions, the shortage of 

construction materials, and other logistic problems of working in Beirut, it is uncertain how long it will be 

before we can begin the construction project.”39 

The Beirut SEP project illustrates how local factors often impeded completion of security enhancements. 

Local factors ranged from the civil war conditions in Beirut, to the Soviet military presence in Kabul, to the 

inability to reach agreement with the landlord in Tegucigalpa. In Kampala, Uganda, where the U.S. Embassy 

building was owned by the United Kingdom, British officials refused to grant the Department permission to 

“harden” the Embassy.40 

Figure 9: U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs. 

Dubs was kidnapped in 1979 and later killed when 

Afghan police stormed the room where he was held. Many 

questions remained about the kidnappers and the role of 

Soviet advisers to the Afghan police during the incident. 

Source: Department of State Records, National Archives 

and Records Administration. 
268

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

SY officials also expressed concern about the ability of an embassy’s staff to manage the growing number 

of security programs and efforts. Holsey Handyside, the Action Officer for High-Threat Posts, noted that most 

RSOs and Administrative Officers had not been asked to manage such large quantities of resources. For example, 

the security program at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador in early 1983 involved 110-120 people and cost $1 

million per year. Furthermore, the new measures and equipment required more training and management, basic 

behavioral changes from post staff, and time for the staff to “digest” and “assimilate” them. Handyside urged the 

Department to continue pressuring all posts to “think security.”41 

z Rejecting a Single Bureau å

As the magnitude of the security measures and efforts became apparent in early 1982, Department officials 

rejected the idea of moving all of the Department’s security-related programs and offices into a single bureau. 

Richard T. Kennedy, the Under Secretary of State for Management, convened a senior level task force to review 

the status of the Department’s security-related programs in order to recommend improvements. The task force 

concluded that it saw no benefit in placing all security 

efforts and programs into one organization; instead, 

it recommended that Kennedy appoint someone to 

coordinate security efforts without “interfering with 

operations.” Kennedy appointed Ambassador Robert 

M. Sayre, Director of M/CT, whose office had recently 

(January 1982) been moved back into the Bureau of 

Management. The task force also reviewed the SEP 

and admitted that SEP faced problems, but it insisted 

that intra-agency and inter-departmental cooperation 

and coordination were not among them.42 

One year later, the Working Group on the 

Enhancement of Security at U.S. Embassies Overseas 

reviewed the SEP and other Department security 

efforts. Headed by SY Director Marvin Garrett, 

the Working Group determined that sufficient 

interagency consultation and coordination on 

security matters existed. The Group found that the 

“main problem” with enhancing security overseas was 

“the insufficiency of resources” being provided by 

Congress, OMB, and the Department.43 

Figure 10: Marvin Garrett, Director of the Office of 

Security, 1982-1983. Garrett headed SY during a period 

of rapidly rising security demands and limited resources. 

He chaired the Working Group on the Enhancement of 

Embassies Overseas, which was an example of how SEP 

contributed to centralizing security-related tasks in SY. 

Source: SY Focus. 
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CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

Even though Department officials rejected creating a single security bureau, the Department’s security 

responsibilities, measures, and programs were already concentrating under SY. SY’s Threat Analysis Group (SY/

TAG) prepared the “threat category list,” which determined which posts were high risk, and thus received SEP 

improvements.44 SY worked closely with M/CT to coordinate Department security efforts. Garrett chaired 

the Working Group on the Enhancement of Security at U.S. Embassies Overseas. He (or his representative) 

also sat on or headed other groups, task forces, and committees related to post security.45 SY officials, including 

former SY head Victor Dikeos, were part of the security survey teams. The RSOs, Post Security Officers (PSOs), 

Marine Security Guards, and SEOs were responsible for the physical and operational security of the posts; they 

implemented and installed the new security measures and equipment, and often conducted security training. 

Regional security technicians, Seabees, and post 

communicators were swamped with installing and 

maintaining the new security equipment purchased 

and distributed by the SEP. Therefore, en totum, the 

emphasis on physical security overseas was placing 

greater demands and responsibilities upon SY, 

straining the office’s resources and structure.46 

z Beirut I: New Method å

The 1983 suicide bombing in Beirut increased 

the already burgeoning demands upon SY and its 

personnel. The radical aspect of the attack, one 

which no one anticipated, was that the driver of the 

vehicle was willing to commit suicide in the process 

of the attack. On April 18, just after 1 p.m., a suicide 

bomber drove a one-half-ton black pick-up truck 

laden with approximately 2,000 pounds of TNT 

to the east entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. 

The driver crashed the vehicle through the wall of 

the Lebanese Internal Security Forces guardroom 

before detonating his bomb. The blast collapsed the 

building’s entryway and a portion of the building 

itself, killing 86 people, including 17 Americans, 

and injuring over 100. Shortly after the bombing, 

officers at the Beirut Embassy wrote: “We were all 

Figure 11: A Marine stands guard as rescue workers search 

the rubble of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. On April 18, 

1983, a suicide bomber drove a pickup truck to the east 

entrance of the Embassy, where the truck exploded. It was 

the first instance of a suicide bomber attacking a U.S. 

diplomatic post. Source: © Associated Press. 
270

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

shocked by the size and intensity of the blast; the fact 

of an attack was not really a surprise.” Richard M. 

Gannon, the security officer at the Embassy, said that 

car bombs were common in the Lebanese capital, and 

that “the prospect of a car bomb deployed against the 

embassy had been considered sufficiently real” that 

Lebanese police refused to allow vehicles to park near 

the Embassy. Shortly after the bombing, SY’s Threat 

Analysis Group (TAG) sent a telegram to several 

high-risk embassies, warning them that a “martyrdom 

complex” was emerging among Palestinian and 

other Near East and Asian groups. “In the past few 

years,” wrote TAG, “there appears to be an increasing 

tendency to carry out operations for the sole purpose 

of the act itself, with no regard for whether the perpetrator lives or dies in committing the act.”47 

In its response to the Beirut bombing, SY enacted several security improvements. It evacuated all Beirut 

Embassy personnel to the British Embassy and the Durraford Buildings, an apartment complex leased by the U.S. 

Government. Within 30 minutes after the explosion, SY and the Marines increased perimeter security around 

U.S. facilities in Beirut; and then added bollards, sandbags, and anti-vehicle devices to limit access. Protective 

Services increased the personnel on the Ambassador’s protective detail and post operations. Marines from the 

Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), a combat unit that was serving as part of the Multinational Force sent to 

Lebanon, set up and manned checkpoints on all access roads to the Durraford Buildings and British Embassy. The 

MAU assigned investigators to the dumping area, where the Embassy’s debris was screened for classified materials 

and passport and visa plates lost in the explosion.48 

Immediately after the bombing, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee offered to provide 

funds to improve security at U.S. overseas posts. Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) said, “I would like to see us have 

whatever force is necessary to protect our embassies.” “If it takes a small army in places like Iran and places like 

Beirut,” he added, “my sense is that Congress would support whatever it costs.” Secretary of State George Shultz 

said that he would “review” the Department’s “security arrangements.”49 

Behind the scenes, SY and Bureau of Administration officials quickly initiated and implemented an “enhanced” 

SEP. The Bureau of Administration compiled a list of 64 posts that faced long-term threats and required immediate 

projects to improve security. The 64 posts were designated as the focus of the SEP. Another 28 posts not placed 

on the SEP list but still requiring security upgrades received funding through the Department’s regional bureaus. 

By June, just eight weeks after the Beirut bombing, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Tracy told the 

Figure 12: A view from the street of the U.S. Embassy in 

Beirut after the April 18, 1983, bombing. Source: © 

Associated Press. 
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CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the Department was working on about 40 of the original list of 64, and 

was giving priority to a “top tier” of 26 posts. Of those 26, said Tracy, the Department had completed security 

improvements on 10 or 12.50 

 Then, on October 23, 1983, six months after the Beirut bombing, a terrorist bombing rocked the U.S. 

Marine headquarters in Beirut. A suicide truck bomber crashed through the gates of the command center used by 

international peacekeeping forces. The subsequent explosion reduced two buildings to rubble, left a 30-foot deep 

crater, and killed 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French paratroopers. After the attack, Lieutenant Colonel Philippe 

de Longeaux of the French forces in Lebanon remarked that “real security is not possible” in Beirut. Congress 

promptly questioned the security measures in place; meanwhile, Secretary Shultz told reporters, “the emphasis on 

security will have to be heightened very significantly.”51

Following the Marine Barracks bombing, the Department submitted and received approval for another 

appropriation request from Congress, enabling SY to make significant progress in improving embassy security by 

late 1983. The new funding allowed projects such as reinforcement of the gate at the U.S. Embassy compound in 

Kuwait to go forward in early December.52 SY worked with local governments to restrict access to U.S. embassies, 

particularly entrances and on-street parking near the embassy. SY implemented several measures to limit the risk 

of vehicle bomb attacks worldwide, including screening vehicles, constructing perimeter walls, hiring more local 

guards, and installing fences, gates, bollards, and vehicle arrest systems. SY approved 81 physical security projects, 

conducted physical security surveys at 33 posts, and spent $3.5 million on 13 new armored vehicles and weapons 

for posts in need. SY obtained equipment for public access control projects at 31 western European posts, and 

it reviewed architectural and engineering drawings 

for security enhancement projects at 25 embassies. 

Moreover, SY, FBO, and A/SPL established a 

mechanism to accelerate the Department’s response 

to post requests for security enhancements. SY 

also established long-term procedures (likely in 

cooperation with FBO) such as more rigid site 

selection for post buildings, construction of freestanding buildings, and larger compounds.53 

In the wake of the Beirut bombings, the 

Working Group on Enhancement of Security at 

U.S. Embassies Overseas gained new relevance. 

Formed just days before the first Beirut bombing, 

the Working Group was created by the Interagency 

Group for Countermeasures (IG/CM). Headed by 

Figure 13: British soldiers assist in rescue operations at the 

U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, after a suicide 

bomber crashed a truck through the gates on October 23, 

1983. The explosion killed 241 U.S. Marines and 58 

French paratroopers, and left a crater 30 feet deep. Source: 

© Associated Press. 
272

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

SY, the Working Group’s members were from SY and other foreign affairs agencies, as well as FBO, OC, and the 

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). During the Working Group’s first meeting in May 1983, it identified 

four goals: 1) moving existing high-threat posts to free-standing buildings; 2) acquiring sufficient land to build 

free-standing posts; 3) using only U.S. personnel to repair a post’s attic, roof, façade, and other sensitive areas; 

and 4) working toward building at least one acoustic or treated conference room for each post.54 The IG/CM 

suggested that the Working Group establish policy guidelines for the entire federal government, and one year later, 

the SY-led group issued a formal policy statement on embassy security that circulated in the Department of State 

and the National Security Council. The statement not only elevated the Working Group’s four goals to policy 

aims of the U.S. Government, but added several other objectives to the federal agenda. These included assigning 

Marine Security Guards to every U.S. embassy, and ensuring the security of word processing, communications, 

and information systems. The Working Group then disbanded, and the Overseas Security Policy Group and the 

Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee continued its efforts. 55 

The surprising element of the Working Group was that M/CT was not included, even though Sayre was 

charged with coordinating the Department’s security policies. The omission indicated that, on a practical 

level, SY, not M/CT, was managing the SEP and the Department’s other security matters. SY’s Threat Analysis 

Group prepared threat alerts for the field, and coordinated with INR, M/CT, regional bureaus, and other 

intelligence agencies in preparing the alerts.56 In truth, Sayre did not have the personnel to direct counterterrorism policy and coordinate security policies and programs. M/CT’s staff numbered 13 officers and 6 

secretaries. In comparison, SY’s Threat Analysis Group alone had 8 officers and 2 secretaries, and SY as an 

entity had 436 people.57 

Yet SY also lacked the staff to meet the growing security demands. After only a few weeks on the job, David 

C. Fields, who replaced Marvin Garrett as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, admitted that SY was “hardpressed to handle its traditional responsibilities and growing demands.” In fact, in addition to 30 vacancies, SY 

experienced a decline in staff between 1980 and 1982. In order to free resources for the new security demands 

that it faced, SY, in 1982, “surrendered, with qualms,” its long-held task of conducting background investigations 

of applicants for civil service jobs to the Office of Personnel Management.58 

Just before Marvin Garrett departed as the head of SY, he formulated a proposal that would increase funding 

for embassy security and provide more staff for SY. Garrett’s proposal was to be submitted to Congress in 1983, 

no doubt to take advantage of Congress’s expressed interest in improving physical security. Assistant Secretary 

Tracy and Under Secretary Jerome W. Van Gorkom instead chose to submit Garrett’s proposal as a supplemental 

request in 1984, after Congress had taken up the Department’s appropriation bill. Sayre, meanwhile, sought 

to shelve Garrett’s proposal altogether and have SY, FBO, and OC directed to work with M/CT and others to 

formulate a new proposal.59 
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CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

z To Kuwait and Back Again å

 The December 12, 1983, terrorist attack on the U.S. and French Embassies in Kuwait led to a substantial 

enhancement of SY and a thorough reconsideration by the Department about how to manage security. During 

the Kuwait City attack, two men crashed a dump truck packed with explosives through the gate of the U.S. 

Embassy compound, and it exploded next to the U.S. Consulate building. No Americans were killed, but the 

Consulate was destroyed and the chancery heavily damaged, despite the fact that the Embassy had taken measures 

to limit vehicular access.60 

Department officials determined that the bombing, the third major attack on a U.S. facility in the Middle 

East since April, constituted “a marked escalation in the security threat” to U.S. posts in the region. On December 

16, the Department ordered its embassies to erect barricades or take measures to prevent further truck bomb 

explosions. Department officials also decided to move the U.S. Embassy in Beirut to the east (Christian) side of 

the city. Since the move cost significantly less than completing the new Embassy in West Beirut, the Department 

shifted the remaining funds to acquire and build more permanent and secure facilities in other regional posts, 

namely Amman, Jordan; Sana’a, Yemen; Manama, Bahrain; and Muscat, Oman. Department officials now 

embraced the idea that free-standing buildings and larger compounds were a necessity.61 

The Kuwait City bombing and the new attitude about security in the Department undercut Sayre’s efforts 

to shelve Garret’s proposal, primarily because Sayre’s recommendations seemed inadequate to the severity of the 

threat confronting U.S. posts. Sayre favored “common-sense, less dramatic and less costly” measures for improving 

embassy security: expanding the Marine Security Guard program to all embassies, constructing better perimeters 

for missions, assigning more security officers to posts, and purchasing additional armored vehicles. However, he 

believed the cost for free-standing buildings and larger compounds to be excessive.62 SY, with FBO and others, 

however, had already extensively developed in other forums the idea of free-standing embassy buildings and larger 

compounds as long-term policy goals for the U.S. Government. The Kuwait City bombing accelerated acceptance 

of SY/FBO’s ideas and shifted greater responsibility for coordination of security measures onto the shoulders of 

SY. 

Despite Sayre’s assertion that SY did not have the resources to augment embassy security, SY always seemed 

to find resources when it needed them. Often, SY responded by using what it had, shifting resources, and 

coordinating inter-agency or inter-departmental assistance. In early 1984, SY had five security officers engaged in 

overseas emergency situations. When the U.S. Embassy and personnel in Guatemala faced a threatened terrorist 

attack, SY quickly sent a security officer and eight additional Marine Security Guards to the Central American 

capital. M/CT, meanwhile, arranged for a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) team to go to Guatemala; 

but when the team arrived in Guatemala City, the Embassy’s RSO coordinated and integrated the JSOC team 

into the Embassy’s MSG detail. In fact, Deputy Assistant Secretary Fields informed Sayre that SY had drastically 

reduced the role of JSOC teams and that they would eventually be phased out. Just nine months after the first 
274

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Beirut bombing, Fields and SY largely and effectively had shouldered the coordination of the SEP and other 

Department security programs. In fact, Sayre likely recognized that coordination had drifted to SY when he 

informed his staff that he was “taking steps” to ensure that M/CT was “at least an info recipient” of message traffic 

on security improvements and enhancements.63 

Under Garrett and Fields, SY gained responsibilities; meanwhile, M/CT lacked the resources to carry out 

its assigned functions. In January 1984, SY instructed its RSOs to submit monthly reports on crimes committed 

against members of the U.S. missions they served. SY also, at the request of Sayre, assisted with M/CT’s AntiTerrorism Assistance program (ATA). ATA had been created in 1981 with five goals in mind: enrich law 

enforcement skills of foreign police forces and provide equipment; strengthen bilateral relations with friendly 

governments; promote cooperation between foreign police forces and the U.S. Government; raise the level of 

respect for human rights; and assist foreign governments in protecting American installations. When ATA was 

finally funded in early 1984, M/CT, due to its lack 

of resources, sought SY’s help. Fields welcomed M/

CT’s appeal. He later thanked M/CT for supporting 

the addition of eight new SY officers who would 

enable SY to establish a meaningful training program 

for foreign police and create “a ready reserve pool 

to provide short-term training for Foreign Service 

personnel at critical posts.”64 

z Enhancing SY å

After the Kuwait bombing, the Department 

of State pushed several initiatives to restructure 

the Department’s organization regarding security. 

One initiative was the Inman Panel. Conceived in 

early March 1984 by Under Secretary of State for 

Management Ronald Spiers, the panel would examine 

potential security improvements and recommend 

necessary changes. Several senior Department officers 

believed that the Department needed to take more 

dramatic action; otherwise, it was exposing itself to 

“second guessing and accusations” that it had no 

strategy for the terrorist threat other than requesting 

supplemental appropriations from Congress. In a 

Figure 14: Under Secretary of State for Management 

Ronald Spiers. Spiers was very supportive of efforts to 

improve security and expand SY. He proposed to Secretary 

of State Shultz the idea of having a committee of esteemed 

individuals examine diplomatic security for the Department 

of State. The committee became the Inman Panel. Source: 

Department of State Records, National Archives and 

Records Administration. 
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CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

memorandum to Secretary Shultz, Spiers proposed convening a group of seven esteemed Department of State, 

Congressional, and business leaders to undertake “a new, comprehensive examination of [the Department’s] 

security strategy.” Among the luminaries Spiers suggested were former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, former Senate 

Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Ambassador Shirley Temple Black, Chrysler Motors Chairman Lee Iacocca, 

and former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. Shultz immediately liked the idea, and recommended 

that the panel be given “a limited but reasonable time to complete” their examination. Before moving ahead, 

Shultz discussed the idea with Fields, Sayre, and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Robert E. Lamb. 

In July 1984, retired Admiral B. R. “Bobby” Inman 

agreed to serve as the panel’s chair, and in August, 

Victor Dikeos, former head of SY, agreed to serve as 

the panel’s Executive Secretary.65 

The final membership of the panel included 

few of the individuals on Spiers’ original list, but 

it remained a highly respected group. In addition 

to Inman and Dikeos, Senator Warren Rudman 

(R-NH) and Congressman Daniel Mica (D-FL) 

represented Congress. Former Under Secretary 

of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger 

represented the Department of State; Lieutenant 

General D’Wayne Gray, Chief of Staff of the U.S. 

Marine Corps, represented the Department of 

Defense; and Anne Armstrong, chair of the President’s 

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, represented the 

intelligence community. Robert McGuire, Chairman 

of the Board for Pinkerton’s, served as the panel’s sole 

private sector member.66 

While the Department was assembling the 

Inman Panel, Fields put forward two proposals in 

June 1984 that would create an “enhanced,” larger 

Office of Security. One proposal, offered jointly with 

FBO, suggested that the Bureau of Administration 

disband A/SPL and divide A/SPL’s positions between 

SY and FBO. The Bureau of Administration could 

then create an “Inter-departmental Committee on 

Figure 15: David Fields, Director of the Office of Security, 

1984-1985; first Director of the Diplomatic Security 

Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1985-1986. Fields 

became the head of SY just after the December 1983 

Kuwait City bombing, and quickly worked to increase SY’s 

staff and resources. Fields also presented two proposals for 

the “Acceleration of Security Programs,” which would have 

extensively expanded SY and centralized the Department 

of State’s security programs in SY. Fields’ ideas were 

embraced by his superiors, which resulted in a much larger, 

more powerful SY prior to creation of the new Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security (DS). Even if the Inman Panel had 

not recommended the formation of a new bureau, Fields 

and his proposals were essentially creating such a bureau. 

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
276

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Physical Security” under the leadership of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, and the committee 

would supervise SEP projects and provide direction and long-range guidance to the Department’s physical security 

program. With this proposal, Fields was formalizing what was already occurring: management, oversight, and 

coordination of the SEP and embassy security was being accomplished by SY.67 

Fields’ other proposal, put forward on June 12, 1984, was innocuously titled “Acceleration of Security Programs 

of Department of State;” however, it proposed a much larger, restructured SY and set an ambitious agenda for 

embassy security over the next several years. Since the Department “has accumulated a body of experience and a 

growing cadre of experts,” the proposal argued, it was time to increase the personnel and material resources to carry 

out embassy security improvements. The Acceleration program delineated three categories of work: “extension to 

all posts...[of] the level of security now afforded the high threat posts,” “replacement of facilities not adequately 

securable” [85 posts], and provision for “on-going service and maintenance to derive maximum benefit from our 

security of overseas missions.” To complete the work in the three categories, SY requested 489 new people (which 

would double its size), plus an additional 275 Marine Security Guards and 100 Seabees, as well as $670 million in 

funding and another $1.438 billion to construct 85 new office buildings overseas.68 

If the sheer numbers were not enough, the Acceleration program clearly indicated that not only would 

SY become a very large component in the Department’s bureaucracy, but it also would be the lead agency on 

diplomatic security. Fields’ proposal made clear that SY would assume control over, if not absorb, some M/

CT programs, such as the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program and Emergency Action Planning (EAP). The 

Acceleration program also arranged for SY to obtain the funding for the Department’s Rewards for Information 

program, recently created by the Payment of Rewards 

for Information Act.69 

The parameters of the Acceleration 

program demonstrate that SY and the Bureau of 

Administration officials were dissatisfied with the 

existing organizational structure and now sought 

a single security bureau to enact and coordinate 

improvements in overseas security. An important 

reason for the shift in attitude was change in personnel 

in the upper echelons of the Department. Sayre had 

received his responsibilities for coordinating security 

policy from Under Secretary of State for Management 

Van Gorkom and Under Secretary of State for 

Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger; however, by 

May 1984, Ronald Spiers had replaced Van Gorkom 

Figure 16: SY Special Agents (front right, and left rear 

with black necktie) provide security for Queen Noor of 

Jordan (wearing headscarf) during her April 1985 visit to 

the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Source: 

Private collection. 
277

CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

and Eagleburger had left the Department. In November 1983, Garrett received little support for his proposal 

from Van Gorkom and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Thomas Tracy; yet, seven months later, 

Fields found sympathy for a stronger, centralized SY among Spiers and new Assistant Secretary for Administration 

Robert Lamb. As Spiers told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “we have had some coordination problems 

within the State Department, and...this is what led me to be a very frustrated Ambassador overseas” (Spiers had 

served as Ambassador to Turkey and to Pakistan).70 

Another reason for the shift to creating a single security entity was the number of other agencies that now had 

representatives at U.S. embassies and consulates overseas. Since the 1950s, the number of agencies represented at 

a given embassy or consulate had increased markedly; moreover, the various agencies had differing security needs. 

This resulted in “a degree of incoherence” in trying to provide for security at the posts. As SY’s Acceleration 

proposal noted, “The multiple survey teams, funding sources, approval chains, and supply conduits contribute[d] 

to confusion and bureaucratic maneuvering which complicates and frequently slows the improvement process.” 

SY’s proposed program asked the Department to seek the National Security Council’s approval for centralizing 

overseas security in the Department, specifically in SY, and having all agencies put their security requirements in 

writing and submit them to the Department.71 

Department officials were sympathetic to both SY proposals. In fact, by August, they had acted on one 

of them: the inter-departmental committee on physical security. This emerged as the Overseas Security Policy 

Group, and SY’s Deputy Assistant Secretary chaired it.72 The support for the Acceleration program reveals that 

leading officials in the Office of Management and the Bureau of Administration were already contemplating and 

establishing some form of an “enhanced” SY in the summer of 1984, well before the Inman Panel had begun its 

work. The SEP and the bombings in Beirut and Kuwait had generated such an emphasis on embassy physical 

security that existing bureaucratic structures in the Department strained to meet the demand. Administration 

officials sought to resolve these problems by centralizing diplomatic security into one entity. SY was the obvious 

candidate; moreover, with Fields at the helm, SY was asking for the responsibility. The centralization included 

moving M/CT’s ATA and EAP programs, the Rewards for Information program, and A/SPL under the control 

of SY. The Acceleration program altered the bureaucracy to coincide with existing practice and to keep pace 

with evolving international circumstances. The program strove to “enhance” SY and outlined the structure of an 

“Office of Diplomatic Security.” The question was whether Congress, the White House, and OMB would accept 

the ambitious program. 

z The Moscow Typewriters å

While the Department was moving to enact SY’s two proposals, the 1984 discovery of Soviet bugs in 

typewriters at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow prompted further scrutiny and criticism of the Department. The 

discoveries pushed Department officials to adopt a more aggressive technical security program and encouraged the 
278

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

movement toward an enhanced security office. The 

discoveries also suggested a possible purpose for the 

chimney antenna that SY engineers had discovered 

in 1978. 

In 1983, French intelligence informed U.S. 

officials that the Soviets might have planted a bug 

in the U.S. Embassy’s communications system. The 

French had found a Soviet bug in one of their coding 

machines. A data storage device that transmitted a 

signal only intermittently, the new Soviet bug could 

be quickly and easily installed, resisted detection by 

conventional methods, and was controlled remotely 

and wirelessly. Working with other agencies, the 

National Security Agency (NSA) presented the 

news to President Ronald Reagan and proposed “Operation Gunman,” which sought to replace all information 

and communications processing equipment at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, more than 20,000 pounds total. 

Reagan approved Operation Gunman, and the NSA found 16 IBM typewriters containing bugs similar to the 

device that the French had found. The devices could record and transmit keystroke sounds to Soviet monitoring 

equipment.73 

The typewriter finds proved alarming, in 

part because SY was unsure how extensively the 

Soviets had penetrated the Embassy. In response, 

SY conducted a worldwide search for additional 

bugs in IBM typewriters. Security Engineering 

Officer George Herrmann recalled that the news was 

“terrifying,” because nearly every telegram generated 

by the Department was prepared as a machinereadable document on an IBM typewriter, and then 

carried to the post communications center. The bugs 

also demonstrated that the Soviets possessed highly 

sophisticated electronic technology. Former head 

of the National Security Administration Lieutenant 

General Lincoln D. Faurer admitted that many 

would concede that the Soviets had “enormously 

Figure 17: An IBM Selectric typewriter, 1983. The Soviet 

espionage bugs in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow were found in 

these typewriters. The news of the bug discoveries worried SY 

personnel since all cable communications were prepared on 

machine-readable documents. Source: © Associated Press. 

Figure 18: Looking into an IBM Selectric typewriter. When 

bugs were found in IBM Selectrics at the U.S. Embassy in 

Moscow, Operation Gunman replaced more than 20,000 

pounds of communications equipment at the Embassy in 

order to reduce the extent of Soviet espionage. Sixteen 

typewriters had bugs. Source: © Associated Press. 
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CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

narrowed the [technological] gap and have caught us 

in a number of places.”74 

Questions arose over how the Soviets were able 

to implant the bugs, and how much damage was done 

to U.S. national security. The Department of State 

learned that the typewriters had been shipped through 

“normal channels,” that is, by unescorted shipments 

that had passed through Soviet customs; in fact, one 

typewriter was left overnight in Soviet customs. The 

typewriters should have received special diplomatic 

handling, which included a U.S. Government escort, 

as required by Department regulations. Moreover, 

some typewriters had been shipped to the Embassy as 

early as 1976, and the batteries in a couple of the bugs 

were found to be dead. This led to the suggestion that 

perhaps the chimney antenna found in 1978 might 

have retrieved the data from the typewriter bugs.75 

While it is possible that damage to national security was minor, Department officials took the breach 

“seriously” and adopted several measures to improve technical security in U.S. embassies. Of the new measures 

that the Department adopted to improve technical security, one was a program to provide equipment maintenance, 

a controlled procurement channel, and inspection and inventory controls for office equipment destined for U.S. 

embassies and consulates. Also, Secretary Shultz asked the Inman Panel to add electronic espionage against 

U.S. overseas posts to its list of subjects to study. The Department assured the U.S. public that there was “no 

evidence that the Soviets ever acted on information obtained from monitoring the compromised typewriters.” 

Yet detractors in the intelligence community and Congress cited the typewriter episode as demonstration of the 

Department’s inattention to technical security.76 

z Beirut II å

During the typewriter discoveries and investigation, the Department worked quickly to increase security at 

U.S.-occupied buildings in Beirut, where the situation was deemed “extremely grave.”77 The Embassy, headed 

by Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew, recommended moving most of its operations and personnel to a new 

office building in East Beirut, while keeping a token presence in West Beirut. SY fully supported the move, 

but expressed “strong reservations” about maintaining a presence in West Beirut, asserting “even a limited U.S. 

presence in West Beirut...is extremely dangerous and should probably be deferred until the situation improves 

Figure 19: In this 1986 image, a DS Security Engineering 

Officer adjusts the settings of a CEI VHF receiver (left) and 

uses a Drake MSR-FM receiver (far right, under speaker 

horn). The two receivers monitor radio signals from 

unauthorized sources at a Department of State facility. The 

monitoring systems were the last generation of vacuumtube receivers used by DS. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security Files. 
280

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

markedly.”78 The Department supported the East Beirut move, and justified keeping West Beirut open because it 

feared that closing the West Beirut office would “send a major negative signal to the Muslims in Lebanon.”79 After 

surveying the Baaklini office building in East Beirut, SY, FBO, and OC inspectors approved it, with SY asserting 

that it offered a “substantially lower” threat of terrorism than West Beirut.80 

SY coordinated, supervised, and/or installed most of the building’s extensive security upgrades, but Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Fields had grave doubts that SY could have everything in place before summer’s end. He 

insisted that perimeter security would have to be very tight to preclude a repeat of the 1983 experience. SY had 

barriers constructed that would “totally block” access to the Baaklini Building, which would be accessible only 

to Embassy employees. SY brought in a Mobile Training Team headed by Bill Penn to prepare local Lebanese 

guards in procedures and skills for protecting the Baaklini Building.81 While many security improvements were 

completed, Ambassador Bartholomew insisted the move to the Baaklini Building occur before the summer ended. 

Given this deadline, the company installing several security measures was stretched extremely thin between the 

two Embassy locations, and could not complete some security upgrades on schedule. One of these upgrades was 

the swinging steel gates for the two entrances to the Baaklini Building. When the compound was attacked on 

September 20, 1984, the gates lay on the ground near where they were to be installed.82 

The Department of Defense endorsed moving Embassy operations to East Beirut, saying that the Embassy’s 

reliance on the 80-man Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) for guarding the perimeter in West Beirut must end 

because the Department could no longer sustain the unit in Lebanon. The facts that troop units were needed 

elsewhere, other members of the Multinational Force had pulled out in February, and the Marines were high 

profile targets demanded that the Pentagon withdraw 

the MAU. Also the three Navy ships stationed 

offshore carrying 2,000 Marines and 1,200 Navy 

personnel that supported the MAU typically served 

a combat role, not a protective one. By June, the 

Navy informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it would 

have to terminate the MAU security support role in 

Beirut, and it strongly advised that Department of 

State, Department of Defense, and the NSC should 

anticipate August 8, 1984, as the termination date for 

the MAU’s role in supporting the U.S. Embassy in 

Beirut.83

The Department of State responded with alarm. 

If the Marines did not stay to provide reinforcement 

to the Beirut Embassy, SY proposed that the U.S. 

Figure 20: The Baaklini Building in East Beirut following 

the September 20, 1984, terrorist bombing. A suicide 

bomber sped into the compound and exploded in front of 

the U.S. Embassy Annex, injuring the U.S. Ambassador, 

the visiting British Ambassador, and RSO Alan Bigler. 

Source: © Associated Press. 
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CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

mission be shut down. The Joint Chiefs conceded that the Marines could stay past the August 8 deadline if the 

Embassy had not completed its move to the Baaklini Building, but they strongly admonished the Department of 

State for not moving faster in finishing the security improvements. Throughout June, SY alerted senior Department 

officials of the dire security situation in Beirut, warning that “U.S. personnel who will continue to operate in West 

Beirut will not be adequately protected.”84 

Most of the Embassy’s staff relocated to the Baaklini Building on July 31, even though several security 

enhancements were not completed. The MAU departed shortly after. The Embassy relied upon the MSG detail 

and an increased number of Lebanese security guards, supported by the Lebanese Army, for the protection of the 

Baaklini Building and the Embassy in West Beirut. On September 20, 1984, a suicide bomber, driving a van 

bearing diplomatic plates, approached the northern entrance of the Baaklini Building. Speeding, the bomber 

navigated the chicanes and headed straight for the U.S. Mission. Guards fired at the vehicle, but could not stop 

the van before it exploded in front of the building. The blast killed at least 14 people and injured many, including 

Ambassador Bartholomew, the visiting British Ambassador, and the Embassy’s Regional Security Officer Alan 

Bigler.85 

While working to survey the damages and injuries in Beirut, the Department of State immediately required 

all 262 overseas posts to revise their security arrangements. It dispatched teams to tighten post defenses against 

vehicle bombs and identify other security needs at 23 high threat posts. Under Secretary Spiers cabled all U.S. 

ambassadors and consuls, instructing them to review “every conceivable aspect” of post security, and bluntly 

telling them that “adequate security should be 

[their] objective, even at the expense of aesthetics or 

convenience.” Posts were told to advise Washington 

of their needs and vulnerabilities, and Spiers received 

assurances from the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) and Congress that SY would receive 

the necessary support to protect U.S. Government 

personnel and property overseas.86 

The Department also requested a supplemental 

appropriation from Congress for embassy security, and 

the request’s specifics were drawn directly from Fields’ 

Acceleration program. Whereas the Acceleration 

program asked for 40 additional security officers 

overseas, 90 SEOs, 14 communications staff, 30 new 

administration staff (for training) and 100 additional 

Seabees, the supplemental submitted to Congress 

Figure 21: Emergency Response Team Special Agents 

(second and third from left) aboard a Navy Sea Stallion 

helicopter enroute to Larnaca, Cyprus, in September 1984. 

The Agents had just spent ten days investigating the U.S. 

Embassy Beirut bombing in Lebanon. Source: Private 

collection. 
282

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

requested 26 security officers, 15 SEOs, 15 communications staff, 20 administration staff, and 50 Seabees. The 

Acceleration program asked for $37.3 million for armored vehicles over 5 years, but the supplemental requested 

$11 million. The Acceleration program wanted $3 million for new security improvements for Main State and $2 

million for the Rewards for Information program; the supplemental asked for $1 million for each. There was $1 

million for research into an ideal embassy (this would become the Model Embassy program), and $28 million to 

seek and obtain new sites for the most vulnerable embassies. In all, SY sought 87 new people and approximately 

$60 million in new funding for security enhancements.87 

Members of the House and Senate were sympathetic to the Department’s supplemental request; however, 

Senate committee hearings revealed that the impediments to improving security overseas rested with the OMB, 

not Congress’s reluctance to appropriate funds. The Department requested money to improve security at 70 posts, 

but OMB limited it to 35 posts. The Department requested funds to install physical access control projects at 10 

posts; OMB cut it to 2. OMB cut the number of new Regional Security Officers from 104 to 51, and reduced the 

armored vehicle program from 120 to 60 vehicles. OMB also denied a $12 million request for 310 new Marine 

Security Guards, and refused a $1.7 million request to improve security at Main State. Of the $174 million of 

security improvement requests by the Department of State, OMB permitted $28 million. In exasperation, Senator 

Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) exclaimed, “Is the OMB on our side or on their side? Who does OMB work for?”88 

Spiers and other Department officials endured extensive questioning and heavy criticism from Congress and 

the public. Just days after the September attack, Congressional representatives questioned why, in spite of two 

previous bombings, Department officials could not reduce the risks to U.S. personnel in Beirut. Representative 

Robert Torrecelli (D-New Jersey) alleged that the entire security program suffered from poor management. “I’ll 

vote for the $100 million,” he remarked, “but you need 100 good managers more than $100 million.” Congress 

also sought to identify who decided “to move the embassy to East Beirut before the security enhancements had 

been completed. ”Spiers conceded some of the Congressional representatives’ points, but he insisted that the 

attack did not result from organizational failings or a lack of resources. He admitted that had all perimeter security 

measures at the Baaklini Building been completed, the bombing might have been avoided. However, Spiers noted 

that other threats, such as rocket attacks and kidnappings, were considered more likely, and installation of the 

vehicle gate was delayed in order to complete improvements for these more likely threats. Spiers stressed that, 

“the Department and other U.S. agencies understood the risks of maintaining our presence in the middle of a war 

zone.”89 

When Congress passed the Department’s supplemental, it rapidly enhanced and expanded SY. Titled the 

1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, the supplemental added $55 million to SY’s budget for FY 1984, 

doubling SY’s budget for FY 1984 to a total of $110 million. The influx of funds is more spectacular given that 

SY’s entire FY 1982 budget was only $27 million. The supplemental request nearly quadrupled SY’s monies in less 

than 2 years, and added 87 positions to SY’s staff, pushing the total personnel for SY to more than 500 people.90 
283

CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

The 1984 supplemental, in conjunction with the second Beirut bombing, allowed the Department of 

State to centralize many security functions under an “enhanced” SY. After the 1984 bombing, the Bureau of 

Administration implemented SY’s proposal to disband A/SPL and divide its people and responsibilities between 

SY and FBO. Congress’s supplemental allowed SY to double the size of its Threat Analysis Group and to devote 

three people toward coordinating security for all agencies with offices and personnel in posts overseas. SY raised 

its number of Seabees by 60 and its number of Marine Security Guard detachments (6 Marines each) by 37. In 

addition to obtaining 26 new RSOs and 41 new SEOs, SY initiated a preventative maintenance program for 

technical equipment, set up a working security committee with the Office of Communications to cooperate 

on security measures, and worked with FBO to create guidelines and standards for current and new sites and 

buildings. SY also gained Emergency Action Planning of M/CT, and the Bureau of Administration changed its 

name to the Bureau of Administration and Security, with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security 

becoming the number-two person in the Bureau.91 

In addition, SY created a permanent Mobile 

Training Team (MTT) program. Although MTTs 

had existed for a decade, the program had become 

more ad hoc after the training tours of the mid1970s. When called, the heads of SY’s Range and 

Locks divisions pulled together a team and headed to 

the designated post. SY officials asked Alan Bigler, 

who had been injured in the second Beirut bombing, 

to head the new MTT program. MTTs were tasked 

to train U.S. and local personnel at high threat posts, 

expand SY’s research and development of security 

products, and increase training for SY personnel. 

Bigler re-formed the MTTs, creating teams that 

were a cross between a training team and a Special 

Forces team. Bigler wanted highly-trained SY experts 

who could perform several functions, namely giving 

the best training for post personnel in high-threat 

areas, offering ambassadors the best advice available, 

providing local RSOs with highly trained agents to 

assist them, and furnishing posts with the capability 

to respond to terrorist, criminal, and high threat 

situations.92 

Figure 22: Regional Security Officer Alan Bigler, injured 

in the 1984 bombing of the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut, 

developed the Mobile Training Teams into formal units. 

The MTTs offered highly trained security personnel for a 

high threat situation. The MTTs later became the Mobile 

Security Details. Source: SY Focus. 
284

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Bigler developed the MTTs into formal units. 

Bigler and his staff drew team leaders from select 

SY agents at high threat posts. All team members 

received extensive training, including Hostage Rescue 

Team training from the FBI. The MTTs trained 

Department personnel in surveillance detection and 

counter-surveillance. Post personnel learned how 

to steal cars so that, in a high-threat situation, they 

could get away from a hostile environment. Other 

training included how to prevent becoming victims 

of crime and how to survive when confronted by a 

criminal. Bigler noted that “a lot of suspicion” existed 

among Foreign Service Officers about what his teams 

were doing, and for what situations they were training 

people. Since their formation under Bigler, Mobile 

Security Details, as the MTTs were later renamed, 

have more than doubled their original size, but they still carry out much of the original mission.93 

Two other programs gained significant funding from the 1984 supplemental. The first was the AntiTerrorism Assistance program. Comprising about eight staff members and a $9 million budget, ATA approached 

terrorism as a global problem requiring international cooperation. Under the control of M/CT, ATA trained 

police forces from other countries in counterterrorism skills, specifically SWAT training, counter-intelligence, 

and threat analysis, among others. The program sought to offer bilateral assistance for anti-terrorism training 

and communications in order to increase the ability of other nations to counter international terrorism. By 1985, 

ATA conducted extensive exchange and training programs with 15 nations, which included Portugal, Costa Rica, 

Turkey, Italy, Thailand, Tunisia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Cameroon, and Liberia.94 

ATA initially generated public protests against its training efforts. The program first conducted its training 

in the Phoenix area; however, demonstrators appeared and accused ATA of training “death squads” and of being 

akin to the Pentagon’s “School of the Americas.” ATA moved its training site to the campuses of Louisiana State 

University and the Louisiana State Police Academy. Congress too had qualms about ATA’s training program, 

and mandated that training could only occur in the United States. John Rendeiro, SY’s first agent assigned to 

ATA, recalled that Congress was reacting partly to the old AID programs and to the death of Daniel Mitrione in 

Uruguay, which had generated considerable hostility and opposition among local nationals in the late 1960s and 

early 1970s. Despite the concerns, ATA conducted “straight counter-terrorism police training, with humane, 

law-abiding, police techniques.”95 

Figure 23: Three Special Agents with the Mobile Training 

Team (wearing ball caps) conduct a weapons familiarization 

firing exercise for staff members of the U.S. Embassy 

Kuwait in 1985. The Mobile Training Team was one of 

the first developed by Al Bigler in the wake of the second 

suicide bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Source: 

Department of State. 
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CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

The 1984 supplemental also funded a second 

program, which enabled the Secretary of State to 

pay rewards for information relating to terrorism. 

Initially called Rewards for Information, the program 

was designed by Special Agent Steve Gleason, who 

had investigated the two U.S. Embassy bombings 

in Beirut. The DS program paid individuals a 

cash reward for information that led to the arrest 

or conviction of terrorists, or the prevention or 

successful resolution of international terrorist acts. 

The Secretary of State determined whether the 

information merited a reward, and rewards were 

paid out of confidential, no-year designated funds. 

At the Attorney General’s discretion, persons 

granted a reward could enter the witness protection program if necessary. The program capped rewards at 

$500,000 per informant. A year later, however, Congress designated $2 million for such rewards, and the 

program was re-titled “Rewards for Justice.”96 

z The Inman Panel and the Creation of DS å

Several months after the 1984 supplemental, in June 1985, the Inman Panel submitted its report to 

Secretary of State Shultz, and in it, the panel urged the Department to undertake a fundamental reorganization 

of diplomatic security. The panel recommended creating a Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), headed by an 

Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security who reported directly to the Under Secretary of State for 

Management. SY and the several initiatives it had gained during the previous two years comprised the bulk 

of the new bureau, but the Inman Panel advocated moving several other security-related programs and offices 

into the bureau, including the Diplomatic Courier Service. The panel also proposed stripping M/CT of the 

Anti-Terrorism Assistance and Emergency Action Planning programs, and giving both to DS. The Inman Panel 

advised the Department to create a Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), which would combine Special Agents 

and SEOs into a highly skilled corps of security professionals within the Foreign Service, to allow for their 

recruitment and advancement. Although the Inman Panel preferred to move all foreign dignitary protection 

duties into the new DS, the panel recommended that DS and the Secret Service form a working group to develop 

standards and procedures, with the function of dignitary protection eventually falling entirely under the purview 

of DS. The panel also suggested improving intelligence gathering and analysis, physical security (building) 

standards, and a substantial building program.97 

Figure 24: A Special Agent instructor (center) of the Mobile 

Training Team teaches a hammer fist protective maneuver 

to a U.S. Embassy Kuwait staff member (right) in 1985. 

Source: Department of State. 
286

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

 The Inman Panel report gained the immediate 

support of the Secretary of State and Congress. 

Secretary Shultz appointed Assistant Secretary 

Lamb to implement the panel’s recommendations 

and tasked him to complete the reorganization of 

the Department’s security programs by January 1, 

1986.98 The Department established the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security on November 4, 1985, with 

the new Bureau acquiring the Courier Service, the 

Rewards for Justice program, as well as ATA and 

the Emergency Planning program. On August 12, 

1986, with overwhelming support, Congress passed 

the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism 

Act (Public Law 99-399), creating the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security and providing the new bureau 

with extensive funding. President Reagan signed the 

act into law on August 27.99 

The transfer of ATA to DS, however, did generate 

a brief clash between Congress and the Inman Panel 

on one side and the Department of State on the other. 

The issue centered upon which office should manage 

ATA. Secretary Shultz said that M/CT should retain 

management of ATA. The House of Representatives’ 

Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Inman Panel 

insisted that DS should manage it because ATA was 

an operational training program. Congress and the 

Inman Panel members did agree that DS and M/CT should coordinate their efforts with regards to ATA’s training 

program, and Shultz concurred. The result was that M/CT would provide policy guidance for ATA; meanwhile, 

DS would manage it.100

With the transfer of ATA and the Emergency Planning offices to DS, the Inman Panel suggested that the 

remnants of M/CT should be reformed into a policy formation and coordination office. The panel drew a marked 

distinction between the operations of counterterrorist programs and the development of counter-terrorism 

policy. It advocated moving all operational components to DS, with the new Assistant Secretary of State for 

Diplomatic Security serving as coordinator of terrorism and security matters in the Department and as chair of 

Figure 25: Admiral (Ret.) B. R. “Bobby” Inman. Inman 

headed the 1984-85 panel to examine security at the 

Department of State. The Executive Secretary of the Inman 

Panel was former SY chief Victor Dikeos. The Inman 

Panel made several recommendations, all adopted by 

Secretary of State George Shultz. The most prominent was 

the creation of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Source: 

© Associated Press. 
287

CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

the Interdepartmental Working Group on Terrorism. The rest of M/CT, the panel believed, should be shifted 

to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs because much of counterterrorism involved diplomacy, and 

counterterrorism policy could “best be carried out from the Department’s foreign policy office.”101 Implementing 

the Inman Panel’s recommendations, the Department named Robert Oakley as Acting Ambassador at Large for 

Counter-Terrorism; and the new office, S/CT, would lead the formulation, presentation, and negotiation of the 

Department’s counterterrorism policy, with the Ambassador at Large reporting directly to the Secretary of State. 

On October 1, 1985, the Department transferred the 20 remaining staff of M/CT to the Ambassador at Large.102

Figure 26: On September 19, 1986, President Reagan hosts a ceremony in the White House Oval Office to commemorate his 

signing of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act three weeks earlier, on August 27. The law created the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security, provided the new bureau with increased funding, and placed the Rewards for Justice program 

and the Diplomatic Courier Service within DS. The first Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Robert E. Lamb 

(third from right) attends the event, along with (left to right) Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger; Secretary of State George 

Shultz; U.S. Representatives Dante Fascell, William Broomfield, and Olympia Snowe; U.S. Senator Claiborne Pell; President 

Reagan; U.S. Representative Dan Mica; and U.S. Senator Richard Lugar. Source: White House. 
288

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

z Conclusion å

The shift of terrorist methods from individual and 

small group acts to mob attacks and suicide bombings 

redefined diplomatic security during the early 1980s. 

With attacks on U.S. diplomatic personnel and 

buildings becoming symbolic acts against the United 

States, terrorism magnified the need for a larger, more 

centralized security entity in the Department of State. 

Hostage situations, killings of diplomats, mob attacks, 

and suicide bombers subverted the long-held concepts 

of “gentleman diplomats” and diplomatic immunities, 

as well as U.S. officials’ commitment to demonstrating 

U.S. openness and friendliness in its diplomacy and 

embassies. The mob attacks on U.S. Embassies in Iran, 

Pakistan, and Libya prompted the Department to create 

the Security Enhancement Program (SEP) to harden U.S. 

posts against such attacks. Although the SEP did not 

attain its lofty goals, the implementation of measures and 

the installation of new equipment and barriers increased 

SY’s responsibilities and importance. Moreover, as the 

local security officers, SY’s RSOs gained greater authority, 

and they were the ones whom ambassadors and chiefs of 

mission turned to in crisis situations. 

Although the Inman Panel complained that between 1979 and 1984 the “organization for security activities has 

become complicated by the proliferation of special offices and separate budgets for specific programs,” the opposite 

had occurred. The 1983 suicide bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and of the Marine barracks at the Beirut 

airport, and the 1983 suicide bombing in Kuwait pushed the Department to concentrate several security-related 

initiatives and programs into an “enhanced” SY. It also encouraged the creation of a panel to study how security was 

implemented in the Department. The second Beirut bombing in 1984 provided the impetus for the Department to 

embark on SY’s “Acceleration” program, which essentially created the basic structure for a larger diplomatic security 

entity within the Department. By the time the Inman Panel recommended that the Department create a “bureau 

of diplomatic security,” such an entity already existed in rough form and substance in the rapidly expanding and 

evolving SY. The panel justified further centralization, bringing the Diplomatic Courier Service under SY’s wing 

and giving M/CT’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance and Emergency Action Planning programs to SY.103 

Figure 27: Secretary of State George Shultz. Secretary Shultz 

strongly supported programs and reforms to improve security 

for U.S. diplomatic posts overseas. He also implemented 

all of the Inman Panel’s recommendations for improving 

security, including the creation of the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security. Perhaps no Secretary of State was more supportive 

of diplomatic security. Source: Department of State, Office 

of the Historian Files. 
289

CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

Although much has been made of the pre-/post-Inman Panel dichotomy, the fact was that between 1979 and 

1984, SY was rapidly evolving into a different entity. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security David Fields 

admitted that he and Assistant Secretary of State Lamb “were trying to adjust the structure, garner more resources, 

and change procedures.”104 Whereas in 1982, the idea of centralizing the State Department’s security functions 

into one organization was rejected, just two years later the idea was welcomed and enacted when proposed by 

SY in David Fields’ Acceleration plan. The growing security needs during the years 1979 to 1984 redefined 

diplomatic security and accelerated the transformation of SY. It was Fields’ larger, enhanced SY that became DS. 

Endnotes

1 Bruce Laingen, “Diplomats and Terrorism,” Foreign Service Journal, September 1981, pp. 18-19. 

2 Thomas L. Friedman, “State-Sponsored Terror Called a Threat to U.S.,” New York Times, 30 December 1983, pp. A-1 and 

A-6. Laingen, “Diplomats and Terrorism,” p. 18. 

3 Oral History Interview, David C. Fields, 21 November 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 5. Oral History Interview, 

Peter Bergin #2, 15 November 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 1-2.

4 William H. Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 257-264. David Harris, The Crisis: The President, 

the Prophet, and the Shah – 1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam (New York: Little, Brown, 2004), 158-160. Gary Sick, 

All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985), 175. 

5 Sick, All Fall Down, 190-191. Victor L. Tomseth, “Crisis after Crisis: Embassy Tehran, 1979,” Embassies under Siege: 

Personal Accounts by Diplomats on the Front Line (Washington DC: Brassey’s for the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy of 

Georgetown University, 1995), Joseph G. Sullivan, ed., p. 50. For measures taken in Tehran and Islamabad, see Testimony 

of Karl Ackerman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, 21 February 1980, Hearings before the Subcommittee 

of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Departments of State, Justice,...Appropriations for 1981, 

96th Congress, 2nd Session, 1980, pp. 583-595. 

6 Tomseth, “Crisis after Crisis: Embassy Tehran, 1979,” p. 50. Testimony of Ackerman, 21 February 1980, Hearings 

before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, pp. 583-595.

7 Oral History Interview, David Fields, 21 November 2005, p. 2. Herbert G. Hagerty, “Attack on the U.S. Embassy in 

Pakistan, 1979,” Embassies under Siege, pp. 70-87, 84-85, 87. 

8 Oral History Interview, David Fields, 21 November 2005, p. 2. Hagerty, “Attack on the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, 1979,” 

Embassies under Siege, pp. 70-87, 84-85, 87. 

9 “Iranians in Beirut Besiege U.S. Embassy,” New York Times, 11 November 1979, p. A-13. Testimony of Ackerman, 19 

June 1980, Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Operations and on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Security Procedures at U.S. Embassies, 96th Congress, 1980, p. 

177.

10 Audit Report “The Security Enhancement Program,” Inspector General of the Department of State (John D. Rendahl, J. 

Warren Gardner, William E. Keppler, and James A. Weiner), June 1983, p. 8, Folder – Security Enhancement Program 

1983, Box 18, Records of the Office of Counter Terrorism (M/CT), Alphabetical Files, 1978-1986, RG 59 - Lot 91D494, 

Suitland (hereafter cited as M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86). 

11 Memorandum “Embassy Security and Defense,” Office of Security for the International Group on Terrorism, 18 February 

1981, Folder – Security General 1981, Box 7, Records of the Office for Combating Terrorism (M/CT) – Country and 
290

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Functional Files, 1980-1982, and Terrorist Incident Files, 1973, 1976, 1980-1981, RG 59 - Lot 83D135, Suitland 

(hereafter cited as M/CT Country/Incident Files). For quotations, see Tomseth, “Crisis after Crisis: Embassy Tehran, 

1979,” Embassies under Siege, pp. 49, 169ff. 

12 Telegram 308936 “Post Management Responsibility for Security,” Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., (Robert M. 

Sayre, Director of the Office for Combating Terrorism) to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, 20 November 1981, Folder 

– Security General 1981, Box 7, M/CT Country/Incident Files. 

13 Oral History Interview, John F. Perdew, 21 March 2006, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 8. Memorandum “Embassy 

Security and Defense,” Office of Security (SY), 18 February 1981. Audit Report “The Security Enhancement Program,” 

Department of State Inspector General, June 1983, Folder – Security Enhancement Program 1983, Box 18, M/CT 

Alpha Files 1978-86, pp. 8-9. Attachment 3 “A/SPL Budget, by Fiscal Period,” enclosed with Audit Report “The Security 

Enhancement Program,” Inspector General, June 1983.

14 Memorandum “Embassy Security and Defense,” SY, 18 February 1981. Audit Report “The Security Enhancement 

Program,” Inspector General, June 1983, pp. 8-9. Attachment 3 “A/SPL Budget, by Fiscal Period.” 

15 Oral History Interview, John Wolf, May 9, 2005. Memorandum, “Security Enhancement Survey Schedule,” Jenkins 

to Marvin L. Garrett, Jr., Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, et al., 22 May 1981, Box 7, M/CT 

Country/Incident Files. Memorandum “Embassy Security and Defense,” SY, 18 February 1981. Testimony of Ackerman, 

19 June 1980, Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Operations and on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Security Procedures at U.S. Embassies, 96th Congress, 1980, p. 

177. Oral History Interview, John Perdew, 21 March 2006, p. 8. 

16 Testimony of Ackerman, 19 June 1980, Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Operations and on Asian 

and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Security Procedures at U.S. Embassies, 

96th Congress, 1980, p. 177. Oral History Interview, John Wolf, 9 May 2005. 

17 Oral History Interview, John Wolf, 9 May 2005. 

18 Oral History Interview, John Wolf, 9 May 2005. 

19 Memorandum “Embassy Security and Defense,” SY, 18 February 1981. Memorandum “Revised Security Enhancement 

Survey Schedule,” George C. Jenkins (A/SPL) to Thomas M. Tracy, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, 

Ackerman, et al., 4 March 1981, Folder – Security General 1981, Box 7, M/CT Country/Incident Files. 

20 Oral History Interview, John Perdew, 21 March 2006, p. 8. Briefing Memorandum “The GAO [General Accounting 

Office] Report on Overseas Security,” Tracy to the Deputy Secretary of State, 22 October 1982, Folder – Secretary / 

Seventh Floor Principals: Briefing and Information Memoranda 1982, Box 21; and Memorandum “Your Request for 

Information, Same Subject, to A/SY,” John F. Perdew (A/SPL) to Mayer Nudell (M/CT), 20 September 1982, attached 

to Memorandum “List of High Threat Posts for Action by Ambassador Handyside,” Sayre to Tracy, 24 September 1982, 

Folder – S/S Briefing 1983, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

21 Audit Report “The Security Enhancement Program,” Inspector General, June 1983, p. 5. Memorandum, Gerald P. 

Carmen, Administrator of General Services Administration (GSA) to Haig, 31 July 1981, Folder – Security General 1981, 

Box 7, M/CT Country/Incident Files. Attachment 3 “A/SPL Budget, by Fiscal Period,” M/COMP of Report #85-11 

F “The Security of U.S. Embassies and Other Overseas Civilian Installations” (Woldman Report), Joel M. Woldman, 

Congressional Research Service, 7 January 1985, Folder – ASEC - Woldman Report, Box 6, Records of the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security-- Subject Files, 1985-86, RG 59 - Lot 89D328, Suitland (hereafter cited as DS Subject Files 1985-

86). Briefing Memorandum “The GAO Report on Overseas Security,” Tracy to the Deputy Secretary, 22 October 1982. 

22 Briefing Memorandum “The GAO Report on Overseas Security,” Tracy to Deputy Secretary, 22 October 1982. 

Memorandum “Your Request for Information, Same Subject, to A/SY,” Perdew to Nudell, 20 September 1982. 
291

CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

23 Report “Improvements Needed in Providing Security at Overseas Posts,” GAO to Secretary of State, 30 September 1982, 

abstract page enclosed with Briefing Memorandum “The GAO Report on Overseas Security,” Tracy to Deputy Secretary, 

22 October 1982. 

24 Woldman Report, 7 January 1985, pp. 25-29, particularly pp. 25-26. Memorandum “Your Request for Information, 

Same Subject, to A/SY,” Perdew to Nudell, 20 September 1982. 

25 “Turkish Consul Slain in Los Angeles,” Washington Post, 29 January 1982. “Turkish Diplomat is Slain on Coast,” New 

York Times, 29 January 1982. “Youth, 19, Held in Coast Slaying of Turkish Aide,” New York Times, 30 January 1982. 

Statement “Murder of Turkish Consul General,” Department of State, 29 January 1982, Folder – Turkish Consul General’s 

Assassination, Los Angeles, January 28, 1982, Box 8, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86.

26 Letter, Sukru Elekdag, Ambassador of the Turkish Republic, to Haig, 11 February 1982, Folder – Turkish Consul General’s 

Assassination, Los Angeles, January 28, 1982, Box 8, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

27 Letter, Daryl F. Gates, Chief of Police of Los Angeles, to Secretary of State Haig, 4 February 1982; Letter, Tracy to 

Gates, 18 February 1982; and Letter, Haig to William P. Clark, 20 February 1982, all Folder – Turkish Consul General’s 

Assassination, Los Angeles, January 28, 1982, Box 8, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

28 Memorandum “Protective Detail Policy,” Tracy to Kennedy, 17 June 1982; Memorandum “Protective Security Details,” 

Garrett to Tracy, 2 June 1982; both Folder – Secretary/Seventh Floor Principals, January-June 1982, Box 18, M/CT 

Alpha Files 1978-86. 

29 Memorandum “Protection of Foreign Missions to United Nations in New York,” Sayre to Kennedy, 1 June 

1982; Memorandum “Proposed Legislation on Protection of Consulates,” Sayre to Kennedy, 29 June 1982; 

Memorandum “Responsibility for Protective Services to the UN and Related Mission – NYPD Reimbursement,” 

Sayre to Hunt, Weiss, et al., 13 October 1983; all Folder – Secretary/Seventh Floor Principals, Box 18, M/CT 

Alpha Files 1978-86. 

30 Memorandum “Protection for Foreign Missions in the United States,” Fields to Sayre, 23 April 1984, Folder – Secretary/

Seventh Floor Principals, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files, 1978-86. 

31 Memorandum “Protection of Foreign Diplomats in Washington Metropolitan Area,” Sayre to DePree, 2 August 1984, 

Folder – Secretary/Seventh Floor Principals, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files, 1978-86. 

32 Hearing 97-64 on H.R. 6254, “To Provide Improved Protection for Foreign Diplomatic Missions,” U.S. House of 

Representatives Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 4 May 1982. 

33 Memorandum “Proposed Executive Order,” John Condayan (A) to Ronald I. Spiers, Under Secretary of State for 

Management, 21 February 1984; Memorandum “Proposed Executive Order,” David A. Stockman to the President, 19 

March 1984; and Memorandum “Regulations on Protective Security for Foreign Officials,” Sayre to Burman (L/M), 26 

March 1984; all Folder – Secretary/Seventh Floor Principals, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files, 1978-86. 

34 Memorandum “Protection of Foreign Officials in the United States,” Sayre to Spiers, 23 March 1984, Folder – Secretary/

Seventh Floor Principals, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files, 1978-86. 

35 Memorandum “Inching Towards a New Embassy in Moscow,” William Eaton to Spiers, 15 October 1986, p. 8, enclosed 

with Memorandum “The Moscow Embassy,” Spiers to the Secretary, 15 October 1986, Folder – ASEC – Moscow 

Embassy 1989, Box 3, DS Front Office Files – 1989 Subject Files, RG 59-Lot 90D311, Suitland. Report “Moscow 

Security Program,” Department of State, 8 December 1978, Inman Panel [?] Briefing Book, Box 11, DS Front Office 

Files – Subject Files 1988, RG 59-Lot 90D154, Suitland, pp. 27-40. 

36 Memorandum “Inching Towards a New Embassy in Moscow,” Eaton to Spiers, 15 October 1986, p. 8. Report “Moscow 

Security Program,” Department of State (SY), 8 December 1978. pp. 27-40. 
292

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

37 Report of Investigation “The Kidnapping and Death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs,” Special Assignments Staff, Office of 

Security, 5 February 1980, Folder – Dubs, Adolph, Ambassador – Afghanistan – Kidnapping Death – FEB 14, 1979-

1980 – Thru, Box 12, M/CT Country/Incident Files. 

38 Report of Investigation “The Kidnapping and Death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs,” Special Assignments Staff, 5 February 

1980, pp. 8-9, 10, 16. 

39 Lillian Harris Waterman, “Beirut 1976: Security Problems of the Diminishing Mission in a Hostile Environment,” SY Focus, 

Volume III, Number 3, (June-August 1977): 2. Memorandum “Your Request for Information, Same Subject, to A/SY,” 

Perdew to Nudell, 20 September 1982, enclosed with Memorandum “List of High Threat Posts for Action by Ambassador 

Handyside,” Sayre to Tracy, 24 September 1982, Folder – S/S Briefing 1983, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

40 In Kampala, the U.S. Embassy was housed in the British High Commission building. Memorandum “Your Request for 

Information, Same Subject, to A/SY,” Perdew to Nudell, 20 September 1982. 

41 Memorandum “Problem Paper: Observations/Conclusions on the Security Up-Grade Effort...,” Holsey G. Handyside 

(A/HTP) to Tracy, 20 January 1983, Folder – S/S Briefing 1983, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

42 Memorandum “Security Improvements in the Face of Resource Constraints – The Management Dimension,” Richard T. 

Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management, to Secretary of State, 31 March 1982, Folder – Secretary / Seventh 

Floor Principals: Memoranda – Other Offices – January-June 1982, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. Historical 

Study “The Office for Combatting Terrorism (M/CT),” Petersen, Office of the Historian, HO Files. 

43 “Report of the Working Group on Enhancement of Security at U.S. Embassies Overseas,” SY, n.d. [15? April 1983], 

Folder – Security General 1983, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

44 Memorandum “SY/TAG – Threat List,” Sayre to Gordon E. Harvey (SY), 25 August 1982, Folder – S/S Briefing 1983, 

Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

45 Memorandum “The GAO Report on Overseas Security,” Tracy to Deputy Secretary, 22 October 1982. Memorandum 

“Emergency Action Planning,” Edwards Marks (M/CT) to Sayre, 3 March 1983, Folder – Security Programs: Conferences, 

Box 18; Memorandum “Clearances,” Garrett to Sayre, 25 February 1983, Folder – Security General 1983, Box 18; 

Memorandum “Final Meeting of the Working Group on Enhancement of Security at Embassies Overseas,” Garrett, 

Chairman, to Members and Invitees, 30 September 1983, Folder – Security General 1983, Box 18; Memorandum “Policy 

Group on Security Policies and Programs Meeting of January 12, 1983,” Sayre to Jerome W. Van Gorkom, Under Secretary 

of State for Management, 25 February 1983, Folder – Policy Group 1983, Box 12; all M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

46 Memorandum “Security Enhancement Survey Schedule,” Jenkins to Tracy et al., 1 April 1981, enclosed with Memorandum 

“Security Enhancement Survey Schedule,” Jenkins to Garrett et al., 22 May 1981, Folder – Security General 1981, Box 

7, M/CT Country/Incident Files. Memorandum “Problem Paper: Observations/Conclusions on the Security Up-Grade 

Effort...,” Handyside to Tracy, 20 January 1983. 

47 Memorandum “U.S. Embassy Beirut,” Capt. Beth A. Salamanca (A/SY/PTI/ETS) to Harvey, 3 May 1983, DS Files, 

Rosslyn. Telegram 3800, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Research, 28 April 

1983; and Telegram 5100, Robert S. Dillon, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, to Secretary of State, 27 April 1983; both 

Folder – Beirut Bombing 1983, Box 1, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. George P. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, 

Power, and the Victory of an American Ideal (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), p. 199. Richard M. Gannon, 

“The Bombing of Embassy Beirut, 1983,” Embassies Under Siege, p. 94. Telegram 118327, Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy 

Secretary of State (Stauffer, Bedrosian), to U.S. Embassy Dhaka, 29 April 1983, Folder – Beirut Bombing 1983, Box 1, 

M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

48 Memorandum “A/SY Actions Taken in Response to First Beirut Bombing of April 18, 1983,” Fields to Robert E. 

Lamb, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, 27 September 1984; and Memorandum “Responses for Brooks 
293

CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

Committee,” Garrett to Tracy, 18 May 1983; both DS Files, Rosslyn. See also Damage Assessment – Classified Material, 

DS Files, Rosslyn. 

49 “Embassy Security Funds Promised,” Washington Post, 22 April 1983, p. A20. Bernard Gwertzman, “Shultz Going to the 

Mideast to Bolster U.S. Diplomacy, Officials Say,” New York Times, 22 April 1983, p. A3. 

50 Memorandum “List of Security Enhancement Posts,” Tracy to Garrett, DePree, et al., 20 April 1983, Folder – S/S Briefing 

1983, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. Testimony of Tracy, 28 June 1983, Hearing before the House of Representatives 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, The U.S. Embassy Bombing in Beirut, 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983, p. 19.

51 “Tougher Security was Set in Kuwait,” New York Times, p. A-18. Friedman, “State-Sponsored Terror Called a Threat to 

U.S.,” New York Times, 30 December 1983, pp. A-1, A-6. Stenographic Transcript of Hearings before the Committee on 

Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, “Fiscal Year 1985 Embassy Security Supplemental Authorization,” Alderson Reporting, 28 

September 1984, attached to Memorandum, Jerry Ehrenfreund, Committee on Foreign Relations, to Spiers, 1 October 

1984, Folder – AMGT / HFAC / SFRC / Testimony, Box 2, Records of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Subject Files 

- Beirut Bombing, 1983-1985, RG 59 - Lot 89D327, Suitland. Hereafter cited as DS Subject Files - Beirut Bombing. 

Judith Miller, “Security in Beirut Called Impossible,” New York Times, October 27, 1983, p. A-8. Richard Halloran, 

“Some in Congress Question If Security Was Adequate,” New York Times, October 26, 1983, p. A-6. 

52 “Tougher Security was Set in Kuwait,” New York Times, p. A-18. Friedman, “State-Sponsored Terror Called a Threat to 

U.S.,” New York Times, 30 December 1983, pp. A-1, A-6. Stenographic Transcript of Hearings before the Committee on 

Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, “Fiscal Year 1985 Embassy Security Supplemental Authorization,” Alderson Reporting, 

28 September 1984. 

53 Memorandum “Security Actions Taken Since Beirut Embassy Bombing,” Garrett to Lamb, 10 January 1984, attached 

to Briefing Memorandum “Your Briefing Session on Security of U.S. Missions Abroad,” Spiers to Deputy Secretary, n.d. 

[11-13 January 1984], Folder – S/S Briefing 1984, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

54 Memorandum for Files “First Meeting of the Working Group on Enhancement of Security at U.S. Embassies Overseas, May 

26, 1983,” Royal M. Wharton (INR/IC/CD), 6 June 1983, attached to Memorandum, Wharton to Hugh Montgomery 

(INR/OD), Curl, Garrett, and Sayre, 16 June 1983, Folder – Security General 1983, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

55 Memorandum “IG/CM Meeting, June 3, 1983,” Donald S. McDonald, Director of the Office of Intelligence Coordination 

(INR), to Garrett and Richard Curl (INR/IRE), n.d. [4-16 June 1983], attached to Memorandum, Wharton to 

Montgomery, Curl, Garrett, and Sayre, 16 June 1983. Memorandum “Policy Statement on Embassy Security,” Fields, 

to General Richard G. Stilwell (Ret.), Chairman of the Interagency Group/Countermeasures, 15 May 1984, attached to 

Memorandum “Technical Security of U.S. Diplomatic Facilities,” Sayre to Oliver North, National Security Council, 18 

June 1984, Folder – Security General 1984, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

56 Memorandum “Meeting of Marvin Garrett’s Working Group on Embassy Security...,” Wharton to Theodore “Ted” 

Papendorp (M/CT), 4 October 1983, Folder – Security General 1983, Box 18; and Memorandum “Preparation and 

Dissemination of Terrorism Threat Warnings,” Spiers to Sayre et al., 27 December 1983, enclosed with Memorandum 

“Preparation and Dissemination of Terrorism Threat Warnings,” Sayre to M/CT Staff, 3 January 1983, Folder – Preparation 

and Dissemination of Terrorism Threat Warnings – 1984, Box 13; all M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

57 Information Memorandum “Management of Security and Terrorism Functions,” Sayre to the Deputy Secretary, 19 

October 1982, Folder – Secretary / Seventh Floor Principals: Briefing and Information Memoranda 1982, Box 21; and 

Memorandum, [J. Coffman?], [27 March 1984?], Folder – Intelligence Working Group – 1984, Box 13; both M/CT 

Alpha Files 1978-86. Testimony of Spiers, Lamb, and Fields, 25 September 1984, Hearing before House of Representatives 

Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Commerce, Justice, State...Supplemental Appropriations for 1985: Special 

Hearing on the Bombing of the United States Embassy, Beirut Lebanon, September 20, 1984, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 

1984, pp. 30-31. Department of State, Office of Security (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1981), p. 3. 
294

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

58 Memorandum “Staffing – FLETC, Glynco, Georgia,” Fields to Sayre, 6 March 1984, Folder – Security General 1984, 

Box 18; and Memorandum “Comments on S/IG Draft Memo 17 on M/CTP,” Sayre to Ambassador Frederick L. Chapin, 

9 August 1984, Folder – Inspection, Box 13; both M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. Memorandum “Management of Security 

and Terrorism Functions, Sayre to Deputy Secretary, 19 October 1982. 

59 Memorandum “Additional Steps to Correct Security Deficiencies,” Sayre to Garrett, 25 November 1983; and Memorandum 

“Supplemental Appropriation Request to Improve Security of Personnel Abroad,” Sayre to Spiers, 1 December 1983, 

attached to Memorandum “Proposed Security Supplemental,” Sayre to Shumate, et al., 30 November 1983; both Folder 

– Security General 1983, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

60 David Lamb, “Seven Die in Six Kuwait Bombings,” Los Angeles Times, 13 December 1983, pp. B-1, B-6, B-7. 

61 “Tougher Security Was Set in Kuwait,” New York Times, p. A-18. Letter, Spiers to Representative Neal Smith, Chair of the 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Committee of Appropriations, 

House of Representatives, 15 June 1984, Folder – Archives – Beirut Bombing 1984 #1, Box 9, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-

86. Telegram 30875 “Emergency Drills,” Dam (Crunner, Robinson) to Security Officer Collective, 1 February 1984, 

Folder – Security General 1984, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

62 Memorandum “Supplemental Appropriation Request to Improve Security of Personnel Abroad,” Sayre to Spiers, 1 

December 1983. 

63 Memorandum “Comments on S/IG Draft Memo 17 on M/CTP,” Sayre to Chapin, 9 August 1984. Memorandum “SY 

Resources,” Fields to Sayre, 15 March 1984, Folder – Security General 1984, Box 18; Memorandum “(S) JSOC Utilization,” 

Harvey to Garrett, Sayre, 16 November 1981, enclosed in “Policy – Crisis Management – 1981 Material,” Folder – Policy – 

Terrorism Consultations with Host Country, Box 13; and Memorandum “Reference Materials,” Papendorp to M/CT Area 

Officers, 9 January 1984, Folder – Security General 1984, Box 18; all M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

64 Memorandum “Comments on S/IG Draft Memo 17 on M/CTP,” Sayre to Chapin, 9 August 1984. Memorandum 

“Compliance Review,” Sayre to Ambassador Harrop (S/IG), 4 January 1984, Folder – Inspection, Box 13, M/CT Alpha 

Files 1978-86. Report “The Historical Development of the Office for Combatting Terrorism,” Anthony L. Wilner to 

Marks, 10 August 1983, Folder – Counter Terrorism 1983, Box 3; Memorandum “Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program – 

SY Role,” Sidney Friedland (M/CT) to Sayre, March 1984, Folder – Security General 1984, Box 18; and Memorandum 

“SY Resources: Reaction and Training Team,” Fields to Sayre, 15 March 1984, Folder – Security General 1984, Box 18; 

all M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

65 Action Memorandum “Proposal for an Advisory Panel on the Security of U.S. Missions Abroad,” Spiers to the Secretary, 7 

March 1984, attached to Action Memorandum “The Secretary’s Advisory Panel on the Security of U.S. Missions Abroad,” 

Spiers to the Secretary, 18 April 1984, Folder – Secretary: Security of U.S. Mission Abroad, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 

1978-86. Shultz’s comments were written in the margins of Spiers’ memorandum. Action Memorandum “The Secretary’s 

Advisory Panel on the Security of U.S. Missions Abroad,” Spiers to the Secretary, 18 April 1984. Shultz to Admiral (Ret.) 

B. R. Inman, 5 July 1984; Shultz to Eagleburger, 5 July 1984, attached to Shultz to Inman, 5 July 1984; and Shultz to 

Armstrong, 5 July 1984, attached to Shultz to Inman, 5 July 1984; all Folder – Security Programs: Conferences, Box 18, M/

CT Alpha Files 1978-86. Action Memorandum “Proposal for an Advisory Panel on the Security of U.S. Mission Abroad,” 

Spiers to the Secretary, 7 March 1984. Letter, Shultz to Lieutenant General Lincoln D. Faurer, Director of the National 

Security Agency, 16 August 1984, Folder – Secretary: Security of U.S. Mission Abroad, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

66 Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee following September 1984 bombing in Beirut, Spiers, Folder 

– AMGT: HFAC/SFRC Testimony, Box 3, DS Subject Files - Beirut Bombing. 

67 Memorandum “Providing for Funds for Continuing Security Upgrade,” Fields and Buffalo (A/FBO) to Lamb, 27 June 

1984, attached to Shultz to Faurer, 16 August 1984, Folder – Secretary: Security of U.S. Missions Abroad,” Box 18, M/

CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 
295

CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

68 Memorandum “Acceleration of Security Programs of Department of State,” [SY - Fields], 12 June 1984, attached to 

Shultz to Faurer, 16 August 1984. 

69 Memorandum “Acceleration of Security Programs of Department of State,” [SY - Fields], 12 June 1984. 

70 Stenographic Transcript of Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, “Fiscal Year 1985 Embassy 

Security Supplemental Authorization,” Alderson Reporting, 28 September 1984, enclosed with Ehrenfreund to Spiers, 

1 October 1984, p. 39; and Stenographic Transcript of Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 

Representatives “Hearing on and Mark-up of H.R to Combat International Terrorism; H. Con. Res. 337,” 26 September 

1984, p. 27; both Folder – AMGT/HFAC/SFRC Testimony, Box 2, DS Subject Files - Beirut Bombing. 

71 Memorandum “Acceleration of Security Programs of Department of State,” [SY], 12 June 1984.

72 Memorandum “The Secretary’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security: Tasking Requirements,” Hill (Kauzlarich) to Fields 

et al., 6 August 1984, Folder – Secretary: Security of U.S. Missions Abroad, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

73 Jay Petezell, “The Moscow Bug Hunt,” Time, 10 July 1989. David Hoffman, “U.S. Embassy in Moscow Was Bugged,” 

Washington Post, p. A-7. Ronald Kessler, Moscow Station: How the KGB Penetrated the American Embassy (New York: 

Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1989), 92, 96. Fact Sheet Memorandum “Soviet Espionage Against US Missions in the USSR,” 

C. Cavanaugh, 9 April 1987, Laird Commission Briefing Book, Box 11, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic 

Security – Subject Files 1988: Correspondence, Telegrams, Papers, Reports, RG 59 - Lot 90D154, Suitland. 

74 Herrmann, Oral History Interview, 31 May 2005, p. 4. George J. Church, “The Art of High-Tech Snooping,” Time, 20 

April 1987. Sharon Begley, with Susan E. Katz and Karen Springer, “High-Tech Conversation Stoppers, Newsweek, 20 

April 1987. Kessler, Moscow Station, 95-97. Faurer quotation on pages 96-97. 

75 Hoffman, “Embassy Typewriter Bugging Blamed on Routine Shipment,” Washington Post, 27 March 1987, p. A-30. 

Kessler, Moscow Station, 95-97. 

76 Hoffman, “Embassy Typewriter Bugging Blamed on Routine Shipment,” Washington Post, 27 March 1985, p. A-30. 

Draft Report of the Gunman Project, Damage Assessment Team, June 1985. Memorandum, Inman to the Secretary, 12 

June 1985, DS Files. Memorandum “Under Secretary for Management Ronald I. Spiers’ Appearance Before the Senate 

Intelligence Committee,” Department of State, 13 June 1985, Folder – Gunman 1985, Box 2, DS Subject Files 1985-86. 

Briefing Memorandum “Technical Security,” Spiers to the Secretary, 17 March 1986, Folder – ASEC Moscow, Box 2, DS 

Subject Files 1985-86. Talking points on Gunman discoveries, Department of State, July [?] 1985. 

77 Telegram 40187 “Terrorist Threat to Americans,” Shultz (Cadogan, Montgomery) to All European Diplomatic Posts, 10 

February 1984, Folder – Security General 1984, Box 18, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

78 Memorandum “Proposed Embassy Move from West to East Beirut,” Fields to Lamb, 14 May 1984, Folder – Beirut 

Bombing 1984 #1, Box 9, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

79 For support of move, see Memorandum “Beirut Operations,” Lawrence B. Lesser (NEA/EX), 10 May 1984; and 

Memorandum “Beirut Operations,” Clarence Pegues (NEA/EX), 21 May 1984; both Folder – Archives – Beirut Bombing 

1984 #1, Box 9, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. For concerns about “ceasing” operations in West Beirut, see Memorandum 

“Beirut Buildings,” [?], n.d. [@27 September 1984], Folder – Archives – Beirut Bombing 1984 #2, Box 10, M/CT Alpha 

Files 1978-86. 

80 Memorandum “Proposed Embassy Move from West to East Beirut,” Fields to Lamb, 14 May 1984; and Memorandum 

“Security Overview of the T/NOB (East Beirut)- Baaklini Building,” Andy Koritko (A/SY/OPS/PSD) to Fields, 14 June 

1984; both Folder – Archives - Beirut Bombing 1984 #1, Box 9, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. 

81 Bill Penn, a former Marine, was an Explosives and Ordinance Disposal Captain. Memorandum “Security Overview 

of the T/NOB (East Beirut)-Baaklini Building,” Koritko to Fields, 14 June 1984; Memorandum “Proposed Embassy 
296

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Move from West to East Beirut,” Fields to Lamb, 14 May 1984; Memorandum “Monthly Status Report – June 1984,” 

J. McKennan (ARSO) to Department of State, 24 July 1984; Memorandum “Monthly Status Report – July 1984,” 

McKennan to Department of State, 19 August 1984; and Telegram 7437 “Status Report – Embassy Operations,” Lyne 

(Embassy Beirut) to Secretary of State, 27 August 1984; all Folder – Archives – Beirut Bombing 1984 #1, Box 9, M/CT 

Alpha Files 1978-86. 

82 Telegram 5568 “Realignment of Embassy Operations,” Bartholomew to Secretary of State, 18 June 1984, Folder – 

Archives – Beirut Bombing 1984 #1, Box 9, M/CT Alpha Files 1978-86. Memorandum “Monthly Status Report – July 

1984,” McKennan to Department of State, 19 August 1984. Testimony of Spiers, Lamb, Fields, et al., 25 September 

1984, Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Commerce, Justice, State...

Supplemental Appropriations for 1985: Special Hearing on the Bombing of the United States Embassy, Beirut Lebanon, 

September 20, 1984, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 1984, p. 15.

83 Memorandum “Background to Decision to Relocate Embassy Beirut,” SY, DS Files Rosslyn. 

84 Prepared answers for press questions following the September 20 bombing, SY, September 1984, Folder – ABLD, 

Background, Box 1, DS Subject Files - Beirut Bombing. 

85 Prepared answers for press questions following the September 20 bombing, SY, September 1984. Staff Report “The Security 

of American Personnel in Lebanon,” Scott Cohen and Jerry Christianson, Staff Directors for the Senate Committee on 

Foreign Relations, 25 October 1984, enclosed with Memorandum “SFRC Staff Report on the Recent Embassy Bombing 

in Beirut,” W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. (H) to the Secretary, 25 October 1984, Folder – Beirut Bombing, Box 9, M/CT Alpha 

Files 1978-86. 

86 Spiers, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee following September 1984 bombing in Beirut, 

Folder – AMGT: HFAC/SFRC Testimony, Box 3; and Telegram 287353, Department of State (Spiers) to All 

Diplomatic and Consular Posts, 27 September 1984, Folder – Telegrams, Beirut, Box 1; both DS Subject Files - 

Beirut Bombing. 

87 Testimony of Spiers, Lamb, Fields, et al., 25 September 1984, Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, Special Hearing on the Bombing of the United States Embassy, Beirut Lebanon, September 20, 1984, House 

of Representatives, pp. 38-79. 

88 Testimony of Spiers, Lamb, Fields, et al., 25 September 1984, Hearing before Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, Special Hearing on the Bombing of the United States Embassy, Beirut Lebanon, September 20, 1984, House 

of Representatives, p. 23. Stenographic Transcript of Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 

“Fiscal Year 1985 Embassy Security Supplemental Authorization,” Alderson Reporting, 28 September 1984, pp. 6, 15-17. 

Biden’s quotation is on p. 17. 

89 Telegram 289705, Department of State to Embassy Beirut, 26 September 1984; and Statement of Spiers, Department of 

State, 26 September 1984; both DS Files. 

90 Testimony of Spiers, Lamb, Fields, et al., 25 September 1984, Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, Special Hearing on the Bombing of the United States Embassy, Beirut Lebanon, September 20, 1984, House 

of Representatives, p. 30. The Inman Panel noted several actions already taken by the Department. See Report of the 

Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, Inman Panel, June 1985, p. 5. 

91 Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, Inman Panel, June 1985, pp. 6-9. 

92 Oral History Interview, Alan O. Bigler, 22 November 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, pp. 2-3. Report of the Secretary 

of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, Inman Panel, June 1985, pp. 6-9. 

93 Oral History Interview, Alan Bigler, 22 November 2005, pp. 2-3. 
297

CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

94 Oral History Interview, John Rendeiro, pp. 1-2. Memorandum “Department of State Initiatives,” SY, n.d., Box 2, 

Records of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Subject Files 1988, RG 59-Lot 90D154, Suitland. Statement before the 

House Subcommittee on International Security, Robert B. Oakley, Director of S/CT, Folder--AMGT, HFAC/SFRC 

Testimony, Box 3, DS Subject Files - Beirut Bombing.

95 Oral History Interview, John Rendeiro, pp. 1-2, 7. 

96 Letter, Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, to David A. Stockman, Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB), Folder --Secretary/7th Floor, Action Memorandums, 1983, Box 18, M/CT Alpha 

Files 1978-86. Oral History Interview, Fred Burton, 9 October 2008, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 2. Congressional 

Committee Statement, Spiers, 26 September 1984, DS Files. Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on 

Overseas Security, Inman Panel, June 1985. Bill to Amend Title 50 of the U.S. Code to Authorize the United States 

Secretary of State to Pay Rewards...,” Folder-- Secretary/7th Floor, Action Memorandums 1983, Box 18, M/CT Alpha 

Files 1978-86. 

97 Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, Inman Panel, June 1985, pp. 1-2.

98 Memorandum “Appointment of Coordinator to Implement Inman Panel Recommendations,” Spiers to the Secretary 25 

June 1985, Folder – Hay Report – Organization 1985, Box 3, DS Subject Files 1985-86. 

99 The House of Representatives approved the legislation (HR 4151) creating DS by a vote of 389 to 7 on March 18, 1986; 

and the Senate passed the bill with an amendment by a simple voice vote on June 25. The two bills were reconciled and 

passed both houses of Congress by a voice vote on August 12, 1986. Memorandum “Issues on Management of Security 

Functions,” Spiers to Donald Bouchard (A) and Robert A. Lamb (M), 30 October 1985, Folder – Communications 

Security, Box 3; Memorandum “Issues on Management of Certain Security and Terrorism Functions,” Sayre to Spiers, 

24 October 1985, Folder – Communications Security, Box 3; and Memorandum “Rationale for Diplomatic Security 

Service,” n.d., attached to Letter, Spiers to Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

29 October 1985, Folder – Reprogramming Letter, Box 1; all DS Subject Files 1985-86. Report of the Secretary’s 

Advisory Committee on Overseas Security, June 1985, pp. 73-75. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on 

Security at the United States Missions in Moscow and Other Areas of High Risk, 29 April 1987, Folder – ASEC Chron 

1987, Box 5, ASEC Chron Files 1971-1996, RG 59-Lot 03D134, Suitland.

100 Letter, House Committee on Foreign Affairs to the Secretary, 20 September 1985; and Letter, Shultz to Representative 

Dante B. Fascell, Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, October 1985; both Folder – 

ASEC Congressional Correspondence, Box 1, DS Subject Files 1985-86. 

101 Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, Inman Panel, June 1985, pp. 29, 67-68. Letter, 

Shultz to Stockman, 20 June 1985, Folder – Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, Box 5, DS Subject Files 1985-86. 

102 Letter, Shultz to Fascell, October 1985. Memorandum “The Office for Combating Terrorism (M/CT),” Peterson, HO 

Files. Memorandum “Devolution of M/CTP Responsibilities, plus attachment Transfer of M/CTP Functions,” Oakley 

to Spiers, October 1985, Folder – PER: Hays Report – Organization 1985, Box 3, DS Subject Files 1985-86. 

103 Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, Inman Panel, June 1985, pp. 1-2.

104 Oral History Interview, David Fields, 21 November 2005, p. 5. Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #2, 15 November 

2005, pp. 1-2. 

299

CHAPTER 8 ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: A Bureau for Diplomatic Security, 1986-1992

The Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) appeared to have an 

auspicious beginning. With strong support from the Inman Panel, Congress, and Secretary of State George P. 

Shultz, DS obtained extensive monies, personnel, and other resources. Also, the Inman Panel’s call for centralization 

of the Department’s security functions resulted in several security-related offices, such as the Diplomatic Courier 

service and the Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program, being moved into DS. Further centralization in 1989 brought 

the Office of Information Management (IM) into DS, adding responsibilities for communications and computer 

security. 

Despite strong support, increased resources, 

and greater authority, DS experienced a rough start. 

Some offices and divisions, such as the Diplomatic 

Couriers and Information Management (IM), did 

not want to join DS. Construction of the new 

U.S. Embassy in Moscow presented additional 

problems when the foundations of a Soviet listening / 

surveillance network were discovered in the building’s 

support structure. The fraternization of two Marine 

Security Guards with known operatives of the Soviet 

KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or State 

Security Service) further undermined confidence in 

the Department’s management of security. Then, in 

1990 and 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, 

many believed that the security threat posed by the 

Soviet Union had ceased to exist. Congress cut funds 

CHAPTER 8

ALL UNDER ONE ROOF

8

A Bureau for Diplomatic Security, 1986-1992

Figure 1: August 10, 1988: Secretary of State George P. 

Shultz (center left, dark suit) arrives in Quito, Ecuador, 

for the inauguration of President Rodrigo Borja. Secretary 

Shultz is followed by the U.S. Embassy Regional Security 

Officer (left of Shultz, in a white dress) and by two DS 

Special Agents on his protective detail (center rear, tall, in 

dress suits). On the previous day, drug lords had bombed 

the Secretary’s motorcade during his visit to La Paz, Bolivia. 

Source: Private collection. 
300

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

and staff, and IM left the bureau. DS shifted to a “risk management” strategy, focusing its now-limited resources 

upon those overseas posts facing the highest security threats. 

z A New, Expanded Bureau for Diplomatic Security å

The new Bureau of Diplomatic Security would 

have been unrecognizable to Robert L. Bannerman, 

who created the Security Office in 1945. Headed by 

an Assistant Secretary of State, assisted by a Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary and a Front Office staff, 

DS stood in sharp contrast to Bannerman and his 

single secretary. Whereas Bannerman had divided 

the Security Office into three divisions (Background 

Investigations, Evaluations, and Physical Security), 

DS had 34 divisions, grouped into 11 offices. In fact, 

all three of Bannerman’s divisions were now under the 

same Deputy Assistant Secretary, and Investigations 

and Evaluations were two divisions under the 

Office of Investigations. Furthermore, the Office of 

Investigations was supported by nine Field Offices 

across the country, a significant change from relying 

upon local Post Office Inspectors in 1945.1

The new DS was also a much larger, more 

expansive bureau than Fields and Lamb had proposed 

with the Acceleration program, or that the Inman 

Panel had recommended. DS was divided into three 

parts: Operations, Policy and Counterterrorism, 

and Resource Management. Operations contained 

several of SY’s “traditional” tasks, including 

Investigations, Protection (Secretary’s detail and 

Dignitary protection), Overseas Security, Security Technology (Technical Security), the Diplomatic Couriers 

and Counterintelligence. Policy and Counterterrorism oversaw the Threat Analysis Group, as well as the AntiTerrorism Assistance (ATA) and Emergency Planning programs. Resource Management and Policy consisted 

of many programs that Victor Dikeos had promoted, including Professional Development, Administration, 

Management, and a new Public Affairs office that would serve as DS’s liaison to the press.2

 

Figure 2: Robert E. Lamb, Assistant Secretary of State for 

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1985-1989. Earlier, 

as Assistant Secretary of Administration, Lamb supported 

Director David Fields’ efforts to expand SY. Secretary of 

State George Shultz asked Lamb to oversee implementation 

of the Inman Panel recommendations and to serve as the 

first Assistant Secretary of State for DS. Source: Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security Files. 
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DS Agents also gained new law enforcement 

powers, as well as law enforcement status. DS had 

pressed for greater arrest authority for several years, 

and in 1985, in the wake of the Beirut bombings and 

the Inman Panel report, Congress passed Public Law 

99/93, which gave DS agents to the power to arrest 

suspects and execute search warrants. DS Agent 

Gerald Lopez made the first DS arrest, and then in 

July 1986, two DS Agents cooperated with U.S. Postal 

Service agents to apprehend two suspects charged with 

21 counts of passport and visa fraud in Houston. The 

new law, however, only permitted DS Agents to make 

arrests and execute warrants in connection with their 

specific law enforcement duties, for example during 

visa and passport fraud investigations and dignitary 

protection details. If a DS Agent seized a person for 

passport fraud and discovered the person to be in 

possession of illegal drugs, the DS Agent could not 

arrest the individual on drug charges.3

 

The Special Assignments Staff (SAS) also 

expanded its range of investigations and began to 

formalize its procedures. The SAS initially focused 

its investigations upon homosexuals and sexual 

deviants; however, the Irvin Scarbeck case in the early 

1960s and the Alfred Erdos case of 1972 (in which 

the Deputy Chief of Mission killed his male lover 

at the U.S. Embassy in Equatorial Guinea) helped 

to expand SAS’s investigations to include criminal 

activities such as rape, drug smuggling, and murder. 

In previous eras, if someone did something wrong or 

illegal overseas, they were often shipped out and fired. In the 1973 Erdos v. United States decision, this changed; 

the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a U.S. embassy constituted “special maritime jurisdiction,” 

in other words, a crime committed at a U.S. embassy or on its grounds would be treated under U.S. law just 

like a crime committed on a U.S. ship. As a result, SAS had to document and process the person and the crime, 

Figure 3: DS trainers simulate a terrorist incident aboard 

an airplane in 1988. As terrorism became a preeminent 

threat, DS, with its expanded resources, developed specialized 

security training for U.S. Ambassadors and other Department 

personnel. U.S. Ambassador-designate to Czechoslovakia 

Shirley Temple Black (right) participates with others in this 

particular exercise. Source: Department of State. 

Figure 4: Louis Schwartz, Jr., Director of the Diplomatic 

Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for Diplomatic Security, 1986-1988. Source: Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security Files.
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History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

prompting SAS to develop formal techniques for 

criminal investigations.4

 

With the creation of DS, Criminal 

Investigations—SAS had changed its name in the early 

1980s—expanded significantly under the direction of 

Clark M. Dittmer. In 1982, only three agents worked 

in Criminal Investigations (CI), but by 1986 under 

DS, the office had grown to ten people. Dittmer 

began to formalize CI’s procedures and practices and 

tasked Special Agent Jimmy Hush to write a manual, 

which detailed investigative procedures, and provided 

guidance for new DS agents entering the CI office. 

In writing the manual, which appeared in 1986-87, 

Hush borrowed procedures and practices from the 

Secret Service, the FBI, the New York City Police 

Department, and the Los Angeles Police Department, 

among others.5

Under DS, the Secretary of State’s protective 

detail expanded, and Secretary Shultz had a much 

larger detail than any previous Secretary. Before 

the Inman Panel, the Secretary’s detail numbered 

only about 30 agents, but in its review, the Inman 

Panel recommended that DS double the budget and 

personnel for the Secretary’s detail. After the Inman 

Panel, DS added agents to the detail, raising Secretary 

Shultz’s detail to 41 agents. The Secretary’s detail, however, fluctuated in size according to the level of security that 

each subsequent Secretary desired. The detail for Secretary James A. Baker III (1989-1992) numbered 34 agents, 

and when Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger assumed the office in 1992, the detail shrank to 30 agents.6

 

DS considered other security measures for the Secretary, such as a secure telephone booth and a Secretary’s 

residence. Since Secretary Shultz traveled more than most Secretaries of State, DS developed a “telephone booth” to 

ensure that the Secretary could make calls without worries of talking in a “bugged” room. Two U.S. Navy Seabees 

accompanied Shultz and set up the telephone booth in his room. DS also proposed creating an official residence 

for the Secretary of State, an idea first suggested during the SY days. Prior to the Inman Panel, Secretaries either 

owned or leased their residences, which made it costly to install such physical security measures as alarm systems and 

Figure 5: Clark M. Dittmer, Director of the Diplomatic 

Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Diplomatic Security, 1988-1993. Open to new and 

promising ideas, Dittmer was instrumental in expanding 

the Criminal Investigations office and creating the CounterTerrorism office. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

Files. 
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bullet resistant glass. Given the increasing number 

of threats to the Secretary and the development of 

sophisticated timing devices in the 1970s, DS had 

deemed a Secretary’s residence a necessity. Although 

the Secretary’s detail was expanded under the new 

DS, the cost of a residence proved too much even for 

the Inman Panel to recommend, and the idea did not 

get sufficient support.7

 

Further improvements in security occurred for 

the Harry S Truman Building (“Main State,”) after 

the 1985 murder of a Department employee. A 

young man entered the building with a gun, went to 

a seventh floor office—the same floor as the Office 

of the Secretary of State—and murdered his mother. 

The murder prompted the Department to tighten 

access and visitor controls to Main State. DS installed 

an automated card reader system at Main State’s 

entrances, erected barriers at driveway entrances, and 

in 1987, introduced a domestic Uniformed Protective 

Officer contract program. Also, in 1987, DS sought 

to promote security among Department personnel by 

holding its first annual Security Awareness Day in the 

Department’s Exhibit Hall; most of DS’s offices gave 

demonstrations. In 1988, DS installed magnetometers and x-ray screening, and required all visitors to Main State 

to pass through them. DS set up a press visiting area and required all Eastern Bloc reporters to be escorted while 

in the Department. In October 1989, uniformed security guards contracted by DS assumed access control duties 

and regular patrols at Main State and ten Department annexes in the Washington area.8

 

z The Rewards for Justice Program å

Under the new DS, the Rewards for Justice program (RFJ) expanded its efforts and outreach, largely due to 

the efforts of Special Agent Brad Smith. Initially created as “Rewards for Information,” the RFJ offered money 

in exchange for information that led to the arrest or conviction of terrorists, but awareness of the program 

remained limited. Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Robert Lamb and Ambassador at Large 

for Counter-Terrorism L. Paul Bremer concluded that the Department had not sufficiently advertised the RFJ. 

Figure 6: A DS Security Engineering Officer tests the 

Secretary of State’s “telephone booth.” The booth allows the 

Secretary to have a secure conversation even if his/her room 

is bugged with a listening device. Secretary of State George 

Shultz was the first to use the booth. Source: Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security Files. 
304

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

As a result, DS conducted a poster campaign at all U.S. embassies, consulates, and passport agencies in April 

1987, publicizing rewards for information about five terrorist incidents. Despite the greater distribution, the 

poster campaign did not yield any tips that resulted in convictions. DS and S/CT then decided to expand 

the publicity campaign further. They ordered new posters in English, Arabic, French, German, and Spanish, 

but the posters were displayed in U.S. facilities and Interpol offices, not public spaces. The Department 

considered media releases through U.S. Government media channels and, in the most high-risk areas, paid 

advertising in host country media.9

 

The structure of the RFJ program added other difficulties. Several rewards approved in 1985 and 1986 

remained unpaid in 1990, even though the funds had been designated. The unpaid rewards prevented the 

Department of State from asking for funds to pay rewards approved in 1988 and 1989, some of which led 

to the conviction of TWA 847 hijacker Fawas Yunis. DS agents also recognized that the Bureau’s policy of 

requiring informers to report directly to U.S. officials in U.S. facilities discouraged those who feared discovery 

and repercussions. To correct this, DS established a special post office box that allowed informers to contact U.S. 

officials by mail rather than appearing at a U.S. embassy.

10 

In response to the December 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, 

Scotland, the U.S. Government and the airline industry raised the amount of the rewards. President George 

H. W. Bush signed legislation that increased RFJ awards to $2 million, and the Air Line Pilots Association 

agreed to match any Department of State reward for terrorist acts against U.S. air carriers, up to $1 million. 

The Air Transport Association added another $1 million, raising the possible reward amount to $4 million. 

Although the larger rewards raised the RFJ profile, 

DS met resistance from some Foreign Service 

Officers who disliked the more “black and white” 

law enforcement approach.11 

DS Agent Brad Smith creatively and successfully 

increased public awareness and the effectiveness of 

the RFJ program. He improved foreign language 

publicity efforts, ran advertisements in Arab press 

outlets, and produced radio and television spots with 

stars such as Charlton Heston and Charles Bronson. 

Noting that smoking was very popular in the Middle 

East, Smith implemented the “matchbook cover” 

campaign. Printed in Arabic, the matchbooks 

detailed reward amounts, described how to submit 

information, and featured illustrations of known 

Figure 7: Matchbook covers of the Rewards for Justice 

program, including one for Osama bin Laden. The 

matchbooks are placed in local stores that sell cigarettes and 

thereby provide exposure to segments of the population that 

posters in a U.S. embassy or diplomatic facility would not 

reach. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
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CHAPTER 8 ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: A Bureau for Diplomatic Security, 1986-1992

suspects. The matchbooks were placed in local stores. To improve the discretion and security of communications 

channels for those offering information, DS set up telephone hotlines at relevant embassies. Smith later developed 

a website for the RFJ program.12 

z Overseas Security Advisory Council å

The increase in the number of terrorist attacks focused attention upon the security and safety of U.S. citizens 

living and working abroad, which led to another addition to DS—the Overseas Security Advisory Council 

(OSAC). U.S. corporations with overseas operations grew concerned about the security of their U.S. citizen 

employees. Speaking to the American Society for Industrial Security in 1984, Secretary of State Shultz announced 

that he would create a council that would bring together corporate executives and Department officials to discuss 

terrorism and share information related to security. Shultz then asked Assistant Secretary Lamb and Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Fields to put the council together. Sixteen major corporations initially joined OSAC, including 

Citibank, Bechtel, Boeing, Exxon, IBM, and Pan American Airlines. The Inman Panel strongly endorsed OSAC, 

asserting that while the Department did not have an official responsibility to protect private citizens, businesses, 

and other organizations operating abroad, it did have a moral obligation to provide them with some guidance 

and information about security within a particular 

country.13

OSAC was a “huge success” from the beginning. 

Under the guidance of DS, OSAC sought to facilitate 

a dialogue between Department security experts and 

U.S. companies operating overseas, particularly those 

operating in countries considered high risk. As a 

service to the private sector, DS updated companies 

on security situations in countries, developments 

in protective security, and advances in security 

technology. Together, DS and corporate officials 

formulated security and crisis-response guidelines for 

U.S. companies operating overseas. The Department 

also benefited from OSAC, by preventing private 

corporate security forces and measures from acting at 

cross-purposes with DS operations.14 

Initially, OSAC members focused on terrorism, 

hostage situations, and crime. Private companies 

sought information and advice from the Department 

Figure 8: Created in 1984 at the initiative of Secretary 

George Shultz, the Overseas Security Advisory Council 

(OSAC) assumes new importance as terrorism emerges as 

the preeminent threat to U.S. citizens abroad after the Cold 

War. OSAC brings together DS officials and private sector 

leaders to share information and coordinate appropriately, 

to improve security for U.S. citizens working and living 

overseas. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
306

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

on the likelihood and prevention of threats. DS established a private liaison analyst group to analyze relevant data, 

and make its findings available to the business community on a frequently updated Overseas Security Electronic 

Bulletin Board. In 1990, DS began sharing the electronic bulletin board with the Bureau of Consular Affairs on a 

daily basis, extending the advisory service to all U.S. citizens working and traveling abroad. The sharing resulted 

from the “no double standard” on threat information that arose after the downing of Pan Am Flight 103. The “no 

double standard,” mandated by Congress, stated that U.S. Government officials and employees could not possess 

information on threats that was not available to the general public.15 

z Couriers å

The Department’s well-established Diplomatic Courier service was a new addition to DS. The service came 

under heavy scrutiny from the Inman Panel after the 1984 discovery of Soviet bugs in typewriters at the U.S. 

Embassy in Moscow. Because the typewriters likely had been shipped unaccompanied rather than by courier 

into the Soviet Union, the Inman Panel determined that there were “serious flaws in the [courier] system.” The 

panel recommended transferring the courier service to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. In doing so, the panel 

hoped that the courier service would retain its historic identity, while establishing a closer operational relationship 

with professional security agents, and thus, increase security.16 The Office of Communications (OC), which 

oversaw the courier service, protested the Inman Panel’s recommendation. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

Communications Robert Ribera warned that the transfer would lead to the courier system’s “demise.” Also, after 

the typewriter finds, OC revised procedures and provided couriers with a cleared U.S. escort when they arrived, 

departed, or transited all posts. OC also assigned 

armed guards and armed vehicles to protect couriers 

working at high-threat posts. Despite OC’s objections, 

the Department transferred the Diplomatic Courier 

service to DS in 1985, and DS promptly added 12 

positions to the courier staff and conducted a major 

review of pouch and courier operations.17

The concerns about diplomatic couriers may 

have resulted more from the Department’s demands 

upon the couriers rather than lax security standards. 

Prior to the Inman Panel, the courier service with its 

staff of 75 maintained its headquarters in Washington, 

with Regional Diplomatic Courier Divisions in 

Washington, Frankfurt, and Bangkok. All classified 

material sent from the Department to diplomatic posts 

Figure 9: Circa 1986, a DS Diplomatic Courier loads bagged 

pouches aboard an international flight at a Washington, 

D.C., airport. Today, Diplomatic Couriers spend tens of 

thousands of hours annually delivering tens of millions of 

pounds of classified diplomatic pouch material by air, sea, and 

over land, including palletized equipment for new Embassy 

construction. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
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CHAPTER 8 ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: A Bureau for Diplomatic Security, 1986-1992

was assembled into pouches in the Diplomatic Mail 

and Pouch Center in Main State. Once assembled, 

pouches heading to Europe and Asia were then sent 

to the Defense Courier Service receiving station in 

Fort Meade, Maryland. From Fort Meade, couriers 

carried the pouches onboard military or commercial 

flights to the courier receiving stations in Frankfurt 

and Bangkok. In Bangkok or Frankfurt, a courier 

based in that city took their assigned pouches, usually 

on commercial flights, to delivery points on regularly 

scheduled routes. As required since the 1940s, couriers 

were expected to “never lose sight of the pouches 

while they are outside the cargo hold of the aircraft;” 

therefore, couriers often boarded the plane at the last 

minute. A single courier might stay in transit for as 

many as 25 days in a row, visiting perhaps 10 cities on one route. Pouches headed for Africa, the Caribbean, and 

Latin America did not pass through the Defense Courier Service, but went to the Washington Regional Diplomatic 

Courier Division. At the Washington regional center, couriers followed the same procedure as those in Bangkok 

and Frankfurt. DS later established a regional center in Miami for pouches bound for Latin America and Africa.18

The challenge for Department of State couriers 

was the quantity and size of diplomatic pouches, 

not the structure of system and routes. By the 

1980s, couriers faced a situation similar to that 

during the 1920s: the system had grown into what 

one official called a “freight hauling concern.” With 

the Department’s computerized communications 

center and improved technologies of the 1970s and 

1980s, much of the Department’s correspondence 

(despatches, instructions, memoranda, circulars, 

etc) was cabled. However, as diplomacy expanded 

to include agriculture, finance, education, police/

Interpol, and cultural exchanges, the number of 

agencies and personnel at U.S. embassies grew 

dramatically, as did the amount of information 

Figure 10: A Diplomatic Security Courier Escort monitors 

the loading of a container, or “pouch.” By the 1990s, the 

“old” (1920s) problem of couriers being a “freight hauling 

service” reemerged, and “pouches” now assumed all shapes 

and sizes. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 

Figure 11: A Diplomatic Courier supervises the unloading 

of Department of State materials from Bahrain. After 

being transferred to DS, the courier system was expanded 

and reorganized. Under the new hub-and-spoke system, 

Department of State couriers now made short trips to a 

couple of posts. Source: Department of State. 
308

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

transmitted between overseas posts and Washington. The Department estimated that the weight of its escorted 

pouches had increased twenty-nine fold since 1947 and would soon reach 4.5 million pounds of classified 

material per year.19 Couriers struggled to maintain close supervision of their pouches. DS recommended 

hiring U.S. escorts or planeside security watchers to enhance the security of classified pouches while couriers 

handled any official business. Couriers admitted that they found it “impossible to provide adequate security 

when trying to oversee the loading, offloading, and maneuvering what was often 16 full baggage carts through 

a crowded terminal.”20 

Whereas in the late 1940s, a courier’s pouch resembled a hand-held brief case, by the 1980s, “pouches” assumed 

multiple sizes and weights because the Department was shipping numerous items including office equipment and 

building materials via pouch. This, in part, resulted from security requirements spurred by the typewriter finds 

at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and by the lack of an alternative secure means of transport. The large size of 

pouches threatened to jeopardize the courier service’s protection under international law. A Department official 

admitted, “our broad interpretation of what may be shipped by pouch stretches the intent of...the [1961] Vienna 

Convention.” By 1985, 40 countries had placed restrictions on incoming diplomatic pouches, in part due to 

suspicion of the contents of large pouches. The General Accounting Office (GAO) warned that the United 

Figure 12: During the late 1980s, under the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the amount of materials that Diplomatic Couriers 

were carrying increased markedly. With most reports and memoranda sent via electronic means, the Department was now 

shipping office equipment (e.g. typewriters), building materials, furniture, and other items in “pouches,” largely due to the lack 

of a secure means of transport. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
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CHAPTER 8 ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: A Bureau for Diplomatic Security, 1986-1992

Nations International Law Commission might revise 

the definition and laws governing the inviolability of 

pouches if the United States did not voluntarily limit 

its use of diplomatic pouches.21 

Despite the warnings, the Department of 

State, in practice and policy, expanded the volume 

of materials it transported in secure pouches. A 

1987 policy decision required secure transit for all 

building materials associated with new construction 

and security upgrades at overseas posts. This included 

all construction materials, furniture, furnishings, and 

supplies. Combined with the extensive program to 

update post security as mandated by the Omnibus 

Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, 

the 1987 decision guaranteed that the volume of 

pouch contents would increase rather than decrease.22

After transfer of the Courier service, DS officials 

instituted new security guidelines for couriers. 

Couriers were instructed to travel in a window 

seat and “avoid emotional reactions” that might 

draw attention. Couriers were not to carry liquor, 

“provocative” materials, or items such as membership 

cards that identified political or religious affiliations that could place the courier in danger. In case of a airline 

hijacking or hostage situation, couriers were not to hide the nature of their duties or the location of their pouches; 

however, they should not volunteer any information. Upon their release, and if detained by airport officials, 

couriers were to take control of their pouches as soon as possible, or at least maintain visual control of the aircraft. 

They should immediately notify the regional courier office of the emergency situation that they were experiencing 

and the status of their pouches23 

After joining DS, the Diplomatic Courier service grew. By 1990, it handled more than 78 million pieces a 

year for approximately 40 U.S. Government agencies. In FY 1991, the Courier division’s budget was over $20 

million and had a staff of 120 employees.24 DS also altered the structure of the courier system. DS shifted to a 

“hub and spoke” system, with couriers making short trips to one or two posts instead of regional centers with long 

routes and couriers stopping at several posts. The hub and spoke arrangement meant that new couriers no longer 

logged the many miles that their senior colleagues had. In fact, Courier Joel Bell’s record may be secure: retiring 

Figure 13: Diplomatic Courier Joel Bell. After 37 years 

as a courier, he travelled more than 9 million miles, more 

than any U.S. Government employee, astronauts included. 

Source: Department of State. 
310

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

in 1987 after 37 years as a courier, Bell travelled an 

estimated 9 million miles, more than any other U.S. 

Government employee, astronauts notwithstanding.25

z Breaches at Embassy Moscow å

Besides diplomatic pouches, the Department 

confronted intense scrutiny from Congress, the press, 

and the public regarding security at the U.S. Embassy 

in Moscow. The typewriter bugs had prompted 

Congressional criticism of the Department’s 

handling of security; in fact, Senator Patrick Leahy 

(D-Vermont) called Embassy Moscow “a sieve.” 

Congress and the Inman Panel pressured the 

Department to reduce the number of Soviet nationals 

employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and at the 

Soviet mission to the United Nations; in fact, Soviets 

in the United States outnumbered U.S. diplomats 

in the Soviet Union by about 100. A Department 

of State official acknowledged that several Soviet 

diplomats in the United States were KGB agents, and 

U.S. Embassy officials in Moscow knew of at least 50 

Soviet employees who worked for the KGB. Also, 

U.S. Embassy officers discovered that the Soviets 

had employed a fine powder, popularly called “spy 

dust”, to track Embassy personnel and their activities 

in order to identify agents of other U.S. agencies. Another irritant emerged when the Soviets completed the 

structural shells of the last three buildings (chancery, consulate, and reception hall) at their embassy complex at 

Mount Alto in Washington; meanwhile, the new U.S. Embassy in Moscow languished far behind schedule and 

was more than $90 million over budget.26 

On August 17, 1985, just after the Inman Panel released its report (and before DS was created), the 

Department of State, without warning, locked out all Soviet workers from the construction site of the New 

Embassy Office Building (NOB) in Moscow. U.S. officials had discovered that rebars in the NOB’s concrete 

pillars had been altered to serve as antennae, that unauthorized changes had been made to the roof design, and 

that Soviet construction workers were caught putting objects in the concrete. In short, U.S. officials found that 

Figure 14: The Administration building of the Russian 

Embassy on Mount Alto in Washington, D.C., with a 

security camera in the foreground. As a result of the bugs 

found in the structure of the new U.S. Embassy building 

in Moscow, U.S. officials would not allow the Russians 

to occupy their new embassy on Mount Alto until 1994, 

even though construction was completed in 1985. Source: 

© Associated Press. 
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collectively the alterations created the foundations of 

an extensive bugging network. While SY and other 

agency personnel were investigating the discoveries, 

SY Engineer John Bagnal recalled that they suddenly 

saw lights in a steeple of a nearby Russian church, 

prompting them to dub the building, the “Church 

of Holy Telemetry.” Upon hearing of the discoveries, 

John Wolf, a Security Engineering Officer who worked 

on the project, said that he felt like he had been “had.” 

Representative Connie Mack (R-Florida) described 

the NOB as “essentially an eight story microphone 

plugged into the Politburo.” It did not help that in 

the NOB’s façade, Soviet workers had arranged bricks 

of a darker shade to read “CCCP” (Cyrillic for USSR) 

from a distance, or that the architectural firm hired to 

design the Embassy had employed a Russian who later 

moved back to the Soviet Union and disappeared. 

Department officials halted construction at the NOB, and Soviet workers were locked out until an alternative 

plan could be determined.27 

The Department tried to import U.S. workers to continue NOB construction, but that too encountered 

difficulties. One subcontractor defaulted on three contracts and basically went bankrupt. Of 42 contractors hired 

by the Department, 19 did not have Defense Industrial Security Clearances, and one contractor that supplied 

16 workers sent 7 workers back to the United States for not having proper security clearances. In addition, the 

Office of Foreign Buildings (FBO) showed a lack of coordination in managing of the construction and repairs. 

The new project manager sent to Moscow by FBO told a visiting group of U.S. Senate officials about his plan to 

fix the NOB roof, a plan that would cost $700,000; however, FBO denied the plan was under consideration and 

said the repairs would only cost $80,000. Two other FBO officials working on the same roof repair project offered 

conflicting descriptions of which repairs needed to be completed. Citing “poor management and coordination,” 

the Senate group concluded that the Department of State officials had waited too long to address construction 

and security problems in Moscow.28 

Evidence of Soviet espionage in the new NOB’s structure, and the exposed inadequacies of security and 

oversight at the construction site prompted the new Bureau of Diplomatic Security to create the Construction 

Security program. Organized by John Wolf, DS assigned a construction security team to each FBO project. The 

team included a site security manager, Seabees, and cleared U.S. guards. The Seabees would conduct surveillance 

Figure 15: The New Office Building at the U.S. Embassy 

in Moscow. Due to the bugging system discovered in the 

structure of the red brick building, the United States expelled 

the Soviet workers, tore down the upper floors (to the base of 

the fifth floor), inserted shielding to prevent any new bugs, 

and rebuilt the upper floors. Soviet workers arranged darker 

colored bricks so that one could read “CCCP” (Russian 

for USSR) in the façade of the U.S. Embassy. Source: © 

Associated Press. 
312

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

and inspect the construction work to see if workers had tampered with or altered parts of the project. DS also 

developed a Transit Security program to ensure the secure transport of construction materials to the site, and that 

only designated, cleared workers could enter the site.29 

Despite the new construction security measures, the question of securing the NOB’s classified floors remained. 

Assistant Secretary Lamb endorsed a plan to nearly triple the amount of space dedicated to classified work, and 

the Inman Panel had favored improving shielding at all U.S. embassies in medium to high threat environments. 

A special multiple agency taskforce recommended 

installing specialized shielding in the NOB, but DS 

argued that the experimental system did not justify 

the $21 million price tag. DS instead proposed more 

traditional shielding, which would cost only $5 million 

and delay the building’s completion only until mid1989. As Under Secretary of State for Management 

Ronald Spiers explained to Secretary Shultz, delaying 

construction and increasing the cost of the Moscow 

Embassy project would be highly unpopular with 

Congress. On the other hand, completing the facility 

without shielding, Spiers said, would leave it without 

the necessary protection and subject the Department 

to further criticism and scrutiny from other agencies. 

Shultz approved DS’s proposal.30 

Congress was already critical of management 

and security at the NOB construction site when the 

Reagan Administration and the Soviets drew further 

attention to security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, 

resulting in the withdrawal of all Soviet nationals 

from embassy employment. Despite opposition by 

U.S. Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman and several 

Embassy officers, the Department (as recommended 

by the Inman Panel) proposed a reduction in the 

number of Soviet nationals working at the Embassy. 

In late August 1986, the FBI arrested a Soviet 

employee at the United Nations for espionage, and 

the Soviets reciprocated by arresting a U.S. News and 

Figure 16: Sergeant Clayton J. Lonetree, U.S. Marine 

Corps. Lonetree served as a Marine Security Guard at the 

U.S. Embassies in Moscow and Vienna. While in Moscow, 

he became involved with a Russian woman, and supplied 

classified materials about both embassies to “Uncle Sasha.” 

He was convicted and sent to prison. Source: © Associated 

Press/Mark Wilson. 
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World Report reporter. At the same time, a bipartisan measure was moving through Congress that called for a 

reduction in the number of Soviets working at the United Nations. When Congress issued its report in early 

October—the report insisted that the employment of Soviet nationals constituted a “threat to the security of 

U.S. operations”—the Soviets told the White House that they would not comply with the reductions. President 

Reagan then expelled several Soviet officials from the United States, and the Soviet Union and the United States 

proceeded to engage in a series of reciprocal expulsions that culminated in the Soviets’ withdrawal of all Soviet 

nationals from employment at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.31

Amid this atmosphere, newspaper headlines announced that two Marine Security Guards (MSGs), Sergeants 

Clayton J. Lonetree and Arnold Bracy, had worked with “Uncle Sasha” (the cover for KGB officer Aleksei G. 

Yefimov) and facilitated KGB espionage of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. News that Lonetree had committed 

espionage appeared in early January; then in February, Ambassador Hartman and the Department divulged that 

several MSGs at the Embassy were dismissed from duty for rules and currency violations, actions unrelated to 

the Lonetree affair.32 The revelation that a second Marine guard had engaged in espionage, however, brought the 

entire affair to the cover of the April 20, 1987 edition of Time, and Time’s cover showed a Marine in dress uniform 

with a large black eye next to the phrase “Spy Scandals” in large letters. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 

called the revelations “a very great loss,” and Assistant Secretary Lamb said “a serious loss of classified information” 

had occurred.33 As the third security breach at Embassy Moscow in nearly as many years, the Lonetree-Bracy affair 

was problematic, not because Marine guards had assisted the KGB spies whom they were assigned to keep out, 

but because Lonetree and Bracy confessed to letting KGB agents into the most sensitive areas of the Embassy, the 

secure upper floors that included the Communications Programs Unit (CPU).34 

Confusion clouded events and the cases, in 

part because Bracy recanted his confession; however, 

Lonetree and Bracy (if the latter did assist the KGB) 

may have been separate espionage efforts. Both 

Marines became romantically involved with Russian 

female employees, and both women introduced 

the two Marines to “Uncle Sasha.” The two guards, 

however, could not have conspired together because 

they only stood night watch duty together twice, 

in October 1985 and in November 1985, and both 

instances occurred before Lonetree began cooperating 

with Yefimov. Lonetree assisted Uncle Sasha during 

his assignment at Embassy Moscow and later in 

Vienna. He confessed to providing Yefimov with 

Figure 17: As part of the DS Antiterrorism Assistance 

program, DS Special Agents are shown here training a 

partner nation’s security force. Source: Department of State 

Records. 
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History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

floor plans of secure upper floors of both embassies, and with the identities— and in some cases, photographs—of 

persons working for other agencies. Bracy later confessed that he assisted Lonetree in allowing Soviet agents to 

have access to classified areas of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, assistance which included turning off alarms. Bracy 

later recanted his confession, after he twice failed lie detector tests. Only Lonetree was convicted of espionage, but 

he denied working with Bracy and passed polygraph tests on this question.35 

After Bracy’s March 1987 confession, the White House, Department of State, Marine Corps, and other 

agencies were in a “near crisis” atmosphere, and the Department of State and the Marine Corps quickly made several 

changes to security at Embassy Moscow. On March 25, the Department ordered the Embassy to stop transmission 

of all classified communications and processing of classified information. All communications equipment—a total 

of 120 crates—as well as the secure conference rooms were removed and returned to Washington for inspection. 

Classified communications did not restart until April 1988, when Secretary Shultz travelled to Moscow for a 

two-day visit. On March 30, 1987, the entire Marine Security Guard detail was replaced with 28 new Marines. 

Regional Security Officer Frederick Mecke, who had requested Bracy’s removal from post and had improved 

security at the Embassy, was recalled and reassigned to Washington. Mecke’s reassignment was not unusual; by 

November 1987, around 70 percent of Embassy personnel received new assignments and were replaced.36 

The White House could not ignore the scandal, and President Reagan named three commissions to review 

security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird headed the Moscow Assessment 

Review Panel, which studied security procedures and the state of security at the existing Embassy in Moscow. Among 

other things, the Laird Commission held Ambassador 

Hartman responsible for the lax security at the Embassy, 

saying that he “failed to take appropriate steps to 

correct the situation.” Former Secretary of Defense 

and Director of the CIA James Schlesinger headed 

another commission that studied the NOB structure. 

In his report, Schlesinger charged that the bugs in the 

NOB were “both foreseeable and foreseen,” and the 

Department of State “was one of the last to get on board” 

in appreciating the extent and pervasiveness of the Soviet 

espionage. Third, Reagan asked Anne Armstrong, Chair 

of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 

(PFIAB), to review security at the U.S. mission in 

Moscow. PFIAB recommended spending $80 million 

to remove the bugs from the NOB, and apparently 

reiterated many of Laird’s and Schlesinger’s criticisms.37 

Figure 18: Senator Olympia Snowe (R-Maine). While 

serving in the House of Representatives, Snowe and Daniel 

Mica (D-Florida) were critical of the Department of State’s 

handling of security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, once 

using a Magic Slate to illustrate the lack of security. Despite 

the criticism, Snowe was a strong supporter of DS. Source: 

© Associated Press / Dennis Paquin. 
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Seizing upon the Embassy’s problems, Congress dramatized the lack of security in Moscow in order to force 

improvements in security at the Department of State. Representatives Daniel Mica (D-Florida) and Olympia 

Snow (R-Maine), the Chair and ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee respectively, 

travelled to Moscow to investigate security conditions at the Embassy. Supporters of SY and DS, Mica and Snowe 

held a press conference and displayed a “Magic Slate” (an erasable tablet) to dramatize the lack of security at the 

Embassy. Mica said that he and Snowe were told during their briefing that the Magic Slate was “the only secure 

means of communication in the embassy.” While the Magic Slate had an element of humor, Snowe and Mica’s 

findings possessed none: “[T]he embassy’s security system has serious shortcomings and is fundamentally flawed 

in both physical and personnel areas.”38 

Congress used the Marine Security Guard scandal to examine several security-related issues. Besides delving 

into the training of Marine Security Guards and management of the MSG program, Congressional committees 

scrutinized security at the bug-plagued, partially constructed NOB and at the existing Embassy. Committee 

members reviewed U.S.-Soviet agreements and the site selection for the new U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the 

new Soviet Embassy in Washington, which had occurred during the height of détente under President Richard 

Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. Congress studied the security threat posed by the new 

Soviet Embassy on Mount Alto, and some Congressmen moved to eject the Soviets from Mount Alto (the highest 

point in the District of Columbia) and relocate the Soviet Union’s embassy elsewhere in Washington.39 

Barely a year old, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security confronted a major security breach that questioned the 

Department’s ability to maintain security at its posts. As part of its response, DS refused to waver in its support 

of the Marines and the MSG program, and it took the attitude that Lonetree and Bracy were only two “bad 

apples” in a program that had done excellent work for many years. DS officials later admitted that the Marine 

Corps took the Lonetree and Bracy revelations pretty “hard,” and that the affair “shamed” the MSG program. The 

Department of State, however, proceeded to conclude a new memorandum of agreement with the Marine Corps, 

a vote of confidence in the Marine Corps that had served the Department so well. Senior DS officials Mark 

Mulvey and Greg Bujac, among others, defended the Marines before Congress. Mulvey described the Marines’ 

honorable efforts in Saigon and how the Marine guards had saved the U.S. Embassy building in Cyprus from 

burning down, and probably saved U.S. lives as well. Bujac, meanwhile, described the “positive and rewarding” 

relationships that he and other RSOs had developed with the Marine detachments, which he attributed to the 

Marines’ highly professional conduct and personal integrity. DS was not going to let two “bad apples” taint what 

was an otherwise successful program.40 

As a result of the Lonetree-Bracy affair, DS reformed and expanded its Criminal Investigations office, for 

as one former CI agent remarked, “CI had not done its job.” The Laird Commission acknowledged that CI had 

made “a strong effort” to coordinate with other agencies; however, CI’s briefings of U.S. personnel contained 

“moldy,” “uninteresting,” and excessively general information. DS brought in FBI Special Agent Ray Mislock 
316

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

to reorganize the office, and as a result, CI adopted 

many FBI techniques. DS increased CI’s staffing and 

improved its training. By the fall of 1988, DS had 

authorized 38 CI positions, filled 23 of them, and 

had 4 officers detailed from other agencies.41 

DS’s Construction Security encountered 

difficulties from FBO. FBO did not want either a DS 

security team or even a DS officer at the construction 

sites. Furthermore, FBO feared that DS would slow 

down the work, and thus increase project costs, or 

would infringe upon the project director’s work. FBO 

sought to have the Security Officer report to FBO 

rather than DS. Ultimately, Construction Security 

was transferred to FBO on December 22, 1989, and 

renamed Construction Security Management.42 

Congress and the Reagan Administration 

moved to resolve the dilemma about what to do with 

the bug-riddled, partially constructed U.S. Embassy 

in Moscow. Of the three commissions appointed by 

President Reagan to review Embassy Moscow security, PFIAB and the Schlesinger Commission recommended 

partial rebuilding of the NOB. Schlesinger suggested tearing down only the top few floors of the NOB, rebuilding 

them, and building a six-story annex next door, for a total cost of $35 million; meanwhile, PFIAB advised spending 

$80 million to clean out the bugs in the NOB structure. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, however, 

voted unanimously to demolish the building and start over. A Department of State-commissioned study by the 

BDM Corporation and MK Ferguson Company concluded that razing and rebuilding the new Moscow Embassy 

was the better option, and it would cost $160 million and take 45 months to complete (1992). In October 1988, 

President Reagan announced that the NOB would be demolished because “there’s no way to rid it of the many 

listening devices that have been built into it.” Secretary Shultz concurred, saying that demolition and rebuilding 

was “the only option.” The United States was also considering suing the Soviets in order to recoup some of the 

costs of the compromised structure.43 

z From Risk Avoidance to Risk Management å

Despite the uproar over the Moscow Embassy, DS faced budget cuts in 1988. One Congressional committee 

aide remarked, “Diplomatic Security were the hotshots for a little while and got overextended. They’ve got some 

Figure 19: A DS Security Engineering Officer (left) 

confers with a General Services Officer at a construction 

site in the U.S. Embassy Compound in Brussels, Belgium. 

Discovery of the foundations of a “bug” network in the 

U.S. Embassy in Moscow elevated construction security as 

a key concern. Construction Security was transferred to the 

Foreign Buildings Office (now called Overseas Buildings 

Operations), but DS maintains a strong voice in the security 

standards for any new Department of State building. 

Source: Private collection. 
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CHAPTER 8 ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: A Bureau for Diplomatic Security, 1986-1992

real problems now, but I don’t know how much of it 

they brought on themselves.” The urgency to improve 

security after the Beirut attacks had faded, and for 

fiscal year (FY) 1988, the Reagan Administration 

requested $303 million for DS, well below the 

$458 million anticipated by the Bureau. Assistant 

Secretary Lamb admitted, “Each post is going to see 

cutbacks in every [security] program.” The Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB) set a ceiling of 

$303 million for DS’s budget in FYs 1989 and 1990 

as well. In FY 1990, the total funds available to DS 

were only $180 million, and DS leaders questioned 

whether they could fulfill the security responsibilities 

authorized by Congress.44 

The budget cuts, in part, reflected the end of 

the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc and 

the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991. Soviet 

Premier Mikhail Gorbachev enacted the domestic 

policies of glasnost and perestroika (“openness” and 

“restructuring”), which enabled Soviet citizens to 

criticize various policies and actions taken by the 

Soviet government. U.S. Embassy officers in Moscow 

claimed “the prospects [that] the Gorbachevian 

reforms open for the Embassy to influence change 

in Soviet society are unprecedented.” Gorbachev 

also encouraged Soviet satellite nations to adopt 

similar policies, and in the fall of 1989, the United 

States and the world witnessed the collapse of Sovietbacked Communist governments across Eastern 

Europe. Perhaps few events were as dramatic as the 

fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and 

the subsequent reunification of Germany in October 

1990. Former head of the CIA William E. Colby 

found himself advising East European intelligence 

Figure 20: DS Special Agents (left and right) provide 

security for South African anti-apartheid leader Nelson 

Mandela during his June 1990 visit to New York. By 

1990, the DS Bureau’s duties and tasks were expanding, 

even as it was enduring budget cuts at the end of the Cold 

War. Source: © Associated Press. 

Figure 21: Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Premier of the Soviet 

Union, closes his resignation speech, delivered on Soviet 

television on December 25, 1991. With his resignation, the 

familiar red flag with the hammer and sickle was lowered 

from the Kremlin’s flagpole. With the collapse and end of the 

Soviet Union, DS suffered budget cuts and losses of personnel 

due to the false sense that threats to the United States and 

its diplomacy had ended. In a few short years, many would 

be reminded that diplomatic threats had dramatically 

expanded since the late 1960s because of terrorism. Source: 

© Associated Press / Liu Heung Shing. 
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History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

services on how to operate in a democratic society. 

Colby even appeared in a 30-second television ad, 

calling for what would be called “the peace dividend,” 

a 50 percent reduction in military spending, which 

would be reinvested in education, health care, and 

other parts of the U.S. economy.45 

Meanwhile, tensions increased between the 

United States and Iraq during 1990 and 1991 when 

Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded the neighboring 

nation of Kuwait, and DS experienced the odd 

situation of facing increased demands for its services, 

notwithstanding cuts in its budget. President George 

H. W. Bush ordered Operation Desert Shield in the 

fall of 1990, which defended Saudi Arabia and Israel 

from potential Iraqi aggression, and then Operation 

Desert Storm in January 1991, which liberated Kuwait 

from the Iraqi army. The Department of State reported 

an increased amount of hostile surveillance of U.S. 

facilities and personnel, and a rise in terrorist threats 

against U.S. interests. DS increased guard services 

at several Middle East posts, and sent security teams 

to posts considered to be at highest risk in order to 

develop contingency planning for terrorism and mob 

violence. Actions by Iraq prompted the evacuation 

of thousands of people from a number of high threat 

posts, increased protective security, and overtime work 

by RSOs and DS agents. The Department estimated 

that it incurred an additional $22 million in expenses for increased diplomatic security and another $11 million in 

evacuation costs as a result of the Gulf War. Ironically, Congress agreed to large security supplemental appropriations 

for Operation Desert Storm while debating a reduction of budget appropriation for DS.46

The supplementals for the 1991 Gulf War did not arrest the trend of budget cuts and staff reductions faced 

by DS. DS shifted its goals and philosophy from total risk avoidance, as promoted in the mid-1980s, to reducing 

risk “to an acceptable level” where possible, i.e. risk management47 This shift in approach, DS hoped, would allow 

it to direct its increasingly limited resources toward its most urgent security needs. DS, together with the Overseas 

Figure 22: A DS Special Agent (center rear) provides 

security for U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III 

(center) during his November 1990 visit with U.S. troops 

in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. troops were part of Operation 

Desert Shield, which sought to protect Saudi Arabia and 

other Persian Gulf states from potential aggression by Iraqi 

dictator Saddam Hussein. Hussein had recently invaded 

the neighboring state of Kuwait. Source: Private collection.
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Security Policy Group, undertook a wholesale review 

of existing overseas security standards.48 In addition, 

DS revised its Composite Threat List (CTL). Initiated 

in 1987 and published on a quarterly basis by the 

Threat Analysis Division (TAD), the CTL initially 

determined crime and terrorist threats to each post 

overseas. In 1990, the CTL expanded the number of 

threat categories TAD evaluated to terrorism, human 

intelligence, technical intelligence, and local crime. 

The criteria for determining the level of threat in each 

category included the actual expression of the threats, 

the credibility of the threats, the level of local stability 

and civil order, and quality of the bilateral relations 

between the United States and the host government. 

With the expanded threat assessment, DS could 

implement the revised security standards in a threatdriven, post-specific manner. Facing continued 

funding reductions, DS could manage risk, and cut 

local guard and the armored vehicle programs at those 

posts deemed at a lower risk.49 

By the spring of 1991, the budget cuts began 

affecting DS operations. Lamb’s successor, Assistant 

Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Sheldon Krys 

noted that staffing shortages had forced him to employ 

front office personnel on protective details. Overseas 

support positions were not filled, and technical 

security countermeasures work fell behind. In March 

1992, Under Secretary of State for Management John 

W. Rogers informed the House Subcommittee on 

Commerce, Justice, and State that the Department 

faced a conflict between security measures demanded 

by its revised security standards and the Department’s 

ability to pay for implementing those standards.50 

Figure 23: U.S. Ambassador Edward William Gnehm, 

Jr. (center), with a Mobile Security Detail, reopens the 

U.S. Embassy in Kuwait at the end of the 1991 Gulf War. 

Although the Gulf War brought supplemental funding to 

improve security at several posts, DS continued to experience 

budget cuts and shifted its strategy to “risk management” in 

order to target its limited resources to those posts most at risk. 

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 

Figure 24: Secretary of State James A. Baker, III. Secretary 

Baker announced in December 1989 that the United 

States would tear down the upper floors of the partiallyconstructed U.S. Embassy in Moscow, insert shielding, and 

rebuild the floors with U.S. workers and materials. Source: 

Department of State.
320

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

z The Half-Completed Embassy å

Despite President Reagan’s decision to raze and 

rebuild the NOB, his successor, President George 

H. W. Bush, had to determine how to pay for the 

project. In March 1989, the Bush Administration 

announced that it was reconsidering the decision to 

raze the NOB. The Senate Intelligence Committee 

was angry, declaring that any other plan than razing 

the NOB structure would invite a “security disaster,” 

and it reminded the President of a 1988 law that 

barred any spending of funds on the U.S. Embassy in 

Moscow without permission from the Appropriation 

Committees of both houses of Congress.51 

In October 1989, the Department of State 

announced that it would tear down part of the 

NOB structure and rebuild the upper floors only, 

a plan which drew upon the shielding plan initially 

endorsed by Secretary Shultz and advocated by 

the Schlesinger Commission. Department officials 

informed Congress that razing the NOB would 

actually cost $300-400 million and take more than 

5 years, larger and longer estimates than suggested 

previously. The Department also established a 

Moscow Embassy Building Control Office (MEBCO) 

to oversee the chancery construction project. The 

Director of MEBCO would report directly to the Under Secretary of State of Management, and would have 

responsibility for all aspects of the new building project, including planning, design, construction, security, 

acquisition, logistics, budgets, and schedules. DS worked closely with MEBCO, which was staffed by Department 

of State and intelligence community employees, and all awaited a final decision on how reconstruction and/or 

demolition of the building were to proceed.52 

Partly as a result of Congressional opposition, Secretary of State James A. Baker announced two months 

later (December 1989) that the Bush Administration would raze the NOB, but Under Secretary of State for 

Management Ivan Selin offered the caveat: the Department would tear down the structure to the foundation and 

use shielding “to isolate the foundation” and create a secure work space. The Bush Administration also reverted 

Figure 25: James R. Schlesinger. Former Secretary of 

Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of Central 

Intelligence, Schlesinger headed a commission that 

investigated security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and 

his commission recommended the plan ultimately adopted 

by the U.S. Government for the partially constructed 

Embassy. Source: © Associated Press / John Duricka. 
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CHAPTER 8 ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: A Bureau for Diplomatic Security, 1986-1992

to the original $270 million price tag, but said the 

project would take 51⁄2 years. By April 1990, U.S. 

and Soviet officials were nearing an agreement on the 

project, as required by the original 1972 agreement.53

On March 28, 1991, a fire broke out in the 

existing Embassy Moscow office building. Two welders 

were working on the elevator shaft, and the fire ignited 

some flammable material and quickly spread to the 

upper secure floors of the Embassy. Soviet firefighters 

quickly responded to the scene and began fighting the 

fire. Four floors suffered extensive fire, smoke, and 

water damage. Marine Security Guards with gas masks 

initially escorted the Soviet firefighters but had to leave 

the building when their gas masks gave out. As had 

occurred during the fire in 1977, the Regional Security 

Officer caught Soviet firefighters looking around the 

building and taking small items such as alarm clocks, 

picture frames, and drinks. One month after the fire, 

accusations arose that unescorted KGB agents dressed 

as firefighters had entered the vaults and other secure 

areas during the fire, and that secure telephones and 

other communications equipment were missing from 

the Embassy. A preliminary report from Assistant 

Secretary Krys acknowledged that Soviet firefighters 

entered areas of the Embassy without escorts, some 

offices were evacuated before safes and other material 

had been secured, some unclassified computer discs 

were missing, and some material and equipment 

had been compromised. The team investigating the 

damaged floors, however, found no evidence that 

cryptographic or other communications equipment 

had been taken and that the most sensitive areas of 

the Embassy were appropriately secured during the 

emergency.54 

Figure 26: Two DS Special Agents sit with famed Romanian 

Olympic Gold Medal gymnast Nadia Comaneci (center). 

In December 1989, Comaneci defected, seeking asylum in 

the United States. The two DS Special Agents are part of 

her protective detail. Source: Private collection.

Figure 27: Tom Clancy, author of several espionage novels, 

prepares to tape an introduction to a DS counterintelligence 

video in December 1988. Security Awareness video producer 

Jo Harben stands at left. DS officials recognized quickly that 

computer technologies not only transformed work within 

the Department, but also presented new vulnerabilities and 

threats to U.S. diplomacy. DS Security Awareness programs 

sought to inform and encourage Department personnel to 

adhere to security practices that would impede espionage 

efforts. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
322

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Although the security breach was much less damaging than initially suspected, the fire pushed the Department 

of State and Congress to resolve the future of the NOB. The lack of space, alternatives, and security amenities 

compelled Under Secretary Selin to move executive and classified operations to the south wing of the new compound, 

which housed recreational facilities. The bowling alley was converted into the communications center, and was 

dubbed “the submarine.” One-half of the parking garage was turned into workspace. Pressed for space and facing 

growing Congressional opposition to additional expenditures, the Department decided to take up Schlesinger’s 

1985 shielding plan, that is, the Department would demolish and rebuild the upper floors of the NOB, and then 

insert shielding between the unclassified lower floors and the classified upper floors.55 

With a decision on the NOB finally made, the Department started to prepare for rebuilding the NOB. In June 

1992, the United States and the Russian Federation signed a bilateral Supplemental Conditions of Construction 

Agreement. The agreement permitted the Department to tear down the upper floors of the new chancery and 

begin construction with a U.S.-controlled design, U.S. construction workers with Top Secret clearances, a U.S. 

contractor, and U.S. materials. Congress appropriated $240 million for the project for FYs 1992 and 1993. 

Congress also stipulated that MEBCO must submit a detailed plan for review. More than seven years after the 

discovery of bugs in the structure, work on the NOB was about to begin again.56 

z Technological Revolution and Unhappy Merger å

During an April 1987 meeting with Soviet 

Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, Secretary Shultz

explained that the world was experiencing an 

information revolution as a result of the innovations 

in computer technology. Gorbachev admitted that 

science and technology had fostered dramatic changes 

and growth during the 1980s; however, Shultz 

did not believe that the Soviet leader had fully

grasped the magnitude of developments. The Secretary 

stressed that with the information revolution, “the 

old categories” of capital and labor were “becoming 

obsolete” and “the truly important capital is 

human capital, what people know, [and] how freely 

they exchange information and knowledge.” “The 

key,” said Shultz, “is going to be knowledge-based 

productivity, even in defense: an aircraft carrier is 

really one big information system.”57 

Figure 28 Wang Laboratories, Inc., headquarters. The 

Department of State purchased its computers from Wang 

Laboratories. Wang’s self-enclosed system provided the 

Department with a degree of computer security during the 

early years of the computer revolution because the Wang 

system could not interface with the more popular IBM 

system. Moreover, DS and its predecessor SY insisted from 

the beginning that the Department maintain two computer 

systems: classified and unclassified. Source: © Associated 

Press / Townson. 
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If, as Secretary Shultz noted, an aircraft carrier 

was now one big information system, then a system is 

only as secure as the weakest link, and the challenge for 

DS was determining the weak links, or vulnerabilities, 

of the Department’s computer systems. By the mid1980s, DS was already concerned about hackers and 

security breaches, and to a degree, the threat of a hacker 

like Matthew Broderick’s character in the 1984 film 

War Games was a real possibility. DS officials worried 

that a hacker might dial into the Department’s system 

undetected, and implant trojan horses, time bombs, 

trap doors, or viruses. Hackers were also increasingly 

sophisticated in their knowledge and tactics, sharing 

knowledge with each other, and seeking to do much 

more than merely getting into the Department’s 

system in order to brag about it later. With more and 

more FSOs using modems, DS also grew concerned 

about unfriendly parties tapping into the unsecured 

telecommunications lines used by FSOs and obtaining 

copies of facsimiles, messages, and/or documents. 

Moreover, DS made clear in 1988 that many people 

who used personal computers were relying on good 

faith, and that reliance upon passwords and access 

codes as one’s primary security barrier was “no longer valid.” Part of the problem rested with the fact that many 

users employed the same password or access code for several systems, used variations of a single password, or 

selected easily identifiable passwords such as birthdays, anniversaries, and names of children, spouses, or pets.58 

Several U.S. Government entities began setting the computer security policy for the federal government. 

With NSDD-145, President Reagan designated the National Security Agency as the “national manager” for the 

security of the U.S. Government’s computer and telecommunications networks. Congress passed and Reagan 

signed the Computer Security Act of 1987, and among its provisions, computer security procedures to be 

implemented by the OMB were defined, as was the category of “Sensitive But Unclassified” (SBU) information. 

The Reagan White House also issued NSDD-211, which placed the Department of State in charge of the 

Diplomatic Telecommunications Service (DTS), which was largely managed by the Office of Communications 

but worked closely with DS to maintain its security.59 

Figure 29: Sheldon J. Krys, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Diplomatic Security, 1989-1992. Krys favored DS taking 

the lead in information and computer security. The Office of 

Information Management (IM), the Department’s office for 

computer and communications operations, was merged with 

DS. The merger did not go as hoped, and Krys concluded that 

IM should be its own bureau. In 1992, IM was separated 

from DS. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
324

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

DS and its predecessor SY had shaped several elements of the Department’s computer security policy. Due 

to the self-enclosed structure of the Wang system, the Department of State enjoyed a certain degree of computer 

security because the Wang system was incompatible with outside networks such as the Internet. Furthermore, DS 

insisted from the beginning that the Department had to have two distinct and separate systems: classified and 

unclassified. DS engineers recognized that there was no effective means to protect state secrets and national security 

within a single combined information system.60 While some Department officials wanted a single network, DS 

insisted upon separate networks, separate email systems, and a strict ban on email between the classified and 

unclassified networks. DS was working to connect Department personnel in Washington and overseas to email 

networks. In 1991, only 17 percent of unclassified users and 18 percent of classified users had access to email. By 

1993, despite costs that were running close to $10 million, DS planned to provide 77 percent of unclassified users 

and 48 percent of classified users with access to email.61 

With DS’s rise to bureau level, some DS officials believed that DS should take the lead on information 

security. In 1987 and 1988, Director of Technical Security Gregorie Bujac, among others, argued unsuccessfully 

for moving information security into DS. Yet security breaches such as the Lonetree/Bracy affair, the drive 

to centralize security programs in DS, and the 1987 Computer Security Act, had prompted the Department 

of State to combine communications, computer operations, office automation, and records management into 

Office of Information Management (IM) under the Bureau of Administration. Then, in 1989, in an effort to 

improve information security and better coordination of information, the Department, through the efforts of 

Assistant Secretary Krys, transferred IM to DS.62 The IM transfer incorporated OC’s Office of Security (OC/S) 

and all of OC’s electronic and technical countermeasures into DS. Also, OC’s Field Inspection Teams went 

to DS, as did the Shield Enclosure program for post 

communications centers.63 

The merger of IM and DS proved unpopular 

and difficult, and the rapid pace of innovation in 

computer technologies aggravated the situation. 

Several officials in OC and IM did not like the 

transfer. One OC/S veteran, Robert Surprise, who was 

studying at the National Defense University in 1990, 

devoted his research paper to a reassessment of IM’s 

transfer to DS. Surprise concluded that the merger 

did not achieve its intended goals, and that “user and 

IM communities have expressed dissatisfaction with 

the new structure” because it was “too bureaucratic, 

unresponsive, and a hindrance to progress.” The 

Figure 30: DS Special Agents (left and right) protect Great 

Britain’s Princess Diana during her February 1989 visit to 

a Harlem AIDS Center in New York City. Source: Private 

collection. 
325

CHAPTER 8 ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: A Bureau for Diplomatic Security, 1986-1992

Office of the Inspector General used Surprise’s paper to argue that IM should be removed from DS and put back 

into the Bureau of Administration.64 Krys, who had favored the initial transfer, concluded after just two years, 

that IM should be its own bureau (at least theoretically). After three years, Department officials approved IM’s 

move back to the Bureau of Administration. While most information management and communications offices 

left, the security-oriented offices like Computer Security remained with DS.65 

z Conclusion å

During the six years after its creation, DS experienced a series of disappointments. Its budget suffered 

constant cuts; its personnel were cut, retired, or not replaced; and its programs operated at a reduced level. 

The new Embassy Moscow building had a plan, but progress remained stalled. The merger between DS 

and IM went poorly, and after three years, IM moved back to the Bureau of Administration. DS was not 

the only bureau or agency that suffered cuts, because the euphoria of the ending of the Cold War pervaded 

Congressional and U.S. Government thinking. Did the end of the Cold War mean fewer threats to security, 

and thus require a reduction of DS? Did the end of the Cold War mean the end of terrorism as well? In 1992, 

these remained open questions. 

Endnotes

1 Memorandum “Revised Organization Codes and Symbols,” Douglas Langan (DS/RM) to David Fields (DS/DSS), Robinson 

(DS/O), and Fulgham (DS/P), 18 March 1986; and Memorandum “Organizational Structure for the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security,” Robert E. Lamb, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, to Ronald I. Spiers, Under Secretary of State 

for Management, 24 February 1986; both, Folder – AMGT General 1986, Box 1, RG 59-Lot 89D59, Suitland. 

2 Memorandum “Revised Organization Codes and Symbols,” Douglas Langan (DS/RM) to David Fields (DS/DSS), 

Robinson (DS/O), and Fulgham (DS/P), 18 March 1986. Oral History Interview, Greg Bujac, 6 September 2007, 

conducted by Mark Hove. Memorandum “Organizational Structure for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security,” Lamb to 

Spiers, 24 February 1986. 

3 Clark M. Dittmer, “The DSS – A Law Enforcement Service,” DSSAA World, 9 (Summer, 1994): 7-8; Memorandum “First 

DSS Arrest Under Public Law 99-93,” Lamb to the Secretary, 24 July 1986, Folder – ASEC General 1985, Box 2, RG 

59-Lot 89D328, Suitland. Statement before the International Operations Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs 

Committee, Sheldon J. Krys, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 13 March 1991, Folder – AMGT 

Congressional Issues, Box 3, RG 59-Lot 93D66, Suitland.

4 Decision of 474 F.2d 157, United States of America, Appellee, v. Alfred Erdos, Appellant, No. 72-1328, United States 

Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, decision made 14 February 1973, http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/ F2/474/474.

F2d.157.72-1328.html. Oral History Interview, Robert Booth, 7 December 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 5-6. 

5 Oral History Interview, Robert Booth, 7 December 2005, p. 6. 

6 Oral History Interview, William DeCourcy, 19 May 2005, conducted by Jennifer Walele and Mark Hove, p. 7. Action 

Memorandum “Protection of Secretary-Designate Christopher,” Anthony C. E. Quainton, Assistant Secretary of State 

for Diplomatic Security, to John F. W. Rogers, Under Secretary of State for Management, 29 December 1992, Folder – 

ASEC-Protective Security, Box 17430, RG 59-Lot 94D406, Suitland. 
326

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

7 Oral History Interview, Casper Pelczynski, 24 May 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 5. Memorandum “Official Residence 

for the Secretary of State,” Lamb and Donald J. Bouchard, Assistant Secretary for Administration, to the Secretary, n.d. 

(1985); Memorandum “Secretary’s Residence,” John H. Clemmons (A/SY/PRS) to Diane DeVivo (M/MO), 14 January 

1985; and Action Memorandum “Residence for the Secretary of State,” Abraham D. Sofaer (L), J. Edward Fox (H), Bouchard, 

and Lamb to the Secretary, 1 August 1986; all Folder – Secretary’s Residence, Box 5, RG 59-Lot 89D328, Suitland. 

8 Schwartz, “The Building Years, 1985-1988,” DSSAA World, 9 (Summer 1994): 4-5. Memorandum “1988 National 

Assessment of the Hostile Intelligence Threat and U.S. Countermeasures,” Lamb to Brigadier General Richard S. Beyea, 

USAF, Director of Community Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Office, 27 October 1988, Folder – 

IG/CI Meetings, Box 4, RG 59-Lot 90D154, Suitland. 

9 Action Memorandum “Rewards for Terrorism Information Program,” Lamb, L. Paul Bremer, Ambassador-at-Large for 

Counter-Terrorism, and Michael G. Kozak, (L), to the Secretary, 21 March 1988, Folder – Chron March 1988, Box 7, 

RG 59-Lot 90D154, Suitland. 

10 Action Memorandum “Funding for the Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Narcotics Rewards Program,” Dittmer, Acting Assistant 

Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, Morris Busby (S/CT) and Parker W. Borg (Acting – INM), to Jill E. Kent, Acting 

Under Secretary of State for Management, 6 April 1990, Folder – ASEC Threat, Box 5, RG 59-Lot 91D564, Suitland. 

11 Action Memorandum “Funding for the Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Narcotics Rewards Program,” Dittmer, Busby, and Borg 

to Kent, 6 April 1990. Information Memorandum “Cooperation with Air Line Pilots Association on Terrorism Rewards 

Program,” Busby, and Krys, to the Acting Secretary, 6 June 1990; and Letter, Henry A. Duffy, President of Air Line Pilots 

Association (ALPA), to Michael P. Scharf, Esq., Law Enforcement and Intelligence, 30 May 1990; both Folder – ASEC 

Threat, Box 5, RG 59-Lot 91D564, Suitland. Oral History Interview, Michael Parks, 24 May 2005, conducted by 

Jennifer Walele and Amy Garrett. Oral History Interview, Mike Beckner, 6 July 2005, conducted by Amy Garrett. Oral 

History Interview, Anthony Quainton, 3 August 2005, conducted by Paul Claussen and Amy Garrett, HO Files. 

12 Oral History Interview, Parks, 24 May 2005. Memorandum, “Questions submitted by Chairman Neal Smith in 

conjunction with Secretary Baker’s appearance before the CJS Subcommittee March 7, 1990 & Answers, Bordley (FMP-D) 

and Parks, Folder – AMGT: Congressional Issues, Jan-June 1990, Box 2, RG 59-Lot 91D564, Suitland. “Timeline of 

major events in Rewards for Justice Program,” Rewards for Justice program, copy in HO Files. 

13 Oral History Interview, David Fields, 21 November 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 6. Report of the Secretary of 

State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, DS Files, Rosslyn. 

14 Oral History Interview, Fields, 21 November 2005, p. 6. Charter of State Department- American Private Sector Overseas 

Security Advisory Council, n.d. (1985), Folder – Overseas Security Council, Box 4, RG 59-Lot 89D328, Suitland. 

15 Action Memorandum “Public Distribution of DS Overseas Security Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) through CA,” Krys, 

Mary Ryan (Bureaus of Consular Affairs – CA), and Busby to Ivan Selin, Under Secretary of State for Management, 17 

July 1990; and Memorandum “Overseas Security Electronic Bulletin Board Data,” Krys to Elizabeth Tamposi (CA), 4 

December 1990; both Folder – AMGT (OSAC), Box 3, RG 59-Lot 91D564, Suitland. 

16 Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security,” p. 17, DS Files, Rosslyn. Memorandum “Issues 

on Management of Security Functions,” Spiers to Bouchard and Lamb, 30 October 1985, Folder – Communications 

Security; and Memorandum “Transfer of the Diplomatic Courier Service to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security,” Robert 

C. Ribera, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Office of Communications,, to Lamb, 28 July 1985, Folder – 

Courier Service 1986; both Box 3, RG 59-Lot 89D328, Suitland. 

17 Memorandum “The Diplomatic Courier Service and the Office of Communications,” DS, n.d. [1985]; Memorandum “Transfer 

of the Diplomatic Courier Service to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security,” Ribera, to Lamb, 28 July 1985; Memorandum “The 

Placement of the Courier Service,” Lamb to Spiers, 20 August 1985; and Memorandum “A Fresh Look at Our Diplomatic 

Courier Operation,” Lamb to the Secretary; all Folder – Courier Service 1986, Box 3, RG 59-Lot 89D328, Suitland. 
327

CHAPTER 8 ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: A Bureau for Diplomatic Security, 1986-1992

18 Issue Paper on Department of State Diplomatic Courier Pouch System, in Enclosure I, Study of Department of State 

Diplomatic Courier System, General Accounting Office, n.d. [1988], attached to Letter, Joseph E. Kelley, Associate 

Director, to Spiers, 3 August 1988, Folder – ASEC Couriers, Box 5, RG 59-Lot 90D154, Suitland. 

19 Memorandum “Final Thoughts on the Pouch Problem,” Samuel F. Hart (M/MO) to Spiers, 12 November 1985; and 

Memorandum “Review of the Pouch System,” Hart to Spiers, 19 September 1985, Folder – Courier Service 1986, Box 

3, RG 59-Lot 89D328, Suitland. 

20 Memorandum “Request for PIT Positions for Diplomatic Courier Escorts,” Douglas Langan (DS/RM) to Willard A. 

DePree (M/MO), Folder – Courier Service 1986, Box 3, RG 59-Lot 89D328, Suitland. Memorandum “Review of the 

Pouch System,” Hart, to Spiers, 19 September 1985. Enclosure I, Study of Department of State Diplomatic Courier 

System, GAO, n.d. [1988]. 

21 Memorandum “Review of the Pouch System,” Hart to Spiers, 19 September 1985. Memorandum “Diplomatic Pouch 

Service,” Spiers to Customers of State Department Diplomatic Pouch Service Including DOD, AID, USIA, CIA, USDA, 

DEA, 19 August 1985; and Memorandum “The Pouch Problem,” Hart to Spiers, 22 August 1985; both Folder – Courier 

Service 1986, Box 3, RG 59-Lot 89D328, Suitland. Issue Paper on State Department Diplomatic Courier Pouch System, 

n.d. [1988]. 

22 Letter, Kelley to Spiers, 3 August 1988, Folder – ASEC Couriers, Box 5, RG 59-Lot 90D154, Suitland. Enclosure I Study 

on Department of State Diplomatic Courier System, GAO, n.d. [1988]. 

23 Cable, A J. Verrier, 19 November 1985, Folder – Courier Service 1986, Box 3, RG 59-Lot 89D328, Suitland. 

Memorandum “The Diplomatic Courier Service and the Office of Communications,” Folder – Courier Service 1986, 

Box 3, RG 59-Lot 89D328, Suitland. 

24 Telegram “IM Management News – September,” Information management (IM) Channel for all IM Elements, 10 

October 1991, Folder – ACOA General 1992, Box 2/12108, RG 59-Lot 93D66, Suitland. 

25 Jerry LaFleur, “Joel Bell circled the globe as courier – 360 times,” The Roadbag (Spring/Summer 1987), 16. 

26 Joel Brinkley, “U.S. Embassy to Reduce Soviet Staff,” New York Times, 25 June 1985, p. A-3. Ronald Kessler, Moscow 

Station: How the KGB Penetrated the American Embassy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1989), 179-180. Stephen 

Engelberg, “Embassy Security: Story of Failure,” New York Times, 19 April 1987, p. 1, 14. David B. Ottaway, “State Dept., 

Envoy Resisted Changes,” Washington Post, 6 April 1987, p. A-1. Fact Sheet “Soviet Espionage Against U.S. Mission in the 

USSR,” C. Cavanaugh, 9 April 1987, Laird Commission Briefing Book, Box 11, DS Records, RG 59-Lot 90D154, Suitland. 

Memorandum “Inching Towards a New Embassy in Moscow,” October 1986, Folder – Moscow General, Box 5, Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security – 1989 Subject Files, RG 59 - Lot 90D479, Suitland. Hereafter cited as DS 1989 Subject Files. 

27 Memorandum “Inching Towards a New Embassy in Moscow,” October 1986, p. 9. John Wolf, Oral History Interview, 

9 May 2005, p. 6. Testimony of Lamb, 22 April 1987, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Operations 

of the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives, Security at the American Embassy in Moscow and 

the United States-Soviet Embassy Exchange Agreements, 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987, pp. 35-78. “Microphone” 

quotation on p. 65. Oral History Interview, John Bagnal, 29 November 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 11-12. 

Kessler, Moscow Station, 15-16. 

28 Trip Report “Visit to U.S. Embassy in Moscow, September 15-17, 1986,” John Ziolkowski and Dave Keaney, n.d. 

[October 1986], attached to Memorandum “Trip Report – Construction of U.S. Embassy Office Building in Moscow,” 

Ziolkowski and Keaney to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 20 October 1986, Folder – 

ASEC Moscow, Box 2, DS Records, RG 59-Lot 89D328, Suitland. 

29 Memorandum “The Gandy Contract,” Gregorie W. Bujac, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Countermeasures 

and Counterintelligence, to Krys, 21 October 1991, Folder – ASEC Counterintelligence 1991, Box 5/1211, RG 59-
328

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Lot 93D66, Suitland. Oral History Interview, John Wolf, 9 May 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 4. Oral History 

Interview, George Hermann, 7 June 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 10. 

30 Briefing Memorandum, Spiers to the Secretary, 17 March 1986, Folder – ASEC: Technical Security Responsibilities 1985, 

Box 4; Draft Memorandum “Construction Projects in the USSR,” Bouchard to the Secretary, 7 October 1985, Folder – 

ASEC Moscow, Box 2; Draft of NOB Moscow Countermeasures Plan, Dan Carlin to Lamb, Folder – ASEC Moscow, 

Box 2; all RG 59-Lot 89D328, Suitland. 

31 Joel Brinkley, “U.S. Embassy to Reduce Soviet Staff,” New York Times, 25 June 1985, p. A-3. Ottaway, “State Dept., 

Envoy Resisted Changes, Washington Post, p. A-1. Kessler, Moscow Station, 179-181. Philip Taubman, “U.S. Embassy 

Meets Soviet Reality,” New York Times, 1 November 1986, p. 3. Stephen Engelberg, “Embassy Security: Story of Failure,” 

New York Times, 19 April 1987, p. 1. 

32 Bill McAllister and David B. Ottoway, “Severe Security Breach Alleged,” Washington Post, 28 March 1987, p. A-1. Molly 

Moore, “Marine Being Detained on Suspicion of Spying,” Washington Post, 11 January 1987, p. A-7. “Marine Who 

Served in Moscow Embassy Held in Spy Inquiry,” New York Times, 11 January 1987, p. A15. John H. Cushman, Jr., 

“Marine Spy Suspect Reported Lured by a Russian Woman,” New York Times, 14 January 1987, p. D-23. Gary Lee, 

“More Marines Dismissed as Guards in Moscow,” Washington Post, 12 February 1987, p. A-29. “Embassy in Soviet 

Reassigns Marines for Currency Crimes,” New York Times, 13 February 1987, p. A-8. 

33 Stephen Engelberg, “2 Marines Said to Allow Soviets Embassy Access,” New York Times, 26 March 1987, p. A-1. McAllister 

and Ottoway, “Severe Security Breach Alleged,” Washington Post, 28 March 1987, p. A-1. Cover, Time, 20 April 1987. 

George C. Wilson, “U.S. Suffered ‘Great Loss’ in Embassy,” Washington Post, 29 march 1987, p. A-1. Ottaway and 

McAllister, “Soviets Had Access to ‘Sensitive’ Chancery Facilities,” Washington Post, 2 April 1987, p. A-33. 

34 Kessler, Moscow Station, 160. Philip Shenon, “U.S. Drops Its Case Against a Marine in Embassy Spying,” New York Times, 

13 June 1987, p. 1. 

35 Kessler, Moscow Station, 119-120, 142-146,153-155, 159-174, 182-183, 213-214. Leo J. Daugherty III, “‘These Fine 

Smart Detachments’: A History of the United States Marine Corps and the Department of State, 1799-2004,” 2 volumes 

(2004), II: 505-509. Rodney Barker, Dancing with the Devil: Sex, Espionage, and the U.S. Marines: The Clayton Lonetree 

Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 205, 214-215, 220-230. 

36 Don Oberdorfer, “Spy Scandal Snowballed, Melted Away,” Washington Post, 17 January 1988, p. A-1 and A-26. Kessler, 

Moscow Station, 254-255, 222, 272. Bill Keller, “Spy Scandal: U.S. Embassy Still Troubled,” New York Times, 16 

November 1987, pp. A-1, A-12. Stephen Engelberg, “Senate Panel Urges Leveling of Embassy in Soviet Union,” New 

York Times, 30 April 1987, p. A-3. 

37 “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on United States Embassy Security in Moscow,” 7 April 

1987, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1987, 2 volumes (Washington DC: USGPO, 

1989), I: 345-347. Gerald M. Boyd, “President Orders Inquiry in Moscow into Embassy Site,” New York Times, 8 April 

1987, p. A-1. Lou Cannon, “2 Boards to Review Security Worldwide,” Washington Post, 8 April 1987, p. A-1. Kessler, 

Moscow Station, 265-266. Richard Halloran, “Envoy is Blamed in Moscow Spying,” New York Times, 20 January 1988, p. 

A-5. David B. Ottaway, “Soviet Ability to Penetrate U.S. Embassy Underestimated, Schlesinger Report Says,” Washington 

Post, 2 July 1987, p. A-36. “The Schlesinger Report on the Moscow Embassy,” Washington Post, p. A-19. This last item 

consists of excerpts of the report. “White House Statement on the President’s Meeting with the Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board,” 14 July 1987, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1987, 2 volumes 

(Washington DC: USGPO, 1989), II: 826. Elaine Sciolino, “The Bugged Embassy Case: What Went Wrong,” New 

York Times, 15 November 1988, p. A-12. 

38 Oberdorfer, “Marine Guard Spy Scandal Snowballed, Then Melted Away,” Washington Post, 17 January 1988, p. A-26. 

Kessler, Moscow Station, 222. “Embassy Has ‘Serious Shortcomings,’” Washington Post, 8 April 1987, p. A-14. 
329

CHAPTER 8 ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: A Bureau for Diplomatic Security, 1986-1992

39 Marine Security Guard System at Diplomatic Missions Abroad, Hearings before the Defense Policy Panel and the Military 

Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee of Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 100th Congress, 

1st Session, 3 April, 23, 28, 29 July, and 5 August 1987 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1988). Security at the American 

Embassy in Moscow and the United States-Soviet Embassy Exchange Agreements, Hearings before the Subcommittee on 

International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 100th Congress, 1st Session, 3 

and 22 April, 19 May, and 30 June 1987, (Washington DC: USGPO, 1988). Stephen Engelberg, “Senate Panel Urges 

Leveling of Embassy in Soviet Union,” New York Times, 30 April 1987, p. A-3. 

40 Oral History Interview, Greg Bujac #2, 26 October 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 2. Testimonies of Mark Mulvey 

and Greg Bujac, 29 June 1987, Hearings before the Defense Policy Panel and the Military Personnel and Compensation 

Subcommittee of Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Marine Security Guard System at Diplomatic 

Missions Abroad, 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987, pp. 99-101. 

41 Oral History Interview, Robert Booth, 7 December 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 6. Report of the Assessment 

Review Panel for United States Missions in the Soviet Union, Melvin R. Laird, Chairman, July 1987, DS Files, Rosslyn. 

Transcript of Krys’ report to Congress on Security Procedures at U.S. Embassy Moscow, 10 January 1990, attached 

Letter, Bernadette Jenkins, Subcommittee on International Operations, to Krys, 2 November 1989, Folder – AMGT 

Congressional Issues Jan-June 1990, Box 2, RG 59-Lot 91D564, Suitland. 

42 Oral History Interview, John Wolf, 9 May 2005, pp. 4, 6. Oral History Interview, Gordon Harvey, 19 December 2005, 

conducted by Mark Hove, p. 5. Cable 152131 “Transfer of Security-Related Construction Management Functions from 

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to the Bureau of Administration (Foreign Building Operations),” Secretary to State (J. 

B. Dudley, FBO) to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, 11 May 1990, Department of State Files. 

43 Elaine Sciolino, “The Bugged Embassy Case: What Went Wrong,” New York Times, 15 November 1988, p. A12. Stephen 

Engelberg, “Senate Panel Urges Leveling of Embassy in Soviet Union,” New York Times, 30 April 1987, p. A-3. “Informal 

Exchange with Reporters on the Demolition of the New United States Embassy in Moscow,” 27 October 1988, Public 

Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1987, 2 volumes (Washington DC: USGPO, 1989), II: 1393. 

Elaine Sciolino, “Reagan Decides to Raze New Moscow Embassy,” New York Times, 28 October 1988, p. A-11. Don 

Oberdorfer, “Demolition of Embassy Supported,” Washington Post, 27 October 1988, p. A-1. 

44 Elaine Sciolino, “Envoy Security Bureau Faces a Budget Squeeze,” New York Times, 14 September 1988, p. B-5. White 

Paper “DS FY 1989-1990 Funding Situation,” DS, 1989, attached to Memorandum “Planning for the FY 1990 

Budget,” Lamb to Feldman, 23 May 1988; both Folder – ABUD FY 1990 Budget, Box 2, RG 59-Lot 90D479, Suitland. 

Information Memorandum “FY 1989 Goals and Workplans,” Lamb to Spiers, 5 October 1988, Folder – DS Mission 

Statement, Box 1, RG 59-Lot 90D154, Suitland. Briefing “FY 1990 Funding Situation for DS,” DS, 1989, Folder – 

ASEC: Budget 1989, Box 1, RG 59-Lot 90D311, Suitland. Memorandum “Answer to Congressman Rogers’s Question, 

Buckley, DS/POL/PPD, and Grove, DS/RM/FMD, Folder – AMGT Congressional Issues Jan-June 1990, Box 2, RG 

59-Lot 91D564, Suitland. 

45 For the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc, see Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest 

Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Back Bay Books, 1994). Cable “Embassy Moscow’s New 

Role: Challenges, Resources, and New Departures,” U.S. Embassy Moscow to Secretary of State, February 1989, 

Folder – ASEC – Moscow Embassy, Box 3, RG 59-Lot 90D311, Suitland. Oral History Interview, Bruce Matthews, 

17 February 2006, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 6. “Without Red Peril, Who’s the Enemy?,” New York Times, 4 

February 1992, p. A-8. 

46 Memorandum “FY 1991 Supplemental for Operation Desert Shield/Storm,” Department of State; Memorandum “Desert 

Shield/Storm Supplemental for State,” E Hembree (FMP/BP); Memorandum, “Security in the Gulf,” M. Kraft (S/CT) 

and Christopher M. B. Disney (DS/DSS/OP), 20 February 1991; and Reading Statement of Krys before the House of 

Representatives International Operations Subcommittee, 13 March 1991; all Folder – AMGT Congressional Issues 1991, 
330

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Box 3, RG 59-Lot 93D66, Suitland. Answers drafted for testimony before HFAC and SFRC December 5-6, 1990,” 

Terrorism and Security of Our Embassies,” Dittmer, 30 November 1990, Folder – AMGT Congressional Issues, Box 2, 

RG 59-Lot 91D564, Suitland. 

47 Report to the President and Congress “Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act 1991,” Department of State, December 

1991, Folder – APER MCSC, Box 5/12111, RG 59-Lot 93D66, Suitland. Written Statement on Salaries and Expenses 

before House CJS,” Rogers, 3 March 1992, Folder – AMGT Congressional Issues 1992, Box 17427, RG 59-Lot 94D406, 

Suitland. Memorandum “Briefing Materials for Secretary Albright’s Appearance before House and Senate Subcommittees 

on Commerce, State, and Justice Appropriations” and attachments, DS to the Secretary, 21 February 1997, Folder – 

Hearings, Box 5, RG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. 

48 Memorandum “Responses to Questions from Representative Harold Rogers,” M. Coffey (DS/POL/PPD), 28 March 

1990; Proposed Testimony of Selin before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 10 May 1990; and Memorandum 

“Answers to Questions submitted by Chairman Neal Smith in conjunction with Secretary Baker’s appearance before the 

CJS Subcommittee March 7, 1990,” Coffey, 3 March 1990; all Folder – AMGT Congressional Issues Jan-June 1990, Box 

2, RG 59-Lot 91D564, Suitland. Written Statement on Salaries & Expenses before the House CJS, Rogers, 3 March 

1992. Memorandum “Briefing Materials for Secretary Albright’s Appearance...” and attachments, DS to the Secretary, 

21 February 1997. 

49 Oral History Interview, Dennis Pluchinsky, 22 December 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 3. Memorandum 

“Refinements in Threat Assessment Criteria and Procedures,” Dittmer to Disney, Marvin Doig (DS/PSP), Bujac, and 

Mislock, 16 January 1990, Folder – ASEC (Threat), Box 5, RG 59-Lot 91D564, Suitland. Unedited Minutes of Hearing 

before House Subcommittee on International Operations “The Department of State in the Twenty-first Century, Part III: 

Diplomatic Security and Information,” 25 October 1989, p. 12, attached to Letter, Jenkins to Krys, n.d. [1990], Folder 

– AMGT Congressional Issues, Jan-June 1990, Box 2, RG 59-Lot 91D564, Suitland. 

50 Memorandum “FY-1991 Hiring Plan,” Krys to Edward J. Perkins (M/DGP), 1 March 1991, Folder – APER-Staffing 

1991, Box 5/12111, RG 59-Lot 93D66, Suitland. Written Statement on Salaries and Expenses before House CJS, 

Rogers, 3 March 1992. 

51 Robert Pear, “State Dept. Drafts Plan to Rebuild Bugged American Embassy in Moscow,” New York Times, 12 October 

1989, p. A-18. Stephen Engelberg, “Bush Is Warned on Bugged Moscow Embassy,” New York Times, 16 July 1989, p. A-11. 

52 Robert Pear, “State Dept. Drafts Plan to Rebuild Bugged American Embassy in Moscow,” New York Times, 12 October 

1989, p. A-18. Department of State Moscow Embassy Fact Sheet, December 1989, DS Files, Rosslyn. Remarks of 

Honorable Henry J. Hyde, “Embassy Moscow: Paying the Bill,” Congressional Record, 26 October 1990, http://www.fas.

org/irp/comgress/1990_cr/h901026-embassy.htm. U.S. Embassy Moscow, “American Embassy Moscow – Brief History,” 

http://moscow.embassy.gov/links/print.php?record_id=building_history. 

53 David B. Ottaway, “U.S. Embassy in Moscow to be Razed,” Washington Post, 21 December 1989, p. A-51. George 

Lardner, Jr., “U.S. Near Accord on Moscow Embassy,” Washington Post, 29 April 1990, p. A-34. 

54 Oral History Interview, John Rendeiro, 20 December 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 6. Esther B. Fein, “American 

Embassy in Moscow Is Severely Damaged by Fire,” New York Times, 29 March 1991, p. A-8. David Hoffman, “U.S. Sees 

Security Breach in Moscow Embassy Fire,” Washington Post, 1 May 1991, p. A-26. Michael Wines, “U.S. Asserts K.G.B. 

Entered Embassy,” New York Times, 1 May 1991, p. A-5. David Hoffman, “State Dept. Denies Security Compromised 

in Moscow Fire,” Washington Post, 3 May 1991, p. A-9. Memorandum “Preparation for Security Briefing for Ambassador 

Thomas Pickering – Moscow,” Disney to DS Division Heads, 11 March 1993; and Memorandum “Briefing for 

Ambassador Robert Strauss, American Embassy, Moscow,” 29 August 1991, attached to Memorandum “Preparation for 

Security Briefing for Ambassador Thomas Pickering – Moscow,” Disney to DS Division Heads, 11 March 1993; both 

Clint Bushnell’s Files, DS Files, Rosslyn. 
331

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55 Memorandum “Preparation for Security Briefing for Ambassador Thomas Pickering – Moscow,” Disney to DS division 

heads, 11 March 1993. Memorandum “Briefing for Ambassador Robert Strauss, American Embassy, Moscow,” 29 

August 1991. Informal Summary of Closed Session during Secretary Baker’s Appearance before the CJS Subcommittee, 

7 March 1990, Folder – AMGT Congressional Issues Jan-June 1990, Box 2, RG 59-Lot 91D564, Suitland. Oral History 

Interview, Bruce Matthews, 17 February 2006, p. 5. 

56 “American Embassy Moscow–Brief History,” U.S. Embassy Moscow, http://moscow.usembassy.gov/links/links.

php?record_id=building_history accessed 29 October 2007. Oral History Interview, Richard Gannon, 16 November 

2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 6. 

57 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, Power, and the Victory of the American Ideal (New York: Charles 

Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 892-893. 

58 Bruce Scheier, Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked Age (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2000), xii, 278. 

ISS Issue Paper “Protection of Overseas Unclassified Computer System Communications Links,” Office of Information 

Security (DS), p. 16-18, 5.7. Oral History Interview, Herrmann, 31 May 2005, p. 9. 

59 Report “Part IV: Security Countermeasures,” Bureau of Diplomatic Security, n.d. [1985], Folder – ASEC Technical 

Security Responsibilities 1985, Box 4, RG 59-Lot 89D328, p. 57. ISS Issue Paper “Protection of Overseas Unclassified 

Computer System Communications Links,” Office of Information Security (DS), pp. 28-30, 4-5. NTISS Paper No. 2 

“National Policy on Protection of Sensitive, But Unclassified Information in Federal Government Telecommunications 

and Automated Information Systems,” National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security (NTISS), 29 

October 1986, attached to Memorandum “Implementation of the Computer Security Act of 1987,” David Holt (DS/

DSS/L) to Lamb, Clark Dittmer (DS/DSS), Jules Romagnoli (DS/ISS/SYS), and Robert Spencer (DS/P/POL), 16 

May 1989, Folder – ASEC - Information Systems - Computer Security 1989, Box 2, RG 59-Lot 90D311, Suitland. 

OMB Bulletin No. 88-16 “Guidance for Preparation and Submission of Security Plans for Federal Computer Systems 

Containing Sensitive Information,” OMB to the Head of Executive Departments and Establishments, 6 July 1988, 

attached to Memorandum “Security Plans for Federal Computer Systems,” Krys to Joseph H. Linnemann (M/COMP/

BP), 20 July 1988, Folder – AADP (Information Systems Security), Box 1, RG 59 - Lot 90D479, Suitland. 

60 Oral History Interview, Greg Bujac #2, 26 October 2005, p. 4-5. Oral History Interview, Alan Herto, 19 December 

2005, p. 2. Oral History Interview, Robert Surprise, 8 December 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 1-2. 

61 Memorandum “The Department of State’s Electronic Mail Networks,” John E. Clark (ARA/EX) to Krys, 2 April 1991; 

and Memorandum “Expansion of E-Mail Networks Overseas,” Warren E. Littrel (DS/IM) to Krys, 5 February 1991; both 

Folder – ACOA (General) 1991, Box 2, RG 59-Lot 93D66, Suitland. 

62 Oral History Interview, Greg Bujac #1, 4 October 2005, p. 4. Oral History Interview, Alan Herto, 19 December 2005, 

conducted by Mark Hove, p. 2. Letter, Rogers to Representative Neal Smith, Chair of the House Subcommittee on 

Commerce, Justice, and State, 1 October 1992; and Report of Inspection “Information Management in the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security,” Office of the Inspector General, September 1992, attached to Letter, Rogers to Smith, 1 October 

1992, both Folder – AMGT (Reorganization), Box 17428, RG 59-Lot 94D406, Suitland. Information Memorandum 

“Information Security and IM,” Krys to Spiers, 8 February 1989; and Information Memorandum “Communications 

Security – COMSEC,” Lamb to Spiers, 18 January 1988, attached to Information Memorandum “Information Security 

and IM,” Krys to Spiers, 8 February 1989; both Folder – Information Management (IM) 1989, Box 2, RG 59 – Lot 

90D311, Suitland. 

63 Oral History Interview, Alan Herto, 19 December 2005, p. 2. Oral History Interview, Robert Surprise, 8 December 

2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 1-2. Oral History Interview, Greg Bujac #2, 26 October 2005, p. 4-5. 

64 Oral History Interview, Robert Surprise, 8 December 2005, p. 1-2. Memorandum “OC – The History, the Mission,” 

Robert Surprise, n.d. [1998?], copy provided to PA/HO. 
332

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

65 Oral History Interview, Alan Herto, 19 December 2005, p. 2. Information Memorandum “IM Within the DS Bureau,” 

Krys to Selin, 4 January 1991, Folder – AMGT (Reorganization), Box 4, RG 59 – Lot 93D66, Suitland. Information 

Memorandum “Information Management (IM) Status,” Arthur W. Fort to Rogers, 8 December 1992, Folder – AMGT 

(Reorganization), Box 17428, RG 59 – Lot 94D406, Suitland. 
333

CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

The euphoria brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 

War led many in the Department of State and Congress to believe that the primary threats to U.S. diplomacy 

and security had largely vanished. Republican and Democratic Congressmen, as well as political commentators, 

spoke of a “peace dividend,” and one scholar claimed it was “the end of history.” Amid the euphoria, U.S. leaders 

forgot two key elements about diplomatic security. 

First, the euphoria seemed to confuse the end of 

one threat (the Soviet Union) with the cessation of 

other threats. Overlooked, perhaps forgotten, was 

that the transformation of diplomatic security—and 

the elevation of the Office of Security (SY) into the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)—had resulted 

from the threat of terrorism, not Cold War threats. 

Second, U.S. officials seemed to assume that with 

the Soviet Union gone, the Russians (and others) 

would no longer be interested in espionage against 

the United States.1

 

The jubilation of the immediate post-Cold War 

period hampered DS and its efforts to secure U.S. 

posts and facilities. The “peace dividend” led to cuts 

in Department of State appropriations, and U.S. 

officials pursued a “more with less” strategy regarding 

government services, including those provided by 

DS. As the post-Cold War euphoria wore off and 

CHAPTER 9

A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY 

8

DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

Figure 1: November 1989 scene at the Brandenburg Gate 

the morning after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which had 

separated East and West Germany. With the end of the 

Cold War, many spoke of a “peace dividend” and were led 

to believe that most security threats to the United States had 

faded. DS suffered cuts in personnel and monies afterwards, 

even though the threat of terrorism continued, and demands 

for DS’s services increased. Source: © Associated Press.
334

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

new tensions surfaced, DS undertook duties that 

placed its agents in some of the most dangerous 

regional conflicts of the decade. Such duties 

increased DS’s visibility and demonstrated once again 

the Department’s dependence upon a professional 

protective security service. 

Terrorism from domestic and foreign sources 

elevated security concerns in the United States. 

The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 

1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma 

City, and the 1996 bombing at the Atlanta Olympic 

Games brought attention to the need for improved 

diplomatic security. However, the 1998 attacks on 

the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, directed 

by Osama bin Laden, caused extensive casualties 

and brought a new focus upon security issues at U.S. diplomatic facilities. While the Crowe Commission 

investigated the attacks, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security David G. Carpenter and Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Peter Bergin presented a “blueprint” for a restructured DS to 

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The Secretary approved it, and the restructuring resulted in more 

resources, more personnel, more authority, and the ability to report directly to the Deputy Chief of Mission. 

As the demands for security have increased in the years after the East Africa bombings, DS has continued to 

build upon this blueprint. 

z Peace Dividends and Laboratories å

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a belief emerged that many security 

threats had faded, and members of Congress and foreign policy commentators spoke of a “peace dividend.” The 

peace dividend was a budgetary savings that the U.S. Government would incur because it no longer needed 

elevated levels of U.S. military forces to counter the Soviet threat. Although DS officials were acutely aware that 

not all threats emanated from or were fostered by the Kremlin, the pressure from Congress and senior Department 

officials to limit spending overrode DS concerns. 

Like his superiors, the new Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, Ambassador Anthony C. E. 

Quainton, affirmed many “peace dividend” sentiments. He commissioned a task force of senior DS officers to study 

and make recommendations on how DS could adjust to the post-Cold War future. He asserted that DS needed to 

reexamine “the way we do business in light of changing world realities [and] the growing scarcity of personnel and 

Figure 2: Russian President Boris Yeltsin (waving as he 

enters his limousine) is covered by a DS protective detail 

(center and left of center) during a visit to the Lincoln 

Memorial in Washington, D.C., on June 20, 1991. Source: 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

financial resources.” Citing the political pressure to 

streamline the federal government, Quainton advised 

that DS should do the same “to remain relevant, 

efficient, and effective.”2

 

Amid the new post-Cold War world, a 

movement to “reinvent government” emerged, and 

Assistant Secretary Quainton and Under Secretary 

of State for Management Richard Moose sought to 

make DS a “laboratory” for the movement. Headed 

by Vice President Albert “Al” Gore, Jr., “Reinventing 

Government” sought to reduce archaic rules, 

excessive layers of bureaucracy, and wasteful spending 

on duplicate efforts in several agencies. If successful, 

the federal government could be more responsive 

to the public, more effective and cost-efficient in 

its operations, and more innovative in resolving 

challenges and problems. In several ways, such efforts 

echoed the Crockett Reforms of the 1960s, except 

that it was a U.S. Government-wide effort. Under 

Quainton and Moose, “reinventing” DS meant 

embracing the “risk management” approach more 

fully (as opposed to risk avoidance) by developing 

security standards based on threat levels and applying 

countermeasures in a cost-effective manner based 

on a post’s threat classification. Reinventing DS 

also included reclassifying many positions to a 

lower security clearance, eliminating research and 

development in technical security, and reducing the 

Secretary’s detail, the number of local guards at posts, 

and the Diplomatic Security Guard program. There 

was an effort to consolidate background investigations 

and allow U.S. Government employees to transfer 

their security clearance when they moved to a 

different agency (a move to a different department or 

Figure 3: Anthony C. E. Quainton, Assistant Secretary 

of State for Diplomatic Security, 1992-1995. Quainton 

sought to make DS one of the Department of State’s 

laboratories for the “Reinventing Government” effort 

spearheaded by Vice President Albert P. Gore, Jr. Under 

Reinventing Government, DS lost resources and personnel, 

and Quainton tried to have some long-time tasks, such as 

visa and passport fraud investigations, transferred to other 

agencies. The proposals were unpopular among DS rankand-file. Source: Department of State 

Figure 4: Mark E. Mulvey, Director of the Diplomatic 

Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for Diplomatic Security, 1993-1996. Source: Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security Files.
336

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

agency prompts a new background investigation and 

security clearance evaluation).3

 

In what was perhaps one of the most 

controversial elements of the DS “laboratory” effort, 

Under Secretary Moose asked Quainton to consider 

having DS relinquish its criminal investigative 

function. In 1993, Quainton requested Foreign 

Service Officer Jock Covey to prepare a study on 

the topic. Covey reported that while the Bureau 

of Consular Affairs was responsible for preventing 

passport fraud, it relied upon DS to pursue any fraud 

cases. To conduct fraud investigations, DS utilized 

field offices in 21 U.S. cities, which were staffed by 

Special Agents trained as federal investigators with 

full law enforcement powers. Yet in order to bring a 

passport fraud case to court, agents had to persuade 

the local U.S. Attorney of three things: that a more 

serious crime was involved, that the case could be won 

before a jury, and that a meaningful penalty would be 

imposed.”4

 

Based on Covey’s study, Quainton determined 

that the investigative function was unproductive, 

and sought to transfer it to another agency. If DS 

transferred passport and visa fraud investigations to 

another agency, DS could shut down several domestic 

field offices and reap a significant savings for the 

Department. Moose and Quainton even discussed 

the transfer of investigation duties with the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In a meeting with the 

Under Secretary of State, DS Assistant Director for 

Investigations Peter Bergin opposed the transfer. When 

Moose called Bergin later, Bergin bluntly told Moose, 

“[Secretary of State Warren] Christopher and you are 

doing yourselves no service here. You are setting us 

Figure 5: A DS Security Technical Specialist (foreground) 

inspects a surveillance camera while a DS Security Engineering 

Officer works on the mounting hardware at a United States 

diplomatic facility. Although the Cold War had ended, threats 

to U.S. diplomacy, such as espionage, terrorism, and crime, 

continued. Moreover, the United States needed to establish 

embassies in the newly independent states of the former Soviet 

Union. As a result, DS faced many challenges in ensuring the 

technical security of U.S. diplomatic posts during the 1990s. 

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

Figure 6: Winter 1994: A DS Security Engineering Officer 

works to install alarms in the utility tunnels beneath a U.S. 

embassy overseas. The alarm system was a precautionary 

countermeasure aimed at alerting embassy security personnel 

if intruders entered the tunnels. Running beneath public 

streets, such tunnels sometimes were used in espionage efforts 

by foreign intelligence operatives. Source: Private collection. 
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

[DS] up for failure two to five years down the road.” Ultimately the criminal investigations function was retained; 

however, as word of Quainton and Moose’s talks with the FBI spread among DS personnel, Quainton’s standing 

plummeted. In retrospect, Quainton admitted it “effectively ruined [him] with a large number of people” in DS.5

 

Quainton and Moose streamlined other tasks in DS and considered other budget cuts. Under Quainton, the 

Bureau’s 1993 salaries and expenses budget was approximately $180 million, a figure unchanged from 1990 and 

slightly less than the amount in 1986. Quainton and Moose tried to downsize the Secretary of State’s protective 

detail while the Secretary was in Washington, outsource protection of foreign dignitaries, restrict expenditures on 

the local guard program overseas, and reconsider embassy security measures. Quainton sought to reduce DS’s 

protective security commitments, believing that many protective details were unnecessary. The Saudi Arabian 

Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar, was one of only five high level foreign officials who enjoyed a 

full-time DS protective detail, and Quainton considered cutting it. However, Assistant Secretary of State for Near 

Eastern Affairs Edward P. Djerejian insisted that DS retain it because the Saudis provided the U.S. Ambassador 

in Riyadh with a full security detail. As enacted by Moose and Quainton, the Reinventing Government effort 

seemed to view DS as an entity without a past and with a function whose need had lessened. Department officials 

appeared to forget that DS arose as a bureau and expanded dramatically due to the threat of terrorism, not the 

threat posed by the Soviet Union. With the Soviet Union gone, Reinventing Government seemed to accept that 

the Russians, the Newly Independent States (as former Soviet republics were called), and other governments were 

no longer interested in intelligence gathering on the United States, its policies, and its actions.6

 

Furthermore, the implementation of Reinventing Government seemed disconnected from existing threats 

and continually expanding security needs. When successor states emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, 

the United States established diplomatic relations with each of the newly independent states. This required 

establishing new embassies—each with its own staff—and for the new states to establish embassies of their own 

in Washington. (The U.S. Embassy in Moscow continued to function as the U.S. Embassy to the Russian 

Federation.) Just as had occurred with post-World War II decolonization and the subsequent emergence of new 

independent countries, the expansion of U.S. diplomatic posts imposed greater demands upon DS. In the newly 

independent states such as Tajikistan, Armenia, Estonia, and Ukraine, DS assisted in determining the security of 

sites for new U.S. diplomatic posts. It also prepared and established security programs and Marine Security Guard 

details for those embassies and consulates. 

In addition, international espionage did not end with the Cold War. One DS engineer recalled a 1985 

warning by a KGB colonel: “You will some day see a great peace break out. It is easier to spy on your friends.” 

With the end of the Cold War, DS reduced its countermeasures; meanwhile, other agencies cut them outright. 

DS agents knew the FSB (Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti—Federal Security Service), the successor to the KGB, 

was still conducting spy operations. Moreover, the New Independent States, such as Georgia, Ukraine, and 

Belarus, developed their own intelligence services, with people formerly trained by the KGB.7

 
338

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

For example, DS engineers Bruce Matthews 

and Lonny Price learned that the Russians were 

conducting espionage against the new U.S. Consulate 

in Yekaterinburg, as if the Cold War had not ended. 

The building that housed the new U.S. consulate 

abutted a hotel, and upon examining the rooms next 

to the U.S. Consulate, Matthews and Price found that 

the Russians were building listening posts in rooms 

adjacent to the consulate. In Vladivostok, Matthews 

found that the FSB had set up lines along the new 

Consulate’s telephone wires. Using a video camera, 

Matthews began following the lines to their source, 

only to have some FSB “heavies” chase after him.8

 

New Security Demands: 

The Olympics, World Trade 

Center, Burundi, and Haiti

While Russian espionage continued unabated 

after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the demand 

for security imposed new stresses upon DS, even 

as Reinventing Government sought to streamline 

operations in the bureau. One of the first additional responsibilities that DS gained in the post-Cold War 

era was protective security for the U.S. Olympic team. DS had been involved with protective security of 

U.S. Olympic athletes since the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal, Canada—the first Games after the 1972 

Black September terrorist attack in Munich where members of the Israeli Olympic team were held hostage 

and killed. DS became further involved in 1984 when it protected foreign dignitaries who attended the Los 

Angeles Olympics (President Carter ordered a boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow after the Soviet 

Union invaded Afghanistan). More serious concerns about the security of U.S. Olympic athletes first arose 

in 1991 when Cuba hosted the Pan American Games. During the months preceding the Havana Pan Am 

Games, several Cuban sports athletes defected. U.S. officials had concerns that the Cubans would exploit and 

harass U.S. athletes, or even build relationships to exploit at a later date. The U.S. Olympic team turned to 

the Department of State, and DS Agents briefed Pan Am Games athletes on security issues in Tampa before 

they flew to Havana.9

Figure 7: Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger (right) 

presents the Distinguished Honor Award to Diplomatic 

Security Service Director Clark Dittmer on January 15, 

1993, “for outstanding leadership and unwavering 

dedication to the ideals embodied in the charter of the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security.” Dittmer served as DSS 

Director and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for DS from 1988 to 1993. Source: DS Update

newsletter.
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

After the Havana Pan Am Games, DS 

developed a more formalized program, with 

particular emphasis upon preparation prior to a 

Games event. In 1992, the Division of Overseas 

Programs created a specific position responsible 

for the security of U.S. athletes for the Olympics 

in Barcelona, Spain. Bill Marsden, the Regional 

Security Officer (RSO) in Madrid, served as the first 

Olympic Coordinator. For the 1996 Olympics in 

Atlanta, Special Agent Ed Moreno coordinated the 

DS effort at the U.S.-hosted games, which consisted 

largely of dignitary protection and protection of the 

Israeli Olympic team.10 

The bombing at the Atlanta Olympics, although 

perpetrated by domestic terrorists, prompted 

DS to create a permanent Olympic Coordinator 

position. John Kaufman was named as the first 

Coordinator, and he began preparations for the 2000 

Olympics in Sydney, Australia. As Coordinator, 

Kaufman undertook three tasks: working with and 

coordinating assistance for Australian security and 

law enforcement agencies; serving as a liaison with the 

U.S. business community; and preparing to assist the 

U.S. Olympic team. He worked with the Australian 

Prime Minister’s office, and coordinated efforts with 

the Australian Federal Police, Australian intelligence, 

the Secret Service, the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), and the Anti-Terrorism 

Assistance (ATA) program, which provided explosive-sniffing dogs. The U.S., Australian, and New Zealand 

military forces conducted maneuvers as well. Although Kaufman admitted that in 1996, he did not believe 

that the Australians were ready for the Games, by 2000, U.S. officials were enthusiastic about the Australians’ 

preparations, measures, and broad public commitment to assist. After the success in Sydney, DS expanded its 

coordination and preparation for the Olympics and similar events. It initiated an exchange program for the host 

country’s police forces during the years preceding the next Olympics, and DS created a Security Event Training 

program to coordinate protective security.11 

Figure 8: Investigators examine a portion of the site of the 

July 27, 1996, bombing at Atlanta’s Olympic Centennial 

Park. A DS Special Agent coordinated protective efforts 

and conducted briefings for U.S. athletes going to the 

1992 Games in Barcelona. The 1996 bombing prompted 

DS to create a permanent Olympic coordinator, who 

would work with officials of the host country and city in 

preparation for the Olympic Games. John Kaufman was 

the first Olympic Coordinator, and he worked with the 

Australians in preparation for the 2000 Games at Sydney. 

Source: © Associated Press/Eric Draper. 
340

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was the 

first indication for DS that terrorism was evolving 

from a regional phenomenon to a transnational 

phenomenon. On February 26, 1993, a bomb 

exploded in a parking garage of the World Trade 

Center (WTC) in New York City. The NYC Police 

Department and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force 

immediately called upon DS for support during the 

investigation. Working with NYC Police, the FBI, 

and ATF, DS helped to quickly identify a group 

of Middle Eastern radicals as those responsible 

for the attack. FBI and NYC police arrested most 

of the terrorists before they could leave the United 

States; however, Ramzi Yousef, the driver of the van 

containing the explosives, escaped.12 

The ensuing search for Yousef resulted in a 

debate between the Department of State and the 

FBI over the Department’s Rewards for Justice 

program. The Department offered a $2 million 

reward for information leading to the arrest of Yousef, 

but the reward was controversial. First, it departed 

from previous practice of compensating individuals 

for information about specific incidents; the 

Department had not previously paid compensation 

for information on the whereabouts of suspects. 

Also, the Department and the FBI clashed over who 

should pay the reward.13 Since the bombing occurred 

on U.S. soil, the Department of State argued that 

the FBI should pay. The Department insisted that 

Congress had prevented them from offering rewards 

in domestic terrorism cases. The FBI, who placed 

Yousef on its “Most Wanted” list, asserted that it did 

not have funds available to pay a reward for Yousef’s 

capture. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

Figure 10: A DS Agent operates an explosives detector inside 

a crater left by the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. DS 

assisted the New York Police Department and FBI in the 

bombing investigation, and helped to identify terrorists 

responsible for the attack. Source: Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, and Firearms. 

Figure 9: Damage created by the February 1993 

bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City. 

The bombing was the first indicator that terrorism was 

evolving into a transnational phenomenon. DS was 

called to assist the New York Police Department and 

the FBI in the investigation, and helped to identify 

the Middle Eastern radical responsible for the attack. 

Although Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda had ties to the 

bombing, the connections would not become clear until 

1996. Source: © Associated Press / Richard Drew. 
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

then drafted legislation allowing the Department 

of State to offer rewards for domestic attacks if 

perpetrated by international terrorists; in July 1993, 

the Department offered a $2 million reward.14

By this time, Yousef had disappeared 

underground; however, DS Special Agents did much 

of the work that led to his capture in Pakistan. U.S. law 

enforcement officials believed that Yousef had escaped 

to Pakistan, but they had little reliable information 

about his location. In February 1995, nearly two 

years after the WTC attack, a man presented himself 

at the residence of a U.S. diplomat in Karachi, and 

claimed to have information about Yousef’s location. 

DS agents in Pakistan confirmed that the man was a 

legitimate source: he was a former contact for Yousef. 

Based on his information, DS agents Bill Miller and 

Jeff Riner alerted Pakistani officials and prepared to 

raid Yousef’s hotel room. On February 7, 1995, a 

team of Pakistani law enforcement officers and DS 

agents, including Miller, stormed into Yousef’s 

room, waking him from a nap, and arrested him. 

The next day, Pakistani officials turned Yousef over 

to FBI agents, who flew him to New York City for 

arraignment. The informant received a $2 million 

reward, and on March 11, Yousef was indicted for the 

1993 WTC bombing.15 

DS’s protective responsibilities at U.S. Embassies increased, in part due to local conflicts, with two more 

notable examples being Burundi and Liberia. During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, ethnic tensions between 

Tutsis and Hutus spilled over into neighboring Burundi. The situation created a tense, high-risk situation for 

the U.S. Embassy in Bujumbura and threatened the life of the U.S. Ambassador. On April 6, 1994, unknown 

assailants shot down a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President 

Cyprien Ntaryamira as it prepared to land at the airport in the Rwandan capital of Kigali. The assassination 

sparked the Rwandan genocide; meanwhile, Tutsi and Hutu leaders in Burundi appealed for calm.16 As 

Rwanda’s genocide garnered world press attention, ethnic tensions simmered in Burundi, with occasional 

Figure 11: Ramzi Yousef, the driver of the explosives-laden 

truck in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. DS 

agents, through a Pakistani source, located Yousef; and DS 

Agents Bill Miller and Jeff Riner worked with Pakistani 

law enforcement to apprehend Yousef. Yousef was turned 

over to the FBI, and brought to the United States for trial. 

Source: © Associated Press. 
342

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

human rights abuses committed by extremist 

Tutsi groups. U.S. Ambassador Robert Krueger 

investigated the abuses; and in one case where 150 

Hutus were massacred, the Ambassador reported his 

finding to the press. Tutsi newspapers excoriated 

Krueger and published death threats again him, 

prompting DS to increase the number of its agents 

at the U.S. Embassy in Bujumbura. In July 1995, 

Ambassador Krueger, escorted by RSO Chris Reilly 

and ARSO Larry Salmon, traveled to a northern 

province of Burundi with an official government 

convoy. During the trip, his convoy was attacked. 

Reilly and Salmon moved Krueger out of danger, 

and later each received the Department’s Award 

for Valor for protecting the Ambassador. Threat 

analysts in DS’s Intelligence and Threat Analysis 

office, however, warned that Krueger would 

continue to face “an extremely serious threat” from 

Tutsi extremists because of his perceived sympathy 

for the Hutus; and Krueger returned to Washington 

for consultations.17 

DS opposed Krueger’s return to Bujumbura, 

but the new U.S. Ambassador Morris N. Hughes, 

Jr. did not lessen DS’s protective work in Burundi. 

In what Hughes described as “a slow-motion coup 

led by civilians,” the President of Burundi, Sylvestre 

Ntibantunganya, feared for his life and asked Hughes 

on July 23, 1996, to permit him to stay the night 

at the Ambassador’s residence. Hughes consented. 

DS sent a four-person Mobile Security Deployment 

(MSD) team to protect the Ambassador’s residence. 

Ntibantunganya’s protection detail lasted several 

months. DS had serious qualms about the wisdom 

of the Burundian president staying in the U.S. 

Figure 13: In September 1995, Cuba’s Premier Fidel Castro 

thanks his DS security detail (left and second from left) at 

the 50th United Nations General Assembly session in New 

York City, as a U.S. Marshal (center) and an interpreter 

(right) look on. Source: Private Collection.

Figure 12: Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, President of Burundi.

In 1996, Ntibantunganya, a Hutu, feared for his life 

during a civilian-led coup attempt by Tutsis and fled to 

the U.S. Embassy. U.S. Ambassador Morris N. Hughes, 

Jr., allowed him to stay the night, but that night stretched 

to several months. DS sent a four-person Mobile Security 

Detail to the Embassy to assist with security. The lengthy 

stay raised questions within DS about the Embassy’s 

diplomatic inviolability and wisdom of allowing leaders to 

seek refuge at a U.S. embassy. Source: © Associated Press / 

David Guttenfelder.
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

Embassy, and the potential problems it posed for 

the Embassy, its personnel, and its diplomatic 

inviolability.18 

As civil war among three factions engulfed the 

West African nation of Liberia, the declining security 

environment placed heavy demands upon DS agents 

at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia. In 1996, Special 

Agent John J. Frese made several trips to negotiate 

with various factions and bring more that 250 people, 

most of them U.S. citizens, to safety. Frese earned 

the Department’s Award of Valor and other awards. 

In 1998, as the capital city of Monrovia, including 

the neighborhood of the U.S. Embassy, became a war 

zone, Special Agents Tony Deibler, Scott Folensbee, 

and Steve Fakan sought to bring Americans to safety, 

and to rescue several journalists who were trapped in 

a hotel by factional clashes. Their efforts became the 

subject of an episode of the History Channel series 

Heroes under Fire.

19

While protecting the Burundian president was 

unexpected, DS was formally tasked in 1993 to train 

and advise a protective detail for the President of Haiti, 

Jean Bertrand Aristide. Haiti’s chronic economic 

desperation and political corruption led the United 

States to assist Aristide in the hope of encouraging 

democratic stability for the Haitian people—with 

varying levels of success. In 1994, DS hired DynCorp 

to provide a protective detail for Aristide when he 

returned to Haiti, the first time that DS turned to 

a private contractor to provide personal protection. 

Then, in October 1994, DS Agent John Rendeiro flew 

to Haiti with Secretary of State Warren Christopher 

and President Aristide. He and a DS team trained 50 

Haitians to serve as Aristide’s protective detail.20

Figure 14: A DS Agent (center, wearing helmet) escorts 

U.S. Ambassador to Liberia John Blaney to a meeting with a 

rebel group during that country’s civil war. As rival factions 

fought in the streets of Monrovia near the U.S. Embassy, 

the Liberian civil war forced the rescue and evacuation of 

Americans in the West African nation. A DS Special Agent 

made several trips and brought more than 250 people to 

safety in 1996. In 1998, DS Agents rescued Americans 

and journalists trapped by factional fighting on the streets of 

Monrovia. Source: Private collection. 

Figure 15: DS personnel surround Secretary of State Warren 

Christopher (left foreground) as he walks with President 

Jean Bertrand Aristide of Haiti (center in dark suit) during 

a visit to Haiti in October 1994. U.S. Ambassador William 

Swing follows immediately behind Secretary Christopher. 

DS was tasked to train and advise a protective detail for 

President Aristide. A DS team flew to Haiti with Secretary 

of State Christopher and trained a 50-person protective 

detail for the Haitian president. Source: Private Collection. 
344

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

In December 1995, Haitians elected René Préval 

as Aristide’s successor, and DS now had the task of 

protecting President Préval as well. However, DS 

could not legally accept responsibility for protecting 

Préval under the law enforcement authorities that it 

had. President William J. Clinton added Haiti to 

the Foreign Assistance list as an AID mission so that 

DS could proceed with the operation, and funds for 

protecting Préval could be included in Haiti’s foreign 

aid package. The National Security Council pressured 

other agencies to permit DS to protect Préval, and DS 

received additional support from the Department of 

Defense, Secret Service, the Army and Navy Criminal 

Investigative Services, and the Air Force Office of Special 

Investigations. DS conducted the tactical planning and 

the operations of the multi-agency protective security 

detail. A DS team arrived by two C-130s on a Sunday 

morning, and took over the protection of the palace. 

Later, after several months, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for Diplomatic Security Greg Bujac traveled to 

Port-au-Prince, and accepted President Préval’s thanks 

for DS’s efforts. The occasion marked the first-time 

that a head of state formally thanked the Department 

of State’s security office for its efforts. DS supervised 

contracted U.S. personnel serving on the protective 

detail until the detail ended in April 2006.21

z The Boswell Revival å

With the new tasks, DS’s need for additional Special Agents and security personnel in general became 

acute, particularly in the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. The April 19 bombing of the Alfred P. 

Murrah Federal Building in that city by domestic, anti-government militia sympathizers prompted President 

Clinton to direct all federal facilities to meet the minimum security standards. Consequently, the Department 

of State received $1.68 million in the 1996 Antiterrorism Budget Supplemental to upgrade security at its 

domestic facilities. When President Clinton announced that he would request an additional 1,000 law 

Figure 16: President of Haiti, Rene Préval. DS was also 

tasked to train a protective detail for President Préval, who 

succeeded President Aristide. President William J. Clinton 

added Haiti to the Foreign Assistance list and included 

funds for protecting Préval. Source: © Associated Press / 

Lynne Sladkey. 
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

enforcement officers to combat terrorism at home and abroad, Assistant Secretary Quainton asked Under 

Secretary Moose “to seize the opportunity to ensure that DS has adequate personnel.” Quainton received no 

support for his appeal.22 

When Eric J. Boswell took over as Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security in January 1996, 

he criticized the cutbacks in hiring, personnel, and resources that DS had endured since the end of the Cold 

War. DS stopped hiring new agents in 1990, and did not begin hiring again until late 1997. DS suffered 

budget cuts of $186 million in FY 1993 and $156 million in FY 1996; the latter was the smallest annual cut 

during the previous five years. DS lost 126 Foreign Service and 159 Civil Service positions between 1992 and 

1996, prompting Boswell to admit that staff shortages left DS “unable to meet our most critical requirements.”23

Boswell also acknowledged that DS was “graying.” The average age of DS agents was 44, and many were 

approaching retirement. The average age of Security Engineers was 45, and the average age of the Diplomatic 

Couriers was 47. In early 1997, Boswell bluntly told Acting Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick 

F. Kennedy that “asking this Bureau to take further 

reductions...is irresponsible and inconsistent with 

the intent of Congress.”24

 The Department of Defense became highly 

critical of the cuts to DS. With many military 

attachés and other military personnel working in 

U.S. embassies across the globe, the Department of 

Defense complained that the Department of State 

“unilaterally” decided to set aside physical security 

standards when it opened new embassies in the former 

Soviet republics, the former Yugoslav republics, 

Vietnam, and Cambodia. Also, Department 

of Defense officials disliked the fact that the 

Department of State had withdrawn Marine Security 

Guard (MSG) units from several posts, and had not 

assigned MSG detachments to many of the new 

embassies. The Department of Defense made clear 

to the Department of State that it was considering 

three options: “weigh[ing] the risk of operating in 

less than secure facilities, choosing not to locate in the 

host country, or, with DOS approval, constructing a 

DOD facility.”25 

Figure 17: Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Diplomatic Security, 1996-1998. Boswell was critical of 

the cuts DS suffered during the early 1990s, and bluntly 

said that additional cuts were “irresponsible.” He and 

DAS Bujac undertook a rebuilding of DS between 1996 

and 1998, bringing in many new agents and acquiring 

additional monies. Source: Department of State. 
346

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

The 1996 Al-Khobar Towers bombing 

emphasized the need for greater security, and DS 

immediately reviewed security at all U.S. posts in 

the Middle East. On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb 

destroyed the Al-Khobar Towers in Dhahran, 

Saudi Arabia. Nineteen U.S. military personnel 

were killed, and 515 people, including 240 U.S. 

military, were injured. Al-Khobar Towers was not 

a Department of State facility; it was residential 

quarters for U.S. and allied Air Forces for Operation 

Southern Watch, the coalition air operation over 

Iraq. Even so DS immediately sent three security 

teams of six persons each to the Persian Gulf to 

survey and “recommend the necessary upgrades” 

for Department posts and facilities. The three 

teams divided the posts into groups: one team 

focused exclusively on Saudi Arabia, another 

examined posts in Kuwait and Bahrain, and the 

third surveyed Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and 

Oman.26 

Over the next few months, DS completed 

numerous upgrades at several posts in the Persian 

Gulf and former Soviet Union. The upgrades 

consisted largely of perimeter barriers, closed 

streets, additional guards, and training of U.S. 

diplomatic personnel. Congress approved a budget 

supplemental for DS, funding 55 new positions, including 15 security officers for the Persian Gulf and the 

Newly Independent States. The extra money also funded six new mobile training teams, more local guards, 

43 armored and light-armored vehicles, 80 alarm systems, 80 walk-through metal detectors, and other 

equipment.27 

As a result of the Al-Khobar Towers bombing, DS became very proactive in trying to prevent terrorist 

attacks. In February 1997, DS officials informed Secretary Albright that there was “credible evidence of planning 

for a terrorist attack on U.S. interests or facilities in the Persian Gulf.”28 With many connecting the Al-Khobar 

Towers attack to the bombing of a Saudi National Guard facility in Riyadh six months earlier (November 13, 

Figure 18: Gregorie “Greg” Bujac, Director of the 

Diplomatic Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 1996-1998. 

With Assistant Secretary Boswell, Bujac helped to rebuild 

DS after several years of cuts and personnel losses. Bujac 

also traveled to Haiti and received, on behalf of DS, the 

official thanks of President Préval for DS efforts in training 

Préval’s protective detail. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security Files. 
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

1995), NSC Advisor Sandy Berger inquired whether 

the U.S. Government should issue a security alert 

message for the Middle East. Boswell did not believe 

this was necessary because information on a specific 

threat did not exist. However, Boswell assured 

Albright that DS had elevated the threat level in the 

region to “high” and was “properly and adequately” 

addressing the heightened threat situation. Boswell 

also detailed for the Secretary the specific security 

upgrades DS had undertaken at U.S. posts around 

the Persian Gulf.29

After the Al-Khobar Towers bombing, DS gained 

new resources and other agencies began turning to 

DS on issues regarding security and related issues 

at U.S. posts overseas. With intelligence reports 

citing more “surveillance and possible pre-attack 

planning against” U.S. diplomatic facilities, the 

Counterterrorism Subcommittee of the NSC asked 

DS in mid-1997 to coordinate three interagency 

teams that would conduct security vulnerability 

assessments of possible targets. Former SY chief 

Ambassador David Fields headed one of the teams, 

and the three teams presented their findings to the 

Counterterrorism Subcommittee in September 

1997. When Boswell requested an additional 70 

agents, 31 were approved immediately, with many 

going to the security details of the Secretary of State 

and the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. 

Acting Under Secretary Kennedy believed that 

another 32 agents were “warranted” and requested 

information on costs. In December 1997, Boswell 

told Secretary Albright that DS had hired 105 new 

agents and was “reversing a long period of slow 

decline.”30

Figure 19: A soldier stands guard in front of the damaged 

Al-Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. The June 25, 1996, 

bomb killed 19 Americans. DS immediately afterwards 

made many security upgrades at U.S. embassies and 

consulates in the Persian Gulf, and it added 105 Special 

Agents and 6 Mobile Training Teams. DS also adopted 

a more aggressive approach to overseas security. Source: 

© Associated Press/Greg Marinovich. 

Figure 20: A U.S. Navy Seabee Building Chief Petty 

Officer, a DS contractor, and a Senior DS Engineer 

(left to right) replace a Delta Barrier in Athens, Greece, 

in 2008. After the Al-Khobar Towers bombing, DS 

obtained additional resources to improve security at U.S. 

posts overseas. DS also became an active member of the 

Counterterrorism Subcommittee of the National Security 

Council. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
348

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

DS’s Global Plan for Security Engineering 

Officers perhaps best demonstrates the rapid change 

of attitudes within the Department regarding security 

in the wake of the Al-Khobar Towers bombing. 

Designed during the Quainton/Moose period, the 

Global Plan resulted from efforts by the Bureau of 

European Affairs (EUR) to cut personnel at its posts 

in the immediate post-Cold War years. DS offered 

the Global Plan in hopes of making “the best out 

of a bad situation.” The proposed plan argued that 

the technological revolution of computers, wireless 

communications, and connectivity demanded that 

DS restructure its technical security programs; that is 

it would turn over the lock/safe/alarm repair tasks to 

privately contracted technicians under DS supervision 

and eliminate 16 SEO positions. The trade-off was 

that all SEO positions would be transferred out of 

the geographical bureaus and into DS (SEO positions 

were formally part of the geographic bureaus, and DS 

needed approval from the geographic bureaus for 

changes and initiatives). Shortly after Boswell became 

Assistant Secretary, Under Secretary Moose approved 

the Global Plan just before he departed, and the plan 

was soon implemented.31 

After Oklahoma City and the Al-Khobar Towers 

bombings, the new leadership of EUR questioned 

the wisdom of the Global Plan. In fact, they now 

opposed it. Apparently not aware that the Global Plan was a EUR initiative, EUR’s new senior officials asked DS 

“to justify” the Global Plan and the cuts of SEOs at European posts. In addition, several U.S. embassies, who had 

opposed the Global Plan from the start, mounted “valiant and convincing” appeals for retaining their SEOs. By 

August 1997, just one year after the Global Plan’s approval, DS found itself implementing a plan it originally had 

not wanted, at embassies that steadfastly opposed it, and that was now rejected by the geographic bureau that had 

initially pressed for it. By the fall of 1997, DS was hiring more SEOs, and it pledged to work with EUR to resolve 

issues and concerns. Meanwhile, the SEOs moved to DS, and there were few actual cuts.32

Figure 21: A Security Engineering Officer tests the integrity 

of a telephone console. During the 1990s, SEOs were 

assigned to the geographic bureaus, but the Global Plan 

brought them under DS. The Global Plan originally 

sought to restructure SEOs and make personnel cuts in the 

immediate post-Cold War period and during the computer 

revolution. Many U.S. embassies in Europe opposed the 

cuts, and after the Al-Khobar Towers bombing, the SEOs 

were moved to DS and DS was hiring more SEOs. Source: 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

The Al-Khobar Towers bombing and the increase 

in terrorism renewed interest in the Overseas Security 

Advisory Council (OSAC). OSAC was a liaison 

for the private sector, primarily for U.S. companies 

operating overseas. With “peace dividend” budget 

cuts, OSAC withered from a lack of resources and 

inactivity. To conserve limited resources, Assistant 

Secretary Quainton had tried to combine OSAC’s 

private liaison analyst group with DS’s Intelligence 

and Threat Analysis (ITA) division, believing that 

a combined group of analysts could fulfill both 

obligations. ITA struggled to meet the Department’s 

increasing need for threat analysis, and as a result, 

OSAC suffered. In the late 1990s, OSAC developed 

the Research and Information Support Center 

(RISC), which directly supported the private sector 

by providing threat analysis information. The revival 

of OSAC improved its effectiveness as a liaison and an 

advisor to the private sector. OSAC was soon being 

touted as “something that works;” moreover, it began 

bringing in other government agencies to assist the 

private sector.33 

z The Half-Finished Embassy å

DS under Boswell renewed its emphasis upon physical security overseas, but construction of the stalled, 

bugged, and much-maligned new U.S. Embassy in Moscow began moving forward. In 1994, Congress approved 

the Secure Chancery Facilities plan for Embassy Moscow, and the project became known as “Tophat.” The 

next year, the Department of State contracted architects Hellmuth, Obata & Kassebaum, P.C., to design the 

demolition to the fifth-floor slab and the subsequent construction of five new floors. The lower four floors 

would be the unclassified common areas and offices for local employees, as well as the Embassy’s offices for 

administration and budget. The upper floors (the 5th floor and above) contained the classified briefing areas and 

the post communications center. In 1997, U.S. construction teams began demolition of the upper floors down 

to the fifth-floor slab and reconstruction of the New Embassy Office Building (NOB). Shielding was inserted 

between the fourth and fifth floors to prevent installation of any “bugs” from the lower floors.34 

Figure 22: Former U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz 

(left) addresses a February 2004 Overseas Security Advisory 

Council (OSAC) executive council meeting. Others at 

the table (from left to right) are Joe Morton, Diplomatic 

Security Service Director and OSAC co-chair; Ray Mislock, 

director of corporate security for DuPont and former 

director of the DS Office of Counter-intelligence Programs; 

and Joe Petro, executive vice president of Citigroup’s Security 

and Investigative Services and OSAC’s co-chair from the 

private sector. By the mid-1990s, OSAC emerged as an 

example of successful collaboration between the public and 

private sectors. Today it serves several thousand constituent 

members. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
350

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

DS Agent Richard Gannon served as the Director 

of Security at the Moscow Embassy construction 

project, and he and DS worked with the intelligence 

community on the project to address its concerns in 

the best possible manner. One of the intelligence 

community’s fears was that the Russians would 

manage to place a team of agents into the building and 

implant listening devices. DS responded by having 

Marine Security Guards guard the construction site 

24 hours a day. DS installed video cameras along 

the fences and put infrared beam alarms inside the 

fences. The cameras also contained alarms to prevent 

tampering or adjustment. DS collected all videotapes 

from the surveillance cameras in case a concern about 

security arose. If someone got into the building, DS 

could review the specific tape.35

DS also developed a counter-intelligence 

program for the U.S. workers brought to Moscow to work on the NOB in order to safeguard the construction 

site. DS officials concluded that a no-fraternization policy was unachievable, in part, because U.S. electricians and 

laborers would want to visit the city and would need an outlet for rest and entertainment. Despite opposition, 

DS implemented a program that permitted fraternization of U.S. workers with Russians, notwithstanding the 

workers’ Top Secret clearance. DS agents educated workers on the possibilities and signs of espionage, and 

developed relationships with them. DS encouraged the workers to report any fraternization with Russians, and 

assured them that such reporting was without repercussions or punishment. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for Diplomatic Security Peter Bergin said that the idea was to develop transparency, and investigate the 

persons with whom the workers fraternized to see if they were KGB operatives or posed any other problems for 

U.S. workers. If the fraternization was not reported, the worker was sent home. Bergin admitted the program 

was counter-intuitive, but it sought to serve as an enabler for security.36 

z Secretary Albright’s “Worst Day” å

By the mid-1990s, DS recognized that terrorism was changing to a more transnational phenomenon and 

that it was starting to pose a different type of threat. Because many analysts expected a terrorist attack in the 

Persian Gulf and the Middle East, DS took several preparations. In 1997, Peter Bergin, who was then Director 

of the Office of Investigations and Counter-Intelligence, heard that Richard A. Clarke of the NSC and head 

Figure 23: Uniformed Protective Division officers operate 

a metal detector at Saint Patrick’s Cathedral in New York 

City, for the Diplomatic Mass held during the United 

Nations General Assembly’s 50th Anniversary observance in 

September 1995. The DS Uniformed Protective Division, 

761 strong in 2009, safeguards more than 100 Department 

of State domestic facilities in 22 states and the District of 

Columbia. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

of the Counterterrorism Security Group was holding 

meetings on terrorism. The Department of State’s 

Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (S/CT) attended 

these meetings, but DS did not. Bergin attended 

one meeting and determined that DS should 

participate. By the fall of 1997, DS was participating 

in the meetings, and Clarke soon asked DS to do 

vulnerability assessments for him. DS led 10 or 12 

assessment teams, and when the Bureau made its 

presentation Clarke liked what DS produced.37 

According to long-time DS Threat Analyst 

Dennis Pluchinsky, most terrorist groups have a 

domestic agenda, with some groups possessing a 

regional agenda; however, Al-Qaeda’s global agenda 

made it difficult to predict. Also, he said, there was a 

lot of terrorist rhetoric, but the key question for threat 

analysts was whether action would accompany the 

words. The 1992 assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane, 

leader of the Jewish Defense League, led to the arrest 

of El Sayyid Nosair, the first member of Al-Qaeda 

arrested in the United States. That arrest indicated that 

something was brewing in Afghanistan. DS Threat 

analysts noted that there were rumblings and a lot of 

jihadists without jobs. Although U.S. officials had 

identified Ramzi Yousef in the World Trade Center 

attacks of 1993, the connection with bin Laden was 

not clear until early 1996. Bin Laden also was involved 

in terrorism in Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Al-Khobar 

Towers bombing, but again, the connections were not 

immediately clear. Also, Iranian-sponsored terrorist 

attacks in Israel, Argentina, and Bahrain, as well as 

a far right group’s bombing of a federal building in 

Oklahoma City further clouded the terrorist picture. 

On February 23, 1998, bin Laden and four associated 

Figure 24: Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (center, 

with sunglasses), Acting Ambassador John Lange (pointing, 

with tie), a DS Special Agent (standing between them), 

and the Embassy RSO (right), survey the damage at the 

U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Albright then 

travelled to Nairobi to view the damage there. The August 7, 

1998, bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were perpetrated 

by Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda group, and killed 224 

people, including 12 Americans, while injuring more than 

5,000 Kenyans, Tanzanians, and Americans. Source: 

© Associated Press / Brennan Linsley. 

Figure 25: Damage to the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, 

shown the day after the August 7, 1998, bombing. Source: 

© Associated Press / Sayyid Azim. 
352

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

clerics issued a “fatwa,” calling for “jihad against Jews 

and Crusaders,” i.e. the United States and its allies 

such as Israel. The CIA tried to follow this in order to 

see if words would translate into action.38 

On August 7, 1998, two trucks laden with 

explosives entered the U.S. Embassy compounds 

in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania—

at 10:35 a.m. and 10:39 a.m. respectively—and 

detonated. The near-simultaneous explosions killed 

224 people, including 12 Americans. The blasts also 

injured more than 5000 Kenyans, Tanzanians, and 

Americans. Both embassies were heavily damaged. 

Secretary Madeleine Albright described it as “my worst 

day as Secretary of State.” President Clinton called 

the attacks “abhorrent” and “inhuman,” and vowed, 

“We will use all means at our disposal to bring those 

responsible to justice, no matter what or how long it 

takes.” The U.S. Embassy was located in downtown 

Nairobi on Haile Selassie Avenue, near one of the 

city’s busiest intersections. The bomb, comprising 

400-500 pounds of explosives, destroyed the rear 

of the U.S. Embassy, leveled the six-story Ufundi 

Cooperative Building, set ablaze a passing city bus, 

and blew out windows more than one and one-half 

miles away. U.S. Ambassador Prudence Bushnell was 

meeting with the Kenyan Trade Minister in the 18th 

story of a nearby building, and both were injured in 

the blast. In Tanzania, the near-simultaneous blast 

occurred next to the U.S. Embassy, which was located 

three miles out of Dar es Salaam city, in an up-scale 

residential neighborhood. It devastated the front of 

the U.S. Embassy, blew out windows and damaged 

homes blocks away. Secretary Albright travelled to 

Nairobi and Dar es Salaam to survey the damage, met 

Figure 26: The damage to the U.S. Embassy in Dar es 

Salaam, Tanzania. The August 7, 1998, bombing occurred 

four minutes after the bombing in Nairobi, blowing out 

windows and raining debris several blocks away from the 

Embassy. Source: © Associated Press. 

Figure 27: Followed by a DS Special Agent (left), Secretary 

of State Madeleine Albright (wearing a DSS cap) arrives at 

the U.S. Army’s McGovern Base north of Sarajevo, in June 

1997, to visit American troops serving in Bosnia. Secretary 

Albright strongly supported DS’s efforts to improve security 

at U.S. posts overseas. Source: © Associated Press. 
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

with the staffs of both embassies, and personally escorted the caskets containing the bodies of the American dead 

back to Washington. President Clinton, the families of the dead, friends, and Department of State personnel met 

the plane carrying the 10 Americans at Andrews Air Force Base, and held a tearful, “grim ceremony.”39 

The severity and coordination of the terrorist attacks immediately directed suspicions at Osama bin Laden 

and al-Qaeda. The Clinton Administration took several actions, including an attack on bin Laden. First, based 

upon intelligence that bin Laden would be meeting with his top staff on August 20 in Afghanistan, President 

Clinton ordered National Security Adviser Sandy Berger to coordinate “Operation Infinite Reach.” On August 

20, 79 cruise missiles struck targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, heavily damaging al-Qaeda training camps, 

killing 20-30 al-Qaeda members, but missing bin Laden by a few hours. Second, the Clinton Administration 

commissioned the Accountability Review Boards, chaired by Admiral William J. Crowe (Ret.), to investigate the 

bombings and make recommendations on embassy 

security. The boards were informally and collectively 

referred to as the Crowe Commission. Third, the 

Administration asked Congress for $1.8 billion for 

emergency security improvements overseas.40 

Under new Assistant Secretary of State for 

Diplomatic Security David G. Carpenter, DS’s 

response to bin Laden’s attacks on the U.S. Embassies 

in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, initially resembled 

SY’s approach in 1983-84 but then diverged sharply. 

Upon news of the bombings, DS sent 41 DS agents, 

4 SEOs, and 41 Seabees to Tanzania and Kenya to 

meet the two Embassies’ immediate security needs. 

Clarke, the NSC member serving as the National 

Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, 

and Counterterrorism, asked the Department of 

Defense to send two FASTs (Fleet Anti-terrorism 

Support Teams) to the two African capitals, with 50 

Marines going to Dar es Salaam and a platoon of 

Marines to Nairobi.41 

DS moved to enhance security at U.S. 

diplomatic posts regionally and worldwide. Carpenter 

informed Secretary Albright and Under Secretary for 

Management Bonnie Cohen that, “The Usama bin 

Figure 28: David G. Carpenter, Assistant Secretary of State 

for Diplomatic Security, 1998-2002. Under his leadership, 

DS assumed a more proactive approach to overseas security. 

He expanded security procedures for high-threat posts to all 

embassies and required daily reporting by RSOs. He briefed 

Secretary Albright every day on security matters, and he and 

DAS Peter Bergin proposed a new “blueprint” for DS that 

revamped the Bureau to meet the trans-national terrorist 

threat. Source: Department of State. 
354

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Laden [UBL] organization has the ability, training, funding and motivation to strike at U.S. interests almost 

anywhere in the world.”42 With reports that al-Qaeda might be planning more attacks, the three U.S. Embassies 

in Kampala, Uganda, Kigali, Rwanda, and Tirana, Albania, were closed temporarily. DS sent additional agents 

to several posts, including Kampala, Tirana, Asmara, Kosovo, and Kuala Lumpur. DS officers increased embassy 

security at the Department of State’s most vulnerable posts, installing more video cameras and new alarms systems. 

The Bureau instructed low-threat posts to implement the vehicle inspection and personal identification procedures 

that had been followed at high and critical threat posts for some time. DS asked its RSOs around the world to 

submit daily reports on their “security posture,” and to develop long-term and short-term requests for security 

upgrades for their posts. DS officials also created the Emergency Coordination Group, which served as the “focal 

point for all security action issues.”43 

DS assembled seven Embassy Security Assessment Teams (ESATs) to evaluate and make recommendations 

for improvements in the security posture of its embassies. Each team was led by a DS agent and composed of 

one officer each from FBO and several foreign affairs agencies. The teams traveled to 27 embassies around the 

world between August 20 and September 8, 1998. A seventh ESAT traveled to the East Asia and Pacific region 

on September 30. At the recommendation of the ESATs, the U.S. Embassy in Doha (Qatar) was relocated 

to a more secure location in the city. Meanwhile, operations of the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 

were transferred to Almaty, Kazakhstan. In summarizing the ESATs’ findings to Under Secretary Cohen, DS 

officials confessed that most of the 27 embassies required replacement facilities and that there were limits to 

what the United States could do to improve existing 

facilities.44 

DS created the Surveillance Detection Program 

when 217 of 260 U.S. posts (about 85 percent) 

were unable to meet the 100-foot setback. The 

Surveillance Detection Program was a departure 

for DS because its basic focus was to look outward 

from the post. Previously DS and its predecessor SY 

had concentrated on upgrading security within the 

post’s perimeter. The program hired and trained 

local nationals to detect suspected terrorist or 

surveillance activities, as well as suspicious activities 

of individuals or vehicles. The program was part of a 

larger effort to upgrade embassy security, particularly 

perimeter security and local guard details. As Bergin 

later remarked, DS began “looking beyond the 

Figure 29: Indonesian local guard officers stand guard at 

the U.S. Embassy compound in Jakarta. As a key part of 

the Surveillance Detection Program that arose after the 

East Africa bombings, local guard details were upgraded. 

Security personnel at U.S. embassies began looking outward 

to watch those conducting surveillance of the embassy and 

engaging in other suspicious activities. Source: © Associated 

Press. 
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

perimeter” and “watch[ing] the people who were watching us.” Under the direction of an embassy’s RSO, local 

guard personnel patrolled the area around the embassy in cars, food stands, and even apartments overlooking the 

embassy. Bergin informed all diplomatic and consular posts that the terrorists’ “preliminary target assessment and 

information gathering on [embassy] vulnerabilities” was “the weakest link” of their attack plan. Target assessment 

and information gathering, i.e. surveillance of the embassy, was often “poorly done” and occurred over a period of 

time, thus allowing possible detection.45 

For its intensified effort, DS received the necessary money from Congress and support from senior 

Clinton Administration officials. Supplemental funding from Congress not only funded the Surveillance 

Detection Program and security upgrades at U.S. embassies, it also enabled DS to hire 200 new Special Agents 

(130 of whom were hired before 1998 ended), 34 new technical security specialists, and 20 new couriers. The 

hires expanded DS by one-third, and the Bureau numbered more than 1,000. It also increased DS’s presence 

at overseas posts from 270 people to more than 400.46 By December 1998, Secretary Albright had promised 

that all posts would receive funding for a Surveillance Detection Program. The Department reinvigorated 

the long understaffed Mobile Training Teams and advised all Chiefs of Mission to “personally participate” in 

as many training sessions as possible. In his 1999 State of the Union message, President Clinton declared 

diplomatic security a national priority, and asked the nation to give U.S. diplomats the “support, the safest 

possible workplaces, and the resources they need so that America can lead.” 47 

z A Blueprint for DS å

After the East Africa bombings, DS shifted to a proactive approach. Partially symbolized by the creation 

of the Surveillance Detection Program, DS’s new approach led it to more aggressively pursue several initiatives. 

DS began working more closely with other agencies to share information and coordinate responses to terrorist 

threats overseas, particularly the NSC’s Counter-terrorism Security Group (CSG) chaired by Richard Clarke. 

Assistant Secretary Carpenter chaired an ad hoc group of the CSG to study how to implement additional security 

countermeasures for U.S. posts abroad.48 DS organized and dispatched five Security Augmentation Teams (of 

5 persons each) to embassies in the Middle East and Africa. Their objective was to evaluate posts for physical 

security vulnerabilities, lack of host government support/capabilities, and possible Osama bin Laden targets. DS 

also formed a task force to examine chemical and biological warfare threats to overseas posts, and then adjusted 

emergency action plans and provided CBW equipment and training for U.S. personnel. DS also held a town hall 

meeting with more than 500 Department of State employees to discuss security concerns.49 

No single effort represented DS’s new proactive approach better than the Carpenter and Bergin “blueprint” 

for DS. Just as David Fields and Robert Lamb had put forward SY’s Acceleration proposal and did not wait 

for the Inman Panel, Carpenter and Bergin did not wait for the Crowe Commission to recommend changes. 

Instead, they detailed specific proposals to implement and enforce security measures in Department facilities 
356

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

at home and abroad. Their proposals were more 

extensive than those that the Crowe Commission 

would recommend.50 

In their memorandum, Carpenter and Bergin 

pressed for several structural changes for DS and its 

people. First, given the priority of security, they asked 

that the RSO report directly to the Chief of Mission 

or the Deputy Chief of Mission, instead of the 

Administrative Officer as was then currently done. 

Second, they requested permission to create Regional 

Directors of Security who would supervise, review, 

inspect, and consult with RSOs in a designated 

region. The Regional Director of Security would 

also serve as a liaison with the particular geographic 

bureau. Third, Carpenter and Bergin asked to have 

the management of and resource support for RSO 

and ARSO positions transferred from the geographic 

bureaus to DS, just as had occurred earlier with the 

SEOs. Without control over DS personnel and 

monies, Carpenter argued, he had “no flexibility...

to meet an evolving emergency or crisis.” Carpenter 

and Bergin also asked that a formal career path be 

established for DS personnel, and that DS create 

separate promotion panels for its agents and SEOs, 

with DS personnel chairing and comprising a majority on the panels. Finally, Carpenter and Bergin requested 

that the “time-in-class” requirement be adjusted so that senior DS officers would be able to train and mentor the 

new recruits without being selected out of the Foreign Service (many DS agents were facing this in 1999).51 

On March 9, 1999, in a meeting requested by Albright, Carpenter and Bergin presented their “Blueprint for 

DS.” Describing DS as a 1980s car, Carpenter and Bergin asked the Secretary, “How many of us are still driving 

a 1984 automobile?” They recommended that DS be rebuilt in the likeness of the Secret Service. They requested 

each of the items listed above and added two others. They asked that the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic 

Security report directly to the Secretary regarding security matters, and that DS be allowed to hire an additional 

500 agents over the next three years. Albright was sympathetic, and recommended that they consult with Under 

Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas R. Pickering, Director General of the Foreign Service Edward 

Figure 30: Peter Bergin, Director of the Diplomatic 

Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for Diplomatic Security, 1998-2003. Bergin 

helped to develop and institute the Surveillance Detection 

Program. He and Assistant Secretary Carpenter proposed a 

“blueprint” for DS that restructured the Bureau, expanding 

it and making it more responsive to the threats of the postCold War world. Source: Department of State. 
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

W. “Skip” Gnehm, Counselor Wendy Sherman, and 

Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs 

Barbara Larkin.52

Although some resistance arose—in fact, one 

senior officer warned Bergin to “marshal his allies”—

Carpenter and Bergin obtained nearly everything they 

requested. In consultations with Pickering, Gnehm, 

Sherman, and Larkin, they found no opposition to 

the career path, promotion panel, and time-in-service 

proposals. The creation of Regional Director of 

Security and the changing of the chain of command 

so that the RSO reported to the DCM or Chief of 

Mission were also approved, although resistance stalled 

the latter proposal for several months. DS obtained six 

of the seven positions requested for Regional Director 

of Security, and an authorization for 300 additional 

agents (they had requested 500). The proposals for the 

Assistant Secretary to report directly to the Secretary 

and for moving the RSO and ARSO positions into 

DS were opposed outright; in fact, three of the four 

officers consulted expressed concern that this would 

be creating “an autonomous DS.”53 

Despite not achieving the last two elements, DS emerged a much stronger, much larger organization. The 

Department established 37 new RSO positions and 106 new ARSO positions, raising the number of overseas 

posts served by either from 172 to 254. The Department announced that it would undertake a “comprehensive 

curriculum review” of the RSO training, and it pledged to establish 37 new Marine Security Guard detachments, 

increasing the number of posts having such details to 159.54

z The Crowe Commission å

When the Crowe Commission issued its report, it harshly criticized DS, the Department of State, and 

Congress for not meeting the standards set by the Inman Panel. Admiral Crowe attributed the severity of the 

attacks to “a collective failure by several administrations and Congresses over the past decade to invest adequate 

efforts and resources to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions.”55 Commission also criticized DS 

for not requiring full application of security standards at all U.S. posts. It found that DS had granted exceptions 

Figure 31: A DS Regional Security Officer (wearing ball 

cap) speaks with a young man who scaled a fence at the U.S. 

Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, in November 1994. The 

youth was seeking U.S. support for independence for East 

Timor. Source: Agence France-Presse. 
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History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

to both East African embassies on such mandated 

security standards as the 100-foot perimeter 

requirement, because both facilities were categorized 

as medium risk posts and built before 1986. What 

was perhaps less noticed was that DS had completed 

many security improvements at high-risk posts, such 

as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Moreover, 

following a risk management strategy, DS officials 

expected an attack on a U.S. post in the Persian Gulf 

and the Middle East, but not on the continent of 

Africa, where no terrorist attacks had occurred, and 

where DS considered crime to be the greater threat.56

The Crowe Commission offered several 

conclusions regarding the course of action Congress 

and the Clinton Administration should take to improve 

security at U.S. diplomatic posts overseas. It advised the 

Department and the Federal Government as a whole 

to “give sustained priority and funding to security 

improvements.” The Commission recommended that 

the Department should fully examine all posts, make 

note of needed improvements, and, if necessary, close 

those posts that were highly vulnerable and difficult 

to convert to new standards. The Commission 

encouraged the Secretary of State to create an Overseas 

Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) to oversee this work, 

and to evaluate “our overseas presence in the context 

of our national priorities, our resource constraints, and 

our worldwide security concerns.” Albright created the panel, and Admiral Crowe served on it with several former 

ambassadors, members of Congress, and heads of nonprofit organizations and private corporations.57

DS largely concurred with the Crowe Commission’s report; however, the Crowe Commission’s criticism, as 

well as its proposal for a capital building program for the Department of State, signified Washington’s re-recognition 

of the threat of terrorism. In some ways, the Crowe Commission in its criticism seemed to overlook international 

developments (end of the Cold War) and domestic political dynamics (“peace dividend”) of the previous decade. 

While many lawmakers and commentators spoke of the new post-Cold War order, many DS agents and engineers 

Figure 32: Admiral (Ret.) William J. Crowe, head of the 

Crowe Commission created by President Bill Clinton. The 

Crowe Commission examined overseas security in the wake 

of the East Africa bombings. Crowe was critical of the 

Department and Congress for not following through with 

the Inman Panel recommendations. As a result, Congress 

approved a program of more than $1.4 billion to improve 

embassy security overseas. Source: © Associated Press. 
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

did not conflate the threats of Cold War, espionage, 

and terrorism. Enduring shrinking resources, in 

part due to the “peace dividend” and Congressional 

budget cuts, DS had analyzed all U.S. posts across 

the world and focused its energies and resources 

accordingly. Now, after a series of terrorist attacks 

that included al-Khobar Towers, the U.S.S. Cole, and 

the East Africa bombings, Washington’s attention 

focused upon terrorism. 

The Crowe Commission’s proposal for a 

capital building program for the Department of 

State reflected Washington’s new appreciation of the 

terrorist threat. The Commission estimated that the 

sustained building program for new U.S. embassies 

would require $1 billion per year for 10 years, and an additional $400 million per year for security upgrades and 

new security personnel. The Clinton Administration had already asked for $3 billion over 5 years to rebuild 

embassies overseas, but budget caps prevented the Department from asking for more. Secretary Albright also 

tried to convince a hostile Congress to lock in a commitment for the five-year building program. Admiral Crowe 

now criticized Congress and the Department of State. 

He said that the Department was being “intimidated 

by Congress,” and he warned Congress not to appear 

as if it was “putting money in front of lives on the 

priority list.”58 By the summer of 1999, the Clinton 

Administration increased its request for FY 2000 by 

another $264 million, and by $150 million a year for 

the following 4 years. In an attempt to demonstrate 

the national commitment to security that the Crowe 

Commission had called for, Congress approved $1.4 

billion for embassy security in 2000, more than what 

the Clinton Administration had requested.59 

The Crowe Commission also faulted DS’s 

Division of Intelligence and Threat Analysis (formerly 

called the Threat Analysis Group)for its method of 

compiling the Crime-Threat List (CTL). The CTL 

Figure 33: Seven DS Special Agents are shown at Andrews 

Air Force Base in March 1997, forming the protective 

detail for visiting Palestinian Authority President Yasser 

Arafat (third from left). Source: Private collection. 

Figure 34: A Marine Security Guard at “Post One” at U.S. 

Embassy Madrid. The 1998 East Africa bombings marked 

a shift in Department attitudes towards security. Not 

only did Department personnel expect adequate security 

and protection (and demand the resources for it), several 

changes also occurred. Hereafter, an embassy’s Regional 

Security Officer (a DS Agent) would report directly to the 

Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission, to brief them 

on security at the mission. Source: U.S. Embassy Madrid. 
360

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

rated the threat each post faced with regards to the categories of crime and terrorism. The categories were rated 

on a scale of Critical, High, Moderate, and Low. While the Defense Intelligence Agency compiled a similar list 

by country, DS was the only agency examining each post, recognizing that in large countries like Germany, Brazil, 

and India, one area of a country might have a different threat dynamic than another area. Critical of why DS 

had not put Tanzania and Kenya higher on the list, the Crowe Commission believed the CTL was not properly 

compiled, and demanded changes. In response, DS Threat Analyst Pluchinsky divided the “Terrorism” category 

into three separate categories: “Indigenous Terrorism,” “Transnational Terrorism,” and “Political Violence.” He 

also changed the name of the list to SETL (Security Environment Threat List). To the present day, the Department 

of State, NSC, and other agencies continue to rely on SETL for determining the threats faced by a post.60

The Crowe Commission further suggested that the Department of State should consider closing small 

posts. U.S. diplomatic representation to small nation would not be eliminated, but merely carried out from new, 

regional embassies located in less threatened and vulnerable countries. Ambassadors serving at the consolidated 

posts would be “accredited to several governments.” Called the Special Embassy Program, this had been proposed 

when the New Independent States emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but was recast in the wake of 

the East Africa Bombings. The idea represented an effort to regionalize certain functions and re-conceptualize the 

embassy. Some hoped that new technology and a division of labor between posts within the same region could 

improve the efficiency of the U.S. embassy system. Proponents of the Special Embassy Program argued that it 

would reduce costs while increasing security by reducing “field presence and thus the exposure of employees.” 

Although the program was not implemented, the Department of State believed that too many U.S. Government 

representatives served abroad, and suggested that there be an interagency effort to achieve a “leaner, more agile” 

overseas work force.61 

Perhaps the most dramatic change precipitated by the East Africa bombings was a marked shift in attitude 

towards security within the Department of State. As one FSO told The New York Times, “Once you treated the 

threat of terrorism as the price of being a diplomat; you didn’t demand resources for embassy security. Now 

you do.”62 With the emergence of transnational terrorism, the Foreign Service became even more conscientious 

about diplomatic security. Secretary Albright took “a personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility of 

ensuring the security of U.S. diplomatic personnel abroad.” Albright met with her Assistant Secretary Carpenter 

every morning when she was not traveling, and Carpenter and Albright regularly reviewed intelligence pertaining 

to potential future attacks and other security related information.63

This support proved crucial, for DS had asked Secretary Albright to elevate the RSO, so that he/she 

would report to the Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) at the post. Up through the East Africa 

bombings, if the RSO wanted to talk to the Ambassador or DCM, he went through the Administrative Officer. 

Bergin believed this imposed an artificial constraint, and hence, he and Carpenter had asked Albright for a change 

in post organization. She approved it. Under Secretary Pickering did not like it, and it took a number of months 
361

CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

to craft a cable implementing it. The initial draft telegram said the RSO “should report” to the ambassador. 

Bergin objected to the phrasing, asserting that use of the word “should” made the change discretionary and did 

not serve the ambassador or the United States well. In 2000, the draft wording was changed to read that the RSO 

“will report” to the Ambassador. The ALDAC telegram was sent, and as a result, the RSO reports directly to 

the Ambassador, like the post’s Political or Economic Officer. With this change, Carpenter and Bergin achieved 

nearly every item they requested under the blueprint they presented to Secretary Albright.64 

z Security Breaches at Home å

In the late 1990s, the Department of State suffered several security breaches within Main State. The 

first occurred in February 1998, before the East Africa bombings, when an unknown man removed classified 

documents from a secure office suite that served 

Secretary Albright. DS instituted an escort policy 

for all visitors at Main State. In December 1999, 

the investigation of suspected surveillance of the 

Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental 

Affairs’ conference room culminated with the arrest 

of Russian intelligence officer Stanislav Gusev outside 

the building. Gusev had monitored conversations on 

the Department’s Seventh Floor conference room via 

a bug implanted in the arm of a chair. Unable to 

prosecute Gusev due to his diplomatic immunity, the 

United States declared him persona non grata. One 

month later, a laptop containing highly classified 

work disappeared from the offices of the Bureau of 

Intelligence and Research (INR).65 

Assistant Secretary Carpenter admitted that the 

security breaches resulted not from an absence of policy, 

but from non-compliance and a lax attitude toward 

security among Department personnel. For example, 

a review of the INR laptop incident revealed that staff 

had allowed contractors without appropriate clearances 

to enter restricted workspaces, and had propped open 

doors to secure areas. DS tightened its oversight of 

security, established further access restrictions to the 

Figure 35: Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Few 

Secretaries were more supportive of the Diplomatic Security 

Bureau. Secretary Albright approved Assistant Secretary 

Carpenter’s and Director Bergin’s “blueprint” to restructure 

and revamp DS. During a Department-wide town hall 

meeting, she declared, “I don’t care how skilled you may be as 

a diplomat, how brilliant you are at meetings, or how creative 

you are as an administrator, if you are not professional about 

security, you are a failure.” Source: Department of State.
362

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Secretary’s suite, instituted a more rigorous escort policy, strengthened computer safeguards, and set up more security 

patrols and sweeps within Main State. Carpenter also convened an interagency review panel, comprising senior 

representatives from the FBI, DOD, Secret Service, CIA, and DS to review existing countermeasures.66 

Following the security breaches, Secretary Albright initiated measures to emphasize the necessity of following 

security procedures. On May 3, in response to the lost INR laptop, Albright held a Department-wide town 

meeting dedicated exclusively to security. She stressed to all employees the importance of security: “I don’t 

care how skilled you may be as a diplomat, how brilliant you are at meetings, or how creative you are as an 

administrator, if you are not professional about security, you are a failure.”67 Albright also ordered a full-scale 

investigation into the laptop incident. This led to the discipline of a number of Department personnel, including 

the dismissal of Allen Locke, a member of the senior executive service, the suspension of INR’s Donald Keyser, 

and the resignation of Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.68 

During hearings on the security breaches, Congress questioned Carpenter on the Department of State’s 

escort policy. Carpenter had implemented a stringent escort policy for most visitors shortly after he assumed 

leadership of DS in November 1998; however, many geographic bureaus complained that the policy restricted 

their work, forcing Carpenter to withdraw the new escort rules. Carpenter re-implemented new escort regulations 

in August 1999, requiring escorts for all visitors and restricting unescorted members of the press to the first two 

floors of the Truman building. Congressmen questioned the effectiveness of the new policy, particularly what they 

referred to as the “gentleman’s agreement” with the press. Carpenter assured Congress that he was exploring new 

approaches to securing restricted areas, such as hiring 

permanent escorts or establishing an entirely separate 

facility for press events.69 

z Technology and Y2K å

During the 1990s, computer security constituted 

a growing concern for DS. DS security engineers 

admitted that the Department’s Wang computer 

system installed in the 1980s provided computer 

security, primarily because it was a “cocoon” system, 

without connections to outside or civilian networks. 

With the rise of the Internet, Department officers and 

employees increasingly pressured DS to permit access 

to the Internet. Although the Department did have 

File Transfer (FTP) capability before the 1990s, the 

earliest Internet connection appeared in the computer 

Figure 36: The Watch Floor of the DS Office of Computer 

Security’s Network Monitoring Center in Beltsville, 

Maryland, in 2000. Established in 1999 during concerns 

about Y2K, the Center now operates around the clock with 

state-of-the-art cyber security technology to detect and 

respond to threats to the Department of State’s information 

networks. Source: Department of State. 
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

room in 1991. Such connections did not expand to 

major departmental offices until 1993 and 1994. In 

1995, the Department possessed three connections for 

its posts: one to Seoul for Asia and two to Ankara for 

Europe, Middle East, and Africa. In 1998, the Internet 

tunnel was constructed to Scandinavia, and during the 

same year, the Department introduced IP (internet 

protocol) communications system to its posts. The 

NASH handled the encryption of the circuits.70 

With the rapidly developing Internet connections, 

by the mid-1990s, email emerged as a significant 

problem. The Department had three email systems 

operating: MS Mail, Wang Office, and CC Mail. By 

the late 1990s, Department officials recognized that 

they needed to develop tools to manage email. With 

the looming Y2K (Year 2000) computer conversion 

concerns, IRMA took the lead to consolidate everything 

onto Microsoft software and completed the conversion in 1999. Despite email, the number of cables between the 

Department and its posts continued to increase, with instructions, formal statements, and others messages sent.71 

Telephone communications experienced innovations as well. Secure Telephone Unit (STU) III appeared 

in the early 1990s, and arrived as a telephone-size package. The package contained a key and a sealed telephone, 

and one had to insert the key into the telephone for it to work properly. Although transmission of one’s voice 

was encoded, users still had to consider whether the space in which they talked was bugged. The security of the 

STU-III mattered little if the conversation occurred in a “bugged” room. Even so, one DS technical engineer 

recalled that the STU-III became “status symbols” within the Department, suggesting that one had “important” 

information to relay to Washington or overseas.72 

The looming threat of Y2K computer conversion problems greatly improved the security posture for 

Department of State communications. Computer experts and public officials around the world worried that 

the change of date would cause problems for a myriad of computer and electronic equipment. No one was sure 

whether computers, automatic teller machines, power stations, and anything else that relied on computers would 

continue to function when the computer read “2000” for the year. As a result, much of the old equipment was 

replaced; however, the worry was that other countries, particularly allies, might go down as a result of the Y2K 

phenomenon. DS headed the contingency planning for Y2K, and it was a pleasant surprise when Y2K did not 

prove the problem that many feared.73 

Figure 37: DS Special Agents (left and extreme rear, 

center) serve on the protective detail for Secretary of 

State Madeleine Albright (left foreground) during her 

meeting with North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong Il 

(right foreground) in Pyongyang, on October 23, 2000. 

Source: Associated Press.
364

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

z Conclusion å

By 2000, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

had emerged as one of the Department’s preeminent 

offices working on the frontlines of diplomacy. 

Struggling since its creation in 1985, especially during 

post-Cold War efforts to streamline it and transfer 

responsibilities to other agencies, DS witnessed an 

expansion of its responsibilities as the Department’s 

demands for security grew during the 1990s. 

Continued espionage and terrorism, in addition to 

rapidly expanding and evolving computer technology 

placed greater demands upon DS. New security 

responsibilities for protecting the U.S. Olympic 

team, the President of Haiti, and U.S. personnel in 

the regional crises of Liberia and Burundi increased 

demands on DS. Under the leadership of Assistant 

Secretary Eric Boswell and Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Greg Bujac, DS underwent a revival that sought to 

match its financial and personnel resources with the 

responsibilities it was accumulating. 

With the 1998 East Africa bombings, DS experienced a fundamental shift: it moved from a responsive 

entity to a proactive office. Before the Crowe Commission completed its work, Assistant Secretary David Carpenter 

and Deputy Assistant Secretary Peter Bergin offered the blueprint for DS that reconstructed the bureau into one 

of the leading operational bureaus of the Department. DS gained greater funding and increased its personnel to 

meet the terrorist and technological threats confronting U.S. posts overseas. Now, DS’s Assistant Secretary briefed 

the Secretary on a constant basis, and at posts, the RSO reported directly to the Ambassador, just as the Political 

and Economic Officers did. 

By 2000, DS had grown into one of the largest bureaus in the Department, and one of the most critical 

for the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. Security tasks and responsibilities increased at U.S. posts overseas, and 

expanded to computer-based security threats that could compromise the operation, communication, and files of 

the Department. DS also expanded its liaisons and cooperation with overseas police forces, its training of local 

law enforcement, and its assistance in developing protective details for foreign leaders. Although DS agents and 

engineers had always recognized the value of their work, the 1990s found the Department as a whole even more 

appreciative of the DS role as a critical element in U.S. diplomatic operations. 

Figure 38: In March 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine 

Albright (center but unseen) is targeted by eggs thrown 

by anti-American protestors during her visit to the Czech 

Republic. As it is trained to do, her DS Special Agent 

protective detail leaps into action to provide cover for the 

Secretary. Secretary Albright emerged unscathed from the 

assault. Source: Radek Mica / MF Dnes/Profimedia.
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

Endnotes

1 For the “end of history” idea, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 

Oral History Interview, Dennis Pluchinsky, 22 December 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 1. Oral History Interview, 

Bruce Matthews, 17 February 2006, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 6. 

2 Telegram “DS Reorganization Activities,” Anthony C. E. Quainton, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 

to all DS personnel, RSOs, SEOs and Couriers, 23 December 1992; and DS Reorganization segment in Report 

“Consolidating the Department’s Terrorism-Related Functions,” DS to Bureau of Management, 12 December 1992; 

both Folder – AMGA (Reorganization), Box 17428, RAG 59-Lot 94D406, Suitland. 

3 Department of State, “Reinventing Government”: Change at State, September 1993 (Washington DC: Department of State, 

1993), iii, 3-5, 65-78. Memorandum “DS as a Laboratory for Reinventing Government,” Quainton to Robert Pearson, 

National Performance Review Office (M/NPR), 14 May 1993, Folder – AMGA - General 1993 (April - June), Box 2, 

RAG 59-Lot 98D121, Suitland. 

4 Study “Domestic Criminal Investigative Function in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security,” Jack Covey (G. Russell and R. 

T. Spencer), 23 April 1993, attached to Memorandum “Domestic Criminal Investigative Function,” Quainton to J. Brian 

Atwood, Under Secretary of State for Management, 4 May 1993, copy in possession of PA/HO. 

5 Transcript of Oral History Interview, Quainton, 6 November 1997, ADST Frontline Diplomacy collection. Oral History 

Interview, Quainton, 3 August 2005, conducted by Paul Claussen and Amy Garrett, HO Files. Oral History Interview, 

Bergin #1, 15 November 2005, p. 4. 

6 Briefing Paper, DS, attached to Memorandum “Transition Arrangements,” Quainton to All Deputy Assistant Secretaries 

and Office Directors, 9 November 1992, Box 17428; and Memorandum “Retention of Prince Bandar’s Protective Detail,” 

Edward P. Djerejian (NEA), to Quainton, 28 December 1992, Folder – ASEC-Protective Security, Box 17430; both RAG 

59-Lot 94D406, Suitland. 

7 Oral History Interview, Bruce Matthews, 17 February 2006, p. 6. Oral History Interview, Greg Bujac #2, 26 October 

2005, p. 3. Informal Summary of Closed Session during Secretary Baker’s Appearance before the CJS Subcommittee, 

7 March 1990. Briefing for Ambassador Robert Strauss, U.S. Embassy Moscow, 29 August 1991. Oral History Interview, 

Bruce Matthews, p. 6. Oral History Interview, Greg Bujac, 26 October 2005, p. 3. 

8 Oral History Interview, Bruce Matthews, 17 February 2006, p. 5-6.

9 Oral History Interview, John Kaufman, 3 May 2005, conducted by Jennifer Walele and Mark Hove, p. 1. 

10 Oral History Interview, John Kaufman, 3 May 2005, p. 1-2. 

11 Oral History Interview, John Kaufman, 5 May 2005, pp. 2-3. 

12 Pierre Thomas, “Alleged Mastermind of the World Trade Center Bombing is Caught,” Washington Post, 9 February 1995, 

p. A12. David Johnston, “Fugitive in Trade Center Blast is Caught and Returned to U.S.,” New York Times, 9 February 

1995, p. A1. Richard Bernstein, “Behind Arrest of Bomb Fugitive, Informer’s Tip, Then Fast Action,” New York Times, 10 

February 1995, p. A1. See also Samuel M. Katz, Relentless Pursuit: The DSS and the Manhunt for the Al-Qaeda Terrorists, 

(New York: Tom Doherty Associates, 2002). 

13 Douglas Jehl, “Reward Conflict Ended,” New York Times, July 24, 1993, p. 1. 

14 Douglas Jehl, “Reward is Stymied in Towers Bombing,” New York Times, July 23, 1993, p. A1. 

15 Thomas, “Alleged Mastermind of the World Trade Center Bombing is Caught,” Washington Post, 9 February 1995, 

p. A12. Johnston, “Fugitive in Trade Center Blast is Caught and Returned to U.S.,” New York Times, 9 February 1995, 
366

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

p. A1. Bernstein, “Behind Arrest of Bomb Fugitive, Informer’s Tip, Then Fast Action,” New York Times, 10 February 

1995, p. A1. See also Katz, Relentless Pursuit. 

16 Telegram “Presidential Security, “ Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, to William Lacey 

Swing, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, 28 June 1996, Folder – 1996 Chron June, Box 7, RAG 59 - Lot 98D131, Suitland. 

“Background Note: Rwanda,” Department of State, 6 March 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm#history. 

“Background Note: Burundi,” Department of State, 6 March 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2821.htm#history. 

Telegram 2562 “Emergency Action Committee Bujumbura Unanimously Recommends End to Ordered Departure,” 

Robert C. Krueger, U.S. Ambassador to Burundi, to Moose, Quainton, AF/C, and AF/EX, 1 August 1994, attached 

to Action Memorandum “Request for Approval for Extension of ordered Departure from Bujumbura,” Edward Brynn, 

Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, to Moose, 4 August 1994, Folder – (AF) Africa 1994 (July- December), Box 

5, RAG 59 - Lot 98D131, Suitland. 

17 Report “Ambush of Burundi Government Convoy involving U.S. Ambassador Krueger,” A. Hickson, Office of Intelligence 

and Threat Analysis, DS, 7 July 1995; and Report “Burundi Threat Assessment: Ambassador Robert Krueger,” Hickson, 8 

August 1995, enclosed with Memorandum “Safety of Ambassador Krueger,” Quainton to Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary 

of State for Political Affairs, 8 August 1994; both Folder – (AF) Africa 1995 (July-December), Box 4, RAG 59 - Lot 

98D129, Suitland. Memorandum “Presentation of Valor Awards,” Boswell to Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, 

13 February 1996, Folder – 1996 Chron February, Box 7, RAG 59 - Lot 98D131, Suitland. 

18 Telegram 2867 “Burundian President Moves in with Ambassador,” Morris N. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Burundi, 

to Secretary of State, 24 July 1996, attached to Memorandum “Bujumbura,” Boswell to Moose, 24 July 1996, Folder – 

(AF) Africa 1996 (July-December), Box 3, RAG 59 - Lot 01D129, Suitland. Information Memorandum “DS Weekly 

Highlights,” Boswell to Moose, 21 August 1996; Information Memorandum “DS Weekly Highlights,” Boswell to Patrick 

F. Kennedy, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, 10 October 1996; Information Memorandum “DS Weekly 

Highlights,” Boswell to Kennedy, 17 October 1996; and Information Memorandum “DS Weekly Highlights,” Boswell 

to Kennedy, 18 December 1996; all Folder – AMGA Weekly Activities 1996, Box 1, RAG 59 - Lot 01D129, Suitland.

19 For Frese, see “Daily Press Briefing, Friday, April 12, 1996,” Department of State, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/ briefing/

daily_briefing/1996/9604/960412db.html. David Bates, “Security First,” State Magazine, July/August 2007, pp. 43, 45. 

“Officer of the Month October 1998: Special Agent John J. Frese,” National Law Enforcement Memorial Fund, http://

www.nleomf.org/TheFund/programs/OOM/frese_dec98.htm. For Diebler, Folensbee, and Diebler’s efforts, see “Escape 

from Liberia,” Heroes under Fire, The History Channel, 2005. 

20 Oral History Interview, John Rendeiro, 20 December 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 5. Karen DeYoung, “State 

Department Struggles to Oversee Private Army,” Washington Post, 21 October 2007, p. A-1, A-10. 

21 Oral History Interview, Greg Bujac, 26 October 2005, p. 4. Email, Robert Downen (DS/PA) to Mark Hove (PA/HO), 

28 April 2009. 

22 Memorandum “Upgrading Security at Federal Facilities,” President William J. Clinton to Executive Departments and 

Agencies, 28 June 1995, Folder – ASEC – Physical Security 1995, Box 3, 98D129, Suitland. Statement before the House 

Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, Boswell, 12 March 1997, http://www.state.gov/ www/

global/terrorism/970312.html, p. 9. Memorandum “President’s Initiative to Combat Terrorism,” Quainton to Moose, 

2 May 1995, Folder – ASEC Terrorism/Threat 1995 (January-June), Box 3, RAG 59 - Lot 98D129, Suitland. 

23 Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #1, 15 November 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 3. Report “Bureau Program 

Plan, FY 1998-1999,” D. J. Pappas, DS/PPB/PPD, 19 August 1997, attached to Memorandum “Clearance Request: 

Bureau Program Plan,” Robert T. Spencer, DS/EX, to Boswell, 21 August 1997, Folder – AMGA – General 1997, Box 7, 

RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. Action Memorandum “FY-97 Personnel Resources Authorization,” Boswell to Kennedy, 

15 January 1997, Folder – Chron January 1997, Box 5, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland.
367

CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

24 Information Memorandum “DS Weekly Highlights,” William D. Clarke, Acting, to Moose, 14 March 1996, Folder 

– 1996 Chron March, Box 7, RAG 59-Lot 98D131, Suitland. Report “Bureau Program Plan, FY 1998-1999,” D. J. 

Pappas, DS/PPB/PPD, 19 August 1997, attached to Memorandum “Clearance Request: Bureau Program Plan,” Robert T. 

Spencer, DS/EX, to Boswell, 21 August 1997, Folder – AMGA – General 1997, Box 7, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. 

Action Memorandum “FY-97 Personnel Resources Authorization,” Boswell to Kennedy, Acting Under Secretary of State 

for Management, 15 January 1997, Folder – Chron January 1997, Box 5, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. 

25 “Antiterrorism Task Force Report,” Department of Defense, n.d. [late April-early May 1996], p. 8, enclosed with Memorandum 

“Final Report – Antiterrorism Task Force,” John M Shalikashvili, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary of Defense, 

6 May 1996, attached to Memorandum, Richard L. Greene, Director of Finance and Management Policy, to Boswell and 

Kennedy, 10 July 1996, Folder – (NEA) Near East and South Asia 1996, Box 4, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. 

26 Memorandum “Mandate for Action,” Boswell to Riyadh Security Team, 12 July 1996, Folder – (NEA) Near East and 

South Asia 1996 (July-December), Box 4, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. Memorandum “Mandate for Action,” Boswell 

to Kuwait/Bahrain Security Survey Team, 26 July 1996, Folder – 1996 Chron July, Box 7, RAG 59-Lot 98D131, Suitland. 

Memorandum “Mandate for Action,” Boswell to Qatar/United Arab Emirates/Oman Security Team, 26 July 1996, Folder 

– (NEA) Near East and South Asia 1996 (July-December), Box 4, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. 

27 Memorandum “DS Special Agent Intake Requirements,” Kennedy to Boswell, 15 January 1997, Folder – AMGA General 

1997, Box 7, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. Statement before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, 

Justice, and State, Boswell, 12 March 1997, p. 8. It appears that DS only received one half of the new positions it 

requested. See “Counterterrorism Readiness Report,” Bernard Dougherty, DS, 9 August 1996, Folder – Terrorism 

General 1996, Box 2, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. “FY 1997 Performance Report,” Boswell (Pappas), 12 August 

1997, Folder – AMGA General 1997, Box 7, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. 

28 “Report to the President on the Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad,” William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, to 

the President, 15 September 1996, Folder – (NEA) Near East and South Asia 1996 (July-December), Box 4, RAG 59-

Lot 01D129, Suitland, p. 1. Information Memorandum “Countering the Persian Gulf Terrorist Threat,” Boswell and 

Kenneth McKune, Acting, S/CT, to Albright, 6 February 1997. 

29 For an example of connecting the Riyadh and Dhahran bombing, see Report to the President on the Protection of U.S. 

Forces Deployed Abroad, “ Perry to the President, 15 September 1996, p. 5. Information Memorandum “Threat Warning 

– Middle East,” Boswell to Albright, 10 April 1997, Folder – Chron April 1997, Box 5, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. 

Memorandum “Countering the Persian Gulf Terrorist Threat,” Boswell and McKune to Albright, 6 February 1997. 

30 Information Memorandum “Summary of the Extraordinary Protection Reviews,” Boswell to Albright, 26 September 

1997; Action Memorandum “Request for Increase in DS Positions and Intake,” Boswell to Kennedy, 2 June 1997, Folder 

– Chron June 1997; and Information Memorandum “Looking Ahead,” Boswell to Albright, 23 December 1997, Folder 

– Chron December 1997; all Box 5, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. 

31 Action Memorandum “DS Global Plan for Security Engineering Officers,” Boswell to Moose, 22 May 1996, Folder – 

1996 Chron May, Box 7, RAG 59-Lot 98D131, Suitland. The attachments to this document offer the “detailed plan” 

as well as the geographic bureaus doubts about it. For Moose’s approval, see Action Memorandum “DS Global Plan for 

Security Engineering Officers,” 11 June 1996, Folder – ASEC General 1996, Box 2, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. 

32 Action Memorandum “DS Global Plan for Security Engineering Officers,” Boswell to Moose, 22 May 1996. Memorandum 

“Ankara Issues,” Leibengood, Murphy, and Couch, DS, [to Boswell?] n.d. [August 1997], Folder – EUR Region – AprilJune 1997, Box 9, RAG 59 - Lot 01D129. 

33 Memorandum “New Publication of Overseas Security Advisory Council and Attached Draft, Quainton to the Acting 

Secretary, 29 October 1992, Folder – ASEC (OSAC), Box 17430, RAG 59-Lot 94D406, Suitland. Oral History 

Interview, Greg Bujac, 4 October 2005, p. 5-6. 
368

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

34 “American Embassy Moscow–Brief History,” U.S. Embassy Moscow, http://moscow.usembassy.gov/links/links.

php?record_id=building_history, accessed 29 October 2007. Oral History Interview, Richard Gannon, 16 November 

2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 6. 

35 Oral History Interview, Richard Gannon, 16 November 2005, p. 6. 

36 Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #2, 15 December 2005, p. 5. 

37 Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #2, 15 December 2005, p. 4. Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #1, 15 November 

2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 4. 

38 Oral History Interview, Dennis Pluchinsky, 22 December 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 4. The 9/11 Commission 

Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W. W. Norton, 

2004), 66-67. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: The Free Press, 2004), 

133-154, 181. World Islamic Front Statement “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” 23 February 1998, http://www.fas.

org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm. 

39 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), 459-460, 466-468. The 9/11 

Commission Report, 70, 115-116. James C. McKinley, Jr., “Bombs Rip Apart 2 U.S. Embassies in Africa; Scores Killed; No 

Firm Motive or Suspects,” New York Times, 8 August 1998, p. A-1. Dean E. Murphy and Robin Wright, “Bombs Rock 2 

U.S. Embassies; Attacks in Kenya, Tanzania Kill 80, Hurt 1,700,” Los Angeles Times, 8 August 1998, p. 1. Karl Vick, “149 

Confirmed Dead in Embassy Blasts,” Washington Post, 9 August 1998, p. A-1. T. R. Reid, “Tanzania Embassy’s Security 

Low-Key; government Says Bomb Was Put on Truck,” Washington Post, 9 August 1998, p. A-24. Katherine Q. Seelye, 

“Clinton Tearfully Receives 10 Bodies, Praising Lives That ‘Nothing Can Erase’,” New York Times, 14 August 1998, p. A-10. 

40 Albright, Madam Secretary, 468-469. Clark, Against All Enemies, 184-189. The 9/11 Commission Report, 117. Overview 

of Government at Risk Series, Department of State, attached to Email “GAO Report-Govt at Risk,” James Wellman to 

Pat Donovan, 4 December 1998, Folder – ASEC-General, Box 12, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland.

41 Memorandum “Security Enhancements and Mission Reinstatement,” David G. Carpenter, Assistant Secretary of State 

for Diplomatic Security, to Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, 21 August 1998, Folder – (AF) Africa 1998 (JulyDecember), Box 14; Memorandum “Weekly Highlights,” Carpenter to Bonnie Cohen, Under Secretary of State for 

Management, 26 August 1998, Folder – Chron August 1998, Box 10; and Memorandum “U.S. Troops Deployment to 

Protect Embassy Nairobi,” Kristie A. Kenney, to Colonel Joseph Reynes (USAF), Executive Secretary, 15 September 1998, 

Folder – Chron September 1998, Box 10; all RAG 59-Lot 01D129. 

42 Memorandum “Talking Points, Security Brief – ESAT Program,” DS, n.d. [20-24 September 1998], Folder – (AF) Africa 

1998 (July-December), Box 14; and Memorandum “The Year Ahead,” Carpenter to Albright, 15 January 1999, Folder 

– January 1999 Chron, Box 1, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. Clarke, Against All Enemies, 181-185. DS Front Office 

documents corroborate Clarke’s writings. 

43 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 183-185. Memorandum “Security Enhancements and Mission Reinstatement,” Carpenter 

to Cohen, 21 August 1998. Telegram, Kennedy to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts (ALDAC), 9 August 1998, Folder 

– Chron August 1998, Box 10, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. Action Memorandum “Request for Authorization to 

Deploy an Alarm System in Certain Embassies with Video Monitoring Capabilities,” Carpenter to Strobe Talbott, Deputy 

Secretary of State, 19 August 1998, Folder – Chron August 1998, Box 10, RAG 59-Lot 01D129. Oral History Interview, 

Bruce Matthews, p. 6.

44 Steven Lee Meyers, “After the Attacks: The Overview,” New York Times, 22 August 1998, p. A-1. Clarke, Against All 

Enemies, 187-189. Memorandum “Talking Points, Security Brief – ESAT Program,” DS, n.d. [20-24 September 1998]. 

Zagreb, Croatia was “under consideration,” but it is not clear if it was relocated. Memorandum “ESAT Recommendations/

Status Report,” Carpenter to Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 7 October 1998, Folder – Chron 

October 1998, Box 10, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. 
369

CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

45 Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #1, 15 November 2005, p. 3-4. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 

Committee on International Relations, Foreign Relations Authorization for Fiscal Year 2000-2001: Security of United States 

Missions Abroad, Hearing before the Sub-Committee on International Operations and Human Rights, 12 March 1999 

(Washington: USGPO, 1999), 46. Telegram “Increased Physical Security Measures,” Kennedy to ALDAC, 9 August 

1998. Telegram 225284 “Surveillance Detection,” Albright (Bergin) to ALDAC (RSOs and PSOs), 5 December 1998, 

Folder – Chron December 1998, Box 10, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland.

46 Memorandum “Talking Points, Security Brief - ESAT Program,” DS, n.d. [20-24 September 1998]. Telegram “DS 

Highlights,” Carpenter to All RSOs, SEOs, and Couriers, 18 December 1998, Folder – Chron December 1998; and 

Memorandum “Your Appearance on ABC’s ‘This Week’, August 23, 1998, Washington DC,” Carpenter to Albright, 22 

August 1998, Folder – Chron August 1998; both Box 10, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. Memorandum “DS Position 

and Personnel Issues,” Carpenter to Cohen, 7 January 1999, Folder – January 1999 Chron, Box 1, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, 

Suitland. 

47 Telegram 225284, Albright (S. Baker, DS/PSP/FPD) to ALDAC, 4 December 1998, Folder – ASEC – Gen, Box 12, RAG 

59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. Telegram 051275, Albright (Bergin) to Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Lilongwe, March 1999, 

Folder – AF-Lilongwe Malawi, Box 4, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. See also Written Version of Secretary Albright’s 

Testimony Before House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State Department, 

1 March 1, 2000, Folder – AMGA - Cong. Testimony, Box 2, RAG 59-Lot 03D085, Suitland. President Clinton’s 

1999 State of the Union Message quoted in Draft Summary “Department of State’s response to the Crowe Commission 

Reports,” 1 April 1999, Folder – ASEC – ARB, Box 2, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland.

48 Memorandum “Weekly Highlights,” Bergin to Cohen, 3 December 1998, Folder – Chron December 1998, Box 10, 

RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. Memorandum “Weekly Highlights,” Carpenter to Cohen, 13 January 1999; and 

Memorandum “Embassy Security Countermeasures – UBL Threat,” Carpenter to Clarke, 8 January 1999; both Folder – 

January 1999 Chron, Box 1, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. 

49 Memorandum “Weekly Highlights,” Carpenter to Cohen, 13 January 1999. Memorandum “Weekly Highlights,” 

Wayne S. Rychak, Acting, to Cohen, 10 December 1998, Folder – Chron December 1998; and Memorandum “Weekly 

Highlights,” Carpenter to Cohen, 19 November 1998, Folder – Chron November 1998; both Box 10, RAG 59-Lot 

01D129, Suitland. 

50 Carpenter’s memorandum to Cohen is dated 7 January 1999, the day before the release of the Crowe Commission reports. 

However, a signed memorandum on Cohen’s desk on 7 January indicates that the memorandum was typed and proofed 

a couple of days before that date. It is likely that Carpenter, Bergin, and others were discussing or formalizing these ideas 

before 1 January. 

51 Memorandum “DS Position and Personnel Issues,” Carpenter to Cohen, 7 January 1999, Folder – January 1999 Chron, 

Box 1, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. 

52 Memorandum “DS: A Blueprint for the Future,” Carpenter to Cohen, 16 March 1999, Folder – March 1999 Chron, 

Box 1, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. Attached are two memoranda: The first is “A Blueprint for DS,” and the second 

is Carpenter’s 7 January memorandum to Cohen; however, minor adjustments were made to wording and it was re-dated 

9 March, the day Carpenter and Bergin met with Albright. For Albright’s suggestion to consult with the four senior State 

Department officers, see Memorandum “Status Report – Blueprint for DS’ Future,” Carpenter to Cohen, 9 April 1999, 

Folder – April 1999 Chron, Box 1, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. 

53 Oral History Interview, Bergin #1, pp. 3, 5. Memorandum “Status Report – Blueprint for DS’ Future,” Carpenter to 

Cohen, 9 April 1999. Memorandum “Status Report – Blueprint for DS’ Future,” Carpenter to Cohen, 29 June 1999, 

Folder – June 1999 Chron, Box 1; and Memorandum “State of DS Blueprint for the Future,” Carpenter and Edward W. 

Gnehm, Director General of the Foreign Service, to Cohen, 3 August 1999, Folder – August 1999 Chron; both Box 1, 

RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. The last shows Cohen marking all accepted proposals as “OK.” 
370

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

54 Report to Congress on Actions Taken By the Department of State in Response to the Program Recommendations of the 

Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, April 1999, Folder – ASEC - 

ARB, Box 2, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. 

55 Letter, Admiral William J. Crowe (Ret.), to Secretary of State Albright, 8 January 1999, Crowe Commission Files, DS 

Files, Rosslyn. 

56 Executive Overview of Crowe Commission Report, DS Files, Rosslyn. Memorandum “Countering the Persian Gulf 

Terrorist Threat,” McKune and Boswell to Albright, 5 February 1997, Folder – 1997 SEC S/C Files, Box 5, RAG 59-Lot 

01D129, Suitland. Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #2, 15 December 2005, p. 4. Oral History Interview, Dennis 

Pluchinsky, 22 December 2005, p. 3.

57 Crowe Commission Report, DS Files, Rosslyn. Report to Congress on Actions Taken by the Department of State in 

Response to the Program Recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi 

and Dar es Salaam, April 1999, Folder – ASEC - ARB, Box 2, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. 

58 Crowe Commission Report, DS Files, Rosslyn. David Johnston, “Administration to Seek $3 Billion to Protect Embassies 

Abroad,” New York Times, 25 January 1999, p. A9. James Risen, “Embassy Security Budget Is Far Less Than Panel Urged,” 

New York Times, 5 February 1999, p. A3. Shenon, “Spending To Avert Embassy Attacks Assailed as Timid,” New York 

Times, 19 February 1999, p. A1. 

59 James Risen, “U.S. To Seek $264 Million for Building of Overseas Embassies,” New York Times, 5 June 1999, p. A3. 

Shenon, “House Votes $1.4 Billion for Embassy Security; Senate May Balk,” New York Times, 22 July 1999, p. A5. 

60 Oral History Interview, Dennis Pluchinsky, 22 December 2005, p. 3. See also Telegram 94065 “Security Environment 

Profile Questionnaire,” Albright (L. E. Tibbetts – DS/DSS/ITA), 13 September 1999, Folder – ASEC Counterintelligence, 

Box 3, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. Report to Congress on Actions Taken By the Department of State in Response 

to the Program Recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar 

es Salaam, April 1999.

61 Albright, Pickering, Cohen, and Chairman of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) Lewis Kaden comments at 

Press Briefing on the OPAP Report, November 5, 1999, released by the Office of the Spokesman, http://www.fas.org/irp/

threat/991105.html accessed 12/1/2003. 

62 Shenon, “A Year After Bombings, A Case of Diplo-Jitters,” New York Times, July 18, 1999, p. WK-6. 

63 Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #1, 15 November 2005.

64 Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #1, 15 November 2005, p. 5. 

65 Statement of Carpenter, House Committee on International Relations, 11 May 2000, http://www.fas.org/irp/ 

congress/2000_hr/000511-carpenter.htm, accessed 1/26/2006. Transcript of Testimony of Carpenter at Hearing on 

Current Challenges to State Department Security, 11 May 2000, Folder – AMGA Congressional Testimony, Box 2, RAG 

59-Lot 03D085, Suitland. 

66 Statement of Carpenter, House International Relations Committee, 11 May 2000. Transcript of Testimony of Carpenter 

at Hearing on Current Challenges to State Department Security, 11 May 2000. 

67 Statement of Carpenter, House International Relations Committee, 11 May 2000. “Albright ‘furious’ over missing 

laptop,” CNN, 3 May 2000, 3:03 EDT, accessed http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/05/03/state.depart.laptop/ 2/22/06. 

68 Statement of Carpenter, House International Relations Committee, May 11, 2000; “Albright ‘furious’ over missing 

laptop,” CNN.com, May 3, 2000, 3:03 EDT; Steven Mufson, “Senior Diplomat Resigns to Protest Albright’s Action,” 

Washington Post, 5 December 2000, p. A02. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, 

5 December 2000, accessed http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2000/12/dos120500.html 2/22/06. 
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CHAPTER 9 A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY: DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

69 Transcript of Testimony of Carpenter at Hearing on Current Challenges to State Department Security, 11 May 2000. 

70 Oral History Interview, Charles Wisecarver, 18 November 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 2-4. 

71 Oral History Interview, Charles Wisecarver, 18 November 2005, p. 1. Oral History Interview, Alan Herto, 19 December 

2005, conducted by Mark Hove, pp. 2-3. 

72 Oral History Interview, Bruce Matthews, 17 February 2006, p. 1. 

73 Oral History Interview, Alan Herto, 19 December 2005, p. 3. 

373

EPILOGUE NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW CHALLENGES, NEW RESPONSIBILITIES: 2001-2010

One decade into the twenty-first century, a quarter-century after its creation and nearly a 

century after the first Chief Special Agent was hired during World War I, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

reflects the best of its past and all the promise of a 

growing, dynamic force that is equal to the critical 

challenges of the present and the future.1

Diplomatic Security possesses a unique identity 

and set of capabilities and duties today that remain as 

relevant and vital as ever. Despite on-going dramatic 

changes in the threat environment and other dayto-day challenges, the central mission of DS is really 

much the same as it has always been: the critical 

protection of U.S. diplomatic personnel, property, 

and information, together with the investigations 

essential to that mission. The fundamental agenda 

and objectives are essentially unchanged from those 

of the past.

Yet the scope and scale of that mission – and 

how the diplomatic security service performs and 

accomplishes its critical duties – have changed 

substantially over time. The proportions of the task 

and the methodologies of success have evolved along 

with changing circumstances, as the history in this 

book demonstrates.

EPILOGUE

NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW CHALLENGES, 

8

NEW RESPONSIBILITIES 

2001-2010

Figure 1: Protected by a DS Special Agent (center), Secretary 

of State Colin Powell leaves the Presidential Palace in Lima, 

Peru, just moments after receiving word of the series of 

terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City and 

the Pentagon in Washington. By 2001, DS had become one 

of the largest operational bureaus in the Department, and 

one of the most critical to diplomacy. More than ever, in the 

worldwide environment of terrorist threats, the Department 

recognizes DS and its mission as an essential element of 

international diplomacy. Source: Private collection. 
374

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

During most of the half-century following 

World War II, from 1945 until the early 1990s, 

diplomatic security challenges were defined primarily 

by the Cold War. East-West politics overshadowed 

all U.S. national security issues and overseas 

operations, and so diplomatic security duties – 

protection, investigations, and counterintelligence 

– were viewed routinely through the prism of Cold 

War realities. 

Of course this is no longer the case. DS still 

performs counterintelligence work to protect U.S. 

personnel and property abroad; but it is not the sole 

focus of the Bureau’s special agents, security engineers, 

and technical specialists. 

While the central mission of DS security and 

law enforcement today is much the same as in the 

past, DS is in several respects a different organization 

today than what it was at the end of the twentieth 

century. The traditional mission is augmented now 

by major counterterrorism, cyber security, and other 

homeland security responsibilities as well. 

And the organization, while at core the same 

in many ways, has grown substantially in size and complexity. Today DS is among the largest United States 

federal law enforcement agencies with close to 1700 agents, compared to 700 in 1997, and with truly global 

representation and reach.

An increase in resources has provided the necessary capability and flexibility for dealing with today’s complex 

challenges. By necessity, DS overall has increased in size some three-fold; correspondingly, it also is three times 

as well-funded. New technologies and technical innovation are playing a significant part in augmenting DS 

capabilities, as well.

Early in 2004, the Diplomatic Security Bureau headquarters relocated to a new building in Rosslyn, 

Virginia, just across the Potomac River from Washington, DC. In a sense, the move symbolizes the new age of DS 

responsibilities. It is an age of new initiatives, new energy, and yet the same outstanding, diligent performance as 

always. That performance continues to ensure that U.S. diplomacy can be conducted safely and securely around 

the world, often at great personal risk to DS personnel themselves.

Figure 2: Francis X. Taylor, Assistant Secretary of State for 

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 2002-2005. Source: 

Department of State.
375

EPILOGUE NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW CHALLENGES, NEW RESPONSIBILITIES: 2001-2010

Twenty-first century leadership in Washington supports reconstruction and stabilization for failed states 

around the world. Within the scope of its mission, DS shares responsibility for this operational agenda. 

Throughout its history, DS has looked to the policy challenges defined by the United States Government, and 

worked to become a supportive, integral part of the international diplomatic mission. It continues to do so today.

z A Changing Threat Environment å

Clearly the overall threat environment within which Diplomatic Security works today is magnitudes greater 

in size and complexity than that of a decade and more ago. The array of terrorist and criminal threats overseas and 

at home is infinitely larger. At the same time, DS is a far more capable organization for dealing with the markedly 

more complex nature of this difficult, dangerous 

environment. 

The widespread incidence of religion-based 

extremism overseas now impacts U.S. security interests 

in a major way. “Extra-state actors” like these have 

fundamentally destabilized security environments 

for the conduct of U.S. diplomacy and exerted new 

pressures upon protective measures currently in place.

Today, U.S. diplomatic personnel are charged 

with operating in combat zones, and in high-threat 

locations with a nation-building presence, much 

different from diplomatic assignments of the past. As 

a result, diplomatic security operations have changed 

as well, including critical responsibilities at locations 

overseas where the U.S. foreign service might have 

minimized its presence and its activities in the past. 

Given the widespread existence of high-threat posts 

today, simply withdrawing from areas of conflict is 

not a practical option. 

DS responsibilities have evolved and grown 

along with the expanding presence and practice of 

U.S. diplomacy. This has placed DS personnel in far 

greater danger as well, as they go about their assigned 

duties. Sadly, two DS special agents died in the line 

of duty during the Iraq War: Special Agent Ed Seitz 

Figure 3: A DS Special Agent (center, right) follows behind 

as Secretary of State Colin Powell visits Boudhanath 

Temple, the largest Buddhist shrine in Nepal, in January 

2002. Source: © Associated Press.
376

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

died during a mortar attack in Baghdad in 2004, and 

Special Agent Stephen Eric Sullivan died in 2005 

when his motorcade was attacked by a vehicle-borne 

explosive device. Their personal courage and sacrifice 

serve as an inspiration to others in Diplomatic 

Security, and will be long remembered.

DS has utilized local contract guard services 

overseas for decades to help protect U.S. diplomatic 

personnel and facilities. As mentioned in Chapter 

Nine, DS began augmenting these local guards 

with protective security contractors in 1994 to meet 

increasing security requirements in areas affected by 

war and political violence. 

In the extraordinary multi-theater wartime 

environment following September 11, 2001, 

the increasing utilization of protective security 

contractors became a necessary means of augmenting 

DS efforts and personnel, to ensure full protection 

of U.S. diplomats and diplomacy in high-risk, nonpermissive environments like Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The use of private security contractors has enabled DS 

to quickly hire and deploy a skilled cadre of security 

professionals for emergency needs, allowing for 

flexible and cost-effective security in critical-threat, 

non-traditional diplomatic mission environments. 

In 2000, the Department of State awarded the 

first Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) 

contract for security support in Bosnia, Israel/Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan, Haiti, and Iraq. A second 

generation WPPS contact was awarded in 2005 for these same areas as well as Pakistan. As world events and 

emergency needs require, DS will continue to rely on armed security contractors in high-threat locations; and 

those experiences will help shape future operations, oversight, and accountability.

During the 1990s, DS was given responsibility to implement a new stage of hardening U.S. posts overseas 

against potential assaults. Initially, the concept of so-called “fortress embassies” was highly controversial in 

Washington, as Chapter Nine of this book indicates. The denial of Ambassador Prudence Bushnell’s request for a 

Figure 4: In May 2002, DS Special Agent Randall Bennett 

(left) arrives at the spot near Karachi, Pakistan, where 

American journalist Daniel Pearl had been held captive prior 

to his murder at the hands of Al-Qaeda terrorists. Bennett 

led a five-week investigation, joined by Pakistani intelligence 

officials and FBI agents, that nabbed some suspected terrorists 

behind the kidnapping. Al-Qaeda lieutenant Sheik Omar 

Saeed was sentenced to death for masterminding the murder 

plot, and three accomplices were sentenced to life in prison. 

Pearl, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, disappeared in 

Karachi, Pakistan, while exploring links between Pakistani 

Islamic extremists and a British citizen who tried to blow 

up an American airliner in 2001 with explosives hidden in 

his shoes. The search for the terrorist killers later became the 

subject of a major motion picture entitled A Mighty Heart. 

Source: © Associated Press.
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EPILOGUE NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW CHALLENGES, NEW RESPONSIBILITIES: 2001-2010

new, more secure U.S. Embassy building in Nairobi, 

Kenya, followed by the tragic bombings in Kenya and 

Tanzania that killed 12 Embassy staff in August 1998, 

was an historic turning point. 

In the wake of those bombings, the newly 

created Accountability Review Board (the “Crowe 

Commission”) in its 1999 Report cited failure by the 

United States Government to adequately protect its 

people overseas. Diplomatic Security, along with the 

rest of the United States Government, resolved to do 

far better. 

With the new global threat environment and 

its ever-present dangers, necessary expansion and 

revitalization of the DS Bureau has substantially 

enhanced its protective mission. Previously the 

Bureau was relatively small, with senior management 

composed of the Assistant Secretary, the Diplomatic 

Security Service Director, and one Deputy Assistant 

Secretary. Its ranks have since expanded to include 

more Deputy Assistant Secretaries and Assistant 

Directors, and the Threat Investigations and Analysis 

(TIA) Directorate was established as well. These and 

other improvements ensure that DS will be able to 

keep pace with State Department goals and keep up 

with the significant growth in diplomatic security 

tasks and personnel. 

Not all the changes have transpired in the field 

of overseas protection. The DS role in criminal 

investigations has expanded as well, in view of 

an increase in organized criminal activity and the 

related threat environment. Document fraud is of 

more danger to national security than ever before, 

given links to international terrorism, so there is 

even greater emphasis on passport and visa fraud 

Figure 6: Richard J. Griffin, Assistant Secretary of State for 

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 2005-2007. Source: 

Department of State.

Figure 5: Joe D. Morton, Director of the Diplomatic 

Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for Diplomatic Security, 2003-2007. Source: 

Department of State.
378

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

investigations in the aftermath of 9/11. DS also performs a critical role today in the fight against international 

narcotics trafficking, sexual crimes, and currency counterfeiting, assisting in apprehending fugitives from 

justice both at home and abroad. The quality of agent work and tangible results in the criminal investigations 

field has improved dramatically in recent years, with DS investigations facilitating thousands of arrests on 

fraud and other charges.

In every area, DS duties and procedures have transitioned well to meet the demands of the new century. 

After years of reorganization, expansion, and modernization, no federal law enforcement agency today responds 

better to emerging security and criminal threats than Diplomatic Security. 

Strategic and tactical threats against U.S. interests are becoming more sophisticated over time, however, 

and DS must adapt to stay ahead of terrorists and criminals. Like every law enforcement agency, DS must stay 

flexible and relevant, or it will wither away. That’s why Diplomatic Security continues adjusting year after year to 

meet changing circumstances and requirements. By any standard of measurement, DS is performing its job with 

expertise and efficiency, setting the gold standard for modern professional law enforcement.

z Budget and Resources å

Diplomatic Security is able to accomplish its critical mission today only because it has a sufficient budget 

and the resources to do so. And the Bureau’s budget and resources are adequate because the Department of 

State recognizes and fully supports the critical value of DS services to the larger overall mission of United States 

diplomacy and law enforcement. 

Moreover, the federal Office of Management 

and Budget, and the United States Congress also 

understand the critical role and importance of 

DS, and therefore support its annual budgetary 

requirements. Appreciation on Capitol Hill for 

the role and capabilities of DS is far greater today 

than it was immediately following the collapse of 

the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, when some 

assumed that serious threats to U.S. diplomacy and 

national security had ended. Strong Congressional 

support today in view of threats against U.S. 

mission security, and in view of the growth of 

international terrorism and criminal activity, has 

produced the resources essential to DS operations 

and personnel.

Figure 7: During her mission to Iraq in February of 2007, 

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is accompanied by a 

DS Special Agent in a Blackhawk helicopter flight over 

Baghdad. Source: Private collection. 
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EPILOGUE NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW CHALLENGES, NEW RESPONSIBILITIES: 2001-2010

The serious decline in Diplomatic Security’s 

budget and resources at the end of the Cold War, 

however, was a crucible that ultimately made DS 

more efficient and effective at its mission. In the 

long run, this was beneficial. Faced with a drop in 

resources, but shouldering essentially the same range 

of duties, the Bureau inevitably became more efficient 

and resourceful than ever. It had to economize in 

order to sustain its mission. 

Then came the rapid surge in responsibilities, 

public support, and resources following the 1998 

U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa. No longer 

contending with clear-cut distinctions between 

“low-threat” and “high-threat” posts, DS proceeded 

to conduct protective measures commensurate 

with the reality that all U.S. embassies are potential 

targets for acts of terrorism in the current threat 

environment. The positive reversal of the slide in 

DS growth, budgets and resources – together with 

the successful institution of Law Enforcement 

Availability Pay (LEAP) for DS personnel 

beginning in 1999 – substantially reinforced the 

professionalism and preparedness of the service.

z Regional Security Officers å

One important outgrowth of the DS modernization process has been the enhanced role for Regional Security 

Officers (RSOs) in security planning at overseas posts. The nature of RSO duties had been evolving, post-by-post, 

for many years. But it was a seminal event when all RSOs began reporting directly and routinely to their Chiefs 

of Mission rather than to embassy Administrative officers. This major change in the overseas reporting structure 

was one of the many useful outgrowths of the Crowe Commission Report. 

Previously, RSOs reported to management counselors at U.S. embassies. Since 1999, they have reported to 

their ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission. They now serve a primary role in each mission’s planning and 

operations, especially in the areas of protection and security safeguards. RSOs today are less operational, and more 

management and policy-oriented in their tasks and responsibilities at many posts overseas.

Figure 8: Gregory B. Starr, Director of the Diplomatic 

Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for Diplomatic Security, 2007-2009; Acting Assistant 

Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 2007-2008. 

Source: Department of State. 
380

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

At the same time, RSOs also are much more involved in day-to-day bilateral relations between the 

United States Government and the countries where they are posted. They are highly engaged with host 

nation law enforcement agencies, and they are the prime coordinators of U.S. law enforcement working 

groups overseas. Along with other programs, 

RSOs make a critical contribution to OSAC, 

with its presence at more than 100 posts around 

the world today. And RSOs are integral to the 

Antiterrorism Assistance program, implementing 

post and regional strategic requirements of the 

U.S. Government in coordination with host nation 

strategic requirements. 

Given these expanded responsibilities, 

the demands placed on RSOs everywhere have 

increased along with demands on other DS 

personnel and resources, commensurate with 

growing criminal and terrorism threats worldwide. 

To meet this need, the total number posted 

overseas, including Deputy and Assistant RSOs, 

has increased accordingly; they now are on duty at 

all U.S. embassies and most consulates. A greater 

number of U.S. posts now have more than one 

RSO stationed on site, as well.

Countermeasures and 

Security Infrastructure

Inman Panel standards (see Chapter Seven) 

require regular upgrading of security construction, 

equipment, and technology to ensure that DS 

operates at up-to-date levels. And significant 

advances in equipment and technology since 2000 

have placed the Bureau squarely on the cutting edge 

of high-technology proficiency. Yet in the twentyfirst century, DS faces the ongoing challenge of 

keeping U.S. diplomatic facilities, information, and 

Figure 9: A DS Special Agent security detail covers Secretary 

of State Condoleezza Rice (center) during her July 2006 

mission to Lebanon aimed at ending combat between Israeli 

ground forces and Hezbollah. Secretary Rice approaches a 

waiting U.S. Marine Corps helicopter on the grounds of 

U.S. Embassy Beirut. Source: © Associated Press.

Figure 10: Two DS Special Agents (left foreground and 

second from right) protect special Middle East envoy and 

former British Prime Minister Tony Blair (far left) at the 

Annapolis Conference to discuss Middle East peace, at the 

U.S. Naval Academy, November 2007. Source: Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security Files.
381

EPILOGUE NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW CHALLENGES, NEW RESPONSIBILITIES: 2001-2010

personnel secure without compromising openness, 

transparency, and efficiency in the conduct of U.S. 

foreign policy and commercial and consular affairs. 

To protect U.S. diplomatic facilities and 

personnel, DS now deploys state-of-the-art 

countermeasures that ensure physical security overseas 

and at home. This includes modern construction 

standards and transit security, as well as defensive 

equipment to protect buildings and people against 

acts of violence. 

DS security engineers and technicians today 

are implementing physical and technical security 

countermeasures far beyond anything done 

before, to provide an up-to-date, secure working 

environment for diplomatic personnel assigned 

domestically and abroad. Given the constant 

evolution of these environments, DS works tirelessly 

to research, design, test, and implement new security technologies. Comprehensive security surveys and risk 

assessments, along with modern technical security design, engineering, and the installation of security systems 

are all part of the approach. In the process, DS works very closely with the Department’s Overseas Building 

Operations personnel at every step.

Moreover, a new Security Management System 

enterprise Network now enables DS to integrate all 

technical security countermeasures at a given facility 

so that the DS Command Center at headquarters can 

monitor that security and video data. 

The DS Command Center itself is a completely 

updated unit of unprecedented capability and 

responsiveness, ensuring the safety of U.S. personnel, 

property, and information. The completely 

modernized Center, launched in 2009, operates with 

a vast spectrum of new security vigilance capabilities 

including meticulous monitoring of U.S. diplomatic 

facilities overseas as well as alarm systems at domestic 

Figure 11: In March 2008, a DS Special Agent (left, rear) 

looks on as Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qadhafi (on right, 

at table) meets with (left to right) U.S. Representative Peter 

Hoekstra (R - Mich.), U.S. Charge d’Affaires William B. 

Milam, and U.S. Representative John Boehner (R - Ohio) 

inside a desert tent in Surte, Libya. Others present include 

interpreters and Libyan officials with their backs to the 

camera. Source: Private Collection.

Figure 12: In April 2008, DS Special Agents form the 

innermost layer of protection surrounding the Olympic 

torch, during the San Francisco leg of its around-the-world 

journey to the torch-lighting ceremony in Beijing. Source: 

© Associated Press.
382

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

federal facilities within State Department jurisdiction. 

Operating around the clock, the Center is now able 

to track images on surveillance cameras at U.S. 

embassies and consulates abroad; check anomalies in 

intrusion alarms and door activity; examine geospatial 

imagery; monitor Federal Aviation Administration 

aircraft threat alerts; and track activities of DS special 

agents during domestic criminal arrests, among other 

capabilities. 

DS also works to ensure compliance with 

Overseas Security Policy Board security standards, 

including new construction and major renovation 

projects. The Bureau regularly conducts security 

reviews and accreditation inspections for new or 

renovated embassies and consulates; and it conducts 

post occupancy compliance reviews at newly 

commissioned facilities six to nine months after they 

begin operation. Modern standards include new 

bomb-resistant construction techniques, and antiram and forced entry/ballistic-resistant products. 

Chemical- and radiological-based systems are 

installed, as well, to detect explosives.

In the heightened threat environment of 

this century, DS provides funding for thousands 

of personnel supporting U.S. embassy security programs worldwide. DS has succeeded in protecting U.S. 

diplomatic officers, facilities, and classified information during security incidents in scores of locations worldwide. 

As indicated earlier, DS has hired additional protective security personnel to augment the local guard force, and 

funded armored vehicles and residential security and surveillance-detection programs in high-threat areas.

At the same time, DS provides diplomatic personnel at U.S. missions with the knowledge and equipment 

to respond to a chemical, biological, or radiological attack with a minimal loss of life. In an era of threats from 

weapons of mass destruction, escape masks and guidance for safe handling and analysis of suspicious substances 

has become a standard part of countermeasures support. 

Sophisticated new high-security intrusion detection systems have replaced vulnerabilities in old alarm 

systems. DS also led a successful multi-agency effort to develop new technologies to prevent hostile foreign 

Figure 13: Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State for 

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 2008- . Source: 

Department of State.
383

EPILOGUE NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW CHALLENGES, NEW RESPONSIBILITIES: 2001-2010

entities from collecting radio frequency signals 

through windows at U.S. Government facilities. 

And it has designed, tested, and deployed an 

advanced mobile surveillance system for the annual 

United Nations General Assembly gathering in New 

York City, providing data from multiple inputs for 

dissemination to special agents in the field.

Today, DS provides hundreds of fully armored 

vehicles needed by diplomatic missions to safely 

and securely transport U.S. personnel. Electronic 

countermeasures have been developed to protect DS 

vehicles in conflict areas, while vehicle navigation, 

tracking, and video-monitoring systems have been 

upgraded as well. Improved design of the armored 

vehicle fleet enhances protection for personnel 

in critical high-threat environments like Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

As part of the DS Countermeasures Directorate, 

more than 100 Diplomatic Couriers today provide 

scheduled and special delivery of materials for 

the State Department and other federal agencies 

working at U.S. diplomatic posts. They spend tens 

of thousands of hours each year delivering classified 

diplomatic pouch material by air, sea, and over land. 

These diplomatic materials total millions of pounds 

annually, much of it palletized equipment for new 

embassy construction, helping ensure completion 

and accreditation of new U.S. embassy compound 

and renovation projects. 

Meanwhile, reliable modern methods for 

ensuring information security are just as critically 

important as advanced physical equipment and 

hardware. The dramatic growth in crime involving 

electronic technologies has drawn increasing attention 

Figure 14: DS Special Agents carry a “wounded” colleague 

to a helicopter landing zone during a high-threat field 

training exercise at the U.S. Marine Corps base in Quantico, 

Virginia, in July 2008. These high-threat training exercises 

help to prepare Special Agents to perform their assignments 

in some of the most dangerous places in the world, including 

Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Haiti, and Liberia. 

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

Figure 15: Smoke rises from the US Embassy in Sana’a, 

Yemen, on September 17, 2008, after a car bomb 

targeting the Embassy hit the front gate of the compound. 

In the aftermath, the Regional Security Officer and other 

DS Special Agents supervised the response and investigation 

in cooperation with local law enforcement. Source: 

© Associated Press.
384

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

by DS leadership and by Congress. Challenges to the entire State Department computer network have met with 

expanding resources and the advanced technology needed to counter such threats. The DS Security Infrastructure 

program counters external-based intrusions and data theft today with award-winning, state-of-the-art approaches 

that serve as a model for the rest of the U.S. Government.

With more than 45,000 Department users worldwide in the twenty-first century, integrity of the State 

Department computer system poses immense challenges every day for security oversight operations. Department 

employees generate as many as 800,000 e-mails daily, requiring DS to block thousands of viruses and more 

than a half-million cases of spam e-mail on a typical day. There are up to two million external probes of the 

Department’s network vulnerability on a regular daily basis. Overseas efforts to map and steal our technological 

assets, by both state and non-state actors, is an ongoing problem that will require constant vigilance in the years 

ahead.

The contributions of the Cyber Threat Analysis Division to the Department’s computer security infrastructure 

provide an “early warning tripwire” to guard against external threats. Seven days a week, around the clock, the 

DS Network Monitoring Center in Beltsville, Maryland, monitors potential cyber intrusions, ensuring that DS 

maintains a continuous incidence response capability.

DS also scans remotely for security gaps throughout its worldwide cyber network, both frequently and 

regularly. Its site-risk scoring efforts contribute significantly to the Department’s overseas post security system. In 

fact, the DS cyber security paradigm is becoming a best-practices model for other U.S. government agencies, while 

contributing to a new set of rules of behavior for coordination of efforts within the international community.

Success in safeguarding the U.S. Government’s 

cyberspace will continue to require a multi-agency 

approach in the years to come, and Diplomatic 

Security will occupy a key role in that coordinated 

effort, on behalf of the Department of State. Its 

well-trained work force is prepared to meet the 

increasing challenges ahead.

The Security Infrastructure Directorate also has 

made great strides in the speed and efficiency of its 

security clearance review process for federal employees. 

DS slashed the amount of time previously required 

to complete security-clearance investigations on job 

applicants, employees and contractors. In fact DS has 

reduced, by more than half, the average time required 

for standard background security investigations. 

Figure 16: Under Secretary of State for Management 

Patrick Kennedy (left) and Assistant Secretary of State for 

Diplomatic Security Eric Boswell (center) receive a field 

briefing during their mission to Afghanistan in 2008. 

A DS Agent stands directly behind Boswell (in ballcap).

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
385

EPILOGUE NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW CHALLENGES, NEW RESPONSIBILITIES: 2001-2010

DS also took swift action in recent years to help the Department reduce a backlog in the processing and 

issuance of security clearances, by reviewing thousands of clearance applications, interviewing tens of thousands 

of references, and conducting several thousand background investigations. Thousands of contractor personnel 

needed to provide critical protective services and local guard services in Iraq and Afghanistan were rapidly and 

efficiently processed by the Bureau as well. 

Toward the end of the century’s first decade, DS was handling some 25,000 security clearance cases each 

year, the vast majority of which were completed in about ten weeks. Whereas the 2004 Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Defense Act mandated a sixty-day clearance process by the end of 2009, DS was well along the way 

toward completing that goal prior to the deadline.

z Recruitment å

With increasing requirements for DS personnel overseas, and with major law enforcement tasks here at 

home, the need for top-quality DS special agents, engineers, couriers, and specialists has never been greater. 

Fortunately, recruitment efforts in the twenty-first century have proved phenomenally successful. At the end of 

the first decade of this century, the diplomatic service 

force stood at some 1700 special agents, 200 security 

engineering officers, 110 security technical specialists, 

and 100 diplomatic couriers. New agent classes 

numbered about 50 candidates each, quite impressive 

by historical standards.

Not surprisingly, the competition for recruits 

among U.S. law enforcement agencies overall has 

risen sharply along with the dramatic increase in 

the threat environment. Yet within this context, the 

DS recruitment outreach effort has remained highly 

competitive among all such agencies. 

In fact, Diplomatic Security today has a far 

more capable and diverse work force than ever before 

in its history. There is more diversity in gender, 

ethnicity and culture, professional backgrounds, and 

career experiences than in years past; and it is fair to 

say that DS personnel today are more representative 

of the nation overall. Of course this has strengthened 

Diplomatic Security on many levels.

Figure 17: Patrick Donovan, Director of the Diplomatic 

Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for Diplomatic Security, 2009. Source: Department 

of State.
386

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

More important than numbers is the fact that 

DS has been able to maintain the same high quality 

among its recruits, and the same high standards for 

all its personnel, along with rapid and substantial 

growth. 

z Training å

DS maintains a rigorous training regimen 

for all its security professionals, and is working 

constantly to improve upon it. In fact, the process 

has been fine-tuned and vastly improved in recent 

years, based on considerable feedback received 

from the agents themselves. As a result, the level 

of professionalism among DS employees has risen 

steadily over time, producing the outstanding force 

at work today.

Training programs and methods today are 

more standardized than they were in the past. 

The DS Training Center became the first federal 

law enforcement organization ever to receive 

accreditation from the Office of Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) in 

2005. This represented a major endorsement of the 

Bureau’s training practices and, since accreditation 

is an ongoing process, it has been a continuing 

important asset for recruitment efforts.

Training courses, methods, and objectives 

continue to evolve to meet modern hightech requirements in such areas as electronic 

countermeasures; armoring; vehicles; electronic 

monitoring; and information technology. DS 

also has adopted additional skill sets, notably the 

hard-skills-based security training now available 

for families of Foreign Service Officers about to be 

Figure 18: A DS Assistant Regional Security Officer at U.S. 

Embassy Islamabad in Pakistan addresses the local guard 

force at their daily muster during 2009. Source: Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security Files.

Figure 19: Jeffrey W. Culver, Director of the Diplomatic 

Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for Diplomatic Security, 2009-2011. Source: 

Department of State.
387

EPILOGUE NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW CHALLENGES, NEW RESPONSIBILITIES: 2001-2010

posted overseas. The need for a dedicated hard-skills training facility was recognized by Congress and the 

White House, and consequently funding was included in both the 2009 Federal Stimulus package and the 

federal budget for fiscal year 2010.

z Communications with other Law Enforcement Agencies and the Public å

Historically, physical presence was considered the essence of the DS mission, and that of its predecessors, 

throughout the twentieth century. While it is still a vital component, today information is every bit as important 

as physical presence. In fact, both components are critical to any mission and its successful completion in the 

twenty-first century.

Now more than ever, it is raw intelligence, 

threat analysis, information sharing, and analytical 

planning that are essential to decision makers, and 

the critical complement to manpower. The outlook 

has never been better for DS information sharing 

and coordination with other U.S. federal law 

enforcement agencies. This was both essential and 

inevitable. Today’s U.S. law enforcement leadership 

will not abide anything less than full interagency 

cooperation; it is the only way to win against crime 

and terrorism.

Through the inter-agency Counter-Terrorism 

Security Group (CSG), senior U.S. Government 

law enforcement officials now conference daily—

often several times each day—by closed circuit 

television, in secure communications environments. 

Indeed, communications technology advances have 

revolutionized DS security work in this century. To 

cite an obvious example, the use of e-mail in itself 

has greatly expedited and expanded field reporting 

beyond that of the past, significantly enhancing law 

enforcement efforts domestically and worldwide.

In fact, DS regularly interacts and shares 

information with the Department of Homeland 

Security; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; 

Figure 20: DS Security Technical Specialists, of the Project 

Management and Engineering branch, troubleshoot 

a defective door control power supply on a Security 

Management Systems enterprise test fixture in September 

2009. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
388

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

the Drug Enforcement Agency; the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the 

U.S. Marshals Service; and other law enforcement 

agencies – not only at the headquarters level, 

but among U.S. field offices, at overseas posts, 

and through various task forces (including the 

Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Immigration 

and Document Fraud Task Force, and others). 

There is more extensive inter-agency security 

cooperation in connection with major national 

and international events as well, such as U.S. 

presidential inaugurations, the Olympic Games, 

and other events. All federal agencies recognize 

that there simply is no alternative to cooperation 

if law enforcement is to be successful.

Greater DS coordination with other agencies, 

along with its larger presence overseas, also has contributed to a higher profile for Diplomatic Security. It 

has led to wider appreciation of the Bureau’s role in conducting anti-terrorism investigations and its superior 

ability to process information regarding criminal activity and terrorism. Again, the addition of more RSOs 

has improved program coordination with foreign government law enforcement officers. With representation 

at more than 280 overseas missions, the DS “reach” 

is greater now than that of any other U.S. law 

enforcement agency.

At the same time, improved efficiency of 

information flow, and the increasing transparency of 

all governmental operations, have helped to broaden 

public awareness and appreciation for the diligent job 

that DS performs, day in and day out. Traditionally, 

DS and its Department predecessors were less 

inclined to publicize U.S. diplomatic security efforts. 

However, given the reality of linkage between public 

opinion, policymaking, and budgetary resources 

today, there is obvious practical benefit in visibility 

and a positive public image.

Figure 21: DSS Director Jeffrey W. Culver (left) reviews 

defensive positions with the DS Regional Security Officer 

from a guard tower at the U.S. Embassy compound in 

Kabul, Afghanistan, during a visit in December 2009. 

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

Figure 22: A DS Special Agent (far left) leads a rescue team 

evacuating 34 young American missionaries from Leogane, 

Haiti, three days after the January 12, 2010, earthquake. 

Others on the team include additional DS Special Agents, 

a DEA Special Agent, and a helicopter crewman from 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Source: Dale Stroud, 

MissionFieldImages.com.
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EPILOGUE NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW CHALLENGES, NEW RESPONSIBILITIES: 2001-2010

As one prominent example, the critical value 

of OSAC to the security interests of the U.S. private 

sector should be as broadly understood and utilized 

as possible. OSAC has demonstrated time and 

again the benefits of its vital information network 

to U.S. business in the contemporary security 

environment. It should become thoroughly familiar 

to, and accessible by the American commercial sector 

operating overseas. Proactive public communications 

efforts are making this possible.

z Indispensable to U.S. Diplomacy å

Today, it may be said that Diplomatic Security 

is an organization greater than the sum of its many 

individual parts. In its totality as a modern, welltrained federal law enforcement agency, it is an 

indispensable factor and force in the successful 

conduct of U.S. diplomacy. Greater awareness throughout the Department of State of the DS role in facilitating 

the Department’s overall mission has generated unprecedented respect from the rest of the United States Foreign 

Service. And the profile of DS before the entire United States Government has grown as well. 

Diplomatic Security in the twenty-first century 

will continue to look to its distinguished legacy and 

will remember all those who have gone before – those 

who laid the solid foundation upon which the Bureau 

stands today.

Proudly, Diplomatic Security personnel 

recognize that the same key characteristics and 

objectives that motivated their predecessors decades 

ago continue to define DS today and continue 

to be instrumental to its effectiveness: flexibility, 

responsibility, integrity, and individual effort. These 

same traits are every bit as relevant today as they have 

been over the past century. They are, and will remain, 

Diplomatic Security’s hallmark.

Figure 23: During January 2010, DS Special Agents 

coordinate evacuations of U.S. citizens and other tourists 

following historic flooding in Machu Picchu, Peru. This 

effort involves cooperation between the DS Regional 

Security Office and the U.S. Embassy Consular team. 

The DS Agents remained on site until the last tourist was 

evacuated. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

Figure 24: Diplomatic Security Special Agents (fourth 

from right at rear, and at right) provide security for U.S. 

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton as she is greeted 

by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal upon 

her arrival in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in February 2010. 

Source: © Associated Press.
390

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Endnotes

1 Content of the Epilogue is based upon oral interviews 

with Eric J. Boswell, 10 February 2009; Gregory B. 

Starr, 4 March 2009; Joe D. Morton, 6 February 2009; 

Donald R. Reid, 12 May 2009; and Robert A. Eckert, 

12 January 2009, conducted by Robert L. Downen of 

the DS Public Affairs office.

Figure 25: A DS Special Agent (left) and a member of the 

Olympic Organizing Committee discuss security measures 

for U.S. athletes at the Pacific Coliseum in Vancouver, 

Canada, site of the 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic 

Games. This venue housed numerous Olympic skating 

competitions, including figure skating and short-track speed 

skating, at the February 2010 event. Source: Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security Files.
391

CONCLUSION A MONUMENTAL BUT ESSENTIAL TASK

Diplomatic security has a long 

history at the Department of State. Since the 

first American diplomats, U.S. policymakers have 

confronted threats to the nation’s diplomacy and 

sought to counter those threats with effective 

security measures. Ensuring the security of U.S. 

diplomacy, however, has been a monumental task, 

and those assigned to it have undertaken that task 

with limited resources and high expectations. 

In doing so, the men and women of DS and its 

predecessors have created a proud tradition of 

innovation, hard work, and selflessness. 

The United States has always had some form 

of diplomatic security procedures. The persistent 

evolution of threats, the adoption of new technologies, 

and the growth of the Department of State have continually redefined and reshaped diplomatic security. U.S. 

diplomatic security efforts began with codes and diplomatic pouches, and gradually expanded during the nineteenth 

century to include Despatch Agents, safes, formal procedures outlined in Department manuals, and classification 

of Department affairs as “confidential.” The rise of the United States as a world power and its participation in two 

world wars hastened the development of diplomatic security, adding Special Agents, foreign dignitary protective 

details, and passport fraud investigations to its purview. The Cold War prompted the Department of State to 

appoint Regional Security Officers, Technical Security Engineers, and Marine Security Guards. The rise of terrorism 

accelerated the evolution of diplomatic security, not only transforming the Office of Security (SY) into the Bureau 

CONCLUSION

A MONUMENTAL BUT ESSENTIAL TASK

8

Figure 1: As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton 

arrives at the Ekho Moskvy radio station in Russia, in 

November 2009, she is followed (at left, and at center, 

extreme rear) by her DS protective security detail. Source: 

TIME/Callie Shell. 
392

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

of Diplomatic Security (DS), but also expanding 

diplomatic security to include threat analysis, access 

controls, Mobile Security Deployments, physical 

security standards, construction security, and a 24-

hour detail for the Secretary of State. The adoption 

of computer technologies required additional security 

measures to counter a new host of threats to U.S. 

diplomacy, such as viruses, hackers, trojan horses, 

and denial-of-service attacks. Transnational terrorism 

as represented by al-Qaeda’s attacks on September 11,

2001, further defined and expanded diplomatic 

security. Diplomatic security in 2010 hardly 

resembles diplomatic security of earlier generations; 

but the United States, the Department of State, and 

the threats to U.S. diplomacy in 2010 also bear little 

resemblance to their earlier forms. 

Major wars have caused Department officials 

to reshape diplomatic security measures and 

construct new frameworks for enforcing it. During 

World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, 

belligerents exploited new tactics that undermined 

the security of U.S. diplomacy. During World War I,

the Germans and Austrians encouraged sabotage 

and espionage, which in turn led Secretary of State 

Robert Lansing to create Special Agents. During 

the 1920s and 1930s, the Nazis, fascists, and 

Communists created fraudulent U.S. passports and 

recruited U.S. Government personnel to conduct 

espionage, leading the Office of the Chief Special 

Agent to begin conducting passport and visa fraud

investigations. As a result, President Franklin D.

Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull 

expanded diplomatic security in several directions 

under multiple offices, including State Department 

Figure 2: The “Big Board” in the DS Command Center, at the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security headquarters near Washington, 

D.C. A major renovation of the Command Center in 2008 

led to the addition of the video wall, creating a state-of-theart facility. The video wall enables the Command Center to 

monitor the security status of U.S. posts around the world, 

as well as information about threats to U.S. missions, the 

Secretary of State, and U.S. citizens abroad, 24 hours each day. 

The Command Center prepares briefings for U.S. Government 

officials, coordinates the DS response during a crisis, and 

exchanges information with more than 265 diplomatic 

facilities overseas. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

Figure 3: An Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigator 

(center) looks on as a fugitive murder suspect is taken 

into custody at a U.S. border crossing in 2008. Special 

Agents make arrests and assist other U.S. and foreign law 

enforcement agencies in locating and apprehending fugitives 

from justice. In 2008, DS assisted with the return to the 

United States of nearly 140 fugitives overseas. In 2007, 

DS agents made a grand total of 1,956 arrests of passport 

fraud perpetrators, pedophiles, and other fugitives from 

justice at home and abroad, including many featured on law 

enforcement agencies’ “most wanted” lists. Source: Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security Files.
393

CONCLUSION A MONUMENTAL BUT ESSENTIAL TASK

personnel background investigations, creation 

of a multi-level classification system for U.S. 

Government documents, surveillance of foreign 

agents, and munitions controls. The reshaping of 

security during World War II received perhaps its 

clearest expression in Robert L. Bannerman’s threepoint plan for the Security Office, which included 

personnel security (background investigations), 

documentary and physical security (classification, 

training of Department personnel, Main State 

security), and overseas security. 

The Cold War redefined security twice. At 

the Cold War’s beginning, Soviet recruitment of 

U.S. citizens as spies led U.S. officials to consider 

a person’s past and present associations as crucial in 

determining their suitability for U.S. Government 

employment. The early Cold War highlighted 

Soviet technological espionage and exploitation 

of diplomatic privileges, which made every U.S. 

diplomatic post a potential site for a security breach, not just the U.S. embassies in Soviet bloc capitals. The 

Cold War reshaped security a second time when the Communist bloc and the Soviet Union collapsed, ending 

the bipolar framework that had long characterized 

U.S. thought about diplomatic security. Although 

many threats such as espionage continued, often by 

the same players, the end of the Cold War did allow 

U.S. officials to reevaluate and revise how they were 

responding to the evolving threats of terrorism and 

civil disorder, as well as to emerging threats from 

cyber attacks. 

Terrorism has singularly redefined and 

expanded diplomatic security; in fact, by 1975, 

Deputy Assistance Secretary of State for Security 

Victor Dikeos and SY personnel recognized that 

terrorism had fundamentally transformed SY and 

Figure 4: A Regional Security Officer (left) instructs Marine 

Security Guards during a reaction drill, conducted to 

prepare U.S. embassy Marine Security Guards for incidents 

of riots, fires, bomb threats, and civil disorders. Source: 

Department of State.

Figure 5: DS Special Agents investigate a U.S. Government 

vehicle destroyed by a roadside bomb in Afghanistan, in June 

2007. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 
394

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

its mission. Since the emergence of terrorism in 

the mid-1960s, terrorism has not been embodied 

in hostile nation-states, their militaries, and their 

intelligence services, and the battle lines have 

not been defined primarily in territorial terms, as 

was the case during two world wars and the Cold 

War. Terrorism, instead, is a strategy employed 

by groups, organizations, or non-state entities to 

achieve specific objectives. Membership in terrorist 

entities has been elective, fluid, and transnational, 

and some international leaders have supported 

or sponsored terrorist organizations in order to 

facilitate the attainment of their diplomatic or 

national objectives. Over the course of four decades, 

Department officials have altered existing, or initiated new security measures to protect U.S. diplomats and 

diplomacy from terrorism. 

Terrorists and other violent extremists operate on a “moral equation of self-righteousness.” They deem 

that such acts as bombing an embassy, kidnapping or killing a diplomat, or attacking a diplomatic vehicle 

constitute acceptable expression of opposition to a nation-state and its policies, and/or suitable retribution 

for perceived “oppression” from that nation-state, its apparatus (facilities, representatives) — even its local 

“collaborators.” Moreover, terrorists and extremists 

operate under the belief that such tactics constitute 

an effective strategy for drawing attention to the 

“justice” of a cause. Indeed, if one reviews the 

past four decades, one cannot deny that terrorist 

acts, with all of their injury, damage, emotion, and 

drama, have grabbed the attention of the public 

media, national governments, and international 

organizations. 

By undermining one of the most deeply held 

principles of diplomatic immunity—the physical 

security of diplomats—terrorism has transformed 

diplomatic security. When the United States 

emerged as a nation in the late eighteenth century, 

Figure 6: A DS Special Agent on board a “Little Bird” 

helicopter flying over Baghdad, Iraq, in July 2005. Source: 

Private collection. 

Figure 7: A DS Mobile Security Tactical Team trains 

to secure a motorcade in the event of an attack. Source: 

Department of State. 
395

CONCLUSION A MONUMENTAL BUT ESSENTIAL TASK

diplomatic immunities were largely accepted, and 

instances of diplomats being targets of deadly 

violence were rare. Since its rise in the late 1960s, 

modern terrorism has broken down the traditional 

rules, immunities, and practices of diplomacy, 

many of which have been in place since the Vienna 

Convention of 1815 or even the Renaissance. 

Among the most notable has been the ability of 

and commitment by host governments to protect 

the diplomats assigned to them. By breaking 

down such long-held rules of diplomacy, terrorism 

transformed the SY from a reactive force to a 

precautionary entity that introduced additional 

security measures to minimize risk and physical 

harm to U.S. diplomatic personnel. With the 

1983-1984 suicide bomb attacks against the U.S. 

Embassies in Beirut and Kuwait City, terrorism 

joined espionage as a preeminent threat to U.S. 

diplomacy and prompted the elevation of SY to a 

bureau with the resources and authority necessary 

to implement and enforce stronger, more effective 

security procedures. Al-Qaeda’s 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania again transformed 

DS, this time from a precautionary organization into a proactive bureau working to safeguard American 

diplomacy. 

Several factors have abetted those choosing to employ terrorism. Two of the factors include the minimal 

resources and personnel required to inflict terror, and the willingness of particular leaders and non-governmental 

organizations to support or sponsor terrorism as a means to achieve political or diplomatic ends. The brutality 

and horror of the attacks and the ability of such attacks to capture media and public attention have combined 

with the global expansion of mass media – and such media developments as the 24-hour news cycle – to 

further abet terrorism as a strategy. Terrorism has also benefited from post-World War II structural changes 

to international diplomacy. Such changes include the sharp increase in the number of diplomatic posts and 

personnel abroad, the number of U.S. Government agencies represented at an embassy, and the diversification 

of diplomatic relations to encompass social, cultural, environmental, and technological relations, as well as the 

more traditional political and diplomatic ties. 

Figure 8: As the DS Special Agent in charge of his protection 

detail (center) scans the crowd, Great Britain’s Prince Harry 

(right) tours the former site of the New York World Trade 

Center with New York Governor David Paterson (left) in 

May 2009. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
396

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Terrorism has prompted diplomatic security measures that were unimaginable prior to World War 

II. Diplomatic security now encompasses armored cars and security details for ambassadors and other 

dignitaries. It includes threat analysis, surveillance detection programs, rapid response details, building and 

architectural design standards, and construction site security. DS Special Agents have trained embassy staff 

in personal protection skills and embassy chauffeurs in defensive driving skills. Through the Antiterrorism 

Assistance program, DS has provided training and assistance to local police forces to combat terrorism. 

DS’s Rewards for Justice program has obtained information on the perpetrators of terrorist attacks, and the 

Overseas Security Advisory Council has aided U.S. citizens and businesses by sharing information about local 

security conditions. 

Structural changes to U.S. diplomacy since 1945 have increased the demands for diplomatic security. 

Embassies and consulates are now communities, housing representatives of many U.S. Government agencies, 

not the single diplomat or small delegation of three or four persons that often comprised a legation or 

consulate prior to World War II. Around 1885, with the addition of military attachés, diplomacy has 

extended to military relations and gradually expanded to international economic, financial, commercial, 

agricultural, cultural, and environmental relations, in addition to the political and diplomatic realms. 

Additionally, the number of nation-states grew dramatically (largely a result of decolonization), and this, in 

turn, led to a proportionate rise in the number of diplomatic posts and personnel overseas. Furthermore, the 

airplane fostered an exponential increase in diplomatic travel by the Secretary of State and other Department 

officials, and in visits to the United States by senior 

foreign diplomats. The creation of regional and 

international entities such as the United Nations, 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 

and the Organization of American States (OAS) 

further added to the number of diplomatic officials 

and amount of overseas travel. The additional 

facilities and personnel required SY to expand and 

adjust how it implemented and enforced security 

after 1945. 

The exponential expansion of diplomatic 

posts, personnel, and travel has altered the 

dynamics and demands of diplomatic security. 

Whereas local police forces could previously 

protect a single diplomat or small delegation when 

the infrequent need arose, now U.S. embassies 

Figure 9: Security improvements at Main State. DS 

constantly updates and improves security at all U.S. 

diplomatic facilities. In this image, a DS Security Technical 

Specialist (left) and a DS contractor remove a vehicle 

barrier plate in order to lay experimental surface treatment 

at the Department of State’s Harry S Truman building in 

Washington, D.C. Source: Private collection. 
397

CONCLUSION A MONUMENTAL BUT ESSENTIAL TASK

are compounds and communities that require 

a group of DS personnel, large guard details, 

and a contingent of the host nation’s police or 

armed forces for security. The larger groups of 

security personnel also have led to questions 

regarding diplomatic privileges, such as whether 

or not Marine Security Guards merit diplomatic 

privileges (they do). Moreover, the greater number 

of diplomatic personnel overseas has significantly 

impacted how the U.S. public and Congress have 

viewed diplomatic security crises, as exemplified 

by the Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981 and the 

East Africa embassy bombings of 1998. In basic 

structural terms, ensuring the security of U.S. 

diplomacy has become a monumental but essential 

task. In many ways, DS in the twenty-first century 

continues to confront the challenge that bedeviled 

the first Special Agents a century earlier: how to 

allocate limited resources to meet the great task of 

ensuring security for the Department. 

New technologies create greater vulnerabilities, 

expand the number of threats, and increase the 

number of security measures. Despite the allure 

of new technologies and the many ways that they 

facilitate the Department’s work, new technologies 

have increased, not lessened, the need for and the 

cost of security. Technologies such as the telegraph 

and computer have unquestionably offered tangible 

benefits to U.S. diplomacy, whether through more 

or better information or greater productivity of the 

Department’s employees. However, one cannot 

ignore that the adoption of new technologies incurs 

a much higher price than merely the cost of software, 

hardware, and installation. The telegraph was among 

Figure 10: Diplomatic Security weapons familiarization 

training in 2005, part of the “DSAC/Iraq” course offered by 

the DS training center in Virginia. All U.S. Government 

employees working under the U.S. Chief of Mission in Iraq 

are required to undergo this training, to prepare for the 

rigors of serving in Iraq. In February 2007, the course was 

expanded into the “Foreign Affairs Counter Threat” course 

to prepare government employees for service in various highthreat environments abroad. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security Files.

Figure 11: A DS Uniformed Protective Division officer 

screens a package entering the Harry S Truman building 

at the Department of State, in Washington, D.C. The 

DS Uniformed Protective Division safeguards more than 

100 domestic State Department facilities today. Source: 

Department of State. 
398

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

the first technologies to expose this development. 

The telegraph hastened communications between 

the Department and its posts, and provided the 

Department with greater, more current information 

about international events and local national affairs. 

Department officials also deemed the telegraph 

an inherently unsecure communications medium, 

recognizing the ease with which one could “tap” 

a telegraph line, the fact that other governments 

sought to break U.S. telegraphic codes, and the 

need for more sophisticated codes to protect 

classified U.S. communications. The telegraph 

offered significant benefits to U.S. diplomacy, yet 

it also created a greater demand for security if the 

United States was to continue to enjoy the benefits 

of that technology. 

The computer revolution replayed the 

Department’s experience with the telegraph but on 

a larger scale and at even higher stakes. Computers 

exponentially increased the amount of information 

available to Department personnel, sharply elevated 

their productivity, and greatly facilitated the sharing 

and transmission of documents. Simultaneously the 

threats to U.S. diplomacy have also exponentially 

increased, with viruses, worms, phishing attacks, 

spyware, and other types of malware hampering 

U.S. diplomacy. Equally challenging to diplomatic 

security is the capability of “thumb drives” to store 

vast amounts of information without producing a 

detectable signal. The benefits of new technologies 

outweigh the extra costs of security; but as with the 

telegraph, additional security measures and costs are 

needed if the Department is to continue to enjoy the 

benefits of computer technologies. 

Figure 13: The DS Computer Investigations and Forensics 

division (CIF) provides counterintelligence, visa and 

passport fraud, and criminal investigation support. Here, 

a computer forensics evidence technician examines relevant 

data. In recent years, CIF, through the recovery of data from 

a damaged computer’s hard drive, was able to assist a former 

Soviet republic in convicting several people of terrorism 

that targeted U.S. interests. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security Files. 

Figure 12: A DS-trained protective detail provides 

security for President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan in 

2005. DS provided protection for President Karzai 

while it helped to establish and train Afghanistan’s new 

presidential security force, after the 2002 ouster of the 

Taliban-led government. Source: © Associated Press.
399

CONCLUSION A MONUMENTAL BUT ESSENTIAL TASK

The degree or extent of diplomatic security 

appears to be a reflection of a nation-state’s power 

and wealth. During the nineteenth century, 

the United States was a developing nation on a 

continent distant from the European centers of 

power; therefore, its diplomatic security threats 

centered on the confidentiality of correspondence 

and Department business. After 1900, the United 

States became one of several great powers, and 

correspondingly, its concerns about diplomatic 

security grew. During World War I, Secretary 

Lansing created Special Agents; and when the 

United States emerged as a superpower after 

World War II, the Department created an Office 

of Security. As a superpower, the United States’ 

extensive involvement in global affairs resulted in greater amounts of classified information, greater appeal of 

U.S. personnel and facilities as targets of espionage, and a larger bureaucracy to conduct diplomacy. Only a 

nation of great wealth could afford the security measures undertaken since the 1980s to ensure the physical 

security of U.S. embassies overseas.

Finally, this history of diplomatic security has shown that the threats to U.S. diplomacy are real, 

numerous, and constant. Countermeasures and preventative initiatives generally arose after a hostile entity 

exploited for an extended time a particular security weakness in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. Furthermore, 

that weakness resulted from a new tactic by the hostile entity (e.g., suicide bombers breaching perimeter 

security) or the rise of a new diplomatic practice and development (e.g., use of passports and the rise of 

passport fraud during the 1920s). DS and its predecessors consistently have sought to facilitate the conduct 

of U.S. diplomacy, not impede it. 

z 9/11 and Diplomatic Security å

Diplomatic security after September 11, 2001, in several ways, exhibits continuity with the 1990s 

and eras prior to the post-Cold War period. The emphases on protecting U.S. diplomats and diplomatic 

facilities from terrorism, and protecting the Department of State’s computer and communications systems 

from cyber attacks, emerged during the 1990s. Several parallels exist between the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security during the post-Cold War era and the Office of the Chief Special Agent during the World War 

II era. Just like the Chief Special Agent’s office that confronted Nazi and Communist threats during the 

Figure 14: A DS security detail (at left, center, and right) 

protects His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet (right of 

center) during his 2007 visit to the United States. Source: 

Craig Lovell/Eaglevisions.
400

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Figure 15: Organizational Chart for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, January 2010. Source: Department of State. 
401

CONCLUSION A MONUMENTAL BUT ESSENTIAL TASK

1930s, well before World War II had started, DS confronted the terrorist threat well before September 11, 

2001. Perhaps no bureau in the U.S. Government 

was better prepared to meet the elevated security 

needs of the post-9/11 world than DS; programs 

such as Antiterrorism Assistance, Rewards for 

Justice, Surveillance Detection, Mobile Security 

Deployments, and Intelligence and Threat 

Analysis were already well-established by 2001. 

Also, like the World War II era when the use of 

airplanes and developments in cryptology altered 

U.S. diplomacy, technological innovations during 

the post-9/11 era may be altering diplomacy in 

new ways. Video conferencing is one innovation 

that appears to have gained prominence, where 

it was virtually non-existent before 1992. Also, 

cellular telephone cameras, Blackberries, and other 

personal mobile hand-held devices have altered the 

sharing and distribution of information. 

As another parallel of the post-9/11 era with 

the World War II era, the shocking attack did not 

fundamentally alter the Department’s diplomatic 

security office. Although the Japanese attack 

on Pearl Harbor sharply altered the American 

mindset towards the wars in Europe and Asia, 

it did not change the Office of the Chief Special 

Agent, but rather placed greater emphasis upon 

its existing responsibilities of protective details, 

background investigations, and passport fraud. 

The experience of DS after 9/11 appears to have 

followed a similar course. DS already had focused 

upon terrorism and established programs to combat 

it before 9/11. The aftermath of 9/11 appears 

to have expanded and accentuated DS’s existing 

programs, such as Antiterrorism Assistance, Mobile 

Figure 17: The Seabees graduation Class of 2009 assigned 

to DS. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files. 

Figure 16: Two DS Special Agents talk with a visitor to 

the DS exhibit at the annual International Association of 

Chiefs of Police conference. As a law enforcement entity, DS 

continually interacts with other law enforcement agencies 

such as the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service, Drug Enforcement 

Agency, and local police forces. Source: Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security Files.
402

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Security Deployments, the use of contracted private 

protective security details, surveillance detection, 

and threat analysis. 

The parallel with the World War II era, 

however, may not apply to the post-9/11 era 

in one key respect. During World War II, new 

diplomatic security measures and changes in 

munitions controls, the courier system, the 

document classification system, and use of military 

squads to guard U.S. embassies appeared, none of 

which fell within the parameters or duties of the 

Office of the Chief Special Agent. The creation 

of the Department of Homeland Security and the 

President’s authorization of surveillance measures by 

the National Security Agency after 9/11 demonstrate that new developments in security are emerging outside 

the Department of State, yet DS has continued to innovate its diplomatic security efforts and practices. In 

Figure 18: Using a DS Weapons of Mass Destruction 

training program, a U.S. embassy overseas conducts a 

decontamination drill for a possible chemical, biological, 

or radiological attack. Source: Department of State. 

Figure 19: DS Regional Security Office personnel in front of the interim U.S. Embassy in Baghdad (former palace of deposed 

Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein) in April 2006. This image illustrates the sheer magnitude of change in diplomatic security at the 

Department of State in recent decades. The number of DS Regional Security Office personnel in Baghdad shown here is larger 

than the entire Office of Security (SY) was in the early 1960s. Included in this image are the RSO and other DS Special Agents, 

logistics personnel, contractors, Marine Security Guards, military police, Canine Unit personnel, and several DS contract 

personal security detail professionals. Source: U.S. Embassy Baghdad. 
403

CONCLUSION A MONUMENTAL BUT ESSENTIAL TASK

fact, since 9/11, DS has continued to remain at the 

forefront of diplomatic security and has deepened 

its inter-agency relationships.

Diplomatic security has had a long and 

fascinating history in the Department of State. It 

has grown dramatically over the course of more 

than two centuries, and the range of duties defined 

as security-related now extends far beyond the 

codes and diplomatic pouches of the Department 

of State’s early days. The men and women who have 

served as the Department’s security professionals 

have faced a monumental but essential task, 

often with limited resources. Even so, DS and 

its predecessors have also enjoyed a tradition of 

excellent leadership and vision, and a tradition of 

innovation rising from the ranks of Special Agents, 

Security Engineers, Security Technical Specialists, 

Diplomatic Couriers, and other professional 

support personnel. As a result, diplomatic security 

remains a fundamental, even pivotal component of 

U.S. engagement with the rest of the world. 

Figure 20: A DS Assistant Regional Security Officer at 

U.S. Embassy Islamabad in Pakistan (right) inspects 

a communications log with a U.S. Marine Security 

Guard (center), as another Marine guard (left) adjusts 

equipment inside Post One, the facility’s communications 

hub. Marine Security Guards serve U.S. embassies 

worldwide, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Source: 

Department of State.
404

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

Figure 21: IN MEMORIAM: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security honors all its employees 

and contractors who have died while in service to the bureau and the United States of America. 

These four Special Agents and the Diplomatic Courier died in the line of duty since 1988. The 

courage and devotion to duty of our fallen colleagues will never be forgotten. Source: Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security Files. 
APPENDIX

407

President Ronald Reagan today commemorated the signing of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 

Antiterrorism Act of 1986, which he had signed into law on August 27, 1986. This law is the result of a broad 

bipartisan effort which includes the recommendations of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting 

Terrorism, Secretary Shultz’s and Admiral Inman’s Panel on Diplomatic Security, and many thoughtful Members 

of Congress. Congressmen joining the President for the occasion were Senators Richard Lugar, Warren Rudman, 

and Claiborne Pell, along with Representatives Dante Fascell, Bill Broomfield, Dan Mica, and Olympia Snowe.

The President noted that this historic legislation will significantly improve our ability to counter the scourge of 

international terrorism. The President reiterated his commitment to ensure the safety of our diplomats, servicemen, 

and citizens wherever they may be. The $2.44 billion in this act provides the organization and authority necessary 

to increase the effectiveness of our physical security program. Another important part of this act provides for the 

care and welfare of the victims of terrorism and their families.

This act sends a strong signal to those who would instigate acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens or property. 

The President restated his commitment to seek further international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. 

In this regard the President remains convinced that we must confront this criminal behavior in every way possible—

diplomatically, economically, through the legal system, and when necessary, with force.

Along with an improved organization and better physical security, first-rate intelligence remains the key 

element in our ability to confront terrorism. We must continue to improve our ability to predict, prevent, and 

respond to the terrorist threat. This includes continued support for a research and development program to 

counter the evergrowing sophistication of weapons and methods in the terrorist arsenal.

The President recognizes that this legislation in and of itself will not bring an end to terrorism; however, 

we must continue on all fronts with all of our resolve to meet the challenge international terrorism poses to 

democracy and our way of life. Freedom-loving people of every nation reject these criminal acts and support an 

unwavering policy never acquiescing to or accepting this outlaw behavior.

Note: H.R. 4151, approved August 27, was assigned Public Law No. 99 - 399.

STATEMENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE 

ON THE OMNIBUS DIPLOMATIC SECURITY 

AND ANTITERRORISM ACT OF 1986

September 19, 1986

409

EXCERPT FROM THE 

OMNIBUS DIPLOMATIC SECURITY 

AND ANTITERRORISM ACT

 PUBLIC LAW 99-399—AUG. 27,1986 100 STAT. 853

Public Law 99–399

99th Congress An Act

To provide enhanced diplomatic security and combat international terrorism, and for

other purposes.

 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

 This Act may be cited as the “Omnibus Diplomatic Security and

Antiterrorism Act of 1986”.

SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

 The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.

Sec. 2. Table of contents.

TITLE I—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

Sec. 101. Short title.

Sec. 102. Findings and purposes.

Sec. 103. Responsibility of the Secretary of State.

Sec. 104. Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

Sec. 105. Responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.

Sec. 106. Cooperation of other Federal agencies.

Sec. 107. Protection of foreign consulates.

TITLE II—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE

Sec. 201. Establishment of Diplomatic Security Service.

Sec. 202. Director of Diplomatic Security Service.

Sec. 203. Positions in the Diplomatic Security Service.

TITLE III—PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Sec. 301. Accountability review.

Sec. 302. Accountability Review Board.

Sec. 303. Procedures.

Sec. 304. Findings and recommendations by a Board.

Sec. 305. Relation to other proceedings.

TITLE IV—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROGRAM

Sec. 401. Authorization.

Sec. 402. Diplomatic construction program.

Sec. 403. Security requirements for contractors.

Sec. 404. Qualifications of persons hired for the diplomatic construction program.

Sec. 405. Cost overruns.

Sec. 406. Efficiency in contracting.

Sec. 407. Advisory Panel on Overseas Security.

Sec. 408. Training to improve perimeter security at United States diplomatic missions abroad.

Sec. 409. Protection of public entrances of United States diplomatic missions abroad.

Sec. 410. Certain protective functions.

Sec. 411. Reimbursement of the Department of the Treasury.

Sec. 412. Inspector General for the United States Information Agency.

Sec. 413. Inspector General for the Department of State.

Sec. 414. Prohibition on the use of funds for facilities in Israel, Jerusalem, or the West Bank.

Aug. 27, 1986

[H.R. 4151]

Omnibus

Diplomatic

Security and

Antiterrorism

Act of 1986.

22 USC 4801

note.
410

100 STAT. 854 PUBLIC LAW 99-399—AUG. 27,1986

TITLE V—STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORITIES TO COMBAT 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Sec. 501. Rewards for international terrorists.

Sec. 502. Rewards for information relating to international narcoterrorism and drug trafficking.

Sec. 503. Coordination of terrorism-related assistance.

Sec. 504. Counterterrorism Protection Fund.

Sec. 505. Terrorism-related travel advisories.

Sec. 506. Authority to control certain terrorism-related services.

Sec. 507. Management of antiterrorism assistance programs.

Sec. 508. Nonlethal airport security equipment and commodities for Egypt.

Sec. 509. Exports to countries supporting acts of international terrorism.

TITLE VI—INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Sec. 601. Actions to combat international nuclear terrorism.

Sec. 602. Authority to suspend nuclear cooperation with nations which have not ratified the Convention on 

 the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

Sec. 603. Consultation with the Department of Defense concerning certain nuclear exports and subsequent 

 arrangements.

Sec. 604. Review of physical security standards.

Sec. 605. International review of the nuclear terrorism problem.

Sec. 606. Criminal history record checks.

TITLE VII—MULTILATERAL COOPERATION TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Sec. 701. International Antiterrorism Committee.

Sec. 702. International arrangements relating to passports and visas.

Sec. 703. Protection of Americans endangered by the appearance of their place of birth on their passports.

Sec. 704. Use of diplomatic privileges and immunities for terrorism purposes.

Sec. 705. Reports on progress in increasing multilateral cooperation.

TITLE VIII—VICTIMS OF TERRORISM COMPENSATION

Sec. 801. Short title.

Sec. 802. Payment to individuals held in captive status between November 4, 1979, and January 21,1981.

Sec. 803. Benefits for captives and other victims of hostile action.

Sec. 804. Retention of leave by alien employees following injury from hostile action abroad.

Sec. 805. Transition provisions.

Sec. 806. Benefits for members of uniformed services who are victims of hostile action.

Sec. 807. Regulations.

Sec. 808. Effective date of entitlements.

TITLE IX—MARITIME SECURITY

Sec. 901. Short title.

Sec. 902. International measures for seaport and shipboard security.

Sec. 903. Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships.

Sec. 904. Panama Canal security.

Sec. 905. Threat of terrorism to United States ports and vessels.

Sec. 906. Port, harbor, and coastal facility security.

Sec. 907. Security standards at foreign ports.

Sec. 908. Travel advisories concerning security at foreign ports.

Sec. 909. Suspension of passenger services.

Sec. 910. Sanctions for the seizure of vessels by terrorists.

Sec. 911. Definitions.

Sec. 912. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 913. Reports.

TITLE X—FASCELL FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

Sec. 1001. Short title.

Sec. 1002. Fellowship program for temporary service at United States missions in the Soviet Union and 

 Eastern Europe.

Sec. 1003. Fellowship Board.

Sec. 1004. Fellowships.

Sec. 1005. Secretary of State.
411

 PUBLIC LAW 99-399—AUG. 27,1986 100 STAT. 855 

TITLE XI—SECURITY AT MILITARY BASES ABROAD

Sec. 1101. Findings.

Sec. 1102. Recommended actions by the Secretary of Defense.

Sec. 1103. Report to the Congress.

TITLE XI—CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Sec. 1201. Encouragement for negotiation of a convention.

Sec. 1202. Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over terrorist conduct.

TITLE XIII—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Sec. 1301. Peace Corps authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 1302. Demonstrations at embassies in the District of Columbia.

Sec. 1303. Kurt Waldheim’s retirement allowance.

Sec. 1304. Eradication of Amblyomma Variegatum.

Sec. 1305. Strengthen foreign language skills.

Sec. 1306. Forfeiture of proceeds derived from espionage activities.

Sec. 1307. Expression of support of activities of the United States Telecommunications Training 

 Institute.

Sec. 1308. Policy toward Afghanistan.

TITLE I—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

 Titles I through IV of this Act may be cited as the “Diplomatic Security 

Act”.

SEC. 102. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

(a) Findings.—The Congress fmds and declares that—

(1) the United States has a crucial stake in the presence of United States 

Government personnel representing United States interests abroad;

(2) conditions confronting United States Government personnel 

and missions abroad are fraught with security concerns which will 

continue for the foreseeable future; and

(3) the resources now available to counter acts of terrorism and protect 

and secure United States Government personnel and missions abroad, as 

well as foreign officials and missions in the United States, are inadequate 

to meet the mounting threat to such personnel and facilities.

(b) Purposes.—The purposes of titles I through IV are—

(1) to set forth the responsibility of the Secretary of State with respect 

to the security of diplomatic operations in the United States and abroad;

(2) to provide for an Assistant Secretary of State to head the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security of the Department of State, and to set forth certain 

provisions relating to the Diplomatic Security Service of the Department of State;

(3) to maximize coordination by the Department of State with Federal, State, and local agencies and agencies of foreign governments in 

order to enhance security programs;

(4) to promote strengthened security measures and to provide for the 

accountability of United States Government personnel with securityrelated responsibilities; and

(5) to provide authorization of appropriations for the Department 

of State to carry out its responsibilities in the area of security and 

counterterrorism, and in particular to finance the acquisition and improvements of United States Government missions abroad, including real 

property, buildings, facilities, and communications, information, and 

security systems.

Diplomatic

Security Act.

22 USC 4801

note.

22 USC 4801.

INDEX

415

A 

A-1 Code, 15 

Abraham, George E., 135g

Abraham Lincoln Brigade, 37g, 

38 

Acceleration of Security Programs, 

276-277, 281-282, 288, 

300, 355 

Accountability Review Board 

(Crowe Commission), 334, 

353, 355-360, 364, 377, 

379 

Acheson, Dean: 

background investigations, 123 

bugging of Great Seal, 136g, 

137 

physical protection for, 130g, 

151 

visit to Vienna, ixg

Achilles, eodore C., 86 g

Ackerman, Karl D., 236g

Acoustic Conference Rooms 

(ACRs), 176, 178, 180 

Act to Combat International 

Terrorism (1984), 

282-283 

Adams, John, xviiig, xx 

Adams, John Quincy, xix-xx 

Adams Express Co., xxi-xxii 

Adee, Alvey A., xxiv 

Administration, Bureau of, 80, 

133, 138, 142, 147, 165, 

167-168, 270, 276-277, 

283, 300, 324-325 

Administration and Security, 

Bureau of, 283 

Advisory Committee on Personnel 

Security (ACOPS), 80, 

86g, 87, 106 

Afghanistan: 

Al-Qaeda in, 351 

armored vehicle use in, 383 

Boswell/Kennedy visit to, 

384g

Dubs abduction and killing, 

ix-x, 266-267 

roadside bombs, 393g

Soviet role in, 266-267, 338 

U.S. attack on Bin Laden camp 

in, 353 

U.S. Embassy protection in, 

388g

U.S. Marine guards in, 103 

WPPS contracts for, 376, 385 

Africa, xxi, 307, 358 

African diplomats in the United 

States, 182-184 

Agency for International 

Development, U.S. 

(USAID), 201, 219, 228, 

284, 344 

Ainsworth, E. Gardner, 100g

Air Force Oce of Special 

Investigations, 344 

Air Force, U.S., 346 

Air Line Pilots Association, 304 

Air Transport Association, 304 

Airgrams, 42, 43g

Airmail, 41-42, 43g

Al-Khobar Towers bombing, 

346-349, 351, 358 

Al-Qaeda, 340, 351-353, 376g, 

392, 395 

Alarm systems, 336g

Albania, 354 

Albert I, King of Belgium, 16-17 

Albright, Madeleine: 

blueprint for DS, 353g, 356, 

359-361 

Czech attack by protestors on, 

364g

domestic security breaches, 

361-362 

DS expansion, 347 

DS restructuring, 334, 360 

East African Embassy 

bombings, 351g, 

352-353 

Overseas Presence Advisory 

Panel (OPAP), 358

Persian Gulf threats, 346 

Surveillance Detection Program, 

355 

visit to Bosnia, 352g

visit to Pyongyang, 363 g

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 

Bureau (ATF), 339-340 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives Bureau (ATFE), 

388 

Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building

bombing (1995), 334, 

344, 351 

Ali, Muhammed, 222 

Allen, Morse, 75, 83 

Allende, Salvador, 238 

Ambassador at Large for 

Counter-Terrorism (S/CT),

287, 351 

Ambrose, Michael J., 135g

Amerasia spy case, xii, 71, 73-75, 

106, 122, 126-127, 161, 

170 

American Black Chamber, e

(Yardley), 23 

American Legion, 174 

American Republic Aairs, Bureau

of (ARA), 44, 203 

American Revolution, xvii-xviii 

American Society for Industrial 

Security, 305 

Amtorg Trading Company, 3, 19,

39 

Anarchists, 19 

Anderson, Leona M., 135g

Andrews Air Force Base, 353, 

359g

Andrews, Bert, 88, 90 

Anglo-American Telegraph 

Company, xxiii, xxivg

Angulo, Maria, 100g

Annapolis Conference, 380g

Annis, E. Pauline, 135g, 143g

Anschluss, 91g

Anthony, Melvin J., 135g

Anti-Americanism, 200-203, 

256-258 

Anti-Terrorism Assistance 

Program (ATA), 274, 

276-277, 284-286, 288, 

300, 339, 380, 396 
416

Antiterrorism Assistance Program, 

 401

Aqueous Foam System, 260 

Arab-Israeli War (1948), 97 

Arafat, Yasser, 359g

Archibald, James F. J., 4-5 

Argentina, 58, 208, 218, 220g, 

221-222, 238, 351 

Arikan, Kemal, 263 

Aristede, Jean Bertrand, 343-344

Armenia, 337 

Armenian genocide claims, 263 

Armor, William, xiv, 226g

Armored cars, 202-204, 205g, 

207, 273, 282, 383 

Arms and Munitions Control 

Oce, 37 

Arms and Munitions Control, 

Oce of, 51 

Armstrong, Anne, 275, 314 

Army Corps of Engineers, 266 

Army Courier Service, 58 

Army-Navy Register, 39 

Army, U.S.: 

courier service, 13, 15-16, 41

Criminal Investigation Unit, 184 

Criminal Investigative Service, 

344 

Military Intelligence Division, 

15-16, 18, 50, 60, 

184 

Signal Corps, 15 

U.S. embassy guards from, 47, 

101 

Asaka, Prince, 17 

Asaka, Princess, 17 

Asia, xxi-xxii, 41 

Assistant attachés, 91, 98 

Assistant Security Ocers, 72 

Associated Press, 224 

Atlanta Olympic Games bombing 

(1996), 334, 339 

Atlantic, U.S.M. Steam Ship, xxii 

Atomic Energy Commission

(AEC), 148

Australia, 339 

Australian Federal Police, 339 

Australian Intelligence, 339 

Austria, 4-6, 16, 36, 40, 51, 84, 

92, 145, 392 

Award for Valor, 342-343 

Axel, Prince of Denmark, 17 

Aztec Empire, xvii 

B 

B-1 Code, 15 

Baaklini Building, 280-281 

Babylon, xvii 

Bacigalupo, Jim, xiii-xiv 

Background investigations, 18, 

75-80, 86, 140, 166, 171, 

300, 335 

Bacom, John, 186g

Bad Nauheim, Germany, 54 

Bader-Meinho Gang, 216 

Bagby, Nettie, 9 

Bagnal, John, xiii, 176g, 

177-178, 311 

Bahrain, 273, 307g, 346, 351, 

358 

Bailey, E. Tomlin, 175 

Bailey, Wells, 55 

Bainbridge, John, 232g, 233 

Baine, I. Raymond, 20g

Baker, James A., III, 302, 318g, 

319g, 320 

Baker, William R., 135g

Bakhtiar, Shahpour, 256 

Ball, Gary, 220g

Baltic, U.S.M. Steam Ship, xxiig

Bancroft, Edward, xviii 

Bandar, Prince, 337 

Bangkok solution, 216 

Bannerman, Robert B., 239g

Bannerman, Robert C., 35, 239g

death of, 49 

Despatch Agent network 

security reforms, 

21-22, 36 

as former postal inspector, 9 

investigative scope, 18-19 

passport fraud, 39-40 

as Special Agent Chief, 2, 17g

travel of, 13 

Bannerman, Robert L., 239g

diplomatic detentions, 53g, 

54-56 

DS dierences from SY as 

created by, 300 

move to CIA of, 85, 106 

Nazi espionage, 35 

Security Committee, 76, 78g, 

79-80 

Security Oce as created by, 

61, 71, 72g, 74, 86 

security training, 81-82, 84-85

three-point security program of,

75-78, 84-85, 

105-106, 393 

Barnes, Harry G., Jr., 178 

Bartholomew, Reginald, 279-281 

BDM Corporation, 316 

Bearers. See Couriers 

Becht, John A., 135g

Bechtel, 305 

Beckett, George, 221, 223 

Beckner, Mike, xiii 

Beirut Embassy attacks, xii, 197, 

201, 255-256, 258, 262, 

267, 269-270, 279-283, 

288, 317, 395 

Belarus, 337 

Belgium, 2-3, 8, 40, 44, 203, 

316g

Bell, Edward, 7 

Bell, Joel, 309-310 

Bell, John O., 86g

Ben Bella, Ahmed, 173 

Bennett, Randall, 376 

Bennington, Bert, 186g, 188g

Bentley, Elizabeth, 77, 90 

Berger, Sandy, 347, 353 

Bergin, Peter, xiii 

blueprint for DS, 353g, 

355-357, 361, 364 

departure from Beijing of, 

236g

Moscow Embassy construction, 

350 
417

passport fraud investigations, 

336-337

restructuring DS, 334, 353fig

Surveillance Detection Program, 

354-355

terrorism discussions, 350-351

Berle, Adolph, 40

Bermuda, 208, 261

Bernadotte, Count Folke, 97fig, 98

Bernstorff, Johann von, 3fig, 8

Bezjian, Joseph, 136-137, 162

Biafra civil war, 201

Biddle, Francis, 51-52

Biden, Joseph, 282

Biever, Margaret, 210fig

Bigler, Alan, xii, 281, 283-284

Bin Laden, Osama: 

assessment of threat of, 

353-354

early terror involvements of, 

351

East African Embassy 

bombings, 334, 

351fig, 353

rewards offered for, 304fig

U.S. attack on camp of, 353

World Trade Center bombing 

(1993), 340

Bingham, Hiram, 126

Birge, Gene L., 100fig

Birnbaum, Maxmiliano, 48-49

Black, Shirley Temple, 275, 

301fig

Black Chamber, 15-16, 22-23

See also Chief Special Agent, 

Office of

Black September, 212, 216, 338

Blackberries, 401

Blair, Tony, 380fig

Blaney, John, 343fig

Blue Code, xxiv, xxvfig, xxvi, 4, 

10, 15

Bock, Carl L., 135fig

Boehner, John, 381fig

Boeing, 305

Bohlen, Charles E., 137, 140fig, 

141

Bolsheviks, 19

Bond, Richard C., 135fig

Bontempo, Salvatore, 165-166, 

171

Booth, John Wilkes, xxii, xxiiifig

Booth, Robert, xiii

Borden, Robert, 17

Borja, Rodrigo, 299fig

Bork, C. L., 143fig

Bosnia, 351, 352fig, 376

Boswell, Eric J., xiv, 344-345, 

347-349, 364, 382fig, 

384fig

Boswell, William O., 163-168, 

171-172, 181-182, 188

Botswana, xiiifig

Boudhanath Temple, 375fig

Bowers, Claude G., 42fig

Bowles, Chester, 183

Boy-Ed, Karl, 4

Boyd, Al, 199fig

Boykin, Samuel D., 124fig, 128, 

133-134

Bracy, Arnold, 312-315, 324

Brandenburg Gate, 333fig

Brandt, Willy, 152fig

Brazil, 38, 197, 200, 202-203, 

205, 238, 360

Bremer, L. Paul, 303

Bridges, Styles, 128, 140-141

British-U.S. joint information 

control system, 57

Britton, Frank T., 135fig

Broderick, Matthew, 323

Bronson, Charles, 304

Broomfield, William, 287, 407

Browder, Earl, 39

Brown Code, 45fig, 46, 60

Brown, Steve, 220fig

Brum, Baltasar, 17

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 240

Budget, Bureau of the (BoB), 60, 

163

Building access controls, 5-6, 

49-50, 105

Building passes, 49-50

Bujac, Gregory, xiii-xiv, 315, 

324, 344, 345fig, 346fig, 

364

Bulgaria, 54fig, 55, 92-94

Bullitt, William C., 33-34, 43

Bullock, William J., 135fig

Burleson, Albert, 7

Burma, 53

Burton, C., xxfig

Burton, Fred, xiii

Burundi, 338, 341-343, 364

Busbey, Fred E., 141

Bush, George H. W., 236fig, 318, 

320

Bushnell, Prudence, 352, 376

Butler, Raymond L., 164fig

Byrnes, James F., 81, 123

Byrnes, Paul J., 135fig

C 

C-1 Code, 15

Cabinet Committee to Combat 

Terrorism, 240

Cabot, John Moors, 57

California, xxii

Cambodia, 205-206, 345

Cameroon, 284

Camp Holabird, 85

Campbell, John C., 94

Cámpora Demaestre, Hector José, 

208

Canada, 9, 76fig, 77, 390fig

Cannon, John W., 135fig

Cano, Mercedes, 100fig

Caribbean area, 307

Carpenter, David G., 334, 353, 

355-357, 360-362, 364

Carter, Jimmy, 217-218, 257, 

338

Carter, Susan Shirley, 229

Cartwright, Robert, 139fig 

Castro, Fidel, 181fig, 182, 200, 

235fig, 342fig

Catucci, Marie G., 135fig

Cavity resonator, 137
418

CC Mail, 363

Cella, Vincent, 146fig

Central Europe, 35

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 

85, 106, 169, 213-214, 

238, 362

Chad, 183

Chambers, Whittaker, 40, 77, 

89fig, 90, 91fig, 123

Change No. 1, 57

Chappelear, John A., 135fig, 

143fig

Character, 130, 139

Chase National Bank, 19

Chechnya, 351

Cherp, Philip F., 135fig

Chiang Kai-shek, 126

Chichibu, Prince, 17

Chief Special Agent, Office of: 

background checks by, 76

background investigations, 

77-78

budget cuts for, 18

centralizing diplomatic security 

responsibilities, 61

changing nature of, x

creation and early 

responsibilities of, 2, 

8-10, 15, 17fig, 18, 

22-23

FBI recommendations for, 73

investigation of, 79-80

merger into Division of Security 

and Investigations of, 

71, 83, 106

parallels with DS, 399, 401

protection of foreign dignitaries 

by, 8-9, 16-17

and reorganization of 1944, 72

Secretary's travel arrangements 

made by, 13, 16

Security Office's formation using

personnel from, 75

Spanish Civil War returnees 

interviewed by, 38

in the World War II era, 33, 

39-40, 49

Chile, 58, 91-92, 99, 200, 205, 

237-238

China: 

ancient courier services in, xvii

Japanese invasion, 40

loss to Communists of, 121, 

123, 125-126

reestablishment of U.S. 

relations with, 229fig, 

236fig

table-tennis team visit to United 

States, 210fig, 211

U.S. policy toward, 73

China hands, 126

Christensen, Ward, 147fig

Christopher, Warren, 336, 343

Churchill, Winston L. S., 55

Citibank, 305

Civil Aeronautics Authorities, 41

Civil disorder, 91

Civil Rights Act (1964), 228

Civil Rights Movement, 188

Civil Service Commission, 51, 79, 

86, 89-90, 130, 166, 174

Civil war, 91

Civil War, U.S., xxii-xxiii

Clancy, Tom, 321fig

Clark, William P., 264

Clarke, Paul M., 135fig

Clarke, Richard A., 350-351, 

353, 355

Classification of documents, 56-58

Claussen, Paul, xiv

Clinton, Hillary R., xfig, 389fig, 

391fig

Clinton, William J., 344, 

352-353, 355, 358fig

Closed Circuit TV, 223

Coast Guard, U.S., 83

Codes: 

Code Room, 45fig

creation of Division of 

Cryptology, 61

Early uses of, xi, xvii-xix

German, 8

instructions for deciphering, 

14fig

Japanese, 16

in the 1960s, 168

Post-Civil War, xxiii-xxiv

post-World War I, 14-15

post World War II, 60

shortages of clerks trained in, 

91-92

wartime repatriation of devices 

used for, 52-53

in the World War II era, 45-46

Coffey, John W., 169

Cohen, Bonnie R., 353-354

Cohn, Roy, 126

Colby, William E., 317-318

Cold War: 

beginning of, 71, 100, 393

challenges of diplomatic 

security defined by, 

147, 374, 393

discrimination's effect on U.S. 

efforts in, 182-184

ending of, 333-334, 358, 393

as motivator for creation of new 

security positions, 391

NSC-68's view of, 125

protection of diplomats and, 

199

See also Soviet espionage; Soviet 

Union

Cole, U.S.S., 359

Collectors of Customs, xix-xx

Colombia, 209

Colvin, John B., xx

Comaneci, Nadie, 321fig

Combating Terrorism, Office for 

(M/CT), 240, 268-269, 

271, 274, 276-277, 

283-288

Combined Security Classification

Agreement (1944), 57

Command Center, 223-225, 

226fig, 241, 260, 

381-382, 392fig

Commerce, U.S. Department of, 

20-21, 149

Commission on Organization of 

the Executive Branch of the 

Government, 104-105
419

Committee to Combat Terrorism, 

213, 221, 240-241 

Communication Center (State), 

168g, 170 

Communications Oce (OC), 

61, 259, 262, 272, 280, 

306, 323-324 

Communications Program Unit 

(CPU), 313 

Communications security, 10, 

40-45, 58, 91-92, 97-98, 

147, 168-170, 397-399 

See also Computers; E-mail 

Communications Security, Oce 

of, 168 

Communist Party, 39, 51, 79 

Communists in the State 

Department, xiii, 122 

Composite reat List (CTL), 

319 

Computer Investigations and 

Forensics Division (CIF), 

xiig, 398g

Computer Security Act (1987), 

323-324 

Computer Security Committee, 

230 

Computer Security, Oce of, 

362g

Computers, 162, 169-170, 

229-230, 260, 321g, 

322-325, 361-363, 384, 

392, 397, 398 

See also Communications 

Security; E-mail 

Condential documents, 56-57 

Congress, U.S.: 

Acceleration of Security 

Programs, 277 

air hijacking sanctions, 214 

Amerasia case, 74 

anarchists prohibited by, 19 

appropriations for security, 

152, 259, 261-262, 

264, 268, 270-272, 

274, 281-283, 

345-346, 353, 355 

ATA program, 284 

budget-cutting by, 91-92, 

101, 317-318, 325, 

333-334, 359 

computer security, 323 

couriers, 12, 36 

Crowe Commission, 357 

CSA merger with SY, 71 

disclosure of classied 

information, 22-23, 

xix 

document classication, 56 

DS, creation of, 286, 299 

DS funding by, 378 

electronic crime, 384 

enforcement powers for DS, 

301 

Executive Protection Service, 

234, 236 

Federal Stimulus package 

(2009), 387 

homosexuals in the State 

Department, 128g, 

152 

Inman Panel, 275, 286 

Letelier killing, 238 

Logan Act, xx 

loyalty investigations, 51, 79, 

86, 89, 106, 

140-141, 144 

Marine Security Guard increase 

requested by, 

132-133, 137-139 

McCarthy hearings, xiii, 121, 

123-124, 127, 152 

microwave radiation in U.S. 

Embassy, Moscow, 

230g, 231 

Munich hostage crisis, 212 

Neutrality Act, 37, 40 

physical security, 131, 197, 

358, 362 

Pompidou speech boycott, 210 

Prohibition, 18 

protection of foreign dignitaries, 

150, 264-265 

rebuilding of U.S. Embassy, 

Moscow, 320, 322, 

349 

replacement of foreign nationals

with U.S. citizens in 

overseas posts, 133 

Rewards for Justice program, 

285, 340 

security crises, 397 

Soviet espionage, 77, 310, 

312-313, 315-316 

technical security, 279 

threat information, 305 

training programs, 387 

Conigliaro, Concetta, 224 

Conrad, A., xixg

Considine, Michael, xiii 

Constitution, U.S., xix 

Constitutional Convention 

(1787), xix 

Construction Security 

Management, 316 

Construction Security Program, 

311-312, 316 

Consular Aairs, Bureau of, 306,

336 

Consular Aairs Oce, 134 

Consular Services, Oce of 

(CON), 105 

Continental Congress, xix 

Controls, Oce of (CON), 51, 

75, 79-80, 82-85, 88, 

105, 131, 142 

Convent of the Rosary, 98 

Cooper, Paul, 75, 81-82 

Coordination of security, 49g, 

50-51, 60-61 

Corsun, Andy, xiii, 223g

Costa Rica, 284 

Counselor, Oce of the, 6 

Counter-Terrorism, Oce of, 

212g, 213g, 262, 300 

Counter-terrorism Security Group 

(CSG), 351, 355, 387 

Counterfeiting, 378 

Counterintelligence, 22-23, 300, 

398g
420

Countermeasures Directorate, 383

Counterterrorism Subcommittee 

(NSC), 347

Courier X, xiii

Couriers: 

airmail use by, 41-42, 43fig

in ancient times, xvii

Army Intelligence Officers as, 

145-146

cutbacks in service for, 22

during the Cold War, 144-146

in the early Republic, xi, 

xix-xxii

growth in size and amount of 

pouches, 306-308

as heroes or threats, 144-149

Marines as, 11-12

as part of Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security, 285, 288, 

306

in post-independence Israel, 98

in the post-World War I era, 

16, 19-22

pre-World War I security 

measures for, xxv

in the present, 383

replacement of Despatch Agents 

by, 103-104

route descriptions for, 11-12, 

20-21, 36, 41-43

route maps for, 42fig, 104fig

security guidelines for, 309

service in France, 22, 35-36, 

43-44

smuggling of nuclear materials 

by, 146fig, 147

Soviet bloc, 121, 146

use of air transport by, 42, 

43fig

Vienna Convention and, 164

during World War I, 11-13

in the World War II era, 

35-36, 40-45

Covey, Jock, 336

Crampsey, Leo, 84fig, 133fig, 

181fig, 184, 226fig

Crest Control, 223

Crime-Threat List (CTL), 

359-360

Criminal Investigations (CI), 302, 

315-316, 398fig

Croasdale, Bill, 20fig

Crockett, William J.: 

Gentile appointment, 162, 

180fig

Otepka case, 173, 175

reorganization of Security Office 

by, 165, 167-168, 

335

Cronin, Robert, 186fig

Crowe, Adm. William J., 353, 

357-358

Crowe Commission, 334, 353, 

355-360, 364, 377, 379

Cryptology Division, 61

Cuba: 

Missile Crisis (1962), xii, 162, 

168-169, 170fig, 184, 

188

Pan American Games hosted 

by, 338-339

presidential visit to Miami 

(1927), 17

U.S. attitudes toward, 200

Culver, Jeffrey W., xiv, 386fig, 

388fig

Cunningham, Frank, 220fig

Currie, Lauchlin, 40

Customs and Border Protection, 

U.S., 148, 388fig

Cyber attacks, 399

Cyber Threat Analysis Division, 

384

Cyprus, 205fig, 237, 315

Czech Republic, 364fig

Czechoslovakia, xivfig, 16, 40, 93, 

95-96, 147-148, 176

D 

D-1 Code, 15

Dalai Lama, 399fig

Daley, Richard M., 210

Darlan, Adm. François, 45

Davies, Joseph, 34

Davies, Rodger P., 213

Dean, John W., 210

Death squads, 284

Decolonization, 100, 199

DeCourcy, William, xiii, 186fig, 

188fig, 206fig, 207-208, 

210fig, 211, 223, 226

Defense Courier Service, 307

Defense Industrial Security 

Clearances, 311

Defense Intelligence Agency 

(DIA), 360

Defense, U.S. Department of, 101, 

168, 280, 344-345, 362

See also individual service 

branches

DeFossett, William, 184fig

Deibler, Tony, 343

Delta Barriers, 347fig

Democratic Party, 122, 143

Denial-of-service attacks, 392

Denmark, 9, 38, 40, 44

Denza, Eileen, 163

Departmental Orders: 

No. 223, 18

No. 1324, 74-75

Departmental Personnel Division, 

76

Descat, Zelma, 100fig

Despatch Agents. See Couriers

Détente, 199, 233, 315

Detentions, diplomatic, 52-56

Dewey, Thomas, 90

Diana, Princess, 324fig

DiBlasi, Josephine, 135fig, 226fig

Dickey, William, 211

Dies, Martin, 50fig, 51

Dies Committee, 50fig, 51, 76, 

86, 89fig, 90

Dikeos, Victor: 

climate of terrorism, 218, 241

control booths at embassies, 

222fig

DS role of, 226fig

Inman Panel, 275
421

physical security survey, 269

Scarbeck case, 163, 224

Security Enhancement Program, 

260

Security Office reorganization, 

224-225, 227, 229, 241

terrorism's rise, 198, 393

Diplomatic Courier Service, 

285-286, 288, 299-300, 

306, 309

See also Couriers

Diplomatic courtesy, 146

Diplomatic detentions, 52-56

Diplomatic immunity, 121, 138, 

144, 147-148, 164, 

394-395, 397

Diplomatic security: 

in ancient times, xvii

in the early Republic, xviii-xix

evolution of, x, 391

phases of transformation of, 

197-198

post-Civil War, xxiii-xxiv

post-World War I, 13-24

as reflection of nation-state's 

power and wealth, 399

wars' effect on, 392

in the World War I era, 

xxvi-xxvii, 1-13

See also Personnel security; 

physical security

Diplomatic Security, Bureau of 

(DS): 

blueprint for, 355-357, 

360-361, 364

budget cuts for, 316-319, 325, 

345

changing nature of, x

changing threat environment 

for, 375-378

computer security, 321fig, 

322-325, 384, 398

countermeasures and security 

infrastructure, 

380-385

creation of, xii, 71, 285-289, 

299-303, 391-392

criminal investigations, 

377-378, 392fig

criminal investigative functions, 

336

current budget and resources 

for, 378-379

deaths while in service to, 

404fig

expansion of, 345fig, 347, 374

foreign dignitaries protected by, 

317fig

Global Plan for Security 

Engineering Officers, 

348

graying of the staff of, 345

Haiti's president as protected 

by, 343-344, 364

headquarters relocated to 

Rosslyn, 374

indispensability of, 389

interagency communication, 

387-388, 401fig

interagency review panel for 

domestic security, 362

law enforcement powers of, 301

Liberian role for, 343

limits on police powers of, 301

mandated security standards, 

357-358

as member of NSC's 

Counterterrorism 

Subcommittee, 347

Moscow Embassy construction 

role for, 316

Network Monitoring Center, 

362, 384

Olympic Games, 334, 

338-339, 390fig

organizational chart for, 400

parallels with Office of the 

Chief Special Agent, 

399, 401

passport fraud investigation, 

336

in the present, 373

private security contractors used 

by, 343-344, 347fig, 

348, 376, 385, 402

publicizing the work of, 

388-389

restructuring of, 334-337, 

353fig

RSOs expanded role in, 353fig, 

354-357, 360-361, 

379-380, 388, 402fig

Secretary of State protected by, 

302-303

Security Infrastructure 

Program, 384

Special Agents as forerunner to,

6fig

training programs for, 

386-387, 397fig

vulnerability assessments, 351

World Trade Center bombing 

(1993), 334, 340

See also Security Office (SY)

Diplomatic Security Office 

proposal, 277

Diplomatic Security Training 

Center, 231

Diplomatic Telecommunications 

Service (DTS), 169, 323

Diplomats, attacks on: 

in Afghanistan, ix-x, 266-267

in the 1970s, 198-206, 

255-258

U.S. legislation against, 214

in the World War I era, 2-3 

Directorate of National Intelligence 

(DINA) (Chile), 238

Distinguished Honor Award, 

338fig

Dittmer, Clark M., 302, 338fig

Division Control, 223

Division of Investigation, 83

Djerejian, Edward P., 337

Document fraud. See Passports; 

Visa fraud

Document handling restrictions, 

56-58

Documentary and Information 

Systems Division, 225, 

229-230

Documentary security, 75
422

Documents and Communication 

Division, 103

Doherty, John J., 135fig

Dollar Steamship Company, 21

Domestic Crisis Management 

Committee, 241

Domestic Operations Division, 

166, 181, 187, 225

Dominican Republic, 200

Donelan, Joseph F., 213-214

Donovan, Howard, 86fig

Donovan, Patrick, 385fig

Donovan, Gen. William, 40

Dovenoge, Harry, 186fig

Downen, Robert, xiv

Dreyfus, Bertha, 100fig

Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 

207, 388

Drury, Louis Mason, 135fig

Dubs, Adolph, 266

Duffy, Raymond, 226fig

Duggan, Laurence, 40

Dulin, Charles M., 135fig

Dulles, John Foster: 

Bohlen nomination, 140fig, 

141

Otepka given award by, 171

physical protection for, 133fig, 

151-152

Dumba, Constantin T., 4-5 

Duncan, Evan, xiv

Dunn, Albert E., 45

Duran, Gustavo, 125-126

D'Urso, William, xiii, 207-208, 

226fig, 239

Duvalier, Jean Claude, 216

DynCorp, 343

E 

E-mail, 324, 363, 384, 387

See also Communications 

security; Computers

Eagleburger, Lawrence S., 218, 

275-277, 302, 338fig

Earthquakes, 91

East African Embassy bombings, 

334, 351fig, 352-355, 

360-361, 364, 377, 379, 

395, 397

East Timor, 357fig

Eastern Europe, 16, 20fig, 35, 71, 

93-96, 136, 317, 378

See also individual countries

Eastland, James, 174

Eban, Abba, 212

Ecevit, Bulen, 237-238

Ecuador, 205, 284, 299fig

Education and Training unit, 225

Edward VIII, King, 16

Egan, John Patrick, 218

Egypt, xvii, 96-97, 103, 210, 

217-218

Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution, 18

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 

Army-McCarthy hearings, 127

employee loyalty issues, 139, 

141

inspection of foreign diplomatic 

pouches and 

shipments, 148

McCarthy's charges against 

Jessup, 124fig, 125

protection of foreign dignitaries, 

150fig, 151fig, 181

El Salvador, 91-92, 259fig, 

261fig, 268, 284

Elbrick, C. Burke, 202-204, 

205fig, 241

Electronic crime, 383-384

Elekdag, Sukru, 263

Elisabeth, Queen of Belgium, 

16-17

Elizabeth II, Queen, 151fig

Elliot, Hugh, xviii

Ellis, Overton G., 100fig

Embassies, U.S.: 

Army provision of guards for, 

47

Bangkok U.S. Embassy seizure 

by Japan, 53

Beirut attacks, 201, 255-256, 

258, 262, 267, 

269-270, 279-283, 

288, 317

Beirut emergency plan, 91

closing during wartime of, 

52-53

control booths at, 220-222

East Africa bombings, effect on, 

353-355, 360-361, 

364, 377, 379, 395, 

397

Eastern Europe emergency 

plans, 91

emergency planning for, 91

evacuation of, 318

fire in Embassy in Moscow, 

232-233, 321-322

as fortresses, 376-377

Green and Lodge Report on 

security for, 131-134, 

136-137, 152

guards in the post-World War 

II era, 99-103

Iraq security issues, 255fig, 

318, 402fig

Islamabad attacks, 257-258, 

288

in Kuwait, 271, 273, 275fig, 

277, 288, 319fig, 

358, 395

mandated security standards 

for, 357-358

move from Paris to Vichy of, 

44, 48

Paris reopening of, 59

personnel shortages, 92

placing of Security Officers in, 

75

San Salvador emergency plan, 91

security in the World War II 

era, 44, 46-49

Security Enhancement Program, 

259-262, 268-269, 

288

special maritime jurisdiction 

for, 301
423

technology for security of, 

260-261 

Tehran attacks and hostage 

crisis, 197, 255-259, 

288, 397 

Tripoli attacks, 258, 288 

U.S. Marine Corps guards at, 

99-103, 132-134, 

137-139, 220-221 

Yemen bombing (2008), 383 

See also Listening devices; 

Marine Security 

Guards; U.S. Embassy, 

Moscow 

Embassy Security Assessment 

Teams (ESATs), 354 

Emergency Action Planning 

(EAP), 276-277, 283, 

285, 286, 288, 300 

Emergency Action Teams, 206 

Emergency Coordination Group, 

354 

Engraving and Printing, U.S. 

Bureau of, 83 

Equal Employment Opportunity 

Act (1972), 228 

Equatorial Guinea, 301 

Erdos, Alfred, 301 

Erdos v. United States (1973), 301 

Erickson, Nels F., 135g

Eritrea, 354 

Espionage: 

in the American Revolution, 

xviii 

by the Communists, 121, 

144-149, 163, 

175-176 

in Israel, 99 

by the Nazis, 35 

by the Russian Federation, 338 

See also Soviet espionage 

Estep, Ethel Mae, 100g

Estonia, 16, 337 

Ethiopia, 37, 205 

Europe, xxi-xxii, 102 

European Aairs Bureau (EUR), 

148, 348 

European Aairs, Division of, 54 

Eustis, Henry, 3 

Evaluations Branch, 89-90, 105 

Evaluations Division, 142, 166, 

171, 187, 225, 300 

Executive Branch, 104 

Executive Committee on 

Terrorism, 240 

Executive Oce (SY/EX), 225 

Executive Orders: 

2285, 5 

9806, 86 

9835, 86-87 

10450, 139-141 

12478, 265 

Executive Protective Service (EPS), 

211, 235-239, 265 

Explosives detection, 339, 340g

Extra-state actors, 375 

Exxon, 305 

F 

Failed states, 375 

Fakan, Steve, 343

Fascell, Dante, 287, 407 

Fascists, 38g, 45, 46g, 51 

Fatwa, 352 

Faurer, Lt. Gen. Lincoln D., 278 

Faust, John B., 86g

Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA), 382 

Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), 

224 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI): 

Amerasia spy case, 73-74, 122 

assignment of security 

responsibilities to, 

49g, 50-51, 60 

background checks by, 76, 

79-80, 86, 89, 140, 

171 

Bentley confession, 77 

Chief Special Agent liaison 

with, 18 

counterterrorism coordination 

by, 214 

DS communications with, 387 

German espionage eorts, 6 

Hostage Rescue Team training, 

284 

intelligence collecting, 165 

Inter-Agency Working Group 

on Terrorism, 213 

interagency review panel for 

domestic security, 362 

investigative duties transferred 

to, 336-337 

Letelier case, 238 

Manhattan Project spies, 125 

Olympics security, 339 

Otepka case, 172g, 173 

SAS manual procedures derived

from, 302 

security and intelligence review,

85 

security survey by, 73 

SY collaboration with, 182 

technical security 

countermeasures, 166 

World Trade Center bombing 

(1993), 340 

Federal employee loyalty tests and 

programs, 50g, 51-52, 

86-90, 140, 174 

Federal Law Enforcement Training 

Accreditation (FLETA) 

Oce, 386 

Federal Law Enforcement Training 

Center (FLETC), 227 

Federal Protective Service (FPS), 

219 

Federalist Paper #64, xix 

Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti

(FSB), 337-338 

Ferdinand, Prince of Savoy, 17 

Field Oces, 77-78, 132 

Fields, David C., xiii 

Acceleration of Security 

Programs, 281, 355 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

established, 300g
424

as Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Security, 272 

Islamabad U.S. Embassy 

attacked, 258 

JSOC teams, 273 

Overseas Security Advisory 

Council, 305 

Security Oce's growth under, 

256, 274-277, 289 

security vulnerability 

assessments, 347 

File Transfer Protocol (FTP), 362 

Finegan, Catherine A., 135g

Fingerprinting, 93-94 

Finlator, John H., 143g

Fischer, Donovan, 176g, 

177-178, 226g

Fish, Hamilton, xxiii-xxiv 

Fitch, omas F.: 

background investigations, 78 

as Chief Special Agent, 49 

diplomatic detentions, 52 

Security Oce creation, 61 

as Special Advisor to Director of 

Oce of Controls, 85 

Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support 

Teams (FAST), 353 

Fletcher, Eileen N., 135g

Fletcher, Travis L., 135g

Flinn, Dennis, 141g, 142-143, 

144g, 145, 153 

Flynn, Joseph F., 135g

Folensbee, Scott, 343 

For Limited Distribution 

documents, 57 

Ford, Gerald R., 218g, 219, 

236-237 

Ford, Hillman S., 136 

Ford, John W., 135g, 136, 

140g, 141-142, 201g

Foreign Activity Correlation 

Division (FC), 76, 85 

Foreign Activity Correlation, 

Oce of (FC), 51 

Foreign Aairs Counter-threat 

Course, 397g

Foreign Aairs, Department of, 

xviii 

Foreign Buildings Operations, 

Oce of (FBO), 72, 223, 

259, 262, 266, 271-273, 

275, 280, 283, 311, 316, 

354 

Foreign Consulate Program, 

264-265 

Foreign Crisis Management 

Committee, 241 

Foreign Dignitary Protection, 225, 

300 

Foreign Missions Act (1982), 

263g, 264 

Foreign Missions Amendment Act

(1983), 264 

Foreign Operations Division, 142, 

166, 187, 225 

Foreign Service Act (1946), 101 

Foreign Service Administration, 

41-42 

Foreign Service Association, 

217-218 

Foreign Service Auxiliary, 91 

Foreign Service Inspection Corps, 

171 

Foreign Service Institute, 83 

Foreign Service Personnel 

Division, 76 

Foreign Service Security Corps, 85 

Former Soviet Union, 346. See also 

individual countries

Forsyth, ores C., 135 g

Foti, Seth J., 404g

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 

U.S., 301 

France, 200, 209, 

codes and ciphers used in, xvii 

diplomatic pouch transport in, 

22, 35-36, 43-44, 

149g

German espionage eorts, 4-5, 

45, 47-48 

Nazi defeat of, 40, 43, 44g

protection of dignitaries from, 8 

reopening of U.S. Embassy in, 59 

Soviet espionage, 278 

Spanish Civil War volunteers 

"destination" as, 38 

U.S. diplomatic security in, 47 

U.S. Embassy personnel 

shortages in, 92 

U.S. Marine guards in, 138

U.S. Quasi War with, xx 

U.S. World War I role in, 13 

Franco, Francisco, 38g, 126 

Frank, James, 232g, 233 

Franklin, Benjamin, xi, xviii 

Franklin, William L., 135g, 

143g

Franklin, William Temple, xviiig

Freedom of Information requests, 

225 

Freeman, Robert, 81 

Frese, John J., 343 

Fuchs, Klaus, 123, 125 

Fugitives, 378, 392g

Furness, Betty, 145g

Gado, Gerhard, 100g

Gallman, Waldemar J., 95 

Gannett, Taylor W., 49 

Gannon, Richard, xiii, 350 

Garrett, Amy, xiv 

Garrett, Marvin L., Jr., 264, 268, 

272-274, 277 

Gates, Daryl F., 263-264 

Gaullists, 48 

Gays, 128-129 

General Accounting Oce (GAO),

262, 308 

General Service Administration 

(GSA), 49 

Gentile, G. Marvin: 

anti-Americanism in Europe, 

201-202 

appointment of, 162, 175, 

180g, 188 

appropriation of money for 

security, 259 

Chinese table tennis team, 

protection of, 211 

Committee to Combat 

Terrorism, 213 
425

hostage crises, 215g, 216 

integration of Security Oce, 

184g

protection of foreign dignitaries, 

185-186 

protection of U.S. diplomats, 

204, 207 

reorganization of Security 

Oce, 187, 225, 227, 

241 

Soviet listening devices, 178g, 

180 

terrorism's rise, 198 

G 

George Washington Brigade, 38 

Georgia, 337 

Gerard, James W., 5 

German-American Bund, 51 

Germany: 

Anti-Americanism in, 201-203 

attacks on shipping by, 40, 

41g

attacks on U.S. diplomats in, 

2-3 

Berlin Wall's opening, 317, 

333 

censorship of diplomatic 

communications by, 2 

closing of U.S. embassies in 

areas occupied by, 

52-53 

crime threat variations in, 360 

Depression-era espionage, 33, 

35, 47 

detention of diplomats from, 

54-55 

espionage on U.S. embassies by, 

47 

listening devices planted by, 

35, 58 

Munich hostage crisis, 197, 

212, 214-215, 241, 

338 

reunication of, 317 

sabotage and espionage plots in 

U.S. by, 4-6, 13, 392 

Soviet non-aggression pact with, 

40 

unrestricted submarine warfare 

by, 8 

U.S. marriage policy in, 92 

U.S. missions personnel 

shortages in, 92 

U.S. monitoring of travelers to 

Latin America from, 

51 

U.S. occupation of, 101 

U.S. use of postal service of, 16 

wartime care of U.S. Embassy 

in, 59 

Gestapo, 47 

Ghana, 183 

Glaser, Erich, 39 

Glasnost, 317 

Glassboro Summit, 201g

Gleason, Steve, xiii, 285 

Glennon, Joe, 226g

Global Plan for Security 

Engineering Ocers, 348 

Gnehm, Edward W., Jr., 319g, 

357 

Godek, Lillian, 229 

Gold, Harry, 125 

Goliewsky, Nicolas, 48 

Golos, Jacob, 39 

Good conduct, 139 

Goodrich, S. R., 80 

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 317, 322 

Gore, Albert P., Jr., 335 

Gouzenko, Igor, 76-77 

Gray, Lt. Gen. D'Wayne, 275 

Great Britain. See United Kingdom 

(UK) 

Great Depression, 22-24 

Greece, xvii, 95g

Green Code, xxiv, xxvi, 4, 10, 15 

Green, Paul, 85 

Green, eodore F., 131 -134, 

136-137, 142, 152 

Greenbrier Hotel, 54g, 55 

Greenglass, David, 125 

Gregory, omas, 7 

Grew, Joseph C.: 

Amerasia spy case, 74 

courier service inspections, 21 

diplomatic security during 

World War I, 1-2 

increase in number of Assistant 

Security Ocers, 72 

Grey Code, 10, 15, 46, 53, 60 

Grin, Richard J., 377g

Grob, Lou, 178, 179g

Gromyko, Andrei, 162, 201g

Guaranty Trust Company, 18 

Guatemala, 197, 202, 273 

Gulf War, 318, 319g

Gurney, Frank, 3 

Gusev, Stanislav, 361 

H 

H. P. White Labs, 261 

Habyarimana, Juvenal, 341

Hackers, 323, 392 

Hackett, Francis A., 135g

Haig, Alexander, 263-264, 265g

Haiti, 216, 338, 343-344, 

346g, 364, 376, 388g

Haldeman, H. R., 210 

Hall, John R., 135g

Hamilton, Warren M., 36 

Hammond, Charles, 135g

Handyside, Holsey, 268 

Harben, Jo, 321g

Harding, Warren G., 16 

Harrick, Philip, 226g

Harriman, W. Averell, 60, 162, 

188g

Harrison, Leland, 6g, 7-8, 11, 

15 

Harry, Prince, 395g

Harry S Truman Building. See

State Department Main 

building 

Hart, Earl T., 135g

Hartman, Arthur A., 312-314 

Harvey, Gordon, xiii, 226g, 231 
426

Haswell, John H., xxiv

Hatch Act (1939), 50fig, 51

Hawaii, 53fig, 55

Hawkins, Bill, 220

Hay, John, xxvfig

Headley, Frank, 186fig

Heath, Donald R., 94

Helfa-Caulker, Richard E., 182fig

Hellmuth, Obata & Kassebaum, 

P.C., 349

Henderson, Loy, 92, 97

Heroes Under Fire (TV series), 343

Herrmann, George, xiii-xiv, 278

Herter, Christian A., 151, 152fig

Herto, Al, xiii

Heston, Charles, 304

Hewett, Gerard V., 135fig

Hezbollah, 380fig

Hickey, Edward, 226fig

Hill, Elmer, 172

Hindu nationalists, 13

Hipeley, Elmer R., 135fig

Hiss, Alger, 40, 76fig, 77, 90, 

122-123, 126

Historian, Office of the, xiii-xiv

History Channel, 343

Hitler, Adolf, 37, 40, 91fig

Hitt, Ayleene, 143

Hoekstra, Peter, 381fig

Hoffman, Johanna, 39

Hoffman, Thomas F., 135fig

Holden, S., 143fig

Holmes, Julius, 75

Homeland Security, U.S. 

Department of, 387, 402

Homestead Hotel, 54fig, 55

Homosexuality, 121, 125, 

128-130, 180-181, 187

Honduras, 267

Hoover, Herbert, 104

Hoover, J. Edgar, 40, 77, 80

Hoover, Lenora F., 135fig

Hoover Commission, 104-105

Hostage Rescue Team training, 

284

Hotline, 169

House, Edward M., 13

House of Representatives, U.S.: 

Appropriations Committee, 88, 

180-181

Commerce, Justice, and State 

Subcommittee, 319

Foreign Affairs Committee, 

271

H.R. 4151 (1986), 407

protection for UN delegations, 

236

Puerto Rican nationalist attack 

on, 152

State Department supplemental 

request, 282

Un-American Activities 

Committee (Dies 

Committee), 50fig, 51, 

76, 86, 89fig, 90

Hove, Mark, xiv

H.R. 4151 (1986), 407

Hughes, John V., 135fig

Hughes, Morris N., 342fig

Hull, Cordell, 23, 35fig, 52, 54, 

57, 61, 212, 392

Humelsine, Carlyle H., 101-102, 

124fig, 133-134

Hungary: 

detention of diplomats from, 

54fig, 55

espionage by, 176

post-World War I 

independence of, 16

purchase of communications 

gear by, 147

treatment of U.S. Embassy 

employees, 93, 95-96

U.S. marriage policy for, 92

Hunter, John W., 100fig

Hurley, Patrick, 73

Hush, Jimmy, 302

Huskey, William D., 135fig

Hussein, King of Jordan, xiiifig, 

210

Hussein, Saddam, 318

Huston, Harris, 88

Hutus, 341-342

I

Iacocca, Lee, 275

IBM computers, 322fig

IBM Corp., 305

Iceland, 208

Identification cards, 105

Immigrants, Japanese, 51

Immigration and Document Fraud 

Task Force, 388

Immigration and Nationalization 

Act (1952), 134

Immigration and Naturalization 

Service (INS), 213-214

Immigration Border Patrol, 55

Immorality, 130

Incan Empire, xvii

Indexes and Archives, Bureau of, 

xxiv-xxv

India, 103, 360

Indonesia, xfig, 204fig, 214fig, 

354fig, 357fig

Information controls, 56-58

Information Management Office, 

299, 323fig, 324-325

Information Office, 81, 84

Information Programs and Services 

Office, xiv

Information Resource 

Management, xiii

Information revolution, 322

Information security, 383-384

Inman, Adm. B. R. "Bobby", 275, 

286, 407

Inman Panel (1985): 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security's 

creation, 256, 299

Courier Service move to DS, 

306

creation of, 274-275, 277

implementation of 

recommendations of, 

286-287, 300-303, 

357, 358fig, 380, 407

Overseas Security Advisory 

Council, 305
427

purview of, 279

report of, 285, 288

signing of Omnibus 

Diplomatic Security 

and Antiterrorism Act, 

407

U.S. Embassy construction in 

Moscow, 310, 312

Inspector General, Office of, 325

Intelligence and Research, Bureau 

of (INR), 166, 272, 361

Intelligence and Threat Analysis 

Division (ITA), 349, 359, 

401

Intelligence Processing Section 

(IPS), 167, 186

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Defense Act (2004), 385

Intelligence Reporting Branch 

(IRB), 165, 167

Inter-Agency Ad Hoc Committee 

on Terrorism, 201

Inter-Agency Working Group on 

Terrorism, 213, 217, 240

Interagency Group for 

Countermeasures 

(IG/CM), 271-272

Interamerican Affairs, Bureau of 

(ARA), 44, 203

Interdepartmental Committee on 

Internal Security (ICIS), 

147-148

Interdepartmental Committee on 

Physical Security, 275-276

Interdepartmental Working Group 

on Terrorism, 287

Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 

228

International Brigades, 37fig, 38

International Law Enforcement 

Academy, xiiifig

International Monetary Fund, 212

International Telephone and 

Telegraph, 169

Internet, 362-363

Internet Protocol (IP), 363

Interpol, 304, 307

Intrusion detection systems, 382

Investigaciones (Chile), 58

Investigations Branch, 105

Investigations Division, 83-84, 

106, 142, 166, 181, 187, 

225, 300

Iran: 

local guards for U.S. Embassy 

Tehran, 99

RSO's at U.S. Embassy Tehran, 

144fig

Tehran Embassy attacks and 

hostage crisis, 197, 

255-259, 288, 397

terrorism sponsored by, 351

transport of documents to, 58

women's status in, 92

Iraq, 96, 255, 255fig, 318, 

375-376, 378fig, 383, 

385, 394fig, 397fig, 402fig

Iraq War, 375-376

Ireland, xxivfig, 144

Irish revolutionaries, 13

IRMA, 363

Irwin, Frank, 145

Israel: 

defense of, 318

espionage in, 99

fatwa against, 352

Hezbollah conflict with, 380fig

Iran involvement in terrorism 

in, 351

Munich hostage crisis, 197, 

212, 214-215, 241, 

338

post-independence Embassy 

security, 97-99

U.S. military sales to, 210

U.S. protection of dignitaries 

from, 209, 339

U.S. protection of diplomatic 

offices of, 212

U.S. support for, 200

WPPS contracts for, 376

Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra, 

212

Italy: 

ATA training programs with, 

284

courier service in, 40

detention of diplomats from, 

54fig, 55

German espionage in, 47

invasion of Ethiopia by, 37

protection of dignitaries from, 8

U.S. diplomatic security in, 45, 

47

wartime care of U.S. Embassy 

in, 59

Iverson, Clarence, 100fig

J 

Jackson, Lt. Col. Wade, 101-102

Jacobs, Steve, xiii

Jaffe, Philip, 73-74

Jago, John W., 86fig

Japan: 

attacks on shipping by, 40, 

41fig

China as invaded by, 40, 401

closing of U.S. embassies in 

areas occupied by, 

52-53

detention of diplomats from, 

54-56

espionage by, 58

immigrants from, 51

Pearl Harbor's bombing by, 

35, 47, 401

protection of dignitaries from, 

8-9 

terrorism, 197fig, 208

treatment of U.S. diplomats by, 

54

U.S. breaking code of, 16

U.S. domestic monitoring of 

people from, 51

Japanese-Americans, 51

Jay, John, xviii-xix, xxvi

Jefferson, Thomas, xix
428

Jenkins, George, 260

Jessop, Walter, 135fig, 143fig

Jessup, Philip C., 124fig, 125

Jewish Defense League (JDL), 351

Jewish refugees, 47fig, 48-49

Jews, 47fig, 48-49

Jihad, 352

Jim Crow laws, 17

Johnson, Bernard A., 237

Johnson, Lyndon B., 199fig, 

201fig, 207

Johnson, Manja, 100fig

Johnson, Robert D., 135fig, 

143fig

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 101, 

280-281

Joint Special Operations 

Command (JSOC), 273

Joint Terrorism Task Force, 340, 

388

Jones, Art, 198fig

Jones, Robert E., Jr., 236

Jordan, 96-97, 210, 273

Joseph Travers & Sons, 18

Justice Commandos of the 

Armenian Genocide, 263

Justice, U.S. Department of (DOJ), 

6, 18, 23, 39, 235, 238 

K 

Kachulis, Louis, 186fig

Kahane, Meir, 351

Karzai, Hamid, 398fig

Kaufman, John, xiii, 339

Kazakhstan, 353

Kelly, Henry H., 86fig

Kelly, Tim, 220fig

Kelser, Philip L., 86fig

Kennan, George F.: 

bugging of Great Seal, 

136-137, 153

Depression-era security 

measures, 33

Soviet treatment of U.S. 

Embassy custodians, 

59fig, 60

Kennedy, John F.: 

assassination and funeral of, 

161, 184-186, 207

Ben Bella visit to, 173fig

Orrick Committee as created 

by, 169 

Otepka case, 170-171, 173fig

visits by foreign dignitaries, 

181-182

Kennedy, Patrick F., 345, 347, 

384fig

Kennedy, Richard T., 268

Kennedy, Robert F., 170, 202, 

216

Kent, Tyler G., 34, 45-46

Kenya, 198, 334, 351fig, 

352-353, 377, 379, 395

Kenyon, Dorothy, 125

Keogh, John W., 135fig

Keyser, Donald, 362

Khaddam, Abd al Halim, 235

Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 

256

Khrushchev, Nikita S., 182

Kidnapping, 202-204, 241 

Kim Jong Il, 363fig

Kimball, Arthur A., 86fig

King, Karen, 226fig

King, Martin Luther, Jr., 202

Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 261fig

Kissick, Harold G., 86fig

Kissinger, Henry: 

Chinese Peoples Republic-U.S. 

relations, 211

détente, 315

negotiation with terrorists, 215, 

217-218

physical protection for, 

211-212

Pompidou visit, 210

U.S. Latin American policy,

238

Kissinger, Nancy, 212, 229

Kitterman, Richard F., 135fig

Klaus Committee (ACOPS), 80, 

86fig, 87, 106

Klaus Report, 79-80, 106

Klaus, Samuel E., 79-81, 86fig, 

87, 106

Knox, Charles, 99

Knox, Clinton E., 147, 216

Kolb, Oris F., 135fig, 143fig

Komitet Gosudarstvennoy 

Bezopasnosti (KGB), 177, 

299, 310, 313, 321, 350

Korean War, 71, 101, 125, 127

Koreans, 17

Kosovo, 354

Kosygin, Alexei, 201fig

Kouck, Benjamin F., 135fig

Kraevaky, Boris I., 19

Kraft, Doug, xiv

Kranz, Rudolf, 35

Krueger, Robert, 342

Krys, Sheldon, 319, 321, 323fig, 

324-325

Kuwait, 197, 255-256, 271, 273, 

275fig, 277, 288, 318, 

346, 358, 395

L 

Labor, U.S. Department of, 18

Laird, Melvin, 314

Laird Commission, 314-315

Lamb, Robert E.: 

Acceleration of Security 

Programs, 355

as Assistant Secretary for 

Diplomatic Security, 

300

DS creation, 287fig

DS cutbacks, 317, 319

expansion of SY, 256, 277, 

289

Inman Panel, 275, 286

Lonetree-Bracy spy case, 313

Overseas Security Advisory 

Council, 305

Rewards for Justice program, 

303

U.S. Embassy construction in 

Moscow, 312
429

Lampe, Herb, 186fig

Lange, John, 351fig

Lansing, Robert, 4-9, 15, 392, 

399

LaRiviere, Ronald A., 404fig

Larkin, Barbara, 357

Larsen, Emmanuel, 73-74

Latin America: 

hiring of embassy guards for, 

46-47, 102

Letelier assassination, 197, 

237-238

routing of diplomatic pouches 

to, 41, 42fig, 43fig, 

307

terrorism in, 200-204, 216, 

221-222

U.S. diplomatic security in, 46

U.S. monitoring of Axis citizens 

traveling to, 51

U.S. policy toward, 238

Latin American Division, 7

Lattimore, Owen, 126

Latvia, 16

Laurens, Henry, xviifig, xviii

Lausanne Conference (1922), 15

Law Enforcement Assistance 

Administration (DOJ), 235

Law Enforcement Availability Pay 

(LEAP), 379

Leahy, Frank, 310 

Lebanese Internal Security Forces, 

269

Lebanon:

Ali visit to, 222fig

Arab-Israeli War (1948), 97

army of, 281

attacks on U.S. Embassy in, xii, 

197, 201, 255-256, 

258, 262, 267, 

269-270, 279-283, 

288, 317, 395

killing of U.S. ambassador in, 

217fig, 218, 267

Marine Security Guards, 102

protection of diplomatic 

personnel in, 205

Rice visit to, 380fig

U.S. Embassy emergency plan 

for, 91

U.S. Marine barracks bombing, 

255, 262, 271, 288, 

317

Lecker, Fred, 237

Leddy, John M., 86fig

Lee, Arthur, xviii

Lee, Duncan Chaplin, 40

Lee, Lois F., 135fig, 143fig

Lend Lease Act (1941), 40

Lesbians, 128-130

Lestina, Nancy, 229

Letelier, Orlando, 197, 237-238

Liberia, 17, 284, 341, 343, 364

Libya, 209, 255, 258, 288, 

381fig

Lincoln, Abraham, xxii, xxiiifig

Lindsay, John, 209

Lineberry, Gipsy W., 135fig

Linneman, Herbert F., 135fig

Liquor importation by diplomatic 

staff, 18

Listening devices: 

in Eastern European embassies, 

93fig, 96, 176

German-origin, 35, 58

in hotels, 58

shoe bugs, 178, 179fig

typewriter bugs, 232fig, 

277-279, 306, 308, 

310

in the U.S. Embassy, Berlin, 35

in the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, 

xii, 34, 136-137, 

153, 161-163, 

175-180, 188, 

233-234, 277-279, 

310-317

in the U.S. Embassy, Prague, 

xivfig, 176

in the U.S. Embassy, Warsaw, 

35, 161-162, 

178-180, 188

in U.S. missions in Israel, 99

See also Embassies, U.S.

Lithuania, 16

Little, Bill, 186fig

Lloyd, Ralph G., 135fig

Local Guard service, 221

Locke, Allen, 362

Lockerbie bombing, 304, 306

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.: 

embassy security, 142

Soviet espionage, 162-163, 175

Subcommittee of Two, 

131-134, 136-137, 

152

Vietnam War, 188fig

Lofstrand, G. P., 135fig

Logan, George, xx

Logan Act (1799), xx

London Despatch Agent Office, 

xxi, xxv, 12, 22

Lonetree, Clayton J., 312-315, 

324

"Long Telegram" (Kennan), 59

Longeaux, Lt. Col. Philippe, 271

Lopez, Gerald, 301

Los Angeles Police Department 

(LAPD), 302

Louisiana Purchase, xix

Louisiana State Police Academy, 

284

Louisiana State University (LSU), 

284

Lovett, Robert A., 97-98, 102

Loyalist International Brigade, 38

Loyalty Review Board, 86-87, 90, 

126

Loyalty review procedures, 127fig

Loyalty Security Board, 86fig, 

87fig, 88-90, 140

Loyalty tests, 50fig, 51-52, 86-90, 

140, 174

Lugar, Richard, 287fig, 407

Lustgarten, Mike, 84fig

Luxembourg, 40, 44-45

Lydon, Peter, 216

Lynch, Keith C., 135fig

Lynch, Keith O. "Jack", 143fig, 

181-182, 184, 186fig

Lyon, Frederick B., 74-75
430

M

M-138 coding devices, 53 

M Unit, 128-130 

Macatee, Robert B., 96-97 

Mack, Connie, 311 

Macomber, William B., Jr., 204, 

215g, 216, 228 

Madden, Frank J., ixg, 84g, 

135g

Magic Slates, 314g, 315 

Maginnes, Nancy, 212, 229 

Main State. See State Department 

Main building 

Malaysia, 53, 197g, 354 

Malcady, Joseph E., 100g

Mali, 183 

Malware, 398g

Management Analyst Oce, 174 

Management and Budget, Oce of 

(OMB), 60, 261, 268, 

281-282, 317, 323, 378 

Management, Oce of, 277, 300 

Management Planning Division, 

80-82, 84 

Mandela, Nelson, 317g

Manhattan Project, 123, 125 

Manseld, Mike, 275 

Mao Zedong, 123, 126 

Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), 

270, 280 

Marine Corps, U.S., 101, 

138-139 

Marine couriers, 11-12, 16 

Marine Security Guard Handbook, 

137g, 139 

Marine Security Guard School, 139 

Marine Security Guards, 137-139 

assignment to all embassies of, 

272-273 

carrying of weapons by, 201 

Cold War as motivator for 

establishment of, 391 

combat experience as dierent 

from protective 

security, 204-205 

creation of new detachments of, 

357 

detection of listening devices by, 

179g

diplomatic status of, 205, 397 

DS cutting back in use of, 345 

during World War II, 47 

increase in numbers of, 

132-133, 137-139, 

199-200, 276 

for new embassies, 337 

notication of attacks as role of, 

260 

program creation, 99-103 

Secretary of State as protected 

by, 207 

stationing in reinforced control 

booths of, 220-222 

Tehran Embassy attack, 

256-257 

training for, 137g, 138-139, 

393g

as under Foreign Operations 

Division, 166 

at U.S. Embassy London, 99 

at U.S. Embassy Moscow, 266, 

312g, 313-315, 321, 

350 

for U.S. mission in Palestine, 

96-97 

at U.S. UN Mission, 265 

Marriages with foreign nationals, 

92-93 

Marsden, William, 239g, 339 

Marshall, George C., 87, 90, 

95g, 101, 124g, 

125-126 

Marshall, Katherine, 95g

Marshals Service, U.S., 342g, 

388 

Marzani, Carl, 80 

Massey, Capt. George B., 100g

Matchbook cover rewards 

campaign, 304-305 

Matney, William H., Jr., 135g

Mattachine Society, 180 

Matthews, Bruce, xiii, 231, 338 

Matthews, H. Freeman, 47 

Mauretania, S.S., xxvig

May, Rick, 257 

McAdoo, William, 6 

McAndrews, John H. E., 22 

McAteer, Mary, 229 

McCabe, David, xiii, 226g, 227 

McCarran, Pat, 126 

McCarran Rider, 79, 81, 87, 

89-90, 124 

McCarran-Walter Act (1952), 

134 

McCarthy, Joseph: 

accusations of homosexuality 

made by, 125, 128 

Army investigation by, 127 

Bohlen nomination, 141 

censuring of, 127, 143 

charges against the State 

Department by, 

xii-xiii, 121-127, 

152, 170 

McLeod as condant of, 140 

McCarthyism, 144 

McCauley, Edward Jr., 11 

McCloy, John J., 131 

McCoy, Floyd W., 135g, 143g

McDermott, James, xiiig, 150g, 

151g, 152g, 161g, 

173g, 185g

McDonald, James G., 97-99 

McDonnell, Tom, 220 

McGovern Base, 352g

McGuire, Robert, 275 

McGwire, Scott, xiii 

McIntyre, Carl, 211 

McLane, Louis, xx-xxi

McLean, Allan F., Jr., 100g

McLeod, R. W. Scott, 130, 139g,

140-142, 171 

McManus, N. C., 143g

McNulty, Joseph, 186g, 208 

McQuinn, Steve, 144-145 

McShane, Owen, 188g

Meary, Omar, 135g

Mecke, Frederick, 314 

Media relations, 10, 81, 362 
431

Meet the Press, 90

Mein, John Gordon, 202, 205fig

Meir, Golda, 210

Meloy, Francis E., Jr., 217fig, 

218, 267

Menon, V. Krishna, 161fig

Merchants of Death (Englebrecht 

and Hanighen), 37

Metropolitan Club, 182

Mexican Revolution, 11

Mexico, 13, 209

Meyer, Armin H., 214, 216

Mica, Dan, 275, 287fig, 314fig, 

315, 407

Microfilm, 41

Microwaves, 176, 230-232

Middle East, 102, 346, 350, 355, 

358

See also individual countries

Milam, William B., 381fig

Military Assistance Advisory 

Groups (MAAG), 138

Military intelligence, 228

Military Intelligence Division 

(MID), 15-16, 18, 50, 60, 

184

Miller, Bill, 341

Miller, John, xxi

Miller, Marian D., 100fig

Minor, Jack, 144fig

Mislock, Ray, 315, 349fig

Misslbeck, James, 226fig

Mitchell, George R., 237

Mitchell, Horace H., 237

Mitrione, Daniel, 202, 284

MK Ferguson Company, 316

Mobile hand-held communications 

devices, 401

Mobile Reserve, 206

Mobile Security Deployment teams 

(MSD), 342

Mobile Security Deployments, 

392, 401-402

Mobile Security Details, xii, 

283-284, 319fig

Mobile Security Tactical Teams, 

394fig

Mobile Training Teams (MTT), 

219fig, 220, 227, 241, 

280, 283-285, 347fig, 

354-355

Model Embassy Program, 282

Moe, Grace, xiv

Moffitt, Ronni Karpen, 238

Mondale, Walter, 259fig

Mondavi, Robert, 210fig

Monroe cipher, xix, xxiii

Monroe, James, xix-xx

Montgomery, John C., 141

Montoneros, 221fig

Moore, Albert W., 135fig

Moore, George Curtis, 215fig, 

216-218

Moore, Ramsey L., 100fig

Moose, Richard, 335-337, 345, 

348

Moral turpitude, 130

Moran, Richard J., 135fig

Moreno, Ed, 339

Moriarty, James F., 135fig

Morton, Joe H., 218fig, 219, 

226fig, 349fig, 377fig

Morton, Patricia, xiii, 228

Morton, Thruston, 138

Mosbacher, Emil "Bus", 210

Moscow. See U.S. Embassy, 

Moscow

Moscow Assessment Review Panel, 

314

Moscow Ballet, 34

Moscow Embassy Building 

Control Office (MEBCO), 

320, 322

Mozambique, 55

MS Mail, 363

Multinational corporations, 200

Multinational Force (Lebanon), 

270, 280

Mulvey, Mark, 315, 335fig

Munich hostage crisis, 197, 212,

214-215, 224, 241, 338

Munitions controls, 51

Murphy, Francis T., 86fig

Murrah Federal Building 

bombing (1995), 344

Muskie, Edmund, 259fig

Musser, Maclyn, 176-177

Mussolini, Benito, 37

Mutual Defense Assistance 

Program, 138 

N 

Nage, Louis R., 135fig

Napoleon Bonaparte, 1

Narcotics trafficking, 378

Narodnyy komissariat vnutrennikh 

del (NKVD), 33-34, 40, 

60, 77

NASH, 363

National Archives, xiv

National Communications Service, 

169

National Coordinator for Security,

Infrastructure Protection, 

and Counterterrorism, 353

National Defense University, 324

National Munitions Control 

Board, 38

National Security Agency (NSA), 

45fig, 168, 169, 278, 323, 

402

National Security Council (NSC), 

147, 240, 272, 277, 280, 

344, 347, 355, 360

NSC-68, 125

NSC Action 1868, 148

National War College, 172

Naval Academy, U.S., 380fig

Naval Intelligence (ONI), Office 

of, 42, 50, 60, 73

Naval Research Laboratory, 137

Navy Criminal Investigative 

Service, 344

Navy, U.S. Department of, 11, 15, 

18, 20, 45, 85

Nazis: 

espionage by, 35

French defeat by, 40, 43, 44fig
432

U.S. monitoring of, 51 

World War II's start, 40 

Near East, 103 

Near Eastern Aairs, Bureau of, 

203 

Neese, John L., , Jr., 135g, 

143g

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 161g

Nepal, 375g

Netherlands, xvii-xviii, 3, 40, 44, 

200 

Network Monitoring Center 

(Oce of Computer 

Security), 362g

Neutrality Act (1935), 37-38, 40 

New Embassy Oce Building 

(NOB). See U.S. Embassy, 

Moscow 

New Independent States, 360 

New York Despatch Agent, xxi, xxv 

New York Field Oce, 9, 18, 38, 

132, 142 

New York Herald-Tribune, 88, 90 

New York Police Department 

(NYPD), 182, 234g, 

235-236, 238-240, 302 

New York Times, 74, 360 

Newfoundland, xxivg, xxvg

Newland, Paul, 135g

Nguyen Van ieu, 199 g

Nicholson, Donald L, 85, 124 

Nickles, David, xiv 

Nigeria, 183, 201 

Nisei, 51 

Nitze, Paul, 79, 125 

Nixon, Richard M.: 

Chinese Peoples Republic-U.S. 

relations, 211 

détente policy of, 233, 315 

negotiation with terrorists, 

215-216 

Otepka appointment to SACB,

174

protection of foreign dignitaries, 

209-210, 241 

response to Munich hostage 

crisis, 213 

Whittaker Chambers' 

testimony, 89g, 90, 

91fig

Noel, Cleo, Jr., 215g, 216-218 

Nomura, Kichisaburo, 52g

Non-Civil Service applicants, 88g

Non Partisan League, 13 

Noor, Queen of Jordan, 276g

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), 84g, 396 

Northwest Executive Oce 

Building, xxg

Norway, 40, 44-45, 200, 206g

Nosair, El Sayyid, 351 

Nosenko, Yuriy Ivanovich, 177 

Nova Scotia, xxvg

Nowakowski, Julian, 95 

NSC-68, 125 

NSC-5427, 149 

NSC Action 1868, 148 

NSDD-145, 323 

NSDD-211, 323

Ntaryamira, Cyprien, 341 

Ntibantunganya, Sylvestre, 

342-343 

Nuclear testing, 121,123 

Nuclear weapons smuggling, 

146g, 147 

Nye, Gerald R., 37, 54 

Nye, Joseph M., 2, 7g, 8-9, 13, 

16-17, 54 

O 

Oakley, Robert, 287 

Oceans and International 

Environmental Aairs, 

Bureau of, 361 

O'Connell, James, 9 

O'Connor, Daniel E., 404g

Ocial Secrets Act (UK), 45 

Ohio County (WV) Women's 

Republican Club, 122 

Oklahoma City federal building 

bombing (1995), 334,

344, 348, 351 

Olbrich, Ruth M., 135g

Olympic Games, 334, 338-339, 

381g, 388, 390g

Oman, 273, 346 

 and Anti-Terrorism Act

Omnibus Diplomatic Security 

(1986), 286, 309, 407,

409-411

O'Neal, Jennifer, xiv 

O'Neill, Irene F., 135g

Open Forum, 216-217, 217-218

Operation Condor, 238 

Operation Desert Shield, 318 

Operation Desert Storm, 318 

Operation Gunman, 278 

Operation Innite Reach, 353 

Operation Southern Watch, 346 

Operations Center, 224 

Order of Leopold, 17 

Oregon, xxii 

Organization of American States 

(OAS), 396 

Orient Express, 20g

Orrick, William H., Jr., 167, 169

Orrick Committee, 169 

Otepka, Otto, 130, 143g, 161, 

166, 170-175, 180g, 188

Otto, John, 229g 

Overseas Building Operations, 

316, 381 

Overseas missions. See Embassies 

Overseas Operations Division 

(OPS), 226 

Overseas Presence Advisory Panel 

(OPAP), 358 

Overseas Programs Division, 339 

Overseas Security Advisory 

Council (OSAC), 305-306, 

349, 380, 389, 396 

Overseas Security Electronic 

Bulletin Board, 306 

Overseas Security Policy Group, 

272, 277, 318-319, 382 

Overseas security program, 81, 

84-85, 134 

Owens, W. Leroy, 135g, 143 
433

P

Pacheco, Elena, 100fig

Padley, Fred, 186fig

Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza Shah, 

206, 256-257

Pakistan, 103, 255-258, 288, 

341, 376fig, 386fig, 403fig

Palestine, 71, 96-99

Pan American Airlines, 41-42, 

305

Pan American Flight 103, 304, 

306

Pan American Games, 338-339

Panuch, Joseph A., 79-81, 84, 

125

Papen, Franz von, 3fig, 4

Paraguay, 238

Park Police, U.S., 212

Parke, Capt. Lee W., 61fig

Parks, Michael, xiii

Passport Bureau, U.S., 39

Passport Division, 76, 105, 134

Passport Office, 134

Passport to Danger (TV series), 

144-145

Passports: 

Army couriers' use of 

diplomatic, 15

controls over issuance of, 5

denial to Communists of, 19

destruction during wartime of, 

52

of International Brigade 

volunteers, 37fig, 

38-39

investigation of fraud cases, xi, 

xiifig, 19, 106, 

336-337, 391-392, 

398fig, 399, 401

Paul VI, Pope, 188fig

Payment of Rewards for 

Information Act, 276

Peace dividends, 318, 333-334, 

358-359

Pearce, Helen P., 135fig

Pearl, Daniel, 376fig

Pearl Harbor bombing, 35, 47, 

52, 401

Peaslee, Amos J., 12fig, 13, 15

Pedersen, Richard, 162fig

Pedophiles, 392fig

Pelczynski, Casper, xiii

Pell, Claiborne, 287, 407

Penn, Bill, 280

Perdew, John F., 223, 241, 260, 

267

DS role of, 226fig

Perestroika, 317

Perkins, George W., 94

Pershing, Gen. John J., 12fig, 13

Persia, xvii

Persian Gulf, 346-347, 350, 358

Personal Protective Security Unit 

(PPSU) (USMC), 221

Personnel Management, Office of, 

272

Personnel, Office of, 129, 138

Personnel security: 

in Bannerman's three-point 

program, 75-77, 85, 

106

carrying of firearms by agents, 

150

chain of command for, 124fig

during World War I, 2-3 

guarding the Secretary of State, 

xxiii, 52, 84-85, 

95fig, 130fig, 

151-152, 184, 

206-208, 239, 300, 

302-303, 337, 347, 

392

investigating the investigators 

for, 79-80

SY's emphasis on, 142

for visiting dignitaries, 8-9, 

16-17, 84-85, 150, 

151fig, 181-188, 197, 

209, 234-239, 

263-266, 317fig, 339

in the World War II era, 46-49

Personnel Security Board, 87-88

Peru, 373fig, 389fig

Pessoa, Epitácio, 17

Petherick, Charles J., 22

Petro, Joe, 349fig

Pett, Saul, 76fig

Peurifoy, John E., 84, 123, 128

Phishing attacks, 398fig

Phone cameras, 401

Phone taps, 7, 45

Physical security: 

Assistant Security Officer for, 

72

in Bannerman's three-point 

program, 75, 106

building access controls, 5-6, 

49-50, 105

current standards for, 382, 392

in early United States, xx, xxv

at Main State building, 72, 

142-143, 164, 240fig, 

282, 303, 396fig

standards in former Soviet bloc 

countries, 345

surveying, 269

training program for, 82

in the World War II era, 

46-47, 52-53, 73

Physical Security Branch, 105

Physical Security Division, 138, 

150-151, 166, 300

Piatek, Bernard, 99

Pickering, Thomas R., 261, 

356-357, 360

Pinochet, Augusto, 238

Pirre, S., 143fig

Place, James E., 135fig

Plain documents, 56

Plane hijacking, 197fig

Pleasanton, Stephen, xx

Pluchinsky, Dennis, xiii, 223fig, 

351, 360

Poland, 16, 40, 59-60, 91, 

93-95, 99, 148, 161-163, 

178-180, 188

Policy Committee, 241

Policy Division, 225, 300

Policy Planning Council, 171
434

Polish secret police (UB), 95 

Polk, Frank L., 7, 10 

Pompidou, Claude, 209g, 210, 

241 

Pompidou, Georges, 209-210, 

234, 241 

Portugal, 55, 58, 198g, 205, 

284 

Post Oce Department, xxi, U.S., 6 

Postal inspectors, 6, 9-10, 17-18, 

80, 300 

Postal Service, U.S., 301 

Posters, 56g

Postmasters, 79-80 

Powell, Colin, 373g, 375g

Powell, Lewis, xxii-xxiii 

Powers, Gary, 162 

Prause, Heinz, 35 

Prengel, Alex, 136 

Presentation Division, 82 

"Preservation of State Secrets" 

(Soviet pamphlet), 149

President Harding, S.S., 38g

President's Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board (PFIAB), 

314, 316 

President's Loyalty Board, 86 

President's Loyalty Program, 

127g, 140 

President's Temporary 

commission on Employee

Loyalty, 86 

Préval, René, 344, 346g

Price Administration, Oce of, 23 

Price, Lonny, 338 

Professional Development, 300 

Progressive Labor Party, 206 

Prohibition, 18 

Project Management and 

Engineering Branch (DS), 

387 

Project Tophat, 349 

Protection Details (PRS), 226g

Protective Intelligence, 225 

Protective Liaison Sta, 223, 225 

Protective Research Section, 

186-187 

Protective security. See Personnel 

security 

Protective Security Division, 150, 

186-187, 225 

Protective Security Vehicle 

Program, 205 

Protective Services Branch, 

181-185 

Protective Services Division, 105, 

209 

Protective Support Section, 187, 

209 

Protocol, Oce of, 182g, 183 

Prussia, xxii 

Public Aairs Oce, xiv 

Public Law 37, 22g, 23 

Public Law 91-217, 234 

Public Law 94-196, 237 

Public Law 97-418, 265 

Public Law 99-93, 301 

Public Law 99-399, 286, 309, 

407, 409-411 

Public Law 104 (1955), 150 

Public Law 493, 186 

Puerto Rican nationalism, 152 

Pulitzer Prizes, 88 

Pumpkin Papers, 90, 91g

Putney, Lance, 208g

Q 

Qadda, Mu'ammar al-, 209, 

381g

Qatar, 346, 354 

Quainton, Anthony C. E., 240, 

334-337, 345, 348-349 

Quasi War (1798-1800), xx 

Quiñonez, Julia, 100g

R 

Racial discrimination, 182-184, 

188 

Radio Corporation of America 

(RCA), 98 

Radioactive material, 148 

Ralph J. Bunche Library, xiv 

Rand Corporation, 217 

Range and Locks Division, 283 

Raymond, E. Neill, 135g

Raynor, Hayden, 86g

Reagan, Ronald W.: 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security's

creation, 286-287 

electronic communication, 323 

embassy security, 262 

inauguration of, 257 

Lonetree-Bracy spy case, 314 

negotiation with terrorists, 

217-218 

Omnibus Diplomatic Security 

and Antiterrorism Act, 

407 

Operation Gunman, 278 

protection of foreign dignitaries,

264-265 

U.S. Embassy construction in 

Moscow, 316 

Records and Research Branch, 

186, 229 

Red Code, xxiv, 4, 10, 15, 45g

Redding, Robert J., 135g

Refugees, 47g, 48-49 

Regan, James S., 135g

Regional Diplomatic Courier 

Divisions, 306 

Regional Security Ocers (RSOs),

105, 132, 144g, 353g, 

354-357, 360-361, 

379-380, 388, 391, 402g

Regis, Peter, 135g

Reilly, Chris, 342 

Reilly, John F., 136g, 167, 

172-175, 188 

Reinventing government, 335 

Religious extremism, 375 

Renaissance, 395 

Rendeiro, John, xiii, 284, 343 

Republican Party, 86 

Research and Development 

Committee, 240 

Research and Information Support

Center (RISC), 349 
435

Resource Management, 300 

Restricted documents, 56-57 

Reuters, 224 

Rewards for Information program, 

276-277, 282, 285 

Rewards for Justice (RFJ) 

program, 285-286, 299, 

303-305, 340, 396, 401 

Ribera, Robert, 306 

Rice, Condoleezza, 378g, 380g

Riner, Je, 341 

Risk avoidance, 318, 335 

Risk management, 318, 335 

Roberts, Janet F., 135g

Rockefeller, Nelson A., 209 

Rogers, Doris, 229 

Rogers, Gladys, 215g, 228-229 

Rogers, John W., 319 

Rogers, W. A., 3g

Rogers, William P.: 

as chair of Committee to 

Combat Terrorism, 

213 

physical protection for, 

207-208, 239 

terrorism policies of, 204, 214, 

216 

Roman Empire, xvii 

Romania, 54g, 55, 85, 91-93, 

147-148 

Romero, Cesar, 144, 145g

Rooney, John J., 180-181 

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 

assignment of security 

responsibilities by, 50 

Churchill visit to U.S., 55 

depression-era security 

expansion, 33, 35g, 

36, 392 

P. L. 37, 23 

use of military couriers, 41 

visits by foreign dignitaries, 

181 

Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreement 

(1933), 33 

Root, Elihu, 11 

Rosenberg, Ethel, 125, 127 

Rosenberg, Julius, 125, 127 

Rosetti, Joseph, xiiig, 226g

Rostow, Walt W., 170-171 

Rountree, William M., 86g

Roy, J. Stapleton, 362 

Royer, Antoinette, 100g

Rudman, Warren, 275, 407 

Rumania, 54g, 55, 85, 91-93, 

147-148 

Rumrich, Guenther Gustave, 39 

Runkel, Maggie, 207, 208g

Rusk, Dean: 

discrimination against visiting 

dignitaries, 183-184 

Gentile appointment, 162, 

180g

Inman Panel, 275 

Kennedy funeral, 185, 186g

Marine Security Guards, 137g

Otepka case, 170, 174-175 

physical protection for, 151, 

184, 185g, 206-207 

Russell, Donald S., 80-81 

Russian Empire, 2-4, 8, 16, 19 

Russian Federation, 322, 338, 

391g

Russian Revolution (1917), 19 

Rwanda, 341, 354 

S 

Sabotage, 4-6 

Saeed, Omar, 376g

Safe havens, 220g, 221-222, 241 

Saint Patrick's Cathedral, New 

York, 350 

Salmon, Larry, 342 

Saltzman, Charles K., 138 

Sanjuan, Pedro, 183, 188 

Sapir, Pinhas, 212 

Sartain, Richard, 223g

Satterthwaite, Joseph, 99 

Saud Al Faisal, Prince, 389 

Saudi Arabia, 318 

Al-Khobar Towers bombing, 

346-349, 351, 358 

Hillary Clinton visit to, 389g

partition of Palestine, 96 

U.S. Embassy security 

improvements at, 358 

U.S. Marine guards in, 103 

Saudi National Guard, 346 

Sayre, Robert M., 265, 268, 

271-276 

Scali, John, 211 

Scarbeck, Irvin C., 161, 163, 224,

301 

Schlesinger, James, 314, 316, 

320g, 322 

School of the Americas, 284 

Schwartz, Louis, Jr., 301g

Scowcroft, Brent, 275 

Screening Committee, 123 

Seabees, U.S. Navy: 

armoring cars, 203, 205g, 

207 

construction and repair of U.S. 

embassies, 179-180, 

188, 233, 266, 

311-312 

East African Embassy 

bombings, 353 

increase in numbers of, 276, 

282-283 

Seals, 10 

Secret documents, 56-57 

Secret Intelligence, Bureau of, 6-7 

Secret Service: 

Chief Special Agent liaison 

with, 18 

German espionage plans, 5-6 

interagency review panel for 

domestic security, 362

Olympics security, 339 

Presidential protection by, 207 

protection of foreign dignitaries 

by, 17, 209g, 

210-212, 235-236, 

264, 344 

SAS manual procedures derived

from, 302 

Security of Information training 

lm used by, 83 
436

Secret Service Uniformed Division, 

265

Secretary of State, guarding of: 

xxiii, 52, 84-85, 95fig, 130fig, 

151-152, 184, 

206-208, 239, 300, 

302-303, 337, 347, 

392

See also individual Secretaries; 

Security Office (SY)

Secretary of State's Code, xxvi

Secure Chancery Facilities Plan for 

Embassy Moscow, 349

Secure Telephone Unit (STU) III, 

363

Security Advisory Board 

(State-War-Navy 

Coordinating Committee), 

81

Security and Consular Affairs, 

Bureau of (SCA), 134, 

140-141, 165, 171, 

181-182

Security and Investigations 

Division, 71, 83-85, 88

Security Augmentation Teams, 

355

Security Awareness Day, 303

Security awareness training, 81-85

Security clearances, 75-80, 86, 

166, 335

Security Committee, 76, 78fig, 

79-80

Security determination, 75-76

Security Division (SY): 

branches and functions of, 

105-106

building access controls, 105

establishment of, 71, 83-85

giving Office status to, 134

Green and Lodge Report, 

131-134, 136-137, 

152

homosexuals investigated by, 

128-130

Marine Security Guard 

program, 138

McCarthy's charges against the 

State Department, 

121-122, 124, 127

restructuring of, 105, 

142-144, 153

Security Task Force study of, 

104

Security Engineering Officers, 348

Security Enhancement Program 

(SEP), 259-262, 268-271, 

276-277, 288

Security Environment Threat List 

(SETL), 360

Security Evaluations staff, 75

Security Event Training program, 

339

Security Infrastructure Directorate, 

384

Security investigation procedures, 

78fig

Security Management System, 381, 

387fig

Security of Information (film), 

82-83

Security Office (OC/S), 324

Security Office (SY): 

administrative reforms, 

164-167

attacks and seizures of 

embassies, 255-258

centralizing of security-related 

tasks in, 268fig, 269

changing nature of, x

Congressional relations with, 

180-181

creation of, 60-61, 71, 72fig, 

74, 86, 399

equal opportunities for women 

in, 215fig, 228-229

expansion of, 256, 273-277, 

282-283, 289

Field's proposals for, 274-277

flagging of security risks by, 77, 

123

foreign dignitaries protected by, 

184-185, 188, 197

handbook revision, 173

integration of, 184fig

investigation of, 79-80

investigations of immorality, 

130

Lebanon role of, 269-272, 

279-281

listening devices uncovered by, 

163, 176-177

Marine Security Guard 

program, 138

merger into Division of Security 

and Investigations of, 

71, 83-84

during the 1960s, 161

organizational charts for, 

135tab, 143fig, 

167fig, 187fig, 225fig, 

227fig

Otepka case, 161, 170-173, 

175, 180fig

powers of, 140

raising of Security Division to 

status of, 134

reorganizations of, 142-144, 

153, 162, 165, 

167-168, 187, 

224-225, 227, 229, 

241, 335

security awareness training, 

81-83

Security Enhancement Program, 

259-262, 268-271

technology for embassy 

security, 260-261

during three phases of 

transformation, 

197-198

weapons as carried by agents of, 

150

See also individual divisions of 

SY; Diplomatic 

Security, Bureau of; 

Marine Security 

Guards; Secretary of 

State, guarding of

Security risks, 77, 123-124
437

Security survey teams, 269

Security Task Force, 104-105

Security training, 81-85

Security vulnerability assessments, 

347

Security Watch Committees, 201, 

203

Segregation, 17, 182-184

Seitz, Edward J., 375, 404fig

Selassie, Haile, 150fig

Selin, Ivan, 320, 322

Senate, U.S.: 

Foreign Relations Committee, 

122fig, 123, 126, 

270, 277, 340-341

Inter-American Affairs 

Subcommittee, 185fig

Internal Security Subcommittee, 

126, 167, 171-174

Resolution 231, 123

Select Committee on 

Intelligence, 316

State Department supplemental 

request, 282

Subcommittee of Two, 121, 

131-134, 136-137, 

152

Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 

information, 323

September eleventh attacks, xii, 

373fig, 392, 399, 401-403

Serbia, 8

Sergei (Soviet caretaker), 137

Service, John Stewart, 73-74, 122, 

126

Seward, William H., xxii-xxiii

Sex crimes, 378

Sharp, Robert S., 9, 18

Shea, Howard, 135fig

Shea, Terence, 199fig, 201fig

Shepherd, Gen. Lemuel, 138

Sherman, John, xxiv

Sherman, Wendy, 357

Sherrill, Henry Knox, 151fig

Shipkov, Mikhail, 94

Shipping Board, 18

Shultz, George: 

Anti-terrorism Assistance 

Program's 

management, 286

Bureau of Diplomatic Security's 

creation, 287fig, 299

improving security at overseas 

posts, 270-271

information revolution, 

322-323

Inman Panel, 274-275, 

285-286, 288fig, 

300fig, 407

Lonetree-Bracy spy case, 314

Overseas Security Advisory 

Council, 305, 349fig

physical protection for, 302

technical security, 279

U.S. Embassy construction in 

Moscow, 312, 316, 

320

Sierra Leone, 183

Signal intelligence office, 15-16

Simitière, Pierre E. de, xviifig

Single motherhood, 130

Sipes, John W., 86fig

Sirhan, Sirhan B., 216

Six-Day War (1967), 200

Skippon, Charles D., Jr., 135fig, 

143fig

Sky Marshals, 228

Smith, Col. Bernard L., 100fig

Smith, Brad, 303-304

Smith, Elizabeth B., 135fig

Smith, Thomas, 3

Smith-Mundt Act (1948), 89

Smoot, Harvey W., 135fig

Smyth, Richard T., 100fig

Smyth, Robert L., 86fig

Snider, Fred C., 136

Snow, Conrad E., 86fig, 88

Snowe, Olympia, 287, 314fig, 

315, 407

Sonoda, Sunao, 237

Sons of Liberty, xvii

Sorenson, Paul, xiii, 214

Sourwine, Julian G., 172-174

South America, xxi-xxii

South American Telegraph Co., 2

South Asia, 103

South Korea, 102

Soviet Cultural Institute, 176fig

Soviet espionage: 

Amtorg Trading Corporation, 

19

on Australian Embassy, 232

bugging of Great Seal, 

136-137, 153,

162-163, 175

in Canada, 76-77

Depression-era, 33-34

diplomatic pouches and 

baggage used in, 

146-148, 153

listening devices at U.S. 

Embassy, xii, 34, 

136-137, 153, 

161-163, 175-180, 

233-234, 277-279, 

310-317

Lonetree-Bracy case, 312-315

Manhattan Project spies, 123, 

125

microwaves used in, 176, 

230-232

obtaining U.S. unclassified 

material as, 144, 149

typewriter bugs, 232fig, 

277-279, 306, 308, 

310

See also Cold War

Soviet Union: 

Afghanistan role of, 266-267, 

338

Army Intelligence Officers as 

couriers in, 145-146

collapse of, 299, 317, 

333-334, 360, 378

détente, 199, 233, 315

fire at U.S. Embassy in, 

232-233, 321-322

German non-aggression pact 

with, 40
438

hotline with the United States, 

169 

imports from the United States, 

19 

Mt. Alto site for Embassy in 

Washington, 233, 

310, 315 

nuclear testing by, 121, 123 

occupation of Eastern Europe 

by, 59 

restrictions on travel by 

diplomats of, 148 

strategic intelligence restrictions 

on citizens of, 149 

treatment of U.S. Embassy 

custodians by, 58g, 

60 

U-2 plane shot down over, 162 

U.S. monitoring of travelers to, 

51 

U.S. passport forgeries in, 38 

See also Cold War; U.S. 

Embassy, Moscow 

Sow, Adam Malik, 183 

Spain, xvii, 3, 38, 46, 58, 359g

Spam, 384 

Spanish Civil War, 37g, 38-39, 

125-126 

Spaso House, 34, 136-137 

Special Agents, 2, 6-10 

Special Assignments Sta (SAS), 

225, 301-302 

Special Coordination Committee

(NSC), 240 

Special Embassy Program, 360 

Special Green Code, 4 

Special Investigations Sta, 301 

Special Liaison Committee, 174 

Special Program and Liaison Sta 

(A/SPL), 260-262, 271, 

275, 277 

Special Protocol Service Section 

(SPSS), 183 

Special Red Code, 4 

Special War Programs Division, 

75 

Specter, Arlen, 270 

Spence, Julius A., 135g

Spiers, Ronald, 274-277, 

281-282, 312 

Spyware, 398g

Sri Lanka, 102-103, 204 

St. Mars, Verne, 226g

Stalin, Joseph, 126 

Starr, Gregory B., xiv, 379g

State Department Main building: 

bombing at, 218-220 

Diplomatic Mail and Pouch 

Center in, 307 

Marine Security Guard training 

at, 138-139

murder in, 303 

physical security at, 72, 

142-143, 164-165, 

240g, 282, 303, 

396g

security breaches in, 361-362 

Uniformed Protective 

Division's role in, 

397g

State Department reorganization 

(1944), 72 

State-Navy-War Coordinating 

Committee (SNWCC), 61, 

81, 103 

Stcherbina, Tatiana, 47g, 48-49 

Steamships, xxii, xxvi 

Steinhardt, Laurence, 92 

Steinkolk, Roger, 135g

Stettinius, Edward R., 72-74 

Stevens, Arthur G., 86g

Stimson, Henry L., 19, 23 

Stimulus package, 387 

Stormer, R. Reed, 135g

Strategic Information Oce 

(Commerce Dept.), 149 

Strategic intelligence, 149 

Strategic Service, Oce of (OSS), 

73, 85 

Stuart, Wallace W., 100g

Subcommittee of Two, 121, 

131-134, 136-137, 152 

Submarine attacks, 8, 40-41 

Subversive Activities Control 

Board, 174 

Sudan, 197, 215g, 216-217, 

224, 353 

Sudetenland, 40 

Suicide bombings, 269-270, 

280g, 281, 399 

Sullivan, Stephen Eric, 376, 

404g

Sullivan, William H., 256

Summers, James A., 135g

Supreme Court, U.S., 143 

Surprise, Robert, xiii, 324-325 

Surveillance Detection Program, 

354-355, 401 

Swihart, James W., 86g

Swing, William, 343g

Switzerland, 53-54, 58g, 60 

Syria, 96-97, 210, 255-256 

T 

Taft, Robert, 141 

Taft, William Howard, 8 

Tajikistan, 337, 354 

Taliban, 398g

Tangiers, 91-92, 102 

Tanzania, 198, 334, 351g, 

352-353, 377, 379, 395 

Taylor, Francis X, xiii, 374g

Taylor, William B., xxi 

Technical security, xiv, 142, 166, 

178-179, 277-279, 300, 

336g, 381, 391 

Technical Services Division, 166, 

187, 225, 230 

Technical Surveillance 

Countermeasures 

Subcommittee, 272 

Tehran Embassy attack, 197, 

255-259, 288, 397 

Telegraphic security, xxiii-xxiv, 

xxvi, 2-4, 397-398 

Tenney, W. Davidson, 135g

Terranova, Joseph, 226g
439

Terrorism: 

Al-Khobar Towers bombing, 

346-349, 351, 358 

Al-Qaeda, 340, 351-353, 

392g

Atlanta Olympic Games 

bombing (1996), 

334, 339 

Beirut U.S. Embassy attacks, 

xii, 197, 201, 

255-256, 258, 262, 

267, 269-271, 

279-283, 288, 317, 

395 

Beirut U.S. Marine barracks 

bombing, 255, 262, 

271, 288, 317 

categories of, 360 

climate of, 218-224, 241 

diplomats as targets of, 

198-206, 266 

domestic, 218-219 

East African Embassy 

bombings, 334, 

351g, 352-355, 

360-361, 364, 377, 

379, 395, 397 

Iranian-sponsored, 351 

Islamabad Embassy attacks, 

257-258, 288 

Kuwait bombing, 273, 275g, 

277, 288, 395 

in Latin America, 200-204, 

216, 221-222 

Letelier assassination, 197, 

237-238 

Lockerbie bombing, 304, 306 

Munich hostage crisis, 197, 

212, 214-215, 241, 

338 

"no double standard" on threat 

information, 306 

Oklahoma City federal 

building bombing 

(1995), 334, 344, 

348, 351 

phases of, 197-198 

rise of, 197-198, 393-394 

September eleventh attacks, 

373g, 392, 399, 

401-403 

State Department in 

coordinating role 

against, 214

suicide bombings, 269-270, 

280g, 281 

Tehran Embassy attacks and 

hostage crisis, 197, 

255-259, 288, 397 

threat analysis and, 351 

Tripoli Embassy attacks, 258, 

288 

U.S. negotiation policies in case 

of, 215-216 

World Trade Center bombing 

(1993), 334, 340 

World Trade Center 

destruction (2001), 

373g, 392, 395g, 

399, 401-403 

Yemen U.S. Embassy bombing, 

383g

See also Rewards for Justice 

(RFJ) program 

Tet Oensive, 207 

ailand, 53, 73, 102, 209, 284 

ant, U, 188 g

atcher, Margaret, 265 g

ayer, Charles, 141 

omas, Henry, 83 

omas, John M., 238 

reat Analysis Group (TAG), 

198, 223-224, 241, 

269-270, 272, 283, 300, 

359 

reat category list, 269 

reat Investigations and Analysis 

Directorate (TIA), 377 

ree-point security program, 

75-78, 84-85, 105-106, 

393 

umb drives, 398 

urber, James, 14 

Timberlake, Clare H., 82 

Time, 40, 313 

Todd, Gene, 178 

Tolson, Jerome F., Jr., 232 

Tomseth, Victor, 257 

Toon, Malcolm, 232 

Top Secret documents, 57, 73, 82,

138 

Tophat project, 349 

Torricelli, Robert, 282 

Tracy, omas A., 260, 264, 

270-272, 277 

Training: 

air terrorism simulation, 301g

for allied security forces, xiiig, 

313g

for Army intelligence ocers, 

145-146 

controlled explosion exercise, 

xivg

decontamination drill, 402g

high-threat, 383g

for motorcade security, 394g

protective maneuvers, 285g

reaction drills for Marine 

Security Guards, 

393g

security awareness, 84-85, 106 

weapons familiarization, 397g

wrist grabs, xg

Training Center (DS), 386 

Training Services Division, 81-82 

Transjordan, 96-97, 210, 273 

Treasury, U.S. Department of, 6, 

83, 210, 213, 236-237, 

239, 264-265 

Treaty of Paris (1782), xviiig

Treband, F. W., Jr., 135g

Tripp, Scott, 237g

Trojan horses, 392 

Trout, Jim, 84g

True, Ralph, 95g

Truman Act (1946), 103 

Truman, Harry S: 

condentiality in loyalty 

investigations, 174 

Dewey's charges against, 90 

Great Seal bug, 136g, 137 
440

loyalty investigations, 86, 127 

McCarthy's charges against 

State Department, 

122-123 

National Security Agency 

created by, 168 

visits by foreign dignitaries, 

181 

Truman Act (1946), 103 

Tudda, Chris, xiv 

Tully, Francis R., 186 

Tully, Susan, xiv 

Tunisia, 205, 284 

Tupamaros, 202 

Turkey, 237, 262-263, 284 

Tutsis, 341-342 

Tydings, Millard, 125-126 

U 

U-2 a air, 162 

U-3, 18 

Uanna, William L., 142, 143 g

Ufundi Cooperative Building, 352 

Uganda, 267, 354 

Ukraine, 337 

Uniformed Protective Division, 

350 g, 397 g

Uniformed Protective O cer 

contract program, 303 

United Arab Emirates, 346 

United Kingdom (UK), 57, 

199 g, 203, 267 

American Revolution, xvii 

courier system, 21 

Foreign O ce, 21 

illicit import of liquor by 

Embassy of, 18 

Marine guards at U.S. Embassy 

in, 99 

Palestine mandate ended by, 

96-97 

Spanish Civil War volunteers 

"destination" as, 38 

U.S. use of postal service of, 16 

U.S. World War II sales of 

arms to, 40 

World War I, 3-5, 7-9 

United Nations General Assembly 

(UNGA), 151, 181, 

188 g, 212, 215, 235 g, 

342 g, 350 g, 383 

United Nations Security Council 

(UNSC), 162, 175 

United Nations (UN), 234-235, 

237-239, 265 

Commission on the Status of 

Women, 125 

International Law Commission, 

309 

protective detail at, 225, 226 g

Survey, Research, and 

Development Branch, 

126 

U.S. call for fewer Soviet 

workers at, 313 

United Press International, 224 

United States Information Service 

(USIS), 201 

Unrestricted documents, 57 

Unwed motherhood, 130 

Uruguay, 184, 202, 205, 238, 

284 

U.S. Ambassador to the United 

Nations, guarding of, 347 

U.S. Commission to Negotiate 

Peace, 15 

U.S. Embassy, Moscow: 

construction of, 233-234, 266, 

299, 310-316, 

320-321, 349-350 

res in, 232-233, 321-322 

fraternization policy, 350 

installation of shielding below 

5th Floor, 349 

listening devices in, xii, 34, 

136-137, 161, 

175-180, 188, 

233-234, 277-279, 

310-317 

microwave radiation in, 176, 

230-232 

Soviet withdrawal of employees 

from, 313 

typewriter bugs, 232 g, 

277-279, 306, 308, 

310 

U.S. Expeditionary Forces, 12 g, 

13 g

U.S. Express, xxi-xxii 

U.S. High Commissioner of 

Germany, 105 

U.S. News and World Report, 

312-313 

V 

Van Gorkom, Jerome W., 272, 

276-277 

Vance, Cyrus, 218, 234, 239 

Vanceboro Bridge, 4-5 

Vandivier, Philip F., xi g

Varros, George, 226 g

Vatican, xvii, 203 

Venice, xvii 

Vergennes, Comte de, xviii 

Versailles Conference (1919), 

13 g, 15 

Vice-President's Task Force on 

Combatting Terrorism, 407

Video conferencing, 401 

Vienna Convention (1815), 395 

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations (1961), 161, 

163-164, 181, 308 

Vietnam, 92, 184, 201, 205, 209,

315, 345 

Vietnam War: 

as Cold War struggle, 71 

Nguyen Van ieu visit, 199 g

protection of diplomats during,

188 g

protests against, 184, 199 g, 

200, 206-208 

State Department bombing as 

protest against, 219 

Vincent, John Carter, 126 

Viruses, computer, 384, 392, 398

Visa Division, 75, 105, 134 

Visa fraud, xi, xii g, 19, 48-49, 

106, 336, 377, 392, 398 g
441

Visa Oce, 134 

Volcanoes, 91 

Volstead Act (1920), 18 

Von Papen, Franz, 3g, 4 

Voss, Otto Hermann, 39 

Vulnerability assessments, 351 

Vulture, S.S., 12 

W 

Wager, Mary E., 100g

Waight, Jim, 229g

Waldheim, Kurt, 215 

Waldorf Astoria Hotel, 151, 

209-210, 237 

Wall Street Journal, 376g

Waller, Russ, 219g, 220, 261 

Wang Laboratories, Inc., 322g

Wang Oce, 363 

Wang system, 322g, 324, 362 

War Games (lm), 323 

War Information, Oce of 

(OWI), 56-57, 76 

War of 1812, xx 

War, U.S. Department of, 15-16,

18, 20, 23, 50, 58, 85, 

101 

Waring, Robert O., 217g

Warren Commission Report, 186 

Washington Naval Conference 

(1921-1922), 16-17 

Washington Regional Diplomatic 

Courier Division, 307 

Washington Witch Hunt

(Andrews), 88 

Wasson, omas C., 97 -98 

Watch Ocer Group (WOG), 

223-224 

Waterman, Henry S., 49 

Wathen, Lillian R., 135g

Weapons of mass destruction, 382 

Weather Underground, 218g, 

219 

Weinberger, Casper W., 255, 

287g, 313 

Weisenberg, Leslie, 22 

Welland Canal, 4-5 

Welles, Sumner, 39 

Wells, Kenneth, 73-74 

West, Benjamin, xviiig

Westwater, John H., 135g

White, Andrew D., xxvg

White, Franchot, 261 

White, Harry Dexter, 40, 77 

White, Rollie W., 135g

Whitehead, Blair, 135g

Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 10g

Williams, Dennis, 209 

Williams, G. Mennen, 182g

Wilson, Edwin C., 42g

Wilson, Woodrow, 4-8, 12g, 

13g, 15 

Wilson Magazine Camera 

Company, 50 

Winter Olympic and Paralympic 

Games, Vancouver (2010), 

390 

Wisecarver, Charlie, xiii 

Witch hunts, 88 

Witness program, 285 

Wolf, John, xiii, 261, 311 

Women, equal opportunities for, 

215g, 228-229 

Women Special Agents, 228 

Women's Action Organization, 

228 

Woods, Michael, 236g

Woodward, Stanley, 55 

Working Group on Terrorism and 

Extraordinary Dangers, 217 

Working Group on the 

Enhancement of Security, 

268-269, 271-272 

Works Progress Administration 

(WPA), 56g

World Tourists, Inc., 39 

World Trade Center bombing 

(1993), 334, 340 

World Trade Center destruction 

(2001), xii, 373g, 392, 

395g, 399, 401-403 

World War I, xii, xxvi-xxvii, 

1-13, 37 

World War II era, xii

communications security in, 

35-36, 40-46 

destruction of condential 

records during, 52 

diplomatic detentions in, 

52-56 

diplomatic security eorts' 

expansion during, 33 

embassy security in, 44, 46-49

information controls in, 56-58 

parallels to post 9/11 era, 

399-402 

physical security in, 46-47, 

52-53, 73 

post-liberation security 

problems, 59-60 

U.S. sales of arms to the United

Kingdom during, 40 

visa fraud in, 48-49 

World War III, 91 

Worldwide Personal Protective 

Services (WPPS) contracts, 

376 

Worms, computer, 398g

Y 

Y2K issue, 363 

Yardley, Herbert O., xxvi, 15-16, 

22-23 

Yeaton, Maj. Ivan D., 34 

Yemov, Aleksei G., 313 

Yeltsin, Boris, 334g

Yemen, 273, 383g

Yousef, Ramzi, 340-341 

Yugoslavia, 36, 93, 103, 145, 176

Yunis, Fawas, 304 

Z 

Zimmerman telegram, 11g

Zionism, 96