REVIEW OF FAA’S CALL TO ACTION PLAN FOR 

RUNWAY SAFETY 

Federal Aviation Administration

Report Number: AV-2010-071

Date Issued: July 21, 2010
U.S. Department of

Memorandum

Transportation

Office of the Secretary

of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

Subject: ACTION: FAA’s Call to Action Plan for 

Runway Safety

Federal Aviation Administration

Report Number AV-2010-071

Date: July 21, 2010

From: Lou E. Dixon

Principal Assistant Inspector General 

 for Auditing and Evaluation 

Reply to 

Attn. of: JA-1 

To: Federal Aviation Administrator

Runway safety is a top priority for all users of the National Airspace System, and 

runway incursions (potential collisions on airport runways) remain among the 

most critical safety concerns. In fiscal year (FY) 2008, the total number of runway 

incursions reached a 5-year high of 1,009. While they subsequently decreased to 

951 in FY 2009, this still represents a 30-percent increase since 2004. Reducing 

the risk of runway incursions is a key performance goal for the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) and requires heightened attention at all levels of the 

Agency as well as proactive efforts by airlines and airport operators. 

In August 2007, FAA, airline, and airport officials created a Call to Action Plan

(the Plan) for improving runway safety after several close calls at some of the 

Nation’s busiest airports. The Plan identified a series of short-, mid-, and longterm initiatives to reduce runway incursions. FAA also established a Runway 

Safety Council—a joint government/industry body to develop a systemic approach 

for improving runway safety. 

We conducted this audit at the request of Senator John Rockefeller and Senator 

Kay Bailey Hutchison of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Committee. Specifically, they asked that our office conduct a comprehensive 

review of the current state of aviation safety, including a focus on runway safety 

issues. Our audit objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of actions taken as a 

result of FAA’s Call to Action Plan for improving runway safety. 

We conducted the audit at eight airports and two airlines from January 2009

through April 2010 in accordance with government auditing standards prescribed 
2

by the Comptroller General of the United States. Exhibit A details our audit scope 

and methodology. Exhibit B lists locations visited or activities contacted.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

Since the Plan’s inception in 2007, the most serious runway incursions decreased 

from a total of 24 to 12 in FY 2009 (50 percent). While the Plan clearly had an 

impact on the reduction in serious incidents, there are a number of other factors 

that may have contributed to the decrease as well. First, airport operations have 

decreased by 14 percent since FY 2007; with fewer aircraft and vehicles on

runways and taxiways, there is less potential for runway incursions to occur. 

Second, important safety improvements were implemented at several major 

airports before the Plan was established. Finally, FAA’s runway incursion 

severity rating process can be inconsistent, subjective, and potentially susceptible 

to bias, making the accuracy of year-to-year comparisons of serious incidents 

questionable. 

Nevertheless, airport, airline, and air traffic control officials we spoke with 

credited the Plan for creating an environment of heightened attention about 

runway safety among all users—a substantial accomplishment. To date, FAA and 

industry stakeholders have implemented a series of short-term initiatives identified 

in the Plan. These include upgrading airport surface markings, completing safety 

reviews at high-risk airports, and improving pilot training and cockpit procedures 

during taxi operations. However, to achieve its overall goal of reducing runway 

incursions by 10 percent by FY 2013, FAA must follow through to set milestones 

for the Plan’s mid- and long-term initiatives as well. These include expediting key 

technologies to alert pilots when it is unsafe to enter a runway and ways to notify 

pilots of airport changes (such as temporarily closed runways or inoperable 

navigational aids). Ultimately, the success of the Plan depends on sustaining the

current momentum to complete all Plan initiatives. In the past, we found that 

FAA’s efforts diminished as it initially met its overall goal for reducing runway 

incursions only to later see a rebound in the total number of incidents.1

We are making a series of recommendations to ensure the initiatives of FAA’s 

Call to Action Plan are effectively implemented.

 

 1 OIG Report Number AV-2007-050, “Progress Has Been Made in Reducing Runway Incursions, but Recent 

Incidents Underscore the Need for Further Proactive Efforts,” May 24, 2007. OIG reports are available on our 

website: www.oig.dot.gov.
3

BACKGROUND

FAA defines a runway incursion as any incident involving an unauthorized 

aircraft, vehicle, or person on a runway.2

Runway incursions are also rated by severity (Categories A through D).

 Runway incursions are classified into 

three categories: (1) operational errors (when the actions of a controller cause an 

incident); (2) pilot deviations (when the actions of a pilot cause an incident); and 

(3) vehicle/pedestrian deviations (when the actions of a vehicle operator or 

pedestrian cause an incident).

3

Figure 1. Path of Category A Runway Incursion 

at LeHigh Valley International Airport

 Category 

A runway incursions (the most serious) represent incidents in which a collision 

was barely avoided. For example, on September 19, 2008, in Allentown, 

Pennsylvania, a Cessna 172 landed at Lehigh Valley International Airport and was 

unable to exit at the first taxiway as instructed. Meanwhile, the controller cleared 

a Mesa Airlines regional jet to take off from the same runway. During take-off, 

the Mesa crew heard the Cessna pilot tell the controller that he had missed his exit, 

saw the Cessna in front of them on the runway, and aborted their take off. 

However, the crew had to swerve the aircraft to miss the Cessna, and a collision 

was avoided by an estimated 10 feet (see figure 1).

Source: NTSB

Category D runway incursions (the least serious) are those incidents where there is 

no chance of a collision. These include incidents where an aircraft, vehicle, or 

person entered or crossed a runway without authorization but did not conflict with 

an aircraft. 

 2 This new definition corresponds with the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) definition and was 

adopted by the FAA at the start of FY 2008. 3 Guidance for program administration, including rating the severity of runway incursions, is contained in FAA 

Order 7050.1, Runway Safety Program.

Tire marks created by the Mesa Air 

regional jet as it veered around the 

Cessna aircraft
4

FAA has two goals for runway safety: (1) reduce Category A and B runway 

incursions to a rate of no more than 0.45 per million operations by the end of 

FY 2010—and maintain or improve that rate through FY 2013—and (2) reduce 

total runway incursions by 10 percent from the FY 2008 baseline by 2013. FAA’s 

Air Traffic Organization’s (ATO) Runway Safety Office is responsible for 

overseeing the Agency-wide runway safety program. However, three FAA lines 

of business are actually responsible for implementing specific runway safety 

actions: ATO (Terminal), Aviation Safety (Flight Standards), and Airports

Division. 

After several close calls involving commercial aircraft in 2007, the FAA 

Administrator met with aviation community leaders from airlines, airports, air 

traffic control and pilot unions, aerospace manufacturers, and FAA managers to 

identify ways to improve runway safety. The group developed a five-point, shortterm Call to Action Plan that was further expanded in 2008. It also identified midand long-term actions. Table 1 details the actions outlined in the Plan. 

Table 1. Summary of Call to Action Initiatives

Short-Term Actions

1. Within 60 days, conduct safety reviews at the airports where wrong runway departures and 

runway incursions are the greatest concern.

2. Within 60 days, disseminate information and training across the entire aviation industry.

3. Within 60 days, accelerate required airport signage and markings improvements at the top 

75 airports, ahead of FAA’s June 2008 deadline.

4. Within 60 days, review cockpit procedures and air traffic control (ATC) clearance procedures. 

5. Implement a voluntary self-reporting system for all air traffic controllers and technicians.

Mid-Term Actions

1. Accelerate the modernization of the Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) system to digitally 

communicate key information to pilots.

2. Accelerate runway status lights used to alert pilots of unsafe conditions.

3. Implement National Transportation Safety Board and Commercial Aviation Safety Team 

recommendations relating to air traffic clearances/phraseology and cross checking runway 

alignment.

Long-Term Actions

1. Deploy moving map cockpit displays that provide the capability to see other traffic and include 

conflict alerting.

2. Expedite the development of off-the-shelf, low-cost ground surveillance for smaller airports.

3. Modernize the aeronautical information dissemination program to permit distribution of graphic 

information, such as airfield construction diagrams.

Source: FAA’s Call to Action Plan
5

FACTORS OTHER THAN THOSE INCLUDED IN THE CALL TO 

ACTION PLAN HAVE LIKELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE DECREASE 

IN SERIOUS RUNWAY INCURSIONS

Since the Plan’s inception in FY 2007, the most serious runway incursions have 

decreased by 50 percent (from 24 to 12). While the Plan clearly had an impact on 

the reduction in serious incidents, there are a number of other factors that may 

have contributed to the decrease as well. We identified three such contributing 

factors. First, since FY 2007, airport operations have decreased by 14 percent,

resulting in fewer aircraft and vehicles using runways and taxiways, which

diminishes the potential for runway incursions to occur. 

Second, many safety improvements were made before or apart from the Plan. For 

example, at larger, more complex airports, such as Atlanta Hartsfield and Chicago 

O’Hare, controllers were providing more detailed taxi instructions to pilots than 

what was required by FAA orders before the Plan was established. At least 24 of 

the 75 commercial airports (32 percent) installed enhanced surface markings prior 

to the Plan’s inception. Additionally, officials at three airports we visited credited 

the use of end-around taxiways to the significant drop in their runway 

incursions—an initiative that was never included in the Plan.4

Third, FAA’s current process for rating the severity of runway incursions is highly 

subjective and has potential for bias; making comparisons to prior years less 

reliable. Runway incursion severity is currently determined by a panel of three 

subject matter experts (one each from the Airports, the Air Traffic, and Aviation 

Safety Organizations) who review and rate each incident. 

In 2007, FAA’s Air Traffic Safety Oversight Office (AOV) reported that the 

severity definitions contained in FAA’s Runway Safety Program guidance (FAA 

Order 7050.1) do not provide sufficient guidance to differentiate between 

classifications. For example, the guidance includes broad definitions such as 

“narrowly avoided” for classifying a Category A incident, “a significant potential” 

for classifying a Category B incident, and “ample time” for a Category C incident. 

AOV recommended that the ATO take corrective actions to standardize the

process for all runway incursions severity classifications. We identified similar 

concerns. For example, we evaluated a judgmental sample of serious runway 

incursions that occurred between FY 2007 and FY 2009 and found several runway 

incursions that appeared similar but had different ratings. As shown in table 2, 

aircraft involved in both of these runway incursions missed each other by 50 feet, 

but the one in FY 2007 was rated as a Category B incident while the FY 2009 

incident was rated as a Category C. 

 4 An end-around taxiway is a taxiway that is constructed around the perimeter of an airfield, thus reducing the need for 

pilots to use taxiways that cross an active runway.
6

Table 2. Similar Runway Incursions Caused by 

an Aircraft Crossing in Front of a Departure

Category B Runway Incursion,

FY 2007

Category C Runway Incursion,

FY 2009

At Los Angeles International Airport 

(LAX), the ground controller cleared a 

Boeing 737 pilot who had switched radio 

frequencies without authorization to cross 

the runway—while the local controller had 

cleared an Airbus 320 pilot for takeoff on 

the same runway. The Boeing 737 pilot 

questioned the clearance, but not until he 

crossed the hold-short line. The 

estimated horizontal proximity between 

the 2 aircraft was 50 feet.

At Phoenix Deer Valley Airport (DVT), a 

Piper PA28A pilot took the crossing 

clearance for another aircraft and taxied 

across the runway hold-short line without 

authorization, conflicting with a departing 

aircraft. The closest horizontal separation 

reported between the 2 aircraft was 

50 feet.

Source: OIG analysis of FAA’s Runway Incursion Database

Further, there is little or no documentation on how the panel of subject matter 

experts determined the severity rating. FAA’s Runway Safety Program guidance 

does not explicitly require documentation to be maintained justifying the basis for 

the rating. Consequently, there is no audit trail that would allow a third party to 

replicate the panel’s decision-making logic in rating an incident’s severity. For 

example, if the three panel members cannot come to a unanimous agreement on a 

rating, the Runway Safety Office Director makes the final determination, yet no 

official records are maintained to document the Director’s justification for the 

rating.

We also found that when additional information is received, the database narrative

used in the rating determination is not updated. For example, we questioned the 

severity rating of a Category C incident because the narrative indicated that the 

pilot took “evasive action” and missed the vehicle by “50 feet.” Based on similar 

incidents, it appeared to us that this incident should have been rated as a Category

A or B runway incursion. Through discussions with panel members, we 

determined that the panel had subsequently obtained the pilot’s statement, which 

indicated that he saw the vehicle one mile out, was aware of the vehicle’s location, 

and was able to safely maneuver to land. However, the database used to document 

the incident’s details and the panel’s decision was not updated to include this new 

information. This highlights the importance of properly documenting the basis for 

its severity rating so that third-party reviews can understand the process used to 

assign the rating.

The Runway Safety Program Office is modifying its guidance in response to 

AOV’s and our concerns. Also, FAA is working to implement an automated 

process to rate the severity of runway incursions that will reduce subjectivity and 

human bias in the rating process. However, the model still has limitations that 

restrict its use as a complete and independent replacement for an assessment panel. 
7

Figure 2. Enhanced Surface Markings at 

Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport

Source: OIG

For example, in an independent validation report, FAA contract evaluators noted 

that not all runway incursion scenarios (or factors within a scenario) can be 

included in the automated model. FAA is working to improve the reliability of the 

model; meanwhile, it must rely on the assessment panel to rate the severity of 

runway incursions.

FAA AND INDUSTRY MADE PROGRESS ON SHORT-TERM 

ACTIONS TO IMPROVE RUNWAY SAFETY 

Since the Plan’s inception in 2007, airport, airline, and air traffic officials have 

taken notable steps to implement the Plan’s short-term actions. These include 

enhancing surface markings at airports, improving airport vehicle driver training 

programs, and conducting safety reviews at high-risk airports to identify corrective 

actions. FAA also established a Runway Safety Council—a joint 

government/industry body to develop a systemic approach for improving runway 

safety. 

Airports Implemented Initiatives To Enhance Surface Markings and 

Employee Training

All 75 large, commercial airports enhanced their airport markings and signage 

(ahead of the FAA-mandated date of 

June 2008) to better alert pilots when 

they approach a runway entrance (see 

figure 2 for example). In March 2008, 

FAA expanded this effort by requiring 

smaller airports (those with less than 

1.5 million passenger enplanements)

to install enhanced taxiway centerline 

markings. Depending on the number 

of enplanements at their locations, 

airports must complete this action by 

either December 31, 2009, or 

December 31, 2010. 

In response to the Plan, airports were 

also encouraged to require recurrent 

training for anyone who operates a vehicle on taxiways or runways. As a result, 

all 560 certificated airports now require initial and recurrent training for airport 

employees (e.g., vehicle drivers), and 555 of the 560 certificated airports require it 

for non-airport employees (e.g., airline or construction workers) as well.
8

Finally, local airport, air traffic, and 

pilot representatives conducted safety 

reviews at 42 airports and identified

airport-specific actions needed to 

address safety risks, as required by 

the Plan. For example, as shown in 

figure 3, at San Francisco 

International Airport, a surface 

painted taxiway directional sign was 

installed to prevent serious runway 

incursions that occurred when pilots 

on this taxiway (i.e., Taxiway C) did 

not turn onto Taxiway E as instructed 

and instead entered an active runway

located on the other side of Taxiway E. Air traffic also adopted a procedure that 

required all aircraft that are originating from that side of the airport (mostly 

general aviation) but departing from the other side of the airport to use the endaround taxiway, thus avoiding any runway crossings. As a result of these efforts, 

surface/runway incidents in the area of the intersection of Taxiways C and E have 

been eliminated.

Airlines Made Progress on Pilot Training Initiatives

As called for in the Plan, commercial air carriers committed to providing more 

realistic pilot training for taxiing aircraft from the gate to the runway. For 

example, the two airlines we visited require pilots to practice complex taxi 

procedures during simulator training. Commercial air carriers also reviewed their 

cockpit procedures and eliminated distractions during taxi operations. For 

example, one airline we visited eliminated six of the seven items in the taxi-out 

checklist to reduce distractions. However, these actions were voluntary, not 

mandated; therefore, FAA must continually oversee airlines’ procedures and 

training to ensure they maintain these safety improvements. To its credit, FAA 

Flight Standards personnel indicated that they are developing an inspection 

checklist for inspectors to use during reviews of airline runway safety programs. 

The ATO Is Implementing Air Traffic Control Safety Initiatives 

The Plan required the ATO to improve clearance procedures and implement a 

voluntary safety reporting system for air traffic controllers. FAA performed an 

extensive review of air traffic control procedures, resulting in six new changes to 

improve runway safety. Two procedures have been implemented: (1) controllers 

must provide pilots with explicit taxi instructions to the assigned runway and 

(2) an aircraft must be clear of all intermediate runways before receiving a 

departure clearance. The remaining four procedures involve eliminating implied 

Figure 3. Surface Painted Taxiway Directional 

Sign at San Francisco International Airport

Source: OIG

Taxiway E

Taxiway C

New

directional 

sign
9

runway crossings, requiring specific clearance for explicit runway-to-runway 

crossings, setting new limitations on multiple landings clearances, and adopting

international phraseology to clear departing aircraft on the runway.5

FAA also began implementing its Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP) to 

provide controllers with an anonymous means to report potential safety concerns. 

ATSAP has been implemented at air traffic facilities in the Central and Western 

Service areas. Air traffic facilities in the Eastern Service Area are scheduled for 

completion in FY 2010. Early indications are that ATSAP has had a positive 

impact in identifying and mitigating safety concerns. For example: 

 These 

changes are scheduled for implementation in 2010.

• At one location, an airline was using limited flaps to save fuel, which led to 

pilots missing the high-speed taxiway exit. The pilots would then mistakenly 

turn at the next intersection, which was an active runway. As a result of ATSAP 

and pilot reports, the airline was able to educate crews on what to do if they miss 

the high-speed taxiway. 

• At another location, an ATSAP report identified a visibility problem in the 

tower where controllers could not see some areas of the runway. This report 

resulted in the removal or relocation of equipment, which allowed controllers to 

see aircraft on both sides of the airfield.

FAA Established a Runway Safety Council To Improve Runway Safety

FAA established the Runway Safety Council on October 29, 2008, as a joint 

government and industry body to develop a systemic approach to improving 

runway safety. A key focus of the Council is the Root Cause Analysis Team 

(RCAT), which was established to analyze serious runway incursions and make 

safety recommendations to the Council. As of December 2009, however, the 

RCAT has completed reviews for only two runway incursions and has not made 

any recommendations to the Council. While the program has had a slow start, 

FAA officials expect future reviews to take less time. 

 5 Implied runway crossings allow pilots to cross all runways en route to the assigned departure runway. With these

eliminated, air traffic control will instruct pilots to hold short of every runway en route to the departure runway and 

issue separate crossing clearances for each runway. Explicit runway-to-runway crossings will require pilots to 

obtain a specific clearance to cross each runway. Multiple landings clearances will limit the distance from the 

airfield before controllers can issue landing clearances to pilots. The adoption of international phraseology to clear 

departing aircraft onto the runway but not for take-off will require the use of “line-up and wait” phraseology, which 

is used by controllers in other countries. U.S. controllers currently use the phraseology “taxi into position and hold.”
10

FAA’S CALL TO ACTION PLAN LACKS SOME KEY SAFETY 

INITIATIVES AND A LONG-TERM STRATEGY

We found that FAA’s Call to Action Plan lacked critical components that could 

significantly reduce runway incursions. In particular, we identified two initiatives 

that should have been included in the Plan given their known safety benefits at 

airports: (1) adding “hotspot” information (potentially hazardous intersections) on 

FAA-published airport diagrams to warn general aviation pilots of areas where 

runway incursions most often occur and (2) implementing end-around taxiways at 

airports nationally—a critical safety enhancement because it reduces the need for 

pilots to cross runways. In addition, FAA has not taken steps to fully assess 

important longer-term safety initiatives included in the Plan (such as expediting 

technologies that provide alerts directly to pilots of impending runway incursions)

or set possible completion dates. Completing and improving Plan initiatives is 

important to fully address safety improvements agreed upon by all aviation 

stakeholders during the 2007 Call to Action. 

FAA Did Not Include Two Key Initiatives in the Plan 

FAA has made little progress in adding hotspot information to its own airport 

diagrams published by the National Aeronautical Charting Office (NACO).

6

However, as of September 24, 2009, only 35 of the 560 (6 percent) certificated 

airports have hotspots identified on their NACO airport diagrams. Further, FAA 

does not have a strategy to prioritize updates to NACO diagrams at high-risk 

airports. Only 8 of the 42 (19 percent) high-risk airports identified during the Call 

to Action had diagrams with known hotspots included. For example, both Fort 

Lauderdale Executive and DeKalb Peachtree general aviation airports have 

historically had a high number of runway incursions, but their airport diagrams 

have not been updated to include hotspots. 

In 

contrast, commercially available Jeppesen airport diagrams have included this 

information on their diagrams for years. Information on hotspots is especially 

important for general aviation pilots who are responsible for 70 percent of the 

runway incursions caused by pilots and are the primary users of the NACO airport 

diagrams. In fact, the organization that represents general aviation, the Aircraft 

Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), indicated that it has been trying to get 

FAA to add hotspots on these diagrams for over 2 years. 

In addition, FAA does not have a national plan to identify and install end-around 

taxiways at airports where feasible. End-around taxiways (taxiways around the 

perimeter of an airfield) are one of the most effective means to prevent runway 

 6 Both the FAA and Jeppesen diagrams generally contain the same information but may be presented differently. 

Jeppesen charts are obtained from the company with a subscription cost, and FAA charts can be obtained from its 

online website at no cost. Hardcopies of FAA charts can also be obtained at a minimal cost.
11

incursions because they reduce the need for aircraft to use taxiways that cross 

runways. At three of the eight airports we visited, officials attributed the 

significant drop in their runway incursions to the use of end-around taxiways. For 

example, Atlanta Hartsfield opened an end-around taxiway in April 2007 (see 

figure 4), thus allowing air traffic control to eliminate approximately 600 runway 

crossings daily. Runway incursions at Atlanta Hartsfield decreased from 22 in 

FY 2008 to 15 in FY 2009, which, according to the air traffic manager, was due in 

part to the use of the end-around taxiway. 

Figure 4. End-Around Taxiway at 

Atlanta Hartsfield Jackson International Airport.

 Source: OIG and FAA

FAA Has Not Implemented Mid- and Long-Term Call to Action 

Initiatives

While FAA has made substantial progress with the Plan’s short-term initiatives, it 

has not fully vetted mid- and long-term initiatives identified in the Plan or set 

milestone dates. These initiatives include the following: 

• accelerating the Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) system to better communicate 

key information, such as runway and taxiway closures or construction.

• accelerating runway status lights used to alert pilots of unsafe conditions.

7

• implementing National Transportation Safety Board and Commercial Aviation 

Safety Team recommendations to improve air traffic clearances/phraseology 

and cross checking runway alignment procedures.

• deploying moving map cockpit displays that provide the capability to see other 

traffic and include conflict alerting.

 7 For further information on this system see OIG Report Number AV-2008-021, “FAA’s Implementation of Runway 

Status Lights,” January 14, 2008. 

End-Around Taxiway V 

at Atlanta Airport
12

• expediting off-the-shelf, low-cost ground surveillance systems at smaller 

airports.

• modernizing the aeronautical information dissemination program to permit the 

distribution of graphic information, such as airfield construction diagrams. 

These initiatives are important for reducing the risk of future runway accidents. 

For example, both runway status lights and moving map display technologies 

include conflict alert capabilities that provide direct warnings to pilots of 

impending incursions—a longstanding NTSB recommendation because pilots 

provide the first line of defense in preventing runway accidents. At the time of our 

review, however, FAA had not yet established a plan for expediting the 

implementation of these initiatives. 

FAA’S NATIONAL PLAN FOR RUNWAY SAFETY IS INCOMPLETE 

AND LACKS ACCOUNTABILITY 

We found that FAA’s National Plan for Runway Safety (the National Plan), which 

is FAA’s program for improving runway safety on an ongoing basis, did not 

include key initiatives and lacked accountability mechanisms to ensure runway 

safety remains a priority. The Call to Action Plan was a one-time event designed 

to reinvigorate runway safety efforts due to close calls that occurred in 2007. To 

ensure runway safety is addressed on a continuous basis, FAA’s Runway Safety 

Office is responsible for developing a National Plan, which identifies activities it 

plans to take to improve runway safety. The National Plan is developed in 

coordination with other FAA lines of business and the aviation community and is 

separate from the Call to Action Plan.

In May 2007, we reported that FAA no longer prepared the National Plan and that 

greater authority and accountability at the national level was needed to ensure 

runway safety remains a top priority for all FAA lines of business. The National 

Plan is a critical mechanism for setting FAA’s current and long-term strategies and 

initiatives for improving runway safety and holding responsible organizations 

accountable for the timely implementation of runway safety initiatives. In 

response to our report, FAA reestablished its National Plan in December 2008—

6 years after its last plan was issued in July 2002. However, we found that the 

December 2008 National Plan was incomplete. Specifically, it did not include 

three of the six mid- and long-term initiatives identified during the Call to Action 

Plan nor did it include initiatives for hotspots or end-around taxiways. 

The National Plan also did not consistently include milestones, identify 

responsible organizations and resources, or include metrics for measuring the 

effectiveness of actions taken as required by FAA Order 7050.1 (Runway Safety 
13

Program). For example, the National Plan included 25 initiatives identified as 

next steps following the Call to Action Plan; however, 24 lacked milestones and 

all 25 lacked required resources and metrics for measuring their effectiveness. 

The National Plan also included five initiatives to improve pilot training and 

instruction, yet it did not identify milestones, resources, or metrics. Without clear 

responsibilities and set milestones, FAA will not have a mechanism to ensure 

planned actions are completed in a timely manner. 

Since 1997, we have been reporting on the need to improve program 

accountability within FAA’s Runway Safety Program. While the Runway Safety 

Office is responsible for the overall management of FAA’s runway safety 

program, it is the responsibility of other FAA offices to ensure individual 

initiatives are implemented. As such, runway safety is a shared responsibility 

among the various FAA lines of business. For example, it is the responsibility of 

the ATO to ensure changes to air traffic procedures are implemented timely, the 

responsibility of Flight Standards to ensure pilots are properly trained, and the 

responsibility of the Airports Division to ensure runway markings are installed 

properly. However, as shown in figure 5, the current alignment of the Runway 

Safety Office within the ATO limits the ability of the Director to hold other FAA 

organizations accountable for implementing initiatives since those organizations 

are outside his authority. 

Figure 5. Key FAA Lines of Business Responsible for Runway Safety

Source: OIG
14

In 2001, we recommended that FAA consider realigning the Runway Safety 

Office under the Deputy Administrator.8

CONCLUSION

 In its response, FAA stated that it would 

evaluate the recommended realignment as part of the ATO development. 

However, the position was never aligned under the Deputy Administrator. By 

aligning the Runway Safety Office outside of FAA’s operational lines of business, 

FAA would be better able to hold individual lines of business accountable and 

ensure that runway safety remains a priority. This is vital to allow continued 

improvement in runway safety including follow through on incomplete initiatives.

Reducing the risk of runway incursions is a critical part of FAA’s primary mission 

to oversee and enhance the margin of safety of the National Airspace System. 

While the number of serious runway incursions has declined since 2007, it is 

important that FAA complete its efforts to prevent runway accidents. In the past, 

we found that FAA’s actions to improve runway safety diminished as it met its 

overall goals for reducing runway incursions. Sustained commitment along with 

adequate resources and executive level attention will be crucial to achieving longterm results in this important safety area. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure that all actions identified by FAA and industry stakeholders during the 

2007 Call to Action are addressed, we recommend that FAA:

1. Establish milestones for the implementation of mid- and long-term initiatives 

identified during the Call to Action Plan and include these initiatives in 

FAA’s National Runway Safety Plan.

In addition to completing the initiatives identified in the Call to Action Plan, we 

recommend that FAA:

2. Require that the basis for runway incursions severity ratings be clearly 

documented in a consistent manner to provide an audit trail for third-party 

review and replication of the rating process.

3. Establish milestones and responsibilities for identifying runway “hotspots” 

on FAA-published airport diagrams and include this initiative in FAA’s 

National Plan for Runway Safety.

 8 OIG Report Number AV-2001-066, “Despite Significant Management Focus, Further Actions Are Needed To 

Reduce Runway Incursions,” June 26, 2009.
15

4. Develop a plan and establish timelines for constructing end-around taxiways 

at airports (where such actions are feasible) and include this initiative in 

FAA’s National Plan for Runway Safety.

5. Revise FAA’s National Plan for Runway Safety to include the responsible 

FAA office, specific milestones, and metrics for each initiative.

6. Realign the Runway Safety Office outside of FAA’s operational lines of

business, such as directly reporting to the Deputy Administrator.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

RESPONSE

We provided FAA with a draft copy of this report on May 3, 2010, for comment

and received FAA’s response on June 18, 2010. In its response, FAA emphasized 

the positive impact it believes the Call to Action Plan has had on the reduction in 

serious incidents and stressed that it has built controls into its severity rating 

process. In addressing our specific recommendations, FAA fully concurred with 

recommendations 1, 2, 3, and 5 and provided reasonable timeframes for 

completing the planned actions. FAA partially concurred with recommendations 

4 and 6 but proposed acceptable alternative courses of action with reasonable 

timeframes. With regard to recommendation 4, FAA agreed that end-around 

taxiways do reduce runway crossings. FAA proposed, however, to first review 

(and potentially update) the criteria for evaluating the justification and feasibility 

of more end-around taxiways since they can also add certain risks if installed with 

insufficient clearances from active runways. With regard to recommendation 6, 

FAA stated that while it believes the Runway Safety Office has demonstrated 

effectiveness, the Agency is committed to continually improving its safety 

initiatives and will periodically review organizational structures and processes.

ACTIONS REQUIRED 

We consider all six recommendations resolved as addressed but open pending 

completion of the planned actions. We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation 

of FAA representatives during this audit. If you have any questions concerning 

this report, please contact me at (202) 366-1427 or Daniel Raville, Program 

Director, at (202) 366-1405.

#

cc: FAA Deputy Administrator

Martin Gertel, M-100

Anthony Williams, ABU-100
Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology

16

EXHIBIT A. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 through April 2010 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. The following scope and methodology were used in conducting this 

review. 

The audit included site visits to eight airports and two airlines, and fieldwork at 

FAA Headquarters in Washington, DC. We also interviewed pilot, controller, and 

general aviation industry associations and representatives from the National 

Transportation Safety Board (see exhibit B for list of all entities contacted or 

visited). 

To evaluate the impact and status of Call to Action initiatives, we interviewed

responsible FAA Headquarters personnel, industry personnel, and field personnel. 

We also reviewed related documentation (including local action plans) and 

physically verified the accomplishment of infrastructure improvements. We 

obtained runway incursion data from FAA’s national runway incursion database 

and compared incursion data from FY 2007 to FY 2009 to determine the impact 

the Plan had on runway incursions. We used FY 2007 as our base year to 

determine the impact of the Call to Action because this was the year in which the 

Plan was initiated. 

To evaluate other factors impacting runway incursions, we obtained the number 

airport operations from FAA’s Air Traffic Activity System and compared the 

number of operations from FY 2007 to FY 2009. We also reviewed specific 

actions taken at the airports and airlines we visited, and interviewed air traffic, 

airline, and airport personnel. Finally, to evaluate FAA’s process for rating the 

severity of runway incursions, we: (a) reviewed AOV’s 2007 audit report on the 

severity rating process and related correspondence, (b) reviewed FAA guidance 

contained in FAA Order 7050.1, (c) observed the process used by the panel to rate 

runway incursions, (d) selected a sample of runway incursions and reviewed 

related documentation, and (e) reviewed the validation report for the automated 

system to be used to rate incursions (Runway Incursion Severity Classification 

model). 

We judgmentally selected the eight air traffic control towers/airports we visited. 

Six were selected because they were among the 42 high risk airports identified as

part of the Call to Action surface reviews. Two additional facilities (Addison and 
17

Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology

Fort Worth Meacham) were selected because they had implemented the Air 

Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP) and also had a history of runway 

incursions.

Finally, we followed up on the status of FAA actions taken in response to the six 

recommendations in our May 2007 runway incursion report.

To determine the accuracy and completeness of the national runway incursion 

database, we judgmentally sampled runway incursion investigation reports and 

compared these reports to the runway incursions listed on the national runway 

incursion database.
Exhibit B. Entities Visited or Contacted

18

EXHIBIT B. ENTITIES VISITED OR CONTACTED 

FAA Headquarters in Washington, DC

• ATO – Safety Services (including the Runway Safety Office and Regional 

Runway Safety Program Managers)

• ATO – Terminal Services

• Aviation Safety – Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service

• Aviation Safety – Flight Standards Service

• Office of Airports

FAA Air Traffic Control Towers and Airport Operators

• Addison, Dallas, TX

• Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International, Atlanta, GA

• Dallas/Fort Worth International, Fort Worth, TX

• DeKalb Peachtree, Atlanta, GA

• Fort Lauderdale Executive, Fort Lauderdale, FL

• Fort Lauderdale Hollywood International, Fort Lauderdale, FL

• Fort Worth Meacham International, Fort Worth, TX

• San Francisco International, San Francisco, CA

Airlines, Industry Associations, and other Federal Agencies

• American Airlines

• Delta Airlines

• Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

• Air Line Pilots Association

• Airports Council International

• Air Transport Association

• National Air Traffic Controllers Association

• National Transportation Safety Board
Exhibit C. Major Contributors to This Report

19

EXHIBIT C. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT 

Dan Raville Program Director

Name Title

Mary E. (Liz) Hanson Project Manager

Mark Gonzales Senior Analyst

Karen B. Thompson Senior Analyst

Kevin Montgomery Analyst

Andrea Nossaman Writer-Editor
20

Appendix. Agency Comments

APPENDIX. AGENCY COMMENTS 

Federal Aviation 

Administration 

Memorandum

Date: June 18, 2010

To: Lou Dixon, Principal Assistant Inspector General for Auditing and Evaluation

From: Ramesh K. Punwani, Assistant Administrator for Financial Services/CFO

Prepared by: Anthony Williams, x79000

Subject: OIG Draft Report: FAA’s Call to Action Plan for Runway Safety Federal 

Aviation Administration

Runway safety is one of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) top priorities. An 

aggressive and effective FAA runway safety program has significantly reduced the number of 

serious runway incursions. While we are energized by the progress the FAA has made working 

together with airports and operators, we also recognize the need for and are committed to 

sustaining those achievements and continuing to improve runway safety.

The Call to Action has significantly increased safety at our nation's airports. The Call to Action 

Plan was jointly developed by the FAA, industry, and labor - and each committed to 

accomplishing the actions identified and to support a continuing effort to reduce runway 

incursions. Even though the Office Inspector General’s (OIG) draft report states, “most airport, 

airline, and air traffic control officials we spoke with all credited the Plan for creating an 

environment of heightened attention about runway safety among all users- a substantial 

accomplishment” the draft report gives very little credit to the Call to Action for the dramatic 

improvement in runway safety. We believe the data show otherwise.

Data Demonstrate Call to Action Plan Effectiveness

Available data demonstrate the significant positive effect the Plan has had on incursions as 

compared to the other factors cited in the OIG draft report. For example, the report points out the 

decrease in traffic and indicates this decrease may be contributing to an overall reduction in 

serious runway incursions. Traffic counts alone do not tell a convincing story. During fiscal years 

(FY) 2004 through 2006 the number of serious runway incursions increased despite the fact that 

traffic counts were decreasing. In FY's 2007 and 2008, the number of serious incursions increased 

slightly despite a 5 percent reduction in the number of operations. A 14 percent reduction in FY 
Appendix. Agency Comments

21

2009 traffic does not explain a 50 percent decrease in the number of serious incursions during the 

same time period. 

The OIG report also lacks recognition of the causality between surface safety improvements and 

actions taken pursuant to the Plan. Specifically, almost no credit for safety improvements is given 

to the focused Runway Safety Action Team (RSAT) visits to higher-risk airports. But when 

comparing events at the first 20 airports to receive the focused surface safety reviews that resulted 

from the Call to Action, the overall number of serious incursions at those airports was reduced by 

50 percent. Airport management at Dallas Fort Worth directly attributes much of the improved 

safety to the Call to Action safety analysis conducted and the airport adopting that format for 

continued quarterly safety meetings. The Call to Action risk items and approach were 

incorporated into the process used today on all RSATs. Almost all of these RSATs identify 

specific short-term measures to improve signage and markings, identify hot spots and other 

measures needed to improve pilot and driver situational awareness. The OIG report should more 

clearly recognize the successful contribution of RSATs to safety improvements. The significant 

reduction in serious incursions is system-wide and is, at least in part, an outcome of the call to 

action plan.

FAA Accurately Assessing Incursion Severity

We disagree with the OIG draft report’s characterization of the incursion severity rating process. 

A close examination of FY 2009 data by Runway Safety analysts demonstrates exceptional 

consistency among the results of the expert panels who rate the severity of an incursion. While we 

recognize that there is some subjectivity involved in assessing surface events, the data show that 

FAA has adequately controlled for that subjectivity and provided consistently accurate 

characterizations of these occurrences. We ask that OIG revise its characterization in the draft 

report, particularly in the Results in Brief section. That said, we are always open to constructive 

suggestions to improve our processes, and are committing to several improvements, as noted

below.

Documentation maintained on the assessment process indicates the events cited in Table 2 of the 

report were assigned different rankings because the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) 

incident involved two air carrier aircraft, both of which where still on the ground, when the 

departure missed the aircraft crossing the hold line by 37 feet. Documentation on the event at 

Phoenix Deer Valley Airport (DVT) indicated the departure took no unusual or evasive actions 

and was airborne at 150 feet or greater altitude when it passed the intersection where the other 

aircraft had crossed the hold line - thus a significantly lower risk of any possible collision. This 

type of distinction is the result of subject matter experts collecting and reviewing all available 

information when making severity determinations.

FAA Making Progress Implementing New Approaches to Reduce Incursions

FAA is working with new approaches and technologies to further reduce incursions and improve 

runway safety. Examples include Runway Status Lights (RWSL), low cost ground surveillance 

systems, and end around taxiways (EAT). The draft report’s discussion of three of these could 

better recognize the progress that has been achieved to date. 

The report faults the FAA for not accelerating the installation of RWSL, but does not give credit 

for the significant progress already achieved. An evaluation RWSL system was installed at LAX 

in a remarkably short time through a cooperative FAA/LAX effort. This system is in operation 
Appendix. Agency Comments

22

today and has already proven very effective. Another system is almost operational at BostonLogan Airport. The FAA has awarded a national contract for installing RWSL at 23 major 

airports.

Similarly, the draft report faults the FAA for not setting milestones for low cost ground 

surveillance systems (LCGS). While we agree that the test systems (at 5 airports) are just now 

being installed, the contracts awarded for these test systems include a delivery clause for the 

procurement of additional systems. This will significantly accelerate subsequent procurement and 

installation.

Finally, we share the OIG view that controlled end around taxiways (EAT) are a safety benefit 

because they reduce runway crossings. The FAA does have guidance for EAT installation, in 

AC 150/5300-13 change 4, and does encourage EAT use to improve efficiency and capacity at 

locations that can meet the standard. However, we are also aware of concerns that EATs installed 

with insufficient clearances from active runways can also add risk to our aviation system.

Runway safety remains one of the FAA’s top priorities. FAA has achieved tremendous progress 

in reducing the number of serious runway incursions and remains committed to further 

improvement.

Response to Recommendations:

OIG Recommendation 1. Establish milestones for the implementation of mid- and long-term 

initiatives identified during the Call to Action Plan and include these initiatives in FAA’s National 

Runway Safety Plan.

FAA Response: Concur. The Runway Safety Call to Action Mid/Long-Term Initiatives Action 

Plan Working Group convened on January 25, 2010 and April 8, 2010. The Working Group 

includes representatives from the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), Office of Airports, and 

Aviation Safety. The Working Group representatives provided schedules, milestones, and status 

updates for the actions required to implement the mid- and long-term initiatives. An Action Plan 

has been drafted and is in the process of being finalized. Pending review and approval by the

Working Group members, the Action Plan will be finalized and published by September 30, 2010.

It should be noted that many actions relating to mid- and long-term initiatives were well underway 

even before the effort to formalize the action plan. For example, Direct Notice to Airmen 

(NOTAM) entry by airport operators will enable FAA to improve the accuracy and timeliness of 

airport NOTAM information. Last year the FAA completed a safety analysis that will allow all 

airports with 24-hour air traffic control towers to enter NOTAMs into the automated NOTAM 

system. This direct entry system is scheduled to be demonstrated over the next six months at up to 

twelve airports. These airports include: Atlantic City (ACY), Memphis (MEM), BaltimoreWashington Thurgood Marshall (BWI), Norfolk, VA (ORF), Reagan National (DCA), Chicago 

O’Hare (ORD), Chicago Midway (MDW), Richmond (RIC), Denver (DEN), Washington Dulles 

(lAD), Fort Wayne (FWA), and Fairbanks (FAI).

Additional mid- and long term initiatives are also progressing. The Airport Traffic Situational

Awareness - Surface with Indications and Alerts (ATSA SURF-IA) program is developing traffic

display and alerting on electronic flight bags (EFB). This system will provide pilots and vehicle

drivers situational awareness through a GPS-like airport moving map display as well as direct
Appendix. Agency Comments

23

warnings to the cockpit or vehicle through indications of conflicting traffic or, in the case of

potential collisions, alerts to allow the potential situation to be mitigated. Flight testing for

requirement definition has already been performed at the Philadelphia International Airport and

the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, and the system performed satisfactorily. The SPR

(Safety, Performance, and Requirements) document development is scheduled to be completed in 

September 2010.

OIG Recommendation 2. Require that the basis for runway incursions severity ratings be clearly 

documented in a consistent manner to provide an audit trail for third-party review and replication 

of the rating process.

FAA Response: Concur. Although this was not specifically enumerated in the Call to Action 

Plan, the responsibility for the severity assessment process was shifted within the ATO Office of 

Safety to the Runway Safety Office on October 1, 2009. The documentation and rationale used 

during the assessment process is being retained to facilitate internal reviews and external audits. 

An updated FAA Order 7050.1, Runway Safety Program, describing the severity rating process 

has been coordinated and is being forwarded for signature. The order should be signed by 

September 30, 2010 A Standard Operating Procedure for severity classification is scheduled to be 

completed by November 30, 2010, and will define additional requirements to document team 

proceedings described in FAA Order 7050.1. The Runway Safety Office is committed to 

continuous improvement and the updated Runway Safety order also establishes a quarterly 

management review of severity classifications. The results of these reviews will be used to 

identify any remaining rating inconsistency or subjectivity and to implement methods to continue 

to improve the consistency of rankings.

OIG Recommendation 3. Establish milestones and responsibilities for identifying runway 

"hotspots" on FAA-published airport diagrams and include this initiative in FAA's National Plan 

for Runway Safety.

FAA Response: Concur. Currently 90 NACO airport diagrams have hotspots indicated. Each 

publication of NACO charts adds more hotspot data in the flight information publications. It is 

anticipated that all current hotspots will be depicted on NACO charts within the next six 

publication cycles (approximately April 2011). Airport diagrams will be regularly updated as 

additional hotspots are identified or a hotspot risk mitigated. Airports mentioned as not having hot 

spots depicted on the airport diagram (Atlanta Dekalb-Peachtree (PDK) and Fort Lauderdale 

Executive (FXE)) do have hot spots depicted on current publications. Supplemental information, 

such as pictures of these confusing areas with additional descriptions, has been published as 

kneeboard-sized charts (a common size and format for aeronautical information used by pilots) 

and tri-fold brochures. Much of this information is available on the Runway Safety Website.

Runway Safety fully agrees that adding hot spots to NACO diagrams where appropriate should be 

and is a high priority for the Office of Runway Safety. In addition, the Runway Safety Office has 

worked with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) to provide this information on 

their Airport Directory website.

OIG Recommendation 4. Develop a plan and establish timelines for constructing end-around

taxiways at airports (where such actions are feasible) and include this initiative in FAA's National 

Plan for Runway Safety.
Appendix. Agency Comments

24

FAA Response: Partially concur. Although EATs do reduce runway crossings, the FAA is

concerned that they can add also add risk by crossing in front of aircraft taking off or landing.

Accordingly, we believe it is premature to just proceed with developing a plan for installing more 

EATs. Instead, we propose to review (and potentially update) the criteria for evaluating the 

justification and feasibility of end-around taxiways at commercial service airports. This review 

will be complete by September 30, 2011.

OIG Recommendation 5. Revise FAA's National Plan for Runway Safety to include the

responsible FAA office, specific milestones, and metrics for each initiative.

FAA Response: Concur. The next publication of the National Plan occurs in FY 2011 (scheduled 

for December 2010). We are currently updating the plan and will incorporate the responsible 

office for each identifiable initiative. In addition, we will add milestones and metrics to each 

initiative (where applicable).

OIG Recommendation 6. Realign the Runway Safety Office outside of FAA's operational lines

of business, such as directly reporting to the Deputy Administrator.

FAA Response: Partially concur. As exemplified by FAA-wide actions taken as a result of the

call to action, the reduction in the total number of runway incursions and the dramatic reduction in 

serious runway incursions; the office has clearly demonstrated its effectiveness. However, we are 

committed to continually improving our safety initiatives and will periodically review

organizational structures and processes to that end.