Citi Global Credit Markets  Credit Quantitative Analysis

Market Commentary

Intended for Institutional Clients Only | CSS Market Commentary is not a product of Debt or Equity Research

May 16, 2017

The U.S. Corporate Bond Risk Premium and 

Market Liquidity

Analyzing Post Credit Crisis Increases in the Corporate Bond 

Risk Premium in the Context of Corporate Bond Market 

Liquidity

Each day we compute the price of risk in the U.S. corporate market as the average spread per 

unit of duration times spread (DTS) volatility. We call this the corporate bond risk premium. We 

observe that the average of those daily values has been consistently higher since the credit 

crisis of 2007-2009 and, along with other evidence, suggests that liquidity has decreased in the 

corporate bond market. 

Highlights: 

● The majority of buy- and sell-side market participants report that liquidity in the U.S. corporate bond 

market has decreased since the credit crisis of 2007-2009.

● Nevertheless, most traditional measures of market liquidity (i.e., bid/ask spreads, trading volumes, 

and price impact of trades) provide little support for decreases in corporate bond liquidity.

● Amid record new corporate bond issuance, the amount traded per face outstanding has decreased, 

and relative trading in illiquid assets has increased.

● One measure of liquidity not previously considered is the average amount of credit spread per unit 

of duration-times-spread volatility in the corporate bond market; the average daily risk-reward ratio.

● In fact, we observe a systematic increase in the price of risk in the corporate bond market, even 

though average price volatilities are similar before and after the credit crisis. That is, investors are 

requiring more spread compensation for their risk since the credit crisis, but risk has not increased.

● Changes in the price of risk in the corporate bond market may not be reflected in traditional 

measures of liquidity such as bid/ask spreads, but may be a reflection of decreased leverage in the 

financial system resulting in greater costs for market participants to fund cash positions.

Figure 1. Left: Time Series of the U.S. Corporate Bond Risk Premium, 1999-2017; Right: Average Values of Daily U.S. 

Corporate Bond Risk Premiums, Non-Default Spreads, and Spread-Times-Duration Volatility, Pre- and Post-Crisis 

Statistics of the Risk Premium Before and After the Credit Crisis of 2007-2010

Terry Benzschawel

terry.l.benzschawel@citi.com

(212) 723-1464

Source: Citi
The U.S. Corporate Bond Risk Premium 

and Market Liquidity

Introduction

In a recent report by IOSCO (2016) found 68% of buy-side respondents reported a perceived 

deterioration in corporate bond market liquidity between 2004 and 2015. Among sell-side participants, 

that number is 80%. Perceptions are that it is increasingly difficult to trade in large sizes, to execute 

orders quickly, or to establish reliable prices. Market participants also expressed the view that in the 

event of an unexpected or significant market event, such as an abrupt interest rate rise, investors could 

face a possible rush to a crowded exit to sell their positions. Reasons citied for this perceived 

deterioration in liquidity are complex. They reflect the interaction of various regulatory initiatives, 

extraordinary current and future monetary policy, and the undermining of the market-making liquidity 

model, largely due to greater capital constraints on banks and broker-dealers. 

2

1 It is not the objective of this report to describe all the work that has been done on the issue of deteriorating liquidity, but merely 

to highlight the main evidence and themes that underlie the current debate.

Figure 2. Top: Average Daily Corporate Bond Trading 

Volume; Portfolio Guidelines for Credit Picking Robots: 

Bottom: 21-Day Moving Averages of Bid-Ask Spreads

Despite these anecdotal reports, there is very 

little direct evidence to corroborate these views 

and nearly all report conclude that, at least in 

from typical measures of liquidity, little if any 

deterioration liquidity has occurred (see for 

example, Adrian, Fleming, Shachar and Vogt, 

2015; Mizrach, 2015; Committee on the Global 

Financial System, 2016; Liebschutz and Smith, 

2016).1 Some even conclude that market liquidity 

has improved since the crisis.

Trading Volume: For example, the top panel of 

Figure 2 shows that average daily trading 

volume of corporate bonds has increased since 

2009. Although traded volume does not reveal 

the cost of trading or the amount of unexecuted 

trades, it is a direct measure of the level of 

activity that the market accommodates. 

However, given the record-breaking increase in 

new issuance (see below) since the credit crisis, 

overall turnover, the amount traded per face 

outstanding, has actually decreased.

Source: SIFMA, FINRA and Trace

Bid/Ask Spreads: Proponents of the view that 

corporate market liquidity has not deteriorated 

robust point to the fact that average bid/ask

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York

spreads, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 2, have declined since the credit crisis. Despite this, the 

level of bid-offer spreads for corporate bonds has been consistently higher with respect to other, more 

liquid, fixed income markets. Moreover, because these spreads are estimated from transaction data, 
they do not capture cases where investors 

may have forgone trading due to high bidoffer spreads.

Price Impact of Trades: Another measure 

of liquidity is the impact that executed 

trades have on market prices. In more 

liquid markets, executed trades of a given 

size may generate less price impact than 

in less liquid markets, all else equal. 

Figure 3 shows that the price impact per 

$100 million of corporate bonds traded has 

declined since the crisis and now sits 

below pre-crisis levels. Thus, the evidence 

from trading volume, bid/ask spreads and 

3

price impact of trades show little evidence of declining 

liquidity in the corporate bond market. 

Source: FRBNY (using FIRNA TRACE data)

Figure 3. Relative Price Impact per $100MM of Corporate Bonds 

Traded, 2005-2015

Dealer Balance Sheets: Trading of corporate bonds in the secondary market is conducted over-thecounter. That is, most trading continues to be intermediated by brokers and dealers, but that has been 

changing with the emergence of exchange traded funds (ETFs) and automated trading. Dealers can 

match offsetting orders from investors so that they avoid holding bonds on their balance sheets, or they 

can buy bonds from sellers and hold them on their balance sheets until offsetting trades are found, thus 

bearing the risk that prices fall in the interim. The former is called the “agency model” while the latter is 

called the “principal model.” In the corporate bond market, some dealers have reportedly attempted to 

shift from the principal model toward the agency model in recent years, but the ability of dealers to 

switch trading models without affecting liquidity is limited by the market’s structure. 

The left panel of Figure 4 shows dealer balance sheet size in dollar amounts since 1990. The figure 

indicates that dealer size grew exponentially from 1990 through 2008, with a peak close to $5 trillion. 

Dealer assets then collapsed after the Lehman failure and remain stalled at around $3.5 trillion, the 

level of 2005 (indicated by the red dotted line in the chart). If the previous trend growth had continued 

(indicated by the solid red line), dealer balance sheet size would be more than three times larger than 

it is today. 

Source: Federal Reserve Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association

Figure 4. Left: Dealer Balance Sheet Size, 1990-2015; Right: Annual Issuance of Investment-Grade and High Yield 

Corporate Debt
4

Dealer Inventory: Given the tens of thousands of outstanding corporate bond issues which vary in 

issuers, credit quality, maturity, seniority, and optionality, it is difficult for dealers to match demand and 

supply. As shown in the left and right panels of Figure 5, dealers’ corporate bond inventories plunged 

during the financial crisis and have stagnated since. This decrease in dealer inventories mirrors the 

balance sheet stagnation of dealers shown in Figure 4 and is similarly consistent with the notion of 

decreased liquidity in the corporate bond market. Finally, the right panel of Figure 5 superimposes the 

growth of corporate bond assets on dealer inventories, serving to highlight the fact that dealer 

inventories have decreased amid accelerating growth in the size of the corporate bond market.

Source: Federal Reserve Board Source: Investment Company Institute, Haver Analytics, T. 

Rowe Price, Federal Reserve Board

Trade Size: Trading volume reflects the product of the number of trades and average trade size. The left 

panel of Figure 6 shows that corporate bond trade volumes have declined through the financial crisis but 

have generally been increasing slowly since then. Still, trading volume when divided by size remains 

much lower than their pre-crisis peak. In fact, the right panel of Figure 6 shows that the actual number of 

trades has increased since the credit crisis, but that the decline in trading volume reflects the fact the 

that average trade size has decreased. Anecdotally, market participants have reported more difficulty 

executing large “block” size trades compared to the pre-crisis period (Liebshutz and Smith, 2016). Some 

market commentators see this trend as evidence that investors find it more difficult to execute large 

trades and so are splitting orders into smaller trades to lessen their price impact. 

Figure 6. Left: 21-Day Moving Average of Average Trade Size Where Average Trade Size is Total Volume Divided by 

Number of Trades Each Day; Right: Average Trade Size and Average Daily Number of Trades by Quarter for All 

Corporate Bonds 

Source: FRBNY based on data from TRACE and 

Mergent FISD Source: TRACE data

Figure 5. Left: Quantity of Corporate and Foreign Bonds (Held in the U.S.) Owned by Securities Brokers and Dealers; 

Right: Dealer Inventory and Investment-Grade and High Yield Mutual Fund Net Assets and Bond ETFs
5

Bond Liquidity: The left panel of Figure 7 shows that while the number of trades for the 1,000 most 

liquid bonds has remained roughly constant over the last decade, the number of trades of less liquid 

bonds has more than doubled. Also, as shown in the right panel of Figure 7, the spread premium for 

illiquid bonds has increased roughly 20% since 2008. 

Figure 7. Left: Average Daily Number of Trades of Liquid (Blue) and Less Liquid (Red) Bonds; Right: Goldman Sachs 

Estimate of Extra Spread for Illiquid Bonds

Source: Mizrach (2016) Source: Goldman Sachs Investment Research

Summing Up the Debate: Although far from exhaustive, the results above represent the main 

arguments for and against the notion of changes in the liquidity of the corporate bond market. That is, 

proponents of the view of no evidence for changes in liquidity point to increased daily trading volumes 

and declines in average bid/ask to below pre-credit-crisis levels. In addition, despite the majority of buyand sell-side market participants who report perceived declines in liquidity, the no-change proponents 

point to the lower price impact of given trade sizes to support their view. In fact, the balance of written 

reports on the subject of liquidity, albeit mostly from government sponsored sources, conclude that there 

is no compelling evidence of decreases in corporate bond liquidity since the credit crisis. In addition, 

those sources claim that whatever evidence that might suggest declining corporate market liquidity is not 

conclusive because the structure of the corporate bond market has changed greatly since the credit 

crisis. They argue that dealer ownership of corporate bonds has declined because dealers have shifted 

from a “principal” to an “agency” role and their decreased presence has been taken up by other market 

participants, including exchange traded funds, hedge funds, and electronic high-frequency-trading firms.

First, it is clear that dealer balance sheets and inventories have decreased amid increasing new bond 

issuance. In addition, although trade volume has increased, daily turnover percentages have decreased 

along with average trade size. Results indicate that the increase in number of trades have actually come 

from increases in number of relatively illiquid bonds traded and that the illiquidity premium for these 

bonds has increased since the credit crisis. Finally, although it is possible that changes in market 

structure where dealers have moved to more of an agency role, there is little evidence to support that 

claim or its role in maintaining pre-crisis liquidity.

The Corporate Bond Risk Premium and Liquidity

Amidst this background debate, consider now evidence regarding liquidity in the corporate bond market 

from an historical analysis of the price of risk in the corporate bond market. We define the daily corporate 

bond risk premium as the average amount of yield spread to Treasuries above the compensation for 

default risk as a function of bonds’ volatilities of durations-times-spreads (DTS). Because we have 
6

described the theory and method for calculating the corporate bond risk premium in great detail in 

several places (Benzschawel and Assing, 2012, Benzschawel, Su and Xin, 2015; Benzschawel, 2016) 

we describe them only briefly herein, preferring to focus on its relation to corporate bond liquidity. 

Background: The Corporate Bond Risk Premium: : The notion that one can derive a single-quantity, 

the credit risk premium, to characterize the risk-reward properties of the corporate bond market comes 

from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) as well as empirical analysis of corporate 

bond spreads. For example, the left panel of Figure 8 shows average bond spreads to US Treasuries by 

agency credit rating on a logarithmic spread axes.2 That plot shows clearly that, to a large extent, bonds 

of all ratings move in tandem over time. That is, there is a single factor controlling spreads; the credit risk 

premium. Additional evidence for a unitary risk premium in the corporate market comes from an analysis 

of spread volatilities by agency credit rating as well as spread-to-volatility ratios as shown at the right in 

Figure 8. The red dots (right axis) show that average ratios of rolling five-year average yield spreads-tospread volatilities are similar for all rating categories. This too supports the CAPM view that, to a large 

extent that, at least on average, the market pays the same amount per unit of volatility regardless of 

asset risk characteristics. Finally, the green dots (right axis) plot the average volatility of spread-tovolatility rations (the red dots) and those values are also similar for all rating categories.

2 Note that the relationship between bond price as a function of yield is linear on a logarithmic yield scale. 

One complication in estimating the corporate bond risk premium comes for the fact that yield spreads for 

corporate bonds spreads contain a premium for expected losses from default. To account for this, we 

obtain estimates of firms’ expected default-related losses from model-based default probabilities and 

recovery values (discussed below). That is, given estimates of default probabilities, pT to durations T

and recovery values in default, RV we can use the following approximation from the price-yield 

relationship to compute a bond’s spread value of default, sd, as:

sd = −

1

T

ln 1 − pT ∙ LGD , (1)

and the remainder of the spread, called the non-default spread, sλ as: 

sλ = s − sd . (2)

Source: Citi

Figure 8. Left: . Monthly Average Yield Spreads to US Treasuries by Rating Category on a Logarithmic Spread Axis, 

1990-2016; Right: Blue (Left Axis): Average Monthly Spread Volatility by Agency Rating Category; Red (Right Axis): 

Ratios of Rolling 5-Year Average Spreads to Spread Volatilities by Rating; and Green (Right Axis) Volatility of Monthly 

Spread-to-Spread Volatility Ratios
7

Figure 9. Average Spreads Versus Agency Ratings 

Showing Spread Compensation for Expected Default 

(Black Area) and Non-Default Spread, 1994-2017

Source: Citi

For perspective on the amount of default and nondefault spread, consider Figure 9 that shows average 

spreads by agency credit rating model for the 

corporate bonds in Citi’s Broad Investment Grade 

(BIG) and High Yield Indexes over the period from 

1994 to 2010.3 The dark area in Figure 9 shows the 

magnitude of the default spread, sd, calculated using 

Equation 1, a value of Tof 4.5 years,4 cumulative 4.5-

year default probabilities (PDs) by rating category 

from Sobehart and Keenan’s (2002, 2003) Hybrid 

Probability of Default (HPD) model, and assuming a 

40% recovery value in default. The light area 

represents average values of the non-default spread,

3 The credit spreads and bond indicative data come from the corporate bonds in Citigroup’s Broad Investment Grade (BIG) 

Index and High Yield Cash Pay Index (see Citigroup Index, 2013).

4 4.5-year cumulative default rates were used as that term corresponds roughly to the average duration of the bonds in those 

indexes. 

5 The model is called a “hybrid” because it contains a Merton model component along with other statistical and balance sheet 

information.

sλ. The average values of the non-default spread premium range from 69bp for triple-A-rated bonds to 

727bp for triple C-rated ones, but is five-to-ten times larger than the average spread compensation for 

default regardless of rating category. 

The HPD Model: Although Figure 9 shows average values of the risk premium, default rates vary over 

the credit cycle as do credit spreads. Thus, every day, we estimate bonds’ PDs from their obligors’ 

default rates determined from Citi’s HPD model.5 The HPD model consists of a Merton structural model 

(Merton, 1974) shown in the left panel of Figure 10. Merton developed this as a contingent claims model 

based on the relation between the value of a firm’s assets, its equity, and debt. Within the model, 

ownership of common stock is seen as equivalent to being long a call option on the firm’s assets while 

ownership of debt is equal to ownership of the firm’s assets minus the value of the equity call. Default, 

then, results from equity holders failing to exercise their call (not paying off the face value of debt) and 

leaving bondholders with ownership of the assets. Importantly, because of its dependence on equity 

market information for generating PDs, one can obtain daily estimates of firms’ default risk as equity 

market prices change.

Figure 10. Citi’s Hybrid Probability of Default Model Consisting of a Merton Model Variable (Left Pane) and Market 

and Balance Sheet Information (Right Panel)

Source: Citi
8

As shown in the right panel of Figure 10, the HPD model also includes inputs from four other variables 

that include:

1. 12-month equity volatility;

2. 12-month equity return relative to the S&P 500 index;

3. Profitability ratio: P/R = NI/E; and

4. Book value of leverage, TL/TA.

The purpose of the four variables above is to penalize volatile, highly leveraged, and/or unprofitable 

companies thereby reducing their borrowing capacity. These latter variables are combined with the 

Merton model variable as shown in the right portion of Figure 10. Notice that the variables are fed into 

the model as z-scores, with each variable computed as the difference between the long-term average of 

the calibration universe divided by its standard deviation. Then, coefficients are applied to the five zscore inputs, with the resulting sum put through a non-linear transformation and then mapped to 

historical default probabilities.

Because the HPD model and its performance at predicting defaults are presented in great detail 

elsewhere (Sobehart and Keenan, 2002, 2003; Benzschawel, 2013), we limit our discussion of the 

model herein. The main point is one can obtain reliable estimates of firms’ PDs everyday using the HPD 

model. In addition, to compute expected losses, we obtain estimates of firms recovery values in default 

form Citi’s Decision-Tree default model (Benzschawel, Haroon and Wu, 2011).

The Credit Risk Premium: If the hypothesis of a meaningful risk premium in the corporate market is 

correct, one ought to be able to model the non-default credit spread for bond i on day t as:

sλ,i = λtσν,i ,

Figure 11. Bond’s Non-Default Spreads sversus SpreadDuration Volatilities ,i

. Points and Best-Fit Lines of 

Slope = 1.0 are Color-Coded by Duration Bucket, Jun-2015

Source: Citi

(3)

where ,iis the bond’s duration-times-spread (DTS) volatility and λtis the daily average spread value 

per unit of spread duration volatility. If so, then on any given day the relationship between bonds’ nondefault spreads and their spread duration volatilities ought to be related by a constant value of λt

.

In fact, the data in Figure 11 from a day in June 

2015 shows that bonds’ values of sλ,i as a function 

of ,i are well described by a line of slope 1.0 on 

log-log axis.

In practice, we calculate daily values of λt by first 

defining the market beta (i.e., β=1) as the average 

spread-duration volatility of the of bonds in the 

median bucket of agency rating and durations.6

Then for individual bonds, we can compute their 

betas, βi as

6 A detailed description of the calculation of the daily risk premium can be found in Benzschawel, Su and Xin (2015). 

.

βi =

,i

,β=1

(4)

where ,β=1 is the spread-duration volatility of 

the bond whose β=1. We also identify the 

median value of sin the median bucket and the 

spread-duration of the bond in our calibration 

universe whose value of βiis closest to 1.0 (i.e., 

having the minimum value of ,i− ,β=1 ). We designate the ratio of the median non-default spread 

to spread-duration volatility at β=1 (i.e., its risk premium relative to duration-times-spread volatility) as
9

and designate that value as the risk premium  on day t. That is,

λt =

sλ,i

,β≅1

=  .

(5)

Figure 12 shows daily values of the corporate credit risk premium from January 1999 to May 2017 (blue

curve referenced to the 

left vertical axis). Daily 

values of non-default 

spreads, sλ,β=1 and 

duration-times-spread 

volatility, ,β=1 in 

basis points are also 

shown (referenced to 

the right vertical axis).

The red vertical lines in 

Figure 12 serve to 

mark the period of the 

credit crisis of mid2007 to 2010. 

Inspection of values of 

the risk premium 

during pre- and postcrises suggests that

the corporate bond risk premium has increased since the credit crisis. That is, the average of daily 

values of λt appear to have risen since the end of the crisis in 2010. 

Figure 13. Average Values of the Credit Risk Premium 

λt, Non-Default Spreads, si,β=1 , and DurationTimes-Spread Volatility, ν,β=1,Overall, Before, 

During, and After the Credit Crisis of 2007-2010

Figure 13 presents average values of the credit risk 

premium λt, non-default spreads, si,β=1, and 

duration-times-spread volatility, ν,β=1 overall from 

1999-2017 as well as before, during, and after the 

credit crisis of 2007-2010. Values are shown in 

tabular form at the top and graphically below. The 

average value of the risk premium over the period 

from 1999 to May of 2017 is 0.68, rising to 0.73 

during the credit crisis. The pre-crisis average is 0.55 

and post-crisis is 0.81. Also, the average non-default 

spread si,β=1 is 74bp, rising during the credit crisis 

to 150bp. The pre-crisis average non-default spread 

is 47bp, with the post-crisis level falling from 150bp 

to 78bp, still well above the pre-crisis level. An F-test

on the differences between pre- and post-crisis 

average values of the risk premium is highly 

significant (F=1.60, p.< 0.001),7 indicating that there 

has been a change in the level of the risk premium 

since the end of the credit crisis.

Source: Citi

7 That is, there is a less than 1 in 1,000 chance that the observed

difference between the pre- and post-crisis levels of the risk premium is due to chance. 

Source: Citi

Figure 12. Time Series of Daily Values of the U.S. Corporate Bond Risk Premium, λt(Left 

Axis) and Component Values of Non-Default Spreads, si,β=1 and Duration-TimesSpread (DTS) Volatility, ν,β=1 (Right Axis), 1999-2017
10

Notice also in Figure 13 how levels of duration-times-spread volatilities have changed over the period. 

That is, the average value of the DTS volatility, ν,β=1, over the entire period is 74bp, rising to 237bp 

during the credit crisis. The pre-crisis level of DTS volatility is 95bp and fell back to those levels at 99bp 

post-crisis. The fact that volatilities of spreads are similar before and after the crisis, yet the average nondefault spread has increased over 50% supports the notion of a decrease in credit market liquidity since 

the credit crisis.

Implications for Corporate Market Liquidity: The current results make clear that the price of risk in the 

corporate bond market has risen since the credit crisis. Nevertheless, the implications regarding 

corporate market liquidity are complicated. That is, it is not clear if the cause of the rise in the credit risk 

premium reflects decreases in bond market liquidity or some other factor such as investor risk aversion. 

Also, it might be suggested that the effect of increases in the relative proportion of illiquid bonds traded 

(see Figure 7), may underlie the increase in the measured value of the risk premium. However, the fact 

that the market is charging a greater yield premium for illiquid bonds is enough to suggest that liquidity 

has decreased. One possible explanation for the increase in risk premium since the crisis is that it has 

become more expensive for both dealers and investors to finance cash positions. That is, the increase in 

risk premium may reflect the decrease in available leverage in the financial system.

Summary

The objective of this report was to document the observed increase in the price of risk in the corporate 

bond market since the credit crisis of 2008-2010 as it impacts the debate regarding changes in corporate 

bond market liquidity. There is considerable disagreement as to whether corporate bond liquidity has 

decreased since the credit crisis and evidence was presented to support both views. Market participants 

overwhelmingly report decreases in liquidity. Yet nearly all authors of empirical reports fail to conclude 

that liquidity has decreased. These reports, most often supported by government or regulatory agencies, 

cite decreases in average bid/ask spreads, increasing trade volume, and decreasing impact of trade size 

as evidence for a liquidly functioning corporate bond market. Furthermore, while acknowledging 

decreases in dealer balance sheets and inventories, these authors argue that post-crisis changes in 

corporate market dynamics underlie whatever evidence would support the argument for decreases in 

liquidity.

Dealer inventories have fallen sharply amid record new corporate bond issuance. Also, although trading 

volume has increased since the crisis, the volume divided by size has decreased and the amount traded 

per unit face outstanding (i.e., the turnover) has also decreased. Even though bid/ask spreads have 

decreased, average trade sizes have also decreased serving to account, at least in part, for decreasing 

bid/ask spreads. In addition, the proportion of trading in illiquid bonds has increased and the premium for 

trading those bonds has increased. Add to this the fact that the price of risk in the corporate bond market 

has increased by over 50% since the credit crisis and it is hard to escape the conclusion that the 

dynamics of the corporate bond market have changed. Whether these changing dynamics are called 

changes in “liquidity” may be just a matter of semantics if one restricts the argument to measures of 

liquidity such as trading volume and bid/ask spreads. Finally, it was suggested without proof that the 

increases in the credit risk premium may reflect general decreases in market liquidity, reflecting 

increased costs of funding cash positions by dealers and investors.
11

References

Adrian, T., Fleming, M. Shachar, O. and Vogt, E. Has U.S. Corporate Bond Market Liquidity Deteriorated? 

Liberty Street Economics, October 5, 2015

Benzschawel, T., Haroon, A. and Wu, T. A Model for Recovery Value in Default, Journal of Fixed 

Income, Fall, pp. 15-29, 2011

Benzschawel, T. and Assing, A. Inferring Default Probabilities from Credit Spreads, Journal of Fixed 

Income 13, pp. 16-24, Spring 2012

Benzschawel, T. Citi’s Hybrid Probability of Default Model: The Sobehart-Keenan HPD Model – Ten Years 

After, Citi, July 10, 2013

Benzschawel, T., Su, Y. and Xin, X. The Credit Risk Premium, , Citi, June 25, 2015

Benzschawel, T. Credit Modeling: Advanced Topics, Incisive Media, London, 2016

Citigroup Index Group, Index Guide – 2013 Edition, Citigroup, January 2013

Committee on the Global Financial System. Fixed Income Market Liquidity, CGFS Papers #55, Bank for 

International Settlements, January, 2016 

IOSCO, Examination of Liquidity of the Secondary Corporate Bond Markets, International Organization of 

Securities Commissions, August, 2016

Liebschutz, J. and Smith, B. Examining Corporate Bond Liquidity and Market Structure, U.S. Department 

of the Treasury, July 7, 2016

Merton, R. A. On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structures of Interest Rates. Journal of 

Finance 29, pp. 449-470, 1974

Mizrach, B. Analysis of Corporate Bond Liquidity, FINRA Office of the Chief Economist, 2016

Sharpe, W. F. Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, Journal of 

Finance, 19 (3), 425–442,1964

Sharpe, W. F. The Sharpe Ratio, Journal of Portfolio Management, pp. 49-58, Fall 1994

Sobehart, J. and Keenan, S. Hybrid Contingent Claims Models: A Practical Approach to Modeling Default 

Risk, Credit Ratings: Methodology, Rationale and Default Risk, M. Ong (ed.), Risk Books, 2002

Sobehart, J. and Keenan, S. Hybrid Probability of Default Models: A Practical Approach to Modeling 

Default Risk, Quantitative Credit Analyst 3, pp. 5-29, 2003

Terry Benzschawel

Managing Director

Citi Credit Sales & Trading

(212) 723-1464

terry.l.benzschawel@citi.com

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