NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ANNETTEKAYE CASADY, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

THOMAS and CANDALEE PARKER, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0307

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2013-010016

The Honorable Michael J. Herrod, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Annettekay Casady, Lind, WA

Plaintiff/Appellant

Thomas G. Parker, CandaLee Parker, Queen Creek

Defendants/Appellees

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined.
CASADY v. PARKER

Decision of the Court

2

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Annettekaye Casady appeals the dismissal of her complaint 

against Thomas and CandaLee Parker (collectively, “Parker”). The superior 

court found that Casady’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 

12(b)(6). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Citing criminal statutes, Casady sued Parker for stalking; 

harassment; use of electronic communication to terrify, intimidate, 

threaten, or harass; false reporting to law enforcement agencies; false 

reporting of child abuse or neglect; aggravated harassment; and taking the 

identity of another person. Casady also requested an order against 

harassment and the return of a $5,000 loan with interest. 

¶3 Casady’s complaint alleged that she had contacted Parker in 

June 2011 “to resolve a personal conflict[] that arose from [Parker and me] 

having a personal relationship with Johnny Reynolds.” Casady “requested 

no more contact and [Parker] promised . . . [that] there would be no more 

contact.” Casady complained that she had since received “over 7000 emails, 

texts, and posts, letters, cards, from [Parker].” Moreover, Casady alleged 

that Parker “further[ed] these acts with ‘aggravating circumstances’ by 

teasing, taunting, degrading, and publishing [Casady’s] disability.” 

¶4 Casady requested $400,000 in “general damages . . . for 

personal attacks causing detrimental quality of life, for the work of cleaning 

this away, damages to relationships and self-esteem and for the laws 

[Parker] broke to create damages to [Casady’s] life and liberty, ability to 

work, [and] ability for future employment and education.” Parker moved 

to dismiss Casady’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Finding that 

Casady’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 

the superior court dismissed Casady’s complaint with prejudice. Casady 

timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶5 Casady argues that her complaint should have survived 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). We review the dismissal of a complaint 

under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355 ¶ 7, 

284 P.3d 863, 866 (2012). In our review, we accept the complaint’s 

allegations as true and resolve all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 
CASADY v. PARKER

Decision of the Court

3

Southwest Non–Profit Housing Corp. v. Nowak, 234 Ariz. 387, 390–91 ¶ 10, 322 

P.3d 204, 207–08 (App. 2014). Mere conclusory statements, however, are 

insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Cullen v. AutoOwners, Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 419 ¶ 7, 189 P.3d 344, 346 (2008). Dismissal 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if—as a matter of law—the plaintiff 

would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts. Coleman, 

230 Ariz. at 356 ¶ 8, 284 P.3d at 867 (quoting Fid. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. State 

Dep’t of Ins., 191 Ariz. 222, 224 ¶ 4, 954 P.2d 580, 582 (1998)). We will uphold 

a dismissal when the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts entitling him 

or her to relief. Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High Sch. Dist. No. 82 Bd. of 

Governors, 184 Ariz. 419, 424, 909 P.2d 486, 491 (App. 1995). 

¶6 With two exceptions, Casady has alleged only criminal 

violations, not civil causes of action. A plaintiff can only advance private 

causes of action for criminal offenses when the legislature has so provided.

Phoenix Baptist Hosp. v. Aiken, 179 Ariz. 289, 295, 877 P.2d 1345, 1351 (App. 

1994). Casady has not demonstrated that the legislature has done so for 

those criminal violations. 

¶7 The two civil causes of action that Casady has ostensibly 

raised—an order against harassment and the return of a $5,000 loan—are 

not cognizable. Casady failed to proffer sufficient factual support for those 

claims; instead, she merely levies conclusory statements, which are 

insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Cullen, 218 

Ariz. at 419, 189 P.3d at 346. The superior court therefore properly 

dismissed Casady’s complaint.

CONCLUSION

¶8 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.