No. 86-533

IN THE SUPREMECOURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1987

AARON STANSBERRY, Petitioner/Respondentand Cross-Appellant,-vsED ARGENBRIGHT, Superintendentof Public Instructionand TRUSTEES OF ROOSEVELT COUNTY HIGH SCHOOLDISTRICT #5A, Respondents/Appellantsand Cross-Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the FirstJudicialDistrict, In and for the County of Lewis & Clark, The Honorable Henry Loble,Judgepresiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

ForAppellant:
CharlesE. Erdmann; Erdmann & Wright,Helena, Montana

For Respondent:
Emilie Loring; Hilley & Loring,GreatFalls,Montana

Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 26, 1987 Decided: May 26, 1987Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The DistrictCourt of the FirstJudicialDistrict, Lewis and Clark County, reversed the actions of the Roosevelt County Board of School Trustees (School Trustees), the County Superintendent of Schools (County Superintendent), and the State Superintendentof Public Instruction (StateSuperintendent), and directed thatMr. Stansberrybe offered a contract

as a tenured teacher. School Trustees appealed and Mr. Stansberrycross-appealed. We reverse. The issuesare: 1. Did the District Court err in reversing the decisions of the School Trustees,the County Superintendent,and the State Superintendentand directing thatMr. Stansberrybe offered a contract? 2. Did the District Court err by not directing the School Trustees to pay Mr. Stansberry back pay and retroactive fringebenefits? Mr. Stansberrywas a tenured teacher who taught in the Wolf PointHigh School District for sevenyears prior to this controversy. In 1981 Mr. Stansberry requested sabbatical leave for the 1982-83 school year pursuant to the Professional Policies Agreement between the School District and the Wolf Point EducationAssociation. The agreement provides in pertinentpart:

5575.8 Sabbatical Leave a. Sabbatical leave shall be available to a teacher after seven (7) years of service.A teacher receiving sabbatical leave shall be awarded 50% of their annual base salary they would have received had he or she remained at his or her teaching position. Such salary will be paid upon completion of thegranted sabbatical leave and uponbeginning to teach in the system in the school year following his/her absence.
b. Leave may be granted by the Board of Trustees upon application approval by a joint review panel representing the WPEA and the school system to engage in full-time study, travel, research, work experienceor otherprofessionally advantageousactivity.

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c. Teachers on sabbatical leave receive normal salary increments, tenure rights, and fringe benefits while on leave and must return to their former position or similarposition.

Inpart Mr. Stansberry's application letter stated:

I would like to make formal application for a Sabbatical Leave during the 1982-83 school year. If this application is accepted, I intend topursue either an MA or MFA degree in English, concentrating in CreativeWriting.

In a December 1981 School Board meeting, Mr. Stansberry's applicationwas approved. The SchoolBoard minutesprovided:

The Board next took under consideration the written request from Mr. Aaron Stansberry for Sabbatical Leave during the 1982-83 school year. He stated thathis intent is topersue [sic]either a MA or MFA in English, concentrating in Creative Writing. A letter accompanied this request which was signed by Mrs. Penny Nelson, Mr. William Gilman, High School Principal, and Mr. Michael Thompson, High School English Instructor recommending that Mr. Stansberry's Sabbatical Leave requestbe approved. A motionwasmade by Listerud and seconded by Hansen that the Board approve granting a request thatMr. Stansberryhave Sabbatical Leave during the 1982-83 schoolyear. A vote was takenand themotion carried.In April 1982, Mr. Stansberrywas informed by the University of Montana English Department that he had not been accepted to the graduate program. The above facts are all undisputed. The parties disputewhat occurred at a May 18, 1982,meeting betweenMr. Stansberryand District SuperintendentRobertKinna. Mr. Stansberry testified that he met with Mr. Kinna, informed him that his application for graduate school had been denied,and asked himwhat he should do. Mr. Stansberry further testified that Mr. Kinna responded by saying that it

was fine to "continuewithmy sabbaticalleave" and that "the purpose of the sabbatical leavewas for a teacher to recharge his or her batteries." Mr. Kinna testified that he did not make the above statementsand that hewas not informedby Mr. Stansberry that he had not been accepted to the graduate program. Mr. Kinna stated they had talked about sabbatical leave fringe benefits and salary. In August 1982, Mr. Stansberry wrote Mr. Kinna and stated: 

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# .. . I didn't attend the university this summer; therefore, Iwon't be advancing an additional stepon thepay scale." Thepurpose of this letterwas to confirmthe School District's records on Mr. Stansberry's current level of teacher education. The letter would not have placed the School District on notice that Mr. Stansberry would not be attending graduate school because the letter was only to inform the District which salary level to use in computing Mr. Stansberry's salary during his sabbaticalyear. Had Mr. Stansberry completed the summer school course he would have been entitled to a smallpay increase. In February 1983, Mr. Kinna wrote Mr. Stansberry and requested documentation thathe had pursued the intentofhis sabbatical leave. OnMarch 11, 1983,Mr. Stansberrywrote to Mr. Kinna and stated:Ihave instructed the Registrarat the University ofMontana to sendyou a transcript ofmy work last quarter. Originally I moved to Helena to attend several classes at Carroll College, but my pocketbook couldn't afford $98 per credit, so I have beenworking at avariety of jobs. However, I doplan to take severalmore classesbefore returning to Wolf Point. As I remember a person on a sabbatical leave can do three things: 1) return to school; 2) travel; and 3) work at a job related to his teaching field. Well, I have returned to school. Also I've traveled: Mexico, Texas,Colorado,Utah and Western Montana. Currently I'm working as a tutor in English, Social Studies and Math. I also work at outside sales and public relations. I hope this outline of my leave is satisfactory.
The previous quarters' work Mr. Stansberryreferred towas a six-credit, graduate non-degree course which could not be applied to his MA or MFA. The School Trustees, the County Superintendent, and the State Superintendent all maintain that this was the first indication they had that Mr. Stansberryhad not attended graduate schoolduring his leave. In a letter dated March 15, 1983, Mr. Kinna informed Mr. Stansberry that:

At a regular March 14, 1983,School Board meeting, the Trustees voted unanimously to terminate your teaching services for the 1983-84 school year. After reviewing the reason for granting your sabbatical leave and comparing it to your letter of March 11, 1983,no other decision could be reached.

In a followup letter regarding the reasons for the termination of his teaching services,Mr. Kinna stated that "[t] he stated reason for the sabbatical leavewas in no way honored by Mr. Stansberry."Mr. Stansberry appealed the SchoolTrustees' decision to the County Superintendentof Schools, who affirmed the School Board. He then appealed to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, who also affirmed the School Trustees. He then appealed the matter to the District Courtwhich first remanded for additional fact gathering and then reversed the School Trustees, the County Superintendent, and the State Superintendent, and directed them to offer Mr. Stansberry a contract as a tenured teacher. The School Trustees appealed that decision to this Court. Mr. Stansberry cross-appealed requesting back pay and fringe benefits which the District Courtdid not award him. I Did the District Court err in reversing the decisions of the SchoolTrustees,the County Superintendent,and the State Superintendentand directing thatMr. Stansberry be offered a contract? A recentMontana case provides us with precedent which gives us guidance on this issue. In Yanzick v. School District No. 23, Lake County Montana (1982), 196 Mont. 375, 641 P.2d 431,a tenured school teacher's contractwas not renewed because he had allegedly demonstrated a lack of fitnessby:

(1) cohabitating with a female teacher; (2) using human fetuses in the classroom when discussing abortion; and (3) making statements to his classroom regarding his living arrangements with the teacher and the subject of abortion. The opinion pointed out that the record must showgood cause for the termination of a teacher's tenure and that in addition the conductof the teacher,including a characterization that it is immoral, must be such as to directly affect the performanceby the teacher ofhis duties as a teacher. The Yanzick court's reversal of the District Court upheld the nonrenewal of the teacher's contract. The Courtheld that the District Court and the Supreme Court may reverse theprevious decision only if substantial rightsof the teacher were prejudiced because the administrative findings and conclusionswere:



# . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantive evidence on the whole record. Yanzick, 644 P.2d at 439 (citing SS 2-4-704 and 711,MCA.) In comparing thepowers of the schooldistrict to terminate a teacher and the rights of a tenured teacher, the Yanzick court stated:

While it is true that the trustees of a school district do have the power and duty to both employ a teacher and terminate a teacher under the appropriate circumstances, the rights of the teachers must also be kept constantly in mind. The tenure of a teacher is clearly both a valuable and a 

### - substantialrightwhich cannotbe-taken away excepF forgood cause. (Emphasisadded.) Yanzick, 644P.2d at 440. Therefore,the question before the County Superintendent, the State Superintendent, and the District Court was whether the school trustees had "good cause" not to renewMr. Stansberry's contract keeping inmind that Mr. Stansberry's tenure was a substantial and valuable rightwhich could onlybe taken away for good cause. The District Court found that "the administrative findings and conclusionsofboth the County Superintendentand of the State Superintendent 'were clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

### ' " Thus, there are two questions that this Court must answer in addressing this issue. First, did the District Court err in finding that the County Superintendent's findingswere clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the wholerecord? Second,did the District Court err in reversing the decisions of the County Superintendentand the State Superintendentbased on an error of law? It is well established that the District Courtmay not substitute its judgment for that of the County Superintendent as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Yanzick, 644 P.2d at 438. In this case the District Court remanded to the County Superintendent foradditional findings of fact on two questions

## --whether theMay 18, 1982,meeting between Mr. Stansberry and Mr. Kinna put the School District

on notice thatMr. Stansberryhad notbeen accepted to graduate schoolandwhether theAugust 18, 1982,letterplaced the School District on notice that Mr. Stansberry was not planning to attend graduate school. After remand to the County Superintendent, both of these issues were specifically found in favor of the School District. These determinations were then apparently reversedby theDistrictCourt. The primary factual controversy in this case concerns what was said during the May 18th meeting between Mr. Stansberry and Mr. Kinna. The County Superintendent found thatMr. Stansberryhad failed to informMr. Kinna at theMay 18th meeting that he had not been accepted to graduate school. Inmaking that determination, the County Superintendenthad the opportunity to listen to and observe the demeanor, conduct, and testimony of the witnesses. Testimonywas given on both sides of the controversy and the County Superintendent found for the School District. We conclude that the District Court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the County Superintendent. As was stated in another administrativecase:

If there is substantial credible evidence on the record,the findingsare not "clearlyerroneous." 

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. . If the record contains support for the factualdeterminations made by the agency, the courts may not weigh the evidence. They are bound by the findingsof the agency. City of Billings v. Billings Firefighters (1982), 200 Mont. 421, 431, 651P.2d 627, 632. Substantial credible evidence supports the factual determinations made by the County Superintendent. Therefore, the District Court was bound by the County Superintendent's findings. We conclude that the findingsof the County Superintendentand State Superintendentwere not clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,probative and substantial evidence and therefore reverse the District Court in its conclusion that such administrative findings were clearly erroneous. The County Superintendent found that the August 18, 1982, letter from Mr. Stansberry to Mr. Kinna did not place the School District on notice that Mr. Stansberry was not planning to attend graduate school. The District Court did not specifically reverse this holding, but indicated the letter may have been notice to the School District that Mr. Stansberry was not planning on attending graduate school. Once again, we affirm the County Superintendent's decision that the letter was not such notice. Substantial credible evidence in the record supports thatdetermination. The second question is whether the District Court erred in reversing the decisions of the County Superintendent and the State Superintendentbased on an error of law. Section 2-4-704(2), MCA,provides inpertinentpart:

The Court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisionsare:

(d) affectedby other error of law.The District Court concluded that the County and State Superintendents erroneously referred to S 20-4-207, MCA, instead of the proper statute,S 20-4-204, MCA, and that Mr. Stansberry's conduct did not constitute "good cause" for termination of his job. The District Court was correct in concluding that the County and State Superintendents erroneously referred to S 20-4-207, MCA. Section 20-4-207, MCA, only applies to thedismissal of a teacherbefore the expiration ofhis or her contract. That statute is inapplicable to Mr. Stansberry's case because his contract was simply not renewed, as opposed to a dismissal during the contract term. Yanzick held:

We hold that section 20-4-207, MCA, which sets forth the grounds upon whch the trustees may dismiss a teacherbefore the expirationofhis employment contracat isnot applicable to the termination of the services of a tenure teacher under the provisions of Section 20-4-203 and 20-4-204, MCA. Yanzick, 641P.2d at 441. In his firstorder,the County Superintendentconcluded:

5. Petitioner was properly given reasons for his termination and was granted a hearing pursuant to section 20-4-204,MCA. 6. Good cause existed for the termination of Petitioner and the Wolf Point Board of Trustees acted properlywithin theirdiscretion.

ORDER
On the basis of the foregoingFindings of Fact and Conclusion of Law the Hearing Officer finds that good cause existed for the termination of Petitioner.
The State Superintendent's first order stated that 

### "[t] here

was good and just cause for his termination." Up to this point, the County and State Superintendentscorrectly appliedthe law. However,the State and County Superintendents then confused the issue and erred by referring to $ 20-4-207,MCA, the violation of "adopted policies", and Mr. Stansberry's purported dismissal before the expiration of his employment contract. For instance, the State Superintendent stated in his second order:

14. That Petitioner did violate Wolf Point School Board's policy on sabbatical leave when he did not pursue his sabbatical as outlined in his letter of October 18, 1981 and when he did not notify the schoolboard of his change inplans and goals forhis sabbatical leave. 15. That Petitioner was properly dismissed before expiration of his employment contract for violation of the adopted policies of the school board.

18. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that therewas a violation of adopted board policy and that such violation is cause for dismissal under contract pursuant to Section 20-4-207, MCA, and within the prerogatives of the Board of Trustees of Roosevelt County High School DistrictNo. 45A. Although these references were made in error, we conclude this does not constitute reversible error. Mr. Stansberry's substantial rights were not prejudiced as a result of the erroneous references. Mr. Stansberry was put

on notice of the reasons for nonrenewal from the day he was informed his contract was not being renewed. The procedure followed by both the Board of Trustees and the County Superintendent followed the provision of $ 20-4-204, MCA. In addition,in the original orders,both the County Superintendent and the State Superintendent correctly referred to 5 20-4-204, MCA, and the good cause standard. We concludethat the erroneous reference to 

### 5 20-4-207, MCA, in the subsequent orders did not prejudice Mr. Stansberry and does not constitute reversibleerror. We will next turn to the "good cause" standard and its application to Mr. Stansberry's contract nonrenewal. In Yanzick, the good cause standardwas premised onwhether the teacher's conduct directly affected his duties as a teacher. Yanzick, 641 P.2d at 441. No contention is made in the present case that the conduct of Mr. Stansberry directly affected his duties as a teacher. The question is of course not related to his conduct in the classroom as was true in Yanzick. Nonetheless,based on Yanzickwe conclude that good

cause must be shown in order to terminate Mr. Stansberry's contractbecause hewas a tenured teacher. We conclude that the breach of an agreement between a teacher and the School Trusteesmay constitutegood cause for nonrenewal of the teacher's contract. The statutes do not give any specific guidance on what constitutes good cause under these circumstances. Each case therefore must be considered on its own facts to determine whether or not good

causehasbeen established. We conclude that the findings of fact establish an agreement between Mr. Stansberry and the School Trustees under which Mr. Stansberry would study toward an MA or MFA and improve his teaching qualifications in return for the sabbatical leave. Under the Professional Policies Agreement Mr. Stansberry was to be awarded 50 percent of his annual base salary which was to be paid upon completion of the granted sabbatical leave and upon beginning to teach in the system in the school year following his absence. The findings of fact establish there was no modification of that agreement.The Professional Policies Agreement establishes that a sabbatical leave may be granted by the School Trustees upon application approval by the Teachers' Association and the school system to "engage in full time study, travel, research,work experience or other professionally advantageous activity.'l Here Mr. Stansberrywas found to have applied by a letter in which he stated that if accepted he intended to pursue either an MA or an MFA in English, concentrating in creative writing. The correct application procedure was followed in this case. Clearly an agreement under which Mr. Stansberry, an English teacher,would gain credits towards an MA or an MFA would be aprofessionally advantageousactivity so far as the School Trustees are concerned. Clearly a significant or substantial benefit would result from compliance with the agreement. The failureofMr. Stansberry to complywith that agreement therefore eliminated a substantial benefit to the School Trustees. Based upon the wording of the Professional Policies Agreement, we may properly conclude the benefit to the School Trustees was the primary reason for the approval of the sabbatical leave. In doing so, we note that this is the first teacher in the Wolf Point system to have been granted such a sabbatical leave. Thebreach of the agreement by Mr. Stansberry deprived the school district of an essential part of the bargain which it had made in the agreement. We conclude that the breach of an agreement which resulted in such a deprivation ofbenefit to the school district constituted good cause fornonrenewal ofhis contract. We agree with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the County Superintendent in his original order:FINDINGS OF FACT

3. Petitioner applied for Sabbatical Leave on October 18, 1981 to "pursue either a MA or MFA degree in English, concentrating in Creative Writing". Source: Joint Exhibit 1. 4. The school board voted to grant Petitioner's leave based on the representation that he would pursue a graduate degree. Source: Bartel testimony; Respondent's Exhibit 3.

CONCLUSIONSOF LAW

2. Petitioner violated his agreement with the School Board when he failed to pursue the full course of study that was the basis for his leave. 3. Petitionerviolated Wolf Point SchoolBoard Policy when he failed topursue the full course of study thatwas the basis forhis leave. 4. By failing to attend graduate school and pursue either a MA or MFA in English Petitioner violated his professional responsibilities as a teacher. 5. Petitionerwas properly given reasons for his termination and was granted a hearing pursuant to section 20-4-204,MCA. 6. Good cause existed for the termination of Petitioner and the Wolf Point Board of Trustees acted properlywithin their discretion. Based upon these facts,we affirm the conclusionreached by the County Superintendent that good cause existed for refusal to renew Mr. Stansberry'scontract. Accordingly,we reverse the DistrictCourt.

Did the District Court err by not directing the School Board to pay Mr. Stansberry back pay and retroactive fringe benefits?We need not address this issue since we have reversed the District Court in effect reinstating the County Superintendent's decision that Mr. Stansberry should not be offered

a contract as a tenured teacher. We reverse the District Court, and affirm the decision of the State Superintendent that Mr. Stansberry's nonrenewal

We Concur: 

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JusticesMr. Justice John C. Sheehy,dissenting:

I dissent from the wrongful refusal to renew the teaching contractof this tenure teacher. Under our statutes teachers are accorded a good many powers and responsibilities, and some substantial rights. Foremostamong the rights,andperhaps the most cherished, is the right of tenure. First granted, as far as my research goes, in 1913 (Section 801, Chapter 76, Laws of 1913), for nearly 75 years it is a right that has been continuously reenacted, fiercely guarded by the teachers,and protected by thisCourt: A teacher's tenure is a substantial, valuable and beneficial right which cannot be taken away except forgood cause. State ex rel. Saxtorphv. District Court (1954),128Mont. 352, 275 P.2d 209. Though the original enactment provided tenure to a teacherupon the second annual teaching contract,S 20-4-203, MCA, its effect at the time that thematters related to this action took place was that whenever a teacher "has been elected by the offer and acceptance of a contract for the fourth consecutive year of employment by a district" the teacher became a "tenure teacher" (not "tenured teacher"; legislators and perhaps educators feel no compunction in using a noun for an adjective.) Under the statutes prevailing and applicable here, S 20-4-204, MCA, provided that if the trustees of a school district resolved not to reelect a teacher for a coming teaching year, the district had to notify the teacher of the termination in writing before April 1 of the last contract year. The statutedid not state reasons upon which such lack of reelection might be based. However this Court inserted the requirement of "good cause" in Saxtorph, supra and wereaffirmed that position in Yanzick v. School District No. 23,Lake County,Montana (1982), 196Mont. 375, 641~.2d 431. The majority have cited Yanzick at several points, but they have neglected a critical part of that decision in Yanzick,wherewe said: In view of our reversal of the District Court, it is necessary that we review the record in some detail. We have already indicated that the record must show good cause for the termination of the teacher's tenure. In addition, the conduct of the 

### -- teacher, including a characterization that it is 

### -- immoral, must be such as to directly affect the 

## ----- erformance 

### by the teacher of his duties of a 

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## - - feacher. (Emphasissupplied.)
196 Mont. 392; 641P.2d 441. Nothing in the record before us, the same record that

was before the County Superintendent, the State Superintendent, and the District Court, indicates that the ability of Stansberry to teachwas affected in the slightest degree by the brouhaha arising out of the sabbatical leave. District Judge Henry Loble determined thatwe had set out in Yanzick a true test for the non-reelection of a tenure teacher for cause,and ruled accordingly. More than that,District Judge Loble made a fact finding in this case which is clearly correct,and as such isbinding

on us. (Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P.) The District Court sat in review of proceedings before the County Superintendent and then the State Superintendent of Education. As such he was bound by the standardsof review in § 2-4-704. He obviously determined that he should reverse the decision of the State Superintendentand of the County Superintendent because their administrative findings and conclusions were clearly

erroneous in view of the reliable, probative substantial evidence on the whole record, and arbitrary and capricious.The District Court determined that the County Superintendent and the State Superintendenthad proceeded in terminating Stansberry as a tenure teacher under the wrong statute. They had utilized the provisions of S 20-4-207, MCA, which applies only to the termination of a tenure teacher during the contract year, and not the statute 

### - applying to the reelection of a teacher for the coming year. Incorrectly relying on 20-4-207, the administrators had determined that Stansberry's contract should not be renewed for "violation of the adopted policies" of the school district. Therewas no such adopted policy. Another factual dispute involved whether Stansberry had informed Superintendent Kinna on May 18, 1982 that his application for graduate study at the University of Montana had been rejected. Stansberry wanted to know from Kinna if he was to "stick around for the followingyear or justwhat I should do." Stansberry said thatKinna's responsewas "fine, to continue with his sabbatical leaveand that the purpose of a sabbatical leave was for a teacher to recharge his or her batteries." In examining the record, the District Court found that the Superintendent was uncertain as to what was said at theMay 18meeting, that the Superintendentcould not recall making the statements attributed to him by the petitioner and that Kinna did not deny that he had made the statements, although if he had he probably would recall it. TheDistrict Court felt that thispointwas important to be resolvedby a more specific finding and remanded the cause to the County Superintendent for a further determination as to what was actually said at the meeting of May 18. The County Superintendent convened another hearing on thispoint and then, two years later, Superintendent Kinna's memory became crystal clear. He denied the statements.On August 18, 1982, Stansberry wrote superintendent Kinna to give him his current address in Missoula and to advise him "I didn't attend the University this summer; therefore Iwon't be advancing an additional step on the pay scale." Stansberry also said, "It has been a good summer. Besides attending my 20th year high school reunion, I recently returned froma trip toMexico." Kinna and the school district and now this Court determined that this letter did not sufficiently advise them that Stansberry was not pursuing a Master's or other degree

on his sabbatical. It is difficult to see what other conclusionscould be drawn from the letter. The findings of the District Court should be agreed to by this Court. On the whole record, the District Court was correct: Stansberry, apparently believing he had the permission of Superintendent Kinna after he had been advised that he wasn't accepted to graduate school, went ahead with his sabbatical leave and did accomplish some of the requirements of sabbatical leave as set forth in the Professional PoliciesAgreement of the Board and theUnionwhich represents the teachers. He engaged in study as a student at the University ofMontana; he read some worthwhile books; he traveled;he worked;he took a six-credit course at the University ofMontana; and he engaged in other professionally advantageous activity, such as being a tutor to junior high school students. The conduct for which he was terminateddid not rise to the seriousnessof "good cause" which must be shown before he could be refused employment as a tenured teacher. It should be kept inmind that he has not only losthis job, but that his professional career is placed in serious jeopardy. In determining that the County Superintendent and the State Superintendent were clearly erroneous in view of the whole record,the DistrictCourt found:

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# .. The County Superintendent and the State Superintendent proceeded under the wrong statute after remand. Both before and after remand they made a finding concerning a violation of "adopted policies" which was properly considered only under a statute that has no relation to the present proceeding. The conduct of Petitioner Stansberry did not rise to the levelof "goodcause" forwhich the School Board might lawfully terminate his status as a tenured teacher. The School Board in this instance had never granted a sabbatical leave before. Except as might be stated in the Professional Policies Agreement, there was no "adopted policy" of the Trustees as concerns sabbatical leave.. 

# . . Thus we have in this case a situation where the County Superintendent and the State Superintendent found that Stansberry had breached the adopted policies of the board, policies which did not exist. The majority here have resorted to a different ground, a "breach of an agreement between the teacher and a school trustee" where no such agreement existed. The only agreement existing between this teacher and the school district is that formedby his union, agreed to by the District,which provides that in sabbatical leave, a teachermay return to school, travel, or work at a job relating to his teaching field. The principle of tenure for teachers deserves a higher interpretation of good cause than is advanced here. Iwould affirm theDistrict Court. Because of the majority opinion I do not discuss the cross-appealof the teacher.

Iconcur in the foregoingdissent:

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