Battle of Okinawa III MEF Staff Ride Battle Book Nash
Cover background photo: LtCol Richard P. 

Ross, commander of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 

1st Marine Division, braves sniper fire to place 

the division’s colors on a parapet of Shuri Castle 

on 30 May 1945. This flag was first raised over 

Cape Gloucester and then Peleliu.

Official Department of Defense photo 121832
Battle of Okinawa

III MEF Staff Ride

Battle Book

Douglas E. Nash Sr.

History Division

U.S. Marine Corps

Quantico, Virginia

2015

1

Contents

Welcome by Commander, III MEF 3

Commander’s Intent 10

Schedule of Events 12

Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas (CinCPOA)

Joint Staff Study for Operation Iceberg 15

Chronology of the War in the Pacific 17

Operation Iceberg/Invasion of Okinawa Planning Overview 23

Chronology of the Battle of Okinawa 30

Suggested Routes, Maps, and Vignettes 33

Tenth Army Order of Battle 70

III Amphibious Corps Concept of Operations 73

III Amphibious Corps Order of Battle 79

U.S. Commander Biographies 82

Japanese Strategy and Okinawa 88

Japanese Order of Battle 94

Japanese Commander Biographies 100

The Kamikazes—Divine Wind and the Fleet

that Came to Stay 103

Comparative Ranks 107

Weapons and Equipment 109
2

Comparative Losses 141

Bibliography 145

USMC and U.S. Navy Medal of Honor Awardees 147

Author’s Acknowledgements 153
3

Welcome by Commander, III MEF

Welcome to the III Marine Expeditionary Force and Marine Forces 

Pacific (MarForPac) Staff Ride for the Battle of Okinawa.

The Battle of Okinawa was the Marine Corps’ final battle of World 

War II. For three months, the U.S. Tenth Army, including the Marines of III Amphibious Corps, fought a grueling and bloody struggle 

to seize the largest island of the Ryukyus chain. Allied planners anticipated this battle would be the opening phase of the greater struggle 

for the Japanese home islands. Using Okinawa as a base, they planned 

to launch Operation Downfall—the invasion of Japan and the endgame of World War II

Dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki shortly after 

the fall of Okinawa ultimately precluded the need to invade the home 

islands. On 15 August 1945, Japan announced that it would surrender 

to the Allied powers. However, the fact that Okinawa did not become 

the base from which the Allies would launch the final invasion of Japan does not diminish its significance. The almost fanatical defense of 

the island by Japanese forces and the bloody toll their efforts exacted 

played an important role in convincing American planners to seek 

means other than an invasion to force Japan’s surrender. The fall of the 

island also helped to further isolate Japan, cutting off its supply routes 

with the rest of its empire and enabling the United States to more 

effectively blockade the home islands. 

The battle proved to be the last opposed amphibious assault of World 

War II and the end of the grand drive across the Pacific that began 

with the landings on Guadalcanal in August 1942. Over the course of 

three years, the Allies had conducted a two-pronged assault to retake 

the territories seized by Japan in 1941–42 and breach Japan’s inner 

defenses. The first, led by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 

advanced from the Solomon Islands across New Guinea and into 

the Philippines (refer to map on page 5). The second, commanded by 

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, moved across the Central Pacific 

Ocean, beginning with the Gilberts in November 1943, advancing to 
4

the Marshalls in early 1944, and culminating with the seizure of the 

Marianas and liberation of Guam in the summer of that year. In the 

course of this twin advance, the Japanese fortresses at Truk and Rabaul had been isolated, its lines of communications with its territories 

in Southeast Asia severed, and the home islands subjected to an unremitting bombing campaign launched from bases in the Marianas. 

Yet the Japanese showed no sign of surrendering. Indeed, in the fall 

of 1944, they demonstrated an even greater determination not to give 

up ground and capitulate. The 1st Marine Division’s (1st MarDiv) 

fight for the island of Peleliu left the veteran division a bloodied shell. 

Beginning with the Philippines campaign, Japanese aircraft began 

suicide kamikaze strikes against U.S. Navy ships. These defensive tactics also inflicted significant casualties during the Battle of Iwo Jima, 

the only battle of the Pacific war where American casualties exceeded 

those of the Japanese. 

There was a cold logic to Japan’s change in tactics. Its efforts to stem 

the Allied assault across the Pacific had led to egregious, irreparable 

losses of personnel, ships, and equipment. The Imperial Japanese Navy 

was a shell of its former self, its carrier air arm virtually annihilated 

during the Marianas campaign. Unable to match the United States’ 

industrial strength and the overwhelming power of the U.S. Marine 

Corps, Army, Army Air Corps, and Navy, the Japanese sought to wage 

a war of attrition. By choosing a deliberate defense that would inflict 

as many casualties upon the Allied forces as possible, the Japanese 

hoped that they would be convinced that a negotiated truce would be 

preferable to the high costs that would result during an invasion of 

the Japanese home islands. Therefore, the Japanese defenders would 

fight to the death with their mission being to make the Allies pay the 

highest price possible in Allied blood. 

With the Marianas lost and their supply lines with Southeast Asia 

cut off, the Japanese leadership now faced the problem of preparing 

for the next Allied attack and anticipating where that attack would 

come. Would it be the islands of Formosa (Taiwan) or Okinawa? For 

the Americans and their British allies, the task was simpler if no less 

daunting. It now was time to breach Japan’s inner defensive ring, seize 
5

Okinawa, and prepare for the next (and hopefully final) phase of the 

war, the invasion of the Japanese mainland. 

What challenges would seizing an island this close to Japan involve? 

Could the Allies continue its successful island-hopping campaign all 

the way to Tokyo? What stood in the way of victory? How did the 

American leadership read the strategic, operational, and tactical situation? What were the Allied operational objectives and the best ways 

to secure them? These then were the questions of the moment and 

some of the things we will examine in the invasion of the Ryukyu 

Islands—the Battle of Okinawa—as we study on the ground during 

our ride culminating on the south side of Hill 89.

The Staff Ride

We will spend our days together walking and riding over the ground 

contested in this battle, continuing a long-standing military practice 

used by armies for over a century. We continue to use the title “staff 

Map depicting strategic situation in the Pacific from October 1944 to March 1945.
6

ride” for these specialized battlefield studies to evoke several objectives:

l History is important and we want to “get it right,” but history 

is useful only as a vehicle that moves us to a discussion of contemporary concerns to help us shape our future.

l We are conducting a seminar where the participants will share 

views on a broad range of ideas and issues, often from different 

vantage points.

l The team building that results from an intellectual adventure 

such as this may be as important as the substantive content of 

that adventure.

l Lastly, the insights that we develop, hone together, and share 

with others will help us as we confront again some or all of those 

dilemmas faced by our predecessors and as we take on increased 

responsibilities in our service, wherever that may carry us.

The Battlefield as a Metaphor

This staff ride complements those that you have already taken at some 

point in your career, whether at EWS, the Command and Staff College, or MCWar. Our staff ride offers some wonderful opportunities 

to visit yet again the continuing challenges of senior leadership—

planning, organizing, and integrating complex operations; training 

and equipping individuals and units; building, leading, and rebuilding 

effective teams, the absolute requirement for resolute moral leadership under stress; the meshing of ideas and technology; and finally, 

inculcating the qualities essential to “fighting through”—closing with 

and slugging it out with the enemy, ultimately destroying him man to 

man, after all other options are exhausted.

This ride focuses on the 82-day battle known by the local population 

as tetsu no bofu (Typhoon of Steel), which began on Easter Sunday, 1 

April 1945 (also April Fool’s Day). We will follow primarily III Amphibious Corps while framing the engagements fought by the Army’s 

neighboring XXIV Corps and Tenth Army, the higher headquarters 
7

for the operation. This no-holds-barred fight pitting Marines and 

soldiers against determined Japanese defenders fighting to the death 

from underground positions was one of the most memorable battles 

in the history of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Early in March 1945, American sailors, Marines, soldiers, and airmen were firmly established throughout the Central Pacific and the 

Philippines, but the war against Japan was not yet won. Iwo Jima had 

fallen in February, and the larger strategic decision had been made to 

invade Okinawa rather than Formosa to gain a springboard for the 

invasion of Japan. With the recent memory of the fanatical resistance 

encountered at Peleliu and Iwo Jima still fresh in everyone’s mind, 

no one was under any illusion that an invasion of Okinawa would be 

any easier. As Admiral Raymond A. Spruance maneuvered his Fifth 

Fleet into position to initiate the invasion on 21 March with Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner’s Tenth Army, few realized that 

the climactic battle of the war in the Pacific was at hand; even fewer 

believed that this would be one of the bloodiest battles the Marine 

Corps would ever fight, second only to Iwo Jima.

The leaders we will follow during this period are familiar to all of us 

from some of our previous study and staff rides—Nimitz, Spruance, 

Turner, Buckner, Geiger, del Valle, and Shepherd. We will also drop 

down a notch and look at division and regimental leaders in this primarily infantry, tank, and artillery fight. 

We will see new and forbidding ground near towns named Naha, 

Maeda, Itoman, Wana, and the ancient Ryukyuan capital of Shuri. 

And we will see how forces of the embattled Japanese Thirty-second 

Army, fighting on Japanese soil, offer up a sustained and bitter defense, 

with a few offensive surprises that gave U.S. forces a taste of what they 

could expect to encounter during an invasion of mainland Japan. 

The After-Action Review

Staff rides always end with an after-action review (AAR), a practice 

that fits as naturally with these rides as it does in our other training. 

Both armies involved in this fighting wrote comprehensive reports on 
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operations prior to and during the period that we are studying. They 

asked essentially the same questions that we ask in our reports today. 

What did we expect to happen? What happened? What did we learn 

from those experiences? And finally we add, how should this help us 

in the future?

A number of broad themes seem to present themselves for our study 

and reflection, including:

l The role, influence, and adaptation of doctrine

l Leadership, unit cohesion, and morale

l The planning and conduct of joint operations

l The role of intelligence, communications, and logistics

l Combined arms training and fighting

l Larger unit operations

l Generalship

Battlefield Guides 

Our battlefield guides for this ride include experienced battlefield 

leaders, historians, and instructors to help us understand the complexities and context for one of the most crucial battles of World War II.

Take a few minutes to record your expectations for the staff ride on 

the notes pages at the end of this battle book. As we progress through 

presentations and discussions, and as we take time to reflect, ask yourself what is really happening and, as importantly, what is NOT happening. Think about these questions in the context of the challenges you face today and the solutions that you are positing. Think also 

about the recurring themes of these and other battlefields you know 

that help inform us about leading effectively through the “fog and 

friction” of modern military operations. All this and more we will 

discuss at the AAR at the end on day four. 
9

Once again, we are off to tromp another battlefield rich in insights for 

us that will help guide and sustain us as we face our futures.
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Commander’s Intent

Purpose 

To provide a leadership case study from the United States and Japanese experiences by examining the Battle of Okinawa, as part of the 

III MEF commanding general’s professional development program.

Method

This staff ride will begin with an afternoon seminar introducing the 

main themes we will explore together. The discussion will focus at 

the intersection of the operational and tactical levels of war. The key 

considerations are senior-level decision making ( Japanese and American), intelligence, logistics, changing the line of operations of a big 

organization on the fly, and command and staff in battle.

Using the III MEF headquarters as a base of operations, we will 

travel by bus over the next three (or four) days to various “stands” 

and, from our study and initial explorations of “war on the map,” 

determine what actually happened on the ground. Each stand has 

been carefully chosen generally following the force, which has the 

initiative to illustrate a key objective, to emphasize the difficult Marine Corps, Army, and Navy coordination and integration challenges, 

to track the decisions of the senior leaders, and to follow the fight 

on the ground, as much as modern terrain considerations will allow. 

Throughout the staff ride, we will be emphasizing the role of the 

leader to shape the future, to build and sustain teams, to manage 

processes, and to nurture learning.

We will conclude each day with a seminar highlighting the observations and insights of the day, offering selected additional topics, and 

setting the stage for the following day. The commanding general will 

lead an after-action review at the conclusion of the staff ride at our 

last stop at the Peace Memorial Park in Mabuni. 

End State

This rich and engaging battlefield metaphor will provide a perfect set-
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ting for the III MEF Senior Leader Team to study, discuss, and reflect 

on the following:

l Assessing the situation for the role of operational and tactical 

leadership in battle;

l Understanding joint operations, “meshing the cultures,” and 

making it work;

l Dealing with the unexpected and decision making under uncertainty;

l Fighting through, qualities of leadership, and adaptability;

l Seeing and shaping the future; and

l Building effective teams and managing complex processes.
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Schedule of Events (illustrative)

Day 1 

1400–1700 Welcome brief, overview, and team 

building

Day 2

0800–0830 Mission brief 

0830–0900 Travel to site overlooking the Hagushi 

beaches

0900–1200 Landings at Hagushi beach

1200–1300 Lunch, en route to Nago and Motobu 

Peninsula

1300–1700 III Amphibious Corps sweeps to the 

north, battle for Motobu Peninsula

1700–1800 Return to MEF HQ

1800–2000 Dinner followed by seminar and preview for following day

Day 3

0800–0830 Mission brief

0830–0930 Travel to Shuri Line

0930–1200 III Amphibious Corps attacks at

Shuri Line

1200–1300 Lunch, en route to Naha

1300–1700 Japanese counteroffensive of 4–5 May, 

6th MarDiv takes Sugar Loaf Hill, 1st 

MarDiv takes Shuri Castle
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1700–1730 Return to MEF HQ

1730–2000 Dinner followed by seminar and preview for following day

Day 4

0800–0830 Mission brief

0830–0900 Travel to Oroku Peninsula

0900–1200 Marine turning movement at Oroku

Peninsula and Naval Underground HQ

1200–1300 Lunch, en route to Yaeju-dake Line

1300–1500 Tenth Army assaults Yaeju-dake Line

1500–1530 Movement to Mabuni/Hill 89

1530–1700 Final battles along Kiyan Peninsula, 

cornerstone of Peace Memorial Park

1700–1730 Return to MEF HQ

1730–complete Dinner, commanding general’s AAR, 

and out brief (or see below)

Day 5 (Optional)

0900–1000 Final out brief with commanding 

general (if required)
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Author’s note: the format of this staff ride battle book closely adheres to the model set forth in William G. Robertson’s The Staff Ride, 

published by the U.S. Army’s Center of Military History in 1987, as 

well as the example posed by Colonel French MacLean’s Battle of the 

Hürtgen Forest battle book, written for the commander, U.S. Army 

Europe’s staff ride in 2000. Any errors contained herein are strictly 

those of the author. 
15

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Ocean Areas (CinCPOA) 

Joint Staff Study for Operation Iceberg

Shortly after concluding the seizure of the Marianas in August 1944, 

Admiral Nimitz, CinCPOA, directed his staff to begin preparing a 

staff study to determine requirements for the next phase of the Central Pacific offensive. While the need to take Iwo Jima had already 

been accounted for and plans had been drawn up accordingly, the 

next phase depended on whether the Allied invasion of Japan would 

go through the island of Formosa (Taiwan) via the Philippines or the 

Ryukyu Islands chain (referred to as Nansei Shoto by the Japanese) 

via the Marianas. Initially, General MacArthur advocated taking Formosa for use as a base to attack Japan, while Nimitz was in favor of 

the Ryukyuan approach. 

Finally, MacArthur was won over to Nimitz’s argument, partly because the campaign in the Philippines was proving to be much longer 

and costlier than initial estimates, requiring his full attention. With 

that obstacle removed–MacArthur would be designated a supporting 

commander–Nimitz’s staff began drawing up initial plans for the invasion of the Ryukyus to determine overall theater requirements and 

to provide guidance for subordinate units. The operation was designated Iceberg, and the study that resulted from CinCPOA’s staff became the basis for all directives concerning the operation. Nimitz did 

not intend the staff study to dictate or commit to any course of action. 

Rather, it was intended to facilitate the planning and implementation 

by his major subordinate commanders for their own respective operational and logistical planning. 

The resulting 161-page CinCPOA staff study, issued on 25 October 

1944, consisted of a 7-page concept of operations that envisioned the 

campaign unfolding in three phases, beginning on 1 March 1945 (for 

CinCPOA Joint Staff Study concept of operations, refer to packet of 

additional study materials). As a prerequisite, the staff assumed the 

capture of Iwo Jima and the neutralization of the Japanese Navy, as 

well as air superiority being established throughout the Ryukyus. It 
16

foresaw the main purpose of seizing Okinawa and its surrounding 

islands as securing bases from which to attack mainland Japan and 

complete the destruction of its air and naval forces that were necessary prerequisites for a successful amphibious operation. The concept 

of operations was supported by eight appendices (A–H), totaling 154 

pages, detailing the proposed scheme of maneuver, air operations, naval operations, submarine operations, logistics, troop list, preliminary 

seizure of islands (such as Ie Shima) subsequent to Phase I, and seizure and development of additional positions during Phase III.

Politically, CinCPOA could count upon President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s support of Iceberg. Though the nation had been at war for 

nearly three years and the end of the war in Europe was only months 

away, the people of America, though increasingly war-weary, were 

united in their resolve to see the war with Japan through to victory. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in their approval of the 

strategy, seeing Okinawa as a necessary stepping-stone essential for 

any successful invasion of the Japanese home islands. No one, except 

a very small group of people including the president, knew about the 

nuclear weapons being developed, and even then they were not certain that the atomic bomb would work. Though everyone believed 

that the Battle of Okinawa would be a bloody affair, few harbored any 

illusions that Japan would not surrender without a fight. Therefore, it 

was a battle that had to be fought.

The Joint Staff Study, marked top secret, was distributed throughout 

all the major subordinate commands, including Fifth Fleet/Task Force 

50, Tenth Army, and commanding general of Fleet Marine Force Pacific. On 9 November 1944, Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner, commander of Fifth Fleet and Task Force 51 (making the main effort) 

issued his personal guideline memorandum for Iceberg to his staff, 

which was also deeply involved in the final planning stages for Operation Detachment, the invasion of Iwo Jima. This document was to 

provide the basis for all subsequent planning, and except for moving 

the date back one month due to the prolongation of the seizure of Iwo 

Jima as well as some minor changes, it was to become the framework 

of the actual order used for the invasion, Task Force 50 Order 1-45, 

issued 3 January 1945.
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Chronology of the War in the Pacific

19 September 1931–27 February 1932: Japanese invade and occupy 

Manchuria and create the puppet state of Manchukuo.

7 July 1937: Marco Polo Bridge incident sparks open war between 

Japan and China.

12 December 1937: Japanese bombers sink USS Panay (PR 5), a U.S. 

gunboat tasked with patrolling the Yangtze River. Public opinion in 

the United States turns against Japan.

1–3 September 1939: German invasion of Poland sparks World War II.

22–26 September 1940: Japan invades and occupies French Indochina.

26 July 1941: United States freezes Japanese assets, restricts trade, and 

establishes an oil embargo, following Japanese occupation of southern 

Indochina.

7 December 1941: Japan commences grand offensive against western 

colonial holdings throughout East Asia with a surprise attack against 

the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Four U.S. battleships are sunk 

and the Americans suffer more than 3,000 casualties.

8 December 1941: Japan launches invasion of the Philippines and 

Malaya.

8 December 1941: Japan invades and occupies Thailand.

8–10 December 1941: Japan invades and occupies Guam.

8–23 December 1941: Japan launches invasion of Wake Island. Their 

attempts at a landing are repeatedly thwarted by aviators from Marine 

Fighter Squadron 211. The Japanese finally achieve victory against the 

island’s exhausted defenders on 23 December.

8–25 December 1941: Japan invades and seizes Hong Kong from 

British control.

10 December 1941: the British battleship HMS Prince of Wales (53) 
18

and battlecruiser HMS Repulse (1916), en route to intercept the Japanese invasion force headed toward Singapore, are sunk off the coast 

of Malaya by Japanese bombers.

22 January 1942: Japanese forces begin offensive against British Indian Empire with an invasion of Burma.

15 February 1942: Japan’s conquest of Malaya and Singapore is completed. Eighty-thousand British Commonwealth troops surrender to 

the Japanese.

27 February 1942: joint American-Dutch-Australian-British fleet 

defeated at battle of the Java Sea, opening way for Japanese occupation of Indonesia.

9 April 1942: United States and Filipino defenders of Bataan surrender 

to Japanese forces. Survivors suffer the Bataan Death March as they 

are moved from the peninsula to Camp O’Donnell 80 miles north.

18 April 1942: B-25s led by Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle 

launch a carrier-borne raid against Tokyo.

4–8 May 1942: U.S. carriers intercept and defeat Japanese attempt to 

invade Port Moresby at the battle of the Coral Sea.

5–6 May 1942: Corregidor, the last American outpost in the Philippines, falls to Japanese forces. The Philippines is now completely 

occupied by Japan.

4–7 June 1942: Japanese launch offensive against Midway Island in an 

attempt to lure U.S. carriers into a decisive battle. U.S. carriers launch 

a counterambush that leads to the destruction of four Japanese carriers and brings an end to Japanese expansion in northern and central 

Pacific.

7 August 1942: United States conducts first counteroffensive of the war 

with the landing and seizure by two Marine divisions of an airfield on 

Guadalcanal. The field will be completed and named Henderson Field.

8–9 August 1942: Japanese sink American and Australian cruisers 
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defending forces on Guadalcanal at the battle of Savo Island. Three 

heavy cruisers are sunk.

12–14 September 1942: during the battle of Edson’s Ridge, 1st MarDiv repels Japanese effort to seize Henderson Field.

23–26 October 1942: in the battle of Lunga Point, the Japanese attack 

on Henderson Field is repelled by the 1st MarDiv.

26 October 1942: during the battle of Santa Cruz Islands, the Japanese inflict considerable damage against U.S. naval forces defending 

Guadalcanal.

12–15 November 1942: during the naval battle of Guadalcanal, Japan 

suffers decisive defeat as it attempts to retake Henderson Field. 

7 February 1943: the last Japanese forces withdraw from Guadalcanal.

30 June 1943: Allied forces begin Operation Cartwheel to isolate Rabaul and retake western New Guinea from Japanese control.

5 August 1943: Allied forces seize New Georgia.

1 November 1943: Allies begin operations to regain and secure Bougainville from Japanese control.

20–23 November 1943: in the Battle of Tarawa, the 2d MarDiv wages 

bloody battle to seize and secure Betio Island in the Tarawa Atoll as 

Allied forces commence the Central Pacific drive into the Gilberts. 

The 27th Infantry Division concurrently seizes Makin Island, another 

atoll in the Gilberts chain.

26 December 1943: beginning of the battle of Cape Gloucester in 

New Guinea.

31 January–3 February 1944: U.S. forces begin advance into the Marshall Islands for battle of Kwajalein.

17–23 February 1944: during the battle of Eniwetok, the United 

States successfully seizes Eniwetok Atoll from the Japanese, securing 

the Marshall Islands.
20

8 March–3 July 1944: the Japanese attempt to invade northern India 

is repulsed by commonwealth forces in the battle of Imphal.

4 April–22 June 1944: in the battle of Kohima, commonwealth forces 

secure supply lines to Imphal, ending the Japanese campaign to invade India.

22 April 1944: Allies secure Cape Gloucester.

15 June–9 July 1944: U.S. forces assault Saipan in the first wave of the 

Marianas campaign. 

19 June–20 June 1944: a Japanese attempt to sink the Saipan landing fleet is thwarted by American carrier aircraft during battle of the 

Philippine Sea or “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.” This a decisive defeat of Japanese naval air forces.

21 July–10 August 1944: United States assault and liberate Guam in 

the second phase of the Marianas campaign.

24 July–1 August 1944: United States assault and seize Tinian from 

Japanese control as it continues to secure the Mariana Islands.

15 September–27 November 1944: the 1st MarDiv and 81st Infantry 

Division wage a grueling struggle to seize and secure Peleliu, an island 

in the Palau Islands.

20 October 1944: U.S. forces land at Leyte Island and begin the liberation of the Philippines.

23–26 October 1944: United States defeats Japanese attempts to disrupt the landings at the Philippines during the battle of Leyte Gulf. 

This is the largest naval battle of the Pacific theater and the first use 

of kamikaze by Japanese.

24 November 1944: Twentieth Air Force begins strategic bombing 

campaign against Japan from bases in the Marianas Islands.

15 December 1944: U.S. forces land on Mindoro Island in the continuing campaign to liberate the Philippines.
21

9 January 1945: start of the battle of Luzon. U.S. forces begin campaign to liberate largest of the Philippine Islands.

3 February–3 March 1945: United States liberates capital city of the 

Philippines in the battle of Manila.

19 February 1945–26 March 1945: three U.S. Marine divisions assault and secure the island of Iwo Jima for the largest all-Marine battle of World War II.

9 March 1945: Twentieth Air Force begins firebombing campaign of 

Japanese cities.

1 April–22 June 1945: in the Battle of Okinawa, the United States 

begins campaign to seize and secure the Ryukyu Islands so that they 

may be used as a staging area for the invasion of the Japanese home 

islands.

13 April 1945: Franklin D. Roosevelt dies. Harry S. Truman sworn in 

as president.

8 May 1945: Victory in Europe Day. End of the war with Germany.

16 July 1945: Trinity atomic bomb test. First successful nuclear detonation.

6 August 1945: Twentieth Air Force B-29 drops atomic bomb on 

Hiroshima.

8 August 1945: Soviet Union declares war against Japan and subsequently invades Manchuria and inflicts a decisive defeat against Japanese forces there.

9 August 1945: Twentieth Air Force B-29 drops atomic bomb on 

Nagasaki.

15 August 1945: Japanese Emperor Hirohito announces surrender of 

Japan to the Allied powers. Remaining pockets of resistance in the 

Philippines and China surrender.
22

28 August 1945: Allies begin the occupation of Japan.

2 September 1945: Japan formally surrenders to the Allied powers. 

End of World War II in the Pacific.
23

Operation Iceberg/Invasion of Okinawa

Planning Overview

Official U.S. Navy photo, National Archives collection

U.S. Navy and Marine officers, some of whom would play crucial roles during the Battle 

of Okinawa, pictured at a staff conference at Saipan. Present are (left to right) VAdm 

Richmond K. Turner, USN (Task Force 51); LtGen Holland M. Smith (V Amphibious 

Corps); Adm Raymond A. Spruance, USN (Fifth Fleet); RAdm Marc A. Mitscher, USN 

(Task Force 58); MajGen Roy S. Geiger; RAdm Richard L. Conolly, USN; and MajGen 

Pedro A. del Valle (1st MarDiv). 

1. U.S. strategy and Okinawa: an element of the Pacific island-hop 

ping campaign.

l The situation in October 1944—Japan via Formosa or Okinawa

l Joint planning considerations

l Campaign design

l Maturation of amphibious doctrine
24

2. Review of Operation Iceberg via the Marine Corps planning 

process using a copy of the original October 1944 staff study. 

(Note: the amount of time that the commander of III MEF 

wishes his subordinate commanders and staff to devote to this 

activity needs to be determined. Otherwise, this could be optional.)

l Problem framing

l Course of action development

l Course of action war game

l Course of action comparison and decision

l Orders development

l Transition

3. Actual Task Force 51 planning assumptions. Subordinate commands in the Pacific Fleet were directed to undertake their 

planning for the assault on Okinawa based on the following 

assumptions: 

l That Iwo Jima had been seized at a sufficiently early date to 

permit the gun support and air support units to participate in 

the assault on Okinawa. 

l That the United States would maintain continuing control of 

the air in the objective area. 

l That assault shipping and supporting naval forces would have 

been released from the Luzon operations.

All the assumptions turned out to be reasonably sound. The 

additional six weeks separating the Okinawa and Iwo Jima operations permitted most of the ships damaged by kamikazes in 

the Luzon operations of General MacArthur to be repaired and 

returned to battle duty. 
25

4. Actual Task Force 51 concept of operations. Operation Iceberg 

was planned to be carried out in three phases. 

Phase I included the following: 

l The capture of Kerama Retto six days before the main landings on Okinawa and the establishment there of a logistic anchorage and of a floating seaplane base;

l The capture of four very small islands (Keise Shima) just eight 

miles west of the Okinawa port of Naha on the day before the 

main landing and the emplacement of 24 155mm guns thereon;

l Assault and capture of the southern part of Okinawa—the 

area lying south of the narrow neck formed by Ishikawa Isthmus; and

l Possibly, the capture of the island Tonachi-jima, lying 30 miles 

west of the Motobu Peninsula on Okinawa. 

Phase II estimated to commence 1 May 1945, included the following: 

l The capture of the island Ie Shima, lying just west of the Motobu Peninsula, and

l The capture of Motobu Peninsula. 

Phase III, the two operations estimated to commence on 1 July 

1945 and 1 October 1945, respectively, included the following: 

l The capture of Miyako-jima, an island 150 miles to the southwest of Okinawa, and 

l The capture of Kikai-jima, an island 170 miles to the 

north-northeast of Okinawa on the way to Kyushu.

The actual basic order further provided that, subsequent to the 

assault on Okinawa, this force would capture, occupy, and defend ad-
26

ditional positions for establishing secure sea and air control over the 

East China Sea. 

Approximately 116,000 troops were assigned to the initial assaulting units, out of a total of 183,000 troops made available by 

CinCPOA for the assault phases of the operation. 

5. Tenth Army concept of operations (excerpt from Major Charles 

S. Nichols Jr. and Henry I. Shaw Jr., Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific,

1955):

A tentative operation plan was issued by Tenth Army on 6 January 

1945 with instructions that it would be placed in effect on order of the 

commanding general, Tenth Army. This was done on 11 March 1945, 

concurrent with the briefing of Fifth Fleet units, which had been actively engaged against the enemy at Iwo Jima and had little time to 

prepare for the Okinawa operation. 

The operation order directed XXIV Corps to land with two divisions 

abreast on the beaches south of Hagushi; 96th Division (Major General James L. Bradley) on the right, less one regiment in corps reserve; 

7th Division (Major General Archibald V. Arnold) on the left with 

one regiment in division reserve but under the operational control of 

the commanding general, XXIV Corps. On order of the commanding general, 77th Division, one field artillery group of XXIV Corps 

Artillery was to be landed on Keise Shima prior to L-Day to support 

the attack on Okinawa. The group would revert to control of commanding general, XXIV Corps upon his arrival in the objective area. 

The remainder of XXIV Corps Artillery (Brigadier General Josef R. 

Sheetz) would land on corps order and support the corps attack with 

long-range interdiction, counterbattery, and harassing fires.

Simultaneously, the III Amphibious Corps was to land with two divisions abreast on the beaches north of Hagushi and move rapidly 

inland, coordinating its advance with XXIV Corps. The 1st MarDiv 

(Major General Pedro A. del Valle) was to assist the 6th MarDiv (Major General Lemuel Shepherd Jr.) in the capture of Yontan airfield by 

quickly seizing the high ground northeast of Chimu; thereafter, it was 
27

to continue the attack, making the main effort on the right to maintain contact with XXIV Corps and assist its advance. The 1st MarDiv 

scheme of maneuver placed the 5th and 7th Marines in assault with the 

5th Marines on the right. The 1st Marines remained in division reserve. 

The 6th MarDiv, less the 29th Marines, would land on the left of 

the 1st MarDiv. The 4th Marines, less the 2d Battalion in division 

reserve, would be on the right and the 22d Marines on the left. The 

division was charged with the initial mission of capturing Yontan airfield and protecting the northern flank of the Tenth Army. The 29th 

Marines in corps reserve, in addition to being prepared to land on 

designated beaches, would stand ready to revert one battalion landing team (BLT) to the 6th MarDiv on order. III Amphibious Corps 

Artillery was to land on corps order to support the attack, and once 

ashore to coordinate field artillery, air support, and naval gunfire in 

the Marines’ area. 

For the initial phase of the operation, following the landing, the objective area consisted of that part of the island lying south of a general 

line across the Ishikawa Isthmus running through Chimu and including the Eastern Islands. To isolate the objective, the isthmus was to 

be seized quickly by III Amphibious Corps to block enemy reinforcement from the north. At the same time, XXIV Corps was to secure a 

general east-west line through Kuba Saki to seal off the Japanese in 

the south. After the capture and occupation of central Okinawa, the 

attack would continue to the south to secure the remainder of the 

objective. 

Upon the completion of Phase I, the second phase was to be executed 

when directed by General Buckner with troops locally available. This 

involved the seizure of Ie Shima and the rest of Okinawa. It was contemplated that Motobu Peninsula in the north of the island would be 

secured by means of a combined shore-to-shore amphibious and land 

assault, followed by a shore-to-shore attack against Ie Shima. The capture of the rest of northern Okinawa would bring the end of Phase II.*

* Charles S. Nichols and Henry I. Shaw Jr., Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1955), 

25–26.
28

6. Command and control relationships (shown below):

As shown in the diagram above, overall command and control for all 

naval, air, and ground task forces assigned for Operation Iceberg fell 

under Admiral Spruance, who was also designated as commander of 

Central Pacific task forces. He was responsible for two primary forces—the Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 51), charged with carrying out the actual invasion of Okinawa, and the covering forces and 

special groups (Task Force 50), Task Force 58 (the fast carrier force), 

and Task Force 57 (the British carrier force). 

Task Force 51, commanded by Vice Admiral Richmond Turner, was 

composed of six subordinate task forces. The landing force, designated 

Expeditionary Troops or Task Force 56, was commanded by Army Lieutenant General Buckner. Supporting task forces were the Amphibious 

Central Pacific

Task Force

Admiral R. A. Spruance

Covering Forces 

and

Special Groups

(Task Force 50)

Admiral R. A. Spruance

East Carier Force

(Task Force 58)

British Carrier Force

(Task Force 57)

Joint

Expeditionary

Force

(Task Force 51)

Vice Admiral R. K. Turner

Amphibious

Support Force

(Task Force 52)

Rear Admiral

W. H. P. Blandy

Western Islands

Attack Group

Rear Admiral

L. N. Kiland

Landing Force

77th Division

Expeditionary

Troops

(Task Force 56)

LtGen

S. B. Buckner Jr.

Demonstration

Group

Rear Admiral

J. Wright

Landing Force

2d Marine Division

Southern Attack

Force

(Task Force 55)

Rear Admiral

J. L. Hall Jr.

Landing Force

XXIV Corps

Northern Attack

Force

(Task Force 53)

Rear Admiral

L. F. Reifsnider

Landing Force

III Amphibious Corps

Gunfire and

Covering Force

(Task Force 54)

Rear Admiral 

M. L. Deyo
29

Support Force (Task Force 52), Gunfire and Covering Force Group 

(Task Force 54), Northern Attack Force (Task Force 53), the Southern 

Attack Force (Task Force 55), and the Demonstration Group, which was 

responsible for carrying out a diversionary maneuver.

Per the Landing Force Manual, initial command of Task Force 54 

during the landing operation would be exercised by Admiral Turner. Once the preponderance of forces were ashore, General Buckner 

would establish Tenth Army Headquarters and from that point forward would exercise direct command and control of all ground and air 

forces based on the island, including III Amphibious Corps and the 

Tactical Air Force, Tenth Army.
30

Chronology of the Battle of Okinawa

14–31 March 1945: preliminary air operations.

23 March–1 April: naval bombardment. 

26–31 March: the 77th Infantry Division assaults and captures Kerama Retto and Keise Shima islands.

1 April (Easter): amphibious landings begin on main island at Hagushi beach.

2 April: the 7th Infantry Division reaches the eastern coast and severs 

the island in two; III Amphibious Corps swings to the north; U.S. 

Army’s XXIV Corps swings to the south.

4 April: XXIV Corps slams up against the outposts of the Japanese 

Machinato Line and is soon bogged down amid an interlocking defensive system.

6–7 April: first of 10 major kamikaze attacks (Ten-Go Plan).

9–10 April: seizure of Tsugen Shima Island by 27th Infantry Division.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
31

16–21 April: seizure of Ie Shima Island by 77th Infantry Division.

19 April: all-out attack on outer ring of defenses of Shuri Line by 

XXIV Corps.

20 April: end of organized resistance on Motobu Peninsula in 6th 

MarDiv area of operations.

26 April: Admiral Nimitz sends a dispatch notifying Tenth Army that 

the Miyako Operation of Phase III had been postponed indefinitely 

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, thus freeing the III Amphibious Corps for full use on Okinawa.

1 May: the 1st MarDiv relieves the 27th Infantry Division in southern Okinawa.

4–6 May: major Japanese counteroffensive repulsed by XXIV Corps. 

4 May: the 27th Infantry Division relieves 6th MarDiv in northern 

Okinawa.

7 May: III Amphibious Corps takes over western sector of the Tenth 

Army front in southern Okinawa.

8 May: the first elements of 6th MarDiv enter the lines on the southern front.

11–21 May: all-out attack by Tenth Army against the inner defenses 

of the Shuri Line. 

30 May–4 June: Japanese Thirty-second Army withdraws from Shuri 

Line to new positions in the Kiyama Peninsula.

31 May: the 5th Marines captures Shuri Castle.

4 June: the 6th MarDiv assaults Oroku Peninsula in amphibious envelopment

18 June: General Buckner killed by Japanese artillery; Major General 

Roy S. Geiger assumes command of Tenth Army, he becoming the 

first Marine general to command a field army.
32

21 June: end of organized Japanese resistance.

22 June: Tenth Army raises flag for its new headquarters, marking the 

official capture of Okinawa.

23 June: General Joseph W. Stillwell assumes command of Tenth 

Army.

30 June: mop-up of southern Okinawa complete.
33

Suggested Routes, Maps, and Vignettes

Introduction

The Battle of Okinawa raged from 1 April to 21 June 1945, a period of 82 days encompassing some of the most savage fighting that 

occurred anywhere in the Pacific. More than 200,000 people were 

killed or wounded during the battle, including a large civilian population caught between the two opposing armies. Although Okinawa 

is approximately 60 miles long, most of the fighting took place in 

the southern third of the island, its most developed and most heavily 

populated portion. (Refer to Maps A and B for overall orientation.)

This battle book is designed to examine the Marine Corps’ participation in the battle during a three-day staff ride. To accomplish this on 

Okinawa’s crowded road network, an early start is required. While the 

U.S. Army’s role in the battle was central to the overall Allied success (in fact it provided the majority of the ground forces), the time 

available limits the staff ride to those areas of the battlefield where III 

Amphibious Corps and its units battled the Japanese. 

The first stand will focus on the landings at the Hagushi beaches, including the logistical preparations so essential for success, while the 

second stand will focus on the drive across the island toward the northern coast. Central to this phase was the hard fighting for the Motobu 

Peninsula and the capture of Ie Shima, which we will briefly discuss. 

The route of this guide follows no “tour” signs; therefore, the staff ride 

leader should recon the route before the staff ride and should have a 

detailed local road map. Many of the stands are in rural areas near active military installations, so be careful not to stray into off-limits areas.

The staff group leader may want to start this staff ride at a location 

where he or she can discuss the overview of the landings. Locations 

for this stand may be Kitanakagusuku (site of the EM Hotel Costa 

Vista parking lot) or Skyline Ridge, though the Hotel Costa Vista 

(the website can be found at http://www.costavista.jp) is much closer 

to the invasion beaches. This information may be covered the day or 

night before the ride in a briefing format.
34

A note on vignettes: this staff ride is designed to be scalable; that is, it 

can be used by units ranging in size from infantry company to MEF 

and from the MEF command element to the Marine air wing. As 

such, it is the responsibility of individual units conducting their own 

staff rides to select appropriate vignettes that reinforce the teaching 

points relevant to their units’ mission. The History Division stands 

ready to assist units in developing these vignettes but recommends 

that units appoint a Marine taking part in the staff ride to serve as the 

focal point for vignette selection. 

In regards to individual accounts, George Feifer’s Tennozan: The Battle 

of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb is a good source for vignettes, as is 

William Manchester’s Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War. 

One of the best of the genre is Eugene B. Sledge’s With the Old Breed: 

At Peleliu and Okinawa. A particularly dramatic, first-person account 

is “A Hill Called Sugar Loaf ” by First Sergeant Edmund H. DeMar, 

USMC (Ret), in Leatherneck ( June 1995).
35

Reference Map A
36

Reference Map B
37

Selected Stands and Maps for the Battle of Okinawa 

Stand 1 Landings at the Hagushi Beaches

Stand 2 III Amphibious Corps Sweeps to the North; Battle

 for Motobu Peninsula

Stand 3 The Battle at the Shuri Line; 1st MarDiv Joins

 the Attack 

Stand 4 The Japanese Counteroffensive of 4–5 May

Stand 5 6th MarDiv Takes Sugar Loaf; 1st MarDiv at Wana 

 Ridge and Wana Draw

Stand 6 Japanese Withdrawal; 1st MarDiv Takes Shuri

Stand 7 6th MarDiv Landings at Oroku Peninsula, Japanese 

 Naval Headquarters

Stand 8 Tenth Army Assaults Yazu-dake, Yaeju-dake—

 Kunishi Ridge Defensive Line

Stand 9 Alternate Landing Beaches at Minatogawa

Stand 10 Japanese Final Resistance at Mabuni and End at Hill 

 89; Peace Memorial Park
38

Map to Stand 1
39

Map 1 to Stand 2
40

Map 2 to Stand 2
41

Map to Stands 3–6
42

Map to Stand 7
43

Map to Stand 8 
44

Map to Stands 9 and 10
45

Stand 1

Landings at the Hagushi Beaches

Directions: the first stand is conducted in the unused parking area 

across the street from the Hotel Costa Vista on the hilltop on the 

outskirts of Kitanakagusuku. The street address is 901-2311 1478, 

Kisyaba, Kitanakagusuku-son, Nakagami-gun, Okinawa. Phone: 098-

935-1500. (Grid 52RCE79851015)

Orientation: you are standing in the parking lot across the street from 

the Hotel Costa Vista, located on the hilltop overlooking the town of 

Kitanakagusuku. As you look to the west, Camp Foster lies directly to 

your front on the opposite side of the Okinawa Expressway. From this 

position, you can see all of the Hagushi landing beaches used during 

the invasion on 1 April 1945. To your north and east, you can clearly 

see the zones of action taken by the XXIV Corps as it cut the island 

in half by 2 April. 

Description: at that time, the entire bay before you was filled with 

hundreds of ships and landing craft of all descriptions—from battleships, such as the USS Tennessee (BB 43), to amtracks. Kadena Air 

Base is located roughly in the center of the beaches, with Yomitan to 

the north and Chatan to the south. Extending as far north as Zampa 

Point, four divisions (1st and 6th MarDivs and 7th and 96th Infantry 

Divisions) conducted a nearly textbook landing operation. 

The dust and smoke from the prelanding bombardment would have 

nearly obscured the area beyond the beaches, and hundreds of aircraft 

would be seen in the sky, conducting bombing runs and strafing attacks against known Japanese positions. The sounds of the bombardment would have been clearly audible to us at our present location. 

Expecting the worst, Task Force 51 and all of the other supporting 

naval elements carried out one of the most thorough and lethal bombardments of the Pacific war. 

Still, most men going in with the initial waves fully expected to be 

killed or wounded. Instead, there was little resistance encountered at 
46

the beach, to everyone’s surprise. The landing troops were able to easily advance beyond the beach, overcoming sporadic and uncoordinated 

resistance. Few suspected that this was a deliberate part of General 

Mitsuru Ushijima’s defensive strategy. While the landings were unopposed, this was still the largest amphibious operation in the Pacific 

and represents the full realization of the amphibious warfare doctrine 

developed in the 1930s at Quantico, Virginia.

Teaching Point 1: amphibious operations are, by their very nature, 

complex. Although the Japanese chose not to defend at the waterline, 

the landings at the Hagushi beaches were a textbook case of how to 

properly conduct a large-scale landing. Everything from naval gunfire, close air support, communications, ship-to-shore movement, and 

logistics was carried out as near to perfect as possible using the resources and technology available at the time. 

Teaching Point 2: the individual Marine taking part in the landing 

operation on day one of the invasion fully expected that he would 

have to fight his way off the beach. When that did not happen, he 

was surprised again when no serious Japanese resistance was encountered once he moved inland. According to several of the first-person 

accounts consulted, this led many Marines and soldiers to believe that 

the battle would be a “cakewalk” compared to previous battles such as 

Peleliu and the Philippines. The fact that they were all proved wrong 

was realized within the week, when troops of the XXIV Corps ran 

up against the outer defenses of the Shuri Line. The takeaway is that 

troops must train to anticipate surprises—that when surprises occur, 

not to become discouraged but to adapt and overcome uncertainty.

Stand 2

III Amphibious Corps Sweeps to the North; 

Battle for Motobu Peninsula

Directions: from the Hotel Costa Vista, get onto the Okinawa Expressway and drive to its terminus at Exit 10 (Kyoda Interchange). 

This roughly approximates the route that the 6th MarDiv took as it 

moved north up the island. Enter Route 58 and drive through Nago 
47

city. As soon as possible, take Route 84 north. Here, you are entering 

the Motobu Peninsula. After travelling two miles along Route 84, 

turn left and follow the signs toward Mount Yae-take (also spelled 

Yae Dake). Once you arrive, park in the lot and walk the remaining 

1/10 of a mile across the road from the parking lot, where there is 

an observation platform. (Note: you cannot reach all the way up Yae 

Dake. There is a communications tower that is off-limits to nonofficial personnel. Coordination in advance through III MEF G-6 is 

advised.) (Grid 52RCQ93354650)

Orientation: from this vantage point (1,945 feet), you can clearly see 

to the northwest, west, southwest, and south. To the northwest, you 

can clearly see the island of Ie Shima, taken by the troops of the 77th 

Infantry Division. To the south, the city of Nago can be seen. You are 

now standing on the key terrain initially held by the Japanese defenders as they attempted to hold off the Marines of the 6th MarDiv from 

8 to 20 April. 

Description: the battle for Mount Yae-take on the Motobu Peninsula 

was the first heavy fighting experienced by the 6th MarDiv. While 

many of its battalions were not new to combat, it was the first time 

that the entire division was engaged. Here, the Kunigami Detachment, 

consisting of two battalions of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade 

commanded by Colonel Takesiko Udo, ended their delaying tactics 

and assumed a deliberate defense, intending to make the Marines pay 

dearly for every foot of ground. 

Aided by severely broken terrain, which included steep hillsides, deep 

draws, and limestone caves, the defenders did just that, forcing the 

Marines to dig them out one by one. Although the defenders were 

quickly encircled, no thought was given to surrender. Finally, after five 

days of difficult and costly fighting, Marines overcame the last defensive positions by 20 April, though a few Japanese stragglers continued 

to evade capture until the war ended. 

While the Kunigami Detachment was completely wiped out and Colonel Udo killed, the Marines paid a steep price—207 killed and 757 

wounded. Having eliminated the last major pocket of resistance in the 
48

northern two-thirds of the island, the 6th MarDiv could now concentrate on mopping up stragglers and preparing for its next mission. At 

the time, most Marines in the division thought that their part in the 

Battle of Okinawa was finished, but this was not to be.

Teaching Point 1: when it became clear that the Japanese were not 

going to defend on the beaches, Tenth Army ordered III Amphibious 

Corps to rapidly advance north to seize the northern half of the island. This forced the 6th MarDiv to configure its battalions for rapid 

movement along unpaved roads and in terrain that was very favorable for defense. The solution was to use amtracks and tanks to carry 

Marines aboard and drive north as fast as possible until they hit enemy resistance. This improvised mechanized concept worked very well 

until the division encountered the deliberate Japanese defense of the 

Motobu Peninsula, but by then most of the northern part of the island 

had already fallen. 

Teaching Point 2: Marines were surprised when they finally encountered the Kunigami Detachment in its dug-in positions on the Motobu 

Peninsula. Expecting an easy fight, they instead had to transition to 

“corkscrew and blowtorch” tactics that required tremendous coordination to carry out successfully. Marines must be ready at all times to 

shift to different tactics and techniques as different combat situations 

dictate.

Stand 3

The Battle at the Shuri Line; 1st MarDiv Joins the Attack

Directions: situated in the Kakazu Heights Park, the Kyoto Tower 

provides an excellent 360-degree view of the area surrounding Kakazu Ridge. This place is easy to find off of Highway 58 heading south 

from Camp Foster or north from Camp Kinser. Look for the white 

signage just before the Ojana Intersection (Pref. Route 34) marking 

where you make your first turn; right if you are heading north on 

58, left if you are heading south. At the Maehara Intersection (Pref. 

Route 241) turn right. After the bridge at the first light with the pedestrian overpass, turn right (follow the signs). At the next light, turn 
49

right down the narrow road, and the park appears on your right side. 

(Grid 52RCQ73800500)

Orientation: once you have ascended the platform, you will immediately see Futenma Airfield approximately two kilometers to the north. 

To your left, you will see the town of Ginowan and the western coastline; and to your right, you will see the eastern coastline and the town 

of Ouki. Between these two points can be seen most of the terrain 

features that the XXIV Corps and the Japanese fought over between 

9 and 29 April, including Kakazu Ridge, Nishibaru Ridge, Tombstone 

Ridge, the Tanabaru Escarpment, and Skyline Ridge. As you face to 

the south, you can spot most of the heavily defended key terrain features encountered by the 1st MarDiv from 29 April to 4 May, including Machinato and the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment.

Description: on 27 April, the 1st MarDiv was chopped from III Amphibious Corps to the XXIV Corps, then heavily engaged along the 

outermost portion of the Shuri Line, where it was bogged down in 

heavy fighting. Having suffered many casualties, General Buckner 

had convinced General Geiger of the need to attach General del Valle’s division to support the Tenth Army’s main effort. 

With this, the nascent plan to launch another amphibious operation 

along the island’s southeast coast evaporated and the Marines of the 

1st MarDiv soon found themselves engaged in the heaviest fighting 

they had seen since Peleliu, as Buckner’s Tenth Army continued its 

frontal assault. Relieving the Army’s depleted 27th Infantry Division 

by 29 April, del Valle’s Marines attacked straight into the teeth of the 

prepared Japanese defensive positions, suffering heavy losses in men 

and equipment. 

As heavy rains began to fall on 1 May, the hellish conditions for both 

Marines and soldiers intensified. Constant shelling had turned the battlefield into a quagmire, making it difficult to move and even more difficult to keep forward elements supplied. Even evacuating the wounded 

required herculean efforts by Marines every step along the way. Combat raged both day and night; though the Marines were successful in 

eliminating one Japanese position after another, it came at a high price. 
50

Japanese use of cave positions made it extremely difficult for Marines 

to locate them until they approached to a very close range, and usually 

after they had been fired on first. Even more effective was the Japanese’s use of reverse slope defensive positions, which often resulted 

in the Marines having to give up positions of hills just taken when 

confronted by determined and well-led Japanese counterattacks that 

saw troops pouring forth from caves dug into the hill’s reverse slopes. 

But this was just a taste of what was to come.

Teaching Point 1: there will be occasions where commanders are left 

with no option but frontal assault, with the prospect of heavy casualties being a near certainty. Commanders and troops will have to 

adapt themselves to the situation and fight through, relying on their 

individual weapons, teamwork, and training to see them through. 

Since such situations will require extraordinary effort by leaders at 

the platoon, company, and battalion levels, officer and NCO casualties will be inordinately high, requiring junior leaders to train during 

peacetime to be prepared to move up one or two levels of leadership 

should their immediate leaders become casualties so that the unit will 

continue to function. For example, should a company commander become a casualty, a company executive officer or platoon commander 

must be prepared to assume command without hesitation. Similarly, 

should a platoon commander or platoon gunnery sergeant be killed 

or wounded, corporals or sergeants must be prepared to assume these 

key leadership positions while continuing the fight.

Teaching Point 2: the U.S. Army attempted to outflank Kakazu Ridge 

defenses on 19 April using the 193d Tank Battalion unsupported by 

infantry. The battalion was nearly wiped out, losing 22 out of 30 tanks, 

when Japanese infantry, supported by mines, artillery, and antitank 

guns, swarmed the tanks with satchel charges and hand grenades. 

Marine tank battalions learned to avoid sending in unsupported armor and instead insisted on having infantry accompany the tanks all 

the way, even if it meant heavy losses for the infantry. As a result, no 

Marine tanks were lost to individual Japanese infantrymen.
51

Stand 4

The Japanese Counteroffensive of 4–5 May

Directions: Hacksaw Ridge, aka the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment, is 

located at 3-48-1 Iso, Urasoe, Okinawa Prefecture. To get there, take 

Highway 330 (the Urasoe Bypass) south and get off at the Highway 

38 exit; turn left, going south on Highway 38. After approximately 

2,000 feet, turn left at the Urasoe Junior High School. Follow the 

road around for about one kilometer until you come to Urasoe Elementary School. Go 500 feet past the school, and you will see the 

parking lot at the base of the Urasoe Castle Park. Parking is free. 

(Grid 52RCQ73100365)

Orientation: as you stand atop the escarpment, the scene of vicious 

fighting that was still taking place when the Japanese conducted their 

counteroffensive—the objective of their efforts, the Tanabaru Escarpment—lies four kilometers to the northeast. To the southwest, you 

can see the ramparts of Shuri Castle. Off to the east, you can see Conical Hill, the rightmost bastion holding the eastern flank of the Shuri 

Line. Off to your west (with the aid of binoculars), you can make out 

the white water tower marking the location of Sugar Loaf Hill. Both 

east and west coasts are also visible from this location.

Description: although Hacksaw Ridge/Urasoe-Mura Escarpment 

was the scene of an epic two-week battle between U.S. Army troops 

and the Japanese, it offers a good vantage point to describe and follow the action that occurred from 4 to 5 May when the Japanese 

Thirty-second Army conducted its only major counteroffensive of the 

campaign. Intended to encircle and destroy the 1st MarDiv in the 

west by an amphibious envelopment and to force the XXIV into retreating by seizing the Tanabaru Escarpment in its rear, the plan was 

an ambitious one that would see the Japanese Army emerge from its 

underground galleries and maneuver in the open for the first time in 

significant numbers.

Preceded by a heavy artillery barrage in the early morning hours of 

4 May that caught American forces by surprise, major elements of 
52

the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade on the Japanese left and the 24th 

Infantry Division on the right infiltrated the front lines of the 7th 

and 77th Infantry Divisions between Maeda and Onaga. The Japanese 27th Tank Regiment also maneuvered in the open in support of 

the main attack. One infantry battalion even managed to penetrate as 

far as the town of Tanabaru. 

However, by daylight, U.S. forces had recovered from their initial surprise and were soon able to bring superior firepower to bear that had 

a devastating effect on Japanese troops caught in the open, as well as 

upon their supporting artillery which had to move out of their caves 

in order to fire. Even less successful were the two amphibious operations carried out by the two engineer shipping regiments. The one on 

the west coast intended to cut off 1st MarDiv carried out by the 26th 

Engineer Shipping Regiment, which attempted to land too close behind the front line and was intercepted by U.S. Navy coastal craft and 

shot up. Those troops who managed to land at Kuwan were wiped out 

by Marine defenders before they could seize a beachhead. The attempt 

on the east coast by the 23d Engineer Shipping Regiment fared just as 

poorly, with most of its men killed. 

By 5 May, it was evident to General Ushijima and everyone on his 

staff that the counteroffensive, begun with such high hopes, was a 

complete failure. Not only had all the attacking units (with the exception of one battalion) been unable to reach or hold their objectives, 

but they had been driven back with heavy losses. The tank regiment 

had been virtually wiped out. But worst of all, nearly half of their artillery was lost due to naval and ground counterbattery fire. American 

counterattacks began in earnest on 5 May and by 7 May had recovered all of the ground that had been lost. In all, the Thirty-second Army

had lost more than 7,000 of its best men, some 10 percent of its entire 

force, and had absolutely nothing to show for it. U.S. casualties had 

been relatively light in comparison. 

With the Japanese unable from this point forward to mount anything 

other than local counterattacks (except for an abortive attempt by Japanese paratroopers to destroy American aircraft at Kadena airfield on 

23 May), the tide had shifted. Though there were still six weeks of 
53

heavy fighting remaining before the island was finally secure, General 

Buckner’s biggest concern, a large-scale Japanese counterattack, had 

passed. Despite the fact that the III Amphibious Corps did not play 

a decisive role in repelling the Japanese counteroffensive (since most 

of the Japanese effort was directed against the Army’s 7th and 77th 

Infantry Divisions), the fact that Geiger’s Marines had held their own 

ground and helped to destroy a Japanese supporting amphibious assault on their right flank figured prominently in the overall American 

success.

Teaching Point: the Japanese counteroffensive was completely unexpected. While most commanders expected some sort of banzai attacks 

like what had been experienced at Saipan, no one was prepared for the 

scale and scope of this attempt to defeat Tenth Army. Commanders 

and troops at all levels should constantly assess an enemy’s capability, 

free of cultural or mental bias, and focus on what he could do, as opposed to what you wish he would do. 

Stand 5

6th MarDiv Takes Sugar Loaf; 1st MarDiv at

Wana Ridge and Wana Draw

Directions: the first stand is located on the hilltop (nicknamed “100 

Meter Hill”) overlooking Sueyoshi Park, which encompasses Wana 

Ridge and Wana Draw. The park’s address is 1-3-1 Shurisueyoshicho, 

Naha, Okinawa Prefecture 903-0801. Phone: +81 98-951-3239. 

Open weekdays 0900–2200 and on Saturday, Sunday, and holidays 

0700–2200. The parking lot can accommodate up to 30 vehicles, but 

large tour buses can fit only with difficulty, and tour groups may need 

to be dropped off so the bus can park elsewhere. Once you park, return 

to the main road (Highway 241) and travel north along the sidewalk approximately 200 feet; once you pass the post office on your 

left and cross the bridge, turn left at the narrow footpath that parallels the creek. After 100 meters, follow the signs to the hilltop. (Grid 

52RCQ71950155) Following completion of this stand, stop at Sugar Loaf Hill, located across the street (south) from the Coop Apple 

Town Shopping Mall and Toys“R” Us store. Located adjacent to the 
54

Naha City Office and Omoromachi Medical Center, take Highway 

58 south and get off at the Uenoya intersection, heading east. The water tower can be found on your right. (Grid 52RCQ69450225)

Orientation: from 100 Meter Hill, the town of Shuri and Shuri Castle can be seen approximately two kilometers to the south; three kilometers to the west on the northern outskirts of Naha, you can see 

the white water tower indicating Sugar Loaf Hill. Imagining what 

the battlefield looked like 70 years ago will be a challenge, since urbanization has taken over so much of this part of the island. However, 

by focusing on the key terrain, such as Wana Ridge, Sugar Loaf, and 

Shuri Castle, you can get an idea of the size and scale of the battlefield, as well as how these terrain features figured so prominently in 

descriptions of the battle. While there is little today to see of Sugar 

Loaf Hill (construction and development has trimmed it down), there 

is a memorial plaque mounted at the base of the observation tower; 

from that vantage point, you have a very clear view of Shuri Castle to 

the southeast and Wana Ridge to the east. 

Description: at this point in the battle, III Amphibious Corps moved 

south to take over the right flank of Tenth Army’s front line from 

XXIV Corps, which focused exclusively on the east half of the zone 

of action from Shuri to the east coast. The Marines were in for one 

hell of a fight. The struggle for Sugar Loaf Hill, Horseshoe Hill, HalfMoon Hill, Wana Ridge, and Wana Draw from 5 to 30 May 1945 

has been described as some of the most difficult ever experienced by 

the Marine Corps, comparable only to Iwo Jima and Peleliu in terms 

of savagery, lethality, and sheer misery. Both the 1st and 6th MarDivs 

experienced an astronomical number of casualties, with approximately 

200 Marines being lost for every 100 yards gained. More than 3,000 

Marines from the 6th MarDiv were killed or wounded in the fighting 

around Sugar Loaf Hill alone. 

In a static battlefield reminiscent of World War I, Marines fought 

from water-and mud-filled foxholes, while corpses of both friend and 

foe decomposed within an arm’s reach. Constant artillery fire, interspersed with Japanese counterattacks, allowed the Marines of both 

divisions little or no rest, while logistical difficulties caused by im-
55

passible roads swollen by the rain forced them to get by on meager 

rations. Evacuation of casualties was fraught with danger as both the 

wounded and stretcher bearers were subject to the fire of an enemy 

with no respect for the sensibilities of the existing laws of land warfare 

as embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. It is no 

wonder that the Battle of Okinawa had the highest rate of psychological casualties than any other battle in the Pacific; most Marines knew 

that the only way out was to either be killed or wounded.

Despite these obstacles, the Marines pressed doggedly onward, inflicting even greater losses upon the Japanese who continued to defend from caves and tunnels. Fortunately, the disastrous Japanese 

counteroffensive of 5 May had resulted in the loss of most of their 

remaining frontline troops and half of their artillery, resulting in their 

replacement by untrained service and rear-echelon troops. Even so, 

these men fought just as stubbornly but were slowly overcome by determined Marines and soldiers, who time and again resorted to corkscrew and blowtorch tactics using flamethrowers and satchel charges 

to drive the Japanese out of their positions into the open where they 

would be quickly killed. 

Resupply became extremely difficult, particularly for the 1st MarDiv, 

which found itself in a muddy wasteland where even tracked vehicles 

had difficulty moving. Food, ammunition, and other supplies often 

had to be hand carried laboriously to the front lines, and the wounded 

were evacuated the same way. A partial solution was found when Marine torpedo bombers were used for low-level supply drops directly 

above frontline units. 

By 19 May, Sugar Loaf had fallen to the 29th Marines and Wana 

Draw to the 1st Marines by the 30th. Marines began to advance into 

the outskirts of Naha itself. The loss of Conical Hill and the town of 

Yonabaru on the east coast to the Army’s XXIV Corps meant that 

both the left and right flanks of the Thirty-second Army had been 

turned. While the stronghold at Shuri still held firm as always, General Ushijima decided to withdraw lest the remainder of his command 

become encircled and destroyed. 
56

Teaching Point 1: by this point, the battle had degenerated into a noholds-barred slugging match, with victory going to the one with the 

most firepower and physical endurance. Individual bravery counted 

for a great deal, for without it, units would have never advanced. Being 

a leader in such situations often demands that you set an example for 

your men, knowing that in all likelihood the price of doing so means 

that you will become a casualty.

Teaching Point 2: when conventional means of supply no longer suffice, logisticians must resort to creative ideas to get supplies ashore 

and to the frontline troops who need them most. In this case, the use 

of torpedo bombers to drop supplies was a masterstroke; for without 

it, 1st MarDiv’s attack would have stalled. While the situation in 6th 

MarDiv was slightly better due to its location on the western coast of 

Okinawa, the use of amtracks to ferry supplies from coastal supply 

dumps to positions immediately behind the front lines helped enormously.

Teaching Point 3: while 6th MarDiv was learning corkscrew and 

blowtorch tactics in the Motobu Peninsula, 1st MarDiv—having 

learned them at Peleliu several months earlier—instinctively put them 

into practice again when its companies and battalions encountered 

the well-prepared enemy positions along the Shuri Line. While effective, these tactics were enormously costly in the number of Marines 

and soldiers killed or wounded in action. Units should train for all 

situations and ensure that new recruits benefit from lessons learned 

by those who have been in the unit longer.

Stand 6

Japanese Withdrawal; 1st MarDiv Takes Shuri

Directions: to get to Shuri Castle from all points north of Naha via 

Highway 58, drive south into the Naha area on Highway 58. Look for 

signs for Highway 29 and Shuri Castle site. Turn left on Highway 29. 

Drive on 29 for a considerable distance (past Highway 330). You will see 

signs for Shuri along the way. At Highway 50, you can veer right. This 

will take you to the well-marked parking area. If you miss that turn, you 
57

can also turn right at Highway 49. From all points north of Naha coming on the expressway, exit the expressway at the Naha City exit (number 1). Turn right along Route 82. From there, you will see many signs 

directing you. Take a left on Highway 29 and another left on Highway 

49. This will take you to the underground parking area. Parking is available on the premises. As of 2014, the parking rates are ¥940 (yen) for 

large vehicles and ¥310 for small vehicles. Admission fee for the castle 

is ¥820 for individuals and ¥660 for groups. (Grid 52RCQ71930045)

Orientation: Shuri Castle offers many vantage points that the staff 

ride group can use. From its northern ramparts, you can view Wana 

Ridge and, to the northwest, you can see the water tower marking the 

location of Sugar Loaf Hill. Naha is plainly visible, as well as the port 

area including the Oroku Peninsula, site of today’s modern international airport. To the east lies the town of Yonabaru, which fell to the 

Army’s 7th Infantry Division on 23 May. For this particular stand, the 

best vantage point to view the direction of the Japanese withdrawal 

and the terrain features that made their continuing defense feasible is 

the southern ramparts of the castle, where there is a large fenced-in 

area that can hold a group of 20 people. Looking south, you can see 

the Kiyan Peninsula, the goal of Thirty-second Army, where General 

Ushijima intended to continue his deliberate defense.

Description: with envelopment in the west by III Amphibious Corps 

and in the east by XXIV Corps a near certainty, by 22 May, General 

Ushijima had a decision to make—stand and defend in place and risk 

immediate encirclement and annihilation or withdraw to the Kiyan 

Peninsula to continue the fight. While the unrelenting kamikaze attacks were hammering the American fleet anchored offshore, the U.S. 

Navy showed no sign of departing any time soon. The attempt by the 

battleship Yamato to interdict the American fleet had failed weeks 

before when it was sunk halfway to Okinawa. 

With no hope of relief or reinforcement, many of Ushijima’s subordinates, including his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Isamu Chō, 

wanted to conduct “honorable death” (i.e., suicide) attacks against the 

Americans and be done with it; others, including his operations officer, 

Colonel Hiromichi Yahara, continued to maintain a more level-headed, 
58

strategic point of view and urged the continuation of the deliberate 

defense that had inflicted so many casualties on the attackers. Yahara’s 

point of view won out; instead of dying in place, Ushijima decided 

to withdraw his army to a more defensible position where the fight 

could continue, thus guaranteeing that the battle would rage for another month.

Thus, on the evening of 29 May, Thirty-second Army began its planned 

withdrawal partially concealed by heavy rains that reduced visibility 

to near zero. Some units left rear guards behind to cover their old 

positions while other units were directed to conduct counterattacks to 

keep the Americans off balance and to conceal the withdrawal. Though 

the long columns of withdrawing troops were frequently interdicted 

by artillery, naval gunfire, and air attack, suffering heavy losses in the 

process, the Tenth Army never realized that a large-scale withdrawal was taking place until the Japanese had safely arrived undetected 

in their new positions by 4 June along the Kunishi, Yuza-dake, and 

Yaeju-dake ridgelines. Nevertheless, Thirty-second Army lost nearly 40 

percent of its remaining strength during the withdrawal, leaving only 

30,000 men remaining, few of which were combat troops. 

American patrols sensed that something had occurred. While the 

Japanese defenders seemed to be alert, they were not responding to 

attacks by the Marines and soldiers with the same intensity as before, 

and Japanese artillery fire had noticeably slackened. Encouraged by 

the apparent weakening of the Japanese defenders, the 5th Marines of 

1st MarDiv attacked Shuri on 29 May and found the castle with its 

commanding views virtually undefended; all that was left was a small 

rear guard that fought and died in place. Despite this encouraging development, information was slow to get passed up the American chain 

of command, for it was not until 30 May that Tenth Army realized 

that Japanese intentions had changed. 

Meanwhile, 6th MarDiv fought its way house to house through 

Naha, which had been virtually destroyed during the fighting. Although they too encountered stubborn rear guards left behind to 

delay their pursuers, the city had fallen to the 22d Marines by 29 

May as well. The Army was enjoying similar success in the east. 
59

However, by 31 May, Tenth Army finally realized that the Japanese 

had slipped the noose and an opportunity to end the battle four weeks 

earlier had been lost when it denied the III Amphibious Corps’ proposal to conduct an end-run amphibious operation. A ground pursuit 

was finally undertaken by 31 May but, hampered by heavy rains that 

turned roadways into rivers of mud, the Americans had lost their one 

and only chance to catch Ushijima’s army in the open and destroy it.

By 4 June, the Thirty-second Army, though seriously weakened, was set 

in its new defensive sector. Short of artillery, ammunition, and above 

all trained manpower, the survivors occupied elaborately prepared positions that had been painstakingly constructed months earlier by the 

24th Infantry Division and settled in with a determination to make 

the Americans pay dearly for every foot of ground they took. In this, 

they were to prove successful.

Teaching Point 1: just as the Japanese offensive of 4–5 May had been 

completely unexpected, so was the great withdrawal of 29 May. Failure to anticipate this course of action caught Tenth Army off guard, 

leading it to miss an opportunity to exploit the withdrawal with a 

vigorously conducted pursuit, and causing the battle to drag on for 

another month. Commanders and their staffs must war-game possible enemy courses of action (COAs) and develop decision points that 

trigger the correct response to enemy COAs.

Teaching Point 2: the Japanese withdrawal was a masterpiece of 

planning and execution. Operational security and a simple, effective 

deception plan ensured that the bulk of Thirty-second Army escaped 

before Tenth Army realized what was happening. In the future, the 

Marines can be certain they will face intelligent and resourceful opponents who are capable of getting inside our decision cycle and eliminate any options we have to respond in a timely manner. 
60

Stand 7

6th MarDiv Landings at Oroku Peninsula,

Japanese Naval Headquarters

Directions: finding the Kaigungo Navy Headquarters Park can be 

challenging. Take Highway 58 south from Kadena toward Naha. 

Take a left onto Route 7 where there is a sign directing you to the 

headquarters, and follow it until you see another sign directing you to 

turn left. At the end of this road there is a T intersection with a parking garage in front. Turn left and follow the road uphill and around a 

small bend to a parking lot at the bottom of some stairs. Parking here 

is free but the lot is small and could get crowded during the busier 

times of year. There is an entrance fee of ¥440 for adults. The park is 

open year round from 0830 to 1700. (Grid 52RCP67789705)

Orientation: adjacent to the entrance to the Japanese Navy underground headquarters stands an observation tower, which provides excellent views in all directions. To the immediate north is the city of 

Naha and its port; to the west is the Oroku Peninsula, now occupied 

by the new Okinawa International Airport. To the southeast approximately eight kilometers away, you can see the Kunishi, Yuza-dake, and 

Yaeju-dake ridgelines protecting the approaches to the Kiyan Peninsula in the distance. 

Description: with the Shuri Line now in American hands, General 

Buckner had to decide what to do next. He could continue with the 

current plan (i.e., continue battering down the Japanese defenses with 

frontal attacks) or try the indirect approach by conducting amphibious operations on either flank. Decidedly biased against the latter, he 

continued his drive south into the teeth of the Japanese defense, but 

finally consented to III Amphibious Corps’ request to allow a shallow 

envelopment on the western coast of Okinawa at a point below Naha. 

While the rest of Tenth Army, including the 1st MarDiv, pressed 

forward down the peninsula from 2 June onward, overcoming Japanese rear guards and horrendous weather along the way, 6th MarDiv 

prepared for its amphibious operation, scheduled to commence on 4 
61

June. Designed to get behind Japanese defenses on the Oroku Peninsula, the attack would include both a frontal attack by one regiment 

over the Kokuba River in Naha, while another landed on the tip of the 

peninsula, with a third regiment remaining in reserve. 

The landing force, spearheaded by the 4th Marines, achieved complete surprise and quickly established a beachhead in the rear of Japanese Vice Admiral Minoru Ōta’s force. Reinforced later in the day 

by the 29th Marines, the 4th Marines had seized the airfield by the 

end of the second day and, by 7 June, had pushed as far as Itoman on 

the southwest coast, effectively isolating Admiral Ōta’s 5,000 sailors. 

Ironically, Ōta’s troops had been initially ordered to withdraw toward 

the Kiyan Peninsula on 28 May but, upon arrival and seeing that no 

fighting positions had been prepared for them, he ordered them all to 

return to their old positions in Oroku the following day. Thus, they met 

their fate at the hands of 6th MarDiv, whose Marines systematically 

took Ōta’s command apart. By 10 June, all Ōta could control was the 

terrain in the immediate vicinity of his command post. Rather than 

surrender, he and 175 of his men committed suicide on 13 June, most 

using hand grenades. The same day, 6th MarDiv declared the Oroku 

Peninsula clear of Japanese and became available for future missions. 

Though the amphibious right hook had been an overwhelming success, it did not come cheaply—1,608 Marines were killed or wounded, 

and 30 tanks were destroyed. The Japanese naval forces, though surprised, fought to the death, and only 200 out of the 5,000 defenders 

surrendered to the 6th MarDiv. 

Today, in addition to the views available atop the observation tower, visitors can tour the underground galleries of the former Japanese 

naval headquarters. Ōta’s living quarters have been preserved, as well 

as the farewell message he left inscribed on the wall. Dug entirely by 

hand using picks and shovels, the tunnel system is an engineering 

wonder open to the public. At the exit, there is an excellent museum 

that details the fighting that took place on the peninsula, along with 

many artifacts retrieved from the tunnels.
62

Teaching Point 1: Marines must always be prepared to exploit the excellent maneuver opportunities offered by their expertise in amphibious warfare. Though the landings at Oroku Peninsula were relatively 

shallow, enveloping the Japanese rear by only a few miles, they were 

sufficient to turn the enemy’s flank and swing the momentum to III 

Amphibious Corps’ advantage. Though the number of veterans in the 

ranks of 6th MarDiv had decreased noticeably after two months of 

combat, there was still enough remaining to train the new personnel 

in the basics of amphibious landings.

Teaching Point 2: this was the last opposed amphibious landing of 

World War II. Though small in scale compared to the landing of 1 

April as well as Iwo Jima, it was still larger than that carried out at 

Guadalcanal almost three years earlier. While amphibious operations 

are rare these days, Marines must still be able to plan and execute 

those operations on short notice.

Stand 8

Tenth Army Assaults Yazu-dake, Yaeju-dake—Kunishi 

Ridge Defensive Line

Directions: this stand is located at the General Simon B. Buckner Jr. 

Memorial at 599 Maezato, Itoman, Okinawa. (Grid 52R CP68058905) 

It is somewhat off the beaten path, so a thorough recon in advance is 

highly recommended. To get there from the Japanese underground 

naval headquarters, take Highway 331 south. After the point where 

Highway 331 and the 331 bypass intersect, turn left approximately 

100 meters past the intersection onto Maezato Road. Drive about 1.6 

kilometers (1 mile) east until you come to a small roadside pull off on 

the right. Park on the left side of the highway. Take the small pathway up the hill on the right. You will see the Buckner Memorial and 

find yourself standing along the eastern portion of Mezado (Maezato) 

Ridge, about one kilometer south of Kunishi Ridge. 

Orientation: from this point on Mezado Ridge, as you look to the 

north, you can make out Kunishi Ridge. To the southeast looms the 

town of Makabe, as well as the cliffs that mark the southern coastline 
63

of Okinawa. To the east you can see the western slopes of Yuza-dake 

and the Maeda Escarpment. To the west lies the sea.

Description: with the fall of Shuri and the Oroku Peninsula, the way 

was now open to continue the pursuit and destruction of the Thirty-second Army after its withdrawal to the Kiyan Peninsula. While 6th MarDiv finished mopping up the Japanese Navy forces at Oroku, by 7 June 

the 1st MarDiv kept pushing south through torrential rains, keeping up 

with Army units of the XXIV Corps to their left. The fighting during 

the next 2 weeks promised to be as bloody as the previous 10 weeks, 

with 30,000 Japanese troops holed up in caves and underground tunnels waiting for the assault. 

From 7 to 10 June, most of the delay was caused by flooded roads, 

mud, and lack of supplies. Most Japanese encountered were rear 

guards or bypassed units that chose to fight it out rather than surrender. However, by 10 June, troops of III Amphibious and XXIV 

Corps had run up against the Thirty-second Army’s final defensive line, 

which ran from west to east through Mezado, Kunishi, Yazu-dake, 

and Yaeju-dake ridges before terminating at the sea near Minatogawa. 

It would take more than a week to overcome this final defense line. 

Here the decimated battalions and regiments of the (from left to 

right) 62d and 24th Infantry Divisions and the 44th Independent Mixed 

Brigade, their ranks rebuilt with supply, maintenance, administrative, 

and headquarters troops, would make their final stand. With their 

defeat certain, their only hope now was to kill as many Americans as 

possible. Fortunately for the Americans, the defenders were short on 

nearly everything—primarily heavy weapons and ammunition—but 

they would expertly use what they had and make the Marines and 

soldiers of Tenth Army pay dearly for every foot of ground.

Weather continued to hamper the advance. Typhoon season began 

two weeks earlier than expected and roads were quickly washed out. 

The delivery of supplies was tremendously slowed as trucks, jeeps, 

and even amtracks got stuck in the knee-deep mud. Supply problems 

quickly intensified, forcing logisticians to once again resort to airdrops 

to get the supplies to where they were needed. Once again, creative 
64

solutions had to be found to get supplies to the front. Even individual replacement had to carry water, rations, and ammunition forward. 

Living conditions were squalid, to say the least, with Marines and 

soldiers crouching in flooded foxholes or fighting positions. Trench 

foot became a common ailment as well as other skin problems arising 

from constant exposure to wet, humid conditions.

Note that, on this particular spot, while viewing the advance of the 

8th Marines south of Mezado Ridge, General Buckner was struck 

and killed by Japanese artillery fragments on 18 June. He was the 

most senior U.S. general killed in action in World War II. The monument erected here by his men, as well as two smaller monuments 

commemorating the death of other senior Army officers nearby, is one 

of the few memorials on the island to honor fallen U.S. servicemen. 

Teaching Point 1: during this phase of the battle, American troops 

had perfected the tactics developed during the previous two months, 

allowing them to reduce Japanese defensive positions with fewer casualties than those suffered during the battle for the Shuri Line. Practice 

makes perfect, provided that sufficient tools (flamethrowers, satchel 

charges, etc.) are at hand to carry out the task.

Teaching Point 2: when difficulties arose in evacuating wounded under fire and bringing up reinforcements, 1st and 6th MarDivs 

resorted to using tanks as battlefield taxis. Taking advantage of the 

escape hatches underneath each M4 Sherman, crews would take in 

the wounded from exposed forward positions after dropping off reinforcements and supplies in the same way. Using available equipment 

in new and different ways was a hallmark of the war in the Pacific, and 

Okinawa was no exception.
65

Stand 9

Alternate Landing Beaches at Minatogawa

Directions: from the Buckner Memorial, take Highway 331 east to 

the town of Gushichan. Proceed through the town until you come to 

the northern outskirts of town where you see a corner garage on the 

right. Turn right at the garage and follow the country road south for 

approximately one kilometer until you come to the Gushikami Castle 

observatory located at latitude 26°7’16.80” N, longitude 127°45’0.46” 

E. (Grid 52RCP75008975)

Orientation: the Gushikami Castle observatory (actually a park/picnic area), partially located on the grounds of the former castle that 

was destroyed in the sixteenth century, is an excellent vantage point 

to view the proposed landing beaches at Minatogawa. To best view 

them, look over the ledge at the northeastern tip of the park. In the 

opposite direction (west) you can view the top of the tower at the 

Peace Memorial Park, less than three kilometers away.

Description: the decision not to conduct a major amphibious operation on the southern coast of Okinawa is one of the greatest what-ifs 

of the battle. With an entire Marine division (the 2d) in reserve and 

plenty of amphibious shipping to spare, why did the commander of 

Tenth Army, General Buckner, decide not to carry one out? 

The idea was floated as early as the last week of April, before 1st MarDiv was committed into action on the Shuri Line. Alarmed at the prospect of doing nothing more than carry out repetitious frontal assaults 

against a dug-in and fanatical enemy, Marines (and soldiers too) at every echelon chafed at having to follow unimaginative orders that countered everything Marine Corps doctrine had taught them to do, which 

was to use amphibious maneuver to avoid the enemy’s strength.

Several senior Marines and naval officers, including Commandant of 

the Marine Corps General Alexander A. Vandegrift (who visited the 

island during this period), recommended either using 2d MarDiv or 

pulling out 1st or 6th MarDivs, loading them up in transports, and 
66

conducting a landing at the relatively open beaches at Minatogawa on 

the island’s southeast coast. This operation, Vandegrift and the others 

reasoned, would have turned the Japanese’s flank and forced them to 

either commit their reserve or pull out troops from the Shuri Line in 

response, thus making it easier for Tenth Army to break through and 

end the deadlock. 

The beaches themselves at Minatogawa were adequate and were wide 

enough to allow a force of one division to land two regiments abreast. 

The Japanese realized this too as early as 22 April when the Thirty-second Army’s operations officer, Colonel Yahara, felt that the possibility 

of an American landing on the southern coast was his greatest fear. 

He knew as early as 1 May that Thirty-second Army had few reserves to 

counter a landing should it happen. Had the landing been carried out 

as General Geiger recommended, it may well have ended the campaign at least a month earlier. Even Major General John R. Hodge, 

commander of XXIV Corps, and Major General Andrew D. Bruce, 

commander of the 77th Infantry Division, urged landing at Minatogawa. So why did Buckner hesitate?

There were many factors weighing on his mind at the time. A primary 

one was that he did not want to risk such a large percentage of his 

force at a time when he realized that Tenth Army had hit the Japanese main line of defense at Shuri and, to overcome the Japanese, he 

felt that, he would need every man he had. His staff also advised him 

that, in their estimate, should any division be landed in the south, it 

would be isolated and thus on its own should it be hit by a large-scale 

Japanese counterattack. Furthermore, it would divert artillery, air, and 

naval gunfire support when Buckner and his staff felt they would need 

every bit of it to overcome the Shuri defenses. Finally, the logisticians on his staff believed that it would be impossible to supply a division-size force from the Minatogawa beaches inland. The specter of 

Anzio was also said to have influenced Buckner and his staff as well. 

At Anzio, an Allied corps had been isolated on a small beachhead far 

beyond the range of supporting artillery, except that provided by naval 

gunfire, and had come within a hair’s breadth of being thrown back 

into the sea by a series of determined German counterattacks. 
67

What we do know is that the relatively shallow amphibious envelopment carried out on 7 June by 6th MarDiv was very successful and 

achieved complete tactical surprise, despite using worn-out amtracks 

and exhausted Marines who had been fighting on the Shuri Line for 

a month. Could this have been carried out earlier, when more equipment was still operational and more Marines with landing experience were still serving in the ranks? It would be worth conducting a 

mini-wargame to see how this might have turned out.

Incidentally, the headquarters of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade

can be viewed below the eastern face of the hill below Gushikami 

Castle Park, located in a series of caves and manmade tunnels facing 

to the east. It was here where the Japanese right flank was finally 

breached on 19 June and where many of the surviving staff members 

of the brigade headquarters chose to commit suicide rather than surrender to the Americans. Though much of it has been closed off to 

cave explorers, much can still be seen by looking through the remaining openings.

Teaching Point 1: Marines at all levels should always look for opportunities to exploit the Marine air-ground task force’s (MAGTF’s) 

unique capabilities. Should a MAGTF find itself in the position 

where it is under a joint task force not led by a Marine officer, the 

commander and staff may have to educate the supported command as 

to how a MAGTF can be employed for the best advantage.

Teaching Point 2: an amphibious envelopment was the Japan’s greatest worry. Had the Tenth Army attempted one in late April or early 

May, it would have turned the tide of the battle and may have led to 

a successful conclusion earlier than it did. When conducting a COA 

wargame, the Red Team should be instructed in the importance of using a reverse method (i.e., what are the Blue Team’s most dangerous/

most likely COAs?) for war-gaming possible MAGTF responses, to 

ensure that opportunities for maneuver are not overlooked.
68

Stand 10

Japanese Final Resistance at Mabuni and End at Hill 89; 

Peace Memorial Park

Directions: take Highway 58 south until it becomes Highway 331. 

Continue south to the bottom of Okinawa and you will see road signs 

in English and Japanese leading you all the way to the park. Free 

parking is available. Hours are 0900–1700 daily, closed on Mondays 

and from December 29 to January 3. Museum admission is ¥300 for 

adults. Phone: 098-997-3844. (Grid 52RCP72008655)

Orientation: once in the park, the staff ride group should first walk 

up the steps (about 1/2 mile) to Hill 89 in order to view the entire Kiyan Penisula from the south. Here, one can see the hills to the north, 

including Kunishi Ridge, Yuza-dake, and Yaeju-dake, and understand 

that once these defensive bastions fell to the advancing Americans, 

there was little to stop them since the ground levels out nearly all the 

way to the southern coast. 

After viewing the terrain, take a moment to walk into the park from 

the back side of the hill where you can view the spot where the Japanese commanders committed suicide. View all the monuments erected to the various Japanese units that met their end here, as well as the 

memorial gardens where black granite obelisks are engraved with all 

the names of the fallen, Allied and Japanese. Then, time permitting, 

the staff ride group is encouraged to visit the museum itself.

Description: when Yaeju-dake fell to the Americans on 12 June, any 

semblance of a coherent Japanese defense collapsed. By 15 June, both 

flanks had been turned, resulting in the remaining Japanese forces being compressed into pockets at Madeira, Kiyan, and Mabuni. Headquarters for Thirty-second Army was situated in a series of caves in the 

limestone cliffs at Mabuni near Hill 89 in far more spartan surroundings than what they had enjoyed when they formerly occupied the 

underground tunnel complex below Shuri Castle. 

The last organized defense was attempted on 19 June by the 24th In-
69

fantry Division at Madeira, and by the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade

east of Mabuni. By 20 June, even these were crushed by the concentric 

American advance. The western portion of the Kiyan Peninsula fell 

to III Amphibious Corps by 21 June. Thirty-second Army’s headquarters at Mabuni was overrun on 22 June by the 7th Infantry Division. 

Earlier that morning, Generals Ushijima and Chō committed ritual 

suicide on a ledge overlooking the sea on Hill 89. But, by this time, 

the battle was practically over. 

Marines and soldiers continued mopping up and hunting for stragglers until the end of June and several large groups of Japanese surrendered after the war was over. Work immediately began on preparing 

the island to be the staging base for the invasion of Japan. Construction work had progressed substantially, especially regarding the building of 22 additional airfields, when the news arrived announcing the 

atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When the war ended 

on 2 September, most of this work stopped and the surviving Marines 

and soldiers of Tenth Army breathed a sigh of relief—they would be 

going home alive.

Teaching Point 1: breaking up the tactical integrity of enemy units 

led to the quick collapse of the Japanese defenses. Penetrating their 

front line and attacking into their rear areas in order to separate them 

from the frontline units left the Japanese with no adequate response 

and no time to react. 

Teaching Point 2: many Japanese soldiers attempted to evade capture 

dressed as civilians and by mixing in with columns of refugees. In 

order to avoid or lessen the chances of ambushes or suicide attacks, 

thorough screening of all noncombatants, including women, must be 

taken into consideration. Several high-value targets, such as Colonel 

Yahara, were able to evade detection for months by posing as simple 

peasants after successfully fooling their interrogators.
70

Tenth Army Order of Battle

Task organization, Task Force 56/Tenth Army

U.S. ground forces order for Operation Iceberg (182,821 total as of 1 April; 146,451 were 

ashore as of 8 April; the number had increased to 190,301 by 30 June).
71

U.S. Tenth Army (Task Force 56)

1st Engineer Special Brigade

53d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade

20th Armor Group

80th Medical Group

III Amphibious Corps

1st Marine Division (26,274)

6th Marine Division (24,356)

2d Marine Division (Tenth Army Reserve)

XXIV Corps

XXIV Corps Troops

XXIV Corps Artillery

1181st Engineer Construction Group

7th Infantry Division (21,929)

27th Infantry Division (16,143)

77th Infantry Division (20,981)

96th Infantry Division (22,330)

Tenth Army Tactical Air Force (Task Group 99.2)

Headquarters Squadron, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing

Air Defense Command (Task Unit 99.2.1)

 Marine Aircraft Group 14 

 Marine Aircraft Group 22

 Marine Aircraft Group 31

 Marine Aircraft Group 33

 Marine Aircraft Group 43

301st Fighter Wing (P-47 Thunderbolts)

 318th Fighter Group 
72

413th Fighter Group

507th Fighter Group

VII Bomber Command

11th Bombardment Group, Heavy (B-24 Liberators)

494th Bombardment Group, Heavy (B-24 Liberators)

41st Bombardment Group, Medium (B-25 Mitchells)
73

III Amphibious Corps Concept of Operations

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

BGen Merwin H. Silverthorn, chief of staff, aboard the command ship a day before an 

attack, designates on a relief map a Japanese position on the beach of Okinawa Shima in 

the Nansei Shoto island group to MGen Roy S. Geiger, commanding general of III Amphibious Corps, and other members of the staff including (from left) BGen D. R. Nimmer, 

Corps Artillery; Col Walter A. Wachtler, C-3: and LtCol Sidney S. Wade, C-2.

The following synopsis of the III Amphibious Corps concept of operations for Operation Iceberg is drawn from Victory and Occupation: 

History of the U.S. Marine Corps in World War II by Benis Frank and 

Henry Shaw.

General Geiger became involved in the planning for Iceberg in November 1944, when he was directed to report to General Buckner 

for planning purposes. Upon receipt of this order, the III Amphibious Corps commander immediately reported by dispatch. Shortly 

thereafter, III Amphibious Corps headquarters received a copy of the 

tentative Plan Fox together with all available intelligence on the prospective target and a request that Geiger prepare a tentative corps 

operation plan. 
74

When the III Amphibious Corps plan was completed, and at the request of Buckner, Geiger, accompanied by his chief of staff, Brigadier 

General Merwin H. Silverthorn; his G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Sidney S. Wade; his G-3, Colonel Walter A. Wachtler; his G-4, Colonel 

Francis B. Loomis Jr.; and other members of his staff, departed Guadalcanal for Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, arriving at Schofield Barracks on 9 

December. After personally contacting their opposite numbers on the 

Tenth Army staff, the III Amphibious Corps staff officers prepared to 

present their plan to General Buckner.

Geiger planned to employ the 1st and 6th MarDivs in the assault, 

with General del Valle’s division on the right or south flank. The 

choice of these divisions was logical since they were both located in 

the Solomons and there would be no problem in establishing liaison. 

The 2d Division, based in Saipan, would be the floating reserve of the 

Army, according to the III Amphibious Corps plan.

The question then arose regarding what steps would be taken if the 

Japanese were encountered in strength as III Amphibious Corps advanced eastward across Okinawa, for there was no doubt that an additional division would have to be inserted in the line before the east 

coast was reached. Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith took this 

question up with the Tenth Army commander, who agreed that III 

Amphibious Corps would have first call on 2d MarDiv.

General Watson’s division was scheduled to make the feint landings 

on the southeast coast of Okinawa on L-Day and L plus 1, and it was 

not contemplated that Geiger would need it before the third day of 

the operation. The III Amphibious Corps staff members presented 

their plan orally to General Buckner on 19 December, when it was 

approved. According to General Smith, who was present on this occasion, Geiger’s staff members “did a very creditable job.” 

Scheme of Maneuver

Basically, the scheme of maneuver ashore was designed to attain early 

use of the airfields so that land-based air supremacy over the target 

could be gained and held. An additional dividend derived from the 

capture of the airfields would be their use as staging bases for continu-
75

ing mass air raids on both Japan and those areas within flying range of 

Okinawa under enemy control. As in the case of earlier amphibious 

landings in the Pacific, certain preliminary softening-up steps had to 

be taken before the main assault was launched. 

Kerama Retto was to be seized by the 77th Infantry Division (Reinforced) on 26 March 1945, or six days before L-Day. Following the 

first day of operations in the Kerama Retto and beginning the night 

of the 26th, Marines of the Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion were to reconnoiter the reef islets of the island 

group. First they were to investigate Keise Shima for the presence of 

enemy troops, and in the following days and nights prior to L-Day, 

they were to land on Aware Shima, Mae Shima, and Kuro Shima. 

To support the landing on Okinawa, a field artillery group of XXIV 

Corps Artillery was to land and be emplaced on Keise Shima prior 

to L-Day. 

While these operations were underway, Okinawa would receive increased air and naval gunfire bombardment, which would mount in 

intensity until the first assault waves neared the beaches. At this time, 

the fire would lift from the beach area and continue inland. The Army 

and Marine divisions were to land on the Hagushi beaches, General 

Geiger’s corps on the left. The mouth of the Bishi Gawa marked the 

beginning of the corps boundary, which roughly followed the course 

of the river, to a point just north of Kadena; here, the line headed almost due east to bisect the island. 

Once landed north of the Hagushi town, the Marine assault divisions 

were to move rapidly inland, coordinating their advance with that of 

XXIV Corps. On the Marine left flank was the 6th MarDiv—the 

22d Marines on the left and the 4th Marines, less its 2d Battalion in 

division reserve, on the right. The 29th Marines, the third infantry 

regiment of the 6th MarDiv, was corps reserve and was to be ready 

to land on any of the beaches. It was also to be prepared to revert one 

battalion landing team to the 6th MarDiv on order.

General Shepherd’s initial mission was the capture of Yontan airfield 

while protecting the northern flank of the Tenth Army. General del 
76

Valle’s division, landing to the right of the 6th, was to assist in the 

capture of Yontan by quickly seizing the high ground northeast of 

Kina. The attack was then to continue, with major emphasis placed 

on maintaining contact with General Hodge’s corps and assisting his 

advance. The 1st MarDiv scheme of maneuver placed the 5th and 7th 

Marines in the assault, the 7th on the left, and the 1st Marines in 

division reserve.

Adjoining the 1st MarDiv was to be the 7th Infantry Division, with 

one regiment in division reserve but under the operational control of 

XXIV Corps. The other Army assault division was to be 96th, which 

was to land with two regiments abreast and a third in corps reserve. 

Artillery support for the Marines was to come from III Amphibious 

Corps Corps Artillery and those artillery units organic to the divisions. General Geiger’s guns were to land on his order to support the 

attack and, once ashore, corps artillery would coordinate all supporting arms in the Marine sector. XXIV Corps Artillery, less the group 

on Keise Shima, would land on General Hodge’s order and support 

the attack with long-range interdiction, counterbattery, and harassing 

fires. 

Following the initial landing, operations were designed to isolate the 

Phase I objective, which consisted of that part of the island lying 

south of a general line drawn across the Ichikawa Isthmus, through 

Chimu, and including the Eastern To prevent enemy reinforcement 

from the north and to fulfill its assignment in Phase I, III Amphibious Corps was to gain control of the isthmus as swiftly as possible. 

To seal off the Japanese in the south, General Hodge’s troops were 

to drive across the island, his right flank units holding a line that ran 

through Futenma to Kuba Saki. Once the central portion of the island 

had been captured and secured, the direction of attack would be faced 

to the south and continued until all of the objectives of the first phase 

had been achieved.

Phase II, the seizure of northern Okinawa and the capture of Ie Shima, was to be executed with Tenth Army troops locally available when 

Buckner was satisfied that Phase I had been accomplished. The first 

major military objective in the north was Motobu Peninsula, which 
77

was to be taken by means of simultaneously launched attacks from 

sea and land. Once the peninsula had been gained, a shore-to-shore 

assault would be made against Ie Shima. The end of Phase II would be 

signaled when the rest of northern Okinawa had been captured.

While higher echelon air planning for Iceberg detailed both strategic 

and tactical missions, the Tenth Army was more immediately concerned with the latter. Carrier-based tactical aviation, aboard the Task 

Force 52 escort carrier group (Transport Group 52.1, Rear Admiral 

Calvin T. Durgin), was to provide the invasion force with air support 

until Major General Francis P. Mulcahy’s squadrons were established 

ashore and could take over. At this time, the Tactical Air Force (TAF) 

would also be responsible for overall air defense. 

When this responsibility was assumed, TAF operations would be 

based on the following order of priority: (1) attainment of air superiority by annihilation of enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground 

and destruction of enemy air installations; (2) interdiction and destruction of enemy troop and supply movements immediately within 

or heading toward the target area; and (3) execution of combined airground attacks on specific frontline objectives.

The importance of the first priority lay in Tenth Army recognition 

of the yet-existing Japanese air strength and the threat it posed to 

the invasion force. As soon as Air Defense Command (ADC) fighter 

squadrons were established ashore on captured airfields, they were to 

begin fulfilling their assigned missions. From these fields, ADC was 

to provide air defense to ground units on the island and naval forces 

in its environs.

Combat air patrols, close air support, and other related flight missions 

were considered the means by which the defense was to be maintained. Although it was a function of ADC, close air support is not 

normally a part of air defense; it is more closely associated with a 

ground offensive concept.

Despite this fact, however, Okinawa’s terrain and the nature of the 

Japanese defenses were to provide Marine aviators of the Air Defense 
78

Command with ample opportunities to display close air support techniques born of experience accumulated in earlier Pacific campaigns.*

(History Division note: this was the official III Amphibious Corps 

concept of operations. As you will see during execution of the plan, 

the situation changed rapidly and continually, requiring commanders 

and staffs at all levels to adjust their plans to successfully continue the 

mission. Fighting a tough, resourceful enemy defending his homeland 

will always require that a MAGTF expect the unexpected yet still be 

able to react accordingly to get the job done.)

* Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw Jr., Victory and Occupation: History of the U.S. 

Marine Corps in World War II, Vol. V (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 

Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1968), 66–69.
79

III Amphibious Corps Order of Battle

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

III Amphibious Corps (66,636)*

Headquarters, III Amphibious Corps 

III Amphibious Corps Headquarters and Service Battalion

III Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion

III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion

1st Military Police Battalion

11th Motor Transport Battalion

7th Service Regiment

Amphibious Battalion, FMFPac (Attached)

* Excluding 2d MarDiv.
80

III Amphibious Corps Artillery

 1st Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery Group

 2d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

 2d Provisional Field Artillery Group

 1st 155mm Howitzer Battalion

 3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion

 6th 155mm Howitzer Battalion

 7th 155mm Gun Battalion

 8th 155mm Gun Battalion

 9th 155mm Gun Battalion 

1st Marine Division (26,274)

Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division

1st Marines

5th Marines

7th Marines

2d Battalion, 8th Marines 

11th Marines (Artillery)

1st Engineer Battalion

1st Medical Battalion

1st Motor Transport Battalion

1st Pioneer Battalion

1st Service Battalion

1st Tank Battalion
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3d Armored Amphibian Battalion (Provisional)

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

6th Marine Division (24,356)

Headquarters Battalion, 6th Marine Division

4th Marines 

22d Marines

29th Marines

15th Marines (Artillery)

6th Engineer Battalion

6th Medical Battalion

6th Motor Transport Battalion

6th Pioneer Battalion

6th Service Battalion

6th Tank Battalion

1st Armored Amphibian Battalion

4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

9th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (under control of Tactical Air Force,

Tenth Army)

Marine Aircraft Group 14

Marine Aircraft Group 22

Marine Aircraft Group 31

Marine Aircraft Group 33

Marine Aircraft Group 43
82

U.S. Commander Biographies

Official U.S. Army photo

MajGen Roy Geiger and LtGen Simon Buckner, USA, with helmet, commanding general 

Tenth Army, as they met at headquarters of III Amphibious Corps.

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (24 February 1885–20 February 1966): the senior 

U.S. naval commander in the Pacific theater 

during World War II, Chester W. Nimitz 

served as commander, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. Born in Fredericksburg, Texas, Nimitz graduated from the United States 

Naval Academy in 1905. His early career was 

marked by service aboard submarines, destroyers, and battleships and as a military observer in Germany. Between 1920 and 1923, 

he studied the logistical requirements for fighting in the Pacific at 

the Naval War College. Notable early commands included the, Submarine Division 20 (1929–33) and the cruiser USS Augusta (CA 31) 
83

(1933–35). He was appointed to rear admiral following duty at the 

Bureau of Navigation in Washington, DC, between 1935 and 1938. 

His subsequent commands included Cruiser Division Two, Battleship Division One, and chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Following 

the Pearl Harbor attack, he was appointed commander in chief Pacific Fleet with the rank of admiral. He subsequently commanded the 

United States’ drive across the Central Pacific. In December 1944, he 

was promoted to fleet admiral. Following the war, he served as chief 

of naval operations from 1945–47. He retired to California, where he 

died at his home in 1966.

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (3 July 

1886–13 December 1969): one of the United States’ senior naval commanders during 

World War II, Raymond Spruance served 

as the commander of the Fifth Fleet and 

Central Pacific Force during the Battle of 

Okinawa. A native of Baltimore, Maryland, 

Spruance graduated from the United States 

Naval Academy in 1906. Notable prewar 

duties included commanding officer of five 

destroyers, staff billets, service at the Naval 

War College, commanding officer of the battleship USS Mississippi

(BB 41), command of the Tenth Naval District and Caribbean Sea 

Frontier, and command of a cruiser division. In June 1942, he commanded Task Force 16 at the Battle of Midway and was instrumental 

in the United States’ decisive victory against the Japanese fleet during 

that engagement. Following Midway, he served as chief of staff to 

Admiral Nimitz and later as deputy commander in chief. In 1943, he 

was appointed the commander of the Central Pacific Force and, as 

commander of the Fifth Fleet, directed the Gilberts, Marshalls, and 

Marianas campaigns. He was also commander during the battles of 

Iwo Jima and Okinawa. He succeeded Nimitz as commander in chief 

Pacific Fleet in 1945 and served as the president of the Naval War 

College from 1946–48. He died in California in 1969.
84

Admiral Richmond K. Turner (27 May 

1885–12 February 1961): Richmond Turner 

was the United States’ primary amphibious 

forces commander throughout the Pacific War. During the Battle of Okinawa, he 

served as commander of Joint Expeditionary 

Force/Task Force 51. A native of Portland, 

Oregon, he graduated from the United States 

Naval Academy in 1908. His early duties included service aboard destroyers, gunboats, 

and battleships and as an ordnance officer. In 

1927, he received training as a naval aviator and subsequently served 

as commander of Aircraft Squadrons, Asiatic Fleet and executive officer of the carrier USS Saratoga (CV 3). Following service at the Naval 

War College and as commander of the cruiser USS Astoria (CA 34), 

he led the War Plans Division in Washington from 1940 to 1941. 

Following the outbreak of the war, he became assistant chief of staff 

of the U.S. Fleet and was then appointed commander of Amphibious Force, South Pacific Force in June 1942. In that capacity, he led 

the successful amphibious campaigns at Guadalcanal, the Gilberts, 

Marshalls, Marianas, and Bonin Islands. His postwar billets included service on the Navy Department’s General Board and U.S. Naval 

representative on the United Nations Military Staff Committee. He 

retired in 1947 and died in California in 1961.

Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner Jr. 

(18 July 1886–18 June 1945): Simon Buckner 

was the commanding general of the Tenth 

United States Army/Task Force 56 during 

the Battle of Okinawa. A native of Kentucky, 

Buckner attended the Virginia Military Institute before being appointed to the United States Military Academy, from which he 

graduated in 1908. His early service included 

tours in the Philippines, superintendent of 

the Virginia Military Institute, commandant of cadets at West Point, 

posts at the General Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
85

and Army War College in Washington, and regimental commands. 

During the early years of World War II, he served as the commander of the Army’s Alaska Defense Command. In 1944, he was given 

command of the newly activated Tenth Army, a joint Army-Marine 

Corps formation, which he subsequently led at Okinawa. On 18 June 

1945, just days before the end of the struggle for the island, he was 

killed by Japanese artillery fire. He was the last American general to 

die in combat during World War II. His command was assumed by 

III Amphibious Corps commander Major General Roy Geiger. 

Major General Roy S. Geiger (25 January 

1885–23 January 1947): Roy Geiger commanded the III Amphibious Corps and, for a 

brief time, the Tenth Army during the Battle 

of Okinawa. Born in Florida, he graduated 

from Florida State Normal and Industrial 

College and Stetson University before enlisting in the Marine Corps in 1907. He was 

commissioned a second lieutenant in 1909. 

His initial duties included service with 

battleship detachments in Nicaragua, the 

Philippines, and China. In 1917, he completed flight training in Pensacola, Florida, and became a naval aviator, among the first in the 

Marine Corps. In 1918, he commanded the First Marine Aviation 

Force. During the interwar years, he commanded several Marine 

squadrons and attended the Command and General Staff School at 

Fort Leavenworth, the Army War College, and the Naval War College. He became commanding general of the 1st Marine Aircraft 

Wing in 1941. In this capacity, he led the Cactus Air Force’s defense 

of Guadalcanal during the Solomons campaign. After serving as 

director of Marine aviation in 1943, he took command of the I Amphibious Corps and led it during the battle of Bougainville. He led the 

same formation (redesignated III Amphibious Corps in 1944) during 

the battle of Guam. He commanded the corps again at Okinawa and 

temporarily took command of the Tenth Army when its commander, 

Lieutenant General Buckner, was killed in action on 18 June 1945. 

The next month, he assumed command of Fleet Marine Force Pacific, 
86

which he held until being recalled to Headquarters Marine Corps in 

1946. He died in 1947.

Major General Pedro del Valle (28 August 

1893-28 April 1978): Pedro del Valle commanded the veteran 1st MarDiv during the 

Battle of Okinawa. Born in Puerto Rico, he 

graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 

1915 and was subsequently commissioned a 

Marine second lieutenant. Initial duties included service in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, battleship detachments, and Marine 

Corps Schools in Quantico. He served as an 

assistant naval attaché to the U.S. embassy in 

Italy from 1935 to 1937 and observed Italian forces during the Ethiopian War. He commanded the 11th Marines from 1941 to 1942 and 

led that regiment during the battle of Guadalcanal. Following service as president of the Marine Corps Equipment Board from 1943 

to 1944, he became commanding general of III Amphibious Corps 

artillery during the battle of Guam in August 1944. In November 

of that year, he assumed command of the 1st MarDiv, which he led 

at the Battle of Okinawa. Following postwar duties at Headquarters 

Marine Corps, he retired in 1948. He died in Maryland in 1978. 

Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr. 

(10 February 1896–6 August 1990): Lemuel Shepherd commanded the 6th MarDiv 

during the Battle of Okinawa. A native of 

Norfolk, Virginia, he graduated from the 

Virginia Military Institute in 1917 and was 

commissioned a second lieutenant in the 

Marine Corps. With the 5th Marines, he 

served with the American Expeditionary 

Force during World War I. Following his 

service in Europe, he became White House aide and aide-de-camp to 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Subsequent duties included 

command of a battleship detachment, service in China, and duties at 
87

the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico. In March 1942, following the 

outbreak of World War II, he organized and trained the 9th Marines. 

He was appointed assistant division commander of the 1st MarDiv 

in 1943 and served with that formation during the New Britain campaign from December 1943 to March 1944. In May of that year, he 

assumed command of the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade and led that 

formation during the battle of Guam. The brigade served as the building block of the 6th MarDiv, which Shepherd commanded during 

the Battle of Okinawa and during occupation duties in China. The 

following year, he became Assistant Commandant and chief of staff 

of Marine Corps Headquarters and then as commandant of Marine 

Corps Schools from 1948 to 1950. He commanded the Fleet Marine 

Force during the Korean War and was appointed Commandant of the 

Marine Corps in 1952. He retired in 1956 but was subsequently recalled to serve as the chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board 

from 1956 to 1959. He died in California in 1990.

Major General Francis P. Mulcahy (9 March 

1894–11 Dec 1973): Francis Mulcahy was 

commanding general of the 2d Marine Aircraft 

Wing and the Tactical Air Force, Tenth Army, 

during the Battle of Okinawa. A native of New 

York, Mulcahy graduated from the University 

of Notre Dame in 1917 and was subsequently 

commissioned in the Marine Corps. Attending 

naval flight school that year, he became a naval 

aviator and served with the Allied air forces in 

World War I. During the interwar years, he saw service in the Banana 

Wars in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic and attended the 

Air Corps Tactical School, the Command and General Staff School at 

Fort Leavenworth and the Naval War College. At the start of World War 

II, he was serving as an observer of the British campaign in North Africa. 

He assumed command of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing in August 1942 

and led that formation in the Solomon Islands. He then served as the 

commanding general of aircraft, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, before his 

assignment as the commander of the Tactical Air Force, Tenth Army. He 

retired from the Marine Corps in 1946 and died in California in 1973.
88

Japanese Strategy and Okinawa

Official Imperial Japanese Army photo

The following synopsis of the Japanese strategy is drawn from Okinawa: The Last Battle by Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. 

Gugeler, and John Stevens.

The active formulation of a defense plan for the Ryukyus dates from 

the American capture of the Marianas in June and July 1944. The 

first plan for the ground defense of the Ryukyus was established 

in a Thirty-second Army directive of 19 July 1944. This document 

outlined a plan to destroy the Americans at the water’s edge that, 

failing to “annihilate” them from previously constructed positions, 

embodied a fortified defense in depth. In accordance with this directive, construction of cave and underground positions began in 

the summer of 1944. The command on Okinawa was convinced that 

the situation was urgent and informed the troops that “the Empire 

is determined to fight a showdown battle with an all-out effort for 

the preservation of national unity when the enemy advances to the 
89

Nansei Shoto.” In instructions issued in August, Thirty-second Army 

Headquarters stated: 

The enemy counteroffensive has become increasingly severe and they have infiltrated into our central Pacific defense area and are now boldly aiming toward the Nansei 

Shoto. Should we be unable to defend the Nansei Shoto, 

the mainland and the southern frontier would become 

isolated. Thus, the execution of the present war would be 

extremely difficult and would become a life-and-death 

problem for our nation. 

In the early part of 1945, important changes were made in the original defense plan. It was decided not to attempt the destruction of the 

invading forces at the beaches but to have the Thirty-second Army offer 

a strong resistance around a central fortified position; a decisive land 

battle would be avoided until the kamikaze planes and the Japanese 

fleet should destroy the American warships and transports. The general character of the final plan reflected the critical situation that faced 

General Ushijima with the departure of the 9th Division for Formosa 

and with the fading of prospects for reinforcements. He had to alter 

his plans to fit his resources, so depleted by now that he had to mobilize virtually the entire civilian population of the island. 

The Japanese high command was determined to hold Okinawa and 

planned to employ the major portion of the empire’s remaining air 

strength as well as a large portion of its fleet in an attack on the American sea forces. The Japanese hoped to isolate and weaken the invading ground forces by destroying the American naval units and support 

shipping lying off Okinawa. To accomplish this, they relied chiefly on 

bomb-laden planes guided to their targets by suicide pilots, members 

of the Japanese Navy’s Special Attack Corps known as the Kamikaze 

(Divine Wind) Corps. This desperate measure was expected to equalize 

the uneven ground battle by cutting off the Americans from supplies 

and reinforcements. It would enable the Thirty-second Army to drive 

the invaders into the sea. 

Despite the hopes of the Japanese high command, planning of the 
90

Thirty-second Army for the defense of Okinawa proceeded on the assumption that it was impossible to defeat the enemy and that the most 

that could be done was to deny him the use of the island for as long 

a period as possible and inflict the maximum number of casualties. 

Acting on this assumption, General Ushijima drew his forces together 

into the southern part of Okinawa and, from the strongly fortified 

positions around Shuri, prepared to make his stand there as costly to 

the enemy as possible. He would not go out to meet the invaders; he 

would wait for them to come to him and force them to fight on his 

terms. The Thirty-second Army artillery was instructed not to fire on 

the invading ships and landing forces to avoid revealing its positions 

and exposing them to the devastating naval gunfire of the Americans. 

Units were not to oppose landings in their sectors until enough enemy 

troops had been brought ashore to render escape by sea impossible. 

The Thirty-second Army planned to defend only the southern third of 

Okinawa strongly. The principal defenses would be established in the 

rugged ground north of Naha, Shuri, and Yonabaru. Landings north 

of this line would not be opposed; south of it the Americans would 

be met on the beaches. Wherever the Americans landed, they would 

eventually come up against the Shuri defenses, where the main battle 

would be fought. 

The Japanese estimate of American plans was very accurate. The enemy expected the Americans to land across the Hagushi beaches on 

the west coast, with 6–10 divisions, and to strike out for the Yontan 

and Kadena airfields. He anticipated that American landing forces 

would form large beachheads of two-division strength each, hold 

within these perimeters until sufficient supplies were unloaded to 

permit a strong attack, and then advance behind massed tanks and 

concentrated artillery fire. The Japanese estimated that it would take 

the Americans about 10 days to launch their attack against the main 

Shuri defenses. They believed that the Americans intended to draw 

the main Japanese force into the Shuri Lines so that a not too costly 

secondary landing could be affected with perhaps one division on the 

east coast somewhere south of Shuri, near Minatoga. 

The Thirty-second Army disposed its available troops in accordance 

with its general plan of defense and its estimate of the enemy’s capa-
91

bilities. Only two battalions of the 2d Infantry Unit were left in the 

north to defend not only the Motobu Peninsula but also Ie Shima, 

where they destroyed the island’s airfield. The only force stationed in 

the area immediately behind the Hagushi beaches was the 1st Specially Established Regiment, Boeitai, which was ordered to fight a delaying 

action and then, after destroying the two airfields in the sector, to 

retreat. The 62d Division manned the defensive belt across the island 

north of the Naha Shuri-Yonabaru line. Its 63d Brigade was to absorb 

the shock of the American attack southward at the narrow waist of 

the island between Chatan and Toguchi, while the main line of resistance was established from Uchitomari to Tsuwa north of the Shuri 

defenses. Deployed to support the 63d, the 64th Brigade was dug in 

to fight in the successive positions around Shuri. Artillery attached to 

the 62d Division was emplaced in direct support on the west side of 

the line. 

Having selected the Shuri area as their main battle position, the Japanese with shrewdness and great industry organized the ground for 

a strong defense. The main zone of defense was planned as a series 

of concentric positions adapted to the contours of the area. Caves, 

emplacements, blockhouses, and pillboxes were built into the hills 

and escarpments, connected by elaborate underground tunnels, and 

skillfully camouflaged; many of the burial tombs were fortified. The 

Japanese took full advantage of the terrain to organize defensive areas 

and strong points that were mutually supporting, and they fortified 

the reverse as well as the forward slopes of hills. Artillery and mortars 

were emplaced in the caves and thoroughly integrated into the general 

scheme of defensive fires. 

To meet the threat of landings in the south, the Thirty-second Army

stationed the 24th Division in defensive positions covering the Minatoga beaches and extending across the southern end of the island. The 

44th Independent Mixed Brigade was moved to the Chinen Peninsula 

and was ordered to cooperate with the 24th Division in repelling any 

landings in the area. Artillery was registered on the Minatoga beaches, 

and some of the 320mm mortars were moved to this sector. 

During the long period of planning, the Japanese Imperial Gener-
92

al Staff and the Thirty-second Army were constantly concerned with 

fixing the probable date of the American invasion; each changed its 

view several times and on occasion they were not in agreement. It 

was during and after the invasion of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, in 

the summer of 1944 that the Japanese first expected an immediate 

invasion of Okinawa and, accordingly, began to pour troops into the 

island. But after the invasion of the Palaus and Leyte in September 

and October 1944, the Imperial General Staff in Tokyo considered it 

unlikely that sufficient American troops would be immediately available for another major operation. During the Philippines operations 

at the end of 1944, the Imperial General Staff in Tokyo was in doubt 

as to whether the next blow would fall on the south China coast or 

on Formosa, although the command of the Thirty-second Army was 

still convinced that Okinawa would be invaded and pushed forward 

preparations for its defense. 

Again, at the beginning of 1945, the Imperial General Staff was uncertain whether the next American attack would be against Formosa 

or Okinawa. By the end of February, as a result of the invasion of 

Iwo Jima, which pointed to the American strategy of cutting off the 

Japanese home islands from the mainland and the Indies, the Japanese concluded that Formosa would be bypassed and that Okinawa 

would be the next target. Their aerial reconnaissance and intelligence 

reports revealed an increase in west-bound American shipping to the 

Philippines and the Marianas during the latter part of February—an 

increase that swelled to large proportions early in March; this seemed 

a clear indication of the imminence of another American operation. 

When the invasion fleet appeared off Iwo Jima, it was considered 

by some to be a feint for the invasion of Okinawa. With the Iwo 

Jima battle in progress and submarine activity increasing around the 

Ryukyus, it was taken for granted that the invasion of Okinawa would 

soon follow on or about 1 April 1945. 

As one of the last steps in preparing for the expected struggle, the Japanese command on Okinawa on 21 March ordered all air, shipping, 

and rear-echelon units to “prepare for ground combat.” On 27 March, 

the day after the American invasion of the Keramas, Thirty-second 
93

Army advised its units that “the enemy is planning to land his main 

strength tomorrow, the 28th, on the western coast of southern Okinawa, in particular in the Yontan-Kadena sector.” When the American 

forces invaded Okinawa, a few days later than had been predicted, 

the Thirty-second Army adhered strictly to its plan of offering little 

resistance until the invaders should come up against their outposts at 

the Shuri Line. The Japanese Combined Fleet commander, meanwhile, 

prepared to execute his plan, delayed by Task Force 58’s foray into the 

Inland Sea in March, to destroy the American fleet by air and surface 

action. Before many days had passed, the enemy was to react to the 

invasion with a fury never before encountered.*

* Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, DC: Center for 

Military History, 1947), 92–96.
94

Japanese Order of Battle

Official Imperial Japanese Army photo

Imperial Japanese Army Units

Thirty-Second Army (7,075)

24th Infantry Division (14,360)

Headquarters 

22d Infantry Regiment 

32d Infantry Regiment 

89th Infantry Regiment 

42d Field Artillery Regiment 

24th Reconnaissance Regiment 

24th Engineer Regiment 

24th Transport Regiment 

Signal Unit 
95

Decontamination Training Unit

Ordnance Repair Unit

Veterinary Hospital

Water Supply and Purification Unit

1st Field Hospital

2d Field Hospital

62d Infantry Division (11,623)

Headquarters 

63d Brigade Headquarters 

11th Independent Infantry Battalion 

12th Independent Infantry Battalion 

13th Independent Infantry Battalion 

14th Independent Infantry Battalion 

273d Independent Infantry Battalion 

64th Brigade Headquarters 

15th Independent Infantry Battalion 

21st Independent Infantry Battalion 

22d Independent Infantry Battalion 

23d Independent Infantry Battalion

272d Independent Infantry Battalion

Engineer Unit 

Signal Unit

Transport Unit

Field Hospital

Veterinary Hospital
96

44th Independent Mixed Brigade (4,485)

Headquarters

2d Infantry Unit

15th Independent Mixed Regiment

Artillery Unit

Engineer Unit

5th Artillery Command

Headquarters

1st Medium Artillery Regiment (-) 

23d Medium Artillery Regiment

7th Heavy Artillery Regiment

100th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion

1st Independent Artillery Mortar Regiment (-)

1st Light Mortar Battalion

2d Light Mortar Battalion

21st Antiaircraft Artillery Command

Headquarters 

27th Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion 

70th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion 

80th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion 

81st Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion 

103d Independent Machine Cannon Battalion 

104th Independent Machine Cannon Battalion 

105th Independent Machine Cannon Battalion 
97

Machine-Gun Units

3d Independent Machine-Gun Battalion 

4th Independent Machine-Gun Battalion 

14th Independent Machine-Gun Battalion 

17th Independent Machine-Gun Battalion 

Antitank Units

3d Independent Antitank Battalion 

7th Independent Antitank Battalion 

22d Independent Antitank Battalion 

32d Independent Antitank Company 

11th Shipping Group (four sea-raiding battalions)

7 Independent Battalions (light infantry formed from seven sea-raiding base battalions)

49th Line of Communication Sector

Engineer Units

19th Air Sector Command

27th Tank Regiment 

Army unit total: 66,636 (This figure represents the total Japanese 

strength. Included in it, however, are an estimated 5,000 Okinawans, 

mostly regular conscripts, who were integrated into Japanese units.)

Imperial Japanese Navy Units

Okinawa Base Force (headquarters, coast defense, and antiaircraft 

personnel)

27th Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron
98

33d Midget Submarine Unit 

37th Torpedo Maintenance Unit

Torpedo Working Unit

81mm Mortar Battery

Oroku Transmitting Station

Naha Branch, Sasebo Naval Stores Department

Naha Branch, Sasebo Transportation Department

Naha Navy Yard, Sasebo Naval Base 

Oroku Detachment, 951st Air Group

Nansei Shoto Air Group 

226th Construction Unit 

3210th Construction Unit

Navy unit total: 8,825 (This figure represents both regular naval ratings and the Japanese, Korean, and Okinawan military civilians who 

were utilized in the naval land combat organization.)

Okinawan

502d Special Guard Engineer Unit 

503d Special Guard Engineer Unit 

504th Special Guard Engineer Unit 

Blood-and-Iron-for-the-Emperor Duty Unit (high school students)

Boeitai assigned to the Army 

Boeitai assigned to the Navy 

Nursing students 

Regular conscripts not included under Army units 

Okinawan total: 23,350

Grand total (rounded out):

Army units: 67,000
99

Navy units: 9,000

Okinawans: 24,000

Japanese strength on Okinawa: 100,000

Source: Charles S. Nichols and Henry I. Shaw, Okinawa: Victory in 

the Pacific (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, U.S. 

Marine Corps, 1955), 302–4.
100

Japanese Commander Biographies

Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima (31 

July 1887–22 June 1945): Mitsuru Ushijima 

commanded Japan’s Thirty-second Army during 

the Battle of Okinawa. Born in Kagoshima 

Prefecture, he graduated from the Imperial 

Japanese Army Academy in 1908 and from 

the Army Staff College in 1916. His first appointments included service with the Japanese 

forces based at Vladivostok, Russia, during 

the international intervention for the Russian 

Civil War, administrative postings with the War Ministry, and command of the Imperial Japanese Army’s 1st Infantry Regiment. During 

the Second Sino-Japanese War, he commanded the 36th Infantry Brigade and the 11th Division. Between 1941 and 1944 he served in billets 

in Japan as commandant of the Noncommissioned Officers Academy 

from 1941to 1942 and commandant of the Imperial Japanese Army 

Academy from 1942 to 1944. He took command of the Thirty-second 

Army on Okinawa that year and was tasked with preparing it for an anticipated American landing. He led his forces throughout the battle for 

the island until his death on 22 June 1945 when he committed ritual 

suicide rather than surrender to American forces.

Lieutenant General Isamu Chō (19 Jan 

1895–22 June 1945): chief of staff of the Thirty-second Army during the Battle of Okinawa, 

Isamu Chō was a native of Fukuoka Prefecture. Graduating from the Imperial Japanese 

Army Academy in 1916 and the Army Staff 

College in 1928, his first service was with the 

Kwantung Army in eastern China. Throughout his career, Chō participated in a number 

of organizations and plots dedicated to undermining Japan’s liberal democratic institutions and creating an ultranationalist state 

and society. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, he commanded 
101

the 74th Infantry Regiment and served as chief of staff of the 26th Division in Manchuria, where his unit was involved in a series of border 

incidents with the Soviet Union. Between 1940 and 1942, he served 

in Southeast Asia and helped plan the Japanese invasion of that region in 1942. He returned to Manchuria in 1942 and served there 

in various posts until 1944. He was appointed chief of staff of the 

Thirty-second Army in 1945 and helped build the elaborate defenses 

around Shuri Castle. He committed ritual suicide alongside his commanding general on 22 June 1945.

Colonel Hiromichi Yahara (12 Oct 1902–7 

May 1981): Hiromichi Yahara was the Thirty-second Army’s operations officer during the 

Battle of Okinawa. Born in Tottori Prefecture, he graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in 1923 and from the 

Army War College in 1929. Among his first 

assignments was serving as an exchange officer in the United States with the 8th Infantry in 1933. Following his return to Japan, he 

worked as an instructor and in various staff 

billets in Southeast Asia between 1940 and 

1941. He returned to Japan as an instructor that year and was subsequently assigned as a senior staff officer for the Thirty-second Army on 

Okinawa in 1944. During the Battle of Okinawa, he supported defensive tactics that he hoped would grind down the American forces 

through attrition. Against Yahara’s wishes, General Ushijima ordered 

him not to commit ritual suicide. Yahara escaped the Japanese lines 

disguised as a civilian but was eventually apprehended by the Americans and became a prisoner of war. The most senior Thirty-second Army

officer to survive, he published an account of the Battle of Okinawa in 

1973. He died in 1981.
102

Vice Admiral Minoru Ōta (7 April 1891–

13 June 1945): Minoru Ōta commanded 

the Japanese naval forces during the Battle 

of Okinawa. Born in Chiba Prefecture, he 

graduated from the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy in 1913. Upon graduation, he 

served on several battleships and then enrolled at the naval artillery school. Following 

further service aboard battleships, he became 

an instructor at the Naval Engineering College. During the First Shanghai Incident of 

1932, he commanded a battalion of Japanese 

special naval landing forces and commanding the 6th Kure Special Naval Landing Force in 1938 during the Second Sino-Japanese War. He 

was slated to command the landing forces for Midway, though American victory during the battle of Midway meant that Japan was unable 

to launch the operation to seize the island. Following this he served 

in New Georgia and in staff billets until assignment to Okinawa in 

1945. During the struggle for the island, he commanded all the naval 

forces and oversaw the defense of the Oroku Peninsula. When his position was encircled by American forces, he committed ritual suicide 

on 13 June 1945.
103

The Kamikazes—Divine Wind and the Fleet 

that Came to Stay

Official Imperial Japanese Army photo

Official U.S. Navy photo
104

By the spring of 1945, Japanese air power was virtually nonexistent. 

The long Allied island-hopping campaign in the Central Pacific combined with the equally costly march up the Solomons and Papua New 

Guinea island chains had inflicted such a heavy cost on Japanese naval 

and army aviation forces, particularly in trained pilots, that the Japanese could no longer hope to challenge their enemy on equal terms. 

The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot of the previous June had effectively 

destroyed the Japanese naval air arm, leaving only land-based aviation in a position to challenge the approaching Pacific Fleet. With no 

significant assets to offer the Thirty-second Army, including aircraft to 

provide aerial interdiction or close air support, the Japanese defenders 

of Okinawa had no hope that their rescue would come from the sky. 

There was, however, one force that might turn the tide in the Japanese’s favor—the Kamikaze (Divine Wind) Special Attack Corps. First 

introduced during the battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, this 

all-volunteer corps was created to deliberately crash their bomb-laden 

aircraft directly upon the decks of Allied warships, with the intent of 

sinking them at the relatively cheap cost of an obsolescent airplane 

and barely trained pilot. Fueled with the fanaticism of the Bushido 

cult and adoration of their emperor, the new corps had no shortage of 

volunteers. Sufficient aircraft were still available throughout the home 

islands that would penetrate the combat aerial patrols over the fleet 

and dive through clouds of antiaircraft fire to incinerate themselves 

and their intended victims.

Initially derided by the Allies as a foolish last-ditch act of desperation, 

the Divine Wind achieved results far in excess of anything its developers could ever hope for. While these suicide aircraft at no point had 

any chance to wipe out the enormous fleet of ships encompassing 

Okinawa, they still inflicted enormous damage. During the kamikaze 

offensive against American forces at Okinawa (codenamed Operation 

Ten-Go), more than 1,800 special attack aircraft based in Kyushu and 

Formosa carried out a series of attacks between mid-March and the 

end of June 1945. 

The most lethal attack was the one carried out 6–7 April against the 

Allied invasion fleet when 355 kamikazes and nearly 100 convention-
105

al aircraft struck over a 19-hour period, sinking 6 ships and damaging 

21 others, inflicting more than 500 casualties, for a loss of 400 aircraft. During the 10 individual large-scale attacks carried out under 

the Ten-Go operations plan, more than 1,100 kamikaze aircraft were 

shot down by antiaircraft fire and by fighter aircraft, as well as several 

hundred conventional aircraft. U.S. Navy losses were horrendous; by 

the end of the battle, more than 26 ships were sunk and 225 damaged, 

with 9,731 crewmen being killed or wounded—the highest number 

of casualties suffered by the U.S. Navy during any battle in the Pacific.

The ships of the Pacific Fleet comprising Task Force 50, of which Task 

Force 51 was a subordinate element, made up the mightiest invasion 

fleet ever assembled in history. Formed around the core of Fifth Fleet, 

Task Force 50 at one point had eight American and British task forces 

subordinated to it, including 300 warships, of which there were 43 

fleet and escort carriers, 18 battleships, and 1,139 other ships including 327 dedicated to supporting the logistics effort ashore. Though 

Admiral Spruance and his commanders had anticipated kamikaze 

attacks and had made considerable efforts toward combating them, 

including air strikes on home airfields, they could not have imagined 

the ferocity of the attacks when they finally came. 

Coupled with the one-way journey of the gigantic battleship Yamato

on 6 April, the Divine Wind’s offensive created wide consternation 

among Task Force 50, causing some of its commanders at one time 

or another to contemplate pulling out as the Navy had done during 

the initial stages of the battle of Guadalcanal. But unlike Guadalcanal, Spruance insisted that this fleet had come to stay. The Yamato

was sunk by 10 torpedo and 5 bomb hits on 7 April and never got 

anywhere near Okinawa. Four of its escorting destroyers were sunk 

as well, in exchange for the loss of 10 carrier-based aircraft. It represented the last hope of the Japanese and was sent to the bottom, along 

with any chance that the Japanese would fight to a draw.

Spruance’s fleet continued to fight kamikazes on the sea and in the 

sky until the end of the battle, all the while providing magnificent 

support to the forces engaged ashore. Though the loss of life and ships 

was unbearably high, never once did the fleet stop supporting the 
106

troops. And by the time that the smoke from thousands of shot-down 

kamikazes had cleared, the U.S. Navy was the undisputed master of 

the Pacific.

Official U.S. Navy photo

Photographed from a USS Ticonderoga (CV 14) aircraft, Third Fleet aircraft carriers 

anchor in Ulithi Atoll on 8 December 1944 during a break from operations in the Philippines. The carriers are (from front to back) the USS Wasp (CV 18), USS Yorktown (CV 

10), USS Hornet (CV 12), USS Hancock (CV 19), and Ticonderoga. 
107

Comparative Ranks

Commissioned Officer Ranks

U.S. NAVY U.S. ARMY U.S. MARINE 

CORPS

JAPANESE ARMED 

FORCES*

Ensign Second

Lieutenant

Second

Lieutenant

Shō-i (Second Lieutenant/

Ensign)

Lieutenant

( Junior Grade)

First Lieutenant First Lieutenant Chū-i (First Lieutenant/

Lieutenant [ Junior Grade])

Lieutenant Captain Captain Tai-i (Captain/Lieutenant)

Lieutenant 

Commander

Major Major Shōsa (Major/Lieutenant 

Commander)

Commander Lieutenant 

Colonel

Lieutenant 

Colonel

Chūsa (Lieutenant Colonel/

Commander)

Captain Colonel Colonel Taisa (Colonel/Captain)

Commodore Brigadier General Brigadier 

General

Shōshō (Major General/

Rear Admiral)

Rear Admiral Major General Major General Chujo (Lieutenant General/

Vice Admiral)

Vice Admiral Lieutenant 

General

Lieutenant 

General

Taisho (General/Admiral)

Admiral General General —

Fleet Admiral General of the 

Army

— Gensui (Field Marshal)

Admiral of the 

Navy

General of the 

Armies

— Dai Gensui (The Emperor)

*

 Japan used the same term for both army and navy officer ranks. Naval ranks were 

indicated by the term Kaigun, while army ranks were indicated by the term Rikugun. 

Thus a rear admiral was a Kaigun Shōshō, and a major general was a Rikugun Shōshō.
108

Enlisted Ranks

U.S. NAVY U.S. ARMY U.S. MARINE 

CORPS

IMPERIAL 

JAPANESE 

NAVY

IMPERIAL

JAPANESE 

ARMY

— — — — Nitōhei (Private 

Second Class)

Apprentice 

Seaman

Private Private Ittō Suihei 

(Seaman)

Ittōhei (Private 

First Class)

Seaman 

Second 

Class

Private First 

Class

Private First 

Class

Jōtō Suihei (Able 

Seaman)

Jōtōhei (Senior 

Private)

Seaman 

First Class

Corporal Corporal Suihei Chō 

(Leading

Seaman)

Heichō (Lance 

Corporal)

Petty Officer 

Third Class

Sergeant Sergeant — Gochō (Corporal)

— Technician 

Third Grade

Staff Sergeant — —

Petty Officer 

Second 

Class

Staff Sergeant Platoon

Sergeant

Nitō Heisō (Petty 

Officer Second 

Class)

Gunsō (Sergeant)

— Technician 

Second Grade

Technical

Sergeant

— —

Petty Officer 

First Class

Technical 

Sergeant

Gunnery

Sergeant

Ittō Heisō (Petty 

Officer First 

Class)

Socho (Company 

Sergeant Major)

— Technician 

First Grade

Master Tech. 

Sergeant

— —

Chief Petty 

Officer

Master

Sergeant

First Sergeant

Master

Gunnery

Sergeant

First Sergeant

Sergeant Major

Jōtō Heisō (Chief 

Petty Officer)

Juni-I (Regimental 

Sergeant Major)
109

Weapons and Equipment 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
110

Weapons and Equipment—U.S. Forces

Rifles

M1 Garand

By 1945, the M1 had replaced the M1903 Springfield as the standard 

rifle used by both the Army and Marine Corps. As a semiautomatic 

rifle, the Garand gave U.S. forces a superior rate of fire against Japanese forces, and U.S. infantrymen could fire up to 40–50 rounds per 

minute. Ammunition was placed in eight-round clips into an internal 

magazine. It was well built, easy to use, and devastatingly accurate.

Caliber: .30

Length overall (without bayonet): 43.6 in. 

Muzzle velocity: 2,800 ft./sec.

Weight: 9.5 lb.

Range: 500 yd.

M1A1 Carbine

The M1 Carbine provided those soldiers and Marines with specialized tasks, such as mortar crews, paratroopers, and machine-gun 

crews, with a light-weight and accurate defensive weapon. The weapon’s small size, large magazine (15 rounds), and high rate of fire (30 

rounds per minute [rpm]) was of particular value in the Pacific theater, 

where close-quarters combat was common. Nevertheless, its stopping 

power was far less substantial than the M1 Garand.
111

Caliber: .30

Length overall (without bayonet): 35.6 in.

Muzzle velocity: 1,990 ft./sec.

Weight: 5.2 lb.

Range: 300 yd.

Browning Automatic Rifle

A mainstay of Marine Corps arsenals since the Banana Wars, the 

Browning automatic rifle, or BAR, was a standard armament of smallunit fireteams. By the Battle of Okinawa, Marine and Army infantry squads were usually equipped with two to three BARs each. The 

weapon was difficult to use and provided less firepower than a standard squad light machine gun. It could be fired prone, using a bipod, 

or standing as a shoulder-fired or waist-fired automatic rifle.

Caliber: .30

Length overall (without bayonet): 43.7 in.

Muzzle velocity: 2,2822 ft./sec.

Weight: 19.8 lb.

Range: 1,500 yd.
112

Machine Guns

M1928A1/M1A1 Thompson submachine gun

A popular weapon due to its substantial stopping power, the Thompson was a particularly effective infantry weapon for close-quarters 

jungle combat. Several different models were used, ranging from the 

complex M1928A1 to the simpler M1 and M1A1.

Caliber: .45

Length overall (without bayonet): 33.5 in.

Muzzle velocity: 935 ft./sec.

Weight: 10.6 lb.

Range: 160 ft.

Browning M1919A4 air-cooled .30-caliber medium machine gun

The air-cooled Browning .30-cal was a standard squad, company, and 

vehicle mounted machine gun. Weighing only 31 pounds, it was a 
113

versatile and well-built weapon that could fire at a rate of 400–500 

rounds per minute. It was utilized both with infantry units and on 

tanks, aircraft, and other vehicles.

Caliber: .30

Length overall (without bayonet): 37.94 in.

Muzzle velocity: 2,800 ft./sec.

Weight: 31 lb.

Range: 1,500 yd.

Browning HB M2 .50-caliber heavy machine gun

A mainstay of American arsenals since its introduction, the .50-cal 

M2 Browning was a powerful, versatile, and highly effective heavy 

machine gun. It was a common armament on U.S. armored vehicles, 

including tanks and amtracks. Most fighter planes used in the Battle 

of Okinawa were equipped with six to eight .50-cal machine guns.

Caliber: .50

Length overall (without bayonet): 65.1 in.

Muzzle velocity: 2,910 ft./sec.

Weight: 83.78 lb.

Range: 2,000 yd.
114

Flamethrowers

M1/M1A1/M2-2 flamethrowers

Flamethrowers were highly effective against bunkers and other fortifications. They used a variety of fuel, ranging from petrol, petrol with 

napalm powder, naval fuel oil and diesel, and bunker fuel oil. The fuel 

was ignited by compressed hydrogen or nitrogen.

Range: M1: 15–20 yd.

M2: 50 yd.

M2-2: 60 yd.

Duration of fire: 6–9 sec.

Handheld Antitank Weapons

M1/M9/M9A1 Bazooka
115

Easy to use, versatile, and highly effective, the Bazooka was a recoilless antitank rocket launcher that could penetrate about 4.7 inches of 

armor. They were also useful against enemy pillboxes. 

Length M1: 54 in. 

M9/M9A1: 61 in.

Caliber: 2.36 in.

Warhead: M1: M6-shaped charge 

M9/M9A1: M6A3/C-shaped charge

Range: 250–300 yd.

Artillery

M1A1 75mm Pack Howitzer

Pack Howitzers were highly mobile field pieces that could be broken 

down into six separate loads for animal transport or towed by a truck. 

Its lightweight (just under a ton) design made it an ideal piece for the 

artillery units of Marine battalion landing teams.

Caliber: 75mm

Weight: 1,439 lb.

Traverse: 6 degrees

Elevation: +5 degrees to +45 degrees

Muzzle velocity: 1,250 ft./sec.

Range: 9,600 yd.

Ammunition: High explosive, high explosive antitank, 

smoke, chemical
116

M2A1 105mm Howitzer

By 1945, most light artillery units utilized M2A1 105mm howitzers 

alongside the smaller 75mm pack howitzers. Weighing about two 

tons, the heavier pieces could still be towed by a one-ton truck. It had 

a maximum range of about 12,330 yards and a rate of fire of two to 

four rounds per minute.

Caliber: 105mm

Weight: 4,980 lb.

Traverse: 46 degrees

Elevation: -5 degrees to +66 degrees

Muzzle velocity: 1,550 ft./sec.

Range: 7 mi.

Ammunition: High explosive, high explosive antitank, 

smoke, chemical

M1/M1A1 155mm Howitzer
117

Serviced by a crew of 11, the 155mm howitzer had an effective range 

of about nine miles and could fire about one to three rounds a minute. 

Weighing in at 5.67 tons, it was moved by a D-18 dozer/tractor.

Caliber: 155mm

Weight: 12,800 lb.

Traverse: 25 degrees

Elevation: -2 degrees to +63 degrees

Muzzle velocity: 1,847 ft./sec.

Range: 9 mi.

M1A1 155mm Gun “Long Tom”

Weighing in at 13.4 tons, the powerful Long Tom had an effective rate 

of fire of one to three rounds per minute and could hit targets at more 

than 14 miles. It was serviced by a crew of 11 and was transported by 

a D-18 dozer/tractor.

Caliber: 155mm

Weight: 30,600 lb.

Traverse: 60 degrees

Elevation: -2 degrees to +65 degrees

Muzzle velocity: 2,799 ft./sec.

Range: 14.7 mi.

Ammunition: Armor-piercing, high explosive, smoke, 

chemical
118

M1 81mm mortar

The standard battalion mortar, the 81mm M1, weighed 136 pounds 

and had a maximum effective range of more than 3,000 yards. Muzzle-loaded, drop fired rounds included 6.87 pounds of light high explosives, 10.62 pounds of heavy explosive, and white phosphorus and 

illumination rounds.

Caliber: 81mm

Rate of fire: 18 rpm

Muzzle velocity: 700 ft./sec.

Range: 3,290 yd.

M2 60mm mortar

The standard light mortar used by American infantry units, the M2 

60mm was a muzzle-loaded, drop fired piece that could launch a 

three-pound explosive round or an illumination round. Its rate of fire 

was about 18 rounds per minute.
119

Caliber: 61mm

Rate of fire: 18 rpm

Muzzle velocity: 518 ft./sec.

Range: 2,000 yd.

Armor

M4 Sherman Medium Tank

The principal Allied tank of World War II, the M4 Sherman, was often outclassed by better armed and armored German tanks in the European theater. In the Pacific, however, the Sherman was more than a 

match for Japanese armored vehicles and provided essential support 

to Marines and soldiers throughout the Okinawa campaign.

Weight: 33.4 tons

Length: 19 ft., 2 in.

Width: 8 ft., 7 in.

Height: 9 ft.

Crew: 5 (commander, gunner, loader, driver, codriver)

Armor: 76mm

Armament: 75mm gun, .50-cal MG (machine gun), two .30-cal MGs

Speed: 25–30 mph

Range: 120 mi.
120

LVT-4 (Landing Vehicle Tracked 4)

Better known as amtracks, LVTs gave U.S. assault forces a significant 

and powerful sea-to-shore capability. They were particularly useful in 

the Pacific, where islands were often ringed by rugged reefs on which 

the standard vehicle/personnel landing craft would run aground. 

Once ashore they could serve as armored transports.

Weight: 16.5 tons

Length: 26 ft., 1in.

Width: 10 ft., 8 in.

Height: 8 ft., 1 in.

Crew: 2–7

Armor: 6–13mm

Armament: Two .50-cal MGs

Speed: 20 mph on land, 7.5 mph in water

Range: 150 mi. on land, 75 mi. in water

LVT(A)-4 (Landing Vehicle Tracked [Armored] 4)
121

A heavier armed and armored version of the amtrack, these so-called 

“amtanks” were designed to provide better fire support for U.S. assault 

forces at the beach and were armed with a 75mm howitzer. These 

armored amtracks were also useful during inland fighting, where they 

could perform the functions of a tank.

Weight: 19.95 tons

Length: 26 ft.

Width: 10 ft.

Height: 10 ft.

Crew: 6 (commander, gunner, loader, driver, assistant driver, 

antiaircraft machine gunner)

Armor: 6–38mm

Armament: One 77mm M2/M3 howitzer, three .30-cal Browning 

MGs

Speed: 24 mph on land, 6.8 mph in water

Range: 124 mi. on land, 74.5 mi. in water

Aircraft

Vought F4U Corsair Fighter-Bomber

Coupling superior speed and maneuverability with the ability to carry 

a substantial ordnance load of rockets and bombs, the Corsair was a 

model close air support airframe. Its dynamic performance capabilities also made it an effective interceptor against Japanese kamikaze 

attacks. By 1945, it was the backbone of the Marine Corps’ aviation 

arm.
122

User: USN/USMC

Crew: 1

Speed: 446 mph

Service ceiling: 36,900 ft.

Range: 1,005 mi.

Armament: Six .5-inch MGs, eight 5-inch rockets, or two 

1,000-pound bombs

Republic P-47 Thunderbolt Fighter-Bomber

Nicknamed “The Jug” because of the shape of its fuselage and large 

size, the Thunderbolt was the heaviest single-engine fighter in U.S. 

service. Able to take substantial punishment and carry a large ordnance load of bombs and rockets, the plane was an ideal ground support fighter plane. Like the Corsair, it was an effective fighter as well.

User: USAAF

Crew: 1

Speed: 433 mph

Service ceiling: 43,000 ft.

Range: 800 mi.

Armament: 8 .5-inch MGs, 10 5-inch rockets, or 2,500 lb. of 

bombs
123

Northrop P-61 Black Widow Night Interceptor

Designed as a radar-equipped night fighter, the Black Widow was 

utilized primarily as a ground attack plane in the Pacific theater. Its 

long wings, powerful engines, and center bomb rack allowed it to carry an arsenal of bombs and rockets.

User: USAAF

Crew: 2–3

Speed: 366 mph

Service ceiling: 33,100 ft.

Range: 610 mi.

Armament: Four 20mm cannons, four .5-inch MGs, six 5-inch 

rockets, or four 1,600-pound bombs

Grumman TBF/TBM Avenger Torpedo Bomber

Built to replace the antiquated TBD Devastator as the Navy and Marine Corps’ principal torpedo bomber, the Avenger bore the stout and 

craggy design features associated with the Grumman “Iron Works.” It 
124

was a capable attack plane able to carry both antishipping torpedoes 

and bombs.

User: USN/USMC

Crew: 3

Speed: 267 mph

Service ceiling: 30,100 ft.

Range: 1,130 mi.

Armament: Three .5-in MGs, one .3-inch MG, eight 3.5-inch 

or 5-inch rockets, or one Mark 13 torpedo or 2,000 

lb. of bombs.

Curtiss SB2C Helldiver

Although the Helldiver had largely replaced the venerable SBD 

Dauntless as the Navy’s primary dive-bomber by 1945, it never quite 

eclipsed the latter airframe in the affections of Navy pilots, who preferred the SBD’s more forgiving performing characteristics. Nevertheless, carrier-based Helldivers could deliver a substantial bomb load 

against Japanese ground targets throughout Okinawa.

User: USN

Crew: 2

Speed: 295 mph

Service ceiling: 29,100 ft.

Range: 1,165 mi.

Armament: Two 20mm cannons, two .3-inch MGs, 2,000 lb. 

of bombs
125

Grumman F6F Hellcat Fighter

Easier to fly aboard carriers than the Corsair, the Hellcat served as the 

Navy’s premier carrier fighter during the latter years of World War 

II. A match for the Japanese Zero, Hellcats were largely responsible 

for the destruction of the Japanese naval air arm during the battle of 

the Philippine Sea. It could also carry bombs and rockets for ground 

attack. A small number of Marine squadrons flew the night fighter 

variant of the rugged airframe.

User: USN/USMC

Crew: 1

Speed: 330 mph

Service ceiling: 37,300 ft.

Range: 1,530 mi.

Armament: Six .5-inch MGs, two 1,000-pound bombs, or six 

5-inch rockets

North American B-25 Mitchell Medium Bomber
126

Renowned as the plane that carried out the first American bombing 

raid against the Japanese home islands, the Mitchell was a versatile 

medium bomber able to deliver substantial ordnance against enemy 

targets. 

User: USAAF

Crew: 6

Speed: 272 mph

Service ceiling: 24,200 ft.

Range: 1,350 mi.

Armament: 12–18 .5-inch MGs, 3,000 lb. of bombs

Consolidated B-24 Liberator Heavy Bomber

Alongside the B-17, the Liberator was one of the Army Air Force’s 

standard heavy bombers upon America’s entry into the war. Its longer 

range made it a more suitable airframe for the Pacific theater, and the 

plane served as both a bomber and cargo plane. 

User: USAAF

Crew: 11

Speed: 290 mph

Service ceiling: 28,000 ft.

Range: 2,100 mi.

Armament: 10 .5-inch MGs, 5,000 lb. of bombs (normal), 

12,800 lb. of bombs (maximum)
127

Weapons and Equipment—Imperial Japan

Image courtesy of Jody Harmon of Harmon Maneuver Art

Official Imperial Japanese Army photo
128

The following Japanese weapons, ranging from small arms to tanks, 

are representative of the most common types encountered by Marines 

and soldiers during the Battle of Okinawa. 

Pistol

Model 14 (1925) 8mm Pistol

This was a semiautomatic, recoil-operated, magazine-fed hand weapon. A development of the Nambu 8mm pistol, its front sight is a 

blade-type sight and the rear sight is a nonadjustable open V notch. 

The safety lever is moved to the forward position for fire and rearward 

for safe. An unusually large trigger guard permits firing with a gloved 

hand. 

Caliber: 8mm (.315 in)

Capacity of magazine: 8 rounds

Weight (empty): 2 lb.

Muzzle velocity: 950 ft./sec.

For ammunition, rimless ball cartridges were provided and were interchangeable in the Nambu and the model 94 pistols. 
129

Rifle

Model 99 (1939) 7.7mm Rifle 

The Japanese replaced their 6.5mm weapons with this shorter, heavier caliber weapon, an improved version of model 38 (1905) Arisaka 

rifle. The rifle has a blade front sight and a leaf rear sight graduated 

from 500 to 1,500 meters. Modifications, other than the larger caliber 

which also help to identify this piece, are as follows: monopod under 

forend; antiaircraft sight arms attached to rear sight leaf; magazine 

floor plate hinged to forward part of trigger guard; and sling swivels 

attached to side instead of under part of rifle.

Caliber: 7.7mm (0.303 in.)

Length overall (without bayonet): 44 in.

Muzzle velocity: 2,300 ft./sec.

Weight: 8.8 lbs.

For ammunition the weapon used five-round clips, three clips to a 

package. It fired a rimless type, supplied in ball, tracer, and armor-piercing varieties. This ammunition can be used in the 7.7mm model 92 

(1932) machine gun, but the model 92 ammunition is semirimmed 

and cannot be used in the rifle. 
130

Machine Guns

Model 99 (1939) 7.7mm Light Machine Gun

This was a gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, light machine gun. 

Its appearance is almost identical to model 96 with two exceptions, 

that it has an adjustable rear monopod and a barrel-locking nut instead of a barrel catch. It can further be identified by the markings on 

the top of the receiver meaning “99 Model.” It has a blade front sight 

and a rear peep sight controlled by a click drum graduated from 200 

to 1,500 meters, as well as a windage adjustment. A telescopic sight 

10-degree field of view and 2.5 magnification were also provided. The 

safety lever on the right side of the trigger housing is set at horizontal 

to fire and vertical for safe.

Caliber: 7.7mm (0.303 in.) 

Length overall: 42 in. 

Weight (without magazine or bayonet): 20 lb. 

Magazine capacity: 30 rounds

Muzzle velocity: 2,300 ft./sec. 

Cyclic rate of fire: 800 rounds per minute
131

For ammunition the weapon used 7.7mm rimless ammunition only. 

This ammunition was used in the Model 92 heavy machine gun, but 

the semirimmed ammunition for model 92 could not be used in this 

gun. 

Model 92 (1932) 7.7mm Heavy Machine Gun

This was the standard Japanese heavy machine gun. It is a gas-operated, strip-fed, full automatic, air-cooled, modified Hotchkiss-type 

weapon. Its forerunner, which was still frequently encountered, was 

the Model 3 (1914), which fired 6.5mm ammunition. The standard 

sights consist of a blade front sight and a rear peep sight mounted on 

a post adjustable for windage and range (300–2,700 meters). Special 

antiaircraft front and rear sights are provided, and there are three 

variations of optical rear sights, which are often used. The weapon is 

set on safety by turning the trigger thumb piece. 

Caliber: 7.7mm (0.303 in.) 

Weight (including tripod): 122 lb. 

Strip capacity: 30-round clips 

Cyclic rate of fire: 450 rpm 

Muzzle velocity: 2,400 ft./sec. 

For ammunition this gun used 7.7mm semirimmed ammunition (ball, 

tracer, armor piercing, and incendiary). It also used the 7.7 rimless 

ammunition if loaded on strips. 
132

Mortar

Model 97 (1937) 81mm Mortar

This weapon was very similar to the U.S. 81mm mortar M1. It is a 

smooth-bore, muzzle-loading, high-angle fire weapon, which breaks 

down into three sections for transport. The mortar is provided with 

a collimator sight, which is heavier and more complex than the U.S. 

M1 sight. 

Caliber: 81mm (3.19 in.) 

Maximum range (light shell): 3,100 yd. (approximately) 

Length of barrel: 49.5 in. 

Total weight: 145 lb. 

Weight of shell: 6.93 lb. (1 lb. of TNT) 

For ammunition, this weapon fired high explosive shells which are 

interchangeable with the U.S. M43 81mm light shell. Heavier shells 

have been reported, but no specimens have been recovered. The fuses 

can be adjusted to give instantaneous or delayed action detonations. 
133

Grenade

Model 97 (1937) Hand Grenade

The model 97 (1937) fragmentation hand grenade was carried by all 

frontline troops and is almost identical with Model 91, except that it 

has no provision for a base propellant attachment and has a shorter 

fuse delay time. It cannot be fired from a grenade discharger. 

Length overall: 3.75 in. 

Diameter: 1.97 in. 

Weight: 1 lb. (approximately) 

Fuse delay: 4–5 sec. (approximately)

To operate, arm with safety pin in position, screw firing pin down 

into firing pin holder as far as it will go. To throw, hold the grenade 

with the fuse pointing down. Remove safety pin, being sure that safety 

cover does not fall off. Strike head of fuse against solid object such as 

helmet, keeping hand clear of gas vent hole. Throw immediately as 

timing for the fuse is sometimes erratic. 
134

Antiarmor

Model 1 (1941) 47mm Gun

This is an antitank weapon of modern design. The wheels are independently sprung, and a lock is provided on each wheel for locking 

the springs out of action. It has a semiautomatic, horizontal, sliding-wedge breech mechanism. The low silhouette, wide tread, and 

long split trails give this gun excellent stability. Preliminary tests indicate a muzzle velocity of 2,700 feet per second. The steel disc wheels 

are fitted with sponge rubber filled tires. 

Caliber: 47mm (1.85 in.)

Weight: 1,600 lb. 

Traverse: 60 degrees

Elevation: +19 degrees 

Depression: -11 degrees

Muzzle velocity 2,700 ft./sec. 

For ammunition, armor-piercing high explosive and standard high 

explosive shells have been recovered. 
135

Artillery

Model 95 (1935) 75mm Gun

The 75mm Model 95 gun was a horse-drawn piece with split trails, 

hydropneumatic recoil mechanism, and horizontal, sliding-wedge 

type breechblock. A comparison with the Model 90, designed five 

years earlier, reveals that this later weapon had only the apparent advantage of reduced weight. On the other hand, it suffered from loss 

of range and lower muzzle velocity. It is seemingly more rugged in 

construction than the Model 94 mountain gun and yet gave a lower 

performance than the Model 90 field gun. The Model 95 was not designed to replace either of these guns but was to be used by some unit 

other than the field or pack artillery. 

Caliber: 75mm (2.95 in.)

Maximum range: 11,000 m. (12,000 yd.), also reported as 

9,000 m. (9,850 yd.)

Traverse (total): 50 degrees

Maximum elevation: +43 degrees

Maximum depression: -8 degrees

Muzzle velocity: 500 m./sec. (1,640 ft./sec.)

Weight: 2,438 lb.

Sight: Panoramic

Maximum rate of fire: 10–12 rpm
136

For ammunition, the model used high explosive, armor piercing, 

shrapnel, smoke star, and chemical.

Model 92 (1932) 105mm Gun

This weapon superseded the Model 14 (1925) 105mm gun. Readily 

recognized by its long slender barrel and trail, it was designed particularly for long-range fire. Other distinctive features are the pronounced length of the sleigh and the three-step interrupted thread 

breechblock. The recoil system is hydropneumatic. Mounted on heavily constructed wooden wheels with solid rubber tires, the weapon is 

normally tractor drawn but may be drawn by a 5-ton truck. 

Caliber: 105mm (4.13 in.)

Maximum range: 18,700 m. (20,100 yd.), also reported as 

16,400 yd.

Traverse (total): 30 degrees

Maximum elevation: +48 degrees

Maximum depression: -10 degrees

Weight in firing position: 6,600 lb.

Muzzle velocity: 2,500 ft./sec.

Sight: Panoramic

Tube length: 5 ft., 6 in.
137

Maximum rate of fire: 6–8 rpm

Weight of HE projectile: 33 lb.

Ammunition is semifixed. The following types of projectiles have been 

recovered: high explosive (long pointed shell); high explosive; chemical; and armor piercing. Time fuses were provided for the smoke, 

incendiary, and chemical shells. The standard model 88-point detonating (instantaneous or delay) fuses were used with the high explosive 

and chemical shells.

Model 96 (1936) 150mm Howitzer 

A well-designed and effective weapon, it was the most modern of 

its type known to be possessed by the Japanese. Mounted on sturdy, 

rubber-shod, wooden wheels, the weapon was normally tractor drawn. 

One of the outstanding characteristics was the extreme elevation of 

75 degrees, used only when a deep loading pit was dug beneath the 

breech. Other features are a long split trail, interrupted thread breechblock, and a hydropneumatic recoil mechanism.

Caliber: 150mm (5.9 in.)

Maximum range: 10,000 m. (11,000 yd.)
138

Traverse (total): 30 degrees

Maximum elevation: +75 degrees

Maximum depression: -7 degrees

Weight in firing position: 8,765 lb.

Sight: Panoramic

Tube length: 11.57 ft.

Rate of fire: 6–8 rpm

Weight of HE projectile: 80 lb.

For ammunition, the Model 96 used semifixed high explosive, armor 

piercing, shrapnel, smoke, and incendiary tracer.

Model 96 (1936) Type 2, 25mm Antiaircraft-Antitank Automatic Cannon

This was a gas-operated, air-cooled, magazine-fed, full automatic or 

semiautomatic machine cannon. It was used in dual- and triple-fixed 

mounts, emplaced customarily around airstrips for antiaircraft defense. 

However, it was capable of a 10-degree depression, which makes it effective for direct fire against ground targets. Traverse and elevation are 

controlled by hand wheels.
139

Caliber: 25mm (.984 in.)

Estimated vertical range: 14,000 ft.

Traverse: 360 degrees

Maximum elevation: +80 degrees

Maximum depression: -10 degrees

Magazine capacity: 15 rounds

Weight (single gun without mount): 246 lb.

Weight (three guns triple mount): 5,330 lb.

Sight: Optical linked to analog computer

Cyclic rate of fire (per barrel): 300 rpm

Muzzle velocity: 2,978 ft./sec.

For ammunition, the weapon was furnished with high explosive tracer, high explosive, and armor-piercing tracer ammunition.

Armor

Medium Tank Model 97 (1937) 

This tank was the most common Japanese armored vehicle employed 

against U.S. forces during the Battle of Okinawa. The Type 97 (1937) 

medium tank first appeared in the Philippines in 1942 and was used 

in Burma and throughout the Pacific theater. A number of Type 97 

mediums (improved) constituted a sizable part of the Japanese armored division, which operated on Luzon in the Philippines in Jan-
140

uary and February 1945. Although this tank is considered a superior 

fighting vehicle compared to prewar U.S. and Allied tanks, Japanese 

armor on Okinawa, concentrated in the 27th Armor Regiment, never mounted an attack with more than 16 tanks at any one time and 

rarely employed the principle of mass. Instead of making use of the 

mobility of its tanks, the Japanese frequently chose instead to employ 

them from fixed defenses and emplacements and to make piecemeal 

counterattacks. As a result, the Japanese armored effort resulted in little more than delay. Compared with the U.S. M4 Sherman, the Type 

97 was decidedly inferior but could still be used effectively against 

infantry lacking antitank weapons. 

Weight: 15 tons

Length: 18 ft.

Width: 7 ft., 8 in.

Height: 7 ft., 8 in.

Clearance: 16 in.

Crew: 4

Armor: 8–25mm (0.32–0.98 in.)

Armament

 Main: One 57mm Model 97 gun

 Hull: One 7.7mm Model 97 MG

 Rear turret: One 7.7mm Model 97 MG

Ammunition: 57mm 80 rounds HE (high explosive) 

or 40 rounds APHE (armor-piercing 

high explosive); MG 2,350 rounds ball 

or 1,350 rounds AP

Engine: 12-cylinder diesel

Horsepower: 150 hp at 2,000 rpm

Speed: 25 mph

Range: 100 mi.
141

Comparative Losses

Official U.S. Army photo

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
142

U.S. Losses

Marine Corps

Unit KIA/DOW WIA MIA Total

III Amphibious Corps: 35 149 4 188

1st Marine Division 1,115 6,745 41 6,901*

6th Marine Division 1,622 6,689 15 7,326

Subtotals: 2,772 13,583 60 14,415

(*Includes 376 casualties suffered by 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, while attached to 

1st MarDiv.)

Army

Unit KIA/DOW WIA MIA Total

XXIV Corps: 55 346 2 403

7th Infantry Division 1,122 4,943 3 6,068

27th Infantry Division 711 2,250 24 3,255

77th Infantry Division 1,018 3,968 40 5,026

96th Infantry Division 1,506 5,912 12 7,430

Subtotals: 4,412 17,419 81 22,182

Evacuation due to battle fatigue (Army and Marine Corps): 26,200

Total ground combat losses: 7,374 KIA/DOW 31,807 WIA 239 MIA

 Total: 39,420

Total including battle fatigue: 65,620

Replacements received: USMC: 11,147 Army: 12,277 Total: 23,424
143

Navy

Ships: 36 sunk, 368 damaged (Includes 43 so badly damaged they were later 

scrapped.)

Personnel losses:

 4,907 KIA/MIA

4,824 WIA 

 Total: 9,731

Air (Army, Navy, and Marine Corps)

Aircraft lost in combat: 458

Lost due to other causes: 305

Total aircraft losses: 763

(Includes 41 Marine aircraft lost in combat and 166 USMC

aircrew KIA from various causes.)

 Total U.S. personnel losses: 75,351

Japanese Losses (estimated)

Land forces (including Imperial Japanese Army and Navy)

KIA/MIA: 66,000

Captured: 7,400 Japanese and 3,400 Okinawan militia

and laborers (Boeitai)

Surrendered postwar: 8,950 (includes Japanese and Boeitai)

Total Japanese taken prisoner (excluding Boeitai): 10,755

Imperial Japanese Navy (excluding garrison on Okinawa)

16 warships sunk, including battleship Yamato

3,650 sailors and airmen KIA/MIA
144

Air forces

7,830 aircraft destroyed (including kamikaze)

4,155 lost in direct combat

2,655 lost in operations (during takeoff or landing,

engine failure, etc.)

1,020 destroyed on the ground in Japan or Formosa

4,600 airmen KIA/MIA

Civil-Military Operations

The Battle of Okinawa was fought amidst a densely populated rural 

area that sustained tremendous damage to its civilian infrastructure, 

particularly in the south where most of the heavy fighting took place. 

Of a civilian population estimated at 355,000 prebattle (some 80,000 

had been evacuated to the mainland prior to the battle), approximately 285,272 were registered afterward by U.S. Army and Marine Corps 

civil affairs units, which rose to 295,000 by 1 July. Between 42,000 and 

50,000 men, women, and children are initially believed to have died 

during the battle due to causes ranging from naval gunfire to air bombardment as well as atrocities carried out by Japanese troops. The total 

number of civilian dead was revised upward to 122,000 after postwar 

study (this number undoubtedly included Okinawans pressed into 

service as laborers or militia). Thus, nearly a third of the island’s civilian population perished during the fighting, and the destruction of 

centuries-old farms raised the specter of famine upon the survivors. 

To govern the occupied territory, a military government manned by 

both Navy and Army civil affairs forces was established charged with 

the responsibility of easing the suffering of the civilian population 

as well as getting it back to work and assisting in the cleanup and 

reestablishment of government functions such as public health and 

schools. American civil administration continued in Okinawa until 

15 May 1972, when the island formally reverted to Japanese control. 
145

Bibliography 

Alexander, Joseph H. Marines in World War II Commemorative Series: 

The Final Campaign: Marines in the Victory of Okinawa. Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1996.

Appleman, Roy E. et al. Okinawa: The Last Battle. Washington, DC: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1947. (Includes map 

set, issued separately.)

Feifer, George. The Battle of Okinawa: The Blood and the Bomb. Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2001. (Originally published in 

1992 under the title Tennonzan: The Battle of Okinawa and the 

Atomic Bomb.)

Fisch, Arnold G. Jr. Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–

1950. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

1988.

Frank, Benis M., and Henry I. Shaw Jr. History of U.S. Marine Corps 

Operations in World War II Volume V: Victory and Occupation. 

Washington, DC: Historical Branch, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1968.

Huber, Thomas M. “Japan’s Battle of Okinawa April–June 1945.” 

Leavenworth Papers, no. 18 (1990). Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute.

Leonard, Charles L. “Okinawa: A Marine Returns,” After the Battle, 

no. 43 (1984). London: Battle of Britain Prints International.

MacLean, French. Battle of the Hürtgen Forest Staff Ride Battle Book. 

(Heidelberg, Germany: Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, 10 

December 2000).

Manchester, William R. Goodbye Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War. 

New York: Little Brown, 1980.

Nichols, Charles S., and Henry I. Shaw. Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific. 

Washington, DC: Historical Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, 1955.
146

Robertson, William G. The Staff Ride. Washington, DC: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1987.

Rottman, Gordon L. Okinawa 1945: The Last Battle. Oxford: Osprey 

Publishing, 2002.

Schlosser, Dr. Nicholas J. Staff Ride slide presentation, “The Battle 

of Okinawa: Typhoon of Steel.” Quantico, VA: Marine Corps 

History Division, Marine Corps University, 2014.

Shaw, Henry I. Jr., Bernard C Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh. History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Volume 

III: Central Pacific Drive. Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. 

Marine Corps Historical Branch, 1966. 

Sledge, Eugene B. With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa. Novato, 

CA: Presidio Press, 1981.

Yahara, Hiromichi. The Battle for Okinawa: A Japanese Officer’s Eyewitness Account of the Last Great Campaign of World War II. New 

York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995.

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York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 1977.
147

USMC and U.S. Navy Medal

of Honor Awardees

On an individual basis, 24 servicemen received the Medal of Honor 

for actions performed during the Battle of Okinawa. Thirteen of these 

went to the Marines and their organic Navy corpsmen, nine to Army 

troops, and one to a Navy officer.

Within III Amphibious Corps, 11 Marines and 3 corpsmen received 

the award. Eleven of the 14 were posthumous awards. Most, if not all, 

deceased Medal of Honor recipients have had either U.S. Navy ships 

or Marine Corps installations in Okinawa named in their honor. 

The Marine Corps and Navy Okinawa Medal of Honor awardees, 

and a brief synopsis of their award citations, include the following:

Corporal Richard E. Bush, USMC, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. Severely wounded while leading the first squad to penetrate the Mount 

Yae-take inner defenses, he was evacuated to a nearby aid station. 

When an enemy grenade landed in the midst of the wounded men, 

he unhesitatingly pulled it to his body to protect his comrades from 

serious injury or death on 16 April 1944.

Hospital Apprentice First Class Robert E. Bush, USN, 2d Battalion, 

5th Marines. He was administering plasma to a wounded officer on 

an exposed ridgeline when the enemy attacked. He fought off the 

charging enemy with his pistol and a carbine, killing six despite his 

own serious wounds. He calmly ignored his critical condition until his 

patient was evacuated on 2 May 1945.

*Major Henry A. Courtney Jr., USMC, 2d Battalion, 22d Marines. 

Gallantly leading by personal example, he inspired a small group of 

men from his unit to assault and capture the crest of Sugar Loaf Hill. 

He continued to lead attacks against the superior enemy defending 

forces until killed by a hostile mortar burst on 14–15 May 1945.

Corporal James. L. Day, USMC, 2d Battalion, 22d Marines. By 

his extraordinary heroism, repeated acts of valor, and quintessential 
148

battlefield leadership, Corporal Day inspired the efforts of his outnumbered Marines to defeat a much larger enemy force in sustained 

combat operations against Japanese forces on Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands, on 14–17 May 1945.

*Corporal John P. Fardy, USMC, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. When 

heavy enemy small-arms fire drove his squad to cover in a narrow 

drainage ditch and an enemy grenade fell among the men, he smothered the lethal explosion with his own body to protect his comrades’ 

lives on 6 May 1945.

*Private First Class William A. Foster, USMC, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Dug in with another Marine on the point of a perimeter defense during a fierce close-in battle with the enemy, he threw himself 

on a grenade that landed out of reach in his foxhole to protect the life 

of his comrade on 2 May 1945.

Private First Class Harold Gonsalves, USMC, 4th Battalion, 15th 

Marines. After repeatedly braving terrific enemy bombardment to aid 

his forward observation team, he dived on an enemy grenade that 

landed in his midst, sacrificing his own chances of survival to protect 

his fellow Marines on 15 April 1945.

*Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class William D. Halyburton Jr., USN, 

2d Battalion, 5th Marines. When his assault unit suffered severe casualties, he unhesitatingly went to the aid of the wounded man closest 

to the enemy positions. He interposed his own body as a shield in the 

line of fire and continued his ministrations until he was killed on 19 

May 1945.

*Private Dale M. Hansen, USMC, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Using 

a rocket launcher, a rifle, and grenades, he seized the initiative at a 

critical point in the battle action and in a one-man assault destroyed 

a pillbox, a mortar, and 12 of the enemy, materially aiding the accomplishment of his company’s mission on 7 May 1945.

*Corporal Luis J. Hauge Jr., USMC, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Making a determined one-man assault on a pair of enemy machine-gun 

positions holding up his company’s advance, he wiped out one with 
149

grenades and, although painfully wounded, continued his attack and 

succeeded in destroying the second on 14 May 1945.

*Sergeant Elbert L. Kinser, USMC, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. During 

an enemy counterattack when a grenade fell in the midst of his men, 

he threw himself on the deadly missile and absorbed the full force of 

the shattering explosion with his own body on 4 May 1945.

Hospital Apprentice First Class Fred F. Lester, USN, 1st Battalion, 

22d Marines. He was hit while going to the aid of a wounded man. 

Although he was again wounded dragging his patient to safety, he directed the administration of proper medical treatment to several men, 

steadfastly refusing aid for his own wounds, which he realized were 

fatal on 8 June 1945.

*Private Robert M. McTureous Jr., USMC, 3d Battalion, 29th Marines. When machine-gun fire suddenly assailed stretcher bearers 

evacuating his unit’s wounded, he made two one-man grenade assaults on the enemy gun positions. Although seriously wounded, he 

stoically crawled 200 yards to shelter before calling for aid on 7 June 

1945.

*Private First Class Albert F. Schwab, USMC, 1st Battalion, 5th 

Marines. Attacking alone up a high ridge, he used his flamethrower 

to burn out an enemy machine gun that had pinned down his unit. 

When a second machine gun opened up, he attacked directly into its 

fire, silencing it as he fell fatally wounded on 7 May 1945.

(*Posthumous award)

The secretary the Navy also awarded Presidential Unit Citations to 

the 1st and 6th MarDivs, the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, and Marine 

Observation Squadron 3 for “extraordinary heroism in action against 

enemy Japanese forces during the invasion of Okinawa.” Marine Observation Squadron 6 also received the award as a specified attached 

unit to the 6th MarDiv.
Note Page
151

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Marines observe a TBM Avenger dropping supplies in early June 1945. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

A Marine fires bazooka rocket launcher at Japanese positions in Okinawa in June 1945.

153

Author’s Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Mr. Charles D. Melson, the Historian 

of the Marine Corps, for his advice and Dr. Nick Schlosser of the U.S. 

Army Center of Military History for assisting in the construction of 

the U.S. order of battle charts and the War in the Pacific timeline for 

this publication, as well as the section on U.S. weapons. In addition, 

the mentorship of Colonel (US Army, Ret) French MacLean, a veteran 

staff ride small group leader, towards the development of this volume 

has been invaluable. Lastly, the author would like to thank the members of the USMC History Division, Editing and Design Branch, for 

all the work that went into making this publication a reality.

Cover background photo: LtCol Richard P. 

Ross, commander of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 

1st Marine Division, braves sniper fire to place 

the division’s colors on a parapet of Shuri Castle 

on 30 May 1945. This flag was first raised over 

Cape Gloucester and then Peleliu.

Official Department of Defense photo 121832