No. 86-533 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1987 

AARON STANSBERRY, 

Petitioner/Respondent and 

Cross-Appellant, 

-vsED ARGENBRIGHT, Superintendent of Public 

Instruction and TRUSTEES OF ROOSEVELT 

COUNTY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT #5A, 

Respondents/Appellants and 

Cross-Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the First Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lewis & Clark, 

The Honorable Henry Loble, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Charles E. Erdmann; Erdmann & Wright, Helena, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Emilie Loring; Hilley & Loring, Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 26, 1987 

Decided: May 26, 1987 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

The District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis 

and Clark County, reversed the actions of the Roosevelt 

County Board of School Trustees (School Trustees), the County 

Superintendent of Schools (County Superintendent), and the 

State Superintendent of Public Instruction (State Superintendent), and directed that Mr. Stansberry be offered a contract 

as a tenured teacher. School Trustees appealed and Mr. 

Stansberry cross-appealed. We reverse. 

The issues are: 

1. Did the District Court err in reversing the decisions of the School Trustees, the County Superintendent, and 

the State Superintendent and directing that Mr. Stansberry be 

offered a contract? 

2. Did the District Court err by not directing the 

School Trustees to pay Mr. Stansberry back pay and retroactive fringe benefits? 

Mr. Stansberry was a tenured teacher who taught in the 

Wolf Point High School District for seven years prior to this 

controversy. In 1981 Mr. Stansberry requested sabbatical 

leave for the 1982-83 school year pursuant to the Professional Policies Agreement between the School District and the 

Wolf Point Education Association. The agreement provides in 

pertinent part: 

5575.8 Sabbatical Leave 

a. Sabbatical leave shall be available to 

a teacher after seven (7) years of 

service. A teacher receiving sabbatical 

leave shall be awarded 50% of their 

annual base salary they would have 

received had he or she remained at his 

or her teaching position. Such salary 

will be paid upon completion of the 
granted sabbatical leave and upon beginning to teach in the system in the 

school year following his/her absence. 

b. Leave may be granted by the Board of 

Trustees upon application approval by 

a joint review panel representing the 

WPEA and the school system to engage 

in full-time study, travel, research, 

work experience or other professionally 

advantageous activity. . . . 

c. Teachers on sabbatical leave receive 

normal salary increments, tenure 

rights, and fringe benefits while on 

leave and must return to their former 

position or similar position. 

In part Mr. Stansberry's application letter stated: 

I would like to make formal application for a 

Sabbatical Leave during the 1982-83 school year. 

If this application is accepted, I intend to pursue 

either an MA or MFA degree in English, concentrating in Creative Writing. 

In a December 1981 School Board meeting, Mr. Stansberry's 

application was approved. The School Board minutes provided: 

The Board next took under consideration the 

written request from Mr. Aaron Stansberry for 

Sabbatical Leave during the 1982-83 school year. 

He stated that his intent is to persue [sic] either 

a MA or MFA in English, concentrating in Creative 

Writing. A letter accompanied this request which 

was signed by Mrs. Penny Nelson, Mr. William 

Gilman, High School Principal, and Mr. Michael 

Thompson, High School English Instructor recommending that Mr. Stansberry's Sabbatical Leave 

request be approved. A motion was made by Listerud 

and seconded by Hansen that the Board approve 

granting a request that Mr. Stansberry have Sabbatical Leave during the 1982-83 school year. A vote 

was taken and the motion carried. 
In April 1982, Mr. Stansberry was informed by the University of Montana English Department that he had not been 

accepted to the graduate program. The above facts are all 

undisputed. The parties dispute what occurred at a May 18, 

1982, meeting between Mr. Stansberry and District Superintendent Robert Kinna. 

Mr. Stansberry testified that he met with Mr. Kinna, 

informed him that his application for graduate school had 

been denied, and asked him what he should do. Mr. Stansberry 

further testified that Mr. Kinna responded by saying that it 

was fine to "continue with my sabbatical leave" and that "the 

purpose of the sabbatical leave was for a teacher to recharge 

his or her batteries." Mr. Kinna testified that he did not 

make the above statements and that he was not informed by Mr. 

Stansberry that he had not been accepted to the graduate 

program. Mr. Kinna stated they had talked about sabbatical 

leave fringe benefits and salary. 

In August 1982, Mr. Stansberry wrote Mr. Kinna and 

stated: " . . . I didn't attend the university this summer; 

therefore, I won't be advancing an additional step on the pay 

scale." The purpose of this letter was to confirm the School 

District's records on Mr. Stansberry's current level of 

teacher education. The letter would not have placed the 

School District on notice that Mr. Stansberry would not be 

attending graduate school because the letter was only to 

inform the District which salary level to use in computing 

Mr. Stansberry's salary during his sabbatical year. Had Mr. 

Stansberry completed the summer school course he would have 

been entitled to a small pay increase. 

In February 1983, Mr. Kinna wrote Mr. Stansberry and 

requested documentation that he had pursued the intent of his 

sabbatical leave. On March 11, 1983, Mr. Stansberry wrote to 

Mr. Kinna and stated: 
I have instructed the Registrar at the University of Montana to send you a transcript of my work 

last quarter. Originally I moved to Helena to 

attend several classes at Carroll College, but my 

pocketbook couldn't afford $98 per credit, so I 

have been working at a variety of jobs. However, I 

do plan to take several more classes before returning to Wolf Point. As I remember a person on a 

sabbatical leave can do three things: 1) return to 

school; 2) travel; and 3) work at a job related to 

his teaching field. 

Well, I have returned to school. Also I've 

traveled: Mexico, Texas, Colorado, Utah and Western Montana. Currently I'm working as a tutor in 

English, Social Studies and Math. I also work at 

outside sales and public relations. 

I hope this outline of my leave is 

satisfactory. 

The previous quarters' work Mr. Stansberry referred to was a 

six-credit, graduate non-degree course which could not be 

applied to his MA or MFA. The School Trustees, the County 

Superintendent, and the State Superintendent all maintain 

that this was the first indication they had that Mr. 

Stansberry had not attended graduate school during his leave. 

In a letter dated March 15, 1983, Mr. Kinna informed Mr. 

Stansberry that: 

At a regular March 14, 1983, School Board meeting, 

the Trustees voted unanimously to terminate your 

teaching services for the 1983-84 school year. 

After reviewing the reason for granting your sabbatical leave and comparing it to your letter of 

March 11, 1983, no other decision could be reached. 

In a follow up letter regarding the reasons for the termination of his teaching services, Mr. Kinna stated that " [t] he 

stated reason for the sabbatical leave was in no way honored 

by Mr. Stansberry." 
Mr. Stansberry appealed the School Trustees' decision to 

the County Superintendent of Schools, who affirmed the School 

Board. He then appealed to the State Superintendent of 

Public Instruction, who also affirmed the School Trustees. 

He then appealed the matter to the District Court which first 

remanded for additional fact gathering and then reversed the 

School Trustees, the County Superintendent, and the State 

Superintendent, and directed them to offer Mr. Stansberry a 

contract as a tenured teacher. The School Trustees appealed 

that decision to this Court. Mr. Stansberry cross-appealed 

requesting back pay and fringe benefits which the District 

Court did not award him. 

I 

Did the District Court err in reversing the decisions of 

the School Trustees, the County Superintendent, and the State 

Superintendent and directing that Mr. Stansberry be offered a 

contract? 

A recent Montana case provides us with precedent which 

gives us guidance on this issue. In Yanzick v. School District No. 23, Lake County Montana (1982), 196 Mont. 375, 641 

P.2d 431, a tenured school teacher's contract was not renewed 

because he had allegedly demonstrated a lack of fitness by: 

(1) cohabitating with a female teacher; (2) using human 

fetuses in the classroom when discussing abortion; and (3) 

making statements to his classroom regarding his living 

arrangements with the teacher and the subject of abortion. 

The opinion pointed out that the record must show good cause 

for the termination of a teacher's tenure and that in addition the conduct of the teacher, including a characterization 

that it is immoral, must be such as to directly affect the 

performance by the teacher of his duties as a teacher. 

The Yanzick court's reversal of the District Court 

upheld the nonrenewal of the teacher's contract. The Court 
held that the District Court and the Supreme Court may reverse the previous decision only if substantial rights of the 

teacher were prejudiced because the administrative findings 

and conclusions were: 

. . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, 

probative and substantive evidence on the whole 

record. 

Yanzick, 644 P.2d at 439 (citing SS 2-4-704 and 711, MCA.) 

In comparing the powers of the school district to terminate a teacher and the rights of a tenured teacher, the 

Yanzick court stated: 

While it is true that the trustees of a school 

district do have the power and duty to both employ 

a teacher and terminate a teacher under the appropriate circumstances, the rights of the teachers 

must also be kept constantly in mind. The tenure 

- of a teacher is clearly both a valuable and a 

substantial right which cannot be-taken away excepF 

for good cause. (Emphasis added.) 

Yanzick, 644 P.2d at 440. Therefore, the question before the 

County Superintendent, the State Superintendent, and the 

District Court was whether the school trustees had "good 

cause" not to renew Mr. Stansberry's contract keeping in mind 

that Mr. Stansberry's tenure was a substantial and valuable 

right which could only be taken away for good cause. 

The District Court found that "the administrative findings and conclusions of both the County Superintendent and of 

the State Superintendent 'were clearly erroneous in view of 

the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the 

whole record. ' " Thus, there are two questions that this 

Court must answer in addressing this issue. First, did the 

District Court err in finding that the County Superintendent's findings were clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole 
record? Second, did the District Court err in reversing the 

decisions of the County Superintendent and the State Superintendent based on an error of law? 

It is well established that the District Court may not 

substitute its judgment for that of the County Superintendent 

as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. 

Yanzick, 644 P.2d at 438. In this case the District Court 

remanded to the County Superintendent for additional findings 

of fact on two questions -- whether the May 18, 1982, meeting 

between Mr. Stansberry and Mr. Kinna put the School District 

on notice that Mr. Stansberry had not been accepted to graduate school and whether the August 18, 1982, letter placed the 

School District on notice that Mr. Stansberry was not planning to attend graduate school. After remand to the County 

Superintendent, both of these issues were specifically found 

in favor of the School District. These determinations were 

then apparently reversed by the District Court. 

The primary factual controversy in this case concerns 

what was said during the May 18th meeting between Mr. 

Stansberry and Mr. Kinna. The County Superintendent found 

that Mr. Stansberry had failed to inform Mr. Kinna at the May 

18th meeting that he had not been accepted to graduate 

school. In making that determination, the County Superintendent had the opportunity to listen to and observe the demeanor, conduct, and testimony of the witnesses. Testimony was 

given on both sides of the controversy and the County Superintendent found for the School District. We conclude that 

the District Court erred in substituting its judgment for 

that of the County Superintendent. As was stated in another 

administrative case: 

If there is substantial credible evidence on the 

record, the findings are not "clearly erroneous." . . . If the record contains support for the factual 
determinations made by the agency, the courts may 

not weigh the evidence. They are bound by the 

findings of the agency. 

City of Billings v. Billings Firefighters (1982), 200 Mont. 

421, 431, 651 P.2d 627, 632. 

Substantial credible evidence supports the factual 

determinations made by the County Superintendent. Therefore, 

the District Court was bound by the County Superintendent's 

findings. We conclude that the findings of the County Superintendent and State Superintendent were not clearly erroneous 

in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence 

and therefore reverse the District Court in its conclusion 

that such administrative findings were clearly erroneous. 

The County Superintendent found that the August 18, 

1982, letter from Mr. Stansberry to Mr. Kinna did not place 

the School District on notice that Mr. Stansberry was not 

planning to attend graduate school. The District Court did 

not specifically reverse this holding, but indicated the 

letter may have been notice to the School District that Mr. 

Stansberry was not planning on attending graduate school. 

Once again, we affirm the County Superintendent's decision 

that the letter was not such notice. Substantial credible 

evidence in the record supports that determination. 

The second question is whether the District Court erred 

in reversing the decisions of the County Superintendent and 

the State Superintendent based on an error of law. Section 

2-4-704(2), MCA, provides in pertinent part: 

The Court may reverse or modify the decision if 

substantial rights of the appellant have been 

prejudiced because the administrative findings, 

inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 

(d) affected by other error of law. 
The District Court concluded that the County and State 

Superintendents erroneously referred to S 20-4-207, MCA, 

instead of the proper statute, S 20-4-204, MCA, and that Mr. 

Stansberry's conduct did not constitute "good cause" for 

termination of his job. The District Court was correct in 

concluding that the County and State Superintendents erroneously referred to S 20-4-207, MCA. Section 20-4-207, MCA, 

only applies to the dismissal of a teacher before the expiration of his or her contract. That statute is inapplicable to 

Mr. Stansberry's case because his contract was simply not 

renewed, as opposed to a dismissal during the contract term. 

Yanzick held: 

We hold that section 20-4-207, MCA, which sets 

forth the grounds upon whch the trustees may dismiss a teacher before the expiration of his employment contracat is not applicable to the termination 

of the services of a tenure teacher under the 

provisions of Section 20-4-203 and 20-4-204, MCA. 

Yanzick, 641 P.2d at 441. 

In his first order, the County Superintendent concluded: 

5. Petitioner was properly given reasons for 

his termination and was granted a hearing pursuant 

to section 20-4-204, MCA. 

6. Good cause existed for the termination of 

Petitioner and the Wolf Point Board of Trustees 

acted properly within their discretion. 

ORDER 

On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact 

and Conclusion of Law the Hearing Officer finds 

that good cause existed for the termination of 

Petitioner. 

The State Superintendent's first order stated that " [t] here 

was good and just cause for his termination." Up to this 

point, the County and State Superintendents correctly applied 
the law. However, the State and County Superintendents then 

confused the issue and erred by referring to $ 20-4-207, MCA, 

the violation of "adopted policies", and Mr. Stansberry's 

purported dismissal before the expiration of his employment 

contract. For instance, the State Superintendent stated in 

his second order: 

14. That Petitioner did violate Wolf Point 

School Board's policy on sabbatical leave when he 

did not pursue his sabbatical as outlined in his 

letter of October 18, 1981 and when he did not 

notify the school board of his change in plans and 

goals for his sabbatical leave. 

15. That Petitioner was properly dismissed 

before expiration of his employment contract for 

violation of the adopted policies of the school 

board. 

18. There is sufficient evidence in the record 

to support a finding that there was a violation of 

adopted board policy and that such violation is 

cause for dismissal under contract pursuant to 

Section 20-4-207, MCA, and within the prerogatives 

of the Board of Trustees of Roosevelt County High 

School District No. 45A. 

Although these references were made in error, we conclude this does not constitute reversible error. Mr. 

Stansberry's substantial rights were not prejudiced as a 

result of the erroneous references. Mr. Stansberry was put 

on notice of the reasons for nonrenewal from the day he was 

informed his contract was not being renewed. The procedure 

followed by both the Board of Trustees and the County Superintendent followed the provision of $ 20-4-204, MCA. In 

addition, in the original orders, both the County Superintendent and the State Superintendent correctly referred to 

5 20-4-204, MCA, and the good cause standard. We conclude 
that the erroneous reference to 5 20-4-207, MCA, in the 

subsequent orders did not prejudice Mr. Stansberry and does 

not constitute reversible error. 

We will next turn to the "good cause" standard and its 

application to Mr. Stansberry's contract nonrenewal. In 

Yanzick, the good cause standard was premised on whether the 

teacher's conduct directly affected his duties as a teacher. 

Yanzick, 641 P.2d at 441. No contention is made in the 

present case that the conduct of Mr. Stansberry directly 

affected his duties as a teacher. The question is of course 

not related to his conduct in the classroom as was true in 

Yanzick. Nonetheless, based on Yanzick we conclude that good 

cause must be shown in order to terminate Mr. Stansberry's 

contract because he was a tenured teacher. 

We conclude that the breach of an agreement between a 

teacher and the School Trustees may constitute good cause for 

nonrenewal of the teacher's contract. The statutes do not 

give any specific guidance on what constitutes good cause 

under these circumstances. Each case therefore must be 

considered on its own facts to determine whether or not good 

cause has been established. 

We conclude that the findings of fact establish an 

agreement between Mr. Stansberry and the School Trustees 

under which Mr. Stansberry would study toward an MA or MFA 

and improve his teaching qualifications in return for the 

sabbatical leave. Under the Professional Policies Agreement 

Mr. Stansberry was to be awarded 50 percent of his annual 

base salary which was to be paid upon completion of the 

granted sabbatical leave and upon beginning to teach in the 

system in the school year following his absence. The findings of fact establish there was no modification of that 

agreement. 
The Professional Policies Agreement establishes that a 

sabbatical leave may be granted by the School Trustees upon 

application approval by the Teachers' Association and the 

school system to "engage in full time study, travel, research, work experience or other professionally advantageous 

activity.'l Here Mr. Stansberry was found to have applied by 

a letter in which he stated that if accepted he intended to 

pursue either an MA or an MFA in English, concentrating in 

creative writing. The correct application procedure was 

followed in this case. 

Clearly an agreement under which Mr. Stansberry, an 

English teacher, would gain credits towards an MA or an MFA 

would be a professionally advantageous activity so far as the 

School Trustees are concerned. Clearly a significant or 

substantial benefit would result from compliance with the 

agreement. The failure of Mr. Stansberry to comply with that 

agreement therefore eliminated a substantial benefit to the 

School Trustees. Based upon the wording of the Professional 

Policies Agreement, we may properly conclude the benefit to 

the School Trustees was the primary reason for the approval 

of the sabbatical leave. In doing so, we note that this is 

the first teacher in the Wolf Point system to have been 

granted such a sabbatical leave. The breach of the agreement 

by Mr. Stansberry deprived the school district of an essential part of the bargain which it had made in the agreement. 

We conclude that the breach of an agreement which resulted in 

such a deprivation of benefit to the school district constituted good cause for nonrenewal of his contract. 

We agree with the findings of fact and conclusions of 

law made by the County Superintendent in his original order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 

3. Petitioner applied for Sabbatical Leave on 

October 18, 1981 to "pursue either a MA or MFA 

degree in English, concentrating in Creative Writing". Source: Joint Exhibit 1. 

4. The school board voted to grant Petitioner's leave based on the representation that he 

would pursue a graduate degree. Source: Bartel 

testimony; Respondent's Exhibit 3. 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

2. Petitioner violated his agreement with the 

School Board when he failed to pursue the full 

course of study that was the basis for his leave. 

3. Petitioner violated Wolf Point School Board 

Policy when he failed to pursue the full course of 

study that was the basis for his leave. 

4. By failing to attend graduate school and 

pursue either a MA or MFA in English Petitioner 

violated his professional responsibilities as a 

teacher. 

5. Petitioner was properly given reasons for 

his termination and was granted a hearing pursuant 

to section 20-4-204, MCA. 

6. Good cause existed for the termination of 

Petitioner and the Wolf Point Board of Trustees 

acted properly within their discretion. 

Based upon these facts, we affirm the conclusion reached 

by the County Superintendent that good cause existed for 

refusal to renew Mr. Stansberry's contract. Accordingly, we 

reverse the District Court. 

Did the District Court err by not directing the School 

Board to pay Mr. Stansberry back pay and retroactive fringe 

benefits? 
We need not address this issue since we have reversed 

the District Court in effect reinstating the County Superintendent's decision that Mr. Stansberry should not be offered 

a contract as a tenured teacher. 

We reverse the District Court, and affirm the decision 

of the State Superintendent that Mr. Stansberry's nonrenewal 

We Concur: ../ 

Justices 
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting: 

I dissent from the wrongful refusal to renew the 

teaching contract of this tenure teacher. 

Under our statutes teachers are accorded a good many 

powers and responsibilities, and some substantial rights. 

Foremost among the rights, and perhaps the most cherished, is 

the right of tenure. First granted, as far as my research 

goes, in 1913 (Section 801, Chapter 76, Laws of 1913), for 

nearly 75 years it is a right that has been continuously 

reenacted, fiercely guarded by the teachers, and protected by 

this Court: 

A teacher's tenure is a substantial, valuable and 

beneficial right which cannot be taken away except 

for good cause. State ex rel. Saxtorph v. District 

Court (1954), 128 Mont. 352, 275 P.2d 209. 

Though the original enactment provided tenure to a 

teacher upon the second annual teaching contract, S 20-4-203, 

MCA, its effect at the time that the matters related to this 

action took place was that whenever a teacher "has been 

elected by the offer and acceptance of a contract for the 

fourth consecutive year of employment by a district" the 

teacher became a "tenure teacher" (not "tenured teacher"; 

legislators and perhaps educators feel no compunction in 

using a noun for an adjective.) 

Under the statutes prevailing and applicable here, S 

20-4-204, MCA, provided that if the trustees of a school 

district resolved not to reelect a teacher for a coming 

teaching year, the district had to notify the teacher of the 

termination in writing before April 1 of the last contract 

year. The statute did not state reasons upon which such lack 

of reelection might be based. However this Court inserted 

the requirement of "good cause" in Saxtorph, supra and we 
reaffirmed that position in Yanzick v. School District No. 

23, Lake County, Montana (1982), 196 Mont. 375, 641 ~.2d 431. 

The majority have cited Yanzick at several points, but 

they have neglected a critical part of that decision in 

Yanzick, where we said: 

In view of our reversal of the District Court, it 

is necessary that we review the record in some 

detail. We have already indicated that the record 

must show good cause for the termination of the 

teacher's tenure. In addition, the conduct -- of the 

teacher, including a characterization that -- it is 

immoral, must ----- be such as to directly affect the 

erformance by the teacher -- of his duties - of - a 

feacher. (Emphasis supplied.) 

196 Mont. 392; 641 P.2d 441. 

Nothing in the record before us, the same record that 

was before the County Superintendent, the State 

Superintendent, and the District Court, indicates that the 

ability of Stansberry to teach was affected in the slightest 

degree by the brouhaha arising out of the sabbatical leave. 

District Judge Henry Loble determined that we had set out in 

Yanzick a true test for the non-reelection of a tenure 

teacher for cause, and ruled accordingly. 

More than that, District Judge Loble made a fact finding 

in this case which is clearly correct, and as such is binding 

on us. (Rule 52 (a), M.R.Civ.P.) The District Court sat in 

review of proceedings before the County Superintendent and 

then the State Superintendent of Education. As such he was 

bound by the standards of review in § 2-4-704. He obviously 

determined that he should reverse the decision of the State 

Superintendent and of the County Superintendent because their 

administrative findings and conclusions were clearly 

erroneous in view of the reliable, probative substantial 

evidence on the whole record, and arbitrary and capricious. 
The District Court determined that the County 

Superintendent and the State Superintendent had proceeded in 

terminating Stansberry as a tenure teacher under the wrong 

statute. They had utilized the provisions of S 20-4-207, 

MCA, which applies only to the termination of a tenure 

teacher during - the contract year, and not the statute 

applying to the reelection of a teacher for the coming year. 

Incorrectly relying on 20-4-207, the administrators had 

determined that Stansberry's contract should not be renewed 

for "violation of the adopted policies" of the school 

district. There was no such adopted policy. 

Another factual dispute involved whether Stansberry had 

informed Superintendent Kinna on May 18, 1982 that his 

application for graduate study at the University of Montana 

had been rejected. Stansberry wanted to know from Kinna if 

he was to "stick around for the following year or just what I 

should do." Stansberry said that Kinna's response was "fine, 

to continue with his sabbatical leave and that the purpose of 

a sabbatical leave was for a teacher to recharge his or her 

batteries." In examining the record, the District Court 

found that the Superintendent was uncertain as to what was 

said at the May 18 meeting, that the Superintendent could not 

recall making the statements attributed to him by the 

petitioner and that Kinna did not deny that he had made the 

statements, although if he had he probably would recall it. 

The District Court felt that this point was important to 

be resolved by a more specific finding and remanded the cause 

to the County Superintendent for a further determination as 

to what was actually said at the meeting of May 18. The 

County Superintendent convened another hearing on this point 

and then, two years later, Superintendent Kinna's memory 

became crystal clear. He denied the statements. 
On August 18, 1982, Stansberry wrote superintendent 

Kinna to give him his current address in Missoula and to 

advise him "I didn't attend the University this summer; 

therefore I won't be advancing an additional step on the pay 

scale." Stansberry also said, "It has been a good summer. 

Besides attending my 20th year high school reunion, I 

recently returned from a trip to Mexico." 

Kinna and the school district and now this Court 

determined that this letter did not sufficiently advise them 

that Stansberry was not pursuing a Master's or other degree 

on his sabbatical. It is difficult to see what other 

conclusions could be drawn from the letter. 

The findings of the District Court should be agreed to 

by this Court. On the whole record, the District Court was 

correct: 

Stansberry, apparently believing he had the 

permission of Superintendent Kinna after he had 

been advised that he wasn't accepted to graduate 

school, went ahead with his sabbatical leave and 

did accomplish some of the requirements of 

sabbatical leave as set forth in the Professional 

Policies Agreement of the Board and the Union which 

represents the teachers. He engaged in study as a 

student at the University of Montana; he read some 

worthwhile books; he traveled; he worked; he took a 

six-credit course at the University of Montana; and 

he engaged in other professionally advantageous 

activity, such as being a tutor to junior high 

school students. The conduct for which he was 

terminated did not rise to the seriousness of "good 

cause" which must be shown before he could be 

refused employment as a tenured teacher. It should 

be kept in mind that he has not only lost his job, 

but that his professional career is placed in 

serious jeopardy. 

In determining that the County Superintendent and the 

State Superintendent were clearly erroneous in view of the 

whole record, the District Court found: 
. . . The County Superintendent and the State 

Superintendent proceeded under the wrong statute 

after remand. Both before and after remand they 

made a finding concerning a violation of "adopted 

policies" which was properly considered only under 

a statute that has no relation to the present 

proceeding. The conduct of Petitioner Stansberry 

did not rise to the level of "good cause" for which 

the School Board might lawfully terminate his 

status as a tenured teacher. The School Board in 

this instance had never granted a sabbatical leave 

before. Except as might be stated in the 

Professional Policies Agreement, there was no 

"adopted policy" of the Trustees as concerns 

sabbatical leave.. . . 

Thus we have in this case a situation where the County 

Superintendent and the State Superintendent found that 

Stansberry had breached the adopted policies of the board, 

policies which did not exist. The majority here have 

resorted to a different ground, a "breach of an agreement 

between the teacher and a school trustee" where no such 

agreement existed. The only agreement existing between this 

teacher and the school district is that formed by his union, 

agreed to by the District, which provides that in sabbatical 

leave, a teacher may return to school, travel, or work at a 

job relating to his teaching field. 

The principle of tenure for teachers deserves a higher 

interpretation of good cause than is advanced here. I would 

affirm the District Court. Because of the majority opinion I 

do not discuss the cross-appeal of the teacher. 

I concur in the foregoing dissent: b'