2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-27-2009

USA v. Hudgins

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 07-4568

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Hudgins" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 947.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

Nos. 07-4568 and 08-1379

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

WILLIAM HUDGINS,

 Appellant

 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal No. 06-cr-00490-001)

District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson

 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 13, 2009

Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: July 27, 2009)

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

William Hudgins was convicted of three counts of a six-count indictment for two

separate armed robberies of the same business six weeks apart. The District Court

originally sentenced him to 444 months’ imprisonment, but later revised the sentence to a
Count One charges Hudgins with interference in interstate commerce by robbery 1

(18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) and Count Two with using and carrying a firearm during a crime of

violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)). 

Counts Three through Six, respectively, charge Hudgins and Fields with 2

conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)),

interference with interstate commerce by robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)), using and

carrying a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)), and

2

within-Guidelines 384 months after the Probation Office notified the court it had erred in

its Sentencing Guidelines range computation. Hudgins raises two issues on appeal: (1)

whether the District Court properly denied his motion to sever Counts One and Two of

the indictment from Counts Three through Six; and (2) whether the District Court

imposed a reasonable sentence in light of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

We conclude that the District Court properly denied Hudgins’s motion to sever and that it

imposed a reasonable sentence. 

The grand jury’s indictment alleged six counts against Hudgins. Counts One and

Two stem from Hudgins’s alleged armed robbery of JM Films, 3621 North Broad Street,

Philadelphia, in May, 2006. The government alleges that on May, 18, 2006, Hudgins, 1

acting alone, gained entrance to JM Films by telling the store’s clerk he was an

acquaintance of co-defendant Leroy Fields. Once inside the store, Hudgins produced a

handgun and ordered the clerk to give him the store’s money. Hudgins stole

approximately $1,508 from the store, along with the clerk’s cell phone. 

Counts Three through Six of the indictment stem from Hudgins’s and Fields’s

alleged armed robbery of the same store in July, 2006. The government alleges that 2
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)).

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Hudgins, this time with Fields and a third individual not apprehended, entered JM Films

with a gun, beat the clerk with the gun, and bound the clerk’s hands. Officers arrived on

the scene to find Hudgins and Fields rummaging through the store, arrested them both,

and recovered the gun. 

Before trial, Hudgins filed a motion to sever the counts related to the two

robberies. The District Court denied the motion, finding substantial similarity and

connection between the May and July robberies, in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a),

and no reasons why prejudice would result from joinder under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. Fields

pled guilty to all Counts against him and testified against Hudgins at his trial. The jury

acquitted Hudgins of Counts One, Two and Six (the counts associated with the May

robbery and the firearms possession count) and convicted him of Counts Three, Four and

Five (the counts associated with the July robbery). 

At Hudgins’s original sentencing hearing, he raised several objections with the

court including ineffectiveness of counsel. The government argued for a withinGuidelines sentence, noting Hudgins’s prior history of preying on elderly victims, his

multiple parole violations, and his repeated terms in state prison. The court then imposed

a sentence of 444 months, at the bottom of the Guidelines range. 

Before the District Court signed the judgment and commitment order, however, the
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Probation Office advised the court it had erred in its Guidelines range computation; the

revised range was 360 months to life. Hudgins was granted a re-sentencing hearing,

where the court heard from Hudgins, his family members, and his counsel. Hudgins’s

counsel asked for a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines. The court then imposed a

within-Guidelines sentence of 384 months. 

DISCUSSION

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This court has

appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We review the

joinder of offenses under Rule 8(a) de novo. United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 287

(3d Cir. 2003). We review the District Court’s denial of a motion for severance for an

abuse of discretion. United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 369 (3d Cir. 2001). We review

the court’s sentence for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v.

United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007). 

I. Severance

Hudgins first argues that joinder of the May and July robberies was improper

because the permissible joinder grounds under Rule 8(a) were not present. The

government argues that they were, noting that the two robberies were of similar character

and that they were part of a common plan. Rule 8(a) states that: 

The indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate counts

with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged--whether felonies or

misdemeanors or both--are of the same or similar character, or are based on

the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a
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common scheme or plan.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). The offenses need not be identical to be joined; it is sufficient if

“each was committed in pursuit of the common scheme charged.” United States v. Scott,

326 F. Supp. 272, 276 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aff’d, 460 F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1972). Joinder is

desirable at the trial level because it “promote[s] economy of judicial and prosecutorial

resources.” United States v. Gorecki, 813 F.2d 40, 42 (3d Cir. 1987). 

We conclude that the offenses were substantially similar, a common plan existed

between them and, therefore, that they were properly joined. All counts related to

robberies of the same business, by the same defendant, even of the same clerk, merely six

weeks apart. Hudgins targeted the same establishment and used a handgun in both

robberies. Indeed, the only substantial difference in the second robbery was Fields’s

presence. Moreover, further proof of a common plan is evidenced by Hudgins’s use of

Fields’s name to gain entrance to the store during the first robbery. This information was

not contained in the indictment, but, in Rule 8 motions, courts may look beyond the

indictment for information that clarifies factual connections between the counts. United

States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 242 (3d Cir. 1992). 

Alternatively, Hudgins argues that joining the offenses was an abuse of discretion

by the District Court because joinder prejudiced him. Rule 14(a) states that “if the joinder

of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial

appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of
6

counts, sever the defendants' trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires. Fed.

R. Crim. P. 14(a). For joinder to be proper, a jury must reasonably be expected to

compartmentalize the evidence from the separate offenses. United States v. Reicherter,

647 F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir. 1981). Defendants bear a “heavy burden” in showing

prejudice from joinder. United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 655 (3d Cir. 1993). They

must demonstrate that joinder will result in a “manifestly unfair trial, beyond a mere

showing that he would have had a better chance of acquittal with separate trials.” United

States v. Sanes, 57 F.3d 338, 341-342 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). 

Hudgins takes issue with joining the offenses because he wished to testify about

the second robbery but not the first. In his brief, he alludes to prejudice resulting from

joinder on these grounds. Ultimately, though, Hudgins’s own acquittal rebuts this. The

District Court instructed the jury to consider each count separately and the jury returned a

verdict that acquitted Hudgins of all counts for the first robbery, while convicting him of

three of the four counts from the second robbery. This verdict demonstrates that the jury

compartmentalized the evidence and separated the offenses. If Hudgins’s testimony

concerning the second robbery had tainted the jury’s treatment of the first robbery, they

would not have acquitted him of it. Concluding that there was prejudice, as Hudgins’s

brief does, ignores this reality. 

Even had there been two trials, evidence from the first robbery could have been

admitted in the second robbery trial as proof of plan and knowledge under Fed. R. Evid.
7

404(b). We have upheld denial of severance in more complex cases. See e.g., United

States v. Thomas, 610 F.2d 1166, 1170 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding severance unnecessary in

a case involving 31 separate bank fraud charges); United States v. Catena, 500 F.2d 1319,

1325-26 (3d Cir. 1974) (finding no abuse of discretion in refusing to sever over 100

counts of medicare fraud). By contrast, this case is relatively simple: two defendants, two

crimes, six counts. The District Court exercised its discretion to join the offenses

properly and no “manifestly unfair” trial resulted. 

II. Sentencing 

Review of a district court’s sentence must first ensure the court committed no

significant procedural error and then consider the sentence’s reasonableness. Gall v.

United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007). Hudgins argues his sentence was procedurally

deficient because the District Court did not properly consider the § 3553(a) factors and

that the court treated the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory. The government argues

that the court did consider the factors, albeit briefly, and, even so, a detailed consideration

was not necessary as the court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence. The government

does not address Hudgins’s argument that the court treated the Guidelines as mandatory,

but our review shows no such treatment. Therefore, we hold that the court adequately

considered the § 3553(a) factors. 

Each § 3553(a) factor need not be explicitly addressed if the record demonstrates

that the court took the factors into account, nor must a court consider arguments lacking
8

merit. United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007). Moreover,

“circumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the

[Sentencing] Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is . . . 

proper . . . .” Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007). At Hudgins’s resentencing, after explicitly mentioning he would consider the 3553(a) factors, the District

Court then referenced the violent nature of Hudgins’s crimes, his extensive criminal

history, including multiple robberies of elderly victims, and the need to imprison him for

a lengthy period of time to protect the public and rehabilitate him “for correctional

reasons.” (App. 65-66). The court then considered the recommended Guidelines range of

360 months to life for Hudgins and imposed a sentence within that range. The court’s

sentence, and our review of the record, indicate a sufficient consideration of the § 3553(a)

factors. 

Moreover, contrary to Hudgins’s position, the District Court did not treat the

Guidelines as mandatory. In fact, the court went out of its way on the record to clarify the

issue with the government’s attorney, who stated correctly that “the guidelines are a

starting point . . . [a]nd from there, the 3553 factors do have to be considered.” (App. 43.) 

The court then imposed its sentence by weighing both the Guidelines and the 3553(a)

factors, thus committing no procedural error. 

The sentence was substantively reasonable, too. A district court is awarded broad

sentencing discretion because of their superior access to the facts of each case. Gall, 128
9

S. Ct. at 597. A within-Guidelines sentence is more likely to be a reasonable one. United

States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 2006). Additionally, appellate courts

generally respect the Guidelines, as they “reflect a rough approximation of sentences that

might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.” Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468. There exist no

persuasive reasons here not to accord the District Court this discretion. 

Hudgins’s brief fails to rebut both the court’s consideration of the § 3553(a)

factors and its reasonable imposition of a within-Guidelines sentence. The fact that

Hudgins “only” stole purses and chains does nothing to lessen the fact that he stole them

from weak and elderly victims and those unlikely to report crimes, not to mention the fact

that Hudgins committed the present robberies using a handgun, and beat and bound a

store clerk. In sum, Hudgins, as his counsel acknowledges, is a career offender. Our

review of the record indicates that the District Court addressed Hudgins’s arguments at

sentencing, adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors, and imposed a reasonable,

within-Guidelines sentence. 

For the reasons set forth above, we will AFFIRM the Order of the District Court.