COAST GUARD

Observations on Arctic 

Requirements, Icebreakers, 

and Coordination with 

Stakeholders 

Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director

Homeland Security and Justice

Testimony Before the

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 

Maritime Transportation, Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, 

House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 11:00 a.m. EST

Thursday, December 1, 2011

GAO-12-254T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-254T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 

Maritime Transportation, Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, House of 

Representatives 

December 1, 2011 

COAST GUARD

Observations on Arctic Requirements, Icebreakers, 

and Coordination with Stakeholders

Why GAO Did This Study

The gradual retreat of polar sea ice, 

combined with an expected increase in 

human activity––shipping traffic, oil 

and gas exploration, and tourism in the 

Arctic region––has increased the 

strategic interest that the United States 

and other nations have in the Arctic. 

As a result, the U.S. Coast Guard, 

within the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), has responsibilities in 

the Arctic, which are expected to 

increase. This testimony provides an 

update of: (1) the extent to which the 

Coast Guard has taken actions to 

identify requirements for future Arctic 

operations; (2) issues related to the 

U.S. icebreaking fleet; and (3) the 

extent to which the Coast Guard is 

coordinating with stakeholders on 

Arctic issues.

This statement is based on 

GAO-10-870, issued in September 

2010, and includes selected updates. 

For the selected updates, GAO 

analyzed Coast Guard, Department of 

Defense (DOD,) and other related 

documents on Arctic operations and 

capabilities. GAO also interviewed 

Coast Guard and DOD officials about 

efforts to identify Arctic requirements 

and coordinate with stakeholders. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making new 

recommendations in this statement.

GAO previously recommended that the 

Coast Guard communicate with key 

stakeholders on the process and 

progress of its Arctic planning efforts. 

DHS concurred with this

recommendation and is in the process 

of taking corrective action.

What GAO Found

The Coast Guard has taken a variety of actions—from routine operations to a 

major analysis of mission needs in the polar regions—to identify its Arctic

requirements. The routine operations have helped the Coast Guard to collect 

useful information on the capability of its existing assets to operate in cold 

climates and strategies for overcoming logistical challenges presented by longdistance responses to incidents, among other things. Other operational actions 

intended to help identify Arctic requirements include the establishment of 

temporary, seasonal operating locations in the Arctic and seasonal biweekly 

Arctic overflights, which have helped the Coast Guard to identify performance 

requirements and test personnel and equipment capabilities in the Arctic. The 

Coast Guard’s primary analytical effort to identify Arctic requirements is the High 

Latitude Study, a multivolume analysis that is intended to, in part, identify the 

Coast Guard’s current Arctic capability gaps and assess the degree to which 

these gaps will impact future missions. This study also identifies potential 

solutions to these gaps and compares six different options—identified as Arctic 

force mixes—to a baseline representing the Coast Guard’s current Arctic assets. 

However, given current budget uncertainty and the Coast Guard’s recent 

acquisition priorities, it may be a significant challenge for the agency to acquire 

the assets that the High Latitude Study recommends.

The most significant issue facing the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet is the 

growing obsolescence of these vessels and the resulting capability gap caused 

by their increasingly limited operations. In 2010, Coast Guard officials reported 

challenges fulfilling the agency’s statutory icebreaking mission. Since then, at 

least three reports—by the DHS Inspector General and Coast Guard 

contractors—have further identified the Coast Guard’s challenges to meeting its 

current and future icebreaking mission requirements in the Arctic with its existing 

polar icebreaker fleet. Prior GAO work and these reports also identify budgetary 

challenges the agency faces in acquiring new icebreakers. Given these issues 

and the current budgetary climate, it is unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able 

to fund the acquisition of new icebreakers through its own budget, or through 

alternative financing options. Thus, it is unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able 

to expand the U.S. icebreaker fleet to meet its statutory requirements, and it may 

be a significant challenge for it to just maintain its existing level of icebreaking 

capabilities due to its aging fleet. 

In 2010, GAO reported the Coast Guard coordinates with various stakeholders 

on Arctic operations and policy, including foreign, state, and local governments, 

Alaskan Native governments and interest groups, and the private sector. GAO 

also reported that the Coast Guard coordinates with federal agencies, such as 

the National Science Foundation, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, and DOD. More recently, the Coast Guard has partnered with 

DOD through the Capabilities Assessment Working Group—an interagency 

coordination group established in May 2011—to identify shared Arctic capability 

gaps as well as opportunities and approaches to overcome them, to include

making recommendations for near-term investments. The establishment of this

group helps to ensure collaboration between the Coast Guard and DOD 

addresses near-term capabilities in support of current planning and operations.

View GAO-12-254T. For more information, 

contact Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610, 

or caldwells@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-12-254T 

Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard’s efforts to 

identify Arctic requirements and to coordinate with stakeholders on Arctic 

issues and operations. The retreat of sea ice, combined with an expected 

increase in human activity—shipping traffic and oil and gas exploration—

has increased the strategic interest that the United States and other 

nations have in the Arctic region. For example, in 2011, northern shipping 

routes opened during the summer months, which permitted more than 40 

vessels to transit between June and October 2011. As a result of these 

and other anticipated changes in the Arctic, the Coast Guard is expected 

to face increasing responsibilities in the waters off of Alaska’s 44,000 

miles of coast. In addition, the United States has developed national-level 

policies that guide the actions of the Coast Guard and other stakeholders. 

These policies indicate that the United States has an enduring interest in 

working collaboratively with other nations to address the emerging 

challenges arising from the effects of climate change and globalization in 

the Arctic, and they identify Arctic national security needs including 

protecting the environment, managing resources, and supporting 

scientific research.1

Since the Arctic is primarily a maritime domain, the Coast Guard plays a 

significant role in Arctic policy implementation and enforcement. The 

Coast Guard is a multimission, maritime military service within the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that has responsibilities 

including maritime safety, security, environmental protection, and national 

defense, among other missions.2

 

1

National Security Presidential Directive 66 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, 

Arctic Region Policy (Jan. 9, 2009); National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: May 

2010).

As more navigable ocean water 

emerges in the Arctic and human activity increases, 9 of the Coast 

Guard’s 11 statutory missions will take on additional importance, including 

Defense Readiness, Ice Operations, and Marine Environmental 

Protection.

2

The Coast Guard’s 11 statutory mission areas include: Aids to Navigation; Defense 

Readiness; Drug Interdiction; Ice Operations; Living Marine Resources; Marine 

Environmental Protection; Marine Safety; Migrant Interdiction; Other Law Enforcement; 

Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; and Search and Rescue. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-254T 

The Coast Guard currently has limited capacity to operate in the waters 

immediately below the Arctic Circle, such as the Bering Sea. Increasing 

responsibilities in an even larger geographic area, especially in the harsh 

and remote conditions of the northern Arctic, will further stretch the 

agency’s capacity. See appendix I for a map of the Arctic boundary and 

the Arctic Circle line of latitude.3

Presently, all of the Coast Guard’s assets are based well below the Arctic 

Circle, so Coast Guard operations above the Arctic Circle are constrained 

by several factors, including long transit times for surface vessels and 

aircraft to cover vast distances to reach the Arctic Circle. When the Coast 

Guard is able to respond to an incident, its surface and air assets are also 

limited by fuel capacity and the distance to fuel sources. Figure 1 

compares the State of Alaska to the lower 48 states to illustrate the large 

distances between Coast Guard assets and Point Barrow (the 

northernmost point of land in Alaska).

 

3

Arctic stakeholders do not define the Arctic geographical area the same way. The Arctic 

Research and Policy Act of 1984 for example, defines the Arctic as all U.S. and foreign 

territory north of the Arctic Circle, all U.S. territory north and west of the boundary formed 

by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers, and all contiguous seas, including the 

Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain. Pub. L. 

No. 98-373, 98 Stat. 1242, 1248 (1984). For the purposes of this statement, we are 

limiting our analysis to a more specific definition of the Arctic—the more remote region 

above the Arctic circle. 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-254T 

Figure 1: Coast Guard Facilities and Assets in the State of Alaska Superimposed on 

the Lower 48 States

My statement today discusses (1) the extent to which the Coast Guard 

has taken actions to identify and report on requirements for future Arctic 

operations; (2) issues related to the U.S. icebreaking fleet; and (3) the 

extent to which the Coast Guard is coordinating with stakeholders on 

Arctic issues.

This statement is based on our September 2010 report on the Coast 

Guard’s coordination with stakeholders on Arctic policy and efforts to 

identify Arctic requirements and capability gaps, along with selected 

updates we obtained in November 2011.4

 

4

GAO, Coast Guard: Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but More 

Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial, 

For our September 2010 report, 

we interviewed officials from the Coast Guard, other federal entities, and 

the International Maritime Organization, as well as state, local, and 

Alaska Native stakeholders. We also reviewed Coast Guard documents 

related to coordination with stakeholders on Arctic issues, efforts to plan 

GAO-10-870

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2010).
 

Page 4 GAO-12-254T 

for increased Arctic activity, and challenges and factors affecting the 

Coast Guard’s Arctic operations. More detailed information on the scope 

and methodology for our September 2010 report can be found in that 

report. For the selected updates, we analyzed Coast Guard, Department 

of Defense (DOD,) and other related documents on Arctic operations and 

capabilities. We interviewed Coast Guard and DOD officials about efforts 

to identify Arctic requirements and coordinate with stakeholders. We also 

reviewed how a recent effort aligns with key practices we have identified 

for enhancing and sustaining interagency coordination.5 For new 

information that was based on work not previously reported, we obtained 

Coast Guard views on our findings and incorporated technical comments 

where appropriate. We conducted the performance audit work that 

supports this statement in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards.

Scientific research and projections of the changes taking place in the 

Arctic vary, but there is a general consensus that Arctic sea ice is 

diminishing and some scientists have projected that the Arctic will be icediminished for periods of time in the summer by as soon as 2040.6

 

5

See GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, 

 As 

recently as September 2011, scientists at the U.S. National Snow and Ice 

Data Center reported that the annual Arctic minimum sea ice extent for 

2011 was the second lowest in the satellite record, and 938,000 square 

miles less than the 1979 to 2000 average annual minimum. These 

environmental changes in the Arctic are making maritime transit more 

feasible and are increasing the likelihood of human activity including 

tourism, oil and gas extraction, commercial shipping, and fishing in the 

GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

6

A Joint Coast Guard / U.S. Navy Statement on Arctic ice terminology supports usage of 

the term “ice diminished” rather than “ice free” because both agencies recognize that the 

region will continue to remain ice-covered during the wintertime through the end of this 

century and the current and projected decline in Arctic sea ice is highly variable from year 

to year. The term “ice-diminished” refers to sea ice concentrations of up to 15 percent ice 

in the area. 

Background

Diminishing Ice Opens 

Potential for Increased 

Human Activity in the 

Arctic
 

Page 5 GAO-12-254T 

region.7 Despite these changes, however, several enduring 

characteristics still provide challenges to surface navigation in the Arctic, 

including large amounts of winter ice and increased movement of ice from 

spring to fall. Increased movement of sea ice makes its location less 

predictable, which is likely to increase the risk for ships to become 

trapped or damaged by ice impacts.

As we reported in September 2010, the Coast Guard faces challenges to 

Arctic operations including limited maritime domain awareness, assets, 

and infrastructure.8 In a 2008 report to Congress, the Coast Guard stated 

that maritime domain awareness in the Arctic is critical to effective 

engagement in the Arctic as activity increases.9 However, several 

factors—including (1) inadequate Arctic Ocean and weather data, (2) lack 

of communication infrastructure, (3) limited intelligence information, and 

(4) lack of a physical presence in the Arctic—create challenges for the 

Coast Guard in achieving maritime domain awareness in the Arctic. The 

Coast Guard also faces limitations in assets and infrastructure in the 

Arctic. These include (1) an inadequate portfolio of small boats for Arctic 

operations, (2) the environmental impact of Arctic conditions on 

helicopters and airplanes, and (3) a lack of cutter resources for Arctic 

patrols.10

 

7

In August 2011, the Department of the Interior approved preliminary plans for one 

operator to drill for oil and gas in the Arctic pending receipt of the operator’s well 

containment plan and other requirements.

8

GAO-10-870. 

9

According to the Coast Guard, maritime domain awareness is an effort to achieve an 

understanding of anything in the maritime environment that can affect the security, safety, 

economy, or environment of the United States. The process of achieving maritime domain 

awareness includes: (1) collection of information, (2) fusion of information from different 

sources, (3) analysis through the evaluation and interpretation of information, and (4) 

dissemination of information to decision makers, with the goal of identifying risks and 

threats before they turn into catastrophic events. 

10See GAO-10-870 for a detailed discussion of these challenges to the Coast Guard’s 

Arctic operations.

Coast Guard Faces 

Challenges to Arctic 

Operations
 

Page 6 GAO-12-254T 

The Coast Guard has taken a variety of actions to identify its Arctic 

requirements. As we reported in September 2010, these encompass a 

range of efforts including both routine mission operations and other 

actions specifically intended to help identify Arctic requirements. Through 

routine mission operations, the Coast Guard has been able to collect 

useful information on the capability of its existing assets to operate in cold 

climates, strategies for overcoming logistical challenges presented by 

long-distance responses to incidents, and the resources needed to 

respond to an oil spill in a remote and cold location, among other things.11

We also reported that the Coast Guard had efforts underway specifically 

designed to inform its Arctic requirements, including the establishment of 

seasonal, temporary operating locations in the Arctic and biweekly Arctic 

overflights. The temporary operating locations were established during 

the summers of 2008 through 2010, and have helped the Coast Guard 

identify performance requirements and obstacles associated with the 

deployment of small boats, aircraft, and support staff above the Arctic 

Circle. The seasonal (March-November) biweekly Arctic overflights were 

initiated in October 2007 to increase the agency’s maritime domain 

awareness, test personnel and equipment capabilities in the Arctic, and 

inform the Coast Guard’s Arctic requirements, among other things.12 As 

we reported in September 2010,13

 

11For more details on these efforts, see 

these efforts addressed elements of 

three key practices for agencies to better define mission requirements 

GAO-10-870, app. V.

12For example, the Coast Guard has also partnered with the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to track methane and carbon dioxide emissions over 

Alaska during Arctic domain awareness flights.

13GAO-10-870. 

Coast Guard Is 

Identifying Arctic 

Requirements, but 

Funding Is Uncertain

Coast Guard’s Efforts to 

Identify Arctic 

Requirements
 

Page 7 GAO-12-254T 

and desired outcomes: (1) assessing the environment; (2) involving 

stakeholders; and (3) aligning activities, core processes, and resources.14

The Coast Guard’s primary analytical effort to identify and report on Arctic 

requirements, the High Latitude Study (the Study), identifies the Coast 

Guard’s responsibilities in the Polar regions, discusses the nature of the 

activities it must perform over the next 30 years, and concludes with a 

high-level summary of the Coast Guard’s material and nonmaterial needs 

to meet the requirements.15 Specifically, the Study identifies the Coast 

Guard’s current capability gaps in the Arctic and assesses the degree to 

which these gaps will impact future missions. Of the Coast Guard’s 11 

mission areas, 9 are expected to experience future demand in the Arctic 

region. The Study identifies several current capability gaps that affect the 

majority of these mission areas. Specifically, gaps in communications 

capabilities affect all 9 mission areas, while deficiencies in the information 

available about sea ice coverage in the Arctic affects 8 mission areas.16

Of the 9 mission areas that the Coast Guard will need to carry out in the 

Arctic, the Study identifies 7 mission areas expected to be significantly or 

moderately impacted by current capability gaps. In general, these missions 

all address the protection of important national interests in the Arctic or the 

safety of mariners and the environment. See appendix II for more detail 

The other major gaps that affect the majority of mission areas are related 

to the lack of polar icebreaking capacity, which will be discussed later in 

this statement.

 

14GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington D.C.: June 1996). For more information on 

how the Coast Guard’s efforts addressed the three key practices, see GAO-10-870. 

15ABS Consulting, High Latitude Study Mission Analysis Report, prepared for the United 

States Coast Guard, (July 2010). The Coast Guard provided this study to Congress in July 

2011. The High Latitude Study comprises three volumes: (1) Polar Icebreaking Needs (in 

both the Arctic and Antarctic regions); (2) Arctic Mission Area Needs; and (3) Antarctic 

Mission Area Needs. Volumes 1 and 2 are intended, in part, to provide decision-makers 

with options for meeting the Coast Guard’s mission requirements in the Arctic. According 

to Coast Guard officials, the High Latitude Study was not a part of the formal acquisitions 

process, and would instead be used to inform a more detailed future analysis that will 

serve as the first step in the icebreaker acquisition process.

16The National Ice Center provides information about sea ice coverage to the Coast 

Guard, but the High Latitude Study notes that the products that the National Ice Center 

provides are not well-suited for Coast Guard use. 

High Latitude Study 

Identifies Arctic 

Requirements
 

Page 8 GAO-12-254T 

about the degree of impact that current capability and capacity gaps are 

expected to have on future Coast Guard mission performance.

The Study then identifies potential solutions to specifically address gaps 

in communications and electronic navigation capabilities, recommending 

that the Coast Guard acquire more than 25 additional communication or 

navigation facilities for Arctic operations. In addition to these capabilities, 

the Study compares six different options—identified as Arctic force 

mixes—to a baseline representing the Coast Guard’s current Arctic 

assets. These force mixes add assets to the existing baseline force mix, 

and contain different combinations of cutters (including icebreakers), 

aircraft, and forward operating locations and are designed to mitigate the 

mission impacts caused by current capability gaps. See appendix III for a 

description of the assets included in each Arctic force mix.

The High Latitude Study also includes a risk analysis that compares the 

six Arctic force mixes in terms of the ability of each force mix to reduce 

the risk that is expected to exist in the future Arctic environment. Risk 

reduction is determined in part by (1) identifying a list of potential Arctic 

maritime incidents requiring Coast Guard support, such as maritime 

accidents resulting in multiple casualties or a major oil spill, or both; (2) 

quantifying the likelihood that these search and rescue and maritime 

environmental protection incidents could occur and the resulting impact 

should they occur; and (3) assessing the relative effectiveness, or risk 

reduction, of force packages the Coast Guard may employ to respond to 

those incidents.17 The intent of the analysis is to provide information on 

risk-reduction alternatives to inform the acquisition process. According to 

the Study, the baseline Arctic force mix reduces less than 1 percent of 

risk in the Arctic because this patrol capability cannot reasonably respond 

to northern area incidents, while the six other Arctic force mixes reduce 

between 25 and 92 percent of risk annually, though the amount of risk 

reduced varies by season. See appendix III for the amount of annual risk 

in the Arctic reduced by each force mix.

 

17The types of risk addressed by the analysis are those to public safety and property that 

are addressed by Coast Guard Search and Rescue and Marine Environmental Protection 

missions. Requirements under the Coast Guard’s Defense Readiness mission area were 

excluded from the risk analysis, because identifying and assessing potential defense 

incidents was beyond the scope of the study.
 

Page 9 GAO-12-254T 

As we reported in September 2010, administration budget projections 

indicated that DHS’s annual budget was expected to remain constant or 

decrease over the next 10 years. Moreover, senior Coast Guard officials, 

based in Alaska, reported that resources for Arctic operations had already 

been reduced and were inadequate to meet existing mission 

requirements in Alaska, let alone expanded Arctic operations. These 

officials also reported a more than 50 percent year-to-year reduction 

between 2005 and 2009 in the number of large cutters available for 

operations in their region. Officials also expressed concern that the 

replacement of the 12 older high-endurance cutters with 8 new cutters 

may exacerbate this challenge. Given the reductions that have already 

taken place, as well as the anticipated decrease in DHS’s annual budget, 

the long-term budget outlook for Coast Guard Arctic operations is 

uncertain. The challenge of addressing Arctic resource requirements in a 

flat or declining budget environment is further underscored by recent 

budget requests that have identified the Coast Guard’s top priority as the 

recapitalization of cutters, aircraft, communications, and infrastructure—

particularly with regard to its Deepwater program.18

This budget challenge is exacerbated when the costs of the High Latitude 

Study’s proposed resource requirements are taken into account. 

Specifically, the Study estimates that the cost of acquiring the assets 

associated with each of the six Arctic force mixes would range from $1.01 

billion to $6.08 billion, and their corresponding annual operating costs 

would range from $72.3 million to $411.3 million. See appendix III for the 

estimated acquisition cost of each Arctic force mix. Additionally, the 

estimated cost for the recommended communications and electronic 

navigation capabilities for Arctic operations is about $23.4 million. Given 

current budget uncertainty and the Coast Guard’s recent acquisition 

priorities, it may be a significant challenge for the Coast Guard to acquire 

the assets that the Study recommends.

Recent budget 

requests also have not included funding for Arctic priorities, aside from 

the annual operating costs associated with existing icebreakers.

 

18The Deepwater program is a long-term, multibillion-dollar acquisition program intended 

to replace or modernize the Coast Guard’s aging vessels, aircraft, and some 

communications systems.

Funding for Identified 

Arctic Requirements Is 

Challenging and Uncertain
 

Page 10 GAO-12-254T 

The most significant issue facing the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet is the 

growing obsolescence of these vessels and the resulting capability gap 

caused by their increasingly limited operations. As we noted in our 2010 

report, Coast Guard officials reported challenges fulfilling the agency’s 

statutory icebreaking mission, let alone its standing commitment to use 

the icebreakers to support the Navy as needed.19

• Polar Sea (inoperative since 2010): The Polar Sea is a heavy 

icebreaker

Since then, at least 

three reports have further identified the Coast Guard’s challenges to 

meeting its current and future icebreaking mission requirements in the 

Arctic with its existing polar icebreaker fleet, as well as the challenges it 

faces to acquire new icebreakers. The Coast Guard’s existing fleet 

includes three icebreakers that are capable of operating in the Arctic:

20 commissioned in 1978 with an expected 30-year 

lifespan. A major service life extension21

• Polar Star (inoperative since 2006): The Polar Star is a heavy 

icebreaker commissioned in 1976 with an expected 30-year lifespan. 

The Polar Star is currently undergoing a $62.8 million service life 

project, completed in 2006, 

was expected to extend the Polar Sea’s service life through 2014. 

However, in 2010, the Polar Sea experienced major engine problems 

and is now expected to be decommissioned in 2011. According to a 

Coast Guard budget official, this will allow its resources to be 

redirected toward the ongoing service life extension of the Polar Star. 

Fig. 2 below shows the Polar Sea in dry dock.

 

19The Coast Guard and the Navy have a long-standing memorandum of agreement 

regarding the use of the nation’s icebreakers—the Coast Guard operates the nation’s 

icebreakers and uses them, when needed, to support the Navy. The 1965 U.S. Navy-U.S. 

Treasury Memorandum of Agreement was executed to permit consolidation of the 

icebreaker fleet under one agency. That rationale was reinforced by a 1982 Roles and 

Missions Study which stated that polar icebreakers should be centrally managed by one 

agency and that the Coast Guard was the appropriate one due to the multimission nature 

of polar ice operations. This memorandum of agreement was updated in 2008. The 

signatories were DOD and DHS and the agreement included an update on responsibilities 

for coastal security. 

20Icebreakers receive different classifications from the International Maritime Organization 

based on their icebreaking capabilities. A heavy icebreaker is classified as a Polar Class 1 

vessel, and is capable of conducting year-round operations in the Arctic and Antarctic. A 

medium icebreaker is classified as a Polar Class 3 vessel, and is capable of operating in 

the Arctic region in the spring, summer, and fall. 

21A service life extension is a rehabilitation effort involving extensive maintenance and 

repair conducted to extend the service life of an asset.

Coast Guard 

Continues to Face 

Challenges Related to 

Icebreakers
 

Page 11 GAO-12-254T 

extension, and is expected to return to service in 2013. The ongoing 

service life extension is expected to extend the Polar Star’s service 

life through at least 2020.

• Healy (operative): The Healy is a medium icebreaker, commissioned 

in 2000, with an expected 30-year lifespan. The Healy is less capable 

than the heavy icebreakers and is primarily used for scientific 

missions in the Arctic. As a medium icebreaker, the Healy does not 

have the same icebreaking capabilities as the Polar Sea and Polar 

Star. Because of this, it cannot operate independently in the ice 

conditions in the Antarctic or ensure timely access to some Arctic 

areas in the winter. 

Figure 2: Polar Sea in Dry Dock
 

Page 12 GAO-12-254T 

Since we reported on Coast Guard’s Arctic operations in September 

2010, at least three reports have further identified the Coast Guard’s 

challenges to meeting its current and future icebreaking mission 

requirements in the Arctic with its existing polar icebreaker fleet, as well 

as the challenges it faces to acquire new icebreakers.

• DHS-OIG Report on the Coast Guard’s Polar Icebreakers.

22 The DHS 

Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported that the Coast Guard 

and other U.S. agencies are unable to meet their current Arctic 

mission requirements with existing icebreaking resources. This 

January 2011 report noted that the Coast Guard’s icebreaking 

resources are unlikely to meet future demands as well, in part 

because the agency has not followed its life cycle replacement plan, 

which requires replacement of icebreaking ships after 30 years of 

service. Further, between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2009, the 

National Science Foundation (NSF) had budgetary authority over the 

Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet. Among other things, the Inspector 

General reported that this funding arrangement resulted in deferred 

maintenance on the icebreakers, which has affected their long-term 

operability. The report concludes that without funding for new 

icebreakers or major service life extensions of existing ones, the U.S. 

will lose all polar icebreaking capabilities by 2029.23 The OIG report 

included four recommendations related to the Arctic.24

• U.S. Polar Icebreaker Recapitalization Report.25 The Coast Guard 

provided a report to Congress26

 

22DHS Office of the Inspector General, The Coast Guard’s Polar Icebreaker Maintenance, 

Upgrade, and Acquisition Program, OIG-11-31 (Washington, D.C.: January 2011). 

on the recapitalization of the U.S. Polar 

23To determine the Healy’s lifespan, the DHS-OIG report uses the date that the Healy was 

placed “In Commission, Special” status, whereas we report on the “In Commission, Active” 

date.

24The OIG recommended that the Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and 

Stewardship: (1) Request budgetary authority for the operation, maintenance, and 

upgrade of its icebreakers; (2) in coordination with DHS, request clarification from 

Congress to determine whether Arctic missions should be performed by Coast Guard 

assets or contracted vessels; (3) conduct the necessary analysis to determine whether the 

Coast Guard should replace or perform service-life extensions on its two existing heavyduty icebreaking ships; and (4) request appropriations necessary to meet mission 

requirements in the Arctic and Antarctic. 

25ABS Consulting, U.S. Polar Icebreaker Recapitalization: A Comprehensive Analysis and 

Its Impacts on U.S. Coast Guard Activities, prepared for the United States Coast Guard,

(October 2011). 

Three Studies Detail 

Icebreaking Issues
 

Page 13 GAO-12-254T 

icebreakers (Recapitalization report), which assessed options for 

recapitalizing its existing icebreaker fleet, including building new 

icebreakers, or reconstructing the Polar Sea and Polar Star to meet 

mission requirements, among other options.27

• High Latitude Study.

This October 2011 report 

found that the most cost-effective option would be to build two new 

heavy icebreakers, while performing minimal maintenance to keep the 

existing icebreakers operational while construction is taking place. In 

addition to having the lowest acquisition cost of any option—at $2.12 

billion—this option also has the lowest risk due to the complexity (and 

therefore risk) associated with the other options of performing major 

service life extensions or reconstructing the Polar Sea and Polar Star. 

The risk associated with these options is driven by high levels of 

uncertainty in terms of cost, scheduling, and technical feasibility for 

reconstructing the existing fleet. Given the time frames associated with 

building new icebreakers, the Recapitalization report concluded that the 

Coast Guard must begin planning and budgeting immediately.

28

 

26This report was developed pursuant to a provision in the Coast Guard Authorization Act 

of 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-281, 124 Stat. 2905, 2928-29 (2010)) mandating, in general, that 

the Coast Guard require a non-governmental, independent third party to conduct a 

comparative cost-benefit analysis of the recapitalization of the existing fleet of polar 

icebreakers. 

This report included a separate and broader 

analysis of the Coast Guard’s icebreaker needs, while the findings of 

the first two reports were limited to an analysis of the existing Coast 

Guard polar class icebreakers. The Coast Guard provided the Study 

to Congress in July 2011. It found that the common and dominant 

contributor to the significant mission impacts in the Arctic discussed 

above is the gap in polar icebreaking capability, and that the existing 

icebreaker fleet is insufficient to meet the Coast Guard’s statutory 

mission requirements in both the Arctic and Antarctic, even if two new 

icebreakers are built. To fulfill these mission requirements, the study 

found that the Coast Guard needs a minimum of six icebreakers 

(three heavy and three medium icebreakers). Further, if Navy 

presence requirements are taken into account, the Coast Guard 

would require three additional heavy icebreakers and one additional 

medium icebreaker for a total of ten icebreakers (six heavy and four 

27These options include performing major service life extensions on the Polar Sea and 

Polar Star, allowing the Coast Guard to defer new construction by five years, as well as 

long-term leasing options. All options include a major service life extension for the Healy. 

28ABS Consulting, High Latitude Study Mission Analysis Report. 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-254T 

medium icebreakers).29 The Study does provide cost estimates for 

acquiring the recommended icebreakers, but it does not directly 

assess the feasibility of its recommendations.30

As mentioned above, the Coast Guard faces budget uncertainty and it 

may be a significant challenge for the Coast Guard to obtain Arctic 

capabilities, including icebreakers. Given our analysis of the challenges 

that the Coast Guard already faces in funding its existing acquisition 

programs, it is unlikely that the agency’s budget could accommodate the 

level of additional funding (estimated by the High Latitude Study to range 

from $4.14 billion to $6.9 billion) needed to acquire new icebreakers or 

reconstruct existing ones. The Recapitalization report similarly concludes 

that the recapitalization of the polar icebreaker fleet cannot be funded 

within the existing or projected Coast Guard budget.31 All three reports 

reviewed alternative financing options, including the potential for leasing 

icebreakers, or funding icebreakers through the NSF or DOD. The 

Recapitalization report noted that a funding approach similar to the 

approach used for the Healy, which was funded through the fiscal year 

1990 DOD appropriations, should be considered.32

 

29The High Latitude Study does not detail the icebreaking capability specifically required 

to meet statutory mission requirements in the Arctic. However, the Study does find that 

providing year-round icebreaking capability in the Arctic would require two heavy, two 

medium, and two light icebreakers. This capability would be necessary to meet at least 

one statutory mission requirement under the Coast Guard’s Defense Readiness mission—

assured access to ice-impacted waters through a persistent icebreaker presence in the 

Arctic. 

However, the Coast 

Guard has a more immediate need than DOD to acquire Arctic 

capabilities, including icebreakers, making it unlikely that a similar funding 

approach would be feasible at this time. For more details on Coast Guard 

funding challenges and options specific to icebreakers, see appendix IV.

30For example, the High Latitude Study includes “Rough Order of Magnitude” estimates 

that it would cost $4.14 billion to acquire the three heavy and three medium icebreakers 

required to meet the Coast Guard’s mission requirements. When the Navy’s presence 

requirements are taken into account, the estimated cost increases to $6.9 billion.

31The report based its assessment on the Coast Guard’s Capital Investment Plan through 

fiscal year 2016, and longer-term budget projections through fiscal year 2020 that 

assumed an increase of no greater than inflation. However, since the analysis took place, 

the Capital Investment Plan has been subject to downward revision. 

32Pub. L. No 101-165, 103 Stat. 1112, 1121 (1989). 

Funding Limitations 

Remain the Main 

Challenge Related to 

Icebreakers
 

Page 15 GAO-12-254T 

The Coast Guard continues to coordinate with various stakeholders on 

Arctic operations and policy, including foreign, state, and local 

governments, Alaskan Native governments and interest groups, and the 

private sector. In September 2010, we reported that the Coast Guard has 

been actively involved in both bilateral and multilateral coordination efforts 

such as the Arctic Council.33 The Coast Guard also coordinates with 

state, local, and Alaskan Native governments and interest groups; 

however, some of these stakeholders reported that they lack information 

on both the Coast Guard’s ongoing planning efforts and future approach 

in the Arctic. In response to these concerns, in 2010 we recommended 

that the Commandant of the Coast Guard ensure that the agency 

communicates with these stakeholders on the process and progress of its 

Arctic planning efforts.34

The Coast Guard also coordinates with federal agencies, such as the 

NSF, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and 

DOD, and is involved with several interagency coordination efforts that 

address aspects of key practices we have previously identified to help 

The Coast Guard agreed with our 

recommendation and is in the process of taking corrective action. For 

example, in April 2011, the Coast Guard issued a Commandant 

Instruction that emphasizes the need to enhance partnerships with Arctic 

stakeholders. Additionally, in August 2011, the Commandant participated 

in a field hearing in Alaska which included discussion about the Coast 

Guard’s Arctic capability requirements. 

 

33The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum for promoting cooperation, 

coordination, and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic 

Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in 

particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. 

The eight permanent member states include Canada, Denmark (representing also 

Greenland and Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United 

States.

34For more information about the Coast Guard’s coordination with these stakeholders, 

please see GAO-10-870. 

Coast Guard 

Coordinates with 

Numerous 

Stakeholders on 

Arctic Operations
 

Page 16 GAO-12-254T 

enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies.35 For 

example, as discussed above, the Coast Guard collaborates with the NSF 

to manage the nation’s icebreaker fleet, including scheduling icebreaker 

time for research activities,36 while NOAA provides the Coast Guard with 

weather forecasts and warnings, as well as information about ice 

concentration and type. Additionally, the Coast Guard is involved with 

interagency efforts such as the Interagency Policy Committee on the 

Arctic, created in March 2010 to coordinate governmentwide 

implementation of National Security Presidential Directive 66 / Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 25.37

Since our September 2010 report, the Coast Guard has partnered with 

DOD on another interagency coordination effort, the Capabilities 

Assessment Working Group. DHS and DOD established the working 

group in May 2011 to identify shared Arctic capability gaps as well as 

opportunities and approaches to overcome them, to include making 

recommendations for near-term investments. DHS assigned the Coast 

Guard lead responsibility for the working group, which was directed to 

focus on four primary capability areas when identifying potential 

collaborative efforts to enhance Arctic capabilities, including near-term 

investments. Those capability areas include maritime domain awareness, 

 

35GAO-06-15 identifies eight key practices that federal agencies can engage in to 

enhance and sustain collaborative efforts. These key practices are: (1) define and 

articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) 

identify and address needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and 

responsibilities; (5) establish means of operating across agency boundaries; (6) develop 

mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7) reinforce agency 

accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; and (8) reinforce 

individual accountability for collaborative efforts through performance management 

systems. 

36Between fiscal years 2006 and 2009, the operation and maintenance of Coast Guard 

icebreakers was funded through the NSF’s budget, which according to Coast Guard 

officials and a 2011 report from the OIG, presented challenges to maintaining the polar 

icebreaker fleet and ensuring Coast Guard crews are properly trained. Fiscal years 2010 

and 2011 appropriations however, directed the transfer of the $54 million icebreaker 

budget from the NSF to the Coast Guard. See, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 

(Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034, 3145 (2009)) and Full-Year Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2011 (Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011)). Additionally, the Coast 

Guard’s fiscal year 2012 budget request included a request for $39 million to fund the 

operational costs of the icebreakers.

37See GAO-10-870, app. IV for descriptions of other select interagency coordination 

efforts and how they address key practices.
 

Page 17 GAO-12-254T 

communications, infrastructure, and presence. The working group was 

also directed to identify overlaps and redundancies in established and 

emerging DOD and DHS Arctic requirements. This working group will 

address several of the key practices we have identified—articulating a 

common outcome; identifying and addressing needs by leveraging 

resources; and reinforcing agency accountability for the effort through a 

jointly developed report containing near-term investment 

recommendations. The establishment of the working group helps to 

ensure that collaboration between the Coast Guard and DOD is taking 

place to address near-term capabilities in support of current planning and 

operations; however, upon the completion of the report in January 2012, 

the working group is expected to be dissolved.

GAO is also conducting an ongoing review of DOD’s May 2011 Report to 

Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage that was 

directed by the House Committee on Armed Services38 and will report on 

our results in January of next year. That report will assess the extent to 

which DOD’s Arctic Report addressed congressional requirements and 

DOD’s efforts to identify and prioritize the capabilities needed to meet 

national security objectives in the Arctic, including through collaboration 

with the Coast Guard.

Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy 

to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

For information about this statement please contact Stephen L. Caldwell, 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice, at (202) 512-9610, or 

caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 

statement. Other individuals making key contributions to this testimony 

include Dawn Hoff (Assistant Director), Elizabeth Kowalewski (Analyst-InCharge), Christopher Currie, Katherine Davis, Geoffrey Hamilton, Adam 

Hoffman, John Pendleton, Timothy Persons, Steven Putansu, Jodie 

Sandel, David Schmitt, Amie Steele, Esther Toledo, and Suzanne Wren. 

 

38H. Rep. No. 112-78, at 291 (2011). 

GAO Contacts and 

Staff

Acknowledgments
Appendix I: Map of the Arctic Boundary

Page 18 GAO-12-254T 

This appendix provides a map of the Arctic boundary, as defined by the 

Arctic Research and Policy Act. As discussed in the report, the Coast 

Guard currently has limited capacity to operate in the waters immediately

below the Arctic Circle, such as the Bering Sea. Increasing 

responsibilities in an even larger geographic area, especially in the harsh 

and remote conditions of the northern Arctic, will further stretch the 

agency’s capacity.

Figure 3: Map of the Arctic Boundary as Defined by the Arctic Research and Policy 

Act

Appendix I: Map of the Arctic Boundary
Appendix II: Impact of Capability Gaps on 

Coast Guard Mission Performance

Page 19 GAO-12-254T 

This appendix provides information on the degree to which the Coast 

Guard’s existing capability gaps in the Arctic are expected to impact 

future mission performance. Of the Coast Guard’s 11 mission areas, 9 

are expected to experience future demand in the Arctic, and the degree to 

which existing capability gaps are expected to impact these missions has 

been classified as Significant, Moderate, or Low. Examples of how these 

gaps are expected to impact each mission are also included below.

Figure 4: Impact of Existing Capability Gaps on Future Coast Guard Mission 

Performance in the Arctic

Note: Two Coast Guard missions – Drug Interdiction and Migrant Interdiction – are not expected to be 

impacted by capability gaps in the Arctic. 

Appendix II: Impact of Capability Gaps on 

Coast Guard Mission Performance 
Appendix III: Arctic Force Mixes 

Page 20 GAO-12-254T 

This appendix provides information on potential solutions to the Coast 

Guard’s existing capability gaps in the Arctic. The High Latitude Study 

compares six Arctic force mixes in terms of the ability of each force mix to 

reduce the risk that is expected to exist in the future Arctic environment. 

The force mixes add assets to the baseline force mix (which represents 

the Coast Guard’s current Arctic assets) and include different 

combinations of cutters (including icebreakers), aircraft, and forward 

operating locations. The specific asset combinations for each force mix 

are described below. The estimated acquisition cost for each Arctic force 

mix and the percent of risk the force mix is expected to reduce in the 

Arctic is also shown below.

Appendix III: Arctic Force Mixes
Appendix III: Arctic Force Mixes 

Page 21 GAO-12-254T 

Figure 5: Arctic Force Mixes

Note: Risk and risk reduction vary by season, because winter ice coverage affects accessibility. For 

example, the cruise industry is responsible for most of the risk present in the Arctic in the spring, 

summer, and fall, but does not contribute any risk during the winter. 
Appendix IV: Funding Limitations Related to 

Icebreakers 

Page 22 GAO-12-254T 

This appendix provides an overview of the funding challenges the Coast 

Guard faces related to icebreakers. These include limitations in the Coast 

Guard’s existing and projected budget, as well as alternative financing 

options.

The Coast Guard faces overall budget uncertainty, and it may be a 

significant challenge for the Coast Guard to obtain Arctic capable 

resources, including icebreakers. For more than 10 years, we have noted 

Coast Guard difficulties in funding major acquisitions, particularly when 

acquiring multiple assets at the same time. For example, in our 1998 

report on the Deepwater program, we noted that the agency could face 

major obstacles in proceeding with that program because it would 

consume virtually all of the Coast Guard’s projected capital spending.1 In 

our 2008 testimony on the Coast Guard budget, we again noted that 

affordability of the Deepwater acquisitions would continue to be a major 

challenge to the Coast Guard given the other demands upon the agency 

for both capital and operations spending.2 In our 2010 testimony on the 

Coast Guard budget, we noted that maintaining the Deepwater 

acquisition program was the Coast Guard’s top budget priority, but would 

come at a cost to operational capabilities.3 This situation, of the 

Deepwater program crowding out other demands, continued, and in our 

report of July this year we noted that the Deepwater program of record 

was not achievable given projected Coast Guard budgets.4

 

1

GAO, Coast Guard Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project’s Justification and 

Affordability Need to be Addressed More Thoroughly, 

Given the 

challenges that the Coast Guard already faces in funding its Deepwater 

acquisition program, it unlikely that the agency’s budget could 

accommodate the level of additional funding (estimated by the High 

Latitude Study to range from $4.14 billion to $6.9 billion) needed to 

acquire new icebreakers or reconstruct existing ones.

GAO/RCED-99-6 (Washington, 

D.C.: Oct. 26, 1998).

2

GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent Performance, 

and Related Challenges, GAO-08-494T (Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2008).

3

GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2011 Budget, Recent Performance, 

and Related Challenges, GAO-10-411T (Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2010). 

4

GAO, Coast Guard: Action Needed As Approved Deepwater Program Remains 

Unachievable, GAO-11-743 (Washington, D.C.: July 2011).

Appendix IV: Funding Limitations Related to 

Icebreakers 

Coast Guard Budget 

Limitations
Appendix IV: Funding Limitations Related to 

Icebreakers 

Page 23 GAO-12-254T 

The U.S. Polar Icebreaker Recapitalization Report contains an analysis of 

the Coast Guard’s budget which also concludes that the recapitalization 

of the polar icebreaker fleet cannot be funded within the existing or 

projected Coast Guard budget.5

This means that it is unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able to expand 

the U.S. icebreaker fleet to meet its statutory requirements as identified 

by the High Latitude Study. As we reported in 2010,

This analysis examined the impact that 

financing a new polar icebreaker would have on Coast Guard operations 

and maintenance activities, among others. The report found that given the 

Coast Guard’s current and projected budgets, as well as its mandatory 

budget line items, there are insufficient funds in any one year to fully fund 

one new polar icebreaker. Additionally, though major acquisitions are 

usually funded over several years, the incremental funding obtained from 

reducing or delaying existing acquisition projects would have significant 

adverse impact on all Coast Guard activities.

6 the Commandant of 

the Coast Guard has recognized these budgetary challenges, noting that 

the Coast Guard would need to prioritize resource allocations, while 

accepting risk in areas where resources would be lacking. Given that it

takes 8-10 years to build an icebreaker, and the Coast Guard has not yet 

begun the formal acquisition process, the Coast Guard has already 

accepted some level of risk that its statutory mission requirements related 

to icebreakers will continue to go unmet. 

The three reports discussed earlier in this statement all identify funding as 

a central issue in addressing the existing and anticipated challenges 

related to icebreakers. In addition to the Coast Guard budget analysis 

included in the Recapitalization report, all three reports reviewed 

alternative financing options, including the potential for leasing 

icebreakers, or funding icebreakers through the National Science 

Foundation (NSF) or the Department of Defense (DOD). Although DOD 

has used leases and charters in the past when procurement funding 

levels were insufficient to address mission requirements and capabilities, 

 

5

The report based its assessment on the Coast Guard’s Capital Investment Plan through 

fiscal year 2016, and longer-term budget projections through fiscal year 2020 that 

assumed an increase of no greater than inflation. However since the analysis took place, 

the Capital Investment Plan has been subject to downward revision.

6

GAO-10-870. 

Limitations on 

Alternative Financing 

Options
Appendix IV: Funding Limitations Related to 

Icebreakers 

Page 24 GAO-12-254T 

both the Recapitalization report and the High Latitude Study determined 

that the lack of existing domestic commercial vessels capable of meeting 

the Coast Guard’s mission requirements reduces the availability of 

leasing options for the Coast Guard. Additionally, an initial cost-benefit 

analysis of one type of available leasing option included in the 

Recapitalization report and the High Latitude Study suggests that it may 

ultimately be more costly to the Coast Guard over the 30-year icebreaker 

lifespan. Another alternative option addressed by the Recapitalization 

report would be to fund new icebreakers through the NSF. However, the 

analysis of this option concluded that funding a new icebreaker through 

the existing NSF budget would have significant adverse impacts on NSF 

operations and that the capability needed for Coast Guard requirements 

would exceed that needed by the NSF.

The Recapitalization report noted that a funding approach similar to the 

approach used for the Healy, which was funded through the fiscal year 

1990 DOD appropriations, should be considered.7 However, the report 

did not analyze the feasibility of this option. We have previously reported 

that because of the Coast Guard’s statutory role as both a federal 

maritime agency and a branch of the military, it can receive funding 

through both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOD.8 For 

example, as we previously reported, although the U.S. Navy is not 

expressly required to provide funding to the Coast Guard, the Coast 

Guard receives funding from the Navy to purchase and maintain 

equipment, such as self-defense systems or communication systems, 

because it is in the Navy’s interest for the Coast Guard systems to be 

compatible with the Navy’s systems when the Coast Guard is performing 

national defense missions in support of the Navy. However, according to 

a Coast Guard budget official, the Coast Guard receives the majority of its 

funding through the DHS appropriation, with the exception of 

reimbursements for specific activities.9

 

7

Pub.L.No 101-165, 103 Stat. 1112, 1121 (1989). 

Also, as the Recapitalization plan 

acknowledges, there is considerable strain on the DOD budget. A recent 

8

GAO, Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support 

Missions May Depend on DOD’s Implementation of the 2008 National Defense 

Authorization Act, GAO-08-311 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008).

9

For example, NSF reimbursed the Coast Guard for polar icebreaker maintenance from 

2006 to 2011, and the Coast Guard receives reimbursements for certain U.S. Navy related 

security operations. 
Appendix IV: Funding Limitations Related to 

Icebreakers 

Page 25 GAO-12-254T 

DOD report on the Arctic10 also notes budgetary challenges, stating that 

the near-term fiscal and political environment will make it difficult to 

support significant new U.S. investments in the Arctic. Furthermore, DOD 

and the Coast Guard face different mission requirements and timelines. 

For example, DOD’s recent report states that the current level of human 

activity in the Arctic is already of concern to DHS, whereas the Arctic is 

expected to remain a peripheral interest to much of the national security 

community for the next decade or more. As a result, the Coast Guard has 

a more immediate need than DOD to acquire Arctic capabilities, such as 

icebreakers. For example, with preliminary plans for drilling activity 

approved in 2011, the Coast Guard must be prepared to provide 

environmental response in the event of an oil spill. Similarly, as cruise 

ship traffic continues to increase, the Coast Guard must be prepared to 

conduct search and rescue operations should an incident occur. For 

these reasons, it is unlikely that an approach similar to the one that was 

used to build the Healy would be feasible at this time.

 

10DOD, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage, 

(Washington, D.C.; May 2011). 
Related GAO Products

Page 26 GAO-12-254T 

Coast Guard: Action Needed As Approved Deepwater Program Remains 

Unachievable, GAO-11-743, Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011.

Coast Guard: Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but 

More Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be 

Beneficial, GAO-10-870, Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2010.

Coast Guard: Observations on the Requested Fiscal Year 2011 Budget, 

Past Performance, and Current Challenges, GAO-10-411T, Washington, 

D.C.: February 25, 2010.

Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2010 Budget and Related 

Performance and Management Challenges, GAO-09-810T, Washington, 

D.C.: July 7, 2009.

Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil 

Support Missions May Depend on DOD’s Implementation of the 2008 

National Defense Authorization Act, GAO-08-311, Washington, D.C.: April 

16, 2008.

Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent 

Performance, and Related Challenges, GAO-08-494T, Washington, D.C.: 

March 6, 2008.

Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and 

Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15. Washington, 

D.C.: October 21, 2005.

Coast Guard Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project’s Justification 

and Affordability Need to Be Addressed More Thoroughly, 

GAO/RCED-99-6, Washington, D.C.: October 26, 1998.

Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance 

and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118, Washington D.C.: June 1996.

Related GAO Products

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