J-S04033-19

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LANDARE JELMAIK HINES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1519 MDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 14, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-14-CR-0000641-2014

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 18, 2019

Landare Jelmaik Hines (“Appellant”) files this appeal from the order of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County that dismissed his petition 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. After careful review, we affirm.

This Court briefly summarized the factual background of the case on 

direct appeal:

Briefly, Appellant’s convictions stemmed from evidence that 

he and two women, Tiffany Ingram and Sarah Frank, conspired to 

sell heroin out of a residence in State College, Pennsylvania. 

During an investigation of these individuals in March of 2014, 

Sarah Frank delivered heroin to a confidential informant on two 

occasions, and to an undercover detective on a third. Based on 

Frank’s deliveries, as well as additional information acquired by 

police during the investigation, a search warrant was obtained for 

Ingram’s residence. On March 28, 2014, when the search warrant 

was executed, police discovered Appellant inside Ingram’s home. 

Appellant was taken into custody and searched, revealing a small 

amount of marijuana and a key to a safe where narcotics were 
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found [(62 bags of heroin)]. A search of Ingram’s residence 

revealed narcotics, drug paraphernalia, and evidence indicating 

that Appellant was residing there.

Commonwealth v. Hines, 1730 MDA 2015 (Pa.Super. 2016) (unpublished 

memorandum).

Appellant proceeded to a trial at which a jury convicted Appellant of 

Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession of Drugs with the Intent to Deliver 

(PWID), conspiracy to commit PWID, and various misdemeanor drug charges. 

On May 21, 2015, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 8 to 16 

years’ incarceration. Appellant filed timely-post sentence motions, which were 

subsequently denied. On November 17, 2015, this Court affirmed the 

judgment of sentence. 

On December 8, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. 

Thereafter, Appellant acquired counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition 

on May 15, 2017. On January 26, 2018 and March 22, 2018, the PCRA court 

held hearings on Appellant’s petition, and on August 14, 2018, the PCRA court 

entered an order denying Appellant’s amended petition. Appellant filed a 

timely appeal and complied with the lower court’s direction to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the Court err and abuse its discretion when it found there 

was insufficient evidence here to find an agreement, promise, 

or implication of leniency was given to either Ingram, Frank, or 

Young? In doing so, did it fail to consider the prosecutor’s 

testimony, finding that each witness’[s] hope for consideration 

based on the value of their testimony came solely from their 

attorneys, as opposed to from the prosecutor? Did the Court 
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apply the incorrect legal standard, abuse its discretion when it 

found any implication of leniency [was] immaterial, and fail to 

consider the question of materiality cumulatively?

2. Did the Court err and abuse its discretion, violating Appellant’s 

right to due process of law when it granted Young’s attorney[’]s 

motion to quash a subpoena?

3. Did the Court err and abuse its discretion by denying 

Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing 

to cross-examine Young on his full criminal record in order to 

establish bias in favor of law enforcement? In doing so, did the 

Court apply the incorrect standard under Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?

4. Did the Court err and abuse its discretion by denying 

Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to 

the accomplice jury instructions? In doing so, did the Court 

apply the incorrect prejudice standard for a claim of 

ineffectiveness?

Appellant’s Brief, at 1-2 (quotations omitted).

Our standard of review is as follows:

When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, we must determine 

whether the PCRA court's order is supported by the record and 

free of legal error. Generally, we are bound by a PCRA court's 

credibility determinations. However, with regard to a court's legal 

conclusions, we apply a de novo standard.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 635 Pa. 665, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (2016)

(quotation marks and quotations omitted).1

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1 We note that any PCRA petition, “including a second or subsequent petition, 

shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant’s sentence became final on December 17, 

2015 when the thirty-day appeal period expired for seeking review with our 

Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (providing that a “judgment 

becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review 

in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review”); Pa.R.A.P. 

1113(a). Thus, Appellant filed a timely petition on December 8, 2016.
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To be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted from 

one of the enumerated circumstances found in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). 

Appellant invokes two of these circumstances: (1) a constitutional violation 

and (2) ineffectiveness of counsel; Appellant must show that either 

circumstance “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable 

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9543(a)(2)(i), (ii).

Appellant first argues that the Commonwealth violated his due process 

rights by failing to disclose exculpatory impeachment evidence pursuant to 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 

In Brady, the Supreme Court of the United States held that “[w]here evidence 

material to the guilt or punishment of the accused is withheld, irrespective of 

the good or bad faith of the prosecutor, a violation of due process has 

occurred.” Id. We are guided by the following principles:

Under Brady and subsequent decisional law, a prosecutor 

has an obligation to disclose all exculpatory information material 

to the guilt or punishment of an accused, including evidence of an 

impeachment nature. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Strong, 563 

Pa. 455, 761 A.2d 1167, 1171 & n. 5 (2000). To establish a Brady

violation, an appellant must prove three elements:

[1] the evidence [at issue] was favorable to the 

accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it 

impeaches; [2] the evidence was suppressed by the 

prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] 

prejudice ensued.
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Commonwealth v. Lambert, 584 Pa. 461, 884 A.2d 848, 854 

(2005) (citation omitted).

The evidence at issue must have been “material evidence 

that deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 572 Pa. 283, 815 A.2d 563, 573 (2002). “Favorable 

evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its 

suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 

U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)).

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 Pa. 17, 71-72, 18 A.3d 244, 275-76 (2011).

With respect to the disclosure of impeachment evidence relevant to a

witness, our Supreme Court has provided the following:

Exculpatory evidence favorable to the accused is not confined to 

evidence that reflects upon the culpability of the defendant. 

Exculpatory evidence also includes evidence of an impeachment 

nature that is material to the case against the accused. Napue 

v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 

(1959). As the court in Napue sagely observed: “[t]he jury's 

estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may 

well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such 

subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying 

that a defendant's life or liberty may depend.” Id. at 269, 79 

S.Ct. 1173. Any implication, promise or understanding that the 

government would extend leniency in exchange for a witness' 

testimony is relevant to the witness' credibility. United States 

v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 

(1972). As Brady and its progeny dictate, when the failure of 

the prosecution to produce material evidence raises a 

reasonable probability that the result of the trial would 

have been different if the evidence had been produced, due 

process has been violated and a new trial is warranted. 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 

L.Ed.2d 481 (1985).

Strong, 563 Pa. at 462–63, 761 A.2d at 1171 (emphasis added).
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Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his Brady

claim after the lower court found “there was no understanding, implication, or 

promise from the Commonwealth that a testifying witness would get any 

consideration in exchange for their testimony.” P.C.O. at 12. The PCRA court 

had highlighted the statements of ADA Nathan Boob, the prosecutor at 

Appellant’s trial, when he claimed at the PCRA hearing that he had made no 

promises or inducements to the testifying witnesses and had told the 

witnesses the following: “I am offering you nothing. You must decide what 

you are going to do and if you think that will help you or not.” Notes of 

Testimony (N.T.), PCRA hearing 1/26/18, at 69. 

However, Appellant asserts that ADA Boob had implied the witnesses 

would be treated favorably in exchange for their testimony against Appellant, 

claiming that ADA Boob conveyed an “informal understanding” that he would

evaluate the witnesses’ testimony against Appellant when considering their 

own cases in the future. Attorney Boob did not dispute that he may have 

suggested to the witnesses that he would “consider the value of their 

testimony” in forming their subsequent plea offers. N.T., 1/26/18, at 76-77.

Nevertheless, we need not determine whether the prosecutor’s 

statements constituted impeachment evidence that should have been

disclosed to the defense, as Appellant has not shown that the result of the 

proceeding would have been different if the evidence had been produced. 

Appellant’s trial counsel thoroughly attempted to impeach the credibility of the 

Appellant’s co-defendants and his cellmate at trial, emphasizing that each 
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witness had motive to testify favorably for the Commonwealth in order to 

receive favorable treatment in their own criminal cases. The PCRA court 

summarized the substance of the witnesses’ testimony as follows:

At trial, the Commonwealth called both Ingram and Frank 

to testify against [Appellant]. Both were facing charges for their 

involvement in the heroin distribution conspiracy. Ingram 

testified Petitioner was in charge of the drug distribution 

operations, he was bringing in the drugs and was controlling the 

money. Frank testified that she was addicted to heroin and was 

selling for [Appellant] to afford to have heroin for personal use. 

Both testified that they were not promised or offered any sort of 

reduced sentence in exchange for their cooperation and testimony 

against [Appellant].

The Commonwealth also called Richard Young (Young) to 

testify against [Appellant]. Young was incarcerated on unrelated 

charges and was [Appellant’s] cellmate. Young wrote a letter 

detailing what [Appellant] told him about his drug operations while 

the two were discussing their respective cases. Young testified 

consistent with that letter stating [Appellant] detailed how he 

would bring large amounts of drugs from the Harrisburg area to 

State College, weight and package them, store them in the safe 

under the mattress, and then give to people like Frank for 

distribution. Young also testified [Appellant] asked him to pass a 

note to Ingram asking her to take the blame for the whole 

operation, and that [Appellant] threatened Frank for cooperating. 

The note was introduced into evidence. Young testified that he 

was not offered nor did he hope for something in exchange for his 

testimony, but was motivated to testify because he heard 

[Appellant] physically abused Ingram’s three children and had 

threatened Frank.

[Appellant] was represented by Attorney Ronald 

McGlaughlin (Attorney McGlaughlin) at trial. Attorney McGlaughlin 

questioned Young on eight (8) of his prior convictions for crim[e]n 

falsi charges, and implied Young stole a letter at issue in this case 

from [Appellant]. Attorney McGlaughlin also elicited that Young’s 

bail had been reduced and he was able to start serving time on 

his state sentence in exchange for his cooperation. Attorney 

McGlaughlin questioned Ingram on why she was testifying to 
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which she responded she was hoping for a lesser sentence, but 

she was not promised anything and was testifying because she 

didn’t want to take responsibility for something for which she 

wasn’t entirely responsible. Attorney McGlaughlin likewise 

thoroughly questioned Frank about her motivations for testifying, 

to which she responded that she was not promised anything, but 

her bail was reduced after she agreed to cooperate but had been 

revoked prior to her testimony.

In his closing, Attorney McGlaughlin highlighted Young’s 

lack of credibility, and his motivations for testifying including his 

reduced bail. Attorney McGlaughlin also highlighted that Young 

had pending charges and was obviously seeking a benefit in 

exchange for his testimony against [Appellant]. Attorney 

McGlaughlin highlighted Ingram’s lack of credibility in his closing, 

especially that she hoped to get a better plea deal in exchange for 

her testimony. Attorney McGlaughlin highlighted Frank’s 

credibility problems and her hopes for a favorable plea deal in 

exchange for her testimony, and how her bail and been reduced 

in exchange for her cooperation.

After both the Commonwealth and Attorney McGlaughlin

finished their closing statements, the Court instructed the jury on 

the appropriate law to apply to the charges. All instructions were 

in accordance with Pennsylvania Law and consistent with the 

Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions. The 

Court properly instructed the jurors to consider the potential bias, 

prejudice, and other motivations a witness may have that would 

affect their testimony. 

PCRA court opinion (P.C.O.), 8/14/18, at 1-4.

Moreover, we emphasize that the prosecution presented overwhelming 

physical evidence that connected Appellant to the drug operation conducted 

from Ingram’s home. When executing a warrant to search Ingram’s home, 

officers detained Appellant and found him in possession of a key to a safe 

hidden under the bed in the master bedroom, which contained a large amount 

of heroin. The officers discovered a large quantity of U.S. currency, additional 

drugs, and men’s clothing in the master bedroom, along with evidence to 
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suggest that Appellant was residing there. Thus, we cannot find that there is 

a reasonable probability that the result of Appellant’s trial would be different 

if the disputed evidence had been produced. Bagley, supra. As a result, we 

find the PCRA court properly denied Appellant’s Brady claim.

Second, Appellant argues that the PCRA court abused its discretion and 

violated Appellant’s right to due process when it granted the motion of Young’s 

attorney’s, Deborah Lux, to quash a subpoena for her to testify at Appellant’s 

PCRA hearing. Although Atty. Lux argued that her testimony was protected 

by attorney-client privilege, Appellant asserted that he only wished to question 

her as to her prior conversations with the prosecution about the possibility of 

favorable treatment for Young if he testified favorably at Appellant’s trial.

Section 5916 of the Judicial Code governs confidential communications 

to an attorney in criminal proceedings; it provides that “[i]n a criminal 

proceeding counsel shall not be competent or permitted to testify to 

confidential communications made to him by his client, nor shall the client be 

compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege is waived 

upon the trial by the client. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5916. 

Even if we were to assume that the trial court’s decision to quash Atty. 

Lux’s subpoena was incorrect, it was harmless error.2 Although Appellant 

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2 Although Appellant properly preserved and developed this issue for our 

review, it was not addressed by the lower court or by the Commonwealth. 

However, “[t]his Court may affirm the lower court for any reason, including 

such reasons not considered by the lower court.” Commonwealth v. 
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argues that Atty. Lux should have been allowed to testify as to her 

communication with the prosecution with respect to a possible deal available 

to her client, Young, if he testified favorably at Appellant’s trial, Young himself 

testified that he was not offered nor did he hope for something in exchange 

for his testimony, but was motivated to testify because he heard Appellant 

physically abused Ingram’s three children and had threatened Frank.

Moreover, we reiterate that Appellant’s trial counsel thoroughly crossexamined Young as to his potential bias and motives for testifying. We again 

emphasize that even without the testimony of Young and his counsel, the 

prosecution presented overwhelming physical evidence linking Appellant to 

the drug enterprise in which his co-defendants were involved. Thus, we 

conclude any potential error was harmless.

Third, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 

cross-examine Young on his full criminal record in order to establish his bias 

in favor of law enforcement. In reviewing a claim of the ineffectiveness of 

counsel, we are guided by the following principles:

It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have provided 

effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and 

proves all of the following: (1) the underlying legal claim is of 

arguable merit; (2) counsel's action or inaction lacked any 

objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's 

interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that there was a 

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Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 381 n. 6 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation omitted). 

Additionally, we “may affirm a judgment based on harmless error even if such 

an argument is not raised by the parties.” Commonwealth v. Allshouse,

614 Pa. 229, 261, 36 A.3d 163, 182 (2012).
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reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel's 

error. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 

973, 975–76 (1987); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The PCRA court may 

deny an ineffectiveness claim if “the petitioner's evidence fails to 

meet a single one of these prongs.” Commonwealth v. 

Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 744 A.2d 717, 738 n.23 (2000).... 

Because courts must presume that counsel was effective, it is the 

petitioner's burden to prove otherwise. See Pierce, supra; 

Commonwealth v. Holloway, 559 Pa. 258, 739 A.2d 1039, 

1044 (1999).

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1114 (Pa.Super. 2018) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Natividad, 595 Pa. 188, 207–208, 938 A.2d 

310, 321 (2007)).

There is no arguable merit to Appellant’s claim that his trial counsel 

failed to adequately impeach Young’s credibility. Atty. McGlaughlin thoroughly 

cross-examined Young with eight of his prior crimen falsi convictions. In light 

of Young’s prior criminal record, Atty. McGlaughlin attempted to convince the 

jury that Young obtained specific details about Appellant’s case by stealing a 

letter from Appellant’s casefile in his jail cell. Atty. McGlaughlin also suggested 

that Young had a motive to testify favorably for the prosecution as Young was 

awaiting sentencing on additional charges. 

Moreover, Appellant cannot show that the outcome of the trial would 

have been different had trial counsel impeached Young with his entire criminal 

record. In addition to the fact that Atty. McGlaughlin did confront Young with 

eight prior convictions of crimen falsi offenses to convince the jury to question 

Young’s credibility, we again note that there was overwhelming physical 

evidence linking Appellant to the drugs found in his co-defendant’s home. As 
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a result, the PCRA court properly found that trial counsel was not ineffective 

in failing to introduce additional charges to impeach Young’s credibility.

Lastly, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object 

to the jury instruction on accomplice liability, which “allowed the jury to 

conclude whether Ingram and Frank were accomplices, rather than instructing 

[the jury] that they were accomplices as a matter of law.” Appellant’s Brief, 

at 46. Appellant claims this instruction would have directed the jury to find 

Ingram and Frank were “corrupt and polluted sources whose testimony should 

be viewed with disfavor and accepted only with care and caution.” Appellant’s 

Brief, at 47.

In reviewing the adequacy of the trial court’s instruction, we consider 

the following principles:

In reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction, the entire 

charge is considered, not merely discrete portions thereof. The 

trial court is free to use its own expressions as long as the 

concepts at issue are clearly and accurately presented to the jury. 

It is the policy of this Court to give our trial courts latitude and 

discretion in phrasing instructions.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 630 Pa. 493, 552, 107 A.3d 52, 87–88 (2014)

(citing Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 591 Pa. 1, 915 A.2d 1122, 1138 

(2007)). “Only when the court commits an abuse of discretion or provides the 

jury with an inaccurate statement of law is there reversible error.”

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 631 Pa. 67, 121–22, 108 A.3d 779, 812 (2014) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Hall, 549 Pa. 269, 701 A.2d 190, 207 (1997)).
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In a similar case, Commonwealth v. Jones, 542 Pa. 464, 518, 668 

A.2d 491, 517 (1995), the Supreme Court held that it was not error for a trial 

court to allow the jury to decide whether other individuals were the 

defendant’s accomplices rather than giving a binding instruction that required 

the jury to find the individuals were the defendant’s accomplices as a matter 

of law. As the trial court also instructed the jury that an accomplice’s 

testimony must be given care and scrutiny before it can be considered 

credible, the Supreme Court determined that the instruction was proper.

Likewise, in this case, it was appropriate for the trial court to permit the 

jury to decide whether Ingram and Frank were Appellant’s accomplices. The 

trial court properly instructed the jury on the proper level of care and scrutiny 

that the jury was required to give to an accomplice’s testimony. As the trial 

court’s instruction accurately stated the law relevant to accomplice liability 

and Appellant has not shown the trial court abused its discretion, there is no 

arguable merit to this ineffectiveness claim.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing 

Appellant’s petition.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/18/2019