PKSOI Papers

THE GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE CENTER:

A VEHICLE FOR TRANSITIONING TO THE 

HOST GOVERNMENT

Raymond A. Millen

Carolyn Pruitt
PKSOI PAPER

The Government Assistance Center: 

A Vehicle for Transitioning to the

Host Government

Raymond A. Millen 

Carolyn Pruitt

May 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided 

they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations 

security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial 

perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. 

This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
ii

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ISBN: 978-0-9833514-2-9
iii

Foreword 

Policy-makers and strategists have long recognized that complexity and chaos are common features 

of the strategic environment, which encompasses 

both the international and domestic realms. In war, 

the military seeks to mitigate these features through 

superb organization and staff-work, among other pursuits. Unfortunately, outside of the military, this same 

discipline is not applied to other endeavors, such as 

Security Sector Reform, Disaster Response, and Humanitarian Assistance.

In this monograph, Professor Raymond Millen proposes a way for non-military organizations to render 

assistance and development to fragile states through 

an organizational approach. Accordingly, he proffers 

the concept of the Government Assistance Center as a 

vehicle for effective coordination and cooperation in 

Whole of Government and Comprehensive approaches. Conceptually, the Government Assistance Center 

embodies a standardized camp and an organizational 

structure for decision-making.

The standardized camp has an expeditionary capability, using state-of-the-art barrier and shelter 

systems. Standardized camps permit diverse organizations and agencies to interface with one another as 

well as with the host government in an orderly manner. In this sense, it epitomizes the government-in-abox concept. Due to their standardized design, Government Assistance Centers have the same capabilities 

regardless of the contributing nations and organizations involved. Their expeditionary character permits 

Government Assistance Centers to deploy into remote 

countries and become operational within days. More-
over, Centers may re-locate within a country quickly, 

adapting to dynamic changes.

The most interesting feature of the Government 

Assistance Center is the integrated decision-making 

apparatus. This unique capability permits the formulation of policy and strategy to occur within the 

host nation, leading to more practical and germane 

solutions to national and local issues. The integrated 

nature of the apparatus encourages cooperation and 

coordination of participating organizations and agencies, injecting their expertise on issues which concern 

them. In praxis, this is smart power to the nth degree.

Professor Millen concludes his study with points 

for consideration regarding prevalent issues which 

confront practitioners, and he briefly discusses how 

the UN might place Government Assistance Centers 

into practice. Ultimately, the monograph provides a 

way for Whole of Government and the Comprehensive approaches to succeed without excessive dependency on the U.S. Army’s skill sets.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a topic of 

consideration and debate among the government and 

international communities.

CLIFF D. CROFFORD, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, U.S. Army Peacekeeping

and Stability Operations Institute

iv
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen (retired) is 

currently the Security Sector Reform analyst at the 

Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations Institute, 

Carlisle, PA. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982, was commissioned as an infantry officer, 

and later as a Foreign Area Officer for Western Europe. 

He held a variety of command and staff assignments in 

Germany and Continental United States. At the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, he served 

as the Director of European Security Studies, producing 

studies on NATO, Afghanistan, and counterinsurgency. 

Professor Millen served three tours in Afghanistan 

first, from July through November 2003 on the staff of 

the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, focusing on the Afghan National Army and the General staff; 

second with Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan from August 2006 to August 2007 establishing police coordination centers in northern Afghanistan; 

and third from September 2008 to September 2009 as an 

MPRI Senior Mentor for the Afghan Assistant Ministry 

of Defense for Strategy and Plans. Mr. Millen has published articles in a number of scholarly and professional 

journals to include Parameters, Joint Special Warfare 

Journal, Small Wars Journal, Comparative Strategy Journal, Infantry Magazine, and the Swiss Military Journal. 

The second edition of his book, Command Legacy, was 

published by Potomac Books in December 2008. Professor Millen is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command 

and General Staff College, and holds an M.A. degree in 

National Security Studies from Georgetown University, 

as well as an M.A. degree in World Politics and a Ph.D. 

(ABD) in Political Science from Catholic University of 

America.
vii

SUMMARY

The international community needs to take a new 

approach regarding assistance and development ventures for fragile states. Few would quarrel with the 

view that current methods are incredibly expensive, 

wasteful, susceptible to corruption and less than effective in the long run. Much is written about the necessity of Security Sector Reform, Disaster Response, 

and Humanitarian Assistance as the means to lifting 

struggling states out of the pit of despair. However, 

the vast majority of the literature only numbs the 

reader with laundry lists of goals, considerations, and 

requirements; little is written on how to organize the 

assistance effort. 

There is also a large assumption, not borne out by 

practice, that cooperation and coordination among 

states, among organizations, and even among domestic agencies are frictionless if they all share a common 

goal. Moreover, the literature on Whole of Government and Comprehensive approaches (defined in 

the study) suggests unity of effort among partners is 

a given. In practice, states and organizations do not 

subordinate their interests to other interests easily, so 

unity of effort often suffers correspondingly. Recent 

experience in Afghanistan, particularly in regards to 

provincial reconstruction teams, offers a possible solution to this dilemma.

This monograph proposes the establishment of 

a new unifying assistance and development organization to help fragile states and is divided into five 

sections. The first section briefly examines the challenges associated with Whole of Government and 

Comprehensive approaches as well as with provincial 

reconstruction teams. The section concludes with the 
viii

introduction of an organizational paradigm, the Government Assistance Center, designed to amalgamate 

the efforts of all participating donors (states, nongovernment organizations, international organizations, 

government organizations, etc.), rendering assistance 

and development to fragile states at various echelons 

of government.

The second and third sections address the organizational aspects of the Government Assistance Center. Section two proposes a standardized camp design, 

which offers a routinized way for donors physically 

to come together and interface with the host government. The expeditionary design of the Government 

Assistance Center permits swift access to fragile 

states without regard to existing infrastructure, heavy 

equipment, and specialized personnel. The third section describes the essential purpose of the Government Assistant Center and introduces the integrated 

decision-making mechanism, which consists of an integrated planning board, a council, and an implementation coordination board. Transcending the activities 

of a normal headquarters, the mechanism emulates 

the interagency process and seeks innovative, tailored 

solutions to complex problems plaguing a fragile state. 

The fourth section involves issues and caveats 

which Government Assistance Centers must consider 

as they deliberate policy and strategy. In this regard, 

the Center’s council must consider the possible unintended consequences of policies, strategies, and programs when implementing Security Sector Reform 

(Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration; 

Rule of Law, Military reform, Police reform, and Economic reform), Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Response, and Counterinsurgency. 
ix

The fifth section proposes a framework in which 

the Government Assistance Centers can be placed 

into practice. Fundamentally, the framework heralds 

an innovative, more efficient method for helping fragile states: greater and more equitable burden-sharing 

among donor states; a mode for all donors, regardless 

of size and resources, to make more meaningful contributions; and a path to end the over-reliance on the 

military for such ventures.

 Ultimately, there should be no illusions regarding the proposal. The international environment is 

complex, random, and chaotic. The domestic environment of host nations requiring assistance is no less 

so. The Government Assistance Center paradigm is 

designed to provide assistance to fragile states without suffering the historical exorbitant costs, wastage, 

and unmanageable corruption. Each Center offers 

a way for international actors to coordinate their actions and cooperate synergistically. The interagency 

process mechanism institutionalizes creative thinking 

for problem solving as well as strategic thinking for 

policy and strategy development. Finally, Government Assistance Centers underscore the sincere commitment of the international community to break the 

cycle of dysfunctional governance. 
1

The Government Assistance Center: 

A Vehicle for Transitioning to the

Host Government

By Raymond A Millen and Carolyn Pruitt

The international community needs to take a new 

approach regarding assistance and development ventures for fragile states. Few would quarrel with the 

view that current methods are incredibly expensive, 

wasteful, susceptible to corruption and less than effective in the long run. Much is written about the necessity of Security Sector Reform, Disaster Response, 

and Humanitarian Assistance as the means to lifting 

struggling states out of the pit of despair. However, 

the vast majority of the literature only numbs the 

reader with laundry lists of goals, considerations, and 

requirements; little is written on how to organize the 

assistance effort. 

There is also a large assumption, not borne out by 

practice, that cooperation and coordination among 

states, among organizations, and even among domestic agencies are frictionless if they all share a common 

goal. Moreover, the literature on Whole of Government and Comprehensive approaches (defined in 

the study) suggests unity of effort among partners is 

a given. In practice, states and organizations do not 

subordinate their interests to other interests easily, so 

unity of effort often suffers correspondingly. Recent 

experience in Afghanistan, particularly in regards to 

provincial reconstruction teams, offers a possible solution to this dilemma.

This monograph proposes the establishment of 

a new unifying assistance and development organization to help fragile states and is divided into five 
2

sections. The first section briefly examines the challenges associated with Whole of Government and 

Comprehensive approaches as well as with provincial 

reconstruction teams. The section concludes with the 

introduction of an organizational paradigm, the Government Assistance Center, designed to amalgamate 

the efforts of all participating donors (states, nongovernment organizations, international organizations, 

government organizations, etc.), rendering assistance 

and development to fragile states at various echelons 

of government.

The second and third sections address the organizational aspects of the Government Assistance Center. Section two proposes a standardized camp design, 

which offers a routinized way for donors physically 

to come together and interface with the host government. The expeditionary design of the Government 

Assistance Center permits swift access to fragile 

states without regard to existing infrastructure, heavy 

equipment, and specialized personnel. The third section describes the essential purpose of the Government Assistant Center and introduces the integrated 

decision-making mechanism, which consists of an integrated planning board, a council, and an implementation coordination board. Transcending the activities 

of a normal headquarters, the mechanism emulates 

the interagency process and seeks innovative, tailored 

solutions to complex problems plaguing a fragile state. 

The fourth section involves issues and caveats 

which Government Assistance Centers must consider 

as they deliberate policy and strategy. In this regard, 

the Center’s council must consider the possible unintended consequences of policies, strategies, and programs when implementing Security Sector Reform 

(Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration; 
3

Rule of Law, Military reform, Police reform, and Economic reform), Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Response, and Counterinsurgency. 

The fifth section proposes a framework in which 

the Government Assistance Centers can be placed 

into practice. Fundamentally, the framework heralds 

an innovative, more efficient method for helping fragile states: greater and more equitable burden-sharing 

among donor states; a mode for all donors, regardless 

of size and resources, to make more meaningful contributions; and a path to end the over-reliance on the 

military for such ventures.

 Ultimately, there should be no illusions regarding the proposal. The international environment is 

complex, random, and chaotic. The domestic environment of host nations requiring assistance is no less 

so. The Government Assistance Center paradigm is 

designed to provide assistance to fragile states without suffering the historical exorbitant costs, wastage, 

and unmanageable corruption. Each Center offers 

a way for international actors to coordinate their actions and cooperate synergistically. The interagency 

process mechanism institutionalizes creative thinking 

for problem solving as well as strategic thinking for 

policy and strategy development. Finally, Government Assistance Centers underscore the sincere commitment of the international community to break the 

cycle of dysfunctional governance. 
4

*Since 1992, the United States has participated in a number 

of peace operations: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and 

Afghanistan (though the last two morphed into counterinsurgencies). Added to these recent experiences is a long history of peace 

and occupation operations: post-Civil War Reconstruction, Philippines, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama among others.

The Collision of Concepts with Reality

Rendering assistance to fragile states is hardly a 

new undertaking for non-government organizations, 

the United Nations, and the United States, so the implementation of stability and humanitarian operations 

should have reached a rather high level of proficiency 

by now.* The reality is less stellar due to the inherent 

complexities of state interventions and the number of 

diverse actors involved. Yet, no prudent alternatives 

are available. Security Sector Reform, Disarmament, 

Demobilization, and Reintegration programs, Disaster Response, and Humanitarian Assistance require 

donors and partners. Without such contributors, the 

United Nations would be reduced to the status of figurehead, and if the United States tried to go it alone, 

it would inevitably exhaust its economy and mental 

stamina as well as risking the legitimacy of its actions. 

Winston Churchill captured the dilemma writing, 

“There is at least one thing worse than fighting with 

allies – And that is to fight without them.” So why is it 

so difficult to work together? The answer is paradoxically both simple and complex.

Within the U.S. federal bureaucracy, it is well understood that differences in organizational cultures 

handicap cooperation and coordination of policy for-
5

mulation and implementation. As strategic theorist 

Rich Yarger explains:

Various departments and agencies are organized differently and each tends to have its own organizational 

culture. That is, each has a set of organizational beliefs and assumptions that color what they perceive 

and how they think and feel about the issues. Organizational theory argues these manifest themselves in 

the way organizations behave, react, and interact externally, such as mission, goals, and control systems, 

and internally, such as language, norms of behavior, 

recognition, censure and status, and power relationships. Thus, each organization has its own values and 

norms and its own physical, behavioral, and verbal 

manifestations. It gets more complicated because 

large organizations have subcultures within them.1

 

Differences in cultures and interests become even 

more pronounced when a nation state collaborates 

with other nation states, international organizations, 

civil society organizations, and host nation governments. In view of these obstacles, it would seem logical 

that a more unilateralist approach, either by a single 

nation state or an organization, is a more efficient and 

effective means of engaging fragile states. However, 

unilateralism is usually reserved for instances of vital 

national interests, and assistance operations rarely if 

ever falls into that realm.

Whole of Government and Comprehensive 

Approaches

For reasons of funding, limited capacity, multiple 

priorities, and legitimacy, multilateral approaches 

to international problems have become the accepted 
6

norm of foreign relations. Predictably, the U.S. government, in its role as a global leader, has embarked 

on conceptualizing multilateral solutions for fragile 

state dysfunctions. Embracing two approaches, the 

Whole of Government and the Comprehensive, the 

United States seeks to create greater unity of effort 

not only among U.S. government departments and 

agencies, but also between the U.S. government and 

international partners. Articulated in FM 3-07 (Stability Operations), the Whole of Government approach 

“integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government 

to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.” The 

emphasis is on collaborative planning for the purpose 

of “achieving the balance of resources, capabilities, 

and activities that reinforce progress,” as well as the 

sharing of limited resources (i.e., financial, military, 

intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, developmental, and strategic communications). Similarly, the 

Comprehensive approach “integrates the cooperative 

efforts of the departments and agencies of the United 

States government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and 

private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward 

a shared goal.” 2† In essence, both approaches imply 

the use of a loose, interagency-like framework to promote greater collaboration among donors as well as 

between donors and the host country.

†

 For simplicity in this monograph, the term, U.S. agencies, 

is used to mean all U.S. departments and agencies. The term, 

donors, is used to include the United States, other nation states, 

intergovernmental organizations (e.g., UN, NATO, OAS, etc.), supranational organizations (e.g., EU, World Trade Organization, 

etc.), private sector firms, private volunteer organizations, contractors, nongovernmental organizations (e.g., ICRC, Amnesty 

International, Doctors Without Borders, etc.) and others involved 

in assistance and development ventures.
7

There seems to be a fairly wide gulf between the 

articulated approaches and practical results though. 

A successful interagency process entails more than 

conducting meetings, exchanging information, and 

setting milestones. Unity of effort—the purpose of the 

process—is the product of consensus and cooperation. 

Consensus is a general agreement (not complete) on a 

decision. Cooperation is the willingness and ability to 

work together towards a common goal. If both consensus and cooperation are complete, then synergistic 

effects directed at an objective suffers little friction. 

Deficiencies in one or both may have a severe impact 

on the success of an enterprise though. If a partner 

disagrees with any aspect of a policy or strategy, the 

motivation to accomplish supporting goals may suffer, especially if that partner begins to experience challenges. Even if consensus is 100 percent, insufficient 

cooperation may doom the undertaking. Here, differences in organizational culture and interests, personality conflicts, misunderstandings, and so on significantly degrade unity of effort disproportionately. 

These differences are daunting but by no means insurmountable. As militaries over millennia have long 

recognized and strived to perfect, organization is the 

most efficient and effective way to achieve results. In 

pursuit of war, organizational structures, procedures, 

and processes are indispensible. Correspondingly, 

the pursuit of assistance and development enterprises are no less complex and sometimes even more 

so. Hence, most problems associated with consensus 

and cooperation are organizational in nature. Achieving sufficient unity of effort from a diverse collection 

of donors is simply unlikely with a decision-making 

system based on informal, ad hoc arrangements. Seeking greater efficiencies through better organization is 
8

a logical recourse, but the idea does not enjoy strong 

appeal outside of the military because of misconceptions about bureaucracy. President Dwight Eisenhower captured this dilemma in the public realm, pointing 

out that people erroneously associate organization 

with rigid bureaucracy: 

To the adult mind “organization” seems to summon 

visions of rigidity and machine-like operation, with an 

inescapable deadly routine and stodginess in human 

affairs. Yet it is not the enemy of imagination or of any 

other attractive human characteristic. Its purpose is 

to simplify, clarify, expedite, and coordinate; it is the 

bulwark against chaos, confusion, delay, and failure. 3

To re-emphasize, organization is not defined by 

meetings dedicated to the exchange of information 

and issuing of tasks; nor is frenetic activity a sign of 

effective organization. Eisenhower suggested that 

organization required a more expansive, holistic approach—a mechanism which integrated the ideas of 

practitioners and subject matter experts, permitted 

candid debate on policy issues and strategy, and assisted in the coordination and implementation of policy decisions. In addition to producing effective policy 

and strategy, the process as Eisenhower viewed it fostered consensus building and cooperation through the 

inculcation of teamwork and camaraderie. 

In view of Eisenhower’s exceptional command experience during and after World War 

II, it is not surprising that the U.S. interagency 

process reached its peak under his Administration’s National Security Council mechanism.4

 The logic of this mechanism is so profound that this 

study (in the interagency process mechanism section) 

makes use of it as the means to invigorate the Whole 

of Government and the Comprehensive approaches.5
9

 Accordingly, the Government Assistance Center is 

the vehicle for an integrated decision-making apparatus to function within the host nation.

Some skeptics might view an interagency-like paradigm as unsuited for the Comprehensive approach, 

suggesting that time honored arrangements, such as 

ad hoc coalitions and alliances, are sufficient to achieve 

greater unity of effort and efficiencies. This is mostly a 

romanticized view of cooperation among donor nations 

and organizations. Invariably, coalitions and alliances 

fall short of expectations, primarily due to divergent 

national interests, organizational agendas, cultural 

norms, and strategic viewpoints, as well as the tendency of smaller partners to sub-optimize contributions.6

 Even during World War II, the Western Allies in Europe experienced substantial rifts which threatened to 

undermine the war effort, and this despite complete 

agreement on the strategic goal of defeating Germany.7

 As addressed earlier, other factors intrude on cooperation and consensus; being part of a coalition does 

not suppress this behavior.

Indubitably, intrusions in the domestic affairs 

of other states in the form of Security Sector Reform 

(SSR), Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration 

(DDR), Disaster Response, and Humanitarian Assistance require just as much organization as a military campaign so as to create order and synchrony 

of activities as well as enhancing the development 

of policy and strategy. Interventions impose tremendous demands on both donors and the host nation. 

Reforms and assistance create winners and losers in a 

host country, result in first and second order of effects 

(i.e., unintended consequences), and can make the 

host nation even more fragile; so donors must have a 

unified policy and strategy to anticipate problems and 

opportunities as well as to shape favorable outcomes. 
10

In terms of an organizational approach, the provincial reconstruction team framework provides a 

starting point from which to craft an expeditionary 

capability for Whole of Government and Comprehensive approaches. 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams—a Good Start

The original intent of provincial reconstruction 

teams (PRT) in Afghanistan was to provide security 

so that development and construction programs could 

take place in a permissive environment. They were 

designed as an interim structure to help improve stability by building up the capacity of the Afghan government to govern, enhance economic viability, and 

deliver essential public services (e.g., security, law 

and order, justice, health care, and education).8

The Teams offered a way for the bulk of U.S. coalition partners and friends to contribute to the assistance 

effort short of war fighting. As provincial reconstruction teams were a novel initiative, the organizational 

structure was rather loose and varied from donor country to donor country. In 2005, analyst Peter Jakobsen 

wrote that the basic PRT structure comprised a headquarters, a civil affairs (CA) team, a civilian-led reconstruction team, an engineer unit, a security unit, military observer teams, interpreters, and a medical team.9

 Although more U.S. agencies (e.g., Department of 

State, USAID, and U.S. Department of Agriculture) 

have since joined PRTs, the camps are essentially run 

by the military. 

In Afghanistan, cooperation between PRTs and 

international/nongovernmental organizations has 

suffered, partly due to the military semblance of PRTs 

and partly due to the competition generated by the 
11

provision of goods and services to local communities. 

According to Barbara Stapleton of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, development and assistance organizations are reluctant to associate with the 

military for fear of endangering their neutral status.10

 As Jakobsen observed, due to criticism and pressure 

from the UN and humanitarian organizations, the 

United States curtailed PRT provision of Humanitarian Assistance and reconstruction as well as quick impact projects. Even civil affairs teams had to limit their 

activities with the civilian population because their 

use of civilian clothes and vehicles blurred the distinction between the military and civilian agencies.11

Aside from this diminished cooperation, another 

frustration for ISAF headquarters (NATO’s International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan is the 

inconsistent performance among provincial reconstruction teams. Whereas a U.S. PRT can depend on 

powerful military forces (i.e., Brigade Combat Teams) 

in its area of operation for security, an allied PRT has 

only a small security contingent (a platoon of around 

thirty soldiers) and a very limited capacity for much 

of anything. Consequently, the ability of allied PRTs 

to support development and assistance programs is 

significantly circumscribed by insufficient capabilities. On top of that, allied PRTs take instructions primarily from their home governments in the form of 

national caveats, so unity of effort among is basically 

an illusion.12

The provincial reconstruction team framework 

represents a solid foundation for the next generation 

of assistance efforts, but changes are needed. Clearly, 

a future organization needs to be disassociated with 

the current term, which connotes a limited mandate 

and too close an association with the military. Hence, 
12

a clean-slate designator is needed to encourage partnering with various organizations. The term “Government Assistant Center” is apt since it conveys a 

unified purpose with the intent of helping states help 

themselves. A further proposal is to break the overuse 

of acronyms, using the abbreviated “Center” rather 

than GAC. 

 Ideally, the organizational design of a Government Assistance Center enhances the international 

community’s ability to render assistance to fragile states quickly, permits greater collaboration 

and coordination among engaged actors, and establishes a framework for the integrated staff process to function effectively. A national level Center 

always deploys first to engage the host government, 

develop policy and strategy, and provide guidance 

on ends, ways, and means to subordinate Centers arriving later. The number of subordinate Centers required largely depends on the mission, complexity, 

and geographic size of the host nation (Figure 1). In 

some cases, two subordinate Centers may suffice to 

support a mission, such as DDR programs; in other 

cases, dozens of subordinate Centers may be needed 

to support a larger effort (i.e., counterinsurgency). 

Fundamentally, the success of the Government AssisFigure 1. Levels of Government Assistance Centers
13

tance Center initiative depends on the number of willing contributors, not only to share the burden, but also 

to gain greater acceptance by fragile states. As the next 

section argues, a Center’s organizational effectiveness 

and efficiency are a product of both the physical structure and the organizational process.

Standardized Camp Design

Similar to provincial reconstruction teams, Centers 

are organized into camps because they have several 

distinct advantages over other methods of deploying 

into a country. Camps can be built rapidly on undeveloped land in or near the national and provincial 

capitals. This precludes the need to locate and rent 

office space, classrooms and other facilities from the 

host nation infrastructure.

The establishment of camps is the international 

community’s first demonstrable commitment of assistance to a host country. The manner in which the camp 

is constructed and laid-out should create a favorable 

impression on the host government and the populace. 

To this end, the construction effort should be highly organized and prompt; the camp should be logically designed, clean, and functional. One of Imperial Rome’s 

great legacies was the army camp, which symbolized 

the organizational power of Rome. Like seeds planted 

throughout the empire, hundreds of Roman camps 

grew into cities over time, a remarkable phenomenon.13 Likewise, Government Assistance Center camps 

should have a standardized design and a dedicated 

engineer support package with the goal of establishing 

a functioning Center in a matter of days (Figure 2).14

 Establishing a physical presence is a discipline, which 

requires thorough preparation. The camp is a reflection of the Center’s professionalism
14

Figure 2. Standardized Camp Design
15

The use of commercial quick-assembly perimeter 

barriers, shelter systems, and plastic floorboards for 

all camp facilities represents a leap forward in establishing camps quickly. Technological advances in 

barriers, shelters, and flooring provide users with durable, easy set-up, and configurable systems to meet 

any need. Because of their light weight and compactness, camp packages can be airlifted into the host nation in a matter of days. Moreover, fewer specialized 

equipment and people are needed to establish a camp. 

Barriers and facilities can be easily disassembled used 

again as needed.15 For power, generators provide ample electricity for the camp, precluding the need to use 

the existing electrical grid (which is usually intermittent and unreliable). Access to assured communications (i.e., cell/satellite phones, internet, and radios) 

is one of the most powerful tools a Center can provide 

to its personnel. Maintenance facilities, motor parks, 

and warehouses provide the necessary logistical support. Extra warehouse capacity is particularly useful 

for potential Disaster Response and Humanitarian 

Assistance. The availability of empty warehouses permits the rapid staging of supplies and equipment in 

the event the host country is affected by a disaster. 

Consequently, camps should be located near airports 

or seaports whenever suitable for logistical access.

Security. Deployments ranging from Humanitarian Assistance to counterinsurgency require security. 

Even without an existential security threat, Centers 

must remain alert to pilferage, robbery, and periodic 

demonstrations. In this regard, there are two kinds of 

security tasks—camp security and excursion security. 

It would be a mistake to try and perform both tasks 

with one security contingent because the attempt leads 

to administrative turmoil and overextends the securi-
16

ty force. Camp security is necessary for the protection 

of personnel and equipment, but using military forces 

in this role gives the camp a military character, which 

in turn might create barriers to cooperation with donor organizations. For this reason, Centers should 

minimize the military presence so as to encourage the 

participation of these organizations in camp activities. 

Consequently, UN designated police forces or private 

security firms have a more benign image and are more 

than sufficient to guard a camp.

Security for excursions to different locales, on the 

other hand, are better handled by military forces since 

these operations tend to be more complex, requiring 

tight planning and robust capabilities. Military forces 

are well adapted to providing security for convoys 

and local community activities (i.e., medical, construction, Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Response, 

etc.). With the exception of post-conflict periods in the 

aftermath of an intervention, the UN will likely have 

the lead in providing security. Even though UN military forces have a more benign image than national 

military forces, including them in the camp garrison 

gives the camp a military character. A better arrangement would be to establish a military base nearby and 

have it interact with the Center as a visitor or as a linkup point with donor organizations. 

To ensure a Center functions as envisioned, camp 

designers need to identify critical offices and facilities. 

While the following list of offices and facilities are not 

exhaustive, they represent a solid foundation for a 

camp.16

Donor and Interagency Process Offices/Rooms. 

Offices for representatives from the Departments 

of State, Justice, and Agriculture (or the equivalent 

ministries of other countries), USAID, mentor teams 
17

(e.g., ministerial, military, and police), and other donor organizations are essential components of any 

Center (Figure 3). For the interagency process bodies, 

two large planning rooms for the integrated planning 

board and the implementation coordination board 

are essential to support the interagency process. The 

council conference room requires a large conference 

table for the director and advisors as well as space for 

chairs along the wall. Occupancy should not exceed 

twenty-five participants though. The interagency support staff requires a large office for about fifty desks 

with computers as well as a few printers and copiers. 

The interagency process coordinator and his/her deputy also have desks there. 

Director’s Office. The director chairs the Council 

of the interagency process mechanism and is the mentor for the host nation executive. The director is expected to make frequent visits to embassies, subordinate Centers, and key organizations. The office should 

have sufficient room to permit private meetings with 

visitors and some seclusion so the director can think 

without interruptions. An anteroom with secretary 

protects the director from unscheduled visitors.

Engineer Office. An integral component of the 

Center is the engineer office. It oversees the construction of camps, manages contracts, and often employs 

local labor. Since the engineers are a military asset, the 

engineer unit should operate from the nearby military camp so as to avoid an overt military association. 

However, the engineer commander and small staff 

would be most effective operating from permanent offices in the Center, while the deputy commander and 

main staff operate out of the military camp.
18

According to Colonel Matt Russell, a former Senior 

Engineer in Iraq (Multi-National Division-North), contracts and construction projects are two critical functions requiring engineer management. Accordingly, 

the engineer office identifies and manages contracting 

requirements in order to facilitate construction of base 

camps. The engineer legal office reviews contracts, 

submittals, modifications, and any amendments. An 

integrated approach by the engineer representatives, 

lawyers and associated contracting personnel enhances timely and accurate construction planning and 

contracting. Essential as well is the inclusion of local 

city and facility management engineers from the host 

nation as early as possible into the contracting and 

construction process. The participation of host nation 

engineers from the government and private sectors 

facilitates and promotes proper and transparent contracting procedures, which help curb corruption and 

establish equitable labor practices.17

For construction projects, the engineer office is 

most appropriate for interacting with nongovernment, 

government, and international organizations as well 

as with local governance officials vis-à-vis construction programs. In this capacity, inspectors from the 

engineer unit ensure the participating organizations 

Figure 3. Donor Representation to Centers
19

and officials provide skills training, hire local labor for 

local projects, and pay fair wage for labor. This approach ensures that local communities retain authority over construction projects and the employment of 

their own citizens. Moreover, ownership is enhanced 

when local government officials, city engineers, private construction firms, and the populace are involved 

in the entire process, from contracting negotiations to 

the actual construction.

In view of the large number of construction projects, the engineer office is the logical choice for managing them. To this end, a weekly projects coordination meeting provides the opportunity for all donors 

to submit project proposals and provide updates on 

current projects. The engineer office can resolve construction conflicts among donor organizations, thereby mitigating redundancies and waste.

Inspector General Office. An inspector general 

office monitors programs and funding, principally 

as a means of mitigating corruption. Rather than being an endemic problem, it is well to understand that 

some level of corruption affects every society. Fragile 

states are normally impoverished, so whenever affluent states deploy into country, it is natural that avarice 

would grip the host government and population. An 

unregulated influx of money, even under the auspices 

of assistance, can exacerbate corruption to unmanageable levels. The inspector general also attends the 

weekly assistance projects coordination meetings.

Public Affairs Office. The good work performed 

by Centers is of interest to domestic and host nation 

populations. Successful deployments, widely reported in the media and receiving approval is a superb 

recruiting tool and an incentive for prospective donor 

states to contribute to Centers. The public affairs of-
20

fice enhances national will and legitimacy within the 

host nation and more broadly among populations 

internationally. The Center director should consider 

the impact of the media when formulating policy and 

strategy, but should take care that public affairs not 

degenerate into propaganda, since this can backfire 

and might be illegal.

Camp Supervisor Office. The camp supervisor is 

responsible for camp operations and maintenance. 

The supervisor is the final arbiter of camp related issues, ensuring the camp runs smoothly. A small staff 

provides administrative support for directives and 

communications.

Land Management Office. Although it may seem 

trivial compared to the myriad of tasks engineers must 

accomplish, land management of the camp becomes a 

crucial concern as the camp grows. Each camp needs a 

land management office to plan and monitor camp expansion in an orderly manner. Experience in Afghanistan suggests that inattention to land management can 

lead to frequent, time-consuming shuffling of offices, 

facilities, and accommodations as the camp expands. 

Housing Office. The housing office manages room 

assignments and guest quarters. Tight control of accommodations lessens the occurrences of squatters, 

people departing with room keys, over-crowding, and 

vacant rooms. The number of offices, lavatories, and 

accommodations is predicated on the mission, but the 

camp should be large enough to accommodate internal expansion. The housing office collaborates with 

the land management office when camp expansion is 

considered.

Communications Center. The lifeblood of the 

Center is communications because access to real-time 

information is an imperative—knowledge generates 
21

power. The federal level Center requires powerful and 

varied communications in order to interact with the 

subordinate Centers operating throughout the host 

country. Having both FM and AM radios assures communications regardless of terrain restrictions. Satellite 

linkage is required for internet access, which permits 

personnel to search for information, email, contact 

government departments and agencies for queries, 

teleconferencing, and virtual conference rooms. Cell 

phones are a convenient way to communicate, but experience suggests that service and coverage might be 

erratic. Satellite phones are a good back-up, but due to 

their expense, should only be used when other means 

of communication are not available. The communications facility requires enough trained radio operators 

to operate on a 24-hour schedule. The communications facility also creates and issues cards with Center 

radio frequencies, call-signs, key telephone numbers, 

and dialing information. As a technique for alerting 

personnel in the field, the communications facility 

could use cell phone texting capability for emergency 

messages and instructions. Lastly, trained information technology technicians are essential to the maintenance of all communications systems.

Internet Station. A community internet station is 

an essential commodity for the Center. The internet 

permits personnel to conduct independent research, 

supplementing normal support from their parent organizations. Assistance and development organizations, most notably NGOs, often do not have access to 

the Internet, so the internet station provides additional incentive for their personnel to visit the Center and 

collaborate on activities. Host nation officials should 

be encouraged to use the station for official research 

and discovery learning. It also provides an opportu-
22

nity for host government officials to escape the local 

politics for a while and converse confidentially with 

their Center mentors or advisors. 

Motor Pool. The motor pool office manages positive control, security, and maintenance of vehicles. In 

coordination with the land management office, the 

motor pool office organizes designated parking spaces as well as the convoy staging area. Without close 

management of vehicle parking, the fuel point, and 

dispatch procedures, the camp shall suffer from endless congestion and loss of control over vehicles.

Supply. The supply office manages the ordering, 

receipt, and storage of supplies, including warehouse 

management. Pilferage, waste, and fraud become rife 

when supply operations are not closely attended to. 

Excess warehouses are prudent in anticipation of natural or manmade disasters, requiring the staging of 

humanitarian relief and assistance. The future is unpredictable, but Centers should anticipate some type 

of disaster occurring and have the flexibility to react 

to it. Additionally, a secure area for sensitive items 

storage containers is needed for safeguarding money, 

specialized equipment, and ammunition. Safeguarding funds, which can range into the millions of dollars, 

is an important issue. The camp needs funds for camp 

maintenance and operations; development and assistance teams need funds for projects; training teams 

need funds to pay salaries, purchase equipment, 

As the preceding paragraphs reveal, a Center requires significant support personnel for the operation 

and maintenance of a camp. A typical Center should 

comprise several hundred personnel if Whole of Government and the Comprehensive approach are properly engaged. 
23

The Raison D’être of Government Assistance 

Centers

In one dimension, Government Assistance Centers permit U.S. government agencies to connect with 

the host government in a formal, organized manner. 

In another, other donors (e.g., countries, organizations, groups, etc.) can connect through the Centers 

and into the host government in a coherent manner as 

well (Figure 4.). In this sense, Centers are analogous 

to transformers, which permit electronic devices from 

one country to work in another country. Centers harmonize and coordinate the plethora of assistance and 

development efforts proffered to the host nation, all 

the while ensuring the host nation government is not 

overwhelmed. Centers permit donors to communicate 

with one voice (or at least not a cacophony), understand where they fit in the overall strategy, and think 

like a corporate body. Over and above the rudimentary tasks of assistance, development, and mentoring, Centers engage in strategic and critical thinking. 

They formulate policies and strategies which address 

Figure 4. Center-Host Government Interaction
24

host root causes a, develop plans aimed at resolving 

or mitigating specific obstacles, and coordinate the 

implementation of the various programs aligned with 

the policy. 

What Centers bring to a fragile state is important 

because care must be taken to avoid creating an organization which becomes an end in itself—a self-licking 

ice cream cone so to speak. The ultimate purpose of 

each Center is to set the conditions for its departure 

from the host country, and not become overly committed to success, to the point it loses perspective. In 

this sense, Centers serve as the vehicle for the eventual 

transition of responsibilities to the host government. 

As a caveat, Centers must avoid creating dependency 

between the host nation and donors. Similarly, Centers should not see themselves as the host nation’s salvation, creating the belief that withdrawal will lead to 

the political or economic collapse. Both conditions are 

a recipe for eventual state failure.

The appropriate officials from the federal level 

Center should meet with their host nation counterparts to create an informal contract, establishing a 

cooperative roadmap for assistance (i.e., timetables, 

guidelines, and programs). Centers are the vehicle for 

self-help, but if the host nation cannot or will not assume responsibility, then the stated policy should be 

the withdrawal of all Centers until the host government (or its successor) is willing to meet its obligations. Withdrawal is always a difficult (and political) 

decision, especially after the investment of substantial 

time, money, and resources into the enterprise, so the 

President (or UN Secretary General) should empower 

the federal level Center director with the authority to 

withdraw. For this reason, even before the Centers arrive, the appropriate representative (e.g., ambassador, 
25

UN special envoy, etc.) should sit with the host nation 

chief executive and review the roadmap for the Centers. 

Creating Synergist Effects through the Integrated 

Decision-making Process

The core of each center is its strategic thinking 

mechanism. According to Rich Yarger, strategic thinking comprises five competencies—critical thinking, 

systems thinking, creative thinking, thinking in time, 

and ethical thinking.18 Each competency is important 

for policy and strategy formulation. For an in-depth 

examination of strategic thinking, Rich Yarger’s Strategy and the National Security Professional, and Colin 

Gray’s Modern Strategy are excellent resources. The 

product of strategic thinking is policy and strategy 

articulated as goals, resources, and methods (ends, 

ways, and means). Moreover, each policy or strategy 

decision must be tested for feasibility, acceptability, 

and suitability. 

The mechanism mobilizes the decision-making 

process in pursuit of the following: 1) permit the orderly input, discussion, and integration of issues and 

ideas into policy papers for Council consideration; 

2) establish a forum in which policy and strategy are 

scrutinized, debated, and developed in an unequivocal, definitive matter; and 3) coordinate and assist with 

the implementation of directives as well as providing 

a feedback mechanism for the Center’s attention. The 

federal level Center develops policy and strategy, 

whereas subordinate Centers refer to this policy and 

strategy for development of lower level strategy and 

planning. To be clear, the integrated staffing process 

seeks to harmonize the interactions associated with 
26

Whole of Government and the Comprehensive approaches so as to establish rational, consistent policies 

and strategy. On one hand, the process is complicated and subject to immense friction. But on the other 

hand, attempting to develop policy and strategy in an 

ad hoc, disjointed manner exchanges the complex for 

chaos and cosmetic solutions.

The director has the enormous task of making the 

integrated decision-making process function. The 

principal and immediate task of the director is to create a corporate body from the various and diverse donors engaged in the enterprise. Promoting teamwork 

is accomplished through the inclusive atmosphere 

fostered by the interagency process. Realistically, not 

all personalities are suited for teamwork, so selection 

of key personnel is critical. Since the selection process 

is not infallible, the director should have the authority 

to remove people who are incorrigible, parochial, or 

disruptive. On a similar note, pessimism and disparaging remarks about people or organizations are contagious and poison relations. The director must exude 

confidence and optimism, and demand subordinates 

follow suit. In this regard, challenges and problems 

must be addressed as objectives rather than insurmountable obstacles.

As the prime mover of all Center activities, the 

choice of Center director requires careful consideration. In that directors must translate higher policy 

into concrete plans and implementation, they should 

possess acute executive management skills. For the 

federal-level Center, the director should be a retired 

senior grade officer or former governor due to the political and strategic responsibilities of the position. For 

subordinate Centers, retired field grade officers and 

former mayors have the requisite skills to manage 
27

planning and implementation of policy and strategy.19

 Proper recruitment in terms of advertising the position, salary and benefits, and interviews is essential 

for placing quality executives as directors. An executive management course for selected leaders provides 

the basis for work requirements. At the federal-level 

Center, the director’s main focus is to ensure the staffing process provides him with integrated information 

for policy and strategy formulation. At subordinate 

level Centers, directors focus more on planning and 

implementation of higher policy and strategy. 

In appearance and action, the Center is both impartial and non-partisan so that cultural differences 

among organizations and government agencies are 

mollified to the point that cooperation and coordination can occur. The Center should encourage key organizations to provide representatives, offering office 

space with official internet accounts and accommodations in the camp. Having a secure place to work, 

sleep, conduct hygiene, and associate with others during off duty hours is an effective way to build working relationships. Most important, the Center should 

encourage key host nation government officials to 

come to the camp weekly to meet privately with mentors, functional experts, and conduct research on the 

internet. These visits do not replace the normal mentor visits to their counterparts, but they do provide 

a respite from the machinations of their government 

bureaucracy and may accelerate the transition to host 

government ownership.

The integrated decision-making mechanism is the 

Center’s locomotion that gives its meetings true relevance and means for action. Without a well designed 

decision-making mechanism, meetings become nothing more than exchanges of information. Now, in-
28

formation by itself does nothing if there is no way to 

make use of it. The mechanism’s effectiveness hinges 

on organizational structure, processes, and procedures to foster thorough preparation of integrated issue papers for discussion, to establish a staff routine 

to manage the workload, to provide the key advisors 

and decision-makers with the time to reflect before 

acting on policy, and to provide the Center with a way 

to monitor implementation of policies and programs 

as well as assisting in coordination.

In view of their different responsibilities and roles, 

the federal-level Center focuses on policy and strategy development, while subordinate Centers focus on 

lower level strategy, planning, and implementation. 

Nevertheless, the decision-making mechanism for all 

remains essentially the same. Structurally, the mechanism comprises the integrated planning board, the 

council, and the implementation coordination board. 

The integrated planning board, the council, implementation coordination board, and supporting staff 

represent the brain trust of the Center. The personnel 

comprising these bodies are dedicated to making the 

decision-making process function as designed, so success hinges on their ability to work as a team.

Integrated Planning Board. The integrated planning board prepares policy and strategy issues for the 

council to review and debate. The composition of the 

board depends largely on the Center’s mission (e.g., 

DDR, SSR, Humanitarian Assistance, and Disaster 

Response). Board members should be deputies to the 

principal advisors sitting on the council. Board members must have the authority to request information 

from their parent organizations (i.e., U.S. federal government, UN, and head offices) in the development 

of written products. The deputies keep their princi-
29

pal bosses apprised of progress on issues so they are 

aware of the other perspectives, disagreements, and 

challenges that arise during the process.

The development of papers for council consideration is not a bureaucratic paper drill. First, the integrated staff process and discussions within the board 

harmonize the diverse organizational terms and concepts into a common vocabulary, perhaps one of the 

most important and difficult, but worthwhile, tasks 

of the board. Coming to a common understanding 

of words, acronyms, and concepts avoids misunderstandings, ambiguity, and confusion. The board 

should use the following truism of bureaucracy: that 

which can be misinterpreted, will be. 

Second, the process of integrating ideas, viewpoints, and guidance into papers sparks debate, bargaining, and compromise below the council level. If 

the deputies can reach consensus regarding a course 

of action, they can forward the paper to the council 

for review and agreement. If the disagreements cannot be resolved, then the paper should list the points 

of disagreement in parallel columns for the council to 

debate and resolve. Needless to say, the deputies are 

continuously conferring with their parent organization and the council principals during this process, so 

all concerned with a certain policy or strategy are educated on the issues at hand and able to provide input. 

Third, the board provides the council with papers 

in an orderly and measured manner, perhaps three 

to four papers per council meeting. Additionally, papers should have a concise standard format for ease 

of reading and gleaning of important facts. Generally, 

the format might be organized as follows: general 

background, goals, courses of action, estimated costs, 

and relevant supporting documents. The general 
30

background section is drawn from pertinent intelligence as well as executive summaries of studies. The 

objectives section articulates the specific issue goals, 

ensuring they are aligned with higher level objectives. 

The courses-of-action section articulates detailed 

guidance for implementation. This section will likely 

be area where most disagreements emerge and hence 

the focus of debate. An appendix on anticipated costs 

establishes a paper trail for expenditures, forcing the 

Centers to focus on the budget and advising the host 

government on anticipated costs. Finally, attached 

supporting documents provide greater details to consider during the council discussions.

Fourth, the integrated planning board has an exhausting work schedule, with established meetings 

three times weekly so as to provide polished papers to 

the Center council. Board members expend substantial time requesting information or guidance as well 

as keeping their bosses and parent organizations informed. Due to sensitivities, it would be more prudent 

not to have military personnel actively involved in 

producing papers. However, a few military representatives (e.g., Civil Affairs, engineers, and intelligence) 

should be present at the meetings to provide the military perspective. The military should attach a formal 

military statement to each policy paper on the security 

implications and requirements.

Fifth, the entire integrated decision-making process needs a coordinator who supervises the running 

of both boards and the council. The integrated process 

coordinator chairs the integration planning board, so 

as to manage the long term schedule for policy papers, 

serve as the honest broker during discussions, supervise the production of papers, and keep the director 

apprised of all pertinent issues and points for the up-
31

coming council meeting. The coordinator distributes 

upcoming papers to council members for review 48 

hours prior to the scheduled council meeting. 

The Council. The council comprises the director 

(chairman) and the core principal advisors. Although 

predicated on the type of mission, generally, the principal advisors include representatives from the State 

Department, USAID, Department of Agriculture, UN, 

Engineers, Civil Affairs, and other donor representatives as appropriate (e.g., NGOs, IOs). The host nation 

government’s executive (e.g., president, prime minister, or governor) should attend the weekly meetings 

as well. While it is important that the host government 

understand the reasoning behind decisions, its executive should also be exposed to the interagency-like 

process and the conduct of meetings.

The director may open the meeting by having a 

designated security analyst from the integrated support staff provide a short situation update. Although 

the director chairs the meetings, the process coordinator acts as the manager so as to facilitate the agenda. 

As such, the coordinator introduces each issue paper, 

summarizing the issues and highlighting the disagreements. The sleek format and early distribution 

of the papers educates the members of the issues at 

hand to prompt informed discussion. The coordinator 

recognizes members to speak (with the tacit approval 

of the director), and places a time limit on individual 

viewpoints so as to facilitate the discourse. When the 

discussion has run its course, the coordinator summarizes what has been discussed, the areas of agreement, 

and the areas of disagreement. If agreement has been 

reached regarding policy or strategy action, the director may verbalize his decision on the spot.
32

 At the conclusion of the meeting, the coordinator 

summarizes the discussion and the decisions made. 

The verbal review reinforces what has transpired at 

the meeting and permits participants to ask for clarifications. Experience suggests that misunderstandings 

often arise if no verbal summary is given. After the 

meeting, the coordinator produces a written policy 

action directive for council members to review and 

comment on before the director signs it into policy. 

In this manner, decisions and the background context 

are firmly fixed in the minds of the participants. 

Incidentally, for contentious issues or irreconcilable differences within the council, the director bears 

the burden of decision, knowing full well that many 

officials will remain dissatisfied with a decision and 

continue to argue their points. A technique that the 

director might use is to make decisions on contentious issues outside of the council. The director can 

retain freedom of action by discussing the issue with 

an inner circle of advisors and then weigh the alternatives in private before making a decision. Resorting 

to an inner circle for discussing sensitive issues also 

minimizes the risk of premature leaks. Regardless of 

the decision process, the director has the coordinator 

produce a policy action directive (as before) and distribute it among the council members for review and 

comment. In this manner, council members will know 

that their viewpoints received a fair hearing even if 

they were not accepted in part or whole.

The size of a meeting should generally be limited 

to around 15 people in order to foster an intimate 

atmosphere, where advisors can speak frankly and 

comfortably without fear of their views being leaked. 

However, the director can occasionally invite outside 

specialists to council meetings to provide greater ex-
33

pertise for the deliberations. This membership ceiling 

should not preclude the use of experts, consultation 

committees, or the like from presenting their views 

for specific issues. Outside expertise brings fresh perspectives and greater depth to policy challenges, so it 

should be sought out whenever feasible. Often times, 

visiting experts can brief their studies to the council, 

which can debate the issue in private. Ultimately, the 

coordinator is responsible for controlling the number 

of participants but is only authorized to expand the 

membership at the request of the director. 

Implementation Coordination Board. Like the 

integrated planning board, the members of the implementation coordination board should be deputies to 

the principal advisors sitting on the council. Board 

members must have the authority to assist and coordinate actions for the policy or strategy implementers. 

Coordination involves informing relevant government agencies and donor organizations of a policy 

project and persuading them to assist the lead agency 

on a policy project. The implementation coordination 

board also has the task of ensuring the policy directive 

does not conflict or undermine existing policy or new 

policy from higher echelons.

Although the implementation coordination board 

monitors and reports back to the council on the progress of policy projects, it should not be used to prod or 

demand results from government agencies and donor 

organizations. Rather, it should be perceived as an 

agent for assistance rather than a bureaucratic oppressor. The board also serves as a conduit for feedback 

from the field to the integrated planning board and 

to the council, either for good ideas (best practices) 

or obstacles encountered in the implementation of a 

policy project. If success is to be achieved, the council 
34

must understand why something is not working and 

consider corrective actions.

Integrated Support Staff. The integrated support 

staff provides administrative and some subject matter 

expertise to the integrated planning board, council and 

implementation coordination board. The staff should 

comprise around fifty functional and geographic experts, producing issue papers, policy and strategy 

directives, and special projects. Their functional and 

geographic expertise assists in the development of issue papers in addition to integrating the ideas of policy board members. Care should be taken that the staff 

does not replace or marginalize the policy board members in terms of considering all ideas and viewpoints. 

The chief of staff and the coordinator ensure the staff 

remains in its lane. Additionally, the staff reviews and 

prepares new ideas for the interagency coordinator to 

schedule on the agenda. The chief of staff serves as the 

coordinator’s deputy and attends all planning board 

and council meetings.

Processing Policy and Strategy Ideas

The council for the federal-level Center most often 

begins the interagency process with a review of a UN 

strategic assessment, UN Mission Concept, or perhaps 

a country team assessment. Theoretically, one of these 

documents provides the broad guidance for the development of ends, ways, and means concerning Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilization, 

and Reintegration. The federal-level Center provides 

the subordinate Centers (i.e., provincial or city) with 

policy and strategy directives as a catalyst for them to 

formulate supporting strategy and planning.
35

As operations and programs begin to mature, 

practitioners can provide feedback on progress, problems, local solutions, and general feedback through 

the appropriate Center’s implementation coordination board. This process serves as an important source 

for new policy ideas and refinements to strategy. 

Of course, ideas which arise from discussions in the 

Council, the integrated planning board, or the implementation coordination board can be submitted to 

the support staff for the integrated planning board to 

examine. At times, an issue or cluster of issues may 

be too complex for the Councils to consider properly. 

The authority to request the specialized perspectives 

of experts, academics, or analysts can provide a tremendous service, either as individuals or as part of a 

study committee. The point is, the interagency process 

is not a closed system, churning out policy decrees 

without thought. For practical solutions to problems, 

Centers must serve as clearing houses for innovative 

solutions.

To emphasize, at the interpersonal level, the inclusive nature of generating policy ideas fosters a sense 

of teamwork and accomplishment. People are more 

apt to support a policy if they are part of the process, 

particularly if their ideas are embraced in the process. 

Even if their ideas are not incorporated, people have 

the satisfaction that their ideas are given a fair hearing. 

Camaraderie develops naturally as a result of working 

together over an extended time. This is not to say that 

personal frictions won’t arise, that is highly improbable, but working within a group creates familiarity 

which helps overcome cultural barriers, differences in 

vocabulary, and prejudices. 

The interagency system permits the director to 

retain flexibility with policy and strategy as well as 
36

shielding him from political sniping and ex parte attempts to influence decisions. By officially discussing 

policy issues only in the council forum, it is much more 

difficult for people to influence decisions through furtive encounters. On the other hand, the director is free 

to meet informally with whomever for advice. The 

inclusive, integrated nature of developing policy and 

strategy opens all sides of the argument for council 

members to consider, so when the director makes a 

decision, it is exceedingly difficult for critics to describe the policy as arbitrary or parochial. Some issues 

will be too sensitive for an early commitment, so the 

director can use the process to delay the decision (i.e., 

calling for the formation of a committee to study the 

matter more) as a means to following a hazardous 

course.

Policy and Strategy Considerations

As Centers begin developing policy and strategy, 

they must remain sensitive to the implications and 

multi-ordered effects of decisions. Policy and strategy 

formulation must address the specific strategic effects 

desired. Solutions which address only the immediate problem tend not to consider possible unintended 

consequences. Good intentions are not a justification 

for programs. Accordingly, the Center council and director must study the potential impact of policy and 

strategy on the political structure, society, the economy, rule of law, and security institutions. An overriding principle by which all Centers should abide 

is “First, Do No Harm.” The following paragraphs 

touch on some considerations the council and director 

should bear in mind when deliberating on policy and 

strategy.
37

Security Sector Reform. By definition Security Sector Reform (SSR) is “the set of policies, plans, programs, 

and activities that a government undertakes to improve 

the way it provides safety, security, and justice.”20

 By implication, security sector reform involves policy 

and strategy at the highest levels as well as the subordinate strategies, plans, and programs in support. It 

is critical to bear in mind that although SSR is highly 

intrusive in the domestic affairs of a state, it is initiated at the request of the host country and designed 

as a self-help mechanism. Security sector reform deals 

primarily with four areas of collaboration— Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR); Rule 

of Law; Military Reform; and Police Reform. As a matter of practice, the federal level Center should deploy 

first to the country’s capital in order to engage the host 

government in the planning and formulation of policy 

and strategy. Thereafter, the number of subordinate 

Centers needed is contingent on the mission, which in 

turn is shaped by the geographic size of the host country, the population, and the access to remote areas. 

Building confidence and cooperation with the host 

government largely depends on the degree to which 

the international assistance effort is organized and 

ready to begin work. Government Assistance Centers 

can provide this capability because they are structured to deepen cooperation and coordination among 

donors as well as between donors and the host nation. 

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. Although Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is a subset of Security Sector Reform, 

it serves as the primary driver. It follows logically that 

if DDR falters, progress in SSR is likely to stagnate. Ideally, DDR does not begin until after a peace agreement 

between the host government and rebels is in effect. Be-
38

cause implementation of a lasting peace is contingent 

on trust, the host government requests UN assistance 

with implementation. The challenges inherent in DDR 

militate against an ad hoc, under-resourced intervention, though that is the traditional UN approach.21

 Government Assistance Centers can mitigate common problems with DDR through better coordination 

of effort, providing comprehensive progress reports to 

donors, and adapting policy and strategy to the changing situation. As a matter of pragmatism, a minimum 

of three Centers should oversee DDR, with the federal 

level Center interacting with the transitional government and establishing the joint monitoring committee 

for the ceasefire and peace agreement as well as the 

national commissions for DDR, elections, truth and 

reconciliation. The subordinate DDR Centers administer the DDR cantonments directly (Figure 5). It is 

worth noting that the Center should represent neutral 

ground for all factions in order to foster greater trust 

in the proceedings. The Center does not have command and control over the UN security forces, so liaison officers might be desirable to improve situational 

awareness and greater coordination. 

As obvious as it may seem, the task of the federal 

level Center is to determine the multi-order effects of 

conducting DDR if no peace agreement is in the making or if no security forces are immediately available 

to fill the security vacuum. Note that the conflict in Afghanistan became more acute in part due to a premature execution of DDR. There was no peace agreement 

or surrender on the part of the Taliban government, 

so only the Afghan Militia Forces (mostly from the 

Northern Alliance) started DDR at the end of 2003. It 

should have been no surprise (although it apparently 

was) that the Taliban, criminal organizations, and lo-
39

cal power brokers seeped into the security vacuum. 

Thus, a peace agreement and the availability of police 

for the local communities are key factors for the initiation of DDR.

The subordinate Centers focus on the DDR activities for the government forces and the anti-government forces respectively. As a prudent measure, a 

zone of separation is established in the ceasefire, so 

each Center should be located where it can implement 

DDR most effectively (but not in the zone of separation). The DDR Centers have the daunting task of 

processing former combatants through one or more 

cantonments. Time and action are critical components 

during the ceasefire, so each Center needs to supervise 

Figure 5. Centers Supporting DDR
40

the swift construction of cantonments, which like the 

Center camps should have a uniform design for ease 

of construction. Cantonments should also exploit new 

technologies with barrier and shelter systems so they 

may be constructed swiftly and wherever needed (Figure 6).22 As a practical matter, former combatants safeguard and run their own cantonments with the DDR 

personnel organizing the process. Former combatants 

should be employed and paid for camp construction, 

operations, and maintenance as a means to keep them 

occupied even before DDR processing begins. Some 

key considerations for cantonment design highlight 

the complexities of DDR:

• Weapon storage facility

• Weapons turn-in point for weapons earmarked 

for destruction

• In-processing facility to determine the status of 

former combatants (e.g., war service, medical, 

personal data, etc.)

• Barracks for single males

• Barracks for single females

• Barracks for families, segregated by whole, single parents, adolescent parents, and pregnancies.

• Barracks for male child soldiers

• Barracks for female child soldiers

• Barracks for handicapped or severely injured 

soldiers
41

• Male and female Lavatories

• Medical facility

• School house

• Vocational and life skills training facility

• Workshop

• Multifunctional facility (e.g., worship, truth 

and reconciliation hearings, social events, etc.)

• Dining facility

• Sports field (doubles as ceremony parade 

ground)

The weapon storage facility is a confidence-building measure for each faction. If the cantonment commanders agree to have the facility locked, they retain 

possession of the key. DDR personnel encourage the 

turn-in of excess or specific weapons/munitions for 

destruction. As a caveat, there should be no cash-forweapons program since this may subvert the DDR 

process. The turn-in point for weapons and munitions 

earmarked for destruction should be outside of the 

cantonment and far enough away for safe detonation. 

Only specialists (unexploded ordinance or engineers) 

should destroy munitions.
42

Figure 6. DDR Cantonment
43

The in-processing facility serves to determine the 

status of former combatants. DDR personnel need to 

verify individual claims of service, including those 

who provided service support or are family members 

of soldiers. DDR personnel must deal with the delicate 

issue of sex slaves, forced marriages, and child soldiers. Some females of forced marriages may wish to 

remain with their spouses and others will not. Former 

sex slaves may not wish to return to their village due 

to the cultural stigma, so DDR personnel may need to 

find a relative in another village willing to take them 

in. DDR personnel also must determine whether villages want child soldiers back (some child soldiers 

have done horrendous things, so it becomes a consideration) or else find a relative in another village.

Medical exams are essential in view of the rampant cases of sexually transmitted diseases, infectious 

illnesses, injuries, and disabilities. In view of the potential numbers requiring medical care, a surge of 

medical personnel (ideally from the host nation) may 

be required during the initial period. Quarantine barracks may be required for contagious people, which 

in turn expands the number of medical personnel 

needed for care.

The segregation of former combatants within the 

cantonment has positive implications. It helps weaken 

the grip rebel commanders have on their soldiers, especially child soldiers. Segregation cuts down on sexual-related incidents and predatory practices. Families 

(particularly very young parents) can provide greater 

support to each other in this environment as well. In 

this manner, former soldiers gradually begin to take 

charge of their lives rather than taking orders from 

their former commanders.
44

Handicapped soldiers may require barracks accommodating their disability (e.g., entrance ramps, 

wider living spaces, modified lavatory plumbing fixtures, etc.) as well as being fitted with prosthetic limbs 

and the like.

Because child soldiers have had their education 

interrupted for years, school becomes a critical factor 

in their rehabilitation since it is a symbolic return to 

normalcy. Additionally, special counseling for child 

soldiers may be warranted to determine if they are 

suffering from psychological problems, such as post 

traumatic stress disorder among other syndromes. 

Adult vocational training must reflect the economy 

of the country, reflect the soldier’s likely and potential, and not flood the market with specific vocations. 

For instance, teaching carpentry in a country of adobe 

buildings is hardly useful; a soldier may earnestly aspire to be a mechanical engineer, but he must get an 

education first; and training an army of masons will 

hardly make this vocation a viable livelihood. Similarly, soldiers require life skills training so they may 

function in society. Skills like cooking, paying for 

items in a store, applying for a job, and maintaining a 

household help them make the transition to a normal 

life.

The workshop is useful for putting newly trained 

skills to use. As such, former combatants can make 

improvements and repairs to the cantonment, keep 

them occupied, and reinforce the skills they have recently acquired. Constant improvements to the camp 

create pride in accomplishments and can serve as the 

basis for former combatants to start up their own businesses. 

A garden permits DDR trainers to instruct on farming techniques. Likewise, a barn might also be built 
45

to teach husbandry and other related programs. DDR 

personnel should be chary of equipment and techniques which the society cannot sustain or maintain 

properly. Simple equipment and techniques are more 

practical. DDR personnel might explore assisting new 

farmers acquire land in their village areas as well.

As a capstone to these programs, DDR trainers 

should offer tools and material for sale to the graduates, not to make a profit, but to instill a sense of value 

in the items. This study examines this idea at the end 

of the section.

The multifunctional facility should be viewed as 

a place for religious and social interaction. If possible 

and culturally acceptable, things like board games, 

arts and crafts, and other activities encourage former 

soldiers and their families to interact in a social manner. The truth and reconciliation trials are essential 

for the rehabilitation of soldiers who have committed 

atrocities. DDR personnel do not pass judgment on 

soldiers suspected of committing atrocities; the facility provides a venue for the UN and the host nation to 

address these issues in a neutral environment. To this 

end, mobile courts from the responsible Center visits 

the cantonment to conduct the trials.

The dining facility permits former combatants 

to practice their culinary skills under the supervision of their vocational trainers. This type of work is 

classified as multi-purpose in that running a kitchen 

involves interrelated skill sets (e.g., inventory, ordering or shopping, menu preparation, nutrition, meal 

preparation, kitchen maintenance, sanitation, etc.). If 

approached properly, the dining facility can become 

one of the most important places for various aspects of 

vocational training to come together, and a place run 

almost entirely by former soldiers.
46

The sports field permits former soldiers to channel 

their energy through organized activities. DDR personnel need only to organize teams, explain the game 

rules to the referees, and provide the equipment. The 

sports field also doubles as a ceremony field. Ceremonies are exceedingly important in most cultures, providing a sense of importance to the individual. DDR 

personnel must provide certificates to individuals for every accomplishment (vocational and life skills training, 

sports champions, best barracks, best culinary activity, 

DDR processing, etc.). Above all else, DDR personnel 

absolutely need the capability to design and produce 

certificates rapidly.

The aforementioned passages only address some 

of the complexities associated with DDR and serve 

to underscore the necessity of organization. One of 

the frustrations associated with DDR is the issue of 

funding. The federal level Center council should remain alert to funding issues during the DDR process. 

Donors may curtail or stop funding for a variety of 

reasons, so the council must exploit ways to maximize 

funding while it exists. A post-conflict opportunity 

may capture the UN’s attention today, only to be forgotten a few months later by a new crisis—money and 

resources are always limited. If the Center can legitimately reduce expenses without undercutting DDR 

objectives, then it might be able to continue DDR programs to fruition.

Rule of Law. Arguably, Rule of Law issues may 

have the greatest strategic impact on the stability of 

the host nation, starting with the federal constitution.23 The constitution is the social contract between 

the central government and the citizens. However, 

it is not enough for the social contract to guarantee 

the protection of inalienable rights. As the American 
47

Founding Fathers recognized, democratic political 

systems often fail due to the confluence of innate human imperfections and the insatiable quest for power. 

Invariably this combination erodes freedom to the 

point that a tyranny emerges. At this point, a cycle of 

tyranny, rebellion, and anarchy ensues that is not easily broken. Thus, in order for sovereignty to remain 

vested in the people, a structure system of checks and 

balances is provident. The separation of political institutions (i.e., executive, legislative, and judicial) sharing powers is necessary to prevent the accumulation 

of power in any one branch. Structurally, each branch 

needs the concurrence or involvement of at least one 

other branch to conduct the business of government. 

Similarly, limiting the power of the federal government by devolving all power not specifically vested 

in the central government to local governments and 

the individual is just as important. The implications 

of limited federal government are profound. Except 

for national security threats, local government and 

individuals are responsible for local security and selfprotection respectively. Paradoxically, guaranteeing 

the right of self-preservation though an armed populace serves to quell predatory practices of criminals. 

Local government officials are more accountable to 

their communities as well as responsible for services 

and social reform when they are elected from below 

and not through appointments from above.

Theoretically, if the political system stands as a sentinel to individual freedoms, there should be no need 

to provide a listing of rights; but if citizens demand 

a listing of rights as insurance against encroaching 

government, they should be limited only to inalienable rights (i.e., property, self preservation, and free 

speech) and avoid utopian declarations. Compare the 
48

logic of the inalienable rights to property and to free 

speech with the utopian rights to education and not 

to live in poverty. In view of the specialized nature of 

crafting a constitution, the federal level Center should 

deploy with constitutional scholars to work closely 

with host nation officials in the creation of an enduring social contract. These scholars must report back 

to the UN on their satisfaction or concerns with the 

constitution. Structural flaws which have a negative 

impact on the separation of powers must be noted and 

tied to the future funding of programs.

Judicial reform requires a holistic, long-term program. A balance among law enforcement, the court 

system, and detention operations is essential; a weakness in one militates against a solid system of law 

and order. Accordingly, judicial reform takes years to 

function in ways that do not violate individual rights. 

A dysfunctional criminal justice system seriously undermines the underpinnings of society if graft, bribery, 

intimidation, and murder supplant justice. In such an 

environment, societal reaction can be highly destabilizing with mob rule, vigilantism, and vengeance 

creating a cycle of continual violence. Judicial reform 

exemplifies the interconnectivity of SSR nodes, since 

a weakness here has an immediate deleterious impact 

on the other programs. Subordinate Centers can assist 

judicial reform effectively by providing office space 

for legal experts, human rights lawyers, and mentors. Centers might serve as a secure venue for mobile 

courts for adjudicating legal cases in dangerous areas.

Police Reform. Police reform is complex in that 

it consists of so many diverse roles and responsibilities (i.e., national, border, specialty, and community). 

Unlike military reform, a prevalent police presence is 

urgent and immediate. Determining the number of 
49

police required for sufficient societal order and stability becomes a primary task of the Centers. A general 

planning guide suggests 2.5 policemen per thousand 

residents, but not all policemen are alike.24 However, 

the prevalent idea of mass producing national police 

resembles a nostrum to a complex societal instrument 

for law and order. National police undercut the principle of limited government and can be used to extend 

the arbitrary power of the central government. It is not 

without reason that authoritarian governments are often called police states.

Creating community police forces through local recruitment and service helps limit corruption, 

predatory practices, and collusion with criminals by 

policemen. Policemen who grew up in a community 

are less likely to bring shame on the family under 

this arrangement. Moreover, locally elected provincial and district chiefs of police are more responsible 

to their constituents than to the central government, 

serving to reinforce separation of powers. The planning figure of 2.5 policemen per thousand residents 

determines the size of the community police forces. 

Admittedly, community police are not as efficient as 

national police in terms of centralized command and 

control, but they lead to fewer systematic abuses of 

power. Centers should invest in police mentor teams, 

which are tasked with recruiting, organizing, equipping, initial training, and paying community police. 

Formal training for selected leaders and eventually 

the entire community police force should be conducted in phases thereafter. Exigencies (e.g., insurgencies, 

failed states, or ungoverned regions) may require the 

temporary reliance on existing militias so as to maintain security. The topic of militias is always politically 

sensitive because of alleged atrocities or crimes. In the 
50

final analysis, the policy on militias must take into account the consequences of a security vacuum on local 

communities.

National police should form a small percentage of 

the overall law enforcement requirement. Logically, 

they are most effective in the capital and large cities 

to serve as a back-up to community police. Highway, 

border, and specialty police (i.e., counter-narcotics, 

SWAT, federal investigators, etc.) require extensive 

formal training, so police reform strategy needs to 

take a long term view of professionalizing law enforcement.

Corruption among policemen is to be expected. 

Police mentors need policy guidelines on which levels 

of corruption are not tolerated (red lines) and which 

levels are deferred until later. Building rapport between mentors and their counterparts is an effective 

way to build trust and to address corruption issues. 

Because corruption is often a sensitive issue, gaining 

trust rather than lecturing is the preferable when seeking a reduction of corruption to manageable levels.

Military Reform. The establishment of military 

institutions requires a thorough analysis of the country’s national security policy, which generally identifies threats, national interests, and strategic objectives. 

Foremost among its missions is protecting the nation 

state from external invasion. As a rule of thumb, the 

military is a blunt instrument against insurgent forces 

and should be used sparingly. In principle, the first 

line of defense against inchoate insurgent forces and 

criminal gangs is the police with the military providing back-up or securing again an area that insurgents 

have seized.

A primary source of information and expertise is 

the agency which administers Security Force Assis-
51

tance (e.g., Office of Military Cooperation or the Embassy Security Assistance Office), so a representative 

at the Center will prove invaluable military reform 

issues.

Determining the size, composition, and distribution of the military is a matter of staff work by national security professionals and strategists. The 

process has long term ramifications. A military force, 

which exceeds adequate levels of defense, can create 

a security dilemma with its neighbors. Additionally, 

exorbitant military expenditures constrain a free market economy. It is well to remember President Eisenhower’s warning about excessive defense spending 

in the name of national security—a bankrupt country 

is a defenseless country. Using the national security 

policy as the foundational document, the country’s 

ministry of defense develops strategic defense planning documents, such as the national military strategy, defense planning guidance, and defense capabilities planning guidance. This is a long, laborious, and 

iterative process, which takes years before a balanced, 

rational defense policy is attained. This does not mean 

the establishment of the military institution is held in 

abeyance until the defense planning documents have 

gone through the first iteration. The foundation of any 

army lies in the infantry branch, so populating the 

new army initially with infantry units will not create 

an imbalance in the final armed forces. When appropriate, other branches (i.e., armor, artillery, engineers, 

signal, intelligence, etc.) as well as other services (i.e., 

coast guard and air force) can fill out the armed forces 

proportionately. An important point when dealing 

with the host nation is the common desire for the latest weapons. As a casual observation, it seems like 

everyone wants prestigious weapon systems but they 
52

don’t want to maintain them. In Afghanistan, boneyards comprising thousands of rusting armored vehicles, helicopters, and aircraft are a testament of giving 

a nation state what it wants and not what it needs for 

adequate national security. The strategic defense planning documents are the most effective way to keep the 

host nation ministry of defense grounded.

Of greater import is creating a professional, disciplined force. Training is essential but by no means 

indicative of how the military will perform in the 

field, especially when the host nation is beset by an 

insurgency. The military must have the freedom to fail for 

this is the only way it can learn, cultivate innovation, 

recognize good leaders, and become an independent 

institution. Against this necessary maturation, a countervailing tendency among trainers not to risk committing the fledgling forces to decisive combat may occur. 

In part, this hesitancy may be the connection between 

a unit’s performance and the trainer’s competency. 

Another part could be the McClellan syndrome—the 

famous Civil War general who built a magnificent 

army but eschewed decisive battle out of fear of attrition. Center councils must arrest these proclivities early or risk creating a parade-ground army. This holds 

particularly true for planning, command and control, 

and sustaining the force for major operations against 

insurgents. The freedom to fail means the military can 

suffer a defeat, perhaps a rout in the process. It is under these circumstances that the gifted leaders come 

to the forefront, the errors in planning and execution 

become apparent, and logistical snags corrected. No 

magic formula or blueprint exists that has universal 

application with standing up new armies, but finding 

a balance is a necessary consideration.
53

Military educational institutions serve to professionalize the military. Basic training, career courses, 

noncommissioned officer courses, officer candidate 

courses or academies, command and general staff 

courses, and senior service colleges all develop and 

build military skills and thinking. At a suitable time, 

the federal level Center develops the military education system policy in conjunction with retired military 

professionals recruited as advisors. In like manner, 

the UN can recruit retired officers and noncommissioned officers to serve as faculty for these courses, 

academies, and colleges until such time as the host nation military can assume responsibility. 

Economic Reform. One of the key, immediate tasks 

of the federal level Center is to formulate an economic 

strategy for the host nation. Economic vitality is a critical component of a state’s national security because an 

impoverished country susceptible to predatory actors 

and generally a source of regional instability. The strategic economic goal is to have the federal government 

recognize wealth creation as a national interest.25 The 

central theme of the economic strategy is to foster a 

growing middle class in the country, giving the lower 

classes a standard of living to aspire to. One way to 

this end is fostering local economies to generate wealth 

rather than a centralized run economy. The power elite 

will no doubt resist this approach since little economic 

aid and funding will trickle through the layers of government, meaning fewer opportunities for corruption. 

This reaction is only logical; money is the wellspring 

of power, so powerbrokers want access to government 

contracts and aid. By using the subordinate Centers as 

the means to providing assistance and development, 

donors can avoid rancorous negotiations with host 

nation officials. Subordinate Centers can manage local 
54

economic assistance programs through small business 

loans, acting as watchdog for activities which undermine the local economy, and monitoring the levels of 

taxation. It is essential that the host nation not view 

Centers as cash cows, spending money profligately. 

Likewise, providing free items, such as tools, utensils, 

and seeds to the population can have negative multiordered effects; it cannot help but weaken the local 

economy; plus, the recipients will not value the items 

to the same degree they would had they purchased 

them. Inasmuch as few people can afford these things, 

Centers can provide money loans for their purchase. 

On the face of it, loaning money appears an unnecessary step, but the process gives value to the items in 

the mind of the purchaser. Moreover, recording the 

loans makes it more difficult for individuals to take 

the commodities and sell them. The loan recipients 

can repay the loan with commodities, which the Center can provide to others as appropriate. 

Construction projects can be a boon for local communities with a few caveats. First, only pursue projects 

the community needs and wants (consultation). Second, employ local labor only for these projects. Using 

outside contractors for labor may be more convenient, 

but the local community does not gain the full economic benefit. Third, be prepared to provide on-thejob training for local laborers. Most illiterate people 

learn by show and hands-on training, so they are fast 

learners in that sense. Last, build only those projects 

that the local community can sustain after the Center 

departs. This means, the local community must have 

the capability, the will, and the resources to maintain 

the finished product.
55

Humanitarian Assistance. Humanitarian Assistance should be limited in scope and duration. If not 

monitored and managed, Humanitarian Assistance 

through the provision of consumer goods can easily 

disrupt local economies and create counterproductive 

dependencies between the population and the international community. Humanitarian Assistance makes 

most sense when applied in conjunction with disaster response, a calamity which has disrupted normal 

commerce and endangers lives. Nevertheless, once the 

immediate crisis has passed, the Centers must inform 

the affected authorities that Humanitarian Assistance 

will end at a certain date. 

Disaster Response. It might be that in Disaster 

Response, the Centers could have the greatest impact. 

The federal level Center can deploy quickly to engage 

the host nation in determining initial needs and the 

most effective places for subordinate Centers. Shortly 

thereafter, the subordinate Centers deploy to provide 

the needed material assistance. It is during Disaster 

Response that the deployment of standardized Centers with assigned interagency personnel underscores 

their value to the international community. The capability to deploy Centers, set up a secure camp within 

days, organize the Humanitarian Assistance effort, 

and distribute aid in an orderly and secure manner 

should not lie only in the realm of the military. Experience suggests that enough Centers deploy to keep 

refugee camps (perhaps using the cantonment design) 

as manageable as possible. What the donors want 

to avoid is a convergence of millions of refugees in 

certain areas, such as a country’s major cities. Proper 

dispersion of people reduces the threat of epidemics, 

disease due to inadequate hygiene, and mass disorders. The first order of business is to stop the dying, so 
56

determining the immediate needs (e.g., water, food, 

shelter, security, etc.) becomes paramount.

Counterinsurgency. Centers need not assume a 

military character even in an insurgency. As long as 

there are military camps which can come to the assistance of Centers, private security personnel are sufficient for immediate protection. Even during an insurgency, Centers can provide Security Sector Reform 

throughout the echelons of government. It is during 

the hold and build phases that Centers provide the 

greatest service to a counterinsurgency strategy. The 

various advisor and mentor teams, construction and 

development elements, and capacity building personnel inter alia can stage from Centers, complementing 

the security gains of the counterinsurgents. 

 

Concept-to-Practice Considerations

Government Assistance Centers offer an opportunity for all donor states and organizations, large and 

small, to make effective contributions to the assistance 

and development of fragile states. Under the auspices 

of the United Nations, prospective donor states may 

volunteer to contribute personnel, resources, and land 

for the stationing of cadre Centers in key regions of 

the world to train and prepare until deployed under a 

UN mandate.

A designated UN department (e.g., Department of 

Peacekeeping Operations) can manage the program: 

assigning geographic regions to specific Centers for 

the development of assessments and contingency 

planning; designating the federal level Centers; and 

coordinating the locations of home stations of Centers within designated countries. Additionally, the 

UN department manages personnel and equipment 
57

requirements, hosting donor conferences with contributing nation representatives attending. Ideally, 

nationality considerations should not affect manning 

requirements, but initially, Centers will likely have a 

lead-nation character until they become established. 

Eventually, the program might evolve from donor 

state contributions to advertising job positions and 

hiring the most qualified people. This approach might 

result in fewer personnel turnovers, eliminate the national features of Centers, and result in greater equity 

of salaries.

To enhance expeditionary capabilities, Centers 

should have standard deployment packages comprised of quick erection shelters, engineer equipment, 

generators, vehicles, water purification unit, and the 

like. Each permanent Center should be located on or 

near an airbase/airport for rapid deployment. Initially, an excellent resource of knowledge is the U.S. 

Army, which possesses a wealth of experience on 

preparation for overseas deployments (e.g., administrative and medical packets, packing lists, and load 

planning).

Training can be enhanced by after-action reports 

and conferences, hosted by the director and staff of 

recently deployed Centers. Personnel from nongovernment organizations and similar entities should be 

encouraged to participate as well. Along these lines, 

Centers should develop relationships with organizations that are likely to operate in the same geographic 

areas. Since ninety percent of cooperation stems from 

trust, developing relationships is a worthy pursuit. 
58

Conclusion

Government Assistance Centers are two tiered 

organizational approach to providing assistance and 

development to fragile states in a swift, effective, and 

synchronized manner. Centers are a generational advance from provincial reconstruction teams in that 

they can perform assistance in remote and insecure 

regions. The main differences are that they are not 

military in nature and provide a way for all donor actors to engage the host government in a coordinated 

and cooperative manner.

The first organizational tier lies in the camp layout. 

Using standardized camp and cantonment designs in 

addition to exploiting the latest technological advances in barrier and shelter systems, Government Assistance Centers can deploy and be operational far more 

quickly than in the past. From a fiscal standpoint, 

standardized camps make for a more predictable and 

transparent budget, especially in terms of construction, operations and maintenance costs.

The second organizational tier addresses the mechanism which drives the integrated decision-making 

process. The inherent flaws in the Whole of Government and Comprehensive approaches are ameliorated 

through an organizational structure which emulates 

the Eisenhower National Security Council mechanism. 

Hence, policy and strategy issues undergo thorough 

study and staff preparation in the integrated planning 

board; the director and council members are kept apprised of issues raised during the staffing process, so 

they are well-informed (some would say educated) on 

the key issues; the council deliberates on policies and 

strategies, which provide the most efficient and effective assistance for the host nation; lastly, the imple-
59

mentation coordination board helps the practitioners 

with coordination of programs as well as providing 

clarification or additional guidance on decisions. 

Through this mechanism, Centers are critical thinking 

organizations, structured to fulfill the unique needs 

of fragile states. They provide a way for donor states 

and organizations to interact with the host nation in a 

coherent and coordinated manner. 

Security Sector Reform, Humanitarian Assistance, 

and Disaster Response are enterprises, requiring a 

disciplined approach to policy and strategy formulation. In view of their non-military character, Centers 

engender greater cooperation and trust among donor organizations and between donors and the host 

government. Primarily, Centers are designed to lift 

the burden of assistance and development from the 

military services. Conceptually, all UN member states 

can contribute to the Centers, thereby spreading the 

financial burden equitably. Finally, Government Assistance Centers represent a 21st century solution to 

21st century challenges. 
60

Notes

 1. Harry R. Yarger, Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 

95.

 2. Department of the Army, Stability Operations: FM 3-07 

(GPO: October 2008), 1-4, 1-5.

 3. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), 630.

 

4. This feat in organization is obscured by President Kennedy’s unwarranted dismantling of the Eisenhower NSC mechanism. Though subsequent reforms of the NSC, most notably the 

George H. W. Bush Administration (1988-1992), have corrected 

some of the most egregious defects, the NSC mechanism as it now 

functions cannot rival the Eisenhower NSC.

5. A comprehensive description of the Eisenhower NSC 

mechanism is available in Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Organizational History of the National Security Council, report 

prepared by James S. Lay Jr. and Robert H. Johnson, 86th Congress, 2d sess., 1960; Incidentally, the United States does employ 

a form of the interagency process overseas. U.S. embassies rely on 

country teams, and combatant commands have introduced interagency teams to provide decision makers with integrated products. Yarger, 104-106.

 

6. Mancur Olson renders a compelling theory on group behavior in The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory 

of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Wallace 

Thies provides superb insights into the behavior of NATO alliance partners in Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in 

NATO (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003).

 7. Ambrose describes how discord over landing craft allocations, the Transportation Plan, the invasion of Southern France, 

and the recognition of de Gaulle as the representative of the 

French people threatened the success of the Normandy invasion 
61

and subsequent campaign. Stephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme 

Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (New 

York: Doubleday & Company, INC., 1970), 295-409.

8. Center for Army Lessons Learned, PRT Playbook: Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (GPO: September 2007), 9, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/07-34/07-34.pdf.

9. In Europe, Civil Affairs teams are called Civil-MilitaryCooperation (CIMIC) teams. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “PRTs in 

Afghanistan: Successful but not Sufficient,” DIIS Report 2005: 6 

(Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies Report, 

2005), 11.

10. Barbara Stapleton, “The Provincial Reconstruction Team 

Plan in Afghanistan: A New Direction?” State Reconstruction and 

International Engagement in Afghanistan, London School of Economics and Political Science and University of Bonn [Conference] 

(Bonn: May 2003), 5, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28378, (Accessed 

August 23, 2010).

11. Jakobsen, 18-19.

12. I lived in an allied PRT in northern Afghanistan for nine 

months and often visited the other PRTs during the course of my 

duties. I regarded the soldiers and civilians as dedicated professionals, but noted their governments had not provided them with 

the necessary resources and responsibilities to fulfill their mission. My knowledge of U.S. PRTs and other allied PRTs is a result 

of discussions with American officers and noncommissioned officers who operated in PRTs in Regional Commands East and West.

13. Roman camp construction was a feat of organizational 

genius, which contributed to the development of European cities, http://www.principialegionis.org/armycamps.html; http://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Castra, (Accessed 29 November, 2010).

14. Camp design adapted from Colonel Russell’s study on 

DDR centers. As Colonel Russell’s academic advisor for his paper, I had the opportunity to exchange ideas on camp designs, 

support centers, and cantonments. Similarities between his paper 

and this monograph are a result of my edits and our discussion. 
62

Matthew Russell, The IDDR-SAF Support Centers and Cantonments

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 2011), 18.

15. According to Colonel Russel, traditional camps can take 

up to six months before they have full operational capability. 

Russell, 9-17; a number of commercial companies produce a variety of shelters and barriers to meet all camp needs quickly. For a 

few examples, see http://www.drash.com/default.aspx, http://

www.hesco.com/raid/, http://www.shelter-systems.com/prepareshelters.html, and http://www.westernshelter.com/military/browse/category/1, (Accessed 02 February 2011).

16. The Stability Operations Field Manual provides a basic 

structure of provincial reconstruction team, which served as a beginning point in this study. FM 3-07, Appendix F.

17. Matt Russell, email interview by the author, Carlisle, 

Pennsylvania, 25 August 2010. Colonel Russell was the 18th Engineer Brigade Commander (TA/CBT) - Senior Engineer MND-N 

from April 2008 to July 2009.

18. Yarger, 12-14.

19. Although active duty field grade officers (lieutenant 

colonel and colonel) normally possess mid-management executive skills, their military status and career track would disqualify 

them. Department of State and USAID officials generally lack the 

background and training for executive management and leadership

20. FM 3-07, 6-1.

21. I do not intend this as a criticism but as recognition of the 

conditions UN and NGO agencies face when conducting DDR. 

The UN handbook, Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, 

Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards is an excellent resource 

for DDR practitioners, addressing both common challenges and 

guidelines for action. See http://www.unddr.org/index.php. 

22. Russell, 23.
63

23. It is disturbing that the crafting of constitutions appear 

to be given short shrift in Security Sector Reform. This is not to 

say constitutions are ignored; they are not. But they are poorly 

written and fail to establish sufficient checks and balances in the 

federal government. A comprehensive account of the Founding 

Fathers’ intent with the U.S. political system can be found in W. 

Cleon Skousen, The Five Thousand Year Leap: 28 Great Ideas That 

Changed the World (Franklin, TN: American Documents Publishing, LLC, 1981, second printing 2009).

24. The International Association of Chiefs of Police gives a 

general ratio of 2.5 police per 1,000 residents, though warns it is 

an inappropriate instrument for staffing decisions. In this sense, 

the ratio is an historical trend. “Police Officer to Population Ratios, Bureau of Justice Statistics Data,” Research Center Directorate 

Perspectives, www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs, (Accessed 11 May 2010.)

25. Two excellent articles addressing pernicious practices 

with economic assistance and more effective solutions are Carl 

J. Schramm, “Expeditionary Economics: Spurring Growth After 

Conflicts and Disasters,” Foreign Affairs, 89, no 3 (May-June 2010), 

http://vnweb.hwwilsonweb.com/ (Accessed 17 March 2011); 

Mats Berdal and Nader Mousavizadeh, “Investing for Peace: The 

Private Sector and the Challenges of Peacebuilding,” Survival, vol 

52, no 2 (April-May 2010): 37-58.
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