Nos. 2--06-- 0996 & 2--06--1053 cons. Fi led: 4-1-08

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPL

E OF TH E STATE ) Appeal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court OF IL LINOIS, ) o f D u P ag e C o un t y. ) Pl ai n tif f -A pp el l an t, )

) v. ) No. 04-- CF--3607 ) JOSE J. SANDO VAL, ) Ho no r ab le ) Georg e J. Bakali s, Defe ndan t-Appell ee. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPL

E OF TH E STATE ) Appeal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court OF IL LINOIS, ) o f D u P ag e C o un t y. ) Pl ai n tif f -A pp el l an t, )

) v. ) No. 03-- DT--2937 ) JOSE J. SANDO VAL, ) Ho no r ab le ) Georg e J. Bakali s, Defe ndan t-Appell ee. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JU STI CE GI LL ERAN J OHNS ON

de l iv ered th e op in i on

of th e c our t: The Stat e appeal s orders in whi ch al l of the charge s pe nd ing in tw o c ase s ag ainst t he de f en da n t, Jos e J . Sa

nd ova l , we re d i sm i ss ed f ort he fa ilu r e t o br ing him t o t r ial w it hin 16 0 d ays under t he sp ee dy

trial sta tute , s ec ti on 103--5( b) of the Code o f Cri mi nal Pro cedure o f 1963 (725 ILCS 5/ 103

-- 5( b) (Wes t 200 4) ). Sand ova l fi led a s ingle spe edy t rial de mand, ident ify ing t he charges to whi ch the dem and was m

eant to apply

as "Du Page DUI," b

ut not pr ovid ing the

doc ke t nu

m be rs of2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-2- t he cas es invo lving tho se c har ges . We det er mine t hat Sand ova l's spee dy t rial de mand wa s su ffi cient under se cti on 3 --8 --1 0 of

the Un if i ed Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/3--8-- 10 (West 20 04 )) to in

voke hi s statut ory and constitutional righ ts to a speedy

t rial. H ow ever , it was effect ive o nly as t o t he ch ar ge s na med in hi s dem and, nam el y, the DUI ch

arges. Theref

ore, t he trial

court erred in di sm i ssi ng th e other c ha rgesagai ns t hi m . I. BACKG

ROUND On Ju ne 14, 200 3, i

n c as e N o. 03

- - DT
- - 29 37 , in Du P age Co unt y, Sa ndo val was char ged by se pa ra te ci tation s wi th (1) d rivi ng u nder the inf

luen ce (DUI) (625 ILCS 5 /11--5 01(a)( 2) (West 2002) ); (2) im

proper la ne usage (625 ILC S 5/11--709 (West 2002)); (3) drivi ng wh il e hi s l ic ense wa s revoked (625 ILCS 5 /6--30 3 (West 2002) ); a nd (4) DUI ( 625 IL

CS 5/1 1--501 (a)(1) (W

est 200 2)). Sandoval posted bond and was to appear in court on Jul

y 11, 2003. He f

ailed to appear, and be

nch wa rra n ts w ere i ssue d f

or h i s a rre st. On De ce mbe r27 , 20 04 , in c as e N o . 04

- - CF

- - 36 07 , als o in Du Page County, Sandova l wa s charged by compl ai nt with (1) aggrav ated DU I (625 ILCS 5/11--501(d)(1)( A) (Wes t 2004)); (2) obs t ru ct ing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-- 4(a) ( West 2004)); (3) im

proper lane us age (625 ILCS 5/11--709 (West 2004)); (4) fai

lure to sign

al (625 ILCS 5/11--804 (West 2004)); and (5) driv in g while hi s li cense was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6--303(a) (We st 2004 )). The f irst two counts aro se on March 25, 2004, wh il e th e re mai ni ng cou nts arose o n Decem ber 16, 2004. On Feb

ruary 3, 2005, he was in dicted on t he cha rg e o f obst ru ct ing just ice and on t wo co unt s of Cl as s 4 fel ony DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-- 501(a

)(2), (c

-- 1) (1 ) ( West 200 4) ). The sep ar at e indict ments sup er sed ed c ou nt s I a nd I I o f the com plai nt.2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-3- In Decem ber 2004, Sandoval

was in ca rc er ate d i n a D ep ar tm en t of Cor re cti on s ( De pa rtm en t) fac ility o n o t her cha rg es . O n Oc t o ber 3, 20 05 , h e ma iled c o pie s o f a pro se spe edy t rial de mandto t he Stat e's A

tt orney i n Du Page County

and to the Du Page County cl erk, usin g a form provided by t he Depart men

t. The form, whi

ch was titled "D ema nd f

or Speed y Tri al an d/or Qua sh

Wa rran t," in vokedbot h sec t ion 1 03- -5 (b) of t he sp eed y tr ial sta t ut e ( 725 ILC S 5 /1 03- -5 (b) (Wes t 200 4) ) a nd se cti on 3- -8 --1 0 of

th e C ode . It i

n cl ud ed sp ac esin

wh i ch th e defe ndant was t o su pp ly ce r t ain informat ion, including t he charges pen din g agai nst the def endan t. At t he b ot to m, the f

orm dem anded tria l wi thi n 16 0 days "on

the a bov e stated

ch arges ." In t he dem

and, Sandoval

wrot e that he was presen tly in carcerated and servi

ng a 21⁄2-year sentence f or a Jun e 15, 2 005, c onv

i cti on of DUI. On t he line for listing t he cha rg es p ending against him, he wrote "Du Page DUI." Sandoval did n ot provide ca se num

bers f or t he charges he i

dentif ied. The de man d fo r m c ont ained in t he r eco rd has "0 4CF3 607 " wr itt en o n t he t op co rne r, in diff er ent han dwriti ng. Sandoval

al leges that it wa s added by the Du Page County cl

erk after that offi

ce received t he de man d. T he St at e d o es no t dis pu t e t ha t co nt en t io n. T he r e is no evi dence that the copy mai l ed to the S tate

h ad th e n um b er wr itten on it. On Aug us t 9, 20 06 , c oun sel

appe ared f or S an dov al in ca se No. 04 --CF- -3 60 7 a

n d m ov ed to dism iss the charges because San

doval was not brought to trial

withi n the tim e required b

y the speedy trial statut e. The State admi

tt ed that it li

kel y rece iv ed the m ailed speedy

trial dem and, but i t argued that t he lack of c ase number s o n t he de mand pr event ed t he Stat e fro m kno wing which c ase s t he demand pertained to. The State submi tt ed documen

ts showin g that m ul ti pl e c as es we

re r eturned on a recor d search for "Jose Sando val " and that a search for "Jo se J. Sa nd o va l" pr od uce d ca ses be yond2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-4- t he two a t i ss ue

in th i s a ppe al . Th

e Sta te f urth er a rgu ed tha t San dov al vi ol ate d a l oca l court rul e requirin g that case num

bers be i ncl uded in speedy

trial dem ands. The trial court found that

the l ocal court rul e requ i ri ng th e i nc l usi on of cas e n um be rs pla ced a bur den o n t he defen

dant bey ond those contained

in th e s pe ed y tri al sta tute a nd se cti on 3 --8 --1 0 of t he Co de. The co ur t furt her fou nd t hat t he St at e had act ual no t ice o f the demand and t hat t he intere sts of

j usti ce re qui red re cogn

ition of th e dem an d. The courtre aso ned t hat a de fendant might not have the i

nf ormation n

eeded to incl

ude cas e number s and t ha t t he St at e' s At t o r ne y co uld ea sily search for pendi ng cases . The court t hen stated: "If such a

sea r ch r ev ea ls mor e t han o ne pe nding cas e, t he de fendant sho uld be immed iat ely w r it t ed in t o de t er mine w he t he rhe is de man di ng tri al on those ca se s a nd if

he i s, which

case the Stat e el

ects to proceed on." Determin in g that t he speedy

trial term h ad ru n , the tr

i al cou rt dism iss ed t he cha rg es. On S ept ember 1 5, 200 6, t he co ur t denied t he State's m otion to recons i der. On Septembe

r29 , 20 06 , a h ea r ing wa s he ldon a sim il ar motion to dism

iss the charges in case No. 03--DT--2937, t he o t he rca se pe nd ing ag ain st Sa nd o va l. The trial court did n

ot ma ke fi ndi ngs about act ual no t ice, but it d et er mined t hat Sand ova l's demand f orspeedy trial was suf fi ci ent as to t hat case as wel

l a nd di sm is sed the cha

rges. The State separately appeal ed in both case s, and we co nso lidat ed t he ap pea ls for dispo sitio n. II. AN AL YSIS The St at e co nt ends t hat Sand ova l did no t pr op er ly demand a s pee dy t rial and that it lac ked actual notice of the cha

rges that Sandoval

in tendedto be covered b

y the dem and. It also argues that Sa nd o va l faile d t o co mply w it h a lo ca l co ur t r ule requiri ng that sp ee dy tri al de man ds under s ec ti on 103

-- 5( b) co nt ain the case nu mbe r s o f t he ch ar ge s s ub jec t t o t he de man d. Sa nd o va l ar gu es t ha t his2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-5- demand co mplied wit h sec t ion 3

-- 8- -1 0 and t hat t he St at e e as ily co uld ha ve de t er mined t he sp ec ific cases su bje ct t o t he de man d. He als o ar gu es t ha t t he lo ca l co ur t r ule pla ce s a n imp er miss ible additional burden on defendan

ts. A. Compl

ia nce wi th Section 3--8--10 Secti on 103--5(b) of the speedy trial statut e p rovides tha

t "[e ]v ery pers on on

ba il or recogniz ance

shal l be tried by the court h av ing j urisd i cti on withi n 160days fro m the d at e de fendant dem ands tria l unl ess del ay i s occa si oned by the def en dan t." 725 IL

CS 5/1 03--5(b) (We st 2004 ). Al though the p arties d

i scu ss on l y sec tion 103-- 5(b ), s ec ti on

3- -8 --1 0 of

th e C ode

appl i esto de f en da n ts c om m itted to a Dep artm

en t fa ci l ity w ho h av e charges

pen di ng i n a ny coun ty. Peo ple v. Stat en , 1 59 Ill . 2d 4 19, 423 (1994). T hat section i nvokes s ection 103--5(b) but provides f urther specif ic requi rements for the speedy trial demand. In particular, section 3--8-- 10 pro vi des: "[T he per so n demand ing spe edy t rial] s hall include in the demand under s ub se cti on (b), a st a t ement of t he plac e o f pre sent co mmi t ment, t he t er m, and lengt h of t he r emaining t er m, t he cha rg es p ending ag ai nst hi m or her to be tri

ed an d the c oun

ty of t he cha rg es, and t he demand shall be ad dr esse d t o t he st at e's a t t or ney of t he co unt y where he o rshe is charged wi th a copy to the clerk of tha t cour t and a co py t o t he chief ad minist ra t ive officer of t he Dep ar t ment of

Cor re cti on s i n sti tuti on or f ac il ity to whi ch he or she i s comm

itted. " 730 ILCS 5/3--8 --10 (W

est 200 4). An Eigh teenth Judi

ci al Cir cu it Cou

rt ru l e requi

res tha t a d em an d f or s pe ed y tri al under s ec ti on 103

-- 5( b) sh al

l be in wri t ing , w ith a p ro per cap t ion and cas e number , a nd signe d and dat ed by t he de f en da nt or the def en dan t's a ttorney . The

rul e provi des that the

requi rem en ts are m an datory and that "a de man d f ortrial that does not compl

y *** shal l n ot be recogni

zed unl ess the Court fi

nds that2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-6- t he Stat e had a ctual

notice of

def en dan t's tri al dem an d an d tha t the i ntere sts of

j usti ce re qui re recogn i tion of [i t]." 18th Jud. Ci r. Ct. R. 30 .06(b ) (ef

f . Jul y 15, 200 3). It is un disputed that Sandoval's pro se de man d f or s pe ed y tri al com pl i ed wi th th e l etter of se cti on 3- -8

-- 10: it includ ed t he pla ce and term

of Sandoval's i

mprisonm ent and a des cr ipt ion o f the chargespendi

ng agai nst hi m, an d it was prop erl

y se rv ed on th e requi red pers ons or off i ces . However, the State argue s tha

t the words

"Du P age D UI," sta

n di n g a l on e, we re in suf f i ci en t to co n sti

tute t he st at ut o r ily r eq uir ed "s t at eme nt o f ** * t he ch ar ge s p en din g a ga inst " S an do va l, becausethe y we re n ot acc omp an i ed by cas e n um be rs. "The righ t t o a s pe ed y t r ial i s guaran teed by the Federal

and Il l inoi s Cons titution s (U.S. Cons t., amen

ds. VI, XIV; Ill . Const . 1970, art. I, §8) ." Stat en , 159 Il l. 2d a t 426 . I n add itio n, crim in al de fen da nt s in I llino is ha ve a s t at ut o r y rig ht t o a s pe ed y t r ial. 725 IL CS 5/103--5 et seq. (We st 2004 ). The speedy trial statut e enf

orces the constitutional

righ t t o a speedy

trial an d th usits protecti ons a

re t o be liber ally c o nst r ue d in f av or of the def

en dan t. Peopl e v . Buf ord , 374 Ill . App. 3d 369, 37 2 (200 7). "[ T]h e s tatu tory ri gh t to a s pe ed y trial i s n ot the pre cise eq uivalent of t he constitutional

right." Stat en , 15 9 I ll. 2d at 426. "Proo f of a vi olation of the statut ory ri ght requires o nly t hat t he defend ant has no t been t ried wit hin the p er iod set by the s t at ut e and t hat t he de fendant has not caused o r cont ributed to the delay s." Stat en , 159 Il l . 2d at 42 6. The spe edy t rial pr ovisio ns impose a bur den o n t he de fendant t o file a d emand s ufficient to put t he Stat e's Atto rney on n ot ice that the defendant is i nvokin g hi s or her r igh

t t o a sp eedy

trial . Pe o ple v. Mi

ls ap , 261 Il

l . App. 3d 827, 831 ( 1994) . Fo r a per so n co mmi t t ed t o a Dep ar t ment fa cili t y, a de mand pu rsu ant t o s ect ion 3

-- 8- -1 0 is a p re co ndit ion t o t he ru nning of the 160-day period. See Sta ten , 15 9 I ll. 2 d a t 42 8- 29 . T he de man d u nd er se ct io n 3

- - 8-

- 10 mus t be cle ar an d u ne qu ivo ca l.2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-7- Stat en , 159 Ill . 2d at 429, citin g Pe o ple v. Ho we ll , 119 Ill . App. 3d1, 9 ( 198 3) . H ow ever , " [t ]he speedy trial statut e 'm

ust be l ib erall y c onstrued and i

ts salutary

provisi ons cann ot be f rittered away by technical evasi ons.' " Pe opl

e v . Sta n itz , 367 Il

l . A pp. 3d 9 80, 9 84 (2006), quo ting Peo ple v. Fosdick , 36 Il

l . 2d 524 , 528 (1 967). A tr ial cou rt 's de t er minatio n of w het her a de fendant 's demand was sufficient t o invo ke t he sp eed y tr ial sta t ut e will be uphe ld o n app eal abse nt an abu se o f discr et ion. Buf ord , 374 Il

l . App. 3d a

t 372. The Sta te ci tes a num

ber of cas es i

n wh ic h courts have f

ound a defe

ndan t's speedy trial demand to be i

ns uf f i ci en t. Wi thout excepti

on, howev er, the

y are di sti ng ui shabl e f rom the c ase bef ore us. For in stance, a speedy trial dem and was h eld in eff ective where i

t di d n ot com

pl y wi th s ec ti on 3--8--10 beca

us e i t di d not contai n any ident ifi cat ion at all of t he cha rg es p ending a gainst t he de f en da n t. See Mi

ls ap , 26 1 I ll. A pp . 3d at 82 9 ( in t he sp ac e p r o vid edf or pend ing char ges , t he defend ant st at ed s imply

"UN KNOWN "). In Mi

ls ap , the deman

d fu rt her failed t o c omp ly with t he statutory re quir ement s in tha t it d id no t sho w any pr oo f of ser vice o n t he chi ef adm in istrat iv e off ic er of the Depa

rtme nt f aci l ity w he re the def en dan t was l ocated. Mi

ls ap , 261 Ill . App. 3d at 829. I n Stat en , the suprem

e court r ej ected a de f

en da n t' s ef f ortsto recharacteriz e a j ury dem and as a s peedy trial demand wher e t he jur y demand " ne it h er ci ted to s ec ti on

3- -8 --1 0 n

or c ontai n ed th e req ui si te in form ation as t he de t ails o f his incarc er at ion, t ime serve d and t ime remaining o n his sent ence , a nd t he pe nding charge." Stat en , 15 9 I ll. 2 d a t 42 6. T he se ca se s s imply sta n d f or th e prop osi ti on th at, to co nst it ut e a n e ffec t ive sp ee dy t r ial d ema nd , t he de man d mu st co nt ain the inf orm ati on listed in the statute. Several courts hav e also f

ound that a dem

and f or speedy tria l i s i nef f ecti ve whereit makes no m en ti on of speedy trial right s and app ear s t o be so me ot her co ur t for m entir ely, suc h as a jury de mand2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-8- that simply

re que st s t rial by

ju r y ( Stat en , 159 Ill . 2d at 422 ; People v . Madsen , 196 Ill . App. 3d 220, 224 (1990)), o r an

ap pe ara nc e f orm tha t incl ude s a ba re r eq ue st f or"an 'i mm ediate' trial" ( Peo ple v. E ri ck son , 266 Il

l . App. 3d 27 3, 277 ( 1994) ) . These attempts to make some ot her co ur t fo r m d o do u ble du ty

asa s pe ed

y trial deman d a re con dem n ed on th e grou n d that th

ey "s mack of

ef f ortsto hi de o rbu r y t he irinten

t to invoke

the speed y tria l provisi ons of the C ode." Peopl

e v . Docker

y , 313 I ll. App. 3d 684, 687 (2000) (collecting c ases). "[T]he dem and f or speedy trial i s ex t r eme ly significant beca use it is t he so le means by which a defend ant may prec lude t he St at e fro m pro sec ut ing him, irr es pe ct ive o f ho w r ep r eh en sible t he cr ime may be, or how ove rw helming the evi den ce of gui l t," and th usth e l eg i sl atu re i s e n ti tled to im po se st at ut or y req uire ments on t he manner in which a def en dan t dem an ds a spe edy tria l . Stat en , 159 Ill . 2d at 422 . However, the la

w is equal l ycl ear t hat , w her e a d efenda nt has p ro per ly complied wit h t he statutory r e qu i re m en ts o f th e s pe ed

y -tri al pr ov i si on s a n d th ere d oes n ot ap pe ar to b e a n y ef f ort to "hi de" t he spe edy-tri al

dem an d, the dem an d m ust b e dee m ed ef f ecti ve . In Pe o ple v. Hu ff

, 195 Ill . 2d 87 (2001), t he suprem

e court held that a documen t was eff ective as a s pe ed y t r ial d ema nd wh en it referred to sp ee dy tri al righ ts on its f ace, al though it di

d not incl ude a ci te to the speedy

trial statut e. Hu ff , 195 Ill . 2d at 94. T he docum ent at issue

in cl uded i n the titl e the words "Dem

and f or Speedy Tri al ," and wi

thin the text it dema

nded a jury t rial wit hin either 120 days fro m the t ime the d efenda nt was taken in to custody or 160 days f

rom the date of the dem

and. In hol

din g that t he dem

and was suf f i ci en t, the suprem

e court r ej ected requirem

ents f or speedy tria

l de ma nds, be yond those contai

ned in t he st at ut e, t hat had be en impos ed in Peop l e v . Grou nd , 2 57 I ll. Ap p. 3d 95 6, 959 ( 1994) . In Gr ou nd , a case ex am

in in g the requirem

ents f or a speedy

t rial de mand und er sec t ion 1 03- -5 (b) , t he appe ll ate cour t held that no speed y trial demand was vali

d unless it (1 ) s et fo rth

the de man d f or2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-9- speedy t rial in the t itle o r he ading o f the do cument in tended to serve as a dem

and; (2) expressl

y stated that t he defen

dant dem anded "a s

peedy trial "; an d (3) cited i

n the b odyof

th e d ocum

en t th e s tatu te und er wh i ch the dem an d was made. Gr ou nd , 257 Ill . App. 3dat 959-6 0. The supr em e court he ld th at Gr ou nd had i

mproperl y e xpan ded the requirem

ents of the speedy tri al

statut e: "We d o no t agr ee w ith t he co nclusio n in Gr ou nd that a d em an d f or asp ee dy t r ial is va lidonly if i

t sat isfies the re quir ement s set for t h in Gr ou nd . The cou rt in that case im posed a remedy that w ent far bey

ond t he problem

bef ore it. " Hu ff

, 195 Il l . 2d at 93 . T he su pr eme co ur t t he n u ph eld th e v al i di ty of the def

endan t's speedy trial dem and, despi te the fact th at it did n

ot cite the speedy trial

stat ute in i

ts t ext. In reaching this

holdi ng, the su preme c our t di sti ngu i sh ed s ection 103 --5(b ), wh

i ch "doesnot requi

re tha t a dem an d f or aspe edy t rial be in any pa rti cu l ar f orm ," f rom secti on 3- -8 --1 0 of

th e C ode , w h i ch

doe s c ontai

n re qu i re m en ts f orthe f orm of the speed y tria l dem an d. Hu ff , 1 95 I ll. 2d a t 93. Neve rt heless, we be lieve t ha t , wh er e t he sp ec ific re qu i re m en ts of s ection 3--8 --10 ar

e m et, Hu ff condem ns j ust as surel

y a ny eff ort to im pose additional re qu i re m en ts on the exerci se of speedy tri al righ ts under that stat ute. As we hav e hel d, no particul ar "ma gic words " a

re re qu i re d to c on sti

tute a speedy trial deman d s o lon g a s th

e s tatu tory re qu i re m en ts are m et. Pe o ple v. Peco , 3 45 I ll. App. 3d 7 24, 734 (2 004 ). We also not e t hat her e, as in Hu ff , t he record does not suggest t hat Sandoval was attemptin

g to hi de the dem

and f or speedytria

l : the f orm was cl ea rl y l ab el ed "D em an d f orS pe ed y T rial " and was properly served on al

l of the required pers ons. The Sta te a rg ue s th at s ec ti on 3- -8 --1 0 s h oul

d b e rea d to i n cl ud e a re qu i re m en t th at def en da n ts in cl ude the c ase

num be rs of the cha rgeson wh

i ch they are see king speedy

trial , in order t o ensure that the Stat e recei

ves ef fecti ve not ic e of the speedy

trial dem and. In es se n ce , the S tate

i s a rg ui n g that,2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-10- even when a defe ndan t compli es wi th the li teralrequirem

ents of secti

on 3--8--10 by identifying the pend ing chargeson w hich he see ks s pee dy t rial, t he de mand ca nnot be effect iveunless t he de fendant also in cl udes the case n

umb erof thos e cha rg es t o fa cilitat e t he St at e's filing of t he de mand in t he proper case fi

le. It is a f undam en tal pri nc i pl e of statutory cons tructi on, howev er, t hat in inter pr et ing a statut e a co ur t must give effect t o a legislat ur e's int ent , a nd t hat t he bes t indicat ion o f legislative intent is the langua ge o f the statute, gi ven i ts plai n a nd ord ina ry m ean ing. Buf ord , 374 Ill . App. 3d at 373, citi

ng Pe o ple v. Co r de ll , 22 3 Il l . 2d 380 , 38 9 (2 006 ). H ere , th e p l ai n l an gua ge of se cti on 3--8--10 requires only

"a st at ement of *** the charges pending agai nst" the defendant: not the case num be rs associ ated with those cha rges, nor the statut ory ci

tes for the off

enses charged, nor any

ot her in form ation, but si

mpl y " a statement" of the c

harges. 730 ILCS 5/3--8--10 (Wes t 200 4) . H ad t he l egi slaturewished

to require that

suc h add itio nal informat ion be p ro vided, it co uld have do ne so . T he Sta te has provi

de d u s wi

th no authority, an

d in deed there i s none, f

or reading suc

h addi tional requi rem en ts i nto the statute. The di ss en

t i s unh appy

wi th thi s r es ul t an d s ug ge ststhat we hav e s t r aye d fr o m Stat en 's st at ement t hat a sp eed y tr ial demand mus t be "c lear a nd unequiv ocal." However, i

t is the l egi slature that has def

in ed what constitutes a suf

fi ci ently clear and un equivocal speedy trial dem and wh en t he defend ant is

in custody on ot her cha

rges, and, as we have n

ot ed, the legisl ature has r eq ui r ed o nly a "s tate m en t" of th e charges pen di ng a gai ns t the def

en dan t. Stat en i s n ot to t he co nt r ar y; t he iss ue in t ha t case was whether tho se same stat uto ril y def in ed standards set forth t he requirem ents t ha t defen dants f il in g speedy trial dem ands m ust meet, and the court held that they did. T ha t ho ldin g is not at odds wi

th our de ci si

on h ere. M oreover , Stat en

in volv ed a purport ed "speedy

trial dem and" contain edin a n enti rel y di f f eren t docum en t. By con tra st, the speedy

trial dem and f il ed by Sandoval2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-11- was plainly l

abeled as su ch and was pr op er ly served on t he r equ ired par t ies, t her eby "clear ly and unequi voca ll y " notif ying th e State th at Sandova

l wassee ki ng a spe edy tria l on h i s DUI ch arges . As we ha ve noted, th e p rotecti ons

of t he sp ee dy t r ial s t at ut e a r e t o be liber ally c o nst r ue d in f av orof defendan

ts ( Buf ord , 374 Ill . App. 3d at 372 ) a nd mus t no t be diminis he d t hr o ug h a n u nd uly onerous readin

g of the statuto ry requi

remen ts (see Sta n itz , 36 7 I ll. App. 3d a

t 984). The se c onc er ns are particularly

relevant where, as here, a def endan t is acti ng pro se and lac ks t he r es o ur ce s a va ilable to an attor ney . Court s hav e stated, alb eit in

the dif feren t context o f postconvi

ction proceedi

ngs, that a pro se de fe ndant need pr ese nt only a limi t ed a mou nt of d et ail in esta blishi ng t he gist of hi s constitutional

cl ai m , s o as to provide

suc h a def en dan t a m ean ingf ul opportuni

ty to b e heard. Pe o ple v. P in eda , 373 Ill . App. 3d 113, 116 (2007). Apply in g these pri

nci ple s to t he pro se spe ed y t r ia l demand fi led in the cases before us, we hol d that Sandoval

adequately

descri bed t he pendi ng charges when he i de nt ified t he m a s "Du Pag e DU I. " While it is po ssible t o imagine " st at ement s" by de f en da n ts that w ould not ad equately i dentif y the charges pendi

ng again st them, i

n thi s case, the use of "D UI " is a clea r r efer ence t o t he o ffense o f driving while und er t he inf l ue nc e, whi

ch i s a vi ol ati on of one speci

fi c statut e (625 ILCS 5/11--501 (West 2004)). The deman d thus provided th e inf orm ati on necess ary to enab le

the Stat e to locate t he particu lar ca ses in w hi

ch the dem

and was asserted. We

re cogni ze t hat t her e ar e a nu mber o f subse ct ions o f the DUI st at ut e und er which a defend ant ma

y b e charged; in

deed, Sandoval

was cha rged with v

iolating three

different subs ect ions of t he st at ut e. Neve rt heless, by identifying the name o f the offense and th e c oun ty where the charges were pendi ng, Sandoval

provided the State with adequ at e no tice of the c harges on wh

ic h he was asse rt ing hi s speedy

trial righ t. To the extent that Sandov al ' s m ul ti pl e D UI charge s l ef t th e S tate wo nder ing whi

ch charges were sub

ject to the d ema nd , it wa s fr ee t o inq uir e fu r t he ro f Sa nd o va l.2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-12- However, we ca nno t st r et ch t he pla in l an gua ge of section 3--8--10 to r equi

re that Sandoval provi

de thi s i nf orma tion in h i s deman d wh

ere th at resul

t is not sup ported b y the s tatute i

tsel f . B. T he Lo ca l Ru le Bef ore the tr ial

cour t, the St ate ar gued t hat Sandoval's spe edy t rial de mand wa s de fect ive becauseit di

d not comply

with a local rule of the ci rcuit court t hat

required suc

h dem ands to in cl ude the case n umb er of any charge on wh

ic h speedy tria l wassough

t. Sand ova l arg ued t hat , w her e t he sta tute did n ot require thi s i

nf ormation, the l

ocal rul e was in v al

i d b ec au se

it con f l i cte d w ith th e s tatu te and i mpe rmissi bl y i mposed an

addi tional burden on him. T he t rial co ur t agr eed wit h Sand ova l and found the l

ocal rul e i nva li d in sofar as it r eq uir ed ad dit io na l info r mat io n in t he de man d. On ap pe al, t he St at e a r gu es t ha t t his fi ndi ng was i n error. Cour t rules are in terpret ed under the sam

e prin ci ple s that guid e o ur co nst ru ct ion o f sta t ut es ( 134 Ill. 2d R. 2) , a nd our review is de novo ( Peop l e v . A

tou , 372 Il l . App. 3d 78 , 82 (20 07)). Su pr eme Court Rule 21(a) pr o vid es t ha t cir cu it co ur t s may "ado pt ru les go ver ning civil and crim in al ca se s, " s o lon g a s th

ose ru l esdo n ot co n f l i ct w ith the supreme cour t ru les or Ill in ois statu tes. 134 Il l . 2d R. 2 1(a). Lo ca l ru les " 'may no t abr o ga t e, limit o r mo difyexi sting law.' " Atou , 37 2 I ll. App. 3d at 82, quo ting Pe o ple v. Sims , 165 Ill . App. 3d 204, 207 (1 988). M oreover , local rul es must not chan ge su bstan ti ve l aworim

pose add itio nal bur dens on lit igant s, a s co mpar ed t o t he requi rem en ts of c orrespon

di ng statutes or su

prem e court rul

es. Vision P oint of S ale, Inc . v. Haas , 226 Ill. 2d 3 34, 357 (20 07) ; People ex rel. Brazen

v. Fi nl ey , 11 9 Ill. 2d 485 , 49 1 (1 988 ); Atou , 372 Il l . App. 3d a

t 82. The l ocal rule at i ssue

he re, wh i ch requi res that spe edy

tria l dem an ds i nc l ude c ase num be rs in or der t o be dee med effect ive, c learly co nfli ct s wit h sec t ion 3

-- 8- -1 0, whi ch has no such2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-13- r eq uir eme n t. T he lo ca l ru le a lso impe r miss ibly impo se s a dd it io na l bu r de ns o n lit iga nt s, in t ha t it provides that a speedy

trial dem and that does not comply

with the l ocal rul e "s ha ll not be recogn i zed," regardless of

whether the dem

and would be v al

id un derthe appl

ic abl e statut es. See Vision P oint , 226 I ll. 2d at 358 (t o t he ex

tent t hat a l ocal rul

e required that

re sp on se s to re qu es ts to ad m it b e f il ed wi th t he clerk and r equ ired t he st riking o f nonc omp lyi ng r esp ons es, while the su pr eme co ur t r ule did not requi re f il ing b ut onl y tim el y serv i ce on the othe r party , the l

ocal ru le co nf lict ed wit h t he su pr eme courtru le and im

per mi ssibly

im po sed a ddit ional subst ant ive burdens on litigant s); Atou , 372 Ill . App. 3d at 83 ( lo ca l ru le r eq uir ing t ha t sp ee dy t r ial dem ands b e served on the State's A tt orney i n open courtand s t riking d emands t hat wer e no t so ser ved impr op er ly placed a n a d di ti ona l bu rde n on de f en da n ts seek in g to f il e s uc h deman ds , w h ere th

e s pe ed y trial sta tute did not req

ui re su ch serv i ce). In t he se cir cu mst an ce s, t he lo cal rul e i mproperl y m odif ie s existin g la w. Sandoval 's speedy

trial dem an d i s not in

va l i d f or fa il ure to com

pl y wi th the l ocal rul e. C. Non-DUI Charges The Stat e's f

in al argu m en t on appe al i s th at, ev en if the D UI charges

agai ns t Sand oval were pr o pe r ly dis missed as a resul t o f h is speedy trial dem and, t he o t her char ges aga inst him (impro per lane us ag e, dr iving wh ile lic en se r ev o ke d, failu r e t o sig na l, an d o bst r uc t io n o f jus t ice ) we r e n o t list ed in t he demand and sh

ould not have

been dis missed. Sandoval

argues that "the underl

yi ng charges that accompan ied those charges also were deemed to be i ncl uded in the dem

an d." Neith er

pa rty ci ted to anyauth ori

ty re ga rdin g th i s a rg um en t, a n d th us it is sub j ect to wai

ve r. 210 Il l . 2d R. 3 41(h

)(7); Mik o lajc zyk v. Ford M ot or Co. , 374 Ill . App. 3d 646, 677 (2007). In the interests of j ustice, howeve r, we exa m ine the a ppl i cabl e law.2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-14- Whe n a defe ndan t has been

in dicted on mul

tipl e charges, those charges m ay be sub ject t o com pul sory j oin der un der ce rtai n c i rcum stan ces . The l aw

of com pu l sor y j oi n de r i s i n ter twi n ed wi th speedy tria l cons i derati

ons b eca use ch arges that are required to be j oined under compul sory j oinde

r rules also must be t ried wit hin the s ame pe rio d o f time whe n a sp eed y tr ial demand is filed o n any one of t he ch arges . People v . Quigl ey , 183 Il l . 2d 1, 15 -16 (19 98). Ch arges are s ubj ect to com

pul sory joi nder if t he y ar e b as ed o n t he sa me a ct , ar e w it hin the j urisd i cti on of a s ing l e c ourt, a

nd arise f rom f ac ts that were known to t he State at t he t i m e th e f i rs t of fense w as c har ged . 7 20 I LCS 5/ 3- -3 (b) (West 2004). However, t raff ic off enses that are char ged by the u se o f a unifor m citat ion o r c omp laint f orm compl eted by a poli ce off ic er rather than a prosecutor are not subj ect to compul sor yj oi nder wi th ch ar ge s b r o ug ht un de ran ind ict men t , an d t he irvia bilit y u n der spe edy t rial ru les must be determi ned ind ivid ua lly. See Peop l e v . Ja ck son , 118 Ill . 2d 179, 192-93 (19 87) ; People v . Kizer , 365 Ill . App. 3d949, 95 5 (200 6). If m ul tip l e charges

are not subjec t t o c omp ulso ry joinde r, a de mand f orspeedy trial

on one charge do es not r equire that t he other charges b e tr i edat the sam e tim e. Rath er, the remai

ni ng charges m

ust be brought to t rial

withi n 160 day s of the date on whi ch judg ment on the fi rst charge was rendered. 725 ILCS 5/103--5(e) (West 200 6); People v . Gay , 37 6 I ll. App. 3d 796 , 811 (2 007). In one of the c ase s b ef

ore us, c ase

No. 03--DT- -2937 , al

l of th e ch arges were init iat ed by a poli ce off ic er via separat e t raf

f i c c itati ons . Th ere f ore, the non -DU I ch arg es in th

at c as e a re n ot subj ect to compul sory j oinde rwit h t he DU I c har ges , a nd t he sp eed y tr ial demand f il ed in c onn ec ti on wi th the DUI charges does n

ot appl y to the non-DUI charges. See Ja ck son , 118 Ill. 2d a t 1 93; Ki zer , 365 Il l . App. 3d a

t 955.2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-15- In ca se No . 04

- - CF

- - 36 07 , all o f t he ch ar ge s w er e in it ially br o ug ht in a co mp lain t th at, al though co mplet ed by a p o lice o fficer, wa s a ppr oved by the State 's Attorn ey . Th

us , th ey are not go ve r ne d b y Ja

ck son . In addition, a superseding i ndictment was later fi

led wi th respect to the fi

rst tw o coun ts. H owev er , the n on -D UI charge s ( ob str

uc tin g j us ti ce , i

m pr ope r lan e u sa ge , f ai l ure to sig na l, and driv

in g whi le li cense rev oked) are not based on the s am e act as the DUI charges an d thus are n ot s ub j ec t to com

pul sory j oin der wi th the DUI ch arges . 720 IL

CS 5/3 --3 (West 200 4); Quigl ey , 183 Ill . 2d at 9, citing Pe o ple v. Na vis , 24 Ill . App. 3d 842, 846 (197 4) (a ct of d rivi ng wh ile int o xic ated wa s ind ep en de nt o f an d h ad no r ela t io nsh ip t o t he simu lt an eo us ac t o f dr iving wh il e li cense rev oke d); se e a

l so Peo ple v. Wa sh

i ng ton , 21 I ll . A

pp. 3d 1 077 , 10 79 ( 197 4) ( charg es of dr iving whi le in to xi cated and f

ailure to yi

eld to a p edestrian

at a crosswalk were b ased on two sep arate a cts). Accordin

gly, the deman

d for speedy

trial on th e D UI charge s w asn ot ap

pl i ca b l e to the n on-DU I ch arges . As not ed a bove , w hen a d efenda nt faces multiple c har ges and re qu es ts spe ed y trial on l y asto some, t he t ria l o f t he r ema ining c har ge s mu st beg in wit hin 1 60 da ys o f the resolution of the first charges. 725 I LCS 5/103-- 5(e) ( West 2006) . The record does not r efl ect that t hi s tim

e has run as to the non-DUI charges

in ei ther case. Acco rd ingly, the dismissal of t hos e cha rg es must be vacated an d the cas es re man ded f or fu rther p roceed ings . III. CONCLUSION Sand ova l's spe edy t rial de mandsu f f i ci en tl y com pl i ed wi th s ec ti on 3 --8 --1 0 of

t he Co de a nd is not i nval i d on t he gr ou nd t hat it d id no t co mply with t he loc al ru le, a nd t hus t he de mand must be deem edeff ective as to t he DUI charges pe nd ing ag ain st him inDu Pa ge Coun ty. W e the ref ore af f i rm the di sm i ss al of the f oll owi ng charg es on

speedy trial

gro unds: in

case No. 03-- DT--2937, t he two2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-16- coun ts o f DUI; an d i n ca se No. 04 --CF- -3 60 7, t

h e c oun ts of Class

4 f el ony DU I. Th e di sm i ss al of t he non -DU I ch arg es pe nd

ing ag ai nst San dov al --i n c as e N o. 03--DT--2937, im proper lane us age and dr iving wh ile lic en se r ev o ke d, an d, in ca se No. 04-- CF--3 607 , th e c oun ts of obstruction of j ustice, im proper l an

e u sa ge , f ai l ure to si gna l , an d dri vi ng w hi l e l i cen se re voke d--wa s error. We

theref ore v ac ate the d i sm i ssa l of th ose ch arges . The

j udgm en ts of th e ci rcui t court of Du

Page Coun ty a re aff irm edin par t and va cat ed in pa rt , a nd t he causes ar e r emande d fo r fur t her pr oc eed ings o n t he no nDUI charges. Af fi rmed i n part and va

cated in part; cause rem

anded. ZENOFF, J., co ncurs. JUSTICE McLAR

EN, disse ntin g: The major ity ho lds t hat a de mand ident ify ing an un speci

fi ed and si ngl e "DuPage DUI" was sufficient under section 3--8--10 to demand speedy trial f or multipl e DUI charges in m

ultipl e cases. By do ing so , it igno re s t he r equ irement s o f sect ion 3

-- 8- -1 0 and est abl is hedprin ci ple s f rom our suprem e court t hat pla

ce the burden

on the defe

ndan t t o make a cl

ear and un

equivocal speedy trial dem and. I wo uld deter

m in e th at, beca us e Sa nd ova l f ai l ed to com pl y wi th th e requi rem en ts of se cti on 3--8--10, the speedy

trial period nev

er began to run , an d I w oul d reve rs e th e di sm i ss al of the charges. A cc ordin gl

y , I d i ss en t. The crux of the probl

em is that Sandoval

had m ulti ple DUI charges pen

din g in two se pa ra te cases, al ong with a

dditional charges i n each case, y et he dem anded a speedy

t r ial fo rmer ely a sing le "Du Page DUI." As a r esul t, t he State could not determin e the charges to whi

ch the dem

and was in tendedto ap

pl y wi th out c on du cti

n g a n in v es ti ga ti on . B y re qu i ri n g th e S tate to do s o, th

e m aj ori ty2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-17- shi fted t he bur den t o t he Sta

te to protect th e def

en da n t' s spe ed y trial ri gh ts- -a b urden th at th e S tate does n ot have un

der s ection 3--8 --10. Secti on 3--8--1 0 app l

i es th e sp eedy tri al pr otec ti ons

of se cti on 1 03- -5(b) of

the Code of Crim in al Procedure o f 19 63 (7 25 I LCS 5/ 103

-- 5( b) ( West 200 4) ) t o d efenda nt s incar cer at ed in a Dep ar t ment of Corrections f aci li ty. It also provide s addi

tional re qu i re m en ts for speedy trial

demands, including a st at ement of t he cha rg es p ending a gainst t he defen dant to be tr ied. 730 ILCS 5/3--8--10 (West 200 4) . I n enac t ing sec t ion 3

-- 8- -1 0, t he legis la ture acknowledged that

a defe ndan t commi tt ed to the De pa rtm en t reta ins a ri gh t to aspeedy

trial on untried

char ges , bu t it also re co gnized t hat t he defend ant 's loss of libert y is not ba sed sole ly upo n u ntr i ed charg es an

d i nstead i s b as ed

on a pri or conv i cti on. Peop l e v . Penr

od , 316 Ill . App. 3d 71 3, 71 8 ( 20 00 ) . T hu s, it is wel l s ettled that, when se cti on 3--8--10 appli

es, the de fe n da

n t b ea rs th e b urden to f il e a deman d that b oth

com pl i eswi th se cti on 3- -8

-- 10 a nd is sufficient t o p ut t he St at e's At t or ney on no t ice t hat t he de fendant is invoking his or her speedy

trial righ t. See Peo ple v. Stat en , 15 9 Ill. 2d 419 , 42 8 (1 994 ); Pen rod , 316 Ill . App. 3d at 718 ; People v . Mils ap , 2 61 I ll. App. 3d 8 27, 831 (1 994 ). The demand must be clea r a nd unequi voca l . Stat en , 159 Ill . 2d at 429, citing Pe o ple v. Ho we ll , 119 Ill . App. 3d 1, 9 ( 19 83 ). If a proper de man d is not m

ade, th e 160 -day spe edy tria l peri od neve r be gi nsto run. Stat en , 159 Ill . 2d at 428-2 9. . In Stat en , t he su pr eme court rejected an argu m en t th at a defen dant's section 3--8--10 speedy trial deman d w assuf

f i ci en t w hen it was in

correct ly fi led under section 103--5(b) and omi tt ed inf orm ati on about the t im

e served, the tim

e rema in in g on the sentence , and the pendi ng charge. Stat en , 159 Ill . 2d at 421-22. Rel yi ng i n part on previous cases f rom th i s court, Stat en

establ ished th at, becau se t he legis la ture chose to im

pose additional

requirem

ents on al

ready i ncarcerated2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-18- defendan ts, section 3--8--10 pl aces th e b urden on th e def en da n t to mak e a deman d that c om

pl i eswi th t he st at ut e, and t he St at e's k now ledge of a defend ant 's incar cer at ion d oe s no t excu se t he defend ant f rom com pl ying. Stat en , 15 9 I ll. 2d at 428, citin g Pe o ple v. Da vis , 92 Ill . App. 3d 869 (1 981 ), and Peo ple v. Went lent , 109 Il l . App. 3d 29 1 (198 2). Thus, overrul

ing th e Four th Di strict's l

i b er al con str uc ti on of secti on 3- -8 --1 0 a

n d i ts de term ina ti on t hat st rict co mpliance wit h sec t ion 3

-- 8- -1 0 wa s no t re quir ed, t he co ur t in Stat en stated: "We do not view as 't echnica l' or 'meaningless' t he co ndit ions t hat t he legis la ture has attached to the speedy

trial ri ght of sec tion 3--8--1 0. Altho ugh t he infor matio n re quir ed by that se cti on ma y b e for the adm

in istrat iv e conven ie nce of the Stat e, t he legislat ur e plac ed t he bur den o n defend ant s t o a ffi rmat ively demand sp eed y tr ials pur sua nt t o t his section. W hen de f en da n ts ar e se rving p riso n t er ms for exist ing co nvictio ns at th e ti m e th ey f ac e tri al on addi tional ch ar ge s, t he y do no t su ffer a lo ss o f li be rt y while await ing t rial o n t he pe nding charges. To exe

rci se th ei r statutory

right to b e tr

i ed wi thin 16 0 d ays, th ey

n ee d on l y to comply with section 3--8-- 10." Stat en , 159 Ill . 2d at 428. Obse rving ca se s h

ol ding that a dem

and f il ed under section 103--5(b), when section 3--8--10 was appl ic abl e, precluded the 160-day

period f rom begi nni ng to run, the court al so stat ed: "The above aut ho rit ies r ec o gniz e t hat a d efe nda nt who cla ims a vio lat io n o f a sp ee dy-trial

righ t ca nn ot preva il if the de man d f ort r ial fa ils t o co mply wit h t he t er ms of t he go ver ning speedy

trial provisi on. To t reat t he i

nf ormational

requirem ents of secti

on 3--8--10 as surplus age would b e to inf rin ge on t he legislat ive pr er og at ive t o s et re aso nable co ndit ions on an incar cer at ed d efenda nt 's right t o r ece ive a t rial wit hin 160 days o f the demand . As2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-19- refl ected by the statut es exam

in ed i n the i nstant case, the l

egi sl ature has seen

fi t t o pro vi de different t ime per iod s and demand requi rem en ts f or off en derswh o are di

f f eren tly si tuated." Stat en , 159 Ill . 2d at 429-30, ci ting Peo ple v. Willis , 235 Ill . App. 3d 1060 (1992), and Pe o ple v. Ja ck son , 235 Il

l . App. 3d 73 2 (199 2). The cou rt th en h el d that, because

section 3--8--10 had n

ot been satisf ied, the 160-day peri

od never be gan to run. Stat en , 159 Ill . 2d at 430. The maj or ity does not discuss the defe ndan t's burden to present a cl

ear and un

equivocal demand as r eq ui r ed by Stat en and i nstead at tempts t o merely

distin guish cas es on the f acts. However, those cases, unl

ike t he major ity her e, follow ed t he su pr eme co ur t 's re aso ning in Stat en . For exam ple , in Mi ls ap , a deman

d was ins uf

f i ci en t when i t was f il ed am ong pa persbeari ng a di ff erent case num

ber and the de f en da nt w rote " un known " f or the p en di ng charg es . Ob se

rving the ab senc e of

inf orm ati on about t he char ges , su ch as t he nat ur e o f the char ges or t he da t e o f the incident leading t o t hem, t he Fourth District determin

ed that the deman

d was i nsuf fi ci ent to place the Stat e's A tt orney on notice that t he de fendant was invok ing hi s ri ght to a sp eedy

tria l in a parti cul ar ca se. The c our

t n oted th at, wh ile it may so metimes be dif fi cul t for anincarc er at ed d efenda nt t o o bt ain the nece ssar y inf or matio n, t he l egi slature i

nten ded s ection 3--8 --10 to i

m pose speci

f i c requ i rem en ts f or the de man d. Mi ls ap , 261 I ll. Ap p. 3d at 83 2- 33 . Lik ew ise , t he Fo ur t h D ist r ict r ec en t ly o bse r ve d t ha t a d efe nd an t "s ha ll in cl ude" the charges pen

din g under section 3--8--10 and that a fa il ure to provide al

l c harges pend ing co uld le ad to t he concl

usion that a d ema nd is ins uf f i ci en t. People v . Gay , 376 Ill . App. 3d 796, 802 (2007 ). By

ig no r ing wh er e t he bu r de n lie s, t he majo r it y do es ex ac t ly wh at St aten dis ap pr o ve d-

- it tre atsthe req ui rem en ts of se cti on 3--8--10 as surplusage . It f urth er i gnores the l eg i sl ature' s dec i si

on2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-20- to tre at d if f eren tl y de f en da n ts i n ca rc er ate d on

oth er ch arge s- -d ef

en da n ts wh o , un like t ho se dir ec t ly subj ect t o se ct io n 1 03

- - 5, do no t lo se t he irli berty wh il e awai ting tri al and wh ose statut ory speedy

trial ri ghtsexi st onl

y through the a ppl i cation of sec tion 3--8--1 0. Because se cti

on 3--8

-- 10 a pplied, t he bur den w as firmly on Sa ndo val to co mply with t he stat uto ry requirem

ents, in cl udin g providi ng the charges pend ing. Alt hou gh S ando val did no t leave t he l ine f or pe nd ing charg es en

ti rel y bl an k, h i s dem an d w as am bi guou s a bou t whic h o f h is many chargeshe meant it t o a pply t o. Sand ova l merely wro t e "D u P age DUI " whe n he had m ulti ple DUI charges an

d mul tipl e other charges pendi

ng, i n two sep ar at e ca ses. As a r esu lt, he did n ot provide notice to the Stat e of whi

ch of h is ma ny charges, i

ncl ud i ng wh ic h of h is mul tipl e DUI charges in curred on d

if f ere nt d ate s, h

e w as se ek

ing to inv oke , n ordi

d h e of f er a si m pl e m ea ns of loca t ing t he inten ded c ase or case s. The r ec o r d ma ke s a pp ar en t t he co nfu sio n r es ult ing fr o m Sand ova l's failure t o s pec ify t he charge or c h arge s to wh ich he so ug ht t he de man d t o ap ply. T he sing le dem and was a ppli ed to t wo se pa ra te ca se s, ea

ch wi th mul tipl e charges, y

et the clerk wrote only

one case n

umb er on the dema

nd. T wo separate appeal s were al so fi led in volv in g the si ngl e dem and, and the b

rief s i n ne ither appea l referenced the ot her one. Furt her, a reco rd search for Sando val 's nam e retu rned mul

tiple cases. The trial court pla ced the burden

on the Stat e to discover the charges that Sandoval

in tended to ref eren ce, s tatin g tha t the ca se n

um be rs coul d be di f f i cul t for a de f en da n t to obt ain and t hat t he Sta te co uld have det er mined t he cha rg es a t issue w ith a r eco rd sea rc h. I n t he alt er nat ive , t he trial courtnoted that t he Stat e coul d have wr itt ed in S ando val to det er mine his i nt ent . Like wise, t he ma jori ty states th at, "[t ]o t he ext ent t hat Sand ova l's multiple DU I c har ges left t he St at e wo nder ing whi ch charge s w ere s ub

j ec t to the dem

and, i t was free to in

quire f urther of Sandoval ." Sli

p op. at 11.2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-21- But this ign ores that t he b

urden was on San

doval to begi n wi th to provide a c le ar and une quiv ocal dem and. The Stat e had n

o burden to assert Sandoval' s statut ory speedy trial righ t o r to undertake an inv esti gation to fi

ll in i nf orma tion that San dova l ha d the bur den to suppl y . The fl aw in t he su gg es t io n t ha t Sa nd o va l co uld be wri tt ed i n to deter mi

ne h is in tent is f urther il lustrat edb y

th e dete rm in ati on th at th e s pe ed y trial pe ri od beg an to runwhen t he ambiguo us d emand wasf i rst f il ed. I f it is nece ssar y to wr it in t he de fendant t o d et er mine the int ent of t he de mand, t he demand canno t be said t o be clear and un eq uiv o ca l as r eq uir ed by se ct io n 3

- - 8-

- 10 . T hu s, it wo uld seem in appropriate to start t he tim e runni ng wh en the dem an d is first made. But t he effect of t he maj ori ty o pin io n is t ha t t he t ime will run eve n while the St at e is at t empt ing t o de t er mine t he ap plic ab le charges. The m aj ority also in

terpret s the State's argumen t as one that wo uld require specif ic case num be rs in order to compl

y wi th secti on 3--8 --10. B ut cas e n um be rs are not necessari

ly required. I would r equi

re only that t he dem

and b e suf

fi ci ent to allow the State to prepare its prosecut io n withoutresort in

g to speculation or sign

if ic ant in vestigation. I suggest that the standard is a nal ogous to t he sp ec ificit y t o wh ich t he de fen da nt is e nt it led in a chargi ng i nstrume nt, for purposes of p re par ing a def en se a nd p rotecti on ag ai

ns t doubl e j eopardy . A defend ant i s en

titl ed to a chargi

ng i ns trum en t that provi

des an i den tif i ab l e of f en se. A l ack of spe ci f i ci ty a bout the ch arges can ra i se due pro ces s an

d doub l e j eopardy

conc ern s. Peo ple v. A lvarado , 301 Ill . App. 3d 1017 (1998). In the sam e respect, in

order t o pro perly

prepare it s pr os ecu t ion, t he Stat e m

ust be m ade aware of an

y s peedy trial is sues and wh

en dem ands f or t rial take ef f ec t. When t he de fendant 's de scr ipt ion o f the charg es pe nd ing i s i nsuf f i ci en t to al l ow th e S tate

to2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-22- do so , it fails in i

t s basic r equ irement of p ro viding notice to the St ate and cann ot start t he speedy

trial peri od run ni ng u nde r section 3--8--1 0. It i s i roni c tha t, had the c ourt entered an or der pr ohibit ing furt her pr os ecu t ions o n t he inf orm ati on co nt ained in t he demand , there would be no way of determi

ni ng wh ic h charge was sub

ject to do uble jeo par dy. Wit hou t t he required spe cifi ci ty, the order could not pin down tha t either charge was speci fi ed and thus was

subj ect to double

jeopa rdy . The major ity re so lves t he de ficiency by disre gar ding the

nece ss ity of spe cificity, and it ar bit r ar ily ap plie s t he pr inc iple o f do ub le jeo pa r dy by in dis crim in ately appl yi ng i t in the pl ural des pite the si ngular dema

nd. Here, in lieu o f ca se nu mbe r s, Sa nd o va l co uld ha ve pr o vid ed a d es cr ipt io n t ha t inc lud ed it ems suc h as t he da t es o f the char ges , t he loc at ions o f the alleged offense s, a nd t he circ umst ance s o f the ar re st s, w hich wo uld have allowe d t he St at e t o k now which o f the char ges he inte nded t he de mand to ap ply t o , w it ho ut re so rt t o sp ec ula t io n o r c alling him int o co ur t t o cla rify hi s i nten t. But he di d not do so. In ste ad , h e d em

an de d a sp ee dy tri al f oronly a single D UI char ge, wit h no ind icat ion o f the DU I ch ar ge t o wh ich he mea nt t he de man d t o ap pl y. Wh en Sandoval wrot e "DuPage DUI " wit hou t pr ovid ing det ails abo ut which cha rg es t he demand ap plie d t o , he did not co mply with sec t ion 3

-- 8- -1 0. Fo r t he sa me rea so ns t hat t he de mand fai led to m eet the req ui rem en ts of se cti on 3 --8 --1 0, th

e Sta te a l so d i d not ha ve ac tua l noti ce of t he charges. I t simp ly lac ke d t he info r mat io n ne ce ss ar y t o ap ply t he de mand t o a ny given cha rg e, and it wa s n ot re qu i re d to a ss er

t Sa n dov al ' s r i gh ts for hi m. A s a resul

t, I wo uld h

old that the speedy

trial peri od neve r be gan to run an d tha t the tri al court erred

when it di sm i ssed the ch arges . Because Sa ndoval ' s dem an d w asin suf

f i ci en t un de r s ec ti on 3- -8 --1 0, i

t i s un n ec es sa

ry to address the appl

ic abi li ty of the l ocal co ur t ru le req uiring case num bers to be i

ncl uded i n speedy trial2--06-- 0996 & 2--06-- 1053 c ons.

-23- dem ands und er secti on 103 --5(b ). H owev er, I observe that, to the extent that it appl ie s to an in carcerated defen

dant who m

ust make a speedy

trial dem and under sec t io n 3

- - 8-

- 10 , t he r ule is co nsist ent with the statut ory requi remen t t hat defen dants provi de t he ch ar ge s p en din g a ga inst t he m.