Reposted corrected version

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

JOAN MAURI BAREFOOT,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JANA SUSAN JENNINGS et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

S251574

Fifth Appellate District

F076395

Tuolumne County Superior Court

PR11414

January 23, 2020

Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 

Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 

Kruger, and Groban concurred.
1

BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS

S251574

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

If amendments to a revocable trust made shortly before 

the settlor dies disinherit a beneficiary, does that individual, as 

one who is not named in the trust’s final iteration, have standing 

to challenge the validity of the disinheriting amendments in 

probate court on grounds such as incompetence, undue 

influence, or fraud?

The Court of Appeal interpreted Probate Code section 

17200, subdivision (a),

1 which provides that “a trustee or 

beneficiary of a trust may petition the court under this chapter 

concerning the internal affairs of the trust or to determine the 

existence of the trust,” as permitting only a currently named 

beneficiary to make such a petition. It further concluded that 

because the plaintiff was no longer a named beneficiary, she 

lacked standing to challenge the validity of the amendment that 

eliminated her interest under section 17200.

We disagree with the Court of Appeal, and hold today that 

the Probate Code grants standing in probate court to individuals 

who claim that trust amendments eliminating their beneficiary 

status arose from incompetence, undue influence, or fraud.

2

1 All further statutory references are to the Probate Code 

unless otherwise indicated.

2 We do not decide here whether an heir who was never a 

trust beneficiary has standing under the Probate Code to 

challenge that trust.
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

2

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because no party petitioned the Court of Appeal for a 

rehearing, we take this factual and procedural discussion

largely from that court’s opinion. (Barefoot v. Jennings (2018) 

27 Cal.App.5th 1, 3-4 (Barefoot); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.500(c)(2).) 

The underlying petition in probate court alleges the 

following: Joan Lee Maynord and her now deceased husband 

established the Maynord Family Trust (Trust) in 1986. After 

her husband’s death in 1993, Maynord served as the sole 

trustor. Plaintiff Joan Mauri Barefoot (plaintiff), one of 

Maynord’s daughters, was a beneficiary and successor trustee

under the Trust. Two of Joan Lee Maynord’s other daughters, 

Jana Susan Jennings and Shana Wren (collectively defendants), 

were also beneficiaries. (Maynord’s three other children, one 

deceased, are not involved in this litigation.)

“In or around August 2013 and continuing through 2016, 

Maynord executed a series of eight amendments to and 

restatements of the Trust, referred to as the 17th through the 

24th amendments. The 24th amendment was the final 

amendment prior to Maynord’s death. In these amendments 

and restatements, [plaintiff’s] share of the Trust, as set out in 

the 16th amendment, was eliminated and [plaintiff] was both 

expressly disinherited and removed as a successor trustee. At 

the same time Wren was provided with a large share of the 

Trust and named successor trustee.” (Barefoot, supra, 27 

Cal.App.5th at p. 4.)

After Maynord’s death on August 20, 2016, plaintiff filed 

a petition in probate court alleging the amendments

disinheriting her were invalid on three grounds: (1) Maynord 

was incompetent to make the amendments; (2) the amendments 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

3

were the product of defendants’ undue influence; and (3) the 

amendments were the product of defendants’ fraud. Regarding 

standing, the petition alleged that plaintiff was “a person 

interested in both the devolution of [Maynord’s] estate and the 

proper administration of the Trust because [plaintiff] is 

[Maynord’s] daughter and both the trustee and a beneficiary of 

the Trust before the purported amendments. She will benefit by 

a judicial determination that the purported amendments are 

invalid, thereby causing the Trust property to be distributed 

according to the terms of the Trust that existed before the 

invalid purported amendments. Therefore, [plaintiff] has 

standing to bring this petition.”

Defendants moved to dismiss the petition under sections 

17200 and 17202 (authorizing dismissal of a petition if

reasonably necessary to protect the Trust), arguing that 

plaintiff lacked standing because she was neither a beneficiary 

nor a trustee under the Trust. Plaintiff responded that she had

standing because she was a beneficiary before the amendments

— which, she argued, were invalid — were executed. The trial 

court ultimately agreed with defendants and dismissed the 

petition. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed judgment in defendant’s 

favor. We granted plaintiff’s petition for review to resolve the 

narrow standing question.

II. DISCUSSION

Underlying this action is the revocable trust that Maynord 

and her deceased husband created in 1986. “A revocable trust 

is a trust that the person who creates it, generally called the 

settlor, can revoke during the person’s lifetime.” (Estate of 

Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058, 1062, fn. omitted.) The 

primary duty of a court in construing a trust is to give effect to 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

4

the settlor’s intentions. (Brock v. Hall (1949) 33 Cal.2d 885

(Brock).) 

Our review concerns whether plaintiff has standing to 

assert the invalidity of the Trust amendments that left her 

without an interest in her mother’s trust estate. In concluding 

that plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the 

amendments to the Trust, the Court of Appeal suggested that 

plaintiff relied exclusively on section 17200, subdivision (a), 

which provides: “Except as provided in Section 15800, a trustee 

or beneficiary of a trust may petition the court under this 

chapter concerning the internal affairs of the trust or to 

determine the existence of the trust.” Section 15800 generally 

provides that so long as the trust remains revocable (that is, as 

long as the settlor is alive) and the settlor is competent, the 

settlor, “and not the beneficiary, has the rights afforded 

beneficiaries under this division.” (Id., subd. (a); see Estate of 

Giraldin, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1066.) Here, the settlor

(Maynord) has died, so section 15800 is no longer relevant.

The Court of Appeal interpreted section 17200’s reference 

to “a trustee or beneficiary” in subdivision (a) to mean that even 

wrongly disinherited beneficiaries are prohibited from making 

the petition. As we will explain, the Court of Appeal’s approach 

runs counter to both the Probate Code and cases interpreting it.

Initially, we note that when a demurrer or pretrial motion 

to dismiss challenges a complaint on standing grounds, the court 

may not simply assume the allegations supporting standing lack 

merit and dismiss the complaint. Instead, the court must first 

determine standing by treating the properly pled allegations as 

true. If, having taken the allegations as true, the court finds no 

standing, it should sustain the demurrer or dismiss the petition. 

If it finds standing by contrast, the court should allow the
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

5

litigation to continue. (Warth v. Seldin (1975) 422 U.S. 490, 501 

[standing in federal courts]; Estate of Plaut (1945) 27 Cal.2d 424, 

426, 429-430 [will contest].)

The applicable Probate Code provisions support plaintiff’s 

standing to challenge the merits of the Trust amendments on

the grounds of incompetence, undue influence, or fraud. Section 

17200, subdivision (a), authorizes a beneficiary to petition the 

court concerning the trust’s affairs “or to determine [its]

existence.” Section 17200, subdivision (b)(3) contemplates the 

court’s determination of “the validity of a trust provision.” 

Plainly, the term “trust provision” incorporates any 

amendments to a trust. Section 24, subdivision (c) defines a 

“beneficiary” for trust purposes, as “a person who has any 

present or future interest, vested or contingent.” Assuming 

plaintiff’s allegations are true, she has a present or future 

interest, making her a beneficiary permitted to petition the 

probate court under section 17200.

Years ago, this court observed that as a general matter, 

the Probate Code “ ‘was intended to broaden the jurisdiction of 

the probate court so as to give that court jurisdiction over 

practically all controversies which might arise between the 

trustees and those claiming to be beneficiaries under the trust.’ ” 

(Estate of Bissinger (1964) 60 Cal.2d 756, 765 (Bissinger), 

quoting Estate of Marre (1941) 18 Cal.2d 184, 187.) The wisdom 

of those decisions has not lessened over time. More recently, the 

Court of Appeal in Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943

explained that an expansive reading of the standing afforded to 

trust challenges under section 17200 “not only makes sense as 

a matter of judicial economy, but it also recognizes the probate 

court’s inherent power to decide all incidental issues necessary 

to carry out its express powers to supervise the administration 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

6

of the trust.” (Estate of Heggstad, at p. 951.) Other Courts of 

Appeal that have addressed the same question are in 

agreement. (Drake v. Pinkham (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 400, 407-

409 [individual petitioned under § 17200 claiming two 

amendments to a trust that disinherited her were invalid on the 

ground the settlor was incompetent]; Conservatorship of Irvine

(1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341 [“it is clear from viewing 

section 17200 as a whole that a probate court has jurisdiction 

over both inter vivos and testamentary trusts to entertain 

petitions for instructions regarding the validity (and thus, 

invalidity) of trust agreements or amendments”].) 

Reading the Probate Code section consistent with the 

statutory scheme as a whole, and examining the statutory 

language to give it commonsense meaning, we conclude that 

claims that trust provisions or amendments are the product of 

incompetence, undue influence, or fraud, as is alleged here,

should be decided by the probate court, if the invalidity of those 

provisions or amendments would render the challenger a 

beneficiary of the trust. (See Coalition of Concerned 

Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 

737 [courts should not examine statutory language in 

isolation].) So when a plaintiff claims to be a rightful beneficiary 

of a trust if challenged amendments are deemed invalid, she has 

standing to petition the probate court under section 17200.

Defendants argue that interpreting section 17200 to 

permit purported beneficiaries to challenge a trust or its 

amendments would “invite chaos” because it would permit 

individuals with no present interest in the trust to “meddle” 

with its administration. We think defendants overstate the 

matter. Our holding does not allow individuals with no interest 

in a trust to bring a claim against the trust. Instead, we permit 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

7

those whose well-pleaded allegations show that they have an 

interest in a trust — because the amendments purporting to 

disinherit them are invalid — to petition the probate court. 

Additionally, section 17206 provides the probate court 

with wide latitude to “make any orders and take any other 

action necessary or proper to dispose of the matters presented 

by the petition.” This section supports a finding of standing 

here. We have held that although the probate court has no 

general equity jurisdiction, it does have the power to apply 

equitable and legal principles in order to assist its function as a 

probate court. (Bissinger, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 764-765.) 

Indeed, the probate court is given broad jurisdiction “ ‘over 

practically all controversies that might arise between the 

trustees and those claiming to be beneficiaries of the trust.’ ” 

(Id. at p. 765, quoting Estate of Marre, supra, 18 Cal.2d at p. 

187.) Using such discretion, the court can preserve trust assets 

and the rights of all purported beneficiaries while it adjudicates 

the standing issue. As one court explained, interpreting section 

17200 as we do here “not only makes sense as a matter of judicial 

economy, but it also recognizes the probate court’s inherent 

power to decide all incidental issues necessary to carry out its 

express powers to supervise the administration of the trust.” 

(Estate of Heggstad, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 951.)3

3 We also note that defendants’ restrictive interpretation of 

the Probate Code does not promote the public interest in 

preventing the administration of trust property that is procured 

through fraud or undue influence. This interest is expressed 

most clearly in section 21380, which provides that certain 

donative transfers (e.g., transfers to the drafter of the trust or to 

the settlor’s caregiver) are presumptively the product of fraud or 

undue influence. Courts have held that “no contest” provisions 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

8

Defendants also contend that section 850 allows “any 

interested person” to file a petition to take certain actions 

challenging title and property transfer issues, and provides the 

exclusive means to challenge trust provisions. That section 

concerns “the transfer of property of the trust.” (See § 17200.1.) 

We need not examine in detail what section 850 does and does 

not do because plaintiff is asserting her standing as a 

beneficiary to challenge the validity of several amendments to 

the Trust only, and not contesting any transfer or sale of 

property into or out of the Trust. We therefore leave the 

statute’s interpretation to a future case.

To hold other than we do today would be to insulate those 

persons who improperly manipulate a trust settlor to benefit 

themselves against a probate petition. Today’s narrow holding 

in fact provides an orderly and expeditious mechanism for 

limited challenges like plaintiff’s to be litigated early in the 

probate process, in probate court, and to ensure that the settlor’s

intent is honored. (See Brock, supra, 33 Cal.2d a p. 885.) 

in trusts cannot be used to avoid this section because that would 

undermine the Legislature’s intent to deter persons from 

procuring trust benefits through fraud or undue influence. 

(Graham v. Lenzi (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 248, 256.) Similarly, 

where a person fraudulently induces a settlor to amend a trust 

so that it transfers all of the settlor’s estate to that person and 

disinherits all prior beneficiaries, it would undermine the public 

interest if a court were to rule that those valid beneficiaries had 

no standing to contest the fraudulently procured amendment. 
BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

9

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 

remand the matter to that court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

CHIN, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Barefoot v. Jennings

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 27 Cal.App.5th 1

Rehearing Granted

________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S251574

Date Filed: January 23, 2020

________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Tuolumne

Judge: Kate P. Segerstrom

________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

The Singhal Law Firm, Dinesh H. Singhal; Law Offices of Nathan D. Pastor and Nathan D. Pastor 

for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Anglin Flewelling, Robert Collings Little; Haskett Law Firm and Amber C. Haskett for Bonnie Sterngold 

as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Artiano Shinoff, Howard A. Kipnis, Steven Barnes; Forethought Law, Bryan L. Phipps; The Law Office of 

Ciarán O’Sullivan, Ciarán O’Sullivan; McCormick Barstow and Herbert A. Stroh for Executive Committee 

of the Trusts and Estates Section of the California Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

Jones & Lester, Mark A. Lester and Theresa Loss for Ventura County Bar Association – Probate and Estate 

Planning Section as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Nancy Reinhardt and Nancy Reinhardt for San Fernando Valley Bar Association – Trusts 

and Estates Section as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Astor & Kingsland and Lya R. Kingsland for Orange County Bar Association – Trusts and Estates Section 

as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, Sean M. SeLegue; Gianelli & Associates, Gianelli | Nielsen, Eric T. 

Nielsen, Michael L. Gianelli and Sarah J. Birmingham for Defendants and Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Nathan D. Pastor

Law Offices of Nathan D. Pastor

2033 N. Main St., Ste. 750

Walnut Creek, CA 94596

(925) 322-1012

Herbert A. Stroh

McCormick Barstow, LLP

656 Santa Rosa Street, Suite 2A

San Luis Obispo, CA 93406

(805) 541-2800

Sean M. SeLegue

Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP

Three Embarcadero Center, 10th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111-4024

(415) 471-3100