FOURTH DIVISION

	January 24, 2002

No. 1-97-0315

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)       Appeal from

								)    the Circuit Court

		Plaintiff-Appellee,			)     of Cook County.

								)

	v.							)   No. 93-CR-04871-01

								)

TERRENCE GRIFFIN,					)        Honorable

								)   Edwin A. Gausselin,

		Defendant-Appellant.		)     Judge Presiding.

	JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

	Fifteen-year old defendant Terrence Griffin was tried and

convicted as an adult of first-degree murder and sentenced to 45

years' imprisonment.  He appealed, arguing that his confession was

involuntary and the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress.  On appeal, we found that the trial court's consideration of

all of the factors under the totality of the circumstances test was

incomplete.  We then remanded the case for the limited purpose of a

new hearing on the voluntariness of defendant's statement,

specifically addressing the presence or absence of defendant's parents

and any evidence of police conduct frustrating his parents' attempts

to confer with defendant.  People v. Griffin, No. 1-97-0315 (1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).  We also retained

jurisdiction to allow review of the court's decision at the new

hearing.

	Following a new suppression hearing on remand, the trial court

again denied defendant's motion to suppress, finding the statement

voluntary.  Defendant now appeals from that decision and argues that

his confession was involuntary where the police (1) prevented

defendant's parents from conferring with him prior to making a

statement, (2) interrogated defendant in the absence of an adult

concerned for his welfare, and (3) held him at the police station for

over 18 hours before he confessed.  For the following reasons, we

reverse.

	During the second suppression hearing, the parties agreed to

stipulate to and include the testimony from defendant's first motion-

to-suppress hearing.  At that hearing in April 1994, youth officer

Begeske testified that at approximately 11 p.m. or midnight on January

25, 1993, he was called to the Calumet City police station in his

capacity as a youth officer.  He identified himself at defendant's

first interview at 3 a.m., which lasted about 30 minutes.  Defendant

was read his Miranda rights, indicated that he understood those rights, and waived them.  After the interview, defendant remained in a

juvenile holding cell with a bed and toilet during the day and would

have been fed breakfast and lunch.

	Begeske next spoke with defendant at 5:10 p.m.  At that

interview, Investigator Glumac and Assistant State's Attorney

Danielian were also present.  Defendant was again "Mirandized" before

Danielian conducted the interview, which ended at approximately 8 p.m. 

Begeske was present when defendant made a statement, which was then reduced to writing.  Danielian reviewed defendant's two-page statement

with him, allowing him to make any changes before signing it.

	On cross-examination, Begeske stated that defendant's parents

were not at the police station when he arrived.  He acknowledged that

defendant's father, Mr. Willie Griffin, came to the station that day,

but stated that no one advised him that defendant's mother, Mrs.

Pearlie Griffin, was there.  While Begeske spoke with Mr. Griffin

during the day, he did not notify defendant's parents that defendant

was at the station for questioning.  Begeske testified that defendant

never asked to speak to his parents.  

	Defendant testified that he was 15 years old at the time of the

arrest and was a freshman in high school.  He stated that Begeske was

present during the 3 a.m. interview, but defendant thought that he was

an investigator, not a youth officer.  Defendant had previous contact

with the police and other youth officers.  He denied that anyone

explained his rights to him and testified that he asked to speak to

his parents constantly.  Defendant stated that he received breakfast

and lunch and was able to sleep in his cell.  

	Mrs. Griffin testified that, about one-half hour after the police

came to her house on January 24 looking for her younger son Frank, she

proceeded to the police station to see defendant.  She stated that she

spent at least five or six hours at the station, but the woman at the

front desk would not allow her to see her son.   

	Danielian testified that he first interviewed defendant during

the 5 p.m. interview and explained his role as an assistant State's

Attorney.  The conversation lasted approximately one hour before Danielian asked defendant if he would be willing to give a written

statement.  Defendant then read a portion of the statement to confirm

that he could read English.  They read through the statement together

and defendant was allowed to make corrections. 

	The second motion-to-suppress hearing in April 2000 contained the

following testimony.  Officer Begeske testified that, when he arrived

at the Calumet City police station around midnight on January 25,

1993, defendant’s father was present.  Mr. Griffin had arrived with

his other son, Frank, and Chief Rhodes.  Begeske spoke with Mr.

Griffin and told him that defendant was a suspect in a shooting and

that Frank was a witness.  He stated he was present when defendant's

oral and handwritten statements were made and that at no time during

either interview did defendant request to see his parents.  Begeske

stated he was there "to make sure that everything was running smoothly

*** if the defendant needed anything, you know, water, pop, *** make

sure that he was taken care of."  He checked on defendant in his

holding cell during the day, but did not know how many times he did

so. 

	Begeske again spoke with Mr. Griffin sometime that afternoon

before defendant’s confession, where they talked about the progress of

the case.  However, later in his testimony, Begeske stated that he did

not remember if he spoke with Mr. Griffin before or after defendant

made his statement.  Begeske testified that Mr. Griffin was aware that

defendant was a suspect but did not indicate that he wanted to speak

with him.  On cross-examination, Begeske stated that he did not advise

Mr. Griffin that his role as a youth officer was to protect the interests of his sons or that Mr. Griffin could be present during

defendant's questioning.  Begeske never told defendant that his father

was in the lobby or that his father could speak with him.  When he

spoke with Mr. Griffin, it was through the glass window in the lobby. 

He did not recall seeing Mrs. Griffin at the station.  

	Begeske stated that he was the only youth officer at the station

that day for several juvenile suspects and witnesses.  Further,

Begeske admitted that he was active in the investigation of this case. 

At 2:40 a.m., he "Mirandized" Frank and questioned him about the

shooting.  He then "Mirandized" and spoke with another witness, Landry

Williams, about his knowledge of the crime.  Begeske stated that

either he or another investigator "Mirandized" defendant at the 3 a.m.

interview.  Begeske also testified that he was involved in and present

for the "Mirandizing" of three juvenile codefendants at 6:53 a.m.,

11:20 a.m., and 4:30 p.m.  Begeske agreed that he left the station to

investigate this crime from approximately 2 a.m. to 6 a.m.  When he

returned to the station, he again interviewed Frank.  During that

conversation, Begeske learned the location of the weapons used in the

shooting, and he and another officer proceeded to codefendant Dearlo

Terry’s grandmother's house, where they retrieved several guns. 

Begeske returned to the station with the weapons and Terry and again

questioned Frank.

	Begeske initially denied that he and Danielian left the interview

room during defendant's second interview from 5:10 p.m. until 8 p.m.,

but later admitted that he left defendant's presence for the

statements of two other juveniles.  Codefendant Terry's written statement contained Begeske's and Danielian's signatures and indicated

an interview start time of 5:34 p.m. and an end time of 6:45 p.m. 

Terrence Hodges' written statement indicated an end time of 7:10 p.m. 

Begeske stated that, while he was present for the statements of Terry

and Hodges, he did not conduct the interviews.  Further, Begeske

stated that he and the other officers confronted defendant with other

witnesses' statements and may have shown defendant the recovered

weapons.

	Mr. Griffin testified that around midnight of January 25, 1993,

he and Frank accompanied the police to the station.  His wife arrived

about an hour or two later and told Mr. Griffin that defendant was in

custody.  Mr. Griffin stated that he and his wife repeatedly asked the

uniformed woman at the front desk to see their sons but were never

allowed to see them.  They stayed at the station all night but left in

the morning to care for their other children and returned to the

station around noon.  At that time, he and his wife spoke with Chief

Rhodes, who said that defendant and Frank were being held and refused

them access to their sons.  The Griffins then left the station.  On

cross-examination, Mr. Griffin denied that he spoke with a youth

officer that day. 

	Mrs. Griffin testified that she went to the police station after

learning from her daughter that defendant was in custody.  At the

station, she and her husband asked the woman at the front desk to see

their sons several times, but she refused.  They left the station

early in the morning and returned approximately five hours later when

they again repeatedly asked to see their sons.  At one point, they spoke with Chief Rhodes in his office.  Rhodes explained that

defendant was involved in a shooting and that he signed a confession. 

Mrs. Griffin asked Rhodes to see defendant, but he told them she could

not see him because he had already confessed. 

	Lieutenant Patrick O'Meara testified that there were no female

police officers or civilians assigned to the police station front desk

during the early morning of January 25, 1993.  Between 11 p.m. on

January 24 and 7 a.m. on January 25, only one female police officer

was on duty and she was assigned to street duty. 

	Danielian next testified that he introduced himself when he

interviewed defendant.  He stated that the 5 p.m. interview lasted

approximately one-half hour before defendant was taken out of the

room.  When defendant was brought back into the office at 7:30 p.m.,

Danielian asked him if he would like to make a written statement and

defendant agreed.  Danielian stated that defendant never asked for his

parents and never indicated that he had been treated poorly.  On

cross-examination, Danielian stated that he interviewed all seven

juvenile suspects and witnesses at the station that day.  At some

point, Danielian asked Begeske if someone had contacted defendant's

parents and, after that conversation, Danielian understood that the

Griffins knew that their sons were at the station.  Danielian himself

did not contact defendant's parents, nor did he direct Begeske to find

them.

	The trial court then made the following factual findings.  The

court found that defendant was arrested and brought to the Calumet

City police station at approximately 11 p.m. on January 24, 1993.  Defendant's parents arrived at the station shortly after midnight,

with Mrs. Griffin arriving about one hour after her husband.  Begeske,

in his capacity as a youth officer, arrived at the station around

midnight and met with Mr. Griffin, telling him that defendant was a

suspect and Frank was a witness to a shooting.  Defendant was

questioned twice during his time in custody, and on both occasions

Begeske was present.  Defendant was given his Miranda warnings.  Except for the time that he was being questioned, defendant was fed,

kept in a holding cell with a bed and allowed to use the washroom. 

The court noted that defendant displayed average intelligence and had

been involved in the criminal justice system on prior occasions. 

Although defendant claimed to have asked for his parents constantly,

both Begeske and Danielian testified that he did not and the court

found Begeske credible in this regard.  While defendant was detained

for 18 hours before making a statement, the court found he was only

questioned for a 30-minute period prior to that time.  There was no

assertion of mistreatment or coercion.

	The court did not believe Mr. and Mrs. Griffin's testimony that

they asked a woman at the front desk to see their sons and further

stated that the evidence showed no women were working in the station

during the time in question.  However, the court found their testimony

that Chief Rhodes refused to let them see defendant was "unequivocal

and uncontroverted."  The court then weighed the factors delineated in

In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 727 N.E.2d 1003 (2000), and found defendant's statement voluntary.  

	At defendant's trial in 1996, Terrence Hodges testified that he

witnessed the crime and that defendant was the shooter.  While Frank

testified that he could not identify defendant as the shooter, and

Landry Williams testified that he did not see the actual shooting,

both boys had given prior written statements to the police detailing

the crime and identifying defendant as the shooter.  These prior

inconsistent statements, as well as defendant's statement, were all

introduced into evidence.  After deliberating, the jury convicted

defendant of first-degree murder and the court sentenced defendant to

45 years' imprisonment. 

	For this appeal, we need only address the trial court's denial of

the motion to suppress defendant's statement.  When reviewing whether

defendant's statement was voluntary, we accord great deference to the

trial court's factual findings and will reverse those findings only if

they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.  In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50, 727 N.E.2d 1003, 1010 (2000).  However, we apply the

de novo standard of review when reviewing the ultimate question of whether defendant's confession was voluntary.  In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 50, 727 N.E.2d at 1010.  The State bears the burden of showing by a

preponderance of the evidence that a confession was knowingly and

intelligently made.  In re R.T., 313 Ill. App. 3d 422, 428, 729 N.E.2d 889, 894 (2000).

	The taking of a juvenile's confession is "'a sensitive concern.'" 

In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54, 727 N.E.2d at 1012, quoting People v. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d 470, 476, 363 N.E.2d 371, 373 (1977).  In analyzing the voluntariness of a juvenile's confession, courts must take great care to assure that these statements were neither suggested or coerced

nor a product of fright or despair.  People v. Kolakowski, 319 Ill. App. 3d 200, 213, 745 N.E.2d 62, 74 (2001).  Courts look to the

totality of the circumstances and consider factors including

defendant's age, intelligence, background, experience, mental

capacity, education, and physical condition at the time of

questioning; the legality and duration of the detention; the duration

of the questioning; and any physical or mental abuse by police,

including any threats or promises.  In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54, 727 N.E.2d at 1012.  Additional factors to consider when assessing the

confession of a juvenile include the time of day when questioning

occurred and the presence or absence of a parent or other adult

interested in the minor's welfare.  People v. Plummer, 306 Ill. App. 3d 574, 584, 714 N.E.2d 63, 70-71 (1999).  No single factor is

dispositive.  In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54, 727 N.E.2d at 1012.  Because a minor is "'an easy victim of the law,'" his confession will

be found involuntary if the facts reveal that it was "'a confession

wrung from a child by means which the law should not sanction.'"  In re V.L.T., 292 Ill. App. 3d 728, 736, 686 N.E.2d 49, 54 (1997), quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599, 601, 92 L. Ed. 224, 228-29, 68 S. Ct. 302, 304 (1948).

	Defendant argues that three circumstances during his detention at

the police station created an overall coercive atmosphere, rendering

his statement involuntary.  He first contends that the police

improperly prevented his parents from conferring with him prior to

making a statement.  The State responds that this is only one factor to consider and that the remainder of the totality of the

circumstances analysis weighs in favor of admitting defendant's

statement. 

	Our supreme court has found that the "concerned adult" factor,

whether the juvenile had an opportunity to speak with a parent or

adult interested in his welfare before or during interrogation, is an

important element in determining the voluntariness of defendant's

confession.  In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 55, 727 N.E.2d at 1012.   While there is no per se rule that juveniles must be allowed to consult with their parents prior to questioning, courts have

repeatedly held that police conduct which frustrates parents' attempts

to confer with their child is particularly relevant and a significant

factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis.  In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 55, 727 N.E.2d at 1013; People v. McDaniel, No. 1-98-4719 (December 5, 2001); People v. Golden, 323 Ill. App. 3d 892, 900, 753 N.E.2d 475, 482 (2001); Kolakowski, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 214, 745 N.E.2d at 75; In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d 227, 235, 689 N.E.2d 1172, 1179 (1998); In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d 545, 553, 672 N.E.2d 331, 336 (1996).  "It suggests that, at worst, the police were trying to coerce a confession and at best that they were conducting

the interrogation without due regard for the suspect's age."  In re R.T., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 430, 729 N.E.2d at 895, citing In re V.L.T., 292 Ill. App. 3d at 737, 686 N.E.2d at 55; In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 554-55, 672 N.E.2d at 337; People v. R.B., 232 Ill. App. 3d 583, 595, 597 N.E.2d 879, 887 (1992).  

	When a juvenile's parents are present, request to see their

child, and are prevented from doing so by the police, the presumption

arises that the juvenile's will was overborne.  In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d at 237, 689 N.E.2d at 1180.  The relevant inquiry is whether

the absence of a parent or other adult interested in the minor's

welfare contributed to the coercive atmosphere of the interview. 

People v. Smith, No. 1-00-1341 (December 7, 2001). 

	In the present case, the police clearly frustrated the attempts

of defendant's parents to see him.  While the trial court did not

believe the Griffins that they repeatedly asked a woman at the front

desk to see defendant, it specifically found that the evidence that

Chief Rhodes of the Calumet City police department refused to allow

them to see their son was "unequivocal and uncontroverted."  Both

parents spent most of the night at the police station, leaving in the

morning only to tend to younger children at home.  Both returned to

the station at noon and spoke with Chief Rhodes, who told the Griffins

that defendant had already confessed and they could not see him.  In

fact, defendant did not make or sign a statement until after 5 p.m.

that evening.  Begeske knew Mr. Griffin was at the station and spoke

with him repeatedly, but never allowed him to see defendant.  The

Griffins, by their presence at the police station, indicated an

interest in their son and the police had an affirmative duty to stop

questioning and allow his parents to confer with him.  McDaniel, slip op. at 24; In re L.L., 295 Ill. App. 3d 594, 602, 693 N.E.2d 908, 914 (1998); In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d 965, 974, 675 N.E.2d 156, 163 (1996).  The fact that defendant never requested to confer with his parents is irrelevant and "'blatantly disregards the interest of the

parents in wishing to confer with their child before questioning.'" 

McDaniel, slip op. at 24, quoting In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d at 237, 689 N.E.2d at 1180.  Therefore, we find that the police frustrated defendant's parents' attempts to see him "so that they

could create an intimidating atmosphere and obtain a confession."  In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 555, 672 N.E.2d at 338.  While this factor alone does not tip the scales in favor of suppressing

defendant's confession, we find it contributed significantly to a

coercive atmosphere and strongly weighs against a finding that

defendant's statement was voluntary.

	Defendant next argues that he was denied the presence of an adult

concerned for his welfare.  He asserts that, although Officer Begeske

was acting as a youth officer during defendant's interviews, he was

actively involved in the investigation of defendant's case and

gathered evidence against defendant.  Begeske's actions, defendant

argues, significantly contributed to the coercive atmosphere

surrounding his statement.  The State responds that Begeske was

present during the questioning of defendant, ensured that he was

treated properly, and there was no coercion.  

	While there is no requirement that a youth officer be present

when a minor is questioned, it is a significant factor in the totality

of the circumstances analysis.  Kolakowski, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 213, 745 N.E.2d at 74; In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d at 237, 689 N.E.2d at 1180.  Just as the absence of a parent does not per se make a confession involuntary, the presence of a youth officer does not per se make a juvenile's confession voluntary.  In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 555, 672 N.E.2d at 338.  However, in Illinois, even when

youth officers are present, their role is unclear.  One line of cases

holds that a youth officer's role is to verify that minors' parents

have been notified, ensure that the minors have been given Miranda rights, and see to it that minors are properly treated, that they are

fed, given access to washroom facilities, and allowed to rest, and

that they are not coerced in any way.  People v. Williams, 324 Ill. App. 3d 419, 429-30, 753 N.E.2d 1089, 1098 (2001); Kolakowski, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 213-14, 745 N.E.2d at 74-75; Plummer, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 588, 714 N.E.2d at 73; In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d at 976-77, 675 N.E.2d at 165.  Other cases find that a youth officer may not merely

be present and remain silent, but must demonstrate an interest in the

minors' welfare and affirmatively protect their rights.  People v. McDaniel, slip op. at 25; In re L.L., 295 Ill. App. 3d at 603, 693 N.E.2d at 915; In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d at 237, 689 N.E.2d at 1180.  These cases are fact specific and each case must be evaluated

on its own particular set of circumstances.  Plummer, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 587, 714 N.E.2d at 73.

	In the present case, while the court made no factual findings as

to Begeske's role as a youth officer, we find that Begeske failed to

fulfill his duties under either of the above standards.  Begeske did

not remain a neutral observer but, rather, worked against defendant's

interests.  While an investigator's role is to interrogate witnesses and collect evidence, it is clear that the role of a youth officer is

to act as a concerned adult interested in the juvenile's welfare.  A youth officer cannot be adversarial or antagonistic toward the

juvenile.  In re L.L., 295 Ill. App. 3d at 603, 693 N.E.2d at 915.  Thus, these roles are inherently incompatible.  Youth officers cannot

act in their role as a concerned adult while at the same time actively

compiling evidence against that juvenile.

	Here, Begeske admitted that, while he was acting as the only

youth officer to seven juveniles including defendant, he actively

investigated this case.  He "Mirandized" and interrogated several

witnesses, continued his investigation of the shooting outside the

station, and executed a search at a codefendant's relative's house for

the murder weapons.  Accordingly, we hold that Begeske was not an adult concerned for defendant's welfare.  Rather, he contributed to

the coercive atmosphere surrounding defendant's confession.  We note

that, with this holding, we do not mean to suggest that youth officers

must act solely in that capacity and cannot also investigate crimes. 

They may continue their investigations on other, unrelated matters

while acting as youth officers. 

	While the State argues that In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 727 N.E.2d 1003 (2000), and People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 758 N.E.2d 813 (2001), dictate that defendant's confession was voluntary, both

cases are distinguishable from the case before us.  In In re G.O. and Morgan, the presence of a concerned adult was but one factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis.  In both cases, our supreme

court found defendants' statements voluntary, based in part on the

fact that the police did not prevent the juveniles' parents or other

concerned adult from speaking with the minors.  People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, ___440-41, 758 N.E.2d 813, 834-35 (2001); In re G.O, 191 Ill. 2d at 55-56, 727 N.E.2d at 1013.  In In re G.O., defendant's mother was initially reluctant to go to the station, finally arriving

after defendant confessed, and was then brought to see defendant.  In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 50-56, 727 N.E.2d at 1010-13.  In Morgan, the police reasonably believed that the victims, defendant's grandparents,

were his legal guardians and, therefore, did not contact defendant's

mother in Virginia for several hours.  Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at ___440-41, 758 N.E.2d at 834.  

	Here, however, both of defendant's parents remained at the police

station for several hours and repeatedly asked to see defendant.  The

trial court specifically held that the chief of police frustrated

defendant's parents from conferring with him prior to or during

interrogation.  Further, neither In re G.O. nor Morgan involved a youth officer who actively investigated defendant's case and compiled

evidence against him while serving as a youth officer.  Therefore, In re G.O. and Morgan are distinguishable from the case at bar.

	Instead, the present case is similar to People v. McDaniel, No. 1-98-4719.  McDaniel involved a 14-year-old minor with little prior police contact charged as an adult with first-degree murder and

aggravated battery with a firearm.  The appellate court found that,

despite defendant's mother's numerous requests to see her son, the

police frustrated her attempts to confer with defendant prior to his

interrogation.  Moreover, while a youth officer was present during the

questioning of defendant, the court noted that the youth officer

showed no interest in protecting defendant's rights.  Based mainly on these two factors, the court held that defendant's statement was

involuntary.  The facts of the present case are more egregious than

those in McDaniel and warrant the suppression of defendant's confession.

	Lastly, defendant contends that his 18-hour detention before he

made a statement also contributed to the coercive atmosphere

surrounding his confession.  As stated above, the length of

questioning and duration of the detention, as well as the time of day

the juvenile was questioned, are factors in the totality of the

circumstances analysis, but are not dispositive of the issue of

voluntariness.  In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54, 727 N.E.2d at 1012.  The facts reveal that defendant was taken into custody about 11 p.m.,

held in a juvenile holding cell for 18 hours, and questioned for 30

minutes at 3 a.m. before confessing sometime after 5 p.m.  While this

conduct is not condoned, this factor alone does not render defendant's

confession involuntary.  However, it did contribute to the coercive

nature of defendant's confession and weighs against its admission. 

	We conclude that the totality of the circumstances dictates that

defendant's confession was involuntary.  Weighing in favor of the

admission of his statement are that he was of average intelligence and

had two previous contacts with the police.  He was "Mirandized:" before

questioning and responded that he understood those rights.  There was

no physical abuse and defendant was allowed food, a place to rest, and

access to washroom facilities.  

	However, the other factors weigh against admission.  Defendant

was just a week past his 15fifteenth birthday at the time of his arrest.  Further, the chief of police frustrated the attempts of his parents to

confer with him either before or during questioning.  Significantly,

defendant was also deprived of any concerned adult because his youth

officer actively investigated and gathered evidence against defendant. 

Defendant was taken into custody at 11 p.m., interrogated during the

early morning hours and the next day before making a statement 18

hours later.  Thus, we find that the coercive atmosphere created by

these circumstances rendered defendant's statement involuntary and

defendant's motion to suppress his statement should have been granted.

	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's denial of

defendant's motion to suppress, remand for a new trial, and vacate

defendant's conviction and sentence.

	Reversed and remanded; conviction and sentence vacated. 

	HOFFMAN, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.