FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ABHIJIT PRASAD,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-10454

D.C. No.

3:18-cr-00368-

CRB-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 9, 2021

San Francisco, California

Filed November 8, 2021

Before: Marsha S. Berzon, Morgan Christen, and 

Bridget S. Bade, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bade;

Concurrence by Judge Christen
2 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

SUMMARY*

Criminal

The panel affirmed the district court’s forfeiture order 

under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii) in the amount of 

$1,193,440.87, in a case in which a jury convicted Abhijit 

Prasad of twenty-one counts of visa fraud, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), and two counts of aggravated identity 

theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).

Prasad owned and operated Maremarks, a company 

through which Prasad filed petitions seeking H-1B status for 

nonimmigrant, foreign workers in specialty occupations to 

come to the United States as Maremarks’ employees 

performing work for Maremarks’ end-clients. Engaging in 

a scheme that created a “bench” of unemployed H-1B 

beneficiaries, Prasad violated § 1546(a) by falsely 

representing in the H-1B petitions that there were specific, 

bona fide positions available for the H-1B beneficiaries 

when those positions did not exist.

Challenging the district court’s interpretation of 

18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I)(7), Prasad argued that the 

district court erred in calculating the amount he was required 

to forfeit for his commission of visa fraud.

Prasad contended that he did not “obtain” the entire 

$1,193,440.87, as that term is used in § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I), 

because he eventually paid portions of the money to the H1B beneficiaries. The panel rejected this contention because 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 3

Prasad possessed the full $1,193,440.87 paid by the endclients and had control over the money before he paid a 

percentage of it to employees.

Prasad argued that even if he “obtained” the 

$1,193,440.87, the “proceeds” are limited to his profit, 

which excludes the amount he paid to the H-1B beneficiaries 

for their work for end-clients. The panel rejected this 

argument. Because the term “proceeds” in 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I)(7) is ambiguous, the panel looked to 

other sources to determine its meaning. Considering the 

term “proceeds” in the context of the forfeiture statute, the 

statute’s punitive purpose, and this court’s prior construction 

of virtually identical criminal forfeiture provisions, the panel 

concluded that the term “proceeds” extends to receipts and 

is not limited to profit.

Prasad argued that the amounts he paid to the H-1B 

beneficiaries were “legitimate” and not “derived from 

unlawful activity,” even if the visa applications he submitted 

were fraudulent. Prasad appeared to argue that because the 

H-1B beneficiary employees performed legitimate work for 

end-clients, the portions of the money that Maremarks 

received for that work and subsequently paid to the 

beneficiary employees should not be considered proceeds 

derived from his criminal conduct. The panel rejected this 

argument because it does not adequately explain how these 

portions are not proceeds obtained “directly or indirectly” 

from his visa fraud, as provided in § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I). The 

panel wrote that the money the end-clients paid for the work 

beneficiaries performed was “obtained directly or indirectly 

from” Prasad’s unlawful conduct, and concluded that the full 

$1,193,440.87 therefore constitutes “proceeds obtained . . . 

from the commission of” visa fraud.
4 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

Judge Christen concurred in the judgment. In her view, 

this case is the wrong vehicle for parsing the ambiguity of 

“proceeds” in 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I). She would 

affirm solely based on § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II), under which 

Prasad’s particular scheme easily warranted forfeiture of his 

gross receipts as “property used to facilitate . . . the 

commission” of his crimes.

The panel resolved remaining issues and affirmed 

Prasad’s convictions in a concurrently filed memorandum 

disposition.

COUNSEL

Juliana Drous (argued), San Francisco, California, for 

Defendant-Appellant.

Audrey B. Hemesath (argued), Special Assistant United 

States Attorney; Michael A. Rodriguez, Assistant United 

States Attorney; Merry Jean Chan, Chief, Appellate Section, 

Criminal Division; David L. Anderson, United States 

Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, San Francisco, 

California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 5

OPINION

BADE, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Abhijit Prasad was convicted 

following a jury trial on twenty-one counts of visa fraud, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), and two counts of 

aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1028A(a)(1). The district court sentenced Prasad to a total 

of thirty-six months’ imprisonment on all counts and three 

years’ supervised release. The district court also entered a 

forfeiture order, under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii), in the 

amount of $1,193,440.87. Prasad argues that the district 

court erred in calculating the amount he was required to 

forfeit for his commission of visa fraud. He asks us to vacate 

the forfeiture order and remand to the district court to 

redetermine the forfeiture amount. We conclude that the 

district court did not err in determining the amount subject 

to forfeiture and affirm.1

I.

A.

Prasad owned and operated Maremarks, which he 

describes as a “visa services company” and the government 

describes as a “workforce supply company” or “supplier.” 

Through Maremarks, Prasad filed petitions seeking H-1B 

status for nonimmigrant, foreign workers in specialty 

occupations—here software engineers—to come to the 

1 Prasad also appeals his convictions, asserting evidentiary errors 

and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. This opinion addresses 

only Prasad’s arguments challenging the forfeiture order. A 

concurrently filed memorandum disposition resolves the remaining 

issues on appeal and affirms Prasad’s convictions.
6 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

United States as Maremarks’ employees performing work 

for Maremarks’ end-clients.2

In these petitions, Prasad was required to establish that 

the H-1B beneficiary employees would fill specific, bona 

fide positions that were available at the time he filed the 

petitions, and that there was, or would be, a legitimate 

employer-employee relationship between Maremarks and 

the H-1B beneficiaries. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(i), 

(h)(4)(i)(A)(1); id. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining “employer”); 

United States v. Nanda, 867 F.3d 522, 525–26 (5th Cir. 

2 The Immigration and Nationality Act allows employers in the 

United States, like Maremarks, to request H-1B status for nonimmigrant 

foreign workers in specialty occupations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c); 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i). The 

prospective employer must first file a Labor Condition Application 

(LCA) with the Department of Labor (DOL) that identifies the specialty 

occupation it seeks to fill and attests to certain employment terms and 

conditions. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B); 

20 C.F.R. §§ 655.700(b), 655.730(c)–(d). If the Secretary of Labor 

certifies the LCA, the employer must then submit a Petition for a 

Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129) that requests H-1B nonimmigrant 

worker classification for the foreign worker. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(i), 

(h)(2)(i); 20 C.F.R. § 655.700(b)(2). The employer files these 

documents with the Department of Homeland Security, and the United 

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) processes them. 

See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)–(2); 20 C.F.R. § 655.700(a), (b)(3). If USCIS 

approves the employer’s H-1B petition, the beneficiary employees are 

admissible as temporary nonimmigrant workers and can obtain an H-1B 

nonimmigrant visa. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)–(2); see 20 C.F.R. 

§ 655.700(b)(3). H-1B beneficiaries are authorized to work in the United 

States only for the petitioning employer for the employment term 

specified in the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(i), (h)(2)(i)(D)–(E). For 

an H-1B beneficiary to work for an employer other than the petitioneremployer, the prospective new employer must go through the same 

application process as the original petitioner-employer, “and the alien is 

not authorized to begin the employment with the new petitioner until the 

petition is approved.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(D).
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 7

2017). At the time Prasad operated Maremarks, the 

employer had to maintain the “right to control” the H-1B 

beneficiary’s employment through the employment term 

specified in the petition. Donald Neufeld, U.S. Citizenship 

& Immigr. Servs., HQ 70/6.2.8 (AD 10-24), Determining 

Employer-Employee Relationship for Adjudication of H-1B 

Petitions, Including Third-Party Site Placements 4 (2010) 

(2010 USCIS Memo).3

When Prasad filed the petitions, he represented to USCIS 

that there were existing positions available to the prospective 

H-1B beneficiary employees at Cisco Systems and Ingenuus 

Software. In fact, there were no positions available for these 

workers at Cisco or Ingenuus. Instead, after the petitions 

were approved, Maremarks assigned the H-1B beneficiary 

employees to work for other end-clients. The end-clients 

paid Maremarks as the employer of the H-1B beneficiaries, 

and Prasad paid the H-1B beneficiaries after taking a 

percentage for himself.

As the government acknowledges, “supplier companies 

can file visa petitions with [USCIS] for qualified 

beneficiaries who seek to come to the United States on 

nonimmigrant work visas.” But Prasad violated the law by 

falsely representing in the H-1B petitions that there were 

specific, bona fide positions available for the H-1B 

beneficiaries when those positions did not exist. Thus, 

Prasad engaged in a “bench and switch” scheme. This 

scheme involves filing a petition for H-1B status to recruit a 

foreign worker, despite lacking a specific position for that 

3 This guidance was effective during the period that Prasad filed the 

petitions at issue in this case. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., PM-602-0114, Rescission of Policy 

Memoranda 1 (2020).
8 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

worker at the time the petition is filed, so that the employer 

can create a “bench” of unemployed H-1B beneficiaries. 

Nanda, 867 F.3d at 526; 2010 USCIS Memo, supra, at 10. 

This “bench” allows the employer to contract with endclients to fulfill their immediate labor needs without the 

uncertainty and potential delay inherent in filing legitimate 

petitions seeking H-1B status.4 Carrying out this scheme 

required Prasad to make false representations to USCIS, 

which led to his conviction on twenty-one counts of visa 

fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).

B.

Based on Prasad’s visa fraud convictions, the 

government sought criminal forfeiture, under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I), in the form of a personal money 

judgment against Prasad for $1,193,440.87. The 

government argued that $1,193,440.87 “represent[s] the 

amount of proceeds Prasad obtained as a result of the 

criminal conduct for which he was convicted.” Prasad 

opposed the government’s motion but did not dispute that 

Maremarks received $1,193,440.87 from the end-clients for 

the work the H-1B beneficiaries performed. Instead, Prasad 

argued that the most the court could order him to forfeit was 

$238,688.17, which was the estimated amount he kept after 

paying the beneficiary employees for the work they 

4 The number of H-1B petitions that USCIS can grant each year is 

capped by statute, see 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A)(vii), (g)(5), and USCIS 

reviews the petitions it receives based on a random selection process if 

there are sufficient petitions to meet the cap. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 214.2(h)(8)(iii)(A)(5)(ii); Rubman v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. 

Servs., 800 F.3d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 2015). USCIS denies the petitions 

that are not selected in this process without review. Rubman, 800 F.3d 

at 384.
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 9

performed for the end-clients.5 The district court disagreed 

and ordered forfeiture in the full amount the government 

requested. Prasad filed a timely notice of appeal, see Fed. R. 

App. P. 4(b)(1), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of 

federal forfeiture statutes. United States v. Casey, 444 F.3d 

1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006).

III.

Prasad argues that the district court erred by ordering 

him to forfeit the entire $1,193,440.87 that Maremarks 

received from the end-clients in payment for the H-1B 

beneficiaries’ work. Prasad does not assert any error in the 

district court’s factual findings; rather, he contends that the 

portion of the $1,193,440.87 that he paid the H-1B 

beneficiaries for their work for the end-clients is not subject 

to forfeiture because it is not “property . . . that constitutes, 

or is derived from or is traceable to the proceeds obtained 

directly or indirectly from the commission of the offense.”6 

5 Prasad estimates that the H-1B beneficiaries received 

approximately eighty percent of the $1,193,440.87.

6 When a defendant is convicted of visa fraud, § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)

mandates that a district court

shall order that the person forfeit to the United 

States . . . any property real or personal—

(I) that constitutes, or is derived from or is 

traceable to the proceeds obtained directly or 
10 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I). Thus, Prasad challenges the 

district court’s interpretation of § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I).7

To support his assertion that the district court erred in its 

interpretation of § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I), Prasad argues that: 

indirectly from the commission of the offense of 

which the person is convicted; or

(II) that is used to facilitate, or is intended to be 

used to facilitate, the commission of the offense 

of which the person is convicted.

18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii).

7 As noted in the concurrence, another subsection of 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii) also requires forfeiture of property “that is used to 

facilitate, or is intended to be used to facilitate, the commission of the 

offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II) (the “facilitation” provision). 

We do not address whether the district court’s order can stand under that 

provision, however, as the parties did not brief that issue before us or the 

district court. The government sought forfeiture under subsection (I) (the 

“proceeds” provision) by tracking the language of subsection (I) and 

requesting “a forfeiture money judgment of $1,193,440.87, representing 

the amount of proceeds Prasad obtained as a result of the criminal 

conduct for which he was convicted.” And although the district court 

cited subsections (I) and (II) in its order, it did not discuss or apply the 

facilitation provision, and instead ordered forfeiture for “the amount of 

illegal proceeds obtained directly or indirectly from the commission of 

the offense of conviction,” language nearly identical to the proceeds 

provision. “In our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the 

principle of party presentation,” and thus, “we rely on the parties to frame 

the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of 

matters the parties present.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 

1575, 1579 (2020) (citation omitted). Accordingly, because the parties 

have developed neither arguments as to whether a facilitation theory 

could support the forfeiture order under § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II), nor an 

evidentiary record on the point, we do not consider it. See id.; A-1 

Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. County of Monterey, 90 F.3d 333, 338–39 (9th 

Cir. 1996).
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 11

(1) he did not “obtain” the amounts he paid the H-1B 

beneficiaries; (2) those amounts do not constitute 

“proceeds” because the term “proceeds” is limited to his 

profits and thus does not extend to the receipts from his 

criminal activity; and (3) the amounts he paid the H-1B 

beneficiaries were not “derived from” his commission of 

visa fraud because they resulted from the H-1B 

beneficiaries’ legitimate work for the end-clients. For the 

reasons set forth below, we reject these arguments and affirm 

the district court’s forfeiture order.

A.

Prasad contends that he did not “obtain” the entire 

$1,193,440.87, as that term is used in the criminal forfeiture 

statute, because he eventually paid portions of that money to 

the H-1B beneficiaries. Section 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) 

mandates forfeiture of the property a defendant “obtained 

directly or indirectly from” the criminal offense. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I). To construe the term “obtain,” we start 

with its plain meaning. United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 

713, 717 (9th Cir. 2008). The plain meaning of the term 

“obtain” is “to come into possession of” or to “get or 

acquire.” Obtain, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989); 

see also Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626, 1632 

(2017) (construing “obtained” as used in 21 U.S.C. 

§ 853(a)(1)’s virtually identical criminal forfeiture provision 

according to its plain meaning, i.e., “to come into possession 

of” or to “get or acquire” (citations omitted)). Because the 

term “obtained” can be interpreted according to its plain 

meaning, that reading controls. See United States v. Harrell, 

637 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011).

Here, Prasad possessed the full $1,193,440.87, including 

the portions he paid to the H-1B beneficiaries, because he 

received and had control over the money before he paid a 
12 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

percentage of it to employees. Control over property 

connotes possession of it. See Possession, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“In common speech a man is 

said to possess or to be in possession of anything of which 

he has the apparent control . . . .” (quoting Frederick Pollock 

& Robert Samuel Wright, An Essay on Possession in the 

Common Law 1–2 (1888))). The end-clients paid 

$1,193,440.87 to Maremarks for the H-1B beneficiaries’ 

work. The government traced those payments to 

Maremarks’ bank account and established that Prasad was 

the sole signatory on that account. Thus, Prasad had control 

over the $1,193,440.87 that went through the account.8

 See 

Signatory Authority, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra

(defining “signatory authority” as “[l]icense to make a 

decision, esp. to withdraw money from an account”).

Under our precedent, it does not matter that Prasad paid 

portions of the $1,193,440.87 to the H-1B beneficiaries and 

at that point no longer possessed those portions. See United 

States v. Newman, 659 F.3d 1235, 1243 (9th Cir. 2011), 

abrogated on other grounds by Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. 1626. 

We have explained that “[r]equiring imposition of a money 

judgment on a defendant who currently possesses no assets 

furthers the remedial purposes of the forfeiture statute by 

ensuring that all eligible criminal defendants receive the 

mandatory forfeiture sanction Congress intended and 

disgorge their ill-gotten gains, even those already spent.” Id. 

at 1243 (citation omitted) (construing 18 U.S.C. 

§ 982(a)(2)’s materially similar criminal forfeiture 

provision). Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) only 

8 Prasad asserts that his payment of portions of the $1,193,440.87 to 

the H-1B beneficiaries indicates he did not possess the entire 

$1,193,440.87, but the very act of payment establishes that he did 

control, and thus possess, the money.
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 13

requires that the government show that the defendant had 

possession of the property at some point to establish that the 

defendant “obtained” it. See id. 

In sum, because Prasad controlled the $1,193,440.87, he 

possessed it and so necessarily had obtained it. We therefore 

conclude that Prasad “obtained” the $1,193,440.87 that the 

end-clients paid to Maremarks.

B.

Prasad argues that even if he “obtained” the 

$1,193,440.87, the “proceeds” that he “obtained” are limited 

to his profit, which excludes the amount he paid to the H-1B 

beneficiaries for their work for end-clients. As Prasad 

correctly notes, “‘[p]roceeds’ can mean either ‘receipts’ or 

‘profits’ . . . in ordinary usage.” United States v. Santos, 553 

U.S. 507, 511 (2008) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) 

(construing the term “proceeds” in the federal moneylaundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956);9 see also United 

9 Santos, a plurality decision, construed the term “proceeds” within 

the elements of the money laundering statute and, because the term was 

ambiguous, it applied the rule of lenity to conclude that “proceeds” was

limited to profits. 553 U.S. at 514–15. Justice Stevens concurred with 

the plurality decision, but only on the scope of the money laundering 

statute as applied to the specific facts before the Court, and he stated 

concerns that, under the facts presented, interpreting “proceeds” as 

receipts could lead to a merger problem by allowing two crimes to arise

from the same conduct. See id. at 525–28 & n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring). 

United States v. Christensen rejected the argument that Santos compelled 

us to construe the term “proceeds” in the RICO forfeiture statute to mean 

“profits.” 828 F.3d 763, 823 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The issue in Santos was 

quite different, however. The interpretation of ‘proceeds’ in Santos

affected the scope of criminal liability for money laundering, not the 

amount of forfeiture.”). Here, we are, as in Christensen, asked to 

construe the term “proceeds” in the criminal forfeiture statute; once 
14 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

States v. Peters, 732 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding 

that the term “proceeds” in 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2) could 

mean either “profits” or “receipts” in “ordinary usage,” and 

rejecting argument that Santos compelled construing 

“proceeds” as profit (citation omitted)).

But a statutory term may not be read in isolation and 

must instead be construed in its proper context within the 

statute. See Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826, 1833–

34 (2019); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law

167 (2012). And because the term “proceeds” is ambiguous, 

we must look to “other sources” to determine its 

meaning. See Nader, 542 F.3d at 717 (citation omitted). 

Considering the term “proceeds” in the context of the 

forfeiture statute, the statute’s punitive purpose, and our 

prior construction of virtually identical criminal forfeiture 

provisions, we conclude that the term “proceeds” extends to 

receipts and is not limited to profit. 

1.

We first consider the term “proceeds” in the context of 

the forfeiture statute. Section 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) provides 

for forfeiture of the “proceeds obtained . . . from the 

commission of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) 

(emphasis added). Prasad argues that we should construe 

this statute as limiting forfeiture to “profits obtained” from 

the commission of the offense. “[O]btain” means “to come 

again the holding in Santos does not affect the issue before us because 

“[f]orfeiture is an aspect of the sentence, not an element of the underlying 

crime,” and thus there is no possibility of a merger problem. Id. at 822–

23 (citing Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 38–39 (1991)); see also 

id. at 824 (stating “[o]nly the desire to avoid a merger problem united 

the plurality and Justice Stevens in Santos” (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)). 
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 15

into possession of” or to “get or acquire.” Honeycutt, 137 S. 

Ct. at 1632 (citations omitted). “Profit” is “[t]he pecuniary 

gain in any transaction; the amount by which value acquired 

exceeds value expended.” Profit, Oxford English 

Dictionary, supra. Thus, Prasad argues that we should 

construe the statute to limit forfeiture to “the pecuniary gain 

in any transaction, or the value acquired less the value 

expended” (i.e., profit) “that is acquired or which the 

defendant comes into possession of” (i.e., obtained).

But when, as here, a defendant possesses and controls the 

receipts of his criminal conduct but ultimately retains only a 

portion of those receipts for his own profit, Prasad’s 

construction of “proceeds obtained” cannot be reconciled 

with the common meaning of “obtain”—to “come into 

possession of” or “acquire.” See Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 

1632. Instead, Prasad’s construction of “proceeds” as profit 

would require us to construe “proceeds obtained . . . from the 

commission of the offense,” see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I), to mean “proceeds that are part of what 

the defendant obtained from the commission of the offense.” 

Nothing in the statute supports this convoluted construction 

of “proceeds obtained.”

Rather, in common English usage, we say that a person 

obtains, or gets, or acquires revenue or income (i.e., 

receipts), which may ultimately result in profit after 

accounting for costs. See Profit, Black’s Law Dictionary, 

supra. Indeed, “receipts” means “the amount, sum, or 

quantity received,” such as “money.” See Receipts, Oxford 

English Dictionary, supra; Receipt, Black’s Law Dictionary, 

supra (defining “receipt” as “income”); see also Proceeds, 

Black’s Law Dictionary, supra (defining “proceeds” as “the 

amount of money received from a sale” (emphasis added)), 

quoted in Casey, 444 F.3d at 1076 n.4. Thus, the district 
16 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

court’s construction of “proceeds” as “receipts” is supported 

by the common meaning of the relevant statutory language.

The Sixth Circuit recently reached the same conclusion 

based on similar reasoning. See United States v. Bradley, 

969 F.3d 585, 588–89 (6th Cir. 2020). In Bradley, the court 

rejected the defendant’s argument that “forfeiture of a 

crime’s ‘proceeds,’” under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1),10 “does 

not include money received by the defendant from the crime 

but paid to coconspirators.” Id. at 588. Instead, it held that 

the term “proceeds” in 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) means receipts 

because the statute “holds defendants responsible for the 

‘proceeds’ they ‘obtained’ through the conspiracy,” id. at 

588–89, and “it is beside the point whether the money stayed 

in [the defendant’s] pocket (e.g., kept as profits) or went 

toward the costs of running the conspiracy (e.g., used to pay 

coconspirators),” id. at 589. Thus, the court concluded that 

“[§] 853(a)(1) asks only whether the defendant obtained the 

money,” not what he did with it. Id. (citing Newman, 659 

F.3d at 1243).

We conclude that Congress’s use of the phrase “proceeds 

obtained” demonstrates that the focus of forfeiture is 

whether the defendant obtained the property from the 

commission of the crime, not whether the defendant made a 

profit based on what he later chose to do with that property. 

See id. at 588–89; see also Newman, 659 F.3d at 1243 

(stating property is forfeitable regardless of whether the 

defendant “saves his stolen loot,” “spends [it] on wine, 

10 21 U.S.C. 853(a)(1), which is materially similar to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I), requires forfeiture of “any property constituting, or 

derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as 

the result of such violation.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1).
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 17

women, and song,” or even reinvests it “as part of the 

criminal enterprise” (citation omitted)).

Moreover, it would make little sense to construe 

“proceeds” as profit, as Prasad urges, because that 

construction would allow a defendant to defeat the United 

States’ vested claim to property obtained from the 

commission of the crime by reinvesting that property into the 

criminal enterprise before his conviction, rather than 

pocketing it as profit. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (“All right, 

title, and interest in property . . . vests in the United States 

upon the commission of the act giving rise to 

forfeiture . . . .”); United States v. Lazarenko, 476 F.3d 642, 

647–48 (9th Cir. 2007).

In sum, while the term “proceeds” is ambiguous on its 

own, we must look to the entire text of a statutory provision 

when interpreting the meaning of a particular term. Here, 

placing “proceeds” in its proper context by interpreting it in 

light of the term “obtained” and 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (as 

incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)) supports that 

“proceeds” under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) denotes 

receipts.

2.

We also apply 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) in light of 

its statutory purpose and conclude that construing 

“proceeds” to include receipts advances that purpose, while 

limiting “proceeds” to profit hinders it. We favor an 

interpretation of a statute that furthers and does not obstruct 

the statute’s purpose. Burns v. Stone Forest Indus., 147 F.3d 

1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); Scalia & 

Garner, supra, at 63–64; see also The Emily & The Caroline, 

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 381, 389 (1824) (rejecting construction 

of statute offered by claimants because that construction 
18 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

would “render[] the law in a great measure nugatory[] and 

enable offenders to elude its provisions in the most easy 

manner,” thereby frustrating the law’s purpose).

Section 982 provides for “criminal forfeiture,” which “is 

designed to punish the offender.” United States v. 

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998); United States v. 

Beecroft, 825 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] general 

hallmark of criminal forfeiture orders—distinguishing them 

from orders of restitution—is that they indeed serve to 

punish the defendant.” (citations omitted)), abrogated on 

other grounds by Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. 1632, 1635. 

“Forfeitures help to ensure that crime does not pay: They at 

once punish wrongdoing, deter future illegality, and ‘lessen 

the economic power’ of criminal enterprises.” Kaley v. 

United States, 571 U.S. 320, 323 (2014) (citations omitted).

A criminal forfeiture that simply divests a defendant of 

the profits from his crime has little deterrent value. 

Construing “proceeds” as profits would allow a defendant to 

avoid forfeiture of certain property obtained from his 

criminal activity by reinvesting it in the criminal enterprise 

or using sophisticated accounting practices to conceal 

profits. See Peters, 732 F.3d at 101. Therefore, limiting 

“proceeds” solely to profits would hinder 18 U.S.C. § 982’s 

punitive purpose and so is a construction that should be 

avoided. See The Emily & The Caroline, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 

at 388–89 (rejecting interpretation that would undermine the 

statute’s purpose). On the other hand, construing “proceeds” 

to include receipts advances 18 U.S.C. § 982’s purpose, and 

thus is the preferred construction. See Burns, 147 F.3d at 

1184–85.
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 19

3.

Defining the term “proceeds” in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) to include receipts is consistent with 

our past interpretation of the term “proceeds” as used in 

similarly worded criminal forfeiture provisions, including: 

18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3), and 

21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1). A court’s prior construction of 

statutory language is relevant to the meaning of a similarly 

worded provision. See United States v. Durcan, 539 F.2d 

29, 31 (9th Cir. 1976) (concluding that prior construction of 

similar statutory language from a different statutory 

provision controlled); Scalia & Garner, supra, at 322 (stating 

that the prior construction canon applies “to interpretations 

of the same wording in related statutes”).

First, we have held that “proceeds” means receipts for 

purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2).11 See Newman, 659 F.3d 

at 1243. The forfeiture provision in 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2) is 

materially identical to the forfeiture provision here.12 In 

Newman, we reasoned that “proceeds” goes beyond the 

money in the defendant’s possession when apprehended and 

includes amounts that “the criminal spent . . . as part of the 

criminal enterprise.” 659 F.3d at 1243. “Congress intended 

[that criminal defendants] disgorge their ill-gotten gains, 

11 The Second Circuit has also concluded that “proceeds” means 

receipts under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2). See Peters, 732 F.3d at 101–02.

12 Section 982(a)(2) mandates forfeiture of “any property 

constituting, or derived from, proceeds the person obtained directly or 

indirectly, as the result of” certain specified crimes. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 982(a)(2). Our construction of § 982(a)(2) is particularly noteworthy 

because materially similar provisions within the same statute should be 

construed in the same way. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 

260 (1993).
20 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

even those already spent.” Id. (quoting Casey, 444 F.3d at 

1074). Thus, it did not matter that one of the defendants, 

who participated in a mortgage fraud conspiracy, 

“personally profited very little” or that the banks had 

recovered part of the loan amounts. Id. at 1238, 1244 

(citation omitted). The “proceeds” of the offense equaled 

the entire amount of the loans the defendant fraudulently 

obtained, i.e., his receipts. Id. at 1244.

Second, we have held that RICO’s criminal forfeiture 

provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3), also extends beyond 

profits to receipts.13 Christensen, 828 F.3d at 822 (holding 

that “‘proceeds’ in the RICO forfeiture statute refers to gross 

receipts rather than net profits”). In Christensen, we 

explained that construing the term “proceeds” broadly to 

include receipts frees the government from “the 

unreasonable burden . . . of proving net profits” by 

demonstrating “what the defendant’s overhead expenses 

were.” Id. (quoting United States v. Simmons, 154 F.3d 765, 

771 (8th Cir. 1998)); see also Peters, 732 F.3d at 101 (stating 

that construing “proceeds” under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2) to 

mean profits would incentivize “criminals to employ 

complicated accounting measures to shelter the profits of 

their illegal enterprises” (citation omitted)). Additionally, in 

Christensen, we considered the punitive purpose of RICO’s 

forfeiture provision and concluded that construing 

“proceeds” to encompass receipts effectuates that purpose, 

while limiting it to profits would not. 828 F.3d at 822–24. 

13 Section 1963(a)(3), which is very similar to § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I), 

requires forfeiture of “any property constituting, or derived from, any 

proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from 

racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection in violation of section 

1962.” 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3).
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 21

Accordingly, we held that “proceeds” under RICO’s 

criminal forfeiture provision means receipts. Id. at 822.

Third, we construed the forfeiture provision of the 

Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1), to require 

forfeiture of the receipts of illegal drug transactions.14 

Casey, 444 F.3d at 1076 & n.4 (defining the term “proceeds” 

in the forfeiture provision as “the amount of money received 

from a sale” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1242 (8th ed. 

1999))). In Casey, the defendant was convicted of 

distribution of ecstasy where his only role was serving as a 

“middleman” who “transferred the [$7,000] he received to a 

third party who actually shipped the drugs.” 444 F.3d at 

1072–73. The defendant argued that the “proceeds” he 

obtained were limited to the $200 he made as profit—not the 

$7,000 he received and transferred (i.e., the receipts). Id. at 

1072, 1076 n.4. We disagreed. Id. at 1073–74. “Even 

though [the defendant] no longer ha[d] the drug proceeds,” 

we reasoned that the defendant “received funds that should 

never have been available for him to spend.” Id. at 1073–

74.

We again emphasized the punitive nature of criminal 

forfeiture in Casey. Id. Construing “proceeds” to 

encompass the entirety of the defendant’s receipts “negates 

any benefit [the defendant] may have received from the 

money, ensuring that, in the end, he does not profit from his 

criminal activity.” Id. at 1074. Ultimately, we held that the 

“proceeds” were “the $7,000 [the defendant] received in the 

illegal drug transaction.” Id. at 1076. In other words, 

14 Under § 853(a)(1), the court must order forfeiture of “any 

property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained,

directly or indirectly, as the result of” certain drug offenses. 21 U.S.C. 

§ 853(a)(1).
22 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) mandated forfeiture of the receipts of 

the defendant’s crime. See id.

In sum, we have consistently held that “proceeds” means 

receipts when used in criminal forfeiture provisions that are 

materially similar to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I), 

specifically 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3), 

and 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1). We see no reason to make 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) an outlier, especially considering the 

statutes’ nearly identical language and shared punitive 

purpose. United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1051 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“[C]ourts generally interpret similar 

language in different statutes in a like manner when the two 

statutes address a similar subject matter.” (citations 

omitted)).

4.

Finally, we recognize that Congress referred to “gross 

proceeds,” “gross receipts,” and “proceeds” within the 

various forfeiture provisions under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a). 

Typically, under the presumption of consistent usage and 

material variation, a material change in terminology within 

the same statute denotes a change in meaning. Sosa v. 

Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004) (“[W]hen 

the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute 

and different language in another, the court assumes 

different meanings were intended.” (citation omitted));

Scalia & Garner, supra, at 170. Applying this presumption 

here could suggest that “proceeds” is limited to profits, given 

that “gross proceeds” and “gross receipts” more readily 

invoke the concept of receipts than the term “proceeds” 

alone.

But this presumption “is not rigid and readily yields” to 

context “to meet the purposes of the law.” Sun v. Ashcroft, 
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 23

370 F.3d 932, 939–40 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Atl. Cleaners 

& Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)). 

Additionally, the presumption of consistent usage and 

material variation loses force when the relevant terms were 

added on different occasions, as is the case here.15 See 

Kniess v. United States, 413 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1969) 

(stating that “phrases employed by one legislative draftsman 

are an unreliable clue as to that which another writer, at a 

different point in time, . . . may have intended by the use of 

slightly different terms”); Scalia & Garner, supra, at 172–

73. Because, as we have discussed in detail, the purpose of 

18 U.S.C. § 982 reveals that “proceeds” means receipts, and 

the relevant terms were added at different times, the 

presumption is overcome here.

* * *

The term “proceeds” under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) could mean either profits or receipts. 

However, in the context of the entire text of the provision, 

the punitive purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 982, and our prior 

construction of substantially similar criminal forfeiture 

15 Congress individually added each of 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)’s 

forfeiture provisions. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 

100-690, § 6463(c), 102 Stat. 4374, 4375 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 

§ 982(a)(1)); Act of Aug. 9, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 963(c), 103 Stat. 

183, 504 (1989) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)); Crime Control Act 

of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2525(b), 104 Stat. 4789, 4835, 4874 

(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(3)); Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. 

No. 102-519, § 104(b), 106 Stat. 3384, 3385 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 

§ 982(a)(5)); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 

1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 249(a), 110 Stat. 1936, 2020 (codified at 

18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7)); Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 

§ 217, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–573 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)); 

Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-184, § 2, 

112 Stat. 520, 520 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(8)).
24 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

provisions, we conclude that the better construction is that 

“proceeds” means receipts. The term “proceeds” is not 

limited to Prasad’s profits. Rather, Prasad must forfeit the 

receipts he “obtained directly or indirectly from” his 

commission of visa fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I). 

Thus, the district court did not err by including the portions 

of the $1,193,440.87 that Prasad received from the endclients and paid the H-1B beneficiaries as wages in its 

calculation of the “proceeds” subject to forfeiture.

C.

Prasad also asserts that the amounts he paid to the H-1B 

beneficiaries were “legitimate” and not “derived from 

unlawful activity,” even if the “visa applications” he 

submitted were fraudulent. It appears Prasad is arguing that 

because the H-1B beneficiary employees performed 

legitimate work for end-clients, the portions of the money 

that Maremarks received for that work and subsequently 

paid to the beneficiary employees should not be considered 

proceeds derived from his criminal conduct.

But § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) requires forfeiture of “the 

proceeds obtained directly or indirectly from” Prasad’s 

commission of visa fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) 

(emphasis added). “From” means a “ground, reason, cause, 

or motive: because of, on account of, owing to, as a result 

of, through.” From, Oxford English Dictionary, supra. 

“Direct” means “stemming immediately from a source.” 

Direct, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 

2004); see also Direct, Oxford English Dictionary, supra 

(defining “direct” as “effected or existing without 

intermediation or intervening agency; immediate”); Direct, 

Black’s Law Dictionary, supra (defining “direct” as 

“immediate”). And “indirect” means “not direct.” Indirect, 

Oxford English Dictionary, supra.
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 25

Congress’s inclusion of the phrase “directly or 

indirectly” before “from” indicates that the unambiguous 

and plain meaning of the statute reaches broadly, extending 

beyond proceeds that stem directly or immediately from the 

criminal offense. See Ass’n of Priv. Sector Colleges & 

Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 444 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 

(noting “directly or indirectly” is “extremely broad 

language” (quoting Roma v. United States, 344 F.3d 352, 

360 (3d Cir. 2003))); United States v. Gharbi, 510 F.3d 550, 

556 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that the phrase “all property . . . 

obtained directly or indirectly” is “expansive”). Section 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) is therefore expansive, reaching all 

proceeds that a defendant obtained as a result of the crime.

Here, Prasad obtained the amounts he paid the H-1B 

beneficiaries that he employed to work for the end-clients as 

a result of his commission of visa fraud. Maremarks—acting 

through Prasad—entered contracts to provide the H-1B 

beneficiaries as workers for end-clients. The end-clients 

paid Maremarks $1,193,440.87 in exchange for the work the 

beneficiary employees performed under Maremarks’ H-1B 

petitions. But Prasad fraudulently obtained H-1B status for 

these foreign workers; this status provided the only 

authorization for them to work in the United States, and it 

required that they work as Maremarks’ employees. See 

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(i), (h)(2)(i)(D)–(E). Consequently, 

the entire $1,193,440.87 that the end-clients paid Maremarks 

for work the H-1B beneficiaries performed was derived from 

Prasad’s unlawful acquisition of each beneficiary’s H-1B 

status through visa fraud.

Moreover, it was not happenstance that the end-clients 

paid Maremarks for the H-1B beneficiaries’ work, rather 

than paying the beneficiaries directly. The H-1B 

beneficiaries could only work in the United States as 
26 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

Maremarks’ employees because Maremarks, through 

Prasad, served as the petitioner-employer filing the petitions 

seeking H-1B status on their behalf. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 214.2(h)(1)(i), (h)(2)(i)(D)–(E); United States v. Kalu, 791 

F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 2015). To maintain the H-1B 

beneficiaries’ authorization to work in the United States 

under Maremarks’ approved H-1B petitions, Maremarks had 

to exercise the right to control the H-1B beneficiaries’ 

employment as their employer for the duration of the 

employment term specified in the petition. 2010 USCIS 

Memo, supra, at 3–4.

At the time Prasad committed his acts of visa fraud, a 

workforce supplier, like Maremarks, had to pay the H-1B 

beneficiary’s wages to establish that it had the right to 

control the H-1B beneficiary’s employment. Thus, 

obtaining the money from the end-clients as payment for the 

services provided by Maremarks employees before paying 

portions of it to those H-1B beneficiary employees was a 

necessary part of Prasad’s visa fraud scheme, and it 

ultimately facilitated his ability to obtain money from his 

commission of visa fraud. See Nanda, 867 F.3d at 526. 

Thus, Prasad obtained the $1,193,440.87 as the result of his 

criminal conduct.

We reject Prasad’s argument that the portions he paid the 

H-1B beneficiaries “derived from” their legitimate work, not

his commission of visa fraud, because it does not adequately 

explain how these portions are not “proceeds obtained

directly or indirectly from” his visa fraud. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) (emphasis added). While Prasad’s 

argument is unclear, he could be arguing that the work the 

beneficiaries performed was an additional link in the causal 

chain demonstrating that he did not obtain those amounts 

“directly” from his criminal activity. But 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) reaches beyond “proceeds obtained 
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 27

directly” or immediately from the commission of the crime 

to “proceeds obtained,” even indirectly, from the crime. 

Here, the beneficiary employees’ fraudulently obtained 

H-1B status authorized these employees to work for 

Maremarks’ end-clients and earn the $1,193,440.87 Prasad 

obtained. We conclude that the money the end-clients paid 

for the work the beneficiaries performed was “obtained 

directly or indirectly from” Prasad’s unlawful conduct. See 

United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 332–33 (6th Cir. 

2010) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2) forfeiture 

provision reached “proceeds obtained” from money 

generated through “legitimate” sales because they “resulted 

‘directly or indirectly’” from the criminal offense).

Consequently, the full $1,193,440.87 constitutes

“proceeds obtained . . . from the commission of” visa fraud. 

18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I).

IV.

We affirm the district court’s forfeiture order in the 

amount of $1,193,440.87 because that amount constitutes 

the “proceeds” Prasad “obtained directly or indirectly from” 

his commission of visa fraud. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I). Accordingly, § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) 

mandates forfeiture of these funds.

AFFIRMED.

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the district 

court’s forfeiture of the gross receipts of Prasad’s crimes. I 

write separately because the majority relies on 
28 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I), and I rely on 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II).

The government sought forfeiture pursuant to both 

subsections and the district court invoked both subsections 

in its forfeiture order. Subsection (A)(ii)(I) authorizes the 

forfeiture of “proceeds” realized from a criminal violation, 

but as the majority correctly observes, “proceeds” is an 

ambiguous term that “can mean either ‘receipts’ or 

‘profits’ . . . in ordinary usage.” Opinion at 13 (quoting 

United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 511 (2008) 

(plurality)). In my view, this case is the wrong vehicle for 

parsing the ambiguity in the statute’s first subsection 

because the parties’ briefs do not distinguish between the 

statute’s subsections, much less contest the applicability of 

(A)(ii)(II), and the circumstances of Prasad’s particular 

scheme easily warranted forfeiture of his gross receipts as 

“property used to facilitate . . . the commission” of his 

crimes under (A)(ii)(II). For these reasons, I would affirm 

the forfeiture order solely based on § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II).1

Prasad was convicted of twenty-one counts of visa fraud 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) and two counts of 

aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

1 I agree with the majority that “we rely on the parties to frame issues 

for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the 

parties present.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 

(2020) (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008)). 

This is why I would rely on (A)(ii)(II) to affirm the district court’s 

forfeiture order. Subsection (A)(ii)(II) independently supports the 

district court’s forfeiture order and Prasad’s brief leaves (A)(ii)(II) 

unchallenged. The government’s brief does not advance the majority’s 

analysis of (A)(ii)(I); it defines the term “proceeds” by citing a civil 

forfeiture statute without explaining why the civil provision should apply 

here. Because the forfeiture order is affirmable pursuant to (A)(ii)(II), I 

would leave the interpretation of subsection (A)(ii)(I) for another day.
UNITED STATES V. PRASAD 29

§ 1028A(a)(1). Prasad’s visa fraud scheme involved filing 

petitions for H-1B status to recruit foreign workers and 

falsely representing that specific positions were available for 

those workers at the time the petitions were filed. In this 

way, Prasad created what the majority describes as a “bench” 

of unemployed H-1B beneficiaries. Opinion at 7–8. 

Prasad’s scheme did not end once the foreign workers were 

placed in jobs within the United States. In order to acquire 

the H-1B visas, the governing regulations required Prasad to 

maintain actual employer-employee relationships between 

his company, Maremarks, and the H-1B beneficiaries. See

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(i), (h)(4)(i)(A)(1), (h)(4)(ii). Thus, 

Prasad received payments from the end-clients for each pay 

period and passed on part of those payments to the workers. 

Passing a portion of the funds through to the employees 

allowed Prasad to maintain the required employer-employee 

relationships with the “bench” of workers, and also allowed 

him to avoid scrutiny by USCIS. Thus, reinvesting part of 

each payment from end-clients was essential in order for his 

scheme to succeed as an ongoing enterprise.

The government’s indictment notified Prasad that if he 

was convicted, it would seek forfeiture of “any property real 

or personal, that constitutes, or is derived from or is traceable 

to proceeds obtained directly or indirectly from the 

commission of said violation,” § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I), or “any 

property used, or intended to be used to facilitate the 

commission of said violation” pursuant to 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II).

The government’s Application for Forfeiture Money 

Judgment reiterated that it sought forfeiture under both 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) and (II), and the parties stipulated that 

the district court would make the factual determination 

regarding the forfeiture, rather than submitting the issue to 
30 UNITED STATES V. PRASAD

the jury. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(5); see also Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 32.2(b)(1)(B) (explaining that forfeiture determinations 

“may be based on evidence already in the record, including 

any written plea agreement, and on any additional 

evidence . . . submitted by the parties and accepted by the 

court as relevant and reliable”).

The district court ordered Prasad to forfeit the gross 

receipts of his criminal enterprise: $1,193,440.87. This 

amount accounted for all the money Maremark received 

from the end-clients including the funds that Prasad kept as 

profits and the portion Prasad paid to the H-1B workers each 

pay period. The court entered the forfeiture judgment 

pursuant to both 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) and (II).

Prasad briefly urges us to construe “proceeds” as 

“profits,” and argues the district court erred by including in 

the forfeiture judgment the funds he passed on to his bench 

of workers. But Prasad overlooks that only 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I) is limited to the “proceeds” of his 

crimes. The statute’s second subsection sweeps more 

broadly and covers all property “used to facilitate, or [that] 

is intended to be used to facilitate, the commission of the 

offense of which the person is convicted.” 

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II). Because Prasad continuously 

reinvested the money he received from end-clients to 

perpetuate his visa fraud scheme, the district court correctly 

ruled that the money Prasad paid to the H-1B employees was 

forfeitable pursuant to § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II) as property 

used to facilitate the commission of his crimes.