FILED

November 26, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

JULY SESSION, 1997

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9611-CR-00408

)

Appellee, )

)

) KNOX COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. MARY BETH LEIBOWITZ

CHRISTA GAIL PIKE, ) JUDGE

)

Appellant. ) (First Degree Murder-Death Penalty)

ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE

CRIMINAL COURT OF KNOX COUNTY

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

WILLIAM C. TALMAN JOHN KNOX WALKUP

P.O. Box 506 Attorney General and Reporter

Knoxville, TN 37901-0506

KATHY MORANTE

JULIE A. MARTIN Assistant Attorney General

P.O. Box 426 425 5th Avenue North

Knoxville, TN 37901-0426 Nashville, TN 37243

RANDALL E. NICHOLS

District Attorney General

WILLIAM CRABTREE

S. JO HELM

Assistant District Attorneys General

City-County Building

Knoxville, TN 37902

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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OPINION

In this capital case, the Defendant, Christa Gail Pike, was convicted of first

degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. After the

sentencing hearing, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) That the

murder was extremely heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or

serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; and (2) that the

murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing

a lawful arrest or prosecution of the Defendant or another. Tenn. Code Ann. §

39-13-204(i)(5) and (6). The jury found that the State had proven beyond a

reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating

circumstances and sentenced the Defendant to death by electrocution. The

Defendant was also sentenced to a consecutive sentence of twenty-five (25)

years for the conspiracy to commit first degree murder conviction.

On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review:

(1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the

verdict of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit

first degree murder and the sentence of death;

(2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to prohibit

the news media from covering pretrial proceedings;

(3) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant the

Defendant’s motion for a change of venue;

(4) whether the trial court erred by failing to allow the

Defendant to select a jury composed of a cross-section

of the citizens of Tennessee;

(5) whether the trial court erred by allowing the skull of

the victim into evidence;

(6) whether death by electrocution is cruel and unusual

punishment under the federal and state constitutions;
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(7) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state

and the Defendant the same number of peremptory

challenges; and 

(8) whether the trial court erred in its sentencing on the

conspiracy to commit first degree murder conviction.

After a review of the record, we affirm both the convictions and the

sentence of death. 

BACKGROUND

On January 13, 1995, N. Duncan Whitaker Sutherland, an employee of

the University of Tennessee Grounds Department, discovered the semi-nude,

slashed and badly beaten body of a young female near the greenhouses on

the agricultural campus. He immediately notified officials. 

Officers from the Knoxville Police Department and the U.T. Police

Department were summ oned to the scene. Officer John Terry Johnson testified

at trial that the body he found was lying face down on debris and was nude from

the waist up. Blood and dirt covered the body and remaining clothing, and it was

apparent that the victim’s head had been bludgeoned. Multiple cuts and slashes

appeared on the torso. Officer Johnson stated that he thought he was looking at

the victim’s face but he could not be sure because it was extremely mutilated.

As other officers arrived, they began securing the crime area. The area of

the crime scene tripled as officers discovered other spots of blood, articles of

clothing, footprints, and broken foliage. When officers turned the body over, it

appeared that the victim’s throat had been slashed. A rag was around the

victim’s neck. Detective Donald R. Cook, of the U.T. Police Department,
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accompanied the body to the morgue, and he testified at trial that after the body

was cleaned, it was apparent that a design resembling a pentagram had been

carved in the victim’s chest. 

Dr. Sandra Elkins, the Knox County Medical Examiner, testified at trial that

she had performed the autopsy on the victim, who was later identified by dental

records as Colleen Slem mer. She testified that after removing the victim’s

clothing and cleaning the body, she had started with the torso to document major

sharp force or slash and stab wounds. If it was a fairly major wound, she would

measure it and assign it a letter. Utilizing a chart to demonstrate her findings, Dr.

Elkins described each major wound, later explaining that at some point it became

obvious that if she labeled each wound, she would have to go through the

alphabet again, and unless she “wanted to stay there for three days,” she

“basically threw up [her] hands and just said, enumerable [sic] more superficial

slash wounds on the back, arms and chest.”

Dr. Elkins noted numerous slash and stab wounds on the back, arms,

abdomen, and chest. She described a six inch gaping wound across the middle

of the victim’s neck which had penetrated the fat and muscles of the neck and

stated that she had found ten additional slash wounds on the victim’s neck and

in the throat area. Other slash wounds were on the victim’s face and it appeared

that a pentagram had been carved on her chest. Dr. Elkins repeatedly stated that

throughout the infliction of each of these injuries, she was medically certain that

the victim had been alive because of the vital reaction appearing around each

wound. She stated that the area around each wound was red in appearance,

indicating that the heart had still been beating when the wound was inflicted. She
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also testified that none of the aforementioned wounds would have rendered the

victim unconscious.

Dr. Elkins testified that the cause of death was blunt force injuries to the

head. She stated that the skull showed a minimum of four blows to the head; two

to the left side of the head, one over the right eye, and one in the nose area. The

right frontal area of the skull had been fractured as had the bridge of the nose.

However, the major wound, labeled as injury “W”, involved most of the left side

of the head. Dr. Elkins determined that this injury, caused by a blunt blow to the

left side of the head, had fractured the right side of the skull and imbedded part

of the skull in the victim’s brain. She also found small divots in the skull

containing black particles from an asphalt chunk which was later determined to

have been used to administer the blows.

During this portion of her testimony, Dr. Elkins was allowed to use the

victim’s skull to describe the injuries. She testified that in order to determine the

cause of death, it was necessary to remove the head of the victim and have the

skull prepared by Dr. Murray Marks, a forensic anthropologist at the University of

Tennessee. She explained that she had cut the top portion of the skull in order

to remove the brain and when she had removed the brain, she discovered that

loose pieces of skull were driven into it. She testified that at that time it seemed

there was a larger hole in the skull than the pieces she had removed from the

brain would fill. Dr. Marks had pieced together those loose portions of the skull

and had fitted them into the left side area of the head. Dr. Elkins then showed

the jury a piece of skull that had been given to her the Friday before the trial and

demonstrated that it fit perfectly into the rest of the skull. The skull, numerous

photographs, and items of the victim’s clothing were introduced into evidence. 
-6-

Robert A. Pollock, the orientation specialist at Knoxville Job Corps, testified

that he had spoken with the Defendant on January 13, 1995, concerning a

misplaced I.D. card. He stated that after the Defendant had left, he noticed a

black leather jacket hanging on the chair where she had sat. He testified that he

had locked the room at approximately 4:00 p.m. that day and did not return until

7:30 a.m., January 17. He stated that on the 17th, he found the jacket still

hanging on the chair and took it to the Job Corps’ Safety and Security Captain,

William Hudson. Hudson testified that he had called the Knoxville Police

Department and that Officer Arthur Bohanan had picked up the jacket.

Officer Bohanan identified the coat, and it was introduced into evidence.

He testified that he had discovered a small piece of bone in the inside pocket of

the coat and had immediately taken it to Dr. Marks at the University of

Tennessee. Dr. Marks testified concerning the process by which the skull had

been prepared and again demonstrated that the bone fragment given to him by

Officer Bohanan fit perfectly into the bone reconstruction of the skull of the victim.

Kim Iloilo, a Job Corps resident/student and friend of the Defendant,

testified that the Defendant told her on January 11, 1995, the day before the

murder, that she was going to kill Colleen Slemmer because “she just felt mean

that day.” The following day, the Defendant met Iloilo in the parking lot at

approximately 4:00 p.m. and told her that she needed to find Shadolla Peterson.

Later that evening, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Iloilo saw the Defendant leave the

Job Corps Center with the victim, Tadaryl Shipp, and Shadolla Peterson. She

saw Shipp return to the Center at approximately 10:15 p.m. The Defendant and

Peterson returned five minutes later. 
-7-

Iloilo testified that the Defendant then came to her room to tell her that she

had just killed Colleen Slem mer. The Defendant showed Iloilo a piece of

Slemmer’s skull she had kept as a souvenir. The Defendant told Iloilo that she

had cut Slem mer’s throat, had beaten her, and had thrown pieces of asphalt at

her head. The Defendant stated that as she was cutting Slemm er’s throat,

Slemmer was asking her to stop, but that she continued to cut her throat because

“she kept talking.” Iloilo stated that as the Defendant described hitting Slemmer

in the head with a piece of asphalt and carving a pentagram in her chest, she

danced around in a circle, smiling and singing. Iloilo testified that at breakfast the

next morning, Iloilo asked the Defendant about the piece of skull and the

Defendant told her it was in her pocket, stating “And, yes, I’m eating breakfast

with it.” Iloilo identified the black jacket that had previously been introduced into

evidence as one similar to a jacket the victim often wore.

On cross-examination, Iloilo admitted that she did nothing when the

Defendant told her of her intention to kill Slemmer because she had just “blown

[it] off as soon as it was said.” She testified that she had never seen the

Defendant fight with anyone else.

Stephanie Leigh Wilson, another resident/student at the Job Corps Center,

testified that on January 13, 1995, she had been in class with the Defendant

when the Defendant told her to look at the Defendant’s shoes, stating, “That ain’t

mud on my shoes. That’s blood.” Wilson stated that the Defendant then showed

her a piece of human skull and told her that she had slashed Slemmer’s throat

and had beaten her in the head with a rock. On cross-examination, Wilson

admitted that in a prior statement to police officers, she had stated that the

Defendant told her that the killing “had been a spur of the moment thing.”
-8-

Randy York, a criminal investigator with the Knoxville Police Department,

testified that he had been assigned this case on January 13, 1995. He testified

that on the following day, he interviewed the Defendant and Tadaryl Shipp at the

Police Department and that he had informed them of their rights and had taken

a statement from the Defendant. He stated that the Defendant explained in detail

how the killing had occurred and told him that the blood-stained jeans she had

worn during the incident were still in her room. She also told Officer York that

she had discarded two pieces of I.D. of the victim and the victim’s black gloves

in a trash can at a Texaco station on Cumberland Avenue. The Defendant gave

consent to search her room and then went with York back to the Job Corps

Center. From there the Defendant retraced her steps, describing what had

occurred on the night of the killing. She eventually took Officer York to the exact

location where the body was found. The Defendant later gave a tape-recorded

statement, which was transcribed in some forty-six (46) pages. Copies of the

transcription were given to the jury, and the jurors were allowed to listen to the

tape through individual headphones. 

In her statement made to Officer York, the Defendant stated that she and

Slemmer had been having problems for some time. She recounted an incident

whereby she had awakened one night to find Slemmer standing over her with a

box cutter. She stated that Slemmer had been “trying to get [her] boyfriend” and

had been “running her mouth” everywhere. She stated that on the night of the

killing, she had planned only to fight Slemmer and let her know “to leave me the

hell alone.” 

According to the Defendant, she asked Slemmer to accompany her to

Blockbuster Music Store, and as they were walking, the Defendant told Slemmer
-9-

that she had a bag of “weed” hidden in Tyson Park. The group (the Defendant

refused to name other parties who were involved in the incident) smoked

marijuana and began walking toward the U.T. campus. Upon arriving at the

steam plant on U.T.’s agricultural campus, the Defendant and Slemmer

exchanged words. The Defendant then began hitting Slemmer and banging her

head on the Defendant’s knee. She threw Slemmer on the ground and kicked

her repeatedly. According to the Defendant, as she slammed Slemmer’s head

into concrete, Slemmer kept asking, “Why are you doing this to me?” The

Defendant continued to kick Slemmer in the face and in her side as Slemmer

cried. 

The Defendant and another person held the victim down and dragged her

to another area where the Defendant cut her with a box cutter. The Defendant

stated that as Slemmer screamed, she began to hear voices telling her that

Slemmer would tell on her and that she would go to prison for attempted m urder.

Slemmer attempted to get up and the Defendant cut her on the back. The

Defendant stated that Slemm er kept trying to get up and run, telling the

Defendant that if she would just let her go she would walk back to her hom e in

Florida. The Defendant told her to “shut up” because it “was harder to hurt

somebody when they’re talking to you.” The Defendant stated that the more

Slemmer talked, the more the Defendant kicked her.

Slemmer asked the Defendant what she was going to do to her, and the

Defendant thought she heard something. The Defendant left the scene to check

out the surrounding area to make sure no one was around. When she returned,

the Defendant began cutting Slemmer across the throat. When Slemmer
-10-

continued to talk, the Defendant cut her throat more. The Defendant stated that

the episode lasted “for about thirty minutes to an hour.” 

Slemmer attempted to run again, and the Defendant threw a rock which hit

Slemmer in the back of the head. She stated that “the other person” also hit

Slemmer in the head with a rock. The Defendant continued to hit her and then

asked her, “Colleen, do you know who’s doing this to you?,” but according to the

Defendant, Slemmer only made groaning noises. The Defendant and the other

person washed their hands and shoes in a mud puddle. They discarded the box

cutter and the miniature meat cleaver that had been used in the incident. The

Defendant described dragging Slemmer to some nearby trees and leaving her

clothes in the bushes. After the Defendant’s statement was played for the jury,

pictures of the Defendant and Tadaryl Shipp, each of them wearing a necklace

in the shape of a pentagram , were introduced into evidence. 

Mark A. Waggoner, an officer with the Knoxville Police Department,

testified that he had been dispatched to a Texaco Station on Cumberland Avenue

where he retrieved a pair of black gloves and two of Slemmer’s I.D. cards. These

items were also made exhibits. Another officer, Lanny Janeway, used a chart to

illustrate each of the locations where blood or evidence was found. Photographs

of bloody chunks of asphalt, blood drippings on leaves, and pools of blood were

introduced into evidence. The bloody piece of asphalt and the victim’s bloody

clothing were also introduced into evidence.

Special Agent Raymond A. DePriest, a forensic scientist employed by the

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, testified that he had received blood samples

taken from the shoes and clothing of the Defendant and Shipp. Those items that
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he determined had human blood on them were sent to the DNA unit. Margaret

Bush, an employee of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation assigned to the

DNA unit, testified that the shoes of the Defendant and Shipp contained an

insufficient amount of DNA for analysis but that the blood on the clothing of both

had matched the DNA profile of the victim. She stated that there was a 1 in

200,147 chance in the Caucasian comm unity that there would be such a match

and a 1 in 600,018 chance in the African-American comm unity. The state rested

its case.

Dr. Eric Engum, a psychologist retained by the Defendant, testified for the

defense that he had conducted a clinical interview and had administered a

battery of tests to the Defendant. He concluded that the Defendant suffers from

a very severe borderline personality disorder and exhibits signs of cannabis

dependence and inhalant abuse. He testified that the Defendant is not so

dysfunctional that she needs to be institutionalized but that she has a multiplicity

of problems in interpersonal relationships, in controlling her behavior, and in

achieving vocational and academic goals. He stated that the battery of tests

administered to the Defendant indicated that she is an extremely intelligent young

woman.

Dr. Engum stated that it was his opinion that the Defendant did not act

with deliberation or premeditation in killing Slemmer, but had acted in a manner

consistent with his diagnosis of borderline personality disorder; she lost control.

He explained that she had danced around when relating the event to another

person because of the emotional release she experienced from having assured

through the killing of Slemmer that she could maintain her relationship with Shipp.

When questioned about the piece of skull found in the Defendant’s coat, Dr.
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Engum explained that the Defendant actually has no identity and the action of

taking and showing a piece of Slemmer’s skull to friends was her way of getting

recognition, “no matter how distorted” that recognition was.

On cross-examination, Dr. Engum stated that there was no question that

the Defendant had killed Slemmer. He reiterated that it was his opinion that once

the attack began, the Defendant literally lost control. However, Dr. Engum

admitted that it had been a deliberate act to entice Slemmer to the park to beat

her. He admitted that carving a pentagram on Slemmer’s chest and bashing her

head had been a deliberate act. He recognized that the Defendant had time to

calm down when she left Slemmer to see if anyone was around. He also

conceded that the weapons the Defendant carried with her and used in the attack

might indicate that she had intended to kill the victim. 

William Bernet, medical director of the psychiatric hospital at Vanderbilt

University, testified that he had reviewed the statement of the Defendant and

Kimberly Iloilo and the reports of Dr Engum, Dr. Elkins and Dr. Marks. He

concluded that although there were satanic elements in this crime, the pattern

was that of an adolescent dabbling in Satanism. He then described a pattern

known as the phenomenon of collective aggression, whereby a group of people

gather and become emotionally aroused and the end result is that they engage

in some kind of violent behavior. On cross-examination, Dr. Bernet admitted that

he had spoken neither with the Defendant nor any of the witnesses. 

Based on this evidence in the guilt phase, the jury found the Defendant,

Christa Gail Pike, guilty of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first

degree murder.
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In the sentencing phase of the trial, the State relied on the evidence

presented at the guilt phase and presented no further proof. In mitigation, Carrie

Ross, the Defendant’s aunt, testified that the Defendant had experienced no

maternal bonding because she was premature and was raised by her paternal

grandmother until she died in 1988. Ross stated that the Defendant was shuffled

between her mother and father and that the Defendant’s mother set no rules for

her. She testified that on the occasions that the Defendant had visited her house,

she behaved as a “little girl,” playing Barbie and dress-up with her eleven-yearold cousin. On cross-examination, however, Ms. Ross admitted that she had

previously described the Defendant as a pathological liar and had been afraid to

have the Defendant around her own children. She admitted saying that the

Defendant had been out of control since she was twelve-years old.

Glenn Pike, the Defendant’s father, testified that he had kicked the

Defendant out of his house in 1989 and that he had signed adoption papers for

her prior to her eighteenth birthday. On cross-examination, he admitted that in

1989, there had been an allegation that the Defendant had abused his two-yearold daughter by a second wife. He stated that he was unable to make the

Defendant do her schoolwork and that she had always lied and been

manipulative.

The Defendant’s mother, Carissa Hansen, a licensed practical nurse,

testified that the Defendant had lived with her 95% of the time since her

grandmother’s death. She adm itted smoking marijuana with the Defendant in

order to “establish a friendship.” She related that the Defendant had taken an

overdose shortly after the death of her paternal grandmother. Hansen also
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testified that one of her boyfriends had whipped the Defendant with a belt and

that she had the boyfriend arrested.

On cross-examination, Ms. Hansen admitted that the Defendant had been

a problem for ten years. She admitted that the Defendant had pulled a “butcherknife” on the previously mentioned boyfriend. She testified that the Defendant

had lied to her and stolen from her on numerous occasions and had quit high

school. She stated that she had no control over the Defendant since she was

eight years old. Following Ms. Hansen’s testimony, the defense rested.

As rebuttalproof, Harold James Underwood, Jr., a University of Tennessee

police officer, testified that on January 13, 1995, he was assigned to secure the

murder scene in this case. He testified that the Defendant came to the scene at

approximately 4:00 p.m. and asked him why the area had been marked off. She

then questioned him concerning the identity of the victim and whether or not the

police had any suspects. Underwood testified that the Defendant seemed

amused as she was giggling and moving around.

Based on the proof, the jury found the existence of the following two

aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That the murder was

extremely heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical

abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; and (2) that the murder was

committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful

arrest or prosecution of the Defendant or another. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-

204(i)(5) and (6). In addition, the jury found that the State had proven beyond a

reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating

circumstances and as a result, sentenced the Defendant to death.
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TRIAL ERRORS

A. Sufficiency of the Proof

The Defendant argues that the State did not prove every element of the

offenses of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder

beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, in regard to the first degree murder

conviction, the Defendant argues that the State did not introduce any evidence

relating to deliberation or of the Defendant having the opportunity to reflect upon

her actions after “the mind was free from the influence of excitement or passion.”

She argues that there was no proof outside of the uncorroborated statement of

the Defendant that Shadolla Peterson or Tadaryl Shipp participated in the murder

so as to warrant the conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The

Defendant also maintains that the proof was insufficient to justify the jury’s

sentence of death and that the jury failed to properly consider and weigh the

mitigating factors against the aggravating factors.

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence,

we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in

determining whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We do not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence and are required to afford the state the strongest legitimate

view of the proof contained in the record as well as all reasonable and legitimate

inferences which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832,

835 (Tenn. 1978).
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Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to

be given to the evidence, as well as factual issues raised by the evidence are

resolved by the trier of fact, not this court. Cabbage, 571 S.W .2d at 835. A guilty

verdict rendered by the jury and approved by the trial judge accredits the

testimony of the witnesses for the state, and a presumption of guilt replaces the

presumption of innocence. State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973).

An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the proof has the burden of

illustrating to this court why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict

returned by the trier of fact in his or her case. This court will not disturb a verdict

of guilt for lack of sufficient evidence unless the facts contained in the record and

any inferences which may be drawn from the facts are insufficient, as a matter

of law, for a rational trier of fact to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-201(a) and -201(b) provide

that a deliberate act is "one performed with a cool purpose" and a premeditated

act is "one done after the exercise of reflection and judgment." The existence of

premeditation and deliberation is a question of fact that may be inferred from the

manner and circumstances of the homicide. State v. Tune, 872 S.W.2d 922, 925

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). In Tune, this Court held that "[w]hile willful killing with

a deadly weapon is not sufficient by itself to support an inference of

premeditation, there were other circumstances before the jurors from which they

could infer the existence of both premeditation and deliberation in this

Defendant's mind." Id.
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In the light most favorable to the State, the evidence reflects that the

Defendant told a friend the day before the killing that she was going to kill the

victim. Also, during the killing, the Defendant made repeated attacks on the

victim over a period of time in which she could have reflected upon her actions,

especially when she left the victim to see if anyone else was around. By the

Defendant’s own statement, the reason for killing the victim was to assure that

the victim could not testify against her for “attempted murder.” And finally, the

Defendant’s own expert admitted that the act of carrying a box cutter and meat

cleaver was a deliberate act. We are satisfied that the evidence in this case was

sufficient to establish the elements of prem editation and deliberation so as to

warrant the jury’s verdict in the first degree murder conviction.

In regard to the conspiracy to commit first degree murder conviction, the

Defendant maintains that there was no proof beyond her “uncorroborated

statement” that a box cutter had been used on the victim or that others had

attacked the victim with cutting instruments. In her statement to the police, the

Defendant related that others were with her when the killing took place. She also

stated that a person referred to as “he” had participated in the torture of the victim

and that this person had brought a miniature meat cleaver with him that evening.

The essence of conspiracy has always been an agreement to commit a

crime. State v. Hodgkinson, 778 S.W .2d 54, 58 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). A

conspiracy requires a knowing involvement. However, no formal or expressed

agreement is necessary and the agreement may be proved by circumstantial

evidence. State v. Shropshire, 874 S.W.2d 634, 641 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

“The unlawful confederation may be established by circumstantial evidence and

the conduct of the parties in the execution of the criminal enterprise. Conspiracy
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implies concert of design and not participation in every detail of execution.”

Randolph v. State, 570 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). A confession

may sustain a conviction where there is other evidence sufficient to show the

commission of a crime by someone. Franklin v. State, 513 S.W.2d 146, 151

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1974). 

In this case there was a confession by the Defendant that she and another

person referred to as “he” accompanied the victim to Tyson Park. Both the

Defendant and another person participated in dragging the victim to a more

isolated location and mutilating the victim with a box cutter and a meat cleaver.

A witness testified that the Defendant stated she was going to kill the victim the

day before the murder. A witness testified that the Defendant, Tadaryl Shipp and

Shadolla Peterson left with the victim and returned together later that evening

without the victim. DNA testing of the Defendant’s and Shipp’s clothing revealed

blood stains matching that of the victim’s. Both the Defendant and Shipp wore

pentagram necklaces and a “Satanic Bible” was recovered from a search of

Shipp’s room. The Defendant admitted that she and the other person carved the

pentagram in the victin’s chest. The Defendant contends that the proof was

insufficient to demonstrate that she possessed the requisite reflection to support

the conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Yet, there is ample

circumstantial evidence that the Defendant and Shipp deliberately planned and

executed the killing.

Finally, the Defendant contends that the proof was insufficient to justify the

jury’s sentence of death and that the jury failed to properly consider and weigh

the mitigating factors against the aggravating factors. However, the record
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reveals that the application of both of the aggravating factors was supported by

evidence.

The jury found that the aggravating circumstance that the murder was

especially “heinous, atrocious or cruel” was applicable in this case. The medical

examiner testified that there were so many wounds on the victim’s body they

could not be cataloged. The victim’s throat had been slashed repeatedly,

defensive wounds were on her right arm, and at least four heavy blows had been

administered to her head. A pentagram had been carved in her chest. The

medical examiner repeatedly testified that all of the wounds prior to the final blow

to the head had been made while the victim was alive and conscious. We

conclude that the record amply supports application of this aggravator. 

The jury also found that the aggravating circumstance that the murder was

committed for the purpose of “avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful

arrest” was applicable. The Defendant, herself, told officers that as the victim

continued to beg for her life, she told the victim that she was not going to be

“rotting in jail because of [her] stupid ass.” She also stated that a voice kept

telling her that she would go to prison for attempted murder if she let the victim

go. We conclude that there was ample evidence to support the application of this

aggravator.

The mitigating circumstances offered to the jury were that the Defendant

had no significant history of prior criminal activity, that the murder was committed

while the Defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional

disturbance, that the Defendant was young, that the capacity of the Defendant

to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct or to conform her conduct to the
1

Tenn essee Suprem e Cou rt Rule 30 becam e effec tive Janu ary 1, 1996 , and wa s a one year pilot 

project which was to expire on December 31, 1996. However, on December 30, 1996, the rule,

as am ended , was m ade pe rma nent.

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requirem ents of the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease

or intoxication, and any other mitigating factor that was raised by the evidence.

The Defendant argued that her difficult childhood should also be considered as

mitigation.

Again, in reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a

rational juror could have concluded that the applicable aggravating circumstances

outweighed the mitigating factors. Therefore, we conclude that the sentence of

death was supported by the evidence.

B. Media Coverage

The Defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant her

motion to deny television coverage of the pretrial proceedings. The Defendant

asserts that media coverage in the case made jury selection difficult, but the

Defendant presents no proof that a juror was biased because of the coverage.

The Defendant also asserts that the cameras in the courtroom “arguably affected

witness testimony and was generally disruptive of the proceedings,” but again,

the Defendant cites no specific instances to justify this conclusion.

Supreme Court Rule 30 provides for in-court media coverage at trial

proceedings.1 Coverage is subject, at all times, to the authority of the judge to

“(i) control the conduct of the proceedings before the court; (ii) maintain decorum

and prevent distraction; (iii) guarantee the safety of any party, witness, or juror;

and (iv) ensure the fair and impartial administration of justice.” Rule 30(A)(1),
-21-

(D)(2). Further, Rule 30 (D)(2) allows the trial court, upon a proper showing, to

limit in-court media coverage in order to accommodate any of these important

interests. 

This Court has held that Rule 30 presumptively entitles the media to incourt camera coverage. State v. Freddie Morrow, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9601-CC00022, Robertson County (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Apr. 12, 1996). Given

this presumption, any finding that such coverage should be denied, limited,

suspended, or terminated must be supported by substantial evidence that at least

one of the four interests in Rule 30(A)(1) and (D)(2) is of concern in the case

before the court. The burden of proof in producing this evidence is on the party

seeking limits on media coverage.

In the present case, the record before the court reflects only the general

statement of counsel that pretrial media coverage would make jury selection

difficult and would deprive the Defendant of a fair trial because it “arguably

affected witness testimony and was generally disruptive of the proceedings.”

There is no evidence to substantiate the Defendant’s claims. Although jury

selection was lengthy, there is no assertion that any particular juror was biased

because of the media coverage. The Defendant provides no proof that testimony

was affected or that the proceedings were disrupted. We cannot, therefore,

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to exclude pretrial

media coverage. 

C. Change of Venue

The Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant her

motion for a change of venue. She maintains that a majority of prospective jurors
-22-

admitted that they had heard detailed information about the case. The Defendant

cites the United States Supreme Court decision in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,

81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961), in support of the proposition that a change

of venue should be granted if extensive pretrial publicity was such that the court

should presum e the jury is tainted even if prospective jurors stated that they

would be able to set aside what they had seen or heard.

However, in Dowd, jury selection lasted more than four weeks. Also the

Supreme Court specifically stated that due to “swift, widespread and diverse

methods of communication,” it is not required that jurors be totally ignorant of the

facts and issues involved. 366 U.S. at 722, 81 S.Ct. at 1642. The court also

stated that “[i]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and

render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” 366 U.S. at 723, 81

S.Ct. at 1643. In Dowd, the panel consisted of 430 persons. The court itself

excused 268 of those persons due to their fixed opinions of guilt, and 103 were

excused because of their conscientious objection to the death penalty. 366 U.S.

at 727, 81 S.Ct. at 1645. The voir dire record indicated that 370 of the

prospective jurors entertained some opinion as to guilt, ranging from mere

suspicion to absolute certainty. Of the twelve jurors selected, eight thought the

Defendant was guilty. Id.

In the present case, although many potential jurors had indicated that they

had heard something about the case in the media, every juror who said he or she

was familiar with the case said that he or she could disregard the reports and

render an impartial decision. All potential jurors who said they could not

disregard the reports were excused for cause. The Defendant has cited no

specific response from any seated juror that was troublesome.
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D. Excusal of Jurors

The Defendant asserts that the trial court impanelled a jury that was prodeath penalty and improperly excused for cause those prospective jurors that

indicated that they were opposed to the death penalty. The Defendant suggests

that the trial court erred in denying her proposal that a “don’t ask, don’t tell,”

procedure be used whereby jurors would not be required to tell the court about

their personal feelings about the death penalty.

In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d

841 (1985), the United State Supreme Court reaffirmed as the proper standard

for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of

his or her views on capital punishment the test of “whether the juror’s views would

‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in

accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” In State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d

506, 518 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1037, 110 S.Ct. 758 (1990), the

Tennessee Supreme Court held that “the trial court’s finding of the bias of a juror

because of his views of capital punishment shall be accorded a presumption of

correctness and the burden shall rest upon the Defendant to establish by

convincing evidence that that determination was erroneous.”

The Defendant notes that in the present case the trial court examined

prospective jurors extensively regarding their thoughts about the death penalty

and allowed counsel to exam ine those who indicated that they had a problem

with the death penalty in an effort to rehabilitate them. The Defendant cites no

prospective juror who was excluded that should not have been. Applying the
-24-

standard as set forth in Alley, the Defendant has failed to establish by convincing

evidence that the court’s actions were erroneous. This issue is without merit.

E. Use of the Skull as Evidence

The Defendant next complains that pursuant to Rule 403 of the Tennessee

Rules of Evidence, the skull of the victim should have been excluded because its

probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The

Defendant asserts that the skull was also cumulative evidence because prior to

its admission, numerous photographs of the skull were admitted to show the

damage to the victim’s head.

The State argues that the introduction of the skull was an important portion

of the medical testimony. The medical examiner testified that she had sent the

skull to a forensic anthropologist to be reconstructed because she could not tell

exactly what had happened without the reconstruction. The skull was used by

the medical examiner to show the amount of force that was applied to it, as well

as the weapon that was used. Pieces of asphalt were embedded in the skull. 

In this case, the skull had been thoroughly cleansed and was no more

prejudicial or gruesome than a model diagram would have been. Dr. Elkins, the

medical examiner, testified that the reconstructed skull would illustrate to the jury

what had occurred to the victim and demonstrate the amount of force that was

applied as well as the type of weapon used to inflict the head injuries. There is

no question that the nature and type of injuries sustained by the deceased and

the manner in which death occurred were relevant considerations by the jury.

Moreover, the skull was used to illustrate that the piece of skull found in the
-25-

Defendant’s jacket fit perfectly into the reconstructed skull. The skull was,

therefore, highly relevant in establishing the circumstances surrounding the

offense. See State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 263 (Tenn. 1994); cert. denied,

115 S.Ct. 743, 130 L.Ed2d 644 (1995); State v. Morris, 641 S.W.2d 883, 888

(Tenn. 1982). This issue is without merit.

F. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The Defendant contends that the punishm ent imposed upon her, death by

electrocution, is cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal

constitutions. However, this issue has been previously decided by the

Tennessee Supreme Court and determined to be without merit. See State v.

Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn.

1993); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991).

G. Peremptory Challenges

The Defendant contends that at the time of the offense, the rules in effect

gave the Defendant fifteen (15) peremptory challenges compared to the State’s

eight. See Rule 24(d), Tenn. R. Crim. P. (1995). However, at the time of trial, the

rules had been changed to give an equal number of peremptory challenges to

both the Defendant and the State. See Rule 24(d), Tenn. R. Crim. P. (1996). 

The Defendant argues that application of the new rule violated the ex post facto

provision of the Tennessee Constitution which requires that rules not be applied

to events which occurred prior to their enactment.

The term "ex post facto" as used in Article I, § 10, cl. 1, of the U.S.

Constitution, provides that "[n]o state shall ... pass any ... ex post facto law." The
-26-

Tennessee Constitution's ex post facto prohibition found in Article I, § 11,

provides:

That laws made for the punishment of acts committed previous to the

existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal are contrary to

the principles of a free Government; wherefore no Ex post facto law shall

be made. 

Two critical elements must be present for a law to fall within the prohibition.

 First, it "must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before

its enactment"; and second, "it must disadvantage the offender affected by it."

Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2451, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987)

(quoting Weaver v. Graham , 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17

(1981)); State v. Ricci, 914 S.W .2d 475, 480 (Tenn. 1996). Furthermore,

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112 provides that: 

whenever any penal statute or penal legislative act of the state is repealed

or amended by a subsequent legislative act, any offense, as defined by the

statute or act being repealed or amended, committed while such statute or

act was in full force an effect shall be prosecuted under the act or statute

in effect at the time of the commission of the offense.

Yet, the United States Supreme Court has held that laws which change a

rule of evidence, but which do not increase the punishment nor change the

elements of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt, but only

remove existing restrictions on the competency of certain classes of evidence or

of persons as witnesses do not constitute ex post facto laws. State v. Bragan,

920 S.W.2d 227, 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citations omitted). In Dobbert v.

Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977), the Supreme

Court held that the prohibition of ex post facto laws does not extend to every

change of law that "may work to the disadvantage of a defendant." Instead, it is

intended to secure "substantive personal rights" from retroactive deprivation and
-27-

does not "limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which

do not affect matters of substance." Id. Thus, laws which change rules of

procedure but which do not affect any substantial right of a defendant are not ex

post facto laws. 

Here, it is apparent that the trial court applied a procedural rule that had

been amended after the commission of the crimes in question. The Defendant

also claims that the right to a fair and impartial jury was impaired by the increase

in peremptory challenges for the State. However, the Defendant has not

proffered any evidence that the jury, as it was composed by the State’s using the

additional peremptory challenges, prevented her from receiving a fair trial.

Absent proof that the Defendant was disadvantaged or that a substantive right

was impaired by the amended procedural rule, we cannot conclude that an ex

post facto violation occurred. This issue is without merit.

H. Sentencing on the Conspiracy Conviction

The Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant

to a consecutive sentence of twenty-five (25) years for the conviction of

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The Defendant complains that the trial

court inappropriately used the aggravating circumstance that the crime was

especially cruel to sentence her to the maximum sentence. She further

complains that the trial court erred in determining that she was a dangerous

offender and ordering her to serve the sentence consecutively to the death

sentence.
-28-

When an accused challenges the length, range, or the manner of service

of a sentence, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo review of the sentence

with a presumption that the determinations m ade by the trial court are correct.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d). This presumption is “conditioned upon the

affirmative showing in the record that the trial court considered the sentencing

principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d

166, 169 (Tenn. 1991).

In conducting a de novo review of a sentence, this court must consider: (a)

the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (b) the

presentence report; (c) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to

sentencing alternatives; (d) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct

involved; (e) any statutory mitigating or enhancement factors; (f) any statement

that the Defendant made on his own behalf; and (g) the potential or lack of

potential for rehabilitation or treatm ent. Tenn. Code Ann. § § 40-35-102, 1-103,

and -210; see State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).

If our review reflects that the trial court followed the statutory sentencing

procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after having given due consideration and

proper weight to the factors and principles set out under the sentencing law, and

that the trial court’s findings are adequately supported by the record, then we may

not modify the sentence even if we would have preferred a different result. State

v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).

At the sentencing hearing, the State called as its only witness Officer

Debbie Wade, a Corrections Officer with the Knox County Sheriff’s Department.

She testified that on the day the Defendant was sentenced to die, she gave
-29-

Officer Wade a letter and requested that it be passed to her co-Defendant,

Tadaryl Shipp. Officer Wade gave the letter to her lieutenant and was told not

to pass it to Mr. Shipp. The letter was introduced into evidence and read as

follows:

Tadaryl, hey, love, I just wanted you to know how

much I love you. I have ten months to live. Imagine

that. I would spend every moment with you if I could,

baby. I want to tell you to tell them you lied in your

statement and go along with mine. Do you have a

copy of mine? If not, I’ll give you one. Okay? I love

you big bunches, baby, and no matter what they do to

me they can’t change what’s in my heart. Please write

me. I miss you so much. You see what I got for trying

to be nice to that whore. I went ahead and bashed her

brains out so she would die quickly instead of letting

her bleed to death and suffer more and they fuckin fry

me. Ain’t that some shit. Please write and tell me what

you’re feeling. Baker said he would give you some

paper and shit while you are out there. Also tell your

lawyer if he wants me to I’ll testify, testify for you, I will.

Love you for the rest of my life. Little devil.

The trial court classified the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender on

the conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court also

considered several enhancement and mitigating factors in setting the sentence

above the minimum presumptive sentence of fifteen (15) years. First, the trial

court applied enhancement factor number (2), that “[t]he Defendant was a leader

in the commission of an offense involving two (2) or more criminal actors.” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-35-114(2). The trial judge then stated that factor number (5),

that “[t]he Defendant treated or allowed a victim to be treated with exceptional

cruelty during the commission of the offense,” would not be relied upon heavily

because it had already been used in sentencing the Defendant to death on the

other count. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(5). Factor number (7), that “[t]he

offense involved a victim and was committed to gratify the Defendant’s desire for

pleasure and excitement,” factor number (9), that “[t]he Defendant possessed or
-30-

employed a firearm, explosive device or other deadly weapon during the

commission of the offense,” and factor number (10), that “[t]he Defendant had no

hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high,” were

also found to be applicable. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-114 (7),(9), and (10).

The trial court found that no mitigating factors were applicable.

We find error with only one of the trial court’s applications of enhancement

factors. The trial judge held that the Defendant had no hesitation about

committing a crime when the risk to human life was high. Tenn. Code Ann. §

40-35-114(10). We believe that the court improperly applied this enhancement

factor. Enhancement factor (10) refers to the defendant having "no hesitation

about committing a crime when the risk to human life is high." This Court has

previously recognized that factors which are inherent in a particular offense, even

if not designated as an element, should not be given substantive weight in

increasing a sentence. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 735 S.W .2d 825, 830 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1987). We conclude that the risk to human life is inherent in the

grading of the offense of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. According

to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-12-107, “conspiracy is an offense one

(1) classification lower than the most serious offense that is the object of the

conspiracy.” First-degree murder is classified as a capital offense, therefore

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is a Class A felony, a class reserved

for only the m ost serious offenses. 

Moreover, the indictment contains allegations in support of the element of

conspiracy that an overt act be taken, that the Defendant and two others left the

Job Corps center, took the victim to an isolated location and attacked her with a

box cutter. Not only is the risk to human life inherent in the offense, in the case
-31-

sub judice, high risk acts were included in the indictment as charged in support

of an element of the crime. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-103(a), (d).

Enhancement factors may be applied “if not themselves essential elements of the

offense as charged in the indictment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114. For both

of these reasons, we conclude that enhancement factor should not have been

applied. 

The evidence produced at trial, including the Defendant’s own statement,

and the letter introduced at the sentencing hearing would certainly support the

factor that she was a leader in the commission of the offense. The statement of

the Defendant, the testimony concerning her recounting of the incident to others,

the fact that she carried a piece of the victim’s skull as a souvenir, and her return

to the scene were evidence of her desire for excitement and pleasure. Again, by

her own statement, the Defendant admitted carrying a deadly weapon.

Although we disagree with the trial court’s finding that the Defendant’s age

and lack of a significant history of prior criminal activities were not applicable

mitigating factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in sentencing the

Defendant to the maximum sentence of twenty-five (25) years. Clearly, when the

applicable enhancing factors are weighed against the mitigating factors, the

record supports the trial court’s sentence.

The trial court found that consecutive sentences were warranted because

the Defendant is a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no

regard for human life and had no hesitation about committing a crime in which the

risk to human life was high. See State v. W ilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 937-39

(Tenn. 1995). Again, given the circumstances surrounding this offense,
-32-

especially the heinous nature of the crime and the fact that the Defendant

showed no remorse, we conclude that the Defendant met the criteria for

consecutive sentencing and the trial court did not abuse her discretion in ordering

such. The sentencing issues raised by the Defendant are without merit.

CONCLUSION

Upon careful review of the record, we conclude that the Defendant has

offered no grounds that warrant relief from her convictions of premeditated first

degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Moreover, we

conclude that the Defendant has failed to establish any ground warranting relief

from the sentence of death and the consecutive sentence of twenty-five (25)

years.

Therefore, after a thorough review of the issues and the record before us

as mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(b) and (c), and

for the reasons stated herein, we affirm the appellant’s sentence of death. We

conclude that the sentence was not imposed in an arbitrary fashion, the evidence

supports the jury’s finding of the aggravating circumstances, and the evidence

supports the jury’s finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any

mitigating circumstances. Moreover, a comparative proportionality review,

considering both the circumstances of the crime and the nature of the appellant,

convinces us that the sentence of death is neither excessive nor disproportionate

to the penalty imposed in similar cases.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
-33-

_________________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE

CONCUR:

__________________________________

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE

__________________________________

JOHN K. BYERS, SENIOR JUDGE