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v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

HONDURAS: A PARIAH STATE, OR 

INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS TO ORGANIZED 

CRIME DESERVING U.S. SUPPORT?

R. Evan Ellis

June 2016

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vi

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ISBN 1-58487-723-5
vii

FOREWORD

For the U.S. Armed Forces, and militaries throughout the world, non-traditional missions have become 

an increasingly important part of the range of operations that they are called on to conduct. In the Western Hemisphere, one of the most prominent examples 

has been the involvement of Central American armed 

forces in the fight against transnational organized 

crime groups and violent street gangs such as Mara 

Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 (B-18). The longterm propriety of employing the military in what is, 

at its core, a law enforcement role, continues to be 

a subject of debate not only in Central America, but 

also throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, 

and elsewhere in the world. Nonetheless, in the face 

of the inadequacy of law enforcement institutions to 

meet the challenge, because of its magnitude, lack of 

resources, corruption, and other shortcomings in law 

enforcement institutions, elected leaders across the 

ideological spectrum in Honduras, as well as neighboring El Salvador and Nicaragua, have consistently 

assigned their armed forces prominent roles in combating these challenges.

Perhaps the most extreme of such cases has been 

Honduras, where the military has not only been 

used to augment law enforcement capabilities, but in 

which the administration of President Juan Orlando 

Hernandez has created a new elite police force within 

the armed forces, the Military Police for Public Order 

(PMOP), as well as a creative structure for integrating 

military and police units, prosecutors, special judges, 

and other government assets within the National Interagency Security Force (FUSINA), under the President and his national security council.
While President Hernandez himself has been the 

target of national protests over allegations of corruption and abuse of power, the new security structures 

that he has put in place and their application via Plan 

Morazán have produced significant results, including 

a reduction in the nation’s murder rate from 86.5 per 

100,000 in 2011, to 64 per 100,000 by 2014. With help 

from the United States, Honduras has significantly reduced the use of its national territory as a transit zone 

by narcotraffickers and has dismantled the leadership 

of the two most important drug smuggling organizations operating in the region, the Cachiros and the 

Los Valles.

The present monograph by Latin America research 

professor Dr. R. Evan Ellis of the Strategic Studies 

Institute (SSI) examines the policies and strategies 

of the Hernandez administration in the fight against 

organized crime and gangs in Honduras, both with 

respect to its innovations and achievements, as well 

as its shortcomings, as a case study of an important 

mission that armed forces in the region are increasingly called upon to perform. The monograph also 

provides concrete recommendations for U.S. military 

leaders and policymakers with respect to effectively 

engaging with Honduras in the struggle against the 

shared threats of organized crime and gangs.

This monograph is the latest in an ongoing series of works by SSI to provide strategic-level insight for U.S. military leaders, as well as policymakers and academics, on important security and 

viii
ix

defense issues in Latin America and the Caribbean. We hope that you find it stimulating and of 

interest.

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

xi

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

R. EVAN ELLIS is a research professor of Latin American Studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic 

Studies Institute with a focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere 

actors. Dr. Ellis has presented his work in a broad 

range of business and government forums in 25 countries. He has given testimony on Chinese activities in 

Latin America to the U.S. Congress on multiple occasions and has discussed his work regarding China and 

other external actors in the region on a broad range of 

radio and television programs, including CNN International, CNN En Español, The John Bachelor Show, 

Voice of America, and Radio Marti. Dr. Ellis is cited 

regularly in the print media in both the United States 

and Latin America for his work in this area. Dr. Ellis 

has published over 130 works, including China in Latin 

America: The Whats and Wherefores (2009), The Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement with Latin America

(2013), and China on the Ground in Latin America (2014). 

Dr. Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a 

specialization in comparative politics.

xiii

SUMMARY

The public protests against Honduran President 

Juan Orlando Hernandez, which peaked in July 2015, 

highlighted perceptions of corruption by Hondurans 

of their President and his government, and fostered 

a new spirit of civic participation in Central America. Outside the region, less noticed is that President 

Hernandez has also made significant changes in the 

strategy and institutions of the country in combating the interrelated scourges of organized crime and 

violent gangs, which have plagued Honduras as well 

as its neighbors. That new approach, set forth in the 

administration’s interagency security plan and Operation MORAZÁN, has produced notable successes. 

With U.S. assistance, the National Interagency Security Force (FUSINA) and the Honduran government 

dismantled the leadership of the nation’s two principal family-based drug smuggling organizations, the 

Cachiros and the Los Valles, and significantly reduced 

the use of the national territory as a drug transit zone, 

particularly narco flights. Murders in the country have 

fallen from 86.5 per 100,000 in 2011, to 64 per 100,000 

in 2014.

The approach taken by the Hernandez administration to produce these results includes the creation of 

innovative new structures. These include a new military-led interagency organization, FUSINA, which integrates elements from the armed forces, police, prosecutors, special judges, and other state resources to 

combat organized crime and delinquency in the country. More controversially, he has created a new police 

force within the military, the Military Police of Public Order (PMOP), which has been deployed both to 

provide security to the nation’s principal urban areas, 

Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela, and San Pedro Sula, and 
xiv

to participate in operations against organized crime 

groups. In the fight against narcotrafficking, he has 

advanced a concept of three interdependent “shields”: 

1. An air shield to better control Honduran airspace, enacted in January 2014, which enables 

suspected drug flights to be shot-down and the 

acquisition of three radars from Israel to support intercepts by the Honduran air force; 

2. A maritime shield, with new naval bases on the 

country’s eastern coast and new shallow-water 

and riverine assets for intercepting smugglers; 

and,

3. A land shield, including enhanced control of 

the border with Guatemala through the “MayaChorti Task Force.”

Beyond FUSINA, the Hernandez administration 

has also sought to reform the nation’s national police, 

albeit with slow progress. It is also reforming the penitentiary system, dominated by the criminal gangs MS13 and B-18.

In the implementation of its new approach, the 

Hernandez administration has also faced a number 

of difficult challenges. These include persistently 

high levels of corruption at all levels of government, 

a substantial presence of organized crime in the private sector, slow police reform, institutional rivalries 

between government organizations, difficulties with 

the integration of intelligence capabilities supporting 

FUSINA, difficulties in combating money laundering, 

societal concerns regarding human rights violations 

by the military and other government entities, and the 

long-term hurdle of a changing culture of gangs, violence and poverty that permeates the country.
xv

This monograph focuses on the evolution of the 

transnational organized crime and gang challenges 

in Honduras, the strategies and structures of the Hernandez administration in combating them, associated 

challenges, and recommendations for the U.S. military and policymakers to support the country in such 

efforts.

1

HONDURAS: A PARIAH STATE, OR 

INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS TO ORGANIZED 

CRIME DESERVING U.S. SUPPORT?

INTRODUCTION

In July 2015, tens of thousands of Hondurans 

turned out in the streets of the nation’s principal cities, 

Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela, and San Pedro Sula for 

recurring weekly protests against the government of 

President Juan Orlando Hernandez, which many saw 

as corrupt and going beyond democratic mechanisms 

to exercise and consolidate its power.1 Key protest issues included a scandal involving the nation’s principal state health organization, the Honduran Institute 

for Social Security (IHSS), in which government payments for false or substandard medicines may have 

resulted in the deaths of ill and elderly Hondurans, 

while part of the illicit gains went to the nation’s leading politicians, including the President’s own electoral 

campaign.2 For many, however, the last straw was 

the April 2015 ruling by Honduras’ Supreme Court 

to overturn the nation’s constitutional prohibition of 

re-election.3 Many in the country saw the decision as 

orchestrated by President Hernandez to sustain himself in power. This decision was viewed by many as 

being related to other actions by Hernandez that some 

in Honduras found questionable, such as when he, as 

head of Congress, played a key role in the removal of 

four Supreme Court justices supporting ex-President 

Manuel Zelaya.4

While the allegations of corruption and abuse of 

power by opponents of President Hernandez are serious, they also contrast dramatically with evidence 

that the Hernandez administration has made significant progress in combating organized crime and inse-
2

curity in Honduras. In less than two years, murders in 

Honduras were reduced from 86.5 per 100,000 in 2011, 

to 64 per 100,000 in 2014, in a country that was previously the most violent in the region.5

 By the estimate 

of the Honduran government, shipments of drugs 

via air have declined 98%,6 an achievement publicly 

corroborated by U.S. authorities,7 and a significant accomplishment for a country through which 80% of all 

U.S.-bound cocaine once passed.8

These successes of the Honduran government, 

largely overshadowed by the political scandals noted 

in the previous paragraphs, are fundamentally important not only for the country, but also for its neighbors, the region, and the United States. The 2014 immigration crisis, in which an estimated 60,000 Central 

American children arrived at the U.S. southern border, attempting to enter the United States, forced the 

Obama administration to dedicate $3.7 billion in one 

month9 to deal with a humanitarian crisis coming from 

three countries that collectively had received only $1.2 

billion in U.S. aid since 2008.10 Moreover, while the solutions adopted by the Hernandez government have 

shortcomings and raise concerns from the perspective 

of democratic governance, they also contain innovative elements and have produced achievements that 

will serve as a reference for other states in the region 

with similar challenges.

Beyond the region itself, a full and nuanced understanding of the achievements and shortcomings of 

the security initiatives of the Hernandez government 

in Honduras is important for the U.S. government 

as it makes decisions regarding how, and to what 

degree, to continue to support Honduras in its fight 

against transnational organized crime, violence and 

insecurity.
3

While a significant amount has been written in 

both the Latin American and U.S. media regarding 

organized crime, gangs, and the political challenges 

faced by the Hernandez administration, there has 

been a relative absence of detailed academic work 

published in English regarding the security challenges 

facing Honduras, and the initiatives of the Hernandez 

administration for addressing them. This monograph 

is designed to help fill that void.

Methodology.

This monograph examines the state of security 

challenges in Honduras, with a focus on street gangs 

and transnational organized crime. It reviews the 

principal security policies, relevant government structures, and initiatives of the Hernandez government to 

combat those challenges, followed by an examination 

in greater detail of key difficulties or areas of contention associated with that struggle, then concludes 

with a series of recommendations for U.S. policymakers to support Honduras’ fight against the challenges 

of gangs and transnational organized crime.

This work employs a qualitative approach, based 

on in-person, telephone, and email interactions by the 

author with officials and academics in the Honduras’ 

defense, security, and law enforcement sectors, including 17 in-depth interviews conducted in Tegucigalpa 

during July 2015, supplemented by the review and application where appropriate of English and Spanishlanguage documents, news accounts, and secondary 

sources.
4

The Honduran Security Challenge.

For more than 40 years, Honduras has been an 

important transit country for narcotics flowing from 

“source zone” countries in South America, such as Colombia and Peru, to the United States.11 In the 1970s, 

Honduran drug trafficker Juan Ramon Matta leveraged the country’s strategic geographic position as a 

“bridge” moving the cocaine of Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel in Columbia to the Guadalajara Cartel in 

Mexico.12

The same strategic geography also placed Honduras in arguably the most hotly contested part of the 

Western Hemisphere during the Cold War. During 

this period, Honduras’ neighbors on all sides (Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala) were involved in 

civil wars with spill-over effects into Honduras, even 

though Honduras itself managed to avoid an internal 

conflict.

Beyond drugs and civil wars, the geography of 

Honduras has also prejudiced it with respect to hurricanes, tropical storms, and other natural disasters. 

More than 30 hurricanes have impacted the country 

since 1950, including Hurricanes Fifi and Mitch, the 

latter causing an estimated $2 billion in direct damages when it struck the country in 1998, leaving an 

estimated 20% of the country’s population homeless.13

Finally, Honduras’ strategic location has contributed to it being one of the countries of the region most 

beset by gang violence, together with neighboring 

Guatemala and El Salvador. The gang presence centers 

on, but is not exclusive to, two groups: Barrio 18 (B-18) 

and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), each of which has its 

origin in Central American immigration to the United States during the region’s civil wars in the 1980s. 
5

Many settled in the greater Los Angeles area, with 

Central American youth giving birth to both street 

gangs there. The subsequent deportation of thousands 

of undocumented Central American immigrants with 

criminal records beginning in 200014 transplanted the 

new gangs to the region, where they quickly spread.

The security situation in Honduras has particularly degenerated during the last 15 years as a product 

of the interaction between gangs, drug traffickers, immigration, and weak institutions. As B-18 and MS-13 

took root in Honduras and fought to displace rival 

gangs and each other, the resulting violence increased 

outbound emigration, already high because of the 

lack of economic opportunities in the country. Such 

immigration split up families, leaving more Honduran youth without two-parent family structures in 

violent neighborhoods, vulnerable to recruitment by 

the gangs. 

With respect to narcotrafficking, family-based 

Honduran criminal smuggling groups such as the 

Cachiros and the Los Valles moved drugs through the 

region, generally financed by Mexico-based cartels 

and other groups. They found a readily available labor 

force to help it to do so, particularly in isolated rural 

areas with few other economic opportunities, such as 

the Departments (geographical divisions) of Copan, 

Olancho, and Gracias a Dios. Their ability to move 

drugs was further facilitated by a police force and political class which had come to be compromised at the 

highest levels by money from transnational organized 

crime, contributing to a dysfunctional judicial system 

in which impunity approached 100%, particularly for 

actions involving protected major criminal groups.

The growing crisis of governability in Honduras from the interaction of gangs and narcotrafficking deepened even further in 2009 when Honduran 
6

President Mel Zelaya was ousted from power in an 

irregular process, which many within the country, 

and in the regime, saw as a violation of Honduras’ 

democratic principles.15 Whether or not the ouster of 

President Zelaya was defensible within the nation’s 

laws and constitutional framework, it caused the international community, particularly in the Americas, 

to isolate the Honduran government,16 including a 

cut-off of most U.S. security assistance.17 In the resulting breach, Mexican cartels significantly ramped up 

the use of Honduran territory for U.S.-bound narcotics shipments.18

By the outset of the Hernandez administration, the 

movement of drugs through Honduras had come to 

be dominated by two family-based clans: the Cachiros

(the Rivera Maradiaga brothers) and the Los Valles, although both subsequently suffered grave blows at the 

hands of both the Honduran government and U.S. law 

enforcement.

The Cachiros, whose origins involved smuggling, 

including cattle, operated principally in the inaccessible and sparsely-populated eastern portion of the 

country, in Departments such as Atlántida, Olancho, 

Colon, and Gracias a Dios. As the use of the country as 

an air bridge to the United States grew during the period of Honduras’ international isolation, the Cachiros

dominated such operations.

During this period, the Cachiros and other groups 

also brought significant quantities of drugs into the 

country by sea, initially moving much of the product 

along Honduras’ rugged, inaccessible coastline, taking advantage of the lack of government presence 

there. Drugs brought in both by air and by sea were 

also commonly transferred to trucks, cars, motorcycles, and people for movement overland to the border with Guatemala.
7

Behind the scenes, the Honduran government, 

with the support of the United States and other international law enforcement organizations, was working 

to take down such networks. These efforts culminated 

in an important victory in January 2015 when the two 

top leaders of the Cachiros, Javier Eriberto and Devis 

Leonel Rivera Maradiaga, both fled to the Bahamas, 

where they turned themselves in to U.S. authorities.19

By contrast to the Cachiros, the Los Valles operated 

principally in the Department of Copan, in the west 

of Honduras along the border with Guatemala. Their 

strategic geographic position allowed them to control 

drug flows moving west from the Atlantic coast of 

Honduras, as well as from El Salvador, in the south, 

moving toward the Guatemalan border. Los Vallesaffiliated smugglers reportedly controlled property 

on both sides of the (then poorly supervised) Honduras-Guatemalan border which they reportedly operated as their own private “customs houses” for narcotics and other contraband passing across, en route to 

Mexico and the United States. 

Both the Los Valles and Cachiros enjoyed strong 

relationships to the Honduran political class, as illustrated by the case of Jose Miguel “Chepe” Handal, 

who reportedly purchased cocaine from the Los Valles 

on behalf of interests in Guatemala.20 In doing so, 

Handal reportedly enjoyed protection as the cousin of 

Arístides Mejía, the Minister of Defense under previous Honduran President Manuel Zelaya

The two principal heads of the Los Valles organization, Miguel Arnulfo and Luis Alonso Valle Valle, 

were arrested and extradited to the United States in 

October 2014.21

In addition to the two principal transporter groups, 

a number of other smaller drug smuggling organiza-
8

tions also operated in Honduras, with varying levels 

of affiliation with, or subordination to, the Cachiros and 

Los Valles. These included groups such as the “Olancho 

Cartel” (reportedly operated by the Saramiento family), the “South Valley” cartel (operating in Choluteca, 

the strategic point where Nicaragua, Honduras, and 

El Salvador converge in the Gulf of Fonseca), and the 

“AA Brothers” organization. They also included the 

group “14e,” a shadowy umbrella organization, rumored to coordinate the efforts of the 14 leading families in San Pedro Sula involved in narcotrafficking.

With the exception of the 14e, such groups are not 

so much independent cartels as organizations that 

subcontract to, or are affiliated with, the Los Valles 

or Cachiros, and which have grown and have taken a 

measure of independence as those two groups have 

been progressively dismantled during the course of 

2014 and 2015.

Even these smaller groups are in a state of flux. 

For example, members of the Saramiento family were 

reported to have fled to Nicaragua following actions 

against the Olancho Cartel in July 2015,22 while cartel 

boss and mayor of the village of El Paraiso, Alexander 

Ardon, and his AA Cartel have reportedly become a 

focus of the Honduran authorities.23

As noted previously, the use of aircraft, vis-à-vis 

boats, to bring drugs into Honduras (particularly to 

the Atlantic coast), fell off with U.S. re-engagement 

with the country, as well as with the increased Honduran state presence since 2010, particularly in the 

sparsely populated eastern region of the country.
9

In addition, narcotraffickers continue to apply 

creativity and substantial resources to find new ways 

to conceal drug shipments, including the use of submarines. Although Honduran authorities reportedly 

do not intercept such vessels frequently, persons interviewed for this monograph mentioned rumors of 

such vehicles sunk off the northern Honduran coast in 

the area of Islas de Bahia, near the island of Roatan.24

Finally, transportation of drugs overland is often 

part of drug smuggling, including movement by car, 

commercial vehicle, motorcycle, and foot traffic. Shipments brought into the country by aircraft and boats 

are moved by such means across the country, generally to the Guatemalan border as part of their larger 

journey toward the United States. To do so, smugglers 

use a broad range of techniques to conceal their cargo; 

from hidden compartments in cars and trucks, to artificial breast implants, to planting cocaine in the intestines of cows.

In such operations, local labor has played an important role in offloading incoming narcotics-carrying 

aircraft and ships, storing drugs until such time as it 

is believed that security and market conditions make 

opportune their movement to their next destination, 

and physically transporting the drugs when that time 

comes.25

In general, Mexican groups such as the Sinaloa 

Cartel and the Zetas, contracted for and partially financed the movement of drugs across the country. 

Yet such groups generally did not operate directly in 

Honduras.

Honduran narcotics experts that were consulted 

for this monograph generally viewed the Mexican cartels as maintaining a distant and pragmatic posture 

with respect to narcotraffickers in the country. The 

cartels would frequently shift between the groups 
10

they contracted with for drug shipments as the situation of those groups in the country evolved. Indeed, 

in the face of occasional robberies of drug shipments 

(tumbes), the cartels reportedly bought back the stolen drugs from the organizations that hijacked them, 

regarding it as a cost of business.

As previously noted, Mexican cartels have generally not operated in Honduras directly, however, the 

cartels and leaders have played an important role in 

the country and continue to maintain relationships 

with Honduran traffickers. The most famous example is Joaquim “El Chapo” Guzman, leader of Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel, who reportedly spent time in the 

principal compound of Los Valles in the village of El 

Paraiso.26

The influence of the Mexican cartels is also reportedly strong in Choluteca, Honduras’ principal outlet 

to the Pacific coast, where the South Valley cartel of 

Orlando Pinto Espino operates. 

While opinions differ regarding the presence in 

Honduras of Mexico’s newly emergent cartel Jalisco 

Nuevo Generación, those interviewed for this monograph generally believed that they were operating 

in the country. Some even suggested that they were 

involved in operations in the Department of Yoro, 

which potentially serves as a geographical bridge between the Atlantic coastal provinces and the border 

with Guatemala.

With respect to the Zetas, who came to exercise considerable influence in neighboring Guatemala during 

the 2008-2011 period,27 although the group reportedly 

has a presence in Honduras,28 those consulted for this 

monograph believed that its influence in the country 

was declining.

Finally, with the previously noted dismantling of 

the leadership of Honduras’ narcotrafficking orga-
11

nizations, the Cachiros and Los Valles, some Mexican 

cartels may now be taking a more active role in the 

country, reaching out to the smaller cartels and others 

to build new networks for transporting drugs through 

Honduran territory. The Honduran newspaper El 

Heraldo, for example, reported an alleged meeting between members of Mexico’s Juarez Cartel and ranchers 

in Olancho to discuss such support activities.29

Beyond the movement of drugs across the country, authorities have found some evidence that, since 

2013, criminal organizations have been processing 

drugs in laboratories in Honduras.30 The first of such 

laboratories was uncovered in 2011 in the Merendon 

mountain area, near the border with Guatemala.31 The 

second was found approximately 40 kilometers from 

La Ceiba, and the third was discovered in the vicinity 

of the village of Omoa, also close to the border with 

Guatemala.32

Rumors have also circulated that coca plants may 

be grown in the northern Department of Yola, although to date, authorities have not uncovered specific evidence that this is occurring.

Beyond cocaine, Honduran narcotics experts consulted for this monograph suggested that synthetic 

drugs such as methamphetamines are being produced 

in the country. In one case, 13.6 tons of pseudoephedrine, a precursor chemical used in the production of 

methamphetamines, was reportedly found in San 

Pedro Sula. The chemicals (the largest quantity ever 

found in one place in the region), were said to be 

linked to narcotrafficking operations of the Ramirez 

Corria brothers. The extent of synthetic drug production in Honduras is unknown, in part because Honduran authorities reportedly lack capabilities, such as 

trained police chemists, to effectively investigate such 

activities.
12

Gangs.

With respect to gangs, as in other northern triangle 

countries, the two principal groups in the country are 

Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 (B-18). The two 

are similar in strength, sophistication, and activities 

in Honduras, although B-18 is believed to have more 

members in Honduras, when measured by the number of each gang in Honduran prisons, and reportedly 

tends to be more violent.

The gangs are generally concentrated in the country’s major urban areas; Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, 

and to a lesser extent, La Ceiba. B-18 is reportedly 

more dominant in Tegucigalpa, while MS-13 is more 

powerful in San Pedro Sula. La Ceiba is principally 

populated by smaller gangs, including Los Grillos and 

Los Colocho.

B-18 and MS-13 also have a limited presence in 

smaller towns, such as Roatan and El Paraiso. There 

has also been some dispersion of gang members into 

the countryside. In response to anti-gang legislation 

passed in 2001, some gang members began to migrate 

to rural areas, although in recent years, according to 

those consulted for this monograph, they have mostly 

reconsolidated in urban zones.

The situation of B-18 and MS-13 in Honduras is 

somewhat different from that in other Central American countries. In Honduras, the leadership structures 

of the gangs are more diffuse, and by contrast to El 

Salvador, a smaller percentage of their leaders are in 

prison. Nor has the split in B-18 between the Revolucionarios and Surenos factions, manifested in neighboring 

El Salvador, been replicated in Honduras. 
13

The truce temporarily achieved between B-18, MS13, and four smaller gangs in El Salvador in 2012,33

gave rise to an attempt by Honduran Bishop Romulo 

Emiliani to achieve a similar pact between the gangs 

in Honduras.34 By 2013, it was clear that such attempts 

had failed.35

By contrast to other Central American countries, 

in recent years, new smaller street gangs have also appeared in Honduras, including Los Chirizos,

36 El Combo 

que no se dejan,37 and Los Benjamin,

38 each local to Tegucigalpa and generally focused on extortion. 

With respect to the origins of the smaller gangs, the 

first two emerged from an extortion group led by the 

mafia figure El Gato Negro, who both extorted and protected merchants in the public market of Tegucigalpa 

from B-18 and MS-13. El Gato Negro was eventually 

assassinated (reportedly by police with whom he had 

previously collaborated in the extortion racket), paving the way for the emergence of Los Chorizos and Los 

Combo Que No Se Dejan as groups who had previously 

worked for him. 

The criminal activities of the gangs in Honduras 

have generally been focused on extortion, and to a 

lesser degree, distributing and selling drugs in the 

urban areas that they control. In addition, the gangs 

serve as assassins for transporters and other organized 

crime groups.

Such groups also earn some revenue from extorting immigrants along routes to the United States. 

Within B-18 and MS-13, there is reportedly some specialization, where some “clicas” (the smallest unit of 

gang members) earn revenue as assassins, versus others that focus more exclusively on extortion and other 

crimes.
14

Those interviewed for this monograph emphasized the adaptability and quality of constant change 

of both the gang and narcotrafficking organizations in 

Honduras. 

To some degree, as the two established gangs have 

aged, they have also become more “corporate,” coming to own transportation companies, bars and discos, 

as well as providing security for their own operations 

while extorting their competitors.

The current generation of gang members also generally does not use tattoos, or uses small tattoos on 

concealed parts of their body. This change in behavior 

from the previous generation of B-18 and MS-13 in El 

Salvador appears to be an adaptation to anti-gang legislation passed in 2001 and modified in 2015,39 as well 

as the targeting of gang members by Honduran law 

enforcement, and to some extent, the social stigma of 

gang membership.

The gangs have also evolved as organizations. Reflecting the need to manage their substantial revenue 

streams, B-18 and MS-13 have sent members to schools 

to study skills useful to their organizations, including 

law and accounting.40 They have also reportedly sent 

members to infiltrate police academies, and to a lesser 

extent, the military.41

With growing revenues, some senior gang leaders, 

referred to in some circles as “master homies,” have 

come to resemble successful businessmen, living in 

well protected neighborhoods, driving fine cars, and 

otherwise enjoying affluent lifestyles.

The gangs in Honduras are also evolving their activities and tactics, driven not only by the actions of 

authorities, but also popular culture. One law enforcement expert interviewed in Tegucigalpa for this monograph noted, for example, that in the months follow-
15

ing the broadcast of the television drama “Cartel de los 

Zapos” (a dramatization of the exploits of Colombian 

drug kingpin Pablo Escobar), the use of motorcycles 

to commit assassinations in the streets of Tegucigalpa 

(a tactic highlighted by the show) experienced a significant surge in Honduras, prompting the National 

Assembly to pass a law prohibiting the carrying of 

passengers on motorcycles.42

Honduras’ New Initiatives to Combat Organized 

Crime and Insecurity.

With the election of Porfirio Lobo in November 

2009, and in recognition of the dramatic expansion 

in narcotrafficking activity that occurred in the country during its period of isolation by the international 

community following the ouster of President Manuel 

Zelaya, the United States began to re-engage with 

Honduras in the security domain in important, albeit 

limited ways.

On the Honduran side, President Lobo took important actions during his presidency to re-engage with 

the United States and combat organized crime and delinquency. An oversight body for investigating police 

corruption was created and the military was given the 

authorization to support the national police. A new 

Honduran national security council was established, 

as well as a constitutional reform permitting extradition to the United States. Lastly, a major counter-organized crime initiative, “Operation LIGHTNING”43

was launched. One key to Lobo’s success with such 

new initiatives under difficult circumstances was his 

strong relationship with then head of the National 

Congress (subsequently elected President) Juan Orlando Hernandez, who helped to craft many of the 

initiatives and secured their passage in the Congress.
16

While not widely appreciated outside of Honduras, 

the scope of changes in laws related to public security 

in Honduras under President Lobo, and subsequently 

President Hernandez, is impressive. Former Interior 

Minister and head of the non-governmental Centro de 

Documentation de Honduras (Documentation Center of 

Honduras [CEDOH]) catalogs 34 separate laws which 

have been passed since 2010 regarding security and 

defense matters.44

Since assuming office, President Juan Orlando 

Hernandez has relied heavily (albeit not exclusively) 

on the Honduran military, reflecting his conviction, 

shared by many in the country, that in the near term, 

the national police and other instruments of government have been too thoroughly penetrated by criminal elements to be effective.45

According to senior Hondurans knowledgeable of 

the President who were interviewed for this monograph, Hernandez’s disposition to use the military as 

his primary tool for combating organized crime has 

roots in his past experiences. Hernandez attended a 

conservative military academy in San Pedro Sula in 

his youth and reportedly has a particularly close personal relationship to Amilcar Hernandez, one of his 

16 brothers, who was a well-respected officer in the 

Honduran military before his career was cut short by 

an accident during a military parachute jump.

To date, the cornerstone of President Hernandez’s 

approach to combating organized crime in Honduras 

has been the creation of an operational-level interagency task force to execute operations against transnational organized crime and insecurity in the country. The task force, Fuerza de Seguridad Interinstitucional 

Nacional (National Interagency Task Force [FUSINA]) 

was planned and officially established upon the President’s January 2014 inauguration.
17

Although the organization was compared by persons interviewed for this monograph to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in actuality, 

FUSINA is narrower and more operational in its orientation than DHS. Nonetheless, its significance as a 

creative and ambitious structure, wrestling with the 

inter-institutional challenges of the fight against organized crime and delinquency in Honduras is no less 

ambitious, and no less filled with challenges.

Although officially, FUSINA was created by President Hernandez, the organization also reflects intellectual inputs from the nation’s key military leaders, 

including commander-in-chief of the Honduran 

armed forces General Freddy Santiago Díaz Zelaya, as 

well as Colonel Gustavo Adolfo Paz Escalante, who 

became FUSINA’s first director.

National Interagency Task Force (FUSINA).

FUSINA operates under the authority of the Honduran National Security Council, created by Hernandez’s predecessor, Pepe Lobo. It includes the 

President, the President of the National Congress, the 

President of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Presidency, the Minister of 

Defense, the Minister of Public Security, and the head 

of the Honduran Joint Chiefs of Staff. While, for use in 

this role, the National Security Council and its members are specified in the Honduran constitution, not 

all Presidents have made use of the council as actively 

as President Hernandez has.

Although FUSINA is not specified in the framework of the Honduran constitution, the government 

characterizes FUSINA as the “operational arm” of the 

National Security Council, particularly in matters of 
18

combating organized crime and insecurity. The members of the National Security Council provide oversight of FUSINA, particularly the Minister of Defense 

and Minister of National Security, and are reportedly 

consulted when FUSINA executes operations against 

high-impact personalities, such as major narcotraffickers or political figures. Nonetheless, the day-to-day 

activities of FUSINA are managed by the colonel-level 

military officer, currently Gustavo Paz, who heads the 

organization.46

The guide for the activities of FUSINA is the President’s “Interagency National Security Plan,” adopted 

upon his assumption of office. The plan addresses 

both FUSINA and its primary mission, “Operation 

MORAZÁN.”47 By contrast to previously conducted 

interagency operations of more limited scope, such 

as Operation LIBERTAD,48 Operation MORAZÁN 

contemplates operations by FUSINA against criminal 

organizations and insecurity in the entirety of the national territory.

Operation MORAZÁN includes four phases: 

1. Configuration and Dissuasion, realized during President Hernandez’s first two months 

in office, during which time key structures to 

implement the new plan, including the Military 

Police of Public Order (PMOP), were set up;

2. Taking the Initiative, officially spanning from 

January through May 2014, during which time 

the major operations contemplated under the 

plan were launched; 

3. Domination, from May 2014 through January 

2016, during which time the newly established 

security structures are envisioned to substantially re-establish order in the country; and, 

4. Stabilization and Transition, from January 

2016 through January 2018, during which time 
19

the new security organizations are anticipated 

to “consolidate their successes” and importantly, return control to civil authorities.49

From the name “Operation MORAZÁN,” to the 

use of terms such as “domination,” the plan reflects 

its military roots. While such language (to be “dominated”) presumably refers to organized crime rather 

than civil society, the choice of words highlights the 

differences in attitudes between the Honduran armed 

forces and other parts of civil society.

With respect to the establishment of FUSINA as 

the key organization for implementing Operation 

MORAZÁN, the organization has been assigned part, 

but not all, of the assets of the armed forces and national police, as well as judicial investigators and judges. 

Other elements of the armed forces and resources of 

the Honduran government are reportedly available to 

be assigned to FUSINA on short notice, when needed.

Although as noted previously, the head of FUSINA is a military officer, its second in command is 

an officer of the National Police. In addition, reflecting FUSINA’s intra-institutional character, the other 

agencies contributing resources are included on its 

managing executive board, facilitating access to those 

organizations for operational issues.

The entirety of the newly created PMOP (discussed later in greater detail) is assigned to FUSINA, 

as well as the elite paramilitary police force, the Tigres. 

With respect to Honduran Army, Navy, and Air Force 

units, as of July 2015, FUSINA had 6,300 members of 

the armed forces under its jurisdiction, including over 

3,000 members of PMOP, and approximately half of 

Honduras’ naval assets.50
20

Other Honduran government organizations that 

could potentially play a role in the fight against gangs 

and criminal organizations, available to be tasked by 

FUSINA, include the nation’s principal counter-drug 

agency, the Dirección de la Lucha Contra Narcotráfico (Directorate for Combating Drug Trafficking [DLCN]).51

Organizationally, below the level of senior leadership, FUSINA is divided into 18 intra-institutional 

task forces, generally organized by the Departments 

of Honduras (for budgetary, as well as operational 

reasons). Special additional task forces, such as MayaChorti, whose mission is to control illicit flows (including people and contraband as well as drugs) along the 

border with Guatemala, are also included as distinct 

entities within the FUSINA command structure.

Replicating the organization at the national level, 

each task force is co-led by a military officer and an 

officer of the National Police, and generally includes 

some military and police personnel, at least one investigator from the “public ministry,”52 as well as access 

to judges with national jurisdiction for making rapid 

decisions on special cases, such as the disposition, and 

potentially extradition, of high-profile cartel heads.

Military Police for Public Order (PMOP). 

The PMOP is the best known and most controversial component of President Hernandez’s security 

plan, and arguably the most misunderstood.

The PMOP organizationally falls under the joint 

chiefs of staff of the Honduran armed forces, although 

as noted previously, it is operationally assigned in its 

entirety to FUSINA. The enabling law for the PMOP 

was designed and passed through the Honduran Congress in August 2013 by Hernandez himself, who was 

then President of the body.53
21

The principal objective of the PMOP is to serve as 

a professional force free of the corruption undercutting the effectiveness and the public acceptance of the 

National Police; and that can legally and practically 

conduct a subset of difficult law enforcement operations, such as imposing order in urban neighborhoods 

dominated by the maras (gangs) and conducting actions against narcotrafficking organizations.

In addition to such core missions, PMOP has also 

been deployed in other roles, including providing security for important public events and escorting highprofile criminals to prison or to the airport for extradition.54

As of July 2015, the PMOP had six battalions, each 

with 524 persons, and similar complements of vehicles and equipment, as well as a canine battalion, oriented toward counter-drug operations. The first two 

battalions were created in September 2013 and were 

deployed in Tegucigalpa and its sister city Comayagüela. The third and fourth battalions were created 

in February 2014, and the fifth, sixth, and the canine 

battalion in August 2014.

The PMOP is anticipated to grow to 10 battalions, 

plus the canine battalion, with a total complement 

of 5,976 members. While the Hernandez administration has talked about an eventual “return to civilian 

control” in Honduras after the problem of gangs and 

insecurity is brought under control, and while such is 

clearly contemplated in the fourth phase of Operation 

MORAZÁN, Honduran experts interviewed for this 

monograph indicated that the PMOP would likely 

continue in existence. 
22

Although President Hernandez sought a constitutional amendment that would have separated the 

PMOP from the Honduran armed forces as a separate 

force under the executive branch, the defeat of this 

initiative in the Honduran Congress in January 201555

left the organization as formally part of the military. 

Undeterred, the President has announced his intention to revisit the issue of enshrining the PMOP within 

the Honduran constitution as an independent entity 

through a popular referendum to be held in conjunction with the 2017 national elections. 56

In establishing its doctrine, the PMOP has received 

substantial assistance from the Honduran armed forces, including help in formulating its doctrine from the 

doctrine organization of the Honduran Joint Chiefs of 

Staff; although in doctrine and other matters, PMOP 

has also drawn insights from the Honduran National 

Police, the military police of the United States, and 

other foreign partners such as Mexico, Colombia, and 

Guatemala. According to PMOP authorities consulted 

for this monograph, the organization continues to refine its doctrine and they hope to have it consolidated 

by 2016.

At the level of enlisted personnel, the PMOP is 

populated by the selection of candidates from volunteers from the Honduran armed forces. By contrast, 

the officers of the PMOP are assigned to the unit by 

the leadership. Thus, all PMOP personnel, both officers and civilians are, or become, active duty military 

personnel. 

Within the enlisted ranks, those interested in joining the PMOP must have at least one year of service 

in the armed forces and must receive the approval of 

their commanding officer to apply. According to representatives of the Honduran military interviewed for 
23

this monograph, applicants from all ranks and experience levels are accepted, but aside from officers and 

non-commissioned officers (NCOs), younger recruits 

are preferred because of their presumed physical 

adeptness, as well as to avoid, where possible, disciplinary challenges arising from a large number of 

older recruits supervised by younger officers. 

Non-military applicants are accepted into the 

PMOP only in a limited number of fields, including those with experience in law, medicine, and 

psychology.

As the ranks of the PMOP units are filled, the 

armed forces conduct a parallel campaign to backfill 

those units from which the PMOP recruits are taken. 

According to Honduran officers consulted for this 

monograph, this process has caused some loss of experience and personnel shortages in operational units, 

although the adverse impacts are expected to level off 

once the current surge to create all 10 PMOP battalions has passed.

Once accepted, those entering the PMOP receive 

initial training in basic competencies of the institution. Officers and NCOs attend the two-month long 

“Military Police Operations Course,” while those of 

lower ranks attend the four month “Basic Course.” 

Both courses are taught in the armored cavalry post 

RECALBLIN (Regimento de Caballería Blindado) in the 

Department of Choluteca.

As of the end of 2015, both courses were taught 

by officials from the military police itself, by definition, former military officers with two years or less 

in the organization (based on the date of the PMOP’s 

creation).

Upon graduating the operations course or basic 

course, candidates are officially accepted as members 
24

of the PMOP. From this point, candidates may receive 

additional training in police specialties, such as forensic graphology, customs, crime scene investigations, 

the chain of custody, combat medicine, and human 

rights. For these specialty courses, outside experts are 

brought in, including personnel from the public ministry, which supports the PMOP through programs in 

their “Training School for the Public Ministry.”

In order to avoid the risk that those joining the 

PMOP are, or later become, corrupt (as has occurred 

widely within the Honduran national police), the 

PMOP has a program of monitoring and confidence 

tests, including psychological testing and other 

screening upon entry, as well as polygraphs approximately every six months for those members serving 

in the organization. In addition, by contrast to regular 

police officers, the military structure of PMOP places 

its members under more constant supervision and 

deploys its members in a fashion that, in principle, 

gives them fewer opportunities for close contact with 

the people in the zones in which they operate. As a 

result, those interviewed for this monograph argue 

that members of the PMOP are less vulnerable to 

being corrupted. 

On the other hand, others argue that the limitations 

that the PMOP have in their contact with the population also gives them fewer opportunities to gather intelligence from, and build positive relationships with, 

that population.

Tigres. 

The elite national police unit called the Tigres (Tigers), like the PMOP, was spearheaded as a legislative initiative of Juan Orlando Hernandez before he 

became president.57
25

The Tigres were designed to be an elite, highly capable unit within the police force for taking on difficult 

missions like those against transnational organized 

crime groups. From the beginning, the unit was closely coordinated with, and substantially funded by the 

United States, which provided equipment, confidence 

testing, and training paid for by the U.S. Department 

of State, including courses conducted by Colombian 

Special Forces units.

At the time of the research for this monograph, the 

Tigres had an estimated 250 persons, less than a tenth 

the number of personnel in the PMOP. 

An important contributor to Hernandez, then head 

of the Congress, in establishing the Tigres was not only 

the pervasive corruption within the regular Honduran police, but also nine prior initiatives by the United 

States to establish special units within that force in 

areas such as anti-gang activities, anti-kidnapping, 

and counter-narcotics; this emphasized to him and 

others in the government that in providing assistance 

in the fight against organized crime and insecurity, 

the United States preferred to work through civilian 

organizations.

While organizationally the Tigres are part of 

the Honduran National Police, within the 

Ministry of Public Security, they are under the 

operational command of FUSINA, along with the 

PMOP.

Despite the substantial capabilities of the unit, the 

Honduran government sought to minimize the public 

profile of the force following an unfortunate incident 

involving the improper diversion of $1.3 million in 

cash seized58 in October 2014, during the unit’s first 

major operation; the arrest of Miguel Arnulfo and 

Luis Alonso Valle Valle, leaders of the Honduran narcotics smuggling organization Los Valles.

59

 Although 
26

the theft was quickly discovered, the incident cast a 

shadow over the unit at a key moment when the question of the need for a “military police,” rather than 

new or reformed units within the Honduran National 

police, was a key theme of debate.

As a complement to the creation of new structures 

such as the PMOP and the Tigres, the Hernandez administration has also engaged in a purge of corrupt 

elements of the National Police.60 As set forth in Operation MORAZÁN, the official plan of the Honduran 

government is to return law enforcement operations 

to civilian organizations such as the National Police 

once both public order has been restored and corruption within police institutions has been brought under 

control.

Other Organizations within the Public Ministry.

Although FUSINA and the PMOP, and to a lesser 

extent the Tigres, have received the lion’s share of media attention in the Hernandez administration’s struggle against organized crime, other organizations have 

also played an important role. These include Agencia 

Técnico de Investigación Criminal (ATIC), Fiscal Especial 

Contra el Crimen Organizado (FESCO), and the Dirección de la Lucha Contra Narcotrafico (DLCN).

According to Hondurans consulted for this monograph, the creation of ATIC was driven by Honduran 

Attorney General Oscar Fernandez Chinchilla to provide greater investigative capabilities within the public ministry. ATIC has received a significant share of 

resources, particularly in the 2015 fiscal year, generating some resentment from other organizations, such 

as DNIC, whose own budget has not expanded to a 

similar degree. As of July 2015, ATIC had approxi-
27

mately 120 investigators, with an additional 50 reportedly being added.

The DLCN, as noted previously, is the principal investigative organization in the fight against criminal 

organizations. It was created in 1995 as an independent organization under the Honduran Public Ministry. As of July 2015, the DLCN had a modest force 

of 53, although it was programmed to nearly double 

in size, with 43 new investigators. The body works 

closely with FUSINA in the fight against criminal organizations. Indeed, its support from the armed forces 

is explicitly specified in Article 48 of the law enabling 

the organization.

Prior to December 2015, the DLCN was headed by 

Isaac Santos, a retired military officer. Owing to differences with the head of the Public Ministry, Oscar 

Fernando Chinchilla, Santos was dismissed and replaced by Soraya Cálix, a career criminal investigator 

who previously headed the Public Ministry Office of 

the Special Prosecutor Against Organized Crime.61

In addition to its funding by the Honduran government, the DLCN also receives training and other support from the Russian Federal Drug Control Service 

(FSKN),62 among other international organizations. 

Senior DLCN personnel, such as its deputy head Zoilo 

Salustio Hernandez, reportedly travel frequently to 

Russia for training programs.

FUSINA Operations.

As of July 2015, within the framework of Operation 

MORAZÁN, the most significant operational activities of FUSINA included the interdiction of narcotrafficking flows, operations against narcotraffickers and 

other high-profile criminals, and the establishment of 
28

security in areas dominated by maras, and other police 

organizations.63

To this end, two types of FUSINA operations 

stood out.

First, FUSINA deployed significant numbers of the 

newly created PMOP to major urban areas, such as Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela, and San Pedro Sula. These 

forces patrolled public spaces, and allowed authorities to re-establish a presence in neighborhoods such 

as Flor del Campo (Tegucigalpa), which had previously become so heavily dominated by gangs that the 

national police did not dare to enter.

Second, FUSINA employed its forces to deny the 

use of national territory as a transit zone or base of 

operations for narcotraffickers. The efforts of FUSINA 

in this respect is conceptualized in terms of three 

“shields”: 

1. an air shield, which refers to control over Honduran airspace against narcotics flights, particularly in the remote and sparsely populated 

eastern part of the country, which became a 

major problem during Honduras’ period of international isolation in 2009;

2. a maritime shield, to protect the Honduran 

coast and inland waterways against the importation of drugs and their associated transfer to 

overland traffic via vehicles and persons, generally toward Guatemala; and, 

3. a land shield, associated with the control of 

the Honduran-Guatemala border via the interagency Maya-Chorti Task Force, as well as the 

deployment of military forces throughout the 

country to control routes used to move drugs 

overland from clandestine airstrips and coastal and river disembarkation points across the 

country, generally toward that border.
29

The air shield was enabled by the passage of a law 

in January 2014, authorizing the Honduran military to 

shoot down aircraft making unauthorized incursions 

into its national airspace.64 Its application in Honduran airspace is supported by the acquisition of three 

radars from Israel, delivered in late 2013.65 Nonetheless, the risk that the program could lead to the downing of an innocent aircraft by the Honduran military 

reportedly raised concerns within the United States, 

which, in response, restricted military support activities that could contribute to such a shoot-down.66

Although Honduran officials interviewed for this 

monograph maintained that the air shield is functioning well even without U.S. support, to date, the 

Honduran military has not forced down a single 

aircraft. Nonetheless, since the implementation of 

the air shield, drug flights to Honduras have fallen 

dramatically.67

As a complement to blocking air traffic, the Honduran government also engages in a continual process 

of identifying and destroying clandestine airstrips 

in the country.68 However, one official consulted for 

this monograph characterized such operations as a 

relatively unproductive game, with the government 

disabling airstrips and the narcotraffickers rebuilding 

them. Yet, others consulted for this study countered, 

arguing that despite the ease of building airstrips in 

the generally flat terrain in the east of the country in 

La Mosquitia, the drug trafficker’s response provides 

insights into who the narcotraffickers are and who 

is helping them, since doing so generates observable 

and traceable activity, particularly since construction 

equipment is not common in the remote areas where 

such airstrips are built.69
30

With respect to the maritime shield, the Honduran 

government has generally focused on deploying naval 

assets along the Atlantic coast, where the Honduran 

Navy has boosted its presence from one modest shore 

facility to seven, in addition to augmenting control 

points on inland rivers.

At least two Honduran naval craft have been deployed in the Gulf of Fonseca to perform counter-drug 

missions.

To date, the maritime domain has been the area in 

which the United States has most effectively been able 

to help Honduras with material, training, and intelligence support, as well as with its own complementary 

maritime operations.70

In addition to support from the United States, the 

Honduran Navy has generally been effective in working with Nicaragua to coordinate intercept operations 

along the coast shared by the two countries. According to persons interviewed for this monograph, such 

cooperation reportedly includes relatively fluid exchanges of intelligence and is bolstered by good political relations between the two countries and their 

presidents.71

In the Gulf of Fonseca, on Honduras’ Pacific coast, 

coordination of naval intercept operations is complicated by the unresolved dispute over the maritime 

boundary in the area between Honduras, Nicaragua, 

and El Salvador,72 although the coordination between 

the three navies has reportedly improved. 

In general terms, Honduras’ maritime shield has 

been limited by a relatively small navy of aging vessels supporting a relatively high operational tempo. 

Honduras currently has three large craft and 25 smaller vessels. Nonetheless, the country has acquisition 

projects that would increase its capabilities. 
31

As an example, the capability of the Honduran 

Navy to perform coastal intercepts has been bolstered 

by new militarized “go-fast” boats, seized from narcotraffickers. With assistance from the United States, 

these craft have been adapted with new 300 horsepower 4-cylinder engines, hull modifications, and gun 

mounts. According to senior Hondurans consulted for 

this monograph, these new craft have been particularly useful for patrolling in the relatively shallow waters 

along the Atlantic shoreline, which features numerous 

inlets and islands.

Beyond these “go-fast” boats, the Honduran Navy 

is reportedly considering the acquisition of two new 

roll-on/roll-off landing craft from the Colombian vendor Cotecmar, as well as a new offshore patrol vessel.

Turning to the land shield portion of Honduras’ 

counter-drug operations, the principal focus to date 

of the Honduran government has been the control of 

the Honduras-Guatemala border. Through FUSINA, 

the Honduran government has also deployed ground 

forces to control routes for the movement of drugs in 

other parts of the country.

The primary vehicle for controlling Honduras’ 

border with Guatemala has been the interagency Maya-Chorti Task Force. One important goal for FUSINA 

in operating this task force on the border between the 

two countries has been to cut the numerous informal 

border crossings (pasos ciegos) that allow narcotics and 

other contraband to move across the border without 

state control. A study by the Conference of Central 

American Armed Forces (CFAC) estimated that there 

were 55 such informal crossings along the HondurasGuatemala border alone.

While the Maya-Chorti Task Force has significantly increased the presence of Honduran forces in the 
32

border region,73 the sheer quantity of drugs moving 

through the area, the difficult terrain, and the number 

of people with adjoining property on both sides of the 

border facilitating passage of contraband through the 

pasos ciegos continue to make controlling the border 

difficult.

Beyond the presence of the Maya-Chorti Task 

Force on the border, the majority of FUSINA’s PMOP 

and civilian police elements are deployed in Honduras’ principal urban areas: Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela, and San Pedro Sula. Smaller numbers of ground 

forces are also deployed throughout the country to 

control overland movement of narcotics, to provide 

security, to gather intelligence, and to conduct operations against high-profile criminals once authorized 

by judicial and other appropriate authorities.

With respect to operations against specific criminal targets, the FUSINA concept of operations begins 

with intelligence to identify a potential criminal target or activity of interest. Such intelligence is obtained 

from multiple sources, including the country’s newlycreated National Investigative Intelligence Organization (Dirección Nacional de Investigación e Inteligencia 

[DNII]), formed in 2013,74 and which reportedly has 

a particular specialization in electronic intelligence. 

Such intelligence collection includes obtaining information from PMOP units, civilian national police 

units, investigative organizations such as the national 

counter-narcotrafficking organization (DNIC), as well 

as foreign sources, with important partners reportedly 

including Nicaragua,75 Colombia, Guatemala, and the 

United States.

Supported by such multi-source intelligence, in 

principle, FUSINA leverages the prosecutors under 

its operational control in conjunction with investigators from supporting organizations such as DNIC, to 
33

prepare cases to be acted upon. Where the case requires police action against a criminal target, FUSINA 

then obtains the authorization of the relevant judicial 

authority to proceed. For normal operations, a local 

judge will typically be used to approve such action; 

but for high-profile cases where there is concern that 

the local judge could be corrupted or intimidated, 

FUSINA has three special judges with national jurisdiction and presents its request to one of these individuals to authorize police action.

In addition to such judges, another organizational 

innovation of FUSINA in the fight against organized 

crime is the use of embedded investigators and prosecutors. Such investigators and prosecutors are operationally assigned to FUSINA and often travel with the 

military and police units to the scene of the operation. 

The FUSINA leadership believes that such integration 

makes the process of coordination between parts of 

the police/criminal system faster and more accurate, 

helping to eliminate delays and miscues that contributed to the near total impunity within the Honduran 

justice system. Prior to embedded investigators and 

prosecutors, for example, military or police units 

would conduct an operation and then transfer the 

case to authorities to conduct a judicial investigation. 

Under the new system, with police investigators and 

prosecutors present during the operation, they are reportedly able to do their investigation more rapidly, 

as well as with a better understanding of what actually transpired in the operation.

The new approach also generated concerns. One 

law enforcement expert consulted for this monograph 

noted that having an investigator spend days “tromping around in the woods with a military unit” was 

perhaps not the best use of time, given the limited 

number of prosecutors available.
34

The new system also raises questions about protection of citizen rights through the traditional separation between police, prosecutor, and judge, creating 

the appearance of “judicial officials being put in the 

service of the police.”

Yet such concerns notwithstanding, the new system has arguably contributed to improvements in the 

struggle against crime and insecurity in the country.

With respect to the conduct of operations at a technical level under the new system, if a law enforcement 

action such as the detention of a person is necessary, 

FUSINA may use either PMOP units, national police 

units (including recently created elite units such as the 

Tigres), or a combination of both to execute the operation. As an example, the previously mentioned October 2014 operation to detain Miguel Arnulfo and Luis 

Alonso Valle Valle employed both the Tigres and the 

PMOP, as well as other units.76

To understand the change represented by the employment of PMOP in operations against transnational organized crime entities, it is important to note that 

in the pre-FUSINA period in Honduras, as in other 

Central American countries such as El Salvador, the 

military conducted operations in tandem with national police units in order to have sufficient firepower 

and legal arrest authority. In Honduras, perhaps even 

more so than in those other countries, the level of corruption within the police puts many operations at risk 

due to the possibility that some people in the police 

chain of command are being paid by criminal organizations and tipping off the criminals prior to the conduct of an operation. The use of the PMOP, by taking 

the national police out of the chain, has likely reduced 

the risk of compromised operations. Yet in the short 

term, one troubling side effect has been to substitute 
35

the military for the police in important law enforcement operations, relegating the police to only routine 

or inconsequential activities.

Beyond improved coordination between military, 

law enforcement, and judicial organizations, FUSINA 

has also sought to increase jointness and the interagency character of Honduran government operations. 

The organization, for example, coordinates the use of 

naval assets to resupply and move personnel of other 

military branches and government organizations between posts, including naval bases and other control 

points in remote parts of the country. Such coordination has become increasingly important, not only for 

deploying investigators, prosecutors, police and military police contingents, and supporting intelligence 

operations in remote areas, but also in supporting the 

Honduran Navy in establishing and sustaining multiple new bases to control remote areas of the country’s 

coast, such as in the Department of Gracias a Dios.

To minimize the probability of the corruption of 

the soldiers, policemen, investigators, and others in 

the organization, FUSINA has adopted a policy of frequent personnel rotations; yet doing so has created a 

significant logistics burden. In addition to the adverse 

impact on personnel, the ships, aircraft, and vehicles 

used to transport the personnel are strained as well. 

Finally, the rotation policy requires FUSINA to reimburse the Honduran Navy for fuel and other resources 

that are used in support of FUSINA operations.

Lastly, in addition to the operations themselves, 

the leadership of FUSINA has recognized the importance of strategic communication and has dedicated 

attention to managing public perceptions of its successes. As an example, statistics involving the activities of the organizations under its operational control, 
36

including counter-narcotics operations, actions against 

clandestine runways, confiscation of properties, arms 

seizures, arrests of criminal leaders, and other activities, are reported through FUSINA.77 Even when an 

operation is primarily performed by one particular organization, such as the PMOP, the Tigres, ATIC, or the 

DNIC, per policy of the Honduran leadership, it is reported as performed “by FUSINA” with “the support 

of” the other Honduran organizations. While persons 

consulted for this monograph indicated that this posture has caused some minor resentment among the 

organizations leading the operation, it has also arguably bolstered the image of FUSINA and the perception that the government is conducting a coordinated 

national-level campaign against organized crime and 

insecurity.

Penitentiary Reform.

In parallel with activities of FUSINA and associated organizations such as the PMOP, the Hernandez 

administration is also attempting to reform the penitentiary system. Like other penitentiary systems in 

Central America and elsewhere in the region, that of 

Honduras is considered vastly overcrowded with an 

inmate population of more than 14,500 and growing, 

in facilities with a capacity for 8,000.78 Moreover, as in 

neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador, the facilities 

have become dominated by the criminals who inhabit 

them, using them as secure spaces from which to manage their extortion operations in coordination with 

members of their organization on the outside.79

One of the initiatives already put into place by the 

Hernandez administration is the blocking of cell phone 

service to and from the prisons to limit the number of 
37

extortion calls made from inside.80 Such control has 

been partially successful, with a significant decrease in 

such extortion calls.81 Reportedly, such controls have 

not been completely effective because it has not been 

possible to block all calls, including those by prisoners 

using contraband satellite phones (for which service is 

not interrupted by the blocking of cellphone signals)

and because prisoners are still able to communicate 

with the outside through visits from family members, 

relaying instructions to others who can deliver the extortion demands by phone or in person from outside 

the prison walls.82

To help address the challenge of prison overcrowding, the Hernandez administration proposed 

creating two new facilities: a minimum-security and 

a medium-to-maximum security prison, which together would provide capacity for 4,500 inmates. To 

date, the first of these facilities, in the town of Porvenir, with space for 2,000 inmates, has been completed. 

The second, in the north of the country near the town 

of Anaco, designed to house 2,400 inmates, is reportedly going slowly due to cost overruns and lack of 

resources.

The Honduran military has also created a small 

detention facility for high-level prisoners within the 

compound of the 1st Battalion, with space for approximately 20 persons, maintaining those held there in 

relative isolation and control, if also under relatively 

sparse conditions, reportedly without access to cellphones or computers.

At the same time that the government is adding 

these two new prisons and the small supplemental 

facility in the 1st Battalion headquarters, the government is also contemplating consolidating the 24 facilities throughout the country down to 12 and modernizing and re-establishing control over those that remain.
38

While in the short term, control of Honduran prisons remains a problem, as with Honduras’ neighbors, 

the military is attempting to play a role by controlling 

the perimeters separating the prisons from the outside communities; yet prison perimeter control is not 

a popular mission for the military and only partially 

prevents activities, such as the smuggling of weapons 

and contraband cellphones to inmates. However, it is 

regarded by the military as necessary because of the 

failure of civilian law enforcement to prevent such 

flows due to the ability of the gangs to corrupt and 

intimidate those controlling the prisons. This includes 

realistic threats to harm prison workers and their 

families due to the ties that inmates have with gangs 

outside the prison.

Cooperation with the United States. 

In its activities against organized crime and insecurity, the Hernandez administration has made an effort to work more closely with the United States, albeit 

with mixed success.

As president of the Congress, in January 2012, 

Hernandez successfully spearheaded a change to the 

provision of the Honduran constitution prohibiting 

extradition; and in May 2014, the country conducted 

its first extradition to the United States: Carlos Arnoldo Lobo.83 Although not widely publicized, Honduran experts consulted for this monograph noted that 

the country continues to extradite an average of approximately five people to the United States per week. 

The Honduran government has also worked closely with the United States on operations against the 

leadership of narcotrafficking groups, particularly the 
39

two principal family-based smuggling organizations 

in the country: the Los Valles and the Cachiros. 

In addition, the Hernandez administration has cooperated closely with the United States in the area of 

maritime narcotrafficking interdiction operations as 

part of the maritime shield concept.84

At a personal level, President Hernandez reportedly has had a particularly good relationship with the 

U.S. Southern Command and General John F. Kelly, 

the U.S. Marine Corps general who commanded it 

through the end of 2015.85

Cooperation with Other Countries. 

While Honduras continues to work closely with 

the United States in its fight against gangs, drugs, and 

other elements of organized crime and insecurity, it 

also collaborates with and receives support in this 

struggle from a variety of other countries, including 

Taiwan, Russia, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, among 

others.

With respect to Russia, as noted previously, Honduras’ principal counter-narcotics organization, the 

DLCN, and potentially other organizations, reportedly receive training and intelligence support from their 

Russian counterpart, the FSKN.

Nicaragua is reportedly one of the closest collaborators in the region with Honduras with respect to 

counter-narcotics intelligence, as well as police and 

military operations. There is reportedly a fluid cooperation between the two countries in patrolling their 

combined shoreline, and the presidents of both countries reportedly enjoy a close personal relationship.
40

Guatemala is the first country in the region to 

establish joint multinational patrols with Honduras 

along their shared border, in the form of the MayaChorti Task Force.86 Currently, the two countries reportedly collaborate closely with respect to managing 

the shared border and on other issues.

Impacts of Honduran Government Efforts in the 

Fight Against Organized Crime and Gangs.

Although President Hernandez had only been 

in power two years at the time this monograph was 

written, his administration’s security policies have 

had a remarkable impact on delinquency and organized crime in the country. Nonetheless, some outside 

the administration have questioned the accuracy of 

government figures showing strong progress against 

murders and criminal activity.87 Whatever the truth 

regarding the statistics, it is clear that much work remains to be done.

According to official figures, homicides in Honduras during the January-July period dropped from 

3,688 in 2013, to 3,271 in 2014, to 2,757 in 2015.88

With respect to narco-flights, prior to the Hernandez regime, almost 80% of U.S.-bound drug flights 

stopped in Honduras. By 2015, thanks in part to the 

country’s air interdiction program, the number of 

such flights showing up on U.S. radars had fallen to 

almost negligible numbers.89

Narcotraffickers moving drugs are reportedly 

changing tactics. Some have switched from light 

planes to larger turboprop aircraft. Another new tactic has been an increase in short, low-altitude flights 

below the radar monitoring the area. With respect to 

the overland traffic, Honduran authorities noted an 

increase in the use of vehicles with hidden compart-
41

ments (caletas), as well as more smuggling inside of 

animals such as mules and horses. In the maritime 

domain, those moving drugs through the country 

previously sent large shipments of up to 2,000 kg of 

cocaine in “go-fast” boats. During the past year, however, there has reportedly been a trend toward the use 

of smaller, slower vessels, following more indirect 

routes. 

According to Honduran law enforcement officials, 

Honduran traffickers used to bring in narco-shipments by air to Atlantic coast towns, such as Palacios 

in the northeast of the country, and openly transfer 

their cargo into armored cars for transit to Guatemala 

via highway. In the past year, they have reportedly 

switched to more remote landing facilities in areas 

such as Ibanos and Brus, then covertly moving their 

product via canals and other means before eventually 

being able to use roads.

Another observed shift, prompted by increased 

counter-drug activities in the east of the country, is 

the expanded use of routes along the Pacific coast to 

move drugs. Areas such as Choluteca (on the Pacific 

coast of the country where Honduras converges with 

El Salvador to the north and Nicaragua to the south) 

have reported an increase in narcotrafficking activity. 

The increased use of the Pacific side of the country for 

drug smuggling is reflected in the unexplained surge 

in upscale houses, hotels, and other establishments 

in Choluteca. The expansion of routes on the Pacific 

side of the country includes the smuggling of cocaine 

across the Nicaraguan border in animals. 

In addition to the displacement of narcotrafficking 

operations to the Pacific, more drugs are reportedly 

being sent from South America through Costa Rica 

and Panama, instead of directly to Honduras.
42

Beyond the impact on patterns of trafficking and 

the tactics of narcotraffickers, the combination of 

increased interdiction activities and increased operations against cartel leaders has reportedly had an 

impact on the structure of criminal groups moving 

narcotics. Smaller groups, which were once contractors to major family clans such as the Cachiros, including: the Byron Ruiz organization, Ramon Matta (son of 

famous cartel leader Juan Ramon Matta), the Olancho 

Cartel of Moises Amador (who was eliminated in an 

operation in July 2015), the Sizo Cartel, and the Brus 

Cartel, are reportedly working in a more independent 

fashion, generating increased violence in some areas 

of the country as a result.

With respect to maras, the intervention of the military police has allowed the government to re-establish 

presence in some urban neighborhoods. The most 

celebrated case has been the re-establishing of state 

presence in the Flor de Campo, a neighborhood in the 

south of Tegucigalpa, once so dominated by the gangs 

that the national police could not maintain a presence 

there.90 The PMOP has also reportedly restored state 

presence in other once gang-ridden neighborhoods 

as well, including Ulloa, Carrizal, Campo Cielo, and 

Centavo in the south of Tegucigalpa, as well as the El 

Lato and Barrio Kennedy neighborhoods in the heart 

of the city.91

Despite progress in such neighborhoods, persons 

consulted for this monograph generally concurred 

that only limited progress had been made in reducing 

the level of extortion and other criminal activities by 

the gangs. Others noted that in some urban neighborhoods, merchants such as taxi and bus drivers who 

once had to pay extortion money to three or four different groups, now only have to pay off the principal 

two (B-18 and MS-13).
43

To some degree, in reaction to the presence of 

the PMOP and increased activities by Honduran law 

enforcement in general, the groups are reportedly 

changing their extortion tactics, making greater use 

of radios and other communication alternatives to cell 

phones to avoid government electronic surveillance. 

Some gangs are also employing children to collect 

extortion payments, as well as obligating non-gangaffiliated civilians to participate in such activities to 

prevent them from exposing gang members to law 

enforcement organizations.

Challenges for Honduras in the Fight Against 

Organized Crime.

The ability of Honduras to make significant advances against organized crime and insecurity must 

be understood in the context of uncertainty in the 

continuity of the current Hernandez administration. 

As noted in the introduction of this monograph, 

throughout 2015, and particularly in July, the Hernandez government was confronted by protesters calling 

themselves the “indignant,” decrying what they saw 

as a combination of corruption and procedural irregularities by the President and those surrounding him, 

seeking to enrich themselves and to centralize power, 

using payoffs and other forms of influence within 

the nation’s institutions to marginalize its political 

opponents.92

Yet such protests do not necessarily reflect a desire to replace the Hernandez administration with a 

return to the previous left-of-center regime of Manuel 

Zelaya, or its contemporary manifestation, the LIBRE 

movement, even if he and his followers hope to capitalize on it as such.93
44

The continuity of the Hernandez administration 

in power neither assures success in the fight against 

organized crime and insecurity, nor would its fall 

condemn the nation to devolve into a narco-state. Yet 

at least in the short term, President Hernandez’s fall 

would likely undermine the efforts of the government 

to combat organized crime and insecurity, including the loss of the lessons learned from the innovations achieved. Still, the degree of the negative impact 

would depend on the degree of political chaos generated in the country by his ouster, and the orientation 

of the government that followed.

Beyond the future of the Hernandez administration, the greatest challenge for the country in combating transnational organized crime and other sources 

of insecurity over the medium term is, arguably, corruption.

In addition to the previously mentioned accusations against President Hernandez, the exposure of 

narco-politicians, such as Jose “Chepe” Handal, provides a glimpse into the extent of the problem; as does 

the assassination of politician Juan Gomez in January 

2015, which reportedly so frightened the leaders of 

the Cachiros that they fled to the Bahamas the next day 

to turn themselves in to U.S. authorities, rather than 

face the Honduran justice system.94 Similarly, the U.S. 

extradition request against former Honduran VicePresident and head of the Continental Group, Jaime 

Rosenthal,95 illustrates how deeply corruption and 

criminality has infected all parts of Honduran politics 

and the economy.

On the other hand, corruption at the highest levels of the Honduran political system is not necessarily centralized in one interested group. Corruption at 

these levels permits innovative or courageous politi-
45

cians to combat organized crime in select areas, while, 

by design or otherwise, leaving other interests untouched.

Below the level of political elites, such corruption within the police force also creates particularly 

difficult obstacles in combating organized crime and 

insecurity. The police must interact with the population on an ongoing basis, while its adversaries have 

enormous resources to bribe officials and put them 

and their families at risk. Such corruption directly 

impedes the ability of law enforcement and other 

government organizations to combat criminals and 

undermines their confidence in working together and 

sharing information, thus destroying the effectiveness 

of the organization from the inside.

Police Reform. 

The elimination of corrupt elements from the national police and its reform as an institution, have 

gone very slowly. Although a significant number of 

polygraphs and other confidence testing has been 

performed, few of the policemen who have failed the 

confidence tests, and even fewer senior level police 

officials, have been removed.

The effectiveness of police reform has been limited 

by three factors:

1. it began from the bottom up, not the top down, 

leaving in place the senior leadership, which is 

arguably a major part of the problem; 

2. the process lacks the transparency to generate confidence among a public already deeply 

skeptical about both political and police corruption; and,

3. the replacement of corrupt police is impeded 

by legal and administrative obstacles.
46

Within the current system, the internal investigative arm of the national police, DICEP (Direccion de 

Investigacion y Evaluacion de la Carrera Policial), can recommend dismissing police officers, but does not actually have the authority to fire them.

Further complicating dismissing police officers 

suspected of involvement in corruption is a culture in 

which Honduran judges regard polygraph tests as an 

insufficient basis for firing officers.

In part, Honduran experts interviewed for this 

analysis suggest that one problem slowing the purging of corrupt officials from the Honduran police is the 

Organic Law, which defines the police organization, 

and which makes it very difficult to fire officers without a lengthy set of procedures and extensive proof 

of wrongdoing. Although changes were made to this 

law in 2012, those consulted for this monograph did 

not regard the modifications as sufficient to make a 

difference.

Even if the Organic Law could be sufficiently modified or replaced, those consulted for this monograph 

suggested that the extent of corruption uncovered 

within the police has exceeded what those initiating 

the reforms initially expected,96 making it difficult to 

fire all of the contaminated police without destroying 

the national police as an institution, creating an even 

greater problem of public order.

Potential Future PMOP Corruption. 

By contrast to the national police, corruption in the 

PMOP and other newly created security organizations 

has been limited. Nonetheless, the scandal of the $1.3 

million in cash stolen by members of the well-trained 

and carefully vetted police unit the Tigres illustrates 
47

that confidence tests do not establish absolute guarantees of future behavior and highlight that publicly exposed incidents of corruption may damage the organization in ways that go far beyond the incident itself. 

In the case of the PMOP, although the organization 

generally adopts a relatively distant posture from the 

community that it protects, and is subject to frequent 

rotations of personnel, its members are not invulnerable to corruption. PMOP units, for instance, coincidentally patrol in the same areas as regular police, 

setting the stage for the development of relationships 

between the two, and the transfer of certain improper 

behaviors or attitudes by the national police to their 

PMOP counterparts.

In less than two years of the existence of PMOP, 

according to officials from the organization, approximately 10% of the force have been dismissed for reasons related to failing confidence tests.97 While such 

figures suggest that the system is effective in identifying and eliminating personnel at risk of being corrupted, it also illustrates that such risks exist despite 

the disciplined military culture from which PMOP 

members are drawn.

Institutional Rivalries. 

To a degree, the PMOP has generated discomfort 

both in the national police, which views the organization as a rival police force, as well as within the 

military, which supports it, but reportedly has reservations about how its planned separation from the 

armed forces (pursuant to a successful national referendum in 2017 to change the constitution) would 

affect the military as an institution.
48

More broadly, there are also other institutional rivalries, including competition for resources for investigation between the newly-created police investigative organization ATIC (the brainchild of Honduran 

Attorney General Oscar Fernandez Chinchilla), and 

the national counter-drug organization, DNIC. Indeed, such rivalries may have played a role in the dismissal of the head of DNIC, Isaac Santos, in December 

2015.98

Intelligence. 

Despite an innovative structure and the considerable progress that FUSINA has achieved within two 

years of its formation, the organization reportedly 

lacks effective intelligence capabilities at multiple levels, and lacks the ability to integrate intelligence from 

the organizations that support it to produce complete, 

timely, actionable knowledge.

FUSINA’s military police organization, the PMOP, 

even with the greatest presence on the ground, is not 

only new to police-style intelligence gathering and 

investigation, but maintains a relative distance from 

the local community to avoid corruption, which also 

impedes the collection of information from them. Although FUSINA interagency task forces at the departmental level generally contain regular police units, 

and although these police units are experienced in collecting intelligence from the local community, these 

police are often viewed by their military counterparts 

as unreliable, and their intelligence thus suspect. In 

addition, persons interviewed for this monograph 

spoke of concerns within the military that police units, 

bitter over the formation of the PMOP as an affront 

to their own competence, may not completely share 
49

intelligence with the organization, potentially prejudicing FUSINA performance. 

Beyond the PMOP, FUSINA is also hampered in 

its intelligence capabilities by its dependence on multiple outside sources for its intelligence, including: 

data obtained via national technical means from the 

recently formed DNII, which is still in its infancy (created in 2013); as well as intelligence from the PMOP, 

police units, and investigative organizations such as 

the DNIC. In addition to being new, the fact that these 

organizations report to different ministries, plus have 

concerns about corruption in the other entities with 

which they are working, augments their tendency to 

protect their own intelligence and sources, creating 

“stovepipes.”

Criminal Investigation Capability. 

Parallel to the problem with intelligence, Honduras currently has numerous organizations that 

perform law enforcement investigation and intelligence, including, but not limited to, the previously 

mentioned organizations PMOP, ATIC, DNIC, and 

DNII. The result is that each has access to only a piece 

of relevant knowledge on the criminal activities that 

they are pursuing. Consequently, they lack the ability to pool resources to meet specific needs, they may 

engage in redundant efforts, and there is an uneven 

level of quality.

FUSINA Interagency Coordination.

Although FUSINA is an innovative design reflecting the incorporation of much thought and operational experience of its creators, the institutional compromises required to bring it to fruition may well generate 
50

problems that hamper it as an organization. To accommodate both police and military organizational 

equities, for example, each FUSINA departmental 

interagency task force has a dual command structure, 

represented by both a military and a police official. 

While the arrangement avoids placing police officers 

under the direct operational control of a military officer, or vice-versa, it complicates accountability, and 

creates ambiguity regarding the chain of command. 

In practice such issues are generally worked out 

without difficulty on an interpersonal basis between 

the military and police commanders in charge, with 

the military head of the task force taking orders directly from the military officer who heads FUSINA, while 

the police commander of the task force receives his orders from the deputy commander of FUSINA, who is 

a member of the police. This arrangement reportedly 

works so long as there is no significant disagreement 

about the operation between either the police or military leader at the task force level, or between the head 

of FUSINA and his police deputy commander. 

While police officers are not generally put directly 

under military officers, it has occurred at least once at 

the departmental level: in Olancho, where three Tigres 

(national police) units were put under control of the 

local military officer due to the complete removal of 

the police in the zone because of corruption charges. 

Although the arrangement was made to function, 

knowledgeable persons interviewed for this monograph acknowledged that it generated some tension.

FUSINA Administrative Challenges. 

As with any new organization, a number of operational difficulties have emerged within the FUSINA 

structure that have caused tension and are still being 

worked out. For example, regular (non-PMOP) mili-
51

tary officers within the FUSINA structure do not receive additional pay or compensation for incidental 

expenses while deployed to locations far from their 

permanent home and family. According to persons 

consulted for this monograph, the workload of local 

FUSINA commanders can be onerous by comparison 

to that of regular military officers because they are 

double-hatted; having responsibilities for the military 

unit that they are head of as well as for the interagency 

coordination of the FUSINA task force that they command, each of which can be a full-time responsibility.

Finally, the frequent rotation of personnel assigned 

to FUSINA, in an attempt to avoid the corruption of 

units from their prolonged exposure to the persons of 

one area has also reportedly put a significant burden 

on the organization—particularly command staffs at 

the interagency task force (departmental) level.

Honduras-Guatemala Border Control.

Currently, the vast majority of drugs entering Honduras through the Atlantic coast cross the HondurasGuatemala border on their journey to the north. The 

border has traditionally been difficult to control due 

to the large number of puntos ciegos (informal border 

crossings), combined with persons owning adjoining 

properties on both sides of the border, facilitating passage from one side to the other. Control of the border 

is also compounded by the corruption of police and 

the historic absence of state presence.

The Honduran government has significantly expanded its activities in the area through the MayaChorti Task Force. It has sought to close many of the 

informal crossings, and has arguably employed the 

PMOP to lessen the effects of corruption. Yet, the 
52

border continues to be challenged by the sheer volume of drugs moving through the area, and the constantly changing and innovative tactics used by narcotraffickers to cross.

A new free trade accord signed between Honduras 

and Guatemala in February 2015,99 and in effect on December 15 of the same year,100 is likely to increase the 

volume of legitimate trade crossing the border, creating more opportunities for narcotraffickers to conceal 

the flow of drugs and other illicit goods. 

Compounding the difficulties in controlling the 

border traffic created by the free trade accord, the 

opening of an improved highway in August 2015 from 

Choluteca (where Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua converge in the Gulf of Fonseca) to Puerto Cortez 

in the north101 may increase further illicit shipments 

crossing the country from south to north toward the 

border.

Money Laundering. 

Money laundering by transnational organized 

crime groups is a growing problem in Honduras. 

The Honduran economy is arguably less convenient 

for money laundering than neighboring El Salvador, 

which uses the U.S. dollar as its currency, or Panama, 

with its large infrastructure for international finance. 

Yet money laundering in Honduras, including both 

the remote east of the country as well as urban areas 

such as Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela, and San Pedro 

Sula, is reportedly increasing.102

In December 2014, acknowledging the problem, 

the Honduran government passed an important new 

anti-laundering law.103 Perhaps the extent of the problem was highlighted most dramatically in October 
53

2015 when the Honduran government shut down 

Continental Bank, the largest financial firm in the 

country,104 based on charges by the U.S. Department 

of the Treasury that the bank was involved in laundering drug money for the transportistas (carriers) organization Cachiros.

105

Human Rights. 

While the number of alleged human rights violations involving the Honduran military to date has 

been limited, the number of accusations have increased since the formation of the PMOP.106 Its creation 

and role in fighting crime has given it high public visibility. The PMOP arguably has the greatest regular 

interaction with the population, although as noted 

previously, it is more limited than that of regular 

police units.

While the PMOP leadership appears to take its role 

seriously in both exerting controls and providing human rights training to its personnel, training courses 

are not always adequate to prevent bad actions by all 

personnel. 

In addition, some consulted for this monograph 

argued that the possibility for improper treatment 

of the population is increased by the military character of the organization, fueling a disposition of some 

members to view the areas to which they are assigned 

as enemy territory filled with gang members, narcos, 

and other criminals, thus setting the stage for abuses 

to occur.

On the other side, it is to be expected that the criminal elements or others whose activities are impaired 

by the PMOP presence will be tempted to leverage the 

suspicion with which some members of Honduran 
54

society view the organization107 and file complaints or 

make statements to the media that discredit the organization to hamper its freedom of action.

Leadership by Civilian Institutions. 

While the innovative solutions adopted by the 

Hernandez administration are not necessarily undemocratic, for some they generate concern regarding 

the character of democracy in the country. A December 2014 report by the Inter-American Commission 

on Human Rights expressed concern that through the 

law authorizing PMOP, the government was assigning to the military regular citizen security tasks that 

were not necessarily appropriate to the nature of the 

military as an institution.108

It is of note that the PMOP oath does not begin 

with words regarding their protection or service to 

the citizenry of Honduras, but with the words “I am a 

military professional...”

Although arguably necessary in the short term, the 

privileging of the military, via FUSINA and PMOP, as 

the principal tool for combating organized crime and 

insecurity in the country reflects a widespread belief 

among many in the military, the current government, 

and also in the population at large that civilian institutions have proven themselves incapable of providing 

the basic goods required by Honduras.109

Within this framework, the success of PMOP, in 

conjunction with the powers conferred upon its members, such as legal detention, arguably contributes to a 

pattern in which the military prefers to work with the 

organization, rather than with the civilian police or 

even elite forces, when conducting operations against 

criminal organizations, reinforcing the tendency to 
55

exclude the national police from key citizen security 

functions. 

Another troubling aspect of the FUSINA framework is the blurred line between the positive goal of 

interagency coordination and the integration of separate parts of the government in the name of efficiency, 

but in a manner that subtly undermines checks and 

balances between branches of government. This reduced delineation caused by the FUSINA framework 

can potentially impair the due process of law for those 

accused of wrongdoing. Although prosecutors and 

judges supporting FUSINA technically retain their independence from the military units with which they 

work, their co-location under the same military commander, and their close working relationship with 

and dependence on the military units to protect and 

sustain them, is a powerful if subtle inducement for 

those prosecutors and judges to identify with the perspective of those conducting the operation. Indeed, 

officials interviewed for this monograph, for example, 

characterized one benefit of FUSINA as allowing “all 

of the branches of government” to work together 

against the enemy.

It is also not clear, in practical terms, when and how 

law enforcement functions will be returned from the 

military to the police. As noted previously, although 

Plan Morazán established a timetable for the transition 

back to civilian control, in January 2016, which was 

supposed to have been the end of the “Domination” 

phase of the plan, despite notable improvements in 

public security, persisting challenges seemed to argue against moving to the “Consolidation” phase in 

which control is theoretically to be returned to civilian institutions. For example, the reform of deeply 

corrupted police institutions, whose dysfunctionality 
56

has been widely cited as an important justification 

for the PMOP, is proceeding very slowly. Similarly, 

in a response to a public statement by U.S. Congressman Tim Kaine following his February 2015 visit to 

Honduras, President Hernandez affirmed that while 

the role of the military in Honduras would be slowly 

reduced as conditions permitted, there was no commitment to eliminate the PMOP.110

Relationship with the United States.

While the United States-Honduran relationship 

was almost universally characterized as positive by 

Honduran officials and others interviewed for this 

monograph, the sometimes divergent priorities of 

the two countries generate friction. On the United 

States side, the Obama administration has sought to 

downplay the use of military tools in its engagement 

with the country. It has not substantially assisted or 

engaged with the PMOP as the core security initiative of the Hernandez administration. Nor has it supported the Hernandez administration’s air shield initiative, possibly out of concern that an aircraft could 

be downed with innocent passengers aboard. In April 

2014, after Honduras passed its new law authorizing 

aerial interceptions, the United States suspended the 

providing of radar data that might be used to support 

such intercepts.111

In the wake of the previously mentioned protests 

and allegations against the Hernandez administration 

during 2015, the United States has sought to strike 

a balance between supporting the government and 

acknowledging the opposition. For example, in the 

official 2015 Fourth of July celebration at the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa, invitees from the Honduran 

government found the embassy compound decorat-
57

ed with unlit torches, the same type as those which 

became the national symbol for protest against the 

Hernandez administration. In July 2015, when the 

U.S. Senate approved funding for a Guatemalan-style 

foreign juridical organization to investigate serious 

crimes in the country,112 Honduran protesters took 

their march against the Hernandez administration to 

the U.S. Embassy, where they were received by U.S. 

Ambassador James Nealon before marching on the 

Honduran Presidential Palace.113

While President Hernandez is widely characterized as a conservative, pro-U.S. businessman, he is 

more likely to turn away from the United States than 

is commonly recognized, if he is backed into a corner. 

President Hernandez comes from a difficult family 

background and has succeeded through his own determination, skill, and through the help of key family 

members, such as his brother Marco Agosto Hernandez, in rising first to the leadership of the Honduran 

Congress, and later to the Presidency, in a cutthroat 

political system. Honduran analysts consulted for this 

monograph argue that while President Hernandez 

recognizes the importance of the United States as an 

enabler of the prosperity of the nation (and to an extent, the success of his own security plan), he arguably 

does not identify with the more traditional Honduran 

elites, whom he sees as having bowed to the interests 

of the United States.

By contrast, President Hernandez reportedly enjoys a close personal relationship with Ecuadoran 

President Rafael Correa (who himself harbors deep 

personal animosity toward the United States), and 

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega. Moreover, President Hernandez’s political mentor and predecessor 

in the Presidential Palace, Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo Sosa, 

did his undergraduate studies in the revolutionary, 
58

anti-U.S. Patrice Lumumba University in the former 

Soviet Union. 

Such relationships and background do not make 

President Hernandez anti-U.S., but serve as a caution 

that, if pushed into a difficult political position by the 

United States, he could turn to a more anti-U.S. populist path.

Replacing the Criminal Economy.

A growing concern is how the government’s operations against transnational organized crime impacts the people employed by them. The three sources 

of employment most frequently mentioned in this 

regard were: 

1. the payment of local persons (principally living 

in impoverished areas in the east of the country) for unloading shipments of narcotics from 

boats and aircraft, and in some cases, helping to 

transport it overland; 

2. persons working in the estates of narcotraffickers or surrounding communities who were left 

without work and living spaces when those 

residences were seized; and, 

3. legitimate businesses associated with the activities of persons and groups involved in criminality. The previously noted October 2015 government move against Banco Continental and its 

umbrella organization, Grupo Continental (the 

largest business organization in the country) 

highlights the potential of the anti-crime campaign to produce unemployment and hardship 

in the short term.114
59

Freezing or destruction of commercial activities in 

the course of going after criminal groups could have 

an unintended consequence: those losing work could 

turn to criminal activities themselves. While there has 

been talk of compensating those put out of work by 

the seizure of criminal businesses, such assistance 

has traditionally not been included as part of the government plan against transnational organized crime. 

Moreover, Honduran government organizations associated with economic and labor matters, which could 

help address the adverse side effects of the government’s campaign against criminality, are not included 

within the national security cabinet, nor in the group 

of interagency players under the operational control 

of FUSINA. 

Urban Culture of Gangs, Violence, and Poverty.

The major urban areas of Honduras, particularly 

Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela, San Pedro Sula, and to 

some degree La Ceiba, have been impacted for more 

than a decade by not only poverty and inequality, but 

also by the culture of violent crime and gangs. Such 

culture has been reinforced by the sustained emigration of Hondurans seeking employment and better 

conditions in the United States and elsewhere, contributing to the absence of fathers, and in many cases 

mothers as well. While the PMOP is making progress 

in restoring government presence and a sense of security in some urban neighborhoods such as Flor de 

Campo (as noted previously), it must contend with the 

corrosive effects of a society with greatly weakened 

family structures and few economic opportunities, in 

which violence and crime has become the norm.
60

Most people interviewed for this monograph did 

not perceive social and economic development programs to be a significant portion of the interagency 

security plan of the Hernandez government; yet such 

programs need to be instituted at some point if the 

peace achieved through the PMOP in select areas of 

the country is to be sustainable.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. 

POLICYMAKERS 

Adequate Level of U.S. Financial Support 

for Honduras.

During the 6 years prior to the crisis spawned in 

Washington D.C. in 2014 by Central American child 

migrants, the United States spent a total of $600 million on Central America as a whole; yet the Obama administration was forced to commit $3.7 billion within 

a matter of weeks to deal with the refugee crisis. That 

crisis arguably contributed to the administration’s request of $1 billion in funding for the countries of the 

northern triangle in 2016, of which approximately 

$750 million was approved by the U.S. Congress in 

December 2015.115 In the coming years, it is imperative 

that the level of assistance to the region correspond 

to its strategic importance and the potential adverse 

impact on the United States if the economic and governance structures in the region were to degenerate.

Since U.S. support for Honduras should not focus 

exclusively or excessively on security matters, a security assistance component that corresponds to the 

relative needs and priorities of Honduras, as a U.S. 

partner, is a necessary part of a holistic package for a 

prosperous, stable, and democratic country.
61

Prudent Engagement on Military Police and Air Interdiction. 

While the United States prefers Honduras to pursue an approach to organized crime that is less reliant 

on the military, the U.S. attempts to avoid supporting 

Honduras in important areas of its programs against 

organized crime, such as the PMOP and aerial interdiction, could undercut the success of Honduras’ security efforts, while also damaging the United StatesHonduras relationship. This lack of support could also 

undercut the ability to improve the degree to which 

such programs are done with maximum respect for 

citizen rights and civilian safety.

Concerns over excessive militarization of law enforcement, or possible human rights abuses by the 

newly formed PMOP force, should be addressed by 

supporting the force in a manner that offers constructive recommendations and technical or educational 

support for avoiding problems.

Similarly, with respect to air interdiction, the United States should provide support, where possible, in 

the domain of radar data, intelligence, and perhaps 

even support for Honduras’ aging F-5 interceptor aircraft, in conjunction with working with Honduras on 

protocols and training to avoid shooting down an innocent aircraft. While not supporting activities related 

to Honduras’ air interdiction program may help the 

United States to keep its hands clean, active U.S. engagement with Honduras in this area may be the best 

way to avoid the loss of innocent lives.
62

Focus on Technology, Intelligence, and Training 

Support. 

Honduran experts consulted for this monograph 

emphasized that the items most desired from the 

United States in terms of assistance for Honduras’ security program include: police and security technology, technical intelligence support, and training in a 

range of police and counter-organized crime matters. 

Options for U.S. support that reflect both Honduran needs and U.S. sources of comparative advantage 

include providing national technical means of intelligence support to supplement the abilities of Honduras’ new national intelligence organization, the DNII. 

Other options include: law enforcement and investigative technical training to the PMOP; real time intelligence coordination for Honduras’ air and land shield 

operations, as well as its maritime efforts; technology 

to support Honduran anti-money laundering and financial crimes efforts; sensors to augment control of 

the Guatemala border; and intelligence and special 

operations training to support campaigns against the 

leadership of both narcotrafficking organizations and 

maras.

With respect to communications, Hondurans with 

experience in patrolling the remote eastern area of the 

country mentioned the need for radios permitting coordination between air, ground, and maritime assets, 

as well as more and better night vision goggles.

Look for Innovative Material Solutions.

With respect to material support, Honduran experts consulted for this monograph mentioned unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as a capability that 
63

could save money and manpower spent on naval and 

aircraft patrols in remote areas like La Mosquitia, as 

well as helping them to position manned patrol and 

intercept assets more effectively. They also mentioned 

the need for a greater number of shallow-bottomed 

craft for riverine patrols and intercept; perhaps to 

include fan-powered swamp boats like those used to 

navigate the everglades in the United States.

Strengthen Institutional Ties in Professional 

Military Education. 

To build confidence in the United States-Honduras institutional relationship, and to strengthen institutional capability in Honduras in support of its 

security program, the United States should expand 

scholarships for Hondurans to attend courses in U.S. 

Security and Defense institutions, such as the Western Hemisphere Institute for National Security Center 

(WHINSEC), the U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.

In addition to constructing capabilities to combat 

narcotrafficking and organized crime, and strengthening relationships of confidence with the United States, 

the use of Latin America-oriented schoolhouses, like 

WHINSEC, also facilitates bonds between Honduran 

officers and those from other nations of the region, 

such as Guatemala. Persons interviewed for this 

monograph highlighted such ties forged in institutions, such as WHINSEC, as facilitating operational 

and intelligence cooperation on the borders and in 

shared maritime domains that narcotraffickers seek 

to cross.
64

Expand U.S. Coast Guard Ties with the Honduran 

Navy. 

Within the framework of providing more effective 

support to the Honduran maritime shield, the United 

States should explore ways to strengthen education, 

training ties, and personnel exchanges between the 

Honduran Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard, given that 

the Coast Guard is well matched to the capabilities 

and mission set of the Honduran Navy, and already 

has ample experience in engaging with it on maritime 

security matters.116 In an interview with Honduran naval personnel, greater interactions with the U.S. Coast 

Guard were uniquely singled out as an item that could 

benefit the Honduran Navy.

Work Where Possible with the Inter-American 

System.

As illustrated in this monograph, narcotrafficking, gangs, and other transnational crime phenomena 

are problems with sources and effects that go far beyond Honduras’ borders. The nation has nine distinct 

maritime borders (two in the Pacific and seven in the 

Caribbean); these borders, and unresolved differences 

over them, are exploited by narcotraffickers in moving 

drugs through the region. On the other hand, as noted 

in the monograph, Honduras’ neighbors, particularly 

Nicaragua and Colombia, are some of its most important sources of intelligence, and are key to operational 

coordination in addressing the challenge.

While the importance of a multinational approach 

to the challenge of organized crime in Honduras is evident, the question of which multinational approach 

is also important. Honduran officials interviewed for 
65

this monograph noted how institutions of the InterAmerican system, such as the Conference of Central 

American Armed Forces (CFAC), and the Inter-American Defense College have helped in facilitating contacts and fluid coordination between nations. 

The Inter-American system is particularly relevant 

in addressing Honduras’ challenges because it contains existing structures relevant to both the security 

and developmental dimensions, while at the same 

time including the United States, which is a key actor with respect to both the destination for narcotics 

and persons transiting Honduras, as well for intelligence, interdiction, developmental support, and other 

aspects of the solution.

Leverage the Central America-Dominican Republic 

Free Trade Agreement for Economic Support.

As previously mentioned, the Hernandez security 

concept needs a strong development component to 

succeed. This would replace the money taken out of 

the criminal economy by successful government actions against the narcotraffickers, create meaningful 

development in urban areas to build alternatives to 

desperation, and (with time) chip away at the culture 

of violence and criminality in the country. In the context of such development needs, the United States has 

an important vehicle in place for expanded trade and 

investment in Honduras in the form of the Central 

America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement 

(CAFTA-DR). Within this framework, the U.S. Department of Commerce should work more closely with 

the Hernandez administration to promote expanded 

U.S. investment in, and trade with, Honduras; thereby 

leveraging the tax and other advantages accruing to 
66

businesses investing in Honduras and producing (at 

least in part) for the U.S. market under CAFTA-DR, 

and taking advantage of the relative proximity of 

Honduras to the United States. Simultaneously, the 

United States and its Honduran counterparts must 

work to eliminate impediments to such investments, 

including concerns by U.S. and other multinational 

companies regarding security, investment protection, 

infrastructure, and labor issues.
67

CONCLUSION

Honduras is at a pivotal moment with respect to its 

struggle against the transnational crime and insecurity that have torn the nation and its neighbors apart 

during the last decade. The crisis of 60,000 unaccompanied migrant children from Central America during 

the summer of 2014 illustrates that the United States 

is connected to what happens in the country through 

ties of geography, economic relations, and family; 

thus, the United States has an important stake in the 

country’s success in resolving the challenges that currently confront it.

The current Honduran approach to addressing 

these security challenges is creative, intelligent, and 

pragmatic, if imperfect, and it is producing positive 

results. The success of the security plan of the Hernandez administration is important not only to the future 

of the country and the region, but also to the United 

States.

If the concept of the United States managing its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean through 

a framework of mutual respect is to have any meaning, the United States must have the political courage 

to help its partners in the way that they want to be 

helped, taking the risk that mistakes may be made 

along the way that may not paint the United States in 

a positive light, but doing everything possible to make 

sure that those efforts succeed.

For Honduras, Latin America, and for the Caribbean more broadly, the willingness to take such risks

is the essence of the friendship and the posture of 

respect valued throughout the region.
68

ENDNOTES

1. Dana Frank, “Protests light up long Honduran night,” Miami Herald, July 16, 2015, available from miamiherald.com/opinion/

op-ed/from-our-inbox/article27393925.html.

2. Gustavo Palencia, “Honduras president: graft-linked companies helped fund my campaign,” Reuters, June 3, 2015, available from reuters.com/article/us-honduras-corruption-idUSKBN0OJ26B20150603.

3. David Alire Garcia, “Top Honduran court paves way for 

presidents to seek re-election,” Reuters, April 23, 2015, available

from reuters.com/article/2015/04/23/us-honduras-reelection-ruling-id

USKBN0NE2TA20150423.

4. See Tatiana Paz, “La destitución fue conversada con Rivera Avilés: Juan Orlando Hernández” (“The firing was discussed 

with Rivera Aviles“), La Prensa, December 14, 2012, available from 

laprensa.hn/especiales/377758-273/la-destitución-fue-conversada-conrivera-avilés-juan-orlando-hernández.

5. Iris Amador, “Honduras Records Significant Decrease in 

Violence as Armed Forces and Police Remain Vigilant,” Diálogo, 

September 21, 2015, available from dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/2015/09/21/feature-05.

6. “Honduras ha reducido un 98.11% aterrizaje de avionetas 

con droga en 5 años” (“Honduras has reduced landings of narco 

flights by 98.11% in 5 years”), El Nuevo Diario, October 1, 2015, 

available from elnuevodiario.com.ni/internacionales/372236-honduras-ha-reducido-98-11-aterrizaje-avionetas-dr/.

7. David Gagne, “US Official Praises Honduras Efforts to 

Combat Drug Trafficking,” Insight Crime, May 5, 2015, available from insightcrime.org/news-briefs/us-official-praises-hondurasanti-drug-trafficking-efforts.

8. See “Victims caught in Honduras drugs crossfire,” BBC 

News, July 16, 2012, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/

hardtalk/9737563.stm.
69

9. David Nakamura and Wesley Lowery, “White House requests $3.7 billion in emergency funds for border crisis,” The Washington Post, July 8, 2014, available from washingtonpost.com/politics/

white-house-to-seek-38-billion-for-border-control-more-than-previously-signaled/2014/07/08/ac95a56e-06a9-11e4-bbf1-cc51275e7f8f_story.

html.

10. “U.S. Agencies Considered Various Factors in Funding 

Security Activities, but Need to Assess Progress in Achieving 

Interagency Objectives,” GAO-13-771, Washington DC: General 

Accounting Office, September 13, 2013, available from gao.gov/assets/660/658145.pdf.

11. See “Cocaine from South America to the United States,” 

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Prevention, available from 

https://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOCTASouthAmerica/

English/TOCTA_CACaribb_cocaine_SAmerica_US.pdf.

12. See, for example, “Trial of Honduran Drug Kingpin Matta 

Opens,” Los Angeles Times, October 6, 1990, available from articles.

latimes.com/1990-10-06/local/me-1378_1_drug-kingpin.

13. See, for example, “Central America after Hurricane Mitch,” 

Inter-American Development Bank, February 2000, available 

from iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/backgrounder2.htm.

14. See, for example, Steven C. Boraz and Thomas C. Bruneau, 

“Are the Maras Overwhelming Central America,” Military Review, 

November-December 2006, available from usacac.army.mil/CAC2/

MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20061231_art007.

pdf.

15. Helene Cooper and Marc Lacey, “In a Coup in Honduras, 

Ghosts of Past U.S. Policies,” The New York Times, June 29, 2009, 

available from nytimes.com/2009/06/30/world/americas/30honduras.

html?_r=0.

16. The country was, for example, suspended from the Organization of American States. See “Honduras suspended from 

OAS,” CNN, July 5, 2009, available from edition.cnn.com/2009/

WORLD/americas/07/05/honduras.coup.OAS/index.html.
70

17. See, for example, Ginger Thompson, “U.S. Suspends $30 

Million to Honduras,” The New York Times, September 3, 2009, 

available from nytimes.com/2009/09/04/world/americas/04honduras.

html.

18. These dynamics were reinforced by an increase in control over the Petén region in neighboring Guatemala, which had 

previously been used as a key stop in the movement of drugs 

through Central America.

19. Hondurans consulted for this monograph believe that the 

men believed that they would have a higher probability of survival within the U.S. justice system, than facing justice in Honduras.

20. “Honduran police detain alleged drug kingpin ‘Chepe’ 

Handal,” Reuters, March 13, 2015, available from reuters.com/article/us-honduras-drugs-idUSKBN0M90HK20150313.

21. “Leaders of Honduran Drug Cartel Face Federal Drug and 

Money Laundering Charges in the Eastern District of Virginia,” 

Federal Bureau of Investigation Official Website, December 19, 

2014, available from https://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2014/leaders-of-honduran-drug-cartel-face-federal-drug-and-moneylaundering-charges-in-the-eastern-district-of-virginia.

22. See, for example, Sam Tabory, “Arrests Add to Murky Picture of Crime-Politics Links in Honduras,” Insight Crime, August 

19, 2015, available from insightcrime.com/news-briefs/arrests-addmurky-honduras-picture-crime-political-relationship.

23. “Cabecilla del cartel de los AA está enmontañado” (“Boss 

of the AA cartel taken down”), El Heraldo, November 5, 2015, 

available from elheraldo.hn/pais/898146-466/cabecilla-del-cartel-delos-aa-est%C3%A1-enmonta%C3%B1ado.

24. “Honduras Narco-Sub Caught Smuggling Cocaine,” The 

Huffington Post, September 13, 2011, available from huffingtonpost.

com/2011/07/14/honduras-narco-sub_n_898432.html.

25. Some drug shipments are believed to have been stored 

for a year or more in concealed locations in Honduras before proceeding on the next leg of their journey.
71

26. See, for example, Jacobo G. Garcia, “‘El ‘Chapo Guzmán’ 

podría encontrarse en Honduras’” (“El Chapo Guzman could be 

in Honduras”), El Mundo, November 20, 2013, available from elmundo.es/internacional/2013/11/19/528bbd5261fd3d914e8b457a.html.

27. Steven Dudley, “The Zetas in Guatemala,” Insight 

Crime, September 8, 2011, available from insightcrime.org/images/

PDFs/2016/InSight_Crime_The_Zetas_in_Guatemala.pdf.

28. Jeremy McDermott, “The Zetas Set Up Shop in Honduras,” Insight Crime, February 4, 2013, available from insightcrime.

org/news-analysis/zetas-set-up-in-honduras.

29. “Carteles mexicanos en labores de reclutamiento en Honduras” (“Mexican cartels recruiting in Honduras”), El Heraldo, 

May 29, 2015, available from elheraldo.hn/alfrente/844491-209/carteles-mexicanos-en-labores-de-reclutamiento-en-honduras.

30. Such laboratories possibly use cocaine base smuggled 

into the country from Colombia. Nonetheless, other experts interviewed for this monograph assessed that the logic of moving 

cocaine base made such activity unlikely.

31. “Hallazgo de narco laboratorio, otra puntada en el laberinto del crimen organizado en Honduras” (“Discovery of narco 

laboratory, another piece in the laberynth of organized crime in 

Honduras”), El Proceso, March 2011, available from proceso.hn/

component/k2/item/54953.html.

32. “Destruyen ‘narcolaboratorio’ en Omoa, Cortés, Honduras” (“Narco laboratory destoyed in Omoa, Cortes, Honduras”), 

El Criterio, July 23, 2015, available from criterio.hn/destruyen-narcolaboratorio-en-omoa-cortes/.

33. Randal C. Archibold, “Gangs’ Truce Buys El Salvador a 

Tenuous Peace,” The New York Times, August 27, 2012, available from nytimes.com/2012/08/28/world/americas/in-el-salvadorgang-truce-brings-tenuous-peace.html.

34. “Mareros en Honduras proponen tregua, anuncia Emiliani” (“Maras in Honduras propose truce, Emiliani announces”), 

La Prensa, August 15, 2013, available from laprensa.hn/honduras/
72

sanpedrosula/338500-98/mareros-en-honduras-proponen-tregua-anuncia-emiliani.

35. “No hay tregua entre pandillas de Honduras” (“There is 

no truce between gangs in Honduras”), El Heraldo, April 7, 2014, 

available from elheraldo.hn/pais/581528-214/no-hay-tregua-entre-pan

dillas-de-honduras.

36. “Honduras: Los Chirizos, banda heredera del ‘Gato Negro’” (“Honduras: The Chirizos, a band descended from the ‘Black 

Cat’”), El Heraldo, April 22, 2015, available from elheraldo.hn/alfrente/833604-209/honduras-los-chirizos-banda-heredera-del-gato-negro.

37. “Entramos a la ‘cueva del diablo’ (VIDEO)” (“We enter the 

‘Devil’s Cave’ (Video))”, La Tribuna, February 16, 2015, available 

from latribuna.hn/2015/02/16/entramos-a-la-cueva-del-diablo-video/.

38. “Los Benjamins son trasladados a cárcel de máxima seguridad” (“The Benjamins are moved to a máximum security 

prison”), La Prensa, December 19, 2015, available from laprensa.hn/inicio/912710-417/los-benjamins-son-trasladados-a-c%E1rcelde-m%E1xima-seguridad.

39. Héctor Calíx, “Honduras: Reforma a ‘ley antimaras’ llega 

al CN” (“Honduras: Reform of the ‘anti-maras’ law”), El Heraldo, 

March 17, 2015, available from elheraldo.hn/pais/823301-214/honduras-reforma-a-ley-antimaras-llega-al-cn.

40. “Profesionales universitarios son miembros de Mara 18” 

(“University professionals are members of Mara 18”), El Heraldo, 

August 6, 2014, available from elheraldo.hn/pais/735969-214/profesionales-universitarios-son-miembros-de-mara-18.

41. “Honduras: Infiltrados, el cáncer en la policía” (“Honduras: Infiltrators, the cancer in the police”), Mafia&Co, March 7, 

2011, available from https://mafiaandco.wordpress.com/2011/03/07/

honduras-infiltrados-el-cancer-en-la-policia/.

42. “Congreso prohíbe dos pasajeros en moto” (“Congress 

prohibits motorcycles from having two passengers”), El Heraldo, 

April 7, 2014, available from elheraldo.hn/pais/568000-214/congresoprohibe-dos-pasajeros-en-moto.
73

43. “Reconciliación internacional desplazó agenda del presidente Porfirio Lobo” (“International reconciliations displaces the 

agenda of President Porfirio Lobo”), El Heraldo, April 7, 2014, 

available from elheraldo.hn/alfrente/564768-209/reconciliacion-internacional-desplazo-agenda-del-presidente-porfirio-lobo.

44. Victor Meza, Edmundo Orellana, Leticia Salomón, Thelma Mejia, and Feliz Molina, La Militarización de la seguridad publica en Honduras (The Militarization of public security in Honduras), 

Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Centro de Documentación de Honduras, 

2015, p. 39.

45. Although serious allegations of corruption have been 

raised against President Hernandez himself, the consensus of 

those interviewed for this monograph is that, whether or not true, 

the President nonetheless had a serious desire to combat organized crime, and regarded the main body of the national police as 

too corrupted to be the principal tool in this activity.

46. Nonetheless, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly exercises a significant operational role in the organization, 

with and through its operational head, beyond the orders, which 

may come down in his name.

47. Indeed, FUSINA’s own mission statement places its activities “in the framework of Operation MORAZÁN.”

48. This operation, conducted in February 2013, was focused 

on San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa.

49. Nonetheless, as of January 2016, the government had not 

made any public statement regarding the shift from the “Domination” phase to the “Consolidation” phase of Plan Morazán.

50. Honduran officials consulted for this monograph estimated that 75% of Honduran naval assets or more could be rapidly 

assigned to FUSINA if needed for an operation.

51. According to Honduran National Police officials consulted for this monograph, such organizations may potentially support and be supported by FUSINA, but do not generally dedicate 

persons to the organization on an ongoing basis.
74

52. At the time of this writing, the “Public Ministry” had 

assigned a total of 24 investigators/prosecutors to FUSINA.

53. See “Decreto No. 168-2013” (“Decree No. 168-2013”), Gaceta Oficial, No. 33,211, August 24, 2013, available from www.tsc.gob.

hn/leyes/Ley_Policia_militar_orden_publico_2013.pdf.

54. See, for example, “Honduras: Dictan detención judicial a 

la esposa de ‘Chepe’ Handal” (“Honduras: Judicial detention is 

ordered for the wife of ‘Chepe’ Handal”), El Heraldo, March 21, 

2015, available from elheraldo.hn/sucesos/824440-219/honduras-dictan-detenci%C3%B3n-judicial-a-la-esposa-de-chepe-handal.

55. “Congreso de Honduras rechaza rango constitucional 

para Policía Militar” (“Honduran Congress rejects giving military 

police constitutional status”), Nación, January 24, 2015, available 

from nacion.com/mundo/centroamerica/Congreso-Honduras-constitucional-Policia-Militar_0_1465453540.html.

56. “Congreso de Honduras rechaza rango constitucional 

para Policía Militar” (“Honduran Congress rejects giving military 

police constitutional status”), Nación, January 24, 2015, available 

from nacion.com/mundo/centroamerica/Congreso-Honduras-constitucional-Policia-Militar_0_1465453540.html.

57. Technically, the Tigres were created before the PMOP, 

with an enabling law in June 2012. “Más dudas que confianza 

genera creación de TIGRES: Conadeh” (“More doubts about the 

confidence generated by the creation of the Tigers: Conadeh”), 

May 20, 2013, Honduprensa, available from https://honduprensa.

wordpress.com/2013/05/20/mas-dudas-que-confianza-genera-creacionde-tigres-conadeh/.

58. “Oficiales hondureños detrás del robo millonario a los 

Valle” (“Honduran officials behind the theft of millions of dollars 

from the Valles”), Teleprogreso TV, December 12, 2014, available 

from teleprogreso.tv/micanal/?p=48821. According to one account, 

the amount seized was even greater, but the additional cash has 

never been uncovered and returned.

59. “Honduras: Junto a su hermano capturan a líder del cartel 

de los Valle” (“Honduras: The leader of the Valles is captured, 
75

together with his brother”), El Heraldo, October 5, 2014, available 

from elheraldo.hn/inicio/754734-331/honduras-junto-a-su-hermanocapturan-a-l%C3%ADder-del-cartel-de-los.

60. “Depuración de la Policía es una burla a la sociedad” (“The 

cleansing of the police is a joke on society”), El Heraldo, July 5, 2015,

available from elheraldo.hn/alfrente/856134-331/depuraci%C3%B3nde-la-polic%C3%ADa-es-una-burla-a-la-sociedad.

61. “Fiscal destituye al director de la DLCN” (“The Attorney 

General removes the Director of the DLCN”), El Heraldo, December 16, 2015, available from elheraldo.hn/pais/911914-466/fiscal-destituye-al-director-de-la-dlcn.

62. “Honduras y Rusia firmarán convenio contra las drogas” 

(“Honduras and Russia sign an anti-drug agreement”), El Heraldo, April 7, 2014, available from elheraldo.hn/pais/329870-214/

honduras-y-rusia-firmaran-convenio-contra-las-drogas.

63. See, for example, “FUSINA Repels Honduran Drug Gangs 

in Mosquito Coast Region,” Diálogo, June 16, 2015, available from 

dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/2015/06/16/feature-05.

64. “Honduras aprueba derribar aviones sospechosos de narcotráfico” (“Honduras approves the downing of aircraft suspected of narcotrafficking”), BBC, January 18, 2014, available from 

bbc.com/mundo/ultimas_noticias/2014/01/140118_ultnot_honduras_

autoriza_derribo_aviones_sospechosos_drogas_lav.

65. “Honduras compra radares a Israel por $30 millones” 

(“Honduras buys radars from Israel for $30 million”), El Economista, December 19, 2013, available from eleconomista.net/2013/12/19/

honduras-compra-radares-a-israel-por-30-millones.

66. James Bargent, “US Halts Honduras Cooperation Over 

Narco-Plane Shoot Down Law,” Insight Crime, April 1, 2014, 

available from insightcrime.org/news-briefs/us-halts-honduras-cooperation-over-narco-plane-shoot-down-law.

67. See, for example, “Honduras: Fuerza Aérea halla narcoavioneta en La Mosquitia” (“Honduras: Air Force discovers a 
76

narco aircraft in La Mosquitia”), La Prensa, March 24, 2014, available from laprensa.hn/inicio/626506-96/honduras-fuerza-aerea-hallanarcoavioneta-en-la-mosquitia.

68. “FF AA destruyen ocho pistas de narcos” (“Armed Forces 

destroy eight narco runways”), La Prensa, August 15, 2013, available from laprensa.hn/honduras/tegucigalpa/378986-98/ff-aa-destruyen-ocho-pistas-de-narcos.

69. On the other hand, one tactic reportedly employed by narcotraffickers in the area is to take tractors from local businessmen, 

and later, return them to their owners, complicating the identification of the network of persons in the local area supporting the 

narcotraffickers.

70. See, for example, “Coast Guard offloads 25 tons of cocaine 

seized in Eastern Pacific drug transit zone,” U.S. Southern Command Official Website, November 20, 2015, available from southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Coast-Guard-offloads-25-tons-of-cocaineseized-in-Eastern-Pacific-drug-transit-zone.aspx.

71. See, for example, “Honduras y Nicaragua llaman a paz en 

el golfo” (“Honduras and Nicaragua call for peace in the Gulf”), 

La Prensa Grafica, May 10, 2014, available from laprensagrafica.

com/2014/05/10/honduras-y-nicaragua-llaman-a-paz-en-el-golfo.

72. See, for example, “Pugna entre El Salvador y Honduras 

por una isla” (“Fight between El Salvador and Honduras for an island”), Nacion, September 3, 2013, available from nacion.com/mundo/centroamerica/Pugna-Salvador-Honduras-isla_0_1363863632.html.

73. “Fuerza Maya Chorti en Honduras” (“Maya Chorti force 

in Honduras”), Defensa, April 10, 2015, available from defensa.com/

frontend/defensa/fuerza-maya-chorti-honduras-vn15253-vst167.

74. “Ley de Inteligencia es ambigua y débil” (“Intelligence 

law is ambigious and weak”), El Heraldo, July 4, 2014, available 

from elheraldo.hn/pais/574608-214/ley-de-inteligencia-es-ambigua-ydebil. See also Thelma Mejia, “Cold War Policies Revived by Honduran Intelligence Law,” Inter Press Service, February 2, 2013, available from upsidedownworld.org/main/honduras-archives-46/4109-

cold-war-policies-revived-by-honduran-intelligence-law.
75. According to at least one source interviewed for this 

monograph, Nicaragua is one of the most important sources of 

intelligence data for FUSINA and Honduran law enforcement.

76. “Honduras detains leaders of Central American drug 

gang,” Reuters, October 5, 2014, available from reuters.com/article/

us-honduras-drugs-idUSKCN0HU0WP20141005.

77. See, for example, “Fusina incrementa seguridad en 15 

mercados de la capital” (“Fusina increases security in 15 markets 

in the capitol”), El Heraldo, November 6, 2015, available from elheraldo.hn/pais/898213-466/fusina-incrementa-seguridad-en-15-mercados-de-la-capital. See also “Fusina destruye puntos ciegos en 

frontera con Guatemala” (“Fusina destroys blind crossings in the 

frontier with Guatemala”), El Heraldo, January 20, 2015, available 

from elheraldo.hn/sucesos/787172-219/fusina-destruye-puntos-ciegosen-frontera-con-guatemala. See also “Fusina incauta 55 paquetes de 

droga en registro a bus” (“Fusina seizes 55 packets of drugs in the 

inspection of a bus”), El Heraldo, December 3, 2015, available from 

elheraldo.hn/inicio/907921-465/fusina-incauta-55-paquetes-de-drogaen-registro-a-bus.

78. Kyra Gurney, “Is Honduras Militarizing its Prison System?” Insight Crime, September 18, 2014, available from insightcrime.org/news-briefs/is-honduras-militarizing-its-prison-system.

79. See, for example, Kyra Gurney, “What an Extortion Call in 

Honduras Sounds Like,” Insight Crime, March 4, 2015, available 

from insightcrime.org/news-analysis/what-an-extortion-call-in-honduras-sounds-like. See also Hannah Stone, “Inmates Run Honduras Prison as Micro-State,” Insight Crime, July 19, 2012, available 

from www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/inmates-run-honduras-pri

son-as-micro-state.

80. Ximena Moretti, “Honduran authorities reduce extortion 

by blocking cell phone service at prisons,” Dialogo, May 30, 2014, 

available from dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/

regional_news/2014/05/30/honduras-seguridad.

81. Moretti.

77
82. “Honduras: Mensajes en clave de maras salen ahora desde 

la PN” (“Honduras: Coded messages are now being sent out from 

the National Police”), El Heraldo, August 26, 2014, available from 

elheraldo.hn/sucesos/741211-219/honduras-mensajes-en-clave-demaras-salen-ahora-desde-la-pn.

83. Jen Psaki, “Extradition of Carlos Lobo,” U.S. Department 

of State Official Website, May 9, 2014, available from state.gov/r/

pa/prs/ps/2014/05/225844.htm.

84. See Michael Wimbish, “SOUTHCOM commander reaffirms US military support to Honduran fight against traffickers, 

organized crime,” U.S. Southern Command Official Website, June 

4, 2014, available from http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/

Gen--Kelly-visits-Honduras.aspx.

85. As of the time this monograph was written, Vice Admiral 

Kurt Tidd had been named as successor to General Kelly, but had 

not yet assumed command.

86. “Guatemala, Honduras create task force on crime, migration, following visit by US VP Joe Biden,” Fox News, March 23, 

2015, available from foxnews.com/world/2015/03/23/guatemala-honduras-create-task-force-on-crime-migration-following-visit-by-us.html.

87. “UNAH no puede avalar cifras de reducción de homicidios en Honduras” (“UNAH can’t make use of data regarding reduction of homicides in Honduras”), El Heraldo, October 3, 2014, 

available from elheraldo.hn/alfrente/754484-209/unah-no-puede-avalar-cifras-de-reducci%C3%B3n-de-homicidios-en-honduras.

88. “Comparativo de Homicidios de01 de enero al 14 julio 

2015” (“Comparison of homicides from January 1, 2014 through 

July 14, 2015”), Secretaria de la Policía de Honduras (SEPOL).

89. “John Kelly: Honduras ya no es el principal puente del 

narcotráfico” (“John Kelly: Honduras no longer is the principal 

narcotrafficking route”), El Heraldo, May 3, 2015, available from 

elheraldo.hn/inicio/836832-331/john-kelly-honduras-ya-no-es-el-principal-puente-del-narcotr%C3%A1fico.

78
79

90. See, for example, “Rendición de cuentas y logros ante 

el pueblo hondureño congregado” (“Assessment and review of 

achievements before the Honduran public”), Presidency of the 

Republic of Honduras Official Website, January 25, 2015, available from presidencia.gob.hn/?p=4730.

91. Honduran officials and others interviewed for this monograph generally concurred that PMOP members enjoyed greater 

respect when they deployed into such neighborhoods than their 

national police predecessors—not only because they were seen as 

less corrupt, but also because they were seen by the criminals as 

more likely to respond effectively if challenged, with functional 

weapons and vehicles.

92. Brianne Berry and Laura V. Natera, “Honduras Breaks the 

Silence: Protests Persist Against Corruption,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, July 22, 2015, available from coha.org/hondurasbreaks-the-silence-protests-persist-against-corruption/.

93. See, for example, Victor Meza, “La oposición política y los 

indignados” (“The political opposition and the ‘Indignant’”), Boletín Especial, No. 9, Centro de Documentación de Honduras, July 

2015, p. 1.

94. David Gagne, “Alleged Head of Honduras Drug Cartel 

in US Custody,” Insight Crime, February 3, 2015, available from 

insightcrime.org/news-analysis/alleged-head-of-honduras-drug-cartelin-us-custody.

95. “El lunes llega solicitud de extradición contra Jaime 

Rosenthal a la CSJ” (“Monday, the request for extradition of Jaime Rosenthal will be presented to the Supreme Court”), El Heraldo, January 3, 2016, available from elheraldo.hn/pais/916202-466/

el-lunes-llega-solicitud-de-extradición-contra-jaime-rosenthal-a-la-csj.

96. See, for example, Marcela Estrada, “Leaked Report: Honduran Police in the Pockets of Organized Crime,” PanAm Post, 

February 7, 2014, available from panampost.com/marcela-estrada/2014/02/07/leaked-report-honduran-police-in-the-pockets-of-organized-crime/.

97. Indeed, beyond PMOP itself, in 2015, two members of the 

FUSINA executive board were put on the list of personnel to be 
80

expelled for alleged corruption, illustrating the persistent risk 

of corruption at the highest levels, even with the new FUSINA 

structure.

98. “Fiscal destituye al director de la DLCN” (“Attorney General fires the director of the DLCN”), 2015.

99. “Honduras y Guatemala firmarán acuerdo de libre comercio” (“Honduras and Guatemala sign a free trade agreement”), El 

Heraldo, February 24, 2015, available from elheraldo.hn/pais/805935-

214/honduras-y-guatemala-firmar%C3%A1n-acuerdo-de-librecomercio.

100. “Unión Aduanera entre Honduras y Guatemala entra en 

vigencia el 15 de diciembre” (“Customs agreement between Honduras and Guatemala enters in effect December 15”), El Heraldo, 

November 20, 2015, available from elheraldo.hn/pais/903657-466/

uni%C3%B3n-aduanera-entre-honduras-y-guatemala-entra-en-vigencia-el-15-de.

101. Alexis Espinal, “Socializan diseños de la nueva carretera 

del corredor del Pacífico” (“Designs for the new Pacific highway 

corridor are presented”), El Heraldo, August 9, 2015, available 

from elheraldo.hn/regionales/867195-218/socializan-dise%C3%B1osde-la-nueva-carretera-del-corredor-del-pac%C3%ADfico.

102. “Honduras, tercer lugar en lavado de activos” (“Honduras, third place in money laundering”), El Heraldo, April 7, 2014, 

available from elheraldo.hn/pais/581488-214/honduras-tercer-lugaren-lavado-de-activos.

103. Héctor Calix, “Honduras: Aprueban nueva Ley contra Lavado” (“Honduras: The new anti-laundering law is approved”), El Heraldo, December 11, 2014, available from elheraldo.

hn/pais/776004-214/honduras-aprueban-nueva-ley-contra-lavado.

104. “Honduras: CNBS ordena liquidación forzosa de 

Banco Continental” (“Honduras: CNBS orders the forced liquidation of Continental Bank”), El Heraldo, October 10, 2015, 

available from elheraldo.hn/pais/889226-214/honduras-cnbs-ordenaliquidaci%C3%B3n-forzosa-de-banco-continental.
81

105. “Honduras: Banco Continental violó normas contra el lavado de activos” (“Honduras: Continental Bank violated anti-money laundering rules”), El Heraldo, October 22, 2015, available from 

elheraldo.hn/alfrente/893397-209/honduras-banco-continental-viol

%C3%B3-normas-contra-el-lavado-de-activos.

106. “Military helps cut Honduras murder rate, but abuses 

spike,” Reuters, July 9, 2015, available from reuters.com/article/ushonduras-military-insight-idUSKCN0PJ0E920150709.

107. “PMOP: Cabildeos, dudas y conjeturas” (“PMOP: Doubts 

and conjecture”), El Heraldo, January 19, 2015, available from 

elheraldo.hn/pais/786999-214/pmop-cabildeos-dudas-y-conjeturas.

108. “Observaciones Preliminares sobre la Situación de los 

Derechos Humanos en Honduras” (“Preliminary observations 

regarding the human rights situation in Honduras”), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, December 5, 2014, available 

from www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2014/146A.asp.

109. According to the polling organization Latinobarómetro, 

in 2015, 62.4% of Hondurans reported that they had either “little” 

or “no” faith in the ability of the police to protect the public order. 

Latinobarómetro 2015, available from http://www.latinobarometro.

org/latOnline.jsp, accessed January 2, 2016.

110. “Militares dejarán labores de seguridad paulatinamente” (“Military will gradually relinquish security tasks”), 

El Heraldo, available from elheraldo.hn/pais/836865-435/mili

tares-dejar%C3%A1n-labores-de-seguridad-paulatinamente, accessed 

January 3, 2016.

111. Bargent, 2014.

112. “US Senate Backs Anti-Impunity Commission for Honduras,” PanAm Post, July 13, 2015, available from panampost.com/

panam-staff/2015/07/13/us-senate-backs-anti-impunity-commissionfor-honduras/.

113. Whitney Eulich, “Honduras: As protests over corruption 

swell, many see ‘positive moment’,” The Christian Science Monitor, 

July 20, 2015.
82

114. See, for example, “Incertidumbre en Honduras por 

acusación de EUA contra Grupo Continental” (“Uncertainty in 

Honduras over the accusation by the USA against Continental 

Group”), El Economista, October 19, 2015, available from eleconomista.net/2015/10/19/incertidumbre-en-honduras-por-acusacionde-eua-contra-grupo-continental.

115. Steven Dudley and Mimi Yagoub, “5 Takeaways from 

US Congress Northern Triangle Aid Package,” Insight Crime, December 18, 2015, available from insightcrime.org/news-analysis/5-

takeaways-from-us-congress-proposed-northern-triangle-aid-package.

116. See, for example, Karen Parrish, “SOUTHCOM ‘Part of 

Solution’ to Drug Crime, Commander Says,” U.S. Southern Command Official Website, March 8, 2012, available from southcom.

mil/newsroom/Pages/Southcom-‘Part-of-Solution’-to-Drug-Crime,-

Commander-Says.aspx.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. R. Evan Ellis

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Denise J. Kersting

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil