[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12126

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

JUANA ROSALINDA NOLASCO-NOLASKO, 

SEBASTIAN OTTONIEL NOLASCO-NOLASCO, 

Petitioners,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A209-425-927

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12126

____________________

Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:

Juana Nolasco-Nolasco and her minor son seek review of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order adopting and affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application 

for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United 

Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 

Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”).1 She raises two issues. First, she argues that substantial evidence does not support 

the IJ and BIA’s finding that she was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because she showed a well-founded fear of persecution on account of her indigenous Mayan Popti race. Specifically, she argues that: (1) the systemic discrimination and economic 

social disparities facing indigenous Guatemalans constitute a pattern or practice of persecution, and (2) the agency should have 

found that her status as an indigenous Mayan was a central reason 

for the criminal violence she fears, as drug traffickers often target

indigenous Guatemalans. Second, she argues that substantial evidence does not support the IJ and BIA’s finding that she was ineligible for CAT relief, and also that the BIA failed to give reasoned 

1 Nolasco-Nolasco’s son is a derivative beneficiary of her asylum claim but did 

not file his own claims for relief from removal, so we primarily focus on Juana 

Nolasco-Nolasco’s claims and arguments. 

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23-12126 Opinion of the Court 3

consideration to her CAT claim. After careful consideration, we 

deny Nolasco-Nolasco’s petition.

I

We review only the BIA’s decision unless the BIA adopts the 

IJ’s decision, in which case we review the adopted portions of the 

IJ’s opinion in addition to the BIA’s decision. Tang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

578 F.3d 1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2009). 

We review factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard, “which provides that the decision can be reversed 

only if evidence compels a reasonable fact finder to find otherwise.” 

Lyashchynska v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 676 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2012) 

(quotation marks omitted). We must affirm “[i]f the BIA’s decision 

is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on 

the record considered as a whole.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

“[T]he mere fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion 

is not enough to justify a reversal of the administrative findings.” 

Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 1223, 1230 (11th Cir. 

2007) (quotation marks omitted). We “view the record evidence 

in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of that decision.” Id. (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

To establish eligibility for asylum, a noncitizen must, with 

specific and credible evidence, establish (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground, or (2) a “well-founded fear” 

that the noncitizen will be persecuted on account of a protected 

ground. Diallo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 596 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 

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2010); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a), (b). The protected grounds include, 

among other things, race and membership in a “particular social 

group.” Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 101(a)(42), 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a), (b). 

A well-founded fear of future persecution may be established by showing: (1) past persecution, which creates a presumption of a “well-founded fear” of future persecution; (2) a reasonable 

possibility of being singled out for persecution on account of a protected ground that cannot be avoided by relocating within the subject country; or (3) a pattern or practice in the subject country of 

persecuting members of a group of which the alien is a part, such 

that the alien faces a reasonable possibility of being persecuted. 8

C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1), (2). To establish a “pattern or practice” of 

persecution based on membership in a group, the applicant must 

show “extreme and pervasive” persecution. Lingeswaran v. U.S. 

Att’y Gen., 969 F.3d 1278, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2020). A government’s 

efforts to improve the situation for a minority group weigh against 

a determination that the country has a pattern or practice of persecuting the group. See id. at 1291 (concluding that the record did 

not compel a finding that there was a pattern of practice of persecuting Tamils in Sri Lanka after the end of the Sri Lankan civil war, 

despite evidence “that Tamils still encounter[ed] discrimination 

and mistreatment,” and noting the government’s “recognized efforts to improve the situation for Tamils and reconcile the country 

since the conclusion of the war, albeit slowly”). 

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Persecution is an extreme concept that is evaluated by considering the cumulative impact of the harms suffered by the petitioner. Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1353 (11th Cir. 

2009) (quotation marks omitted). Economic deprivation that falls 

short of depriving a petitioner of any means to earn a living does 

not constitute persecution. Barreto-Claro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 275 F.3d 

1334, 1340 (11th Cir. 2001); see Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 992 F.3d 

1283, 1292–93 (11th Cir. 2021). 

An alien must prove that he suffered, or will suffer, persecution that is “on account of” a protected ground, a connection 

known as the “nexus” requirement. Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

935 F.3d 1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2019). To satisfy the nexus requirement, the protected ground must have been, or will be, “at least 

one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” INA §

208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). A reason is central if it is 

essential to the motivation of the persecutor, and if the protected 

ground is incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm, it is not central. Sanchez-Castro v. U.S. Att’y 

Gen., 998 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2021). We have stated that “evidence that either is consistent with acts of private violence . . . or 

that merely shows that a person has been the victim of criminal 

activity, does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a 

statutorily protected ground.” Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 

1247, 1258 (11th Cir. 2006).

A noncitizen is eligible for withholding of removal if she 

shows that, upon return to her country, she more likely than not 

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will be persecuted there due to a protected ground, such as her race 

or membership in a particular social group. INA § 241(b)(3), 8

U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). Withholding of removal 

contains the same nexus requirement as asylum, and the “more 

likely than not” standard is higher than the “well-founded fear” 

standard for asylum, so an applicant who fails to meet her burden 

of meeting the asylum eligibility test necessarily fails to show eligibility for withholding of removal. Sanchez-Castro, 998 F.3d at 1286. 

Here, as an initial matter, Nolasco-Nolasco does not challenge the IJ and BIA’s determination that the physical violence she 

experienced from her father and Juan Nolasco or the emotional and 

financial abuse she experienced from her mother-in-law, as well as 

her fear of future harm at their hands, was not on account of her 

race or her membership in a particular social group. When a 

noncitizen fails to offer an argument on an issue, or “makes only a 

passing reference” to it in her brief, that issue is deemed abandoned. Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1341; Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). Therefore, she has abandoned any challenge to the IJ’s nexus finding as to harm inflicted 

by these three individuals. 

Substantial evidence supports the IJ and BIA’s conclusion 

that Nolasco‐Nolasco was ineligible for asylum and withholding of 

removal because she did not demonstrate an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution based on her race. Nolasco-Nolasco’s 

contention that the severe poverty experienced by indigenous people is a part of a pattern or practice of persecution by the 

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Guatemalan government has some support from the Country Report and the OAS Report. But the record does not compel a finding 

either that indigenous peoples in Guatemala face extreme social 

and economic discrimination rising to the level of persecution, or 

that the alleged discrimination faced by indigenous peoples constitutes extreme and pervasive persecution sufficient to establish a 

pattern or practice. See Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d 1353; Lingeswaran, 

969 F.3d at 1290-91. 

Nolasco‐Nolasco gave limited personal testimony as to the 

economic conditions faced by indigenous people, and the OAS Report states that the majority of Guatemalans are affected by poverty, violence, insecurity, and corruption. Moreover, the record 

indicates that indigenous people were provided equal rights by law, 

and the government was required to recognize their customs and 

traditions. And the report notes the efforts of the Guatemalan government to address poverty and violence in indigenous communities with support programs like the National Housing Fund and 

model police precincts, and with expansions in primary education. 

Thus, the record as a whole does not compel a finding that the economic disadvantages experienced by indigenous persons are severe 

enough to constitute the deprivation of any means of earning a living, as required to rise to the level of persecution, or that there is a 

pattern or practice of persecution. See Barreto-Claro, 275 F.3d at 

1340; Lingeswaran, 969 F.3d at 1290–91.

Substantial evidence also supports the finding that the gang 

violence Nolasco-Nolasco fears would not be on account of her 

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race or ethnicity. Though Nolasco‐Nolasco testified that drug traffickers use Mayan children to sell drugs and Mayan adults to cultivate drugs, the record does not compel a finding that the indigenous status of such persons is a central reason they are targeted by 

traffickers. 

II

We review legal issues de novo, including whether the BIA 

afforded a petition “reasoned consideration.” Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

931 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2019). To show reasoned consideration, the BIA need only draft a decision that shows it has “consider[ed] the issues raised and announc[ed] its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and 

thought and not merely reacted.” Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 

792, 803 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Seck v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 

1356, 1364 (11th Cir. 2011)). While the agency has to consider all 

evidence submitted by a petitioner, it need not specifically address 

every piece of evidence. Id. 

To be eligible for CAT relief, an applicant must show that 

she more likely than not will be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); Reyes-Sanchez 

v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004). In this context, “torture” means:

any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 

physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or 

a third person information or a confession, punishing 

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him or her for an act he or she or a third person has 

committed or is suspected of having committed, or 

intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, 

or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, 

when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 

instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of 

a public official or other person acting in an official 

capacity.

8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). To acquiesce, an official must, prior to the

torture, (1) actually know of the torture, or be aware of its high 

probability and deliberately avoid learning the truth, and (2) breach 

his legal responsibility to intervene. Id. § 1208.18(a)(7). An official 

does not acquiesce if he intervenes but is unsuccessful. Id.; SanchezCastro, 998 F.3d at 1288. 

Here, the record does not demonstrate that the BIA failed to 

give reasoned consideration to Nolasco-Nolasco’s CAT claim. The 

BIA specifically rejected Nolasco‐Nolasco’s argument about willful 

blindness, noted that she reported no past torture, and concluded 

she had failed to establish that it was more likely than not that she 

would be tortured in the future. These findings are sufficient to 

demonstrate the BIA’s reasoned consideration. See Jeune, 810 F.3d 

at 803.

Substantial evidence supports the determination that Nolasco-Nolasco is ineligible for CAT protection because she did not 

demonstrate that she more likely than not would be tortured by or 

with the acquiescence of the Guatemalan government. The 

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widespread discrimination and poverty Nolasco-Nolasco raises under her asylum claims does not constitute torture under the law. 

See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). Furthermore, the record does not compel a finding that Nolasco-Nolasco will more likely than not suffer 

mistreatment “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of” a government official. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 208.18(a)(1). The record indicates that the Guatemalan government has made efforts to combat poverty, discrimination, and violence. The limited success, or lack thereof, of these efforts do not 

support a finding of governmental acquiescence to torture. See 

Sanchez-Castro, 998 F.3d at 1288. 

* * *

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Nolasco-Nolasco was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA gave reasoned consideration to Nolasco-Nolasco’s 

CAT claim and substantial evidence supports the determination 

that Nolasco-Nolasco did not demonstrate that she more likely than 

not would be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the Guatemalan government. Therefore, we deny Nolasco-Nolasco’s petition. 

PETITION DENIED.

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