United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 18, 2022 

Decided February 22, 2022 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 21-2182 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ANTHONY X. BAKER, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 03-cr-10091 

Michael M. Mihm, 

Judge. 

 O R D E R 

The district court revoked Anthony Baker’s supervised release after he fled from 

police officers attempting to arrest him, caused a car accident during a high-speed 

chase, and was eventually caught with controlled substances. Baker appeals the 

revocation and sentence of 34 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. 

His appointed counsel believes the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. 

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Baker responded to counsel’s motion with 

arguments that he wishes to raise on appeal. See CIR. R. 51(b). Because counsel’s brief 

appears adequate and addresses the issues we would expect in an appeal of this kind, 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 
No. 21-2182 Page 2 

we limit our review to the issues in the brief and Baker’s response. See United States v. 

Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

 Unless there are extraordinary circumstances, the appellant has a right to counsel 

in a supervised-release revocation proceeding only if he is plausibly denying the 

violations or presenting complex mitigation arguments. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 

778, 790–91 (1973); United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2006). Baker 

does neither. (As we discuss below, his potential challenge to the revocation is 

frivolous.) Nonetheless, we apply the safeguards of Anders to ensure that all issues 

receive proper consideration. United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). 

 Baker was sentenced in 2004 to 262 months’ imprisonment and 8 years of 

supervised release for possessing at least 5 grams of crack cocaine with the intent to 

distribute. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2004). In 2019, his sentence was reduced under 

§ 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222, to time 

served, and he began a six-year term of supervised release. 

Two years later, the probation office petitioned to revoke Baker’s supervised 

release. According to the petition, a police dog alerted for drugs in Baker’s car during a 

traffic stop. When police officers ordered Baker to step out, he instead put the vehicle in 

drive, sped away, and led officers on a dangerous chase. After Baker crashed his car 

and continued his flight on foot, a witness saw him toss away a plastic bag, which was 

later recovered; it contained controlled substances including over 20 grams of crack 

cocaine. The probation office alleged that Baker had violated his conditions of release by 

committing three crimes: (1) possession of crack cocaine with the intent to deliver, 

(2) possession of other controlled substances (cocaine and a fentanyl–heroin mixture), 

and (3) aggravated fleeing and eluding. He was also charged in Illinois state court with 

delivering cocaine and aggravated fleeing and eluding (but not with simple possession). 

At the revocation hearing, defense counsel explained that Baker wished to 

stipulate that the government could call witnesses to “testify consistently with the 

events in the petition” and avoid creating a record that might prejudice him in the state 

prosecution. The court confirmed that Baker wished to stipulate to the three violations 

(namely, “two involving drugs and ... one involving the offense of aggravated fleeing 

and eluding”) and had discussed the matter with counsel. It then asked Baker directly if 

he would stipulate that the government could call witnesses whose testimony would 

establish the violations by a preponderance of the evidence. Baker responded in the 

affirmative, and the court found him guilty of the three violations. 
No. 21-2182 Page 3 

The hearing proceeded to sentencing. Defense counsel asked for a time-served 

sentence, a downward variance from the range of 33 to 36 months of reincarceration 

prescribed by the policy statements in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines. 

§§ 7B1.1(a)(1), 7B1.4 & cmt. n.1. In mitigation, counsel emphasized that Baker had 

maintained employment continuously since soon after his release despite a challenging 

beginning: he had been released suddenly upon the reduction of his sentence, with no 

preparation for reentering society, and was initially homeless and placed in a shelter. 

He passed 44 out of 45 drug tests while on supervision. And he had already served 

almost 18 years in prison—more than his conviction would carry under current law. 

The government emphasized the seriousness of the violations: Baker was caught with 

crack cocaine packaged for sale, powder cocaine, and a combination of heroin and 

fentanyl. His dangerous flight from police placed others in jeopardy when he briefly 

drove the wrong way on a highway and when he hit another car. 

The court acknowledged Baker’s positive work record and “some strong 

indications that you were not using drugs yourself.” It also remarked that he “served a 

long time” before being released when the law changed. Still, the court found that his 

serious and dangerous conduct required a prison sentence because releasing him with 

time served would “send[] the wrong message” to him and others. It thus denied 

Baker’s request for a variance. The court sentenced Baker to 34 months’ 

reimprisonment, concurrent to any sentence in the state case, to be followed by three 

years of supervised release. 

In his response to counsel’s submission, Baker contends that he did not fully 

understand the allegations against him when he stipulated to the three violations. He 

says that he never reviewed the revocation petition before the hearing; his information 

came from what he calls the presentence investigation report (apparently, the probation 

office’s sentencing recommendation, which includes fewer details than the petition). He 

says that he believed at the time of the hearing that he was charged only with the same 

two violations for which he was facing state charges—possession of crack cocaine with 

the intent to deliver and aggravated fleeing and eluding—and that he would not have 

stipulated knowingly to possessing fentanyl. In fact, he insists that immediately before 

the hearing he told his attorney to dispute any accusations involving fentanyl. 

Because Baker wants to challenge the validity of the revocation, counsel first 

considers arguments that Baker did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to 

contest the charged violations. Baker did not seek to withdraw the waiver in the district 

court, and so we would review for plain error. United States v. Nelson, 931 F.3d 588, 
No. 21-2182 Page 4 

590–91 (7th Cir. 2019). We agree with counsel’s conclusion that it would be frivolous to 

argue that accepting Baker’s stipulation was plainly erroneous. Defense counsel stated, 

and Baker confirmed, Baker’s intent to stipulate that government witnesses would 

testify consistently with the revocation petition. Although the court did not set forth the 

allegations in detail—presumably to avoid prejudicing Baker in the state case—it 

referred to three charges, “two involving drugs and one involving the offense of 

aggravated fleeing and eluding.” It thus confirmed that Baker was familiar with the 

charges and wished to stipulate that the government could prove all three. Therefore, 

Baker cannot reasonably argue that the “totality of the circumstances” shows the waiver 

to be unknowing or involuntary. Id. at 591. Further, Baker received due process: he 

“was given adequate notice, represented at all times, appeared at the hearing, and was 

afforded an opportunity to make a statement and present information in mitigation.” 

United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1). 

Baker also argues that the police report of his arrest was insufficient evidence to 

support a finding that he committed the alleged violations. But any challenge to the 

revocation on this ground would be frivolous. Once Baker stipulated that the 

government could prove the violations, the court was required to revoke his release, 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1), no matter the nature of the government’s proof. We further note 

that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in revocation proceedings. FED. R. EVID. 

1101(d)(3); United States v. Falls, 960 F.3d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 2020). 

As to the sentence, counsel concludes correctly that Baker could not plausibly 

challenge his 34-month sentence as unlawful or based on an incorrect policy-statement 

range. Baker faced a statutory maximum sentence of 36 months. The court correctly 

calculated this maximum because (under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 

111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2373 (2010), made retroactive by the First Step Act) the 

maximum sentence for his underlying offense was 30 years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); 

United States v. Corner, 967 F.3d 662, 665–66 (7th Cir. 2020) (instructing district court to 

apply First Step Act when calculating policy-statement range for revocation sentence). 

This reclassified the offense as a class B felony, see 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(2), leading to a 

maximum revocation sentence of 36 months, id. § 3583(e)(3). Similarly, Baker’s new 

three-year term of supervised release was below the maximum allowed term of life. 

See id. § 3583(h) (capping post-revocation supervised release at “the term of supervised 

release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original term of 

supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of 

supervised release”); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (authorizing lifetime supervised release). 
No. 21-2182 Page 5 

 Counsel does not explain his conclusion that the district court properly 

calculated the policy-statement range, but we have confirmed it. The range of 33–41 

months (capped at 36 months because of the statutory maximum) was proper under 

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 based on Baker’s grade A violations (controlled-substance offenses 

punishable by at least one year in prison, § 7B1.1(a)(1)) and criminal history category of 

VI (as properly calculated at the original sentencing, § 7B1.4 cmt. n.1). 

Next, counsel considers and rejects arguments that the court inadequately 

explained its choice of sentence. The court stated, “I certainly take note of everything 

you said” and acknowledged Baker’s positive history of employment and clean drug 

tests since release. But the court went on to explain that a sentence within the policystatement range was necessary because of the dangerous nature of his conduct and the 

need for deterrence. This “adequate statement of reasons” suffices under our deferential 

review, and any argument to the contrary would be frivolous. Jones, 774 F.3d at 404–05. 

Baker adds that the court failed to consider all of his mitigation arguments, but 

any appeal on this ground would be frivolous as well. The court stated that it had 

considered all such arguments and expressly discussed all but one—that Baker faced an 

unusually difficult reentry to society because he was released suddenly with little 

preparation and no home. But when imposing a revocation sentence, unlike at the 

initial sentencing, the court does not have a “strict duty” to address all substantial 

mitigation arguments. United States v. Dawson, 980 F.3d 1156, 1165 (7th Cir. 2020). The 

court did all that was required by allowing Baker to present mitigation arguments and 

considering them “with an open mind.” Id. 

Next, counsel contemplates and rejects substantive challenges to Baker’s 

sentence. We presume the terms of reimprisonment and supervised release to be 

reasonable because both are within the policy-statement ranges, and we will uphold 

them unless “plainly unreasonable.” Jones, 774 F.3d at 403–04. Given the district court’s 

remarks about the seriousness of Baker’s conduct and the need for deterrence, we agree 

with counsel that Baker has no nonfrivolous arguments to raise. 

Finally, to the extent that Baker questions his attorney’s performance in the 

revocation proceedings, any potential ineffective-assistance claim would be appropriate 

in a collateral attack, but not in this direct appeal. See United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 

337, 340 (7th Cir. 2014). 

We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.