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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TYRICE D. EDGE

(AC 34903)

Alvord, Bear and Borden, Js.*

Argued April 22—officially released May 20, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Waterbury, Damiani, J. [judgment]; Cremins, J. [motion

to withdraw plea].)

Carlos E. Candal, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Emily Graner Sexton, special deputy assistant state’s

attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Maureen Platt,

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The defendant, Tyrice D. Edge,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The dispositive

question is whether the court improperly concluded

that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of that

motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The relevant facts are undisputed. In September,

2011, the defendant was arrested and charged with one

count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-70, one count of sexual assault

in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-73a, and one count of risk of injury to a child in

violation of General Statutes § 53-21. At the time of his

arrest, the defendant was on probation following his

2001 guilty plea to certain narcotics offenses, for which

he received a total effective sentence of fifteen years of

imprisonment, execution suspended after eight years,

with five years of probation.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant on May

11, 2012, pleaded guilty, pursuant to the Alford doctrine,1

to one count ofrisk of injury to a child in violation

of § 53-21 (a) (2). At the plea hearing, the court thoroughly canvassed the defendant concerning his plea,

after which it accepted the guilty plea. When the defendant then elected to waive his right to the preparation

of a presentence investigation and report, the court

proceeded to sentence the defendant, consistent with

the terms of the plea agreement, to a term of eighteen

years of incarceration, execution suspended after five

years, with ten years of probation.

The defendant thereafter filed a motion to withdraw

that guilty plea on May 21, 2012. The court heard argument on the motion on June 27, 2012, during which

counsel for the defendant stated that ‘‘[e]ssentially,

there are two bases for the withdrawal of the plea. One

is that [the defendant] advises me that he was not aware

that he could not withdraw his plea once the plea was

accepted. Additionally, and more importantly, [the

defendant] wrote me a letter recently, indicating that

at the time that he entered the pleas he was under the

influence of some medication that was administered to

him at Walker Correctional Institution, that he suffered

from periods of anxiety, depression, confusion, delusions, disorientation, and many other side effects, making him unable to understand fully the ramifications of

the guilty plea.’’ After noting various affirmative

responses of the defendant and his counsel during the

plea canvass, the court ultimately concluded that it

lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the

court dismissed the motion to withdraw, and this

appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that his plea ‘‘was

not knowingly and intelligently entered’’ in violation
of his right to due process. The state responds, as a

threshold matter, that the court properly determined

that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the defendant’s

motion to withdraw. We agree with the state.

A determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law over which our

review is plenary. State v. DeVivo, 106 Conn. App. 641,

644, 942 A.2d 1066 (2008). It is well established that ‘‘the

jurisdiction of the sentencing court terminates once a

defendant’s sentence has begun, and, therefore, that

court may no longer take any action affecting a defendant’s sentence unless it expressly has been authorized

to act.’’ Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, 258

Conn. 30, 37, 779 A.2d 80 (2001). Likewise, Practice

Book § 39-26 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] defendant may not withdraw his or her plea after the conclusion of the proceeding at which the sentence was

imposed.’’ As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘once

a defendant’s sentence is executed, the trial court lacks

jurisdiction to entertain any claims regarding the validity of that plea in the absence of a statute or rule of

practice to the contrary.’’ State v. Das, 291 Conn. 356,

368, 968 A.2d 367 (2009); see also State v. Reid, 277

Conn. 764, 776 n.14, 894 A.2d 963 (2006) (‘‘Practice

Book § 39-26 merely recognizes the general or commonlaw grant of jurisdiction, regulates the procedure by

which that jurisdiction may be invoked, and acknowledges that, absent a legislative grant, jurisdiction does

not continue indefinitely, once invoked, but, rather, terminates with the conclusion of the proceeding at which

the sentence is imposed’’). This bedrock principle

applies with equal force to motions to withdraw guilty

pleas predicated, like the one in the present case, on

an alleged deprivation of a defendant’s ‘‘constitutional

right to due process of law because his original plea

. . . was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary . . . .’’

State v. Dyous, 307 Conn. 299, 334–35, 53 A.3d 153

(2012). Bound by that precedent, we conclude that the

court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction

over the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

The judgment is affirmed.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

1

‘‘Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed.

2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt . . .

but consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of

proceeding to trial. . . . A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is a judicial

oxymoron in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that

the state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept

the entry of a guilty plea nevertheless.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 558 n.2, 941 A.2d

248 (2008).