TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY

Actions Needed to 

Address Limitations in 

TSA’s Transportation 

Worker Security 

Threat Assessments 

and Growing 

Workload

Report to Congressional Committees

December 2011

GAO-12-60

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
 United States Government Accountability Office 

Highlights of GAO-12-60, a report to 

congressional committees 

December 2011 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

Actions Needed to Address Limitations in TSA’s 

Transportation Worker Security Threat Assessments

and Growing Workload 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Within the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) 

manages several credentialing 

programs, which include background 

checking (known as Security Threat 

Assessments) and issuing credentials 

to transportation workers requiring 

unescorted access to the nation’s 

transportation facilities. The number of 

TSA programs and their potential for 

redundancy with state and local 

government programs has raised 

questions about these credentialing 

programs. In response to a mandate in 

the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 

2010, GAO examined TSA 

credentialing programs to identify (1) 

the roles and responsibilities of federal 

and nonfederal government entities 

related to TSA’s transportation worker 

credentialing programs and how they 

compare, and (2) any key challenges 

TSA faced in ensuring the 

effectiveness of its credentialing 

programs. GAO reviewed program 

documentation, such as program 

processes, and conducted structured 

interviews with selected airports, port 

authorities, and state agencies. GAO 

selected nonfederal government 

entities based on volume of 

passengers, truckers, and cargo. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO recommends that (1) TSA and 

the FBI conduct a joint risk assessment 

of TSA’s access to criminal history 

records, (2) TSA assess costs and 

benefits of using state-provided 

criminal history information, and (3) 

TSA develop a workforce staffing plan 

to address its growing Adjudication 

Center workload. 

DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations.

What GAO Found 

Nonfederal government entities have varying roles and responsibilities under 

three TSA transportation worker credentialing programs we reviewed—the 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential program (TWIC) for maritime 

workers; the Hazardous Materials Endorsement program (HME) for truckers 

seeking a commercial drivers license endorsement to carry hazardous materials; 

and the Aviation Workers program for airport workers. TSA administers the TWIC 

credentialing process, with no role for maritime port facility operators outside of 

verifying issued credentials. Under HME, state licensing agencies issue 

endorsements based on whether TSA reports favorable background checking 

results. In contrast, under the Aviation Workers program, TSA and airports share 

responsibility for the vetting process for airport workers, with airports responsible 

for enrolling applicants, adjudicating criminal history results TSA provides, and 

issuing, and if necessary, revoking airport badges. Eleven of 17 selected 

maritime ports—including 4 of the top 10 largest ports—reported implementing 

additional credentialing requirements to those under TSA regulations, which 

generally included requirements for applicants to obtain and present local port 

identification—in addition to a TWIC—to gain unescorted access. At three of 

these ports, local agencies conducted additional criminal history checks. In 

addition, 4 of 6 selected state licensing agencies responsible for issuing 

commercial drivers licenses were conducting additional criminal history checks 

on HME applicants. Some programs included applicant fees which added to the 

costs already incurred by applicants in obtaining TSA credentials. However, port 

officials reported their programs provided additional benefits over TSA’s 

programs. The state and local credentialing programs we reviewed 

complemented the existing credentialing programs administered by TSA. 

TSA faces challenges in ensuring it has the necessary information and appropriate 

staffing to effectively conduct Security Threat Assessments for applicants to its 

transportation worker credentialing programs. First, in general, the level of access 

that TSA credentialing programs receive to Department of Justice (DOJ) Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history records is the level of access 

accorded for noncriminal justice purposes (e.g., equal to that of a private company 

doing an employment check on a new applicant, according to TSA) which limits 

TSA in accessing certain criminal history data related to charges and convictions. 

While TSA is seeking criminal justice type access to FBI systems, the FBI reports 

that it is legally unable to provide this access. The FBI and TSA are collaborating 

on options, but have not identified the extent to which a potential security risk may 

exist under the current process, and the costs and benefits of pursuing alternatives 

to provide additional access. Second, TSA officials reported the agency was not 

reviewing some state-provided criminal history for HME applicants because TSA 

did not have a mechanism to efficiently capture the data in its case system. 

Identifying a solution may help TSA better identify HME applicants posing security 

threats. Third, the TSA Adjudication Center relies on contractors for adjudicating 

applicant cases, and contractor turnover has affected the agency’s ability to meet 

its growing workload. Developing a workforce staffing plan that considers the costs 

and benefits of using contractors will help ensure that TSA meets its growing 

View GAO-12-60 or key components. credentialing workload. For more information, contact Stephen M. 

Lord at (202) 512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-60 Transportation Security 

Letter 1 

Background 8

Stakeholder Roles and Responsibilities Vary under TSA 

Credentialing Programs, and Nonfederal Entities Have 

Implemented Additional Requirements 13

TSA Faces Data and Staffing Challenges in Ensuring Effectiveness 

of its Security Threat Assessments of Transportation Workers 28

Conclusions 41

Recommendations for Executive Action 42

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 42

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 46 

Appendix II TSA Credentialing Programs 51 

Appendix III TSA TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers Programs: 

Legislative Background and Purpose 53 

Appendix IV Criminal Offenses That May Disqualify Applicants from 

Acquiring a TWIC or HME 55 

Appendix V Criminal Offenses That Disqualify Applicants under the Aviation 

Workers Program from Acquiring an Airport-Issued Access Badge 58 

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 61 

Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 66

Contents 
Page ii GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Tables

Table 1: Selected Characteristics of the 11 Selected Maritime Ports 

with State or Local Credentialing Programs 19

Table 2: Four Selected States Conducting Criminal History Record 

Checks on HME Applicants 26

Table 3: TSA Credentialing Programs 51

Table 4: Legislative Background and Purpose of TSA’s TWIC, HME, 

and Aviation Workers Programs 53

Figures

Figure 1: Comparison of TSA and Nonfederal Governing Entity 

Roles with Respect to the TWIC, HME, and Aviation 

Workers Programs 15

Figure 2: Average Monthly Program Enrollment and TTAC 

Adjudication Center Caseload for Reviewing Applicants 

with Potentially Disqualifying Information for TWIC, 

HME, and Aviation Workers Programs—July 2010 through 

June 2011 39
Page iii GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Abbreviations

ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

Compact Act National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Act

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOT Department of Transportation

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

HME Hazardous Materials Endorsement 

MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act 

NCIC National Crime Information Center

SIDA Security Identification Display Area

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TTAC Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing 

TWIC Transportation Worker Identification Credential

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

December 8, 2011

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV

Chairman

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison

Ranking Member

Committee on Commerce, Science,

 and Transportation

United States Senate

The Honorable Peter T. King

Chairman

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

Securing transportation systems and facilities requires balancing security 

to address potential threats while facilitating the flow of people and goods 

that are critical to the U.S. economy and international commerce. Since 

9/11, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken steps to ensure that 

transportation workers, particularly those that transport hazardous 

materials or have unescorted access to secure areas of federally 

regulated maritime or airport transportation facilities are properly 

screened to ensure they do not pose a security threat.1

 

1

Under Coast Guard maritime security regulations, a secure area, in general, is an area 

over which the owner/operator has implemented security measures for access control in 

accordance with a Coast Guard-approved security plan. For most maritime facilities, the 

secure area is generally any place inside the outer-most access control point. For a vessel 

or outer continental shelf facility, such as off-shore petroleum or gas production facilities, 

the secure area is generally the whole vessel or facility. Secured airport areas include 

those portions of an airport, specified in the airport security program, for which security 

measures are conducted and generally include three categories. In general (1) a Security 

Identification Display Area (SIDA) is an area in which appropriate identification must be 

worn, (2) a sterile area provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and is an area to 

which access is generally controlled by TSA or a private screening entity under TSA 

oversight, and (3) an Air Operations Area is an area providing access to aircraft 

movements and parking areas. See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5.

These efforts are 

intended to reduce the probability of a successful terrorist or other 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

criminal attack on the nation’s transportation systems, which include 

approximately 360 ports and more than 450 commercial airports.

TSA reported administering 17 transportation security related 

credentialing programs covering a population of approximately 15 million 

transportation workers such as those accessing airports and maritime 

ports, as well as truckers seeking a hazardous materials endorsement to 

a commercial driver’s license. These 17 TSA credentialing programs 

include conducting applicant background checks—known as Security 

Threat Assessments—which are TSA reviews of applicant information 

and searches of government databases to determine if the applicant has 

known ties to terrorism and meets specified requirements such as those 

relating immigration status and criminal history.2 In addition, pursuant to 

federal law and corresponding regulations, TSA requires that airport and 

aircraft operators ensure that individuals undergo a fingerprint-based 

criminal history records check and terrorism and immigration checks, 

before receiving identification credentials that enable them unescorted 

access to SIDA or sterile areas of the airport.3 Most TSA credentialing 

programs are administered internally with no equivalent nonfederal 

government entity (namely states or port authorities) responsibilities 

under federal regulations.4

 

2

A Security Threat Assessment includes conducting a background check to determine 

whether each applicant is a security risk to the United States. These checks, in general, 

can include checks for criminal history records, immigration status, terrorism databases 

and watchlists, and records indicating an adjudication of lack of mental capacity, among 

other things. TSA security threat assessment-related regulations define the term security 

threat to mean an individual whom TSA determines or suspects of posing a threat to 

national security; to transportation security; or of terrorism. 

However, for 3 of 17 TSA programs, 

nonfederal government entities have certain responsibilities under federal 

statutes and corresponding regulations, such as for enrolling applicants or 

issuing credentials to workers. These 3 programs are as follows:

3

See 49 U.S.C. § 44936; 49 C.F.R. §§ 1542.209, 1544.229 and 1544.230. 

4

For example, in accordance with Coast Guard regulation, all mariners employed aboard 

U.S. merchant vessels greater than 100 Gross Register Tons (Domestic Tonnage), except 

operators of uninspected passenger vessels, are required to have a valid U.S. Merchant 

Mariners Credential. Under this program, TSA and Coast Guard conduct the background 

check, with Coast Guard responsible for issuing a credential. Once the credential is 

issued, the Coast Guard is responsible for verifying the validity of the credential. 

Nonfederal public entities—such as a state or port authority—do not have roles in this 

credentialing process. Port authorities may be state or local government entities, but may 

also be privately operated. 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

• TSA’s Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 

Program: A program requiring TSA to complete a Security Threat 

Assessment on individuals requiring unescorted access to secure or 

restricted areas of maritime facilities regulated under the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 20025 and to issue a TSA 

biometric credential to qualified individuals.6

• TSA’s Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) Threat 

Assessment Program: A program requiring TSA to conduct a 

Security Threat Assessment on truckers who apply for a Hazardous 

Materials Endorsement to a state commercial driver’s license.

• TSA’s Aviation Workers Program: A program requiring TSA to 

complete a Security Threat Assessment and airport operators to 

complete a criminal history record check on individuals who apply for 

or are issued a credential for unescorted access to secure areas in 

U.S. domestic airports, including airport facility workers, retail 

employees, and airline employees.

Federal statutes and corresponding regulations relating to the TWIC, 

HME, and Aviation Workers programs generally do not preempt 

nonfederal governing entities from implementing additional nonconflicting 

requirements. As a result, the number of credentialing programs in place 

by TSA, and the potential for their redundancy with nonfederal governing 

entity programs, has raised questions as to whether transportation 

workers may be subject to redundant background checks with different 

standards and additional costs.

Section 817 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 20107

 

5

Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064, 2073-74 (2002). 

mandated that 

we review background checks and forms of identification required under 

state and local transportation security programs and assess whether 

these programs duplicate or conflict with federal programs. The act also 

mandated that we make recommendations to the House Committee on 

Homeland Security and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 

6

Biometrics refers to technologies that measure and analyze human body 

characteristics—such as fingerprints, eye retinas and irises, voice patterns, facial patterns, 

and hand measurements—for authentication purposes.

7

Pub. L. No. 111-281, 124 Stat. 2905, 2999 (2010).
 

Page 4 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

and Transportation on steps that can be taken to reduce or eliminate the 

duplication with federal programs. To fulfill this requirement, we 

addressed the following questions:

• What are the roles and responsibilities of federal and nonfederal 

government entities related to certain TSA transportation worker 

credentialing-related programs and how do selected nonfederal 

governing entities’ credentialing programs compare to TSA’s 

programs?

• What challenges, if any, does TSA face in ensuring the effectiveness 

of its credentialing-related programs?

To identify which DHS credentialing programs for transportation workers 

have requirements for state and local governments, we analyzed relevant 

federal laws, including pertinent sections, as amended, of the Uniting and 

Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 

Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,8 the 

Aviation and Transportation Security Act,9

To identify the roles and responsibilities of federal and nonfederal 

government entities related to certain TSA transportation security 

credentialing-related programs and how selected nonfederal governing 

entities’ credentialing programs compare to TSA’s programs, we 

examined TSA documentation on the TWIC Program, HME Program, and 

Aviation Workers Program. We also interviewed officials at TSA, the DHS 

Screening Coordination Office

and MTSA, plus relevant DHS 

regulations that set out corresponding requirements for TSA and 

nonfederal governing entities with respect to conducting background

checks and issuing identification to transportation workers. On the basis 

of this information, we focused our analysis on comparing nonfederal 

transportation worker credentialing programs with TSA’s TWIC, HME, and 

Aviation Workers programs. Only the TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers 

programs include nonfederal governing entity responsibilities with respect 

to TSA programs.

10

 

8

Pub. L. No.107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 396 (2001).

, the Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of 

9

Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597, 639-40 (2001).

10The Screening Coordination Office was established by DHS to coordinate the numerous 

and disparate credentialing and screening initiatives within DHS. 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Transportation (DOT) to 

discuss their role and nonfederal government entity roles in TSA 

transportation worker credentialing programs. We also interviewed 

officials from nine stakeholder organizations that represent the broad 

spectrum of nonfederal governing entity interests in TSA’s programs, as 

well as officials from state and local governing agencies at selected 

maritime ports, airports, and state agencies to obtain their perspectives 

on TSA and nonfederal government roles and responsibilities.11

We collected information from maritime port authorities at 17 maritime 

port locations—including the top 10 ports by container volume in 2010—

plus 7 additional ports we identified as having credentialing programs. We 

visited officials at five locations (Baltimore, Maryland; Norfolk, Virginia; 

Miami and Port Everglades, Florida; and New York, New York), based on 

whether a state or local port authority had in place a credentialing 

program outside of TSA’s TWIC program. We also collected information 

from eight category X12 airports—this included 4 of the top 6 airports by 

passenger boardings in 2009 plus four additional airports based on 

proximity to GAO offices.13

 

11These organizations included the American Association of Port Authorities, Owner 

Operator Independent Drivers Association; American Trucking Associations; American 

Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators; American Association of Airport Executives; 

Institute of Makers of Explosives; National Petrochemical & Refiners Association; 

International Liquid Terminals Association; and the Agricultural Retailers Association.

We conducted site visits to three of these 

eight airports (Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Washington Dulles 

International Airport, and Baltimore-Washington International Airport).

Further, we collected information on state requirements for issuing 

hazardous material endorsements to commercial driver’s licenses from 

licensing agencies in six states, including the top five states as ranked by 

commercial drivers license issuance based on DOT data as of December 

2010, plus one additional state that we identified as having additional 

12TSA classifies the nation’s approximately 450 commercial airports into one of five 

categories (X, I, II, III, and IV) based on various factors, such as the number of take-offs 

and landings annually, the extent of passenger screening at the airport, and other security 

considerations. In general, Category X airports have the largest number of passenger 

boardings, and Category IV airports have the smallest. 

13We obtained information from eight airports, including: Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta 

International Airport, Los Angeles International Airport; Denver International Airport; John 

F. Kennedy International Airport; Seattle-Tacoma International Airport; Washington Dulles 

International Airport; Baltimore/Washington International Airport; and Portland 

International Airport.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

state requirements.14

To obtain information on challenges, if any, TSA faced in ensuring the 

effectiveness of its credentialing-related programs, we reviewed our 

reports, and analyzed pertinent laws and regulations related to TSA’s use 

of criminal history record information, as well as TSA program 

documentation, including program training manuals, staffing information, 

and other documents detailing program processes and challenges TSA 

faced, for the TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers credentialing programs. 

We also reviewed TSA data on the number of enrollments and 

adjudication caseload for TSA’s TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers 

programs—covering the period of July 2010 through June 2011. Through 

interviews with knowledgeable TSA officials we determined that these 

data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We interviewed 

headquarters officials from TSA’s Transportation Threat Assessment and 

Credentialing (TTAC) program

To determine how nonfederal governing entities’ 

credentialing programs compare to TSA’s programs, we analyzed 

pertinent federal laws and regulation which authorize the TWIC, HME, 

and Aviation Workers programs, such as MTSA and the USA PATRIOT 

Act, as well as TSA policy documents for implementing the programs, 

such as operational guidance and policies. By reviewing these laws, 

regulations, and policies, we identified requirements of TSA and select 

state and local governing agencies, as well as applicant eligibility 

standards such as lists of disqualifying criminal offenses and duration of 

time that agencies were required to consider these disqualifying criminal 

offenses (“look back period”). We then compared these standards and 

practices with those implemented under nonfederal governing agency 

(state or local) programs we identified. While the information we obtained 

from selected nonfederal governing entities cannot be generalized across 

all states and localities, it provided us with a perspective on how state and 

local government transportation worker programs compare with federal 

programs and requirements.

15

 

14We obtained information from six states: California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, New York, 

and Texas. 

, DHS’ Screening Coordination Office, 

15On September 27, 2011, TSA announced a reorganization that would place TTAC into a 

newly established Office of Intelligence and Analysis. According to TSA, the agency is 

making several enhancements to better align headquarters functions to enable its 

continued evolution to a high performance counterterrorism organization. This includes 

merging various TTAC functions with the Office of Intelligence to ensure vetting and 

intelligence informs daily operations. 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

and the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division, which 

maintains the FBI’s national criminal history repository. Further, we 

reviewed cases from selected nonfederal governing entities of applicants 

whom entities had reported denying credentials, and the reasons they 

had done so. Additionally, we interviewed nonfederal agency 

stakeholders, including officials from two organizations representing state 

criminal justice repository agencies—the National Crime Prevention and 

Privacy Compact Council16 (Compact Council) and SEARCH.17 We then 

evaluated TSA credentialing program processes against TSA’s 

credentialing program mission needs and Standards for Internal Control 

in the Federal Government18

We conducted this performance audit from February through November 

2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The information we obtained through our 

interviews with nonfederal government entities and stakeholder 

organizations are not generalizable, but provided valuable perspectives 

related to TSA’s TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers programs. Appendix I 

contains a more detailed discussion of our objectives, scope and 

methodology.

 

16The Compact Council’s mission statement provides that the Compact Council, as a 

national independent authority, works in partnership with criminal history record 

custodians, end users, and policy makers to regulate and facilitate the sharing of 

complete, accurate, and timely criminal history record information to noncriminal justice 

users in order to enhance public safety, welfare, and security of society while recognizing 

the importance of individual privacy rights.

17SEARCH is a nonprofit organization created by and for states which serves as the 

national consortium for justice information and statistics. It is governed by a Membership 

Group comprised of one gubernatorial appointee from each of the 50 states, the District of 

Columbia, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as eight at-large appointees 

selected by SEARCH’s Chair. Members are primarily state-level justice officials 

responsible for operational decisions and policymaking concerning the management of 

criminal justice information, particularly criminal history information.

18GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO.AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
 

Page 8 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

TSA’s credentialing programs are focused on identifying security threats 

posed by those individuals seeking to obtain an endorsement, credential, 

access and/or privilege (hereafter called a credential) for unescorted 

access to secure or restricted areas of transportation facilities at maritime 

ports and airports, or for transporting hazardous materials. TSA’s 17 

transportation security credentialing programs cover a population of 

approximately 15 million transportation workers in the maritime, surface, 

and aviation transportation modes. See appendix II for a table 

summarizing TSA credentialing programs.

Most of the TSA credentialing programs are administered internally to 

TSA agencies with no equivalent nonfederal government entity 

responsibilities under federal regulations. In this way, there would not be 

potential for redundancy or duplication between DHS and nonfederal 

governing entity functions. Only the TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers 

programs include nonfederal governing entity responsibilities with respect 

to TSA programs. Appendix III summarizes the legislative background

and purpose of these three programs.

As of June 2011, TSA reports that, collectively, the TWIC, HME, and 

Aviation Workers programs accounted for a population of approximately 

4.4 million workers—about 30 percent of the population TSA has vetted 

through its 17 credentialing-related programs. The criteria TSA uses in its 

Security Threat Assessments for TWIC and HME applicants vary from 

that of the Aviation Workers Program. For example, Security Threat 

Assessment criteria are aligned under both the HME and TWIC 

programs. These criteria include 24 disqualifying criminal offenses 

categorized into 10 “permanent disqualifying criminal offenses” and 14 

“interim disqualifying criminal offenses.”19

 

19In addition, the TWIC and HME disqualifying criminal offenses include related 

conspiracy and attempt offenses for each of the 24 specified offenses. 

Four of the permanent 

disqualifying criminal offenses, such as an act of terrorism and 

Background

TSA Transportation 

Worker Credentialing 

Programs
 

Page 9 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

espionage, are not eligible for waiver.20 The other 20 disqualifying 

criminal offenses (6 permanent and 14 interim) are eligible for waiver.

Interim disqualifying criminal offenses are those specified offenses for 

which an individual has either been convicted, or found not guilty by 

reason of insanity during a 7-year period prior to the application, or for 

which an individual was released from incarceration during a 5-year 

period prior to the application. In contrast, under the Aviation Workers 

Program, there are 28 disqualifying criminal offenses, but no permanent 

disqualifiers.21 More specifically, disqualifying criminal offenses under the 

Aviation Workers Program are those for which an individual has been 

convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity during the 10 years 

prior to an application for airport identification. See appendix IV for a 

description of these disqualifying criminal offenses for the HME and TWIC 

programs and appendix V for these disqualifying criminal offenses for the 

Aviation Workers Program.

TSA’s TTAC is responsible for administering Security Threat 

Assessments for transportation workers seeking to obtain a credential.22

 

20Applicants with certain permanent disqualifying criminal offenses and any interim 

disqualifying criminal offenses may request a waiver of their disqualification. In general, 

TSA may issue such a waiver if TSA determines that an applicant does not pose a 

security threat based upon the security threat assessment. There is also an appeals 

process by which any applicant may appeal a TSA finding that the applicant poses a 

security threat.

This includes ensuring only eligible individuals are granted TSA-related 

credentials, such as a TWIC, or a TSA Security Threat Assessment 

approval for a nonfederal governing entity to issue an identification badge 

or endorsement, such as an HME on a Commercial Driver’s License. 

While TSA’s transportation worker credentialing-related programs include 

varying purposes, standards, or agency responsibilities, they generally 

include some or all of following process components:

21Similar to the TWIC and HME disqualifying criminal offenses, the aviation disqualifying 

criminal offenses also include additional related conspiracy and attempt offenses for each 

of the disqualifying offenses. 

22The mission of TTAC is to reduce the probability of a successful terrorist or other 

criminal attack on the transportation system through the application of threat assessment 

methodologies that are intended to identify known or suspected terrorist threats working or 

seeking to access the United States’ transportation system. 

TSA Credentialing-Related

Processes
 

Page 10 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

• Enrollment—Applicants pay an enrollment fee and submit biographic 

(name, address, etc.) and biometric information (photo and 

fingerprints) to TSA or nonfederal governing entity.

• Background checking—Security Threat Assessment processes 

include reviewing information to determine if applicants are 

disqualified to possess a credential based on criminal offenses, 

immigration eligibility issues, links to terrorism, or mental capacity, all 

varying by program. Criminal history record checks, which are 

fingerprint-based, require an adjudicator to review the applicant’s 

criminal history (referred to as a rap sheet) that occurred within a 

designated time frame (or look-back period) and compare this 

information against a set of disqualifying criminal offenses identified in 

statute and corresponding regulations in order to make a 

determination of eligibility. There are two levels of the Security Threat 

Assessment:

• Initial automated vetting. The initial automated vetting process is 

conducted to determine whether any derogatory information is 

associated with the name and fingerprints submitted by an 

applicant during the enrollment process. This check is to be 

conducted against the FBI’s criminal history records. These 

records contain information from federal, state and local sources 

in the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database 

and the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification 

System/Interstate Identification Index, which maintain criminal 

records and related fingerprint submissions.23

 

23The FBI maintains the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, which is 

a national fingerprint and criminal history system that responds to requests from local, 

state, and federal agencies. The system provides automated fingerprint search 

capabilities, latent search capability, electronic image storage, and electronic exchange of 

fingerprints and responses. A segment of this system is the FBI-maintained criminal 

history record repository, known as the Interstate Identification Index (III or “Triple I”) 

system that contains records from all states and territories, as well as from federal and 

international criminal justice agencies. The state records in the III are submitted to the FBI 

by central criminal record repositories that aggregate criminal records submitted by most 

or all of the local criminal justice agencies in their jurisdictions. The records in the system 

are all based on 10 rolled fingerprints, which provide a positive, biometric match between 

the individual and his or her record. The NCIC is a name and biographic descriptor-based 

computerized system containing criminal justice information (i.e. wanted person 

information; sex offender information; missing person information; unidentified person 

information; and stolen property information). 

The FBI’s criminal 

history records check is a negative identification check, whereby 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

the fingerprints are used to confirm that the associated individual 

is not identified as having a criminal record in the database. If an 

individual has a criminal record in the database, the FBI provides 

a criminal history rap sheet to TSA for adjudication. A check is 

also conducted against federal terrorist identity information from 

the Terrorist Screening Database, including the Selectee and NoFly lists.24 To determine an applicant’s immigration/citizenship 

status and eligibility, TSA also checks applicant information 

against the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements 

system.25

• TSA’s TTAC Adjudication Center Review. A second-level 

review is conducted as part of an individual’s background check if 

(1) the applicant has self-identified themselves to be a non-U.S. 

citizen or non-U.S. born citizen or national, or (2) the first-level 

review uncovers any derogatory information, such as a criminal 

offense. As such, not all applicants will be subjected to a secondlevel review. The second-level review consists of staff at TSA’s 

Adjudication Center in Herndon, Virginia reviewing the applicant’s 

enrollment file to determine if derogatory information may be 

potentially disqualifying.

If the applicant is a U.S.-born citizen with no related 

derogatory information, the system can approve the individual’s 

application for a credential with no further review of the applicant 

or human intervention.

 

24Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, dated September 16, 2003, the 

Terrorist Screening Center—under the administration of the FBI—was established to 

develop and maintain the U.S. government’s consolidated database of terrorist screening 

information, called the Terrorist Screening Database. Terrorist identity information in the 

Terrorist Screening Database is used for security-related screening processes. The 

Selectee List, a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database, contains information on 

individuals who must undergo additional security screening before being permitted to 

board an aircraft. The No Fly List, another subset of the Terrorist Screening Database, 

contains information on individuals who are prohibited from boarding an aircraft. The No 

Fly and Selectee lists contain applicable identity information from the Terrorist Screening 

Center’s consolidated database of known or suspected terrorists. 

25Run by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Systematic Alien Verification for 

Entitlements information system is an intergovernmental initiative designed to aid benefitgranting agencies in determining an applicant’s immigration status, thereby ensuring that 

only entitled applicants receive federal, state, or local public benefits and licenses. The 

program is an information service for benefit-granting agencies, institutions, licensing 

bureaus, and other governmental agencies. 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

• Credential Issuance—involves the issuance of a physical card or 

endorsement.

• Verification—refers to the responsibilities of the credential holder as 

well as the responsibilities of those entities which have regulatory 

responsibility for ensuring that only credentialed workers can perform 

certain functions or access secure or restricted areas of transportation 

facilities. This includes making a determination that the credential 

presented is authentic (not fraudulently developed); that the individual 

is the one to whom the document was issued (not an impostor), and 

remains valid (not revoked or expired).

• Renewal—requires applicants to re-enroll, undergo a new Security 

Threat Assessment, and obtain a new credential.

• Revocation—refers to the ability of the issuing entity to physically 

and/or electronically revoke a credential. Authority for revocation 

(such as TSA or a state or local government entity) varies pursuant to 

federal regulations for each credential program.

In general, TSA credentialing regulations related to programs with state 

and local government involvement do not preempt state and local 

governments from implementing their own background checking or 

badging system requirements. For example, the TWIC final rule noted 

that TSA has asserted preemption in some areas “where federal 

regulations have historically dominated the field, such as merchant 

mariner regulations” but not with respect to state “background checks or 

badging systems in addition to the TWIC.” According to the rule, states 

may be the proprietor of ports or port facilities, and as the proprietors they 

are is free to set standards determining who may enter their facilities, as 

does any other proprietor. The TWIC rule further provided that (1) states 

may have set standards for reasons other than guarding against the 

threat of terrorism, such as to combat drug smuggling or organized crime, 

and (2) as such, they are not regulating in the same areas that DHS is 

regulating. In addition, TSA’s 2004 Interim Final Rule for the HME 

program recognized that the state is the licensing body for drivers who 

are state residents, and that the state has a clear mandate and interest in 

protecting the residents and drivers within its borders from dangerous 

drivers. As a result, TSA asserted that it did not wish to preclude 

additional state measures applied to drivers by the state as long as such 

measures are not inconsistent with the TSA rule. In this way, a state may 

conduct background checks using information from the state’s criminal 

Regulations Concerning 

Federal Preemption of 

State and Local 

Credentialing 

Requirements
 

Page 13 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

history repository and/or add additional disqualifying offenses.26 However, 

according to the TSA Interim Rule, a state would be preempted from 

applying a standard in which the federal interim disqualifying offenses are 

no longer treated as disqualifying. Similarly, airports have generally not 

been preempted from instituting additional background checks beyond 

those required by federal regulation and TSA’s Aviation Workers 

Program, as part of their security plan and credentialing program.

TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment for those enrolled in its 

TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers programs, but state and local 

governing entities’ roles and responsibilities in these programs vary by 

program. For example, TSA is responsible for implementing the entire 

TWIC credentialing process including enrollment, background checks and 

credential issuance, with no role for maritime port facility operators—be 

they public port authority or privately operated facilities—outside of 

verifying credentials that have been issued. In contrast, under the 

Aviation Workers Program, TSA and airports and aircraft operators each 

have certain responsibilities for several elements of the credentialing 

process, including the criminal history record check. For example, airports 

and aircraft operators are responsible for ensuring the collection of 

application information, enrolling applicants and transmitting the results to 

 

26Each state maintains a central criminal repository, or database, of criminal arrests and 

convictions of individuals in that state. 

Stakeholder Roles 

and Responsibilities 

Vary under TSA 

Credentialing 

Programs, and 

Nonfederal Entities 

Have Implemented 

Additional 

Requirements

Stakeholders Have Varying 

Roles and Responsibilities 

in Credentialing
 

Page 14 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

TSA for the Security Threat Assessment. TSA’s roles include TSA 

adjudicating the immigration and terrorism checks, running automated 

FBI criminal history records, and transmitting the results of the criminal 

history record checks to the airports and aircraft operators, which have a 

responsibility under TSA regulations for adjudicating the criminal history 

to identify potentially disqualifying criminal offenses specified under TSA 

regulations, and making a final determination of eligibility.27

Figure 1 summarizes the credentialing processes for the TWIC, HME, 

and Aviation Workers programs and the respective responsibilities of 

TSA, nonfederal governing entities, and private entities under these TSA 

programs.

Moreover, 

airport and aircraft operators issue their own local identification badges.

 

27Individuals with unescorted access to an airports Sterile Area and SIDA are required to 

undergo immigration and terrorist vetting as well as a criminal history record check. Those 

requiring Air Operations Area access undergo a terrorist and immigration check, but not a 

criminal history record check.
 

Page 15 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Figure 1: Comparison of TSA and Nonfederal Governing Entity Roles with Respect to the TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers 

Programs
 

Page 16 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Port authorities or state agencies at 11 of the 17 maritime ports we 

contacted—including 4 of the top 10 largest maritime ports—had 

implemented additional credentialing requirements to those of the TWIC 

program.28

• Enrollment. In addition to collecting biometric and/or biographic 

information from applicants, ports with additional programs required 

applicants to have a valid TWIC and generally required employer 

sponsorship as prerequisites for obtaining a local port credential. In 

general, sponsorship included requirements for applicants to provide 

documentation of port employment, such as a letter with an 

authorized employer signature, which the governing entity verifies. For 

example, at the port of Norfolk, the Virginia Port Authority requires all 

facility operators to register with local law enforcement, and once 

registered, these facilities are authorized to submit applications on 

behalf of employees who require access. In general, the programs 

had aligned their renewal requirements with those of the applicant’s 

TWIC. For example, if an applicant has 3 of the 5 years of eligibility 

remaining on their TWIC, then the local credential would need to be 

renewed after 3 years.

Of these 11 maritime ports, 10 required employer sponsorship 

in addition to a valid TWIC, 3 required applicants to undergo additional 

criminal history record checks, and 10 issued a local port identification 

credential in addition to the TWIC which was necessary for gaining 

unescorted access to secure areas of MTSA regulated port facilities. The 

following highlights key elements of these programs.

• Background Checks. At 3 of 11 ports that had additional 

requirements, governing entities were conducting additional criminal 

history record checks, while two others—the Port of Miami and Port 

Everglades—had discontinued conducting additional criminal history 

record checks in May 2011 in addition to the federal-level checks TSA 

 

28Based on information we obtained between April and November 2011.

Nonfederal Governing 

Entities Have Additional 

Credentialing 

Requirements Compared 

to TWIC and HME

Maritime Port Programs
 

Page 17 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

used as part of its Security Threat Assessment for TWIC.29 First, 

whereas TSA’s criminal history record check is conducted based on 

searches of the FBI’s national databases, the governing entities for 

these three ports conduct both state and FBI criminal history record 

checks.30

• Issuance. We found the types of credential issued under local 

programs had similar characteristics, with some ports reporting plans 

to change or eliminate their physical credentials as part of a future 

TWIC reader system deployment. For example, 10 of 11 ports with 

additional credentialing programs had requirements in place for an 

individual to obtain and present a second, locally issued port 

identification for unescorted access to port facilities—in addition to a 

TWIC. Of these, 9 ports reported using machine-readable credentials 

as part of their access control systems.

State repositories are considered more comprehensive 

sources of state criminal history than that maintained by FBI 

databases. Second, one port governing agency considered additional 

disqualifying criminal offenses beyond those stipulated in TSA 

regulations that may disqualify applicants from acquiring the local port 

identification. For example, the Waterfront Commission of New York 

Harbor was screening applicants against additional disqualifying 

offenses, including theft and burglary, as did the two Florida ports 

prior to the repeal of Florida’s state criminal history record check 

requirement for seaport employees.

31

 

29In May 2011, the State of Florida amended Florida State Law 311.12 repealing 

provisions requiring workers accessing the state’s 12 active deepwater public ports to 

undergo a state criminal history records check. The repealed provisions contained 

disqualifying offenses, such as theft and burglary, not specifically identified as a 

disqualifying offense under the TWIC program. The repealed provisions also required that 

individuals who had obtained their TWIC through the federal TWIC-waiver process, 

whereby individuals with disqualifying offenses could be granted a TWIC, had to 

additionally seek a Florida waiver. While Florida has repealed its background check 

requirements, various Florida ports still require that individuals attempting to gain access 

to a port or facility provide a local port-specific identification card in addition to the TWIC.

For example, at the Port of 

30Each state maintains a repository, which is a central database that maintains criminal 

history records on all state offenders. Records include fingerprint files and files containing 

identification segments and notations of arrests and dispositions. The central repository is 

generally responsible for state-level identification of arrestees, and commonly serves as 

the central control terminal for contact with FBI record systems.

31A machine readable identification card can be read with or without direct contact 

(proximity) of the card with an electronic reader. Techniques for storing and reading the 

cards include smart chips which are integrated circuits imbedded in the card which allow 

data to be stored on the card, bar codes, and magnetic strips.
 

Page 18 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Wilmington, North Carolina, the North Carolina State Port Authority 

issues a local identification access card which is a machine-readable 

card with a smart chip that contains some personal information, such 

as a name and picture. In addition to verifying that a cardholder’s 

identification is valid for access to secure or restricted areas of the 

port facility, some entities had designed their systems to provide 

access control capabilities within the port facility so that only those 

populations of workers authorized to enter certain facilities within the 

port were able to do so. Unlike TWICs that cannot be customized by 

port facilities, some port-specific cards were color coded to signify 

areas which cardholders were authorized to access.

Six of 11 port authorities reported plans to revise or do away with their 

credentialing programs once the Coast Guard issues its final reader rule 

for the TWIC program and the ports deploy readers for electronically 

verifying TWICs.32 For example, in 2011, the South Carolina Port 

Authority reported it was planning to eliminate its physical identification 

card for the Port of Charleston and adopt a program whereby the port’s 

central database ties worker enrollment information with individuals’ 

TWIC information. Under this system, the port authority will upload 

permission to different access points which will be read by card readers 

and will verify whether a TWIC is active.33

Table 1 summarizes the key aspects of the 11 ports with additional 

credentialing requirements.

 

32To date, Coast Guard has not issued its final TWIC card reader rule. The Coast Guard is 

responsible for developing TWIC-related security regulations and ensuring that MTSAregulated maritime facilities and vessels are in compliance with these regulations. In 

August 2006, DHS officials decided, based on industry comment, to implement TWIC 

through two separate regulations, or rules. The first rule, issued in January 2007, directs 

the use of the TWIC as an identification credential or flashpass. The second rule, the card 

reader rule, is currently under development and is expected to address how the access 

control technologies, such as biometric card readers, are to be used for confirming the 

identity of the TWIC holder against the biometric information on the TWIC. On March 27, 

2009, the Coast Guard issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making for the card 

reader rule.

33TSA maintains a database identifying whether a TWIC is valid or has been cancelled. 

TSA provides MTSA regulated port facility operators with periodic updates of this 

information.
 

Page 19 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Table 1: Selected Characteristics of the 11 Selected Maritime Ports with State or Local Credentialing Programs

Port with state or local government programa,b

State criminal history 

record check Applicant fee

Local port 

credential issued

Alabama State Port Authority

(Mobile)

yes $25 yes

Port Evergladesc none (authorizing law 

repealed May 2011)

noned yes

Georgia State Port Authority

(Port of Savannah)

none none yes

Maryland Port Administration

(Port of Baltimore)

none none yes

Massachusetts Port Authority

(Port of Boston)

none none yes

Port of Miamic none (authorizing law 

repealed May 2011)

none yes

Port of New York/New Jerseye yes $25 for truck driver credential, 

$66.30 to $94.20 for 

longshoreman background 

checkf

yes

North Carolina State Ports Authority

(Port of Wilmington, Morehead City)

yes $20 yes

Port of Portland (Oregon) none none yes

South Carolina State Ports Authority (Charleston)g none none no

Virginia Port Authority

(Norfolk, Newport News, Portsmouth)

none none yes

Source: GAO analysis of selected maritime port credentialing program information.

a

As reported between April and November 2011. 

b

Covered populations include longshoremen, truck drivers, and other workers including contractors, 

vendors, shipping personnel, and any persons regularly accessing restricted areas of the marine 

terminals. 

c

On May 24, 2011, Florida repealed, among other things, the portions of state law 311.12, which had 

required the state to conduct FBI and state criminal history record checks of all individuals seeking 

unescorted access to restricted and secure areas within the state’s 12 active deepwater ports. These 

provisions of the Florida state law had been in place since 2000. According to a Port Everglades 

official, under this state program applicants were required to pay fees of $50 that included the criminal 

history record check and an administrative fee. 

d

Port Everglades does not charge a fee for TWIC holders to obtain a port credential. Port Everglades 

also issues credentials (with a fee of $25) to those individuals who work only in a supportive or 

administrative position within port offices and do not access secure or restricted areas of the port. 

e

Two separate governing agencies implement the background check and identification programs for 

workers seeking access to facilities at the Port of New York/New Jersey. The Waterfront Commission 

of New Harbor, a bi-state government agency, conducts criminal history record checks and issues an 

identification card to longshoremen seeking access to work at port facilities in New York and New 

Jersey. The Port Authority of New York/New Jersey does not conduct criminal history record checks 

on workers seeking access. However, the port authority requires truckers seeking access to register 

in its truck driver identification system, known as Sealink, and to obtain machine-readable 

identification cards. 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

f

The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor conducts state and FBI criminal history record 

checks on all longshoremen seeking a Waterfront Commission License, which is required to access 

Port of New York and New Jersey facilities. The Waterfront Commission charges varying fees to 

applicants depending upon whether they are New Jersey or New York residents. This includes 

$44.30 in New Jersey and $72.20 in New York to cover the costs of the respective state. An 

additional $22 is charged to cover the cost of an FBI national criminal history check. 

g

Previously, at the Port of Charleston, the South Carolina Port Authority charged an applicant a fee of 

$20 for enrollment and identification costs. However, a port official reported that the port had 

transitioned away from a physical card. Instead, the port had installed TWIC readers and was tying 

the applicant enrollment information to the TWIC card. 

Benefits of Maritime Programs. Officials at ports with credentialing 

programs reported their programs were providing additional security 

benefits to those of the TWIC program. In particular, ports most

commonly cited the following security benefits of their local credentialing 

programs:

• Mechanism for Establishing Business Need: Governing officials 

from 10 of 11 ports with additional programs reported that their local 

enrollment and identification served as a mechanism for establishing 

a valid business reason for an individual to access the secure or 

restricted areas of the port facility, in accordance with TSA and Coast 

Guard requirements. As discussed, under Coast Guard regulations, 

the possession of a TWIC itself is not sufficient to gain unescorted 

access to a secure area of a MTSA-regulated port facility—a facility 

operator must also ensure the applicant is authorized to be in the 

area.34 Because 10 of the 11 ports were requiring employer 

sponsorship, ports were using their enrollment and identification cards 

as a method for determining this business need. In this way, these 

local credentials are serving a purpose not included under TSA’s 

TWIC enrollment process because—as we reported in May 2011—

TSA’s TWIC enrollment process does not require employer 

sponsorship.35 Instead, applicants attest to their need for a TWIC via 

their signature on the application.

 

34The method by which facility operators may meet this requirement is left to the operator 

themselves, such as by questioning TWIC holders to determine whether they have a 

bonafide business need.

35GAO, Transportation Worker Identification Credential, Internal Control Weaknesses 

Need to Be Corrected to Help Achieve Security Objectives. GAO-11-657 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 10, 2011).
 

Page 21 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

• Denying Credentials to Criminals: Governing officials from the five 

ports with active or prior background check requirements cited 

benefits their local programs provide over TWIC to control and 

monitor access to individuals with criminal history. For example, 

maritime port authorities seek to limit crime in their ports and thus 

officials from two ports reported that they required additional scrutiny 

of all TWIC holders who reported receiving their TWIC through the 

TWIC waiver process. The TWIC waivers enabled applicants with 

certain interim disqualifying criminal offenses, such as murder or 

unlawful weapons possession, to obtain a TWIC.36 For example, the 

Port of Miami, Port Everglades, and the Alabama State Port Authority 

provided us with a sample of individuals who had either been denied 

local credentials or had local credentials revoked.37

In addition, officials from three ports reported criminal history record 

checks enabled them to target local risks facing their ports which are not 

addressed under TSA regulations for the TWIC program. For example, 

officials from the Port of Miami and the Waterfront Commission of New 

York Harbor told us that, while they recognized the threats posed by 

terrorism, crime was a major concern for their ports, particularly narcotics 

We provided TSA 

30 of these names to confirm that they had valid TWICs. In 11 of the 

30 cases, TSA adjudicators identified disqualifying criminal offenses 

but the applicants were ultimately approved for a TWIC through the 

redress process (waiver or appeals). Among those offenses 

committed by these 11 individuals were murder, attempted murder, 

carjacking and armed robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm.

 

36Under TSA’s Security Threat Assessment process, applicants who are determined to 

have disqualifying criminal offenses may request a waiver for certain disqualifying 

offenses, including murder and robbery. Appendix IV lists these offenses. MTSA required 

the establishment of a waiver process, and under TSA implementing regulations, TSA 

may issue a waiver if TSA determines that an applicant does not pose a security threat 

after considering, as applicable, the circumstances of the disqualifying act or offense, 

restitution made by the applicant, and federal or state mitigation remedies, court records, 

or official medical release documents indicating that the applicant no longer lacks mental 

capacity, or other factors that indicate the applicant does not pose a security threat 

warranting denial.

37TSA reported all were valid TWIC holders as of July 1, 2011.
 

Page 22 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

trafficking and cargo theft.38 Officials reported that by screening applicant 

criminal history records against certain additional disqualifying offenses to 

those of TWIC, such as theft, they were able to deny access to a 

population of felons they perceived as longstanding criminal risks facing 

the port who might be granted a TWIC. These governing entities reported 

denying credentials to applicants who had been granted TWICs. For 

example, between January 2009 and May 2011, the Port of Miami 

reported it had denied credentials to 101 applicants, including 52 valid 

TWIC holders.39

Further, the three ports reported that they had mechanisms in place for 

conducting recurring criminal history checks on an ongoing basis through 

an automated “rap back” program.

Port Everglades also reported it had denied credentials 

to applicants, including those with valid TWICs. Among those denied, was 

an individual convicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

cocaine in 2007, yet issued a TWIC in 2010. According to these Port 

Everglades documents, this individual was arrested several times for 

other offenses, such as unlawful possession of a firearm, including a 

short-barrel shotgun and machine gun, and other narcotics offenses.

40

 

38Concern over the impact of illicit drugs and drug trafficking came to the forefront in 

Florida during the mid to late 1990s. According to a 1998 Florida State Senate report, 

Florida ports had extensive criminal networks conducting narcotics and cargo theft. 

According to this report, in 1997 there were more cocaine-related deaths in Florida than 

murders. Additionally, the FBI estimates that in the United States, cargo theft amounts to 

$12 billion annually and finds that most cargo theft occurs in or near seaports. 

Specifically, the Waterfront 

Commission of New York Harbor, which conducts background checks for 

longshoremen at the Port of New York/New Jersey, has a mechanism in 

place that allows it to receive automated notifications on arrests and 

warrants. According to officials at the Waterfront Commission of New 

York Harbor, these notifications have led to the suspension and 

revocation of numerous longshoremen credentials. Examples from local 

credentialing programs of those who had TWICs but were denied by 

selected governing port authorities after local disqualifying criminal 

offenses were committed include the following:

39According to Port of Miami officials, many of the 52 TWIC holders were denied because 

they had disqualifying criminal offenses based on the former state port security law, 

including for multiple theft violations.

40A rap back refers to an automated system identifying arrests, wants, or warrant 

information of an individual after compiled criminal history information has been released 

to a requesting agency. 
 

Page 23 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

• An individual issued a TWIC in 2008, who was subsequently 

convicted of robbery and grand theft in 2010. The individual’s local 

credential was revoked in December 2010. TSA identified this 

individual as having a valid TWIC as of July 2011.

• Greater Access Control Than TWIC: At 9 of the 11 ports with 

additional programs, officials reported that having a local credential 

that could be verified by an existing access control system provided 

them the capability to better verify the card presented, while more 

quickly and effectively canceling access control to workers who violate 

security procedures. For example, a Florida port reported it revoked 

the local identification card of an individual because it had been 

notified by state law enforcement of the arrest of the cardholder for 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Officials noted that their 

programs were particularly important in verifying TWIC cardholders 

because the Coast Guard had yet to issue a final rule laying out 

requirements for electronic verification of TWICs.

Costs of Maritime Programs. Some of the 11 ports with separate 

credentialing programs imposed additional costs. The costs were largely 

associated with administering the credentialing program. For the ports 

that charged a fee, the applicants were required to pay these fees in 

addition to their credentialing costs already incurred in obtaining their 

TWIC.41

 

41TSA requires TWIC applicants pay a fee of $132.50 pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 469, which 

requires TSA to charge reasonable fees for credentialing and background investigations in 

the field of transportation.

We found that the nonfederal governing entities were charging 

applicant fees at 3 of 11 ports, ranging from $20 to $94.20. For these 

ports, applicant fees were generally covering costs for administering state 

and national FBI criminal history record checks. We found the fees 

among these ports differed based on the varying costs charged by 

governing entities for conducting the criminal history checks and whether 

an FBI criminal history record check was also required. For example, the 

Alabama State Port Authority conducts state criminal history record 

checks, and charges applicants a fee of $25 to cover the administrative 

costs for these checks and its port identification credential. According to 

the Alabama State Port Authority, applicant fees covered 70 percent of

the costs of its program, with the remainder funded by operating 
 

Page 24 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

revenues.42

Labor and industry organizations have for several years raised concerns 

over the costs imposed by federal, state and local port requirements. For 

example, the International Longshoreman’s Association has expressed 

concerns that allowing states to impose different requirements requiring 

multiple identification cards forces workers to go through additional review 

processes, and paperwork, and costs place an unfair burden on port 

workers, who would face redundant clearance processes. Other 

organizations, including the American Trucking Associations and the 

Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, have also raised cost 

concerns, particularly in that workers may be required to pay applicant 

fees to obtain multiple federal credentials. For example, with respect to 

federal requirements alone, generally a truck driver hauling hazardous 

materials is required to obtain a HME ($89.25 for TSA-managed states 

and more depending on state), and may also be required to obtain a 

TWIC ($105.25, if an applicant already has a HME) if he or she sought 

access to a MTSA-regulated port facility. Depending on the port, a local 

credentialing requirement may add an additional cost to the worker. TSA 

is reportedly developing new regulations in addition to a technical solution 

to help reduce redundancies in TSA’s Security Threat Assessment 

processes under its Transportation Infrastructure Modernization 

program.

Another agency, the Waterfront Commission—which requires 

applicants to successfully undergo a criminal history record check to 

obtain a license and credential authorizing their access to Port of New 

York and New Jersey facilities—charges applicants fees of up to $94.20 

to cover the costs of both the FBI criminal history record check and either 

a New York or New Jersey criminal history records checks depending 

upon the applicant being a resident of New York or New Jersey.

43

 

42The Alabama State Port Authority reported costs including an NCIC subscription for 

conducting name based criminal history checks and classroom supplies for required 

security awareness training required for applicants. 

43TSA established the Infrastructure Modernization program to standardize and 

consolidate the agency’s Security Threat Assessment systems. We are currently 

conducting a separate review of this program and anticipate reporting by the end of 

calendar year 2011.
 

Page 25 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

HME Issuance by State Licensing Agencies. Under federal law and 

corresponding TSA regulations, states are prohibited from issuing a 

commercial drivers license with a hazardous materials endorsement to an 

individual unless TSA first conducts a Security Threat Assessment and 

determines that the individual does not pose a security risk. We found 

that four of the six states we contacted conducted additional state criminal 

history record checks on HME applicants, in addition to the national FBI 

criminal history record checks TSA conducted.44 Of these four states, 

three—Florida, Texas, and Maryland—were submitting the results to TSA 

for further review and action. These three states were not adjudicating the 

results of these criminal history checks, but sending the information to 

TSA as part of its HME Security Threat Assessment.45 The other state, 

New York, was the only selected state which conducted a separate 

vetting program for HME applicants.46

 

44Of the six states that we contacted, the four that conducted state criminal history record 

checks were Florida, Maryland, New York, and Texas. Two others contacted—California 

and Illinois—reported not implementing additional activities.

For example, in accordance with 

New York state law, New York state is required to conduct both a state 

criminal history check and an FBI criminal history check on all HME 

applicants. In addition, New York State’s program includes additional 

disqualifying criteria beyond the HME related disqualifying criminal 

offenses considered under the TSA Security Threat Assessment. For 

example, New York’s consideration of additional disqualifying criminal 

offenses not covered by TSA regulations includes larceny and burglary. 

The four states conducting criminal history record checks charged 

applicants additional fees as part of enrollment to cover the cost of 

required state criminal history record checks—ranging from $15 to $75.

Table 2 summarizes the four selected states with additional background 

checking activities and requirements.

45Two of these four states—New York and Maryland—are required by state statute to 

conduct state criminal history checks on applicants before issuing a HME. The two 

others—Texas and Florida—both reported they were doing so on a voluntary basis.

46According to responsible officials with New York state’s program, New York state’s 

lawmakers established their program to address the unique security threats facing New 

York. 

HME and Aviation Workers 

Credentialing Programs 
 

Page 26 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Table 2: Four Selected States Conducting Criminal History Record Checks on HME 

Applicants

Selected statea 

Additional 

disqualifying 

offenses to TSA

Different look-back 

period than TSA

Additional applicant 

cost for state 

criminal check

Florida none no $36

Maryland none no $42

New York yes 10 years $75

Texas none no $15

Source: GAO analysis of state information.

a

As reported between March and September 2011. 

Airports. The eight airports we contacted reported they did not conduct 

additional background checks beyond those required by TSA—which 

includes adjudicating the results of FBI criminal history record checks 

TSA provided. Unlike with the TWIC and HME programs, local authorities 

(airport operators and aircraft operators) are responsible for adjudicating 

the results of TSA-provided criminal history identified through automated 

FBI criminal history checks rap sheet, to determine whether applicants 

had potentially disqualifying offenses. In doing so, the airports may follow 

up with an applicant if the FBI rap sheet TSA provided lacks a disposition 

of a criminal offense—which is necessary for the airports to determine if 

the applicant has potentially disqualifying criminal offenses. Although not 

required by TSA all of these airports required employer sponsorship to 

verify the employment of applicants and their need to access certain 

areas of the airport. In addition, unlike the TWIC program where only TSA 

can revoke a TWIC, under the Aviation Workers program airport 

authorities are the entities that revoke an airport issued credential—not 

TSA.47

 

47If TSA determines that an individual poses a threat based on checks of information in 

the Terrorist Screening Database or immigration checks, TSA will notify the airport to 

revoke the credential. 

For example, airports are to revoke a worker’s identification badge 

if TSA determines a badgeholder poses a threat and may also do so if a 

worker violates airport security policy.
 

Page 27 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Unlike the TWIC and HME programs which require new fingerprint-based 

criminal checks as part of the renewal process48

In general, TSA credentialing-related regulations do not preempt state 

and local background checks or credentialing programs. Both maritime 

port authorities and state licensing agencies have implemented 

credentialing programs with requirements beyond those of TSA’s TWIC 

and HME programs. While these programs have included additional costs 

to applicants, they have also provided nonfederal governing entities with 

additional tools for identifying potential threats and restricting access not 

offered under TSA’s credentialing programs. Thus, these credentialing 

programs complement, rather than duplicate, the TSA programs we 

reviewed.

, TSA regulations for 

airport operators do not require additional criminal history checks of 

workers with authorized access authority as long as workers maintain 

continuous employment with the same issuing authority. However, 

although not required by TSA regulation, some airports we contacted 

reported conducting fingerprint-based criminal history record checks on a 

random basis to identify potentially disqualifying criminal offenses that the 

identification holder may have committed since the initial Security Threat 

Assessment was conducted.

 

48TWICs, in general, are to expire 5 years after the date of issuance at the end of the 

calendar day. With respect to HMEs, each state must require that hazardous material 

endorsements be renewed every 5 years or less so that individuals are subject to a TSA 

security screening requirement at least every 5 years.
 

Page 28 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Criminal history record checks are a key element of the Security Threat 

Assessment process for TSA’s credentialing programs, helping to ensure 

that the agency detects those applicants with potentially disqualifying 

criminal offenses. As discussed earlier, TSA’s criminal history record 

check compares an applicant’s name and fingerprints against criminal 

history record information provided by the FBI, including from the FBI’s 

National Crime Information Center and Interstate Identification Index.49

TSA reports that it has been difficult to effectively and efficiently conduct 

Security Threat Assessment adjudication of criminal history records due 

to the limited access it has as a noncriminal justice purposes requestor of 

However, according to TSA, the access the agency currently has to 

criminal history information for making its eligibility determinations for its 

credentialing programs—including TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers—

has limitations.

 

49The Interstate Identification Index system uses an index-pointer approach to tie together 

the criminal history record databases of state central repositories and the FBI. Under this 

system, the FBI makes available an index listing the names of individuals on whom it 

maintains criminal history record information. An agency seeking criminal history record 

information on a specific individual will submit that individual’s name and fingerprints to the 

FBI. The Bureau will match the name and fingerprints against the index and then “point” 

the information request to the database (either State or Federal) where the requested 

information is maintained. The index contains information on persons arrested for 

fingerprintable felonies and misdemeanors under state or federal law. It includes 

identification information (for example, name, birth date, race and gender), and FBI and 

state identification numbers from each state that has information about an individual. FBI 

reports the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, which includes the 

Interstate Identification Index, held the criminal histories of more than 70 million subjects. 

TSA Faces Data and 

Staffing Challenges in 

Ensuring 

Effectiveness of its 

Security Threat 

Assessments of 

Transportation 

Workers

Additional Criminal 

History Record 

Information Could 

Strengthen TSA’s Security 

Threat Assessments
 

Page 29 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

criminal history records—and that this limitation had increased the risk 

that the agency was not detecting potentially disqualifying criminal 

offenses. Specifically, the level of access through which TSA receives 

criminal history record information through the FBI’s Interstate 

Identification Index is the level of access accorded for noncriminal justice 

purposes. According to TSA, this level of access only allows a limited 

view of criminal history record information as opposed to a more 

expanded level of access accorded criminal justice agencies. The terms 

“noncriminal justice purposes” and “criminal justice” in this context, stem 

from the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Act of 1998 

(Compact Act).50 The Compact Act, enacted in 1998, in general, 

organizes an electronic information-sharing system among the federal 

government and the states to exchange criminal history records for 

noncriminal justice purposes authorized by federal or state law. The 

Compact Act also established a Compact Council with the authority to 

promulgate rules and procedures governing the use of the Interstate 

Identification Index system for noncriminal justice purposes, not to conflict 

with FBI administration of the Interstate Identification Index for criminal 

justice purposes.51

• Noncriminal justice purposes: The term noncriminal justice 

purposes means “uses of criminal history records for purposes 

authorized by Federal or state law other than purposes relating to 

criminal justice activities, including employment suitability, 

The Compact Act contains, among others, the 

following definitions:

 

50Pub. L. No. 105-251, 112 Stat. 1870, 1874 (1998). According to Compact Council 

documents, the Compact became effective April 28, 1999, after Montana and Georgia 

became the first two states to ratify it, respectively. To date, 29 states have ratified the 

Compact.

51The National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact provides for the creation of a 

Compact Council to oversee noncriminal justice use of the Interstate Identification Index. 

The Compact Council’s mission statement provides that the Council, as a national 

independent authority, works in partnership with criminal history record custodians, end 

users, and policy makers to regulate and facilitate the sharing of complete, accurate, and 

timely criminal history record information to noncriminal justice users in order to enhance 

public safety, welfare, and security of society while recognizing the importance of 

individual privacy rights. Under the Compact Act, the 15 members of the Compact Council 

appointed by the Attorney General are to be comprised of nine State Compact Officers, 

two at-large members nominated by the FBI Director, two at-large members nominated by 

the Chairman of the Compact Council, one FBI Advisory Policy Board representative, and 

one FBI representative. 
 

Page 30 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

licensing determinations, immigration and naturalization matters, 

and national security clearances.” 

• Criminal justice: The term criminal justice “includes activities 

relating to the detection, apprehension, detention, pretrial release, 

post-trial release, prosecution, adjudication, correctional 

supervision, or rehabilitation of accused persons or criminal 

offenders. The administration of criminal justice includes criminal 

identification activities and the collection, storage, and 

dissemination of criminal history records.”52

As an agency categorized with a “noncriminal justice purposes” level of 

access to criminal history records information, TSA reports receiving 

limited access to certain types of criminal history data. For instance, when 

TSA sends the FBI its fingerprint submissions for credentialing program 

applicants, the FBI responds to TSA with criminal history record 

information including federal-level criminal history information, as well as 

state-level criminal history records obtained from any of the 15 states that 

participate in the FBI’s National Fingerprint File Program.53

 

52In addition, the Compact Act defines the term “criminal justice agency” to mean, (1) 

courts, and (2) a governmental agency or subunit thereof that (i) performs the 

administration of criminal justice pursuant to a statute or executive order, and (ii) allocates 

a substantial part of its annual budget to the administration of criminal justice. The term 

criminal justice agency also includes federal and state inspectors general offices. 

As a 

noncriminal justice agency, TSA reports that its access to state criminal 

history information from other states is more limited than the level of 

access available to criminal justice agencies which provides access to 

criminal history record information from all 50 states plus the District of 

Colombia. Thus, TSA reports that its visibility to applicant criminal history 

records is often incomplete because the provided information excludes 

details regarding dispositions, sentencing, release dates, and probation or 

53All 50 states and the District of Columbia participate in the Interstate Identification Index. 

Fifteen states also participate in the National Fingerprint File. National Fingerprint File 

states assume responsibility for providing Interstate Identification Index-indexed records 

for criminal and noncriminal requests—a responsibility traditionally maintained by the FBI. 

Since states traditionally report to have more complete information than what has been 

submitted to the FBI’s systems, the National Fingerprint File allows participating states to 

provide their state rap sheets directly when the FBI processes fingerprint-based criminal 

history record checks. The FBI reports that, as of October 9, 2011, the 15 National 

Fingerprint File states were Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, 

Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, and 

Wyoming.
 

Page 31 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

parole violations, among others. TSA reported that this lack of visibility to 

additional criminal history record information via the FBI’s Interstate 

Identification Index system hinders its ability to fulfill its homeland security 

mission and conduct Security Threat Assessments with more detailed 

and complete information for its credentialing programs.54

According to a 2006 Department of Justice report55 while the FBI’s 

Interstate Identification Index is comprehensive in its coverage of 

nationwide arrest records for serious offenses, it is still missing final 

disposition information for approximately 50 percent of its records.56 For 

example, the FBI reported that information states submitted into its 

systems was not always complete or current and that state repositories 

often reported having more complete or current information than what 

was forwarded to and maintained in FBI systems.57

 

54According to TSA, the agency has conducted over 3 million Security Threat 

Assessments requiring a criminal history record check, and over 40 percent of the cases 

have included associated criminal records identified during automated FBI database 

checks, thus requiring an initial manual review by adjudicators at the TTAC Adjudication 

Center. 

As a result, state 

criminal history repositories contain records, such as arrests and 

convictions, not included—or indexed—as part of the FBI’s databases. 

For this reason, according to the 2006 Department of Justice report, 

checks of state databases, in addition to an FBI check, are considered 

necessary to get more comprehensive data.

55U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, The Attorney General’s 

Report on Criminal History Background Checks (June 2006).

56According to a TSA estimate from November 2010, of the 3 million Security Threat 

Assessments requiring a criminal history record check, over 40 percent of the cases had 

associated criminal records that TSA manually adjudicated for possible disqualifying 

offenses. Of these, TSA’s TTAC issued 62,000 initial threat determinations for applicants 

identified with potentially disqualifying offenses. Of these, roughly 23,560 (38 percent) had 

open dispositions and TSA reported that many of these may have been resolved through 

expanded criminal justice information access to FBI’s Interstate Identification Index.

57The FBI reported that, to address the issue, the Bureau had historically taken a 

proactive approach to encourage and assist agencies to submit complete and accurate 

information in a timely manner. Among these efforts have included providing operational 

and policy guidance to agencies requesting assistance with submitting criminal history 

record information, hosting annual national criminal history improvement conferences, 

technical support to agencies transitioning from manual processing to automated 

electronic submissions. 
 

Page 32 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

According to TSA, being provided “noncriminal justice purposes” level of 

access also affects its ability to run the FBI database checks using the 

fingerprints collected at enrollment on a recurring basis to identify 

potentially disqualifying criminal history of an active credential holder. 

Under the Compact Act, subject fingerprints or other approved forms of 

positive identification must be submitted with all requests for criminal 

history record checks for “noncriminal justice purposes.”58 Thus, to 

conduct fingerprint-based check on an ongoing basis for previously 

approved individuals, TSA would have to submit prints and pay a fee to 

the FBI (funded by an applicant fee) each time it wanted to have a 

criminal history record check run.59 According to DHS Screening 

Coordination Office officials, all of the agency’s credentialing programs 

which include a criminal history record check have weaknesses similar to 

what we reported in our May 2011 report on the TWIC program. In that 

report, we stated that TSA’s controls for TWIC were not designed to 

determine whether TWIC holders have committed disqualifying crimes at 

the federal or state level after being granted a TWIC.60 In particular, we 

noted that TSA conducts criminal history record checks only during 

enrollment or a name-based check of TWIC holders against federal wants 

and warrants on an ongoing basis, but it did not run the broader FBI 

fingerprint based check using fingerprints collected at enrollment on an 

ongoing basis.61

TSA has noted that it does not fit neatly into a criminal justice or 

noncriminal justice definition and asserts that its Security Threat 

Assessments require both criminal justice and noncriminal justice 

 

58Compact Act implementing regulations provide that for purposes approved by the 

Compact Council, a delayed submission of fingerprints may be permissible under exigent 

circumstances. 

59The Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, and Related Agencies 

Appropriations Act, 1991, in general, authorizes FBI to establish and collect fees to 

process fingerprint identification records and name checks for non-criminal justice 

purposes, and the current FBI fee is $17.25 per check (Pub. L. No. 101-515, 104 Stat. 

2101, 2112 (1990)(codified at 28 U.S.C. §534 note)).

60GAO-11-657. 

61TSA reported that it conducts a name-based check of enrollees against federal wants 

and warrants on an ongoing basis for TSA credentialing programs which require a criminal 

history record check. However, these checks are against federal wants and warrants lists, 

not state-level information. Federal wants generally consist of information on wanted 

persons, or individuals, for whom federal warrants are outstanding.
 

Page 33 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

functions.62

The FBI’s position, in general, is that TSA is not a criminal justice agency, 

that the functions it performs are “noncriminal justice” in nature, and that, 

as such, based upon a plain reading of federal law, the FBI cannot legally 

provide TSA with criminal justice access to criminal history records 

information. The FBI notes that the Compact Act specifically defined 

“noncriminal justice purposes” as “uses of criminal history records for 

purposes authorized by Federal or State law other than purposes relating 

to criminal justice activities, including employment suitability, licensing 

determinations, immigration and naturalization matters, and national 

security clearances.” It is the FBI’s position that TSA’s requests for 

criminal history record information fall within this “noncriminal justice 

purposes” definition and, as such, the FBI is not authorized to provide 

TSA with criminal justice access to criminal history record information. 

FBI additionally notes that a broad interpretation of the Compact Act 

outside of its plain meaning would violate the Compact Act related laws of 

the 29 states that have signed the Compact as well as the contractual 

agreement that the United States Government entered into with these 

states.

Within this context, TSA is seeking an expanded level of 

access to FBI’s Interstate Identification Index system data, beyond a 

“noncriminal justice purposes” level of access, to a level of access similar 

to that accorded criminal justice agencies. TSA’s position, in general, is 

that the Compact Act definitions of “criminal justice” and “noncriminal 

justice purposes” do not mandate that TSA Security Threat Assessment 

functions only be accorded a noncriminal justice purposes level of 

access. With respect to the term “noncriminal justice purposes,” it is 

TSA’s position that its statutorily mandated Security Threat Assessments 

are not the same as employment or licensing background suitability 

checks listed in the “noncriminal justice purposes” definition. TSA’s 

position is that its obligation to detect individuals with specific convictions 

to minimize the threat to transportation systems require greater access to 

the FBI’s data.

 

62According to TSA, it is not by definition a criminal justice agency, but is uniquely different 

in scope and nature of mission. Security Threat Assessments, according to TSA, are not 

uniquely noncriminal justice in nature, as they are not employment specific, but the goal of 

conducting them is to prevent, deter, and protect critical infrastructure and transportation 

networks against terrorist attacks. 
 

Page 34 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

TSA is collaborating with the FBI and the Compact Council to identify 

possible options for obtaining greater access to criminal history record 

information for its Security Threat Assessments. Since 2010, TSA has 

made several presentations to members of the Compact Council seeking 

a criminal justice-like access to FBI databases. While the FBI and 

Compact Council have not agreed with TSA’s position seeking a level of 

access similar to that accorded criminal justice agencies, the FBI has 

taken steps to provide TSA access to criminal history related information. 

In particular, FBI reported pursuing technical solutions that would expand 

the extent of state level criminal history available to TSA—as well as to 

other federal agencies classified as noncriminal justice agencies that may 

seek criminal history access through FBI’s systems. For example, as a 

longer-term technical solution scheduled to be operational in 2014, FBI is 

planning to enhance its Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification 

System to allow for automated noncriminal justice access to obtain 

additional information from 36 states, including the 15 National Finger 

Print File states and an additional 21 states.

The FBI, as an interim technical solution, reported plans to provide 

federal agencies improved functionality similar to its longer-term plan. The 

FBI reports that a pilot for this program was to begin in October 2011 with 

TSA serving as the first participating federal agency.63

According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

effective internal controls provide for an assessment of the risks the 

agency faces from both internal and external sources. Management must 

decide upon internal control activities required to mitigate those risks and 

achieve the objectives of efficient and effective operations. As part of this, 

management should design and implement internal controls that are 

informed by the identified risks the program faces, the possible effect of 

those risks, control activities required to mitigate those risks, and the 

According to an 

FBI study, these technical solutions may provide TSA with additional 

criminal history information for roughly 15 percent of its credentialing 

program applicant population. However, TSA reported that while such an 

enhancement would be an improvement from current processes, a 

substantial amount of state’s records will remain inaccessible.

 

63The FBI reports that this solution would provide TSA with additional information to 

support TSA adjudication determinations, including information on the offense level type 

and the specific state statute of the offense.
 

Page 35 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

costs and benefits of mitigating those risks.64 TSA and the FBI have 

shared goals in detecting potential terrorist and criminal threats posed to 

the nation’s transportation facilities. The agencies have continued a 

dialogue on options, and the FBI is implementing technical solutions 

which may improve the criminal history information available to TSA. 

However, the two agencies have not jointly determined the extent to 

which a potential security risk may exist with respect to the level of 

access to criminal history records information that TSA currently receives 

to complete Security Threat Assessments. Conducting such an 

assessment which leverages ongoing coordination with the Compact 

Council, would help address potential security risks that may exist with 

respect to the level of access to criminal history record information 

currently received by TSA for conducting Security Threat Assessments, 

and could be used to help inform discussions about possible alternatives 

to address any risks, and the costs and benefits of pursuing each 

alternative.

TSA could further strengthen its Security Threat Assessment process by 

leveraging certain existing flows of state criminal history information 

already provided by some nonfederal governing entities for its HME 

program. As discussed earlier, four of the states we contacted reported 

conducting their own state criminal history record checks for applicants 

seeking an HME. Three of these four states reported sending the results 

of their state criminal history checks directly to TSA for consideration as 

part of its Security Threat Assessments—Florida, Texas, and Maryland. 

However, TSA HME program officials reported that the agency had 

generally not reviewed and considered the state-provided criminal history 

information from all of these states.

TTAC officials acknowledged that the additional information they were 

receiving from some states may help the agency identify potentially 

disqualifying offenses among HME applicants. However, TSA reported 

that it has not established a mechanism to efficiently capture the 

information from all of the states that were directly providing the 

information. For example, the TTAC Adjudication Center uses a webenabled system—known as its Screening Gateway—as its primary tool 

 

64GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

TSA Could Better Leverage 

Available State Criminal 

History Data
 

Page 36 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

for gathering, viewing, and synthesizing applicant case information for 

each Security Threat Assessment. In this way, all vetting information is 

compiled into a single case record for adjudicator review. For example, 

TSA has in place a mechanism for Florida to transmit applicant state 

criminal history results electronically to TSA for adjudication, but it does

not have such a mechanism to electronically capture the information from 

other states providing the information.65

According to TSA records, the agency has met with officials from states 

that directly provided criminal history records information to discuss the 

technical steps that would be necessary for them to send TSA criminal 

history information in a manner that TSA may effectively use. According 

TSA documentation, as of March 2010 TSA reported that more research 

was necessary to identify technical steps necessary to achieve a solution 

that would allow TSA to leverage the directly-provided criminal history 

information.

TSA officials reported that 

reviewing the information outside of its web-based case system would be 

time consuming and result in delays in processing the Security Threat 

Assessment adjudication caseload—which TSA officials noted was over 

12,000 cases per month for the HME program alone.

TSA reported it has sought possible solutions to receive data directly from 

other states in an automated solution. However, the agency has faced 

obstacles because states have varying data systems and legal and 

practical constraints requiring TSA to develop unique solutions for 

obtaining data from a state. As a result, TSA reported it was pursuing a 

common technical solution for obtaining state criminal information through 

the agency’s TTAC Infrastructure Modernization Program. Nonetheless, 

TSA’s schedule for the modernization program indicates that it will not be 

completed until late 2015 and TSA has yet to determine how the program 

would integrate existing streams of criminal history provided by states. 

Moreover, TSA reported that future efforts to obtain additional state 

criminal information may require TSA to pay additional fees to states and 

the cost of these fees may need to be funded by increasing applicant fees 

for TSA credentialing programs. However, not all states are currently 

charging TSA additional fees for the criminal history information they 

already provide. A senior official with the one state which provided TSA 

 

65Officials with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement reported using a 2005 DHS 

grant to fund a technical solution for transmitting its information to TSA. Officials reported 

doing so to improve the information available for TSA’s Security Threat Assessment.
 

Page 37 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

criminal history record information reported that his agency continued to 

do so because of concerns that TSA was adjudicating HME applications 

without the benefit of criminal history information, and had offered to 

make its records available to TSA in a number of electronic formats.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government highlights the 

need for capturing information needed to meet program objectives and 

assessing the risks agencies face. TSA has reported that it needs access 

to all credible, reliable, and current information possible to meet its 

mission requirements for its credentialing programs and has been 

impeded in doing so because it lacks access to state criminal history 

information. Reviewing these state-provided criminal history records may 

help TSA address this challenge. TSA reported that more research was 

required to determine a format for integrating the information, and 

implementing a solution would carry costs for the agency. Conducting and 

documenting an assessment of the risks associated with not using the 

information—which considers existing and potential technical and staffing 

requirements, as well as analyzing the costs and benefits of establishing 

a format to integrate the information—may help TSA mitigate its reported 

access limitations and better meet its mission needs.

The TTAC Adjudication Center has been challenged to meet its workload 

requirements since it began conducting operations in 2005. According to 

the TTAC Adjudication Center’s current staffing plan, last released in 

February 2011, insufficient federal staff has hampered the Adjudication 

Center’s ability to meet its workload requirements and ensure necessary 

oversight of the credential decision-making process. Among other things, 

the plan states that staffing limitations had left the center unable to 

perform quality assurance and oversight responsibilities, conduct 

necessary redress activities, and issue “Initial Determinations of Threat 

Assessments” in a timely manner.66

 

66If TSA determines an applicant has one or more disqualifying criteria, the agency issues 

an Initial Determination of Threat Assessment letter to the applicant. Redress is 

adjudication of cases for those applicants seeking a waiver or appeal to the Initial 

Determination of Threat Assessment. 

According to a senior TTAC 

Adjudication Center official, the Adjudication Center has faced recurring 

challenges in meeting its workload since it began operations—largely 

related to TSA’s reliance on contractor staff as its primary adjudicator 

workforce. As of July 2011, 72 percent (38 of 53) of Adjudication Center 

TTAC Adjudication Center 

Workforce Challenges
 

Page 38 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

staff were contractors.67 The challenge is that TSA has used three 

different contractors since establishing the adjudication center in 2005, 

and on each occasion the turnovers have led to backlogs as the TTAC 

adjudication center hired and trained new staff.68

According to TSA data for the period of July 2010 through June 2011, the 

TTAC Adjudication Center adjudicated an average of approximately 

36,000 cases a month involving TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers 

Program applicants, including initial cases where automated background 

check results included potentially derogatory information and redress 

cases, such as applicant requests for a waiver or appeal to a prior 

determination.

According to the official, 

federal staff must train each new set of contractors, and it has taken 

about 8 to 10 months for new contractors to become proficient so they 

may assume their full responsibilities. Because the Adjudication Center 

relies on contract staff to adjudicate the majority of its caseload, the 

contractor turnover has required the federal staff to take on additional 

work during these periods. According to the Adjudication Center official, 

federal staff have needed to regularly work overtime over the past five 

years to meet workload requirements. The official also noted that, 

whereas there has been considerable turnover with respect to 

contractors, the Adjudication Center has seen little turnover among its 

federal staff, with only two federal adjudicators leaving the center since 

operations began.

69

 

67The Adjudication Center caseload is completed using contractor staff to perform initial 

adjudication with federal staff reviewing all potentially disqualifying cases, issuing Initial

Determination of Threat Assessments, and conducting redress actions supported by more 

senior contractor staff.

Figure 2 shows the average monthly enrollment and 

TTAC Adjudication Center caseload for the TWIC, HME, and Aviation 

Workers programs—July 2010 through June 2011.

68TSA reported that upon the completion of each existing contract period of performance, 

the government was required to resolicit for a new contractor. 

69According to TSA data, a total of 937,933 applicants enrolled in TSA’s HME, TWIC, and 

Aviation Workers programs from July 2010 through June 2011. During automated vetting, 

396,514 applicants were identified as having some derogatory information requiring 

adjudication center review during this period. 
 

Page 39 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Figure 2: Average Monthly Program Enrollment and TTAC Adjudication Center 

Caseload for Reviewing Applicants with Potentially Disqualifying Information for 

TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers Programs—July 2010 through June 2011

TSA reported that it chose to use contract adjudicators when the 

Adjudication Center was created because it considered them to be the most 

readily available workforce and the most effective way to augment federal 

staff with skilled resources. We have previously reported that to mitigate risks 

associated with using contractors, agencies have to understand when, 

where, and how contractors should be used given the risk of diminished 

institutional capacity, potentially greater costs, and mission risks.70

 

70GAO, A model of Strategic Human Capital Management, 

Further, in 

July 2009, through its Balanced Workforce Strategy, DHS instructed 

GAO-02-373SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002). 
 

Page 40 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

components to review current contracts to determine if inherently 

governmental work was included in the work requirements.71

TSA awarded a new adjudication center contract in February 2010 that runs 

through January 2015. This contract includes a 1-year base period with four, 

1-year options. Under this contract, based on the performance of the 

contractor, TSA may select another contractor within the next 5 years which 

could result in a change in its adjudicator workforce—and pose risks to the 

Adjudication Center’s sustainability and performance in meeting mission 

requirements.72 Furthermore, TSA anticipates expanding the Adjudication 

Center caseload considerably for additional credentialing programs, which 

may further exacerbate these challenges.73 Strategic workforce planning 

includes aligning an organization’s human capital program with its current 

and emerging mission and developing long-term strategies for acquiring, 

developing, and retaining staff to achieve these goals.74

 

71Inherently governmental functions are generally defined as those functions that are so 

intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by federal government 

employees. 

TSA reported that it 

initiated an assessment in March 2011 to determine if adjudication functions 

are appropriate to be performed by a contractor workforce, or if the work is 

inherently governmental and if there would be a cost savings resulting from 

conversion of the contract positions to government personnel. However, in 

September 2011, TSA reported that it did not have a date for when the study 

would be complete. Completing this assessment could help TSA address the 

risk that the agency may be using nonfederal employees to perform 

inherently governmental functions in its Adjudication Center. Moreover, the 

Adjudication Center’s most recent workforce staffing plan does not address 

issues related to its growing workload or the impact of the use of contractors 

for potentially inherently governmental functions. Updating its staffing plan to 

clarify how the Adjudication Center will effectively and efficiently meet its 

current and emerging workload requirements, based in part on the results of 

72According to the contract, for the first year, contractor fees are $5,954,821—of which 

$4,463,918 is for labor.

73According to TSA’s contract for the Adjudication Center, taking on new programs may 

increase the caseload of the adjudication center—including doubling or tripling the 

caseload for some durations. 

74GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning

GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).
 

Page 41 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

TSA’s study, and developing timelines for doing so will help ensure that 

TTAC can effectively meet its growing workload.

The state and local credentialing programs we reviewed complement, 

rather than duplicate, TSA’s credentialing programs. In addition to working 

with state and local entities, TSA also works with the FBI to protect the 

nation’s transportation systems from terrorist and criminal threats. Both 

agencies rely on timely, relevant criminal history data to do so. While TSA, 

the FBI, and Compact Council have collaborated on the issue, TSA and the 

FBI have not completed a joint analysis identifying whether a potential 

security risk may exist with TSA’s present level of access to FBI criminal 

records as a “noncriminal justice purposes” requesting agency. Conducting 

an assessment which identifies the pros and cons of potential solutions to 

mitigate any potential risks could increase the rigor of the Security Threat 

Assessment, benefit federal and state decision-makers and better inform 

Congress about the potential weaknesses and their implications. Although 

TSA has reported seeking additional access to state-level criminal history, 

the agency has not leveraged some existing information it already receives 

directly from states. Conducting an assessment of the risks associated with 

not using the information, as well as the costs and benefits, such as 

technical barriers, to integrating the information into the current adjudication 

process, may help TSA strengthen its process and better meet its mission 

needs.

Since 2005, TSA’s Adjudication Center has been responsible for ensuring 

that the millions of TSA credentialing program applicants do not pose a 

security risk to the United States, and these responsibilities are expected 

to grow considerably as TSA assumes additional responsibility for 

adjudicating Security Threat Assessments for additional credentialing 

programs which may double or triple its current workload. Thus, it is 

incumbent on TSA to complete its reported study to determine whether 

the use of contractors for its Adjudication Center is an inherently 

governmental function and if there would be a cost savings resulting from 

conversion of the contract positions to government personnel. Completing 

this assessment could help TSA address the risk that the agency may be 

using nonfederal employees to perform inherently governmental functions 

in its Adjudication Center. Moreover, updating its workforce staffing plan 

to define how the Adjudication Center will effectively and efficiently meet 

its current and emerging workload requirements, based in part on the 

results of TSA’s study, and developing timelines for doing so, will help 

ensure that TTAC can effectively meet its current and growing workload.

Conclusions
 

Page 42 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the TSA 

Administrator, and the Attorney General of the United States direct the 

Director of the FBI, to jointly assess the extent to which a security risk 

may exist with respect to the level of access to criminal history records 

information currently received by TSA to complete Security Threat 

Assessments, identify alternatives to address any risks, and assess the 

costs and benefits of pursuing each alternative.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Secretary direct the 

TSA Administrator to take the following two actions:

• Conduct an assessment of the risks associated with not utilizing some 

state-provided criminal history information, as well as an analysis of 

the costs and benefits of integrating the information into the current 

adjudication process.

• Develop a workforce staffing plan with timelines articulating how the 

TTAC Adjudication Center will effectively and efficiently meet its 

current and emerging workload requirements, and incorporate the 

results of TSA’s study examining the appropriateness and costs and 

benefits of using contractors.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for their review and 

comment. DHS, in written comments received November 30, 2011, 

concurred with all three of the recommendations in the report directed to 

DHS, and identified actions taken, planned, or under way to implement 

the recommendations. In an email received November 29, 2011, the DOJ 

audit liaison stated that DOJ concurred with the one recommendation we 

directed to DOJ in the report. Written comments are summarized below 

and official DHS comments are reproduced in appendix VI. In addition, 

both DHS and DOJ provided written technical comments, which we 

incorporated into the report, as appropriate.

In commenting on the draft report, DHS and DOJ described efforts the 

departments have underway or planned to address our recommendations. 

However, as discussed below, additional actions are needed to ensure that 

our recommendations are fully implemented. Both DHS and DOJ

concurred with our first recommendation that the FBI and TSA jointly 

assess the extent to which a security risk may exist with respect to the level 

of access to criminal history records information currently received by TSA 

to complete Security Threat Assessments, identify alternatives to address 

any risks, and assess the costs and benefits of pursuing each alternative. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 43 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

DOJ stated that the FBI remains concerned that readers must understand 

that the level of access afforded to TSA to FBI criminal history records 

information for Transportation Worker Security Threat Assessments is one 

prescribed by law and not merely an opinion of the FBI’s. DHS stated that it 

recognizes that there are criminal records at the state level which TSA 

does not receive, and noted that its level of criminal history information 

access is equal to that of a private company doing an employment check 

on a new applicant. DHS stated that it has been working with DOJ, the FBI 

and the states for several years to obtain more comprehensive access to 

criminal history record information, and cited plans for pilot programs with 

the FBI for accessing additional state criminal history records information—

including a pilot to obtain information from over 20 additional states that 

respond to noncriminal justice requests through the FBI’s Interstate 

Identification Index. DHS stated that as the pilots progress, TSA will work 

with the FBI to identify the differences between the standard FBI criminal 

history record information noncriminal justice results and the additional 

state data. DHS noted that TSA will work with the FBI to include these 

results in the overall assessment of risks regarding TSA’s current level of 

criminal history record information access.

DHS also concurred with our second recommendation for TSA to conduct an 

assessment of the risks associated with not utilizing some state-provided 

criminal history information. DHS stated that while TSA concurred with the 

intent of the recommendation, it was no longer necessary to conduct a risk or 

cost and benefit analysis because it has identified a solution to incorporate 

state-provided criminal history records information into its adjudication 

process. Since DHS reported identifying this solution after we provided our 

draft report to the agencies for comment, we will continue to work with TSA 

to monitor progress on the proposed solution as it proceeds.

DHS concurred with our third recommendation that TSA develop a 

workforce staffing plan with timelines articulating how the TTAC 

Adjudication Center will effectively and efficiently meet its current and 

emerging workload requirements, and incorporate the results of TSA’s 

study examining the appropriateness and costs and benefits of using 

contractors. DHS stated that it is currently meeting its Adjudication Center 

workload requirements and provided us with a copy of the workforce 

staffing plan. TSA stated that it recognizes the importance of appropriately 

balancing its federal and contractor workforce and in 2010 began a review 

to ensure that the right workforce balance is achieved. DHS stated that 

TSA is analyzing the results of this review to achieve the best balance of 

federal and contractor resources as part of the Department-wide Balanced 

Workforce Strategy, and that the results would be available once finalized. 
 

Page 44 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Lastly, DHS noted that TSA would continue to assess the staffing needs of 

the Adjudication Center to implement emerging requirements based on the 

results of the Balanced Workforce Strategy. However, these actions do not 

fully address the intent of our recommendation. As we have noted, the 

staffing plan TSA provided cited challenges the Adjudication Center faced 

in meeting workload requirements—such as staffing limitations leaving the 

center unable to perform quality assurance and oversight responsibilities, 

conduct necessary redress activities, and issue “Initial Determinations of 

Threat Assessments” in a timely manner. Given the significant challenges 

cited, it is unclear whether TSA is fully meeting current Adjudication Center 

workload requirements. Since TSA reports it no longer faces challenges in 

meeting its workload, it will be important for TSA to update the February 

2011 staffing plan TSA provided. Lastly, TSA reported that it began a 

review to determine that the right workforce balance is achieved. As 

discussed earlier, TSA reported this review is to determine if adjudication 

functions are appropriate to be performed by a contractor workforce, or if 

the work is inherently governmental and if there would be a cost savings 

resulting from conversion of the contract positions to government 

personnel. However, TSA has yet to complete this assessment nor provide 

timelines for doing so. Completing this study and incorporating the results 

of this assessment into an updated staffing plan remains important for TSA 

to help ensure it appropriately and effectively meets its Adjudication Center 

workload.
 

Page 45 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security 

Administration, the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, the 

Attorney General of the United States, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, and appropriate congressional committees. In addition, this 

report is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-

4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.

Stephen M. Lord

Director

Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 46 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security 

To identify the roles and responsibilities of federal and nonfederal 

government entities related to the Transportation Security Administration’s 

(TSA) transportation security credentialing-related programs, we first 

identified those programs which place certain responsibilities on state and 

local governments. To do this, we analyzed relevant statutes, including 

pertinent provisions of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 

Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 

PATRIOT) Act of 2001,1

 the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,2 and 

the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)3

 of 2002, plus relevant 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations that set out 

corresponding requirements for TSA and nonfederal governing entities with 

respect to conducting background checks and issuing identification to 

transportation workers. 

We also reviewed documentation provided by TSA, such as program 

summaries, which outlined the respective roles and responsibilities of 

federal and nonfederal governing entities under 17 different credentialing 

programs. On the basis of this information, we focused our analysis on 

comparing nonfederal transportation worker credentialing programs with 

three TSA credentialing programs—the Transportation Worker 

Identification Credential Program, Hazardous Materials Endorsement 

Program, and Aviation Workers Program—because they placed certain 

regulatory responsibilities on nonfederal governing entities. Of the 17 TSA 

credentialing programs, only the Transportation Worker Identification 

Credential (TWIC), Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) Threat 

Assessment, and Aviation Workers programs include nonfederal 

governing entity responsibilities. 

We further examined TSA documentation describing, among other things, 

the roles and responsibilities of various entities for enrolling applicants, 

conducting background checks, and issuing credentials. We also 

interviewed headquarters and field officials at relevant agencies, including 

DHS (TSA, Screening Coordination Office, Coast Guard); Department of 

Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of 

Transportation (DOT). In addition, we interviewed officials from nine 

 

1

Pub.L. No.107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 

2

Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

3

Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002). 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 47 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

stakeholder organizations that represent the broad spectrum of 

nonfederal governing entity interests in TSA’s programs, such as the 

American Association of Port Authorities and the American Trucking 

Association to help identify nonfederal government entity credentialing 

programs and perspectives on TSA’s credentialing programs.4

To determine how selected nonfederal governing entities’ credentialing 

programs compare to TSA’s programs, we analyzed pertinent federal 

laws, such as MTSA and the USA PATRIOT Act, and corresponding 

regulations related to the TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers programs, 

as well as operational guidance and TSA policy documents for 

implementing the programs. By reviewing these laws, regulations, and 

policies, we identified requirements applicable to TSA and state and local 

governing agencies, as well as applicant eligibility standards such as lists 

of disqualifying criminal offenses and duration of time that agencies were 

required to consider these disqualifying criminal offenses (“look back 

period”). We then compared these standards and practices with those of 

identified programs that placed certain responsibilities upon nonfederal 

governing agency (state or local) programs we identified.

Through structured questions (in-person, phone, and email), we obtained 

information about credentialing programs and requirements in place by 

state and local governing agencies at selected maritime ports, airports, 

and state agencies. First, we collected information from maritime port 

authorities or other responsible nonfederal governing agencies at 17 

maritime port locations—including the top 10 ports by container volume in 

2010—plus 7 other ports we identified as having programs in place 

through information we obtained from industry groups, state agencies, 

and the U.S. Coast Guard. Collectively, the 17 maritime ports accounted 

for over 93 percent of U.S. waterborne foreign container trade in 2010, 

according to the U.S. Maritime Administration.5

 

4

Other organizations we contacted included the Owner Operator Independent Drivers 

Association ; American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators; American Association 

of Airport Executives; Institute of Makers of Explosives; National Petrochemical & Refiners 

Association; International Liquid Terminals Association; and Agricultural Retailers 

Association.

We visited officials at 5 of 

5

The top 10 ports by container volume in 2010 were: Los Angeles, Calif.; Long Beach, 

Calif.; New York, N.Y.; Savannah, Ga.; Oakland, Calif.; Norfolk, Va.; Houston, Tex.; 

Seattle, Wash.; Charleston, S.C.; and Tacoma, Wash.. The additional seven ports we 

contacted include: Miami, Fla.; Port Everglades, Fla.; Baltimore, Md.; Wilmington, N.C.; 

Portland, Oreg.; Boston, Mass.; and Mobile, Ala.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 48 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

these locations based on whether a state or local port authority had in 

place a credentialing program outside of TSA’s TWIC program (Baltimore, 

Maryland; Norfolk, Virginia; Miami and Port Everglades, Florida; and New 

York, New York). Second, we collected information from 8 category X6

airports including four of the top six airports by passenger boardings in 

2009 plus 4 additional airports based on proximity to GAO locations.7 The 

eight airports accounted for 23 percent of total U.S. domestic passenger 

boardings in 2009, according to the Federal Aviation Administration. We 

conducted site visits to three of these airports (Seattle-Tacoma

International Airport, Washington Dulles International Airport, and 

Baltimore-Washington International Airport). Third, with respect to HME 

issuance, we collected information from six states, including the top five 

states as ranked by commercial drivers license issuance based on DOT 

data as of December 2010, plus one additional state that we identified as 

having additional requirements.8 As of December 2010, the six states we 

contacted accounted for approximately one-third of the over 14 million 

commercial drivers licenses issued in the United States, according to 

information from DOT.9

 

6

TSA classifies the nation’s approximately 450 commercial airports into one of five 

categories (X, I, II, III, and IV) based on various factors, such as the number of take-offs 

and landings annually, the extent of passenger screening at the airport, and other security

considerations. In general, Category X airports have the largest number of passenger 

boardings, and Category IV airports have the smallest. 

We visited officials at two state licensing agencies 

(New York State and Maryland). During our visits to maritime port 

facilities, state commercial drivers license issuing agencies, and airports, 

we interviewed officials, observed enrollment operations centers, and also 

reviewed cases of individuals who had been denied issuance of a state or 

local credential. Specifically, we obtained information from selected 

nonfederal government entities which included background check 

7

We obtained information from eight airports: Atlanta, Los Angeles; Denver; New York - 

JFK; Seattle-Tacoma International Airport; Washington-Dulles International Airport; 

Baltimore/Washington International; and Portland, Oregon.

8

We obtained information from six states: California, Texas, Florida, New York, Illinois, 

Maryland.

9

According to Department of Transportation officials, information on the number of HME 

endorsements by state was not available. Therefore, we used data provided by the 

department on the number of Master Pointer Records in the Commercial Driver’s License 

Information System as a proxy for HME endorsements by state. The system is a database 

that contains certain information on individuals who have either been issued a commercial 

driver’s license or who have been convicted of an offense in a vehicle that requires a 

commercial driver’s license.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 49 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

requirements as part of their credentialing programs. We obtained case 

information from these entities detailing denial of applicants’ credentials. 

As part of this, we obtained case information from three ports with respect 

to individuals the port reported denying to or revoking local credentials 

from, because they had disqualifying criminal offenses based upon state 

program criteria. We provided information on 30 of these cases to TSA 

and then obtained case information on these 30 individuals from TSA—

including whether TSA had identified these individuals as having 

potentially disqualifying criminal histories, whether they had obtained their 

TWIC through a waiver, and whether they had a valid TWIC as of July 1, 

2011. While the information we obtained from nonfederal governing entity 

programs cannot be generalized across all states and localities, it 

provided us with a perspective on how state and local government 

transportation worker programs compare with federal programs and 

requirements.

To obtain information on challenges, if any, TSA faced in ensuring the 

effectiveness of its credentialing-related programs, we reviewed our prior 

reports related to the TWIC program and analyzed pertinent laws and 

regulations, including the National Crime Prevention and Privacy 

Compact Act of 1998.10

 

10Pub. L. No. 105-251, 112 Stat. 1870, 1876 (1998) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 14616).

We then analyzed TSA and FBI program 

documentation, including program training manuals, staffing plans, and 

other documents detailing program processes and challenges TSA faced, 

for the TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers credentialing-related programs. 

In addition, we reviewed and compared TSA data detailing the number of 

enrollments and adjudication caseload for TSA’s TWIC, HME, and 

Aviation Workers programs—covering the period of July 2010 through 

June 2011. Through interviews with knowledgeable TSA officials we 

determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To 

further obtain information on TSA credentialing-related practices and 

challenges, we interviewed headquarters officials from TSA’s 

Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC) program 

responsible for implementing the TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers 

programs, DHS’s Screening Coordination Office, responsible for 

coordinating credentialing programs across DHS; and the FBI’s Criminal 

Justice Information Services Division, which maintains the FBI’s national 

criminal history repository. We also visited the TTAC Adjudication Center 

in Herndon, Virginia to interview officials responsible for adjudicating TSA 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 50 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

credentialing program applications and observe operations. We then 

evaluated the processes against TSA’s credentialing program mission 

needs and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.11

Additionally, we obtained the perspectives of nonfederal agency 

stakeholders, including officials from two organizations representing state 

criminal justice repository agencies—the National Crime Prevention and 

Privacy Compact Council12 and SEARCH.13

We conducted this performance audit from February through November 

2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Collectively, these two 

organizations represent state criminal repository agencies from 50 states 

and the District of Columbia. The information we obtained through our 

interviews with nonfederal government entities and stakeholder 

organizations are not generalizable, but provided valuable perspectives 

related to TSA’s TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers programs.

 

11GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

12The Compact Council, as a national independent authority, works in partnership with 

criminal history record custodians, end users, and policy makers to regulate and facilitate 

the sharing of complete, accurate, and timely criminal history record information to 

noncriminal justice users in order to enhance public safety, welfare, and security of society 

while recognizing the importance of individual privacy rights.

13SEARCH is a nonprofit organization created by and for states which serves as the 

national consortium for justice information and statistics. It is governed by a Membership 

Group comprised of one gubernatorial appointee from each of the 50 states, the District of 

Columbia, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as eight at-large appointees 

selected by SEARCH’s Chair. Members are primarily state-level justice officials 

responsible for operational decisions and policymaking concerning the management of 

criminal justice information, particularly criminal history information.
Appendix II: TSA Credentialing Programs

Page 51 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

TSA implements 17 credentialing programs which include conducting 

background checks—known as Security Threat Assessments—for a 

reported population of over 15 million individuals, such as those 

accessing airports, maritime ports, as well as for individuals seeking a 

hazardous material endorsement to their commercial driver’s license. The 

following table identifies and describes these programs.

Table 3: TSA Credentialing Programs

Program Description

Airspace Waiver Program TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment on passengers and crew of flight 

operations into restricted U.S. airspace, flight operations into the U.S. for carriers that 

do not hold a TSA-approved security plan, and for all flight operations that transit US 

airspace without a takeoff or landing in the US (over flights) that do not hold a TSAapproved security plan. 

Alien Flight Student Program TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment on foreign students seeking new or 

recurrent training at flight schools regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA). 

Aviation Workers Program Requires a Security Threat Assessment on individuals who apply for, or are issued 

personnel identification media at U.S. domestic airports, including airport facility 

workers, retail employees, and airline employees. TSA adjudicates terrorist and 

immigration checks, while airports adjudicate criminal history checks. 

Certified Cargo Screening Program Participation in this program is currently voluntary. As part of participation, TSA 

conducts a Security Threat Assessment on individuals who screen and work at a 

Certified Cargo Screening Facility. 

DCA Access Standard Security Program TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment on all flight crewmembers (e.g. cockpit 

crew, flight attendants, cargo carrier employees) and passengers on non-commercial 

aircraft (non-cargo) flying into Ronald Reagan National Airport (DCA) from 1 of 22 

domestic gateway airports or out of DCA 

FAA Airmen Certificate Program TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment on all FAA Airmen Certificate holders and 

applicants for a certificate based on a foreign license. 

Full All Cargo Security Program TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment on certain individuals with unescorted 

access to air cargo for each operation that is in an aircraft with a maximum certification 

takeoff weight of more than 45,500 kg (100,309.3 pounds) and carrying cargo and 

authorized persons and no passengers.

Hazardous Materials Endorsement Threat 

Assessment Program

TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment on drivers wishing to obtain a hazardous 

materials endorsement on a state-issued commercial driver’s license.

Indirect Air Carrier Program TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment on individuals who perform screening, 

supervise screening, or have unescorted access to air cargo bound for commercial 

airlines, as well as qualified shippers and certain individuals in managerial or ownership 

roles of an indirect air carrier.

Maryland Three Program TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment on pilots who operate aircraft and apply 

for privileges to fly to or from the three General Aviation airports in the Washington, D.C. 

restricted flight zones (Potomac Airport, Washington Executive/Hyde Field, and College 

Park Airport). 

Appendix II: TSA Credentialing Programs
Appendix II: TSA Credentialing Programs

Page 52 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Program Description

Merchant Mariner Credential TSA and Coast Guard conduct a Security Threat Assessment and safety and suitability 

check on individuals seeking employment aboard U.S. merchant vessels greater than 

100 Gross Register Tons (Domestic Tonnage), except operators of uninspected 

passenger vessels

Private Charter Standard Security 

Program 

TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment on private charter flight crewmembers 

operating aircraft with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 45,500kg (100,309 

pounds) or more, or a passenger-seating configuration of 61 or more, or whose 

passengers are enplaned from or deplaned into a sterile area. 

SSI / Civil Litigant Program TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment on individuals who seek access to 

Sensitive Security Information in the course of civil litigation.

Secure Flight TSA conducts uniform prescreening of passenger information against federal 

government watch lists for all domestic and international passengers traveling on 

covered flights into, out of, within, or over the United States. 

Master Crew Vetting Program TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment on flight crewmembers entering, 

departing, or flying over U.S. airspace. 

Transportation Worker Identification 

Credential

TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment on individuals who require unescorted 

access to secure areas of regulated maritime facilities, vessels, and all merchant 

mariners. 

Twelve - Five Standard Security Program TSA conducts a Security Threat Assessment on flight crewmembers operating aircraft 

with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or more. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA information.
Appendix III: TSA TWIC, HME, and Aviation 

Workers Programs: Legislative Background 

and Purpose

Page 53 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Following September 11 2001, legislation was enacted into law that was 

designed to ensure that transportation workers, particularly those who 

transport hazardous materials or require unescorted access to secure 

areas of federally regulated maritime or airport transportation facilities are 

properly vetted to identify whether they pose a security threat. In 

response, TSA established the TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers 

programs. The following summarizes the legislative background and 

purpose of these three programs.

Table 4: Legislative Background and Purpose of TSA’s TWIC, HME, and Aviation Workers Programs

Program Legislative Background and Purpose

TWIC In November 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)a was enacted, requiring 

TSA to, among other things, work with airport operators to strengthen access control points to 

secured areas and to consider using biometric access control systems, or similar technologies, to 

verify the identity of individuals who seek to enter a secure airport area. In response to ATSA, TSA 

established the TWIC Program in December 2001. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 

2002 (MTSA)b required the Secretary of Homeland Security to prescribe regulations preventing 

individuals from having unescorted access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels 

unless they possess a biometric transportation security card and are authorized to be in such an 

area. MTSA further tasked the Secretary with the responsibility to issue biometric transportation 

security cards to eligible individuals unless the Secretary determines that an applicant poses a 

security risk warranting denial of the card. The TWIC Program is designed to implement these 

biometric maritime security card requirements—with TSA responsible for conducting Security Threat 

Assessments and MTSA-regulated port facilities—including private facilities and public port 

authorities—responsible for verifying that workers have a valid TWIC and a valid business case to 

access their facility. TSA has issued and activated over 1.7 million TWICs to maritime port workers 

and denied 1,332 applications as of June 2011.c

HME The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001d prohibits states from issuing a motor vehicle license to individuals 

seeking to transport hazardous materials in commerce unless a determination has been made by 

the Secretary of Transportation that the individual does not pose a security risk warranting denial of 

the license. TSA developed regulations to implement this requirement,e and TSA established the 

HME Program in order to conduct Security Threat Assessments for truckers seeking to obtain, 

renew, or transfer a HME on their state-issued commercial driver’s license. The Federal Motor 

Carrier Safety Administration within DOT oversees license issuance policy and issued a companion 

rule indicating that state motor vehicle agencies can not issue a HME until the applicant has first met 

TSA vetting standards. State motor vehicle agencies are responsible for ensuring that TSA has 

vetted these applicants before it issues a HME. As of June 2011, TSA reported conducting Security 

Threat Assessments on approximately 1.5 million HME applicants, and denying over 15,000 

applications.

Appendix III: TSA TWIC, HME, and Aviation 

Workers Programs: Legislative Background 

and Purpose
Appendix III: TSA TWIC, HME, and Aviation 

Workers Programs: Legislative Background 

and Purpose

Page 54 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Program Legislative Background and Purpose

Aviation Workers Program ATSA established TSA within DOT as the federal agency responsible for civil aviation security 

responsibilities.f

Pursuant to ATSA, responsibility for the security of civil aviation was transferred 

from the Federal Aviation Administration to TSA, along with the Federal Aviation Administration’s 

existing aviation security programs, plans, regulations, orders, and directives. Among other things, 

ATSA directs TSA to improve the security of airport perimeters and the access controls leading to 

secured areas, and take measures to reduce the security risks posed by airport workers. TSA 

corresponding regulations require that before airport and aircraft operators issue identification media 

to workers seeking unescorted access authority to sterile areas or a Security Identification Display 

Area (SIDA), they must undergo a fingerprint-based criminal history record check. TSA 

subsequently issued a Security Directive requiring that airport operators may not issue identification 

media to individuals who work in or have access to the Air Operations Area unless they undergo a 

Security Threat Assessment including name based terrorism and immigration status checks.g TSA 

reports that approximately 1.2 million workers currently hold airport badges.

Source: GAO analysis of DHS information

Notes: 

a

Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597, 610 (2001). 

b

Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064, 2073-74 (2002). 

c

The number of denials refers specifically to the number of final disqualification letters issued by TSA. 

Some denial letters could be repeat applicants. TSA also has waiver and appeals processes, so the 

number of initial disqualification letters issued is greater—over 90,000, according to TSA. 

d

Pub.L. No.107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 396-97 (2001).

e

49 C.F.R. Part 1572. 

f

TSA was subsequently transferred from DOT to DHS in March 2003. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 

403(2), 116 Stat. 2135, 2178 (2002). 

g

SD 1542-04-08G.
Appendix IV: Criminal Offenses That May 

Disqualify Applicants from Acquiring a TWIC 

or HME

Page 55 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Listed below are criminal offenses that can prevent TWIC or HME 

applicants from being issued a credential. Pursuant to TSA implementing 

regulations, permanent disqualifying criminal offenses are those offenses 

listed in 49 C.F.R. § 1572.103(a) for which an applicant has a felony 

conviction, or has been found not guilty by reason of insanity, in a civilian 

or military jurisdiction. Interim disqualifying criminal offenses are those 

offenses listed in 49 C.F.R. § 1572.103(b) for which the applicant has 

either (1) a felony conviction, or been found not guilty by reason of 

insanity, within a 7-year period preceding the application, or (2) 

incarcerated for that crime within a 5-year period preceding the 

application. Applicants with certain permanent disqualifying criminal 

offenses and all interim disqualifying criminal offenses may request a 

waiver of their disqualification pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 1515.7. In general, 

TSA may issue such a waiver and grant a TWIC or HME if TSA 

determines that an applicant does not pose a security threat based upon 

the Security Threat Assessment.

Permanent disqualifying criminal offenses for which no waiver may 

be granted.

1. Espionage, or conspiracy to commit espionage.

2. Sedition, or conspiracy to commit sedition.

3. Treason, or conspiracy to commit treason.

A federal crime of terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g), or 

comparable State law, or conspiracy to commit such crime.

Permanent disqualifying criminal offenses for which a waiver may 

be granted.

1. A crime involving a transportation security incident. A transportation 

security incident is a security incident resulting in a significant loss of 

life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or 

economic disruption in a particular area, as defined in 46 U.S.C. § 

70101. The term ‘economic disruption’ does not include a work 

stoppage or other employee-related action not related to terrorism and 

resulting from an employer-employee dispute.

2. Improper transportation of a hazardous material under 49 U.S.C. § 

5124, or a State law that is comparable.

Appendix IV: Criminal Offenses That May 

Disqualify Applicants from Acquiring a TWIC 

or HME
Appendix IV: Criminal Offenses That May 

Disqualify Applicants from Acquiring a TWIC 

or HME

Page 56 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

3. Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, manufacture, purchase, 

receipt, transfer, shipping, transporting, import, export, storage of, or 

dealing in an explosive or explosive device. An explosive or explosive 

device includes, but is not limited to, an explosive or explosive 

material as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 232(5), 841(c) through 841(f), and 

844(j); and a destructive device, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) 

and 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f).

4. Murder.

5. Making any threat, or maliciously conveying false information knowing 

the same to be false, concerning the deliverance, placement, or 

detonation of an explosive or other lethal device in or against a place 

of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation 

system, or an infrastructure facility.

6. Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 

18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq., or a comparable State law, where one of

the predicate acts found by a jury or admitted by the defendant, 

consists of one of the crimes listed in paragraph 49 C.F.R. § 1572.103 

(a). 

7. Attempt to commit the crimes in paragraphs listed under 49 C.F.R. § 

1572.103 (a)(1) through (a)(4).

8. Conspiracy or attempt to commit the crimes in 49 C.F.R. § 1572.103 

(a)(5) through (a)(10).

Interim disqualifying criminal offenses.

1. Unlawful possession, use, sale, manufacture, purchase, distribution, 

receipt, transfer, shipping, transporting, delivery, import, export of, or 

dealing in a firearm or other weapon. A firearm or other weapon 

includes, but is not limited to, firearms as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 

921(a)(3) or 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), or items contained on the United 

States Munitions Import List at 27 C.F.R. § 447.21.

2. Extortion.

3. Dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation, including identity fraud and 

money laundering where the money laundering is related to a crime 

described in 49 C.F.R. § 1572.103 (a) or (b). Welfare fraud and 

passing bad checks do not constitute dishonesty, fraud, or 

misrepresentation for purposes of this paragraph.
Appendix IV: Criminal Offenses That May 

Disqualify Applicants from Acquiring a TWIC 

or HME

Page 57 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

4. Bribery. 

5. Smuggling.

6. Immigration violations.

7. Distribution of, possession with intent to distribute, or importation of a 

controlled substance.

8. Arson. 

9. Kidnapping or hostage taking.

10. Rape or aggravated sexual abuse.

11. Assault with intent to kill.

12. Robbery.

13. Fraudulent entry into a seaport as described in 18 U.S.C. § 1036, or a 

comparable State law.

14. Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 

18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq., or a comparable State law, other than the 

violations listed in paragraph 49 C.F.R. § 1572.103 (a)(10).

15. Conspiracy or attempt to commit the interim disqualifying criminal 

offenses.
Appendix V: Criminal Offenses That Disqualify 

Applicants under the Aviation Workers 

Program from Acquiring an Airport-Issued 

Access Badge 

Page 58 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Listed below are the disqualifying criminal offenses that, in general, 

prevent individuals under the Aviation Workers Program seeking 

unescorted access to secure areas of an airport from being issued an 

airport access credential. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. §§1542.209, 1544.229, 

1544.230, and Security Directive 1542-04-08G, an individual has a 

disqualifying criminal offense if the individual has been convicted, or 

found not guilty of by reason of insanity, of any of the crimes listed below 

in any jurisdiction during the 10 years before the date of the individual’s 

application for unescorted access authority, or while the individual has 

unescorted access authority. In contrast to TWIC and HME, there is no 

waiver process for any of the disqualifying criminal offenses. However, 

none of the crimes are permanently disqualifying—disqualifying criminal 

offenses are those specified offenses for which an individual has been 

convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity during the 10 years 

before the date of the individual’s application. As such, we refer to them 

below as interim disqualifying criminal offenses for which no waiver may 

be granted.

Interim disqualifying criminal offenses for which no waiver may be 

granted.

1. Forgery of certificates, false marking of aircraft, and other aircraft 

registration violation; 49 U.S.C. § 46306.

2. Interference with air navigation; 49 U.S.C. § 46308.

3. Improper transportation of a hazardous material; 49 U.S.C. § 46312.

4. Aircraft piracy; 49 U.S.C. § 46502.

5. Interference with flight crew members or flight attendants; 49 U.S.C. § 

46504.

6. Commission of certain crimes aboard aircraft in flight; 49 U.S.C. § 

46506.

7. Carrying a weapon or explosive aboard aircraft; 49 U.S.C. § 46505.

8. Conveying false information and threats; 49 U.S.C. § 46507.

9. Aircraft piracy outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United 

States; 49 U.S.C. § 46502(b).

Appendix V: Criminal Offenses That Disqualify 

Applicants under the Aviation Workers Program 

from Acquiring an Airport-Issued Access Badge
Appendix V: Criminal Offenses That Disqualify 

Applicants under the Aviation Workers 

Program from Acquiring an Airport-Issued 

Access Badge 

Page 59 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

10. Lighting violations involving transporting controlled substances; 49 

U.S.C. § 46315.

11. Unlawful entry into an aircraft or airport area that serves air carriers or 

foreign air carriers contrary to established security requirements; 49 

U.S.C. § 46314.

12. Destruction of an aircraft or aircraft facility; 18 U.S.C. § 32.

13. Murder.

14. Assault with intent to murder.

15. Espionage.

16. Sedition.

17. Kidnapping or hostage taking.

18. Treason.

19. Rape or aggravated sexual abuse.

20. Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, or manufacture of an 

explosive or weapon.

21. Extortion.

22. Armed or felony unarmed robbery.

23. Distribution of, or intent to distribute, a controlled substance.

24. Felony arson.

25. Felony involving a threat.

26. Felony involving— 

(i) Willful destruction of property;

(ii) Importation or manufacture of a controlled substance;

(iii) Burglary; 

(iv) Theft;
Appendix V: Criminal Offenses That Disqualify 

Applicants under the Aviation Workers 

Program from Acquiring an Airport-Issued 

Access Badge 

Page 60 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

(v) Dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation;

(vi) Possession or distribution of stolen property;

(vii) Aggravated assault;

(viii) Bribery; or

(ix) Illegal possession of a controlled substance punishable by a 

maximum term of imprisonment of more than 1 year.

27. Violence at international airports; 18 U.S.C. § 37.

28. Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the criminal acts listed above.
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 61 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security 

Appendix VI: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 
Appendix VI: Agency Comments

Page 62 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security
Appendix VI: Agency Comments

Page 63 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security
Appendix VI: Agency Comments

Page 64 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security
Appendix VI: Agency Comments

Page 65 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 66 GAO-12-60 Transportation Security

Stephen M. Lord at (202) 512-4379 or lords@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, David Bruno, Assistant Director, 

and Jason Berman, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. David 

Bieler, James Lawson, and Rebecca Kuhlmann Taylor made significant 

contributions to this report. Michele Fejfar and Richard Hung assisted with 

design and methodology. Geoffrey Hamilton provided legal support. Tina 

Cheng, Jessica Orr, and Robert Robinson provided assistance in report 

preparation.

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(440947)
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