NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION

Action Needed to 

Address NNSA’s 

Program Management 

and Coordination 

Challenges

Report to the Subcommittee on Energy 

and Water Development, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of 

Representatives

December 2011

GAO-12-71

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-71, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Energy and Water 

Development, Committee on Appropriations, 

House of Representatives

December 2011

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Action Needed to Address NNSA’s Program 

Management and Coordination Challenges

Why GAO Did This Study

GAO has issued numerous reports on 

the effectiveness of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration’s 

(NNSA) Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation (DNN) programs. For 

this report GAO was asked to assess 

(1) the extent of annual DNN uncosted, 

or unexpended, balances; (2) the level 

of financial support from foreign donor 

and recipient governments to the DNN 

programs; (3) the effectiveness of DNN 

program performance measures; and 

(4) the coordination of DNN and other 

agency nonproliferation programs. 

GAO analyzed NNSA financial data 

and other pertinent documents, and 

interviewed officials from multiple 

agencies.

What GAO Recommends

GAO suggests that Congress consider 

extending the time frame allowing DNN 

programs to receive and use foreign 

contributions. GAO recommends that 

NNSA, among other things, (1) justify

in its reports to Congress why 

uncommitted DNN program balances 

over threshold should not be 

rescinded, redirected, or used to offset 

future budget requests; (2) better track 

foreign cost sharing; and (3) improve 

performance measurement reporting. 

GAO also recommends that the 

National Security Council (NSC) review 

U.S. programs working to prevent 

nuclear smuggling overseas to reduce

fragmentation and potential overlap.

NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed 

with and NSC did not comment on the

recommendations. NNSA raised 

concerns with GAO’s analysis of DNN 

financial and performance information. 

GAO addressed NNSA’s concerns as 

appropriate. 

What GAO Found

From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, only about half of the total annual funds

available to the DNN programs were costed, or expended, each year. This 

resulted in uncosted carryover balances of more than $1.5 billion on average 

from one fiscal year to the next. During this time, the total uncosted DNN 

operating program balances exceeded thresholds established by the Department 

of Energy by hundreds of millions of dollars every year. However, much of the 

annual uncosted DNN-wide funding balances were committed for future 

expenditure, and total uncommitted uncosted DNN operating program balances 

were under the thresholds. Nevertheless, three DNN programs had uncommitted 

balances that frequently exceeded thresholds during this time. NNSA provides 

semiannual reports to Congress on DNN uncommitted balances. However, these 

reports do not specify the amounts by which program balances exceeded the 

thresholds or explain why the excess balances should not be rescinded, 

redirected, or used to offset future budget requests. 

GAO identified four DNN programs authorized by Congress to receive and use 

contributions from foreign donors, and these authorities expire from 2011 through 

2015. Three of these programs received approximately $47.1 million from fiscal 

years 2006 through 2010 from seven countries. This amount represents about 1 

percent of the total funding from annual appropriations acts directed to the four

programs over the same period. Extending these authorities would give NNSA 

more time to obtain foreign contributions. In addition, NNSA has pursued greater 

cost sharing with foreign countries where DNN programs are implemented, but

the extent of cost sharing is unclear because NNSA does not systematically track 

or maintain such data.

Some DNN program performance measures do not satisfy key attributes that 

GAO has identified in previous work, namely measures that are clear, reliable, 

and balanced. For example, one program measure—securing nuclear material

facilities in Russia and the former Soviet Union—is unclear, because NNSA

counts buildings with security upgrades as completed although NNSA may 

undertake additional upgrades at some of these sites. In addition, the results of 

some DNN programs in fiscal year 2010 appear overstated because DNN 

measured performance against different targets in the end of fiscal year 

performance report than the ones presented in the budget request to Congress. 

Moreover, NNSA has dropped one long-standing measure used by the Global 

Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program to track reemployment of former 

Soviet weapons scientists rather than improve the measure as GAO previously 

recommended and NNSA agreed to revise.

Existing strategies and plans for coordinating federal efforts to combat nuclear 

smuggling overseas do not incorporate all of the key characteristics of effective 

national strategies that GAO has identified in previous studies. In addition, there 

are concerns of potential fragmentation and overlap among some programs 

working to counter nuclear smuggling overseas, especially those providing 

equipment and training. Furthermore, there is no single recognized federal

agency responsible for leading and directing efforts to combat nuclear smuggling

overseas. However, the NSC oversees interagency coordination of these efforts. 

View GAO-12-71. For more information, 

contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or 

aloisee@gao.gov
Page i GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Letter 1 

Background 5

Some DNN Programs Have Had Difficulty Reducing Uncommitted 

Uncosted Balances 11

Foreign Contributions to DNN Programs Have Been Limited, and 

Foreign Cost-Sharing Data Are Not Systematically Tracked or 

Maintained by NNSA 21

Some DNN Program Performance Measures Lack Key Attributes 

and Have Led to Overstated Results 30

Limitations in Interagency Strategic Plans Impede Coordination of 

U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Overseas 38

Conclusions 48

Matter for Congressional Consideration 50

Recommendations for Executive Action 50

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 52

Appendix I Objectives, Scope and Methodology 58

Appendix II Previous GAO Reports Assessing DOE and NNSA Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Programs 62

Appendix III Foreign Contributions Received by DNN Programs, by Program, from 

Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010 64

Appendix IV Foreign Contributions Received by DNN Programs, by Country, from 

Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010 65

Appendix V Foreign Contributions Received by DNN Programs Compared to 

Total Funding from Annual Appropriations Acts, fr 66

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix VI Limitations in Key Attributes of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Program Performance Measures 68

Appendix VII DNN Performance Measures, Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010 75

Appendix VIII U.S. Programs Contributing to Overseas Nuclear Smuggling Prevention 

and Detection 89

Appendix IX Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 93

Appendix X Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration 96

Appendix XI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 100

Tables

Table 1: DNN Operating Programs and Major Program and 

Subprogram Functions and Activities, by DNN Program 

Office in Fiscal Year 2010 6

Table 2: DNN-Wide Costed and Uncosted Balances, Including 

Committed and Uncommitted Uncosted Balances from 

Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010 12

Table 3: Total DNN Operating Program Uncosted and 

Uncommitted Uncosted Balances Over/Under DOE 

Threshold from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010 13

Table 4: Uncosted Funding Balances Over/Under DOE Threshold, 

Selected DNN Operating Programs from Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2010 14

Table 5: Uncommitted Uncosted Funding Balances Over/Under 

DOE Threshold, Selected DNN Operating Programs from 

Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010 17
Page iii GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 6: Differences in DNN Program Performance Targets, Fiscal 

Year 2010 35

Table 7: Summary of Desirable Characteristics for a National 

Strategy 39

Table 8: Key Attributes of Successful Performance Measures 68

Table 9: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Performance 

Measures, from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010, As 

Presented in Annual Budget Requests 79

Figures

Figure 1: Trends in Total DNN Costed, Committed, and 

Uncommitted Funding Balances from Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2010 16

Figure 2: Total Foreign Contributions Received by DNN Program 

from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010 22

Figure 3: Foreign Contributions to DNN Programs by Country from 

Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010 24
Page iv GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Abbreviations

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CBSP Cooperative Border Security Program

CPI Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives

CSI Container Security Initiative

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction program

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office

DNN Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

DOD U.S. Department of Defense

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EWGPP Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium

Production program

EXBS Export Control and Related Border Security 

 program

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

GIPP Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention 

 program

GNDA Global Nuclear Detection Architecture

GTRI Global Threat Reduction Initiative

HEU highly enriched uranium

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training and

Assistance Program

ICP International Counterproliferation Program

INECP International Nonproliferation Export Control 

Program

INMPC International Nuclear Materials Protection

and Cooperation program

IPC interagency policy committee

IPP Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program
Page v GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

IWG interagency working group

Justice U.S. Department of Justice

LEU low-enriched uranium

M&O management and operating

MOX mixed oxide

MPC&A Material Protection, Control, and

 Accounting program

MT metric tons

NDF Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund

NGSI Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

NIAG Nuclear Interdiction Action Group

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSC U.S. National Security Council

NSOI Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative

NTRG Nuclear Trafficking Response Group

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OPDAT Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development,

Assistance, and Training

PDCF Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

PNSP Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program

RCP Regional Combating WMD Program

R&D research and development

SFI Secure Freight Initiative

SLD Second Line of Defense program

State U.S. Department of State

UN United Nations

USG United States Government

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

WMD-PPP WMD Proliferation Prevention Program

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Page 1 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

December 14, 2011

The Honorable Rodney P. Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The threat of nuclear proliferation poses one of the most important 

challenges to U.S. and international security. This threat includes the 

possibilities that terrorist organizations could steal nuclear weapon-usable 

materials from poorly secured stockpiles in various locations around the 

world or that other nations could divert nuclear material intended for 

peaceful purposes to the development of nuclear weapons.1

To address these and related nuclear proliferation threats, the 

Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) implements more than 20 nonproliferation programs worldwide 

under its Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN).

As little as 

25 kilograms of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) or 8 

kilograms of plutonium could be used to make a nuclear weapon.

2 These 

programs include efforts to secure nuclear warheads; protect, 

consolidate, and dispose of weapon-usable nuclear materials and 

radiological sources;3

 

1

Weapon-usable nuclear materials are highly enriched uranium, uranium-233, and any 

plutonium containing less than 80 percent of the isotope plutonium-238. Such materials 

are also often referred to as fissile materials or strategic special nuclear materials.

reduce the risks of nuclear smuggling; research 

and develop nonproliferation technologies; transition weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) expertise and infrastructure in partner countries to 

2

NNSA was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. 

L. No. 106-65 (1999). It is a separate semiautonomous agency within DOE, with 

responsibility for the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors 

programs.

3

Radiological sources include radioactive material, such as cobalt-60, cesium-137, and 

strontium-90. While these materials cannot be used to create a nuclear weapon, they 

could be fabricated into a so-called dirty bomb or device to disperse radioactive materials.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

peaceful purposes; and enhance international export controls and 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear safeguards.4

Many DNN programs originated in the early 1990s, following the 

dissolution of the Soviet Union, and have focused principally on improving 

nuclear security in Russia. Increasingly, these programs have focused 

attention on the security of weapon-usable nuclear materials in countries 

beyond Russia and the former Soviet states. DNN programs have 

engaged more than 100 countries and are seeking to increase nuclear 

security work with several countries where there has been limited prior 

cooperation, such as China and India. In addition to NNSA, other U.S. 

government agencies—including the Departments of Defense (DOD), 

State, and Homeland Security (DHS)—support programs and activities to 

reduce proliferation concerns around the world.

NNSA’s nuclear nonproliferation budget has grown significantly over the 

past decade, from approximately $874 million appropriated for DNN in 

fiscal year 2001, to approximately $2.3 billion appropriated for DNN in 

fiscal year 2011. Funding appropriated for DNN activities is generally 

available for obligation5 until expended and is known as “no year” 

funding.6

 

4

IAEA is an independent international organization based in Vienna, Austria, that is 

affiliated with the United Nations and has the dual mission of promoting the peaceful uses 

of nuclear energy and verifying that nuclear technologies and materials intended for 

peaceful purposes are not diverted to weapons development efforts. Safeguards allow 

IAEA to independently verify that nuclear material and other specified items are not 

diverted from peaceful nuclear uses by, among other things, inspecting all facilities and 

locations containing nuclear material declared by countries to verify its peaceful use. For 

more information, see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its 

Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, 

Typically, NNSA obligates funds when it contracts with a 

management and operating (M&O) contractor, such as a DOE national 

laboratory, to execute certain program functions. The obligation is 

GAO-06-93 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005).

5

An obligation is a definite commitment that creates a legal liability of the government for 

the payment of goods and services ordered or received, or a legal duty on the part of the 

United States that could mature into a legal liability by virtue of actions on the part of the 

other party beyond the control of the United States.

6

For more information on DOE’s no-year funding, see GAO, DOE’s No-Year Funding, 

GAO/RCED-95-91R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 1995).
 

Page 3 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

“costed” when goods and services are received, and, for practical 

purposes, DNN considers funds to be expended when costed.7

Not all DNN obligations are costed during a given fiscal year, and, 

because of the no-year nature of the funding, NNSA carries these 

balances of uncosted obligations over to the next fiscal year. As a result, 

uncosted obligations can accumulate from one fiscal year to the next. In 

addition, uncosted obligations consist of balances that are either 

“committed” or “uncommitted.” Generally, uncosted obligations are 

committed when the M&O contractors enter into legally enforceable 

agreements, such as purchase orders or contracts.8 Uncommitted 

uncosted obligations are balances that have not yet been committed by 

the contractors and may be available to reduce future NNSA budget 

requests.9

This report responds in part to your request that we conduct a review of 

U.S. nuclear nonproliferation strategies.

Furthermore, besides domestic sources of funding, some DNN 

programs have been authorized by Congress to receive and use 

contributions from other foreign governments interested in supporting 

nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

10

 

7

The terms “costed” and “expended” are often used interchangeably by NNSA and used 

interchangeably in instances in this report, but there are minor technical differences 

between them. Specifically, DNN funds are costed after the invoice for work has been 

received, the work has been completed to government satisfaction, and the invoice is 

approved for payment. Expenditures, or outlays, refer to when an obligation is actually 

liquidated through issuance of a check, electronic transfer of funds, or disbursement of 

cash.

Specifically, our objectives 

were to assess (1) the extent of annual DNN uncosted, or unexpended, 

8

The NNSA definition of a commitment is the outstanding contractor encumbrances by the 

M&O contractors—such as the national laboratories—plus the full amount of uncosted 

obligations for direct contracts awarded to non-M&O contractors. The “outstanding 

contractor encumbrances” include the uncosted balances under contracts awarded by the 

M&O contractor and can consist of, among other things, uncosted balances on contracts 

or subcontracts awarded or purchase orders issued by the M&O contractor.

9

For more information on DOE’s funding process and carryover balances, see GAO, DOE 

Management: DOE Needs to Improve Its Analysis of Carryover Balances, 

GAO/RCED-96-57 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 1996).

10In September 2010, we issued a classified report to you on the results of our work on 

U.S. efforts to secure nuclear materials worldwide, and issued an unclassified version of 

that report in December 2010. See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. 

Planning and Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials 

Worldwide, GAO-11-227 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2010).
 

Page 4 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

balances; (2) the level of financial contributions from foreign donor and 

recipient governments to the DNN programs; (3) the effectiveness of DNN 

program performance measures; and (4) the effectiveness of interagency 

strategies and plans for coordinating NNSA and other agency nuclear 

nonproliferation programs, especially those working to prevent and detect 

nuclear smuggling overseas. This report focuses on the management and 

coordination challenges facing the DNN programs, but does not evaluate 

the effectiveness of the programs. In previous reports, we have evaluated 

the effectiveness of various individual DNN programs.11

To assess the extent of DNN uncosted balances, we obtained and 

analyzed financial data generated from NNSA’s official financial 

management system on uncosted and uncommitted DNN funding from 

fiscal years 2006 through 2010. We interviewed knowledgeable NNSA 

officials to assess the reliability of the data from this system, including on 

issues such as data entry, access, quality control procedures, and the 

accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined that the data 

were of sufficient reliability for our purposes. To assess financial 

contributions made by foreign donor governments to the DNN programs, 

we analyzed data in the most recent DOE report to Congress on the 

receipt and utilization of international contributions for nonproliferation 

and threat reduction work. Regarding cost sharing by host governments 

receiving DNN assistance, NNSA officials provided us with data 

estimating the dollar amount of foreign cost sharing for relevant 

programs, and provided us with examples of cost-sharing activity. We 

interviewed NNSA officials on the policies, methods, and systems for 

collecting, estimating, and maintaining foreign cost-sharing information. 

Unless otherwise noted, all dollar figures in this report are presented in 

nominal amounts—that is, they have not been adjusted for inflation. To 

assess the effectiveness of DNN performance measures, we evaluated 

the DNN program performance measures presented by NNSA in its 

 

11For example, see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Address Uncertainties 

with and Strengthen Independent Safety Oversight of Its Plutonium Disposition Program, 

GAO-10-378 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2010); Nuclear Nonproliferation: National 

Nuclear Security Administration Has Improved the Security of Reactors in its Global 

Research Reactor Program, but Action Is Needed to Address Remaining Concerns, 

GAO-09-949 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009); Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s 

Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be 

Reassessed, GAO-08-189 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2007); and Nuclear 

Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the 

Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain, GAO-07-404

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007).
 

Page 5 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

annual budget requests to Congress from fiscal years 2006 through 2010. 

Specifically, for each DNN program, we: reviewed the performance 

measures in each budget request to assess how the measures changed 

over time; compared performance measures in each budget request 

against the measures described in DOE annual performance reports 

produced at the end of each fiscal year; and evaluated the DNN 

performance measures against criteria we developed previously on the 

key attributes of effective performance measures. To assess the 

effectiveness of interagency strategies for coordinating NNSA and other 

agency nuclear nonproliferation programs, especially those working to 

prevent and detect nuclear smuggling overseas, we reviewed relevant 

interagency strategies and coordinating guidance. We evaluated these 

strategies against characteristics and attributes of effective national 

strategies for complex interagency undertakings that we have developed 

previously. To assess coordination between NNSA and other agencies’ 

nonproliferation programs, we focused on 21 programs across five federal 

agencies that are involved in preventing and detecting nuclear smuggling 

overseas. We submitted a standard set of questions to and/or interviewed 

officials representing the 21 programs on a range of issues, including 

scope of program missions and activities, types of interactions with other 

federal programs, and their views on the coordination and integration of 

similar programs across the government. We used the responses to our 

questions and information from our interviews with officials from these 

agencies to evaluate similarities in missions, functions, and activities 

between programs, and obtain official perspectives on the effectiveness 

of coordinating mechanisms and guidance. Additional details on our 

scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2011 to December 

2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The President requests funds from Congress each fiscal year for NNSA 

to execute DNN programs. When Congress appropriates funds for DNN, 

it generally recommends that NNSA direct specific amounts of that 

appropriation to each of the programs funded from that appropriation. In 

fiscal year 2010, there were seven operating programs funded from 

NNSA’s DNN appropriation managed by six DNN program offices. 

Background 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 1 lists these programs by office and describes major program and 

subprogram functions and activities in fiscal year 2010. Appendix II lists 

some of our prior reports on DNN programs and activities.

Table 1: DNN Operating Programs and Major Program and Subprogram Functions and Activities, by DNN Program Office in 

Fiscal Year 2010

DNN program 

office Programs Major program and subprogram functions and activities

(1) Office of Global 

Threat Reduction

(1) Global Threat Reduction 

Initiative (GTRI)

GTRI subprograms work in the United States and internationally to convert 

research reactors and medical isotope production processes from use of HEU, 

remove and dispose of excess nuclear and radiological materials, and protect 

high-priority nuclear and radiological sources from theft.

(2) Office of 

Nonproliferation 

Research and 

Development (R&D)

(2) Nonproliferation and 

Verification R&D program

Nonproliferation and Verification R&D subprograms support long-term basic 

and applied research, development, and testing of new technologies to 

improve U.S. capabilities to detect and monitor nuclear weapons production, 

proliferation of nuclear weapon-usable materials, and nuclear explosions 

worldwide.

(3) Office of 

Nonproliferation and 

International 

Security 

(3) Nonproliferation and 

International Security 

program

Nonproliferation and International Security subprograms provide a range of 

policy and technical support to implement and monitor WMD reductions; 

revitalize the safeguards technology and human capital base at the U.S. 

national laboratories to help strengthen the international safeguards system; 

strengthen nuclear material security and export control systems; transition 

WMD expertise and infrastructure in partner countries to peaceful purposes; 

and improve international nuclear nonproliferation regimes, agreements, and 

arrangements.

(4) Office of 

International 

Material Protection 

and Cooperation

(4) International Nuclear 

Materials Protection and 

Cooperation (INMPC) 

program

INMPC consists of two major subprograms: the nuclear Material Protection, 

Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program and the Second Line of Defense 

(SLD) program. The MPC&A program works to improve the security of nuclear 

warheads and materials at sites in Russia and at nuclear material sites in other 

countries; consolidate and convert weapon-usable nuclear material stocks; 

and enable Russia and other countries to sustain MPC&A upgrades over the 

long term without continued U.S. support.a

(5) Office of Fissile 

Materials 

Disposition

The SLD program seeks to 

strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict 

illicit nuclear and radioactive material trafficking. The SLD program is divided 

into an SLD “core” program that installs radiation detection equipment at key 

foreign land borders, airports, and ports, and a Megaports Initiative that is 

designed to enhance radiation screening of cargo containers at major foreign 

seaports.

(5) U.S. Surplus Materials 

Disposition program

(6) Russian Surplus 

Materials Disposition 

program

The U.S. Surplus Materials Disposition program—also referred to as the U.S. 

Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition program—supports the downblending of 

HEU that is excess to U.S. defense needs and efforts to fabricate 34 metric 

tons of U.S. excess plutonium into mixed oxide fuel, which will be irradiated in 

commercial reactors. The Russian Surplus Materials Disposition program—

also referred to as the Russian Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition program 

or the Russian plutonium disposition program—is planning to assist Russia in 

modifying reactors in that country, which will dispose of an equivalent amount 

of Russian weapon-grade plutonium.
 

Page 7 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

DNN program 

office Programs Major program and subprogram functions and activities

(6) Office of Nuclear 

Risk Reductionb (7) Elimination of WeaponsGrade Plutonium 

Production (EWGPP) 

program

The EWGPP program has facilitated shutdown of Russia’s plutonium 

production reactors by constructing replacement sources of heat and 

electricity. It is expected to complete all programmatic activities in calendar 

year 2011.

Source: NNSA.

a

There is a geographic division of labor between MPC&A and GTRI program efforts to secure and 

protect nuclear materials in foreign locations. The MPC&A program provides security upgrades to 

sites in foreign countries including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, China, and 

India. GTRI addresses security at civilian research reactors and related facilities utilizing nuclear 

weapon-usable materials in all other countries that are not considered high-income.

b

In April 1996, we reported that DOE did not have a standard, effective 

approach for identifying carryover balances that may be available to 

reduce future budget requests, but instead relied on broad estimates of 

potentially excess balances in individual programs.

In fiscal year 2011, this office ceased to exist, and responsibility for administering closeout activities 

under the EWGPP program was transferred to the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition.

12 As a result, we 

reported that DOE could not be sure whether the amount of carryover 

balances by its programs was appropriate.13 Based on our prior work and 

recommendations, and congressional interest in uncosted balances, DOE 

developed benchmarks, or “thresholds”—beyond which uncosted 

balances carried over at the end of a fiscal year should be given greater 

scrutiny—to assess the extent to which carryover balances are 

appropriate. These thresholds are typically expressed as a percentage of 

the total funds available to a program to cost, or expend, in any given 

fiscal year, depending on the types of activities the program is 

conducting. The thresholds give NNSA a tool for evaluating DNN program 

performance based on the variance between target thresholds and actual 

uncosted, or unexpended, carryover balances. The thresholds for DNN 

operating programs generally range from 14 to 17 percent of the total 

program funding available to cost in a given fiscal year.14

 

12GAO/RCED-96-57. 

13For instance, in our 1996 report, we identified almost $500 million in uncosted 

obligations over 3 prior years that were classified as necessary to meet the requirements 

of DOE’s programs when they should have been categorized as available to reduce 

DOE’s budget request.

14For example, in fiscal year 2010, the International Nuclear Materials Protection and 

Cooperation program threshold was 14 percent, while the Elimination of Weapons-Grade 

Plutonium Production program threshold was 17 percent.
 

Page 8 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

These thresholds also provide Congress with a way of overseeing 

NNSA’s financial management. In 1992, Congress began requiring DOE 

to submit an annual report on the status of its uncosted obligations.15 In 

these reports, DOE evaluates uncosted balances against thresholds 

representing standard costing levels for various types of funding, such as 

operating and capital equipment costs. In 2003, Congress required NNSA 

to provide a semiannual report on DNN uncommitted, unobligated, and 

unexpended balances.16

Congress has given specific authority over the past decade to several 

DNN programs to receive and retain contributions from foreign sources 

for program purposes, in addition to funding received from domestic 

sources. We identified four programs that are currently authorized to 

receive and use foreign contributions:17 the Elimination of WeaponsGrade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) program, the International Nuclear 

Materials Protection and Cooperation program (INMPC) program, the 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), and the Russian plutonium 

disposition program.18

Furthermore, other key U.S. government agencies—including DOD, 

State, and DHS—pursue international efforts to reduce nuclear 

proliferation risks. Specifically:

• DOD administers the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, 

which has provided assistance to (1) facilitate the removal of nuclear 

weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; (2) help Russia and 

Ukraine eliminate strategic delivery systems; (3) secure Russian 

nuclear warheads; (4) destroy the Russian chemical weapons 

stockpile; (5) reduce biological proliferation risks across the former 

Soviet Union; and (6) combat WMD smuggling in the region. The CTR 

program has expanded its geographic scope in recent years, including 

 

1542 U.S.C. § 13526 (2006).

1650 U.S.C. § 2454 (2006).

17The United States can receive donations without any particular statutory authority. An 

agency, however, must have statutory authority to receive and use those donations.

18The law providing the authorization refers specifically to the “Russian plutonium 

disposition program”; however, in NNSA budget documents this program is generally 

formally identified as the Russian Surplus Materials or the Russian Surplus Fissile 

Materials Disposition program. In this report, we use the program names interchangeably.
 

Page 9 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

pursuing nuclear security cooperation with India and China in 

cooperation with NNSA. The CTR Policy Office within the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense provides strategic guidance and policy 

oversight, conducts long range planning, and negotiates implementing 

agreements and arrangements for the CTR program. The Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction and Arms 

Control oversees acquisition, implementation, and other management 

issues for the program. CTR program activities are implemented 

through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which 

manages all aspects of CTR’s programming, contracting, and 

funding.19

• State manages its own nonproliferation programs, provides support to 

NNSA and other U.S. agency nuclear nonproliferation programs 

working overseas, and conducts bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to 

address proliferation threats under the Bureau of International 

Security and Nonproliferation.

DTRA also implements international WMD threat reduction 

activities separate from the CTR program.

20

• In 2002 Congress established DHS and authorized it to, among other 

things, develop and deploy technologies to detect, prevent, and 

interdict nuclear materials smuggled into the United States. In 2005, 

the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within 

DHS to enhance national capabilities to prevent nuclear and 

State’s nuclear nonproliferation 

programs include efforts to enhance international export controls and 

border security; counter nuclear smuggling; redirect WMD expertise in 

Iraq, Libya, and other countries to peaceful research; and sustain a 

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund that provides funding to 

address nonproliferation contingencies and other urgent threat 

reduction efforts.

 

19DTRA is DOD’s official combat support agency for countering weapons of mass 

destruction.

20The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation was formed as a result of a 

2005 State reorganization that combined nonproliferation and arms control issues under 

one bureau. For more information on this reorganization, see GAO, State Department: 

Key Transformation Practices Could Have Helped in Restructuring Arms Control and 

Nonproliferation Bureaus, GAO-09-738 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2009).
 

Page 10 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

radiological attacks.21 Part of DNDO’s mission is to coordinate the 

development of a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA)—

which DNDO describes as a worldwide network of sensors, 

telecommunications, and personnel, with supporting information 

exchanges, programs, and protocols, to detect, analyze, and report on 

nuclear and radiological materials outside of regulatory control.22

DNDO also works with other agency programs involved in detecting 

and preventing nuclear smuggling abroad by, among other things, 

developing standards and practices for testing and evaluating 

radiation detection systems and strategies to implement national level 

detection architectures. In addition to DNDO, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) within DHS created the Container Security 

Initiative to identify and screen U.S.-bound maritime cargo containers 

at foreign seaports to prevent and deter terrorist use of maritime 

containers and to request foreign inspection of those containers 

identified as high risk for the possibility they are carrying nuclear or 

radiological weapons or materials. CBP also manages the Secure 

Freight Initiative—a joint DHS, DOE, and State effort—to deploy nonintrusive imaging and radiation detection equipment for the scanning 

of all U.S.-bound maritime cargo containers at foreign seaports.23

National Security Council (NSC) staff have the principal role in 

coordinating the implementation of NNSA, DOD, State, and other agency 

nonproliferation programs. NSC oversees the development of general 

 

21For information on DNDO, see GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved 

Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show 

Limits of the New Technology, GAO-09-655 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2009); and 

Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better 

Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities, GAO-09-257 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2009).

22For information on the global nuclear detection architecture, see GAO, Combating 

Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not Yet Completed a Strategic 

Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or Closed Identified Gaps, GAO-10-883T

(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010); and Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has 

Developed a Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps 

Remain, GAO-11-869T (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2011). 

23For further information on the Container Security Initiative and the Secure Freight 

Initiative, see GAO, Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International Entities to 

Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges Remain, 

GAO-08-538 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 2008); and Supply Chain Security: Feasibility 

and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and 

Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, 

GAO-10-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2009).
 

Page 11 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

policy and establishes guidelines for U.S. nonproliferation programs but 

does not implement programs or control their budgets.

From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, only about half of the total annual 

funds available to the DNN programs were costed each year. 

Furthermore, total uncosted DNN operating program balances exceeded 

the thresholds established by DOE by hundreds of millions of dollars 

every year during this time, including some individual DNN programs with 

large uncosted balances over threshold. However, much of the annual 

uncosted DNN-wide funding balances were committed for future 

expenditure, and the total uncommitted uncosted DNN operating program 

balances were under acceptable thresholds. Nevertheless, three

individual DNN programs had uncommitted balances that frequently 

exceeded thresholds during this time, raising questions about the ability 

of those programs to utilize the funding available to them.

From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, only about half of the total annual 

DNN funding available to cost was costed at the end of each fiscal year. 

As a percentage of the total annual funding available to cost, the annual 

DNN-wide uncosted balances ranged from approximately 47 percent at 

the end of fiscal year 2009 to approximately 51 percent at the end of 

fiscal year 2007. In dollar terms, these annual DNN-wide uncosted 

balances have resulted in carryover balances of more than $1.5 billion on 

average from one fiscal year to the next. For instance, in fiscal year 

2010—the most recent fiscal year in the scope of our review—DNN 

programs costed a total of approximately $1.8 billion of approximately 

$3.6 billion available, leaving about $1.8 billion in uncosted balances at 

the end of the fiscal year. See table 2 for more detail on DNN-wide costed 

and uncosted balances, including committed and uncommitted uncosted 

balances, from fiscal years 2006 through 2010.

Some DNN Programs 

Have Had Difficulty 

Reducing 

Uncommitted 

Uncosted Balances

About Half of DNN Annual 

Funding Is Uncosted but 

Most Is Committed for 

Future Expenditure
 

Page 12 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 2: DNN-wide Costed and Uncosted Balances, Including Committed and Uncommitted Uncosted Balances from Fiscal 

Years 2006 through 2010

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year

2006

Fiscal year 

2007

Fiscal year 

2008

Fiscal year 

2009

Fiscal year 

2010

5-year 

average

Total funds 

available to cost $2,689.5 $3,169.1 $3,355.4 $3,103.1 $3,576.0 $3,178.6

Total funds costed $1,373.6 $1,556.0 $1,758.8 $1,633.2 $1,770.5 $1,618.4

Total funds 

uncosted $1,315.9 $1,613.1 $1,596.6 $1,469.8 $1,805.4 $1,560.2

Total uncosted 

funds committed $971.2 $1,213.6 $1,206.9 $1,127.4 $1,443.7 $1,192.6

Total funds 

committed and 

costed $2,344.8 $2,769.6 $2,965.7 $2,760.7 $3,214.2 $2,811.0

Total uncosted 

funds uncommitted $344.7 $399.5 $389.7 $342.4 $361.8 $367.6

Total uncosted as a 

percentage of total 

funds available to 

cost 48.9% 50.9% 47.6% 47.4% 50.5% 49.1%

Total uncommitted 

uncosted as a 

percentage of total 

funds available to 

cost 12.8% 12.6% 11.6% 11.0% 10.1% 11.6%

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.

Notes: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. Amounts may not total due to rounding.

Furthermore, total uncosted DNN operating program balances exceeded 

DOE thresholds every year by hundreds of millions of dollars during this 

time. For instance, the total uncosted DNN operating program balances 

exceeded the DOE threshold by nearly $800 million in fiscal year 2010. 

See table 3 for more information on the thresholds and total DNN 

operating program uncosted balances compared against these thresholds 

for fiscal years 2006 through 2010.
 

Page 13 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 3: Total DNN Operating Program Uncosted and Uncommitted Uncosted Balances over/under DOE Thresholds, from 

Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010

Dollars in millions

Threshold as 

percentage of 

total funds 

available to cost

Threshold as 

dollars

Uncosted 

balances

Uncosted 

balances 

over/under 

threshold

Uncommitted 

uncosted 

balances

Uncommitted 

uncosted 

balances

over/under 

threshold

Fiscal Year 2006

Total DNN Operating 16.4% $363.8 $1,044.2 $680.4 $313.7 -$50.2

Fiscal Year 2007

Total DNN Operating 16.0% $412.4 $1,244.3 $831.9 $360.7 -$51.7

Fiscal Year 2008

Total DNN Operating 16.0% $456.4 $1,395.2 $938.8 $371.7 -$84.6

Fiscal Year 2009

Total DNN Operating 16.0% $462.6 $1,288.0 $825.4 $323.2 -$139.3

Fiscal Year 2010

Total DNN Operating 15.3% $430.6 $1,226.2 $795.6 $327.3 -$103.3

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.

Notes: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. Totals include balances for some older DNN 

programs to which Congress previously directed funding from DNN appropriations, but do not include 

uncosted and uncommitted uncosted balances associated with appropriations identified by NNSA as 

time-limited funds to DNN operating programs. The negative values indicate the amount by which 

balances were under thresholds. The positive values indicate the amount by which balances were 

over thresholds. Amounts may not total due to rounding.

At the program level, we examined the uncosted balances for the seven 

current DNN operating programs against the DOE thresholds from fiscal 

years 2006 through 2010. In nearly all cases we found that these 

individual programs each had large uncosted balances over DOE 

thresholds at the end of each fiscal year during this time period, ranging 

from approximately $21 million to $490 million. One of these programs—

the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D program—had annual uncosted 

balances below threshold twice during this time. See table 4 for more 

information on the amounts by which individual DNN program uncosted 

balances were over or under DOE threshold during this time.
 

Page 14 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 4: Uncosted Funding Balances over/under DOE Thresholds, Selected DNN Operating Programs, from Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2010

Dollars in millions

Amount of uncosted balances over or under threshold

 Fiscal year 

2006

Fiscal year 

2007

Fiscal year 

2008

Fiscal year 

2009

Fiscal year 

2010

Global Threat Reduction Initiative $27.1 $71.9 $60.0 $156.6 $104.4

Nonproliferation and Verification 

R&D -$0.9 -$10.3 $40.4 $48.9 $29.2

Elimination of Weapons-Grade 

Plutonium Production $141.6 $127.1 $188.2 $115.5 $29.8

Nonproliferation and International 

Security $36.8 $38.3 $45.0 $51.3 $53.5

International Nuclear Materials 

Protection and Cooperation $317.8 $464.2 $490.2 $411.1 $444.8

U.S. Surplus Materials 

Disposition $64.8 $61.5 $30.8 $21.2 $100.8

Russian Surplus Materials 

Disposition $59.0 $62.7 $43.9 $35.0 $33.5

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.

Notes: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. The negative values indicate the amount by 

which uncosted balances were under DOE uncosted thresholds. The positive values indicate the 

amount by which uncosted balances were over thresholds.

NNSA has acknowledged that uncosted DNN program funding balances 

have often exceeded the thresholds in reports to Congress. However, 

NNSA has stated that evaluating DNN programs on the basis of their 

uncosted balances alone is unwarranted and that, in addition, balances 

that are uncosted but committed should be considered when reviewing 

the financial status of the programs. NNSA officials told us that committed 

balances represent funds that have been placed on contracts, often for 

long-lead procurements, the work of which must be validated by project 

teams and NNSA headquarters before being costed. According to NNSA 

officials, because committed funding is tied to signed contracts, it is not 

available for other purposes. According to NNSA officials, the only way to 

fully cost funding in a fiscal year is to provide full funding at the contract 

signing, which would limit NNSA’s ability to govern the execution of DNN 

projects in foreign countries.

In addition, NNSA officials told us, and NNSA reports to Congress stated, 

that a significant amount of DNN work is conducted in foreign countries, 

notably Russia. In these countries, business transactions, including 

contract negotiations and subsequent accounting of these transactions, 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

do not follow the normal obligation and costing patterns for funds costed 

domestically. For instance, funds are obligated upfront to the U.S. 

contractor handling the negotiations with the foreign entity, but costs are 

not reported until the work has been completed, which may take years 

after work orders are placed. NNSA officials told us that this situation can 

cause a lag between when program funds are committed and costed, 

because project payments are not made until after the work is verified as 

completed in these countries.

We found that much of the annual DNN-wide uncosted balances had 

been committed for future expenditure. For instance, of the $1.8 billion in 

total DNN funding that was uncosted at the end of fiscal year 2010, 

approximately $1.4 billion was committed, leaving a total DNN 

uncommitted uncosted funding balance of approximately $361.8 million. 

This fiscal year 2010 uncommitted uncosted balance was also the 

smallest—as a percentage of total funding available to cost—over the 5-

year period of our review, having decreased from 12.8 percent in fiscal 

year 2006 to 10.1 percent in fiscal year 2010. On average during this 

period, the annual DNN-wide uncommitted uncosted balance was 

approximately $367.6 million, or 11.6 percent of total annual funding 

available to cost. See table 2, above, and figure 1 for more information on 

committed and uncommitted uncosted balances DNN-wide from fiscal 

years 2006 through 2010.
 

Page 16 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 1: Trends in Total DNN Costed, Committed, and Uncommitted Funding 

Balances from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010

Note: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars.

Moreover, the total uncommitted uncosted DNN operating program 

balances were below threshold at the end of every fiscal year during the 

5-year period we reviewed, from $50.2 million below threshold at the end 

of fiscal year 2006 to approximately $103.3 million below threshold at the 

end of fiscal year 2010. (See table 3, above, for more information on total 

uncommitted uncosted DNN operating program balances compared to 

DOE uncosted thresholds for fiscal years 2006 through 2010.)
 

Page 17 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Four of the seven DNN operating programs we reviewed—GTRI, 

Nonproliferation and Verification R&D, EWGPP, and the International 

Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation programs—had 

uncommitted uncosted balances below threshold for 4 or all 5 of the fiscal 

years from fiscal years 2006 through 2010. However, the other three DNN 

operating programs—Nonproliferation and International Security, U.S. 

Surplus Materials Disposition, and Russian Surplus Materials 

Disposition—had uncommitted uncosted balances that exceeded DOE 

thresholds at the end of 4 or all 5 of the fiscal years. In our view, this 

raises questions about whether these programs are effectively utilizing 

their funding, and whether uncommitted uncosted carryover balances 

could be directed to other NNSA programs or be used to reduce future 

DNN budget requests. See table 5 for more information on the amounts 

by which individual DNN program uncommitted uncosted balances were 

over or under DOE thresholds during this time.

Table 5: Uncommitted Uncosted Funding Balances over/under DOE Thresholds, Selected DNN Operating Programs, from 

Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010

Dollars in millions

Amount of uncommitted uncosted funding over or under threshold

 Fiscal year 

2006

Fiscal year 

2007

Fiscal year 

2008

Fiscal year 

2009

Fiscal year 

2010

Global Threat Reduction 

Initiative $2.3 -$5.9 -$18.0 -$30.6 -$41.7

Nonproliferation and 

Verification R&D -$47.5 -$42.0 -$11.8 -$5.4 -$18.5

Elimination of Weapons-Grade 

Plutonium Production -$48.1 -$70.9 -$61.5 -$57.7 -$29.4

Nonproliferation and 

International Security $1.5 $15.1 $25.1 $28.4 $21.5

International Nuclear Materials 

Protection and Cooperation -$14.5 $5.4 -$17.5 -$74.7 -$65.0

U.S. Surplus Materials 

Disposition $7.7 $5.8 -$2.9 $3.3 $16.0

Russian Surplus Materials 

Disposition $33.9 $34.3 $21.1 $19.0 $16.7

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.

Notes: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. The negative values indicate the amount by 

which uncommitted uncosted balances were under DOE uncosted thresholds. The positive values 

indicate the amount by which uncommitted uncosted balances were over thresholds.

Specifically, the uncommitted uncosted balances for the U.S. Surplus 

Materials Disposition program exceeded the DOE thresholds for 4 of the 

Uncommitted Uncosted 

Balances of Four DNN 

Programs Were Under 

Annual Thresholds, but 

Balances of Three 

Programs Frequently 

Exceeded Them
 

Page 18 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

5 fiscal years in our review. In addition, the uncommitted uncosted 

balances for the Nonproliferation and International Security and Russian 

Surplus Materials Disposition programs exceeded thresholds in all 5 fiscal 

years. On average, the Nonproliferation and International Security 

program’s uncommitted uncosted balance exceeded its threshold by 

approximately $18.3 million each year. The uncommitted uncosted 

balances for the Russian disposition program exceeded threshold on 

average by approximately $25 million per year.

NNSA provides semiannual reports to Congress on DNN uncommitted, 

unobligated, and unexpended balances. These reports include 

information on the extent to which DNN program uncosted obligations 

consist either of committed or uncommitted funds. For instance, in the 

most recent end-of-year report we reviewed—for fiscal year 2010—NNSA 

identifies uncommitted funding by DNN program in dollar amounts and as 

a percentage of its uncosted obligated funding. The report also includes 

brief explanations for the uncommitted balances by program at the end of 

the fiscal year. However, this report does not identify the amount of 

uncommitted funding in excess of the DOE thresholds by program, or why 

such excess balances should not be rescinded, redirected to other NNSA 

programs, or used to offset future DNN budget requests. This makes it 

difficult to evaluate whether such balances are appropriate on a programby-program basis.

In general, NNSA officials told us that uncertainties associated with the 

congressional appropriations process explain in part why DNN 

uncommitted uncosted balances often exceed DOE thresholds. 

Specifically, the DNN programs have usually operated under a series of 

continuing resolutions for the first few months of the fiscal year until the 

regular DNN appropriation for that fiscal year is approved by Congress. 

Under continuing resolutions, DNN operates on a conservative basis, 

limiting commitment and costing of program funds, due to uncertainty 

concerning when the regular appropriation will be approved by Congress. 

According to NNSA officials, when the annual DNN appropriation is 

delayed months into the fiscal year, the programs face difficulty in fully 

committing and costing available funds before the end of the fiscal year 

because of the shorter period in which to execute the regular 

appropriation.

In addition, NNSA officials provided us with the following explanations for 

why the three programs frequently had uncommitted uncosted balances 

exceeding DOE thresholds from fiscal years 2006 through 2010.
 

Page 19 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

NNSA officials provided several explanations for the Nonproliferation and 

International Security program’s frequent over threshold uncommitted 

uncosted balances during this period. First, they noted that several 

program activities occur at the beginning of each fiscal year as required 

under certain international agreements, and funds must be available at 

the beginning of the fiscal year to enable these activities to be conducted. 

According to these officials, because DNN in most years operates under 

a continuing resolution at the beginning of a fiscal year, the program is 

forced to carry over balances above the threshold to ensure adequate 

funding for these activities. Second, the officials said that export control 

and other training courses supported by the program often occur early in 

the fiscal year to meet schedules of international partners. Full funding is 

needed to execute those training courses, which requires holding money 

from the previous fiscal year in reserve to ensure that they can be 

executed. Third, NNSA officials noted that some program activities are 

conducted at the discretion of foreign partners and, because the program 

cannot control events overseas, this may lead to delays in previously 

agreed-to activities.

In response to these explanations, we asked NNSA officials to address 

three concerns: (1) reasons why Nonproliferation and International 

Security program funding would not at least be sufficiently committed to 

contracts or subcontracts to be under threshold at the end of a fiscal year; 

(2) why the program’s overseas activities could lead to uncommitted 

balances, when other DNN programs with larger work scope overseas 

are able to maintain uncommitted balances under threshold; and (3) 

whether the program has sought to increase the threshold or defer time 

frames for some activities from earlier to later in the fiscal year.

With respect to the first two concerns, accounting definitions and the 

unique nature of Nonproliferation and International Security program work 

limit the program in recording uncosted program funding as committed, 

according to NNSA officials. Specifically, they told us that the program 

relies on technical expertise of DOE’s national laboratories to accomplish 

the majority of its mission. According to these officials, under NNSA’s 

accounting definition of committed funds, DNN program funding that is 

contracted to a national laboratory for personnel expenses associated 

with laboratory technical experts is never counted as committed before 

being costed. Such funding goes from uncosted to costed as actual costs 

are incurred. NNSA officials representing the Nonproliferation and 

International Security program explained that the majority of other DNN 

programs—including those implementing a more extensive range of 

overseas activities—execute their programs by contracting with the 

Nonproliferation and 

International Security
 

Page 20 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

private sector or through subcontracts via the national laboratories. In 

those cases, commitment of DNN funding is tracked, which allows those 

programs to have comparatively smaller uncommitted balances at the 

end of a fiscal year.

Regarding the third concern, NNSA officials said that they believed the 

threshold for the Nonproliferation and International Security program is 

inadequate, given the circumstances described above, but that NNSA has 

not decided whether to pursue a formal exception or threshold increase. 

Regarding the possibility of delaying some program activities to later in 

the fiscal year, the officials told us that in some cases the program must 

defer to the host country on the timing of activities.

NNSA officials told us that the uncommitted uncosted balances in this 

program over this period are due largely to the lack of a milestone plan 

from Russia indicating how it would propose using $400 million pledged 

by the United States to support the Russian materials disposition effort 

under the terms of the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and 

Disposition Agreement. According to NNSA officials, once the Russian 

State Corporation for Atomic Energy submits this plan, the program will 

be able to commit and cost funds that are currently uncommitted and 

uncosted. The United States and Russia have been negotiating the 

milestone plan since a new protocol to the agreement was signed in April 

2010. NNSA officials said that they expect to receive the milestone plan 

from Russia in fiscal year 2012 and begin committing and costing 

program funds at that time.

The uncommitted balances that we identified as being over threshold for 

this program pertain to operating funding for the overall effort to dispose 

of surplus U.S. plutonium. This mission also includes construction of three 

facilities in the United States, which DNN budgets separately from 

operating funds. In general, NNSA officials noted that when there has 

been a change in a construction project, such as a reduction in the 

construction budget or change in work scope, expenses for some 

activities that were originally planned to be incurred in one quarter can be 

deferred to another, or from one fiscal year to the next, resulting in 

uncommitted uncosted carryover. Therefore, according to NNSA, 

programmatic or budgetary changes related to the construction of a 

facility can have a domino effect, resulting in the accumulation of 

uncommitted uncosted balances for operating funding associated with the 

project since some of the operating funds are tied to facility construction 

time lines and milestones.

Russian Surplus Materials 

Disposition

U.S. Surplus Materials 

Disposition
 

Page 21 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Three of the four DNN programs we identified that have been authorized 

by Congress to receive and use contributions from foreign donor 

governments were provided a total of approximately $47.1 million from 

fiscal years 2006 through 2010, by seven different countries, equaling 

about 1 percent of the total funding from annual appropriations acts 

directed to these programs over the same period. In addition to 

contributions made directly to DNN programs by foreign donor 

governments, NNSA has pursued greater cost sharing on the part of 

governments in foreign countries where DNN programs are implemented. 

Cost sharing includes financial and nonfinancial contributions such as inkind assistance. However, the extent of such cost sharing is unclear 

because there is no systematic effort by NNSA to track and maintain this 

data.

From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, three of four DNN programs 

authorized by Congress to receive and use foreign contributions—the 

EGWPP program, INMPC program, and GTRI—received a total of 

approximately $47.1 million, donated by seven countries. These countries 

were Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South 

Korea, and the United Kingdom.24

 

24Two prior foreign contributions, outside the time frame of our review, were made in fiscal 

year 2005—contributions of $7.3 million by Canada and $5.5 million by the United 

Kingdom to the EWGPP program.

Most of these contributions were made 

to the EWGPP program, which received a total of approximately $18.3 

million, or about 39 percent of the total funds contributed. The INMPC 

program received approximately $11.2 million (or about 24 percent of the 

total foreign contributions), while GTRI received approximately $17.6 

million (or about 37 percent of the total foreign contributions). A fourth 

program authorized by Congress—the Russian plutonium disposition 

program—received no foreign financial contributions from fiscal years 

2006 through 2010. See figure 2 and appendix III for more information on 

the foreign contributions by recipient DNN program from fiscal years 2006 

through 2010.

Foreign Contributions 

to DNN Programs 

Have Been Limited, 

and Foreign CostSharing Data Are Not 

Systematically 

Tracked or 

Maintained by NNSA

Foreign Governments 

Contributed 

Approximately $47.1 

Million to Three DNN 

Programs, from Fiscal 

Years 2006 through 2010
 

Page 22 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 2: Total Foreign Contributions Received by DNN Program from Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2010

Note: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars.

NNSA has put these foreign contributions, varying from $140,000 to over 

$10 million, toward a variety of program uses, including (1) assisting the 

overall U.S. effort to facilitate the shutdown of Russia’s three remaining 

plutonium production reactors under the EWGPP program, (2) supporting 

physical security upgrades at a nuclear material site in Russia and 

providing radiation detection equipment on borders in the former Soviet 

Union under the INMPC program, and (3) promoting GTRI efforts to 

remove and secure radiological sources in countries in the former Soviet 

Union. Each authorized DNN program must use the foreign contributions 

within 5 years of receiving them or return them to the contributing nations, 

and none of these programs is permanently authorized to accept 

contributions. EWGPP is authorized to accept contributions through 

December 31, 2011; for GTRI, the expiration date is December 31, 2013; 

and for INMPC and the Russian plutonium disposition program, the 

expiration date is December 31, 2015. The GTRI, INMPC, and Russian 

plutonium disposition programs all anticipate conducting program 

activities beyond the time frames under which they are currently 

authorized to accept foreign contributions. For instance, the GTRI 
 

Page 23 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

program is planning to continue its efforts to convert or verify the 

shutdown of 200 research reactors utilizing HEU until 2022.

State officials told us that State’s efforts resulted in a significant share of 

the $47.1 million in foreign donations provided to the DNN programs. 

Specifically, they said that its Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative 

(NSOI) has facilitated approximately $17.6 million in foreign contributions 

to the SLD and GTRI programs through July 2011. However, data 

provided by State did not specify dates of the foreign donations, and we 

did not determine what percentage of the $47.1 million in foreign 

contributions DOE reported receiving from fiscal years 2006 through 2010 

was the result of NSOI program efforts.

The United Kingdom and Canada accounted for approximately 88 percent 

of the total foreign contributions during this time, with the United Kingdom 

providing approximately $25.3 million (or about 54 percent of the total 

contributions), and Canada providing approximately $16.1 million (or 

about 34 percent of the total contributions). See figure 3 and appendix IV 

for more information on the foreign contributions to DNN programs by 

country.
 

Page 24 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 3: Foreign Contributions to DNN Programs by Country from Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2010

Note: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars.

According to NNSA and State officials, some countries have made 

contributions to DNN programs to fulfill their national commitments made 

under the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and 

Materials of Mass Destruction.25

 

25Under the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of 

Mass Destruction, which was announced by the G-8 nations (Canada, France, Germany, 

Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) at their 2002 summit, the 

G-8 member countries agreed to raise $20 billion over 10 years for nonproliferationrelated assistance. The United States agreed to provide $10 billion, or half of the total 

funding.

Some foreign governments that have 
 

Page 25 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

made financial commitments to promoting nuclear nonproliferation and 

security in the context of the Global Partnership do not have wellestablished nonproliferation programs or the capacity to undertake 

nonproliferation activities in other countries. As a result, some countries 

have chosen to fulfill some of their Global Partnership pledges by 

contributing funding to the DNN programs. In May 2011, the G-8 leaders 

agreed to extend the Global Partnership beyond the original 2012 

expiration date, which may allow for additional foreign donations to the 

DNN programs in the future.

Contributions made by foreign nations remain small, however, compared 

to the total funding from annual appropriations acts directed to the four 

DNN programs we identified that were authorized to receive foreign 

contributions. Altogether, the foreign contributions represent 

approximately 1.1 percent of approximately $4.4 billion in total funding 

from annual appropriations acts directed to these programs from fiscal 

years 2006 through 2010. The foreign contributions to the EWGPP 

program have been most significant, representing about 2.5 percent of 

the total program funding from annual appropriations acts directed to this 

program over this period. For more information comparing the foreign 

contributions to the four DNN programs with total funding from annual 

appropriations acts directed to these programs, see appendix V.

According to NNSA officials, foreign contributions have been important in 

augmenting and accelerating DNN programs. However, for at least one 

program, we have concerns about how effectively NNSA took the 

availability of foreign contributions into consideration as potential offsets 

into future program budget requests to Congress. Specifically, in the fiscal 

year 2006 budget request, NNSA stated that foreign contributions to the 

EWGPP program were critical to the program’s success in facilitating the 

shutdown of the last remaining plutonium production reactor in the 

Russian city of Zheleznogorsk. However, at the end of fiscal year 2010, 

the EWGPP program had accumulated an unobligated funding balance of 

approximately $75.9 million. In fiscal year 2011, $45 million was 

rescinded from NNSA’s unobligated balances, approximately $41.1 

million of which was allocated to the EWGPP program. These 

circumstances raise questions about whether the foreign contributions 

were essential to the EWGPP program, and the extent to which NNSA 

factored the contributions as offsets into its future budget requests to 

Congress.

NNSA officials told us that the agency could not anticipate the timing or 

amounts of foreign contributions when preparing budget requests to 
 

Page 26 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Congress. Furthermore, they noted that foreign contributions were 

applied immediately to the EWGPP project in Zheleznogorsk and that 

they were helpful in allowing the program to be completed within a 

reasonable schedule and below total project cost.

In addition to allowing the DNN programs to accept contributions from 

foreign donor governments, Congress has encouraged the pursuit of

greater cost sharing by foreign countries where some DNN and other 

agency nonproliferation programs are implemented. Cost sharing 

includes financial and nonfinancial contributions such as in-kind 

assistance. We have also recommended greater foreign cost sharing for 

some DNN programs in prior reports. In addition, as we reported in 

December 2010, the President’s 4-year initiative to secure all vulnerable 

nuclear material around the world is predicated on other countries 

providing assistance and engaging in cost sharing with the United States 

to implement cooperative nuclear security programs.26

According to NNSA officials, these three programs have all made efforts 

to develop cost-sharing relationships with international partners, and 

some have established goals or requirements with respect to foreign cost 

matching. The GIPP program, for instance, has set a goal of 25 percent 

cost sharing for projects taking place in Russia and seeks cost sharing on 

projects in all other former Soviet countries on a case-by-case basis. 

According to NNSA officials, while the GTRI program does not specify a 

minimum cost-sharing threshold, for some types of projects the program 

has established specific cost sharing requirements for foreign partners, 

According to 

NNSA officials, NNSA is increasing its cost-sharing efforts with other 

countries for DNN programs as a “force multiplier” to address high-priority 

international nuclear security and nonproliferation objectives and the 

programs are pursuing cost sharing as part of their project management 

practices. NNSA officials identified three main DNN programs conducting 

work overseas where cost sharing may be applicable: the International 

Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation (INMPC) program 

(including both the MPC&A and SLD subprograms), the Global Threat 

Reduction Initiative (GTRI), and the Nonproliferation and International 

Security program’s Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP).

 

26GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better Foreign 

Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide, GAO-11-227

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2010).

DNN Programs Are Not 

Systematically Tracking or 

Maintaining Data on Cost 

Sharing by Foreign 

Countries 
 

Page 27 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

especially high-income countries. For instance, for HEU reactor 

conversions in high-income countries, GTRI will provide technical 

support, while the country where the reactor is located is expected to pay 

for the large expenses associated with the conversion, such as 

purchasing low-enriched uranium replacement fuel. NNSA officials stated 

that INMPC has not formulated specific cost-sharing requirements, but 

where possible the program has included cost-sharing arrangements in 

specific MPC&A program contracts, agreements, and transition plans. For 

SLD Core program and Megaports Initiative projects, NNSA officials 

indicated that in general there is a cost sharing division of labor in which 

the programs provide radiation detection equipment, training, and other 

support, while the partner country assumes responsibility for all 

construction costs and, in some cases, equipment installation and 

personnel costs.

These three programs have adopted different approaches and 

methodologies for how they collect data on or estimate cost sharing. 

Under the GIPP program, for example, project agreements are completed 

between the recipient foreign institute and one of several nongovernmental entities—the International Science and Technology Center, 

Science and Technology Center Ukraine, and the Civilian Research and 

Development Foundation—that manage and transmit funding to project 

participants. According to NNSA officials, these agreements include a 

detailed breakdown of foreign cost sharing in conjunction with the 

breakdown of tasks under the agreement. GTRI has developed a 

methodology combining actual known costs and independent estimates 

performed by project managers to estimate cost sharing. In some 

countries, where the INMPC program can obtain cost information from 

foreign counterparts, it uses those data to develop cost-sharing 

estimates. In cases where foreign cost information is less transparent, the 

program identifies the amount of work scope completed by the foreign 

partner and then it estimates the likely cost of that activity if the U.S. side 

were to have completed those tasks.

None of these programs are yet systematically tracking and maintaining 

this information that would allow for reporting of foreign cost sharing 

DNN-wide. For instance, INMPC officials told us that while projects with 

foreign partners are evaluated to ensure that work is completed, foreign 

cost sharing-amounts are generally collected on an ad hoc basis, and the 

program does not systematically assess or report cost-sharing data. GTRI 

officials stated that the program is developing a process to estimate cost 

sharing in every foreign GTRI project, which will be integrated into GTRI’s 

project management information system, but did not indicate when these 
 

Page 28 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

changes would be incorporated into the system. GIPP officials stated that 

while project agreements with foreign institutes include detailed cost 

sharing amounts, program officials were unaware of an NNSA system 

where such data could be entered, recorded, and used for reporting. As a 

result, NNSA is currently unable to provide comprehensive information to 

Congress—in the annual budget requests or in other reports—on the 

extent to which DNN efforts in foreign countries are being supported by 

financial or in-kind assistance from the host governments.

Notwithstanding these limitations, DNN program officials were able to 

provide us with some estimates and examples of foreign cost sharing. 

The GTRI program estimated a total of over $225 million in foreign cost 

sharing across all of its activity areas from fiscal years 2005 through 

2010. The Nonproliferation and International Security program estimated 

approximately $1.8 million in foreign cost sharing for the GIPP program in 

fiscal year 2008, based on the responses to a questionnaire by institutes 

in the former Soviet Union involved in the program. For fiscal years 2008 

and 2009, INMPC estimated a total of $60.8 million in foreign cost sharing 

under the SLD program.

In addition, NNSA officials provided a range of examples—particularly for 

the INMPC and GTRI programs—where they believe some foreign cost 

sharing has occurred. For instance, according to NNSA officials:

• In Russia, NNSA and the Russian Customs Service have equipped 

383 international border crossing sites with radiation detection 

equipment through cooperation under the SLD Core program. NNSA 

and the Russian Customs Service divided responsibility by splitting 

the number of sites between both parties, with 124 sites funded solely 

by NNSA, 123 funded solely by Russia, and 136 sites that were jointly 

funded. NNSA estimates that the total expenditure by the Russian 

Customs Service in equipping sites for which it was responsible is at 

least $71 million. The joint U.S.-Russian effort to equip these sites 

was completed in September 2011.

• According to information provided by NNSA, some of the Russian 

sites involved in the MPC&A program have used their own funding to 

support security improvements at their facilities, including paying for 

procurement and installation of certain security equipment. For 

example, according to information provided by NNSA, one Russian 

nuclear material site agreed to contribute $190,000 toward replacing 
 

Page 29 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

equipment at two entry control points, while another site agreed to pay 

for increasing the “clear zone” around the external perimeter of the 

site, which NNSA estimated would cost $473,000.

• For HEU reactor conversions in high income countries, the GTRI 

program maintains a policy of providing technical support while the 

country in which the reactor is located pays for the large expenses 

associated with the conversion, such as purchasing low-enriched 

uranium replacement fuel.27

Nevertheless, DNN programs are unable to audit cost sharing by foreign 

partners to validate these estimates, and NNSA officials stressed the 

difficulty in obtaining information from foreign governments that would 

allow DNN programs to validate cost sharing amounts. INMPC and GTRI 

officials told us that their programs can verify that foreign partners have 

completed their tasks in accordance with project agreements, but that the 

agreements with foreign countries do not include rights to audit the costs 

or financial contributions incurred by foreign counterparts. GIPP officials 

told us that under the terms of the project agreements with foreign 

institutes, all tasks are subject to routine audit and monitoring. However, 

these officials said that they doubted that these audits could include a

review of individual institute or host government financial records.

According to NNSA officials, non-highincome countries also share in some conversion costs. In cases 

where HEU reactors are shut down, both high-income and non-highincome countries have paid for all reactor shutdown costs. From fiscal 

years 2005 through 2010, 11 countries paid for some or all the costs 

of reactor conversions and shutdowns. GTRI officials estimated that 

the value of this foreign support from fiscal years 2005 through 2010 

was approximately $128.5 million.

 

27The GTRI program determination of high-income and non-high-income countries is 

based on World Bank categories.
 

Page 30 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Some DNN program performance measures do not satisfy key attributes 

of effective measures that we have identified in previous work, including 

clarity, reliability, and balance. In addition, some of NNSA’s performance 

measures for its nuclear nonproliferation programs changed from fiscal 

years 2006 through 2010, making it difficult to evaluate progress over this 

period. Furthermore, for fiscal year 2010, some DNN program 

accomplishments appear overstated because NNSA used different 

performance targets in its end of year fiscal performance report from the 

ones presented in the budget request to Congress. Moreover, rather than 

updating a critical performance measure for the GIPP program—as we 

recommended and as NNSA officials reported previously they would do—

NNSA has dropped this measure altogether.

Some DNN program performance measures we reviewed did not have 

key attributes of successful performance measures that we have 

identified in our previous work. We have reported that agencies 

successfully measure performance when they use measures that satisfy 

four general characteristics—(1) they demonstrate results, (2) are limited 

to the vital few, (3) cover multiple program priorities, and (4) provide 

useful information for decision making.28 To assess whether program 

performance measures satisfy these general characteristics, we 

developed nine key specific attributes of successful measures, including 

whether the measures are clear, measurable, reliable, objective, and 

balanced.29

We identified clarity concerns in the performance measures for two DNN 

programs. Several of the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D program’s 

performance measures assess progress using unspecified criteria and 

milestones from a classified R&D requirements document. Because these 

performance measures are linked to an unstated secondary set of criteria, 

it is difficult for a third party, unfamiliar with the classified requirements, to 

interpret the measure and discern whether the criteria are appropriate, 

sufficient, and up-to-date for tracking progress. In addition, for the 

MPC&A program, NNSA measures progress by the cumulative number of 

 

28GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 1996).

29GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season 

Performance Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002).

Some DNN Program 

Performance 

Measures Lack Key 

Attributes and Have 

Led to Overstated 

Results 

Some DNN Performance 

Measures Lack Key 

Attributes of Successful 

Measures
 

Page 31 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

buildings with weapon-usable nuclear materials in Russia and the former 

Soviet states with completed MPC&A upgrades.30

We also identified reliability concerns in the performance measures for 

two DNN programs. For the disposition of HEU that the United States has 

declared surplus to defense needs, the U.S. Surplus Fissile Materials 

Disposition program has an endpoint goal of downblending 217 metric 

tons of HEU by 2050.

However, we found this 

measure to be unclear and potentially misleading because, among other 

reasons, it does not provide information about the quantities of materials 

being secured by the program and the total number of buildings 

completed is not adjusted to account for any new upgrade work that may 

be pursued at those locations.

31

Furthermore, we question whether the performance measures are 

sufficiently balanced for two DNN efforts—ensuring the long-term 

sustainability of MPC&A upgrades in Russia and other countries of the 

former Soviet Union, and the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative 

The program has set annual performance targets 

and is measuring annual progress toward this goal. However, NNSA 

officials told us that the 2050 date for completing the blend-down of this

surplus HEU was an arbitrary placeholder because they could not predict 

at what rate nuclear weapons would be dismantled and the corresponding 

rate at which additional HEU will be available for dispositioning. NNSA 

officials told us that this work could be completed sooner, depending on 

the rate at which HEU is made available to the program from defense 

needs. In addition, for the Megaports Initiative, NNSA developed a 

performance measure to track the number of megaports sites where there 

is host-country cost sharing and the estimated dollar amount of such cost 

sharing. However, we found this measure to be unreliable because, as 

noted above, NNSA is unable to validate foreign cost-sharing estimates. 

NNSA officials told us that this measure was difficult to quantify.

 

30NNSA conducts MPC&A security upgrades in two phases: Rapid upgrades include 

improvements such as bricking up windows where material is stored; installing 

strengthened doors, locks, and nuclear container seals; and establishing controlled 

access areas. Comprehensive upgrades include electronic systems to detect intruders, 

central alarm stations, and computerized nuclear material accounting systems.

31Downblending is the process of converting HEU to low-enriched uranium by mixing it 

with other forms of uranium, such as natural or depleted uranium, to dilute and reduce the 

enrichment level of uranium-235 thereby rendering the material less suitable for weapons 

purposes.
 

Page 32 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

(NGSI), a multiyear program to develop the policies, concepts, 

technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to strengthen and 

sustain the international safeguards system over the next 25 years. 

Performance in achieving sustainability of MPC&A upgrades in Russia 

and other countries of the former Soviet Union is measured by the 

cumulative number of MPC&A regulations in the development phase in 

those countries, while NGSI performance is measured by the number of 

safeguards systems deployed and used in other countries to address 

specific safeguards deficiencies. We question whether measuring 

performance in a single area of activity provides a sufficient basis for 

gauging the progress that each effort is making overall toward multiple, 

diverse objectives. However, NNSA officials told us that DNN programs 

are allowed only a limited number of representative published 

performance metrics by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 

Officials representing both programs told us that both programs maintain 

a broader set of internal-use measures that are not provided to Congress 

or the public which the programs use to track and assess progress made 

under both efforts.

For more information on the key attributes of successful performance 

measures we have identified in our previous work, and for further details 

on our findings of clarity, reliability, and balance limitations in the DNN 

measures, see appendix VI.

We examined the performance measures NNSA provided to Congress in 

its annual budget requests from fiscal years 2006 through 2010 for the 

DNN programs, and found that the number and nature of DNN program 

performance measures changed during this period, making it difficult to 

evaluate DNN program performance consistently over time. For instance, 

in its fiscal year 2006 congressional budget request, NNSA included 32 

measures to track the performance of its nonproliferation programs, but in 

its fiscal year 2010 budget request NNSA included 26 measures. Based 

on our review of the performance measures presented in NNSA’s annual 

budget requests, we identified several ways in which DNN performance 

measures changed over the period we reviewed, including:

• Some performance measures used in earlier years were no longer 

relevant by fiscal year 2010 because work was reported by NNSA as 

being completed or because anticipated work was never initiated.

The Number and 

Descriptions of DNN 

Performance Measures 

Changed from Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2010
 

Page 33 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

• Some DNN performance measures during this time were dropped, or 

new measures—that had not been used in prior years to assess 

program performance—were established.

• Some program performance measures were consolidated into a 

smaller number, while some single performance measures were 

disaggregated in to several new measures.

• The descriptions of some program measures also changed over this 

time, which resulted in program progress being measured in new or 

different ways.

NNSA officials told us they believed that the DNN performance measures 

should not be static and should be adjusted to reflect changes in 

circumstances, such as program reorganizations, and in response to 

external recommendations. For instance, NNSA officials told us that a 

Nonproliferation and International Security program performance 

measure tracking the number of foreign nationals trained on 

nonproliferation issues was eliminated after the program undertook a 

review of its program performance measurements in 2009 at the request 

of OMB and determined that the measure did not adequately capture the 

value of the training delivered.

Furthermore, after each fiscal year, in annual performance reports, DOE 

assesses performance made by the DNN programs meeting annual 

targets under each measure. From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, we 

found over 30 instances in which DNN program performance measures 

identified in the congressional budget request for a fiscal year differed 

from the measures assessed in the DOE annual performance reports for 

that fiscal year. In some cases, we determined that these differences

were relatively minor and involved wording or terminology changes, while 

in others the differences were more significant. In other cases, measures 

included in the budget requests for some programs were missing and not 

updated with a new measure in the performance reports. As a result, 

some of the measures NNSA identified to Congress for assessing DNN 

program performance during a fiscal year were not those against which 

actual progress was assessed at the end of the fiscal year.

NNSA officials stated that for any given fiscal year there can be 

differences between the performance measures presented in the budget 

requests to Congress and evaluated in the DOE end of fiscal year 

performance reports. However, these officials noted that performance 

measures identified in a budget request can be developed 9 months prior 
 

Page 34 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

to the beginning of the fiscal year, with the final performance report 

issued several months after the end of the fiscal year, or a period of 24 

months which may pass from the time the performance measures are 

developed until performance is evaluated. NNSA officials noted that 

during this time, DNN programs can be reorganized, be re-evaluated, or 

experience other changes that result in differences between the 

measures in the budget request and the final performance reports. 

However, the end of fiscal year performance reports we reviewed did not 

include explanations in those instances where the performance measure 

changed from the measure proposed in the budget request for that fiscal 

year.

For more information on and examples of the changes in DNN 

performance measures and for a listing of the measures by DNN program 

office and year, from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, see appendix VII.

In DOE’s Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report, released in April 

2011, DNN programs were assessed as to whether they had exceeded, 

met, or did not meet their performance targets for that fiscal year. DOE 

reported that it had met or exceeded the annual performance targets for 

20 out of 26 DNN program performance measures. However, we found 

that the annual targets for several performance measures in the fiscal 

year 2010 performance report differed from the targets presented for 

those measures in the fiscal year 2010 congressional budget request. 

Because some annual targets were lower in the end of fiscal year 

performance report for several programs than the annual targets 

proposed in the congressional budget request, the achievements by 

some programs under those performance measures appear to be 

overstated. See table 6 for more information on the differences between 

targets in both documents for DNN program performance measures in 

fiscal year 2010. 

Some DNN Program 

Accomplishments for 

Fiscal Year 2010 Appear 

Overstated Because of 

Inconsistent Performance 

Measure Targets
 

Page 35 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 6: Differences in DNN Program Performance Targets, Fiscal Year 2010

Performance measure by 

program

Result as reported in 

DOE Fiscal Year 2010 

Annual Performance 

Report

Target in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 

Annual Performance Report 

(DOE assessment based on 

results)

Target in fiscal year 2010 

budget request (GAO 

assessment based on 

results)

Global Threat Reduction Initiative

Cumulative number of HEU reactors 

converted or verified as shutdown prior 

to conversion

72 reactors 71 reactors (target exceeded) 73 reactors (target not met

Cumulative number of kilograms of 

vulnerable nuclear material (HEU and 

plutonium) removed or disposed

) 

2,853 kilograms 2,767 kilograms (target 

exceeded)

2,913 kilograms (target 

Cumulative number of buildings with 

high priority nuclear and radiological 

materials secured

not 

met)

971 buildings 855 buildings (target exceeded) 818 buildings (target 

exceeded)

Cumulative number of excess 

domestic radiological sources removed 

or disposed

26,172 sources 25,214 sources (target exceeded) 24,500 sources (target 

exceeded)

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation Program

Cumulative number of buildings 

containing weapons-usable material 

with completed MPC&A upgrades

213 buildings 213 buildings (target met) 218 buildings (target not 

met

Cumulative number of SLD sites with 

nuclear detection equipment installed 

and cumulative number of Megaports 

completed

) 

399 SLD sites and 34 

Megaports

404 SLD sites and 41 Megaports 

(not met for both)

369 SLD sites and 43 

Megaports (exceeded for 

SLD sites, but not met

U.S. Surplus Materials Disposition Program

 for 

Megaports)

Cumulative percentage of the design, 

construction, and cold start-up 

activities completed for the Waste 

Solidification Building

47 percent 45 percent (target exceeded) 55 percent (target not met

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.

) 

Specifically, we identified annual targets under four performance 

measures for three programs—the GTRI, INMPC, and U.S. Surplus

Materials Disposition programs—that DOE reported as meeting or 

exceeding in its Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report, but which 

appear to be unmet when the reported program results are compared 

against the targets specified in the fiscal year 2010 budget request. For 

example, in the fiscal year 2010 budget request, NNSA proposed 

converting or verifying as shutdown 73 HEU reactors as a target for that 

year. In the end of fiscal year 2010 performance report, however, the 

annual target for this performance measure was changed to 71 reactors, 

which DOE reported as exceeding based on 72 reactors having been 

converted or verified as shut down. When the actual results are compared 
 

Page 36 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

against the annual goal stated in the congressional budget request, 

however, the target should have been reported as not met, rather than 

exceeded.

NNSA officials told us they believed that some flexibility and variation in 

program performance targets during a fiscal year should be allowed, 

given the uncertain circumstances under which the DNN programs 

operate, especially the uncertainty regarding when congressional 

appropriations will be provided and how much of the requested funding 

DNN will receive. NNSA officials told us that DNN is permitted to adjust its 

annual performance measures for its programs within 30 days of the final

appropriation to take into account differences between requested and 

actual funding provided by Congress. GTRI officials told us that a 

congressional funding cut for the program’s gap nuclear material removal 

effort and a redirection of reactor conversion funding in fiscal year 2010 

explain why GTRI changed its targets and why it did not meet the targets 

for these two efforts as presented in the budget request for that year. 

However, the 2010 fiscal year performance report did not include 

explanations in those instances where the performance target changed 

from the target proposed in the budget request for that fiscal year.

For the GIPP program, NNSA has dropped—instead of improving—a 

long-standing performance measure to gauge the success of the program 

in reemploying former Soviet weapons scientists in civilian jobs. In 1999, 

we reported that a major purpose of DOE’s Initiatives for Proliferation 

Prevention (IPP) program was to identify commercial opportunities 

through IPP projects that would attract commercial investment and lead to 

self-sustaining business ventures and long-term employment 

opportunities for WMD scientists in the former Soviet Union.32 However, 

we found that the program had not achieved its nonproliferation goal of 

long-term employment through the commercialization of IPP projects. In 

our December 2007 report on the IPP program,33

 

32See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks 

Posed by Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists, 

we reported that the 

measures DOE used to set program goals and gauge progress were 

GAO/RCED-99-54 (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 19, 1999).

33See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in 

Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed, GAO-08-189 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 12, 2007).

Some DNN Performance 

Measures Have Not Been 

Updated Based on Prior 

GAO Recommendations
 

Page 37 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

outdated, and that performance achievements under the program’s 

“flagship” commercialization goal were overstated. We recommended, 

among other things, that NNSA develop more reliable data on the 

commercialization results of IPP projects, such as the number of jobs 

created.

NNSA agreed with this recommendation, and in 2008 it reported that it 

would revise the program performance measure and include in its budget 

documents a new measure that better reflects program accomplishments. 

However, NNSA has not implemented this action. Neither the fiscal year 

2009 nor fiscal year 2010 NNSA budget request included any new 

commercialization-related measure. In the fiscal year 2010 budget 

request, the previous measure to assess program progress in this area 

was dropped, leaving only one program performance measure: the 

cumulative percentage of non-U.S. government (private sector and 

foreign government) project funding contributions obtained relative to 

cumulative U.S. government GIPP funding contributions.34

In September 2011, contrary to the long-standing commercialization goal 

of the program, NNSA reported to us that commercialization would no 

longer be a leading program objective, but a secondary program benefit, 

and as such would no longer be a published program performance 

measure. Thus, the non-U.S. government cost-sharing measure noted 

above is the only current GIPP performance measure. NNSA officials 

stated that the GIPP program was directed by OMB to retain this costsharing measure, but NNSA officials told us in 2009 and 2010 that they 

did not believe this was a good performance measure for the program.

In 2009 and 

2010, NNSA officials told us that they were still considering new GIPP 

performance measures. However, neither the fiscal year 2011 nor fiscal 

year 2012 budget request included a new GIPP commercialization 

performance measure.

 

34In 2002, the IPP program and another similar DOE nonproliferation program, the 

Nuclear Cities Initiative, were placed under a common management organization within 

DOE and designated the Russian Transition Initiatives program. In 2006, the Russian 

Transition Initiatives program was renamed the Global Initiatives for Proliferation 

Prevention and adopted the mission of addressing the proliferation of WMD expertise 

globally.
 

Page 38 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

None of the existing strategies and plans for coordinating federal efforts 

to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling and illicit nuclear transfers 

overseas incorporates all of the desirable characteristics of national 

strategies that we have identified in previous work. We also identified 

potential fragmentation and overlap among some programs working in 

this area, especially those providing equipment and training in foreign 

countries to counter nuclear smuggling. Furthermore, there is no single 

recognized agency responsible for leading and directing federal efforts to 

combat nuclear smuggling.

None of the existing strategies and plans for coordinating federal efforts 

to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling and illicit transfers overseas 

incorporates all of the desirable characteristics of national strategies that 

we have identified in previous work. We have previously reported that 

complex interagency and intergovernmental efforts—such as programs to 

prevent and detect nuclear smuggling overseas—can benefit from 

development of a national strategy.35 We have also previously identified a 

set of desirable characteristics in national strategies that can enhance 

their usefulness in resource and policy decisions and to better assure 

accountability.36 These elements include (1) purpose, scope, and 

methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; (3) goals, 

subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; 

(4) resources, investments, and risk management; (5) organizational 

roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) integration and 

implementation.37 See table 7 for a summary of the six characteristics.

 

35See GAO, Biosurveillance: Efforts to Develop a National Biosurveillance Capability 

Need a National Strategy and a Designated Leader, GAO-10-645 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 30, 2010); and Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 

Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001).

36In prior reports on nonproliferation, we have used the term overarching strategic plan to 

describe a national strategy for nonproliferation efforts governmentwide. For purposes of 

this report, we use the term national strategy to include strategic plans.

37See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).

Limitations in 

Interagency Strategic 

Plans Impede 

Coordination of U.S. 

Efforts to Combat 

Nuclear Smuggling 

Overseas 

Key Attributes Missing 

from U.S. Government 

Strategies to Counter 

Nuclear Smuggling 

Overseas
 

Page 39 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 7: Summary of Desirable Characteristics for a National Strategy

Desirable characteristic Description

Purpose, scope, and methodology Addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of its coverage, and the 

process by which it was developed.

Problem definition and risk assessment Addresses the particular national problems and threats the strategy is directed 

towards.

Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and 

performance measures

Addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve, steps to achieve those results, as 

well as the priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge results.

Resources, investments, and risk 

management

Addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and types of resources and 

investments needed, and where resources and investments should be targeted based 

on balancing risk reduction with costs.

Organizational roles, responsibilities, and 

coordination

Addresses who will be implementing the strategy, what their roles will be compared to 

others, and mechanisms for them to coordinate their efforts.

Integration and implementation Addresses how a national strategy relates to other strategies’ goals, objectives, and 

activities, and to subordinate levels of government and their plans to implement the 

strategy.

Source: GAO data.

We found that existing interagency strategies to coordinate efforts 

governmentwide against the overseas nuclear smuggling threat lacked 

some of these desirable attributes. We reviewed several interagency 

strategy documents that provide guidelines or direction for coordination of 

federal programs to counter nuclear smuggling overseas. These include 

(1) the 2010 “Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) Strategic 

Plan” developed jointly by DHS, DOD, DOE, State, the Department of 

Justice, the intelligence community, and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC); (2) a 2006 “Strategic Plan For Interagency 

Coordination of U.S. Government Nuclear Detection Assistance 

Overseas,” produced by State; and (3) a 2005 “International Nuclear and 

Radiological Border Security Efforts: Implementation Guidelines” issued 

by the NSC. We found that each of these documents incorporates some 

of the desirable elements of effective national strategies, but that they 

each lacked key components or had other limitations. Specifically:

• 2010 GNDA Strategic Plan. One of DHS’s responsibilities, through 

DNDO, is to coordinate development of the GNDA. In June 2010, we 

reported that DNDO had not developed a strategic plan for the global 

architecture despite our prior recommendations that it do so.38

 

38GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not Yet 

Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or Closed Identified 

Gaps, 

In 

GAO-10-883T (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010).
 

Page 40 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

December 2010, DNDO released the jointly developed strategic plan 

which establishes a broad vision for the GNDA, identifies cross-cutting 

issues, defines several objectives, and assigns mission roles and 

responsibilities to the various federal agencies that contribute to the 

global architecture.39 In July 2011, we reported that the new strategic 

plan addressed some of the key components that we previously 

recommended should be included, such as identifying roles and 

responsibilities for meeting the GNDA’s strategic objectives.40

In addition, the GNDA strategic plan should not be considered a 

comprehensive strategy for coordinating the governmentwide 

response to the overseas nuclear smuggling threat for other reasons. 

For instance, the focus of the GNDA is on detecting, analyzing, and 

reporting on the illicit trafficking and unauthorized use of nuclear and 

radiological materials. However, some U.S. programs involved in 

countering the nuclear smuggling threat overseas are not considered 

part of the global architecture. For instance, neither NNSA’s 

International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP), 

DOD’s Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention 

Program, nor DTRA’s Regional Combating WMD Program are 

included in the list of programs contributing to the GNDA in the 2011 

annual report on the global architecture, even though these programs 

However, we reported that the GNDA strategic plan does not identify 

the financial resources—a desirable characteristic of a national 

strategy—needed to achieve the strategic plan’s objectives. In 

addition, we raised concerns about the ability to measure results 

under the plan, because it did not identify the monitoring mechanisms 

that could be used to determine programmatic progress and identify 

needed improvements. DHS officials responded that they will address 

these missing elements in an implementation plan, which they plan to 

issue before the end of 2011.

 

39In addition, DNDO produces in cooperation with other members of the interagency a 

“Joint Annual Interagency Review of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture” which is 

used to provide information on the current objectives and status of multiple U.S. programs 

seeking to prevent nuclear or radiological terrorism against the United States by means of 

detection, analysis, and reporting on nuclear and radiological materials which the 

agencies have determined as being outside of regulatory control.

40GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Developed a Strategic Plan for its 

Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain, GAO-11-869T (Washington, 

D.C.: July 26, 2011).
 

Page 41 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

are involved in capacity-building and other activities overseas to 

counter nuclear and related WMD trafficking.

• Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination of U.S. Nuclear Detection 

Assistance Overseas. In May 2002, we found that efforts to combat 

nuclear smuggling overseas needed strengthened planning to link 

U.S. programs through common goals and objectives, strategies and 

time frames for providing assistance to other countries, and 

performance measures for evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. 

assistance.41 State subsequently developed a “Strategic Plan For 

Interagency Coordination of U.S. Government Nuclear Detection 

Assistance Overseas.” In March 2006, we found that this plan lacked 

several key components, including a lack of specific performance 

measures, overall program cost estimates, and projected time frames 

for program completion.42

In our current review, we found that the updated version of the 

strategic plan issued by State in December 2006 incorporated some 

but not all of our prior recommendations. The plan does include 

specific performance measures, but it does not include overall cost 

estimates or projected time frames for programmatic work. In addition, 

the 2006 strategic plan does not include some programs such as 

State’s Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI), or other 

We concluded that without these elements, 

State would not have a way of effectively measuring performance 

toward the plan’s goals nor would it have a way of determining the 

level of resources and the amount of time that would be required to 

achieve those goals. We recommended that the Secretary of State, 

working with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the NNSA 

Administrator, strengthen this strategic plan to include specific 

performance measures. We also recommended that they prepare 

overall cost estimates and projected time frames for completion of 

U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance efforts, in order to 

determine the amount and timing of U.S. government resources 

required to achieve interagency goals and objectives.

 

41GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear 

Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO-02-426 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 16, 2002).

42GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination 

Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other 

Countries, GAO-06-311 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006).
 

Page 42 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

recently established programs such as NNSA’s Cooperative Border 

Security Program (CBSP),43

• International Nuclear and Radiological Border Security Guidelines. In 

2005, we found that there was no governmentwide coordination 

guidance for programs to improve foreign capabilities to detect and 

prevent WMD smuggling across borders. We recommended that NSC 

lead a process to develop clear guidance for these programs that 

identifies U.S. government goals and objectives, designates roles and 

responsibilities, and establishes procedures to resolve policy and 

program disputes.

or DTRA’s Regional Combating WMD 

Program. In addition, State officials said that the 2006 strategic plan is 

only intended to address programs providing counter-smuggling 

assistance to foreign countries, and not the full range of programs 

contributing to the detection and prevention of nuclear smuggling 

abroad, such as those conducting R&D on technologies to detect illicit 

nuclear trafficking. As of July 2011, this interagency strategic plan had 

not been updated. State officials told us that State’s Export Control 

and Related Border Security (EXBS) program does not intend to 

update the plan because State’s Office of Export Control Cooperation 

no longer plays a coordinating role in the provision of radiation 

detection assistance since the creation of DNDO and State’s Office of 

WMD Terrorism.

44

 

43According to NNSA, CBSP is no longer an independent program, and its functions were 

merged into the International Nonproliferation Export Control Program in June 2010.

NSC officials told us that they did not know if the 

recommendation had been acted on or implemented by the previous 

administration. However, NNSA officials provided us with a 

document—“International Nuclear and Radiological Border Security 

Efforts: Implementation Guidelines”—issued by NSC in 2005. This 

document describes the U.S. government strategy and guidelines for 

implementation and interagency coordination of U.S. efforts to detect 

nuclear and radiological material movement across international 

borders, provides general descriptions of relevant program roles and 

responsibilities, and includes guidance for an interagency coordination 

mechanism led by State. However, it does not contain all the 

elements we have identified previously for an effective strategic plan. 

For instance, it does not establish priorities, identify measures to track 

44GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better 

Integration, GAO-05-157 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2005).
 

Page 43 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

progress, or define the resources needed to effectively implement the 

strategy.

We reviewed 21 U.S. government programs and offices that we identified 

as playing a role in preventing and detecting smuggling of nuclear 

materials and illicit trafficking of related technologies overseas. The 

programs we reviewed are implemented by five different agencies—

NNSA, DOD, State, DHS, and Justice—and encompass a broad range of 

activities to ensure that nuclear materials, equipment, and technology are 

not illegally transferred or smuggled from overseas locations. These 

include programs that (1) conduct R&D on radiation detection 

technologies; (2) deploy radiation detection equipment along foreign 

borders and points of transit; (3) train and equip foreign customs and 

border security officials to identify and interdict illicit nuclear materials or 

technology transfers; (4) assist foreign governments in the development 

of export control systems; (5) enhance foreign antismuggling law 

enforcement and prosecutorial capabilities; and (6) analyze potential 

foreign nuclear smuggling cases and incidents. See appendix VIII for a 

list and descriptions of the programs and offices we reviewed.

We identified potential fragmentation and overlapping functions among 

some of these programs.45

 

45In this report, and as we have done in previous reports, we use the term fragmentation 

to refer to those circumstances in which more than one federal agency, or more than one 

organization within an agency, is involved in the same broad area of national need. We 

use the term overlap to refer to circumstances when multiple agencies and programs have 

similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target similar 

beneficiaries. The presence of overlap can suggest the need to look closer at the potential 

for unnecessary duplication. However, our review did not go to sufficient depth to 

determine whether and to what extent the programs are actually duplicative, which occurs 

when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in identical activities or provide the 

same services to the same beneficiaries. For more information on fragmentation, overlap, 

and duplication in federal programs, see GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential 

Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, 

For example, we identified six programs 

providing training to improve the capabilities of foreign border security 

and customs officials to prevent smuggling and illicit nuclear shipments, 

including NNSA’s INECP, CBSP, and SLD programs; State’s EXBS 

program; DOD’s Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention 

GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011); and Managing for Results: Using the 

Results Act to Address Mission Fragmentation and Program Overlap, GAO/AIMD-97-146

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 29, 1997).

Concerns about Potential 

Fragmentation and 

Overlap among Some U.S. 

Programs
 

Page 44 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Program (WMD-PPP);

46

Agency officials representing these programs told us that not all of them 

have the same focus, that some concentrate on specialized niches, and 

that many are complementary. For instance, in the area of training foreign 

border security and customs officials, NNSA officials told us that SLD is 

focused on training in the use and long-term sustainment of the radiation 

detection equipment provided by the program, whereas INECP 

concentrates on training foreign customs and border guard personnel at 

official points of entry to detect illicit WMD-related commodity transfers 

and assisting border security officials to detect illicit trafficking of WMDrelated items in “green border” areas between official points of entry.

and DTRA’s International Counterproliferation 

(ICP) Program. Similarly, we identified four programs that are involved in 

providing equipment to foreign governments to enhance the ability of their 

customs and border security organizations to detect nuclear material 

smuggling, including EXBS, WMD-PPP, ICP, and the SLD program.

47

Furthermore, some officials told us that their programs play a 

complementary role by addressing priorities and gaps that other 

DOD officials told us that ICP also conducts training to counter smuggling 

of dual-use commodities, but that this training is focused on 

investigations, which is not part of the INECP training program. Regarding 

the provision of equipment, NNSA, State, and DOD officials noted that 

SLD tends to provide larger equipment, such as radiation portal monitors 

and cargo scanning equipment, while EXBS and ICP provide smallerscale equipment, such as handheld radiation detection pagers, hazardous 

materials kits, and investigative suits to foreign customs and border 

security organizations. Similarly, DOD officials also stated that much of 

the equipment the WMD-PPP program provides—such as coastal radars 

and large communications networks—cannot be provided by other 

programs for budgetary or other reasons. DOD and NNSA officials also 

pointed out geographic distinctions between SLD and WMD-PPP, noting 

that SLD focuses on equipping official border crossings, while WMD-PPP 

provides equipment for green border areas and “blue borders,” or the 

maritime border areas between ports of entry.

 

46Prior to fiscal year 2011, this CTR program activity was referred to as the Weapons of 

Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative, or WMD-PPI. 

47Dual-use refers to equipment or technology that can contribute both to nuclear energy 

and other peaceful nuclear applications or nuclear weapons development or production.
 

Page 45 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

programs have not. For instance, State officials told us that the NSOI 

program helps equip some of the highest-priority sites identified by 

NNSA’s SLD program. According to State officials, the SLD program is 

unable to address some high-priority sites because of limited resources. 

In country after country, according to State officials, NSOI found that SLD 

and other programs lacked sufficient resources to address all of their 

priorities. In cases where the SLD program notified NSOI of additional 

priority sites needing attention, NSOI identified and facilitated financial 

contributions from foreign donors who paid for equipping the locations

that SLD was unable to address.

No single federal agency has lead responsibility to direct federal efforts to 

prevent and detect nuclear smuggling overseas. In the past, we have 

reported that interagency undertakings can benefit from the leadership of 

a single entity with sufficient time, responsibility, authority, and resources 

needed to ensure that federal programs are based upon a coherent 

strategy, are well coordinated, and that gaps and duplication in 

capabilities are avoided.48

For efforts to detect nuclear material smuggling into or movement within 

the United States, a 2005 presidential directive gave DNDO responsibility 

for developing the GNDA and managing the domestic portion of the 

global architecture. However, this directive divided responsibility for the 

international portion of the global architecture among State, DOD, and 

Some of the agency officials we interviewed 

expressed concerns about the absence of a lead agency, recognized 

across the government, serving as the focal point for federal efforts to 

combat nuclear smuggling overseas. For instance, one DOD official told 

us that the absence of a recognized lead agency, empowered to set 

priorities and provide direction to relevant programs across the federal 

government, is an obstacle to a more effective approach to combating 

nuclear smuggling abroad. Another DOD official stated to us that even 

with interagency communication and coordinated working groups, without 

a lead agency having the authority to assign and direct roles and 

responsibilities in this area, ultimately the individual programs will take 

direction from their agency leadership or Congress.

 

48See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations,

GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001); and Biosurveillance: Efforts to Develop 

a National Biosurveillance Capability Need a National Strategy and Designated Leader, 

GAO-10-645 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010). 

No Federal Agency Has 

Lead Responsibility for 

U.S. Efforts to Prevent and 

Detect Nuclear Smuggling 

Overseas
 

Page 46 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

DOE.49

However, it is unclear whether these more defined roles give authority to 

these lead agencies to provide direction and guidance across multiple 

agencies and programs. For instance, State and DOD officials told us that 

neither State nor any other federal agency has the authority to direct the 

activities or coordinate implementation of programs administered by other 

agencies involved in preventing or detecting nuclear smuggling overseas. 

Indeed, notwithstanding its designation of lead agencies, the GNDA 

strategic plan notes that nothing in it shall be construed as limiting any 

authorities or responsibilities of the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, 

State, and Homeland Security, as well as the Attorney General, under 

any statute, regulation, Executive Order, or Presidential Directive.

The 2010 strategic plan for the GNDA takes a step toward 

clarifying lead agencies responsible for different elements of the global 

architecture, including efforts overseas. Specifically, for the exterior layer 

of the GNDA—the portion focused on enhancing international capabilities 

for detecting nuclear and radiological materials abroad—the strategic plan 

identifies four performance goals, designating lead and supporting 

agency roles for each. Lead responsibility rests with State, DOE, and/or 

Justice, depending on the performance goal. For example, State is 

identified as lead agency for establishing and maintaining engagement 

with foreign governments to provide detection assistance and facilitate 

information sharing, while DOE has the lead in improving international 

detection capabilities by providing equipment, training, and sustainability 

support. DOE and Justice share the lead for enhancing international 

detection capabilities by developing and/or participating in international 

programs and efforts.

The NSC has established mechanisms to coordinate efforts in this area, 

including a Countering Nuclear Threats Interagency Policy Committee 

(IPC), and a sub-IPC for international nuclear and radiological border 

security efforts.50

 

49National Security Presidential Directive-43/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-14.

NSC officials declined our request to discuss various 

aspects of the IPC structure and how it coordinates U.S. efforts to combat 

nuclear smuggling overseas. However, some officials from other agencies 

expressed doubts about the value of the NSC’s coordinating role. 

50The IPCs were called Policy Coordination Committees, or PCCs, during the George W. 

Bush administration, and Interagency Working Groups during the Clinton administration.

State Is Taking Steps to 

Enhance One of the 

Principal Interagency 

Coordinating Mechanisms
 

Page 47 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Notably, DOD officials told us that they believed the NSC has played a 

negligible role in coordination of programs to counter nuclear smuggling.

Coordinating groups have been established beneath the IPC structure to 

facilitate greater interagency cooperation at a working level to address the 

nuclear smuggling threat in foreign countries. One of the principal 

coordinating mechanisms for U.S. export control and related border 

security assistance activities overseas is an interagency working group 

(IWG) specified in the 2005 NSC guidelines for international nuclear and 

radiological border security, which is chaired by State’s EXBS program. 

This IWG meets on a regular basis and officials at DOD, NNSA, and 

State told us the meetings are well attended and are useful for 

exchanging information—such as sharing calendars and information on 

planned program activities—and building relationships between program 

managers.

Agency officials identified some limitations with this mechanism and its 

ability to facilitate a more cohesive national response to this threat. For 

example, NNSA and DOD officials told us that the coordination meetings 

are hampered by the participation of many individuals and are oriented 

toward high-level discussion, making in-depth discussion of specific 

issues affecting program implementation difficult in these settings. State 

officials said that they believed they have addressed these limitations, by 

chairing executive level and regional sub-IWG meetings. According to 

State officials, quarterly executive level meetings involving senior level 

participation at the deputy assistant secretary level, allow for high-level 

level discussion of agency programmatic goals and funding priorities. The 

regional sub-IWG meetings are conducted at the action-officer level, held 

approximately two to three times per year, and provide for more focused 

attention on nonproliferation capacity building in specific countries or 

regions, according to State officials.

NNSA and DOD officials told us that while the IWG is useful for 

information exchange, it is not a mechanism designed or suitable for 

conducting more fundamental interagency strategic planning or for 

developing guidance and priorities for individual agency programs. For 

instance, some DOD officials noted that the working group does not seek 

to establish or enforce program missions or evaluate individual program 

priorities, plans, and strategies to avoid potential redundancies or 

duplication of efforts. A State official with the EXBS program told us that 

the working group is not designed to be anything more than a forum for 

exchanging information between programs, and that it does not have the 

mandate to direct the scope and activities of individual agency programs. 
 

Page 48 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Nevertheless, State officials told us that they have recently proposed 

using the EXBS IWG as a means of developing common interagency 

strategies and approaches toward other countries and to encourage 

individual programs to engage or disengage in particular regions, 

countries, and functional areas.

The missions, goals, and activities of many DNN programs—as well as 

many nuclear nonproliferation efforts pursued by other agencies—remain 

critical to addressing one of the most serious risks to U.S. national 

security. Proliferation of nuclear weapons could have a profound impact 

on international stability and endanger vital U.S. interests. If terrorists 

were to acquire and use a nuclear weapon, the results could have farreaching and long-lasting social, financial, and health impacts that are 

difficult to contemplate. Recognizing the importance of the DNN efforts, 

Congress has provided NNSA with significant amounts of funding over 

the past decade. Nevertheless, the serious fiscal realities now confronting 

the nation mean the financial resources available to DNN—and numerous 

other federal government programs and functions—are likely to be 

constrained for the foreseeable future. For these reasons, it is imperative 

that DNN programs are implemented and pursued in the most effective 

and efficient ways possible.

It is essential that NNSA make the most efficient possible use of its 

funding. Regarding the execution of DNN budgets, we acknowledge the 

challenging circumstances under which many of the DNN programs 

operate—including appropriations provided months into the fiscal year, 

delays that may come in executing agreements with foreign governments, 

and difficulties in implementing activities through subcontractors 

overseas—which, as we found, can lead to large uncosted and, in some 

cases, large uncommitted annual balances. However, NNSA must 

maintain strong financial oversight to ensure that funding directed to 

these programs is having the greatest possible impact and that resources 

Congress is making available to DNN are not being underutilized. For 

DNN programs having difficulty committing funding on a timely basis, it is 

appropriate for NNSA to justify as part of its current semiannual reporting 

to Congress on DNN uncommitted, unobligated, and unexpended 

balances why uncommitted DNN program funding balances—especially 

those exceeding acceptable thresholds—should not be rescinded, 

redirected to other NNSA programs, or used to offset future DNN budget 

requests.

Conclusions 
 

Page 49 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Furthermore, contributions from other countries to DNN programs can 

help accelerate these efforts and reduce the financial burden on the 

United States. However, the foreign contributions made to the three DNN 

programs in recent fiscal years have remained relatively small compared 

with the funding directed to these programs from annual appropriations. 

The recent extension of the mandate of the G-8 Global Partnership 

Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction 

beyond the original 2012 expiration date provides NNSA with an 

opportunity to seek out additional foreign contributions to DNN programs 

and provides a reason for extending the time frames authorizing certain 

DNN programs to receive and use such contributions.

In addition to the contributions provided directly to DNN programs by 

foreign donor governments, cost sharing by foreign governments in 

countries where DNN programs are being implemented is another way to 

leverage NNSA’s resources. However, none of the main DNN programs 

conducting work overseas is systematically tracking and maintaining 

information on foreign cost sharing that would allow for reporting of such 

data DNN-wide. Such information could provide a tangible measure of 

foreign governments’ commitment to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation 

objectives, such as the President’s initiative to secure all vulnerable 

nuclear materials worldwide in four years, and enable Congress to better 

understand the levels of foreign financial burden sharing relative to the 

funding appropriated to DNN.

NNSA also faces difficulties in consistently and effectively measuring the 

results of some DNN programs because it uses performance measures 

that changed over time, performance targets that differed in the end of 

fiscal year performance report and in the budget request to Congress for 

at least one fiscal year, and measures with limitations—specifically for the 

MPC&A, NGSI, Nonproliferation and Verification R&D, and U.S. HEU 

disposition programs—concerning clarity, reliability, or balance. As a 

result, Congress and the public may not have a sufficient basis to judge, 

or may be receiving misleading information about, the results of some 

DNN programs, their goals and scope of work, and the limitations and 

challenges they face in implementing their efforts. Furthermore, NNSA’s 

decision to eliminate the commercialization measure for the GIPP 

program raises questions about the fundamental underlying goals of the 

program. From its inception in the mid-1990s, commercialization was a 

central goal of the GIPP program. Eliminating this measure and relying 

only on cost sharing as a performance indicator, in our view, raises 

serious questions about the ability of the program to achieve this long-
 

Page 50 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

standing goal and provides little information on the program’s 

nonproliferation impact and results.

Finally, effective coordination of federal government efforts to prevent and 

detect nuclear smuggling overseas is limited by shortcomings in strategic 

plans, potential fragmentation and overlap among some programs, and 

divided responsibilities among several agencies. Furthermore, it is 

apparent that no single agency or program has the authority to undertake 

and implement a strategic re-evaluation and restructuring across the 

government to address these concerns.

To allow DNN programs to receive and use additional foreign 

contributions in the future, thereby offsetting some future DNN 

appropriations requests, Congress may wish to consider extending the 

time frames under which current DNN programs are authorized in current 

law to receive and use such contributions.

We recommend that the Administrator of NNSA take the following seven 

actions:

• To provide further information to Congress on DNN program budget 

execution, in the end of fiscal year semiannual reports on DNN 

uncommitted program funding balances (1) identify uncommitted 

balances over acceptable carryover thresholds on a program-byprogram basis, and (2) justify why such balances should not be 

considered for rescission, redirection to other NNSA programs, or to 

offset future DNN budget requests.

• To clarify how other countries are sharing in the burden of 

implementing DNN programs, develop ways to better track and 

maintain information on foreign cost sharing for DNN projects 

overseas. To allow Congress to understand the scope of foreign 

country cost sharing, NNSA should include in the annual DNN budget 

requests to Congress information explaining actual or estimated 

amounts of cost sharing during the prior fiscal year by foreign 

governments in countries where DNN program activities have been 

implemented.

• To provide Congress with consistent information on DNN program 

results over time, develop and maintain to the extent practicable a 

consistent set of DNN program performance measures and ensure 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 51 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

that, for each fiscal year, the targets for measuring annual program 

performance as proposed in the budget requests to Congress are the 

same as those used to assess progress in the end of fiscal year 

performance reports. In those cases where circumstances warrant a 

change in performance measures or targets—especially during the 

course of a fiscal year—the end of fiscal year performance reports 

should explain why the measures or targets were changed.

• To provide Congress with better information on the status and 

progress of DNN program performance, address clarity, reliability, and 

balance issues in the performance measures for specific programs as 

follows:

• Develop clearer measures, especially for the Nonproliferation and 

Verification R&D program and MPC&A programs, so the 

requirements and scope of program efforts can be more easily 

understood. For the MPC&A program in particular, reconsider the 

practice under its performance measure of counting buildings and 

facilities as having “completed” MPC&A upgrades, where there is 

additional or ongoing security work under way or planned.

• Clarify the long-term goal under the performance measure for the 

U.S. HEU disposition program to reflect that the overall amount of 

material for dispositioning and the rate at which it will be 

downblended is conditional upon decisions regarding the U.S. 

nuclear weapons stockpile and the pace of warhead 

dismantlement.

• Develop broader, more encompassing, or a more balanced set of 

public measures to gauge progress by the Next Generation 

Safeguards Initiative and in the sustainability of MPC&A upgrades 

provided to foreign countries.

• Provide an updated and more reliable measure to assess the 

nonproliferation impact of the GIPP program, as NNSA previously 

stated it would.

We are making the following two recommendations to the Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs:

• To streamline and eliminate potential for fragmentation and overlap 

among U.S. government programs involved in preventing and 

detecting smuggling of nuclear materials, equipment, and 

technologies overseas, undertake—or direct and delegate an 
 

Page 52 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

appropriate agency or agencies to undertake—a comprehensive 

review of the structure, scope, and composition of agencies and 

programs across the federal government involved in such efforts. 

Such a review should assess several issues, including: (1) the level of 

overlap and duplication among agencies and programs, especially in 

the provision of nuclear detection equipment and in training provided 

to foreign border security, customs, and law enforcement officials; (2) 

potential for consolidation of these functions to fewer programs and 

agencies; (3) the feasibility, costs, and benefits of establishing a 

special coordinator to preside over the allocation of U.S. counternuclear-smuggling assistance to foreign nations and be responsible 

for directing the interagency process of development, funding, and 

implementation of all U.S. government programs related to combating 

nuclear smuggling overseas; and (4) any U.S. laws that would need to 

be amended by Congress in order to facilitate consolidation, 

elimination, or other changes to existing programs.

• Following this review, to ensure remaining programs are being 

coordinated and implemented effectively, issue new guidance that 

incorporates the elements of effective strategic plans, including clearly 

delineating the roles and missions of relevant programs, specific 

priorities and objectives, performance measures and targets, overall 

program cost estimates, and projected time frames for program 

completion.

We provided a draft of this report to the Administrator of NNSA, the 

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (NSC), the 

Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, and the Attorney General for their review and comment. DHS 

and NNSA provided written comments on the draft report, which are 

presented in appendixes IX and X, respectively. State, DOD, and NSC 

did not provide written comments but provided technical comments which 

we incorporated as appropriate. Justice did not provide comments. In its 

comments, DHS provided additional information about the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office’s role in initiatives related to nuclear forensics 

and on the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Strategic Plan and Joint 

Annual Interagency Review, as well as technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate.

In its comments, NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with our 

recommendations. However, concerning our findings, NNSA stated that 

the draft report distorts the facts and reinforces misperceptions about 

DNN’s financial, procurement, and performance management. NNSA 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 53 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

stated that the report leaves the false impression that DNN has unused 

funds and does not make effective program management a priority. 

Specifically, NNSA commented on three points of the report—the 

discussion of (1) uncosted and uncommitted carryover funding, (2) DNN 

tracking of cost-sharing data, and (3) performance measures for several 

DNN programs. NNSA also provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate.

Uncosted and uncommitted carryover funding. NNSA commented that: 

the DOE threshold for DNN programs only applies to uncommitted 

uncosted balances, not uncosted balances; we “buried” information on 

DNN uncommitted balances in the draft report; and that our finding that 

uncommitted uncosted carryover funding of several DNN programs raises 

questions as to whether such balances could be directed to other NNSA 

programs or be used to reduce future DNN budget requests, is “untrue 

and has dangerous implications in the current budget environment.”

NNSA’s assertion that the DOE threshold applies only to uncommitted 

uncosted balances and not uncosted balances is not consistent with 

DOE’s annual reports to Congress on the status of its uncosted 

obligations, in which DNN uncosted balances are evaluated against the 

threshold. For example, DOE stated in its report on uncosted balances for 

fiscal years 2008 and 2009 that total DNN uncosted balances exceeded 

the overall DNN threshold level by a net amount of $827.9 million in fiscal 

year 2009. In addition, the financial statements we obtained from NNSA 

that served as the basis for our analysis compared the uncosted balances 

of each DNN program against a corresponding threshold for each 

program. We also note that NNSA is presenting this information in its 

comment letter for the first time. In August 2011, NNSA officials indicated 

that they did not want us to discuss uncosted DNN funding balances in 

any way due to their concerns that our report would be misunderstood by 

Congress and, in turn, jeopardize future DNN appropriations. However, 

prior to our receipt of these comments, NNSA officials had not provided 

any indication that we should not have analyzed the uncosted data in this 

manner. In response to NNSA’s technical comments, we modified the 

presentation of our analysis of uncosted and uncommitted DNN funding 

balances against the thresholds.

Furthermore, contrary to NNSA’s statement in its comments, the

information on DNN uncommitted carryover is not “buried” in the report. 

Rather, it is presented in a logical sequence following the discussion of 

DNN’s overall and program-specific uncosted funding balances and the 

discussion of the reasons why NNSA believes it is important to consider 
 

Page 54 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

DNN funding that is uncosted but committed. In our view, including 

information on the annual levels of DNN costed and uncosted funding is 

relevant information because it depicts the level at which DNN work is 

being completed and expenditures are being made. At the same time, we 

recognize that information on committed and uncommitted balances can 

be useful in understanding DNN program commitments that have been 

incurred but which may not be payable for years to come, and therefore 

provides a longer-term picture of current DNN program operations. We 

believe both sets of financial data present complementary information, 

provide fuller context to Congress on the execution of DNN budgets, and 

can be used together to provide a more comprehensive picture of DNN’s

financial position today and over time.

We continue to believe that it is appropriate to consider whether DNN 

uncommitted uncosted funding balances—especially the uncommitted 

balances of programs that have routinely exceeded the DOE thresholds—

could be rescinded, directed to other NNSA programs, or used to reduce 

future DNN budget requests. NNSA’s comment that rescission of 

“amounts committed to signed contracts” would create significant delays 

and result in possible contract-related penalties. However, we reiterate 

that our finding pertains to consideration of uncommitted, not committed, 

funding which is not yet contracted. In addition, concerning NNSA’s 

reference to “dangerous implications in the current budget environment,” 

we believe that current U.S. fiscal environment means that all federal 

programs must be held accountable to executing—whether costing or 

committing—their budgets efficiently and on a timely basis.

DNN tracking of cost sharing data. NNSA commented that our draft report 

does not mention the inherent difficulties associated with assessing cost 

sharing with foreign partners at sensitive sites. In the report, we note the 

limitations in NNSA’s ability to audit foreign cost sharing. We also 

explained the efforts NNSA has made to develop cost sharing 

relationships with international partners and the different approaches and 

methodologies DNN programs have adopted to collect data on or 

estimate cost sharing. However, none of the DNN programs we reviewed 

are systematically tracking and maintaining these data to allow for 

reporting of foreign cost sharing DNN-wide. We understand, however, the 

challenges involved in obtaining such information and have added further 

language to the report which reflects NNSA’s comment.
 

Page 55 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

On a related matter, NNSA commented that when it asked us what type 

of methodology might be used as a satisfactory way to calculate foreign 

cost-sharing data, we responded that we could not provide any 

prescriptive advice on how to approach the issue. It is important to note 

that the discussion of this issue was one among many issues discussed 

with NNSA during the exit meeting and throughout our review. 

Furthermore, we point out that our recommendation to NNSA is not that it 

audit or validate foreign cost-sharing data but that it improve its internal 

processes for tracking and maintaining such information and that it 

provide information on actual or estimated amounts of cost sharing in 

annual DNN budget requests to Congress.

Performance metrics for DNN programs. NNSA made several statements 

in its written comments concerning our findings on the performance 

measures of several DNN programs, including the nuclear Material 

Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program, the Global Threat 

Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative 

(NGSI), and the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) 

program.

Regarding the MPC&A program performance measures, NNSA 

commented that the program does not track the amount of material 

secured because estimates of inventories are highly uncertain and the 

specifics are considered sensitive or classified by foreign governments. 

NNSA also commented that having to reclassify buildings previously 

deemed as complete if a new MPC&A upgrade project is initiated would 

require the metric baseline to change frequently and make it an unusable 

measure. We acknowledged in our draft report the difficulties NNSA faces 

in obtaining information from foreign governments on the amounts of 

material being secured by the program. For this reason, we did not 

recommend that NNSA develop a new performance measure that 

attempts to capture and report on such information. With respect to our 

finding that the MPC&A program is not adjusting the total number of 

buildings with completed MPC&A upgrades to account for any new 

upgrade work that may be pursued, NNSA stated that the metric baseline 

would change frequently if it were required to adjust the total number of 

completed buildings when new upgrade work is undertaken. We continue 

to believe it is misleading and could create a false sense of security to 

classify a building as having “completed” MPC&A upgrades when 

additional upgrade work is ongoing at that location. Furthermore, while we 

did not specify the frequency by which NNSA should update MPC&A 

program performance data we believe that NNSA should, at a minimum, 
 

Page 56 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

provide accurate data on this matter in the DOE end of fiscal year 

performance reports and in the DNN budget requests to Congress.

Regarding the GTRI performance measure, NNSA commented that we 

implied that the GTRI program had an ulterior motive to change the 

program’s reactor conversion measure. Our characterization of the 

performance metric is accurate: the measure changed during the time 

frame of our review. NNSA explained the change in the measure, but the 

broader point made in the report concerns the changing nature of DNN 

program performance measures and the difficulty this poses in evaluating 

program performance consistently over time.

Regarding the NGSI performance measure, NNSA stated that we had 

incorrectly claimed that the measure was not sufficiently balanced, and 

that we did not include the full text of the measure, leaving out the word 

“deployed.” We stand by our statement for the following reasons. We 

believe the NGSI is a significant, multifaceted undertaking whose scope 

of goals and activities is not adequately captured by the single current 

published performance measure. The overarching goal of NGSI is to 

develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure 

needed to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as 

it evolves to meet new challenges over the next 25 years. In our view, this 

is a much broader, long-term strategic goal that transcends questions of 

whether safeguards systems have been deployed and used in other 

countries to address specific safeguards deficiencies. We recognize the 

difficulties facing NNSA posed by the limited number of published DNN 

performance measures allowed by OMB. However, we believe NGSI will 

remain an important, wide-ranging DNN program for years to come, 

which calls for a wider, more balanced set of public measures to allow 

Congress to track the program’s performance rather than a single 

measure assessing progress in one dimension of program output. In 

response to NNSA’s comment, we added language to the report 

concerning the word deployed as it relates to the program’s performance 

measure.

Regarding the GIPP program, NNSA commented that we criticized the 

lack of a commercialization metric. NNSA stated that commercialization is 

no longer a leading program metric, but a secondary benefit. We believe 

that our observation regarding this metric is fair and reasonable. 

Commercialization had been a long-standing measure used by the 

program to track reemployment of former Soviet weapons scientists and, 

as we reported in 2007, was considered the “flagship” of the program. We 

explain in our report that NNSA determined that commercialization would 
 

Page 57 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

no longer be a leading program objective and would no longer be a 

published program performance measure. However, as we noted in the 

report, we had previously recommended that NNSA improve the measure 

by developing more reliable data on the commercialization results of 

GIPP projects, not eliminate the measure. Eliminating the measure leaves 

the impression that the program has failed to meet a key program 

objective and raises other questions about GIPP’s continued value as a 

nonproliferation program. In that regard, we do not believe that the single 

current public performance measure for the GIPP program—the 

cumulative percentage of non-U.S. government project funding 

contributions obtained relative to cumulative U.S. government GIPP 

funding—provides Congress with sufficient information on the program’s 

nonproliferation results.

We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator of NNSA, the 

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of 

Energy, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Attorney General, and interested congressional committees. 

In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix XI.

Gene Aloise

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 58 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

The objectives of our review of the National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s (NNSA) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) 

programs were to assess (1) the extent of annual DNN uncosted, or 

unexpended, balances; (2) the level of financial contributions from foreign 

donor and recipient governments to the DNN programs; (3) the 

effectiveness of DNN program performance measures; and (4) the 

effectiveness of interagency strategies and plans for coordinating NNSA 

and other agency nuclear nonproliferation programs, especially those 

working to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling overseas.

To assess DNN uncosted balances, we obtained and analyzed financial 

data generated from the Standard Accounting and Reporting System, the 

Department of Energy’s (DOE) and NNSA’s official financial management 

system. We analyzed data on uncosted and uncommitted DNN funding 

from fiscal years 2006 through 2010. We selected this time frame as the 

most recent five year period of available end of fiscal year financial data. 

This included data on end of fiscal year funding costed by the programs; 

uncosted balances; uncosted funding committed; and thresholds 

developed by the Department of Energy (DOE) to assess the 

appropriateness of uncosted carryover balances. We used this data to 

analyze uncosted and uncommitted uncosted balances at the end of each 

fiscal year, compare uncosted and uncommitted uncosted balances 

against the thresholds, and assess individual DNN programs whose 

annual uncommitted uncosted balances frequently exceeded acceptable 

thresholds.

We conducted a reliability assessment of the system that generated this 

data and interviewed knowledgeable officials from NNSA’s Office of 

Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation on the reliability of the 

data, including issues such as data entry, access, quality control 

procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data. In several 

instances, we found minor discrepancies in the financial data provided to 

us by NNSA, but were able to reconcile and obtain satisfactory 

explanations for the differences from NNSA officials. Specifically, the 

scope of our analysis of DNN-wide uncosted and uncommitted uncosted 

balances included funding for several small DNN program elements that 

involve shared or transferred funding between DNN and other agency 

programs. NNSA does not consider these amounts in its semiannual 

reports to Congress on DNN program uncosted and committed funding. 

According to NNSA, this resulted in minor differences in the data in our 

report and in NNSA’s reports to Congress. We also reviewed external 

auditor reports of DOE’s consolidated financial statements to identify any 

potential material weaknesses that could affect the reliability of the data. 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 59 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

We did not identify any material weaknesses in those reports that would 

raise questions about the reliability of the data during the timeframe of our 

review. We determined that, overall, the data provided to us were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review.

To assess the financial contributions to the DNN programs made by 

foreign donor governments, we analyzed data provided in the most recent 

DOE report to Congress on the receipt and utilization of international 

contributions for nonproliferation and threat reduction work. We analyzed 

these contributions to the four programs authorized by Congress to 

receive such contributions over the most recent 5-year period of available 

data—fiscal years 2006 through 2010—to align with the timeframe of our 

analysis of DNN program uncosted balances. We analyzed the 

contribution data by DNN programs receiving the funding and the 

countries providing the contributions. In addition, using DOE financial 

data, we compared the foreign contributions to each program against the 

amount of funding from annual appropriations acts allocated to each 

program. Regarding cost sharing by host governments in countries where 

DNN activities are implemented, NNSA officials provided us with data 

estimating the dollar amount of foreign cost sharing for relevant 

programs, and provided us with examples of cost-sharing activity. We 

interviewed NNSA officials on the policies, methods, and systems for 

collecting, estimating, and maintaining foreign cost-sharing information. 

NNSA did not have documentation to support the validity or reliability of 

these estimates. We included the cost-sharing estimates to illustrate that 

DNN programs are attempting to measure the level of financial assistance 

by recipient governments, but we noted that these figures were not 

audited and that the NNSA faces difficulties in developing valid and 

reliable foreign cost-sharing estimates. We did not adjust any dollar 

figures in this report for inflation.

To assess the effectiveness of DNN performance measures, we 

evaluated the DNN program performance measures presented by NNSA 

in its annual budget requests to Congress from fiscal years 2006 through 

2010. For each DNN program, we assessed the description of each 

program performance measure in each fiscal year to assess how the 

measures have changed over time. To further analyze consistency in 

these measures, for each fiscal year we compared the description of each 

performance measure in the budget requests against the measures 

described in the DOE annual performance reports produced at the end of 

each fiscal year. For fiscal year 2010, we also compared the annual 

performance targets for the DNN programs as proposed in the budget 

request with the targets and actual accomplishments reported in the 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 60 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

performance report for fiscal year 2010. Furthermore, we evaluated the 

DNN performance measures against criteria we have developed in 

previous reports which identify key characteristics and attributes of 

effective performance measures. We interviewed NNSA officials on some 

of the DNN performance measures, including measures used by the 

Nonproliferation and Verification R&D, Global Threat Reduction Initiative, 

Material Protection, Control, and Accounting, and Global Initiatives for 

Proliferation Prevention programs.

To assess the effectiveness of interagency strategies and plans for 

coordinating NNSA and other agency nuclear nonproliferation programs, 

especially those working to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling 

overseas, we reviewed relevant interagency strategies and coordinating 

guidance. These documents included the Global Nuclear Detection 

Architecture Strategic Plan 2010 produced jointly by the Departments of 

Homeland Security (DHS), Defense, State, and Justice, DOE, the 

intelligence community, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a 2006 

strategic plan produced by the Department of State for interagency 

coordination of U.S. government nuclear detection assistance overseas, 

and 2005 implementation guidelines issued by the National Security 

Council for international nuclear and radiological border security efforts. 

We evaluated these strategies against characteristics and attributes of 

effective national strategies for complex interagency undertakings that we 

developed previously. We also reviewed findings and recommendations 

in our prior reports on programs involved in combating nuclear smuggling 

and evaluated whether current strategic plans and coordinating guidance 

have addressed relevant findings or recommendations in these reports. 

To assess coordination between NNSA and other agency nonproliferation 

programs, we focused on those programs across the federal government 

that play a role in preventing and detecting nuclear smuggling overseas. 

By reviewing agency documentation—such as descriptions of programs 

in NNSA, State, DHS, and Department of Defense budget requests and in 

the “Joint Annual Interagency Review of the Global Nuclear Detection 

Architecture” produced by the interagency partners responsible for the 

GNDA Strategic Plan, as coordinated by DNDO—and interviewing 

agency officials, we identified 21 programs across five federal 

government agencies that are involved in preventing and detecting 

smuggling or illicit transfers of nuclear materials and related sensitive 

technologies overseas for further evaluation. These included programs 

that (1) conduct R&D on radiation detection technologies; (2) deploy 

radiation detection equipment along foreign borders and points of transit; 

(3) train and equip foreign customs and border security officials; (4) assist 

foreign governments in the development of export control systems; 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 61 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

(5) enhance foreign antismuggling law enforcement and prosecutorial 

capabilities; and (6) analyze potential foreign nuclear smuggling cases 

and incidents. These programs we selected do not represent the total 

universe of federal programs involved in this area, nor does our list 

represent a statistically representative sample of the total U.S. 

government effort in this area. To conduct our assessment of coordination 

in this area, we submitted a standard set or questions to and/or 

interviewed officials representing the 21 programs we identified on a 

range of issues pertaining to their programs, including scope of program 

missions and activities, types of interactions with other federal programs, 

and their views on the coordination and integration of similar programs 

across agencies. We used the responses to our questions and 

information from our interviews with officials from these agencies to 

evaluate similarities in missions, functions, and activities between 

programs, and obtain official perspectives on the effectiveness of 

coordinating mechanisms and guidance.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2011 to December 

2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence, to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Previous GAO Reports Assessing 

DOE and NNSA Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Programs

Page 62 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

For over a decade, we have evaluated the implementation and execution 

of Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) nuclear nonproliferation programs. The following 

is a list of selected products on these programs.

For more information on the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, see:

Nuclear Nonproliferation: National Nuclear Security Administration Has 

Improved the Security of Reactors in its Global Research Reactor 

Program, but Action Is Needed to Address Remaining Concerns. 

GAO-09-949. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s International Radiological Threat 

Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the 

Highest Priority Radiological Sources. GAO-07-282. Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 31, 2007.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce 

the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors.

GAO-04-807. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004

For more information on the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D 

program, see:

Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA’s Program Develops Successful 

Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened.

GAO-02-904. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2002.

For information on NNSA’s WMD scientist redirection programs, see:

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in 

Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed. GAO-08-189. 

Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2007.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in 

Russia’s Nuclear Cities Face Challenges. GAO-01-429. Washington, 

D.C.: May 3, 2001.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE’s Efforts to Reduce the 

Risks Posed by Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists.

GAO/RCED-99-54. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 1999.

Appendix II: Previous GAO Reports 

Assessing DOE and NNSA Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Programs
Appendix II: Previous GAO Reports Assessing 

DOE and NNSA Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Programs

Page 63 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

For information on the nuclear Material Protection, Control, and 

Accounting program, see:

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better 

Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials 

Worldwide. GAO-11-227. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2010.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at 

Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded 

Security Upgrades Is Uncertain. GAO-07-404. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 

2007.

For information on the Second Line of Defense Core Program and 

Megaports Initiative, see:

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and 

Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation 

Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 14, 2006.

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in 

Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign 

Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005.

For more information on the U.S. plutonium disposition effort, see:

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Address Uncertainties with and 

Strengthen Independent Safety Oversight of Its Plutonium Disposition 

Program. GAO-10-378. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2010.

For more information on the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium 

Production program, see:

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Effort to Close Russia’s Plutonium 

Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain.

GAO-04-662. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Appendix III: Foreign Contributions Received 

by DNN Programs, by Program, from Fiscal 

Years 2006 through 2010

Page 64 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Dollars in thousands

Program and 

country 

contributing

Fiscal year 2006 

total foreign 

contributions 

received 

Fiscal year 2007 

total foreign 

contributions 

received 

Fiscal year 2008 

total foreign 

contributions 

received 

Fiscal year 2009 

total foreign 

contributions 

received 

Fiscal year 2010 

total foreign 

contributions 

received 

Total, fiscal 

years 2006-

2010

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation

Canada $0.0 $4,418.8 $0.0 $4,067.1 $0.0 $8,485.9

Finland $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $308.8 $308.8

New Zealand $0.0 $497.2 $0.0 $387.0 $0.0 $884.2

Norway $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $837.6 $0.0 $837.6

South Korea $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $300.0 $250.0 $550.0

United Kingdom $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $140.0 $140.0

Subtotal $0.0 $4,916.0 $0.0 $5,591.7 $698.8 $11,206.5

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production

Finland $628.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $628.0

Netherlands $1,190.2 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $1,190.2

New Zealand $308.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $308.0

South Korea $250.0 $250.0 $250.0 $0.0 $0.0 $750.0

United Kingdom $10,300.0 $5,148.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $15,448.0

Subtotal $12,676.2 $5,398.0 $250.0 $0.0 $0.0 $18,324.2

Global Threat Reduction Initiative

Canada $0.0 $1,738.8 $1,975.4 $3,918.0 $0.0 $7,632.2

South Korea $0.0 $0.0 $250.0 $0.0 $0.0 $250.0

United Kingdom $0.0 $0.0 $3,998.0 $5,722.2 $0.0 $9,720.2

Subtotal $0.0 $1,738.8 $6,223.4 $9,640.2 $0.0 $17,602.4

Total $12,676.2 $12,052.8 $6,473.4 $15,231.9 $698.8 $47,133.1

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.

Note: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars.

Appendix III: Foreign Contributions Received 

by DNN Programs, by Program, from Fiscal 

Years 2006 through 2010
Appendix IV: Foreign Contributions Received 

by DNN Programs, by Country, from Fiscal 

Years 2006 through 2010

Page 65 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Dollars in thousands

Donating 

Country

DNN program 

receiving 

contribution

Fiscal year 

2006 foreign 

contributions 

received

Fiscal year 

2007 foreign 

contributions 

received

Fiscal year 

2008 foreign 

contributions 

received

Fiscal year 

2009 foreign 

contributions 

received

Fiscal year 

2010 foreign 

contributions 

received

Total, fiscal 

years 2006-

2010

Canada INMPC $0.0 $4,418.8 $0.0 $4,067.1 $0.0 $8,485.9

GTRI $0.0 $1,738.8 $1,975.4 $3,918.0 $0.0 $7,632.2

Subtotal $0.0 $6,157.6 $1,975.4 $7,985.1 $0.0 $16,118.1

Finland INMPC $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $308.8 $308.8

EWGPP $628.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $628.0

Subtotal $628.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $308.8 $936.8

Netherlands EWGPP $1,190.2 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $1,190.2

Subtotal $1,190.2 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $1,190.2

New Zealand INMPC $0.0 $497.2 $0.0 $387.0 $0.0 $884.2

EWGPP $308.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $308.0

Subtotal $308.0 $497.2 $0.0 $387.0 $0.0 $1,192.2

Norway INMPC $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $837.6 $0.0 $837.6

Subtotal $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $837.6 $0.0 $837.6

South Korea INMPC $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $300.0 $250.0 $550.0

EWGPP $250.0 $250.0 $250.0 $0.0 $0.0 $750.0

GTRI $0.0 $0.0 $250.0 $0.0 $0.0 $250.0

Subtotal $250.0 $250.0 $500.0 $300.0 $250.0 $1,550.0

United 

Kingdom

INMPC $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $140.0 $140.0

EWGPP $10,300.0 $5,148.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $15,448.0

GTRI $0.0 $0.0 $3,998.0 $5,722.2 $0.0 $9,720.2

Subtotal $10,300.0 $5,148.0 $3,998.0 $5,722.2 $140.0 $25,308.2

Total $12,676.2 $12,052.8 $6,473.4 $15,231.9 $698.8 $47,133.1

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.

Note: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars.

Appendix IV: Foreign Contributions Received 

by DNN Programs, by Country, from Fiscal 

Years 2006 through 2010
Appendix V: Foreign Contributions to DNN 

Programs Compared to Funding from 

Appropriations Acts, Fiscal Years 2006-2010

Page 66 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Dollars in thousands

Fiscal year 

2006

Fiscal year 

2007

Fiscal year 

2008

Fiscal year 

2009

Fiscal year 

2010

Total, fiscal 

years 2006-

2010

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation

Total funding from annual 

appropriations acts directed 

to the program $422,730 a $592,730 $624,482 $452,232 $572,050 $2,664,224

Foreign contributions $0.0 $4,916.0 $0.0 $5,591.7 $698.8 $11,206.5

Foreign contributions as a 

percentage of total 

funding directed to 

program from 

appropriations 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 1.2% 0.1% 0.4%

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production

Total funding from annual 

appropriations acts directed 

to the program $174,423 a $225,754 $179,941 $141,299 $24,507 $745,924

Foreign contributions $12,676.2 $5,398.0 $250.0 $0.0 $0.0 $18,324.2

Foreign contributions as a 

percentage of total 

funding directed to 

program from 

appropriations 7.3% 2.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5%

Global Threat Reduction Initiative

Total funding from annual 

appropriations acts directed 

to the program $96,995 a $129,495 $193,225 $393,208 $333,500 $1,146,423

Foreign contributions $0.0 $1,738.8 $6,223.4 $9,640.2 $0.0 $17,602.4

Foreign contributions as a 

percentage of total 

funding directed to 

program from 

appropriations 0.0% 1.3% 3.2% 2.5% 0.0% 1.5%

Russian Plutonium Disposition Program

Total funding from annual 

appropriations acts directed 

to the program $33,427 a $0 -$207,000 -$27 $1,000 -$172,600

Foreign contributions $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0

Foreign contributions as a 

percentage of total 

funding directed to 

program from 

appropriations 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Appendix V: Foreign Contributions to DNN 

Programs Compared to Funding from 

Appropriations Acts, Fiscal Years 2006-2010
Appendix V: Foreign Contributions to DNN 

Programs Compared to Funding from 

Appropriations Acts, Fiscal Years 2006-2010

Page 67 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Dollars in thousands

Fiscal year 

2006

Fiscal year 

2007

Fiscal year 

2008

Fiscal year 

2009

Fiscal year 

2010

Total, fiscal 

years 2006-

2010

Total

Total funding from annual 

appropriations acts directed 

to all four programs $727,575 a $947,979 $790,648 $986,712 $931,057 $4,383,971

Total foreign contributions to 

all four programs $12,676.2 $12,052.8 $6,473.4 $15,231.9 $698.8 $47,133.1

Total foreign contributions

as a percentage of total 

funding directed to 

programs from 

appropriations, all four 

programs 1.7% 1.3% 0.8% 1.5% 0.1% 1.1%

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.

Note: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars.

a

Amounts are adjusted new obligational authority to account for changes to original DNN annual 

appropriations, including across the board rescissions, rescission of prior year unobligated balances, 

transfers to other NNSA accounts, supplemental appropriations, and other structural changes 

affecting the funds available to the programs to obligate and cost.
Appendix VI: Limitations in Key Attributes of 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program 

Performance Measures

Page 68 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

We have found that agencies successfully measure performance when 

they use measures that satisfy four general characteristics—(1) they 

demonstrate results, (2) are limited to the vital few, (3) cover multiple 

program priorities, and (4) provide useful information for decision 

making.1 To assess whether program performance measures satisfy 

these general characteristics, we developed nine key specific attributes of 

successful measures, including whether the measures are clear, 

measurable, reliable, objective, and balanced.2 For more information on 

the attributes of successful performance measures, see table 8.3

Table 8: Key Attributes of Successful Performance Measures

Attribute Definition

Potentially adverse consequences of not 

meeting attribute

Linkage Measure is aligned with division and agencywide 

goals and mission and clearly communicated 

throughout the organization.

Behaviors and incentives created by measures do 

not support achieving division or agencywide goals 

or mission.

Clarity Measure is clearly stated and the name and 

definition are consistent with the methodology used 

to calculate it.

Data could be confusing and misleading to users.

Measurable target Measure has a numerical goal. Cannot tell whether performance is meeting 

expectations.

Objectivity Measure is reasonably free from significant bias or 

manipulation.

Performance assessments may be systematically 

over- or understated. 

Reliability Measure produces the same result under similar 

conditions.

Reported performance data are inconsistent and 

add uncertainty.

Core program activities Measures cover the activities that an entity is 

expected to perform to support the intent of the 

program.

Not enough information available in core program 

areas to managers and stakeholders.

Limited overlap Measure should provide new information beyond 

that provided by other measures.

Manager may have to sort through redundant, 

costly information that does not add value.

 

1

GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 1996).

2

The four characteristics are overarching, thus there is not necessarily a direct link 

between any one attribute and any one characteristic.

3

GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season 

Performance Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002).

Appendix VI: Limitations in Key Attributes of 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program 

Performance Measures
Appendix VI: Limitations in Key Attributes of 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program 

Performance Measures

Page 69 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Attribute Definition

Potentially adverse consequences of not 

meeting attribute

Balance Balance exists when a suite of measures ensures 

that an organization’s various priorities are 

covered.

Lack of balance could create skewed incentives 

when measures over-emphasize some goals.

Governmentwide priorities Each measure should cover a priority such as 

quality, timeliness, and cost of service.

A program’s overall success is at risk if all priorities 

are not addressed.

Source: GAO.

Some National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation (DNN) program performance measures we reviewed did 

not have key attributes of successful performance measures, including 

some DNN performance measures that were potentially unclear, of 

questionable reliability, or lacking sufficient balance.

We identified clarity concerns in the performance measures for the 

following two DNN programs:

• The Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development 

(R&D) program measures the cumulative progress in demonstrating 

the next generation of technologies and methods to detect uranium235 production, plutonium production, and special nuclear material 

movement. For each of these measures, progress is judged against 

unspecified “baseline criteria” and milestones published in an “FY 

2006 R&D Requirements Document.” NNSA officials told us that the 

R&D requirements document is classified. Nevertheless, because 

these measures link performance to a secondary set of criteria that 

are not clearly expressed, it is difficult for a third party who may be 

unfamiliar with the classified requirements to interpret the measure 

and discern whether the criteria provide an appropriate, sufficient, and 

up-to-date basis for tracking program progress.

• For the nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) 

program, NNSA measures progress by the cumulative number of 

buildings with weapon-usable nuclear materials in Russia and the 

former Soviet states with completed MPC&A upgrades.4

 

4

NNSA conducts MPC&A security upgrades in two phases: Rapid upgrades include 

improvements such as bricking up windows where material is stored; installing 

strengthened doors, locks, and nuclear container seals; and establishing controlled 

access areas. Comprehensive upgrades include electronic systems to detect intruders, 

central alarm stations, and computerized nuclear material accounting systems.

Through 

DNN Performance 

Measures Having Potential 

Clarity Limitations
Appendix VI: Limitations in Key Attributes of 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program 

Performance Measures

Page 70 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

fiscal year 2009, the program also gauged progress on the cumulative 

number of Russian nuclear warhead sites with completed MPC&A 

upgrades, but no longer uses this measure because, according to 

NNSA, all 73 warhead sites in the scope of work received completed 

MPC&A upgrades as of December 2008. We identified several 

concerns with both of these measures.

• First, one of the measures focuses on the number of buildings 

with nuclear material having completed MPC&A upgrades, rather 

than the amounts of materials secured. This measure is less than 

optimal because it does not provide information about the 

quantities of materials being secured by the program. NNSA 

officials agreed that this performance measure is less than ideal to 

track material security progress in Russia, but they told us that the 

Russian government’s unwillingness to divulge the amount of 

material located in each building under the program’s scope 

prevented the program from developing a more refined measure.

• Second, in our 2007 report on the MPC&A program, we reported 

that DOE’s measure for reporting progress on the number of 

buildings “secured” by the MPC&A program was a potentially 

misleading indicator of security at those facilities, because a 

building was considered secure after only “rapid” rather than 

“comprehensive” security upgrades had been put in place.5 NNSA 

subsequently revised its performance measure to track the 

number of buildings with completed MPC&A upgrades. According 

to NNSA officials, the program periodically conducts reviews of 

completed sites to assess levels of residual risk and other issues. 

In some cases, additional upgrades may be pursued if warranted 

by the new information. In those cases, however, the MPC&A 

program is not adjusting the total number of buildings completed 

to account for any new upgrade work that may be pursued. In the 

view of NNSA officials, subtracting the number of buildings that 

will receive MPC&A equipment retrofits or additional upgrades 

from the total number of “completed” buildings would be 

impractical, and that to redevelop the measure to only 

 

5

See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian 

Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is 

Uncertain, GAO-07-404 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007).
Appendix VI: Limitations in Key Attributes of 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program 

Performance Measures

Page 71 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

include completed buildings where there is no MPC&A work taking 

place would be potentially confusing to external reviewers familiar 

with the program.

• Third, the completed MPC&A upgrades measure may also be 

misleading and create a false sense of security to the extent 

decision makers interpret this to mean that a nuclear material or 

warhead site is secure and further U.S. assistance is no longer 

required. However, as we reported in our December 2010 report, 

the MPC&A program has a significant effort under way to 

establish practices and procedures to ensure that security 

improvements at Russian nuclear material and warhead storage 

sites will be effectively sustained over time by Russia without U.S. 

assistance. This effort faces a number of challenges and may 

require continued U.S. support to 2018. NNSA officials told us 

they believed that nuclear security is a dynamic, ongoing process 

that has to keep up with an evolving threat, and may never be 

finished.

• Fourth, the MPC&A performance measure for nuclear material 

security in Russia may produce a false sense of security because 

it does not acknowledge that there are several significant sites in 

Russia believed to have large amounts of nuclear weapon-usable 

materials where the program is not planning to pursue MPC&A 

upgrades. As we noted in our December 2010 report, the Russian 

government has refused to include in the scope of MPC&A 

cooperation with NNSA three major facilities in Russia responsible 

for production of nuclear weapons material. NNSA has not been 

provided access to and is not anticipating conducting future 

MPC&A work at those locations.

We identified reliability concerns in the performance measures for the 

following two DNN programs:

• For the disposition of surplus U.S. highly enriched uranium (HEU), 

under the U.S. Surplus Materials Disposition program, NNSA’s 

performance measure tracks progress in the cumulative amount of 

surplus HEU down-blended or shipped for down-blending to LEU 

DNN Performance 

Measures Having Potential 

Reliability Limitations
Appendix VI: Limitations in Key Attributes of 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program 

Performance Measures

Page 72 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

each year.6

• For the Megaports Initiative, NNSA developed a performance 

measure to track the number of megaports sites where there is hostcountry cost sharing and the estimated dollar amount of such cost 

sharing. However, NNSA does not systematically track and verify 

foreign cost sharing for the Megaports Initiative or other DNN 

programs. An NNSA official told us that the Megaports Initiative costsharing values are estimates and are not validated or audited. For 

these reasons, the cost-sharing measure for the Megaports Initiative 

is unreliable. NNSA officials told us that this measure was difficult to 

quantify, and told us that it would be eliminated for fiscal year 2012 as 

a result of a DOE “performance measures streamlining initiative.” 

The measure has an endpoint target of down-blending 

217 metric tons of HEU that the United States has declared surplus to 

defense needs by 2050. The program has set annual performance 

targets and is measuring annual progress toward this goal. Through 

fiscal year 2010, the program had completed down-blending a 

cumulative total of 133 metric tons. However, we identified potential 

reliability concerns with this measure. NNSA officials told us that the 

2050 date was an arbitrary placeholder because they could not 

predict at what rate nuclear weapons would be dismantled and the 

corresponding rate at which additional HEU will be available for 

dispositioning. The program has adopted a conservative time frame 

for tracking performance in this mission area due to this uncertainty, 

even though NNSA officials told us that this work could be completed 

sooner, depending on the rate at which HEU is made available to the 

program from nuclear weapons needs.

We identified concerns as to whether performance measures for two DNN 

programs are sufficiently balanced:

• NNSA has developed one performance measure—the cumulative 

number of MPC&A regulations in the development phase in Russia 

and other countries of the former Soviet Union—to track the long-term 

sustainability of MPC&A upgrades that NNSA has provided to these 

countries. According to NNSA officials, the MPC&A program’s 

sustainability work is very important to ensure that Russia can 

 

6

Downblending is the process of converting HEU to LEU by mixing it with other forms of 

uranium, such as natural or depleted uranium, to dilute and reduce the enrichment level of 

uranium-235 thereby rendering the material less suitable for weapons purposes.

DNN Performance 

Measures Having Potential 

Balance Limitations
Appendix VI: Limitations in Key Attributes of 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program 

Performance Measures

Page 73 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

effectively assume long-term responsibility for maintaining the U.S.-

provided systems. Regulations are important in this regard because 

they establish legal requirements for MPC&A activities for relevant 

ministries, agencies, services, operating organizations, and facilities in 

foreign countries. By working with other countries, such as Russia, to 

develop their MPC&A regulations, NNSA aims to create incentives for 

effective MPC&A procedures and sanctions for noncompliance in 

order to foster a strong MPC&A culture and sustain U.S.-funded 

security upgrades.

However, we have some concerns with the performance measure 

NNSA uses to gauge progress in the MPC&A sustainability. First, 

while development of regulations is an important component of 

effective and sustainable MPC&A systems, according to NNSA 

officials, the extent to which and how effectively these regulations are 

implemented by the facilities responsible for handling and managing 

nuclear materials is unclear. Second, the measure implies that the 

rate at which MPC&A regulations are developed in Russia alone 

provides a sufficient basis for judging whether Russia and other host 

countries are adequately prepared and equipped to sustain MPC&A 

systems on their own independent of U.S. support. However, as we 

reported in December 2010, transitioning responsibility to Russia for 

sustaining MPC&A improvements over the long term has been a 

complex process, pursued at both the national and site levels in 

Russia through multiple project areas, including but not limited to 

development of MPC&A regulations.7

• In 2008 NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative 

(NGSI), a multiyear program to develop the policies, concepts, 

technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to strengthen 

and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet 

new challenges over the next 25 years. According to NNSA officials, 

NGSI is considered an important, high-priority undertaking intended to 

address a range of emerging challenges to the international 

 

7

At the national level in Russia, NNSA is working to enhance infrastructure to sustain 

MPC&A systems for nuclear materials in 10 ongoing project areas, including 

enhancement of Russian nuclear security culture, developing Russian regulations for 

MPC&A operations, and strengthening Russian inspection and oversight capabilities. 

NNSA is also working to develop MPC&A sustainability practices and procedures at 

individual Russian nuclear material sites in seven sustainability areas, such as developing 

an effective MPC&A management structure at the site that plans, implements, tests, and 

evaluates the site’s MPC&A systems.
Appendix VI: Limitations in Key Attributes of 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program 

Performance Measures

Page 74 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

safeguards system. Specifically, NGSI is addressing multiple 

objectives under five long-term safeguards goals, including (1) 

supporting U.S. safeguards policy development and conducting 

outreach bilaterally and multilaterally to strengthen the international 

safeguards system; (2) developing advanced safeguards concepts, 

approaches, and assessment methodologies; (3) developing 

safeguards technologies and methods to optimize effectiveness of 

safeguards implementation; (4) revitalizing the international 

safeguards human capital base; and (5) developing national 

safeguards infrastructure in countries that have nuclear power 

programs or plans for nuclear power.

NNSA has used one performance measure to track safeguardsrelated assistance to other countries under NGSI: the number of 

safeguards systems deployed and used in other countries to address 

specific safeguards deficiencies. However, NNSA does not have a 

broader set of public performance measures to monitor and provide 

information to Congress on progress toward the longer-term 

safeguards-related goals of NGSI, such as progress in addressing 

human capital issues associated with the international safeguards 

system. 

In both of these cases, we question whether measuring performance in a 

single area of activity provides a sufficient basis for gauging the progress 

that each effort is making overall toward multiple, diverse objectives. 

However, NNSA officials told us that DNN programs are allowed only a 

limited number of representative published performance metrics by the 

Office of Management and Budget. Officials representing both programs 

told us that these efforts have been allotted only one performance 

measure each. These officials noted that the programs maintain a 

broader set of internal-use measures that are not provided to Congress or 

the public which the programs use to track and assess progress made 

under both efforts.
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 75 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

We examined the performance measures the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) provided to Congress in its annual budget 

requests from fiscal years 2006 through 2010 for its Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation (DNN) programs, and found that the number and nature 

of some DNN program performance measures changed over this period 

making it difficult to evaluate program performance consistently over time. 

For instance, in its fiscal year 2006 congressional budget request, NNSA 

included 32 measures to track the performance of its nonproliferation 

programs, but in its fiscal year 2010 budget request NNSA included 26 

measures. For descriptions of the DNN program performance measures, 

by nonproliferation program office and year, from fiscal years 2006 

through 2010, see table 9.

Based on our review of the performance measures presented in NNSA’s 

annual budget requests, we identified several ways in which DNN 

performance measures changed over the period we reviewed, including:

• Some performance measures NNSA used in earlier years were no 

longer relevant by fiscal year 2010 because work was reported by 

NNSA as being completed—such as efforts by the nuclear Material 

Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program to secure 

nuclear warheads in Russia, or work by the Elimination of WeaponsGrade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) program to facilitate the 

shutdown of plutonium production reactors in Russia. In other cases, 

performance measures developed in earlier years became irrelevant 

because, according to NNSA officials, anticipated work was never 

initiated, such as assisting Russia in constructing a mixed oxide fuel 

fabrication facility for plutonium disposition.

• Some measures used by NNSA during this time were dropped, while 

some new measures were established. For example, from fiscal years 

2006 through 2009, the Nonproliferation and International Security 

program had a performance measure tracking the number of 

international and domestic experts trained in nuclear nonproliferation 

issues. In fiscal year 2010, this measure was dropped. Conversely, in 

fiscal year 2010 NNSA established two new measures to gauge 

progress by the Nonproliferation and International Security program in 

assisting countries with export controls and nuclear safeguards, which 

had not been used in prior years to assess program performance.

• Some program performance measures used by NNSA in earlier years 

were consolidated into new performance measures, while some single 

measures were divided into several new measures. For example, in 

Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 76 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

fiscal year 2006, the Nonproliferation and International Security 

program maintained three separate measures to track performance in 

U.S. monitoring of Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU) 

downblending. In fiscal year 2007, these three measures were 

consolidated into a single measure—the cumulative metric tons of 

Russian weapons-usable HEU that U.S. experts have confirmed as 

permanently eliminated from the Russian stockpile under the HEU 

Purchase Agreement.1

• The descriptions of some program measures also changed over this 

time, which resulted in program progress being measured in new or 

different ways. For example, the GTRI program changed its measure 

from tracking the cumulative number of HEU-fueled research and test 

reactors converted to low-enriched uranium (LEU) during fiscal years 

2006-2008, to the cumulative number of HEU reactors converted or 

shut down in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. In addition, the International 

Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation (INMPC) program 

stopped monitoring the cumulative percentage of weapon-usable 

material being secured after fiscal year 2006, switched to measuring 

the cumulative number of buildings with weapon-usable material 

secured in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, and then switched to 

evaluating the cumulative number of buildings containing weaponIn fiscal year 2010 this single measure was 

augmented with the addition of another—the annual number of 

special monitoring visits to Russian downblending facilities to confirm 

the elimination of Russian HEU under the agreement. In fiscal year 

2006, the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D program used a 

single measure—the annual number of advanced radiation and 

remote sensing technologies developed—to assess progress in the 

program’s proliferation detection mission. However, in subsequent 

years, this performance measure was divided into three separate 

measures to track detection technology development in three specific 

areas: detection of uranium-235 production, detection of plutonium 

production, and detection of special nuclear material movement.

 

1

In 1993, the United States and Russia signed a government-to-government agreement to 

downblend 500 metric tons of HEU from Russian nuclear warheads into LEU used to 

fabricate fuel for commercial nuclear power plants. Under the agreement, the HEU would 

be converted in Russia and purchased by the United States. The United States 

Enrichment Corporation serves as U.S. executive agent. NNSA implements transparency 

measures under the agreement to, among other things, monitor Russian HEU 

downblending.
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 77 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

usable material with completed MPC&A upgrades in fiscal years 2009 

and 2010.

NNSA officials told us they believed that the DNN performance measures 

should not be static and should be adjusted to reflect changes in 

circumstances, such as program reorganizations, and in response to 

external recommendations. For instance, NNSA officials told us that the 

Office of Nonproliferation and International Security undertook a review of 

its program performance measurements in 2009 at the request of the 

Office of Management of Budget (OMB). Based on the OMB 

recommendations the Nonproliferation and International Security program 

eliminated the performance measure for tracking the number of foreign 

nationals trained on nonproliferation issues, since that measure did not 

adequately capture the value of the training delivered.

Furthermore, after each fiscal year, in annual performance reports, the 

Department of Energy (DOE) assesses performance made by the DNN 

programs meeting annual targets under each measure. From fiscal year 

2006 through 2009, we found over 30 instances in which DNN program 

performance measures identified in the congressional budget request for 

a fiscal year were different from the measures assessed in the DOE 

annual performance reports for that fiscal year. In some cases, we 

determined that these differences were relatively minor and involved 

wording or terminology changes. In other instances, we found the 

differences were more significant. For instance, the fiscal year 2007 

budget request included two measures for the Global Threat Reduction 

Initiative’s (GTRI) recovery of nuclear materials in foreign locations: the 

cumulative kilograms of HEU fresh and/or spent fuel from Soviet-supplied 

research reactors repatriated to Russia, and the cumulative number of 

fuel assemblies containing U.S.-origin spent fuel returned from foreign 

research reactors. However, neither of these measures appears in the 

fiscal year 2007 performance report, and they were replaced with a new 

single measure: the cumulative kilograms of nuclear material (HEU and 

plutonium) removed or disposed.

In other cases, measures included in the budget requests for some 

programs were missing and not updated with a new measure in the 

performance reports. For example, in the fiscal year 2009 budget request, 

NNSA indicated that one of the Nonproliferation and International Security 

program performance measures for the year would be the cumulative 

number of displaced weapons experts in Russia and the former Soviet 

Union employed in Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) 

program grants or private sector jobs. However, the DOE performance 
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 78 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

report for fiscal year 2009 did not assess program performance against 

this measure at all. As a result, in some cases the measures NNSA 

identified to Congress for assessing DNN program performance during a 

fiscal year were not those against which actual progress was assessed at 

the end of the fiscal year.

NNSA officials stated that for any given fiscal year there can be 

differences between the performance measures presented in the budget 

requests to Congress and evaluated in the DOE end of fiscal year 

performance reports. However, these officials noted that performance 

measures identified in a budget request can be developed 9 months prior 

to the beginning of the fiscal year, with the final performance report 

issued several months after the end of the fiscal year, or a period of 24 

months which may pass from the time the performance measures are 

developed until performance is evaluated. NNSA officials noted that 

during this time, DNN programs can be reorganized, be reevaluated, or 

experience other changes that result in differences between the 

measures in the budget request and the final performance reports. 

However, the end of fiscal year performance reports we reviewed did not 

include explanations in those instances where the performance measures 

changed from the measures proposed in the budget requests.
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 79 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 9: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Performance Measures, from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010, As 

Presented in Annual Budget Requests

Fiscal Year 2006

Performance

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2007 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2008 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2009 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2010 

Performance 

Indicators

Global Threat Reduction Initiative

Cumulative number of targeted 

research/test reactors 

converted from highly enriched 

uranium (HEU) to low-enriched 

uranium (LEU) fuel

Cumulative number of 

targeted research/test 

reactors converted from 

HEU to LEU fuel

Cumulative HEU 

reactors converted

a

Cumulative HEU 

reactors converted or 

shutdown

a Cumulative number of 

HEU reactors converted 

or verified as shutdown 

prior to conversion

Cumulative kilograms of HEU 

fresh and/or spent fuel from 

Soviet-supplied research 

reactors repatriated to Russia

Cumulative kilograms of 

HEU fresh and/or spent 

fuel from Sovietsupplied research 

reactors repatriated to 

Russia

Cumulative kilograms of 

nuclear material (HEU 

and plutonium) 

removed or disposed

a

Cumulative kilograms of 

nuclear material (HEU 

and plutonium) 

removed or disposed

Cumulative number of 

kilograms of vulnerable 

nuclear material (HEU 

and plutonium) removed 

or disposed

a

Cumulative number of fuel 

assemblies containing U.S.-

origin spent fuel returned from 

foreign research reactors

Cumulative number of 

fuel assemblies 

containing U.S.-origin 

spent fuel returned from 

foreign research 

reactors

Cumulative number of U.S. 

excess sealed sources 

recovered

a

Cumulative number of 

U.S. excess sealed 

sources recovered

Cumulative radiological 

sources removed or 

disposed a

Cumulative U.S. 

radiological sources 

removed or disposed

Cumulative number of 

excess domestic 

radiological sources 

removed or disposed

Cumulative number of high 

priority sites with vulnerable 

radiological material secured

Cumulative number of 

high priority sites with 

vulnerable radiological 

material secured

Cumulative high priority 

radiological sites 

protected a

Cumulative high priority 

international 

radiological sites 

protected

Cumulative number of 

buildings with high 

priority nuclear and 

radiological materials 

secured

a

Not applicable Not applicable Cumulative funds to 

support threat reduction 

work contracted directly 

with the private sector

b Cumulative funds to 

support threat reduction 

work contracted directly 

with the private sector

Not applicable

a
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 80 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Fiscal Year 2006

Performance

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2007 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2008 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2009 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2010 

Performance 

Indicators

Nonproliferation and Verification R&D

Annual number of advanced 

radiation and remote sensing 

technologies developed and 

evaluated through customized 

tests that challenge and 

characterize their operating 

parameters. These advanced 

technologies are intended to 

improve U.S. capability to detect 

the early stages of nuclear 

weapon programs

Cumulative percentage 

of progress toward 

demonstrating the next 

generation of 

technologies and 

methods to detect 

uranium-235 

enrichment activities. 

(Progress is measured 

against the baseline 

criteria and milestones 

published in the “FY 

2006 R&D 

Requirements 

Document”)

a

Cumulative percentage 

of progress toward 

demonstrating the next 

generation of 

technologies and 

methods to detect 

uranium-235 enrichment 

activities. (Progress is 

measured against the 

baseline criteria and 

milestones published in 

the “FY 2006 R&D 

Requirements 

Document”)

Cumulative percentage 

of progress toward 

demonstrating the next 

generation of 

technologies and 

methods to detect 

uranium-235 production 

activities. (Progress is 

measured against the 

baseline criteria and 

milestones published in 

the “FY 2006 R&D 

Requirements 

Document”)

Cumulative percentage 

of progress toward 

demonstrating the next 

generation of 

technologies and 

methods to detect 

uranium-235 production 

activities. (Progress is 

measured against the 

baseline criteria and 

milestones published in 

the “FY 2006 R&D 

Requirements 

Document”)

Cumulative percentage 

of progress toward 

demonstrating the next 

generation of 

technologies and 

methods to detect 

plutonium reprocessing 

activities. (Progress is 

measured against the 

baseline criteria and 

milestones published 

in the “FY 2006 R&D 

Requirements 

Document”)

Cumulative percentage 

of progress toward 

demonstrating the next 

generation of 

technologies and 

methods to detect 

plutonium reprocessing 

activities. (Progress is 

measured against the 

baseline criteria and 

milestones published in 

the “FY 2006 R&D 

Requirements 

Document”)

Cumulative percentage 

of progress toward 

demonstrating the next 

generation of 

technologies and 

methods to detect 

plutonium production 

activities. (Progress is 

measured against the 

baseline criteria and 

milestones published in 

the “FY 2006 R&D 

Requirements 

Document”)

Cumulative percentage 

of progress toward 

demonstrating the next 

generation of 

technologies and 

methods to detect 

plutonium production 

activities. (Progress is 

measured against the 

baseline criteria and 

milestones published in 

the “FY 2006 R&D 

Requirements 

Document”)

Cumulative percentage 

of progress toward 

demonstrating the next 

generation of 

technologies and 

methods to detect 

special nuclear 

material movement. 

(Progress is measured 

against the baseline 

criteria and milestones 

published in the “FY 

2006 R&D 

Requirements 

Document”)

Cumulative percentage 

of progress toward 

demonstrating the next 

generation of 

technologies and 

methods to detect 

special nuclear material 

movement. (Progress is 

measured against the 

baseline criteria and 

milestones published in 

the “FY 2006 R&D 

Requirements 

Document”)

Cumulative percentage 

of progress toward 

demonstrating the next 

generation of 

technologies and 

methods to detect 

special nuclear material 

movement. (Progress is 

measured against the 

baseline criteria and 

milestones published in 

the “FY 2006 R&D 

Requirements 

Document”)

Cumulative percentage 

of progress toward 

demonstrating the next 

generation of 

technologies and 

methods to detect 

special nuclear material 

movement. (Progress is 

measured against the 

baseline criteria and 

milestones published in 

the “FY 2006 R&D 

Requirements 

Document”)
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 81 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Fiscal Year 2006

Performance

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2007 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2008 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2009 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2010 

Performance 

Indicators

Annual number of advanced 

technologies and operational 

systems (e.g. satellite payloads 

and seismic stations calibration 

data sets) delivered to U.S. 

national security users which 

improves the accuracy and 

sensitivity of nuclear weapons 

test monitoring

Annual index that 

summarizes the status 

of all NNSA nuclear 

explosion monitoring 

R&D deliveries that 

improve the nation’s 

ability to detect nuclear 

explosions a

Annual index that 

summarizes the status 

of all NNSA nuclear 

explosion monitoring 

R&D deliveries that 

improve the nation’s 

ability to detect nuclear 

explosions

Annual index that 

summarizes the status 

of all NNSA detonation 

detection R&D 

deliveries that improve 

the nation’s ability to 

detect nuclear 

detonations

Annual index that 

summarizes the status 

of all NNSA detonation 

detection R&D 

deliveries that improve 

the nation’s ability to 

detect nuclear 

detonations

Percentage of research projects 

for which an independent R&D 

merit assessment was 

completed during the second 

year of effort and again within 

each subsequent three year 

period to assess scientific 

quality and mission relevance

Cumulative percentage 

of active research 

projects for which an 

independent R&D peer 

assessment of the 

project’s scientific 

quality and mission 

relevance has been 

completed during the 

second year of effort 

(and again within each 

subsequent three year 

period for those 

projects found to be of 

merit) 

Cumulative percentage 

of active research 

projects for which an 

independent R&D peer 

assessment of the 

project’s scientific 

quality and mission 

relevance has been 

completed during the 

second year of effort 

(and again within each 

subsequent three year 

period for those projects 

found to be of merit)

Cumulative percentage 

of active research 

projects for which an 

independent R&D merit 

review of the project’s 

scientific quality and 

mission relevance has 

been completed during 

the second year of effort 

(and again within each 

subsequent three year 

period for those projects 

found to be of merit)

Cumulative percentage 

of active research 

projects for which an 

independent R&D merit 

review of the project’s 

scientific quality and 

mission relevance has 

been completed during 

the second year of 

effort (and again within 

each subsequent three 

year period for those 

projects found to be of 

merit) 

Annual number of professional 

papers/exchanges presented, 

each representing science and 

technology knowledge and U.S. 

leadership in program areas

Annual number of 

articles published in 

peer reviewed 

professional 

journals/forums 

representing 

leadership in 

advancing science and 

technology knowledge

Annual number of 

articles published in 

peer reviewed 

professional 

journals/forums 

representing leadership 

in advancing science 

and technology 

knowledge

Annual number of 

articles published in 

merit reviewed 

professional 

journals/forums 

representing leadership 

in advancing science 

and technology 

knowledge

Annual number of 

articles published in 

merit reviewed 

professional journals/ 

forums representing 

leadership in advancing 

science and technology 

knowledge
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 82 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Fiscal Year 2006

Performance

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2007 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2008 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2009 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2010 

Performance 

Indicators

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production

Cumulative percentage of 

progress towards refurbishing a 

fossil plant in Seversk facilitating 

shut down of two weaponsgrade plutonium production 

reactors

Cumulative percentage 

of progress towards 

refurbishing a fossil 

plant in Seversk 

shutting down two 

weapons-grade 

plutonium production 

reactors

Cumulative percentage 

of progress towards 

refurbishing a fossil 

plant in Seversk 

shutting down two 

weapons-grade 

plutonium production 

reactors

Cumulative percentage 

of progress towards 

refurbishing a fossil 

plant in Seversk 

facilitating the shutdown of two weaponsgrade plutonium 

production reactors

Not applicable

Cumulative percentage of 

progress towards constructing a 

fossil plant in Zheleznogorsk 

facilitating shut down of one 

weapons-grade plutonium 

production reactor

Cumulative percentage 

of progress towards 

constructing a fossil 

plant in Zheleznogorsk 

shutting down one 

weapons-grade 

plutonium production 

reactor

Cumulative percentage 

of progress towards 

constructing a fossil 

plant in Zheleznogorsk 

shutting down one 

weapons-grade 

plutonium production 

reactor

Cumulative percentage 

of progress towards 

constructing a fossil 

plant in Zheleznogorsk 

facilitating the shutdown 

of one weapons-grade 

plutonium production 

reactor

Cumulative percentage 

of progress towards 

constructing a fossil 

plant in Zheleznogorsk 

facilitating the shut 

down of one weaponsgrade plutonium 

production reactor

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Annual percentage of 

Russian weapons-grade 

plutonium production 

capability eliminated 

from its 2003 baseline 

of 1.2 metric tons (MT) 

per year (0.4 MT per 

reactor)

Annual percentage of 

Russian weaponsgrade plutonium 

production capability 

eliminated from its 2003 

baseline of 1.2 MT per 

year (0.4 MT per 

reactor per year)

Cumulative actual costs per 

budgeted cost of work 

performed at Seversk

Annual costs 

performance index for 

Seversk construction 

as measured by the 

ratio of budgeted costs 

of work performed to 

actual costs of work 

performed

Annual costs 

performance index for 

Seversk construction as 

measured by the ratio of 

budgeted costs of work 

performed to actual 

costs of work performed

Not applicable Not applicable

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Annual costs 

performance index for 

Zheleznogorsk 

construction as 

measured by the ratio 

of budgeted costs of 

work performed to 

actual costs of work 

performed

c
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 83 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Fiscal Year 2006

Performance

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2007 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2008 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2009 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2010 

Performance 

Indicators

Nonproliferation and International Security

Annual average cost per review 

of nuclear, chemical, and 

biological export license

applications

Not applicable

a

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Cumulative number of 

international and domestic 

experts trained in nuclear 

nonproliferation since 9/11 (e.g., 

IAEA inspectors, export control 

officers, etc.)

Annual number of 

international and 

domestic experts (e.g., 

IAEA inspectors, 

export control officers, 

physical protection 

personnel) trained in 

nonproliferation to fulfill 

the President’s policy 

delineated on February 

11, 2004 and 

implement the U.S.-

sponsored UN Security 

Council Resolution 

1540 criminalizing 

proliferation

a

Annual number of 

international and 

domestic experts (e.g., 

IAEA inspectors, export 

control officers, physical 

protection personnel) 

trained in 

nonproliferation to fulfill 

the President’s policy 

delineated on February 

11, 2004 and implement 

the U.S.-sponsored UN 

Security Council 

Resolution 1540 

criminalizing 

proliferation

Annual number of 

international and 

domestic experts (e.g., 

IAEA inspectors, export 

control officers, physical 

protection personnel) 

trained in 

nonproliferation to fulfill 

the President’s policy 

delineated on February 

11, 2004 and implement 

the U.S.-sponsored UN 

Security Council 

Resolution 1540 

criminalizing 

proliferation

Not applicable

a

Cumulative percentage of 

progress towards redirecting 

former Libyan WMD scientists 

and instituting conformance with 

Libya’s international 

nonproliferation obligations

Not applicable

a

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Cumulative percentage of 

progress in development of the 

next-generation Attribute 

Measurement System to 

determine the mass and 

isotopics of a nuclear warhead, 

warhead component or fissile 

material without revealing 

classified information

Not applicable

a

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 84 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Fiscal Year 2006

Performance

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2007 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2008 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2009 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2010 

Performance 

Indicators

Annual percentage of operation 

of the Blend-Down Monitoring 

Systems during the HEU blenddown process

Cumulative metric tons 

of Russian weaponsusable HEU that U.S. 

experts have 

confirmed as 

permanently eliminated 

from the Russian 

stockpile under the 

HEU Purchase 

Agreement

a

Cumulative metric tons 

of Russian weaponsusable HEU that U.S. 

experts have confirmed 

as permanently 

eliminated from the 

Russian stockpile under 

the HEU Purchase 

Agreement

Cumulative metric tons 

of Russian weaponsusable HEU that U.S. 

experts have confirmed 

as permanently 

eliminated from the 

Russian stockpile under 

the HEU Purchase 

Agreement

Cumulative metric tons 

of Russian weaponsusable HEU that U.S. 

experts have confirmed 

as permanently 

eliminated from the 

Russian stockpile under 

the HEU Purchase 

Agreement

Percentage of the year that the 

on-site Transparency Monitoring 

Office is staffed at the Ural 

Electrochemical Integrated 

Plant

Annual percentage completed of 

the 24 annually allowed special 

monitoring visits to the four 

Russian HEU-to-LEU 

processing facilities to monitor 

conversion of 30 MT per year of 

HEU to LEU

a

Not applicable

a

Annual number of 

special monitoring visits 

completed to the four 

Russian processing 

facilities that downblend 

HEU to LEU to monitor 

and confirm the 

permanent elimination 

of 30 MT of Russian 

HEU from the Russian 

weapons stockpile 

under the HEU 

Purchase Agreement

d

Annual number of former Soviet 

weapons scientists, engineers, 

and technicians engaged

Cumulative number of 

the Global Initiatives 

for Proliferation 

Prevention (GIPP) 

program target 

population of displaced 

Russian and FSU 

WMD experts who are 

currently employed in 

GIPP grants or longterm private sector 

jobs (and cumulative 

number who are 

employed in long-term 

private sector jobs 

resulting from GIPP 

grants)

a

Cumulative number of 

the GIPP target 

population of displaced 

Russian and FSU WMD 

experts who are 

currently employed in 

GIPP grants or longterm private sector jobs 

(and cumulative number 

who are employed in 

long-term private sector 

jobs resulting from GIPP 

grants)

Cumulative number of 

the GIPP target 

population of displaced 

Russian and FSU WMD 

experts who are 

currently employed in 

GIPP grants or longterm private sector jobs 

(and cumulative number 

who are employed in 

long-term private sector 

jobs resulting from GIPP 

grants)

Not applicable

a

Cumulative number of 

technologies commercialized or 

businesses created/expanded

Annual percentage of non-U.S. 

government (USG) project 

funding contributions obtained

a

Cumulative percentage 

of non-USG (private 

sector and foreign 

government) project 

funding contributions 

obtained relative to 

cumulative USG GIPP 

funding contributions

a

Cumulative percentage 

of non-USG (private 

sector and foreign 

government) project 

funding contributions 

obtained relative to 

cumulative USG GIPP 

funding contributions

Cumulative percentage 

of non-USG (private 

sector and foreign 

government) project 

funding contributions 

obtained relative to 

cumulative USG GIPP 

funding contributions

Cumulative percentage 

of non-USG (private 

sector and foreign 

government) project 

funding contributions 

obtained relative to 

cumulative USG GIPP 

funding contributions
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 85 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Fiscal Year 2006

Performance

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2007 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2008 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2009 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2010 

Performance 

Indicators

Not applicable Annual number of 

technologies 

transferred to 

international regimes 

and other countries to 

prevent and counter 

WMD proliferation and 

nuclear-related 

terrorism 

e Annual number of 

technologies transferred 

to international regimes 

and other countries to 

prevent and counter 

WMD proliferation and 

nuclear-related 

terrorism 

Annual number of 

technologies transferred 

to international regimes 

and other countries to 

prevent and counter 

WMD proliferation and 

nuclear-related 

terrorism

Not applicable

a

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Cumulative number of 

countries where 

International 

Nonproliferation Export 

Control Program is 

engaged that have

export control systems 

that meet critical 

requirements

f

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Annual number of 

safeguards systems 

deployed and used in 

international regimes 

and other countries that 

address an identified 

safeguards deficiency

g

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation

Cumulative number of Russian 

Navy warhead sites secured

Cumulative number of 

warhead sites with 

completed MPC&A 

upgrades

a Cumulative number of 

warhead sites with 

completed MPC&A 

upgrades 

Cumulative number of 

warhead sites with 

completed MPC&A 

upgrades

Not applicable

Cumulative number of Russian 

Strategic Rocket Forces and 

12th Main Directorate sites 

secured

Cumulative percentage of 600 

MTs of weapons-usable nuclear 

material secured

a

Cumulative number of 

buildings with 

weapons-usable 

material secured

a

Cumulative number of 

buildings with weaponsusable material 

secured

Cumulative number of 

buildings containing 

weapons-usable 

material with completed 

MPC&A upgrades

a

Cumulative number of 

buildings containing 

weapons-usable 

material with completed 

MPC&A upgrades

Cumulative cost in millions of 

dollars per metric ton to 

complete rapid security 

upgrades on Russian weapons 

usable nuclear material

Cumulative cost in 

millions of dollars per 

metric ton to complete 

rapid security 

upgrades on Russian 

weapons usable 

nuclear material

Not applicable

a

Not applicable Not applicable
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 86 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Fiscal Year 2006

Performance

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2007 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2008 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2009 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2010 

Performance 

Indicators

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Cumulative number of 

MPC&A regulations in 

the development phase 

for the Russian 

Federation and FSU 

countries

Cumulative number of 

MPC&A regulations in 

the development phase 

for Russia and other 

FSU countries

Cumulative metric tons of HEU 

converted to LEU

Cumulative metric tons 

of HEU converted to 

LEU 

Cumulative metric tons 

of HEU converted to 

LEU 

Cumulative metric tons 

of HEU converted to 

LEU 

Cumulative metric tons 

of HEU converted to 

LEU 

Cumulative number of Second 

Line of Defense (SLD) sites with 

nuclear detection equipment 

installed and cumulative number 

of megaports completed

Cumulative number of 

SLD sites with nuclear 

detection equipment 

installed and 

cumulative number of 

megaports completed

Cumulative number of 

SLD sites with nuclear 

detection equipment 

installed and cumulative 

number of megaports 

completed

Cumulative number of 

SLD sites with nuclear 

detection equipment 

installed and cumulative 

number of megaports 

completed

Cumulative number of 

SLD sites with nuclear 

detection equipment 

installed and 

cumulative number of 

megaports completed

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Cumulative number of 

megaports with host 

country cost-sharing, 

resulting in decreased 

cost to the US program, 

with estimated cost 

sharing value

h Cumulative number of 

megaports with host 

country cost-sharing, 

resulting in decreased 

cost to the US program, 

with estimated cost 

sharing value

Fissile Materials Disposition

Cumulative percentage of the 

design, construction, and startup activities completed for the 

Pit Disassembly and Conversion 

Facility (PDCF)

Cumulative percentage 

of the design,

construction, and cold 

start-up activities 

completed for PDCF

Cumulative percentage 

of the design, 

construction, and cold 

start-up activities 

completed for PDCF

Cumulative percentage 

of the design, 

construction, and cold 

start-up activities 

completed for PDCF

Not applicable

a

Cumulative percentage of the 

design, construction, and startup activities completed for the 

Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel 

Fabrication Facility

Cumulative percentage 

of the facility and 

equipment design, 

construction, and cold 

start-up activities 

completed for the MOX 

Fuel Fabrication 

Facility

Cumulative percentage 

of the design, 

construction, and cold 

start-up activities 

completed for the MOX 

Fuel Fabrication Facility

Cumulative percentage 

of the design, 

construction, and cold 

start-up activities 

completed for the MOX 

Fuel Fabrication Facility

Cumulative percentage 

of the design, 

construction, and cold 

start-up activities 

completed for the MOX 

Fuel Fabrication Facility

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Cumulative percentage 

of the design, 

construction, and cold 

start-up activities 

completed for the Waste 

Solidification Building

Cumulative percentage 

of the design, 

construction, and cold 

start-up activities 

completed for the 

Waste Solidification 

Building
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 87 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Fiscal Year 2006

Performance

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2007 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2008 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2009 

Performance 

Indicators

Fiscal Year 2010 

Performance 

Indicators

Cumulative percentage of 

design, construction, and 

startup activities completed for 

the Russian MOX fuel 

fabrication facility

Cumulative percentage 

of design, construction, 

and cold start-up 

activities completed for 

the Russian MOX fuel 

fabrication facility

a

Not applicable

a

Not applicable Not applicable

Cumulative amount of surplus 

U.S. HEU downblended or 

shipped for downblending

Cumulative amount of 

surplus U.S. HEU 

down-blended or 

shipped for 

downblending

Cumulative amount of 

surplus U.S. HEU downblended or shipped for 

downblending

Cumulative amount of 

surplus U.S. HEU downblended or shipped for 

downblending

Cumulative amount of 

surplus U.S. HEU 

down-blended or 

shipped for 

downblending

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.

a

In these 32 cases, the performance measures used to evaluate progress in the Department of 

Energy (DOE) Annual Performance Report for that fiscal year were different from the performance 

measures presented by NNSA in its budget justification to Congress for those programs and that 

fiscal year.

b

In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2007 included a performance measure to 

assess the Global Threat Reduction Initiative’s cumulative funds contracted directly with the private 

sector, though no such metric was presented for the program in NNSA’s FY 2007 budget request to 

Congress.

c

In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2009 included a performance measure to 

assess the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production program’s annual costs performance 

index for Zheleznogorsk construction as measured by the ratio of budgeted costs of work performed 

to actual costs of work performed, though no such metric was presented for the program in NNSA’s 

FY 2009 budget request to Congress.

d

In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2009 included a performance measure to 

assess the Nonproliferation and International Security program’s annual number of special monitoring 

visits completed to the four Russian processing facilities that downblend HEU to LEU to monitor and 

confirm the permanent elimination of 30 metric tons of Russian HEU from the Russian weapons 

stockpile under the HEU Purchase Agreement, though no such metric was presented for the program 

in NNSA’s FY 2009 budget request to Congress.

e

In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2006 included a performance measure to 

assess the Nonproliferation and International Security program’s annual number of technologies 

transferred to international regimes and other countries to prevent and counter WMD proliferation and 

nuclear-related terrorism, though no such metric was presented for the program in NNSA’s FY 2006 

budget request to Congress.

f

In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2009 included a performance measure to 

assess the Nonproliferation and International Security program’s cumulative number of countries 

where International Nonproliferation Export Control Program is engaged that have export control 

systems that meet critical requirements, though no such metric was presented for the program in 

NNSA’s FY 2009 budget request to Congress.
Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010

Page 88 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

g

In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2009 included a performance measure to 

assess the Nonproliferation and International Security program’s annual number of safeguards 

systems deployed and used in international regimes and other countries that address an identified 

safeguards deficiency, though no such metric was presented for the program in NNSA’s FY 2009 

budget request to Congress.

h

In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2008 included a performance measure to 

assess the International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation program’s cumulative number 

of Megaports with host country cost-sharing, with estimated cost sharing value, though no such 

metric was presented for the program in NNSA’s FY 2008 budget request to Congress.
Appendix VIII: U.S. Programs Contributing to 

Overseas Nuclear Smuggling Prevention and 

Detection

Page 89 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

National Nuclear Security Administration

Office of Nonproliferation 

Research and Development

Office of Proliferation Detection This program supports long-term R&D of nuclear material 

detection technologies, including detecting shielded highly 

enriched uranium (HEU) and weapon-grade plutonium. 

Office of Nonproliferation and 

International Security 

International Nonproliferation 

Export Control Program (INECP) 

Helps build and maintain foreign export control systems through 

long term partnerships with counterpart technical experts and 

agencies to strengthen export control licensing procedures and 

practices, promote industry compliance with national export 

control norms and strengthen enforcement capabilities. 

INECP’s export control work began in 1995 in Kazakhstan, 

Russia, and Ukraine and has expanded to adjacent countries 

and to Southeast Asia.

Cooperative Border Security 

Program (CBSP)

Created in 2007, CBSP works to strengthen the capacity of its 

foreign partners to monitor and improve the security of volatile 

borders through technical exchanges and border security 

workshops, as well as other measures designed to help 

facilitate holistic approaches to addressing border security 

challenges. CBSP works in Latin America, the Mediterranean 

region, Transahara Africa, Iraq, and Southeast Asia, among 

other places.

Interdiction-Enforcement Program Through an Interdiction Technical Analysis Group, which draws 

on technical expertise from Department of Energy national 

laboratories, this program supports technical assessments of 

potential nuclear smuggling or trafficking cases, provides 

technical support to interagency meetings on nuclear 

interdiction, and provides training on nuclear commodities and 

technologies related to customs enforcement and border 

security.

Office of International Material 

Protection and Cooperation

Second Line of Defense (SLD) 

Core Program

Initiated in 1998, the SLD Core Program installs radiation 

detection equipment at international land borders, airports, and 

strategic feeder seaports in the former Soviet Union, Turkey, 

Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

SLD Megaports Initiative Established in 2003, the Megaports Initiative provides radiation 

detection systems at key international seaports to screen cargo 

containers for nuclear and other radioactive materials 

regardless of the container destination.

Department of Defense

Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency

International Counterproliferation 

(ICP) Program

The ICP program prevents the spread of weapons of mass 

destruction, components, and related materials through borders 

and across territories of participating nations in the former 

Soviet Union, Baltic region and Eastern Europe, through 

training courses and equipment deliveries targeted at foreign 

government law enforcement, border security, and firstresponder personnel.

Appendix VIII: U.S. Programs Contributing to 

Overseas Nuclear Smuggling Prevention and 

Detection
Appendix VIII: U.S. Programs Contributing to 

Overseas Nuclear Smuggling Prevention and 

Detection

Page 90 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Regional Combating WMD 

Program (RCP)

The RCP program develops regional networks—primarily 

among countries in the Black Sea and Southern Caucasus

regions—in which countries work collaboratively to build and 

sustain long-term defenses against WMD on a regional basis, 

including interdiction of WMD trafficking. Program activities 

have focused on information exchange through workshops on 

topics related to counter-trafficking.

Cooperative Threat Reduction 

program

WMD Proliferation Prevention 

Program (WMD-PPP) 

WMD-PPP assists non-Russia former Soviet Union states, and 

others as determined by the Secretary of Defense in 

coordination with the Secretary of State, in building capabilities 

to stem the potential proliferation of WMD. The program works 

with foreign border guards and customs officers to detect and 

interdict possible WMD trafficking by enhancing land and 

maritime borders through provision of equipment and training. 

Department of State

Bureau of International Security 

and Nonproliferation

Export Control and Related Border 

Security (EXBS) Program

The EXBS program assists development of capabilities in 

foreign countries to detect, deter, and interdict illicit nuclear 

trafficking, and prevent the authorization of transfers of such 

items to end-uses and end-users of proliferation concern. EXBS 

assistance includes placement of in-country advisors and 

provision of specialized training and equipment.

Nuclear Smuggling Outreach 

Initiative (NSOI)

Started in 2004, NSOI works with other countries to identify 

gaps in their capabilities to prevent, detect and respond 

effectively to nuclear smuggling incidents, addresses those 

gaps by negotiating a joint action plan to improve anti-nuclear 

smuggling capabilities, and identifies assistance projects for 

implementing the joint action plan.

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling 

Program (PNSP)

PNSP was started in 2007 to help address funding gaps for 

programs involved in preventing nuclear smuggling overseas, 

including funding projects developed by NSOI where no donor 

can be found, or to serve as a source of funding to attract and 

leverage foreign government donations.

Nuclear Trafficking Response 

Group (NTRG)

The NTRG, chaired by State, was established in 1995 to 

coordinate U.S. government interdiction and other responses to 

incidents of illicit nuclear and radiological smuggling overseas. 

The NTRG focuses on nuclear material smuggling and 

trafficking cases at the “non-state actor” level, and works to 

prosecute nuclear smugglers overseas and develop information 

on nuclear smuggling-related threats.

Office of Counterproliferation 

Initiatives (CPI)

Among other things, CPI supports efforts to prevent nuclear 

smuggling overseas through its chairmanship of the interagency 

Nuclear Interdiction Action Group (NIAG), whose primary 

purpose is to interdict shipments or potential shipments of 

nuclear-related equipment, materials, and technology of 

proliferation concern. The NIAG focuses primarily on incidents 

at the state level involving transfers or potential transfers of 

nuclear and dual-use items of concern from both US and 

foreign markets.
Appendix VIII: U.S. Programs Contributing to 

Overseas Nuclear Smuggling Prevention and 

Detection

Page 91 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Nonproliferation and Disarmament 

Fund (NDF)

Started in 1994, NDF provides a source of contingency funding 

for the U.S. government to respond rapidly, on an ad hoc basis, 

to nonproliferation and disarmament opportunities, 

circumstances, or conditions that are unanticipated or unusually 

difficult, but of high priority. While NDF does not maintain a 

program focused on counter smuggling, in the past, NDF 

support has enabled the acquisition and deployment of radiation 

detection equipment in Eastern and Central Europe and the 

former Soviet Union, as well as the purchase of radiation 

detectors for the Russian Customs Service in support of 

NNSA’s SLD program, and represents a potential source of 

future support of unanticipated, short notice initiatives focused 

on the nuclear smuggling threat.

Department of Homeland Security

Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) 

Container Security Initiative (CSI) Initiated in 2002, CSI involves identifying high risk maritime 

cargo containers at foreign seaports and requesting that foreign 

authorities examine the containers in coordination with CBP 

before they are loaded on vessels destined for the United 

States. CSI efforts are under way at 58 foreign ports.

Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) Initiated in 2006, SFI was created in response to legislative 

mandate that, by 2012 or earlier, 100 percent of maritime cargo 

bound for the United States be scanned at the foreign seaport. 

SFI includes an integrated scanning system, consisting of 

radiation detection equipment and non-intrusive inspection 

imaging systems. CBP also requires importers to provide CBP 

with additional data, or a “Security Filing” prior to loading the 

maritime cargo on vessels bound for the United States to 

assess and identify high-risk U.S.-bound maritime cargo. SFI 

pilots have been completed at ports in Hong Kong, South 

Korea, the United Kingdom, and Honduras, with SFI operations 

continuing at the port in Qasim, Pakistan. 

Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office (DNDO)

Global Nuclear Detection 

Architecture (GNDA) and related 

programs and activities

DNDO is responsible for coordinating the development of the 

GNDA—which DNDO describes as a worldwide network of 

sensors, telecommunications, and personnel, with supporting 

information exchanges, programs, and protocol, to detect, 

analyze, and report on nuclear and radiological materials 

outside of regulatory control. In addition, DNDO supports 

bilateral engagements with international partners to exchange 

best practices and collaborate on research and development 

and testing and evaluation programs. DNDO also leads and 

participates in multilateral initiatives to develop international 

guidance on nuclear detection architectures. Furthermore, 

DNDO supports geographic and transnational studies 

assessing gaps and vulnerabilities in nuclear detection 

architectures and identifying potential solutions.
Appendix VIII: U.S. Programs Contributing to 

Overseas Nuclear Smuggling Prevention and 

Detection

Page 92 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) 

WMD-Directorate FBI conducts extensive outreach and liaison internationally on 

incidents that may involve illicit nuclear trafficking. This includes

maintaining a legal attaché program which enables FBI to assist 

investigation and prosecution of nuclear smuggling crimes 

overseas. At the request of foreign governments, and by 

working with other U.S. government programs, FBI also 

provides training to foreign law enforcement organizations on 

nuclear smuggling detection, response, investigation and 

prosecution issues.

Criminal Division Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 

Development, Assistance, and 

Training (OPDAT)

OPDAT works to strengthen foreign criminal justice institutions 

in combating terrorism and transnational crimes including WMD 

trafficking, by providing legal, enforcement, and prosecutionrelated assistance that helps foreign governments prosecute 

such cases. Activities include encouraging legislative and 

justice sector reform in countries with laws deemed inadequate 

and improving the skills of foreign prosecutors, investigators, 

and judges.

International Criminal Investigative 

Training and Assistance Program 

(ICITAP) 

ICITAP provides assistance to help foreign governments 

develop professional and transparent law enforcement 

institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and 

reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism, including 

potential WMD smuggling. ICITAP’s activities include working to 

enhance foreign investigative, enforcement, and response 

functions through technical assistance and training to foreign 

law enforcement agencies through full-time programs staffed in 

overseas field offices, and intermittent deployments of technical 

advisors and trainers. 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA, DOD, State, DHS, and Justice information.
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 93 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix IX: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 94 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 95 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix X: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 96 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix X: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration
Appendix X: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 97 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix X: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 98 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix X: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 99 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix: XI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 100 GAO-12-71 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Glen Levis (Assistant Director), 

Bridget Grimes, William Hoehn, William King, and Kevin Remondini made 

key contributions to this report. Other technical assistance was provided 

by Allison Bawden, Antoinette Capaccio, Rebecca Shea, Ben Shouse, 

and Kiki Theodoropoulos.

Appendix: XI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(361258)
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