J-A29034-14

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Cou rt. NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee

v. ARTHUR HILLIKER, Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 339 WDA 2014 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered Januar y 31, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County , Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0001290-2012 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., ALLEN and STRASSBURG ER,* JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED DECEMBER 9, 2014 This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence ente red after the trial court convicted Appellant of driving under the infl uence (DUI) of alcohol or controlled substance - general impairment (2 nd offense) and DUI - high rate of alcohol (2 nd offense). 1 We affirm. On February 7, 2012, Appellant was arrested and ch arged with obedience to traffic control devices, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a), 2 as well as the

1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a) and 3802(b), respectively.

2 Subsection 3111(a) provides, Unless otherwise directed by a uniformed police off icer or any appropriately attired person authorized to direct, control or regulate traffic, the driver of any vehicle shall o bey the instructions of any applicable official traffic-con trol device placed or held in accordance with the provisions of this t itle, subject to the privileges granted the driver of an emergency v ehicle in this title.J-A29034-14

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aforementioned DUI offenses. Appellant filed a mot ion to suppress. After holding a hearing on the motion, the trial court de nied it. At Appellant’s non-jury trial, he and the Commonwea lth agreed to a stipulation of facts. The stipulation of facts est ablished that, after Patrolman Mark Hamilton pulled over Appellant’s vehicle on Fe bruary 7, 2012, Appellant failed a series of field sobriety tests. The stipulation of facts further established that Appellant subsequently had his blood drawn and that

his blood alcohol content was .155%. The Commonwea lth dismissed the obedience-to-traffic-control-devices charge, and th e trial court found Appellant guilty of the DUI offenses. After he was sentenced, Appellant timely filed a no tice of appeal. The trial court directed Appellant to comply with Pa.R. A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant then filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In his brief to this Court, Appellant asks us to consider one question, namely, “Whether the stop, search and seizure of Appellant and his vehic le based upon the officer’s

incorrect and mistaken belief that the road on whic h [Appellant] was traveling was one way violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States[’] Constitution and/or Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?” Appellant’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a). The Legislature has defined “official traffic-control devices” as “[s]igns, signals, markings and devices not inconsistent with this title placed or erected by authority of a public bo dy or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warnin g or guiding traffic.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 102.J-A29034-14

- 3 - In a case such as this where the trial court denied a suppression motion, [an appellate court’s] standard of review is well-established. We may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence an d so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the reco rd as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findi ngs of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and ma y reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefr om are in error. An appellate court, of course, is not bo und by the suppression court's conclusions of law. Commonwealth v. Gary , 91 A.3d 102, 106 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). The trial court’s opinion, which we quote verbatim , summarizes the testimony received at the suppression hearing as fo llows.

At approximately 9:22 p.m. on February 7, 2012, Off icer Mark Hamilton with the North Huntingdon Township Po lice Department testified that he observed a Ford Windst ar traveling eastbound on the right travel lane on Route 30 wher e the vehicle braked suddenly, made a wide turn and turned down o nto an one-lane Route 30 eastbound on-ramp from Norwin Tow ne Square. He indicated that at the Norwin Towne Squa re there is an entrance and exit ramp to this Square with a “Do Not Enter” sign facing westbound traffic.

Officer Hamilton further testified that after makin g the turn onto the on-ramp versus the off-ramp, the vehicle p roceeded to the Norwin Towne [S]quare McDonald’s drive-thru lan e. The Officer pulled up next to the [Appellant and] advis ed him to pull over upon receipt of his food. He testified that h e initiated the stop due to the belief that the [Appellant] came do wn the wrong way on a one-way road in violation of Obedience to Traffic Control Devices, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 31 11(a). Officer Hamilton indicated that [Appellant] did not commit any other Motor Vehicle violations besides failing to obey the “Do Not Enter” sign by coming down the on-ramp. He fur ther indicated that he believed the property in the Norw in Towne Square to be a privately owned parcel; however, [he ] was unaware if the roadways had been adopted or accepte d by theJ-A29034-14

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Township of North Huntingdon. He testified that he had no idea whether the township or the Towne Square placed the “Do Not Enter” sign. Mr. Ryan Fonzi, the Associate Planning Director of the Planning and Zoning Department, testified that the two ramps were not maintained by the township, nor were they accepted by ordinance. He further indicated that he did not kn ow who placed the sign, but assumed the sign belonged to PennDOT. Mr. Fonzi further stated that he did not know if the Commonwe alth of Pennsylvania, PennDOT, had designated these two roa ds as ingresses and egresses. Trial Court Opinion, 4/14/2014, at 2-3 (citations o mitted). Based upon this evidence, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress, concluding that “Officer Hamilton established through his test imony that he had reasonable suspicion that section 3111(a) of the Mo tor Vehicle Code was being violated.” Id. at 6. We begin by agreeing with the parties that the tri al court erroneously applied the reasonable suspicion standard in denyin g Appellant’s motion to suppress. As this Court has explained, [a] police officer has the authority to stop a vehi cle when he or she has reasonable suspicion that a violation of the vehicle code has taken place, for the purpose of obtaining necessary information to enforce the provisions of the code. However, if the violation is such that it requires no additiona l investigation, the officer must have probable cause to initiate the stop. Put another way, if the officer has a legitimate ex pectation of investigatory results, the existence of reasonab le suspicion will allow the stop—if the officer has no such expectations of learning additional relevant inform ation concerning the suspected criminal activity, the sto p cannot be constitutionally permitted on the basis of mere suspicion.J-A29034-14

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Commonwealth v. Brown , 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted; emphasis in original). Officer Hamilton testified that he stopped Appella nt’s vehicle because he observed Appellant enter the Norwin Towne Square by driving down the exit ramp, which was marked by a “Do Not Enter” sig n. Because further investigation would not have helped establish wheth er Appellant failed to obey the “Do Not Enter” sign, Officer Hamilton was required to have probable cause to initiate a stop due to his belief that Appellant violated subsection 3111(a). We, however, observe that we s till may affirm the judgment of sentence despite the trial court’s erro neous application of the reasonable suspicion standard, as long as the recor d supports the result reached by the court. Brown , 64 A.3d 1105 n.3. Appellant argues that Officer Hamilton lacked prob able cause to stop his vehicle. According to Appellant, because he wa s traveling eastbound on Route 30 and the “Do Not Enter” sign was facing veh icles traveling westbound on Route 30, he could not have violated s ubsection 3111(a). Appellant insists that he legally turned into the N orwin Towne Square Shopping Center and that Officer Hamilton illegally stopped him. He further maintains that the illegality of the stop is not ex cused by any “good faith” belief or mistake of Officer Hamilton, as this Comm onwealth does not recognize any such “good faith” exception in the co ntext of a probable cause analysis.J-A29034-14

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In reviewing the trial court’s determination, we o bserve the following well-settled principles of law. The police have probable cause where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are su fficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belie f that an offense has been or is being committed. We evalua te probable cause by considering all relevant facts under a tot ality of circumstances analysis.

Commonwealth v. Hernandez , 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Pa. 2007) (quotation and citations omitted). In short, Officer Hamilton’s testimony reveals that he knew that the ramp Appellant utilized to access the shopping cent er was an exit ramp for the center. He also was aware that the ramp was po sted with a “Do Not Enter” sign facing westbound traffic. When we cons ider the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Officer Hamilton’s knowledge was sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the be lief that Appellant violated 75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a) by disobeying the “Do Not Enter” sign. Appellant’s claim that he did not have to obey the “Do Not Enter” sign because it was facing westbound may have provided h im with a defense to the charge that he violated 75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a). However, such a claim

does not undermine the conclusion that Officer Hami lton had probable cause to stop Appellant. See Commonwealth v. Vincett , 806 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. 2002) (disagreeing with the suppression cour t’s conclusion that a police officer lacked probable cause to stop Vincet t for driving the wrong way down a one-way street and holding that the court sh ould have deniedJ-A29034-14

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Vincett’s suppression motion because, although ther e may have been inadequate posting of traffic signs to convict Vinc ett of driving the wrong way on a one-way street, the officer knew the stree t was one-way and, therefore, reasonably believed Vincett was violatin g the Motor Vehicle Code).

We discern no error in the trial court’s decision t o deny Appellant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm Appella nt’s judgment of

sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 12/9/2014