NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ANTHONY G. HUNT,

Claimant-Appellant,

v.

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

Respondent-Appellee.

______________________ 

2012-7039

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 09-4707, Judge Lawrence B. 

Hagel.

______________________ 

Decided: July 16, 2013 

______________________ 

ANTHONY G. HUNT, of Adrian, Michigan, pro se. 

DANIEL B. VOLK, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. 

With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, Principal 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, 

Director, and MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., Assistant Director. 

Of counsel on the brief were DAVID J. BARRANS, Deputy 
2 ANTHONY HUNT v. SHINSEKI

Assistant General Counsel, and CHRISTA A. SHRIBER, 

Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, 

of Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, REYNA, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Anthony G. Hunt appeals pro se from the decision of 

the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(the “Veterans Court”) affirming a decision by the Board 

of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) denying him relief for 

injuries alleged to have occurred during his time in service. Hunt v. Shinsheki, No. 09-4707 (Vet. App. July 29, 

2009). We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Mr. Hunt’s 

claim for a finding of clear and unmistakable error 

(“CUE”) in a September 1983 rating decision because Mr. 

Hunt’s arguments relate to the weighing of evidence and 

do not challenge the Veterans Court’s decision regarding 

the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation. 

We affirm the denial of vocational rehabilitation benefits 

because Mr. Hunt does not qualify for the requested relief 

under 38 U.S.C. § 3102. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Hunt served in the United States Air Force from 

December 1973 to February 1975. At the time of separation, his medical examination did not reveal signs of 

disease or psychiatric conditions. After leaving the Air 

Force, Mr. Hunt filed a series of claims for benefits.

In September 1983, a Department of Veterans Administration (“VA”) regional office denied Mr. Hunt’s claim for 

a nervous condition he argues led to an overdose of medication in 1979 (“first claim”). The decision, which attributed Mr. Hunt’s condition to misconduct that included 

substance abuse, was not appealed and became final. 
 ANTHONY HUNT v. SHINSEKI 3

In June 1988, Mr. Hunt filed for non-serviceconnection pension benefits due to emotional instability 

and paranoia (“second claim”). The regional office denied 

the second claim and Mr. Hunt did not appeal. 

In December 1992, Mr. Hunt requested that the VA 

reopen his second claim, stating that in the years following discharge he experienced a nervous breakdown, 

depression, psychotic symptoms, a history of drug abuse, 

and alcohol dependence. After undergoing a VA medical 

examination in January 1993, the examiner determined 

that he suffered from major depression with psychotic 

features, as well as an adjustment disorder. The medical 

examiner found that the social and vocational condition 

was 70% disabling. The regional office awarded pension 

benefits commensurate with the non-service-connected 

condition. 

In March 1994, Mr. Hunt submitted a serviceconnection claim for a neurological disorder, severe depression, migraines, blurred vision, memory problems, 

dizziness, heart problems, breathing problems, and unexplainable rage (“third claim”). The regional office denied 

relief for the third claim, and specifically advised that the 

claim for depression was bound up with the first claim 

filed in 1983. The VA sent Mr. Hunt a letter advising 

that his claim for depression was finally denied in 1983 

and it would not be reconsidered without new and material evidence. Mr. Hunt responded with a request that 

the VA obtain his psychiatric records from Sheppard Air 

Force Base to establish service-connection. The VA was 

unable to locate any records from Sheppard Air Force 

Base, but did obtain Mr. Hunt’s post-service medical 

records from Henry Ford Hospital. The regional office 

denied the request to reopen the first claim because the 

additional records were not new and material. 

Lastly, Mr. Hunt filed a claim for vocational rehabilitation benefits in January 1995. He asserted that he was 
4 ANTHONY HUNT v. SHINSEKI

entitled to these additional benefits based on his 70% 

rating for non-service-connected disabilities. The regional 

office denied the request for vocational rehabilitation 

benefits because Mr. Hunt’s disability was a non-serviceconnected psychiatric condition. 

THE APPELLATE LANDSCAPE

Mr. Hunt appealed the regional office’s decision not to 

reopen the first claim and, after over a decade of adjudication and development, the case was remanded to determine whether the September 1983 regional office decision 

denying service-connected benefits for a psychiatric 

disorder contained CUE. In October 2008, the decision 

review officer concluded that the September 1983 regional 

office decision was properly decided based on the available evidence of record at the time and the law then in 

effect. Mr. Hunt appealed to the Board.

The Board affirmed all the issues presented on appeal. The Board first affirmed that the 1983 regional 

office decision was not the product of CUE. Mr. Hunt 

argued that there was additional evidence that supported 

his claim for service-connection benefits for a psychiatric 

disorder and that the VA did not satisfy its duty to assist. 

The Board acknowledged that the VA had not obtained 

medical records from Sheppard Air Force Base, but determined that further attempts to obtain such records 

would be futile because they had either been destroyed, 

or, in the event that Mr. Hunt never actually received inservice psychiatric treatment, the records did not exist. 

The Board also agreed that the records the VA obtained 

from Henry Ford Hospital were not new and material. 

The Board next determined as a matter of law that 

Mr. Hunt was not entitled to vocational rehabilitation 

benefits because he did not present a service-connected 

disability. 
 ANTHONY HUNT v. SHINSEKI 5

In a single judge decision, the Veterans Court addressed all of Mr. Hunt’s arguments and affirmed the 

Board’s decision. This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

In his appeal to this court, Mr. Hunt returns to the 

same issues on which his case was previously decided by 

the Board and the Veterans Court. In particular, he 

argues that the Veterans Court erred in not reversing the 

decision finding no CUE in the September 1983 decision1

and he asserts that it is manifestly unjust to deny him 

vocational rehabilitation benefits. 

The CUE Challenge

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans 

Court is limited by statute. 38 U.S.C. § 7292. We have 

jurisdiction over “all relevant questions of law, including 

interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions.” 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). We lack jurisdiction, however, over 

any “challenge to a factual determination” or “challenge to 

a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular 

case” absent a constitutional issue. 38 U.S.C. § 

7292(d)(2). We therefore generally lack jurisdiction to 

review challenges to the Board’s factual determinations. 

See, e.g., Johnson v. Derwinski, 949 F.2d 394, 395 (Fed.

Cir. 1991).

1 Incorporated in Mr. Hunt’s arguments relating to 

CUE are various complaints regarding the VA’s duty to 

obtain evidence, including, in particular, medical records 

from Sheppard Air Force Base. Both the Board and the 

Veterans Court addressed these contentions in detail. We 

do not discern any properly developed challenge to the 

legal authority relied on by the Veterans Court that 

would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court over 

his CUE claim.

 
6 ANTHONY HUNT v. SHINSEKI

The Veterans Court held, inter alia, that the Board 

committed no CUE in denying the request to reopen Mr. 

Hunt’s claim for a psychiatric disorder yet Mr. Hunt asks 

us to overturn the September 1983 regional office decision. His arguments in support of the requested relief, 

however, are premised on us reweighing and/or reevaluating the evidence in the record. As the Board pointed out, 

“the gist of the Veteran’s arguments is that service connection was wrongfully decided at that time. It is clear 

that his attack on the September 1983 rating decision is a 

disagreement as to how the facts were weighed and 

evaluated.” J.A. 22.

This court has consistently held that a request to reweigh the evidence is not a valid CUE claim. E.g., Willsey 

v. Peake, 535 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Rather, 

the CUE provision applies when facts compel a conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ. 38 

C.F.R. § 20.1403; Yates v. West, 213 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). A valid CUE claim 

requires showing that the alleged error, had it not been 

made, “would have manifestly changed the outcome at the 

time it was made.” Bustos v. West, 179 F.3d 1378, 1380

(Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 

310, 313 (Vet. App. 1992)); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 

F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc); Fugo v. Brown, 

6 Vet.App. 40, 44 (1993) (“Even where the premise of 

error is accepted, if it is not absolutely clear that a different result would have ensued, the error complained of 

cannot be, ipso facto, clear and unmistakable error.”). 

While Mr. Hunt may be dissatisfied with how the regional office weighed the evidence in 1983, such a disagreement is insufficient to establish CUE. 38 C.F.R. § 

20.1403(d) (“disagreement as to how the facts were 

weighed or evaluated” cannot constitute CUE). Mr. Hunt 

does not make legal arguments to challenge the validity 

or interpretation of a statute or regulation on which the 

Veterans Court relied, and Mr. Hunt does not present 
 ANTHONY HUNT v. SHINSEKI 7

constitutional issues. Fairly read, the items discussed in 

the informal brief deal with nothing more than the nature 

and extent of Mr. Hunt’s condition. 

This court does not have jurisdiction to review Mr. 

Hun’s fact-based contentions on appeal. See Andino v. 

Nicholson, 498 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting 

that this court should not be “making credibility determinations or weighing evidence—all of which is beyond our 

jurisdiction”); Yates, 213 F.3d at 1375. We therefore 

dismiss the claim to reopen the September 1983 decision 

of the regional office.

The Vocational Rehabilitation Challenge

Mr. Hunt argues that the Board and the Veterans 

Court misapplied 38 U.S.C. § 3102 regarding entitlement 

to vocational rehabilitation benefits and that the denial of 

his claim for such benefits is manifestly unfair. We detect 

no error in the underlying legal analysis. Indeed, the 

statute straightforwardly requires a service-connected 

disability in order for Mr. Hunt to receive, or to elect to 

receive, vocational rehabilitation benefits. The eligibility 

provision states, in relevant part:

A person shall be entitled to a rehabilitation program under the terms and conditions of this chapter if the person is a veteran who has a serviceconnected disability rated at 20 percent or more 

which was incurred or aggravated in service on or 

after September 16, 1940; or . . . the person is a 

veteran who has a service-connected disability rated at 10 percent which was incurred or aggravated in service on or after September 16, 1940.

38 U.S.C. § 3102(a) (emphases added) (non-pertinent 

subsections omitted).

In this case the Board found that “the Veteran does 

not have any service-connected disability” and he therefore did not “meet the basic prerequisite legal criteria for 
8 ANTHONY HUNT v. SHINSEKI

[vocational rehabilitation] benefits.” J.A. 27. To the 

extent Mr. Hunt now argues that he is eligible for vocational rehabilitation benefits based on his psychiatric 

condition, we do not revisit issues of fact on appeal. We 

agree with the Veterans Court’s legal conclusion that 

entitlement to non-service-connected pension benefits 

does not, under the statute, confer service-connected 

compensation benefits. Because Mr. Hunt does not meet 

the statutory requirements to receive vocational rehabilitation benefits, the corresponding discussion in the Veteran Court’s decision is affirmed. 

CONCLUSION

The Veterans Court, in a thorough and detailed analysis, considered all of Mr. Hunt’s arguments and concluded that Mr. Hunt failed to show any basis for relief. We 

have again considered Mr. Hunt’s grievances on appeal. 

Because Mr. Hunt’s CUE arguments are beyond the scope 

of this court’s jurisdiction, we dismiss claims arising out 

of those arguments. We affirm the Veterans Court’s 

decision denying all other relief. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART AND DISMISSED-IN-PART

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.