United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 9, 2013*

Decided May 10, 2013

Before

    JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

    DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

    JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

Nos. 12‐3752 & 13‐1083

ERIC ONYANGO,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

DOWNTOWN ENTERTAINMENT, LLC,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 11 C 8445

Sharon J. Coleman,

Judge.

ORDER

We have consolidated two interlocutory appeals filed by Eric Onyango in his lawsuit

against Downtown Entertainment. We dismiss both appeals for lack of subject‐matter

jurisdiction.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. The appeals are thus submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).
Nos. 12‐3752 & 13‐1083 Page 2

Onyango paid $20 to enter a Chicago nightclub owned by Downtown Entertainment.

Inside the club he encountered Maciej Lampe (a Pole who plays professional basketball in

Spain). Onyango (who is black) alleges that Lampe shoved him and hurled a racial epithet

after asking Onyango to sell him drugs and being turned away. Security personnel then

forcibly removed Onyango, but not Lampe. Onyango has sued Downtown Entertainment

under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claiming racial discrimination. His complaint also includes

supplemental state‐law claims for breach of contract, assault, and negligence. Onyango says

that he suffered physical and emotional injuries, and also has lost business opportunities

because he no longer can network at Downtown Entertainment’s clubs.

Onyango has amended his complaint five times. The current iteration includes a

“Count Six” entitled “Plaintiff’s Basis for Injunctory Relief.” This is not a separate claim but

rather an assertion that “[r]emedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are

inadequate to compensate Plaintiff’s injuries.” Onyango thus demands in his “Prayer for

Relief,” not only damages, but also that Downtown Entertainment “be permanently

enjoined” from excluding him from “its places of public accommodation without lawful

justification,” and from “appeasing non‐black patrons at the expense of violating

contractual and civil rights of black patrons.” The district court entered a minute order

striking “Count Six” on the ground that Onyango did not “plead facts sufficient for the

Court to conclude that there is a substantial likelihood that future violations will occur.”

Onyango filed a notice of appeal from this minute order, which we have docketed as case

No. 12‐3752. He then asked the district court for leave to filed another amended complaint

adding claims of retaliation and fraud. When the court denied that request, Onyango filed a

second notice of appeal, which we have docketed as case No. 13‐1083.

An order denying injunctive relief may be appealable even when the litigation in the

district court is still ongoing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). But as a ground for taking an

interlocutory appeal, the denial of injunctive relief provides only a narrow exception to the

general rule barring appeals from nonfinal decisions. Albert v. Trans Union Corp., 346 F.3d

734, 737 (7th Cir. 2003); Simon Prop. Grp., L.P. v. mySIMON, Inc., 282 F.3d 986, 990 (7th Cir.

2002). Only if the district court’s decision is definitive, i.e., the plaintiff will have no further

chance of obtaining the desired injunction from the district court, does this court have

jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal. Albert, 346 F.3d at 739; Simon Prop. Grp., 282 F.3d

at 990–91; Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F.2d 1397, 1402–03 (7th Cir. 1985). (It should be noted that

Onyango did not file a timely appeal of the denial of his motion for a preliminary

injunction—No. 12‐3752 involves only the minute order addressing “Count Six.”)

The language in the minute order entered by the district court does not end

Onyango’s quest for permanent injunctive relief. It simply says that Onyango’s complaint

lacks sufficient detail for the judge to know whether he has a substantial likelihood of
Nos. 12‐3752 & 13‐1083 Page 3

prevailing on the merits. The minute order should be understood as striking the injunctive

“count” as a separate, free‐standing claim. But Onyango might still get his injunction: An

injunction is a type of remedy, Sherwood v. Marquette Transp. Co., 587 F.3d 841, 845 (7th Cir.

2009); Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 223 (2d ed. 1993), as distinct from an underlying claim

for relief, see Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983); LaSalle Nat’l Bank

v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 18 F3.d 1371, 1376 (7th Cir. 1994); Black’s Law Dictionary 251 (9th ed.

2009) (defining “cause of action,” or “claim,” as “a factual situation that entitles one person

to obtain a remedy in court”). Onyango should not have characterized his request for

injunctive relief as a separate count of his complaint, and the district court’s order striking

the injunctive “count” thwarts him only from obtaining an injunction without succeeding

on his underlying § 1981 or supplemental claims—an impossible feat in any event.

Injunctive relief remains available to him later in the litigation, that is, if he prevails on his

remaining substantive claims. See CustomGuide v. CareerBuilder, LLC, 813 F. Supp. 2d 990,

1002 (N.D. Ill. 2011).

We thus lack subject‐matter jurisdiction over case No. 12‐3752. We also lack

jurisdiction over case No. 13‐1083, since the district court’s order refusing to permit

Onyango to amend his complaint for a sixth time is interlocutory and fits no exception to

the rule against appeals from nonfinal decisions. See Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark Mall Corp.,

644 F.3d 375, 379–80 (7th Cir. 2011); Kerr‐McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 570

F.3d 856, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2009).

Accordingly, both appeals are DISMISSED.