NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 22a0173n.06

No. 21-1493

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ADAM WAYNE CAMPBELL,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN 

Before: ROGERS, KETHLEDGE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Adam Campbell pled guilty to being a felon in possession 

of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1). He now appeals his sentence, arguing that the 

district court erred when it applied a four-level enhancement for unlawfully possessing a firearm 

in connection with another felony offense under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). We affirm. 

In August 2020, Campbell broke into a gun store in Kent County, Michigan and stole 18

firearms. Campbell left seven of the guns in a post office drop box; nine others he traded for drugs. 

Police arrested Campbell later that month and he eventually pled guilty to being a felon in 

possession of firearms.

As part of his plea agreement, Campbell “waive[d] all rights” to challenge his conviction 

or sentence, subject to certain exceptions. The relevant exception here would apply where “the 

District Court incorrectly determined the advisory Guidelines range applicable to the defendant, if 

the defendant objected at sentencing on that basis.” 
No. 21-1493, United States v. Campbell

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The probation office prepared a presentence report, which calculated a guidelines range of

120 months’ imprisonment—the statutorily authorized maximum sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). 

That recommendation was based in part on two enhancements. The first was a two-level 

enhancement for possessing firearms that were stolen. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A). The 

second was a four-level enhancement for possessing the firearms “in connection with another 

felony offense, to wit: Theft of Firearms from a Federal Firearms Licensee as charged in Count

One of the Indictment.” See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). 

Campbell later objected that the presentence report’s “guidelines calculations include two

offense-level enhancements for the same behavior,” namely, his theft of the firearms. Thus, he 

argued, the application of both enhancements amounted to double-counting. The district court 

overruled that objection and sentenced Campbell to 103 months’ imprisonment. This appeal 

followed. 

Campbell now challenges the district court’s application of a four-level enhancement under 

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which applies when a defendant “used or possessed any firearm or 

ammunition in connection with another felony offense[.]” Specifically, Campbell presents two 

arguments as to why (in his view) the application of that enhancement amounted to doublecounting. The first argument is the one he made to the district court: he says that the application 

of both the two-level and four-level enhancements punished him twice “for indistinguishable 

conduct.” But a court may impose two sentencing enhancements for the same conduct if each 

enhancement punishes “distinct aspects” of that conduct. See United States v. Sweet, 776 F.3d 

447, 450 (6th Cir. 2015). Such was the case here: the § 2K2.1(b)(4) enhancement punished 

Campbell for the fact that he possessed stolen guns; the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement punished 

Campbell for the facts that Campbell himself had stolen the guns, and had done so from a licensed 
No. 21-1493, United States v. Campbell

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federal firearms dealer. The enhancements thus punished different aspects of Campbell’s conduct, 

and the district court did not err when it applied the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement to Campbell’s

base-offense level. United States v. Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 2010). 

Campbell’s second argument is that “the exact same conduct that supported the offense of 

conviction (i.e., being a felon in possession) also supported the ‘other’ felony offense (e.g., the 

burglary).” But Campbell did not raise this argument at sentencing. And in his plea agreement, 

Campbell waived all challenges to his Guidelines range unless he “objected at sentencing on that 

basis.” Campbell therefore waived this argument. See United States v. Toth, 668 F.3d 374, 378

(6th Cir. 2012).

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.