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97–824 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–68] 

U.S. STRATEGY FOR SYRIA AND IRAQ AND 

ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

DECEMBER 1, 2015 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Secretary of Defense ....................................................... 4 

Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ..... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Carter, Hon. Ashton B. .................................................................................... 69 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bridenstine ................................................................................................. 79 

Mrs. Davis ......................................................................................................... 79 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 79 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 79 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 83 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 86 

Mr. Moulton ...................................................................................................... 84 

Mr. Russell ........................................................................................................ 85 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 83 

Mr. Walz ............................................................................................................ 84 

(1) 

U.S. STRATEGY FOR SYRIA AND IRAQ AND ITS 

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, December 1, 2015. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

The committee meets today to hear testimony from the Secretary 

and Chairman on our strategy against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq 

and Syria] and the implications for the Middle East. Today is the 

first hearing we have had with Secretary Carter and Chairman 

Dunford together in their current roles, and I think it is appropriate for it to be on this topic, which is foremost in the minds of 

the American people. 

I want to thank you both for being here and also to take this opportunity to thank each of you for your service to the country in 

a variety of roles. It is my view that we are fortunate to have you 

here. 

In all that has been written and said about ISIS since the Paris 

attacks, there seems to be widespread consensus on at least three 

points. One is that ISIS presents a significant threat to the United 

States. Two, the approach we have used to degrade and destroy 

ISIS is inadequate to meet that threat. And, three, a different approach, a greater effort is required. 

While in many ways ISIS is more capable than Al Qaeda, it is 

certainly not invincible. Yet when we tie our own hands and use 

half measures against them, it enhances their prestige and aids 

their cause. As Dr. Henry Kissinger wrote 6 weeks ago, ‘‘The current inconclusive U.S. military effort risks serving as a recruitment 

vehicle for ISIS as having stood up to American might.’’ And David 

Ignatius wrote more recently, ‘‘But the halfway measures taken by 

the U.S. thus far have only helped the jihadists.’’ 

The other consequence of such half measures is that it adds to 

the doubts that allies or potential allies have about our commitment and about our willingness to see the mission through. Hank 

Crumpton, who led CIA’s [Central Intelligence Agency’s] Afghanistan campaign after 9/11, wrote about ISIS earlier this year, ‘‘Many 

have lost faith in U.S. leadership. The perception of U.S. weakness 
2 

and lack of strategic direction dissuades allies from policy and intelligence cooperation.’’ 

I believe that a greater military effort must be run by the military. And I have got to say, Secretary Carter, all three of your 

Obama administration predecessors have complained openly about 

White House aides micromanaging military operations. I myself 

have heard some of these instances from commanders in the field, 

instances that I don’t think would have happened at any other time 

in our history. 

If we are going to be serious about ISIS, the President needs to 

assign the military a clear mission and then allow the military to 

carry it out. I believe there should be a four-star headquarters in 

the region that is fully empowered to take the steps necessary to 

degrade ISIS now. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Mike Vickers made good sense to me when he wrote about 

10 days ago, quote, ‘‘Whatever we would do if ISIL [Islamic State 

of Iraq and the Levant] made good on its threat to attack Washington and New York, we should do it now, before the attack occurred.’’ 

Well, maybe Kissinger, Ignatius, Crumpton, and Vickers are all 

wrong and the President has things contained and well in hand, 

but I don’t think so. And we are looking to you two gentlemen not 

to repeat White House talking points, but to give us your best professional military judgment on what is required to actually degrade 

and defeat this enemy and protect our people. 

Mr. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Secretary Carter and General Dunford, for being 

here today to talk about this incredibly important topic. And I 

agree with the chairman, there is no question that ISIS is a clear 

threat that need to be confronted. They are, I think without question, the greatest national security threat that we face right now. 

It is important to keep in context that that threat is not just ISIS. 

It was Al Qaeda, now it is ISIS. It is part of a broader ideology that 

we need to confront that we have seen spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa and South Asia in many different forms, 

Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in 

Nigeria. We need to figure out how to confront and defeat that 

threat. And there is no question that ISIS remains a grave threat 

to Western targets as well as to stability in the Middle East. 

That said, I don’t think the picture is quite as bleak as the chairman portrayed it. In fact, there was just an article yesterday about 

how ISIS is beginning to lose some of their supporters because 

their momentum has been stopped in terms of gathering territory. 

One of the biggest things, selling points that they had from the 

very beginning was, unlike Al Qaeda, they held territory, and they 

were growing at one time in terms of the territory they held. So 

they could recruit people saying, we are truly going to build an Islamic state. 
3 

Well, they have not gained any territory; they have lost actually 

a few towns. And the bombing campaign that we have committed, 

and primarily the work of the Kurds, has rolled them back in certain places and has undermined that confidence in the jihadists 

that they are in fact just going to roll forward and take everything. 

That is a positive. 

However, the chairman is absolutely correct, it is not enough. It 

is not enough to contain ISIS, because as we have seen in Paris, 

in Beirut, and elsewhere, as long as they exist, they can launch attacks. We must put together a clear strategy to defeat them. 

And that is the other thing that I will agree with the chairman 

on, perhaps not quite as strongly, but the administration does need 

to be clearer in saying what that strategy is and that they are absolutely committed to it. I actually think they have a better strategy and a more comprehensive strategy than at times they have 

said. Let us not forget that the President said I think less than a 

year ago, we don’t yet have a strategy. That is the kind of thing 

that doesn’t need to be said. We need a much clearer message 

about what that strategy is. 

But I think we have it, and that strategy is that we are going 

to use our military force, in combination with as many allies as 

possible, to try and help our allies in the region. But that is the 

key point. We could send 50,000 U.S. troops into Iraq and Syria 

and in short order, I am sure, clear out a good portion of what is 

now ISIS. But what we also know from experience in Iraq and Afghanistan is if a Western force came in and tried to pacify or mollify this part of the world, another terrorist organization would 

grow up in a heartbeat or ISIS would reconstitute itself and 

present itself as the alternative to—as the only people defending 

Muslims against Western aggression. 

So I hope we don’t overreact, because what we need, the only 

way we win this fight is if we find Sunni allies in the region who 

are willing to lead that fight. That is what we have to do. 

And also part of this is removing Assad from power, because as 

long as Assad is in power that is another rallying call for ISIS to 

fight against a brutal dictator who is oppressing their people. So 

that is the trick that we have. ISIS is fighting Assad, but we need 

to defeat both Assad and ISIS. 

And, again, I think this notion that U.S. military might is simply 

going to show up and fix the problem has been disproven by what 

has happened. Understand what gives these groups their greatest 

force. What gives them their greatest force is when they can stand 

up and say, we are defending Islam against Western aggression. If 

all we have is Western aggression, we will never win. 

We have to use our force, we have to work with our allies in the 

region, but at the end of the day what we need is Sunni allies to 

carry this fight. And that means that we have to continue to put 

pressure on the Baghdad government to bring Sunnis in. I mean, 

is the biggest thing that created ISIS, was Prime Minister Maliki, 

now Abadi, have both decided to run a sectarian Shia government. 

So the Sunnis may not like ISIS, but as between that and being 

allied with a Shiite Iran-backed government, they choose ISIS. 

So that is what I think we need to do. Yes, we need to have a 

clearer strategy, we need to state it more clearly and rally our al-
4 

lies. But I hope we don’t fall into the trap of thinking that U.S. 

military might is what is going to solve this problem. It is a far 

more complicated problem than that. 

And with that, I look forward to the testimony from the witnesses and the questions. I thank the chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, Chairman Dunford, again, thank you for being 

here, but more importantly, thank you for the service that you are 

providing the Nation in very difficult jobs in very difficult times. 

And I don’t think any of us underestimate the challenge that is before you. 

Mr. Secretary, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you very much, Chairman Thornberry, 

Ranking Member Smith, all the members of this committee. Thank 

you for inviting me to discuss, with Chairman Joe Dunford, our 

counter-military strategy and its execution. 

And, Chairman, I agree with you. We do need greater effort. We 

are applying greater effort. I am going to try to describe some of 

the ways that we are doing that. 

And, Mr. Smith, the underlying strategy and its clarity, I will try 

to provide that clarity today. 

Now, ISIL’s attacks in Paris, like those they have perpetrated 

elsewhere, were barbaric and they were an assault on the civilization we defend. ISIL requires, and it will receive, a lasting defeat. 

The President had directed us to intensify and adapt the military 

campaign before the Paris attacks, and we will describe those new 

actions today. 

We continue to accelerate our efforts in the wake of Paris and 

we are urging others to do the same, because those attacks further 

highlighted the stakes that not just the United States, but the 

world has in this fight. 

As I have discussed with you in the past, the United States strategy requires leveraging all of the components of our Nation’s might 

to destroy ISIL. Every instrument of national power—diplomatic, 

military, intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, economic, informational—is engaged, and every national security 

agency is contributing to one of the strategy’s lines of efforts. We 

are defending the homeland, acting to defeat ISIL in its core, its 

core in Syria and Iraq, and taking appropriate action wherever else 

in the world this evil organization metastasizes. 

Now, the Defense Department contributes to nearly all the lines 

of effort, but protecting the homeland is among our highest priorities. We are adapting to meet ISIL’s threat, including assuring the 

security of Defense Department installations and personnel. And 

just last week I hosted some of the top national security and law 

enforcement leaders at the Pentagon to discuss efforts to cut off the 

flow of foreign fighters. 

But we at the Defense Department, of course, are also centrally 

responsible for the military campaign, which will be the focus of 

my statement to this committee. Through our own action and those 

of our coalition partners, the military campaign will destroy ISIL’s 
5 

leadership and forces, deprive it of resources and safe haven and 

mobility, all the while we seek to identify and then enable motivated local forces on the ground to expel ISIL from its territory, 

hold and govern it, and ensure that victory sticks. 

That is the right strategic approach for two principal reasons. 

First, it emphasizes the necessity of capable, motivated local forces 

as the only force that can assure a lasting victory. Such forces are 

hard to find, but they do exist, and we are enabling them, and we 

are constantly looking for and finding effective ways to expand 

doing so, and I will describe some of them, but we cannot substitute for such forces. And second, this strategic approach sets the 

conditions for a political solution to the civil war in Syria and to 

crippling sectarianism in Iraq, which are the only durable ways to 

prevent a future ISIL-like organization from reemerging. And that 

is why the diplomatic work led by Secretary Kerry and the State 

Department is the first and absolutely critical line of effort in our 

strategy. 

We are gathering momentum on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq, 

and today I will describe how the U.S. is continuing to accelerate 

the military campaign against ISIL and what more we are asking 

of our global partners. While I can’t describe everything in this unclassified setting, I do want to take a few extra minutes this morning to give as much detail as possible about the new things we are 

doing to accelerate ISIL’s defeat. 

We are at war. We are using the might of the finest fighting 

force the world has ever known. Tens of thousands of U.S. personnel are operating in the broader Middle East region; more are 

on the way. We have some of our most advanced air and naval 

forces attacking ISIL. U.S. troops are advising and assisting 

ground operations in Syria and Iraq. I will briefly describe some of 

these efforts and how we are accelerating them. 

First, in northern Syria, local forces, with our support, are fighting along the Mara line, engaging ISIL in the last remaining pocket of access into Turkey. Meanwhile, a coalition of Syrian Arabs 

that we helped equip in northeastern Syria, with statutory authorizations and funds provided by Congress, for which we are grateful, 

are fighting alongside Kurdish forces and have recaptured important terrain, most recently pushing ISIL out of the town of Al-Hawl 

and at least 900 square kilometers of surrounding territory. They 

are now focused on moving south to isolate ISIL’s nominal capital 

of Raqqa, with the ultimate objective of collapsing its control over 

that city. 

This momentum on the ground in northern Syria has been enabled by increased coalition air strikes as well as support on the 

ground. In early November, we deployed additional strike aircraft 

to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. These and other aircraft in the region, combined with improved intelligence, allowed us in November 

to significantly increase our air strikes against ISIL to the highest 

level since the start of operations in August of 2014. 

To build on that momentum, we are sending, on President 

Obama’s orders and the Chairman’s and my advice, special operations forces [SOF] personnel to Syria to support the fight against 

ISIL. American special operators bring a unique suite of capabilities that make them force multipliers. They will help us garner val-
6 

uable ground intelligence, further enhance our air campaign, and 

above all, enable local forces that can regain and then hold territory occupied by ISIL. Where we find further opportunity to leverage such capability we are prepared to expand it. 

Next, in the south of Syria we are also taking advantage of opportunities to open a southern front on ISIL by enabling fighters, 

trained and equipped by us and other coalition partners, to conduct 

strikes inside Syria. We are also enhancing the border control and 

defenses of a key ally, Jordan, with additional military assets and 

assistance. 

In northern Iraq, Peshmerga units, with the help of U.S. air 

power and advisers, have retaken the town of Sinjar, cutting the 

main line of communication between Raqqa and Mosul, the two 

largest cities under ISIL’s control. To move people and supplies, 

ISIL must now rely on back roads, where we locate and destroy 

them. 

Elsewhere in Iraq, we have about 3,500 troops at 6 locations in 

Iraq in support of Iraqi Security Forces, the ISF. There, we have 

been providing increased lethal fire and augmenting the existing 

training, advising, and assisting program, and we are prepared to 

do more as Iraq shows capability and motivation in the counterISIL fight and in resolving its political divisions. 

Now, the progress in the Sunni portions of Iraq, as mentioned by 

Mr. Smith, as the campaign to recapture Ramadi shows, has been 

slow, much to our and Prime Minister Abadi’s frustration. Despite 

his efforts, sectarian politics and Iranian influence have made 

building a multisectarian Iraqi Security Force difficult, with some 

notable exceptions, such as the effective U.S.-trained counterterrorism [CT] forces. We continue to offer additional U.S. support of all 

kinds and urge Baghdad to enroll, train, arm, and pay Sunni Arab 

fighters, as well as local Sunni Arab police forces, to hold territory 

recaptured from ISIL. 

All these efforts, from northern Syria through Iraq, have shrunk 

the ISIL-controlled territory in both. Importantly, we now have an 

opportunity to divide ISIL’s presence in Iraq from that in Syria. 

This could be important, because while both countries are plagued 

by ISIL, each, as I said earlier, has different political pathologies 

that provide the opportunity for extremism, and they ultimately require different kinds of political progress to ensure lasting victory. 

Next, in full coordination with the Government of Iraq, we are 

deploying a specialized expeditionary targeting force to assist Iraqi 

and Kurdish Peshmerga forces and put even more pressure on 

ISIL. These special operators will over time be able to conduct 

raids, free hostages, gather intelligence, and capture ISIL leaders. 

This force will also be in a position to conduct unilateral operations 

in Syria. That creates a virtuous cycle of better intelligence, which 

generates more targets, more raids, more momentum. The raids in 

Iraq will be done at the invitation of the Iraqi Government and focused on defending its borders and building the ISF’s own capability. 

Next, we are also significantly expanding U.S. attacks on ISIL’s 

infrastructure and sources of revenue, particularly its oil revenue. 

Over the past several weeks, because of improved intelligence and 

understanding of ISIL’s financial operations, we have intensified 
7 

the air campaign against ISIL’s war-sustaining oil enterprise, a 

critical pillar of ISIL’s financial infrastructure. In addition to destroying fixed facilities, like wells and processing facilities, we have 

destroyed nearly 400 of ISIL’s oil tanker trucks, reducing a major 

source of its daily revenues. There is more to come, too. 

And we are improving our capability to eliminate ISIL’s leadership by conducting raids using the expeditionary target force I discussed a moment ago and also targeted air strikes. Since I last appeared before this committee in June, we have removed some key 

ISIL figures from the battlefield: Hajji Mutaz, ISIL’s second in 

command; Junaid Hussein, a key external operative actively plotting against our service members; Jihadi John, an ISIL executioner; and Abu Nabil, ISIL’s leader in Libya. Like previous actions, these strikes serve notice to ISIL that no target is beyond 

our reach. 

Finally, even as we work to defeat ISIL in Syria and Iraq, where 

its parent tumor has grown, we also recognize ISIL has metastasized elsewhere. The threat posed by ISIL and groups like it can 

span regions in our own combatant commands. That is why the Defense Department is organizing a new way to leverage infrastructure we have already established in Afghanistan, the Levant, East 

Africa, and southern Europe into a unified capability to counter 

transnational and transregional threats like ISIL. An example of 

this network in action was our recent strike on Abu Nabil, where 

assets from several locations converged to successfully kill this 

ISIL leader in Libya. 

As that strike shows, there is a lot of potential here, but to do 

more, we need to be creative and to consider changes to how the 

Defense Department works and is structured. This could be an important focus of any new Goldwater-Nichols-type reforms, which I 

know this committee and particularly Chairman Thornberry is exploring. I welcome this timely review and look forward to working 

with you on it as we complete our own ongoing reform initiatives 

in the Department. 

These are eight areas, just eight, of the adaptations we have 

made over the past 6 weeks to accelerate this campaign, and we 

have seen momentum build. 

Chairman Dunford, if I can compliment him for a moment, has 

been a tremendous source of actionable ideas. We have also seen 

real ingenuity from our team at CENTCOM [Central Command] 

and many of the other combatant commands involved in this fight. 

And President Obama is committed to doing what it takes, as opportunities arise, as we see what works, as the enemy adapts, and 

until ISIL is defeated in a lasting way. 

As I just explained, we are constantly looking to do more in this 

fight, but the world must do the same. The international community, including our allies and partners, has to step up before another attack like Paris. France has been galvanized by the attacks 

on its capital and the French have intensified their role. Britain is 

debating expanded air strikes. Italy has made important contributions in Iraq. And Germany is making additional contributions. 

But we all, let me repeat, all must do more. Turkey must do 

more to control its often porous border. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 

states joined the air campaign in the early days, but have since 
8 

been preoccupied by the conflict in Yemen. Meanwhile, Russia, 

which is publicly committed to defeating ISIL, has instead largely 

attacked opposition forces, not ISIL. It is time for Russia to focus 

on the right side of this fight. 

American leadership is essential, but the more contributions we 

receive from other nations, the greater combat power we can 

achieve using our own force. Just as importantly, we also need to 

leverage our allies’ and partners’ relationships and capabilities to 

effectively work with Syrians and Iraqis, who in the end must 

expel ISIL and restore effective governance in those countries. 

The President, Secretary Kerry, and I have spoken to many of 

our counterparts, and the Chairman has as well, and we are encouraging them to provide additional strike and support aircraft, 

special operations personnel, deeper and more effective intelligence 

sharing, additional train, advise, and assist personnel and resources, combat search and rescue capabilities, combat support and 

combat service support, base security forces, and additional economic aid and humanitarian assistance. 

As I conclude, I want to commend this committee on last month’s 

budget deal, which is the kind of deal I called for back in March 

before this committee. It was a consequential agreement for the 

Nation’s security, and we are grateful for it. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter can be found in the 

Appendix on page 69.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Dunford. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, 

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DUNFORD. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member 

Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today to address the military dimension of our counter-ISIL strategy. 

Secretary Carter just provided a brief campaign update and an 

overview of our strategic approach. Before taking your questions, I 

would like to share my perspective on the fundamentals of our 

counter-ISIL campaign in Iraq and Syria and what I believe you 

should expect as we move forward. 

ISIL’s primary sources of strength are its claim to be a caliphate, 

its narrative, and its manpower. To be successful, the coalition’s 

military campaign must reduce ISIL’s territorial control, undermine its brand and aura of invincibility, and destroy its warfighting capability. 

There are two critical elements in a military campaign to achieve 

those ends. The first is to conduct strikes against ISIL targets. The 

strikes are intended to kill leadership and fighters, interdict their 

lines of communication, and deny them their sources of revenue. 

The second critical element in the military campaign is to develop and support effective partners on the ground to seize and secure ISIL-held terrain. The basic framework for the campaign is 

the same for Iraq and Syria, but the conditions on the ground 

present unique challenges and opportunities. Without a partner on 

the ground, Syria has clearly presented the most difficult challenge. Success in Syria requires working with our Turkish partners 
9 

to secure the northern border of Syria; enabled, vetted Syrian opposition forces that are willing to fight ISIL; and conducting strikes 

to attack core ISIL’s command and control and sources of revenue. 

In Iraq we have a partner, and success requires supporting the 

development of Iraqi and Kurdish security forces in enabling their 

operations with intelligence, advisers, logistics, and combined 

armed support. 

Having quickly outlined what we must do in the military campaign, let me provide my initial assessment of how we are doing. 

As with any campaign, we are continuously examining ways to enhance the effectiveness of our operations. Many weeks ago, even 

before I became the Chairman, the leadership across the Department recognized that we needed to increase pressure on ISIL by 

improving the effectiveness of our strikes and accelerating our efforts to development and support effective partners on the ground. 

In short, we were not satisfied that we were doing everything possible to defeat the enemy. 

While recognizing that ISIL is a transregional threat requiring 

a broader strategy, our immediate focus was to bear down on core 

ISIL across Iraq and Syria simultaneously. After a lot of hard work 

by commanders and staffs at every level, we went to the President 

in early October with a number of recommendations designed to 

generate momentum in the campaign. The President approved our 

initial recommendations, and we are currently in the process of implementing his decisions. 

Secretary Carter provided the details of the initiative in his testimony and described where we are starting to see some positive developments and where we may see additional progress in the days 

ahead. While very mindful of the complex challenges that we face 

in this campaign, we are encouraged by the recent developments in 

places like Beyji, Sinjar, and Al-Hawl. To me, those operations indicate what is possible. 

We also believe we are having a greater effect in our strikes 

against ISIL’s leadership and resources. In the days ahead, we will 

be aggressive in looking for ways to reinforce success and we will 

seize every opportunity to increase the tempo and the effectiveness 

of our operations. 

The Secretary and the President have made it clear that they expect me to deliver all of the options that may contribute to our winning the fight against ISIL. I made a commitment to them that I 

would do that and I will reaffirm that commitment to you here this 

morning. 

In closing, as I complete my initial assessment of the campaign, 

I believe we have started to identify and implement a number of 

initiatives to move the campaign forward. We are not satisfied or 

complacent about where we are, and we won’t be until ISIL is defeated. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to join you. I look forward 

to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

As we move into questions, we need to make the most of the limited time we have with the Secretary and General Dunford. So just 

as a warning, we are going to have to be strict on the time. If you 

want to make a 4-minute speech, you are not going to get much 
10 

of an answer. So let’s be respectful of the time. And I want to instruct the staff to put me on the clock starting now. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to go back to the point that Mike Vickers 

made in that article. You know him, worked with him a lot in the 

Obama administration, and he was in the previous administration 

too. His point is whatever we would do if they really were successful in attacking New York and Washington we should do now before the attack occurs, which makes a lot of sense to me. So you 

outlined eight areas of adaptation, you said, of greater effort. Why 

weren’t we doing that before? 

Secretary CARTER. The principal reason why we now have opportunities we haven’t had in the past is twofold, Mr. Chairman. The 

first is the identification of ground forces, starting with Kurds in 

northern Syria, which I mentioned, the Syrian Arab Coalition 

[SAC], Peshmerga and other forces, and forces in the south of Syria 

that are willing to fight ISIL. They have been hard to find. We 

have been looking for them. We have identified a number of them. 

By the way, we are looking for more, and we hope that the Syrian Arab Coalition, as it rolls south toward Raqqa, is like a snowball that continues to gather people who are tired of ISIL’s rule, 

who are willing to fight ISIL, and have them join, with us enabling 

them and accompanying them as appropriate, all the way down to 

Raqqa. So that is one ingredient. 

The other ingredient is our intelligence, which was not so great 

at the beginning of this, as you know, because we were surprised 

again and again and again, has improved tremendously—and by 

the way, some of that as a result of Secretary Vickers’ own work. 

That has given us opportunities both in air strikes and ground operations, like raids and so forth, that we didn’t otherwise have. 

So those are two of the things that have contributed to our being 

able to do more. And I just want to repeat something that Chairman Dunford just said, which is we are looking for and finding new 

opportunities for actionable effort every day. And to your core 

point, and I guess Secretary Vickers’ core point, I think that is absolutely right. We are doing everything that we possibly can to defeat this enemy. 

I described our strategy, I described those efforts. And we are 

doing everything, I should say, that will be effective; that we judge 

will be effective, we are doing now. And I think to answer your 

question directly; we should do everything that we can. But Chairman Dunford is also right. I have asked him, the President asked 

me and him, to continue to provide him with opportunities, and he, 

in addition to the two other factors I named, has been a great 

source of actionable ideas, in part based upon his terrific service in 

Afghanistan. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the defense authorization bill the President 

signed into law last week gives some additional opportunities and 

says basically if you find the Government of Iraq is not inclusive, 

that arms can be provided directly to the Kurds, to Sunni tribes, 

and others. Is that an option that you would consider recommending? 

Secretary CARTER. We are sending arms directly to the Kurds. 

The mechanism by which that works is that there is customs approval by the Iraqi Government—I will come back to why we stipu-
11 

late that—but there is no delay, and a large number of arms and 

other kinds of equipment have reached the Iraqi Kurds from us— 

and by the way, I should say, I think more than 12 other countries, 

a rich source. 

We do that in this way through the Government of Iraq and, 

likewise, much more slowly, and as I said, frustratingly, Sunnis, 

through the Government of Iraq, because we continue to believe 

that supporting a multisectarian approach to governance in Iraq is 

ultimately the most effective approach. 

We have considered the alternatives. I know there are other people who have considered the—but it is a considered judgment to try 

to pursue these through the government of Prime Minister Abadi. 

He has indicated a willingness to do that. Baghdad politics is complicated, we don’t always get what we want, and that is particularly the case, as I think Representative Smith indicated in, the 

matter of arming, training, and equipping Sunnis. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Just following up on that, I think that is the clearest—well, two big problems, two questions. One, what do we do in 

Iraq to find a legitimate fighting force to counter ISIL? Because it 

is not really coming out of Baghdad. I mean, what we were able 

to do during the surge some 7, 8 years ago was to get the Sunni 

tribes to turn on Al Qaeda at the time. And it seems to me that 

is the kind of thing that we are going to need to do again, is to 

reach out to those tribes, take advantage of overactions by ISIS 

groups with Baghdad. But I am not getting a clear picture here 

other than what we have heard over and over and over again, 

which is we hope that at some point the Baghdad government actually stops persecuting Sunnis and starts including them. But there 

doesn’t seem to be any possibility of that, and as the cliche ́ goes, 

hope is not a strategy. 

So what is our strategy for getting Sunnis in Iraq to be willing 

to fight ISIS? What is just the concrete, clear plan to make that 

happen? 

Secretary CARTER. The concrete, clear plan has four streams by 

which we are trying to get Sunnis included in the fight there, and 

let me just go through them. The first is through the Iraqi Security 

Forces themselves, which are now, in sectarian terms, about 20 

percent Sunni. That is one of the seeds of this whole problem from 

the beginning in the collapse the Iraqi Security Forces. At our 

training sites, we have trained Iraqi Security Forces, including 

Sunnis, and they are joining the fight, notably in the area of 

Ramadi. We would like more. Our training sites are turning them 

out every month. That is the first stream. 

The second stream is the tribal fighters, as you indicated. And 

they are, first of all, the Popular Mobilization Force [PMF], which 

is a kind of militia-type force, not independent of the Iraqi Government. And the Iraqi government, and this is where we have a problem, has authorized many more Shia than Sunni PMF. We need 

them to authorize more Sunni PMF, then we are prepared to train 

them. Those are the so-called tribal fighters that you indicated. 

Third is the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service, which we have 

trained and is the most effective force in the fight. And finally, 
12 

there is Peshmerga in the north, who have been extremely effective. 

And the last thing I will say, and I know I am going on a bit, 

but this is complicated, is we are also working with Sunni police. 

This is important, because, remember, ISIL is in Sunni territory, 

so it is not going to work for Shia forces to participate in holding 

and governing those. We need Sunni police forces—and, again, we 

are working on them too—so that when Ramadi is recaptured and 

ultimately when Mosul is recaptured, the peace can be kept there 

by people who are local Sunni and recognizable to local personnel. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. In Syria, the big challenge there is, like I said, 

we are fighting both ISIS and Assad. And I don’t think we really 

succeed against ISIS until we remove Assad. And I know we are 

talking with our allies and working on that. Russia is a huge problem, because despite what they say, their plan is simple, they are 

going to try to keep Assad no matter what. Iran, same story. And 

that just, you know, perpetuates the fight. 

What is the hope and the plan for getting us—because I think 

the key here is to get Russia and Iran to realize that Assad is not 

going to be able to protect their interests. I mean, he can’t right 

now, because he can’t control his country. How do we get to the 

point where we get a replacement for Assad to sort of take that 

wind out of ISIS’ sails and present a more representative coalition 

government? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, you are right, a political transition in 

Syria is essential to ultimately resolving the civil war there. It is 

the civil war that fuels ISIL, that fuels al-Nusra, that fuels all this 

extremism, it has been the civil war there. And there is a political 

transition in which moderate opposition and some of the structures 

of the Syrian Government, not Bashar Assad, but constitute a new 

Government of Syria that can restore some decency and some governance to the territory of Syria. That is the transition we are looking for. 

Now, you ask about the Russians. The Russians have a lot of influence with Assad. They are using it in the wrong way. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Secretary CARTER. And I have said this repeatedly, the Russians 

are wrongheaded in their strategy. They are going at it backwards. 

They had said they were going to go in to fight ISIL and promote 

a political transition. They have backed Assad and targeted people 

who are part of the opposition that needs to be part of Syria’s future. So they are off on the wrong foot. And for us to associate ourselves with what they are doing, they would have to get on the 

wrong foot—the right foot, rather. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And, Mr. Secretary, General Dunford, thank you so much for 

being here today, your leadership. 

I listened to your testimony, I have read in the papers, and we 

have had classified briefings. You all have got an unbelievable complex task in behalf of the American people, and certainly our military, thank you. 
13 

We, a few of us, back when Mr. Boehner was the Speaker, asked 

for a debate on the floor of the House for a new AUMF, Authorization [for Use] of Military Force. In fact, while he was still Speaker 

of the House, he related to the President that you need to send us 

a new AUMF, which President Obama did in February of this year, 

2015. 

Since becoming the new Speaker of the House, 22 Republicans 

and Democrats wrote to Mr. Ryan, and I just want to read one sentence and then I am going to get to my question, and we wrote this 

on November 6th. ‘‘Taken all together, these represent a significant 

escalation of United States military operations in the region and 

place U.S. military personnel on the front lines of combat operation.’’ We hear from the Senate that they say we need to put boots 

on the ground. We continue to not meet our constitutional responsibility. 

And before I get to the question, I want to remind the American 

people what James Madison said: The power to declare war, including the power of judging the causes of war, is fully and exclusively 

vested in the legislature, not the executive branch, but the legislature. 

I would like to ask you and General Dunford in this undertaking 

of trying to defeat this evil group known as ISIL, would it help 

your cause if the Congress met its constitutional responsibility of 

debating a new AUMF? Would it give strength to what you are trying to do, especially with these other countries who are our allies? 

Would it help you in this fight to defeat ISIL if the Congress would 

meet its constitutional responsibility? And I would appreciate a 

statement from each one of you. Thank you. 

Secretary CARTER. Okay. Well, I will go first. The President has 

submitted an AUMF. I looked at it carefully. This was some 

months ago. I testified about it, and I said I asked myself two questions. The first was whether the AUMF as the President proposed 

it would give us the authority to conduct the campaign that is necessary to defeat ISIL. And without going into the details, my answer to that was yes, the one he submitted did, not every one that 

everyone else has proposed would. That one did. 

But the second thing I asked myself was, would this show to our 

troops that their country is behind them? I think they know we are 

behind them. I think they know you are behind them. Would this 

show that the country was behind them in their effort? I think they 

deserve to know that, and for that reason, I think it is desirable 

to have an AUMF. 

The only thing I would say is the lawyers tell me that we don’t 

technically need one, so I will just add that. We can conduct what 

we need to do within the law. But I think it would be helpful, principally because I think you can’t do enough to show the troops that 

we are behind them and that this is a big deal and it is serious 

and the country is behind them. 

Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. Sir, I have a similar answer. It is my understanding that we currently have all the authorities that we need 

to prosecute the campaign against ISIL, but I absolutely believe 

that a clear and unequivocal statement of support for the men and 
14 

women that are prosecuting the campaign and our allies from their 

elected officials would be absolutely helpful. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, since I took all of my time less, I 

want you to know I can do it under 5 minutes, so therefore, I yield 

back 51 seconds. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks for being a good example. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, once again for being before us. I had 

several questions, some of which have already been answered, but 

let me add a couple and see what you are thinking of. 

You said that we are now arming the Kurds. The last time I 

talked to [President of Iraqi Kurdistan Masoud] Barzani he suggested that they needed heavier duty weapons versus light arms. 

And so my question, my first question would be, what are we arming them with? I mean, is it really for the battlefield that they 

find? 

Secondly, I would like you to address this whole issue with respect to the Iraqi Army and the inability for us to really get it integrated or for Iraq’s government to get it integrated. I remember 

back in—under the constitution and under the deal, the whole 

issue of, for example, having a vote on the Kurd area being an 

independent entity, for example. That was something that I continued to ask our military leaders at the time who were overseeing 

Iraq, and the reality was they kept saying that is the hardest part, 

that is the hardest part, we are going to get to it. We never got 

to it, and we left. So now we see the fruits of that in the sense that 

we still are not able to have a military or police force that is very 

integrated. So what do we do about that? 

So we have been taking back territory in Iraq, and one of the 

issues that we had is we have—I mean, it always takes additional—we need to leave troops there or we need to leave somebody 

there in order to hold onto it, otherwise we end up losing that territory. So what is our strategy to do that? 

And the recruitment effort, I would like, and I am sure that it 

would be not within the public realm, but I would love to get a 

brief on the cyber issues and how we are countering the recruitment effort with respect to ISIS, ISIL, whatever you want to call 

them these days, from a global perspective, but in particular are 

we doing anything that you can talk about in this setting with respect to the recruitment effort in the region itself? 

And lastly, DIME, diplomacy, intelligence, military, economic, 

you know, it is not just military that we need here. So, Secretary, 

if you could speak a little to what are some of the other efforts that 

we are doing to counteract what is really something we need to 

eliminate, which is ISIS. 

Thank you. 

Secretary CARTER. Congresswoman Sanchez, I will touch on a 

few of the points and ask the Chairman, especially with respect to 

arming the Kurds, if you don’t mind, Mr. Chairman, and generally 

the Iraqi Security Forces. 

You talk about DIME. Absolutely it is essential that we recognize 

that even though we, I believe this is absolutely true, are the center of the campaign, because there must be a military defeat of 
15 

ISIL, and I also believe that Iraq and Syria, since it is the heart 

of ISIL, we have to defeat it there. 

That said, this is a global fight, it is a multidimensional fight, 

it is in the intelligence sphere, it is in the homeland security 

sphere, it is in the law enforcement sphere. And I won’t go into 

much more to say about that except that I have begun to convene, 

with Secretary Kerry, and I appreciate his cooperation in this regard, all of the agencies and going through what we are all doing 

and making sure the right hand knows what the left is. So, for example, in cyber, you are right, I can’t talk about it here, I am 

happy to come give you a classified briefing, but we are linked up, 

and that is very important, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], Jim Comey, Homeland Security, the intelligence community, 

and our DOD [Department of Defense] people. 

Last thing I will say is you ask have we thought about a hold 

force. The necessity for a hold force is at the root of our strategy. 

Our strategy is to find, identify, and enable forces that can not only 

take territory, but hold territory, because we know from the last 14 

years that that is the tricky part. The hard part about getting victory to stick is to find people who can hold territory and govern it 

decently so that the likes of ISIL don’t come back. And as I said, 

they are hard to find. They do exist, but they are hard to find, and 

we are going to try to make a snowball and get more. 

Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, with regard to the Kurds, 

the Kurds have, as you know, you have been there many times, a 

full range of heavy weapons, heavy vehicles, and our assessment is 

they have the capability to take the fight to ISIL, and, in fact, their 

recent success in Sinjar demonstrates that. 

I was over in October and I did speak to President Barzani. He 

identified some additional support that he wanted, some specific 

ammunition types that he felt like he didn’t have in sufficient 

quantities, and we were working immediately to address that 

shortfall. 

So my assessment is they have the military capability to do what 

must be done, and we are additionally providing aviation support 

and other combined arms capabilities. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, General, if you would like to amplify, please feel free, but try to keep us close to on time. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. General Dunford, you heard the chairman’s admonishment of staying within 5 minutes, so I am going to ask you to 

have your answers as succinct as possible, and if you want to 

elaborate, you can do that in writing. 

You heard the Secretary of Defense today say both in writing 

and verbally that we are at war. Who declared that war? 

General DUNFORD. Representative Forbes, I think what the Secretary was saying, because we have discussed this, is we view the 

fight against ISIL as a threat to the United States and we are mobilizing all of the military capabilities that are necessary—— 

Mr. FORBES. Who would have actually made that declaration? Is 

that something you would make, the Secretary would make—— 

General DUNFORD. If it was a technical declaration of war, it 

would be the Congress. 
16 

Mr. FORBES. But has that declaration been made? 

General DUNFORD. No, it has not. 

Mr. FORBES. So then how does the Secretary say we are at war? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, why doesn’t the Secretary say for himself? 

Mr. FORBES. I understand, but I only have 5 minutes. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I am just going to tell you, by doing that 

I am not—— 

Mr. FORBES. Chairman, I would ask the Secretary, if he wants 

to elaborate, he can do it in writing. He is taking my 5 minutes. 

General Dunford, can you tell me, as the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs, if you know? 

General DUNFORD. We are technically not at war, Representative 

Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. So if we are effectively not at war, let me ask you 

this—— 

General DUNFORD. A declared war. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Have we currently contained ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. We have not contained ISIL—— 

Mr. FORBES. Have they been contained at any time since 2010? 

General DUNFORD. Tactically in areas they have been. Strategically they have spread since 2010. 

Mr. FORBES. Can you ask me if our current strategy, in your best 

personal and professional military judgment, that we have currently implemented, do we have a strategy that will defeat and destroy ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. I think the right components of a strategy are 

in place, Representative Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Is that the strategy that was recommended by the 

Joint Chiefs? 

General DUNFORD. The current strategy, and particularly the 

military dimension of the strategy, is the strategy that was recommended by the Joint Chiefs. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you have any knowledge of whether your predecessor was ever consulted from 2010 until he left office regarding 

the appropriate strategy for dealing with ISIL in his best personal 

and professional military judgment or the best personal military 

judgment of the Joint Chiefs? 

General DUNFORD. I am confident that he was routinely consulted. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you have any knowledge as to whether he was 

consulted? 

General DUNFORD. I do. I was a member of the Joint Chiefs at 

the same time. 

Mr. FORBES. Was the strategies implemented since 2010 the 

strategies that were recommended by the Joint Chiefs? 

General DUNFORD. I can’t speak to all the way back to 2010, 

Congressman Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. How long were you on the Joint Chiefs? 

General DUNFORD. Eleven months before assuming my current 

position. 

Mr. FORBES. All right. During that 11 months, were the strategies implemented at that time the strategies that were recommended by the Joint Chiefs? 
17 

General DUNFORD. We didn’t make a recommendation on the 

strategy during those 11 months. The only recommendations we 

made happened subsequent to that time, which is when I was the 

Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. And, General, in your best personal and professional military judgment, do you believe our strategies since 2010 

were the appropriate military strategies to defeat and destroy 

ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman Forbes, I think we have the 

right elements of the strategy in place today. 

Mr. FORBES. Did we have them since 2010? 

General DUNFORD. I don’t believe the campaign was fully resourced since 2010. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back. 

Thank you, General. And feel free to elaborate on any of that you 

want to in writing. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 79.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, if there is something you 

want—— 

Mr. FORBES. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing].to say about the comments about—— 

Secretary CARTER. No, I just want to be candid. I am not using 

this in some technical sense. But this is serious business, and so 

I believe—— 

Mr. FORBES. And Mr. Secretary—— 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. That is what I mean by war. It 

feels like that to our people who are engaged in it and it has that 

kind of gravity. So it is not a technical thing, it is a descriptive. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, since I have 60 seconds left, in all 

due respect to the Secretary, the word ‘‘war’’ is not just some light 

term. When we use ‘‘war’’ it is a technical word and it needs to be 

used very, very carefully, I think, whether we use it in this committee or use it elsewhere. And with that, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to both of you, of course, for being here and the 

challenges that you are facing. 

I wanted to go back to the AUMF for a second, because I know 

that you have said that you have whatever you need basically in 

terms of the authorities, and yet I have an understanding that in 

Afghanistan, for example, that in fact we have had some inability 

to act preemptively. Would that be the case in any way? 

Secretary CARTER. Since General Dunford was our commander 

there, I think he is probably in the best position to—I will let him 

answer that. 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman Davis, Afghanistan is a declared area of hostilities, and certainly as the commander there I 

didn’t have any restrictions on my ability to act when there was 

a threat to U.S. forces or to the mission. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And, again, preemptively, that was not a problem? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely. I mean, if we had actionable intelligence that there was a threat to the force or a threat to the mis-
18 

sion or, frankly, during my time in Afghanistan, a threat to Afghan 

Security Forces, we were authorized to act against individuals or 

groups designated as hostile. 

Mrs. DAVIS. All right. Thank you. I appreciate that. There 

seemed to be some misunderstanding at some point. 

I also wanted to just go back. You talked about the oil infrastructure campaign, and I am wondering whether there was some decision not to act as quickly in that regard as perhaps we could have 

while there was—could be considered a longer way to do that, and 

what the impacts of that actually are in terms of impact on the 

pocketbook, of course, of ISIL, on the oil trade, and what impact 

that might have on the future, actually, of the region itself, of the 

Sunni region. 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman Davis, I will start with that. 

Back in the spring a detailed analysis was done in conjunction with 

the State Department on the oil infrastructure in Syria and Iraq, 

but in Syria, to identify the critical nodes that if targeted would 

have the greatest impact against the revenue stream of ISIL. And 

so over the course of a couple of months that was heavily studied 

and then brought to Secretary Carter and Secretary Kerry about 

4 weeks ago. 

We had been striking oil infrastructure, but we were able to do 

it in a much more sophisticated, much more effective way subsequent to that study being completed. So that is why you have seen 

a significant increase in the tempo of our strikes over the past couple of weeks. We estimate that approximately 43 percent of the revenue stream that ISIL derives from oil has been affected over the 

past 30 days, and we are continuing now to aggressively pursue not 

only strikes against their oil revenue, but also their cement and 

other industries from which they draw their primary funds. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Anything else? And in terms of the cooperation with 

allies in that regard as well. 

General DUNFORD. The coalition, we have what is called an air 

tasking order, so the coalition is integrated into that air tasking 

order, they conduct strikes. And the coalition is also supporting the 

strikes that we are conducting against the infrastructure. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. And I want to shift just quickly. What 

are your concerns about Pakistan’s commitment to eliminating terrorist organizations? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, we hosted Pakistani leaders here in 

Washington, the Chairman and I, of course the President, just in 

recent weeks, and we do press them on the need to fight terrorists 

and to recognize that terrorism is a threat to Pakistan as well as 

to its neighbors, and by the way, I should add, to U.S. forces in the 

region. So we are concerned about it, we do press them on that and 

urge them to recognize what we think is true, which is that that 

is in fact the principal threat to the Pakistani state today, comes 

from terrorist organizations within. 

Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman Davis, I mean, we are never 

satisfied with the level of cooperation and support that we have 

from Pakistan, but we do have open lines of communication. As 

Secretary Carter said, we recently had the Pakistanis here. I met 

with my counterpart, General Raheel, about 10 days ago. 
19 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes, and I know. And the chairman also hosted, yes. 

General DUNFORD. And what I do believe is that over the past 

18 to 24 months in particular the Pakistanis realize that violent extremism presents an existential threat to the state of Pakistan. 

And I think as a result, the level of cooperation has improved over 

the past year and a half or two years. It is not today, in my assessment, what it needs to be in order for us to be effective, and we 

will continue to work with our Pakistani partners to make sure 

that it gets better. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Are there any tools that we could be 

using, should be using to gain more support? 

The CHAIRMAN. If you all would submit those in written form, I 

would appreciate it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 79.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, who does it feel like we are at war with? 

Secretary CARTER. ISIL and its accompanying. And by the way, 

I wasn’t speaking of myself. And I don’t use this word lightly. I am 

talking of the troops who are involved in it, Congressman. So I 

think that is who feels that they are at war—— 

Mr. MILLER. I understand, but who is the enemy? 

Secretary CARTER. The enemy is ISIL and associated groups, extremists. 

Mr. MILLER. Have you ever heard any Member of Congress say 

we are at war with Muslims? 

Secretary CARTER. No. 

Mr. MILLER. Why would the President on foreign soil last week 

say that, quote, ‘‘GOP’s rhetoric has become the most potent recruitment tool for the militant group.’’ Why would he say that? 

Secretary CARTER. I can’t say. I am not familiar with that quote 

by the President. What I do know the President has said in the 

past, which is obviously true, is that we recognize that this is not 

Islam, per se, that stands behind the Islamic State, it is a particular group of very radical extremists. And that is an important 

distinction to make. I don’t know, I have always heard the President make that distinction—— 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I don’t even think he 

uses the word ‘‘radical extremists.’’ But I think it is pretty disingenuous when he makes this into a political football using language on foreign soil, that has never been said, for political purposes. This committee tries not to do that, and I think the President should do the exact same thing. 

He also said that we are gaining—and you did as well—that we 

are gaining back ground that ISIS has taken and that it is diminishing their recruiting capacity, implying that it is harder for them 

to recruit fighters. 

So my question is, is it a bigger recruiting tool for attacks like 

Paris or expanding their territory? Because the President has said 

and others have implied that as the area shrinks it is harder for 

them to recruit and they are losing fighters. 

Secretary CARTER. I will start, and then the Chairman can pitch 

in. 
20 

I do think that attacks like Paris are aimed at and probably have 

some effect on recruiting to the cause people worldwide who observed that; young radicals, we have had some in our own country 

who have watched the television, been on the Internet. Within 

Syria and Iraq, recruiting for fighters on the ground there, we are 

trying to dry up that supply of recruits, both by making it harder 

to get into Syria and by destroying them when they are there, as 

well as the ultimate, which is to create local forces and a local system of governance that is more attractive to people than joining 

these violent extremists. 

Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I believe that what ISIL is trying to do is, again, advance a narrative of inevitable success and 

invincibility. And so I would expect that they will do two things: 

One, continue to grab territory and establish the caliphate, and 

also conduct external operations that will incentivize others to join 

the movement and also attract resources to the movement. 

Mr. MILLER. General, which do you think they will focus on or 

will they do it simultaneously, regaining territory or increasing 

broader attacks here and other places? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think they are the ultimate 

opportunists and they will take advantage of all of the above whenever the opportunity presents itself. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, and General, thank you for your testimony today. 

I would like to turn my attention first to your statement, page 

3, when you talked about the expeditionary targeting force. And in 

particular it says, ‘‘The special operators will over time be able to 

conduct raids, free hostages, gather intelligence, and capture ISIL 

leaders. That creates a virtuous cycle of better intelligence, which 

generates more targets, more raids, and more momentum.’’ 

The line that was in the statement but you didn’t mention in 

your oral testimony was that, ‘‘This force will also be in a position 

to conduct unilateral operations into Syria.’’ I thought that was significant. I just wanted to explore that a bit. Exactly what does that 

mean and what will those—how extensive will those types of raids 

be? 

Secretary CARTER. That is true. That is in the statement. It is 

very important. We have obviously conducted such raids already. 

If you remember the raid that led to the killing of Abu Sayyaf and 

the capture of his wife and a young Yazidi woman who was being 

held as a slave, a raid into Syria in which we freed 70 prisoners 

who were going to be executed and actually lost an American service member heroically in that action. 

And this is an important capability because it takes advantage 

of what we are good at. We are good at intelligence. We are good 

at mobility. We are good at surprise. We have the long reach that 

no one else has. And it puts everybody on notice in Syria that you 

don’t know at night who is going to be coming in the window. And 

that is the sensation that we want all of ISIL’s leadership and followers to have. So it is an important capability. 

Let me ask the Chairman if he wants to elaborate on that. 
21 

General DUNFORD. I think the one point that you have highlighted, Mr. Secretary, is the intelligence piece, and I think that is 

the most important thing. 

Our effectiveness is, obviously, inextricably linked to the quality 

of intelligence we have, and our assessment is that this force and 

the operations this force will conduct will provide us additional intelligence that will make our operations much more effective. And 

I think that is what the Secretary refers to when he talks about 

the virtuous cycle. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So do you expect that these raids, this use of special forces going into Syria are going to increase exponentially or 

will the primary focus be within Iraq itself? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, our operations will be intel 

driven. The enemy doesn’t respect boundaries; neither do we. We 

are fighting a campaign across Iraq and Syria, so we are going to 

go where the enemy is and we are going to conduct operations 

where they most effectively degrade the capabilities of the enemy. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. To what extent are the financial flows behind each of the bad actors present in Syria, including ISIL, vulnerable to interdiction, and to what extent are we, our allies, and 

our partners disrupting those flows? 

Secretary CARTER. I will start. The Chairman spoke of the oil infrastructure previously. And as we learn more, we are better able 

to target that part of critical infrastructure like oil. The Chairman 

mentioned cement also, which turns out to be a big source of revenue for ISIL. And also that precision allows us to strike those 

parts of the oil infrastructure that are fueling the revenues of ISIL. 

We don’t wish to destroy the entire oil revenue infrastructure of 

Syria or Iraq because someday those countries are going to need to 

be restored to decent governance, but we have to destroy that 

which fuels ISIL, and we are getting better at distinguishing those 

two. And that better intelligence, that better insight is what has 

allowed us to take this next step. And I think it is going to be pretty effective. We are looking to do more. 

General DUNFORD. Just a quick follow-up, Congressman. Just to 

be clear, we do assess today that the majority of the revenue that 

core ISIL has is generated from within Iraq and Syria in the ways 

that the Secretary outlined, the oil industry primarily, other industries like cement, and then taxes on local people. And some of those 

taxes are actually taxes on resources paid by the Government of 

Iraq and Syria, so we have been able to kind of stop that as well. 

So I do think that we are in a position and have over the past 

several weeks had a pretty significant impact on the revenue 

source of core ISIL. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So my last question. We have talked this morning 

about nations, surrounding nations in the region being more on the 

same page and going after, targeting ISIL, particularly the Sunni 

states in the area. How do we get them to be make this their first 

priority given the fact that Saudi Arabia, for example, their primary concern is Iran and expansion? 

Secretary CARTER. In view of the time, it is a very important 

question. Why don’t I take it for the record and we will get back 

to you in written form. It is a very important question. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 
22 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Secretary and General, thank you for being 

here. 

And General Dunford, I have had the opportunity to represent 

Parris Island, and so I know firsthand how working with young 

people, you transform them into extraordinary people with the 

highest level of fulfillment that they could ever achieve. And so it 

is just awesome what the Marine Corps does. 

I appreciate both of you making recommendations to the President to protect American families from further attacks, but the 

President has established a legacy of failure, not accepting commonsense proposals to promote peace. This was cited last week by 

The Washington Post editorial page editor Fred Hiatt, who courageously confirmed, quote, ‘‘He withdrew all U.S. troops from Iraq 

when experts advised that a residual force of 15,000 would help 

keep a fragile peace. He bombed Libya to overthrow its dictator, 

but opposed a small NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 

training force that might have stabilized the new government.’’ 

With the President not accepting your recommendations, Mr. 

Secretary, there are plans for the deployment of approximately 50 

special operations soldiers to northern Syria to advise and assist 

Kurdish and Arab fighters fighting ISIS or Daesh. The White 

House press secretary has said these special operations forces will 

be able to assess the situation on the ground and help local fighters 

with operational planning, tactics, and logistics. 

Given the complicated sociopolitical divide between the Kurds 

and the local Syrian forces, do you believe that this will be successful? And what are the decision points for the strategy? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, we do believe it has every chance of 

being successful. But this is a transactional relationship with these 

forces wherein we provide them some support, we provide them 

some equipment, and we see how they do. In fact, that is what we 

are doing all over. So far, they have shown a willingness to take 

territory, made good use of our equipment, and that is the reason 

why we are prepared to do more with them. 

And by the way, as I said, this I hope will be like a snowball. 

If they do well, we will do more. That will gather more fighters into 

their movement. And, of course, where we would like them to go 

down is to Raqqa and reclaim this so-called capital of the so-called 

caliphate. But it is very transactional because we have to see how 

they are doing and what their level of motivation and effectiveness 

is. 

Mr. WILSON. And, of course, it is bipartisan. We want you to be 

successful. 

Mr. Secretary, the basis of this hearing is to determine the suitable strategy to deal with ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Most recently, 

we have seen ISIS spread terror beyond the region. The President 

has stated on a number of occasions that ISIS is contained. Senator 

Dianne Feinstein, Democrat of California, the ranking member of 

the Senate Intelligence Committee, has expressed a sense of urgency. Recently she said, quote, ‘‘We have to be prepared for an 
23 

ISIS attack on the U.S. homeland. I have never been more concerned.’’ 

Senator Feinstein said, quote, ‘‘I read the intelligence faithfully.’’ 

And then she added, ‘‘ISIL is not contained. ISIL is expanding.’’ 

Her comments serve as a direct rebuttal to the President’s statement, just hours before the mass murders in Paris, we had, quote, 

‘‘From the start, our goal has been to contain ISIS and keep them 

contained,’’ end of quote. 

What specifically does containment of ISIS mean to you? And in 

practical terms, what is DOD doing that it should do to contain 

ISIS? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, our strategy is to destroy ISIL in Syria 

and Iraq and anywhere else it arises. And with respect to the 

homeland, while we don’t have any credible imminent threats that 

I can relate to you today, fortunately, we do take homeland security very seriously. And we particularly take the protection of our 

own personnel seriously for, among other reasons, the fact that 

they were—many of them were singled out by these guys like 

Junaid Hussein, who were trying to recruit Americans. 

A few months ago I went to Chattanooga on a Sunday afternoon. 

There was a ceremony for six of our service members gunned down 

by somebody who had been radicalized basically online, born and 

raised in Chattanooga, Tennessee. 

So this is serious business, the violent extremist tendencies, and 

while we need to get its heart in Syria and Iraq, we need to recognize that this metastasizes elsewhere and protect ourselves and 

protect our people. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Carter and General Dunford, thank you very much for 

being at the hearing this morning. 

Gentlemen, having just returned last week from a congressional 

trip to Afghanistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, with our mission 

being—our main mission being the influence of ISIL in this region, 

I came back—and this is a personal observation—with the idea 

that we have to step up or accelerate our strategies, with the assistance of our allies, of course. Air power. Sea power. Boots on the 

ground. 

And one thing that was brought out in all of the country briefings in these countries was the sharing of intelligence information. 

It is not up to par. And if we can accelerate with all of this power, 

with our allies, I think it would be one way to wipe out this barbarian group once and for all. 

Gentlemen, the entire world is on alert. The American people are 

on edge. There are ISIL cells in our States here in America. So I 

am just wondering what your ideas are on accelerating this mission 

that we have to wipe out ISIL, and what about the intelligence information sharing? 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Congresswoman. I will come to 

the intel piece first. 

First of all, I think your observation is actually exactly right on 

the mark and is a fact. And in the wake of Paris that has been one 

of the things that was identified. 
24 

We have a reasonably good information sharing within the 

United States across the interagency; certainly not perfect, but we 

work that pretty hard every day. As you saw in the wake of Paris, 

other nations not only have a challenge sharing information with 

other countries, but they have difficulty sharing information with 

other agencies within the same country. That has been recognized 

as an issue. 

Certainly, as Secretary Carter and I work on one of the more 

fundamental issues, the foreign fighter issue, that has been identified as probably the single biggest thing that inhibits our ability to 

stop the flow of foreign fighters, is information and intelligence 

sharing across all the countries that are affected. And we think 

there is at least 100, maybe 120 countries that have individuals 

who have actually gone to Syria and Iraq to fight and presumably 

will return home at some point. And so there is a strong imperative 

to do that. 

With regard to accelerating the campaign, you know, Secretary 

Carter and I have talked about what we are doing inside of Iraq 

and Syria, but also recognize that this is a transregional threat 

that requires a global strategy. And as we are conducting operations in Syria and Iraq, and as we are trying to create pressure 

simultaneously across ISIL in Iraq and Syria, we are trying to do 

the same thing in all of the other locations where ISIL exists. And 

we assess today there is certainly a number of branches that are 

sanctioned by ISIL and a number of other groups that are striving 

to become part of ISIL. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, General. 

I do agree with much of what was said today, and I do know that 

I understand the difficulties and challenges in dealing with different cultures and different countries. But I really think that, you 

know, it is going beyond what we ever expected. And now we are 

just all up in the air about whether this is going to hit our own 

country. So I just hope that we can work together and try to beef 

up. 

We have been with our allies now for a long time. Many of them 

we train their troops. So I do think we are ready to step it up and 

once and for all wipe out this barbarian group. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I know you are aware of the fact that there have 

been allegations that intelligence officials at CENTCOM have 

skewed findings on the ISIS war to please their superiors and to 

please those in Washington. I am holding a Daily Beast article 

from November 23. It says, ‘‘Analysts Accuse CENTCOM of Covering Up Cooked ISIS Intelligence.’’ The article goes on to say that 

the inspector general is looking into CENTCOM’s perhaps cooking 

the intelligence to make the picture more rosy than what is occurring. And it goes on to have a concern that, in fact, emails and documents may have been deleted before they were turned over to investigators concerning the CENTCOM doctoring or making a more 

rosy appearance. In fact, the chairman and I sit on the Intelligence 

Committee also. The chairman of the Intelligence Committee has 
25 

sent to the inspector general a letter inquiring about the allegations of those documents having been deleted. 

Now, I said I sit on the Intelligence Committee. I have also attended the classified portions of briefings at this committee, and 

you have said you can only go into so far in this hearing. In your 

written testimony you say, some of this, I can only tell you what 

is unclassified. But you say, ‘‘We are gathering momentum on the 

battlefield in Syria and Iraq.’’ You say, ‘‘All of these efforts from 

northern Syria through Iraq have shrunk the ISIL-controlled territory in both.’’ 

Mr. Secretary, you can understand my concern that while we 

have allegations that CENTCOM is doctoring intelligence to make 

things a rosy picture and while you sit before us and say we are 

gathering momentum and their footprint has shrunk, well, General 

Dunford sitting next to you has admitted that ISIL is not contained, that we are all a little concerned that you are giving us a 

rosy picture. And I personally believe, I think as many do, that not 

only do we not really have a strategy, but you can’t have a strategy 

unless it is based on an accurate picture of what is happening and 

the threat that we have. 

Mr. Secretary, how do you respond to the allegations that the Department of Defense, CENTCOM, perhaps even your own testimony today is painting a much rosier picture than what we are facing? 

Secretary CARTER. First of all, with respect to intelligence, and 

I insist upon accurate, candid advice from the intelligence community and I don’t rely upon just one source. 

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate that commitment, Mr. Secretary, but 

the question is about ISIL and Syria and Iraq. You have made 

statements here in your written statement that their footprint is 

shrinking, has been shrunk. General Dunford is saying they are 

not contained. You say that we are gathering momentum. I know 

everybody has been in the classified briefings that we have had 

here. No one has ever said that to us before. And when you put 

that in the same context of CENTCOM having allegations that 

they have doctored intelligence as to what the circumstances are, 

I think you have somewhat of a high bar to pass to be able to sit 

in front of us and tell us that the battlefield is—it is turning in our 

direction. How do you justify that? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, let’s just be clear about what I said. The 

territory under ISIL’s control has shrunk. That is a fact. And that 

is not a fact that I would suggest is the end of the story. I tell you 

we need more momentum. We need to keep that up. So I am very 

careful. 

Mr. TURNER. Who controls the territory where it has shrunk in 

Syria? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, Kurds, for example. 

Mr. TURNER. And in Iraq? 

Secretary CARTER. Kurds, also, for example. 

Mr. TURNER. And was that part—— 

Secretary CARTER. That is a fact. Is there still a lot farther to 

go? You bet there is. And I am committed, and I will be, and I have 

been absolutely candid with you, I expect intelligence officials to be 
26 

candid with me. I can’t comment on an inspector general investigation. 

Mr. TURNER. So, Mr. Secretary—— 

Secretary CARTER. But I will tell you—— 

Mr. TURNER. It is my time. So it is your testimony here today, 

because the Kurds have made advances, that we have momentum 

and that ISIL is shrinking? 

Secretary CARTER. For that and a number of other reasons we 

are gathering momentum and it is a fact that the territory under 

ISIL’s control has shrunk. That is not a declaration of victory. It 

is a—— 

Mr. TURNER. You have indicated that it is war. Are we winning, 

Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary CARTER. We will win. 

Mr. TURNER. Are we winning now? 

Secretary CARTER. We are going to win. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, Mr. Secretary, you know, most of us on both 

sides of the aisle do not have confidence that you have a strategy 

and that you do not have a strategy based on an accurate assessment. I think your presentation here today shows a disconnect between what all the information that we are receiving and really 

what is being placed into the United States effort. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank both witnesses for their testimony today, particularly the, in my opinion, very powerful statement that both of 

you articulated about the fact that it is Congress’—if we want to 

do something on our side of the witness table, we need to act. We 

need to move forward on an Authorization of Use of Force and the 

general’s comments in terms of the impact that would have on 

those wearing the uniform that are out there taking the fight. 

Frankly, I just hope people will take that to heart. The fingerpointing and chest-thumping that goes on up here sometimes at 

the same time that we have been sitting since February when the 

President sent over language for an Authorization of Use of Force 

and have done nothing is just totally inexcusable and unacceptable. 

I wanted, though, to point or just focus for a moment on the fact 

that we did actually in 2014 move forward on title 10 authorization, which was incorporated into the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], that gave authority for train-and-equip operations. 

You alluded to it, Mr. Secretary, in terms of that program. Again, 

the out-of-country training seemed to have sort of fizzled out. I 

guess the question I want to ask is, is that a dead letter now or 

are you using it in other ways to, again, take the fight to ISIL? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, we are continuing to train and equip 

forces. We are doing it in different ways as we learn more. And we 

are now, particularly in Syria, we have found groups that already 

exist and are fighting and which we can enable with special capabilities and train people specially to accompany them or send 

Americans to accompany them. That is preferable to trying to create entirely new units by taking individuals out of the country and 

trying to put them together. 
27 

We are still—we will continue—we are going to try everything 

that works. So we are doing some of the latter down in southern 

Syria and having some success at doing that, at forming units to 

fight ISIL. But we also continue to look and to find forces that are 

willing to fight ISIL and to give them the equipment, the training, 

and the enabling that will allow them to be successful. And we are 

doing that all over Syria and all over Iraq, and that is the key to 

getting a continued momentum. 

Chairman, do you have anything to add to that? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think the thing that is important is that we are going to need indigenous ground forces and regional ground forces to be successful. So it really is a question, as 

the Secretary outlined, we have changed the method of developing 

those indigenous ground forces, but the end state has remained 

consistent, and the authorities that we have in the NDAA are exactly the ones we need to continue to progress. 

I will give you an example. We were training individuals. We 

brought them into Turkey. We tried to send them back into the 

fight in Syria. We didn’t believe that that was going to get us to 

where we needed to be as fast as we needed to get there. So we 

decided to go with vetted groups and we are currently supporting 

the Syrian Arab Coalition, which is actually one of the groups that 

has had some success in Al-Hawl and is moving now down towards 

Raqqa, which is where core ISIL resides. That authority is what we 

are using to support those forces right now. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And I appreciate you mentioning that specific 

scenario because, again, I think it shows that, you know, there are 

tangible results when we moved as a Congress on a bipartisan 

basis to give you the tools to succeed. And that is why it is really 

not just, you know, a cable news debating topic here in terms of 

authorization. I mean, there is real value in terms of helping us accomplish the goal here, is as Congress, you know, listening to the 

military needs and moving forward and giving people the tools to 

succeed. 

And the taking of Al-Hawl is a perfect example of that, which, 

again, there is no intelligence question about whether that happened. I mean, it has been reported in every sort of international 

media out there. It succeeded. And we should be looking for those 

opportunities on our side of the witness table in terms of giving you 

the tools to move forward. 

And with that I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I want to take a few 

seconds to weigh in on the ‘‘are we at war?’’ question, which was 

so busily discussed up here on the top row. 

If you go back to the 9/11 Commission Report, they very clearly 

stated that we are at war, that we have an enemy, it is Islamic terrorists, and that they are waging war against us. And I would 

argue they are continuing to wage war against us. So whether we 

like it or not, we are in a war. 

Having said that, I think it would be very, very useful if we 

would indeed debate and pass a new Authorization for the Use of 

Military Force to clear up this kind of esoteric discussion. 
28 

General Dunford, when I was in Baghdad a few months ago I 

was talking to American troops, and even though we theoretically 

don’t have troops on the ground, there were some 3,500 American 

troops on the ground. But I was told we can’t have any more than 

that, we are at a limit. 

So my question is, is that true? Are we limited in what we do 

by a number, whether it is 3,500 or maybe now it is 3,550, if we 

are sending some special operating forces over there? Are we limited to a number? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks for asking that question. I have had that conversation with our commanders on the 

ground as well. 

I do not believe we are limited by the number 3,500. We are 

managing 3,500 because that is the number of troops that the 

President has approved to date. But I can assure that you I don’t 

feel at all inhibited about making recommendations that would 

cause us to grow greater than 3,500 were I to believe it would help 

us defeat ISIL. And I have told our commanders, to include General MacFarland as recently as 10 days ago, to not be inhibited at 

all in identifying to me the capabilities he needs on the ground, regardless of the force management level, which is really what you 

are referring to, that 3,500, and that I will bring those options to 

the Secretary and the President. 

Mr. KLINE. Well, I am only somewhat relieved to hear that because I hate to think that we are down to managing a number 

where we have to go to President of the United States to go from 

3,500 to 3,600, or to 3,700, or 3,800. And right now it is my understanding, for example, you, if you needed to, you couldn’t move in 

a battalion of attack helicopters or combat search and rescue or 

something to be stationed in or around Baghdad. 

And I just—you and I, frankly, have had this discussion before, 

including about Afghanistan—and I just think it is a terrible imposition on the military campaign to complete a strategy which I, like 

others, am not at all convinced we really have at this point. But 

presumably you have got a strategy to fight and win. 

If you need the forces to do it, it seems to me you ought to be 

able to move those forces without having to go to the President of 

the United States and say, ‘‘I need another 25 people.’’ And I would 

make the same argument about Afghanistan. I don’t know how we 

got—actually, I do know how we got a number that is below 

10,000. 

But my point is, is that we are getting numbers. You, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, 

and others are being asked to wage a campaign based on a cap of 

numbers in a country. And if that is not true—now you say you feel 

comfortable in going to the President of the United States and saying we need some more numbers. But right now General Austin or 

anybody else can’t send in a battalion, a company, if he feels he 

needs it in Baghdad. Is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, if I could just quickly respond. 

I view my responsibility to identify to the President and the Secretary the capabilities that the commanders need to accomplish the 

mission. And I can assure you that I will not be at all inhibited 

in bringing those recommendations forward to the President and 
29 

Secretary, regardless of what the force management levels or the 

numbers may have been articulated as in the past. I will not feel 

at all constrained in bringing forward recommendations for additional capabilities if that is what it takes us to defeat the enemy. 

Mr. KLINE. Well, the way you put that is exactly correct. It is additional capabilities. It is not numbers. If you need the capability 

to conduct combat search and rescue in a reasonable amount of 

time and fly them from Kuwait to western Iraq, to me is not a reasonable amount of time if you have to go and rescue a downed 

pilot. If you need that capability, it seems to me, Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs, that needs to be recommended. If you don’t think so 

I am a little bit surprised, because from what I hear in visits there 

and talking to others is there is a sense on the ground that they 

need some more capability. 

So please, please, please, please do not hesitate to make the recommendation to get the capability we need, whether it is in Afghanistan or whether it is in Iraq and Syria, and let’s get out of 

managing by the dag-burn numbers. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here. 

And, General Dunford, I am not sure that that isn’t the first time 

since you have become Chairman and as a son of Massachusetts, 

I particularly want to welcome you. It is proud for all of us that 

you are in the position that you are today. So thank you both for 

being here. 

And I think the discussion we have had today really does reinforce the complexity of the challenge that we face, and we have 

heard a number of those here today saying it really, I think, underscores the idea that we really need to have a robust debate that 

involves all of Congress, not just the committees that really need 

to focus on this, because it is a complex situation. We need to better understand the role of our allies, both Sunni and otherwise, 

what the costs are going to be over time, what it is going to require 

of those serving in our behalf. And so I would really like to underscore those who have called for the need to have a new Authorization for the Use of Military Force. 

But given the complexities, I just wanted to get to a couple of 

them. The administration often talks about the 65 countries that 

are participating in the coalition against ISIL. But roughly 50 of 

them have never been directly involved in the air campaign and 

while many who were participating at the beginning have ceased 

their military involvement. 

Can you tell me more about what is behind these countries’ hesitations, and in particular, as we are focusing on what we should 

be sending to the fight, whether or not there is a need for more 

combat troops, boots on the ground? What is the willingness of this 

coalition, particularly our Sunni allies, to lend their forces to the 

fight? 

So I will start with you, Secretary Carter. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, you are right, we do need them to do 

more. In Europe, as I said, the attacks in Paris have galvanized the 

French. The French are coming in very strongly in Syria, which 
30 

they hadn’t done before, and now are very willing to do so. The 

British are debating it, as I said. The Germans appear—they are 

certainly capable of doing more. We want them to do more. And so 

I would characterize for Europe, I hope that the Paris attacks galvanize all of Europe to do more, because they need to do more. 

In Syria and Iraq, elsewhere around the world, and, of course, 

in their own homelands, where, to get back to an earlier point 

made, we share intelligence on homeland security, we depend to 

some extent upon their homeland security structures when it 

comes—when people visit from Europe to the United States, and so 

forth, for our own security. And then you mentioned the Gulf states 

as well. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And that is really where my question I think is 

very important. 

Secretary CARTER. This is something that we began to discuss 

with the Gulf states back at Camp David in the spring, the President did. A natural force, in particularly the Sunni areas of Syria 

and Iraq, would be Sunni Arabs, and a more effective and insightful kind of force. They have been unwilling to field such forces—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. And what are your challenges in confronting that 

unwillingness? What is this? Can you talk more about the why? 

Secretary CARTER. I am going to be very candid with you and I 

have said this before. Many of the Gulf states weight air capabilities, air forces, and so forth, over ground forces and special operations forces. And I think that if they want to, as we would wish 

them to, wield more influence in the Middle East and do more to 

secure this part of the world in which they live too, they are going 

to need to do more of that on the ground. 

And buying our airplanes is fine, we provide them, but when it 

comes to ground forces and special operations forces there is no 

question that they need to build those forces and wield them. They 

frequently complain to me, for example, about how capable the Iranians are, to which I say, yes, and you are not in the same game, 

an effective game on the ground. 

Ms. TSONGAS. It goes to Ranking Member Smith’s statement that 

in the end the Sunni part of the Muslim world has to take this on 

in order for it to be long-term effective. 

General Dunford, I am running out of time, 5 seconds’ worth. 

General DUNFORD. Not only will we not be successful without our 

coalition partners, I don’t see any way that we can be successful 

without our coalition partners. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank both of you for being here and for your service to our 

country. 

In June of this year, Chairman Thornberry held a nuclear deterrence oversight week, and we had a series of hearings and briefings. In one of those hearings we had Deputy Secretary Bob Work 

and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Sandy Winnefeld testify. 

They both did a great job. Both of them emphasized that in their 

opinion nuclear deterrence was the highest priority of DOD and 

they reflected on Secretary Hagel’s 2014 statement to the force to 

that effect. 
31 

Secretary Carter, you now have that job. Do you share Secretary 

Hagel’s view, as well as Bob Work’s and Sandy Winnefeld’s, that 

nuclear deterrence is the highest priority for the DOD, and if so, 

why? 

Secretary CARTER. I sure do, and I actually on Thanksgiving was 

calling service members around the world, and one of the folks I 

called was a missileer who was spending his Christmas in a silo 

in North Dakota and I told him exactly that. I said, what you are 

doing is the single most important thing in the U.S. military. It is 

not in the news every day, and God help us if it is, but it is the 

bedrock of our security, and in the final analysis that it is the ultimate undergirder of American security. And that is why having an 

effective, modern, safe, secure nuclear deterrent is absolutely critical. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Well, I appreciate you doing that, because I 

share that view, and I appreciate the fact that Secretary James is 

putting a renewed emphasis on that area. It is my hope that you 

will also do your own statement to the force and be as clear on that 

issue as your predecessor was. 

But either one of you, Secretary Work, as well as Vice Chairman 

Winnefeld, Admiral Haney, Secretary Kendall, have all made the 

statement that they believe the Long-Range Stand-off weapon 

[LRSO] should be pursued to replace the current air launch cruise 

missiles. Do you all share that view, and do you see that progressing at a pace that you find acceptable? 

Secretary CARTER. I do. I do definitely support it. 

Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. I do as well, Congressman. I think it is important. We talked a minute ago about the threats to our Nation, and 

I think it is all about flexibility and options. And I think that capability reflects an important option that we ought to have were we 

to be engaged in a high-intensity conflict. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you see the progress toward that LRSO slipping 

in funding in any way? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I would personally like to take 

that for the record. I am not tracking the profile at this time. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 79.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe that it should be allowed to slip or 

be canceled? 

General DUNFORD. Well, I know that there is a timeline along 

which it needs to be met because of the obsolescence of the weapon 

system it is replacing. So we ought to have it fielded in time to 

meet the operational requirement, but I don’t know what that is 

right now. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary, do you have anything else to say? 

Secretary CARTER. Exactly to echo, and we can get back to you 

in more detail. There is a schedule to complete it. It, like a lot of 

our nuclear modernization programs, need adequate funding. That 

is not an entirely Department of Defense matter. It is a Department of Energy matter as well. So we watch it closely. But it is 

an important system and we need to manage it with our colleagues 

in the Department of Energy appropriately. We will get back to you 
32 

with some more detail on that. The important point is we support 

it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you both very much. 

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

This committee has a responsibility to conduct oversight of the 

administration’s strategy for prosecuting the U.S. counter-ISIL 

campaign, and it is quite appropriate for members of this committee to express their disagreement and disapproval of the administration’s strategy. 

However, the tone of the disagreement, disapproval, is important. Politicians know that relentless personal attacks on the President himself provoke a visceral reaction by the American people 

against the President, and that is a part of our campaign process. 

But what effect does the unprecedented level of attack on our 

Commander in Chief have on our relationships with our allies, for 

instance? What impact does it have on our ability to galvanize our 

regional and nation supporters to participate in the strategy that 

we are leading? What impact does it have on the enemies of America who we are leading the strategy against? 

If I might start by asking that question of you, Secretary Carter, 

and next of you, General Dunford. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, you can ask the question, but I am not 

going to respond to it, and I will tell you why. I serve at the pleasure of President Obama and obviously support his policies. We are 

coming into an electoral season now in the United States, which I 

respect very much. However, I also very much respect the tradition 

and necessity of Defense to be out of the political swirl, and I intend to conduct myself in that manner over the next year-and-aquarter or so of my service as Secretary of Defense. 

And I especially consider it one of my responsibilities to shield 

our military from that swirl. Their job is to do—give their professional military advice in a candid manner no matter what the politics say and to conduct the Nation’s operations to protect our people. 

So with great respect, I understand where you are coming from 

in terms of your question, but I would prefer not to answer it because of its connection with the electoral cycle. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, thank you. I respect that answer. 

And General Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. Sir, I think it is even more important for me 

in uniform to have the same position. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, thank you. 

And I assume that it probably does have some impact on our relationship with our allies and all of the other components that we 

have to work with to successfully prosecute this mission. 

I have another question. How many ISIL forces are there in Iraq 

and Syria? 

Secretary CARTER. The estimates are in the—and I want to emphasize these are estimates—so the Chairman and I are conferring 

on notes here—estimates in the neighborhood of 30,000. I hesitate 

to give numbers like that for the reason that I don’t think our in-
33 

telligence information is perfect in that regard and because they 

may involve people with varying levels of responsibility or actual 

adherence to ISIL. 

Let me see if the Chairman wants to add anything to that, but 

I would just ask everyone to take with a grain of salt numbers like 

that because we do our best, or our intelligence community does 

their very best to be accurate, but I at least look with caution upon 

those estimates. 

Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. I think that is exactly right, Mr. Secretary. 

And the estimates have been consistently between 20- and 

30,000, Congressman. But I have the same caution in sharing those 

numbers or actually, you know, confirming the veracity of those 

numbers. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank both of you for being here. 

Secretary Carter, I remember that you and I had a conversation 

here many months ago related to the Kurds and the Peshmerga efforts, and to your credit I think you strongly agreed that they had 

stood out an as effective force against ISIS. One of the Peshmerga 

commanders recently voiced a hopeful view of defeating ISIS, in my 

mind the most hopeful to date. He said, for the last 15 months that 

I have been fighting Daesh, I have never seen them so weak. They 

were literally running away. Now, that, as you know, is probably 

a general’s effort to try to improve his morale of his soldiers and 

keep going. 

But it is clear that they have done a marvelous job. And before 

ISIS brings a Paris or an Ankara or a Beirut-like attack to the 

United States, I think it is very important that we really get on 

the ball here. And as you know, this administration, ambassadors, 

two secretaries, they pushed back quite a lot related to the amendment that this committee passed to directly arm and support the 

Kurds. There was a tremendous amount of pushback and resistance to that. And I quite honestly can’t fathom the reason for that. 

But now I guess my question to you is, is everybody on the same 

page now? Is there support now for both the Senate amendment— 

it is in the NDAA—is there support to try to animate that amendment in a way that would make it most effective? I am talking 

about the amendment to support the Kurds now. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, we definitely want to support the Kurds, 

and we want to support Sunni tribes as well. I think the gist of 

your question is, will we continue to do that with, by, and through 

the government in Baghdad now. And our preference is to do that 

because our preference is to support a multisectarian, albeit decentralized government of Iraq because the alternative is sectarianism 

and down that road we know what lies there. 

So we continue to support Baghdad in that regard. And, therefore, when we arm the Kurds, as I indicated in my testimony, the 

Baghdad government gets to look at the shipments and so forth. It 

doesn’t delay them materially. And so it is not a problem from—— 
34 

† Editor Note: The widely recognized definition of ‘‘CJCS’’ is ‘‘Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff.’’ It is unclear to whom Mr. Franks was referring. 

Mr. FRANKS. But isn’t it true—not to interrupt you, sir—but isn’t 

it true that CJCS has been arming the Kurds and helping them directly? 

Secretary CARTER. I am sorry, I don’t recognize the acronym—I 

mean, I recognize the acronym, but it is for the Chairman.† 

Mr. FRANKS. General Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. When you say CJCS, Congressman—— 

Mr. FRANKS. I understand that the Kurds have been armed directly by this group. So I am just wondering is that—what I hear 

you, I hear you saying two different things. I hear you saying that 

we should support the amendment that we had here that called for 

arming the Kurds directly, but that we are still letting the Government of Iraq be sort of the referee of it all to make sure that we 

don’t upset them in some way. 

Secretary CARTER. What I am saying is that we do arm the 

Kurds. By the way, others do as well. I don’t know what organization you are referring to. But other countries are arming the Kurds 

also. We do that with—through, in this nominal manner, the government of Baghdad, for the larger reason that we support multisectarian governance in Iraq. That is simply the reason why we do 

it. 

Mr. FRANKS. But at this point, not to belabor the point here, but 

at this point there is a consensus that the administration is now 

on board with the amendments that we had or the provisions we 

had in this NDAA to step up our support for the Kurds. 

Secretary CARTER. I don’t think it is necessary for us to have language that allows us to directly support the Kurds, because we are 

able to support the Kurds in the way we are doing it now, so we 

don’t need any additional authority. But I hear your basic thinking, 

which is that the Kurds are an effective fighting force, it is important to back them up. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, the point is, 6 months ago, if we had had this 

kind of support, the landscape might looked a lot differently. And, 

you know, I don’t like to do the ‘‘I told you so thing’’ at all, but I 

just am astonished sometimes at this administration’s lackadaisical 

approach to a very dangerous enemy. And I have, unfortunately, 

run out of time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And thank you both for your leadership and service. 

And, you know, Monday morning quarterbacking is always a 

whole lot easier. And I know that you are, you know, very committed to eradicating ISIS. I would like to know how many troops 

you are intending to add to the special ops in Syria? You mentioned, Secretary, that you were intending to do that. How many 

more are you intending to offer? 

Secretary CARTER. There are two ways of answering that question. One is the particular operations that we are preparing to conduct now, I am sorry, in Syria, with our special operations forces, 

are intended to enable capable local ground forces. I would rather— 

I really can’t go into what their operations are going to be here. 
35 

Ms. SPEIER. No, I understand. You have about 50 now. 

Secretary CARTER. And they have indicated a number around 50. 

And the second thing I want to say is that is for starters. If we 

find more forces that we can enable in this way, we are prepared 

to do more. I think the Chairman and I have repeatedly said that. 

We are prepared to do more. I have every reason to believe the 

President will allow us to do more and authorize us to do more 

when we have more opportunities. We are looking for those opportunities to do more. So we are actually eager to do more because 

that will accelerate the defeat of ISIL, but it hinges upon us finding the capable local forces that we can enable in this way. And 

that is what we are looking for. And every time we find them we 

will enable them. 

So I would hope and expect—this gets back to the whole question 

of numbers. The point isn’t numbers. The point is capabilities and 

the ability to enable capable and motivated local forces. The more 

we find them, the more we will do. 

Ms. SPEIER. One other question. You referenced earlier that ISIS 

is metastasizing. I thought that was a very appropriate word and 

also a frightening word. And we know based on The New York 

Times article, certainly, that they have become somewhat entrenched in Libya. I presume, without wanting to, you know, signal 

to ISIS that we are recognizing that and taking steps to address 

that, that you have a plan that you are putting in place to deal 

with that? 

Secretary CARTER. It can’t be any secret to ISIL because we 

killed their leader in Libya a few weeks ago. So it shouldn’t come 

as any surprise that we are determined to get them wherever they 

arise. And metastasis is a good word because these radical cells pop 

up and multiply fueled by the Internet. This is the first Internet 

terrorist organization—I mean, social media, I guess, fueled terrorist organization. So it is a serious and new kind of thing. It does 

spring up everywhere. And we have to strike it everywhere that we 

find it, including Libya, and we already have. 

Ms. SPEIER. You mentioned social media, and their effectiveness 

on social media has left us somewhat flatfooted, I would suggest. 

There is some effort to grant you authorization that would allow 

you to conduct offensive cyberspace operations at the speed in 

which ISIL threats are coming in. Is that going to make a huge difference in our approach to attack them in cyberspace? 

Secretary CARTER. We are looking at, along with law enforcement and Homeland Security, ways of countering them on the 

Internet, I mean, and I will let the law enforcement community 

speak for itself. But there is a very strong effort on the part of the 

FBI to identify self-radicalizing individuals in the United States. 

They do exist, as we know from Chattanooga. 

And I might want to add, by the way, just by way clarification, 

earlier on you were asking about special operations forces in Syria. 

I was speaking of those that accompany and enable ground forces. 

I want to say in addition to that we are forming and have the expeditionary targeting force. That is a force that wouldn’t be on the 

ground all the time in Syria. It would go in, conduct raids, and go 

out. I just want to emphasize that is a larger number of people. 

Ms. SPEIER. And how many troops are included in that number? 
36 

Secretary CARTER. A larger number. I would rather give that to 

you in a classified setting, but a larger number. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Finally, the executive order that is required in order for you to—I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am having, based on what you have said this morning, having 

a difficult time getting to the scope of what needs to get done in 

Syria and Iraq. I know you used some anecdotes that we are making progress and we are gaining momentum. If I am trying to climb 

Mount Everest, I can walk 5 or 6 feet up, look you in the eye with 

a straight face, and tell you I am making progress. And if I run 

the next 15 feet, I can tell you I am gaining momentum. 

Can you tell me, not specifics, but can you tell me the Department of Defense has a game plan that says this is how many motivated local forces we need, this is, you know, everything we have 

got to go, so that you can share with the committee so we could 

see the scope of what has to get done in this effort? Is that laid 

out in your—not for public dissemination, but for our point being 

able to see what have you done, what needs to get done in the 

scope of this issue? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I think the outlines of that are very 

clear. That is what the strategy is about. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I have got the strategy. I got that, Ash. But, I 

mean, how many local forces and how many X, Ys? Do you guys 

know that yet? 

General Dunford. 

Secretary CARTER. Go ahead, General, if you want. 

General DUNFORD. We do, Congressman. We have got the specific 

numbers of brigades that we think that need to be trained in order 

to have successful Iraqi Security Forces. So we have a number of 

objectives. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I am talking about Syria as well. This is a whole 

fight. We have got both countries. 

General DUNFORD. Right. In Syria, to be honest with you, Congressman, I think the military campaign in Syria is designed right 

now to put pressure on core ISIL, while the political reconciliation 

process takes place. There is not a military solution in Syria. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Got you. At some point in time I think it would 

be helpful if we had a sense of what this beast looked like. 

You also mentioned that we spent some period of time studying 

the oil infrastructure. And I know you weren’t there, and you are 

a Marine, that is not how you would do it necessarily. But taking 

out the tankers and how they move oil from point A to point B, 

why is it that we just got to doing that the last week as opposed 

to why weren’t they the first? I mean, I understand the production 

facilities and all of that kind of good stuff, but the movement itself, 

why did we wait so long to do that? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, you know, again, I don’t know 

what the thought process was 6 or 8 months ago. I do know that 

we have a much better appreciation for the revenue sources of 

ISIL, even—I will just share this with you. 
37 

In August I went around to all of the region as I was in transition to try to get a sense—a better sense of ISIL. At that time, 

there wasn’t a clear understanding of how ISIL was generating revenue. Even in the weeks subsequent to August we started to have 

a much better appreciation for the source of ISIL revenue, and so 

started to go after the oil infrastructure and the tankers because 

we then appreciated how much of an impact that would have. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I guess in the same vein, it looked like the French 

targets, the first targets they hit seemed to be targets that we 

should have hit right off the bat. Has all of that changed now? Are 

we in a new paradigm? I got the Monday morning quarterbacking 

nonsense, but going forward, when we see things to hit, are we in 

a position now to hit everything that makes sense from a military 

standpoint? 

General DUNFORD. The simple answer is, Congressman, I can assure you the answer to that question is yes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

The Russians are purported to be introducing significant upgraded air defense capability. What impact will that have on our 

operations and our ability to do what we want to do? 

General DUNFORD. We have watched that development very carefully. That is a very capable air defense system that has been 

brought in. We have a memorandum of understanding to ensure 

safety of flight with the Russians. I, as recently as yesterday, spoke 

to my counterpart, the Russian Chief of Defense, to ensure that 

they would be compliant with that memorandum of understanding. 

They have been over the past 30 to 45 days. And I assess today 

that we have the capability to prosecute the campaign against 

ISIL, the campaign that we envision, with Russia’s presence. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Do our pilots have the right rules of engagement 

if they are engaged? 

General DUNFORD. They do. They do, Congressman. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. And, Chairman 

Dunford, I know you are no stranger to the committee, but welcome in your new capacity as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 

Before I get into my line of questioning, I just want to point out 

my support for my colleague’s earlier discussion on the need for 

Congress to do our job to actually take some action on a new 

AUMF. I understand the President did submit a draft AUMF earlier this year. We, in fact, had several hearings on it. Secretary 

Carter, you mentioned that also. But I think that it is vital that 

we get this right, and the AUMF is part of that. 

I think the men and women who deploy into harm’s way, some 

of whom may not come back, as is the case of Master Sergeant 

Wheeler, deserve to know that not only do they have the moral 

support, but the legal backing of our Nation. So I would hope that 

we here in Congress would devote equal effort to having this debate and talking about the true costs in terms of resources and sacrifices required as we get into the deeper discussion of one strategy 

over another. 
38 

So, gentlemen, what I am concerned with and my line of questioning is really going to focus on the global strategy against ISIL. 

And I think that we have not really discussed in this committee so 

far other regions where ISIL is established outside of the Middle 

East that I believe pose just as big of a threat, perhaps even more, 

and I am thinking in particular of Libya. Patrick Pryor, the DIA’s 

[Defense Intelligence Agency’s] top counterterrorism official, was 

recently quoted as saying about ISIL that Libya is the affiliate that 

we are most worried about, and that it is the hub from which they 

project across all of North Africa. 

While we have a clear and present danger in Syria and Iraq, Mr. 

Secretary, please explain what the larger military strategy is to 

confront a global threat and how we are leveraging the different 

elements of American power, not just our military, and specifically, 

as much as you can in an unclassified setting, about our efforts to 

combat ISIL in Libya. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, it is a—it is, as it must be, a global 

strategy. It has to be in all media, to go back to the earlier question 

about messaging and cyber. And while I believe we play a central 

and essential role, it is not purely a military campaign, it involves 

all the other instruments. But we are absolutely necessary; we are 

not by ourselves sufficient. 

With respect to Libya, we have taken action there in recognition 

of the fact that because of the continuing political discord in Libya, 

which has not been resolved—obviously we are in favor of a political resolution in Libya which would lead to decent governance 

there and therefore not a fertile ground for the growth of ISIL— 

that political settlement has not occurred and therefore it is fertile 

ground for the spread of ISIL, and therefore we are having to take 

military action there. And I gave you an indication of that already, 

striking their leadership there. So it is a focus of ours. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Where else, other than Libya, do you see a real 

threat from ISIL and their forces? And, you know, I am concerned 

that—I see the general nodding—I am concerned that we are—you 

know, there is this training, these areas where there are failed 

states where ISIL is using as a staging base. 

General DUNFORD. Some of the areas that immediately come to 

mind, obviously Egypt is one of the areas where we are concerned. 

That is where the Russian aircraft was taken down. The Boko 

Haram group has sworn allegiance and been accepted as a part of 

the ISIL movement in Nigeria. We have seen ISIL in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. We have seen ISIL in Yemen. We have seen 

elements of ISIL in Lebanon and Jordan. So it is absolutely a global dynamic. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

I would like to return to the discussion earlier about the hold 

force, Mr. Secretary, in Iraq. You know, looking at our vision for 

the future of Iraq and Syria, what political outcomes in Iraq do you 

envision and what is your assessment of Prime Minister Abadi and 

whether he is making the necessary reforms and whether those are 

going to be enough for this hold force? It is hard to find these folks 

and when you do, you have got to be able to try to keep them, you 

know, at their stations. But if they are not buying into what they 
39 

need politically, if they are not getting that, they are going to abandon that role. 

So what is the political consequences that we need to happen in 

Iraq in order to maintain the hold force and to gain more folks to 

become hold forces? 

Secretary CARTER. The political future that we are supporting in 

Iraq and that Prime Minister Abadi says he supports, I have spoken to him and I believe that he supports, but it is difficult to accomplish, is a multisectarian but decentralized Iraqi state in which 

Kurds, Shia, and Sunni can live together under one state, have a 

reasonable amount of self-governance, not by ISIL in Sunni territory, but by people who can do a civilized job of governance in 

Sunni territory, and Kurds and Shia all living together under one 

state, reasonable decentralization and self-governance as appropriate, but under one state and at peace. That is what we are seeking. 

The alternative to that is a sectarian disintegration of Iraq. We 

know what that looks like. And we are hoping that Prime Minister 

Abadi can pursue that road, that he has enough support to do it. 

We are trying to help him do that. But Baghdad politics, no question about it, are complicated, and his predecessor was not on that 

road. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I am out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here and answering questions. 

I guess the first thing I would ask is, how can you reassure this 

body that the same administration that left in 2010, no one had the 

forethought to see ISIS coming, nobody thought it was important 

that we stay on the Iraqi-Syria border—I served with General 

Dunford when he was a colonel working with General Mattis writing op orders and executing the op orders on the Syrian border in 

2003. What has changed? Why should we think that you guys, that 

the administration is on the right path now, they had a ‘‘come to 

Jesus’’ moment and they have changed and now they understand 

the significance in this region, whereas they did not before? 

And you said yourself one reason you are building momentum 

now is because you lacked the intelligence capability, HUMINT 

[human intelligence] and otherwise, since 2010, which you are now 

regaining, but it wouldn’t have been lost in the first place if this 

administration didn’t squander the infrastructure that we had set 

up in 2010. Why should we trust you? I guess that is the question. 

Secretary CARTER. Congressman, one of the reasons that I 

changed the structure of our command in Iraq over the last year 

is because I wanted—precisely because I wanted us to have the 

strength and the insight and the presence of a single senior American military officer in Baghdad. 

That is now Lieutenant General Sean McFarland. And he is now 

connected each and every day to the front, literally to the front in 

Ramadi, to our various areas where we are training Iraqi Security 

Forces. He can talk directly to Prime Minister Abadi, he can talk 

directly to everybody else who is in Baghdad, and has complete 

command over all of our forces in the fight—and by the way, in 

Iraq and Syria. 
40 

Mr. HUNTER. I have got a bunch of questions, and I am going to 

be out of time. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I am just saying that is incredible. 

Mr. HUNTER. Well, I am asking you, what has changed? You? 

The answer is you, you have changed, and that was the dynamic 

that changed? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I think the ability to have people on the 

ground in Iraq is essential to effectiveness there and to have unity 

of command. We now have that again, and I think that is a good 

thing. And it does harken back to another era when we—— 

Mr. HUNTER. We do have it now? 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. Where we once again had it, as 

General Dunford had it in Afghanistan. It is really critical. We now 

have that. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Second question. If you were to declare—or 

not declare war, but we had an Authorization of Use of Military 

Force, would it be against an autonomous state or would it be 

against terror worldwide, ISIS flavor? 

Secretary CARTER. I kind of like the language in the AUMF that 

President Obama submitted, and I will tell you why, because as I 

told you, my first question when I was asked to review that, was 

does it give us what we need to defeat ISIS. 

Mr. HUNTER. And let me ask a different way. Militarily, tactically, are you fighting a state? So I don’t really care about—they 

were talking AUMF like philosophy class. What I mean, General 

Dunford, are you attacking a state or are you attacking war—I 

mean, terrorism in the region? 

General DUNFORD. We are fighting extremists who have used— 

who use violence to advance their political goals in the form of terrorism. 

Mr. HUNTER. What is different between that and Al Qaeda? 

General DUNFORD. In terms of the basic nature of ISIL and Al 

Qaeda, there is not a difference, from my perspective, Congressman. 

Mr. HUNTER. So the fact that they hold territory and that there 

are battle lines in this war in Syria and Iraq, there is a behind 

enemy lines area, there are lines of departure that you would cross 

if you were to go fight them, that is different than Al Qaeda, would 

you say? 

General DUNFORD. It is. What I was referring to is the nature 

and the movement, in other words, ISIL and Al Qaeda. In terms 

of where ISIL is right now, they do in fact hold ground, they have 

declared a caliphate. I think that was an aspirational goal of Al 

Qaeda and something that ISIL has actually done today. So that 

does make it a bit different in the fact that they are currently holding ground and declared a caliphate. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. And in terms of them actually having and 

holding ground, does that make it harder or easier in that area in 

Iraq and Syria where they actually hold ground, does that make it 

easier or harder to fight them compared to an Al Qaeda-type 

enemy? 

General DUNFORD. Yeah. I think in this particular case, ISIL is 

particularly difficult because they are actually using humans as 

shields in places like Raqqa, Mosul, and Ramadi. 
41 

Mr. HUNTER. Which is no different than Al Qaeda in previous 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

General DUNFORD. Correct, but ISIL’s location—we know where 

ISIL is. In the case of Al Qaeda, they blended into the country in 

a much different way than ISIL is. 

Mr. HUNTER. Gotcha. With my last 6 seconds, we are still trying 

to get the Jordanians drones, been unable to do so because the 

State Department has stopped us. Now they are using Israeli Herons and Chinese Reaper equivalents instead of ours. I think we 

ought to fix that, Mr. Secretary, if we can. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ashford. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you, General Dunford. 

I have asked this before, and I was in the Middle East in February and we were briefed on these various topics, the intelligence 

mission, General Nagata’s efforts to form up a Sunni force, and 

some of the Internet issues, the forming up of an Internet combative force there in Baghdad, I believe, at that time. 

And, you know, the home of the 55th Air Wing is in Omaha, near 

Omaha at Offutt, and has a significant role in this effort. And I too 

support the AUMF issue. I think you are absolutely right. I think 

you have mentioned that before. I think it is clear that Congress 

needs to act as quickly as possible in this effort. 

Here is my question, because I was there and was able to talk 

to King Abdullah, and he talked about, you know, putting the flag 

in the ground and getting ISIS out of the cities and all that sort 

of thing, and we talked about the intelligence collaborative efforts 

that were ongoing, and it was impressive to hear those efforts. 

Would you say that now, 9 months later, there is, I hate to put it— 

summarize it, but is there a significant change today from where 

we were 9 months ago in our readiness to achieve these goals that 

were annunciated 9 months ago? Would that phrase be accurate, 

Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, we are constantly looking for opportunities to do more and doing more. So we are doing more than we 

were 9 months ago. I hope 9 months from now we are doing yet 

more, because we are looking for opportunities. 

You mentioned Jordan. We are, with King Abdullah and his people, working once again to identify, and we have found some, people in southern Syria who want to recapture their territory from 

ISIL, and we are supporting and enabling them. 

So we are looking to do more. And we are looking for proposals. 

I look to General Dunford for them, the President looks to me and 

General Dunford for proposals for how we can do more, and we 

have found them. And I have given you a number of indications of 

ways that we have accelerated the campaign over the last few 

months, and we will continue to do that. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you. I don’t believe, at least 9 months ago, 

I don’t know if the question was asked on our group, but I don’t 

believe anybody was talking about being at war in a sense. We are 

in a war footing. I don’t think those words were used then. They 

are now being used. I mean, at least to me and maybe to my constituents back in Nebraska, that being on a war footing is a more 
42 

significant effort than not. And I guess that would be my—would 

you agree with that? 

Secretary CARTER. I used the words in the simple sense as a reflection of the necessity and the seriousness of this business. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thanks. And I would again just say, I think most 

everyone has said it here today, but the AUMF does seem to be the 

right way to go. So thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country. 

I think one question I had when—maybe we are slow to initiate 

it, but I am very glad right now that we are focused on their—the 

infrastructure of the country, whether the oil industry, I think the 

cement industry was mentioned, those sources of revenue that support the regime. But one of the things that was talked about was 

that we don’t want to do this sort of catastrophic destruction of 

particularly, say, the oil industry, because it would be difficult to 

reconstitute in the future when ISIS is gone. 

However, as a Gulf War veteran, I sort of remember what Saddam Hussein did to the oil industry in Kuwait, and yet they were 

able to reconstitute that after the war. And so could you address 

to me why we simply don’t do that sort of catastrophic destruction 

of the oil industry to completely cut off their revenue, that revenue 

source, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary CARTER. Sure. I will start and then the Chairman can 

pitch in. 

Well, there is a balance to be struck there, but the critical thing 

is intelligence. And there we have had gained the insight that allows us to distinguish to a very large extent that part of the energy 

infrastructure which is being directly exploited from ISIL from that 

part which is benefiting the population at large. That is a distinction that is based upon intelligence and underlies our striking. 

You may remember an early period, and this does precede the 

time when Chairman Dunford took over, but we were striking 

parts of the energy infrastructure which were largely small scale, 

we thought, ISIL-operated refining facilities. That proved not to be 

very effective. But in the course of continuing to study this infrastructure, we have learned which parts directly affect them, and we 

are striking them, and we think that is going to have an effect on 

their revenue stream. 

Let me ask Chairman Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think we can have it both 

ways. With the right intelligence and precision munitions, we can 

conduct destruction that will deny ISIL the use of these—of this infrastructure and yet leave it in a condition that at some point in 

the future it can be regenerated. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Well, I would suggest to you that part of 

the strength of ISIS is their ability to govern these territories, and 

part of that is their ability to sustain the economy. And so a collapse of the economy, I think, hurts their ability to govern and further degrades them. 

Let me ask a question about the Syrian refugee issue, and that 

last July, Turkey and the United States agreed in general terms 

on a plan that would provide a safe zone along a 60-mile strip of 
43 

northern Syria along the Turkish border. The United States would 

provide the air power component of that, and Turkish and possibly 

Syrian insurgent forces would work together in terms of ground security. 

Where are we at with this? Because it would seem to me that 

a lot of the Syrian refugees would like to stay in Syria, and if we 

could create safe zones for them, that would obviously give them 

the ability to do that. Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you, Congressman. The idea of humanitarian zones, safe zones—by the way, no-fly zones—zones of various kinds are concepts that we have studied over time, and I will 

start with some of the considerations that have gone into that and 

why we have judged the costs of doing so greater than the benefits. 

But let me start with the benefits of a safe zone. The benefit for 

a safe zone would be a place where people who wished to move 

there could move there and be protected. Now, one has to be careful about who might wish to move there, because people might 

want to live where they live, and also we wouldn’t want to create 

a situation in which people were expelled from countries to which 

they had moved into a safe zone by countries that didn’t want 

them. That is an undesirable outcome. 

From a military point of view, and I will let General Dunford 

elaborate on this, one would need to anticipate that such a zone in 

Syria would be contested. It would certainly be contested by ISIL, 

who would want to prove that it wasn’t safe, and possibly elements 

of the regime who would want to prove it is not safe if it is on Syrian territory. So it ends up being a substantial military operation. 

The Turks, we have discussed things like that with the Turks. 

They have not offered a force of the size that would do that. 

So let me stop there and ask General Dunford if he wants to 

elaborate on that. We have definitely considered those possibilities. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, if you have a brief additional comment. 

General DUNFORD. Nothing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like that for the record, 

please, if they—— 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. Well, it is a complex subject that would 

definitely take more time. 

Mr. Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, I want to thank you for your service, your patriotism, and your wisdom, and appreciate all that you do for us in 

our national defense. I particularly feel confident to have a leader 

of marines at the helm with the new Chairman. 

As a recent Iraq veteran, I am concerned about the fact that 5 

years after we left we now have go to back, and in my new role 

on this committee I want to make sure that we get it right this 

time and after we do militarily defeat ISIS we don’t find ourself 

putting troops back into Iraq again for a third or fourth time. 

So, Mr. Secretary, can you just tell us, what is the mission statement right now for the operation in Iraq? 
44 

Secretary CARTER. Well, Congressman Moulton, you are getting 

to the heart of our strategy, and this is not only the part that is 

essential, but also the part that makes it difficult to achieve, and 

that is that we want a victory over ISIL that sticks. And that 

means forces that participate in the recapture of territory and 

thereafter govern it in a decent manner so that we don’t have a 

new wave of ISIL or ISIL coming back. 

That is necessary in both Iraq and Syria. Those are two different 

cases. But that is why we pursue multisectarian governance, decentralized multisectarian governance in the state of Iraq and why we 

are trying to find a political solution to the Syrian civil war, because while it is important to defeat ISIL, it is important to defeat 

them in a lasting way. And that is a critical part of the strategy 

and the reason why we are so intent upon identifying and enabling 

capable and motivated local forces. 

Mr. MOULTON. Chairman Dunford, can you just answer that 

question? What is General McFarland’s mission statement? 

General DUNFORD. To disrupt, to degrade, and to defeat ISIL. 

Mr. MOULTON. And so my concern is that we haven’t seen 

enough integration of the political side here, that we don’t have a 

political plan that really underlies what our military mission is. 

And we have heard that from—the need for that from General 

Petraeus, General McChrystal, Ambassador Crocker, people on the 

left and the right who have testified before the committee and written about this problem in the press. 

Can you speak a bit to that coordination, that planning, and your 

confidence that General McFarland and others on the ground can 

see a political end state that will stick and make all their military 

efforts worthwhile? 

General DUNFORD. Yeah, Congressman, it is a great question. 

And, frankly, what you said a minute ago about not wanting to go 

back in 5 years is something that we all feel strongly about, which 

is why right now, as difficult as it would be, I do support the objective of a multisectarian unified Baghdad, because I see that as the 

best prospect for a stable, secure Iraq that would not be a sanctuary for violent extremism in the future. So as difficult as it is, 

I think that is a fair objective. 

Clearly, there are many difficulties in pursuing that, not the 

least of which is the Iranian influence. But General McFarland is 

working very closely with Ambassador Jones—you have probably 

been over to visit them—to enable the Abadi government to stand 

up on its own, to provide the kind of support it needs to be independent, independent of influence from outside actors, particularly 

the malign influence of Iran. 

So the overall objective to me is clear, but the path to getting 

there is difficult at best. But, again, I don’t personally have a better idea than to enable the current Government of Iraq to be successful, to provide the kind of stability and security within which 

we won’t see organizations like ISIL. And if at any point in the future, Congressman, I believe that that assumption that we can get 

there no longer obtains, then I would recommend a completely different campaign plan to get after ISIL inside of Iraq. 

Mr. MOULTON. Are you receiving the support and involvement of 

the State Department necessary to achieve those political ends? 
45 

General DUNFORD. I believe we are. In fact, since I have been in 

the job now we have had two separate meetings with Department 

of Defense leadership and Secretary Kerry, and we meet about 

every 3 or 4 weeks on specific issues in the campaign. 

I think it is fair to say that there was a recognition, Secretary 

Carter and Secretary Kerry recognized that we weren’t as integrated across the government as we should be. And so about 2 

months ago we began to meet on a periodic basis to attack specific 

issues. So far, the oil issue is actually an outcome of the first meeting that we had, and the most recent meeting was on foreign fighters, because that clearly requires a whole of government. 

But, again, I would tell you, am I satisfied with the level of integration? No. We are working on that. Am I satisfied that it is going 

to be easy to get after the desired political end state in Iraq? No, 

I don’t think so. I think it is going to be a hard slog. But the cardinal direction to me is clear. 

Mr. MOULTON. General, I just have a couple seconds left. If we 

had retained that level of integration after 2009, would we be in 

the mess we are today in Iraq? 

General DUNFORD. It is fair to say that conditions would be much 

different. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the witnesses being here today. Thank you for your 

leadership. 

I am going to be moving in a direction actually similar to Mr. 

Moulton. Let me just state up front, strategy, ends, ways and 

means, the administration has been under fire in the media to 

some degree because there is the claim that the strategy is the 

same. Well, ends may be similar. I am hoping that I get clarification that ways and means are changing, because if we are just 

doing the same thing, you know, I don’t see how the end result is 

going to be any different. 

The vantage point, I had multiple tours in Iraq myself, including 

the culminating one as the G3 of Multinational Division-North, so 

I am very keenly aware of the challenges in many regards, including the political-military challenges in Iraq. But let me say this, 

that I associate myself, I think, many of the opening remarks that 

you made, Mr. Secretary, I can attest to. You know, you talked 

about how there needs to be more Sunni inclusion in this state. I 

was very frustrated that in the period when Iraq was unraveling, 

Mr. Maliki certainly leading in a very corrupt and sectarian way, 

I didn’t feel that we were using the leverage, the ways and means, 

I didn’t think that we were using our leverage, I thought was fairly 

significant, given the fact that Iraq gets a vote, but we still had leverage I didn’t think that we had used in the political-military 

sphere. 

Now, my question has to do with this interagency process, which 

I recognize you are only a part of, but you are a major player in 

that process. So I would like to know about three different areas, 

Iraq first. What is different in terms of our leverage so that we can 
46 

bring it to bear, especially given this period where we have a new 

leader in Iraq where I think we can shape this relationship so that 

we will see some of the things that you laid out in your initial testimony, that it would actually come to fruition? 

On Syria, I completely concur that a political transition is necessary. I am interested to know, we had Geneva I, Geneva II, what 

vehicles are we going to use, might we create, so that we can get 

some compellance on that score? 

And then thirdly, worldwide, I, again, agree that the long-term 

issue is cutting off the ability to recruit and fundraise for this 

enemy, who really is fraudulent, says they advance the cause of 

Muslims. Nothing could be further from the truth. No one kills 

more Muslims than the Islamic State. So, again, in terms of ways 

and means, what is different in this strategy that we think that we 

are going to make progress? 

Secretary CARTER. I will start, Congressman, then maybe if the 

Chairman wants to. 

First of all, thank you for your own service. Appreciate that. 

And to your next point about reconstituting our leverage in Iraq, 

that is precisely the point I was making earlier, and I think General McFarland is doing that. That is important both to have insight and to wield our political-military leverage in Baghdad. That 

is important. 

And as to also agree with you, Prime Minister Abadi, as 

against—as opposed to Prime Minister Maliki, gives us more opportunities to do that. And so that is very important. And we do try 

to leverage that both in our military ways and in our political, our 

assistance, our marshalling of international assistance. So we do 

have leverage in Baghdad. 

Mr. GIBSON. Mr. Secretary, if I could just for one second. I appreciate the comment. What I am looking at is are we using metrics? 

So that, you know, we are sitting side by side with them and being 

very clear in our communication that the funding that they are getting by the good will of the American taxpayer is at risk and they 

will lose it if they don’t show progress on these metrics. That is the 

kind of leverage I am talking about. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, that is the kind of leverage I am talking 

about too, and the answer is yes. 

And let’s start with Iraq. And then, Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, you asked about ways, so just 

some of the ways that are different in metrics. I will just answer 

the metrics one quickly. One example is the specific number of 

Sunni that we think need to be integrated and trained is a metric, 

and we are working that with the Iraqi Government. That is a recognized objective, and they know our support is contingent upon 

them meeting certain conditions. 

In terms of ways, just to recapture some of the things we spoke 

about today, special operations forces in Syria is a different way. 

The expeditionary targeting force that will be deployed to Iraq is 

a different way. The foreign fighter initiative that has taken place 

over the past couple of weeks between the State Department, the 

Department of Defense, the CIA, the FBI, Homeland Security, and 

so forth is a different way to approach the foreign fighter challenge, 

and that is something that over the last 3 or 4 weeks where I have 
47 

seen a much more concerted effort and a will to start to work that 

issue, recognizing how important it is. 

And probably the last one is the more comprehensive approach 

that we are taking to go after the revenue sources is another way 

that is different from the past. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Secretary Carter, I am trying to piece together what it actually 

means to have an expeditionary targeting force. You know, without 

going obviously into too much detail and violating OPSEC [operational security], what does this mean? Is this a constituted group 

of Iraqi soldiers? Are we talking special forces? What exactly is 

this? Tac [tactical] teams? This is kind of just thrown on us today, 

so I think we would like to know a little more what we can, what 

is this, what are you envisioning here? 

Secretary CARTER. I will. I want to avoid some detail. But this 

is a force that is either American only, but more likely a mixed 

force. And to give you two examples, so this doesn’t tell you anything about our plans going forward, but the two examples I gave 

were the rescue of the individuals who were about to be hostages, 

or prisoners really, who were about to be executed by ISIL. That 

was accomplished with Kurdish forces, a mixture of U.S. and Kurdish, and achieved its objectives, although it required the sacrifice 

of one heroic American to do that. Another example is the killing 

of Abu Sayyaf and the capture of his wife. So those are two examples that have been disclosed of exactly that kind of capability. 

Now, imagine that on a standing basis, being able when occasions arise, and that really means intelligence fed, to conduct raids 

like that anywhere in the territory of Syria and Iraq. That is what 

we are talking about. And that is, as the Chairman says, a new 

way of achieving our objective there, one of several, and there will 

be more. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Okay. And a follow-up question: What is the status on Ramadi and Mosul? We have been hearing about the Iraqis 

and Kurds surrounding and then for months working on surrounding and getting closer and closer to Ramadi, but still, you know, 

we are waiting for them to move. 

And, you know, I worked with Iraqi soldiers too in the ING [Iraqi 

National Guard], and they are just as good as their leadership is. 

And to see them dilly-dallying to take these two major cities I 

think is very frustrating for many of us, including a lot in the public. So I would love to have a status of what is going on besides 

the usual they are working at it. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think I share your frustration, as do the commanders on the ground. They would tell you 

today, and this is something we get an update on every day, that 

over the past several weeks, I mean, real progress in terms of on 

the ground, real progress in kind of tightening the noose around 

Ramadi has taken place. But it has certainly not moved at the pace 

that we would want to see it move. And we are prepared, frankly, 

to provide more support to reinforce the success that the Iraqi Security Forces have in Ramadi, but they haven’t moved as fast as 

we want it to move. And so, you know, the progress that has been 
48 

made over the last several weeks, while real, is not necessarily significant. 

And Mosul is a future operation for Iraqi Security Forces. Right 

now the focus is on Ramadi, once Ramadi is taken. Recently, as the 

Secretary outlined, if you start thinking north of Baghdad, Baiji 

has fallen, the Peshmerga have been successful up in Sinjar area, 

so you are starting to close the noose. We have cut the lines of communication at Sinjar between Mosul and Raqqa. 

So Mosul is a future operation. Probably—I wouldn’t affix a date 

to it—but probably sometime months from now as opposed to 

weeks from now we would start to see operations in Mosul. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here and thank you for your 

service to our country, and I certainly respect you and trust you. 

If you tell me something, I believe it is true. And I know there were 

some frustrations expressed earlier. 

I guess as just kind of a simple thing, just a couple of weeks ago 

this committee was in classified briefings. The next day the Obama 

administration came out and announced what they considered a 

strategy of sending 60 troops, 60 special operators into Syria, but 

they did not have the opportunity to discuss that with Congress, 

because Congress was on vacation. That was an absolute lie from 

the administration. We had been in meetings the day before, and 

they withheld that from us. 

And so when it comes to those types of issues, it would be helpful 

if other people in the administration would be honest with this 

committee. We take this job very seriously, just as I know you two 

do as well. 

With regard to ISIS, ISIL, Daesh, whatever we want to call 

them, Secretary Carter, you made it very clear we are at war, Secretary Hagel said we are at war well over a year ago with them. 

The President disagreed with that assessment at that time. I do 

think he has come around to that now. But it seems that our military lines are conflicting with the goals of the Secretary of State, 

who wants a political solution. Political solutions can take decades, 

and I would respectfully submit that the longer we allow ISIS to 

grow while we are waiting on that political solution, the harder it 

is going to be to defeat them militarily. 

So Secretary Kerry testified before this committee that they had 

been working for years to undermine Assad and to move him out. 

Has Secretary Kerry indicated to you who he would like to replace 

Assad, since they have been working to move him out? 

Secretary CARTER. I don’t want to speak for Secretary Kerry, but 

I do know that in those negotiations, dating back now years, the 

United States and Secretary Kerry, among others, has discussed 

with the other parties that have a stake and a voice how Syria 

would be governed post-Assad. That involves both the naming of 

names, and I can’t repeat them for you, but most importantly that 

the structures of the state of Syria that have not been associated 

with the oppression of their people but that can be part of responsible governance in Syria going forward are preserved under new 

leadership. That is the key to the political transition. 
49 

And to your point about the difficulty of that, you bet it is difficult, because that is why a civil war has been raging there for 

several years. But in order to have an end to ISIL in the territory 

of Syria that sticks there needs to be that political transition. That 

is why the military and the political—— 

Mr. SCOTT. If I could interrupt. I am sorry. Well, so there is no 

plan for who would replace Assad, just that they want to replace 

Assad. But it would be just as complex, would you not agree, as 

finding leadership in Iraq that would be accepting of religious minorities? 

Secretary CARTER. Again, I don’t want to speak for Secretary 

Kerry, but these are exactly the kind of talks that he is having 

with the Russians, the Iranians, and others so that there can be 

something that replaces Assad that provides decent governance for 

the state of Syria, which, Lord knows, really deserves it. 

Anything you want to add to that? 

Mr. SCOTT. I think it would certainly be wise for us to at least 

engage in honest dialogue with the Russians. If there is going to 

be an effort to remove Assad, they certainly—that dialogue should 

be occurring at the highest levels among our countries. 

Secretary CARTER. It is. 

Mr. SCOTT. I want to switch gears for just a second and talk 

about the recapitalization program. Obviously we are involved in a 

tremendous number of countries, tremendous need for intel, the recapitalizations and the importance of the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System]. I just wanted to mention 

that because of the—if we wait much longer on that, Mr. Secretary, 

we are going to end up with a gap in that capability because of the 

major depot maintenance that the current units are going to be 

going through. So I know our combatant commanders need the 

JSTARS, and I just—I hope that we can move forward with that 

recapitalization sooner rather than later. 

Secretary CARTER. It is an important issue in our budget discussions going on right now looking forward to the submission of our 

fiscal year 2017 budget, absolutely. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, thank both for being here, and I respect both 

of you. I would ask that you use your credibility with the administration and encourage them to be more open and honest with us. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, to go back to some comments and questions that 

you answered earlier, if we are in fact at war how will we know 

when we have won? 

Secretary CARTER. The destruction of ISIL entails their expulsion 

from any territory they claim to occupy and their destruction elsewhere around the world, including their various branches and so 

forth. That is what is needed. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. So as long as ISIL is in Iraq or Syria or Libya 

or Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world, we will still be at 

war? 

Secretary CARTER. I believe that in today’s world these threats 

are difficult to confine to one place, and that is the reason why we 

have to go there and why we have to go to Syria and Iraq and 

strike at it and strike at other places where it is. It is in the nature 
50 

of today’s world, mobility among peoples, you see that underlying 

this, and above all, mobility of information, which can radicalize 

people who have never gone anywhere except on their keyboard. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I think it is important if we are at war to define 

in the clearest, most precise terms what victory looks like. With 14 

years of Afghanistan in mind, with the fact that we have been in 

Iraq off and on since 2003, or you can take it all the way back to 

1991, to keep us out of perpetual war, I think it is really important 

that we explicitly define the objectives and the outcomes for which 

we are fighting. I think we owe that to our service members. I 

think we owe that to ourselves. And I would hope that we could 

come up with a better definition of victory and success. 

I appreciate that you acknowledge the importance of political and 

diplomatic components of a solution in Iraq or in Syria, but I am 

interested in your response to a question asked by Mr. Gibson in 

terms of conditionality. There is so much in those countries, we will 

just use Iraq as an example, that we do not control and cannot control and will not be able to predict when it comes to the political 

outcomes. And so when we say that we are going to set conditions 

on our aid, when we say that we are going to set conditions on our 

military presence, do we really mean that? Is that a viable threat? 

Will we really walk away from Iraq if the government there doesn’t 

meet those conditions? 

And I think that is an important question, because if, in fact, we 

will not, then I wonder what the motivation is for the Iraqi Government to take the very important and very difficult steps to integrate these other minorities, whether they be Kurds or whether 

they be Sunnis, into a functioning government, decentralized or 

otherwise. 

Secretary CARTER. First of all, with respect to the first part of 

your question, your point exactly gets back to the military and political going together, because in addition to the—the only end 

state that involves the lasting defeat of ISIL is one in which 

there—where there is local governance that cannot be once again 

supplanted by ISIL. That is why the political and the military go 

together, that is at the heart of the strategy, and that is why enabling capable and motivated forces who can make victory stick is 

the other part of the definition of victory critical to the strategy. 

With respect to the leverage, I will start there in Baghdad. But 

the leverage involves offering to do more for those who are pursuing the same objectives and withholding our support from those 

who are taking a different path or not going down the path they 

are supposed to. So we find alternatives, we find people who will 

act if the people that we are dealing with are not capable of that, 

because we have to act, and we will find such forces that are capable. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Very quickly for General Dunford, what does ISIS 

want us to do and how does that factor into our strategy in confronting them? 

General DUNFORD. ISIS wants us to be impetuous right now as 

opposed to be aggressive, and they would love nothing more than 

a large presence of U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq and Syria so 

they could have a call to jihad. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you. 
51 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank Secretary Carter and General Dunford for 

being here today. 

You obviously have a tremendous task, from everything you have 

said, the diversity of what you are trying to accomplish. I think 

what you heard from members here is that we have some concern 

about whether or not we have the right strategy in total. 

But, needless to say, Russia just added a different dimension by 

putting forward their advanced surface-to-air missiles. How does 

that change, if we are talking about a no-fly zone along Turkey, 

how would that change that dimension for us? Do they gain a higher ground on us at this point? 

Secretary CARTER. Congressman, in view of the fact that the 

Chairman just spoke yesterday to his counterpart in Russia, let me 

ask him to answer that. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, under the current conditions, 

we have a memorandum of understanding with the Russians that 

ensures our safety of flight. And, again, we are not complacent, we 

don’t take it for granted, but it has been in place now for over a 

month, and the Russians have complied with it. And as I mentioned earlier, I spoke to my counterpart as recently as yesterday 

to ensure that the Russians reaffirmed their commitment to the 

memorandum of understanding. 

But you are asking a hypothetical scenario, for example, were we 

to have a no-fly zone and were we then by having a no-fly zone to 

have declared war against Syria, because that is what we would be 

doing if we declared a no-fly zone, particularly with accompanying 

ground forces to protect refugees, as has been suggested, then we 

could expect that that would complicate then the situation inside 

of Syria. 

That is a hypothetical. I mean, today I am confident that we can 

prosecute the campaign against ISIL. If we were at war against 

Syria and Russia was supporting Syria, the presence of the SA–21 

clearly complicates the situation. It doesn’t mean we can’t deal 

with it, but it complicates it. 

Mr. NUGENT. I appreciate that. 

Going back on November 7 at the Reagan National Defense 

Forum, former Under Secretary of Defense [for] Policy Miche`le 

Flournoy argued that putting cards in our hand, in that Syria, so 

the outcome of any political negotiations support U.S. interests. 

Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates argued in The Wall Street 

Journal that we must create a better military balance of power on 

the ground if we are to seek a political solution acceptable to us 

and our allies. 

And, General Dunford, you testified in front of SASC [Senate 

Armed Services Committee] on October of 2015 and you said, ‘‘I 

think that the balance of forces right now are in Assad’s advantage.’’ So my question is, does that still hold true, and if that is so, 

what steps should we take to change that advantage into our advantage? 
52 

† The YPG, People’s Protection Units, is a primarily ethnic Kurdish militia force based in 

northern Syria. 

General DUNFORD. When I testified in October, Congressman, we 

didn’t have any capable ground forces to prosecute the campaign 

inside of Syria. Since that time, we have developed a relationship 

with the Syrian Arab Coalition. When I say we didn’t have any effective ground forces, the YPG † was there. We provided some limited support to them. We had other small number of forces that 

had gone through our original train and equip. But we didn’t have 

a credible force that could actually conduct offensive operations. 

Since that time, we do have now a force that has conducted successful offensive operations, most recently in a location called AlHawl. That is an organization, the Syrian Arab Coalition, of some 

3- to 5,000, but part of a broader relationship with the YPG that 

probably runs north of 15- or 20,000 forces. So we have sufficient 

forces to conduct offensive operations in Syria. 

Mr. NUGENT. So does that change the balance, then, that you 

had referred to? 

General DUNFORD. It changes the balance. It changes the balance. But I would not say today that we have—you know, the correlation of forces is in anything other than Assad’s favor in terms 

of protecting what he holds dear, which is the west part of the 

country, in his regime. He has the capability to do that with the 

support provided by Russia and Iran. 

Mr. NUGENT. As we move forward, and I think most of us are 

concerned, and I am, particularly as a father of three service members, is, you know, are we going to be in the same position, and 

I think you have heard this echoed before, if we pull out of Iraq 

again? You know, are we going to be in the same position that we 

find ourselves today or are we going to actually keep a residual 

force in Iraq to assist with the train and equip mission of the Iraqi 

forces? Do we see us doing that, keeping additional forces in Iraq, 

if we defeat ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, all I can talk to you about is 

the recommendations that I would make at the time. And certainly 

I think we have enduring interests in the region, we have an enduring interest in the stability and security of Iraq, and any recommendations I make subsequent to the defeat of ISIL would reflect those interests. 

Mr. NUGENT. I appreciate that, General. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. I think we have five more members. Hopefully not everybody will take 5 minutes. Are you all okay with that? 

Mr. Secretary, does that work with your—— 

Secretary CARTER. Excuse me. Let me just check, because I know 

I am traveling somewhere and have a—I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

It is just that there is another thing I need to do, a flight I need 

to take. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, I know. That is why I am asking. 

Secretary CARTER. But let’s keep going, and if I need to leave, 

Chairman Dunford just indicated he would be willing to stay a little bit longer. 

The CHAIRMAN. Man, that is taking one for the team. 

Ms. Gabbard. 
53 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for your service. 

Since our policy to overthrow the Syrian government of Assad 

has brought us really into a potential direct head-to-head military 

conflict with Russia, I have some important questions along this 

line. Approximately how many nuclear warheads does Russia have 

aimed at the U.S. and the U.S. have aimed at Russia? 

Secretary CARTER. Congresswoman, I will get you those precise 

numbers as best we know them. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Secretary CARTER. Let me just summarize it by the fact that we 

have, I am confident, a strong, safe, secure, and reliable deterrent, 

but it is also true that Russia, like the Soviet Union that precedes 

it, has a massive nuclear arsenal. 

Ms. GABBARD. Right. And it would be accurate to say that both 

of our countries have the capacity to launch these nuclear weapons 

within minutes? 

Secretary CARTER. We do. 

Ms. GABBARD. I have seen pictures, films, and images from Nagasaki and Hiroshima, I know you have as well. And I presume 

you would agree with me that nuclear war would be devastating 

to the American people. The amount of suffering that it would 

cause and devastation to our families, our children, our communities, our planet, our future generations is difficult to imagine. So 

I am wondering if there has been an assessment on how many lives 

would be lost and the damage that would be done if this nuclear 

war between our two countries were to occur? 

Secretary CARTER. Congresswoman, I have been doing this for a 

long time, including during the Cold War, and working on nuclear 

weapons since the beginning of my career. And to answer your 

question, there have been estimates made right along, when there 

was a Soviet Union, then a Russia, and it is a very simple story. 

It is, as you say, nuclear war would be an absolutely unprecedented and catastrophic—result in catastrophic destruction. That is 

why deterrence is so important. That is why prudence in the field 

of nuclear matters by leaders all over the world is so essential. 

Ms. GABBARD. So the fact that we now have our F–15s patrolling 

the Turkey-Syria border with a primary air-to-air combat operation, there is no air-to-air combat against ISIS, they don’t have 

any air assets, so I can only presume that the purpose of these 

planes would be to target Russian planes. Is that accurate? 

Secretary CARTER. Congresswoman, let me answer your larger— 

the point you began with, which is we have a different view, a very 

different view from Russia about what would be constructive for 

them to do in Syria. We have that disagreement. We can’t align 

ourselves with what they are doing. We are opposing and want 

them to change what they are doing in Syria. 

That is not the same as the United States and Russia clashing. 

I think that the Chairman and his counterpart in Russia just 

talked yesterday about making sure that we didn’t by accident 

have any incident involving U.S. and Russian forces. 

So we have a sharp disagreement there, but that is not the same 

as blundering into an armed situation with one another—— 
54 

Ms. GABBARD. But that sharp disagreement—I only have a 

minute here—that sharp disagreement with two diametrically opposed objectives—one, the U.S. seeking to overthrow the Syrian 

government of Assad, Russia seeking to uphold the Syrian government of Assad—creates that potential, that strong potential and 

strong likelihood for that head-to-head combat or that head-to-head 

military conflict. And Russia’s installation of their anti-aircraft 

missile defense system increases that possibility of, whether it is 

intentional or even an accidental event, where one side may shoot 

down the other side’s plane. And that is really where the potential 

is for this devastating nuclear war, for something that could blow 

up into something much larger. 

Secretary CARTER. I have to correct something, Congresswoman, 

that you said, which is that I would characterize Russia’s perspective differently. And, by the way, what they say and what they do 

are two different things. What they said they were going to do was 

fight ISIL and pursue a political transition and not support Assad 

endlessly, but instead try to pursue a political solution. What they 

have done militarily has had the effect of supporting Assad, no 

question about it, and they haven’t gone after ISIL, they have gone 

after moderate—that is our source of disagreement. 

We are having that disagreement and trying to get them to come 

around, that is what Secretary Kerry is doing, to a more reasonable 

and constructive position, but at the same time, as the Chairman’s 

efforts indicate, we are, and the Russians agree with this, intent 

upon avoiding an accidental situation in the air over Syria. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank you gentlemen both, not only you, but your families, for 

the sacrifices you make to help defend this country, and it is appreciated. 

Mr. Secretary, you said that, you know, we will win, we will defeat ISIS. You said that here today. So I want to ask General 

Dunford, in that strategy, what is our center of gravity really here 

in this fight to defeat ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. The center of gravity for ISIL? 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Yes, sir. 

General DUNFORD. The center of gravity for ISIL, in my assessment, is the existence of a caliphate. Critical capabilities include 

their narrative and also the manpower that they have. So those are 

the three primary sources of strength, if you will, and the existence 

of the caliphate is there. 

But to define defeat, what I would say, because there was discussion earlier, what we want to ensure is that ISIL does not have the 

capability to conduct external operations that present a risk to the 

American people or our allies. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. So you feel we are going after those factors that 

make up the center of gravity? 

General DUNFORD. We are going after their critical capabilities 

to include their center of gravity, which is, again, the existence of 

the caliphate, the fact that they have a narrative. And when I 

talked about foreign fighters, that is a piece of this manpower 

issue, meaning we are keeping them from having the manpower 

necessary to fight. 
55 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I understand. We talked about the coalition, and 

it was mentioned before we have, like, 60-some nations as part of 

the coalition. France has been part of this coalition, but obviously 

they have stepped up. Sixty nations, I imagine some of them may 

be just contributing a box of pencils or something, because we really don’t hear much of what they are doing. 

Do you feel like we are doing enough diplomatically to get these 

60 nations fully engaged in this battle of good versus evil that we 

are engaged in, because we would really like to see these other nations engaged, especially our Middle Eastern allies, if we are going 

to see victory in this. 

Secretary CARTER. We need more contributions from the members of the coalition. You are right, it is good to have political support. It is good to have such widespread political support. Just 

about everybody in the world recognizes that ISIL is an evil thing 

and ultimately a threat to them. 

But they are not backing up, as we are trying to back up, our 

words with deeds. And we are in there swinging. And we need 

more who are in there swinging with us. And that, in my mind, applies particularly to those countries that reside in the region itself. 

We are a long way away, and we are concerned, and we are doing 

our part, and they are right there. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I know it is not totally your lane for that component of the fight, but I do think that we need to put more pressure 

on State Department, or whoever, to gain more support physically 

from our allies. 

A quick question, if I can, General Dunford. As far as congressional notifications of Guantanamo detainee transfer decisions, 

have you or General Dempsey before you not concurred with any 

of those? 

General DUNFORD. I have not. I have only had two cases since 

I have been the Chairman, and I concurred with both. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Did General Dempsey, do you know? 

General DUNFORD. I believe that he may have. I wasn’t there, 

Congressman. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. So I would have to ask him. 

And we have been waiting for a plan on that. Does the delay in 

the plan have anything to do with the cost of closing Guantanamo, 

of transferring patients to the United States? Do you know if Office 

of Management and Budget [OMB] have had anything to say on 

that, what their estimates have been? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, cost is one of the considerations in the 

proposal. Just to relate the whole story, we are working to put together a proposal which we would submit to the Congress. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Has OMB done one at this point? Have they done 

one at all? 

Secretary CARTER. They have worked with us on the cost estimates. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. What did they come up with? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, there is a range depending upon where 

the permanent detention facility would be and what its nature 

would be. So there is a lot of work needs to be done on that. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Some idea? They did one. 
56 

Secretary CARTER. Well, the objective is to—I mean, let me just 

start from the beginning, which is that you talked about transfers. 

But there are people in the Guantanamo Bay detention facility who 

will not be transferred. It is not safe to transfer them. And those 

are the people that we are talking about detaining under Law of 

War detention. Now, we would like to do it in a way that costs less 

and takes fewer of our people to—— 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I guess what I am asking, I am trying to determine—— 

Secretary CARTER. And OMB has been helping with that, yes. 

Dr. WENSTRUP [continuing]. Trying to determine what the cost is 

of holding them in the U.S. versus at Guantanamo. 

Secretary CARTER. Exactly. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I believe they have done a study. I was curious 

what they—— 

Secretary CARTER. Exactly they have, and that will be part of the 

proposal that is brought to you. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. I yield back. I appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your patience. 

I know you have sat through here for a lot of questions. 

Mr. Secretary, you said in your comments that President Obama 

is committed to doing what it takes as opportunities arise, as we 

see what works, as the enemy adapts, until ISIL is defeated in a 

lasting way. 

The President is the only Commander in Chief that we have got. 

We can’t be the Commander in Chief. Under our constitutional 

form of government, you have to report to him. But this President 

has said that ISIL is a JV [junior varsity] team. The day before the 

Paris attacks, he said they were contained. 

You are an honorable man. You believe every word that you are 

telling us, I understand that. When I go to the Middle East, when 

others of us go to the Middle East and talk to leaders there, they 

say there is a lack of American leadership and that is a problem. 

I don’t think that lets them off the hook, by the way. I think that 

they have a role that they should play and they need to step up. 

But you made those comments, and to people like me who doubt 

the President is committed—and I have a lot of constituents that 

doubt it, I think some of our friends in the Middle East doubt it— 

what would you say to me and to people like me that have doubts 

that he truly is committed? 

Secretary CARTER. Congressman, the only thing I can say is to 

repeat what I have said before, which is President Obama has 

given his approval to all of the acceleration steps that I described 

to you today, many of which were devised by, let alone recommended by, the Chairman, CENTCOM, our military leadership. 

So every time we have turned over a new way of attacking ISIL, 

we have gotten the President’s approval. That I can tell you. 

And to your point about American leadership, I agree with you. 

I think American leadership is critical. On the other hand, we need 

followers too, and we need to insist upon that. But American 

leadership is still important, very important. It is critical. We not 

only have the finest fighting force the world has ever known, but 

we have values that people find attractive. That is why we have 
57 

so many friends and allies. But we need them to do more alongside 

our excellent men and women who are in the fight. 

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you another question. You 

were talking in response to some other questions about a possible 

new AUMF. When your predecessor Secretary Hagel was here we 

had a discussion then, and he had his lawyer with him. So this 

may be a question that you want to refer to your lawyer. 

I have looked at the two AUMFs that are out there. I am not a 

military person, but I am a lawyer, so I think I can look at them 

and understand them. But I don’t think you have to be a lawyer 

to understand them. Now that you are telling us that we are sending special operations forces into Syria, can you tell me where in 

any one of those AUMFs there is the authorization to do that? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I am not a lawyer, but I read them too, 

so I can tell you the commonsense meaning of the provision and 

the only one that I am familiar with, which is the one the President submitted. And I was asked earlier one of the reasons why I 

thought it was—it was important to me that it allow what I 

thought was essential to defeat ISIL. 

Mr. BYRNE. But that is the one we haven’t adopted. I am talking 

about the ones that have actually been passed by Congress and 

signed by the President. Do they give you that authorization? 

Secretary CARTER. I apologize. I can’t speak to them. I don’t 

know all of the other ones. I have studied the one that the President submitted. 

Mr. BYRNE. Could you get your lawyers to respond to me on 

that? I am not asking you to give a legal opinion. 

Secretary CARTER. Yeah. 

Mr. BYRNE. But they have got some basis for thinking that. And 

I would say that the plain wording of those two AUMFs that have 

been passed by Congress and signed by the President don’t. Now, 

I would like to give you that authorization. I want to make sure 

we give you whatever you need to do that. 

Secretary CARTER. Happy to get back to you. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. BYRNE. The last question I have is about—and I completely 

agree with you. We need local forces, we need help from the region, 

and we shouldn’t let anybody off the hook. Are you getting the sort 

of support that you feel—are we getting the support we should be 

getting from Turkey? 

Secretary CARTER. I have been urging, actually since I came into 

this job, Turkey to do more. We need Turkey to do more. We need 

it to do more within its own territory so it controls its border, 

which it has not done effectively since ISIL first arose; that it goes 

after the facilitators, the enablers, and the other tentacles of ISIL 

that intrude into Turkey. 

We would like them to operate more both in the air and on the 

ground. Most of their air operations are not directed at ISIL. They 

are directed at the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party], which we 

understand their concern about. It is a terrorist organization within their borders. But we would like to see them do more against 

ISIL. 
58 

Now, I know the President has spoken to President Erdogan 

about this as recently as in the last few days. So it is very much 

at the top of our list, and we would like them to do more. 

Their geography, I mean, they are right there next to Iraq and 

Syria, so they can be a potent source of enablement for us. At the 

same time, if they are not doing enough, it is a serious matter. And 

that is why the President is talking to President Erdogan. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, my time is up. But I want to thank you, both 

of you, for your service and for being here today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and your time today. 

Secretary Carter, we talked in June about, as an airman, my 

concerns about not using air power for all that it brings to the 

fight; my concern about doing that in a weak way. We sort of disagreed on that. But it seems like there has been a slight change 

since then. You know, ISIS’ strength is that they are a state; their 

weakness is also that they are a state, as you mentioned General 

Dunford. 

I feel like part of our challenge is we are stuck in a counterinsurgency mindset, and although we need to have a force on the ground 

afterwards, we need to take them out as a state, not as a counterinsurgency. 

And the discussion of how you have been studying the oil infrastructure, I mean, this reminds me of air campaign planning I 

went through when I was a young officer. You identify their center 

of gravity, their critical capabilities or vulnerabilities, and then you 

unleash American air power in a way that overwhelmingly goes 

after them to defeat them in a way that takes away their capability. 

So I don’t understand why that study wasn’t done—it was done 

this spring—why that wasn’t done 17 months ago when they declared a caliphate, or 15 months ago, or 10 months ago. I mean, 

we are just now realizing oil trucks are moving, and I mean, it has 

been reported since the very beginning. It has been a million dollars a day funding their terrorism. By my math, that is about half 

a billion dollars that potentially they have been put into their coffers to fund and export terror. 

So I am deeply concerned about the lack of using American air 

power for all it brings to the fight. We have averaged about 15 

strikes a day. We have heard about cumbersome approval processes, unnecessarily high rules of engagement where, you know, pilots are going home and not hitting legitimate targets because we 

want no civilian casualties, as opposed to the Law of Armed Conflict, which is very clear, to hit those targets, hit them hard, and 

destroy and defeat them where they are. 

The concern and the problem is, I hear you are saying something 

has changed, but you mentioned a snowball effect. The snowball 

has been going in their direction for the last 17 months. I serve on 

Homeland Security as well. We have got 30,000 foreign fighters. 

We have got 200,000 pro-ISIS social media posts a day. We have 

900 cases in all 50 States right now for homegrown extremists. 

It looks like they are taking on American air power and they are 

winning, and that has added to their propaganda, it has added to 
59 

their metastasizing, it has added to the sort of romantic approach 

of recruiting people to join the fight. The only thing worse than not 

engaging is to engage weekly, and I really feel weekly—w-e-e-k— 

and I really feel that we have added to that by being weak on the 

military side. 

It sounds like you are saying things have changed, but in addition to the changes you mentioned, are we changing the cumbersome approval process? Can we feel a confidence that we are going 

to unleash and unshackle American air power and not just be in 

this limited sort of impotent mindset? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, I think to the extent that 

you are asking are we going to unleash air power, we will. In terms 

of cumbersome approval processes, where we find those kinds of 

things, I can tell you and I can assure you, you know, I will help 

personally to try to cut through it. That is not what I am getting 

now. 

With regard to collateral damage, though, I don’t think in this 

fight we should apologize for bringing our values to the fight in 

terms of collateral damage. So while we should absolutely be aggressive in attacking the ISIL, taking down their command and 

control, taking away their resources, taking away their fighters, at 

the same time I don’t think we should be killing innocent people, 

which would merely feed the narrative of ISIL at the same time. 

So I think the strategic approach is exactly right, which is we go 

after all of those targets, but we do it in a uniquely American way, 

bringing our values to the fight with us. And I am not saying you 

are suggesting we would do otherwise. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Of course, you always minimize collateral damage. 

I mean, that is what we do. 

General DUNFORD. So I think today we have the right balance 

between collateral damage and destruction to the enemy. And I will 

tell you, our threshold for collateral damage increases with the 

value of the target we are going after. And, you know, I can assure 

you, if we are going after Baghdadi’s command and control network 

or some other critical node, then we will go after it as aggressively 

as necessary to make sure we are succeeding in the campaign. 

Ms. MCSALLY. But it was also reported that we weren’t striking 

the oil trucks because you didn’t want to hurt the truck drivers and 

that we actually dropped leaflets on them to warn them before we 

hit them. If that is true, I just want to be clear, I mean, I have 

been involved in the targeting process at all levels, if you are driving a truck for a terrorist organization that is fueling them, you are 

a combatant. Can you just clarify what that is all about? 

General DUNFORD. Well, I think, Congresswoman, we did do 

that. We did because we assessed that the majority of the truck 

drivers were, in fact, just people trying to make a living in the region, a little bit different than an enemy combatant from our perspective. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So you don’t consider them combatants? 

General DUNFORD. We don’t. What we are able to do is separate 

them from their vehicles and destroy the trucks, which is what we 

wanted to do. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Last question is, is it your assessment, 

General Dunford, that the A–10 has been critical to the fight when 
60 

it comes to these strikes, as reported with the AC–130, especially 

on the trucks, and also their combat search and rescue capability? 

Is it your assessment they are critical to this fight? 

General DUNFORD. The A–10 has been a valuable platform in the 

fight. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. And do you consider this fight is going to 

go on for a while? 

General DUNFORD. I do. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bridenstine. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you, General, for being 

here. 

I want to echo, I have a lot of the same concerns as my colleague, 

Ms. McSally, and certainly I was involved in the war in Iraq from 

the beginning, Operation Enduring Freedom. That was, of course, 

in Afghanistan, but then Southern Watch, and then Iraqi Freedom, 

‘‘shock and awe,’’ all of those things. 

I would like to follow up on this question about the drivers of 

these trucks and the leaflets that were dropped. I presume the leaflets told them how to surrender. Is that correct? Because those 

were the leaflets that we dropped in Iraq the first time around. 

General DUNFORD. The leaflets—first of all, we did a couple of 

things. We dropped ordnance in the front of a column, in the back 

of a column, and then dropped leaflets that said if you don’t get 

away from your vehicle, basically you are going to be bombed. And 

so that was the message that was sent. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So there was no effort to capture any of the 

truck drivers or get any kind of intelligence from their operation? 

General DUNFORD. We don’t have any forces on the ground that 

could capture those truck drivers. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Is that a problem? 

General DUNFORD. Well, if you want to capture—Congressman, 

I am not trying to be flippant, but if you want to capture them, you 

would have to have someone on the ground to capture them and 

we don’t. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Is it a problem that we don’t have somebody 

on the ground to capture them? 

General DUNFORD. The lack of human intelligence inhibits our 

campaign, for sure. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I can image. So is that going to be part of 

what we do going forward, is try to—let me ask this, because I am 

just ignorant on this issue. How many ISIS combatants have we 

captured? 

General DUNFORD. I would have to get back to you, Congressman. I don’t know. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 79.] 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Is that not a very critical part of trying to win 

this war. 

General DUNFORD. It is, but we don’t—I don’t have a number. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Can you give me an estimate? Is it a couple 

of hundred, a couple thousand? 
61 

General DUNFORD. It is probably a handful. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. One or two? 

General DUNFORD. It is a handful. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. A handful? Like five or less? 

General DUNFORD. Again, I would like to get back to you, Congressman, to talk about that. We have not been involved in combat 

operations, we, the United States. So we haven’t been in a position 

to capture ISIL. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Now, on these—— 

Secretary CARTER. Can I just add something? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Sure. 

Secretary CARTER. That one of the reasons for the expeditionary 

targeting force is precisely to gain intelligence, and one of the ways 

you do that is by capturing people. So I can tell you one person we 

captured, and that was the wife of Abu Sayyaf. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Where is she now? 

Secretary CARTER. She is being detained. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. By whom? 

Secretary CARTER. By the Government of Iraq. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Of course. So what kind of intelligence are we 

getting now from that? 

Secretary CARTER. We got considerable intelligence. I don’t want 

to go into it any further. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And does that not demonstrate the value of 

human intelligence? 

Secretary CARTER. Of course it does. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So is this something that we are going to 

change? Are we going to start capturing these folks? 

Secretary CARTER. I just said one of the reasons for the expeditionary targeting force is precisely that, that is what I have said 

earlier, and I think it will be a very valuable source of intelligence. 

And as the Chairman said, that is critical to effective employment 

of air power, to the effective identification of forces that we can enable on the ground—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Let me ask you this. How long were these 

trucks—how long did we know about them before we destroyed 

them? Because The New York Times was reporting—actually it 

was the Treasury Department, I believe, that reported $10 million 

a month to fund ISIS through the smuggling of oil operations. Is 

that correct? $10 million a month. How long did we know that 

these trucks were being used to fund ISIS before we did anything 

about it? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, we knew there were oil trucks in Iraq 

from the beginning, of course. What we could not do is distinguish 

those that were being directly used to finance ISIL. We now have 

the intelligence to do that, which allows us to effectively isolate 

them and target them. That is what we are trying to do. We are 

using the tactic, and we may change our tactics. We are using the 

tactics—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Let me ask you, the truck drivers that ran 

away, Mr. Secretary, the truck drivers that ran away because we 

told them to run away, where are they now? Are they now farmers 

in Syria? I am just asking the question because this is critically im-
62 

portant to trying to win a war, which you are telling us we are trying to do. 

Secretary CARTER. I am sorry. I am not understanding why—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The truck drivers. 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. Knowing what the truck drivers 

are doing now is essential to knowing how to win the war. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So the idea is that you believe these people did 

not know that they were involved in funding ISIS? That is what 

you are telling us? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, they probably—if they didn’t realize it 

before—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So they knew they were funding ISIS and they 

are not enemy combatants? Can you explain that? 

Secretary CARTER. I think the Chairman already did. These were 

people who were making a buck, and so we gave them every opportunity to survive the strike. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Mr. Chairman, I am astonished. We need to 

learn more about why we didn’t destroy these trucks a long time 

ago, where these enemy combatants are now, why we are dropping 

leaflets telling them to run away and not surrender. It is quite 

frankly astonishing if we are trying to win. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a vote. 

Mr. Zinke, do you have a question right quick? 

Mr. ZINKE. I do. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your service and dedication. It is 

not easy. 

I guess I am somewhat concerned about, in my experience, about 

but putting forces on the ground, particularly the SF50 [50 special 

forces operators]. And my concern is, is that whenever we put 

forces on the ground we want to make sure that we have adequate 

support for them, particularly medevac [medical evacuation]. My 

experience with northern Iraq, you can’t rely on air all the time. 

So a ground QRF [quick reaction force] with some armor would be 

a good idea. 

Do you concur that having—I guess, General, for you—that having a sufficient force package would incorporate an in-theater, incountry medevac, QRF, and force security? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I can assure you that the kind 

of package that you are referring to, that you are personally familiar with, is and will be in place. 

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you. 

And I guess the last question is, I look at the threats. We have 

ISIS, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda and North Korea and an emerging 

China and Russia. Mr. Secretary, where would you rack and stack 

global warming with that list? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I think when you think about strategy, 

you need to think about overall timeframes and overall of geography. And so you mentioned China, you mentioned Russia, they 

haven’t been the subject of today’s hearing. They were—I had the 

privilege of speaking before the Simi Valley conference that Chairman Thornberry organized, and my focus there was China and 

Russia, because we can’t forget—and nuclear deterrence has been 

raised. There are lots of different aspects to this world. And one 

does need to think in the long term. 
63 

And I think you asked about global warming or climate change 

as in a military threat. It does change some of our military conditions. We try to be a Department that looks ahead. 

Mr. ZINKE. But would you agree—— 

Secretary CARTER. So we are looking ahead at the Arctic and 

that kind of thing and how it will change our operations. 

Mr. ZINKE. But would you agree that the imminent threat, the 

imminent threat, the 5-yard, 5-meter threat, the most damaging 

threat facing us today would be ISIS, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and the 

non-nation-state terrorist activities? 

Secretary CARTER. That is certainly the one that is the most imminent. They are trying to attack us right now. There is nothing 

distant in time or probability about it. 

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you gentlemen for your service. And I greatly appreciate it. And God bless. 

The CHAIRMAN. Much more we could talk about, but you all have 

been very patient. Thank you for answering our questions. And I 

am just going to warn you, next time you all come up here we are 

probably going to—I am going to suggest to Mr. Smith we start on 

the bottom two rows with our questions, because I think some of 

the best questions come from our more junior members. 

With that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:22 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

DECEMBER 1, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

DECEMBER 1, 2015 

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71 
72 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

DECEMBER 1, 2015 

(79) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

General DUNFORD. I have nothing more to contribute than what was said in the 

hearing. [See page 17.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS 

General DUNFORD. We continue to work closely with Pakistan to address security 

issues of mutual interest and to seek support for our strategic objectives in the region. Our security assistance programs continue to improve Pakistan’s capacity to 

combat terrorist organizations, while our engagement efforts at all levels reinforce 

our mutual goals for the region. High-level engagements such as the recent Defense 

Resourcing Conference in early March provide an opportunity for senior leaders 

from both sides to discuss concerns and determine the way ahead in our relationship. These forums provide key opportunities to communicate our expectations for 

Pakistan to address the threat from terrorist organizations. Pakistan recognizes the 

danger posed by these groups, and they have taken some positive steps forward in 

recent years to counter that threat. As Pakistan completes major military operations 

in the tribal areas, our countries have the opportunity to support future stability 

operations to improve security, education, and employment. Finally, we must continue to support the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which provides opportunities for Pakistani military personnel to learn about 

our culture and values and to develop lasting relationships with our own military 

leaders. [See page 19.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

General DUNFORD. Not at this time. The Long Range Standoff Weapon’s (LRSO) 

Tech Maturation & Risk Reduction (TMRR) is fully funded for FY17 and through 

the FYDP. Requested funding levels in PB17 ensure the LRSO replaces the ALCM 

according to current strategic plans. [See page 31.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE 

General DUNFORD. U.S. forces captured one ISIS combatant prior to December 1, 

2015. Since that time, U.S. forces have captured one additional ISIS combatant. 

Both detainees remained in U.S. custody for intelligence screening purposes prior 

to being transferred to the Government of Iraq for prosecution. In addition to U.S. 

unilateral captures, as of 25 March, our forces have enabled and facilitated Kurdish 

partners in the capture of 49 ISIS detainees who remain in Kurdish custody. [See 

page 60.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

DECEMBER 1, 2015 

(83) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. The recent attacks in Paris demonstrate the Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant (ISIL) ability to carry out large-scale, coordinated attacks outside 

the Middle East making them a significant global threat. Evidence has shown that 

several of the Paris attackers previously traveled to Syria for training. The U.S. 

Special Presidential Envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Brett McGurk, 

stated in an interview on November 22, 2015, that the United States would work 

with local forces in northern Syria to close a 98-kilometer border area along the 

Syria-Turkish border. Given the critical need to secure these areas, can you detail 

the level of U.S. involvement and forecasted timeline to secure the largest gap in 

Syria’s border? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. It has been estimated that 9 million Syrians have fled their homes 

since 2011. In your opinion, what are the top three objectives the U.S. must achieve 

in Syria to create an environment safe and stable enough to reverse this growing 

refugee crisis? What actions must be taken, regardless of agency, to obtain these 

objectives? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. Many experts, and numerous former administration officials have 

expressed their concern that the current strategy and airstrikes in Syria are not 

achieving the goal of defeating ISIL. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 

said, ‘‘I think that the resources applied to that mission, frankly, have not been sufficient.’’ Dr. Michael G. Vickers, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, writes, ‘‘We conducted as many airstrikes in two months in Afghanistan in 

2001 as we have in 16 months in Iraq and Syria.’’ Even former Secretary of State 

Hillary Clinton has said we need ‘‘a more effective coalition air campaign, with more 

allies’ planes, more strikes, and a broader target set.’’ Do you believe their criticisms 

are valid? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. A short time before terrorists struck in Paris, President Obama said 

that ISIL has ‘‘not gained ground in Iraq’’ and that they had not established control 

of additional territory in Syria. Despite those statements, in May, ISIL captured the 

strategic city of Ramadi in Western Iraq and that same month, it also captured the 

Syrian city of Palmyra. ISIL continued to control wide swaths of strategic territory 

and has now demonstrated its ability to conduct attacks abroad like the one in 

Paris. General Dunford, do you believe we are winning the war against ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. We continue to make steady progress militarily in our efforts to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIL, as demonstrated by recent 

progress in Hit and Ramadi in Iraq and the Tishrin Dam and Shaddadi in Syria. 

As of May 3rd Iraqi Security Forces have retaken more than 45% of the territory 

in Iraq that ISIL held when the Coalition first began airstrikes in August 2014. The 

counter ISIL operations have restricted their freedom of movement along key communication and transportation routes in both Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, these 

activities have helped to secure key border crossings between Syria and Turkey, 

constraining ISIL’s ability to send reinforcements and much needed supplies. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. Several organizations within the Department of Defense are seeking 

a handheld diagnostic device to bring lab-based molecular diagnostics into the field 

to serve the warfighter, which would bring lab-quality results to the Point of Need, 

at a fraction of the cost. It’s my understanding that—among others—the Naval 

Health Research Center (NHRC), the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and 

the Marines are currently seeking handheld diagnostic devices to address respiratory health, remote/battlefield warfighter healthcare, and biodefense. And I’m 

aware that Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) funded a 3-year contract with 

over $11 million of funding to deliver such a device. That contract has reached its 

initial end date without success. And DTRA recently extended that contract for an 
84 

additional 2 years. Further, private industry is currently developing such a Point 

of Need device. And there are proposals in front of DTRA to bring such devices into 

the field in 12 to 18 months. 

1. Why is DTRA continuing to invest in an expensive project that is not yielding 

positive results? 2. Why is DTRA not considering the adaptation of a currently viable technology to provide handheld Point of Need diagnostics to serve the warfighter? 3. While long-term research and development (R&D) is important to develop 

the technologies that will lead to future generations of products, why are we not 

supporting initiatives that can yield results in the near term, utilizing currently 

proven technologies and product platforms? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALZ 

Mr. WALZ. Mr. Secretary, what is this administration’s vision for the future of 

Iraq and Syria? What is the specific outcome that is envisioned? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. WALZ. How does this vision nest with the strategy for the region? For the 

globe? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. WALZ. Tell me about coordination efforts with the Department of Defense, the 

State, Department, and other agencies. What are we doing well? What aren’t we 

doing well? What help do you need from Congress? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. WALZ. Have we too narrowly focused on counterterrorism at the expense of 

other methods for addressing threats to our interests in Syria and Iraq? What other 

policy objectives should the United States pursue? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. WALZ. Mr. Secretary, is de facto partitioning of Syria and Iraq in our interest 

or that of our allies? Does U.S. policy and strategy assume de facto partitioning in 

these countries? Do you consider de facto partitioning of either Syria or Iraq avoidable? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. WALZ. General Dunford, former senior governmental officials, Ambassador 

Ryan Crocker and Director John McLaughlin, have advocated for no-fly zones in 

Syria. What is the Administration’s view on such a no-fly zone in Syria? Do you 

agree with Ambassador Crocker and Director McLaughlin that a no-fly zone in Syria 

would be appropriate at this time? What is the benefit of a no-fly zone or a safe 

zone, and what resources would be required to implement either of these? 

General DUNFORD. The Administration does not support establishing no-fly zones 

in Syria. I do not believe establishing a no-fly zone is appropriate at this time. Establishing a no-fly zone would divert Coalition resources away from defeating ISIL 

and would require a legal basis under domestic and international law, neither of 

which currently exist. In addition to requiring a significant number of aircraft to 

enforce, establishing no-fly or safe zones would require ground forces. We would be 

required to protect the zone from both violent extremists and Syrian forces, rockets, 

missiles and artillery. We likely would be required to provide humanitarian assistance and assist with governance. Forces committed to a zone could be required until 

the conflict ends and conditions are suitable for civilians to return to their homes. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON 

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman: In your testimony, you mentioned coordination between the State Department and Defense Department has increased since you became Chairman and there have been two meetings to coordinate political and military strategy. How frequently are such meetings planned to occur in the future? Are 

more frequent coordination meetings occurring at a working level? In your view, is 

this level of coordination sufficient to ensure military operations are well coordinated with political efforts? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, I believe the level of coordination is sufficient. My staff 

is in routine contact with the Department of State, as well as many of the other 

Departments and Agencies. My regional and functional staffs conduct planning and 

working-group sessions, from the action officer to the senior leader level, on a weekly basis. Furthermore, these working relationships extend beyond normally sched- 
85 

uled meetings into routine correspondence to properly coordinate political and military strategy as we focus on putting ISIL on a path to defeat. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUSSELL 

Mr. RUSSELL. What is the comprehensive plan with regard to ISIL loss of territory 

in Syria? Has there been any discussion or consideration of zones of influence and 

governorship? As Russia is in the Alawite sphere, the United States in the Kurdish 

Sphere and Jordan in the Sunni-Arab sphere, what is the comprehensive plan to 

reduce ISIS in these areas of influence? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. RUSSELL. What efforts are being made to unite a Sunni-Arab league to resolve 

the question of Sunni Arabs in Iraq and Syria for self-determination? Do you believe 

there can be any solutions without the prospect of Sunni-Arab self-determination? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. RUSSELL. We’ve received reports from special operators and air forces that 

targeting approval can take weeks, causing once valuable intelligence to become 

useless. Why is this happening and what is the process for targeting approval? Is 

it true that plans are not ‘‘approved’’ by the Secretary of Defense, merely ‘‘endorsed,’’ 

leaving the military forces the impression they are on their own should difficulty 

arise? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. RUSSELL. With ISIL in Afghanistan, what measures are being taken to lift 

restriction on their targeting, currently hurdled by a force-protection only rules of 

engagement in that theater? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. RUSSELL. What is the comprehensive plan with regard to ISIS loss of territory 

in Syria? Has there been any discussion or consideration of zones of influence and 

governorship? As Russia is in the Alawite sphere, the United States in the Kurdish 

Sphere and Jordan in the Sunni-Arab sphere, what is the comprehensive plan to 

reduce ISIS in these areas of influence? 

General DUNFORD. U.S. strategy to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) relies on capable and willing partnered ground forces to combat ISIL 

in both Iraq and Syria. The President has authorized U.S. Central Command to 

train and equip select individuals in key capabilities to better enable groups fighting 

ISIL in this region. Working by, with, and through indigenous counter-ISIL forces 

on the ground is a key component in our comprehensive plan to place ISIL on a 

path to defeat. 

Mr. RUSSELL. What efforts are being made to make a Sunni-Arab, Sunni-Kurd coalition in Iraq? As the Kurds now have adequate arms, how will the Sunni-Arab 

tribesmen in the Tikrit/Allam to Bejii area are equip thousands given little to no 

support from anything sent to Bagdad? 

General DUNFORD. Our efforts in Iraq are designed to create Iraqi Security Forces 

that can defend Iraq on behalf of the Government of Iraq. Accounting for the ethnic 

and sectarian makeup of the force is but one component of this effort. Iraq’s Popular 

Mobilization (PMF) Program has created Iraqi formations that represent the sectarian makeup of the areas from which they are recruited. The Government of Iraq 

continues to fund, train, and equip these forces, and has expanded its outreach in 

the majority Sunni Anbar and Ninawa Provinces. A Sunni PMF has been recruited 

from Sunni Arab tribes, and the Iraqi Government has fully supported the effort. 

U.S. and Coalition forces are training, equipping, and providing operational advice 

to both the GOI and to the Sunni PMF in support of this effort. 

Mr. RUSSELL. What efforts are being made to unite a Sunni-Arab league to resolve 

the question of Sunni Arabs in Iraq and Syria for self-determination? Do you believe 

there can be any solutions without the prospect of Sunni-Arab self-determination? 

General DUNFORD. The C–ISIL Coalition includes several Sunni Arab partners; 

their contributions to the Coalition are invaluable. We have not made any additional 

effort to unite a Sunni-Arab league to resolve the question of Sunni self-determination. The military dimension of our C–ISIL strategy supports creating sovereign, inclusive and representative governance in both Iraq and Syria. Including Sunni 

Arabs in the governments of Iraq and Syria will be required to prevent the grievances that helped spawn ISIL from recurring. 

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has organized an Islamic coalition of 41 Sunni nations to counter Sunni extremism. This effort includes religious and cultural compo- 
86 

nents best addressed by Sunni authorities. Coalition and Saudi planners are working to ensure Saudi efforts complement those of the C–ISIL coalition 

Mr. RUSSELL. We’ve received reports from special operators and air forces that 

targeting approval can take weeks, causing once valuable intelligence to become 

useless. Why is this happening and what is the process for targeting approval? Is 

it true that plans are not ‘‘approved’’ by the Secretary of Defense, merely ‘‘endorsed,’’ 

leaving the military forces the impression they are on their own should difficulty 

arise? 

General DUNFORD. The Secretary of Defense has given full authority to CDRUSCENTCOM to conduct military operations against ISIL forces. Authority to conduct 

operations has been delegated to subordinate commanders to decrease the timeline 

for approval. Many factors impact the targeting process to include the need for positive identification, the risk to friendly and non-combatant personnel and infrastructure, and synchronization requirements with ongoing tactical, operational and strategic activity. The main factor is risk management. When CDRUSCENTCOM determines the level of risk associated with a specific strike rises to a given threshold, 

he may elect to seek higher echelon approval for the execution of that strike. 

Mr. RUSSELL. With ISIL in Afghanistan, what measures are being taken to lift 

restriction on their targeting, currently hurdled by a force-protection only rules of 

engagement in that theater? 

General DUNFORD. U.S. forces may take action against any individuals or groups 

who pose a threat to U.S. or coalition forces in Afghanistan. Those authorities include actions against all groups associated with ISIL, to include the Islamic State– 

Khorasan Province (ISKP). Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan will continue to 

assess the sufficiency of his authorities and will request new or expanded authorities through the chain of command when he determines they are necessary. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Mr. JOHNSON. In the interest of ensuring every nation is bearing their share of 

the costs and responsibilities in defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL), what unique capabilities do our allies and regional partners have and how 

can we best enable those capabilities? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. What are we doing to ensure any Russian action does not detract 

from our aims in a post-ISIS Syria and Iraq but rather complements our own objectives? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you believe as Secretary of Defense that we have adequate 

human intelligence in the region? What can we do to improve it? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. In the interest of ensuring every nation is bearing their share of 

the costs and responsibilities in defeating ISIS, what unique capabilities do our allies and regional partners have and how can we best enable those capabilities? 

General DUNFORD. Following a deliberate engagement plan by Secretary Carter 

and Secretary Kerry, our partners are contributing nearly half of the forces in Iraq 

and Syria and their commitments and contributions continue to grow. USCENTCOM has developed a strategy to better utilize partner contributions, which 

includes partners taking on key leadership roles at locations such as Erbil and Al 

Asad. The DoD, in partnership with the State Department, has developed a comprehensive engagement strategy to support USCENTCOMs initiative. 

Mr. JOHNSON. It was recently reported that the Libyan port city of Sirte has been 

transformed from a minor outpost to an ‘‘actively managed colony of the central Islamic State, crowded with foreign fighters from around the region.’’ There have also 

been reports of ISIS attacks in Bangladesh. How extensive is ISIS’ control in Libya 

and have you seen evidence of attempts at aggressive expansion beyond the immediate region? 

General DUNFORD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. What are we doing to ensure any Russian action does not detract 

from our aims in a post-ISIS Syria and Iraq but rather complements our own objectives? 

General DUNFORD. Since 2012, the U.S. and Russia have been part of a United 

Nations effort to bring peace to Syria. The U.S. and Russia co-chair two task forces 

under the UN’s International Syria Support Group (ISSG)—a Ceasefire Task Force 

and a Humanitarian Task Force. Through these task forces, in bilateral sessions of 

the task force co-chairs, and in multilateral forums with regional and international 
87 

partners, we engage Russia. These engagements provide opportunities to ensure 

Russian actions complement the objectives for a post-ISIL Syria. In Iraq, the U.S. 

works by, with, and through the Iraqi government on issues of significance to our 

two countries; Russia has its own diplomatic channel with the Government of Iraq. 

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