SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1300 

CA 11-01450 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ. 

 

JOSEPH V. COSTANZO, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THE WOMAN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF JAMESTOWN, 

NEW YORK AND WOMAN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION 

HOSPITAL (WCA HOSPITAL), DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

 

DAMON MOREY LLP, BUFFALO (FRANK C. CALLOCCHIA OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

CORNELIUS J. LANG, BUFFALO, FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Chautauqua County

(James H. Dillon, J.), entered February 18, 2011 in a personal injury

action. The order denied the motion of defendants for summary

judgment. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is reversed

on the law without costs, the motion is granted and the complaint is

dismissed. 

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for

injuries he allegedly sustained when he slipped and fell on clear

liquid on a stairway in defendant Woman’s Christian Association

Hospital (hereafter, hospital), owned by defendant The Woman’s

Christian Association of Jamestown, New York. We agree with

defendants that Supreme Court erred in denying their motion for

summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendants met their

initial burden of establishing as a matter of law that they “ ‘did not

create the [allegedly] dangerous condition that caused plaintiff to

fall and did not have actual or constructive notice thereof’ ”

(Ferguson v County of Niagara, 49 AD3d 1313, 1314; see Lane v

Wilmorite, Inc., 1 AD3d 907, 908; cf. Rapini v New Plan Excel Realty

Trust, Inc., 11 AD3d 890). With respect to the creation of the

condition, defendants submitted evidence that the stairway is used by

hospital employees and the public alike, and on the record before us,

any conclusion that an employee of the hospital, as opposed to a

member of the general public, spilled the liquid at issue would be

mere speculation (see Castore v Tutto Bene Rest., Inc., 77 AD3d 599;

Berger v ISK Manhattan, Inc., 10 AD3d 510). As for actual notice,

defendants met their initial burden through the submission of, inter

alia, the deposition testimony of various employees who testified that

they were not aware of any complaints concerning the stairway prior to
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CA 11-01450 

plaintiff’s fall and that they did not observe any water or other

substances on the stairway before that time (see Ferington v

Dudkowski, 49 AD3d 1267; Quinn v Holiday Health & Fitness Ctrs. of

N.Y., Inc., 15 AD3d 857). Finally, defendants met their initial

burden on the issue of constructive notice of the wet condition by

submitting, inter alia, plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he did

not see any liquid on the stairs when he ascended the stairway 5 to 10

minutes before his fall. We thus conclude therefrom that defendants

“established as a matter of law that [the wet condition] on the

[stairway] formed so close in time to the accident that [they] could

not reasonably have been expected to notice and remedy the condition”

(Steele v Lafferty, 79 AD3d 1802, 1803 [internal quotation marks

omitted]; see Branham v Loews Orpheum Cinemas, Inc., 31 AD3d 319, 322-

323, affd 8 NY3d 931; Berger, 10 AD3d at 511-512). In opposition to

the motion, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to

defendants’ creation or notice of the wet condition (see generally

Majchrzak v Harry’s Harbour Place Grille, Inc., 28 AD3d 1109; Lane, 1

AD3d at 908; Fowler v St. Luke’s Mem. Hosp. Ctr. [appeal No. 2], 273

AD2d 893). Plaintiff’s “ ‘speculation with respect to . . . the

length of time [the liquid] was on the floor is insufficient to raise

a triable issue of fact’ ” (Bellassai v Roberts Wesleyan Coll., 59

AD3d 1125, 1126; see Berger, 10 AD3d at 512-513; Gloria v MGM Emerald

Enters., 298 AD2d 355, 355-356).

All concur except CARNI and LINDLEY, JJ., who dissent in part and

vote to modify in accordance with the following Memorandum: We

respectfully dissent in part. We agree with the majority that

defendants established as a matter of law that they did not create the

allegedly dangerous condition that caused the accident, i.e., the

liquid on the stairs upon which plaintiff slipped, and that they

lacked actual notice of it. We further agree with the majority that

plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact on those theories of

negligence, and thus we would modify the order by granting those parts

of defendants’ motion with respect to their alleged creation of the

dangerous condition and their alleged actual notice of it. In our

view, however, defendants failed to meet their initial burden on their

motion of establishing as a matter of law that they lacked

constructive notice of the presence of the liquid on the stairs (see

King v Sam’s E., Inc., 81 AD3d 1414), and we conclude that Supreme

Court therefore properly denied that part of their motion seeking

summary judgment dismissing the complaint to that extent, regardless

of the sufficiency of plaintiff’s opposing papers (see Winegrad v New

York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853; Musachio v Smithtown Cent.

School Dist., 68 AD3d 949). 

Defendants’ purported lack of constructive notice is based on the

deposition testimony of plaintiff that he did not notice any liquid

when he walked up the stairs 5 to 10 minutes before he fell. 

Defendants speculate that, because plaintiff did not notice the liquid

on his way up the stairs, it was not present at that time. They thus

further speculate that the liquid must have been spilled on the stairs

less than 10 minutes before the accident, which is an insufficient

period of time upon which to base a finding of constructive notice. 

The mere fact that plaintiff did not notice the liquid as he ascended
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CA 11-01450 

the stairs, however, does not establish as a matter of law that the

liquid was not present at that time. Because plaintiff had no reason

to inspect the stairs as he ascended them, it is possible that the

liquid was there at that time and he simply did not see it. Indeed,

plaintiff testified that he also did not see the liquid before he fell

as he descended the stairs, and defendants have not disputed that the

liquid was in fact there when plaintiff fell. Because defendants

failed to submit any nonspeculative evidence as to how long the liquid

was on the stairs prior to the accident, we conclude that they failed

to establish their lack of constructive notice as a matter of law and

thus failed to establish their entitlement to summary judgment

dismissing the complaint in its entirety (see generally King, 81 AD3d

at 1415). 

Entered: February 10, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court