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66–220PDF 2011

OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE 

TRANSPORTATION’S FISCAL YEAR 

2012 BUDGET REQUEST 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

THURSDAY, MAY 5, 2011 

Serial No. 112–16 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

HON. STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Thursday, May 5, 2011 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Steven M. Palazzo, Chair, Subcommittee on 

Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 7 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8 

Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Acting Ranking Minority 

Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .................................... 9 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Witnesses: 

Dr. George C. Nield. Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 11 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

Dr. Gerald Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure, US Government 

Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19 

Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld, Research Professor of Space Policy and International 

Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 30 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 31 

Discussion 

Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Dr. George C. Nield, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration ............................................................ 58 

Dr. Gerald Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 65 

Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld, Research Professor of Space Policy and International 

Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University ......................................................................................................................... 67 

(1) 

OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE 

TRANSPORTATION’S 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST 

THURSDAY, MAY 5, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steven Palazzo 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
2 
3 

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Office of Commercial Space Transportation’s 

Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request 

THURSDAY, MAY 5, 2011

10:00 A.M.—12:00 P.M. 

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose 

The purpose of the May 5 hearing held by the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics is to review the Fiscal Year 2012 budget request submitted by the FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation (in FAA shorthand the office is referred to 

as ‘AST’) and to examine new initiatives in the request to expand the office’s roles 

and responsibilities. AST’s FY2012 budget request seeks $26.625 million, a 74% increase over the FY2010 enacted level ($15.237 million) and a near-doubling of its 

workforce, asserting that NASA-sponsored commercial cargo flights to the International Space Station, plus the expected start-up of commercial human sub-orbital 

flights, places new regulatory demands on their operations. 

Witnesses 

• Dr. George C. Nield, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration 

• Dr. Gerald Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office 

• Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld, Research Professor of Space Policy and International 

Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University 

Background 

The Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) licenses and regulates U.S. 

commercial space launches and reentries, as well as the operation of non-federal 

launch and reentry sites. It’s mission statement is: ‘‘To ensure the protection of the 

public, property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United 

States during commercial launch and reentry activities, and to encourage, facilitate, 

and promote U.S. commercial space transportation.’’ AST issued its first launch license in 1989 and since then has licensed 204 launches with no fatalities, serious 

injuries, or significant damage to the uninvolved public. 

In 1984 President Reagan signed an executive order designating the Department 

of Transportation as the lead federal agency for encouraging and facilitating commercial launch activities within the private sector. Eight months later Congress 

passed the Commercial Space Launch Act (P.L. 98- 575) which gave legislative authority to DOT’s role as the principal oversight agency for the regulation and licensing of commercial space transportation systems. Subsequently, DOT shifted the office to the FAA. 

Congress last acted on legislation dealing with commercial space transportation 

in the 108th Congress. Two bills were enacted: (1) ‘‘The Commercial Space Launch 

Amendments Act’’, H.R. 5382 (PL 108–492) was introduced by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher and expanded AST’s authority to regulate commercial human space flight; 

(2) H.R. 2608 (PL 108–360) reauthorized the Office of Commercial Space Transportation through FY 2009. No subsequent bill addressing AST has since been enacted. 

Licensing Activities 

There are three types of launches—national security, civil, and commercial. The 

Office of Commercial Space Transportation regulates commercial launches; launches 

of NASA and DOD payloads do not require licenses. In 2010, AST licensed four commercial orbital launches compared to five licensed launches in 2009. For 2011 AST 
4 

forecasts four commercial launches will be licensed. No suborbital flights were conducted under FAA experimental permits in 2010. 

In 2010 one reentry was conducted under an FAA reentry license. The SpaceX 

Dragon Capsule successfully reentered the atmosphere and landed in the Pacific 

Ocean following its first NASA Commercial Orbital Transportation System (COTS) 

demonstration flight. It was the first reentry license ever granted by FAA. SpaceX 

anticipates flying its second COTS demonstration flight later this year and Orbital 

also plans to fly its first COTS demonstration before the end of 2011. 

In addition to licensing launches, AST also licenses the operation of commercial 

launch sites (or ‘‘spaceports ’’). Currently, there are eight— 

• Spaceport Florida, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, FL 

• Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport, Wallops Island, VA 

• California Spaceport, Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA 

• Kodiak Launch Complex, Kodiak Island, AK 

• Mojave Air & Space Port, CA 

• Cecil Field Spaceport, Jacksonville, FL 

• Oklahoma Spaceport, Burns Flat, OK 

• Spaceport America, Las Cruces, NM 

AST’s FY12 budget request seeks $26.625 million, a 75% increase over FY10 en- acted, and compared to the FY11 request it represents a 69% increase ($10.878 million). Three new proposals are responsible for the spending growth— 

(1) proposed establishment of the ‘‘FAA Commercial Spaceflight Technical Cen- ter’’ to be located at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida ($5 million in FY12 

to hire 50 additional employees); 

(2) creation of a ‘‘Space Incentives Program’’ ($5 million in FY12) ; and 

(3) hiring an additional seven employees ($1.25 million) for development and implementation of safety requirements and human factors to support development of commercial crew transportation systems and missions. 

The budget request includes the following justification: ‘‘A key challenge that we 

are facing today involves the beginning of a new era in commercial human 

spaceflight: suborbital human spaceflight (space tourism) and orbital crew transportation to the International Space Station. The publication of the new National Space 

Policy signals an even greater role for the commercial space industry in America’s 

overall space strategy and space traffic management and AST’s activities support 

the growth in the commercial space industry. In addition, the 2012 Budget request 

supports the Presidential Task Force on Space Industry Workforce and Economic Development’s recommendation that FAA establish a Commercial Spaceflight Technical 

Center. The Technical Center will provide safety and technical support for future 

commercial space launch activities and support the continued development of standards and regulations for commercial spaceflight. Due to a projected increase in commercial space transportation launches, AST funding will be used to conduct appropriate research and develop necessary regulations related to commercial human 

spaceflight to ensure public safety.’’ 

The FAA Commercial Spaceflight Technical Center. Many details about the Center 

are still being developed. AST’s budget request notes that the Presidential Task 

Force recommended that FAA establish the Center at the Kennedy Space Center, 

and that its main purpose will be ‘‘to develop safety processes and requirements related to commercial human spaceflight (HSF), along with related research. Primary 

focus areas at the Technical Center will include spaceflight safety, spaceflight engineering and standards, and Space Traffic Management.’’ In supplementary budget 

material provided to committee staff, AST also pointed out that establishing the 

Technical Center at Kennedy will ‘‘enable the nation to continue to benefit from the 

contributions of a significant number of highly-skilled aerospace workers who will 
5 

be seeking employment during the next 12 months. It will allow the FAA and NASA 

to partner in developing an organization with a knowledgeable and experienced staff 

to regulate future commercial space operations.’’ 

Space Incentives Program. The request seeks $5 million to establish a program 

for incentivizing advancements in space transportation by non-governmental organizations. Modeled on previous successful prize programs (e.g., the Ansari X Prize), 

AST proposes to put up a $5 million award for industry to develop and demonstrate 

a low-cost launch system for CubeSats. These are very small low-cost satellites (10 

x 10 x 10 cm) that are favored by universities and other research institutions, and 

are typically carried as secondary payloads on conventional satellite launches. 

Should the prize program produce a winning design, it would enable frequent dedicated low-cost missions carrying one or several CubeSats. 

Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 

In 2004, SpaceShipOne successfully launched two suborbital flights from the Mojave, CA, airport within a two week time-span, winning the $10 million Ansari X– 

Prize. Space industry optimists believed then that suborbital flights carrying space 

tourists would quickly develop with several commercial companies entering the marketplace to offer routine suborbital flights. Later that year Congress passed H.R. 

5382 (P.L. 108–492), the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to license and regulate commercial human 

space flight. 

However, even though the Act extended regulatory authority to DOT (specifically 

to the Office of Commercial Space Transportation), it prohibited federal regulation 

of commercial human space flight companies for eight years following enactment. 

This prohibition covers both suborbital and orbital commercial launch systems. 

The premise of the eight-year prohibition was rooted in the concern that the industry did not yet exist, and thus DOT (and AST) had no relevant experience upon 

which to regulate industry practices. During this period, space launch companies 

would be able to experiment with various designs and processes as they endeavored 

to improve their vehicles’ safety and performance prior to offering licensed suborbital (or orbital) flights. The Act provided two exceptions to the regulatory prohibition; AST could restrict or prohibit design features or operating practices that (1) 

resulted in a serious or fatal injury to crew or space flight participants, or (2) contributed to an unplanned event during a commercial human space flight that posed 

a high risk of causing a serious or fatal injury to crew or space flight participants. 

The eight year ban expires December 23, 2012. 

Thus the increase in AST’s FY2012 budget request is predicated on the expiration 

of the ban and with it the need to develop the technical expertise, and to hire industry veterans. Their budget request states: ‘‘The FY2012 request reflects the addition 

of crew and passenger safety to our regulatory activities.’’ 

The regulatory prohibition may be modified by Congress. On March 31, 2011, during House consideration of H.R. 658, the FAA Air Transportation and Modernization 

and Safety Improvement Act of 2011, an amendment was adopted by the House 

that, among other provisions, extended the regulatory prohibition for another eight 

years following the date of the first licensed commercial human space flight launch. 

The Senate companion bill had no comparable provision. 

To date only one company, Virgin Galactic, is known to be actively testing a prototype sub-orbital commercial human spaceflight vehicle. SpaceShipTwo, a larger 

version of the Ansari X–Prize winner, is undergoing unpowered atmospheric testing 

in California. According to the company, hundreds of interested purchasers have already placed down-payments with Virgin Galatic for the privilege of flying on their 

spacecraft once commercial flights get underway. 

NASA’s Commercial Cargo and Crew Programs 

With the retirement of the Space Shuttle this summer, NASA plans to rely on two 

companies—Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital) and Space Exploration Technologies ( SpaceX)—to provide cargo resupply services to the International Space 

Station until 2020. Under the current contracts each company is obligated to launch 

two supply flights a year, and with regard to SpaceX, it would also bring materials 

back from ISS using their Dragon capsule to reenter the atmosphere and land at 

a permitted site. For these resupply flights NASA is buying a service as though it 

were a traditional commercial customer, thus triggering coverage under AST’s licensing regime. Once both companies are operating resupply flights on a routine 

basis, AST’s regulatory workload will increase by four flights a year, plus two reentries. 
6 

NASA is also pursuing a longer term strategy to use a similar approach of buying 

launch services to ferry astronauts to and from the International Space Station, although agency plans are still uncertain about when these ‘‘commercial crew’’ flights 

will begin. Most of the agency’s notional plans suggest 2016 as a likely date, though 

many technical hurdles still remain, not the least of which is NASA publishing a 

set of human rating requirements to be met by any of the commercial launch bidders. 

Non-NASA flights would also require a new set of regulations be established and 

enforced by AST to ensure that the risk to non-governmental crew and passengers 

are minimized. NASA has vast experience in this arena while AST has none. FAA 

(AST) and NASA are in discussions now about how the two agencies will exercise 

oversight and insight into the design and operation of any commercial orbital crew 

launch systems, as well as their reentry performance, landing sites, and recovery 

operations. The goal is to minimize any overlap between the agencies. 

On Thursday, April 28, 2011, AST published a notice on its website that it will 

hold a public meeting late this month in Florida to seek input from the affected 

community. ‘‘FAA is planning to propose regulations to protect the health and safety 

of crew and space flight participants for orbital human spaceflight as soon as circumstances require after December 23, 2012’’ (the end of the eight year regulatory 

prohibition now in current law). 
7 

Chairman PALAZZO. The Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 

will come to order. 

Good morning. Welcome to today’s hearing entitled ‘‘The Office of 

Commercial Space Transportation’s Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request.’’ In front of you are packets containing the written testimony, biographies and Truth in Testimony disclosures for today’s 

witness panel. I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening 

statement. 

Today, May 5th, marks the 50th anniversary of the first flight 

of an American astronaut, and the second human being into outer 

space. Alan Shepard, riding in a Mercury capsule, launched atop 

a Redstone rocket on a 15-minute suborbital flight that carried him 

to an altitude of 116 miles. His flight was a major first step for 

America’s space program, helping bolster American pride and setting our country and NASA on a spectacular course of space accomplishments. 

Turning to the present, I want to thank our witnesses for taking 

time from their busy schedules to appear before our Subcommittee. 

I realize a lot of work by many people goes into the preparation of 

your statements, and I want to assure you that your expertise and 

wisdom will be valuable to this Committee and Congress as we 

wrestle with issues related to our Nation’s commercial space program. 

The Office of Commercial Space Transportation provides an essential public service, ensuring that commercial launches are undertaken with the highest level of safety. Their record of achievement is significant, licensing over 200 launches without any loss of 

life, serious injury, or notable property damage to the general public. 

However, over the next several years AST, as they are commonly 

known within FAA and industry, faces an increased workload and 

possible added regulatory duties, and their fiscal year 2012 budget 

request reflects these new burdens. The request seeks a 75 percent 

increase over the fiscal year 2010 enacted level and an expansion 

of its workforce by nearly 50 percent. A significant portion of the 

increase would be spent hiring additional staff to develop and implement new safety requirements for suborbital and orbital commercial human spaceflight launch systems. AST also proposes to 

establish a new program modeled after NASA’s Centennial Challenges prize to incentivize development of space transportation 

technologies. Finally, the budget request proposes creation of a 

Commercial Spaceflight Technical Center at NASA’s Kennedy 

Space Center that would initially employ a small number of aerospace engineers, but could over time hire as many as a couple hundred. The request is silent on associated infrastructure costs. 

With respect to commercial human spaceflight, the Commercial 

Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 included two provisions 

that will be central to our discussions today. The first authorized 

AST to regulate commercial human space flight launch systems; 

the second prohibited AST from regulating commercial human 

spaceflight for eight years in order to give space tourism companies 

an opportunity to design, develop, and operate new and experimental launch systems. The freeze was expected to allow the nas-
8 

cent industry to gain experience through experimental flights upon 

which AST could rely as it began to draft a regulatory regime. 

At the time Congress was considering the 2004 Act, industry expressed concern that without any real-world experience, regulation 

writers could choke off creation of the space tourism marketplace 

by writing and enforcing unworkable and overly prescriptive rules. 

Roughly 6–1/2 years have elapsed since the bill’s enactment, and 

as many in this room are aware, there is an effort underway in 

Congress to extend the regulatory prohibition another eight years. 

Given that no prototype commercial suborbital vehicle has yet 

flown into space, does the argument still hold that AST needs an 

experience base upon which it can draft regulations guiding the industry’s design and operation of their vehicles? To what degree 

should AST regulate commercial human space launch systems? 

Should they have insight down to the component level for each type 

of launch vehicle, much the same way that FAA certifies commercial civil aircraft? How would they acquire the knowledge and expertise to take on this role? It is my hope this morning’s hearing 

will help shed light on these and other pressing questions. 

Before closing, I also want to express concerns about AST’s proposal to create a prize program. While I appreciate government’s 

interest in promoting technological development in the space transportation industry, it is my view that NASA is doing more than a 

sufficient job funding new technologies and capabilities through aggressive use of Space Act agreements. In these times when Congress and the White House are focusing on reducing the federal 

budget deficit, I question the wisdom of implementing another form 

of federal largesse. 

Dr. Nield, don’t take this personally, but I want the record to 

note that the FAA’s testimony was provided to our Committee 

about 20 hours ago contrary to Committee rules and past practice. 

By holding back testimony, Members and staff are afforded only a 

handful of hours to review and analyze Administration statements, 

undermining the ability of this body to engage in a well-informed 

dialog with Executive Branch witnesses. The White House’s process 

for vetting testimony of agency witnesses continues to frustrate 

this Committee and Congress. This is not the first time in this stillyoung Congress that testimony has arrived only hours before the 

scheduled start of hearings, and I urge the White House to exercise 

greater diligence. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Palazzo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN STEVEN M. PALAZZO

Good morning and welcome to today’s hearing to discuss the Fiscal Year 2012 

budget request submitted by the FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation. 

Today, May 5th, marks the 50th anniversary of the first flight of an American 

astronaut - and the second human being - into outer space. Alan Shepard, riding 

in a Mercury capsule, launched atop a Redstone rocket on a fifteen minute suborbital flight that carried him to an altitude of 116 miles. His flight was a major 

first step for America’s space program, helping bolster American pride and setting 

our country and NASA on a spectacular course of space accomplishments. 

Turning to the present, I want to thank our witnesses for taking time from their 

busy schedules to appear before our Subcommittee. I realize a lot of work by many 

people goes into the preparation of your statements and I want to assure you that 

your expertise and wisdom will be valuable to this Committee and Congress as we 

wrestle with issues related to our nation’s commercial space program. 
9 

The Office of Commercial Space Transportation provides an essential public service, ensuring that commercial launches are undertaken with the highest level of 

safety. Their record of achievement is significant, licensing over 200 launches without any loss of life, serious injury, or notable property damage to the general public. 

However, over the next several years AST - as they are commonly known within 

FAA and industry - faces an increased workload and possible added regulatory duties, and their FY2012 budget request reflects these new burdens. The request seeks 

a 75% increase over the FY10 enacted level and an expansion of its workforce by 

nearly 50%. A significant portion of the increase would be spent hiring additional 

staff to develop and implement new safety requirements for sub-orbital and orbital 

commercial human spaceflight launch systems. AST also proposes to establish a new 

program - modeled after NASA’s Centennial Challenges prize - to incentivize development of space transportation technologies. Finally, the budget request proposes 

creation of a Commercial Spaceflight Technical Center at NASA’s Kennedy Space 

Center that would initially employ a small number of aerospace engineers, but could 

over time hire as many as a couple hundred. The request is silent on associated infrastructure costs. 

With respect to commercial human space flight, the Commercial Space Launch 

Amendments Act of 2004 included two provisions that will be central to our discussions today. The first authorized AST to regulate commercial human space flight 

launch systems; the second prohibited AST from regulating commercial human 

space flight for eight years in order to give space tourism companies an opportunity 

to design, develop and operate new and experimental launch systems. The freeze 

was expected to allow the nascent industry to gain experience through experimental 

flights upon which AST could rely as it began to draft a regulatory regime. At the 

time Congress was considering the 2004 Act, industry expressed concern that without any real-world experience, regulation writers could choke off creation of the 

space tourism marketplace by writing and enforcing unworkable and overly-prescriptive rules. 

Roughly six-and-a-half years have elapsed since the bill’s enactment, and as many 

in this room are aware, there is an effort underway in Congress to extend the regulatory prohibition another eight years. Given that no prototype commercial sub-orbital vehicle has yet flown into space, does the argument still hold that AST needs 

an experience base upon which it can draft regulations guiding the industry’s design 

and operation of their vehicles? To what degree should AST regulate commercial 

human space launch systems? Should they have insight down to the component 

level for each type of launch vehicle, much the same way that FAA certifies commercial civil aircraft? How would they acquire the knowledge and expertise to take on 

this role? It is my hope this morning’s hearing will help shed light on these and 

other pressing questions. 

Before closing, I also want to express concerns about AST’s proposal to create a 

prize program. While I appreciate government’s interest in promoting technological 

development in the space transportation industry, it is my view that NASA is doing 

more than a sufficient job funding new technologies and capabilities through aggressive use of Space Act Agreements. In these times when Congress and the White 

House are focusing on reducing the federal budget deficit, I question the wisdom of 

implementing another form of federal largesse. 

Dr. Nield, don’t take this personally, but I want the record to note that the FAA’s 

testimony was provided to our committee about 20 hours ago, contrary to committee 

rules and past practice. By holding back testimony, Members and staff are afforded 

only a handful of hours to review and analyze administration statements, undermining the ability of this body to engage in a well-informed dialogue with executive 

branch witnesses. The White House’s process for vetting testimony of agency witnesses continues to frustrate this committee and Congress. This is not the first time 

in this still-young Congress that testimony has arrived only hours before the scheduled start of hearings, and I urge the White House to exercise greater diligence. 

Chairman PALAZZO. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Costello for 

an opening statement. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I thank you for 

calling the hearing today, and let me just associate myself with 

your remarks about testimony coming from the White House in a 

timely manner consistent with the rules of this Committee. It has 

been a longstanding problem. I have been on this Committee for a 

number of years, and we experience the same problem regardless 

of which Administration is in office, and I would just say to you to 
10 

go back, Dr. Nield, and express our frustration. As the Chairman 

said, don’t take it personal but we know the vetting process needs 

to—you all need to do a better job in the White House. We expressed that under the Bush Administration. We will continue to 

express that under the Obama Administration. 

Mr. Chairman, I am very familiar with commercial space transportation and the commercial space transportation industry, not 

only from the hearings that I Chaired in the Aviation Subcommittee but also from the X–Prize Foundation, which is well 

known for designing and managing public competitions for aviation 

and space. They are located across the river, in St. Louis, Missouri, 

from my Congressional district in southwestern Illinois. 

AST’s fiscal year 2012 budget request reflects the office’s changing role as the commercial spaceflight industry expands to provide 

cargo and crew transportation for NASA, build spaceports around 

the country, transport space tourists, and fulfill other missions. 

Congress and the FAA will need to decide how best to proceed with 

respect to safety regulations of this emerging industry. 

Congress passed several laws to allow commercial space transportation to develop, and we must ensure the industry has proper 

federal safety oversight. As the number of launches is expected to 

increase with commercial space tourism and the potential use of 

commercial space launch vehicles by NASA, it is imperative that 

the FAA has the proper resources to ensure new technologies and 

programs evolve safely. 

I look forward to hearing from the FAA Associate Administrator 

for Commercial Space Transportation about FAA’s role in overseeing the commercial space industry to ensure the safety of the 

public, as well as crew and spaceflight participants. I hope this 

hearing will be the first of many substantive hearings by this Subcommittee to examine the current status and future challenges of 

commercial space operations. We need to determine our goals for 

the Office of Commercial Space Transportation and evaluate the 

issues we must consider for the future of the AST. 

I welcome our witnesses and look forward to hearing their testimony. Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back and look 

forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ACTING RANKING MEMBER JERRY COSTELLO

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today’s hearing to review the Fiscal Year 

2012 (FY12) budget request for the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) Office 

of Commercial Space Transportation (AST). 

I am very familiar with the emerging commercial space transportation industry, 

not only from hearings I Chaired in the Aviation Subcommittee, but also because 

the X-Prize Foundation, which is most well known for designing and managing public competitions for aviation and space, is located in St. Louis, Missouri —across the 

river from my Congressional district. 

AST’s FY12 budget request reflects the office’s changing role as the commercial 

spaceflight industry expands to provide cargo and crew transportation for NASA, 

build space ports around the country, transport space tourists, and fulfill other missions. Congress and the FAA will need to decide how best to proceed with respect 

to safety regulation of this emerging industry. 

Congress passed several laws to allow commercial space transportation to develop 

and we must ensure the industry has proper federal safety oversight. As the number of launches is expected to increase with commercial space tourism and the potential use of commercial space launch vehicles by National Aeronautics and Space 
11 

Administration (NASA), it is imperative that the FAA has the proper resources to 

ensure new technologies and programs evolve safely. 

I look forward to hearing from the FAA Associate Administrator for Commercial 

Space Transportation, Dr. George Nield, about FAA’s role in overseeing the commercial space industry to ensure the safety of the public, as well as crew and space 

flight participants. 

I hope this hearing will be the first of many substantive hearings by this subcommittee to examine the current status and future challenges of commercial space 

operations. We need to determine our goals for the Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation and evaluate the issues we must consider for the future of the AST. 

I welcome our witnesses and look forward to their testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of mytime. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Costello. 

If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening 

statements, your statements will be added to the record at this 

point. 

At this time I would like to introduce our witness panel. Our 

first witness is Dr. George Nield, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation at the FAA. He has over 30 years of 

aerospace experience with the Air Force, NASA, and private industry. Dr. Nield came to FAA from the Orbital Sciences Corporation, 

where he served as Senior Scientist for the Advanced Programs 

Group. Our next witness is Dr. Gerald Dillingham, Director of Civil 

Aviation Issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. He 

is responsible for directing program evaluations and policy analysis 

related to all aspects of civilian aviation including safety, finance, 

environment, air traffic control, airport development, and international aviation issues. Our final witness is Dr. Henry Hertzfeld, 

Research Professor of Space Policy and International Affairs in the 

Space Policy Institute at the Elliott School of International Affairs 

and an Adjunct Professor of Law at George Washington University 

in Washington, DC. Welcome to all of you. 

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to 

five minutes each after which the Members of the Committee will 

have five minutes each to ask questions. 

I now recognize our first witness, Dr. George Nield, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation at the FAA. 

STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE C. NIELD, 

ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE 

TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

Dr. NIELD. Chairman Palazzo, Congressman Costello and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to participate 

in this hearing on the activities of the Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation. This is my first 

opportunity to speak to many of you, so I am particularly pleased 

to be here. I know the Subcommittee is specifically interested in 

the Administration’s fiscal year 2012 budget request for AST. I 

would also like to update the Subcommittee on some of our recent 

activities and offer you our view of the future. 

The mission of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation is 

to ensure protection of the public, property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States during commercial launch and reentry activities, and to encourage, facilitate 

and promote commercial space transportation. 
12 

While we take all of our statutory charges seriously, our top priority is safety. To carry out our safety responsibilities, we develop 

and issue regulations, grant licenses, permits and safety approvals, 

and conduct safety inspections during every licensed or permitted 

launch. To date, we have an unblemished safety record: 204 licensed launches without any loss of life, serious injuries, or significant property damage to the general public. 

We are also responsible for licensing the operation of launch and 

reentry sites, or spaceports. Since 1996, we have licensed the operation of eight different spaceports around the country. Last year, 

the FAA awarded four grants for spaceport development. We believe these investments will enhance safety and facilitate future development efforts. 

The capability to accomplish important commercial space transportation research was significantly enhanced last fall through the 

establishment of the Center of Excellence for Commercial Space 

Transportation led by New Mexico State University. The Center of 

Excellence is a partnership between government, industry and academia, and will carry out research necessary to maintain U.S. leadership in commercial space transportation safety and technologies. 

Fifty years ago on May 5, 1961, Alan Shepard became the first 

American to travel into space, but today, we find ourselves at a 

crossroads. Next month, NASA will carry out the final launch of 

the space shuttle. While this is a bittersweet event for all space enthusiasts, it is also an exciting time and an opportunity to begin 

the next chapter in space transportation. 

After the completion of Atlantis’s final mission, NASA is planning to rely on private industry to launch cargo and eventually 

crew members to and from the International Space Station, thereby 

enabling NASA to focus its attention on exploring the solar system. 

It will be the FAA’s responsibility to license and regulate those 

commercial launches to the ISS. 

One of the most important contributors to our near-term workload will be suborbital space flights. In fiscal year 2012, we expect 

to see several dozen licensed or permitted launches, many of which 

will involve suborbital flights. That will mark a significant increase 

in activity for us, and it represents the start of what is likely to 

be a period of sustained and rapid growth. 

The Administration’s fiscal year 2012 budget request for AST totals approximately $26.6 million and provides for 103 full-time employees. The request includes funding for a Commercial Spaceflight 

Technical Center at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida and a 

low-cost access to space incentive program. I would be happy to discuss each of these initiatives in more detail if there is interest. 

Commercial space transportation is currently undergoing a number of changes, and as the regulator, we need to be prepared to 

change along with the industry. For example, in the coming 

months, it may be necessary to revisit some of the statutes and 

regulations that govern commercial space launch activities. Specifically, the FAA’s legislative authority may require revision so that 

we can continue to ensure public safety both in space and on the 

ground. We see the potential for greater regulatory authority in the 

area of on-orbit transportation as well as during launch and re-
13 

entry. We welcome the opportunity to work with Congress on these 

priorities. 

Chairman Palazzo, Congressman Costello and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Nield follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE C. NIELD, 

ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

Chairman Palazzo, Congressman Costello, and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for inviting me to participate in this hearing on the activities of the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Office of Commercial Space Transportation 

(AST). This is my first opportunity to speak to many of you, so I am particularly 

pleased to be here. I know the Subcommittee is specifically interested in the Administration’s FY 2012 budget request for AST. I look forward to answering any questions you may have about our request. I would also like to take this opportunity 

to update the Subcommittee on some of our recent activities, to highlight some of 

the changes to our industry during the past year, and to offer a view of the future 

- what’s on the horizon as we transition to a new role for the nation’s commercial 

space transportation industry. 

The Office of Commercial Space Transportation 

The Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) was established by Executive Order in 1984 and was located in the Office of the Secretary of Transportation. 

In November of 1995, the office was transferred to the FAA, where today it is one 

of the agency’s four lines of business, along with the Office of Aviation Safety, the 

Office of Airports, and the Air Traffic Organization. 

Space transportation activities in the United States fall into three main sectors: 

the civil sector, where the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 

has the primary lead; the national security sector, involving the Department of Defense and the intelligence community; and the commercial sector, which is regulated 

by the FAA. In accordance with federal statute, it is the mission of AST to ensure 

protection of the public, property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States during commercial launch and reentry activities, and to 

encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space transportation. While we take 

all of our statutory charges seriously, our top priority is safety. To carry out our 

safety responsibilities, we develop and issue regulations; grant licenses, permits, 

and safety approvals; and conduct safety inspections during every licensed or permitted launch. To date, we have an unblemished safety record: 204 licensed 

launches, without any loss of life, serious injuries, or significant property damage 

to the general public. 

We are also responsible for licensing the operation of launch and reentry sites or 

‘‘spaceports,’’ as they are popularly known. Since 1996 we have licensed the operation of the California Spaceport at Vandenberg Air Force Base; Spaceport Florida 

at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station; the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport at Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia; Mojave Air and Space Port in California; Kodiak 

Launch Complex on Kodiak Island, Alaska; the Oklahoma Spaceport in Burns Flat, 

Oklahoma; Spaceport America near Las Cruces, New Mexico; and Cecil Field in 

Jacksonville, Florida. 

Development of these sites is necessary for the growth and success of the industry. In FY 2010, the FAA awarded four grants for spaceport development. These investments will facilitate safety and growth of future spaceport development and 

should ultimately inspire additional private investment in commercial space transportation. 

Commercial space transportation research efforts were enhanced last year by the 

establishment of the Center of Excellence for Commercial Space Transportation, led 

by New Mexico State University, Las Cruces. The other institutions that comprise 

the center include Stanford University; the Florida Institute of Technology in Melbourne; the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology in Socorro; the University of Colorado at Boulder; the University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston; and 

the Florida Center for Advanced Aero-Propulsion—a research consortium made up 

of the University of Florida, Florida State University, and the University of Central 

Florida. The Center of Excellence is a partnership between academia, industry, and 
14 

government, and will carry out research necessary to maintain U.S. leadership in 

commercial space transportation safety and technology. 

Additionally, the FAA maintains important relationships with our interagency 

partners. We continue our partnership with the Air Force through our Common 

Standards Working Group where we coordinate on safety issues for expendable 

launch vehicles. We also work with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, NASA, and the Departments of Commerce, State, and Defense in the 

development of interagency policy for the industry, including the new National 

Space Policy released in 2010. We consult with the Department of State regularly 

to promote our commercial space transportation guidance abroad. 

The Administration’s 2010 National Space Policy establishes specific goals to 

strengthen stability in space by, among other things, promoting safe and responsible 

operations in space. This will require steps such as collecting and monitoring detailed knowledge of the orbital environment, and the sharing of that information 

with a variety of space actors. It will also be important to continue taking steps to 

minimize the creation of orbital debris and otherwise help preserve the space environment for responsible, peaceful, and safe activities by all users. Over time, the 

FAA will play a central role in developing and enhancing our nation’s capacity to 

conduct such efforts, along with the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce; 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; NASA; and the Federal Communications Commission. This collaboration will provide global benefits. 

Today and Moving Forward 

As the FAA continues the work of overseeing and enabling the safe development 

of the commercial space transportation industry, the space community as a whole 

finds itself at a crossroads. Last month, we celebrated the 50th anniversary of 

human space flight. Next month, NASA will conduct its final Space Shuttle launch. 

While this is a bittersweet event for all space enthusiasts, it is also an exciting time 

and an opportunity to begin the next chapter in space access, transportation, and 

development. After the completion of Atlantis’ final mission, NASA is planning to 

rely on private industry to launch cargo, and eventually crew members, to and from 

the International Space Station (ISS), thereby enabling NASA to focus its attention 

on exploring the solar system. FAA is engaging with NASA to further refine the licensing and regulatory process for these upcoming commercial crew launches to the 

ISS. 

Throughout the past 50 years, NASA has become the world leader in human 

spaceflight, amassing vast experience and a wonderful track record in space travel. 

There is no equal. 

Similarly, during the past 50 years, the FAA has achieved a stunning record of 

safety in commercial aviation. We are now leveraging that half-century of experience and safety acumen in our regulation and oversight of the commercial space 

transportation industry. 

Working in tandem, the FAA and NASA can bring best practices and our best experiences to bear on the future development of a safe and robust commercial human 

spaceflight industry for our nation - a priority of the Administration. Working with 

NASA and other experts, we can ensure the United States maintains its leadership 

role as human space flight becomes a reality for the commercial industry and private sector development increases to meet demand. 

One of the concerns we have heard expressed, and which Members of this Subcommittee may share, pertains to the demand for commercial launches to low Earth 

orbit: Is there a market? What does that market look like now and in the future? 

Is it sustainable? 

To answer these questions, Congress directed NASA, in coordination with the 

FAA, to conduct an assessment of the potential non-Governmental market for commercially developed crew and cargo transportation systems and capabilities (apart 

from the more established market for launched commercial spacecraft). Assessments 

by NASA and the FAA reveal a diversity of opinion among the space community 

regarding the size of the non-Governmental market for commercial crew and cargo 

launches, as well as the price of a ticket to space. The NASA report concluded that 

‘‘catalyzed by a successful Commercial Crew Program, a stable commercial non-Government market is likely to emerge.’’ NASA investments to date have paid huge 

dividends for industry, providing new capabilities and enabling the development of 

new, lower-cost launch systems. 

Multiple American companies—including small, entrepreneurial enterprises and 

large, established aerospace corporations—have announced that they are ready, 

willing, and able to meet NASA’s future needs, as well as those of non-Governmental customers. 
15 

The future of commercial cargo and crew transportation to low Earth orbit is a 

coming reality, but the largest near-term expansion in activity will be in suborbital 

spaceflight. In calendar year 2010, there were four licensed orbital launches: two 

Falcon 9 test fights and two satellite deployment missions—a Delta II and a Delta 

IV. That same year, we saw the first FAA-licensed reentry, of SpaceX’s Dragon capsule. In FY 2012, we expect several dozen licensed or permitted launches. Although 

most of those missions will involve suborbital launches, it still will be quite a 

change. The dramatic increase in launch numbers will provide the FAA and the 

space community .with important data and facilitate significant improvements 

throughout the industry. 

The President’s FY 2012 Budget 

The Administration’s FY 2012 budget request for AST totals approximately $26.6 

million and provides for 103 full-time employees (FTEs), at a cost of approximately 

$15.8 million. The office’s request for non-pay activities totals approximately $10.8 

million. Key outputs of the request include a projected 6 license and permit applications, 40 launch or reentry operations inspections, 8 launch site inspections, 5 environmental assessments, plus new rulemaking products, the Commercial Space 

Flight Technical Center, the Center of Excellence for Commercial Space Transportation, and incentives for low cost access to space. The budget requests $1.2 million 

and 14 positions to develop and implement additional safety processes and requirements specifically for commercial human spaceflight and the FAA’s efforts to improve spaceflight safety. 

Commercial Space Flight Technical Center 

The budget request for AST includes $5 million and 50 positions for a Commercial 

Spaceflight Technical Center. In anticipation of the commercial cargo launches to 

the ISS that are scheduled to begin this year and with plans for eventual commercial crew missions, it will be vitally important to enhance and ensure the highest 

levels of safety for commercial spaceflight operations. The staffing and activities 

planned for the Commercial Spaceflight Technical Center will provide the detailed 

engineering and operational expertise that will be required to oversee the emerging 

commercial spaceflight industry. 

Specifically, the Commercial Spaceflight Technical Center will perform several 

functions: spaceflight safety, including safety inspections, and accident prevention 

and investigation activities; spaceflight engineering and standards, to be developed 

in cooperation with both NASA and the industry, for spacecraft, spaceports, flight 

crew and participants, and aerospace technicians; range operations, including planning for future upgrades; and facilitating interagency coordination and information 

sharing with regard to space situational awareness, orbital debris, and collision 

avoidance advisories. 

On August 15, 2010, the Presidential Task Force on Space Industry Workforce 

and Economic Development recommended that FAA establish the new Center at the 

Kennedy Space Center in Florida. By co-locating the new Center at the Kennedy 

Space Center, we hope to benefit from the contributions of a significant number of 

highly skilled aerospace workers who will be seeking employment during the next 

12 months. Additionally, this co-location will allow the FAA and NASA to further 

strengthen our partnership by developing a knowledgeable and experienced staff to 

regulate future commercial space operations, and to develop the technical standards 

that will be needed for this emerging and critically important industry. 

Although the relationship between the Commercial Spaceflight Technical Center 

and NASA will be vital, the Center will not duplicate NASA functions. NASA has 

a separate mission and is focused on activities such as the safety of its personnel 

during transport to and from the ISS, operation of the ISS, development of a new 

Heavy-Lift launch vehicle, robotic and human exploration of the solar system, Earth 

and space science, and aeronautics. The FAA is a regulatory agency and has the 

statutory responsibility to oversee commercial space launches and reentries, and to 

ensure public safety during these operations. Establishment of the Commercial 

Spaceflight Technical Center will enable the FAA to strengthen its partnership with 

NASA, drawing on NASA’s expertise and experience in space operations and human 

space flight to augment the FAA’s experience in licensing and regulating commercial 

launches to develop a highly skilled cadre of commercial space hardware and operations experts. 

Low-Cost Access to Space Incentive 

The FY 2012 budget request also includes $5 million to incentivize advancements 

in the commercial space transportation industry. The Low Cost Access to Space Incentive program will provide a $5 million award to the first non-governmental team 
16 

to develop and demonstrate the capability to launch a 1-kilogram cubesat to orbit 

using a partially reusable launch system. The Administration believes that prizes 

and challenges have many potential benefits, including increasing the number of organizations that are addressing a particular problem of national significance, stimulating private sector investment that is many times greater than the cash value of 

the prize, and allowing the Federal Government to pay only for results. 

The high cost of access to space has long been a major obstacle for civil, military, 

and commercial space programs. The dream of low cost, fully-reusable space launch 

systems has recently been demonstrated by the X-Prize competitions, but only to 

suborbital space. This competition will achieve significant reductions in the cost of 

getting satellites to orbit. 

The Space Incentive Program follows a long tradition of prize competitions, including the AnsariX Prize won by Scaled Composites SpaceShipOne in 2004 and the 

Orteig Prize won by Charles Lindbergh in 1927. These awards can lead to significant accomplishments in transportation, and the use of prizes has been very successful in enabling government and industry to come up with innovative solutions 

to challenging problems. This incentive is expected to increase the number of developers and operators focusing on the specific problem of reusable, low-cost, orbital 

space launch systems, and we believe it is of sufficient size to attract the investment 

and commitment of companies who are capable of winning the prize. 

Preparing for the Future 

The FAA stands ready to meet the changes and challenges we know are coming. 

The industry has made significant strides toward a future that will make increasing 

demands on the FAA’s role as a regulator. As activities expand in the marketplace, 

our role will amplify as well. To this end, we are constantly looking ahead. 

In the coming months and years, it may be necessary to revisit some of the statutes and regulations that govern the commercial space launch activities of the FAA. 

Specifically, the FAA’s legislative authority may require expansion to ensure public 

safety in space and on Earth, as the commercial space flight sector evolves. Potentially, there may be a need for greater regulatory authority in the areas of transportation on orbit as well as launch and reentry. In addition, the FAA’s licensing authority may also require revision regarding operations associated with commercial 

hybrid launch systems and commercial cargo vehicles intentionally returning to 

Earth, regardless of whether they return substantially intact. We welcome the opportunity to work with Congress on these priorities. 

In this time of challenge and opportunity, the FAA is mindful of our many responsibilities, and we look forward to working with this Subcommittee as we tackle the 

challenges of shifting cargo and crew launches to the commercial sector and opening 

space to tourism and point-to-point transportation. The commercial space industry 

is ready to expand—and with your support, we are ready for lift-off. 

Chairman Palazzo, Congressman Costello, and Members of the Subcommittee, 

this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be pleased to answer any questions 

you may have. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Dr. Nield. 

I now recognize our second witness, Dr. Gerald Dillingham, Director of Civil Aviation Issues for the U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

STATEMENT OF DR. GERALD DILLINGHAM, 

DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Costello, Members of the Subcommittee. 

My testimony this morning focuses on three areas. First, the recent trends in the commercial space launch industry, and second, 

fiscal year 2012 budget request for FAA’s Office of Commercial 

Space Transportation, or AST, and third, some of the key challenges that FAA and the industry will need to address as the industry matures. 

Regarding the trends in the industry, after reaching a peak of 22 

launches in 1998, the frequency of commercial space launches 

began to fluctuate and generally decline until an uptick occurred 
17 

in 2004. In 2004, five manned commercial test flights took place, 

and since that time additional manned flights have been anticipated but have not materialized. However, other trends seem to indicate that the number of commercial launches is expected to increase. For example, there has been an increase in R&D activities 

including low-altitude flight tests, reusable rocket-powered vehicles 

that are capable of takeoffs and landings. We also see where private companies and states are developing additional spaceports to 

accommodate anticipated space tourism flights and expand the Nation’s launch capacity. In 2006, there were six FAA licensed spaceports. In 2011, the number has increased to eight. Additional commercial spaceports have been proposed in Hawaii, Indiana and 

Wisconsin. 

Now, let us turn to AST’s fiscal year 2012 budget request. FAA 

expects the number of commercial launches will increase over the 

next several years for several reasons. First, the first space tourism 

flights are expected to begin within two years with several 

launches occurring each year. Second, NASA plans to use private 

companies to transport cargo and eventually personnel to the International Space Station. FAA also expects its workload to increase 

over the next several years as it begins to develop safety regulations for these flights, so it has significantly increased its budget 

request. FAA’s fiscal year budget request would increase the budget for AST by nearly 75 percent over fiscal year 2010 budget to 

about $27 million in fiscal year 2012. According to FAA, this would 

fund nearly a 45 percent increase in staffing from 71 Full-time 

Equivalents in fiscal year 2010 to 103 in fiscal year 2012. This request also asks for a $5 million increase in spending on the office’s 

space incentive awards program. 

From our perspective, FAA’s focus on the need to expand its expertise in the areas of human factors and human spaceflight appear reasonable. However, the timing of the requested increase, 

given the current federal budget situation and uncertainties as to 

when and how much FAA’s workload will expand, warrants careful 

consideration by the Congress. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, let us turn to 

the challenges we see on the horizon for FAA’s oversight for the industry as it continues to mature. First, FAA must ensure that its 

regulations on licensing and safety requirements for launches and 

launch sites, which are based on safety requirements for expendable launch vehicle operations at federal sites, will also be suitable 

for operations at private sector spaceports. 

A second challenge for FAA is its dual mandate to regulate safety and promote human spaceflight. FAA and Congress must remain 

vigilant to ensure that any relationship between FAA and the commercial space launch industry remains appropriate. 

A third challenge for FAA will be to ensure that planning and 

implementation of NextGen accommodates spacecraft that are traveling to and from space through the national airspace system. 

For the industry, a key challenge going forward will be maintaining a strong international competitive position for the U.S. commercial space launch industry. Foreign competitors have historically offered lower launch prices than U.S. providers. As the com-
18 

mercial space launch industry expands, high launch costs and export controls will affect its ability to sell its services abroad. 

Finally, an overarching challenge for the industry and the United 

States is a lack of a comprehensive national space launch strategy. 

Numerous federal agencies have responsibilities for space activities 

including FAA, NASA, DOD, State and Commerce. According to a 

2009 National Academy of Sciences study, the process of alignment 

offers the opportunity to leverage resources from various agencies 

to address such shared challenges as a diminishing space industry 

base, the dwindling technical workforce, and reduced funding levels. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Dillingham follows:] 
19 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. GERALD DILLINGHAM, 

DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
20 
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Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Dr. Dillingham. 

I now recognize our final witness, Dr. Henry Hertzfeld, Research 

Professor of Space Policy and International Affairs at the Elliott 

School of International Affairs at George Washington University. 

STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY R. HERTZFELD, 

RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF SPACE POLICY AND 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Dr. HERTZFELD. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today. I am pleased that the Committee has begun the important process of reviewing these matters as the space industry in 

the United States is poised for very significant changes. 

Reviewing the findings of the congressionally mandated 2008 

study of human safety regulations and noting important changes in 

the development of commercial space as well as the environment 

of space itself, I will discuss both near-term and long-term issues 

that will need Congressional review. 

First, because there have been no commercial suborbital flights 

yet, the experimental period for the licensing of human suborbital 

flights will need to be extended. The time period should not have 

a limit determined by an arbitrary number of years but should be 

measured by developing indicators of the maturity of the industry 

and the risks involved. I would recommend that the FAA, perhaps 

the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee 

(COMSTAC) or an independent study, determine these types of 

market indicators. At a future point, when and if suborbital commercial flights develop into a marketable service, the regulatory 

oversight should be transitioned to other parts of the FAA since 

these flights will be within airspace and closer in form to aviation 

than space. 

The second issue is an inherent conflict when one agency has the 

dual mandate to both regulate and promote. The 2008 study found 

no complaints from industry about the OCST’s dual roles. This, 

though, should be carefully monitored and the promotional aspects 

might eventually have to be shifted to other agencies to preserve 

the integrity of the regulatory process. 

A related conflict-of-interest problem in the form of one office 

regulating different competing modes of transportation, in this case 

Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs), Reusable Launch Vehicles 

(RLVs), suborbital flights and possibly even Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also raise issues of fairness, undue influence, and in 

the end of making difficult objective decisions regarding safety. In 

the 2008 study, we noted that there was overlapping jurisdiction in 

determining who will have the lead if there is a serious commercial 

space accident. The FAA OCST, through an agreement, delegates 

that lead to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 

which at present does not have a Congressional mandate to investigate space transportation accidents. Also, a law enacted after the 

Columbia accident, primarily focused on the Shuttle and Space Station, requires a Presidential commission to be formed to lead an accident investigation. However, that same law also applies to a commercial space vehicle that is carrying a government payload. Al-
31 

though all agencies have in the past cooperated fully in these investigations, only one should have the lead responsibility. 

A uniform United States approach to regulating in-orbit space 

activities will become necessary and should be integrated with the 

licensing procedures for commercial space operations. Difficult 

issues of in-orbit liability will need to be studied very carefully before these rules are promulgated. At present within the United 

States, the existing very limited and uncoordinated in-orbit rules 

are split among the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and 

the FAA. These should be coordinated. 

In addition, there are many international dimensions to in-orbit 

regulations. If the United States does not take a leadership role 

and initiate action in this area soon, other nations will. This could 

lead to international rules that might have negative effects on the 

growth of U.S. commercial space operations. As we regulate in-orbit 

activities, the regulatory regime should be clearly delineated between those vehicles that intend to go to outer space and those that 

will remain within airspace. The regulatory difference involves 

international obligations the United States has agreed to under the 

space treaties. A new distinction needs to be clearly made between 

suborbital vehicles and vehicles that enter outer space but are not 

intended to achieve orbit. 

Finally, Congress might want to revisit the informed consent 

rules in the CSLA for space participants. I have two suggestions 

there. One is that the FAA be responsible for drafting clauses dealing with information to be given to the spaceflight participant on 

accident risk history and other data that the FAA is in a better position to provide than private companies. These clauses should be 

required to be included in the consent form. However, the companies are still responsible for drafting the form and making it specific to their vehicles. 

And secondly, states are starting to compete with their own passenger waivers of liability to the private operator. Currently, Florida, Virginia and recently New Mexico and Texas have these laws, 

each with different wording. Federal preemption on this issue 

might be warranted to prevent competition among states on an 

issue that involves interstate commerce and may adversely affect 

safety decisions the companies make concerning the vehicle and operations. 

Thank you. I will be more than happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hertzfeld follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY R. HERTZFELD, 

RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF SPACE POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 

ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation’s role in the supervision and regulation of commercial space flight and am pleased that the Committee has begun the 

important process of reviewing these matters. The space industry in the United 

States is poised for very significant changes and it is very timely to begin the process of reviewing national and international issues that will need to be resolved in 

the years ahead as commercial activity in space grows and evolves. 

Since its inception the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (OCST) within 

the DOT and subsequently within the FAA has actively and successfully developed 

a regulatory environment for commercial space launches and related activities. 
32 

During the past decade the OCST has fulfilled its legislative mandates to regulate 

commercial spaceflight. It has also licensed private spaceports and other space and 

space-related activities reflecting the growth of interest and investment in these 

areas by both entrepreneurs and established companies. 

Of particular interest are the Amendments to the CSLA in 2004, which gave the 

FAA the authority to develop regulations for private human space flight. The regulatory framework was oriented to encouraging the development of commercial 

human suborbital flights and was stimulated by the success of the X-Prize competition. 

However, those promises have not yet, nearly eight years later, resulted in any 

private paying passengers, although the companies developing those vehicles are 

still planning to initiate space adventure/tourist businesses. 

Beyond the continued promises of suborbital commercial activity there are other 

new developments. Among them are; 1) NASA plans to send cargo and astronauts 

to the International Space Station on commercial vehicles, 2) foreign nations are developing new capabilities which will compete with U.S. commercial companies in all 

space efforts, 3) one U.S. company has plans to transport paying customers to an 

in-orbit space facility, 4) the Google Lunar X Prize could put a private vehicle on 

the Moon that might be capable of performing relatively simple activities with commercial value, and 5) commercial UAVs will begin operations which will require new 

air traffic management in the same high altitudes where suborbital vehicles will fly. 

These UAVs may have functional capabilities that will compete with suborbital vehicles as well as LEO satellites. 

Until recently, the OCST focus for human space flight regulations has been on 

suborbital vehicles and passengers. The experimental permit period will end soon 

without any database on flights, safety, or passengers. This experimental period 

should be continued, but instead of an arbitrary period of years being designated for the sunset of that provision, other tests should be developed to 

determine when the regulations should be re-evaluated by Congress. 

Those tests should focus on the availability of enough experience and data from 

the industry to develop meaningful safely rules. Tests should take into account factors such as; 

• The maturity of the business, 

• The ability to fly on a routine scheduled basis, 

• The number of passengers and the amount of cargo transported or research experiments flown, 

• The standardization of vehicles and systems that could provide the basis for a 

vehicle certification regime, and 

• A quantification of the different risks involved. 

Ultimately, the safety of both people and property in flight as well as the safety 

of people and property terrestrially should be the paramount objective of regulations. Rather than go beyond my own technical capabilities and suggest a specific 

test in this testimony, I would recommend a panel of appropriate experts 

(e.g. COMSTAC) be commissioned to study this issue and develop a set of 

specific recommendations. While no statistical analysis will be perfect, a more 

objective set of requirements will better meet the Congressional intent than an arbitrary time horizon. 

Five Different Space Regimes (when viewed from a legal/regulatory perspective) 

The OCST is primarily organized to license commercial space launches and related activities including spaceports. Congress has given additional responsibility to 

the FAA OCST to license re-entry space vehicles and, most recently in 2004, to license commercial human space flight. 

OCST regulated launch activities include suborbital vehicles that may or may not 

go into space but are separated from aircraft regulations by a definition based on 

vehicle propulsion characteristics that have a thrust greater than the lift during the 

greater part of their ascent 

The current division of regulations is fast approaching overlapping and unsettled 

areas of regulation and jurisdiction. We are at a point where the FAA has to do 

more than just license ELVs for launch. Specifically, the most difficult future issues 

will be to regulate commercial in-orbit activities, both for human space flight as well 

as for other purposes. Because of the growing danger to space operations from the 

crowding of certain orbits with human-created space debris as well as the projected 

increased use of commercial services in space by NASA and other government entities, we will need new regulatory authority over in-orbit activity. This involves un-
33 

charted issues of safety as well as financial responsibility to meet the needs of international treaty obligations, the viability of U.S. space operations, and fairness and 

equity for near-term activities that could have a very long horizon of future responsibilities. 

Simply extending the safety review and financial requirements of a 

launch license regime to include in-orbit activities will not be sufficient to 

solve the upcoming issues. 

In order to try to understand these developing concerns in space regulations, I 

suggest that we consider the following reorientation of the categories of spaceflight 

regulation: 

The categories are: 

Activities under both domestic law and the Outer Space Treaties 

1. Launches to Orbit 

2. In-orbit activities 

3. Non-orbital launches and activities 

Activities under domestic law 

4. Sub-orbital launches and activities 

5. Spaceports 

The first three involve activities that fall under the international space treaty obligations and therefore must take into account several factors: 

1. Outer space is, through Article II of the Outer Space Treaty (OST), a place 

without sovereignty; 

2. Article VI of the OST makes States Party to the Treaty responsible for government activities and the activities of non-government entities in space as 

well as requiring continued national supervision; 

3. Article VII of the OST makes States liable for their launch activities. 

What is unique to space is the requirement of State responsibility and liability. 

No other industry faces this. In fact, other high technology industries with low probabilities of catastrophic accidents but with a very high probability of severe damage 

(e.g. civil nuclear power plants, oil platforms) are covered by different treaty obligations. If an accident occurs under those international legal regimes the operator will 

be primarily responsible and liable with the States party to those treaties and 

agreements in a position as a guarantor of payment. 

The last two categories, suborbital launches and spaceports are domestic, involving the use of national airspace and of terrestrial spaceports. When (and if) suborbital markets develop, either for cargo or people, these activities of the OCST 

should be transitioned to other parts of the FAA, as they are closer to aircraft than 

to space from a legal regulatory perspective. The question is when to begin that 

transition. 

I would recommend postponing a consideration of any transition of responsibilities 

for suborbital launches to the indefinite future. As described above, we need to develop a methodology to evaluate the emerging suborbital activity. When we have 

the proper amount of data on safety and reliability of the equipment and 

operating procedures and when the companies have demonstrated that 

they can operate as a business, then Congress can address this issue. 

In outline format below, I have listed a more detailed description of each category. 

Currently, only Category 2 (in-orbit activities) and possibly parts of Category 3 (nonorbital activities) are largely unregulated and will require a thorough study of three 

serious issues: 1) liability, 2) coordination among U.S. Agencies, and (3) coordination 

and harmonization with other nations and international organizations. 

1) Launches to orbit 

a. This category represents the current FAA licensing regime for launches vehicles and re-entry vehicles. 

2) In-orbit activities 

a. In general, in-orbit activities are unregulated. However, there are some situations that have required the U.S. Government to develop specific rules. 

These are spread among a number of agencies and are not well coordinated. 

Specifically, the Federal Communications Commission requires that geosynchronous satellites at the end of their useful life retain enough fuel to be 

transported into ‘‘graveyard’’ orbits; enforcement and verification remains 

problematic. Additionally, the FCC is the agency responsible for representing 

the U.S. at the International Telecommunications Union meetings and for 

authorizing the use of spectrum in the United States. 
34 

b. NOAA has a similar requirement for the commercial earth observation satellites under its jurisdiction. Rather than a specific requirement for end-oflife, their regulations require companies to submit a plan for disposal of the 

satellite that will meet the approval of the Secretary of Commerce. 

c. The FAA OCST has the authority to oversee launches and defines the end 

of the launch period as the time when the launch vehicle last exercises it control over the payload. Normally, this includes some in-orbit activities. They 

also have authority for re-entry vehicles to oversee in-orbit preparations for 

the re-entry. 

d. Finally, IADC Guidelines on Space Debris Mitigation are voluntary rules 

with no specific enforcement provisions. However, some of the recommended 

guidelines have become enforceable through enactment of specific legislation 

and agency regulations in the United States. 

Congress has not given authority for any Agency to coordinate or regulate most 

in-orbit commercial activities. Consideration should now be given to studying inorbit activities and for the United States to take a leadership role in addressing a 

number of possible legal problems associated with commercial in-orbit operations. 

These include addressing: 

i. Liability issues under Treaties that are inadequate and need attention through 

national legislative initiatives 

ii. Sustainability and debris issues remain unresolved including legal uncertainties with future servicing satellites 

iii. Human safety on private in-orbit vehicles may have conflicting authority 

1. NASA ISS transportation for astronauts on commercial vehicles could fall 

under FAA jurisdiction or be exempt and under NASA regulations 

2. Interface with the ISS and international partners will involve not only NASA 

directives but also those of other nations. 

3. Proposals for a ‘‘hotel’’ or private research facility remain open question on 

regulatory and liability exposure. 

Additionally, other nations as well as the United Nations Committee on Peaceful 

Uses of Outer Space are beginning to address issues of in-orbit regulations mainly 

through activities on space debris and space sustainability. The United States will 

need to coordinate its activities with these on-going efforts. 

3) Non-orbital activities: 

(I am suggesting the use of a new term non-orbital, to separate true suborbital 

flights within airspace from launches of rockets that enter into outer space but have 

a planned trajectory that returns to Earth without achieving orbit.) 

Currently sounding rockets that can reach altitudes as high as 1000km, which 

is roughly 10 times the distance defined as the ‘‘edge of space’’ are included in 

the definition of a suborbital trajectory. This is confusing, as the term, suborbital, should mean just what it says: below the point where a rocket or payload cannot reach orbital altitude. Since once something reaches outer space 

there are different rules that may apply due to international treaty agreements. 

Therefore a separation between non-orbital activities and suborbital activities 

may clarify a definitional problem, particularly when and if separate in-orbit 

regulations of commercial spacecraft are issued. An example of a non-orbital 

commercial activity might be a launch vehicle used for point-to-point delivery 

of cargo. 

4) Sub-orbital activities 

These should be limited to those non-aircraft activities that stay within 

airspace (but could cross borders and also fly over the open seas); they 

should be under FAA jurisdiction and be treated similarly to aircraft. If the 

market becomes truly commercial, these activities can graduate from the 

current experimental phase. At that point these activities should be 

transitioned from OCST licensing to another part of the FAA whether private human passengers are aboard or just cargo is being flown. 

5) Domestic spaceport regulations 

These are currently being licensed by FAA under domestic law. 

Accident Investigations 

In the Congressionally-mandated 2008 Analysis of Human Space Flight Study we 

discussed a potential conflict in the delegation of authority for investigating an acci-
35 

dent involving humans in space flight. After the Shuttle Columbia accident, Congress passed legislation requiring a Presidential Commission to be formed following 

certain types of space accidents. (That legislation is now found at Title 51 of the 

U.S. Code, Chapter 707.) 

Those conditions are outlined in §70702, Establishment of Commission. The relevant parts of that section for the issues presently before this Committee are: . . . 

(3) any other United States space vehicle carrying humans that is owned by the 

Federal Government or that is being used pursuant to a contract with the Federal 

Government or (4) a crew member or passenger of any space vehicle described in this 

subsection. 

Clearly, Congress intended that a high profile investigation occur in the event of 

a space accident. Private launch vehicles and spacecraft, whether licensed by the 

FAA or not, are within the purview of this law. Furthermore, if humans are on 

board and are injured, a Commission is also mandated. This section can also be read 

to include suborbital vehicles (as now defined under OCST legislation) if they are 

being used to carry research or other instruments that are under an agreement with 

a Federal Agency. And these types of commercial services onboard suborbital vehicles are the subject of current agreements and discussions between government 

agencies and private companies, although they have yet to actually fly. 

We also were informed during the 2008 study that the FAA OCST has a Memorandum of Agreement with the NTSB that in case of an accident with more than 

$25,000 property damage and/or injury or death to a human being onboard a vehicle 

licensed by the FAA, the NTSB will lead an accident investigation. At present, the 

NTSB has legislative authority to investigate virtually all modes of transport accidents except space. However, in discussions the General Counsel of the NTSB in 

2008, he was clear that the NTSB was consulted and did actively participate in the 

Columbia accident investigation and that there was good cooperation among Federal 

Agencies. 

Therefore, although there may not be any negative or competitive issues regarding the cooperation among Agencies in the case of an accident investigation, it 

would be advantageous for Congress to clear up any ambiguities and to 

clearly designate who will be in charge of a space accident under the specific situations that currently have overlapping jurisdiction. 

Inherent Conflicts Between FAA Role as Promoter and Regulator 

A survey of firms involved in developing commercial space flight capabilities done 

in connection with the 2008 Study found that none of the companies had any issues 

with the FAA’s dual roles of promoter and regulator. 

In my testimony in 2003 before this Subcommittee on this issue, I pointed out 

that there is an inherent possible conflict if the same Agency that is charged with 

promoting an activity is also in charge of regulating it. The conflicts arise two ways: 

1) since regulations cost industry money and possibly market share or profits, there 

will always be pressure from industry to minimize regulations, and 2) as competing 

firms with different types of vehicles capable of serving similar markets develop, 

they will pressure an Agency to favor specific products or types of services with the 

larger and more powerful firms prevailing. 

Elements of these conflicts are present in commercial space, even if today the industry is still too small and too risky for serious issues to arise in regard the Agency’s dual role. More specifically, when the role of promotion was given to the FAA’s 

commercial space operations there was only one type of vehicle, the ELV. Today 

under FAA regulatory authority there are ELVs plus companies developing reusable 

launch vehicles (RLVs), suborbital commercial vehicles, and unmanned high altitude 

vehicles (UAV), all of which can compete against each other for air traffic control 

as well for services in certain markets. For example, future UAVs will need coordination with all launch vehicles in traffic management. But, even more importantly, 

UAVs will perform services such as regional remote sensing and telecommunications 

for private end users. These are the very same types of services that companies now 

provide with LEO satellites and possibly may also provide using suborbital rockets. 

Congress should monitor the maturity of the industry. When and if one 

regulatory Agency or one office within an Agency is burdened with either 

regulating closely competing transportation services and/or burdened with 

choices of which transport mode to promote and which to ignore, these 

functions should be assigned to another Agency or to different offices within an Agency. 
36 

ISS Crew Transfer Issues 

As mentioned above under in-orbit regulatory activities, recent plans of NASA 

rely on commercially provided services for transportation to the ISS. Commercial vehicles will do what has been done previously by government owned and operated 

vehicles or by payments to the Russian Government for Souyz launches. FAA licenses were not required or involved. But, they clearly could be if NASA’s plans materialize. 

There are a number of issues to consider before granting licensing authority to 

the FAA for transporting U.S. Government astronauts or payloads to the ISS. First, 

NASA already has a complex and well-developed set of safety regulations in place 

for both human and non-human space flights as well as for approaching and docking 

with the ISS. What would a new set of regulations add? Would they be less expensive? Would they compromise safety? Since there are no commercial flights to the 

ISS at present, there is no database to judge the wisdom of changing regulations 

and/or the regulatory agency. 

This then could become a chicken-and-egg problem. NASA will possibly be the 

prime customer of the first commercial U.S. in-orbit flights with humans on board. 

It is unlikely that a human-rated private vehicle will be available from any company 

before the planned ISS flights. Therefore, there will be no database without NASA. 

The larger question is, given cost and price, whether NASA will pay for what it will 

demand (that is, safety regulations that are most likely more costly and more comprehensive)? And, if so, will that become the standard for FAA regulations for completely private passenger in-orbit flights as well as NASA in the future, or will the 

FAA develop a different set of regulations for private flights? Over time, if successful, NASA could use those, but in the near-term it may be a wiser path for Congress 

to allow NASA to determine the safety standards for its missions. 

There is yet another issue with the safety of the ISS itself that involves not only 

NASA but also its international partners. Each has veto powers in the ISS agreement. Just recently an announcement was in the press that the Russians would not 

allow a private U.S. vehicle to dock at the ISS. Whether they are concerned about 

their near monopoly power with the Soyuz flights to the ISS or whether they are 

truly concerned about safety is immaterial. If they have the right to deny a U.S. 

vehicle access to (at least) their docking mechanism, then either costs will be greater and/or there will be no market large enough for the commercial U.S. vehicle. In 

this case the FAA will have no input into the decision, as it is not a direct party 

to the ISS agreement. 

Considering other non-government U.S. in-orbit commercial activity, the FAA 

clearly should have a role in both safety and financial responsibility. As with launch 

activities, where the FAA itself does not have the technical competence, they can 

and should establish agreements with NASA and the DOD to aid in the safety review process. And, as they now do in aircraft certification, they can work with the 

manufacturers of components to insure the best standards for quality control and 

safety. At some future point when space vehicles are more standard, the FAA 

should work toward a certification program that is different technically but similar 

in process to the one now used for aircraft. 

The financial responsibility issue is more difficult for on-orbit activities. The difficulties with the current space treaty liability regime are too numerous and complex to describe in this brief summary. As explained below, the core of the issue is 

determining how to implement a fault liability regime as described in the Liability 

Convention. 

With the advent of commercial in-orbit vehicles as well as the more traditional 

satellites and the ever-increasing probability of accidents in space, diplomatic negotiations as required by the Treaty for the first-order settlement of claims may not 

be successful. If these issues are put before a tribunal, it is likely that nobody will 

be compensated since there currently are no rules of evidence, no clear definition 

of what a space object is, no standard of care that is commonly accepted, and no 

history of prior court decisions. Adding to that is the possibility that debris may create an accident many years ahead. Even with insurance policies for liability onorbit, the guarantee of a payment to an innocent party is nonexistent. Extending 

the financial responsibility regulations that now exist for launch vehicles and their 

component parts to in-orbit activity will require much study, analysis, and creativity. This difficult task will involve many Agencies of the U.S. Government, foreign governments, international entities (e.g. ESA) and the United Nations. The 

FAA will have an important role in these discussions and in the future regulation 

of commercial in-orbit activities. 
37 

Consent and Waiver for Private Passengers/Participants in Space 

In the 2004 Amendments to the CSLA, Congress mandated that private passengers on space flights were required to be informed by the operator of the vehicle 

of the risks involved and were also required to execute a reciprocal waiver of claims 

with the FAA. The legislation was quite specific and, among many requirements to 

be disclosed also included a full disclosure of the accidents that space vehicles of 

all types have had. 

The FAA decided to let the companies develop the consent form rather than to 

develop a standard one. It may, at this time, be advantageous for the FAA to 

draft model clauses for the form with the generic information about all 

space accidents and other non-company and non-vehicle related clauses 

that are required. The FAA is in a better position to collect and distribute uniform, accurate, and full data on those topics. Companies would be responsible for 

including those clauses as well as drafting the informed consent agreement appropriate to their vehicle and services. 

Several States that have or are developing private spaceports have enacted legislation that protects operators (private companies) from being sued by passengers for 

liability in case of an accident. Florida, Virginia, and most recently, Texas, have different versions of these provisions. I would question whether this trend in competition among the States in the form of protecting companies is beneficial. 

First, this type of waiver can provide an incentive for carelessness in safety. The 

States do exclude gross negligence or willful actions from the waiver of liability. 

However, safety can be jeopardized in other ways that simply may be financial decisions based on reasonable risk analyses, but ones that are not standard practice in 

most of today’s space vehicles. Companies will argue that safety is paramount since 

any accident in an infant industry situation will mean serious economic losses to 

the company. But, that may not be sufficient when dealing with the many unknowns and risks of spaceflight, as we know it today. 

Second, launches from non-coastal states will likely fly over adjacent states. Accidents are adjudicated according to the laws of the state where the accident occurs. 

Contract and tort laws are different in each state. Therefore, there is a question as 

to whether a consent and waiver form signed under the law of a state where the 

vehicle originated would be honored in another state where the accident occurred. 

In short, it is time to study this issue more closely and for Congress to 

make a clear determination of what authority states may have in issuing 

waivers of passenger liability to the operator of commercial space vehicles. Federal preemption would be appropriate action to avoid an uncoordinated hodgepodge of different state rules for an activity that is primarily national in character. 

Summary of Recommendations: 

1. Experimental permits: The experimental permit for human suborbital commercial flight should not be permitted to expire. Instead of another arbitrary 

period of years being designated for the sunset of experimental permits, other 

tests should be developed to determine when the regulations should be re-evaluated by Congress. I would recommend a panel of appropriate experts be commissioned to study this issue and develop a set of quantifiable tests to evaluate 

the maturity of this industry segment and to make recommendations based on 

the development of a mature market and a reliable and safe operating record. 

At that point these suborbital activities should be transitioned from OCST licensing to another part of the FAA and have a regulatory framework that is 

technically different but otherwise similar to aircraft, whether private human 

passengers are aboard or cargo is being flown. 

2. On-orbit Regulations: Simply extending the safety review and financial requirements of a launch license regime to include in-orbit activities will not be 

sufficient to solve the complex future issues of liability and sustainable space 

activities. In addition to in-orbit regulations of satellites, non-orbital activities 

that enter outer space should also be similarly regulated. Under international 

treaty obligations they create the same U.S. Government liability exposure as 

any other in-orbit activities. Congress should recommend that the FAA commission a study to evaluate the complex legal environment of in-orbit liability 

in order to develop effective and workable U.S. regulations that will clearly 

provide protections that will not unfairly burden industry or governments. 

3. Accident Investigation: Congress should clearly designate who will be in 

charge of investigating a space accident under the specific situations that currently have overlapping jurisdiction. 

4. Informed Consent Waivers: It may, at this time, be advantageous for the 

FAA to draft model clauses for the form with generic information about all 
38 

space accidents and other non-company and non-vehicle related clauses that 

are required. Companies would still be responsible for the form and for providing information about any specific vehicle they operate. 

5. State Laws Limiting Operator Liability to Passengers: Congress should 

study this issue and make a clear determination of what authority states have 

in permitting waivers of passenger liability to the operator of commercial space 

vehicles. Issues of vehicle safety, interstate commerce, and conflicts of laws 

among the various states raise possible future problems. 

6. Promotion and Regulation in One Agency: When the OCST was formed 

it had only one type of vehicle (ELVs) to regulate. It is foreseeable that the 

OCST could be burdened with regulating closely competing economic activities 

(e.g. ELVs, RLVs, suborbital vehicles and UAVs all may be using or transporting payloads capable of providing similar telecommunications or remote 

sensing services to end-users). And, it is also possible that the OCST will be 

in charge of licensing competing vehicles. Choices of which type of vehicle to 

promote and which to ignore are as difficult as issues of developing different 

rules and oversight for different vehicles. If any of these conditions develop into 

true conflicts, Congress should consider a clear separation of functions among 

different agencies. 

Closing Statement 

The future role of the FAA OCST in commercial space will be very important. But 

it will also require changes from today’s regulatory structure. Those changes will 

reflect the changing commercial space environment. If the projections of some advocates materialize and a vibrant suborbital business is created, then these activities 

that occur mainly in national airspace might logically be moved to other parts of 

the FAA that manage domestic airspace and coordinate with ICAO on international 

matters. 

The licensing of in-orbit commercial activities will grow as governments contract 

with commercial firms for different services. There are many new issues that have 

domestic and international implications with regulating in-orbit activities. The FAA 

will be instrumental in shaping these rules for U.S. operations. However, it is unlikely that these services will grow without a large initial market funded by the traditional government space agencies (NASA, DOD, DOC/NOAA) as the prime customers. Commercial firms initially will need to abide by many existing government 

safety rules. Eventually, after gaining practical experience, these rules may be subject to modification, codification, and implementation by the FAA for licensing of private operations in-orbit. Before the point where these firms have obtained a level 

of expertise in safety that satisfies the Congress, the operations of government missions in space should remain with the Agencies that have historically demonstrated 

an excellent overall safety record in a very hazardous and risky environment. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Dr. Hertzfeld. I thank the panel 

for their testimony, reminding Members that Committee rules limit 

questioning to five minutes. 

The Chair will at this point open the round of questions. The 

Chair recognizes himself for five minutes. 

Dr. Nield, your budget request appears to be premised in part on 

the expiration of the eight-year regulatory prohibition at the end 

of calendar year 2012. In the event that the prohibition lapses, how 

will AST approach the task of drafting a framework for regulating 

commercial human spaceflight in the absence of any real experience? And question two, assuming AST desires to put in place a 

structure that is workable and won’t choke the fledgling space tourism marketplace with overly prescriptive regulations, how would 

AST go about the task of regulating an industry that for all practical purposes doesn’t exist yet? 

Dr. NIELD. Thank you for that question. Certainly, the development of regulations to ensure the safety of flight crew and 

spaceflight participants is on our to-do list. That is something we 

are focused on, thinking about, and talking about, but until the 

Congressional moratorium is lifted, we would not be in a position 

to issue any new regulations. However, we do have responsibility 
39 

to regulate the operations and safety of the emerging commercial 

human spaceflight industry as Congress specified in the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 and so we would propose using the tools that we have at our disposal including the 

issuing of licenses, permits, safety approvals, and conducting safety 

inspections to ensure that safety. 

We also continue to have the responsibility to ensure the safety 

of the general public on the ground, and so we are in a position 

today to be responsible for, as I said, 204 licensed launches that 

have already occurred, so industry is present. What is new now is 

the emergence of the commercial human spaceflight, and that is 

really taking two different directions as it goes forward. One, the 

commercial crew development in support of the NASA space station 

which is coming in the next years, and the second is the suborbital 

space tourism activities. So both of those are very important and 

I think they warrant different approaches, and we are trying to 

prepare for both pieces of industry’s activities. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Can you elaborate on the different approaches between the two? 

Dr. NIELD. I think inherently the suborbital flights and the orbital flights are different. On the suborbital side, you have an opportunity for incremental step-by-step flight testing, and of course, 

that is what we saw with the SpaceShipOne winning the X Prize 

back in 2004 and now we have a number of companies that are designing, building and testing vehicles for that type of an operation, 

and we expect to see a number of flight tests in the very near future, but those flights will tend to be just 10 to 20 minutes long 

in the spaceflight portion of it, and they are relatively benign in 

terms of environmental conditions. 

On the orbital side, you can do lots of analysis, you can do lots 

of ground testing, but once you are ready to go to space, you light 

the rocket engine and you pretty much need to go all the way to 

orbit. So that is really a different scenario, and of course, we do 

have 50 years of experience with NASA conducting those human 

space flights to orbit that we can draw on in terms of preparing 

some top-level guidance and safety standards for industry, so we 

are not really starting with a clean sheet. We would propose working closely with NASA and the industry in preparing the overall 

guidance. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Another question, Dr. Nield. To what level 

of detail does AST plan to regulate commercial human launch systems seeking a permit or license? For instance, does AST plan to 

get down to the component level of each system approving their design, operation and maintenance, and will you require several levels of redundancy for each critical system? 

Dr. NIELD. I think someday we will end up with a certification 

process that is very similar to what the FAA does for aviation and 

so that might well entail going down to the system and subsystem 

level and components and so forth. That has led to an incredible 

safety record for aviation. But I think it is too early to try to do 

that kind of thing for space transportation today, and so our approach has been to have top-level system safety performance-based 

regulations that do not dictate the particular kinds of designs or 

particular kinds of operations that are being proposed, but rather 
40 

make sure that we have the right kind of end result, which is to 

ensure the safety of the public on the ground, and to the extent 

possible to also ensure the safety of those on board. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Costello. 

Dr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Dr. Nield, we all agree that safety is the number one responsibility of all of us when it comes to this issue. You indicated that 

the FAA is trying to prepare for putting regulations into place for 

human space transportation. Can you tell us where you are right 

now? Where are we as far as planning is concerned? 

Dr. NIELD. Just to briefly review, we have had and continue to 

have regulations in place to protect the safety of those on the 

ground and so many of the rockets that are being proposed for 

launching commercial crew have already been flying under FAA licenses. What is new is having the people on board. So we have 

known this was coming. We have been studying. We have been 

talking. We have been debating. We have been researching to find 

the best practices within NASA and the industry on how best to 

do that. We worked very closely with NASA on their proposed 

human rating draft requirements that have already been issued, 

and in fact, we have just announced a public meeting down in Cape 

Canaveral later on this month that would allow industry and 

NASA and others to talk to us about the recommendations that 

they would have on a regulatory approach. 

Mr. COSTELLO. In your opinion at this point, what criteria or information do you think the FAA needs to begin to establish regulations? 

Dr. NIELD. I think we have the basic information that is needed. 

We have the 50 years of human spaceflight experience gathered by 

NASA. We have 50 years of experience that the FAA has in regulating the aviation community and 204 licensed commercial 

launches. What we really need at this point is good communication 

and coordination between the parties involved. In order for this industry to be successful, we can’t afford to have one set of requirements for NASA missions and one set of requirements for FAA regulations. That would not allow industry to close their business 

cases and it would be needlessly inefficient, so we need to work together to ensure that we have consistent and compatible requirements. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And you mentioned that you are working with 

NASA now. That relationship, would you tell the Committee that 

it is working well, you feel that you are working cooperatively? 

Dr. NIELD. I think we have made good strides there. Frankly, our 

2012 budget request has a key enabler for that cooperation, and 

that is the Commercial Space Flight Technical Center at Kennedy 

Space Center (KSC). We view that as an excellent opportunity, not 

only to potentially hire some of the experienced workforce that are 

going to be searching for work in the months ahead, but also to be 

basically collocated with NASA to build that cadre of subject-matter experts on engineering standards and launch operations. 

Mr. COSTELLO. As you know, the FAA reauthorization that 

passed the House has an extension of the prohibition on regulations and would extend for eight years after the first licensed 
41 

launch of a spaceflight participant. I understand that may move 

the prohibition to maybe the year 2020 and that the FAA may have 

some concerns with that. Can you express the concerns that the 

FAA may have? 

Dr. NIELD. Yes. I very much understand the intent of the original 

moratorium, which was the fear that the government could stifle 

industry and prevent it from doing creative and original experimentation to really get its feet on the ground, and although there 

have not been commercial human space flights since 2004, I think 

our office’s dual mandate of ensuring public safety and to encourage, facilitate and promote the industry gives us a unique perspective to be able to recognize that the only way to be truly safe is 

not to fly at all. So we understand the delicate balance there and 

we would propose to have the option to be able to take advantage 

of trends, of best practices, of lessons learned, of anomalies during 

flight tests. If something should start to appear as an indicator of 

problems, which was talked about by Dr. Dillingham, then we want 

to be able to move quickly to be able to allow all to take advantage 

of those lessons learned rather than potentially having future accidents. So we are not ready to burden the industry today. We just 

want to focus on safety and try to allow experimentation and creativity as we go forward in a safe manner. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Dr. Dillingham, would you comment on the prohibition, the extension? 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, Mr. Costello. I think we are pretty much 

in line across the panel with regard to the extension of the prohibition. It is not clear to us at the GAO what is the basis of the eight 

years. We would be in the line of sort of incrementally looking at 

what is going on at that point and moving as you get more information, but the caution that we make with regard to sort of the 

eight years, be careful about making regulations in times of crisis. 

That is, if the industry, if there is an accident and all of a sudden 

we are trying to make regulations, sometimes it doesn’t quite work 

out the way that the Congress wants it to work out when they 

don’t have the time to deliberate, and FAA in the same way. So we 

are for incrementalism. We don’t see any basis for eight years. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. [Presiding] You have a new Chairman here 

now. We have a vote on right now, and we will continue this discussion after the vote, and I would expect that would be in about 

15 or 20 minutes, so if we could recess here. The Subcommittee is 

recessed for 20 minutes. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 

will come to order. I want to thank the witnesses for sticking 

around while we had to do our business on the Floor, and Mr. 

Costello, the Ranking Member, has had his options, and are we 

going to give the Chair back? Well, we will now proceed for questions for our panel, and Mr. Brooks from Alabama, we will proceed 

with your time. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Chairman. We 

have got two of them right now. You know, we are facing a $1.6 trillion deficit which I would submit to you is a very serious threat to our country, it could result 

in a Federal Government insolvency or bankruptcy if we don’t get 
42 

it addressed, and I see where you are asking for a 75 percent, or 

AST is asking for a 75 percent funding increase. Then also look at 

the word ‘‘commercial,’’ and when I see the word ‘‘commercial,’’ I 

see little or no government involvement, not substantial or significant government involvement. To me, commercial means free enterprise and private sector as opposed to something that the government has a heavy hand of managing or subsidizing. I also see 

commercial as meaning that there is a profit motive and that is the 

reason for the commercial activity is that there is a way that someone in the private sector can do something faster or cheaper or better than perhaps the government or its competitors and hence they 

can make a profit because they are able to do that better or faster 

or cheaper. Now, of this $15 million that was budgeted in 2010 and $27 million that is requested in fiscal year 2012, Dr. Nield, can you tell 

how much of this is paid for by the commercial space entities via 

either license fees or taxes or some other source of revenue? 

Dr. NIELD. None of it, because under current law, we are not allowed to charge for licenses that we issue. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, you have often used the FAA as an analogy 

with commercial flight, and correct me if I am wrong, but isn’t the 

FAA’s budget significantly paid for through ticket taxes, landing 

fees, fuel taxes and things of that nature? 

Dr. NIELD. That is a significant component of overall FAA expenditures and so as the industry develops, I think it certainly is 

appropriate to think about whether similar ideas can be incorporated for space transportation. The problem is with a relatively 

low number of launches taking place, then if you try to cover the 

cost per ticket, per passenger, for rocket, that ends up putting additional burdens on the industry, which is going to have a negative 

impact on the U.S. efforts. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, that kind of brings us to another question 

that I had. With respect to the low number of launches, why is it 

that we have that low number? 

Dr. NIELD. There is a variety of different reasons for that. I think 

in recent years, the United States has not been competitive with 

the rockets that are offered by other countries. In other countries, 

the space programs tend to be very much part of the government 

efforts. I think the United States is rather unique in that we do 

have a commercial industry. In recent years, DOD and NASA contracts with industry have perhaps caused the U.S. efforts to not be 

as competitive as we would like to see them, but I think recently 

there has been some new entrants to the industry, some new ideas, 

some new entrepreneurial spirit, and we are seeing some of the 

prices come down, and I think that is going to lead to the U.S. market share eventually growing back to where we would like to see 

that in the future. 

Mr. BROOKS. If I recall correctly, AST was created sometime 

around 1984. Is that—— 

Dr. NIELD. That is correct. 

Mr. BROOKS. So it has been in existence for more than a quarter 

of a century, and commercial launches appear to be on the decline 

rather than the increase. Might that be because at least as of now, 

there is little to no commercial viability? 
43 

Dr. NIELD. I would disagree with that assessment. I think the 

progress of the industry has been slower than people would have 

liked to see, but as we look at what we are seeing now in terms 

of research, development, plans, contracts, customers, there is a lot 

bubbling out in the world right now and I think we are about to 

see a rapid increase in a variety of different parts of the industry, 

whether it is space tourism or commercial involvement to allow 

NASA to get lower cost transportation to low Earth orbit so that 

it can concentrate on exploration and a variety of different other 

programs. 

Mr. BROOKS. Is there an impact on the commercial viability of 

these private ventures caused by the regulatory atmosphere of 

AST? Stated differently, are the AST regulations increasing the 

cost of being commercially viable which in turn means they are less 

commercially viable or not commercially viable, which means that 

they don’t do it? 

Dr. NIELD. I would state that we are not a cause of that. I think 

it would be important for the Committee to talk to industry to get 

their impressions, but I believe that the regulations that we have 

in place are very much focused on safety while allowing industry 

to take the steps that are appropriate to have viable businesses. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you. As you may know, I am just a lowly 

freshman on this panel trying to learn the ropes. This is my first 

exposure to this particular issue, and I very much appreciate your 

candor, and I yield the remainder of my time. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I now recognize Mrs. Edwards from Maryland. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 

witnesses today. This is an issue that I have had a longstanding 

interest in. I am trying to understand what the role and responsibility of the commercial sector is with respect to the commercial 

space industry and how that relates also to the responsibilities that 

we have as a government and that our agencies, particularly 

NASA, FAA and others have, so I appreciate your testimony. And 

I, like others, want to express that I share the hope that this is 

just the first of a series of hearings that we hold on commercial 

space transportation because there are a number of issues that I 

think it is important to address and understand well prior to a robust industry being developed. We have to understand the implications of having the FAA as both the regulator of commercial space 

transportation safety and the promoter of the industry it is regulating. As we know, FAA used to have that dual responsibility for 

the commercial airline industry until Congress withdrew the FAA 

role for both promoting the industry and regulating the industry 

because of a perceived conflict of interest and so that the agency 

could focus on safety. I think we have some very similar concerns 

right now, and rather than waiting until the point where we know 

there is a problem and have to withdraw the authority, we should 

deal with that at the outset. 

I think as well as NASA moves forward to work more closely 

with the private sector, these issues of safety, regulatory authority, 

and liability in commercial space will need to be addressed rigorously to ensure the safety of the public and individuals in space or 

near space as well as those of us who are on the ground. So Mr. 
44 

Chairman, I appreciate your holding the hearing today because I 

think it is an important and timely topic. 

I have just a couple of questions, and probably will have some 

additional ones for the record. I am particularly concerned about 

this question of indemnification and liability, because unlike when 

NASA launches even with commercial payloads or purely government payloads and personnel, there is a deep, close relationship 

there, and I can envision an environment where you would have, 

say, a tourist on board. It is not like an astronaut where an astronaut might have specific technical expertise and responsibilities, 

has been engaged in the program all along and understands the vehicle and those sorts of things. If I go into space, and I might want 

to be one of those if I win the lottery and can afford a ticket, I hope 

that nobody gives me any technical responsibility on the vehicle. I 

just want to be there, but I want to get up, get back and be safe. 

So it is difficult also to imagine who the private insurer is out there 

who will indemnify me as a tourist, and I don’t want that to be the 

responsibility of the American taxpayer because some of us can afford to go into space and think that would be a great vacation. So 

I wonder if you could speak about the indemnification responsibilities, liability, where that falls on the private sector versus on the 

government, not on the taxpayer. 

Dr. NIELD. Yes. Thank you. That is an excellent question. Congress in the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 

went on the record and said spaceflight is inherently risky and 

they told the FAA how we should handle the carrying of people onboard rockets, and that is using an approach known as informed 

consent, so these operators are going to have to thoroughly brief 

those ticket buyers on all the things that could go wrong, all the 

possible risks and hazards, and if they understand that and they 

are still willing to go, they would have to sign the paperwork and 

then be allowed to participate. So it is very different from stepping 

on an airliner with the expectation that you are going to arrive 

safely at your destinations. 

In terms of the overall risk sharing and liability system that we 

have in place today, there is a three-tier system. The FAA assesses 

the possible risks and things that could wrong during a flight, and 

we come up with a number known as the MPL, the maximum probable loss, and we use that to establish how much insurance a 

launch operator has to go buy, and that will be up to the level of 

the MPL, or $500 million, whichever is less. The second tier then 

is what has come to be known as indemnification and so the Secretary could ask the Congress to appropriate funds up to $1.5 billion above that amount. If it is a really, really bad day and the 

damages are greater than that amount, then the liability reverts 

to the operator. So all of that is talking about third-party damages. 

Right now, we have no intention of having the taxpayer subsidize 

any claims or complaints or injuries for those who fly on these vehicles. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, and with that I yield. I just would say 

that there is where I will become a real fiscal hawk coming out of 

this pretty liberal Democrat, because there is no way the taxpayer 

should run that kind of risk with a purely private program. Thank 

you. 
45 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Ms. Adams from Florida. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I want to thank the 

panel for being here today. 

Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned about the budget which has 

been proposed by AST in fiscal year 2012. I would like to specifically address Dr. Nield first and then other witnesses if I have 

time. But Dr. Nield, in your testimony, you state AST is responsible for the safe operation of commercial companies and promotion 

of a robust commercial human spaceflight industry. However, in 

your testimony you reference regulating space industry or the development of new regulations 11 times. You mention six times the 

eventual or planned possibilities for robust commercial market 

without any basis for this development in the next few years and 

never once mention jobs or free market solutions or economic development. This is kind of troubling to me. The AST is asking for a 

74 percent increase in its budget over the 2010 enacted level because it wants to prepare and implement regulations for an industry that in the last 20 years has only required 204 instances of regulatory intervention through some kind of license in the last 20 

years. Last year, AST oversaw four commercial orbital launches 

and no suborbital flights, and yet in your testimony, Dr. Nield, you 

said AST expects six license and permit applications, 40 launch or 

reentry operation inspections, eight launch site inspections, five environmental assessments plus new rulemaking procedures. 

My concern is the Administration is asking this Committee to believe that after an eight-year moratorium on regulation and an extension of the moratorium in the wings, your office is going to require an expansion of government regulations, spending and staff 

which to me just defies logic and good sense. 

I have a couple of quick questions. In your testimony, you say, 

‘‘The high cost of access to space has long been a major obstacle 

for civil, military, and commercial space programs. The dream of 

low-cost fully reusable space launch systems has recently been 

demonstrated by the X–Prize competitions but only to suborbital 

space.’’ Do you believe the dream of low-cost access to space will 

be closer within your grasp, or our grasp, with a 74 percent increase in your regulatory agency’s budget? 

Dr. NIELD. If we spend it correctly, I believe it will, and certainly 

some of the programs that we have proposed including the incentive program, the Center of Excellence, and a number of other activities are designed to enable commercial industry to be successful, 

which is our hope and objective. 

Mrs. ADAMS. So you believe the expansion of regulatory authority 

is the best way to encourage the development of commercial space? 

Dr. NIELD. By itself, regulations have the potential to shut down 

the industry and that is not our objective. At the same time, in 

order for industry to be successful, it is helpful to have a common 

set of well-understood standards that all can follow so that we 

would—— 

Mrs. ADAMS. And which would take a 74 percent increase of your 

budget. 

Dr. NIELD. I think if we look at the particular proposals which 

include incentive programs and the Commercial Space Flight Tech-
46 

nical Center, those are the kinds of things that would be helpful 

to the industry to allow them to be successful in the future. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Do you have any concern that the development of 

evolution and growth of a regulatory regime based on very little 

data or information on what to expect from vehicle design or 

human rating standards encourages a market environment of stability that an investor would want to take on? 

Dr. NIELD. I have had a number of discussions with industry 

leaders, and that is exactly what they are asking for. They are very 

fearful that we will end up with separate and conflicting requirements from NASA, with its programs for the space station and 

other activities, and the FAA as the designated regulator for this 

industry, and they want to ensure that we have a consistent and 

compatible set of requirements and so that is why it is so important for us to work closely with NASA to take advantage of that 

50 years of human spaceflight experience, which is a long time. 

Mrs. ADAMS. I will get one last question hopefully. On April 28, 

2011, AST published a notice on its website that it will hold a public meeting late this month in Florida to seek input from the affected community. Are you expecting to issue your first round of 

regulations on December 24, 2012, if the eight-year moratorium expires? 

Dr. NIELD. No, we are not. 

Mrs. ADAMS. I yield back the rest of my time. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you. We will now recognize Mr. Wu 

from Oregon. 

Mr. WU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Nield, I had a set of questions about commercialization and 

other issues which I think need to be answered, and I am now 

going to give those questions to Committee staff and have them 

submit them to you and ask for responses in writing because your 

answer to a prior question, I thought would have elicited a gasp 

from this audience, which is basically that when we commercialize, 

people should not have an expectation of safety, that it is very different from getting aboard an airliner, and that we should have informed consent, sign a disclosure form and then you board the 

booster and vehicle and then you take your chances. Now, I am just 

stunned. I am absolutely stunned about that characterization of the 

future of commercial human spaceflight. 

Now, Dr. Nield, there are a couple of consequences from this picture that you painted, and one is that any launch failure which 

hurts people or kills people, there are immense consequences in addition to killing people, which is something that we should strive 

with every energy to avoid. It would also potentially flatten the 

space program for a period of years just as it did after fatal events 

in the space shuttle and prior. Isn’t that a likely consequence and 

that is the risk that we are taking in the scenario that you paint? 

Dr. NIELD. That is a very important risk and that is why it is 

so important that we have good safety processes in place. That is 

why we have the regulations that we do, and on the commercial 

side, that is why they have the need to pay attention to safety as 

well because not only are they potentially losing their mission, 

their rocket, the people on board but that has the potential to wipe 
47 

out that business if there is a serious accident. So I think they are 

focused correctly on doing things safely. 

In terms of the informed consent process, that is the direction 

that the Congress has given us and so we are following that to the 

best of our ability. In the future—— 

Mr. WU. Okay. I just want to set aside the commercial satellite 

side of this and focus on the potential for commercial human flight, 

and we basically treat human spaceflight very differently, and I am 

just very concerned that any fatalities would cause a dramatic 

pause in U.S. human spaceflight activity to the detriment of our 

national interests, and apparently you are saying that we can’t prevent that currently. 

Dr. NIELD. Our office will do anything we can to ensure safe operations going forward. However, with all due respect, I would 

point out that all forms of transportation have accidents, have fatalities, whether it is in cars, airplanes, boats and trains, and so 

the Nation needs to understand that that is part of the risk of exploring the unknown, of doing new things, and we should anticipate that, try to prevent it where we can but not let deter us from 

moving forward and advancing technology so that the United 

States can remain as a leader in spaceflight. 

Mr. WU. And that is my goal, to have the United States remain 

a leader, and I am concerned that fatalities will undermine our 

ability to do that because, you know, a pause happened after Challenger and Columbia, which were federal projects, and that was 

bad enough. I suspect that with a private venture, the effects 

would be even more dire. 

Let me pull you to a slightly different issue, because I think the 

loss of life and the loss of leadership in space are the most important ones, but if there is an accident like that in a private venture, 

we are talking about public indemnity, taxpayer indemnity for 

damages whereas when it is a federal venture, in essence the government is self-insured. So we are taking on an extra cost, are we 

not, when we put the risk in a commercial space venture for 

human spaceflight? 

Dr. NIELD. On the contrary, I would say that under the current 

liability risk-sharing scheme which I mentioned a few minutes ago, 

there is a requirement in order to get the FAA license to purchase 

insurance from these commercial entities and so to that extent, it 

is a better deal for the taxpayer than an all-government program 

which uses all taxpayer money. 

Mr. WU. Wasn’t the thrust of Congresswoman Edwards’ question 

that there would have to be some kind of liability cap and that the 

Federal Government assumed risk beyond that? 

Dr. NIELD. The current law involves this three-tier system but 

the basic first tier is composed of insurance that the companies are 

required to buy by FAA regulations. 

Mr. WU. Yes, but that is the point, that there are additional tiers 

beyond that. 

Dr. NIELD. That is true. 

Mr. WU. And private entities are not going to assume all of the 

risk but the potential high cost. 

Dr. NIELD. That is an important factor, and we need to look at 

how competitive the U.S. endeavors are compared to other coun-
48 

tries that do not have different tiers. I would point out that in the 

25 years of operation, not a dime of taxpayer dollars has ever been 

used. We have never had to exercise that liability risk-sharing 

scheme, but it is very important to have that in place in order to 

give some certainty to the businesses that their liability is capped. 

Mr. WU. Yes, but you are proposing changes both on the commercial satellite side and human spaceflight, so the risk profile is 

changing. 

Dr. NIELD. Pardon me if I gave that impression. I am not proposing any changes to the liability. 

Mr. WU. I mean the flight profiles and the numbers and the missions. 

Dr. NIELD. We hope to see lots of launches, and that is going to 

help insurers to get confidence in the business if we do it well, and 

that could be a win-win for all, but I am not proposing any changes 

to the liability regimes. 

Mr. WU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for permitting me to go a little bit beyond my time, but I may come back to this line of questioning. Thank you. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you. Now we recognize Mr. Rohrabacher from California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let 

me associate myself with the questions of Mrs. Adams, who I think 

was trying to get to a very important heart of the issue of today’s 

discussion. However, for my friend Mr. Wu, the Congress specifically voted on informed consent and limited liability. I know, I am 

the author of the amendment. I was told not to bring it to the 

Floor, it wouldn’t pass. We brought it to the Floor. It passed by a 

vote of the Congress and then went on to be voted by the Senate. 

So I think that might have been before you were here, however, 

but it was when I was Chairman of this Committee—Subcommittee, that is. 

So informed consent is part of it, and it may or may not be a policy that you want to continue past a certain time period after our 

technology and after this new type of transportation system has 

been developed. Let us just note that we have had certain other industries that have benefited by this type of approach, by limiting 

liability. We do know that it has been long recognized that overcoming gravity is not the most serious obstacle that has to be overcome. Quite often, overcoming the power of trial lawyers is at least 

as equal a challenge, and not necessarily overcoming gravity may 

be much more beneficial to mankind in establishing that capability 

rather than just overcoming trial lawyers. 

With that said, about expanding your budget, let me just note, 

they say idle hands are the devil’s tool, and idle government regulators looking for something to do could actually be of greater concern than being idle hands in the private sector. If we are not going 

to be increasing the regulatory scope of your operation and actually 

the situation, this prohibition is extended, why do you need a bigger budget? I mean, aren’t we just calling for what Mrs. Adams 

was pointing to? We now are bringing on a bigger staff but your 

responsibilities if we do which I think we should, which is continue 

this prohibition, that really your responsibilities haven’t been expanded. 
49 

Dr. NIELD. I would beg to differ. I think the responsibilities potentially are increasing as the industry is increasing, and we would 

like to be prepared to do what we can to enable the successful 

growth. And so if you look at where we were in past years in terms 

of the small number of launches and where we expect to be in 

2012, I expect again a tenfold increase in the number of launches. 

We need to follow through on those license applications, do the 

evaluations, make sure they are safe, process those. We need to 

have our safety inspectors to make sure we are doing all we can 

to ensure safe and successful operations. We have also tried to 

come up with some other ideas including the Commercial Space 

Flight Technical Center and the prize and other ideas that would 

hold out some incentives. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let me put it this way. At a time when 

we have a trillion and a half dollar deficit and we are trying to find 

ways of cutting across the board, it might be beneficial to try to see 

if we can use the staffs that we already have and the budgets that 

we already have by giving people more responsibilities and thus 

maybe getting more productivity out of our offices. 

Let me just note that if we have a variety of spacecraft to choose 

from rather than just one governmental system, which some people 

seem to be pushing to have—NASA has got to be in charge, we 

have to have the NASA alternative. Well, if we just have the NASA 

alternative as compared to three or four commercial activities, once 

there is an accident, we are shut down, as we saw with the space 

shuttle. Instead, if we have various alternatives in the private sector, there is a big benefit to being able to ease over to another alternative rather than just putting it all on the government’s shoulders no matter what the liability question is there. There is a 

major societal benefit to having these alternatives. 

Let me go to Mr. Hertzfeld. You state in your report that without 

sufficient data, defining a minimum set of criteria for human 

spaceflight services, because we are already—let me make this very 

clear. We can already regulate for safety of the people on the 

ground, and that is already a regulatory power of this office. What 

we are really talking about is expanding the ability of people to go 

without the regulation and the massive expansion of regulation on 

the passengers who we believe can decide for themselves whether 

they want to step onto a spacecraft, which is of course the informed 

consent which Mr. Wu was talking about. But if you continue this 

where people have that choice and thus we don’t have to have further regulation, do we see this expansion of power that we are talking about as a necessity for expanding the role of this office? 

Dr. HERTZFELD. I think the answer really eludes us today because this industry is changing rapidly, and I see it as a process 

looking to the future. I was suggesting that we study different 

types of industry indicators such as the structure of the industry, 

the maturity, how many passengers, and how many flights are 

really going to happen. We have had a lot of promises in the past. 

They are slow to materialize. I do believe someday they will but I 

don’t know when that day is. And there are a lot of regulatory 

issues that we can’t get around. We have air traffic control issues, 

if we really go to outer space, we have treaty issues where the government has committed to pay if there is a—— 
50 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, if this eight-year regulatory prohibition 

does not expire, what burden would that add to the public and the 

industry that you see? 

Dr. HERTZFELD. It really depends on what the FAA is prepared 

to do when it does expire. I don’t think they have been specific yet. 

If I remember the legislation correctly, and please correct me if I 

am wrong, that it only gives them the option of looking at regulations when it expires. It doesn’t necessarily mean they are going 

to have to, and that is why I am suggesting we develop a process, 

we develop a way of approaching it so that if it is necessary, they 

can. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And if we don’t have any experience at that 

moment with taking passengers up in a commercial way, how are 

we going to then put in place regulations when we don’t even have 

the operation happening yet because we don’t have a significant 

number of passengers. And by the way, Mr. Wu, it seems that you 

did vote for that amendment when I brought it to the Floor back 

in 2004. 

Mr. WU. I see the wisdom of my colleague. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I yield back my time. Thank you. 

Chairman PALAZZO. All right. Thank you. Mr. Wu would like the 

opportunity to have one more question. If the other Members are 

so inclined, they will have an opportunity to ask one more question 

as well. 

Mr. WU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

This is a topic which has been brought up repeatedly in the commercial airline context where the FAA has responsibility for both 

regulating the airlines as well as promoting commercial airline 

flight, airline travel. The same apparently applies in commercial 

spaceflight, and Dr. Hertzfeld and Dr. Dillingham, I would like 

each of you to comment on this regime and the potential for conflict 

and whether this is a good arrangement or whether as has been 

proposed on a the commercial airline side that these functions 

ought to be separated. 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Wu. Where we are now, when 

we looked at this issue, this potential conflict of interest, we did 

not see any at that point in time. We looked at it a few years ago. 

It does not mean that this situation will not change as the industry 

matures. One of our concerns is that we not wait until there is a 

situation where we have this crisis, and it would be like the Air 

Tran accident. All of a sudden we realized that maybe this is not 

the way it should be. So our position is, it is fine now. As the industry matures, we think that that separation of promotion and 

safety should be looked at real close and maybe Commerce would 

be the place for the promotion aspect of it. 

Dr. HERTZFELD. Back in the late 1980s, early 1990s when the 

FAA really began to gear up, they were only regulating expendable 

launch vehicles, and so there didn’t seem to be much of any potential conflict between promotion and regulation at that time. Today, 

from everything I have seen, we hear no criticism from industry 

about this dual role, and I think that would be a measure when 

we begin to hear complaints, and as I mentioned in the testimony—— 

Mr. WU. You mean complaints about the regulatory side? 
51 

Dr. HERTZFELD. No—well, the regulatory—when you regulate, 

you are going to cost industry some money, and many regulations 

are necessary in this very risky business. It is a question of how 

much and the balance and whether the same agency can successfully promote, which means trying to expand industry, while at the 

same time other parts of the same office are going to regulate and 

put possible burdens on the industry. So it is a balance between 

a social good and competition. Commerce traditionally has had the 

promotion of industry as one of its major mandates, but also, Commerce has the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) and 

it has regulations for NOAA. It is not regulatory authority as well. 

I understand that the FAA has agreements with the space part of 

NOAA in Commerce but—and so there are already some building 

blocks of spreading the promotion of the industry among other 

agencies, and I think at a point where you may be faced with this 

delicate balance, then the Congress might have to look into the 

problem. Today, none of us, I think, have seen any indications that 

there is a conflict there. 

Mr. WU. Thank you very much, Dr. Hertzfeld. Dr. Dillingham, 

thank you. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Wu. Ms. Adams from Florida has indicated she would like to have a question. You are now 

recognized. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Dr. Nield, do you believe that the design and operation of private 

spaceflight capabilities have occurred? Do you believe they exist 

today? 

Dr. NIELD. Yes, I do. 

Mrs. ADAMS. So you believe that you know for a fact what the 

design is going to be and therefore you are able to regulate that 

design? 

Dr. NIELD. In our regulatory approach, we try not to be prescriptive and so we don’t specify what kinds of design of hardware or 

operations that an operator may choose. We try to be performance 

based so again we are protecting the public. 

Mrs. ADAMS. So you believe that the design for performance is 

created and therefore you can regulate it? 

Dr. NIELD. On a top-level system safety basis, I would say the 

answer is yes. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Okay. And that is how you are estimating how 

much money it will cost to regulate this by your budget. How long 

did the process of issuing the first reentry license take from application to issuance? 

Dr. NIELD. Under the law, we are given 180 days to conduct an 

evaluation of a complete application package, either for launch or 

reentry, and—— 

Mrs. ADAMS. Well, the question was very simple. How long did 

it take? 

Dr. NIELD. It was about two weeks from receiving the complete 

package until we were able to make a decision. Now, that is an 

iterative process. We received the—— 

Mrs. ADAMS. So my information that it took somewhere around 

a year is incorrect, from the time it was applied until the time it 

was issued? You are telling me it is two weeks? 
52 

Dr. NIELD. It was about two weeks from a complete application 

until a decision, yes. 

Mrs. ADAMS. That is not what I asked you. Issuance. 

Dr. NIELD. Someone can submit a cover letter and say we are 

going to apply for a reentry license but that doesn’t meet the intent 

of the regulations, so it can drag on until all of the information—— 

Mrs. ADAMS. Dr. Nield, if you don’t want to answer, that is fine. 

When I ask you a specific question, I think I should at least get 

a specific answer. We will move on. 

Dr. Dillingham, GAO reports there will be a 45 percent increase 

in staffing. Do you believe there is enough certainty in the demand 

on FAA to require such a dramatic increase in their staff? 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Does GAO agree with the assertion by AST they 

will need the type of dramatic increases in funding they are requesting for fiscal year 2012? 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. ADAMS. There are currently eight licensed spaceports, according to your testimony. There is not activity at all of them. How 

many spaceports currently have routine flights from them? 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. I don’t think there are any spaceports that have 

routine flights from them. 

Mrs. ADAMS. That is what I was hearing. Do you believe the billions in tax incentives, direct investments and grants at the state 

and federal level for commercialization has yielded the type of fastpaced growth originally envisioned? 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Does the increased activity GAO would expect in 

the next two years for suborbital flights justify a 45 percent increase in staff and a 74 percent increase in the AST budget? 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. No, ma’am. We have argued that may be incrementally based on the development of the industry, one could start 

making that move in that direction rather than the big bang theory. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Thank you. And under your understanding of the 

current regulatory regime, does FAA have the authority to regulate 

a commercial rocket launch with NASA astronauts going to station 

if NASA has contracted with a commercial company for the seats? 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. I do not know the answer to that but I can get 

the answer back to you. Maybe Dr. Nield may help. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Dr. Nield, would you like to take a shot at that? 

Dr. NIELD. Ma’am, it would depend on how the services were procured. If NASA is conducting the launch, no license is required. If 

NASA is having industry conduct the launch, then a license would 

be required under the law. 

Mrs. ADAMS. What about if the commercial rocket is carrying a 

payload to the station? 

Dr. NIELD. That would not be a determining factor. And again, 

we are working with NASA to ensure that their needs and FAA 

public safety needs can be met and have a successful outcome of 

these types of activities. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Dr. Nield, you have heard the discussion here and 

you can see where I am going. 74 percent increase in a time where 

economic restraint should be held. You are asking for us to in-
53 

crease your budget for what if. I have grave concerns about that. 

I just want you to know that. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Brooks from 

Alabama. 

Mr. BROOKS. It seems to me that the real key to whether we are 

going to have a private sector or a commercial venture in America 

that is successful is dependent on whether the businesses that are 

exploring this can make a profit. Short of subsidies by the Federal 

Government—and this is a question I would like for each of you to 

consider. Short of subsidies by the Federal Government, what can 

Congress do to reduce regulatory or other costs of commercial space 

ventures in order to enhance the prospect of profitability which in 

turn would enhance the ability of the private sector to compete in 

space? 

Dr. NIELD. First of all, I think having an enlightened but responsible regulator would ensure that the industry can be successful, 

and that is what we aim to be. Other things would include ensuring that the liability structure that is set up is appropriate to allow 

the businesses to compete internationally. Certainly, research is an 

important area to the extent that we can provide the tools that the 

companies need to have the latest rockets and engineering operations. That would be very important. And I think through the use 

of contests and prizes, the government can have a leverage effect 

on its investment without paying out taxpayer dollars until or unless the requirements of the prize have been met. Historically, that 

has been a very successful incentive for industry investment. So 

those are some of the things that come to mind, sir. 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. I would think that the current regime that is 

in place now where regulation is in fact sort of balanced with the 

development of the industry has been one of the major contributing 

factors to the industry moving as it has up to this point. It is not 

as fast as one might want it to be, but anything that does not tamp 

down the idea of profit for the industry will be helpful, I believe. 

Mr. BROOKS. Do you have any specifics? 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir, not now, but I can in fact get back to 

you with some specifics. 

Dr. HERTZFELD. I think all the things that Dr. Nield mentioned 

will help, more research and more balanced approach and all the 

rest, but I think we have to keep in mind that for the near-term 

future, maybe for longer and in the history, this is a dual use. 

Space is dual use. We have had private companies involved for 

many, many years, mainly as contractors as opposed to selling 

services to the government, but the government depends on all of 

the private companies and always has. This is a slight change in 

what we see in terms of some of the private developments and the 

entrepreneurial efforts, but the government’s research is really 

what has stimulated space and probably the government services 

will for quite a while, and what is happening in the commercial 

sector is interesting. It may take time, but I think that our core 

dependence on the space capabilities will remain as the primary 

stimulus for technology changes and through technology changes 

primarily for cost reductions. I don’t believe the regulatory burden 

is so expensive compared to the technologies in getting to space 

that making regulation a little less expensive is going to make a 
54 

big difference in the price or supply and demand for space as we 

move along. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you. If there is anything specific that comes 

to mind in the future of what we can do to help our commercial 

space industry be more competitive, cheaper to operate, more profitable, particularly in the face of international competition, I would 

welcome that communication to my office. 

Dr. NIELD. Mr. Brooks, if you would permit me? 

Mr. BROOKS. Please. 

Dr. NIELD. One idea built on what Dr. Hertzfeld said is very important, and I think that the effort that NASA has recently employed to purchase services rather than build its own rockets to operate could be a huge incentive to our industry by having companies design their own systems to provide cargo to the space station 

and some day to transport astronauts. I think that could be a real 

enabler to the success of the industry in the long term that NASA 

can take advantage of and that will allow the United States to be 

competitive in this area internationally. 

Mr. BROOKS. Is the private sector now less expensive in delivering payloads to space than NASA? 

Dr. NIELD. Absolutely. 

Mr. BROOKS. We have got the satellites. How about man? 

Dr. NIELD. We have had only limited commercial human 

spaceflight, a few flights by SpaceShipOne, but I think in the future as industry starts to offer that option too, then I believe it will 

end up costing less than a government program as well, and that 

remains to be seen but I think that is the promise of enabling our 

industry. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I recognize Mr. Rohrabacher from California 

for our final series of questions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and let me just note 

that whatever money is invested by these private companies and 

whatever systems we have available to us then without having to 

worry about budget interrogations as you have gone through today 

because we always take it for granted that a private company is 

trying its very best to be as productive and keeping those budgets 

down as much as they can because there is that dynamic that 

doesn’t exist in the Federal Government because government 

doesn’t have the same dynamic as the private sector. And then also 

if one system goes down, we have other alternatives to choose from, 

as I say, compared to the shuttle where we put all our eggs in the 

shuttle basket and it really put us in jeopardy after those accidents. 

Commercial space companies—let me know, Mr. Chairman—I believe are on the edge, the cutting edge of human progress. We now 

have a gang of industrialists, inventors, explorers, entrepreneurs 

and yes, adventurers who are pushing the envelope, and this is 

very American and this is what we are supposed to be all about. 

They are going into the new frontier and they are utilizing it and 

taming it and finding ways of how we can utilize the great resources that are on the frontier. I would suggest that the area between the moon and the Earth will become a commercial enterprise 

zone basically being utilized by commercial enterprises and that 
55 

NASA in the future will be looking to further exploration and the 

moon and beyond and developing new technologies. We have 

reached—your point about well, developing the technology, that is 

really where the cost is as compared to regulatory cost, well, that 

is true, but we have reached the plateau on the development of 

technologies now that will permit commercial enterprise and those 

technologies are there and the cost has already been paid, so I 

would say at this point the regulatory burden is what is probably 

the greatest threat in holding us back from utilizing that space between the Earth and the moon for the benefit of humankind. 

This is very similar to the time period during the last half of the 

last century when aviation was developed in 1903, the first plane 

that went off, and at a certain point it became possible through 

contracts, mail contracts, through war contracts, dual use with 

military and civilian use, civilian airlines became profitable, they 

became a potential. We are at that point right now with commercial space, and let me congratulate the Obama Administration, 

which you will rarely hear from me, and they have managed to see 

this where some of my own colleagues on the Republican side who 

always talk about enterprise and keeping costs down and making 

profit ventures don’t seem to have grasped what this Administration has grasped, and that is, the more money that is invested in 

the private sector and the more potential profit we are making for 

these entrepreneurs, that means there will be more money for 

NASA and other people to do their job and expand the potential of 

human activity in space. 

So Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for a very important 

hearing and I am looking forward in the days ahead to working 

with you to make sure America reaches its potential both with 

NASA and in the commercial area. Thank you very much. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher, and thank you 

for stepping in for me while I had to go to another Committee to 

cast a vote. 

I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members of the Subcommittee may 

have additional questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to 

respond to those in writing. The record will remain open for two 

weeks for additional comments from Members. 

The witnesses are excused and this hearing is adjourned. Thank 

you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(57) 

Appendix 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
58 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. George C. Nield, Associate Administrator 

for Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration 

Questions submitted by Chairman Steven Palazzo 

Q1. You testified during the hearing that, ‘‘ . . . in the coming months, it may be necessary to revisit some of the statutes and regulations that govern commercial 

space launch activities. Specifically, the FAA’s legislative authority may require 

revision so that we can continue to ensure public safety both in space and on 

the ground. We see the potential for greater regulatory authority in the area of 

on-orbit transportation as well as during launch and reentry.’’ 

a. What circumstances would trigger AST’s decision to promulgate additional 

regulations to ensure public safety? 

A1(a). The testimony referred to legislative authority and associated regulation 

changes. The circumstances which drive a need for revision to legislative authority 

are a result of the evolving industry and the complexities of the types of technical 

solutions that are being developed. Specifically, there are four areas where the FAA 

believes legislative changes may be warranted: • On-Orbit authority - see full discussion in part B of this question • Hybrid activities -The current FAA regulatory structure does not fully accommodate non-launch operations of a combined carrier aircraft/launch vehicle system (hybrid activity). Allowing FAA/AST to oversee the entire operation will be 

more efficient for the operator as well as the FAA. • Safety Approvals - Clarify the scope of Safety Approvals to facilitate the introduction of safety services and components into the commercial space transportation industry. • Reentry - Remove the ‘‘substantially intact’’ language from reentry authority; 

this definition treats vehicles designed to survive reentry in one piece differently from vehicles that break up upon reentry. This is not rational from a 

public safety perspective because vehicles that break up upon reentry, but do 

not burn up, can pose an equal or greater public safety risk than those that 

survive by scattering vehicle components and other debris over a wide area. 

In addition, NASA has recently identified the potential need for changes to statutory definitions (such as the one that identifies crew solely as an employee of the 

licensee) to assist the FAA in working with them on the Commercial Crew Program. 

We are in the process of evaluating those definitions to determine if a change may 

be necessary. As to the specific area of future regulatory action, the evolution of the 

industry is driving revisions intended to improve, clarify, and streamline regulations. Proposed revisions result from lessons learned in issuing licenses and permits, 

or from changing standards, technology, or hazards in the commercial space transportation industry. In many cases, regulatory revisions can reduce the burden on 

the industry and the government. For example, the FAA recently issued final regulations that will ease launch window constraints due to concerns about lightning. 

In the near future, the FAA plans to improve and streamline requirements for the 

launch of reusable and expendable launch vehicles, for the launch of amateur rockets, and for the operation of launch and reentry sites. Regulatory updates also come 

from changing standards or technology in the commercial space transportation industry. Additionally, the FAA has several rule updates under consideration to maintain consistency with Air Force and NASA range guidelines, thus reducing the burden on industry. 

b. What would be the rationale for seeking greater regulatory authority for onorbit transportation as well as launch and reentry? What is the scope of onorbit activities that AST would seek to regulate? 

A1(b). The FAA’s interest in incorporating on-orbit authority is intended to cover 

existing gaps in the protection of public and private property on orbit. Two specific 

examples have been discussed. The first involves NASA’s Commercial Resupply 

Services (CRS) contract. Currently, the FAA’s authority ends at the completion of 

the launch and deployment of the payload. NASA is primarily interested in operations of the payload during proximity operations (23 km from the International 

Space Station). After the vehicles undock they will maneuver for an orbit or two 

prior to reentry. Ensuring collision avoidance and prevention of possible damage to 

property on-orbit is increasingly critical, as the Iridium satellite collision shows. The 

second example is protection of public and private property on-orbit during commercial space station operations 
59 

Q2. During the hearing there was discussion about extending the experimental period for manned space flight systems, but in lieu of a schedule-driven regulatory 

moratorium, it was suggested that an alternative approach based on performance or other indicators should be considered. In your view, is this a better approach? If yes, what metrics do you believe should be used? 

A2. The FAA believes the ability to propose regulations is critical to the safety of 

commercial space transportation. Rather than wait for a catastrophic or near-catastrophic event to occur, a well-thought out approach to human space flight regulations developed in consultation with industry is needed. To ensure that the appropriate work of considering occupant safety may begin, the FAA opposes the extension of the moratorium on proposing regulations. 

We believe the original intent of the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act 

moratorium was to preclude regulations from being written before industry had sufficient experience in building and operating commercial human space transportation 

systems. At the time, it was thought that suborbital space tourism would be the 

very first commercial human space business, and that commercial human orbital 

spaceflight was many years away. Suborbital human space flight is following developmental processes similar to aviation in the area of envelope expansion and incremental development, allowing safety insight every step of the way. The FAA has 

maintained adequate safety oversight through permitted activities and pre-license 

activities to have confidence in the safety of this part of the industry without the 

need to actively pursue additional suborbital human spaceflight regulations at this 

time. See answer to question 4 for more detail on the differences between orbital 

and suborbital human spaceflight. 

NASA’s Commercial Crew Program (CCP) has made commercial human orbital 

flight a much nearer-term proposition than previously expected. Orbital human 

space flight is a much more substantial safety challenge from the first flight, requiring greater oversight. With orbital human space flight now in its 50th year, there 

is both sufficient experience and a need to allow the discussions to begin on development of human spaceflight occupant safety regulations. 

It takes many years to craft a good regulation; It is important that the FAA begin 

this work to meet the eventual needs of both NASA-sponsored and non-NASA sponsored flights. Additionally, the availability of potential safety requirements will facilitate orbital commercial space activities by providing greater transparency about 

the potential regulations future vehicles may need to satisfy. 

If metrics are desired, we would be willing to work collaboratively with Congress, 

NASA, and industry to determine them. 

Q3. FAA and NASA are now engaged in discussions on regulating commercial cargo 

and crew launches to the International Space Station. 

a. With respect to commercial cargo, does FAA anticipate promulgating additional regulations to regulate this activity, and if so, how soon do you anticipate publishing a NPRM? 

A3(a). At this time, the FAA has the authority and regulations that are needed to 

license commercial cargo launches to the International Space Station. No additional 

needed regulations have been identified that are specific to commercial cargo. As 

mentioned in the answer to question 1B, additional regulatory authority for on-orbit 

operations to protect public and private property may be warranted, but until Congress provides that authority, there can be no rulemaking in that area. 

b. With respect to commercial crew, from FAA’s perspective, during the launch 

phase, how do the agencies distinguish their regulatory roles over the design 

and performance of the crew capsule and the design and performance of the 

launch system? 

A3b. The FAA derives its authority and responsibilities from the Commercial Space 

Launch Act, recently re-codified at 51 U.S.C. Subtitle V, ch. 509. The FAA’s current 

regulatory authority extends to launch and reentry operations only as they affect 

public safety. Therefore, the FAA’s oversight of the crew capsule design and performance would be restricted to its impact on public safety and would be exercised 

through the licensing process. NASA maintains the responsibility for occupant safety and mission assurance. NASA’s role is not regulatory. Instead, it imposes requirements for mission assurance and for occupant safety through direct contractual requirements (and related NASA oversight) with the launch or capsule designer/operator. 

The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 restricts the FAA’s ability to protect persons on board a launch or reentry vehicle until the end of CY2012, 

unless there has been a death or serious injury to crew or a space flight participant 
60 

during a licensed or permitted human space flight; or there has been an unplanned 

event or series of events during a licensed or permitted flight that posed a high risk 

of causing a serious injury or death. At some point after CY2012, the FAA may exercise its responsibility for occupant safety as its regulations and experience mature, 

but the timeline for that transition with regards to the Commercial Crew Program 

will be determined in the future. NASA will retain the responsibility for mission assurance. 

Questions submitted by Representative Jerry Costello 

Q1. What is AST’s FY 2011 funding level? We have been trying to obtain this information, and it has been some time since Congress passed a final FY 2011 appropriation. Please deliver to us a final FY 11 funding level for AST at the earliest 

possible date. 

A1. AST’s FY 2011 funding allotment was $15,021,161. 

Q2. Within the FY 2012 request for AST, how would you prioritize AST’s programs 

and activities? 

A2. AST’s top-priority activities are those that are intended to ensure public safety, 

including issuing licenses and permits, conducting hazard analyses, developing regulations, and performing safety inspections. These activities account for approximately 40% of our FY 2012 request. Our second priority activities are those related 

to enabling industry, including preparing market forecasts and other publications, 

and awarding spaceport infrastructure grants. For FY 2012 only, a space transportation incentives program is included that is intended to encourage the development 

of low-cost access to space for a variety of government, industry, and academic 

users. These activities constitute approximately 27% of our request. Third priority 

is our safety-related research efforts, including work done by the Center of Excellence for Commercial Space Transportation, totaling 13% of our request. Fourth priority is our activities in support of international and interagency coordination, including significant interactions with both NASA and the US Air Force, totaling 12% 

of our request. Finally, fifth priority is the work we are doing related to Space Traffic Management. This area represents about 7% of our request, but is expected to 

grow in future years. 

Q3. Your FY 2012 request includes $5 million to ‘‘establish a program for 

incentivizing advancements in space transportation by non-governmental organizations’’. Your justification further states that ‘‘The Low Cost Access to Space Incentive would provide a $5 million award designed to jump-start the creation 

of an entirely new market segment. ’’ 

a. In this time of tight budgets, why is providing such prizes a priority for FAA, 

which is an operational and regulatory agency? 

A3(a). The FAA supports the President’s Innovation Initiative and Congress’ America COMPETES Act by offering this prize, which is intended to stimulate private 

investment in low-cost access to space. The incentive model has a long history in 

aviation and other transportation industries of stimulating innovation to the benefit 

of the whole industry. According to the Congressional Research Service, the return 

on investment for the NASA Lunar Lander Challenge was 6 times the prize amount, 

and Ansari X Prize Foundation leaders have estimated that 10 times the prize 

amount was invested by the industry. Prizes also offer a unique advantage in that 

money is not expended until the objectives have been successfully achieved. 

b. Having recently experienced a reduction to both its Facilities and Equipment 

and Research and Development appropriations in the recently passed Continuing Resolution for FY 2011, is FAA prepared to carve out $5 million of 

its budget to fund the space incentives program if similar reductions are 

made to FAA’s FY 2012 budget? 

A3(b). The FAA’s top priority is ensuring public safety, to include licenses and permits with supporting analyses; safety inspections; and tools related to license analysis. Activities supporting the economic competitiveness of the commercial space 

transportation industry, such as the Space Incentive program, are of secondary priority. In the event of budgetary reductions, the FAA would focus its resources on 

its highest priority safety mission. 

c. Does it make sense for an agency with primary regulatory responsibility to undertake such a program rather than R&D organizations who are not so en-
61 

cumbered, such as the National Science Foundation or NASA or, alternatively, the Department of Commerce’s Office of Space Commercialization? 

A3(c). The FAA’s regulatory role does not preclude its ability to be a meaningful 

R&D organization as well. Although seemingly small ($170 million in FY11) in comparison to the budget numbers for other R&D organizations, the R&D activities conducted by FAA lines of business are important components of and large contributors 

to the development and execution of FAA’s regulatory authority. This prize is specifically designed not to overlap with any NASA prize initiative. The FAA believes 

this prize will encourage transportation technologies, rather than support an agency 

specific mission. The FAA is in a unique position to understand commercial space 

transportation, and the incentive is intended to specifically support the space transportation industry. There are no US government programs aimed at reducing the 

costs of access to space by developing reusable space launch systems to build upon 

the advancements of the Space Shuttle. Reusability is widely recognized and accepted as being a necessary technology before commercial space transportation can 

achieve its full potential. 

The National Science Foundation supports science research, not systems development, so there is no overlap. The Department of Commerce has not pursued any 

space-related prize initiatives. 

Q4. A 2008 report conducted by the Aerospace Corporation pursuant to direction in 

the 2004 Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act found that human suborbital and orbital flights should be regulated differently. What is the AST 

doing to understand the risks specific to suborbital and to orbital systems and 

how is it using that information to inform its approach to safety and regulations? 

A4. This is a very important question, and the FAA is in a unique position to see 

the differences between orbital and sub-orbital operations through our work with licensing and permits. Suborbital flights are developing with more of a build-up approach, similar to aircraft development, and involve a shorter duration of exposure 

to the hazards of space. As a result, the FAA has elected not to pursue suborbital 

human space flight regulatory changes once the 2012 moratorium expires. We believe that we have adequate insight to the safety levels of sub-orbital vehicles 

through the development and envelope expansion that take place during flight testing. However, orbital operations are by their nature ‘‘all-or-nothing’’ in that the vehicle must achieve orbit completely in order to be successful, and the duration of 

exposure to the hazards of space is much more substantial. The FAA believes that 

the development of orbital spaceflight regulations must begin soon in order to ensure consistency of approach among all government agencies for the benefit of industry. 

With regards to studying the risks specific to suborbital and orbital systems, the 

FAA is investigating the health effects of spaceflight on participants from the general public—as opposed to highly trained and healthy astronauts. In addition, the 

FAA is investigating the effects of frequent space launch activities on the National 

Air Space System and associated impacts to commercial airline operations. An 

‘‘anomaly database’’ is being developed to track unexpected events in commercial 

space transportation that relate to safety. Finally, the FAA is sponsoring several 

areas of research under the Center of Excellence that directly relate to industry 

safety issues. 

Q5. To what extent has FAA been involved in NASA’s commercial crew development 

(CCDev) program and in the selection of funding recipients for NASA’s CCDev2 

solicitation and what further involvement, if any is planned? 

A5. The FAA has two full time employees located in the NASA Johnson Space Center Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) office and one in the NASA Kennedy Space 

Center Commercial Crew Program (CCP) office to coordinate and communicate regarding these interagency topics. NASA has one full time employee at FAA Headquarters in Washington DC for the same purposes. The FAA participated in NASA’s 

review and evaluation of CCDev proposals but was not a ‘‘voting member’’ in the 

selection of winning proposals for contract. Our participation was to ensure that relevant FAA regulatory requirements were properly addressed in the acquisition process. The FAA and NASA are actively engaged in discussions to determine the best 

path forward to strengthen our government partnership both to increase safety and 

to benefit industry. 
62 

a. What, in your view, would give FAA the authority to impose safety regulations 

for NASA crew members that may fly on commercial spaceflight systems for 

ISS crew rotations rather than having NASA do it? 

A5(a). 51 U.S.C. §50905(c) provides the FAA authority to issue regulations governing the design or operation of a launch vehicle operating under an FAA license 

to protect the health and safety of crew and space flight participants. The intent 

of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is to develop a commercial capability for 

launches to the ISS. Since the FAA licenses commercial launches, it is the intent 

of both NASA and the FAA that the FAA will ultimately license these launches 

within the limits of its regulatory authority. This is to industry’s benefit so that it 

may leverage the developments of the CCP to extend to non-NASA customers. For 

licensed operations, the FAA has responsibility for public safety. At some time in 

the future, and after the expiration for the 2012 moratorium, NASA and the FAA 

may agree that the FAA will exercise responsibility for occupant safety as well. 

b. What are FAA’s plans for working with NASA on human rating requirements 

and safety for potential commercial human spaceflight operations involving 

government crew? 

A5(b). A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the NASA Commercial 

Resupply Services Program and the FAA is already in place, and an MOU between 

the NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) and the FAA is currently being drafted. The FAA and NASA CCP have been conducting joint reviews of NASA ’s requirements and FAA regulations to determine if there are any incompatibilities or conflicts between them. We are also examining how the FAA’s regulations would apply 

under various acquisition strategies being considered by NASA. As part of our ongoing collaboration, the FAA attended NASA’s requirements workshop in June 2011. 

The FAA will continue to stay abreast of requirements development in order to ensure consistency, to reduce industry’s data burden, and ensure that industry can leverage the developments of the CCP to extend to non-NASA customers. 

Q6. What specific issues and questions does Congress need to consider before determining how to handle accidents or collisions that may occur on-orbit? 

A6. Space mishap investigation is extremely challenging, partly because of the remote environment that hampers investigation and partly because many entities 

could be involved or have a stake in the investigation and the outcome. In order 

to address this problem, the FAA, NASA, and the NTSB have a Mishap Tri-Chair 

Working Group which meets monthly; they have agreed to a matrix of responsibilities if a mishap occurs based on their discussions. This matrix would likely be of 

value to Congress in framing the discussion. 

Congress should consider these specific issues when determining how to handle 

accidents or collisions that may occur on-orbit: 

a. On-orbit authority 

b. Liability and indemnification issues under U.S. laws and international treaties 

c. Which entity is best suited to conduct the efforts during the various stages or 

components of an investigation most efficiently; these stages include detection, 

data-gathering, investigation, compliance, enforcement, and international coordination 

d. Existing treaties and legislation regarding mishaps involving NASA or NASA 

-contracted vehicles, to include: 

• The Astronaut Rescue Agreement 

• The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 

2005, (specifically Section 822). 

Q7. In your testimony, you noted that having one set of requirements for NASA and 

one for FAA would not allow companies to close their business cases. Would not 

having regulations in place at the time of any future NASA commercial 

spaceflights for ISS crew rotations be a show-stopper for companies? 

A7. Many in the industry have expressed a desire for the FAA to begin developing 

occupant safety regulations for human spaceflight to provide confidence to their investors that the appropriate regulatory structure is in place to use the commercial 

vehicles they develop in support of NASA ’s requirements for non-NASA missions. 

Not having regulations compatible with the requirements that guided the development of the vehicles could lead to delays in licensing these vehicles commercially. 
63 

1 ‘‘Study of Liability Risk-Sharing Regime in the United States for Commercial Space Transportation’’ page 48, August 1,2006. This report, in response to Public Law 108-492, is available 

at: http://www.faa.gov//about/officelorg/headquartersloffices/ast/reportslstudies/ 2 Ibid, page 52. 

3 Ibid, page 36-37. 

Q8. In your prepared statement, you said that in FY 2012 you ‘‘expect several dozen 

licensed or permitted launches’’. How many of those will be licensed launches? 

What is the basis of your expectation? 

A8. A conservative estimate, taking into consideration range and technical delays, 

is that there will be 20 - 25 licensed launches during FY 2012, of which 12 - 15 

will be orbital launches and 8 - 10 will be suborbital launches. Permitted launches 

are much more difficult to estimate. Based on self-reported intentions of industry 

combined with prudent judgment of the uncertainties, we believe a number of commercial reusable launch operators will conduct 20 - 30 research and development 

launches in FY2012 under experimental permits. In total, we expect 40 - 55 licensed 

or permitted launches during FY2012. The basis of our expectation is from analysis 

of current launch manifests, industry reported intentions, and existing contracts. 

The sum total of these projections is subject to a high level of uncertainty for various reasons, therefore the FAA has revised the total down to a more conservative 

number. 

Q9. You noted in testimony that ‘‘ensuring that the liability structure that is set up 

is appropriate’’ for allowing businesses to compete internationally will be important for the success of the commercial human spaceflight industry. Could you 

please elaborate on how the current liability structure in the U.S. compares to 

the liability structure internationally and how the U.S. structure may affect 

competition? 

A9. The current U.S. regime, set forth under Title 51, Chapter 509, has three tiers. 

Tier I: Maximum Probable Loss (MPL)-Based Financial Responsibility Requirements. The launch licensee is required to obtain insurance to cover claims of third 

parties, including government personnel. The FAA sets the requirements based on 

the largest accident probable, not possible, that would result from licensed launch 

or reentry activities, not to exceed the lesser of $500 million for third party liability, 

or the maximum available on the world market at reasonable cost or $100 million 

for U.S. Government range property, or the maximum available on the world market at reasonable cost. 

Tier II: Catastrophic Loss Protection (Government Payment of Excess Claims, 

Known as ‘‘Indemnification’’). Subject to appropriations, the U.S. Government may 

pay successful third-party liability claims in excess of required MPL-based insurance up to $1.5 billion [$2.7 billion adjusted for inflation]. The U.S. Government 

waives claims for government property damage above required property insurance. 

Tier III: Above MPL-Based Insurance plus Indemnification. If a claim exceeds 

Tier I and II the remaining financial responsibility reverts back to the licensee or 

legally liable party. 

The following are examples from the leading providers of commercial services for 

expendable launch vehicles: 

‘‘Arianespace shall be required to reimburse the French government, up to a 

ceiling of 60 million euros per launch [about $85 million in 2011], in the case 

of damages caused by Ariane launches. Arianespace typically purchases insurance to cover this amount. If the damages exceed this amount the French government is obliged to indemnify the difference.’’ 1

In Russia, ‘‘[t]ypical levels of compulsory insurance vary from $80 million for 

Start launch vehicles to $300 million for Soyuz and Proton. The Russian government pays liability claims in excess of insurance coverage if this specified 

in the launch services contract. If it is not, the launch customer is liable for 

these claims.’’ 2

In the expendable launch vehicle (ELV) satellite services market, if there was 

no U.S. Government indemnification, the FAA believes that U.S. providers 

would be unable to compete against foreign providers. Industry has stated the 

same position. 3 In addition, as detailed in the 2006 report to Congress: 

‘‘. . . private insurance markets still are not able to provide full liability (maximum probable loss) coverage to the commercial launch industry. Private liability insurance capacity remains fragile and far below what would be needed 

to compensate for government indemnification if it were eliminated. Foreign 
64 

4 Ibid., page 10, Executive Summary 

competition has increased, and all credible international competitors have risksharing schemes rivaling or surpassing that of the U.S.’’ 4

Regarding human space flight, the 2004 Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act excludes space flight participants from indemnification eligibility 

against third party claims. If a foreign human space flight competitor had indemnification and the U.S. did not, the FAA believes that in the mid-to-Iong 

term, the U.S. human space flight industry—both orbital and suborbital— 

would be negatively impacted. 

Given the approach to date in ELVs for satellites, foreign competitors may try 

to institute an indemnification system that is more favorable to industry than 

the U.S. liability regime for human space flight. 

The FAA’s commercial space industry advisory committee, COMSTAC, told the 

FAA on June 1, 2011: ‘‘We advocate increased protection of operators and their 

associates when they serve spaceflight participants. While the specific mechanism is yet to be determined, the current indemnification regime (i.e., private 

insurance up to $500M, Government indemnification to $1.5B over that) would 

seem to be the correct way to achieve this protection.’’ 

Q10. To what extent is data being collected to understand the range safety implications of different designs and approaches for commercial spaceflight systems 

and to inform any potential changes in regulations? Does FAA have access to 

company-proprietary data? 

A10. Range safety implications of a design are always reviewed and analyzed in detail for each licensed or permitted launch, including proprietary data. We track and 

annually review with the US Air Force all waivers and exceptions to safety systems 

that were considered or granted by the USAF and the FAA. The FAA has four full 

time employees located at Patrick AFB (Eastern Range) for these purposes, with direct support provided from other FAA staff as required. 

We actively and continuously participate in joint USAF/FAA Common Standards 

Working Groups and in the USAF Range Commanders Council. There is a constant 

evolution of range operations and the FAA has several rule updates in consideration 

now to maintain consistency with USAF and NASA range guidelines. 

Questions submitted by Representative David Wu 

Q1. What did FAA use as evidence of a commercial market to justify the significant 

increase in workforce and supporting activities detailed in its FY 2012 budget 

request, especially since the commercial market assessment for crew and cargo 

systems that NASA recently transmitted to Congress was not completed at the 

time of the FY 2012 budget process? 

A1. The FY2012 budget request for AST was based upon a variety of factors that 

affect our workforce and supporting activities. These factors include the number of 

commercial space launches anticipated in FY2012, but also include the increase in 

the breadth and complexity of planned commercial space operations. Measuring this 

increase is challenging to do; however, market assessments are one good option. 

This is why the FAA annually conducts our own commercial space transportation 

industry orbital market assessment. We provided this data to NASA for its report, 

including having our market analysis contractor perform specific new market assessments for NASA to use in its report. 

Additionally, the FAA regularly polls industry as to its intended schedules. This 

is particularly crucial in the area of suborbital markets, where data is more difficult 

to obtain. 

Another indicator of potential future activity is the amount of money being invested in the industry. The FAA notes that between the Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) contracts, CCDev and Commercial Crew Program (CCP), and the Commercial Reusable Suborbital Research (CRuSR) program, NASA has been ramping 

up investment in the commercial space industry. Previously insignificant figures 

from a few years ago have increased to over $800 million in FY2011. $1.6 billion 

has been proposed for FY 2012 and subsequent years. Although the investments will 

take time to mature into actual launch events, NASA’s investments alone will create 

a large increase in activities requiring the FAA’s engagement as industry progresses 

towards licensed launch events. 
65 

1GAO, Commercial Space Launches: FAA Needs Continued Planning and Monitoring to Oversee the Safety of the Emerging Space Tourism Industry, GAO-07-16 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 

2006). 

Responses by Dr. Gerald Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure, 

US Government Accountability Office 

Questions submitted by Chairman Steven Palazzo 

Q1. During the hearing there was discussion about extending the experimental period for manned space flight systems, but in lieu of a schedule-driven regulatory 

moratorium, it was suggested that an alternative approach based on performance or other indicators should be considered. In your view, is this a better approach? If yes, what metrics do you believe should be used? 

A1. GAO Response: Yes, we believe that a performance-driven approach is better 

than a schedule-driven approach. In 2006, we recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) identify and monitor safety indicators for manned spaceflight so that it could be 

proactive in determining when to regulate crew and flight participant safety. 1 The 

agency has not implemented our recommendation because commercial manned 

space flight has not yet occurred. However, in the absence of such flights, metrics 

could be used along the lines suggested by Dr. Hertzfeld in his testimony. We agree 

with Dr. Hertzfeld that such metrics could take into account factors such as the maturity of the industry; the ability of companies to operate on a routine, scheduled 

basis; the number of passengers and the amount of cargo transported or the number 

of research experiments flown; the standardization of vehicles and systems that 

could provide the basis for a vehicle certification regime; and a quantification of the 

different risks involved. 

Q2. As part of its FY2012 budget request, AST is proposing greater regulatory authority in the area of on-orbit transportation. Does GAO agree with this concept? 

Does AST have the resources and expertise? 

A2. GAO Response: Ultimately, increasing AST’s regulatory authority is a policy decision for the Congress. We have not completed the work that would provide a basis 

for discussing the regulatory authority for on-orbit transportation. Likewise, we 

have not assessed whether AST has the resources and expertise to undertake significant additional regulatory responsibility in this area. 

Questions submitted by Representative Jerry Costello 

Q1. What liability and indemnification issues would commercial human spaceflight 

vehicles carrying U.S. government astronauts or crew raise? 

a. What issues are raised when both government crew and paying spaceflight 

participants are onboard together? 

b. What are the most critical issues for Congress to consider? 

A1. GAO Response: Currently, for commercial launches licensed by the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA), the U.S. government may pay third-party liability 

claims in excess of required launch insurance, up to $1.5 billion. This catastrophic 

loss protection in the event of a commercial launch incident is known as indemnification. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) current 

plan calls for launch contractors to obtain an FAA license for crew flights to the 

International Space Station and, therefore, these flights would be covered under this 

government indemnification. Additionally, space tourism flights require an FAA license and would also be covered under this government indemnification. Congress 

could consider several issues related to indemnification such as: (1) the point at 

which the industry will have outgrown the need for federal indemnification; (2) if 

federal indemnification is eliminated, how much time should be provided for industry to develop alternatives to government indemnification; and (3) if federal indemnification continues, whether an overall funding cap should be established. 

Q2. What does Congress need to understand before determining how accident investigations for commercial human spaceflight and suborbital flights should be 

handled, including on-orbit accidents? 

a. Should the process and authority for accident investigation be the same or 

different if humans are involved? 
66 

2GAO, Commercial Space Transportation: Development of the Commercial Space Launch Industry Presents Safety Oversight Challenges for FAA and Raises Issues Affecting Federal Roles, 

GAO-10-286T (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2, 2009). 3The Aerospace Corporation, et al., Analysis of Human Space Flight Safety, Report to Congress (El Segundo, Calif.: Nov. 11, 2008). 4GAO, Space Acquisitions: Development and Oversight Challenges in Delivering Improved 

SpaceSituational Awareness Capabilities, GAO-11-545 (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2011). 

b. Should the same organization that investigates launches also investigate on 

orbit accidents and if not, why not? 

A2. GAO Response: As we reported in 2009, the role of the National Transportation 

Safety Board (NTSB) in investigating space flight accidents has not been resolved 

and, to our knowledge, that issue remains unresolved. NTSB does not have space 

transportation explicitly included in its statutory jurisdiction, although it does have 

agreements with FAA and the Air Force under which it will lead investigations of 

commercial space launch accidents. 2 A 2008 FAA-commissioned report on human 

space flight suggested that Congress may want to consider explicitly designating a 

lead agency for accident investigations involving space vehicles to avoid potential 

overlapping jurisdictions. 3

Q3. How should any potential civil space traffic management regime correspond to 

national security needs for space traffic management and space situational 

awareness? 

a. Should these functions be handled separately or by one entity? 

b. What criteria should inform the decision of what entity (or entities) is given 

authority for space traffic management? 

A3. GAO Response: Our work indicates that a civil space traffic management function, which could be carried out by one entity, would have to be coordinated or 

linked with the national security community and specifically with the Department 

of Defense’s U.S. Strategic Command-the organization responsible for executing the 

space situational awareness mission. 4 We have no basis to recommend any one entity to handle this function. 

Q4. The 2004 Act limits the commercial human spaceflight safety regime to ‘‘informed consent.’’ Should Congress revisit that approach? 

A4. GAO Response: Because commercial space flights have not yet begun, we do not 

have any basis to challenge the concept of ‘‘informed consent.’’ Congress could revisit 

the issue after the industry develops further and FAA develops safety regulations 

for human space flight, which would replace the informed consent regime. 
67 

Responses by Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld, Research Professor of Space Policy 

and International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, 

George Washington University 

Questions submitted by Chairman Steven Palazzo 

Q1. As part of its FY2012 budget request AST is proposing greater regulatory authority in the area of on-orbit transportation. Your statement also notes the need 

for new regulatory authority. For the near term (next ten years), what on-orbit 

activities do you believe merit the highest concern, and what tools does AST need 

to regulate them? 

A1. There is an assumption built into the question that the AST will be the regulator of all on-orbit activities for the United States Government payloads on commercial space flights as well as the commercial sector. I do believe that the U.S. 

will need more on-orbit supervision of its activities, but the FAA is not the regulator 

for all commercial on-orbit activities, whether government-sponsored or not. 

NASA, NOAA, and the DOD have been performing in-orbit activities since the 

1960s and have adequately developed technical means to perform in-orbit activities. 

They have the full support of overall government policy based on our treaty obligations and requirements should liability issues arise from their activities in space. 

The safety record of government operations in space, although not perfect in the 

hazardous environment of space, has generally been as good as reasonably could be 

expected. And, it has improved with the lessons learned from experience. 

But, Congress has not given any federal agency the mandate to fully regulate 

commercial on-orbit activities. The space regulatory agencies, the FAA, NOAA and 

the FCC, have issued rules and regulations for launches that extend the launching 

activity to the placement in the proper orbit of a payload and to the on-orbit preparations for re-entry. Additionally, the FCC and NOAA have end-of-life requirements that requires payloads to safely be put into ‘‘graveyard orbits’’ or deorbited. 

Specifically, meeting the liability obligations of the space treaties (particularly Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and Articles III and IV of the Liability Convention) may involve the finding of fault for accidents in space. If a U.S. payload is at 

fault, the U.S. Government is liable for damages to the assets of another State 

Party to the Convention. The Government can then turn to a commercial operator 

of that satellite or payload and attempt to recover those damage payments. However, currently there are no requirements for commercial firms to purchase insurance for on-orbit activities, although some companies do. (Iridium, a U.S. company 

which was involved in a serious accident a couple of years ago, did not insure its 

satellites. Fortunately, there was no significant near-term economic damage in space 

from that accident.) 

Whether it is through requiring the commercial operator of a space asset to purchase private insurance or through some other financial arrangement, Congress 

should consider a new on-orbit commercial protocol for space activities. Additionally, 

the government needs to do more to prevent accidents. The recent U.S. policy adopting the IADC Debris Mitigation Guidelines as well as increasing the coordination 

and accuracy of SSA is an example of what has already begun in the U.S. Although 

the FAA has been involved, it is only one part of the broad reaching regulatory system that will be needed. 

Q2. FAA and NASA are now engaged in discussions on regulating commercial cargo 

and crew launches to the International Space Station, especially with regard to 

crew safety, third-party safety, and International Space Station proximity operations. Current proposals suggests that NASA would certify crew capsules used 

to carry government astronauts to and from orbit, while FAA would license their 

launch. What are your thoughts about this division of responsibility? In your 

view, is it sensible? What steps should be taken to ensure there are no safety 

‘gaps’? 

A2. I would need to know more about what is now being discussed between the 

FAA and NASA, but I am concerned about this division of responsibilities. Currently, FAA certifies airplanes for flight; it does not certify space vehicles-it only licenses them subject to a safety review and a showing of financial liability. FAA 

aviation certification is a well-developed system and the rules and requirements are 

codified. NASA ‘‘certifies’’ the Shuttle. That is really different process than aviation 

certification and is more like a quality control process. Each Shuttle flight is separately certified while aircraft certification is valid for all flights of a particular type 

of airplane. There is no current certification procedure for commercial space vehicles, either by the government or by industry. Developing a certification process for 
68 

a launch vehicle and its payload is an entirely new concept and will take years of 

work and experience before it could reach the level of assurance now in place for 

aviation. 

I don’t see any essential reason for the FAA to get involved in technical issues 

of on-orbit activity for a government payload. NASA is well positioned to do that. 

Dividing the responsibility between the FAA and NASA will only create difficult 

communications problems between the Agencies and could possibly increase the risk 

of accidents rather than reduce them. 

Launching government satellites on U.S. commercial launch vehicles does not require an FAA license. If the launch is for a dedicated government payload, then 

NASA procedures (or DOD) are applied for safety reviews and financial responsibility remains a Government guarantee. However, companies may prefer to go 

through the FAA and get a license. This may be advantageous for the company for 

two reasons: 1) the vehicle may be similar to others of its class and already covered 

under an FAA review, and 2) it may provide an extra measure of assurance for the 

company should anything go wrong with the launch. But, to emphasize again, it is 

not absolutely necessary that a commercial launch get a license from the FAA for 

dedicated NASA payloads. 

In the case of ISS supply, even though the current trend in policy is to have 

NASA pay for commercial services, rather than build space hardware themselves or 

through an R&D contract, NASA is still the customer. If NASA wants to impose its 

own criteria for safety and it (or the Government) is able to indemnify those activities, and if NASA is willing to pay for the extra safeguards that it wants, there is 

precedent to bypass the FAA licensing procedures on those particular launches. 

Since a commercial company launching NASA cargo and eventually crew to the 

ISS will also want to market those services and capabilities to private customers, 

they may desire an FAA license for NASA launches as a marketing and quality assurance tool for other commercial sales. 

A benefit of involving the FAA as an observer, advisor, and partner in NASA missions (but not as a regulator) would be the development of a good database of operations for launch and on-orbit activities. Eventually the FAA can make good use of 

the accumulated data and experience in developing future regulations of purely commercial launches and on-orbit activities. This is particularly relevant for the future 

unknowns of private human activity in orbit and for the ISS. 

Questions submitted by Representative Jerry Costello 

Q1. What liability and indemnification issues would commercial human spaceflight 

vehicles carrying U.S. government astronauts or crew raise? 

a. What issues are raised when both government crew and paying spaceflight 

participants are onboard together? 

b. What are the most critical issues for Congress to consider? 

A1. Liability in space is an untested legal regime, particularly for commercial enterprises in space. Through Article VI of the Outer Space treaty, States are responsible 

for the activities in space of their citizens and non-governmental entities. This provision exposes the State to potential payment for damages to the assets of other nations caused, not directly by the State, but by one of its companies operating in 

space. No other industry or sector is treated this way. In other high-technology, 

high-damage industries such as civil nuclear plants or large oil platforms, the operator has the primary responsibility for liability payments with governments sometimes a secondary guarantor. 

Domestic law, it should be noted, often can and will require a company to have 

insurance (FAA does this now with launches) so that the exposure of the government is actually minimized, except in exceptional situations. 

a) The mixing of government personnel with private crew and/or private passengers is complicated. The problems are as diverse as the reasons for having 

private citizens on a spacecraft. Are they government contractors? Are they 

‘‘tourists?’’ Are they doing private R&D or science related to a government 

project? Each scenario might trigger a different legal answer. 

It is possible that those passengers can get in the way of mission personnel (space 

vehicles are not roomy and it is impossible to physically separate private from government people). If an accident occurred as a result, as they have on ships and submarines, assigning liability is of concern. Informed consent is not enough in these 

cases; the passengers and companies involved must have comprehensive financial 

responsibility procedures for all types of fault-based liability. 
69 

Q2. The 2004 Act limits the commercial human spaceflight safety regime to ‘‘informed consent’’. Should Congress revisit that approach? 

A2. Yes, it should be reviewed. Informed consent from passengers is aimed at suborbital human flights and at stimulating the companies by not requiring them to 

insure their passengers who recognize, through informed consent statements, that 

they are taking certain risks. The informed consent requirement also makes it clear 

to the passenger that the FAA has not certified the vehicle or flight (and may therefore absolve the Government from being sued by the passenger). 

However, as mentioned in the testimony, four States that have spaceports are 

now moving to further protect the private launch companies from virtually any legal 

suits from passengers. Each State has slightly different wording in its laws which 

may now result in competition among the various States for launch operators to locate there based on the costs associated with safety issues. (Economic competition 

based on the price of the flight and on other incentives States may give companies 

such as building facilities or providing tax incentives should not be discouraged.) 

Furthermore, these types of informed consent waivers that protect the companies 

may not even be practical from a legal view. For instance, if a launch originates 

in New Mexico (a state with an informed consent law) and then has an accident 

in U.S. airspace above Colorado (a state without such a law), Colorado tort law 

would be applied to the accident and it is highly probable that a Colorado court 

would not allow the application of that waiver to the launch company. Predictability 

and uniformity in these safety regulations across the U.S. would be preferable. 

Q3. What does Congress need to understand before determining how accident investigations for commercial human spaceflight and suborbital flights should be 

handled, including on-orbit accidents? 

a. Should the process and authority for accident investigation be the same or 

different if humans are involved? 

b. Should the same organization that investigates launches also investigate onorbit accidents and if not, why not? 

A3. The expertise required to investigate an accident involving space technologies 

is quite limited. Only a very few agencies (e.g. NASA, DOD, and some parts of DOT 

and others) have the expertise to perform the analyses required. Historically, all 

agencies as well as private consultants, industry experts, etc. have fully cooperated 

in these investigations. I do not believe there has been any serious problem in obtaining that cooperation. 

Therefore, I believe that it is not a question of accidents with or without humans, 

or accidents involving space hardware on Earth, during launch, in-orbit, or returning from orbit, but only one of clearly designating one organization to coordinate an 

accident investigation. That organization could take any format ranging from an ad 

hoc office or Board within an agency such as NASA or DOT created especially for 

each commercial space accident to a more formal office created within an agency organized specifically to develop protocols and procedures for a space accident. That 

organization should be given all necessary legal powers to conduct an investigation, 

obtain evidence, review and keep secure any confidential information (classified or 

commercially proprietary) and procure all necessary technical expertise. The investigatory panel should be completely independent of the Agency hierarchy and should 

report directly to either (or both) the President and Congress. 

There are several possible locations (none need to be permanent organizations or 

office) for this independent activity. NASA itself has a safety office and advisory 

group that could create an investigation panel. The DOT/FAA might also be appropriate, but it currently does not have a full spectrum of technical space expertise. 

The NTSB is an independent body within the Executive Branch but does not specifically have space in its legislative charter. It does, however, have the organizational 

expertise to conduct accident investigations in other transportation modes and currently does have a MOU with the FAA for the investigation of certain space-related 

accidents. 

Q4. How should any potential civil space traffic management regime correspond to 

national security needs for space traffic management and space situational 

awareness? 

a. Should these functions be handled separately or by one entity? 

b. What criteria should inform the decision of what entity (or entities) is given 

authority for space traffic management? 

A4. This is not my specific expertise. I do believe that the key to a successful regime 

for space traffic management must be coordination, just as it is for air traffic con-
70 

trol. And, of course, to get to space or to get back from space involves going through 

air space. Therefore, on either a national or international level, not only does space 

traffic management have to be coordinated in space itself, but also it must be coordinated with air traffic control. 

Therefore, whether one entity does both or whether there are different organizations controlling traffic in and to space, they must work together (and also interface 

smoothly with military traffic command, as is also done currently with air traffic 

control). 

Criteria for this decision should rest mainly on the ability to coordinate the information required. The range of information is vast and complicated and with the 

global reach of space, will involve access to many different types of information such 

as air traffic data, weather data, space weather data, national and international 

launch information. The function will also require a sophisticated level of analysis 

and the ability to make real-time decisions. 

Q5. Should FAA require evidence of a real demand for launch services at a prospective spaceport prior to investing its resources for the work leading to granting 

a license? 

A5. This is a difficult question. If and when there is a surge of private space launch 

activity, the FAA will need the resources. However, at present, the FAA data indicate that number of commercial launches is slightly over 10 per year. Forecasts indicate that the number of launches will remain relatively stable for the next several 

years and may rise to near 20 per year late in this decade. But, those forecasts are 

based on a number of assumptions, including the success of the NASA-led effort for 

commercial crew and cargo flights to the ISS. 

It appears from these numbers there will no surges in launch activity in the immediate future. But, given the many differences in the technical approach to launching from the private companies now building new and experimental launch vehicles 

that the FAA will need for a broad range of technical expertise and possibly new 

resources to evaluate these different approaches. The FAA is closely monitoring the 

development of these new vehicles and, as yet, none are commercially operating. 

Congress should be kept informed and ready to act when and if the FAA needs the 

resources to adequately license these new vehicles and possible new surges in 

launch demand. 

Q6. What, if any, risks are raised when range safety at a private spaceport is conducted by the organization that is operating the spaceport, and how should those 

risks be addressed? 

A6. The obvious risks are the inherent decision conflicts between making money in 

a profit-motivated organization and developing a level of safety that is as high as 

possible and practicable as it could be. There will always be trade-offs between 

money and safety; nothing is 100% safe. For the most part, government agencies 

dealing with space issues are well funded and, particularly when dealing with 

human safety, will err on the side of spending the funds necessary for a higher level 

of safety than a private firm would. 

On the other hand, a private firm will argue that the government is overly cautious and near equivalents in safety can be met with less expensive investments. 

And, they argue, that customers will not buy their services if there is a serious safety breach that was responsible for the loss of life. 

One way the risks can be addressed and possibly managed in an optimum level 

for safety is to require the private spaceport to use a new part-time board that 

would combine government expertise with private sector executives. This relatively 

small office/panel/board would consist of independent individuals who are experts in 

appropriate space and ground support technology, operations, law, and safety. This 

one office would employ a small permanent staff and would be established to oversee and advise all domestic spaceports. The funding for this would be through an 

obligatory payment or tax from each U.S. spaceport (charged on the basis of a formula to insure a proportionate and fair share payment by each spaceport). Each 

spaceport would be required to abide by the recommendations of this Board and an 

FAA license to launch from that facility would be granted only if there were full 

compliance with those recommendations. The FAA licensing process would be independent from this Board. 

One final note on the suggestion for a new Board to be formed (and this note 

equally applies to a possible new organization for accident investigations mentioned 

above) is that the demand for spaceports (and the number of accidents that might 

occur) would warrant the expenditures for these organizations. It might be more appropriate if demand is low to have ad hoc committees of experts both within the 

Government and outside formed for these purposes. 
71 

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