Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

STEPHEN T. OWENS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

JOHN PINNOW MONIKA PREKOPA TALBOT

Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JOHNNY D. WAYT, )

)

Appellant-Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) No. 36A05-1307-PC-338

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE JACKSON CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable William E. Vance, Judge

Cause No. 36C01-0705-PC-1

February 27, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BRADFORD, Judge 
2

CASE SUMMARY

On October 10, 2003, Appellant-Petitioner Johnny Wayt was charged with murder and 

Class A felony robbery. During Wayt’s first trial, the trial court granted Wayt’s motion for 

judgment on the evidence regarding the robbery charge. The trial ended in a hung jury with 

regard to the murder charge. On September 12, 2005, following a subsequent trial, Wayt was 

convicted of murder. Wayt’s murder conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. 

Wayt subsequently sought post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied 

Wayt’s request for relief following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Wayt contends that 

the post-conviction court erroneously determined that the State did not knowingly present 

perjured testimony. Wayt also contends that the post-conviction court erroneously adopted 

the State’s proposed findings and conclusions thereon in whole, and in determining that the

State did not withhold evidence that was favorable to Wayt prior to trial. In addition, Wayt 

contends that the post-conviction court erroneously determined that he did not receive 

ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the 

post-conviction court. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Our opinion in Wayt’s prior direct appeal, which was handed down on October 17, 

2006, instructs us as to the underlying facts and procedural history leading to this postconviction appeal: 

On February 27, 1997, Rhonda Self drove to Ronald Bruner’s residence 

in Vallonia. The two sat at the kitchen table while Bruner weighed a quantity 

of methamphetamine and placed the drug in some baggies. At some point, Jim 

Hauer and John McDonald arrived at the residence, where they smoked some 
3

of the methamphetamine. Hauer purchased a baggie of the drug from Bruner 

and the two of them left approximately twenty-five minutes later.

Later that evening, Bruner attended a gathering at Shannon Weber’s 

residence. Weber was a methamphetamine dealer who had several individuals 

sell drugs for [her]. At some point, Wayt, who was also at the party, told 

Leonard Proffit that he wanted to rob someone and that he needed [Proffit’s] 

help. Proffit’s nephew, Brad, apparently overheard this conversation. Wayt 

informed several others that there would be drugs and money at Bruner’s 

house. As a result, Proffit, Wayt and Weber drove to Bruner’s residence, 

where they intended to buy some drugs from Bruner or to steal 

methamphetamine if he was not at home. Proffit had a key to Bruner’s house 

because he had been doing some work for him. Wayt and Proffit entered 

Bruner’s house, emerged a short time later, and Wayt remarked that “it wasn’t 

supposed to happen that way” and that “things just got all messed up.” Tr. p. 

263-64, 278. They returned to Proffit’s residence, where Kenny Beavers saw 

Proffit stuff some blood stained clothes into a brown paper bag. Proffit then 

burned the clothes and Wayt remarked to Beavers: “I know you know what 

happened. Keep your mouth shut. I didn’t want to do it but I had to do what I 

had to do.” Id. at 453. 

On February 28, George Lebline went to Bruner’s residence to 

complete some work on the outside of the house. At some point, Lebline’s 

brother-in-law, Don Kirts, arrived at the residence. He entered Bruner’s 

residence using a key that Bruner had given him. Kirts had also done some 

work for Bruner and they had been involved in the drug dealing business 

together. Once inside, Kirts discovered Bruner’s body lying on the floor in a 

pool of blood, wrapped in a blanket. Kirts checked for a pulse but there was 

none. Lebline also entered the residence and, upon seeing Bruner’s body, 

contacted the police. 

Dr. James Whitler performed an autopsy on Bruner and discovered 

numerous stab wounds on the body. Dr. Whitler determined that Bruner’s 

death was a homicide and that he died as a result of acute blood loss that was 

caused by multiple stab wounds to his back, chest, and neck. The police 

subsequently found shoe prints on Bruner’s jeans that were found to match the 

soles of Wayt’s boots.

On October 10, 2003, Wayt was charged with murder and robbery. 

Following his arrest, Wayt was placed in a cell with Lee Riley and told Riley 

that “they know [I am] guilty” and “they know [I] did it.” Tr. p. 355, 359. 

When the trial commenced on November 3, 2004, the trial court granted 

Wayt’s motion for judgment on the evidence as to the robbery count. The trial 

ended in a hung jury on the murder count for reasons not apparent from the 

record. Wayt’s retrial on the murder count was scheduled for August 22, 2005. 

Prior to trial, Wayt filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence relating 
4

to the robbery offense for which he had been acquitted. Although the motion 

was granted, the trial court specified that the State would be allowed to refer to 

the factual allegations leading to “the event that the Defendant is charged 

with.” Tr. p. 33. At trial, Detective Rick Blaker testified that a robbery charge 

had been filed against Wayt. Wayt objected, stating that the testimony violated 

the order in limine. The trial court sustained the objection. Later in the trial, 

Proffit testified that Wayt tried “to recruit someone to help him rob 

somebody.” Id. at 403. Wayt objected and moved for a mistrial. However, 

the trial court denied his request and determined that the motion in limine only 

referred to the charges filed against Wayt and that no violation had occurred. 

Id. at 407. Weber and Proffit were also permitted to testify about an alleged 

conversation between Wayt and Bruner that took place while the others were 

discussing the robbery. Apparently, Proffit told the others that Wayt had 

informed him that Bruner would not be home for about two hours and that 

would be the time to go to his house. And according to Proffit’s testimony, it 

was Wayt’s idea to commit the robbery and Wayt had solicited Proffit to assist 

him in the commission of the offense.

Following trial, Wayt was found guilty as charged and sentenced to a 

fifty-five year term of imprisonment.

Wayt v. State, 36A05-0511-CR-628 *2-4 (Ind. Ct. App. October 17, 2006) (first and second set 

of brackets added, all others in original), trans. denied. Wayt’s convictions were 

subsequently affirmed on direct appeal. Id. at *11.

On May 4, 2007, Wayt filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). On 

February 22, 2010, Wayt, by counsel, filed an amended PCR petition. On October 4, 2012, 

Wayt filed a second amended PCR petition. The post-conviction court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing on Wayt’s second amended PCR petition on April 5, 2013. During this 

hearing, Wayt, by counsel, presented argument in support of his PCR petition. On June 19, 

2013, the post-conviction court issued an order denying Wayt’s request for PCR. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Post-conviction procedures do not afford the petitioner with a super-appeal. Williams 
5

v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind. 1999). Instead, they create a narrow remedy for 

subsequent collateral challenges to convictions, challenges which must be based on grounds 

enumerated in the post-conviction rules. Id. A petitioner who has been denied postconviction relief appeals from a negative judgment and as a result, faces a rigorous standard 

of review on appeal. Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind. 2001); Colliar v. State, 715 

N.E.2d 940, 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. 

Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 745 

(Ind. 2002). Therefore, in order to prevail, a petitioner must establish his claims by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5); Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 745. 

When appealing from the denial of a PCR petition, a petitioner must convince this court that 

the evidence, taken as a whole, “leads unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by 

the post-conviction court.” Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 745. “It is only where the evidence is 

without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached 

the opposite conclusion, that its decision will be disturbed as contrary to law.” Godby v. 

State, 809 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The post-conviction court is 

the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Fisher v. 

State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004). We therefore accept the post-conviction court’s 

findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous but give no deference to its conclusions of 

law. Id.

I. Whether the Post-Conviction Court Erred in Determining that Wayt Failed to 

Establish that the State Knowingly Presented Perjured Testimony
6

Wayt contends that the post-conviction court erroneously determined that he failed to 

establish that the State knowingly presented perjured testimony during his murder trial. Wayt 

claimsthat the State knew that Weber falsely testified during Wayt’s murder trial that she had 

not entered into an agreement with the State for future favorable treatment in exchange for

her testimony against Wayt. In raising this contention, Wayt challenges the post-conviction 

court’s determination that he failed to prove the existence of any such agreement between 

Weber and the State prior to Weber testifying against Wayt. Wayt also challenges the postconviction court’s determination that he was not prejudiced by Weber’s allegedly false 

testimony.

A. Existence of Alleged Agreement Between Weber and the State

When a defendant believes that the prosecutor has failed to disclose an 

agreement with a state witness, the burden is on defendant to establish the 

existence of such an agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. [Stanley 

v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1315, 1318-19 (Ind. 1985).] The mere allegation of an 

agreement does not create an agreement and is insufficient to warrant relief. 

Generally, in the absence of a written agreement, proof of an agreement may 

be established by affidavit or other testimony. [See Giglio v. United States, 

405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 765 (1972); McCord v. State, 622 N.E.2d 

504, 508-09 (Ind. 1993); Lopez v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (Ind. 1988).]

Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1113-14 (Ind. 1997). “An express agreement ... does not 

exist if a witness testifies favorably in the hope of leniency, and the State neither confirms 

nor denies that hope to the witness.” Id. at 1113. “Similarly, hopes and expectations of a 

state witness coupled with evidence that a prosecutor-accomplice/witness deal may have 

been consummated after the in-court testimony is insufficient to bring a case within the 
7

Newman[1]rule.” Id.

In the instant matter, Wayt argues that the post-conviction court erred in determining 

that the State did not knowingly present perjured testimony during his murder trial because 

the record demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Weber had entered into an 

agreement for a sentence reduction prior to her testifying against Wayt. In challenging the 

post-conviction court’s determination to the contrary, Wayt argues that the post-conviction 

court erroneously found that Russell Johnson was not a credible witness and that Weber’s 

credibility was made suspect during Wayt’s murder trial. Wayt also argues that the postconviction court failed to make the reasonable inference that Weber lied during Wayt’s 

murder trial from her invocation of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 

during the evidentiary hearing on Wayt’s PCR petition. 

i. Johnson’s Credibility

In challenging the post-conviction court’s determination that he failed to prove the 

existence of an agreement between Weber and the State, Wayt argues that the post-conviction 

court erroneously found that Johnson’s testimony was unreliable. Wayt claims that 

Johnson’s testimony is both reliable and sufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that the State had entered into an agreement with Weber for a sentence reduction in 

exchange for her testimony against Wayt. The State, for its part, claims that the evidence 

presented during the evidentiary hearing is sufficient to sustain the post-conviction court’s 

 

1

 Newman v. State, 263 Ind. 569, 334 N.E.2d 684 (1975) (providing that when a co-conspirator 

testifies against a defendant, any understanding or agreement as to leniency during future prosecution of the coconspirator must be disclosed to the jury).
8

determination that Johnson’s testimony was unreliable. Upon review, we must agree with the 

State.

Johnson testified that he believed there was “at least a verbal agreement [with 

Prosecutor Stephen Pierson], that he was going to do something substantial for [Weber] upon 

her truthful testimony.” Ex. 8, p. 29. However, upon reviewing Johnson’s testimony, the 

post-conviction court found as follows:

Johnson’s testimony is unreliable because his memory of the events in question 

is poor. Johnson could not remember critical facts about the case, about his 

representation of Weber, and about the terms of any agreement. Johnson does 

not recall whether or not he represented Weber at her sentencing hearing. (Pet. 

Ex. 8, p. 3, l. 16-20). He does not recall what sentence Weber received. (Pet. 

Ex. 8, p. 3, l. 23-24). Johnson does not remember whether or not the victim, 

Ronald Bruner, was shot or stabbed. (Pet. Ex. 8, p. 7, l. 8). He does not recall 

the deposition testimony given by Shannon Weber on September 9, 2004, at 

which he was present, or even that there was a deposition. (Pet. Ex. 8, p. 10, l. 

17-24). He does not recall being present during Weber’s testimony at Wayt’s 

trial, but believes that he was not. (Pet. Ex. 8, p. 26, l. 7-8). He does not 

remember why he was not there. (Pet. Ex. 8, p. 26, l. 18-19).

Appellant’s App. pp. 203-04. Our review reveals that the post-conviction court accurately 

described Johnson’s deposition testimony.

In addition, Johnson’s deposition testimony reveals that, by Johnson’s own admission, 

he did not clearly remember the specifics relating to Weber’s case. Johnson indicated that he 

believed that his conversations with Prosecutor Pierson regarding whether Weber would 

testify against Wayt began shortly after he became involved in Weber’s case. He could not 

recall “exactly in the chronology of this case how that worked, but there were definitely 

conversations.” Ex. 8, p. 6. Johnson’s testimony also indicated a hope that Weber would 
9

obtain relief in exchange for her testimony against Wayt. Johnson testified that he 

remembered discussions regarding a ten-year sentence, but, when pressed about the timing of 

these discussions, he admitted that he could not remember the specifics of whether this 

discussion occurred before Weber testified against Wayt. Johnson admitted that his memory 

“is not the greatest,” but that he did not think that Weber and the State ever agreed to any 

exact terms with respect to an alleged agreement for leniency prior to Weber testifying 

against Wayt. Ex. 8, p. 25. 

Our review of Johnson’s deposition testimony clearly demonstrates that Johnson’s 

memory relating to his representation of Weber and the alleged agreement between Weber 

and the State was poor, to say the least. As such, we conclude that the post-conviction court 

did not err in finding that Johnson’s testimony was unreliable with regard to the existence of 

any possible agreement between Weber and the State.

ii. Weber’s Credibility

Wayt also argues that the post-conviction court erroneously concluded that Weber’s 

credibility was shown to be highly suspect during trial. We cannot agree. The record shows 

that Weber was shown to be a convicted felon, a drug dealer and user, and a liar during 

Wayt’s murder trial. Weber testified that she used cocaine and methamphetamine, that she 

was a methamphetamine dealer who obtained the drug from multiple sources, and that she 

had friends who would sell the methamphetamine for her in exchange for drugs. Weber also 

testified that she was a convicted felon and acknowledged that she had initially lied to both 

police and the grand jury about her knowledge of the events relating to Bruner’s death. From 
10

these facts, it was not unreasonable for the post-conviction court to conclude that the jury 

likely looked at Weber’s testimony with suspicion. 

iii. Invocation of Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination

Wayt also argues that the post-conviction court should have inferred that Weber lied 

during Wayt’s murder trial in light of her invocation of her Fifth Amendment right against 

self-incrimination during the evidentiary hearing on Wayt’s PCR petition. The State 

acknowledges that “the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties 

to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against 

them,” Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976), but points out that the postconviction court was not required to make any such inference. We agree with the State and 

accordingly conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in declining to make the 

adverse inference that Weber must have lied in her testimony during Wayt’s trial merely 

because she invoked her Fifth Amendment right when called to testify during the evidentiary 

hearing. 

B. Prejudice

Wayt also argues that the post-conviction court erroneously concluded that he was not 

prejudiced by Weber’s allegedly false testimony. Specifically, Wayt claims that a new trial is 

necessary because he was prejudiced by Weber’s allegedly false testimony that while she 

hoped to receive favorable future treatment from the State, she did not have a deal that would 

guarantee her favorable treatment in exchange for her testimony against Wayt. With regard 

to allegedly false testimony, the United States Supreme Court has held that a new trial is 
11

necessary where the individual demonstrates that he suffered prejudice, i.e., there is a 

reasonable likelihood that, but for the false testimony, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 

(1959)). 

In arguing that he was prejudiced by Weber’s allegedly false testimony regarding her 

alleged potential agreement with the State, Wayt concedes that Weber’s testimony relating to 

the planning of the robbery and the events that occurred after the robbery and murder was 

corroborated by other witnesses. Wayt claims, however, that the other witnesses’ credibility 

was suspect and could only have been believed by the jury because it was corroborated by 

Weber’s testimony. We disagree. 

Our review of the record demonstrates that Weber’s credibility was made suspect as 

she was shown to be not only a liar but also a drug user, a drug dealer, and a convicted felon. 

The credibility of the other witnesses who testified regarding the planning of the robbery and 

the events that occurred after the robbery and murder was no more suspect than Weber’s 

testimony, and it is unreasonable to believe that the jury only believed this testimony because 

it was corroborated by Weber. Further, the State also presented unrelated testimony 

indicating that Wayt acknowledged his role in Bruner’s murder and was in possession of 

Bruner’s property after the robbery. As such, we cannot say that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for Weber’s allegedly false testimony, the result of the proceedings 

would have been different. See id. 

II. Whether the Post-Conviction Court Erred in Adopting the State’s Proposed 

Findings and Conclusions Thereon in Whole
12

Wayt next contends that the post-conviction court erred by adopting the State’s 

proposed findings and conclusions thereon in whole. With regard to the wholesale adoption 

of a party’s proposed findings by the court, the Indiana Supreme Court has held as follows:

It is not uncommon for a trial court to enter findings that are verbatim 

reproductions of submissions by the prevailing party. The trial courts of this 

state are faced with an enormous volume of cases and few have the law clerks 

and other resources that would be available in a more perfect world to help 

craft more elegant trial court findings and legal reasoning. We recognize that 

the need to keep the docket moving is properly a high priority of our trial 

bench. For this reason, we do not prohibit the practice of adopting a party’s 

proposed findings. But when this occurs, there is an inevitable erosion of the 

confidence of an appellate court that the findings reflect the considered 

judgment of the trial court. This is particularly true when the issues in the case 

turn less on the credibility of witnesses than on the inferences to be drawn 

from the facts and the legal effect of essentially unchallenged testimony.

Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1188 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 

704, 708-09 (Ind. 2001)). Further, while post-conviction courts are not encouraged to adopt 

wholesale the findings and conclusions of either party, we will not find bias solely on that 

basis. Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 899, 940 (Ind. 2009). “The critical inquiry is whether the 

findings adopted by the court are clearly erroneous.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

Here, even though the post-conviction court adopted the State’s proposed findings and 

conclusions thereon in whole, our thorough review of the record demonstrates that the postconviction court’s order is supported by the record. As we discussed above, the record 

supports the post-conviction court’s determination that Wayt failed to prove the existence of 

the alleged agreement between Weber and the State by a preponderance of the evidence. As 

such, the post-conviction court’s findings and conclusions thereon are not clearly erroneous,
13

and Wayt has shown no bias or prejudice in this respect.

III. Whether the Post-Conviction Court Erred in Determining that the State

Did Not Withhold Evidence Favorable to Wayt Prior to Trial

Wayt also contends that the post-conviction court erred in determining that the State 

did not withhold favorable evidence from him prior to trial. Specifically, Wayt claims that 

the State deliberately withheld evidence of an agreement with Weber for a sentence reduction 

in exchange for her testimony in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must establish: (1) that the 

prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that the suppressed evidence was 

favorable to the defense; and (3) that the evidence was material to an issue at 

trial. Bunch v. State, 964 N.E.2d 274, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. 

Evidence is “material” under Brady only if there is a reasonable probability 

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. Id. And a “reasonable probability” is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. 

Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345, 358 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Again, with respect 

to an agreement for leniency or a benefit to the witness, we have held that a prosecutor has a 

duty to disclose a confirmed promise to a witness for leniency or personal benefit in 

exchange for testimony. Wright, 690 N.E.2d at 1113. However, “[a]n express agreement ... 

does not exist if a witness testifies favorably in the hope of leniency, and the State neither 

confirms nor denies that hope to the witness.” Id.

Having concluded above that Wayt failed to prove that Weber and the State had 

entered into an agreement for a sentence reduction in exchange for Weber testifying against 

Wayt during Wayt’s murder trial, we conclude that Wayt cannot prove that the State failed to 

disclose evidence of this alleged agreement prior to trial. Furthermore, even if Wayt could 
14

prove that the State failed to disclose evidence of the alleged agreement prior to trial, Wayt 

failed to show that he was prejudiced by the State’s alleged failure to disclose. Again, an 

individual shows prejudice by demonstrating that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for 

the State’s failure to disclose evidence, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 271). 

Again, in the instant matter, the record demonstrates that Weber’s testimony was 

corroborated by other witnesses regarding the planning of and the events that occurred after 

the robbery. The State also presented unrelated testimony indicating that Wayt 

acknowledged his role in Bruner’s murder and was in possession of Bruner’s property after 

the robbery. In addition, Weber’s credibility was made suspect during trial because it was 

shown that she is a drug user, a drug dealer, a liar, and a convicted felon. Moreover, Wayt 

has presented no evidence suggesting that Weber would have been any more or less credible 

had the State disclosed the alleged agreement prior to Wayt’s murder trial. As such, we 

cannot say that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have 

been different if the State had disclosed the alleged agreement prior to Wayt’s trial. See id. 

IV. Whether the Post-Conviction Court Erred in Determining that Wayt 

Did Not Receive Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

The right to effective counsel is rooted in the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ind. 2006). “‘The Sixth Amendment 

recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role 

that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.’” Id. (quoting 
15

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)). “The benchmark for judging any claim 

of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper function of 

the adversarial process that the trial court cannot be relied on as having produced a just 

result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 

A successful claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy two components. 

Reed v. State, 866 N.E.2d 767, 769 (Ind. 2007). Under the first prong, the petitioner must 

establish that counsel’s performance was deficient by demonstrating that counsel’s 

representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, committing errors so 

serious that the defendant did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Id. We recognize that even the finest, most experienced criminal defense attorneys may not 

agree on the ideal strategy or most effective way to represent a client, and therefore, under 

this prong, we will assume that counsel performed adequately and defer to counsel’s strategic 

and tactical decisions. Smith v. State, 765 N.E.2d 578, 585 (Ind. 2002). Isolated mistakes, 

poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render 

representation ineffective. Id. 

Under the second prong, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance 

resulted in prejudice. Reed, 866 N.E.2d at 769. Again, a petitioner may show prejudice by 

demonstrating that there is “a reasonable probability (i.e. a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. A petitioner’s failure to satisfy either prong will 

cause the ineffective assistance of counsel claim to fail. See Williams, 706 N.E.2d at 154. 
16

Stated differently, “[a]lthough the two parts of the Strickland test are separate inquires, a 

claim may be disposed of on either prong.” Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. 

2006) (citing Williams, 706 N.E.2d at 154). 

Wayt challenges the post-conviction court’s determination that he did not suffer 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. With regard to the first prong, Wayt claims that his 

trial counsel, Gregory Inman, was ineffective for failing to illicit testimony from Weber 

regarding the alleged agreement between Weber and the State. In raising this challenge, 

Wayt acknowledgesthat Inman filed a pre-trial discovery request for information relating to 

any agreements entered into between Weber and the State relating to favorable treatment in 

exchange for Weber’s testimony against Wayt. The State responded to Inman’s discovery 

requests but did not disclose any such agreement. 

Despite the lack of disclosure of any such agreement, Inman questioned Weber about 

her hope that she would receive favorable treatment in exchange for her testimony and asked 

Weber if she had made a deal with the State for favorable treatment in exchange for her 

testimony. Inman also attempted to tarnish Weber’s credibility by questioning her about the 

fact that she lied before the grand jury despite being granted immunity for her grand jury 

testimony. 

During cross-examination, Weber denied that she had entered into any agreement with 

the State but admitted that she hoped to receive future favorable treatment from the State. 

She also admitted that she lied to the grand jury when she stated that she did not know 

anything about Bruner’s murder. Inman again referred to Weber’s acknowledgement that she 
17

lied before the grand jury in his closing argument. Wayt has failed to show how Inman’s 

actions in this regard fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Further, with regard to the second prong, Wayt claims that he demonstrated prejudice. 

We cannot agree. Again, the record demonstrates that Weber’s testimony was corroborated 

by other witnesses regarding the planning of and the events that occurred after the robbery. 

The State also presented unrelated testimony indicating that Wayt acknowledged his role in 

Bruner’s murder and was in possession of Bruner’s property after the robbery. In addition, 

Weber’s credibility was made suspect during trial because it was shown that she is a drug 

user, a drug dealer, a liar, and a convicted felon. As we stated above, in light of the fact that 

other witnesses corroborated Weber’s testimony, the fact that the State presented unrelated 

evidence indicating Wayt’s guilt, and the fact that Weber’s credibility was made suspect 

during trial, we cannot say that there is a reasonable probability that, but for Inman’s alleged 

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. See Reed, 866 N.E.2d at 769.

CONCLUSION

In sum, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in determining that 

Wayt failed to prove that the State knowingly presented perjury. We also conclude that the 

post-conviction court did not err in adopting the State’s proposed findings and conclusions 

thereon in whole or in determining that Wayt failed to prove that the State withheld valuable 

evidence prior to Wayt’s trial. In addition, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not 

err in determining that Wayt failed to establish that he suffered ineffective assistance from 

his trial counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
18

The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., and PYLE, J., concur.