IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2014-CP-01389-COA CHARLES MCLAURIN, JR. A/K/A CHARLES MCLAURINS, JR. A/K/A CHARLES MCLAURIN A/K/A CHARLES MCLAUREN APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/26/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROGER T. CLARK COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHARLES MCLAURIN JR. (PRO SE) ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: BY: BILLY L. GORE JOHN R. HENRY JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DENIED PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 04/12/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND JAMES, JJ. GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Charles McLaurin appeals the denial of his petition f or post-conviction collateral relief (PCCR). He argues that: (1) his guilty plea was involuntary , (2) his m o tions prior to the plea h earing w ere never ruled upon, (3) h e received an illegal sentence, (4) h e should have r eceived a f

ree copy of the transcript of his plea hearing or, alternatively , an evidentiary hearing b ef

o re the circuit court, (5) he received inef f e ctive assistance of counsel, and (6) his due-process rights were violated. Finding no error, we af f irm

.FACTS

¶2. On July 15, 2013, McLaurin pleaded guilty as a habitual o f f ender to two f

elony shoplif ting of f e nses that occu r r e d in 2010. McLaurin was already serving a f our-y ear
sentence in Louisiana, and the judge agreed to allow McLaurin’s Mississippi sentence to run concurrently with t he tim e he was serving in Louisiana. M c Laurin’s sentencing order sentenced him

as f ollows:

. . . [ A] total of Four (4) Years to serve in the custody o f the M issis s i ppi Departm ent of Corrections pursuant to Section 99-19-81[ , 1 ]

. . . said sentence being without hope o f p a r o le or p robation in the custody of the Mississippi Departm ent of C orrections. This sentence shall run c oncurrently with the def endant’s sentence in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana

. . . . The def endant shall receive credit f or tim e served. ¶3. McLaurin m isunderstood this sentence and thought that (1) he would receive credit f or the tim e he served in Louisiana, and (2) he would be returned to Louisiana to serve the

rem ainder of h is Mississippi sentence. He sought relief through t he MDOC adm inistrative
process, then f

iled a m otion with the c ircuit c o urt f o r a review. 2 He subsequently f iled

m ultiple m otions and pleadings with t he circuit c ourt in an e f f o r t to b e t ransf

erred to Louisiana and to clarif

y his sentence. T he cir c u i t court issued orders in r ef erence to each

m otion, deny ing relief a nd clarif y ing that the Miss i s s i p p i and Louisiana sentences were to

ru n c o n currently during the tim e that the s e ntences overlapped f rom t he date that the Mississippi sentence began and a lso t hat the c ourt could not order another state to house a

1 M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 (R ev . 2 0 1 5 ).

2 M cL au rin p rev io u sly ap p ealed to th is C o u rt. H is ap p eal w as d ism issed f o r lack o f j u risd ictio n . M

c L a u rin v. S ta te , 1 8 1 S o . 3 d 1 0 2 9 , 1 0 3 1 (¶1 0 ) (M iss. C t. A p p . 2 0 1 5 ). 2Mississippi inm ate. McLaurin then f iled a PCCR petition, which was denied. It is f rom this judgm ent that he now appeals. ANALYSIS ¶4. “A circuit court’s denial of post-conviction relief will not be reversed a bsent a f inding that the court’s decision was clearly erroneous.” M

orris v. State , 66 So. 3d 716, 719 (¶13) (Miss. C t. App. 2011). But “ when issues of law are raised, t he proper standard of review is de novo.” Id.
I. W hether McLaurin’s guilty plea was voluntary. ¶ 5. McLaurin’s argum ents regarding his guilty plea essentially center arou n d mu l t iple f actual m isrepresentations. M cLaurin claim s that the circuit court agreed to apply tim e he served on a previous Louisiana sentence to his tim e to be s erved in Mississippi and that the
court also agreed to s e nd him to Louisiana to serve the rem ainder of his Mississippi sentence. He c ontends that because o f this “unkept bargain,” his g u i l t y plea was i nvoluntary and his “plea agreem ent” was breached. ¶6. In assessing whether a guilty plea is knowingly , voluntarily , and intelligently m ade, this Court considers “whether t he def endant was advised of t he nature of t he charges against him , the rights which he would waive by pleading guilty , the m axim u m sentences that he could receive f

or the crim es charged, and whether he was satisf ie d w ith t he advice and counsel of his a ttorney .” R i chardson v
. S t a t e , 856 So. 2d 758, 761 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). “It should be noted that solem n declarations in open court [ b y a d ef endant] carry a strong p r esum

p tion of verity .” Barnes v. S tate , 803 So. 2d 1271, 1274 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App.

32002).

¶7. The def

endant bears t he b urden of proving t hat a guilty plea was not m ade voluntarily

. Id. The def

endant’s plea will be upheld if this burden is not m et. Id. “ F urther, the record

m ust ref lect that the trial court thoroughly advised t he def endant of all the consequences of

a guilty plea, including t he waiver of rights, satisf action with [ his] attorney [ ,] and advisem ent on the m axim

um and m inim

um penalties [ he could] acquire f or the crim e com m itted.” Id. ¶8. A review of

the plea-hearing transcript r eveals that the circuit court never agreed to send McLaurin to Louisiana, though the court did agree to allow his Mississippi sentence to

run concurrently with his Louisiana sentence. McLaurin claim s that the circuit j udge asked him , “If I s end y ou back to Louisiana w ill y ou still be able to g et y our m edication? ” He uses this to bolster his a rgum ent that the judge intended f or him to be sent back to Louisiana. But this statem ent a nd the discussion M cLaurin claim s took place is not present i n the transcript bef ore this Court. ¶9. On the contrary , the transcript reveals a t horough discussion b etween M cLaurin and the j udge regarding his previous charges in Lou i s i a n a and his guilt as t o t he charges in Mississippi. The court did discuss whether McLaurin was on me d i c a t i o n in order to determ ine that he was in control of his m ental f aculties. The judge discussed each charge along with t he correspo n d i n g s entence and McLaurin’s status a s a habitual of f ender. The plea colloquy reveals that McLaurin’s plea was v oluntary

. W hile he e ssentially argues that he pleaded guilty based on his understanding that he would be sent t o Louisiana and would receive tim e served f

or a p r evious conviction in t hat state, these assertions are not supported

4by t he record. It is true that “an attack on a f acially correct plea m ay survive sum m ary dism issal if supporting a f f idavits of other persons are a t tached,” but McLaurin h a s n ot provided any such evidence to support his claim s. Rigdon v. State , 126 S o. 3d 9 31, 934-35 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). This issue is without m erit.
II. W hether McLaurin’s previous motions should have been ruled upon. ¶10. Relatedly , McLaurin argues that h is requests f or discovery , hi s m otion to suppress, and his d em and f

or a speedy trial were n ever addressed by the t rial court. I t is “recognized that a valid guilty plea operates as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional rights o r def ects which are incident to trial

. ” A nderson v. State , 5 77 So. 2d 390, 3 91 (Miss. 1991). Having f ound McLaurin’s guilty

plea voluntary

and valid, we f

ind this issue is without m e rit.
III. W hether McLaurin received an illegal sentence

. ¶11. McLaurin next clai ms t h a t h i s sentence is i llegal because he was not sent back to Louisiana and did not receive credit f or twenty

- two m o nths that h e s e rved in Louisiana prior
to his guilty plea i n Mississippi. McLaurin’s argum e nt f ails, f irst, because the c ircuit court

never ordered o r even discussed the possibility that McLaurin would be se n t back to Louisiana. Second, the sentence McLaurin received f alls within the param eters o f the f elony shopl i f t i n g s t a t ute as it stood when he com m i tted the crim e and when h e p leaded guilty

. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-23-93(1)(6) (Rev. 2014). This issue is without m erit.
IV. W hether McLaurin was entitled to the transcript of the plea hearing or, alternatively, should have received an evidentiary hearing. ¶12. McLaurin claim s that he was i m p roperly denied a f

r ee c o py o f the plea-hearing transcript. Because he was denied the f ree transcript, h e argues t hat h e s hould have been

5granted an evidentiary hearing. ¶13. “W hen a def

endant pleads guilty , he by p asses the right to a direct appeal, and he f orf eits the right to a f

r ee t r a n script.” E

vans v. S tate , 61 So. 3d 922, 926 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). In order “[ t]o o btain a f ree copy o f a g u i l t y -plea t ranscript, a m ovant has the burden o f proving that he h as been prejudiced on appeal by not having prior access to such transcript.” Id. “This prejudice can be proven by showing specif ic need or proving that the transcript was necessary

to decide a specif

ic issue.” Id. ¶14. W h en McLaurin initially requested a copy of his transcript and the record, he did not list a ny reasons f

or h is request and sim

ply stated that it was “necessary .” Because he did not show a specif

ic need f or the transcript, the court properly denied his request. ¶15. Because McLa u r i n w a s denied a f ree transcript, he a rgues t hat he should have received a n evidentiary h e a r i n g r egarding h is PCCR p etition. However, “[ t ]he r ight t o an evidentiary hearing is not guaranteed.” Brister v. State , 858 So. 2d 181, 182 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). “The trial judge has discretion in allowin g a n e v i d e n tiary h earing[ .]” Id.
Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2015), “ I f it plainly
appears f rom the f ace of the m otion, any

annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the

case t h a t t h e m ovant is not entitled to any relief , the judge m ay m ake an order f or its dism issal and cause the prisoner t o be n otif ied.” Here, the j udge reviewed the r ecord and determ ined that a n evidentiary hearing was n ot necessary . Upon o u r review, we f ind no dif f erent as e ach of McLaurin’s assertions w as adequately addressed within the r ecord. This issue is without m erit.

6V. W hether McLaurin received ineffective assistance of counsel. ¶16. McLaurin n ext argues t hat he received inef f ective assistance of counsel because his attorney erroneously advised h im as to the sentencing arrangem ent and guilty plea. He also
argues that his attorney should have objected at t he p lea hearing a n d that h is attorney should have asked the judge to rule on any pretrial m otions. ¶17. “A voluntary g u ilty plea waives claim s of inef f ective assistance of c ounsel except insof a r as the a lleged inef

f ectiveness relates to the voluntariness of the giving of t he guilty plea.” Rigdon , 126 So. 3d at 936 ( ¶16). Furtherm ore, “[ i]n cases i nvolving post-conviction collateral relief

, where a party of

f ers only his a f

f idavit, t h e n h i s inef

f ective a s sistance of counsel c l a i m i s w ithout m e rit.” Brooks v. State , 89 So. 3 d 626, 628 (¶6) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2011). ¶18. McLaurin’s claim s of inef f ective assistance of counsel again rely upon his

m isrepresentations of what occurred at the plea hearing bef ore t h e circuit court. Af ter reviewing the record and the transcript of the plea hearing, McLaurin’s claim s that the judge told him h e would be transf erred back to Louisiana as well as various o t h e r claim s are unf ounded. W e see no evidence that McLaurin received inef f ective assistance of

counsel, and McLaurin has provided nothing m ore than his own bare assertions. ¶19. Furtherm ore, the transcript of the plea hearing c o ntradicts McLaurin’s current assertions. At t he h e aring, he told the j udge that he w as satisf ied with the services and advice f rom his attorney . Notably , in exchange f or pleading g uilty to t wo shoplif ting charges, the prosecutor agreed not to pursue a t hird shoplif t ing charge. McLaurin has f ailed to s how that

7his counsel was def icient; theref

ore, this issue is without m erit.
VI. W hether McLaurin’s due-process rights were violated. ¶20. Lastly , McLaurin contends that his due-process rights h ave been violated as he is being h e l d in the custody of t he Mississippi Departm ent o f Corrections f or f orty -eight

m onths, w ithout credit f

or tim e served f

or t wenty -two m o nths t hat he served in Louisiana. As we have f

ound no error with his sentence, this issue is without m erit. ¶21. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COU R T O F HARRISON COUNTY DENYING THE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION COLLATERAL R ELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL AR E A S S E S S ED TO HARRISON COUNTY. LEE, C.J., IRVING, P. J., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, JAMES, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.

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