1 

" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

114TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

114–848 

House Calendar No. 163 

F I N A L R E P O R T 

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

THE EVENTS SURROUNDING 

THE 2012 TERRORIST 

ATTACK IN BENGHAZI 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

together with 

ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS 

DECEMBER 7, 2016.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 

printed 


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FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE 

EVENTS SURROUNDING THE 2012 TERRORIST ATTACK IN BENGHAZI 


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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

1 

22–867 

" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

114TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

2016

114–848 

F I N A L R E P O R T 

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

THE EVENTS SURROUNDING 

THE 2012 TERRORIST 

ATTACK IN BENGHAZI 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

together with 

ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS 

DECEMBER 7, 2016.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 

printed 


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HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina, Chairman 

LYNN WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PETER ROSKAM, Illinois 

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

SUSAN BROOKS, Indiana 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, 

Ranking Member 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

LINDA SANCHEZ, California 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

—————— 

This report is dedicated to the memory and service of Glen A. Doherty, 

Sean P. Smith, J. Christopher Stevens, and Tyrone S. Woods 


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COMMITTEE STAFF 

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director & General Counsel 

CHRISTOPHER A. DONESA, Deputy Staff Director 

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel 

SARAH ADAMS, Senior Advisor 

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator 

BRIAN BEATTIE, Professional Staff Member 

KIMBERLY BETZ, Member Liaison & Counsel 

ROB BORDEN, Senior Advisor 

LUKE BURKE, Investigator/Detailee 

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel 

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel 

MARK GRIDER, Deputy General Counsel 

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel 

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel 

J. MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel 

JAMAL D. WARE, Communications Director 

AMANDA DUVALL, Deputy Communications Director 

MATT WOLKING, Press Secretary 

DOUGLAS ALEXANDER, Printing Clerk 

ANNE BINSTED, Finance and Personnel 

Administrator 

FRANK CHANG, Legal Intern 

GEORGE GERBO, Staff Assistant 

ELIZABETH GORMAN, Professional Staff 

Member 

CLARK HEDRICK, Legal Intern 

ABIGAIL HELVERING, Staff Assistant 

PAT KNUDSEN, Shared Employee 

PAIGE LUEKEN, Executive Assistant 

BARBARA MCCAFFREY, Documents Clerk 

ELIZABETH MCWHORTER, Security Manager 

WILLIAM SACRIPANTI, Staff Assistant 

ELIZABETH STAREK, Staff Assistant 

SHARON UTZ, Professional Staff Member 

MINORITY STAFF

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Staff Director & General Counsel 

HEATHER SAWYER, Chief Counsel 

DAVE RAPALLO, Senior Advisor to the Ranking Member 

KRISTA BOYD, Senior Counsel 

PETER KENNY, Senior Counsel 

RONAK DESAI, Counsel 

SHANNON GREEN, Counsel 

VALERIE SHEN, Counsel 

JENNIFER WERNER, Communications Director 

PAUL BELL, Deputy Communications Director 

Linda Cohen, Senior Professional Staff 

Member 

LAURA RAUCH, Senior Professional Staff 

Member 

DANIEL REBNORD, Professional Staff Member 

BRENT WOOLFORK, Professional Staff 

Member 

ERIN O’BRIEN, Investigator/Detailee 

KENDAL ROBINSON, Investigator/Detailee 

MONE ́ ROSS, Staff Assistant 

MAJORITY INTERNS

J. MICHAEL ABLER

JEFF BECK

COURTNEY BALLENGER

MICHELLE BOWLING

CLAY BRYAN

AMANDA GONZALEZ

FRANCESCA SAVOIA

IVY WILBORN


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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE

EVENTS SURROUNDING THE

2012 TERRORIST ATTACK

IN BENGHAZI, 

Washington, December 7, 2016. 

HON. KAREN L. HAAS, 

Clerk, House of Representatives, 

Washington, DC. 

DEAR MS. HAAS: 

Pursuant to H. Res. 567 of the 113th Congress and section 4(a) 

of H. Res. 5 of the 114th Congress, I hereby transmit the attached 

report, ‘‘Final Report of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi.’’ 

Sincerely, 

TREY GOWDY, 

Chairman. 


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22–867 

House Calendar No. 163 

114TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 114–848 

FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE 

EVENTS SURROUNDING THE 2012 TERRORIST ATTACK 

IN BENGHAZI 

DECEMBER 7, 2016.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed 

Mr. GOWDY, from the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding 

the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS 

On July 8, 2016, the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, approved and reported the following investigative report to the House, pursuant to 

H. Res. 567 (113th Congress). 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Illustrations .............................................................................................................. 3 

Part I. Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi ...................................... 9 

Part II. Internal and Public Government Communications about the Terrorist 

Attacks in Benghazi ............................................................................................. 133 

Part III. Events Leading to the Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi ........................... 263 

Part IV. Compliance with Congressional Investigations ...................................... 353 

Part V. Recommendations ....................................................................................... 409 

Additional Views of Rep. Jim Jordan and Rep. Mike Pompeo ............................. 415 

Appendix A: Resolution Establishing the Select Committee on the Events 

Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi ........................................ 453 

Appendix B: Significant Persons and Organizations ............................................ 461 

Appendix C: Questions for the President .............................................................. 467 

Appendix D: Significant Events in Libya Prior to the Attacks ............................ 471 

Appendix E: Security Incidents in Libya ............................................................... 475 

Appendix F: Deterioration of Benghazi Mission Compound Security ................. 531 

Appendix G: Timelines of the Attacks ................................................................... 559 

Appendix H: The September 12 Situation Report and the President’s Daily 

Brief ....................................................................................................................... 575 

Appendix I: Witness Interview Summaries ........................................................... 587 

Appendix J: Requests and Subpoenas for Documents .......................................... 601 


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Appendix K: Analysis of Accountability Review Board, House Armed Services 

Committee, and House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee Reports ... 617 

Appendix L: Glen A. Doherty, Sean P. Smith, J. Christopher Stevens, and 

Tyrone S. Woods ................................................................................................... 643 

Minority Views ......................................................................................................... 645 


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ILLUSTRATIONS 


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1Testimony of GRS 4, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 33 (Mar. 1, 2016) [hereinafter GRS 4 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 2 Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to personal account of 

Dominic A.G. Asquith, U.K. Ambassador to Libya (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:40 AM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05390150). 3Testimony of Gregory Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission, Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State at 18 (Apr. 

11, 2013) [hereinafter Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

PART I: 

Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities 

in Benghazi 

‘‘If you guys don’t get here, we’re all going to f---ing die.’’ 1

Diplomatic Security Agent in Benghazi during the 

attacks 

‘‘I’m in Benghazi this week, lurking about with my eyes everpeeled for RPG’s hurtling towards my motorcade!’’ 2

Ambassador Christopher Stevens, to the U.K. 

Ambassador on the morning of September 11, 2012 

‘‘We’re under attack.’’ 3

Ambassador Christopher Stevens, on the evening of 

September 11, 2012 


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4Public Schedule [for the Secretary of State] for May 14, 2012 found at www.State.gov/pa/prs/ 

appt/2012/05/14/189814.htm. 5 U.S. Representative to TNC Stevens provides an update on Libya, DIPNOTE, Aug. 3, 2011 

found at https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2011/08/03/us-representative-t-n-c-stevens-providesupdate-libya. 6 A Guide to the U.S. History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, 

Since 1776: [State Department/Office of the Historian] found at: https://history.state.gov/ 

countries/libya. 7 Biography of J. Christopher Stevens, Ambassador, Libya, found at: https://state.gov/r/pa/ec/ 

biog/193075.htm. 8See Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 9 (‘‘[Principal Officer 3] left at the end of August, and 

the new Principal Officer was not arriving until—scheduled to arrive until September 15th or 

thereabouts.’’). 9See id. at 57 (‘‘And so basically Chris announces at the meeting that [Principal Officer 4] 

is going to go to Benghazi to cover the first week in the gap, first week in September, and that 

he would cover the second week.’’). 10 Id. 

BACKGROUND: SEPTEMBER 2012 AND THE 

AMBASSADOR’S TRIP TO BENGHAZI 

Stevens’ Decision to Travel to Benghazi 

J. Christopher Stevens, a highly and widely respected diplomat, 

was sworn in as the United States Ambassador to Libya on May 

14, 2012.4 Thirteen months earlier in 2011, while Libya was still 

in the throes of a civil war, Stevens courageously arrived in 

Benghazi, Libya on a Greek cargo ship to serve as the United 

States’ Special Representative to the Transitional National Council 

[TNC].5

Stevens remained Special Representative to the TNC for more 

than six months in 2011 and witnessed both the dictatorship of 

Muammar Qadhafi topple and the reopening of the U.S. Embassy 

in Tripoli, which had previously been evacuated at the beginning 

of the Libyan revolution in February of 2011.6

Stevens left Benghazi in November of 2011, to return to the 

United States, where he would be nominated and confirmed as Ambassador to Libya the following May.7

Stevens had a deep affection for the Libyan people in general and 

the people of Benghazi in particular. He also knew Libya as well 

as anyone in the U.S. Foreign Service. He would soon learn much 

had changed in Libya from the time he left as Special Representative in November of 2011 until the time he returned as Ambassador in May of 2012. 

The Benghazi Mission compound where Stevens lived for several 

months in 2011 remained open while he was in the U.S. awaiting 

confirmation as Ambassador. The Benghazi Mission compound was 

protected by Diplomatic Security Agents and staffed by a Principal 

Officer who provided political reporting on the changes occurring in 

Benghazi as the country attempted to recover after the revolution. 

In August of 2012, three months after Stevens returned to Libya 

as the newly confirmed Ambassador, the Principal Officer in 

Benghazi was nearing the end of his assignment. There would be 

a two-week gap between the Principal Officer’s departure date and 

the arrival of the next Principal Officer.8 No one was scheduled to 

fill this vacancy until September 15, 2012, so Ambassador Stevens 

chose to send Principal Officer 4, to cover the vacancy during the 

first week in September.9 Stevens chose himself to cover the second 

week.10 According to Gregory N. Hicks, who as the Deputy Chief 

of Mission was second in command at the time, Stevens ‘‘very much 


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11 Id. at 9. 12 Id. at 7. 13 Id. at 16–17. 14See Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to Principal Officer 3, 

Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, (Aug. 2, 2012, 2:45 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05390855). 15See Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 23, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 69–70 (Oct. 10, 

2013) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 23 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

wanted to get back to Benghazi . . . he had not been able to go 

since his own arrival in Tripoli’’ in May of 2012.11

The timing of Stevens’ visit to Benghazi was important for another reason as well. He was spearheading an effort to make 

Benghazi a permanent post, Hicks testified: 

One of the things he [Stevens] said to me was that, in his 

exit interview with Secretary Clinton, she expressed the 

hope that we could make the special mission in Benghazi 

a permanent constituent post. And Chris said that one of 

the first things he intended to do after his arrival was develop a proposal to move forward on that project.12

A trip to Benghazi would allow Stevens to personally assess the 

political and security situation and make a recommendation regarding whether the U.S. should have a permanent presence there. 

Discussions were already under way in Washington D.C. on how to 

fund a permanent post. Hicks stated: 

[W]e are only a month from the end of the fiscal year, so 

we have to get a [sic] or, we have to help Washington, the 

executive director’s office of the Near East Bureau to put 

together a package to get it to [the Undersecretary for 

Management] Pat Kennedy for a decision by September 

30th. Otherwise, we lose the money. Because we had surplus money available from Iraq—I can’t remember, Iraq 

contingency fund I think—that had been notified by Pat 

Kennedy for transfer from Iraq—it wasn’t going to get 

spent in Iraq, and so we were going to spend it in Libya 

and in Benghazi. But we had to get the justification forward to do that.13

While the end of the fiscal year funding deadline was looming, 

the Diplomatic Security Agent in charge at the Embassy in Tripoli 

was, nonetheless, concerned about Stevens’ trip to Benghazi. Although his first planned trip to Benghazi in the beginning of August 2012 had to be canceled because of security,14 Stevens was adamant, however, about going in September.15 The Diplomatic Security Agent testified: 

Previous to this—to his decisions to going up there, there 

was—we would meet weekly to discuss the security situation in Libya. . . . [T]here was a specific meeting regarding what was happening in Benghazi. In that meeting, we 

reviewed incidents and probable causes, what’s initiating 

it. And a lot of discussion was that it was the conflict or 

the incidents up there were, you know, local population 

against local population and that that they weren’t specifically targeting Americans . . . up there. I expressed my 


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16 Id. 

concerns about the incidents that did involve us. And the 

basic response was that they . . . were anomalies. 

* * * 

It was the persons attending the meeting. I believe it was 

the Ambassador who actually said its anomalies; we can’t 

account for anomalies. And other members of the group 

seemed to concur with that. And then this trip was 

planned because there was a gap in principal officer up 

there and the opening of the American corner. . . . I knew 

he was bound and determined to go. 

I’ve been wracking my memory trying to remember the 

exact conversations I had with him on this. But I know he 

knew I didn’t—the idea of him traveling there. But I knew 

he was determined to go. So doing everything I can to 

make it as safe as possible, given my resources and the environment—safety—compounds—both compounds, all the 

Americans there.16

Not only was the looming funding deadline an impetus for Stevens’ trip, an upcoming trip by Hillary R. Clinton, Secretary of 

State, in the fall of 2012 was also a motivating factor for him to 

travel to Benghazi. The hope was to establish a permanent consulate in Benghazi for the Secretary to present to the Libyan government during her trip. Hicks discussed this with the Committee: 

Q: Okay. We know that Ambassador Stevens went to 

Benghazi on September 10th. Was there anything about 

his trip to Benghazi in September of 2012 that was sort of 

a precursor for the Secretary’s trip? 

A: Well, you know, when we have a visit by a major political figure, like the Secretary of State, like the President, 

you know, we try to make that visit important publicly. 

And so we generally will create a list of what we call 

deliverables, items of importance to the bilateral relationship. So we hoped for the Secretary to announce the opening of a permanent consulate in Benghazi during her 

visit[.] 

Q: Was there any reason that—was there anything related 

to making Benghazi a permanent post that was part of the 

purpose of Ambassador Stevens going to Benghazi in September? 

A: Oh, absolutely. And so again, we had begun the process 

of developing a political rationale for having a permanent 

post in Benghazi. I sent in that rationale at the end of August to the executive director of the NEA [Near Eastern 

Affairs] bureau. We had begun a process of identifying locations and drawing plans for such a post. 


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17Testimony of Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, Tr. at 50–51 (Apr. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Hicks Apr. 2016 Testimony] (on file with the 

Committee). 18 Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 

Philippe Reines, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y for Public Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 12, 2012, 9:15 

AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075710). 19See Email from Deputy Dir. for Maghreb Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Diplomatic Sec. 

Agent 25, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 27, 2012 4:47 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05394203) 

(‘‘Thanks for your call and clarification that DS has had no volunteers for Benghazi for the upcoming few months.’’). 20See Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 56. 21See id. at 14 (‘‘Principal Officer 4 is chosen to be Acting Principal Officer for the first week 

in September. And he goes to Benghazi and is there with three Diplomatic Sec. special agents, 

all of whom are brand new to the service and on temporary duty assignment.’’). 22See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 23 Testimony at 44–45. 23See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3, Diplomatic Sec. Service, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, 

Libya (Sept. 8, 2012 9:29 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05396013). 

* * * 

And we understood that the situation in eastern Libya was 

unstable and we wanted to—and Chris Stevens wanted to 

make sure that what we were doing was going—was the 

right course of action. And he personally, because he had 

the contacts in the region, because he had their trust. He 

was the only person that we felt could go to Benghazi and 

get a clear picture of the political situation there and the 

security situation there as well.17

The Secretary was planning to travel to Libya in October of 

2012.18

Benghazi: September 1-September 10, 2012 

Security deficiencies plagued the Benghazi Mission compound in 

the lead-up to September 2012. With the departure of the Diplomatic Security Agent in charge at the end of August, only two Diplomatic Security Agents remained to secure the compound.19 A Diplomatic Security Agent from Tripoli was routed to Benghazi to 

serve temporarily during the month of September putting three 

agents on the ground as of September 1, 2012.20 None of the Diplomatic Security Agents in Benghazi had ever served at a high-threat 

post.21

In addition, the Mission compound’s contracted quick reaction 

force, the February 17 Martyrs Brigade militia, which provided interior armed security at the Benghazi Mission compound, informed 

the Diplomatic Security Agents two days before the Ambassador 

was scheduled to arrive it would no longer provide off-compound 

security.22 This meant the three Diplomatic Security Agents on the 

ground would have no security support for any transport or for any 

meetings held off of the compound during Stevens’ visit. The Diplomatic Security Agents attributed the change in policy to an intermilitia power struggle.23 The next day, however, the Principal Officer in Benghazi, joined a meeting with leading militia officials during which time they told him they could no longer guarantee the 

safety of the compound. The Principal Officer described the meeting: 

[T]here was a—it was a growing and nascent group of commanders who—militia commanders who were just becoming kind of players on the security scene. And some of the 


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working assumptions were that they were doing this mainly for personal profit; others for religious and ideological 

reasons. It is trying to understand motivations of groups 

of people who may or may not become future leaders for 

the city of Benghazi or the country of Libya. 

So these folks were identified as people who fit that billet, 

essentially, security official officials who may or may not 

have aspirations for larger roles in Benghazi. 

* * * 

Libya Shield was a brand new organization at that time 

that was kind of emerging from the ranks of the [Supreme 

Security Council] and from other official organizations. 

They had numbers to them. What I characterize in here 

was what was the most fascinating part of the meeting to 

me. I was sitting with Wissam bin Hamid and Jumaa and 

I forget his name al Gha’abi. They were debating which 

militias they belonged to and who was in control of them 

and what their ideology was and what their ambitions 

were. And they weren’t you know, they disagreed on many 

of those things. 

And one member was—one of the commanders was a 

member of the other commander’s brigade under that commander, and that commander was a member of that commander’s brigade under that commander. So it was really 

difficult to determine who was in charge, and I think they 

right there in front of us were, you know, playing that out, 

which is a great opportunity to really get a sense of what’s 

going on in the rest of the country. 

* * * 

Q: [I]t looks like it’s the second to last sentence or third 

to last sentence, it begins: They criticized the [U.S. Government] for supporting National Forces Alliance leader 

and prime minister candidate Mahmoud Jibril. Do you recall what their criticism of the U.S. Government was? 

A: Yeah. So ‘‘supporting’’ is in quotations, right, and which 

is a false accusation against the United States. We don’t 

support candidates in a foreign government’s internal domestic election. But the general perception, because 

Mahmoud Jibril is an American citizen as well as a Libyan, is that the United States Government was backing 

him. He was a big political player, former prime minister 

and someone who was gaining it seemed to be at that time 

someone who may end up with another very high ranking 

position in the Libyan Government. That did not meet 

these particular militia commanders’ idea of a beneficial 

Libyan structure for them, and so they were complaining 

about it. 

Q: [Y]ou go on to write: If Jibril won, they said they would 

not continue to guarantee security in Benghazi, a critical 

function they asserted they were currently providing. 


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24Testimony of Principal Officer 4, Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 64–68 

(May 8, 2015) (on file with the Committee). See also, Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. 

Ambassador to Libya, to Principal Officer 4, Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 

10, 2012 1:51 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05395344). 25Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2, Tr. at 47 (Mar. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. 

Agent 2]. 26Testimony of Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, Tr. at 12–14 (Apr. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony] (on file with the 

Committee). 27 Hicks Apr. 2016 Testimony at 17. 28 Id. at 20, 33–35; see also, Email from Patrick Kennedy, Under Sec’y for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t 

of State, to Robert Neller, Lieutenant General, U.S. Dep’t of Defense (July 15, 2012,) (on file 

with the Committee SCB0076533). 29See Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 12–13. 

The August 6th attack, or incident, if you will, AFRICOM decided to draw down the 

SST team from 16 members to 6. Chris concurred in that decision because he didn’t 

really feel like he had, you know, much leverage other than that. And so [the ComContinued 

What was your understanding of what they meant when 

they said they would not continue to guarantee security in 

Benghazi? 

A: Yeah, I did not take that as a threat against U.S. interests, the U.S. compound, U.S. persons, or anything else. I 

took that more as a general discussion of Benghazi, the security situation in Benghazi is generally deteriorating, if 

they at least their assertion that the general condition in 

Benghazi would deteriorate if they withdrew their security 

support. 

Q: Did you understand what did they mean by withdrew 

their security support? 

A: Well, I mean, that’s one of the questions I was asking, 

right. What do you do? Who are you? Why are you Libya 

1? Why are you Libya 2? What’s your role? How do you fit 

into the security structure? And, as I said, you know, they 

didn’t really have a very good picture of it themselves, so 

I couldn’t come out with one.24

The meeting underscored that the militias in Benghazi controlled 

what little security environment existed there. Not having off-compound support from a militia would significantly threaten Stevens’ 

safety. 

Stevens’ Trip to Benghazi: September 10, 2012 

Stevens arrived by a commercial airplane in Benghazi on the 

morning of September 10, 2012.25 Traveling with him were two of 

the six Diplomatic Security Agents assigned to the Embassy in 

Tripoli. Four Diplomatic Security Agents remained behind at the 

Embassy along with four Department of Defense special operators 

who had previously served as part of the Site Security Team 

[SST].26 In addition, the special operators had previously augmented security at the Benghazi Mission compound, but they were 

no longer able to do so.27 Patrick F. Kennedy, the Under Secretary 

for Management, State Department, terminated the SST’s responsibilities for the Embassy’s security in August of 2012.28 As a result, the SST was no longer able to travel with Stevens or augment 

security in Benghazi.29


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mander of the Site Security Team] and nine other members of the team left he may 

have discussed this in mid -August. 

Full expectation was that when we, as the embassy, and working with the Defense 

Attache ́, achieved the agreement of the Libyan Government to proceed with the 

counterterrorism mission under section 1208, and the training team was given diplomatic immunity, they would return and begin the training mission. So they left. So we 

have at the time, then, six members of the SST left, divided in two different locations, 

four and two. But they are still under AFRICOM authority. 

General Ham issued a letter after the negotiation in Stuttgart over Eid al Fitr describing the relationship of the SST to the embassy going forward. I honestly cannot remember whether the contents of that letter are classified or not. I know it was transmitted 

to us over classified communications. But it was not Chief of Mission authority, I can 

tell you that. They were not told that they were under the authority of the Ambassador 

with respect to security, although they were told to cooperate I believe it told them to 

cooperate with the RSO for internal defense matters, if I remember correctly. 30 Id. at 13–14. 31 Id. 

In fact, during August 2012, the total number of State Department security agents assigned to the Embassy in Tripoli dropped 

from 34 individuals to six.30 Losing 28 security agents reduced not 

only the security resources available to the Embassy, but also those 

available to the Benghazi Mission compound. With limited security 

agents in Tripoli, there were no surplus security agents to send to 

augment security in Benghazi—without leaving the Embassy in 

Tripoli at severe risk. 

Hicks described the impact of the reduction in personnel on the 

overall security platform in Libya: 

[W]hen I arrived on July 31st . . . we had the 16 members 

of the SST and we had about 14 or so State security personnel, who were divided between either special agents or 

MSD, members of the mobile security detail teams. 

Through August, the MSD personnel are withdrawn until, 

by August 31st, . . . the security complement in Libya at 

the time was: In Tripoli is an RSO plus 5 assistant regional security officers protecting approximately 28 diplomatic personnel. And in Benghazi we have three DS special agents protecting two State Department personnel in 

our facilities. 

So the answer to your question . . . we had nine people 

to draw from when Chris decided you know, [Principal Officer 4] is chosen to be Acting Principal Officer for the first 

week in September. And he goes to Benghazi and is there 

with three Diplomatic Security special agents, all of whom 

are brand new to the service and on temporary duty assignment. 

So when Chris goes to Benghazi on the 10th of September, 

[Diplomatic Security Agent 23], the RSO, assigns two of 

our personnel in [Tripoli] to go with him. [N]ow we have, 

on the morning of September 11th, when [Principal Officer 

4] flies back to Tripoli, we now have five Diplomatic security special agents protecting the Ambassador and Sean 

Smith. In Tripoli, we have four we have a Regional Security Officer and three Assistant Regional Security Officers 

to protect 28 diplomatic personnel.31


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32 Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to a Locally Employed Staff, 

U.S. Dep’t of State, and Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 8, 2012, 4:37 AM) (on 

file with the Committee, C05390147). 33 Email from Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep’t of State, to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya (Aug. 1, 2012 10:49 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05390814). 34Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 54. 35 Id. at 59. 

Publicity about Stevens’ trip to Benghazi was reportedly limited. 

He previously told his staff and contacts on the ground ‘‘for security reasons we’ll need to be careful about limiting moves off-compound and scheduling as many meetings as possible in the villa.’’ 32

Stevens said he wanted to ‘‘avoid the RPG reception that the UK 

Amb[assador] got. . . .’’ 33

Upon arriving in Benghazi on September 10, 2012, Stevens received a security briefing at the nearby Central Intelligence Agency 

[CIA] annex on the changing threat environment.34 Due to the 

worsening security environment in Benghazi, the Diplomatic Security Agents at the compound requested support from the Annex’s 

security team, the Global Response Staff [GRS], to supplement Stevens’ movements off-compound in Benghazi.35

Q: You talked during the last hour about the intelligence 

briefing that you provided to the Ambassador the night before the attack. 

What type of reaction did you get from the Ambassador 

from your briefing? 

A: He was interested. He took a lot of notes. It struck me 

a little bit that he was surprised at how fast the situation 

had deteriorated in eastern Libya. 

Q: And what did he do to give you that impression that 

he was surprised at how quickly—— 

A: He was called in to go to his next appointment several 

times, and he refused to leave before we finished. 

Q: Okay, do you know who his next appointment was? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And what was that? 

A: Benghazi City Council, I believe. 

Q: Did the Ambassador ask any questions of you during 

the briefing? 

A: Yes, yeah, he asked a lot of questions. 

Q: And what were his questions along the lines of if you 

can recall? 

A: Specifically about the extremist groups that established 

presence in eastern Libya since the fall of the regime. 

Q: Okay, and do you recall at that time approximately 

how many extremist groups there were that had established a presence? 

A: Several. 

Q: Several? 


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36Officer A, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 116–118. (Mar 2, 2016) [hereinafter Officer A Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 37Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 52. 38 Id. at 52–53. 39 Id. 40 J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Personal Diary, Unofficial Testimony 

prepared by Patrick F. Kennedy, et al. (Sept. 10, 2012) (on file with the Committee, STATE– 

SCB0048881). 41 Id. 

A: Yes. 

Q: Well, from what you can remember, what are the 

names to the extent that you can remember? 

A: Yes, AQIM; Al Qaeda; and Islamic Brethren; AQAP; Al 

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; AQ Pakistan; EIJ, Egyptian Islamic Jihad. By that time, Ansar al-Sharia Derna 

had established a presence.36

Later in the evening of September 10th, Stevens—with Diplomatic Security Agents and GRS security—visited the Benghazi 

Local Council. Media was present upon his arrival.37 One of the 

Diplomatic Security Agents testified: 

Q: So, you knew prior to the council meeting that the 

press was going to show up? 

A: Yes, and we tried to turn that off, but unfortunately, 

we couldn’t. They showed up, but we sent them away. 

Q: Okay. Were you surprised to learn that there would be 

press at the council meeting? 

A: I was.38

Stevens’ visit to Benghazi therefore became public to the extent 

it was not otherwise known.39

Stevens found the meeting with the Local Council fruitful, but 

noted Council members seemed to feel slighted that no sitting U.S. 

Ambassador had visited the city since the revolution ended.40 This 

was a concern among the leaders in Benghazi at the time, as they 

feared the Libyan Government’s control and power would remain 

in Tripoli as it had been during the Qadhafi regime, thus 

marginalizing not just Benghazi, but the whole of Eastern Libya. 

Stevens noted this concern in his personal diary: 

They’re an impressive & sincere group of professionals— 

proud of their service on committees, all working as volunteers. Their main problem is a lack of budget & authorities. Tripoli still runs the country & its bureaucrats are an 

uneven quality. There was a little sourness about why it 

has taken so long to get to Benghazi, and about Ambassadors who came to talk but don’t do anything to follow 

up. But overall it was a positive meeting.41

September 10 Phone Call on September 11 Preparedness 

On September 10, 2012, the day Stevens arrived in Benghazi, 

American military forces were reminded to ‘‘do everything possible 


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42 Readout of the President’s Meeting with Senior Administration Officials on Our Preparedness and Security Posture on the Eleventh Anniversary of September 11th, dated Sept. 10, 2012. 43Leon E. Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace 225 (2014). 44 Id. 45 Id. 46 Id. See also, letter from Ashton B. Carter, Sec’y of Defense, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, 

House Select Committee on Benghazi, Apr. 8, 2015 (‘‘However, it is worth noting that none of 

the military forces listed above were placed on heightened alert ahead of the attacks on 

Benghazi on September 11, 2012.’’). 47 J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Personal Diary, Unofficial Transcript 

prepared by Patrick F. Kennedy, et al. (Sept. 10, 2012) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0048881). 

to protect the American people, both at home and abroad.’’ 42 That 

day the President conducted a conference call with key national security principals to discuss the steps taken to protect U.S. persons 

and facilities abroad and force protection. Leon E. Panetta, Secretary of Defense, one of the conference call participants acknowledged they ‘‘were already tracking an inflammatory anti-Muslim 

video that was circulating on the Internet and inciting anger across 

the Middle East against the United States’’ and that they ‘‘braced 

for demonstrations in Cairo and elsewhere across the region.’’ 43

Due to the Arab Spring, it was a time of heightened concern for 

that region in general. In particular, the discussion focused on several areas including Cairo, Tripoli, Tunis, Khartoum, and Sana’a, 

due to intelligence indicating potential demonstrations could erupt 

in those areas.44

Based on the September 10 conference call with national security 

principals and the President, the Defense Department placed its 

forces on ‘‘higher alert because of the potential for what could happen.’’ 45 Yet, the intelligence and the call for a ‘‘heightened alert’’ 

did not cause any actual adjustment in its posture for assets that 

could respond to a crisis in North Africa.46 Some assets were in the 

middle of training exercises, and others were in the middle of inspections. No fighter jets or tankers were placed on a ‘‘heightened 

alert’’ status. 

SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 

Morning in Benghazi: ‘‘Never Ending Security Threats’’ 

The September 10 visit to Benghazi was Stevens’ first since becoming Ambassador, and the city had changed since his departure 

in the fall of 2011.47 A growing extremist movement had taken 

hold within the city limits and Stevens spent part of September 

10th being briefed on what was happening from a security standpoint. One CIA officer described the declining security environment 

in Benghazi at the time: 

It was a really unique and difficult environment to operate 

in in eastern Libya. It was really a unique environment. 

It’s a country that we have not had—I mean, as you know, 

it was a closed country and it was a police state, and it’s 

not like it’s a country that we had a ton of experience in 

how to operate in. 


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48Officer A Testimony at 147–49. 49Schedule for J. Christopher Stevens, Ambassador, Benghazi Libya: September 10–14 (on file 

with the Committee, C05396585). 

* * * 

New groups are forming. New groups are dissolving. Outside groups are interfering and starting to establish presence. So it was an extremely dynamic and fluid situation. 

As I said, you know, we had the handicap of not having 

good SIGINT coverage within the country. And that goes 

back to the fact that Libya, in general, was a denied area 

for a long, long time for us, and it’s an area that was very 

difficult to operate in. 

Q: Now, [redacted text]. And I’ve noticed you’ve used the 

same word three times, ‘‘deteriorating.’’ And one would 

think that a post-revolutionary country probably would be 

in not the greatest of positions to begin with. 

A: Right. 

Q: And what you’re saying is it deteriorated even from 

that. 

A: That’s correct. 

Q: And tell me why you have chosen to use that word and 

what you mean by ‘‘deteriorating’’? 

A: The level of armed conflict and fighting between the 

various groups increased. The level of assassinations, attacks on foreign entities increased. There were entire 

towns, specifically Derna and around it, that became very 

difficult to travel to; checkpoints that were manned by individuals dressed in Afghan garb, jihadi garb; a lot of evidence of foreign fighters coming in from outside the country. 

Specifically in June of 2012, right before the elections, the 

Islamist militia had an overt show of force, where they had 

a military parade roll in from eastern Libya to downtown 

Benghazi. I mean, I guess it was a message to the Libyan 

electorate that we are here and we have a presence and 

we want to establish Islamic State inside Libya and we 

want sharia to be the law of the country. So there was, 

like, a lot of attempts to intimidate the populace in Libya 

by these extremist groups.48

Security concerns and the anniversary of September 11 kept Stevens on the Benghazi Mission compound for his day full of meetings. 

According to his prepared agenda Stevens had meetings with the 

17th February Brigade, the Arabian Gulf Oil Company, and the 

head of the al-Marfa Shipping and Maritime Services Company.49

Early on the morning of September 11th, one of the Diplomatic 

Security Agents in Benghazi was notified of an individual dressed 

in a uniform typically worn by the local police force conducting surVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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50 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:00 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05271656). 51 Id.; see also Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 104–105; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 80. 52 Email from a Diplomatic Sec. Agent (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:00 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05271656). 53 U.S. Dep’t of State, Cable, The Guns of August: security in eastern Libya (Aug. 8, 2012) 

(on file with the Committee, C055782149). 54 Id. 55 Comprehensive Timeline of Events—Benghazi (on file with the Committee, SCB0047843). 56 J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Personal Diary, Unofficial Transcript 

prepared by Patrick F. Kennedy, et al. (Sept. 10, 2012) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0048881). 57 Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 

PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390691) (re: FOR SER INFO: More on Cairo Embassy Attack). 58See Larry Bell, Muslim Brotherhood Fox Was Hired To Protect Our Benghazi Consulate 

Henhouse, FORBES (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2012/12/02/muslimbrotherhood-fox-was-hired-to-protect-our-benghazi-consulate-henhouse-interview. 59 Id. 

veillance of the Mission.50 The Diplomatic Security Agent in charge 

reported the incident to the head security officer in country at the 

Embassy in Tripoli and to staff at both the Benghazi Mission compound and the Annex, including Stevens.51 The Diplomatic Security Agent described the incident: 

We received word from our local guards that this morning 

they observed a member of the police force assigned to the 

Mission at a construction site across the street from our 

main gate taking pictures of our compound. I briefed the 

Ambo and provided him drafts of letters notifying the [Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and police. Will let you 

know any further details.52

In Benghazi, the Supreme Security Council was the ‘‘most prominent’’ official police force, ‘‘assembled from former members of the 

various militias as an interim security measure.’’ 53 It was ‘‘designed to be an interim security measure’’ following the revolution 

but had not coalesced into an established force and had little impact on the security incidents in Benghazi.54

Stevens’ last meeting of the day was with the Turkish Consul 

General. He escorted the Turkish diplomat to the front gate of the 

compound that evening at 7:39 p.m. [1:39 p.m. in Washington 

D.C.].55

Stevens’ last entry in his personal journal, dated September 11, 

2012, read: ‘‘Never ending security threats . . . ’’ 56

A Protest Begins at the U.S. Embassy in 

Cairo, Egypt on September 11 

In the hours preceding the attacks in Benghazi, a protest of approximately 2,000 demonstrators assembled outside the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, Egypt.57 Cairo is some 600 miles east of Benghazi. 

Plans for a demonstration in Cairo first began to coalesce in late 

August 2012 with the designated terrorist organization, Jamaa 

Islamiya, calling upon its supporters to protest the continued incarceration of its leader, Sheikh Omaar abdel Rahman, also known as 

the ‘‘Blind Sheik.’’ 58 Rahman is serving a life prison sentence for 

his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.59 Additionally, 

in the days preceding the September 11 demonstration in Cairo, an 


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60The original trailer, in English, was posted in July 2012. See Phil Willon and Rebecca 

Keegan, Timeline: ‘‘Innocence of Muslims’’ Unrest, LA TIMES (Sept. 13, 2012), http:// 

articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/12/entertainment/la-et-mn-antiislam-film-sparks-violence20120912. 61 Nancy A. Youssef and Amina Ismail, Anti-U.S. outrage over video began with Christian activist’s phone call to a reporter, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Sept. 15, 2012), http://www. 

mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24737101.html; see also, Email from State Department Press Office, U.S. Dep’t of State, to State Department Press Office, U.S. Dep’t of State 

(Sept. 13, 2012 4:54 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05580045) (The film trailer ‘‘had actually 

been circulating at a relatively low level for some months out there in cyberspace and that it 

only caught fire in the region on the day or just before that day that we began to see these 

various protests.’’). 62See id. (‘‘in the day or days prior to the protests that became violent at our Embassy in 

Cairo, the film had been shown on Egyptian television and was being quite heavily watched, 

and our social media tracking indicated that . . . we expected it to be localized to Egypt.’’). 63 Catherine Herridge, DHS report warned last week of call for ‘burning the embassy down’ 

in Cairo, FOX NEWS, (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/09/19/dhs-reportwarned-last-week-call-for-burning-embassy-down-in-cairo.print.html; see also Intel agencies 

warned U.S. embassy in Egypt of possible violence over film, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Sept. 18, 2012), 

http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/18/238658.html. 64 Email from Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Wendy Sherman, 

Under Sec’y for Political Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012, 6:08 PM) (on file 

with the Committee, C05580024) (Subject: Today’s Benghazi backgrounding points) (‘‘The statement was issued from Embassy Cairo just after noon Cairo time on September 11, well before 

the incident at the Embassy.’’); see also Karen Yourish and David A. Fahrenthold, Timeline 

on Libya and Egypt: Attacks and response, WASH. POST, (Sept. 12, 2012), https:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/timeline-on-libya-and-egypt-attacks-and-response/ 

2012/09/12/85288638-fd03-11e1-a31e-804fccb658f9_story.html?hpid=z1. 65 Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 

PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390691) (re: FOR SER INFO: More on Cairo Embassy Attack). 66 Id. 67 Id. 68 Email from Legislative Mgmt. Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, to H_Egypt, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012 

7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562234) (Subject: Write up of U/S Kennedy Call with 

Hill re Libya) (‘‘Attack in Cairo was a demonstration. There were no weapons shown or used. 

A few cans of spray paint.’’). 

Arabic version of a trailer for a little known anti-Islamic film, produced in the United States, was posted on YouTube.60 This trailer 

caught the attention of Muslims in Egypt and calls were made on 

television, in newspapers, and on social media, to protest the denigration of the Muslim faith as depicted in the movie trailer at the 

U.S. Embassy in Cairo on September 11, 2012.61

Multiple agencies of the U.S. government were aware of the impending demonstration in Egypt. The U.S. Embassy in Cairo notified the State Department, coordinated with Egyptian leaders, and 

ordered most of its personnel not to report to work that day.62 The 

Department of Homeland Security issued an intelligence report on 

September 10, 2012 advising that the Cairo Embassy might be targeted as a means to call for the release of the Blind Sheik as well 

as in response to an anti-Islam film.63

Shortly after noon in Cairo [6 a.m. in Washington D.C.] on September 11, 2012, the U.S. Embassy in Cairo posted a tweet condemning those who would ‘‘hurt the religious feelings of Muslims.’’ 64 A few hours later, demonstrators began gathering outside 

the perimeter wall of the Embassy in Cairo.65 The crowd of demonstrators grew to nearly 2,000 people.66 Armed with spray paint, 

a handful of demonstrators scaled the walls, tore down the American flag, ripped it to shreds, and replaced it with a black militant 

Islamic flag.67 According to Kennedy, there were no weapons 

shown or used during the protest in Cairo.68 Within hours, the 


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69 Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 

PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390691) (re: FOR SER INFO: More on Cairo Embassy Attack) (‘‘Egyptian police did finally move the protesters off the compound peacefully.’’). 70Testimony of Vice Admiral Charles J. Leidig, Deputy Commander for Military Operations, 

U.S. Africa Command, Tr. at 25–26 (Mar. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Leidig 2014 Testimony] (on file 

with the Committee). 

Egyptian police were able to ‘‘move the protesters off the compound 

peacefully.’’ 69

United States Africa Command [AFRICOM] was the U.S Combatant Command with responsibility for all of Africa, except Egypt. 

Despite Egypt not being in its area of responsibility, AFRICOM observed the Cairo protest throughout the day. Vice Admiral Charles 

J. Leidig, the Deputy Commander for Military Operations at 

AFRICOM, discussed AFRICOM’s actions that day: 

[W]e had been observing the events on that day in Cairo 

and the protests, and we were concerned that those protests would cause other protests throughout the region, 

and particularly in North Africa. Even though Egypt is not 

in our area of responsibility, it surely has an affinity with 

the other countries that are in Northern Africa. So we 

were watching that carefully. 

So I actually recall staying at work until almost 1900 [7:00 

p.m. in Libya] because we wanted to see if any riots or protests would break out, and they didn’t.70

Despite the size of the crowd of demonstrators in Cairo and the 

length of the demonstration, the protest in Cairo prompted no 

change in force laydown for the forces that might respond to unrest 

in North Africa. In other words, neither the President’s meeting 

with his Cabinet which included a discussion of the anti-Muslim 

film nor the anniversary of September 11, 2001, nor the demonstration in Cairo prompted any change in U.S. military posture or asset 

readiness in the region. 

The Anti-Muslim Film was a ‘‘Nonevent’’ in Libya 

The protests in Cairo had little to no impact on the Benghazi 

Mission compound or throughout Libya. While the anti-Muslim 

film was one of the reasons protests were called for in Egypt, it 

was virtually unknown in Libya. Hicks testified regarding the reaction in Libya to the film: 

Q: Was it your understanding that the Cairo protest had 

been planned and called for? 

A: I believe I understood that at the time. 

Q: Okay. Had there been any similar protest in Libya that 

were planned and called for prior to that day? 

A: No there were not. And so we were interested in monitoring all our contacts, and monitoring social media, news 

outlets, to see if anything erupted in Libya that was comparable to what was happening in Cairo. And we wanted 

to do that, but we wanted to do that as safely as possible. 


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71 Hicks Apr. 2016 Testimony at 64–68. 

* * * 

Q: Okay. We have heard reports that the demonstrations 

in Cairo were at least in part if not solely based on some 

sort of video or film trailer that was out that was demeaning to the Prophet Mohammed. Did you have that understanding at the time? 

A: Of the Cairo—— 

Q: Yes. 

A: —demonstrations? 

Q: Yes. 

A: I think maybe I did. I’m not sure. 

Q: . Were you monitoring within Libya for any type of reaction to this film? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Okay. And how long had you been monitoring in Libya 

for any type of reaction to this film? 

A: I think we had begun monitoring since about September 8th. 

Q: Okay. And had you had any reaction or hits on your 

monitoring? 

A: Very few, if any. 

Q: So it appeared to be a nonevent in the country of 

Libya? 

A: It was a nonevent in the country of Libya. 

Q: Did you have any conversations with Ambassador Stevens regarding the demonstrations in Cairo and the actions that you were taking in response to that? 

A: I had texted him and said, hey, are you watching TV? 

Embassy Cairo is under attack. 

* * * 

Q: And did he respond? 

A: He said, really? And I can’t remember exactly what he 

said, but anyway it was, what’s going on? And I said, the 

embassy’s been breached, the flag’s been taken down, the 

black flag has been raised in its place. 

Q: Was that the sum total of your communication back 

and forth. 

A: That was the sum total of our communication.71

One of the Diplomatic Security Agents in Benghazi told the Committee what happened after Stevens learned of the Cairo protests: 

Q: Did you hear at any point during the day at some time 

about a protest in Cairo? 


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72Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 82–83. 73 Email from Agent 5, Diplomatic Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep’t of State, to J. Christopher Stevens, 

U.S. Ambassador to Libya (Sept. 11, 2012 1:39 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05393199) 

(Subject: Daily Security Update). 74Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 84–85. 75Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 142. 

A: Yes. I can’t remember exactly when, but I was made 

aware of the protests in Cairo, and the Ambassador had 

asked about it. 

Q: And were you actually in a conversation with the Ambassador? 

A: I was in a conversation with the Ambassador when he 

said, hey, something’s going on in Cairo, and he asked me 

if I would be able to find out something about it for him. 

Q: And were you able to? 

A: I made some phone calls to the command center, in 

D.C. but there was no other information that I received 

other than that there was a protest, and they were actually in the process of evaluating the situation.72

As in Tripoli, the agents in Benghazi monitored social media for 

any planned or called-for demonstrations. On September 11, there 

was no indication in Benghazi that any protests over the film trailer were planned.73 With the film being a virtual nonevent in Libya, 

the Diplomatic Security Agents saw no reason to change their security posture that day. One Diplomatic Security Agent recounted: 

Q: And do you remember any conversations about whether 

or not, because of what the Ambassador had been hearing 

and asked you to follow-up on, or any other reasons, of potentially changing anything about the security setup for 

that evening? 

A: No, no I—no, I can’t think of any changes that we 

talked about making or made based on that.74

Evening in Benghazi 

On the evening of September 11, 2012, there were a total of 

seven U.S. personnel, including Stevens, on the ground at the compound at the time of the attack.75 Sean P. Smith, who prior to 

working for the State Department served in the United States Air 

Force, was one of the U.S. personnel there. Smith was serving as 

the Information Management Officer. He had been in Benghazi on 

a temporary tour of duty from The Hague for 30 days. He arrived 

on September 1 and his role was to run the administrative component of the Mission. The other five U.S. personnel at the compound 

that evening included the two Diplomatic Security Agents who 

travelled with Stevens from Tripoli to Benghazi, and the three Diplomatic Security Agents assigned to Benghazi. 

Stevens’ last event of the day was a meeting with the Turkish 

Consul General, [redacted text]. The Consul General departed at 

7:39 p.m. local time, and four British security team members deVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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76 Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 1940 and 2027, respectively). 77Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 50–51 (Mar. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 78Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 123–124. 79Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 31–32. 

parted at 8:27 p.m.76 No other visitors were on the Mission compound that night. There was no evidence of any group assembled 

outside the Mission compound gate: large, small, peaceful or otherwise. 

THERE WAS NO PROTEST 

All five Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground that night in 

Benghazi were consistent in their testimony—before the attack 

began, there was no protest. 

One agent testified: 

Q: So the intelligence in and around Benghazi was that 

there was no planned protest? 

A: I did not hear of a planned protest, no. 

Q: No one communicated that to you. 

A: No, I did not hear that.77

Another agent testified: 

Q: Do you recall at any time during the day seeing any 

type of crowd form outside of the mission compound. 

A: Other than? 

Q: Other than normal activity that would have occurred in 

Benghazi, just people coming and going. 

A: So other than the attack and the attackers, no. 

Q: Okay. So there was no protest, to the best of your 

knowledge, the day of the attack. 

A: Not to my knowledge.78

Yet another agent testified: 

Q: From your perspective, had there been a protest? 

A: No. There was nothing out there up until, well, up until 

there was. I had been out of the gate at 8:30 that night. 

We had had personnel leaving the compound, and they 

drove away from our compound and didn’t report anything, 

and I spoke with them subsequently, there was nothing 

out there.79

A fourth agent testified: 

Q: Prior to the attack occurred [sic], did you hear anything 

on the outside, such as chanting or any type of sounds 

[that] would be a protest? 

A: No, I never heard any sort of chanting or protest or 

anything. 

Q: Would it then be an accurate description to describe 

the attack as a sort of stealth attack? 


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80Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 144 (Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 81Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 105 (Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 82 Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 81. 83 Id. at 81–82. 

A: It was very sudden. As I had mentioned, conditions immediately before the only warning that I had that something was amiss was that—kind of that cry that I heard 

at assault on the main gate. 

Q: So it was very sudden. And the first attackers that you 

saw enter, were they armed? 

A: Yes.80

The fifth agent testified: 

Q: If there had been something about a planned protest in 

Benghazi, would that be the type of information that you 

would have been interested in? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Do you recall any such information? 

A: No.81

Hicks was asked ‘‘if there was . . . a protest [outside the facility], would that have been reported?’’ 82 In his view: 

[A]bsolutely, I mean, we’re talking about both security officers who know their trade, even though they are brand 

new, and one of the finest political officers in the history 

of the Foreign Service. You know, for there to have been 

a demonstration on Chris Stevens’ front door and him not 

to have reported it is unbelievable. And secondly, if he had 

reported it, he would have been out the back door within 

minutes of any demonstration appearing anywhere near 

that facility. And there was a back gate to the facility, and, 

you know, it worked.83

THE MISSION’S EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN 

The Mission’s emergency action plan relied on the Diplomatic Security Agents as well as the two contracted internal security support entities: The Blue Mountain Guard Force and the February 17 

Martyrs Brigade. The Blue Mountain Guard Force consisted of unarmed guards whose primary role was static surveillance of the 

three entrance gates as well as the interior of the compound. These 

guards had access to an alarm should any danger present itself. 

According to one Diplomatic Security Agent: 

The primary purpose of a local guard force is to man the 

perimeter and the gates in order to delay and deter potential security risks and to afford us additional notice . . . 

if there were to be a security risk. In addition, they were 

in charge of access control, so screening people as they 


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84Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 16. 85Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 22. 

were coming in the compound, screening vehicles as there 

were coming in the compound.84

The February 17 Martyrs Brigade consisted of a rotating set of 

three to four armed guards who lived on compound to operate as 

a quick reaction force to respond to any security incidents against 

the Mission. Their role was to augment security provided by the 

Diplomatic Security Agents. In addition, the February 17 Martyrs 

Brigade was supposed to send additional armed guards if an event 

occurred at the Mission compound. According to one Diplomatic Security Agent: 

Q: And [how] did their role and responsibility differ from 

the local guard force [Blue Mountain Group]? 

A: Well, they were armed primarily. But really what we 

counted on them to do was make a phone call to the 17th 

February Martyrs Brigade so that we could receive backup 

in case something happened. 

Q: Okay. So you were aware that they had a larger contingent of people that was to be available to—— 

A: Right. Right.85

One Diplomatic Security Agent provided a description of the 

emergency action plan at the compound and how the local guards 

were expected to supplement this plan: 

The reaction plan, whether it was something small on the 

first or something larger ultimately on the 11th or 12th, 

and this is the plan that we actually followed, but the reaction plan is to shelter in place. That you would take the 

principal officers, you secure them in Villa C. The agent or 

whoever was in the [Tactical Operations Center] building 

would go operate the communications and reach out to the 

security elements that were supposed to react. 

The security elements that were supposed to react includes 

the local guard is supposed to just give us an alert, a 

heads up of what’s going on. The three to four [February17 

Martyrs Brigade] members that live on the compound are 

supposed to take an active role in our internal defense; additionally, the 20 person [February 17 Martyrs Brigade] 

with heavy weapons and heavy vehicles 2 kilometers away 

that had responded in the past and were expected to respond to any event that necessitated them in the future. 

The security element encompassing other Americans was 

part of the react plan as well to support the [February 17 

Martyrs Brigade] elements that were going to come as 

well. 

So we’re talking almost 30 armed personnel where arrangements were made for them to respond to our location, 

and had done so in training and in actuality in past 

events. So whether the attack had happened—whether 


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86See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 46–47 (for additional details on the reaction 

plans); see also Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 20 and 82, and Diplomatic Sec. Agent 

5 Testimony at 88 and 90. 87Letter from U.S. Dep’t of State to Blue Mountain Group (Feb. 17, 2012) (on file with the 

Committee, C05395135) (Subject: Notice of Contract Award Contract No. SAQMMA–12–C–0092 

Local Guard Services Benghazi, Libya). 88Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 147. 89Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 127; see also Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 

113–114; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 85; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 36 

(‘‘We did have visibility issues, especially at night with our CCTV system. For that reason one 

of the efforts that I tried to lead was having the ESO, Engineering Sec. Office, come out to install new CCTV cameras that we had received. Unfortunately, it wasn’t to be. They were scheduled to arrive I believe the week after the attack.’’). 90DVR: Footage of the Mission. (Sept. 11, 2012). 91Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 109. 92 U.S. Dep’t of State, Diplomatic Note #59 prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 

International Cooperation, Dir. of Gen. Protocol Dep’t Branch, Benghazi Office (Sept. 6, 2012) 

(on file with the Committee, C05389670). 93Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 7. 

something had happened on the first, and it didn’t, although we had somebody armed armed personnel on the 

roof all night, a rotating presence, or something that did 

happen on the 11th or 12th, the expectations were for 

these elements to respond as they had done in the past.86

The unarmed Blue Mountain Guard Force was fully staffed the 

evening of September 11, 2012, with five guards. Two of those 

guards were assigned to the main entrance of the Benghazi Mission compound.87 Three of the four armed February 17 Martyrs 

Brigade guards were at the compound at the time of the attack. 

One of the guards left early for a reported ‘‘family obligation’’ with 

no replacement. The three remaining guards were within the vicinity of the main gate just prior to the attack.88

ALL IS QUIET AT THE FRONT GATE 

The Diplomatic Security Agents at the compound did not observe 

any activity at the main gate during the hour leading up to the attack.89 The only movement of note was the arrival of a local police 

vehicle at the main gate at approximately 9:02 p.m. [3:02 p.m. in 

Washington D.C.].90 According to one of the Diplomatic Security 

Agents, the one security component consistently lacking at the 

compound on a regular basis ‘‘was the police support on the exterior of the compound.’’ 91 On September 6, 2012, in the lead-up to 

Stevens’ visit, the Mission requested the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide one vehicle at each gate of the Mission ‘‘round 

the clock (24 hours/day) from Sept 10, 2012 to September 15, 2012’’ 

to supplement security during Stevens’ visit.92 As the morning 

began on September 11, no police vehicle was located at any of the 

compound gates.93

Q: Who was—what was your understanding of who the 

SSC was? 

A: The Supreme Security Council. I knew that it was a 

pseudo militia/police force/military elements, of, again, different militia groups. 

Q: And do you know what the request had been for increased security? 

A: For at least two vehicles, I believe at each gate. 


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94 Id. 95 [Redacted text]. 96 [Redacted text]. 97 Id. 98 Id. 99 Id. 100Officer A Testimony at 100; see also, Testimony of Chief of Base, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. 

at 130 (July 16, 2015) [hereinafter Chief of Base Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 101Officer A Testimony at 57, 59–60. 102Officer A Testimony at 85. 103See Officer A Testimony at 86. But see, Chief of Base Testimony at 139 ([redacted text].’’). 104Officer A Testimony at 63–64. 105 Id. at 64. 106 Attestation regarding [redacted text]. 

Q: And how—had that request been granted? 

A: They told me the request went in. I don’t know specifics 

of whether it was granted. The first day [September 10] I 

do remember two vehicles outside, though. 

Q: And did they express to you any concerns about the 

status of their request, that it hadn’t been granted and 

that had caused concern for them? 

A: That day, no, but the next day, there were—two vehicles weren’t on—on stations, at the mission, so yeah, that 

was a concern. 

Q: Okay. So that would have been on 9/11—— 

A: Yes.94

That evening, however, a vehicle arrived outside of the Mission 

compound’s front gate at 9:02 p.m. 

WARNINGS AND INDICATORS PRIOR TO THE ATTACKS 

Shortly before the attacks began, a [redacted text] extremist 

indicated [redacted text] on their way to attack the [Mission compound’s front gate] in Benghazi.95

The Committee also found evidence that a former TNC security 

official also claimed he attempted to pass threat information directly to the CIA Benghazi Annex prior to the attack. A few days 

after the attacks, on September 15, 2012, the [redacted text] 96

[redacted text] 97 [redacted text] 98 [redacted text] the former 

TNC official tried to relay the information to the Director of the 

Libyan Intelligence Service and his assistant, who were both out of 

the country. [Redacted text].’’ 99

[Redacted text], however—but what the Committee has uncovered and verified—was the former TNC security official also 

claimed he attempted to pass this threat information directly to the 

CIA Benghazi Annex prior to the attack. This claim was acknowledged by both the Chief of Base in Benghazi and another CIA officer:100

Prior to the attacks, [redacted text] 101 [redacted text] 102 [redacted text].103

[Redacted text], the CIA was unable to confirm whether or not 

the former TNC security official’s claim is true. A [redacted 

text] 104 [redacted text] 105

The CIA also reviewed [redacted text] 106


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107See Email to [Tripoli Station], Sept. 21, 2012 [REQUEST 1000790 to REQUEST 1000795]. 108 Id. 109Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 at 140 (‘‘I can say within 30 seconds to a minute, before the attack 

started the single police car that was out there was a truck and it departed the scene.’’); see also, DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:42 PM). 110 Id. at 141. 111See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 144. See also, Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 at 85– 

86; DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2142.53). 112Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 55. 113DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2143.50). 114Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 137. 115 Id. 

A third person also claimed he tried to contact the U.S. government prior to the attack. A Libyan Special Advisor on Security 

‘‘claimed he had tried to warn the U.S. government of the potential 

for an attack on the Consulate prior to the attack taking place.’’ 107

This individual ‘‘left Libya immediately after the attack’’ and ‘‘was 

afraid of potential threats against him, based in part on his assumption that there were documents in the Consulate likely found 

by the attackers, that they might interpret as him sympathizing 

with the U.S. Government.’’ 108

THE FIRST ATTACK ON THE BENGHAZI MISSION BEGINS 

At 9:42 p.m., the Libyan police vehicle at the front gate of the 

Benghazi Mission compound rapidly departed at the same time 

attackers advanced toward the main entrance.109 Prior to that, the 

Libyan police did not warn the Diplomatic Security Agents at the 

compound, the unarmed Blue Mountain Guards, or the armed February 17 Martyrs Brigade members of the surging attackers or of 

their own departure.110

As the police vehicle fled, dozens of armed men rushed the compound and an explosion occurred near the main gate.111 It was the 

beginning of what would be not one, but several attacks on the 

Benghazi Mission compound. 

The Diplomatic Security Agents recalled first hearing taunts and 

chants when the attackers rushed the compound and then a loud 

explosion. They knew they were in imminent danger. According to 

one Diplomatic Security Agent: 

Q: And how did you find out about the attack? 

A: I heard a loud explosion and chanting outside. 

Q: When you say chanting, what would be—— 

A: Yelling, screaming.112

Attackers quickly breached the main gate pouring onto the compound.113 One Diplomatic Security Agent described his reaction: 

I see the men on the compound. I immediately picked up 

the PA system, and I say, attention on compound, attention on compound, this is not a drill. Repeat, this is not a 

drill.114

The Diplomatic Security Agent immediately activated the alarm 

in accordance with the Compound’s Emergency Action Plan calling 

for shelter in place.115 He stated: ‘‘The react plan is exactly what 


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116 Id. at 142. 117DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2142). 118Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 147. 119 Id. 120 Id. at 141. 121 Id. 122Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 129. 123 Id. 124 Id. at 148; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141. 125Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141; see also, Email to Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep’t 

of State (Sept. 14, 2012, 8:07 AM). (Subject: Re: Log of events on 9/11/12–9/12/12) (on file with 

the Committee, SCB00472640). 

happened: shelter in place, contact your support elements, and wait 

for their arrival.’’ 116

As the alarm was sounding, two unarmed Blue Mountain Guards 

fled through the main gate.117 Immediately upon the initial breach 

of the main gate, the attackers were engaged briefly by gunfire by 

one or more February 17 Martyrs Brigade guards. According to one 

Diplomatic Security Agent, one of the guards was shot during this 

engagement: 

At least one of them got shot. One of the local guards at 

least one, if not two, of the local guards were shot, as well, 

in the process. It was as this group moved from building 

to building and we sheltered per our react plan.118

With minimal resistance at the main entrance, the attackers 

quickly pushed onto the compound and cornered the armed February 17 Martyrs Brigade guards inside their barracks and set fire 

to the barracks.119 The guards incurred no fatalities that evening. 

Besides the initial exchange of gunfire at the main entrance, no additional gunfire was directed toward the attackers on the compound prior to the end of the first wave of attacks at the Benghazi 

Mission compound. 

After the alarm was initiated, the Diplomatic Security Agent in 

the Tactical Operations Center [TOC] immediately called the GRS 

personnel at the Annex, located approximately one mile from the 

Benghazi Mission compound.120

The Diplomatic Security Agents were able to establish an open 

line of communication through a shared radio [redacted text] 

with the Annex during the attack allowing the two locations to 

have continuous communication.121

At the same time, another Diplomatic Security Agent relocated 

to the TOC and tried to call the 17th February guards on the Mission compound for help.122 After this attempt failed, the Diplomatic 

Security Agent called the Annex compound and asked them to contact the headquarters of the February 17 Martyrs Brigade to request support.123 The Diplomatic Security Agent also called the 

Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs for support.124 The agents in the 

TOC then notified the lead security officer in Tripoli.125 One Diplomatic Security Agent described their actions: 

So we are in the TOC office. The other agent and I began 

to make our calls. I notify the second American compound 

via radio. The other agent notifies the February 17 Martyrs Brigade members. And then I subsequently notify 

Tripoli, who subsequently notifies D.C.; it is either State 

ops or the command center. We basically have an open line 


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126Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 128–29. 127Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141; see also Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 

114. 128Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 114. 129Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 142. 130Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 58. 131 Id. 132Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 142. 133 Id. at 141–142. 134Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 86; see also, Email from the Diplomatic Sec. Command Ctr. to the Special Assistants for the Secretary, et al. (page 1) (Subject: Benghazi—Attack 

on Compound—09112012) (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:34 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05578314). 

via radio with the other Americans at the second compound. And I keep Tripoli on speakerphone almost the 

whole time as we are working through and relaying what 

is going on.126

Meanwhile, Stevens, Smith, and one Diplomatic Security Agent 

retreated to the safe haven of Villa C, a dedicated area within the 

Villa that was reinforced with a metal barred-door.127 The Diplomatic Security Agent who was with Stevens and Smith described 

what happened: 

I remember hearing the chants. I mean, they were fairly 

close already. I mean, yelling distance, which is pretty 

close especially in a city setting. So my impression is that 

I don’t have much time. So I ran right to my room, you 

know, put my helmet on, put my vest on, grabbed my 

weapons, my additional weapons, and I turned to lock the 

gate, and basically, it was a jail cell door with three locks 

on it. I locked all three locks. And at about that time Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith were coming out to their 

rooms. Sean Smith was already, you know, donning his 

helmet and vest. I guided them both into the safe haven, 

and set myself up in the safe haven with—I was holding 

my M4.’’ 128

Two other Diplomatic Security Agents attempted to ‘‘go back to 

Villa C to also provide protection for Stevens, but not to shoot at 

this large group.’’ 129

The agents in Villa B attempted to go to Villa C, but they were 

met with a very large hostile force of 7 to 10 attackers with ‘‘AKs 

and RPGs.’’ 130 The two agents made the tactical decision not to 

shoot at this large group because, ‘‘if we would have taken one of 

them out at the time, it could have gone substantially worse.’’ 131

The Agents believed the attackers would have been ‘‘out for blood’’ 

and it would have inflamed an already bad situation.132

Because of this concern, the agents chose to return to Villa B, 

which also served as the cantina or cafeteria for the Mission compound.133 After seeking refuge, one of the agents in Villa B then 

contacted the TOC in Tripoli and the other agent contacted the 

State Department’s Diplomatic Security Command Center [DSCC] 

in Washington D.C. at 9:49 p.m. Benghazi time [3:49 p.m. in Washington, DC].134

Unknown to the Diplomatic Security Agents on the Mission compound, the attackers were a mix of local extremist groups, including the Benghazi-based Ansar al-Sharia, al-Qaeda in the Lands of 


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135The Committee found no evidence of involvement by the Iranian government, specifically 

the Iranian Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force (IRGC–QF) as has been reported. Email from the 

State Department Operations Center (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:06 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05272001). At the time, there were two Ansar al-Sharia (AAS) branches in Libya, the one in 

Benghazi that was involved in the attack, and one in Darnah that was led by former Guantanamo detainee Abu Sufyian bin Qumo. There is no evidence that Qumo had any direct involvement in the attacks on the Mission or the Annex on 11 and 12 September 2012. See Terrorist 

Attack in Benghazi: The Secretary of State’s View, hearing before H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 

113th Cong. 35 (2013). The other Ansar al-Sharia, the Abu Ubaydah Ibn Jarah Battalion, was 

led at the time by Ahmed Abu Khattalah, the lone person charged in connection with the attack. 

NCTC: Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associates with the Benghazi Attacks (Sept 

9, 2013); NCTC Current: Libya: Update on Benghazi Suspects (Sept. 11, 2013); CIA WIRe: 

Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi Attacks (Jan 28, 

2013); CIA WIRe: Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi Attacks (Feb 26, 2013); CIA WIRe: Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated with 

the Benghazi Attacks (Aug. 12, 2013); CIA WIRe: Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly 

Associated with the Benghazi Attacks (Sept. 9, 2013); CIA WIRe Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi Attacks, (Mar. 24, 2014); CIA WIRe: Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi Attacks (July 24, 2014). 136Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 115. 137DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2202.07 and 2202.25, respectively). 138 U.S. Dep’t of State, DSCC’s Timeline for Benghazi and Tripoli Events [hereinafter DSCC 

Timeline] (on file with the Committee, C05391498) (‘‘Ambassador Stevens, who is currently in 

Benghazi, and for [sic] COM personnel are in the compound safe room.’’). 139 Email from the State Department Operations Center (Sept. 11, 2012, 4:05 PM) (on file with 

the Committee, C05272001). 140DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2201–2207); see also, Email to Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 14, 2012, 8:07 AM). (Subject: Re: Log of events on 9/11/12– 

9/12/12) (on file with the Committee, SCB00472640). 

the Islamic Maghreb, and the Muhammad Jamal Network out of 

Egypt. Members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in 

Iraq and Abu Ubaydah Ibn Jarah Battalion also participated.135

The Diplomatic Security Agent located in the safe haven with 

Stevens and Smith described the weapons he saw during a direct 

encounter with the attackers: 

I could hear outside explosions, yelling, chanting, screaming, gunfire, and I reported all of this on the radio just 

saying, this is what my senses are telling me. Then people 

started banging on the doors of the building, so I reported 

that. Hey, there is banging on the doors. They are trying 

to come in, you know, we need immediate assistance. And 

there wasn’t any response on the radio. Shortly after that, 

to my recollection, the doors were blown open. And about 

70 individuals, you know, rushed into the building, all of 

them carrying AK–47s, grenades, RPGs, you know, a mixture throughout everyone.136

The attackers were unable to gain access to the safe haven because the access point had been fortified by the Diplomatic Security 

Agent inside. Instead the attackers started a diesel fire just outside 

the safe haven at approximately 10 p.m.137 At that time, the 

agents in the TOC reported to the Diplomatic Security Command 

Center that Stevens and Smith were located in the safe room.138

Meanwhile, notice of the attack was disseminated in Washington 

D.C. at 4:05 p.m. [10:05 p.m. in Benghazi] through an ‘‘Ops Alert’’ 

by the State Department Operations Center, which notified senior 

Department officials, the White House Situation Room, and others 

the Benghazi Mission compound was under attack.139

As news of the attack spread in Washington D.C., Villa C, the 

main diplomatic building, was quickly engrossed in flames and 

heavy smoke.140 Within minutes, Diplomatic Security Agents reVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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141 Email to Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 14, 2012, 8:07 AM). (Subject: Re: 

Log of events on 9/11/12–9/12/12) (on file with the Committee, SCB00472640). 142Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 117. 143Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 131–132. 144 Id. 145Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 117. 146 Id. at 114; see also, Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 147; Comprehensive Timeline 

of Events—Benghazi, produced by the U.S. Dep’t of State (Last Edit Nov. 1, 2012) (on file with 

the Committee, SCB0047845); Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 25–26. 147Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 117–120. 

ported to the lead security agent in Tripoli that contact with Stevens had been lost.141 A Diplomatic Security Agent described what 

happened next inside the Villa: 

And then slowly, people started to kind of trickle out. And 

then the lights started to kind of dim. My initial response 

or my initial thought was, well, they just knocked out the 

generators. You know, we have regular city power, but we 

also have backup generators. So flickering would be a likely, you know, cause of this. But in reality, it was smoke. 

And it took me about, you know, 2 or 3 seconds after that 

to determine that it was smoke. As soon as I realized it 

was smoke, I turned to the Ambassador and Sean Smith 

and I said, we are moving to the bathroom.142

As Villa C filled with smoke, the two Diplomatic Security Agents 

in the TOC also realized it was on fire:143

Q: At what point did you notice that there was also— 

buildings had been put on fire, and how did that come to 

your attention? 

A: Well, as—it seemed like a long time. Of course, I can’t 

say exactly how much time elapsed between when we 

began our call for help and to when help finally arrived. 

I can’t say certainly. But monitoring what was going on on 

the ground via the security cameras, I could see that Villa 

C—I could see flames starting to lick out of the windows 

and black smoke started to pour out of the windows, and 

that’s when I became aware that they were in very big 

trouble over there.144

The Diplomatic Security Agent inside Villa C with Stevens and 

Smith attempted to lead them to the bathroom in the safe 

haven.145 Once in the bathroom he realized Stevens and Smith had 

not followed him. Due to the thick toxic smoke, he was unable to 

see them and did not hear a response from them when he called 

out.146 Because of the flames, the agent became weak and overcome with smoke and heat. He left the bathroom and crawled to 

his bedroom where he eventually escaped through a window. After 

catching his breath, over and over again he crawled back through 

the bedroom window of Villa C to search for Stevens and Smith.147

The last time I went out, you know, I decided that if I 

went back into the building that I wasn’t going to come 

back out. The smoke and the heat were way too powerful, 

and way too strong, and it was extremely confusing feeling 

my way in a smoke-filled building. And I didn’t want to get 

lost, and so I decided to climb up the ladder to the roof. 


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148Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 121. 149 Id. at 122; see also, Comprehensive Timeline of Events—Benghazi, produced by the U.S. 

Dep’t of State (Last Edit Nov. 1, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0047845). 150Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 147. 151Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 61–62. 152 Id. 153 Id. 154Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141. 155 Id. at 143–44. 

I climbed up the ladder, and pulled up the ladder behind 

me and that’s the moment that I knew the Ambassador 

Stevens and Sean Smith were probably dead.148

As the agent retreated to the rooftop of Villa C, he began taking 

gunfire.149 At 10:14 p.m. [4:14 p.m. in Washington D.C.], he reported to the agent located in the TOC that Stevens and Smith 

were missing and unaccounted for.150

While some of the attackers were trying to break into Villa C’s 

safe haven, other attackers broke through Villa B’s main door.151

The attackers were unable to gain access to the Diplomatic Security Agents and local guard seeking refuge in the back because 

they had successfully barricaded the doors.152

Q: So you said that the attackers who tried to come into 

the room were unsuccessful? 

A: Yes, they tried to breach it one time.153

THE MISSION CALLS THE ANNEX FOR SUPPORT 

When the attack started at 9:42 p.m. [3:42 p.m. in Washington 

D.C.], the Diplomatic Security Agent in the TOC immediately 

called the Annex for backup.154 The agent testified: 

Several requests were made. Unbeknownst to us at the 

time, the situation outside our compound was hostile. Apparently the militia that attacked us had set up heavy gun 

trucks on all four corners of the block we were on, had prohibited traffic from entering from any location, and it was 

difficult for the reaction forces to get to us. 

I can’t tell you exactly when they arrived on compound. It 

is my assessment that it was approximately an hour and 

5 minutes after. So if the attack started at 9:42, I don’t 

think we see them on compound until 10:00, 10:45, 10:50, 

something along those lines. 

Now, it is my understanding that they fought their way in, 

and they ultimately split up into two groups, one of which 

literally fought their way in and climbed blocks and blocks 

of 10 to 12 foot high concrete walls, as well as the secondary group, who rallied with some February 17 Martyrs 

Brigade elements to come in through a different approach 

angle. 

So it was not as if they literally could have just walked 

across the street and walked in. The compound was overtaken, it was overrun. And it is my understanding it 

wasn’t as simple as what it would have seemed on the surface.155


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Once the request for assistance was made to the Annex, the security team there immediately began packing up and preparing to respond. 

The GRS Team Lead described what happened after the Diplomatic Security Agent called and requested their help. 

[A]pproximately 20 [minutes] to 10:00 [p.m.], I got a cell 

phone call on my phone from one of the ARSOs, State Department Regional Security Officers. 

Give or take a few minutes or whatever it was, I’d get that 

phone call from [Diplomatic Security Agent 3], and he’s obviously a bit worked up, and he says: Hey, we’re under attack. And he tells me he’s sitting in the TOC, their Tactical Operations Center, which is a separate building at 

the facility. And he says: I can see approximately 20 guys 

have come through the front gate, they are armed, and 

they are amassing on the soccer field, which is, you know, 

just in front of their—one of the living quarters buildings. 

And I said: Okay. Gotcha. I said: Look, do me a favor, before you hang up or before I lose you on the cell phone network—we had previously given them one of our secure [redacted text] radios. I said: Pick up that radio in the TOC 

and just start giving me a play by play, just keep transmitting, and you know, once you get that radio, hang up 

the phone, and you know, we’ll deal with it. 

So once he hung up, I called—I made a radio call to all the 

guys, the GRS guys to return to the team room, and then, 

you know, within a few minutes guys start trickling in. 

Some guys kind of, you know—you know, it’s in the 

evening, so some guys in shorts and T-shirt, other guys, 

you know, clearly just, you know, thrown pants, T-shirt or 

whatever on, you know, just asking: Hey, what’s going on? 

Hey, I don’t know. I don’t have a lot of specifics other than 

I just got a call from [Diplomatic Security Agent 3]. He 

said the facility is under attack. So at that point, you 

know, I don’t need to tell anybody what to do. As the guys 

trickle in, it’s, you know, word of mouth, hey, start, you 

know, gathering gear, start getting your kit, you know, 

your helmet, night vision gear, ballistic armor, you know, 

weapons, all that good stuff. 

And you know, shortly thereafter, the deputy chief of base 

walks in, and he says: Hey, what’s going on. I heard you 

say call the guys to the team room. I said: Hey, Chief, not 

exactly sure, but the State facility, I just got a call and 

they’re under attack. 

And he asked me, he said: Well, did you tell chief of base 

yet? 

I said: No, I’m just getting—he said: All right. Don’t worry 

about it. I’ll go tell him. 

So we continue to kit up. The guys, you know, are doing 

their thing, start bringing our heavier weapons, equipment 

out to the car. We get the linguist, kind of get him—you 


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156Testimony of GRS-Team Lead, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 20–23 (Apr. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Team Lead Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 157 Id. at 23–24. 

know, get him some body armor, get him a helmet, and 

you know, kind of give him a quick brief. We kind of gravitate out to the vehicles.156

Once the Chief of Base was alerted, he met with the Team Lead 

and the Deputy Chief of Base to determine if they had received any 

additional information about what was happening at the Mission. 

The Chief of Base then began calling partner militia organizations 

for assistance. 

So he starts working phones. I can hear him. You know, 

sometimes he’s able to get through to people, and you 

know, I remember one conversation where he’s given a 

quick data dump, and the guys says: All right. Hey, you 

know, call me back in 2 minutes. 

So when he hangs up, he says: Hey, while—you know, I 

don’t remember who he said it was, but while that person 

is making some phone calls, I’m going to call, you know, 

the other guy and just—you know, I said: Hey, look, Chief, 

what we want is technicals. So what we want is, you 

know, the trucks with bigger guns than what we have because I don’t know what we’re going into. So whether it be 

Dishka-type weapons or some type of heavy machine gun 

mounted on a truck, that’s what I definitely want.157

While the Chief of Base was trying to generate assistance for the 

Annex team, the team members finished loading up their gear into 

two vehicles. The Team Lead was standing outside of the vehicles 

while the Chief of Base contacted their partner organizations. 

Meanwhile, the Annex team members became anxious to depart. 

So while this is going on, one of my—like I said, the guys 

there are pretty much just kind of wrapping up, getting, 

you know, the ammo, and you know, first aid kits, all that 

stuff, and then they’re basically standing by loading in 

front of the building. And one of the officers, my officers 

comes out, and he says: Hey, look, you know, we got to get 

going. We got to go. We got to go. 

I said: Yeah, I know that, but I don’t know what we’re getting into, and the chief’s trying to make some phone calls. 

I want to get some technicals to go with us because I don’t 

know what we’re—what we’re going to get into. 

* * * 

So he goes back into the car. Chief continues to, you know, 

work the phones. He makes contact with maybe another 

two or three guys, and then he circles back with that first 

person he made the phone call to, and the phone is shut 

off. And he tells me: Hey, it’s not going through. It’s shut 

off. I said: All right. Can you try the other guys back? 


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158 Id. at 24–26. 

So he proceeds to, you know, try to make follow up phone 

calls. You know, [one Team Member] pops out again, and 

he’s like, hey, we got to go, we got to go, and at that point 

Chief is like, hey. Yeah, I know. I’m just trying—like, hang 

on. I’m trying to make some—we’re trying to get the 

technicals. We’re trying to, you know, get you guys some 

weapons. 

* * * 

And then one of the other officers,[] came out. He’s like, 

hey, you know, what do we got? I said: Look, Chief’s trying 

to make phone calls. I really want to get some technicals. 

* * * 

So at some point, you know, whatever, couple of minutes, 

it becomes kind of clear that there’s nothing readily coming, or there’s—like Chief isn’t making positive coms with 

anybody who’s saying, hey, I’ve got, you know, two, three, 

four, five technicals, they’re going to meet you at whatever 

location. That’s not happening. So I tell the chief, I say: 

Hey, Chief, look, we’re going. 

And to be honest with you, I don’t recall Chief saying anything. Deputy chief, you know, kind of looks at me, and 

he’s like, well, he’s like, you know, [GRS-Team Lead], God 

speed, hopefully we’ll see you guys back here shortly. 

So at that point, we roll out. I can tell you between, you 

know, the time stamp on our CCTV, like I said roughly, 

I think my phone call came at like 21:43, depending on 

what timestamp you look at, we roll out at like 22:04, so 

21, 23, 24 minutes, whatever.158

The Chief of Base described his actions after he learned about 

the attacks. 

I was calling everybody I could think of. I think I called 

the police, LIS, other militia groups that—we were, you 

know, in an information-gathering mode, and trying to see 

who might be able to respond quickly to the Consulate, to 

the mission. 

Q: How much success were you having in actually getting 

through to people at the police, at Libyan intel with other 

militias? 

A: I didn’t get through to Libyan intel, I don’t think. They 

weren’t actually very helpful to us in Benghazi at all. 

Q: Okay. 

A: But otherwise, I was getting through to the people. 

Q: Okay. And what kind of response were you getting on 

the other end? 

A: Well, there was a lot of disbelief and confusion, and trying to understand what was happening, what—basically, it 


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159Testimony of the Chief of Base, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 24–25 (Nov. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Chief of Base Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 160 Id. at 25. 161 Id. at 29. 

was, as what you might, expect when something like that 

happens.159

Despite multiple attempts, the Chief of Base found his phone 

calls unfruitful. He was unable to generate any additional assistance from the partner organizations he called. He described his 

conversations with the organizations. 

A: Well, there was a lot of disbelief and confusion, and trying to understand what was happening, what—basically, it 

was, as you might, expect when something like that happens. 

Q: Did you hear anything that would give you any pause 

or reason for concern? 

A: Well, I was already concerned, to be honest with you. 

I mean, you know, we could hear the gunfire. There were 

even some tracer bullets flying overhead so we were, 

again, I was trying to get as much information as possible.160

The Chief of Base described what happened after the Annex 

team members finished loading their gear and were ready to depart. 

Q: So at some point, the GRS folks were kitted up, and 

what happened at that point that you can recall? Do you 

recall seeing them all kitted up? 

A: I was standing right in the area that they were getting 

their stuff. It took them, I would say, about 15 minutes to 

get ready. It was a very—to me, the time passed by very 

quickly. 

And people were going to CONEXes and getting ammunition and water, and getting batteries and MPGs and such. 

At one point, [the Team Lead] came to me, I would say 

maybe 15 minutes into it and said that he wanted to see 

if I could arrange a technical, or a gun truck, from 17th 

February. So I called back to 17th February and was working on getting that gun truck. So I was in contact with [the 

Team Lead].161

* * * 

Well, their response was, okay, but I don’t have one, or it’s 

going to be difficult. I have got to check. It was—it was not 

like immediately we are going to be able to—the person 

who I was talking to, who was one of their commanders 

whose name I don’t remember. 

Q: And did you relay that back to [the Team Lead]? 

A: Yes. 

Q: What was his response? 


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162 Id. at 29. 163 Id. at 31–32. 164 Id. at 58–59. 

A: That’s when they left to go on the rescue.162

The Chief of Base was adamant that he never told the Annex 

team members to ‘‘stand down.’’ 

You said that you let them go. Did you give them an affirmative order for them to go? 

A: I think I was working with [the Team Lead] the whole 

time—— 

Q: Okay. 

A: —in an effort to get them to get them gone, to have 

them go. So whether or not I gave an affirmative order, 

but I wanted them to go. They were cleared to go. And 

they went. 

Q: When you say they were cleared to go, is that you giving the clearance? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Did you have any discussions—do you recall having 

any discussions with the deputy chief of base about allowing the guys to go? 

A: I don’t recall any. It was never—I never had any doubt 

about the GRS people going to the State Department compound. I had great concerns and great worry about it but 

I did not, I did not tell anybody to stand down.163

The Chief of Base acknowledged he may have told the team to 

wait while he was attempting to secure additional resources for 

them. 

I may have said wait because we were trying to get this technical 

truck that the team lead wanted. But it wasn’t 10 minutes, or 5 

minutes. It was a short period of time. And the only time I remember ever talking to [Annex team member] was when he came up, 

and I said I’m trying to get a technical truck for [the Team Lead]. 

There was nobody, myself or anybody else in Benghazi, that did 

anything to hold up the GRS deploying. The team lead was always 

cleared to go.164

He further added: 

People were coming and going the entire time. But I did 

not issue a stand-down order. And if there was a delay, 

there was a very short delay, basically the team lead we 

have to try to get this gun truck. 

* * * 

I was doing everything, and to my knowledge, everybody 

on that base was doing everything. I think I carried an 

ammo can at one time to get those guys out the door. 


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165 Id. at 59–60. 166Testimony of GRS 3, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 52 (May 29, 2015) [hereinafter GRS 3 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 167 Id. at 50. 168 Id. at 50–51. 

So it’s, you know, our GRS folks were very brave that 

night. But I, everything that I saw from during the kitting 

up of the team, to their departure till their return and 

heard in between, very much [the Team Lead] was in 

charge of it. Listening to the radio, he was in charge of it. 

So when [the Team Lead] was satisfied, I think, that we 

weren’t going to get the support that we—that he wanted 

to get this gun truck to try to link it up—although I think 

they did link up at some point—that he left. He took the 

team and left.165

One GRS agent did not recall the Chief of Base telling the team 

to ‘‘stand down’’ but he did recall the Chief of Base telling them 

to ‘‘wait.’’ 166

Q: And what did you think when he told you to wait? 

A: I believe at first I just said, okay, maybe he’s talking 

to somebody that can help, and, you know, I respected the 

fact that he wanted us to wait and see if he can gather additional fire power to help. At some point, though, the wait 

was too long, and we decided, you know, we couldn’t wait 

any longer and we left. We didn’t know if that wait was 

going to be an indefinite wait and you’re-not-going wait or 

a real wait or—but nothing was happening for several 

minutes. 

And so we can hear the State Department’s cries for help 

on the radio, and we just reached a point where we decided to leave on our own.167

The agent also acknowledged during the time the team was 

‘‘kitting up’’ and after they loaded into the vehicles, the Chief of 

Base and the Team Lead attempted to obtain additional support 

from the Libyan partner organizations. 

Q: When you said nothing happened—nothing was happening for several minutes, you’re referring to what exactly? There were individuals on the phone? 

A: Yes. 

Q: So that was occurring, but for your purposes—— 

A: For our purposes, we were getting in and out of the vehicles, ready to go. We were just waiting for someone to 

say go. My understanding is they were trying to get us to 

link up with 17 Feb or have 17 Feb go there first, something to do with 17 Feb helping out. But there was never 

a clear, definitive, this is what’s going on. Everything was 

chaotic....168

Another Annex Team Member also recalled that the team was 

told to wait while the Chief of Base and the Team Lead were makVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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169Testimony of GRS 4, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 26–29 (Mar. 1, 2016) [hereinafter GRS 4 

Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

ing phone calls. This member testified that once the team was 

ready to depart he approached the Chief of Base and the Team 

Lead, who were both making phone calls at the time. He explained 

what happened. 

A: Yep. Grab my machine gun, grab my night vision, grab 

my helmet and get back outside, and everybody else is 

doing their job. Cars are already staged. Looked at Ty. His 

car was up. He gave me a thumbs up. Had [GRS 3] and 

[GRS 1] in the car. And I went up to our chief of base and 

team leader, and they’re standing in the courtyard, and I 

said, hey, we’re ready to go. 

Q: Now the team leader at this point, you said you saw 

him on the way into the team room. He was not geared up. 

You saw him with his phone. You didn’t see him on the 

phone? 

A: Not at first. When I came back out they were both on 

their phones. 

Q: Now, team leader and—— 

A: And [the Chief of Base] were both on their phones. I 

looked at [the Chief of Base] and the team leader and said, 

hey, we’re ready to go. [The Chief of Base] looked at the 

team leader, and he said tell these guys they need to wait. 

The team leader looks at me and says you guys need to 

wait. It’s about 9:37. It’s no more than 5 minutes if that. 

* * * 

So at this point in time, the chief told the team leader to 

wait. 

Q: Team leader told you to wait? 

A: Yes. 

Q: All right. What did you do next? 

A: Waited. Went back to the car and just radioed, hey, we 

got to wait guys. Just because the guys needed to know 

the information. 

* * * 

Q: All right. So you go back in the car. You’re in the second car, in the SUV. You’re with [GRS 5], and go to the 

radio and say we got to wait? 

A: And everybody is pretty cool about it. Nobody is getting 

upset.169

The team member was able to see what the Chief of Base and 

the Team Lead were doing when he returned to the vehicle: 

What I’m seeing, and I’m looking at [the Chief of Base and 

the Team Lead] off and on and they’re just talking on their 

phones. And all I can see, as time goes on and we start 


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170 Id. at 30. 171 Id. at 30–32. 

getting calls, from [Diplomatic Security Agent 3] on the 

radio, saying, hey, the Consulate has been overrun. GRS, 

where the bleep are you? We do start getting a little bit 

more agitated.170

The team member continued: 

Q: All right. So you said you heard [Diplomatic Security 

Agent 3] on the radio, and what did he say? 

A: [Diplomatic Security Agent 3], and I can’t recall his 

exact words. It’s been 3 years, but I can recall the gist of 

it, and I can recall the emotions of it. It was, GRS, where 

are you? Consulate’s been overrun. Where are you? Where 

are you? Get your asses over here. We need your help. 

Where are you? Another 10 minutes go by, and that’s 

when I see [GRS 1] get out of his car. He goes to the driver’s side. And I have my door closed, and I see him yelling 

at [the Chief of Base]. He’s going like this. Now, I didn’t 

hear it, but I asked him after what he said to him. He was 

just there. Him and [the Chief of Base] are jaw jacking. 

He gets in the car. I said what’s going on, dude? He said 

he’s telling us to stand down. Now [GRS 1] told me that 

on the radio, but I said my vehicle was doors were closed, 

armored vehicle, but I remember seeing him go to the driver’s side and just—— 

Q: So it was just you and [GRS 5] in your vehicle? 

A: Yeah. And then I also reconfirmed that when I asked 

[GRS 1] later. He wasn’t happy. 

* * * 

We waited another 10 minutes, so it’s been about 25 minutes. 

Q: The first time you said you were ready to go in 5 minutes. Then you said there was 10 minutes. Then you waited another 10 minutes? 

A: Close to 25 minutes.171

Although this team member’s testimony regarding the amount of 

time that elapsed between the Mission’s request for help and the 

team’s departure was consistent with the testimony of other witnesses and the time indicated by the surveillance footage of the 

Annex, his testimony about when the attack began, and thus when 

the Mission called for help, differed. The witness, one of the co-authors of the book ‘‘13 Hours: The Inside Account of What Really 

Happened in Benghazi,’’ testified that the attack began at 9:32 

p.m., ten minutes earlier than other witnesses, documents and the 

surveillance footage indicates. He was asked why he believed the 

attack began at 9:32 p.m. and provided this explanation: 

A: I remember hearing a call on the radio that all GRS 

needed to muster in the team room. I remember there was 


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172 Id. at 22–24. 

not a sense of urgency in the voice. I remember looking at 

my watch. I remember it saying 9:32. And I have said that 

many times. I know it differs, but I know that’s what it 

said. 

Q: So let me stop you there. I know you said it many 

times. I’ve read that in the book. Everywhere else I’ve seen 

it’s 9:42. How do you account for the difference? 

A: Differences of what people want to hear, want to know. 

I was on the ground. I was looking. I was pissed off because somebody was bothering me at 9:32 at night because 

I wanted to go home. 

Q: You were home. 

A: I wanted to get the day over with. Nothing good comes 

when you get bothered at night, especially if you’re in the 

military, and you’re getting called by your leadership at 

9:00 at night, nothing good comes of it. The difference, 

you’d have to ask the person that says it’s 9:42. I don’t 

know. I didn’t see anybody else with me on that report 

there that night, though. We get a call 30 seconds later, 

roughly. 

* * * 

Q: And I don’t mean to pick apart your statement. So the 

book I believe—let me just quote you from the book. It 

says: At 9:02 p.m. an unexpected vehicle drove down the 

gravel road outside the compound. And a little bit later the 

SSC vehicle pulled away 40 minutes after it arrived. A little while later. Almost the moment the SSC pickup pulled 

away from the compound, shots and an explosion rang out? 

A: Sure. And what Mitchell was doing with that is he was 

pulling stuff off the report. We had to get the book cleared. 

Q: Okay. 

A: So if you read it, too, he also says that [GRS 4] looked 

at his watch, and he has assured that it was 9:32 that he 

was called. So we’re getting both what other people were 

saying. That’s what we were trying to do, and [GRS 2] can 

help me out with the book here if I get too far into it. But 

we’re trying to show that there are differences in what 

people saw. I know what I saw. I’m not going to say what 

other people saw, and what those other nine reports that 

went through, but I know what I saw on my watch.172

Another Annex Team member described his recollection of what 

happened between the time the Mission called for help and the 

Annex team departed. After the Team Lead told him the Mission 

was under attack, he got dressed, packed his gear, and loaded into 

a vehicle. 

[I] Ran back in, told [Annex Team Member], we got all of 

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173GRS 1 Testimony at 73. 

ons . . . and we loaded up in the vehicles. It was probably 

about 5 minutes or so after we learned of the ongoing attack. And we’re probably sitting there for a little while. 

We’re sitting in the car, you know, just going over, double 

checking our weapons, double checking our gear, you 

know, kind of saying, hey, you know, what’s going on, 

what’s taking so long. 

We’re probably sitting there a good 15 minutes, and I get 

out of the car. I have the Chief of Base, the Deputy Chief 

of Base, and the team leader on the front porch. They’re 

all three on the phone doing something. 

And I just say: Hey, you know, we’ve got to get over there. 

We’re losing the initiative. The Chief of Base looks at me, 

he says: Stand down, you need to wait. You need to come 

up with a plan. 

And I say: No, it’s too late to come up with a plan. We 

need to get over in the area, get eyes on, and then we can 

come up with a plan. 

And that’s kind of where I left it because they left it at 

that, and I got back in the car.173

The Annex Team Member’s testimony was consistent with the 

other witnesses that while the team was ‘‘kitting up’’ and loading 

their gear into the vehicles, the Chief of Base and the Team Lead 

were making phone calls. 

Q: So you were the only one out of the lead vehicle. And 

you got out of the vehicle and you said you saw the chief 

of base, the deputy chief of base, and the team lead. And 

where were they? 

A: On the front porch of the building 3 

* * * 

Q: And what were each of them doing? 

A: They were on the phone. 

Q: Okay. They were all on the phone? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Okay. And you said that—I’m just paraphrasing: We’ve 

got to get over there. We’re losing the initiative. Did you 

say that? Does that sound right? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And did you say that to anybody in particular or all 

three of them? 

A: Pretty much all three of them because I was looking directly at them. 

Q: Okay. And what was the response that you got from all 

of them or any of them? 


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174 Id. at 78–79. 175 Id. at 80. 176 Id. at 130–31. 

A: ‘‘Stand down. You need to wait.’’ That was from the 

chief of base. 

Q: Okay. Do you remember exactly what the chief—is that 

a paraphrase? Did he use those exact words? Do you remember? 

A: He used those exact words.174

When asked why the team member had not disclosed the ‘‘stand 

down’’ order during previous testimony to Congress, he stated: 

A: At the time, because a lot of it was that no—I mean, 

I didn’t know why the stand down order was given. I 

mean, I guess [GRS team member] got told to wait, you 

know, that’s what he says. I just know when we got told 

to stand down and when [the Team Lead] kind of gave the 

brief of kind of like why we’re told to stand down, it was 

kind of understandable, you know. 

But, yes, it shouldn’t take you 23 minutes or 50 minutes 

to link up with the QRF, because even after we left there 

was still no link up. There was no communication between 

us and the 17 Feb. that I knew of. Because when we rolled 

in, we didn’t know who we were going to be meeting.175

The team member believed that no matter what phrase the Chief 

of Base conveyed that night to direct the team, they would not 

have left unless they made the decision on their own to leave at 

the moment they did. 

A: I mean, just like for the stand down. I don’t think it 

came from anywhere else but [the Chief of Base]. . . . 

So my biggest thing, I think, it was—I don’t believe, you 

know, stand down. I think it was just like a heat-of-themoment kind of thing. But to me, no matter what, when 

he said stand down, or wait, or don’t go, whatever, he 

still—I believe if we didn’t leave on our own, we would 

have never left.176

The Deputy Chief of Base also described what happened between 

the time the Annex was notified of the attack and the time the 

GRS Team departed. 

I was sitting in my—I was sitting at my desk in the SCIF 

and I was working on—I was working on a cable I was 

writing regarding a meeting I had been to earlier in the 

day with the chief of base, and I remember looking at the 

clock that was in the lower corner of the computer screen 

noting that—for some reason it just stuck out—that it was 

9:40 or 9:42. I remember looking at the time. And the GRS 

team leader, [redacted text], came in, and grabbed me 

and pulled me out into the GRS room and said—said he 

had just received communication from [Agent 3] at the 

special mission that they had people inside the wire there. 


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177Testimony of Deputy Chief of Base, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 101–02 (June 4, 2015) [hereinafter Deputy Chief of Base Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 178 Id. at 103. 

They had people inside the compound. And he said: We are 

going to go, we are going to go over there, you know, and 

get those guys, get them out of there. And I said: Okay, 

you know, got that, but we got to let the boss know about 

this and he needs to make the call before we do that. And 

he said, ‘‘yeah.’’ So I went back in. 

I got the Chief of Base, brought the Chief of Base out into 

the GRS team room where we were. The GRS team leader 

advised the chief of base what the situation was and said: 

We got to go get those guys. And the chief of base responded, ‘‘Absolutely.’’ ‘‘Absolutely.’’ Not, ‘‘I got to go call 

the chief of station.’’ Not, ‘‘I got to go check with somebody 

in Washington.’’ All he said was, ‘‘Absolutely.’’ So I want 

to make that very clear because I know there’s conflicting 

accounts about that discussion. There were three people in 

that discussion: myself, the GRS team leader, and the 

chief of base. And anybody writing any books or making 

movies, or whatever else, I can tell you none of those guys 

were in the room when that discussion occurred.177

The Deputy Chief of Base indicated the GRS team was loaded 

and ready to depart approximately 10 minutes after the Team Lead 

told them what was happening at the Mission. 

So [the Team Lead] advised me that he had just gotten the 

call from [Diplomatic Security Agent 3] and then I—and 

then I told him, we got to, you know, we got to check with 

the chief of base on this. And I went and got him, and then 

we had that short discussion. And then, shortly thereafter, 

he advised the GRS team members to start gathering their 

equipment that they were going over there. 

* * * 

And that took—that took about 10 minutes for them to get 

everything together.178

The Deputy Chief of Base raised a concern with the Chief of Base 

that they needed to attempt to confirm whether 17th February or 

any other friendly militia was at the base or would be arrive shortly in order to prevent that force from attacking the GRS team or 

vice versa. The Deputy Chief noted because one GRS team member 

was away from the base at the time, and the remaining were preparing to go to the Mission compound, the Annex effectively was 

without any defensive capability. 

But what happened was, I said to the chief of base: Look 

it, you know, we got a real issue here with potential greenon-blue because we were still operating under the assumption that 17th February was going to show up. 

And, in fact, a bunch of them about did, although it appears to be an uncoordinated response. They did, in fact, 

show up. So you got to remember that these guys that 


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179 Id. at 104–05. 180GRS 4 Testimony at 95. 181 Id. 182DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 2005). 

went over there, the GRS guys, the six of them, [redacted 

text]. And I was really worried about that. If the city is 

blowing up, I got to make sure we get them back safely because what we were doing in making this decision, again, 

which the chief of base made instantly on the spot, without 

equivocation, was we were giving up all of our shooters to 

go over there and rescue the State Department people, as 

well as any QRF capability we would have had to rescue 

the case officer and the lone GRS guy [redacted text] if 

they got into an in extremis situation. 

Now, on top of that, what the GRS guys took with them 

when they responded over there was every piece of heavy 

automatic weapons, and every really solid defensive weaponry capability that we had on the base. So while the chief 

of base agreed to do this right away, this was not a light— 

a decision taken lightly. 

And, again, I feel like the narrative that I have seen in 

public does not account for this and does not account for 

the consideration that there was a green-on-blue situation 

that could have wiped all of those guys out. And then 

where would we have been? We wouldn’t have had the 

ability to do anything to help the State Department people, and we wouldn’t have had the ability to evacuate ourselves or defend ourselves if we came under attack.179

One GRS Agent explained it is not unusual for people to have a 

different recollection of what happened during the time the Diplomatic Security Agents called the Annex to request help.180

Q: Is it unusual in your perspective to have individuals 

with different accounts? 

A: It’s not—of course it’s not unusual to have people have 

different accounts.181

The Annex Team departed at 10:05 p.m., twenty-three minutes 

after the Diplomatic Security Agent at the Mission called and 

asked for their help.182

After departing the Annex, the Annex Team faced a roadblock at 

the intersection of the main road leading to the Benghazi Mission 

compound. A militia was blocking the most direct route to the Mission compound. One GRS Team Member described what they encountered: 

When we arrived, to the corner of the street that leads to 

the front gate, there was at least a couple vehicles there 

and some Libyans standing around outside. We slowly approached. We didn’t know if they were friendly or hostile. 

They didn’t appear to be a threat to us. They didn’t raise 

their weapons at us, so we got out of the vehicles. 


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183GRS 3 Testimony at 53–54. 184GRS Team Lead Testimony at 32–34. 185Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 98. 186Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 150. 

And at that time, the interpreter and [the Team Lead], I 

believe, started talking to somebody. We were receiving ineffective, sporadic fire. We returned fire and moved up the 

street. At that point, that’s when our group split up.183

The Team Lead also described the roadblock: 

Q: And describe what happened when you left the base? 

A: So we roll out, and at this point there obviously was no 

communication via telephone that’s got us anything. So my 

plan now is the route that we’re going to take to get to the 

mission facility, I know there’s two—three militia and/or 

proper Army compounds on the way. So my intentions are 

to basically stop into one of those facilities along the way, 

get the technicals that we were trying to get for support, 

and then roll to the mission facility. 

So we come out to one of the main roads. One of the gates, 

back gates to one of the militia compounds, which is always sealed up and closed, is wide open, and there’s militia guys moving all over the place. 

I look up the street, and there is—I can see, you know, a 

bunch of other movement and what have you, personnel, 

militia guys, whatever, and we have to go north anyways, 

so I said: Hey, push on to, at that corner, there is what 

used to be a Libyan National Army base or compound 

right at the corner. I said: Hey, we’re going to go to that 

compound because that’s the direction we have to travel. 

We get to that corner, and as I’m looking to pull in—and 

there’s guys, you know, standing out in front. And as I’m 

looking there, and then I look at—essentially the path of 

the travel is across the main intersection and across the 

street, and generally speaking, where we would—the access road to the State facility is kind of up a couple of 100 

yards or so on the right, and as I look up, there is—I can 

see a couple of technicals and a bunch of dismounted personnel with AKs or some type of rifle on them. 

So I said: All right. You know what, guys, we’re pushing 

to—through the intersection to that corner. Because there 

was already some type of force where we need to be, so I 

figured with the linguist there, roger that, we can try to 

utilize these guys to assist us.184

At the same time, the Diplomatic Security Agents at the compound were working to clear it. After they cleared Villa B, the Diplomatic Security Agents began searching Villa C, which was still on 

fire, for Stevens and Smith.185 One Diplomatic Security Agent described the smoke in Villa C as so thick it prevented him ‘‘from 

see[ing] your hand in front of your face. There are no lights; the 

electricity [was] down.’’ 186 Because the toxic smoke and heat were 


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187 Id. at 155. 188 Comprehensive Timeline of Events—Benghazi, produced by the U.S. Dep’t of State. (Last 

Edit Nov. 1, 2012) (on file with the committee, SCB0047843); see also, Video: DVR Footage of 

the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2239–2240). 189 Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2245). 190 Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2247). 191Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 155. 

so overwhelming, the Diplomatic Security Agents retrieved gas 

masks, which were ineffective: 

So I put the mask on. And we are being told repeatedly 

through this whole time by the other Americans that are 

there, ‘‘There is no good air in there. The device that you 

have does not provide air.’’ I am aware of this. All you are 

going to do is go in there and become a victim, is what 

they are implying, which is accurate.187

As the agents are making their second round of attempts in and 

out of Villa C to locate Stevens, at 10:38 p.m. [4:38 p.m. in Washington D.C.], a local force, arrived at the Mission.188 A few minutes 

later, the Annex Team arrived on the compound. After three of the 

Annex Team members cleared the main road and the main gate 

they entered the compound.189 Two minutes later, the Annex Team 

Lead and the CIA linguist arrived through the main gate of the 

Mission.190

Over the course of the next 20 minutes, members of the Annex 

Team continued to clear portions of the compound while other 

Annex Team members joined the Diplomatic Security Agents in 

searching for Stevens and Smith.191 One of the Diplomatic Security 

Agents described his attempts to find them: 

One of my biggest concerns is one of us in this recovery effort was going to go in there and become a victim ourselves, requiring our elements to stay on the X later, which 

is a bad situation. I would not want to put our guys at 

risk, any greater risk, by having to fish me out of that 

same situation where you are trying to pull somebody else 

out of. 

So I go in there a fourth time. I got the mask on. I go in 

as far as I have gone. I go directly in the safe haven, and 

I stay there longer than I should. I am stomping on the 

ground, I am feeling around, I am yelling for the Ambassador. I got nothing. The only and, again, the only guidance I had from the agent that was in there at the time 

was that he had him in the safe haven. I wasn’t aware of 

any other location he may have been at that point. 

So I am in there, I don’t know how long, a minute, [two], 

I don’t know. I couldn’t tell you how long exactly. But I 

start to feel the effects of oxygen deprivation. You start 

feeling it in the back of your head. Because I am just not 

getting air, because there is no good air in there. So I start 

thinking about, you know, putting our team in a worse position having to come retrieve me. I back out. 


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192 Id. at 155–156. 193Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 136. 

So, as I come out, I am grabbed by the team leader of the 

other Americans, who says, ‘‘You guys need to’’ . . . ’’get 

the fuck out of here.’’ That is a quote. 

And we pushed this off for the last 20 minutes, basically, 

where they repeatedly told us, you need to go, you need to 

go, and we have been adamant that we need to stay and 

recover or locate the Ambassador and Sean Smith. We 

have stayed up until this point.192

Diplomatic Security Agent 4 found Smith unresponsive inside 

Villa C.193

I go into the safe haven with the intention of recovering 

Smith and Stevens 

Immediately upon entering the safe haven, it becomes very 

clear to me that it would be a very—that would be very 

difficult. The smoke is extremely thick and acrid. From 

what I understand now, that was a result of the 

accelerants used to start the fire. But open flame is not so 

much an issue; it’s the volume and the toxic nature of the 

smoke that made it very difficult. Even immediately entering the room, I became very disoriented. 

But using my internal map, my memory of the layout of 

the safe-haven area, I make my way along the wall searching and feeling my way. I make my way into the safehaven closet, the safe room, where, according to our plan, 

everyone would’ve been staged. And I don’t find anybody 

there. I go and make sure that—I go and work my way 

around the wall to the gate, the locked gate of the safe 

haven itself. And I’m able to confirm that the gate is still 

locked, it was locked by padlock from the inside. So I can 

make the assumption that nobody has entered the safe 

haven and nobody has left. So that limits the search area. 

So I continue to search. I just kind of follow along the 

walls, calling out to the Ambassador and Smith and doing 

my best to feel around for them. 

Q: So, at this point, you have zero visual visibility and 

you’re feeling along the walls? 

A: Uh-huh. 

Q: And so did that mean that you were just necessarily a 

little limited in the surface area you could cover in terms 

of—— 

A: Right. Yeah. You’re right; there was no visibility. So I 

was just trying to feel with my limbs, my hands and feet, 

and still maintain contract with the wall so that I wouldn’t 

lose myself. But, nevertheless, I started to feel very disoriented myself. I started to be worried that, you know, I 

was really craving oxygen by that point, and I eventually 

found myself in the bathroom. I broke a window out to try 


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194 Id. at 136–137. 195 Comprehensive Timeline of Events—Benghazi, produced by the U.S. Dep’t of State. (Last 

Edit Nov. 1, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0047843). 196 Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 18. 197 Id. 198See Hicks Apr. 2016 Testimony at 72. 

and ventilate the space and to get some fresh air for myself. And I cleared my head a little bit. 

I was able to get lower to the ground, and then I worked 

my way back out the way that I had come. And it was at 

that point in the hallway that I came across the body of 

Sean Smith. He was unresponsive. So I grabbed him and 

dragged him back down the hallway to the safe-haven window and then handed him off to the people waiting outside. It was when we had him outside in the clear air 

that—and we had a brief check of him, he had—he was 

unresponsive, not breathing, no pulse, and so felt that at 

that point he was already expired.194

At 11:01 p.m. [5:01 p.m. in Washington D.C.], Smith was reported as killed in action.195 He was an only child, a husband and 

father of two. He was posthumously awarded the Thomas Jefferson 

Star for Foreign Service on May 3, 2013. 

Embassy Tripoli 

At the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, the Deputy Chief of Mission, the 

most senior member of the State Department team in Tripoli, and 

the Chief of Station, the most senior member of the CIA team in 

Libya, learned of the attack soon after it began.196 At 9:45 p.m., 

three minutes after the attacks began, the senior Diplomatic Security Agent notified Hicks of the attack. After realizing he had a few 

missed calls on his cell phone, Hicks attempted to redial the number and reached Stevens: 

I jumped up and reached into my phone at the same time 

I tried to connect with John which I did not do, he ran out 

immediately. 

And I looked at my phone, and I saw two missed phone 

calls, one from a number I did not recognize, and the second from the Ambassador’s telephone. 

I punched the number that I did not recognize and called 

it back, to call it back, and I got Chris on the line. And 

he said, ‘‘Greg, we are under attack.’’ 197

The line went dead. Hicks was unable to reach Stevens again. 

Individuals in the tactical operations center, the command center 

at the Embassy in Tripoli, quickly alerted other relevant Embassy 

staff when the attack was first reported.198 Within minutes, the individuals in Tripoli took quick and decisive actions to execute two 

steps in response to the attacks that night. First, they submitted 

a request to divert an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

asset— colloquially referred to as a ‘‘drone’’—flying over another location in eastern Libya to Benghazi to provide tactical awareness 

of the situation on the ground. Second, the Chief of Station of the 


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199Testimony of Chief of Station, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 112–13 (July 16, 2015) [hereinafter Chief of Station Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 200Testimony of Special Operator, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Tr. at 44–45 (Sept. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Special Operator Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

Annex in Tripoli prepared a rescue team, called ‘‘Team Tripoli,’’ to 

respond forthwith to the attacks in Benghazi. 

Team Tripoli Response 

In Tripoli, when word of the attacks reached the Embassy and 

the CIA Station, a team consisting of four Tripoli Station GRS 

members, one of whom was Glen Doherty, two Defense Department 

special operators, and a CIA linguist sprang into action. Using 

their initiative coupled with previously established contacts, in less 

than an hour, they managed to assemble a response team and acquire an aircraft for transport. The Chief of Station authorized this 

team, dubbed Team Tripoli, to respond to the attacks in Benghazi: 

[M]y specific direction to Team Tripoli was to provide 

quick reaction force to shore up base and to assist the 

[Benghazi Mission compound], the consulate there, and in 

so doing render any assistance to the Ambassador. So that 

was all kind of—they were a complementary set of objectives. 

One of the things, on a more tactical level, was the entire 

GRS contingent in Benghazi, save one officer, was forward 

deployed to the temporary mission facility. So they were, 

in my opinion, very vulnerable. 

At that time, I made the decision to deploy all except one 

of our GRS officers to Benghazi. That gave me certainly a 

sense of trepidation because that left us vulnerable to any 

sort of attack or follow on things. So that was part of my 

thought calculus doing that. I didn’t hesitate, but I certainly thought about that and the ensuing consequences of 

leaving one GRS.199

While the mission of Team Tripoli was supported by the Department of State at Embassy Tripoli and supported by AFRICOM, it 

was a mission orchestrated solely by the CIA Chief of Station in 

Tripoli. As reported by one of the military members of Team Tripoli 

to the Committee: 

Q: Did AFRICOM headquarters or SOCAFRICA have any 

role in planning your deployment from Tripoli to 

Benghazi? 

A: No, sir. 

* * * 

Q: How about the Embassy itself there in Tripoli, were 

they directing the deployment from Tripoli to Benghazi? 

A: Not that I recall, sir.200

Fortuitously, earlier that day a CIA member of the team had brokered an initial agreement with the owner of an aircraft to charter 


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201 Id. at 37. 202 Id. 203 Id. 204 Id. at 47–48. 205See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Timeline of the Department of Defense Actions on September 

11–12, 2012 (May 1, 2013) (on file with the Committee) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Defense 

Timeline] (‘‘A six-man security team from U.S. Embassy Tripoli, including two DoD personnel, 

departs for Benghazi’’); see also, Special Operator Testimony at 41. 

the aircraft as needed.201 During the morning meeting, the CIA officer had queried the operator of the aircraft as to ‘‘How fast can 

you respond?’’ and the [redacted text] owner replied, ‘‘I am not 

sure; probably within 24 hours.’’ 202 Because of this, Team Tripoli 

was able to quickly secure the aircraft for transport from Tripoli 

to Benghazi that night. 

A: Called back again that night and said, ‘‘We need you 

right now,’’ and he was there. He showed up. 

Q: That was good timing, wasn’t it? 

A: It was good timing, sir, convenient.203

* * * 

Q: And how long did it take from the time that call was 

made to the aircraft owner, what did he say about his ability to take off from Tripoli to Benghazi? How long a timeframe do you recall? 

A: I don’t remember what time he said, but I know we had 

got there around 11:30 or midnight, but he was ready to 

go when we had gotten there. And they actually had expedited us through the airport. We didn’t go through any— 

the actual airport procedures. We had weapons and ammo, 

obviously. 

* * * 

Q: And was there no limitation on daylight only flight ops 

with this [redacted text], as I understand was the limitation on the Libyan military C–130? 

A: I don’t think they could fly at night, but he could because he was a privately owned company. The [redacted 

text] was privately owned. 

Q: But your understanding was, at least with respect to 

the Libya C–130—— 

A: Daytime, sir. 

Q: That was limited to daytime ops? 

A: Yes, sir.204

At 12:30 a.m. [6:30 p.m. in Washington D.C.], the Team Tripoli 

departed the Tripoli Mitiga Airport with four GRS officers, including former U.S. Navy SEAL Glen A. Doherty, two military personnel, and a CIA officer acting as a linguist.205


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206Leidig 2014 Testimony at 20. 207 Id. 208 Id. at 26. 209 Id. 210 Id. at 28. 

The Defense Department is Alerted of the Attack 

News of the attack traveled at varying speeds within the Defense 

Department. AFRICOM was the first combatant command to receive an alert about the attacks. By 4:32 p.m. in Washington D.C. 

[10:32 p.m. in Benghazi], news of the attack reached the Pentagon. 

AFRICOM ALERTED OF THE ATTACK 

Members within the AFRICOM command structure learned of 

the attack just more than 30 minutes after it began. At AFRICOM 

headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, Vice Admiral Charles J. 

Leidig Jr., the second in command for military operations, learned 

of the attack just over a half hour after it began.206 He testified: 

The night of the attack, when I received the initial report 

at my quarters that night that there had been—I remember it exactly. I got a report at [10:15]. I tell people I saw 

the same Indiglo watch, and I was asleep in my bed. I 

went to bed, got up early, and it was my routine. So at 

[10:15], I rolled over and got a report that . . . the facility 

in Benghazi [had been overrun], but that the Ambassador 

was in a safe room and was safe. And that was the initial 

report I got at [10:15].207

Following notification, Admiral Leidig recalled his command center staff and returned to work.208 Although the initial reports he 

received were that Stevens had been secured in a safe haven, he 

learned shortly upon returning to work that Stevens was missing:209

When I got to the command center, the focus was on where 

is the Ambassador and trying to locate him. At that point 

I didn’t know where the location that folks had went to. I 

didn’t know who they were. I would later learn over the 

intervening hours that that was some folks from [the 

annex] who had come to move State Department personnel 

to the other facility. Again, it was several hours before I 

knew what the facility was, or the location, or where they 

were at. I just knew that they had moved to another location, and the reports we were getting from—most of our reporting at that point were coming from the defense 

attache ́’, our defense attache ́’ in Tripoli—was that they 

were safe, and they were fine, and that they were at this 

other facility. Our focus was trying to help gather information to see if we could locate where the Ambassador 

was.210

PENTAGON ALERTED OF ATTACK 

Almost an hour after the attacks started, at 4:32 p.m. in Washington D.C. [10:32 p.m. in Benghazi], nearly the same time the 


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211 U.S. Dep’t of Defense Timeline. 212 U.S. Dep’t of Defense Timeline; see SCC Timeline (indicating the Diplomatic Security Command Center received notification of the attack at 3:49 PM EDT). 213Testimony of Vice Admiral Kurt Tidd, Assistant to the Chairman of the J. Chiefs of Staff, 

Dir. for Operations (J3), U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Tr. at 8 (Apr. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Tidd Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 214 Id. at 8–9. 215Leidig 2014 Testimony at 22. 216 Id. at 22–23. 

Diplomatic Security Agents and the Annex security team members 

began clearing the Mission compound in Benghazi half a world 

away, word of the attack finally reached the Pentagon.211 Although 

the Embassy in Tripoli and the Diplomatic Command Center at the 

State Department in Washington received word almost immediately that the Benghazi Mission compound was under attack, 

that notice did not make its way to the National Military Command Center, the operations center at the Pentagon, until 4:32 

p.m. local time in Washington D.C.212 Vice Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, 

the Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time 

of the attacks, testified his staff immediately alerted him about the 

attacks.213 His staff simultaneously contacted AFRICOM to obtain 

additional information regarding the situation on the ground, while 

he notified members of the Secretary of Defense’s staff.214

ASSETS IDENTIFIED TO DEPLOY 

As officials in Washington D.C. began to react to the attacks in 

Benghazi, it is important to describe and understand the assets 

available to respond, the state of those assets, and the military’s 

policies and planning in force that applied to the assets’ use and 

deployment. 

AFRICOM’S Posture and Force Laydown on September 11 

In the days leading up to September 11, 2012, General Carter F. 

Ham, the Commander of the United States Africa Command 

[AFRICOM] conducted a ‘‘deep dive’’ into intelligence reports to 

guide their decision regarding whether any adjustment to the force 

posture needed to be made.215 Leidig testified: 

[B]ased on General Ham’s guidance, we actually did—we 

had been—the military always does planning for September 11th. We always know that there’s a potential for, 

you know, some sort of terrorist activity on September 

11th since its anniversary. General Ham had actually directed in the days running up to it that we do what we call 

a deep dive or a deep look at the intelligence to see if there 

was anything to indicated that there might be anything in 

our [area of responsibility]. We found nothing in any intelligence that would indicate that there was an attack or an 

incident being planned by terrorists in our [area of responsibility].216

Although AFRICOM’s area of responsibility consists of the continent of Africa, with the exception of Egypt, its headquarters are 

based in Stuttgart, Germany. With the exception of a contingent 

stationed in Djibouti, a country on the Horn of Africa approximately 2,000 miles from Libya, AFRICOM did not have assigned 


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217Panetta Testimony at 13. 218 Id. at 14–15. 219Testimony of General Philip G. Breedlove, Commander, U. S. European Command, Tr. at 

21–22 (Apr. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Breedlove Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 220Testimony of General Carter F. Ham, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.Tr. at 28 (June 

8, 2016) [hereinafter Ham 2016 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

forces.217 As a result, AFRICOM had to use United States European Command troops, aircraft, and bases in Europe including 

Ramstein, Germany; Sigonella and Aviano, Italy; and Rota, Spain 

to respond to events occurring on the African continent.218

Planned Assets 

FAST PLATOONS 

The assets AFRICOM would mostly likely call upon in response 

to a crisis situation were the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team 

[FAST] platoons stationed in Rota, Spain. Those platoons were required to be ready to deploy within a certain time frame. FAST platoons, as of September 2012, were typically used to reinforce embassy security and operated from a fixed location within an embassy. FAST platoons did not deploy with their own vehicles, so 

they were dependent on other means for ground mobility. That reality made the FAST platoon less capable to rapidly respond as a 

quick-reaction force. Moreover, the FAST platoon’s ability to move 

on a given timeline required the allocation of aircraft for deployment in a timely manner. 

At the time, FAST platoons did not have dedicated airlift. This 

meant prior to being able to deploy, airlift would need to arrive 

from some other location, most likely Ramstein, Germany, to pick 

up the platoon for an onward deployment. The air base in 

Ramstein, Germany housed C–130s, large transport airframes that 

typically would be used to move the FAST platoons and associated 

equipment. In the days leading up to the attack, none of the C– 

130s in Ramstein were on any heightened alert. To effectuate 

movement, the Commander of United States Air Forces in Europe 

would need to take a series of steps to generate aircraft and prepare an air crew for deployment.219

COMMANDER’S IN EXTREMIS FORCE 

Another asset AFRICOM could call upon when circumstances 

warranted was the Commander’s in Extremis Force [CIF] owned by 

European Command; it is one of the most capable quick response 

forces. General Ham described this force as ‘‘the force of first choice 

should there be an emergent situation.’’ 220 It is a special operations response team that offers capabilities for emergency action 

in missions such as hostage rescue, noncombatant evacuation when 

the security situation is uncertain, or convoy security. The CIF can 

and does work with the U.S.-based Special Operations Force that 

also ultimately deployed the night of the attacks in Benghazi. 

Theoretically, since any deployment from the U.S. to the Middle 

East or North Africa will require significant time for the U.S.-based 

force to reach its destination, the CIF provides a more responsive 

capability when an emergency arises. It has dedicated aircraft for 

transportation. The CIF is tasked to be airborne in a set number 


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221Testimony of Army Major General Michael S. Repass, Commander, Special Operations 

Command Europe, Tr. at 18 (Apr. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Repass Testimony] (on file with the 

Committee). 222 Id. 223 Id. 224Leon E. Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace 225 (2014). 225 Repass Testimony at 8. 226 Id. at 8–9. 227 Id. at 9. 228Testimony of Brigadier General Scott Zobrist, Commander, 31st Fighter Air Wing, U.S. Air 

Forces Europe, Tr. at 15 (Mar. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Zobrist Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 229 Id. at 20. 230 Id. at 21. 231 Id. at 25. 

of hours once alerted, and the military’s air traffic management 

system is supposed to provide two aircraft to ensure the CIF is airborne on the specified timeline. Unlike other assets deployed that 

night the CIF deploys with its own vehicles giving it the ability to 

drive from an airfield where deposited to a crisis site. 

Typically stationed in Germany, in the days leading up to September 11 the CIF was actually deployed to Croatia to perform a 

joint exercise.221 This training exercise had been planned for over 

a year.222

U.S.-BASED SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE 

One other asset that can be used in events similar to the attacks 

in Benghazi is a U.S.-based Special Operations Force [U.S. SOF]. 

That force offers capabilities that complement and expand upon the 

assets brought by the CIF.223 Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta 

described the U.S. SOF as a ‘‘hostage rescue unit from our special 

operations team.’’ 224 [redacted text].225 By design, the CIF would 

typically be able to reach an overseas target first, due to the distance required to deploy from the U.S.226 If required, the CIF can 

assault a target immediately. If time permits, the preferred option 

is to hand the target over to the U.S. SOF, given its more robust 

capabilities.227 Since the U.S. SOF deploys from the U.S., however, 

to respond to the attacks in Benghazi it must travel much farther 

than the CIF and other assets closer to Libya. 

Other Assets 

F–16S AT AVIANO AIR BASE 

Aviano Air Base—situated in Aviano, Italy, approximately 50 

miles north of Venice—is home to the 31st Fighter Wing of the 

United States Air Forces Europe. At the time of the attack, two 

squadrons each consisting of 21 F–16s were stationed at Aviano.228

No tankers to provide air refueling for these F–16s were stationed 

at Aviano.229 The assigned tankers were stationed in Mildenhall, 

England.230

On September 11, 2012, the air squadrons in Aviano were not on 

any heightened alert status, despite the call for a ‘‘heightened 

alert’’ during the President’s call with Cabinet members—an alert 

sequence that would require the pilots and the aircraft to be ready 

in a short amount of time. Rather, they were in a training posture.231 In fact, on that day, the 31st Fighter Wing was in the middle of a two-week inspection to ensure the Fighter Wing met Air 


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232 Id. at 32. 233 Id. at 36. 234 Id. at 29–30. 235 Id. at 56. 236 Id. 237 Ham Testimony at 28. 238 Id. 239Testimony of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Pilot 1, U. S. Air Force, Tr. at 10–11 (May 25, 2016) 

[hereinafter Drone Pilot 1 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 240 [Redacted text]. 

Force requirements.232 The aircraft were in a ‘‘true training configuration’’ which meant nothing was pre-loaded on the aircraft.233

This also meant any live ordnances available at Aviano were not 

assembled, thus, prior to loading onto an F–16, the bomb had to 

be put together piece by piece.234

In addition to the fact that none of the F–16s was on any alert 

status but rather in a true training configuration on the anniversary of September 11, the distance between Aviano and Libya is 

approximately 1,000 miles or the equivalent of two-hour’s flight 

time.235 Because of that distance, an F–16 would have needed two 

air refuelings by the tankers that were stationed nearly 700 miles 

away in Mildenhall, England, at the time.236

These impediments to any fighter aircraft response from Aviano 

to North Africa were well known prior to September 11. Yet the 

alert posture of the aircraft at Aviano did not change in advance 

of that date, nor did the alert posture change after the protests in 

Cairo, Egypt. 

General Ham testified he had not ordered any fighter aircraft at 

Aviano to be placed on alert in the days leading up to September 

11 based on his assessment of the threat intelligence and the probability the type of attacks that would most likely occur would be 

small scale attacks.237 Because of this, he believed if any attack 

were to occur, fighter aircraft would not be the right tool to respond.238 Some other military officials agreed with General Ham’s 

assessment that fighter aircraft would likely not be the right tool 

to respond to potential events in North Africa. 

REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT ‘‘DRONES’’ 

At the time of the attacks, the Air Force operated four remotelypiloted aircraft—colloquially referred to as ‘‘drones’’—from a base 

in southern Europe, approximately four hours from Benghazi. 

These drones were flown by a United States Air Force squadron located in the continental United States, and conducted missions 

over several countries including Libya.239 None of the drones were 

armed, [redacted text].240 A pilot operating a drone on the night 

of the attack explained why: 

Q: Was the aircraft armed? 

A: No, the aircraft did not have Hellfires on it. 

Q: Could it have been armed? 

A: I guess ‘‘could’’ is a very subjective term in this case. 

So the aircraft had pylons which you could put Hellfires 

on, yes. 

Q: If it was capable of being armed. Why wasn’t it armed? 


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241Drone Pilot 1 Testimony at 24–25. 242Testimony of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Pilot 2, U.S. Air Force, Tr. at 15 (May 25, 2016) 

[hereinafter Drone Pilot 2 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 243 Id. at 27. 

A: So as far as, like, the details of that decision, they’re 

above my level as to why that wasn’t armed. But from my 

understanding, the two reasons were—one is the political 

environment between Libya, Italy, America, and Europe 

was that we no longer needed missiles on our aircraft in 

Libya because it had stabilized from the Qadhafi regime, 

post-Qadhafi regime. 

The second reason is, whenever we don’t need missiles on 

the aircraft, we want to pull them off as soon as we can, 

because it provides an opportunity to put more gas on 

board, and with more gas on board, we can fly longer missions and we can provide more intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance to the Combined Air Operations Center.241

Armed drones had not been flown out of southern Europe since 

the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Another pilot who operated the 

drone that night added: 

A: [W]e hadn’t been armed in Libya since at some point 

after the Qadhafi stuff had happened. So at some point 

after that, it was—we knew we were no longer going to be 

armed in that theater. 

Q: How did you know that? 

A: I don’t remember who mentioned it, but I remember 

hearing at some point that the—my understanding of it 

was that the [government hosting the drone base] did not 

want us flying an unmanned aircraft that was armed over 

their country, so therefore they restricted us from having 

armed unmanned aircraft. 

Q: And did you ever hear anything like—was that through 

your chain of command or that was a fellow pilot? 

A: My best guess would be that it was probably our operations supervisor who basically runs the mass brief at the 

beginning of each shift, you know, would have just mentioned one day: Hey, due to, you know, the [government 

hosting the drone base] not wanting us to have armed unmanned aircraft over their country, we’re no longer going 

to be armed in Libya.242

One of the pilots added: 

To the best of my knowledge, that is my understanding for 

what the trigger was for no longer arming the remote-piloted aircraft flying over Libya, was the takedown of Qadhafi.243

To utilize armed drones in a close air support environment, such 

as in Benghazi, a pilot would typically receive targeting instrucVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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244 Id. at 25–26. 245Drone Pilot 1 Testimony at 23. 246GRS 5 Testimony at 43–45; see also, Drone Pilot 1 Testimony at 67 (‘‘there were no JTACs 

in all of Libya.’’). 

tions and clearance from a Joint Terminal Attack Controller 

[JTAC] on the ground.244 One of the drone pilots explained: 

In a close air support environment, which is more akin to 

what [Benghazi] would be, that’s where we would coordinate with a joint terminal attack controller, JTAC, on the 

ground, and he would give us what is called a nine-line in 

order to strike in that close air support environment. And 

that would be the clearance. 

And then the only other option would be to get a nine-line, 

which is equivalent to a strike clearance, from the actual 

Combined Air Operations Center via a chariot directed 

straight from the Combined Forces Air Component commander.245

Although there were no JTAC’s on the ground in Benghazi that 

night, several of the GRS agents possessed the skillset from their 

prior military experience.246 One agent testified: 

Q: And so how many of you had that, what [do] you call 

it again? What did you call it again? 

A: A nine line. 

Q: Nine line? 

A: Yes, sir. It’s just calling for fire. Now they call them 

JTACs. When most of us were in the military it wasn’t as 

specialized, but everyone on that team could have called 

in, called for fire. 

Q: Anybody—— 

A: On our team, yes. 

Q: —could have called it? 

A: Yes, sir. 

Q: So how were you able to—I guess your capabilities— 

I’m talking about you personally, you were able to provide 

a nine line? 

A: Sure. 

Q: And how did you know how to do that? 

A: From the military. From prior training in the military. 

Q: Okay. Would you have had any way to communicate 

with the pilot if a pilot—— 

A: We could have, yes. 

Q: All right. How could that have—— 

A: Through radio. 

Q: Through radio. When you say we were all able to provide precision fire, are you talking about the GRS individuals? 


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247GRS 5 Testimony at 43–45. 248Drone Pilot 1 Testimony at 65–66. 249 Id. This appears to be a concise statement from his perspective of more complex legal and 

operational constraints. 250 Id. at 30–31. 251Testimony of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Sensor Operator, U. S. Air Force, Tr. at 26 (June 

9, 2016) [hereinafter Sensor Operator 1] (on file with the Committee). 

A: Only the GRS individuals, yes. 

Q: Okay. Do you know if everybody was able to do that 

or—— 

A: Yes, I do.247

When asked whether former military personnel were capable of 

serving as a JTAC, one of the drone pilots acknowledged such a 

person could possess the skills necessary to direct a strike.248 According to the witness from his perspective, the problem would be 

whether the military, without approval from the President, would 

have the authority to launch a missile toward a target at the direction of a skilled civilian.249 However, as the pilot pointed out, authority to strike without a military JTAC on the ground could also 

have been provided by the Combined Forces Air Component Commander.250

The year before the attacks in Benghazi, the Defense Department had operated drones over Libya during Operation Odyssey 

Dawn, the U.S. led campaign against Qadhafi troops, and Operation Unified Protector, the NATO mission against Qadhafi troops. 

During both of those operations, the drones had been used to 

launch missiles toward targets in Libya.251 During these operations, the drones were pre-loaded with missiles while stationed in 

southern Europe and always carried weapons during missions over 

Libya. At some point after the fall of Qadhafi, the drones operating 

over Libya no longer carried missiles. 

After the fall of Qadhafi, the Defense Department continued to 

use drones and other ISR assets to gather intelligence information 

in Libya, especially regarding the growing number of Islamic extremist in country. 

In August 2012, the Libyan government restricted the types of 

missions that could be flown in Libyan air space, primarily over 

Benghazi. General Ham explained: 

Q: General, in the summer of 2012, August timeframe, 

ISR missions over Benghazi and Tripoli were suspended 

due to complaints from Libyans. I believe those ISR assets 

were Predators and they were under your command. Is 

that correct? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And what do you recall about the suspension or the 

complaints from the Libyans about those ISR assets operating in Libya? 

A: There were complaints by the Libyan Government to 

the Embassy about overflights. [Redacted text]. 

Q: Did those complaints impact your ability to operate 

those Predator assets at all during that time? 


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252 Ham 2016 Testimony at 168. 253Panetta Testimony at 45. 254Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) found at www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/fest/ 

index.htm. 

A: I do not recall the complaints about the unmanned systems. I do recall complaints about the manned systems. 

And the manned systems, we would have to very carefully 

manage the time slots and when they could fly. 

Q: Were those P–3s? 

A: Yes. 

General Ham described his assessment of the Libyans’s request: 

Sir, I think there were some honest Libyans who didn’t 

like the noise. I mean, they’re just kind of a constant buzz. 

They’re low, and they’re intrusive. 

I think there were some Libyans who voiced concern to 

their government about a foreign power being intrusive. 

And I believe there were Islamic terrorist organizations 

who were influencing members of the Libyan Government, 

because they knew what those aircraft were doing.252

ASSETS AT SOUDA BAY, CRETE 

While conducting oversight in Souda Bay, Members of the Committee received a briefing regarding special operations aircraft that 

were stationed at Souda Bay on the night of the attacks in 

Benghazi and could have been utilized in response to the attacks. 

The Committee sought confirmation of this information through 

interviews and requests for information from the Defense Department. The Defense Department has not denied the presence of 

these assets. 

MILITARY PERSONNEL IN LIBYA 

The only Defense Department asset in Libya not considered that 

night were the military members of Team Tripoli. This was true 

because the Secretary was not even aware of their presence in 

Libya. At the time of his meeting with the President and for a period subsequent to that, the Secretary was not informed military 

personnel were making their way to Benghazi. In fact, he did not 

learn of this until the next day.253 This means the only U.S. military asset to actually reach Benghazi during the attacks was an 

asset the Secretary did not know about, was not told about by his 

subordinates, and did not learn about until after the fact. 

FOREIGN EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM 

The Foreign Emergency Support Team [FEST] is ‘‘the U.S. government’s only interagency, on-call, short-notice team poised to respond to terrorist incidents worldwide.’’ 254 Consisting of representatives from the Defense Department and other agencies, FEST deploys overseas at the request of the Chief of Mission or the State 

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255See id. 256Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/about/ 

c16664.htm. 257 Id. 258 Email from Mark I. Thompson (Sept. 11, 2012 9:58 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05562162) (‘‘The team can launch within 4 hours of Deputies Committee decision.’’). 259Panetta Testimony at 182. 260 Email to Mark I. Thompson (Sept. 11, 2012 10:43) (on file with the Committee, 

C05562162). 261Testimony of Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y for Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State, 

Tr. at 26 (Jan. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Lamb testimony] (on file with the Committee). 262Petraeus Testimony at 49 263 Id. 264Tidd Testimony at 22. 265 Id. at 23. 

ties with specialized crisis response expertise.255 Historically, it has 

deployed overseas in response to attacks on U.S. interests. For example, in 2000, after the USS Cole was attacked, a FEST team was 

deployed to Aden, Yemen.256 Two years earlier, two FEST teams 

were deployed to Kenya and Tanzania. FEST has also been deployed in response to a hostage-taking crisis and abductions of 

Americans.257 Typically, the State Department requests deployment of the FEST in conjunction with the Joint Staff. Once that 

decision is made, the FEST is capable of launching within four 

hours.258

Despite all of these capabilities, the Secretary recalls no discussion of a potential FEST deployment in response to the Benghazi 

attacks.259 Mark I. Thompson, the person in charge of the FEST, 

contacted Kennedy about deploying the FEST on the night of the 

attacks. According to an email response sent to Thompson that 

evening, Kennedy ‘‘did not feel the dispatch of such a team to Libya 

is the appropriate response to the current situation.’’ 260 Charlene 

R. Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, State 

Department also did not believe the FEST was an appropriate 

asset to be deployed that evening. Although in direct contrast to 

the State Department’s own description and the historical record of 

prior deployments of the unit, Lamb described the FEST as ‘‘primarily focus[ing] on providing a strong communications package, 

policy experts, and investigative abilities.’’ 261

David H. Petraeus, Director, CIA, viewed the FEST as a ‘‘support 

element for the conduct of an operation to do a counter-terrorism 

or hostage rescue operation.’’ 262 [Redacted text].263 Yet with Stevens considered missing for hours in Libya after the death of 

Smith, FEST expertise could have augmented the capabilities of 

the U.S. Embassy in Libya. 

Tidd stated a FEST deployment was discussed briefly during the 

7:30 meeting with the White House, but dismissed.264 Kennedy and 

others at the State Department did not want to deploy the FEST 

in response to the attacks in Benghazi. Tidd indicated the State 

Department was concerned about putting individuals in country 

who were not ‘‘trigger pullers’’ and would potentially need rescuing.265

The Practical and Policy Implications Associated with 

Deploying Assets 

Throughout the course of the investigation, Defense Department 

witnesses provided insight into how various assets might have been 


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266Testimony of CIF Commander, Special Operations Command Europe, Tr. at 98 (Aug. 26, 

2015) [hereinafter CIF Commander Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 267Panetta Testimony at 47. 268Tidd Testimony at 16. 

employed to respond to the events in Benghazi, and the constraints—whether imposed by policy or imposed by capability—of 

employing such assets. 

TIME AND DISTANCE 

Given that the attacks occurred in Libya, military officials repeatedly emphasized any asset that would respond to the events 

would be necessarily constrained by the ‘‘tyranny of time and distance.’’ The CIF commander described the difficulties of responding 

to events in Africa: 

So a lot of people that deploy to Africa or work on 

AFRICOM—work for AFRICOM—use the term ‘‘tyranny of 

distance’’ because it takes so long to move what could 

seemingly look like smaller distances. And there’s not a robust network of airfields and staging points that there are, 

say, in a more developed area of the world, like Europe. So 

Europe is a much smaller area, and there’s many developed airfields, fueling sites. Whereas, when you have Africa, it’s, relatively speaking, much more undeveloped and 

exponentially times larger; so you are limited in your ability to move around with fuel, with time. And we call it the 

‘‘tyranny of distance’’ because it’s hard to get from point A 

to point B, and it takes a while.266

With respect to the response to Benghazi, the Secretary explained: 

I knew it was going to take some time [to move an asset 

into Libya], just because of the preparedness for the units 

and then the time and distance involved. You know, you’ve 

heard the term ‘‘tyranny of time and distance,’’ and it’s 

tough in this area.267

Tidd discussed the challenges faced to move forces as quickly as 

possible that night: 

Q: Admiral, one of the lingering questions that we have 

been trying to get a handle on is why it seemed to take 

so long to get the response forces off the ground. The FAST 

team was in Rota on a [specific] timeline. They were ready 

to move prior to that. They sat on the tarmac for about 6 

hours before the planes got there. 

A: That is because we had no alert aircraft in Ramstein. 

So, literally, it was the middle of the night there. And I 

don’t know all of the exact actions that they had to go to, 

but at Ramstein, they had to go and generate the airplanes, get the air crews, wake them up, brief them, tell 

them what we knew, and have the planes ready to go. We 

did not have an alert posture set for the aircraft.268


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269 Id. 270Testimony of Dr. James N. Miller, Under Sec’y of Defense for Policy, Tr. at 71–72 (May 

10, 2016) [hereinafter Miller Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 271Testimony of Vice Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Vice Chairman, J. Chiefs of Staff, Tr. at 

35–36 (Mar. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Winnefeld Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

* * * 

Everybody wanted them there instantaneously. And we 

were getting a lot of questions . . . Are they mov[ing] yet, 

are they moving yet? It was just taking a long time.269

Dr. James Miller, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at 

the time, provided a civilian’s perspective on the logistical challenges faced by the Defense Department that night in response to 

the attacks: 

The logistical issues were the tyranny of distance and 

time, first and foremost. So moving an asset from the 

[U.S.], the longest move, moving the FAST team, getting 

it prepared to deploy—the FAST teams, I should say, both 

from Rota—and then the EUCOM [CIF]. 

So there is, first, the distance to be traveled, the fact that 

it takes time. Second, they need time to spin up. And I 

later became deeply familiar with the various postures and 

so forth, but it is challenging to sustain a very short 

timeline for an extended period of time. And so each of the 

individual units we’re talking about had a specific timeline 

for readiness. My impression was they were all working to 

shorten that timeline and to get prepared and to deploy 

even more rapidly than their timelines. But that I would 

consider a matter of logistics as well.270

Several witnesses also talked about the logistical obstacles to deploying F–16s in response to the attacks in Benghazi. Being able 

to deploy an aircraft and being able to actually utilize an aircraft 

in response to the events are separate questions. From the Defense 

Department’s perspective, even if a F–16 was activated quickly and 

was able to fly to Benghazi before the final mortar attack, logistical 

constraints would still have impacted the capability to actually utilize the F–16s that night. Admiral James A. Winnefeld, the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discussed those constraints: 

But let’s say you could just snap your fingers and there 

were F–16s suddenly over Benghazi immediately. It’s the 

middle of the night; there’s no joint tactical air controller 

on the ground. You don’t even have any communications 

with the people on the ground. You don’t even know where 

this is happening. If you’re lucky and you’ve got a latitude 

and a longitude to point your systems at, you might be 

able to see the action going on on the ground, if there was 

action going on on the ground, but for most of the night 

there wasn’t.271

Rear Admiral Richard B. Landolt, the Director of Operations for 

AFRICOM also explained the logistical and policy constraints of 

employing F–16s in response to the attack: 


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272Testimony of Rear Admiral Richard B. Landolt, Dir. of Operations for U.S. Africa Command, Tr. at 38 (May 5, 2016) [hereinafter Landolt Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 273Winnefeld Testimony at 36. 

A: You still have 3 to 4 hours of the flight time to get to, 

say, Benghazi. And then you need to spin up tanker aircraft because it can’t do a round trip without them. And 

Admiral Leidig talked to General Franklin on that, so 

there was nothing on strip alert there in Aviano. 

And tankers I believed were up in England, Mildenhall, I 

believe. 

* * * 

Q: Were the F–16s—perhaps ‘‘dismissed’’ isn’t the right 

word, but—pick a better word if you have one—but were 

they dismissed because of the [time it would take to activate] issue, or were they dismissed because there wasn’t a 

viable mission for you to employ them? 

A: I would almost say both reasons, because—yeah. So we 

spin it up, what are we going to do with it? I mean, you’ve 

got to put ordnance on it, you’ve got to refuel it, you’ve got 

to brief a mission. We don’t know what the mission is. You 

know, this is an urban environment so—and we don’t have 

people on the ground that can direct targeting. There were 

not tactical action controllers in Benghazi, as far as I 

know.272

Even if F–16s were generated in a timely manner and were able 

to arrive in Benghazi before the attacks ended, policy restrictions 

would have impacted their utility that night. As Winnefeld explained: 

No Air Force or Navy pilot will ever drop a bomb into an 

area where they are not certain who’s there and what’s 

going on unless there’s communications with people on the 

ground and a JTAC or what we call a forward air controller airborne. 

So I mean, it was highly unlikely that we were going to 

be able to make a difference, even if we could get there in 

time with air power, so we chose not to do it.273

As mentioned previously, many of the GRS agents on the ground 

had the JTAC capabilities from prior military experience. Of course 

all of what is laid out above was well known beforehand. There was 

nothing new about the time and distance concerns in Africa or the 

positioning of U.S. assets that might be called upon to respond. 

Not only did the Defense Department know any response to 

events in North Africa would be hampered by distance, the State 

Department also knew the military had such concerns because they 

were constantly reminded. Winnefeld testified he repeatedly 

warned the State Department of this issue: 

The tyranny of distance, in particularly North Africa, as 

I’m sure you’ve probably seen a picture of the U.S. imposed 

upon—you know, the entire continental U.S. fits neatly 


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274Winnefeld Testimony at 74–75. 275Panetta Testimony at 22. 276 Id. at 22–23 277 Id. at 24. 

into North Africa. It’s a big place. We’ve constantly reminded State while I was the Vice Chairman and also, you 

know, National Security Council staff, gently, politely, that 

if you’re counting on reactive forces from DOD to pull your 

fat out of the fire, basically, when there’s an event going 

on, you’re kidding yourselves. It’s just too hard to get 

there. Usually, an event is over fairly quickly, and even in 

the best alert posture we can be in, it’s going to be a couple of hours, two or three hours, before we can be someplace. 

So what you should really be counting on is using these 

forces to either preemptively reinforce an area, like an embassy, or preemptively evacuate an area, like an embassy. 

Don’t count on us to drop in in the middle of the night and 

stop a situation that’s going on. 

Now that won’t prevent us from trying, certainly. If there’s 

an event in a place that—you know, like a Benghazi and 

if we’re postured in order to get there, we’ll certainly try, 

we’ll always try, but I’ve made it very clear to them—and 

they understand this—that they need to be very careful in 

their risk assessments. And it’s a lot easier to reinforce 

and get out early than it is to save something that’s under 

fire. And that has a lot to do not only with the tyranny of 

distance and how long it takes to get there, but you know, 

it’s not easy to take a force and just drop it into the middle 

of an unknown area at night, and it’s even harder when 

you’re under fire. You know, V–22s don’t like to fly when 

they’re under fire, that sort of thing. So we’ve tried to 

make it very, very clear to [State], try, please, please, to 

do good risk assessment and evacuate or reinforce so that 

we don’t have to rescue you in the middle of a firefight.274

The President’s Directive and The Secretary’s Order 

Just minutes after word of the attack reached the Secretary, he 

and General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, departed the Pentagon to attend a previously scheduled 5:00 

p.m. meeting at the White House with President Obama and National Security Advisor Thomas E. Donilon.275 The Secretary recalled two details about the attack on the U.S. facility in Benghazi: 

a building was on fire and Stevens was missing.276 As the Secretary and Dempsey briefed the President on the evolving situation 

in Benghazi, Libya, the Secretary recalled the following guidance: 

The President made clear that we ought to use all of the 

resources at our disposal to try to make sure we did everything possible to try to save lives there.277

Immediately following the meeting with the President, at roughly 

6:00 p.m., the Secretary and Dempsey returned to the Pentagon 


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278 Id. at 22. 279 Id. at 24–25 280See Winnefeld Testimony at 45. 281Panetta Testimony at 25–26. 282 Id. at 23. 283 Id. at 49. 284 Id. at 26. 285 Id. 

and convened a meeting that included Ham, who was in Washington D.C. at the time, and relevant members of the Secretary’s 

staff and the Joint Staff.278

During the meeting, three distinct capabilities were identified to 

deploy in response to the attacks in Benghazi: two FAST platoons, 

the CIF, and the U.S. SOF, capable of response to crises worldwide.279 Again, the Secretary was not aware, and was not told, of 

any assets in Tripoli. 

The Defense Department provided copies of maps identifying assets present in European Command, AFRICOM, and Central Command’s areas of responsibility on September 11, September 12, and 

September 13 to the Committee. The assets identified on the maps 

were purportedly considered during this meeting, although the 

Joint Staff at the time did not keep a daily updated list of assets 

and their locations.280 During its investigation, the Committee determined the maps failed to include assets that actually were deployed in response to Benghazi. For example, a C–17 medical airplane was deployed to Tripoli on September 12 to evacuate the 

wounded, deceased, and other American citizens. That asset was 

not identified on the maps provided by the Defense Department to 

the Committee. Given this discrepancy, the Committee requested it 

confirm whether there were any additional assets not identified on 

the maps or any assets withheld due to special access programs restrictions. It did not respond to the Committee’s request. This failure to respond unnecessarily and unadvisedly leaves questions the 

Defense Department can easily answer, and it is in the public interest that it do so. 

According to the Secretary, within an hour of his return to the 

Pentagon, he issued an order to deploy the identified assets.281 The 

testimony of record is that the President’s direction that night was 

clear: use all of the resources available to try to make sure we did 

everything possible to try to save lives there.282 When asked 

whether he expected or needed the President to later extrapolate, 

clarify, or reissue that order, the Secretary said ‘‘no.’’ 283 The Secretary insisted he understood the President’s directive and no further communication with the President was necessary. Nor did any 

further communication with the President take place. 

Similarly, the Secretary insists his own intentions and actions 

that night, in the aftermath of the President’s orders, were also 

clear: deploy the identified assets immediately. The Secretary said 

his orders were active tense. ‘‘My orders were to deploy those 

forces, period. . . . [I]t was very clear: They are to deploy.’’ 284 He 

did not order the preparation to deploy or the planning to deploy 

or the contemplation of deployment. His unequivocal testimony was 

that he ordered the identified assets to ‘‘deploy.’’ 285

By 7:00 p.m. in Washington [1:00 a.m. in Benghazi], nearly three 

hours after the attacks began, the Secretary issued what he beVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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286 Id. at 49. 287Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 137–138. 288 Id. 289 Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2310). 290See U.S. Dep’t of Defense Timeline (‘‘[At 11:10 PM EET t]he diverted surveillance aircraft 

arrives on station over the Benghazi facility.’’). 291 Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2210 to 2216). 292Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 156. 

lieved, then and now, to be the only order needed to move the 

FAST platoons, the CIF, and the U.S. SOF.286 Yet nearly two more 

hours elapsed before the Secretary’s orders were relayed to those 

forces. Several more hours elapsed before any of those forces 

moved. During those crucial hours between the Secretary’s order 

and the actual movement of forces, no one stood watch to steer the 

Defense Department’s bureaucratic behemoth forward to ensure 

the Secretary’s orders were carried out with the urgency demanded 

by the lives at stake in Benghazi. For much of the evening of September 11, principals in Washington D.C. considered Stevens to be 

missing and reliable information about his whereabouts was difficult to come by. For those on the ground and in the fight in Libya, 

the reality of a second American death was sinking in. 

THE SECOND ATTACK ON THE COMPOUND 

Evacuation to Annex 

In Benghazi, the Diplomatic Security Agents determined Stevens 

would not have survived the fire in Villa C, and they were now engaged in a recovery mission.287 According to Diplomatic Security 

Agent 4, ‘‘[W]e were unable to find Stevens. I was very—at that 

point, I think it was decided that this was probably a recovery mission. We were looking to recover his body.’’ 288

At 11:10 p.m. [5:10 p.m. in Washington], an explosive device detonated several meters inside the back gate, starting the second 

wave of attacks at the Benghazi Mission compound.289 Around the 

same time, the drone arrived on station over the compound.290 GRS 

officers returned fire after being fired on by the attackers, while 

the Diplomatic Security Agents loaded their vehicle and departed 

the compound under fire at 11:16 p.m. [5:16 p.m.].291 Prior to leaving the compound, the Diplomatic Security Agents did not fire their 

weapons during the attacks. As one Diplomatic Security Agent explained: 

I feel now, and I felt then at the time, that I had the support. At that time there was no opportunity to shoot. There 

was a situation, it was a moment where it was myself and 

[another Diplomatic Security Agent], and we were very 

close quarters with an overwhelming force of armed combatants, and at that situation it would not have been the 

smart thing, it would not have been the tactical thing to 

fire your weapon at that time.292

The Diplomatic Security Agents loaded Sean Smith’s body in 

their vehicle and departed the compound through the main gate. 

One Diplomatic Security Agent described what they saw as they 

exited the compound: 


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293Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 138. 294Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 158–162; See also, Comprehensive Timeline of 

Events—Benghazi, produced by the U.S. Dep’t of State. (Last Edit Nov 01, 2012) (StateSCB0047846). 

As we were turning left to go outside the compound, we 

could see at the end of that access road a lot of cars and 

lights and people milling about. I ascertained that was 

probably a checkpoint or a blockade. And so we turned 

around and went the other way. It was at that point the 

attacking force kind of crossed paths with us, had then 

they opened fire on our vehicle, and we continued out.293

Another Diplomatic Security Agent provided further detail about 

the extensive attacks they encountered as they fled the Mission 

compound.294

The situation on the perimeter was getting substantially 

worse. As we loaded into the vehicle, the agent that had 

been taking in the most smoke that was in the safe haven 

with the Ambassador ultimately ends up being the one to 

drive. I still don’t know why we allowed him to do that. He 

did a great job. That adrenaline kicked in. 

As we pull out of the compound . . . we start taking fire. 

So, as we suspected, the individuals that attacked us, 

some of them had remained hidden in the fruit grove on 

the compound and were waiting for a situation to kill us. 

So as soon as we got out of the way of the Libyans, they 

started shooting the side of our armored vehicle, on my 

side of the car actually. Ting ting, ting ting. I don’t know, 

maybe 10 rounds is what hit us on our left side. 

As we exit the compound, we turn right . . . There is a 

large crowd, 40, 50, 60 people. We can’t tell if they are facing us, we can’t tell if they are waiting for us, we don’t 

know. We get, I don’t know, 20 or 30 yards down this road; 

we see this crowd. We decide it is something we would 

rather not encounter. We turn around. 

We go back close to the compound, and there is someone 

we presume to be a 17 February member waiting off to the 

side by the wall who is waving at us, ‘‘Don’t go this way.’’ 

That is enough for us to turn around. So we turn around 

again back toward the crowd, the large crowd that we 

don’t know their intentions. 

* * * 

Okay. So we are heading back in the direction we initially 

attempted to go. As we get about probably a third to two 

thirds to halfway down this road, we encounter an individual that is pulled off from a small group of people at a 

compound. . . . This individual is waving us into his compound as if to say, you know, this is somewhere safe, come 

in and we will protect you. We decide this is a terrible 

idea. We all advise for the driver to just keep going. 


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295Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 158–163. 296 Id. 297 Id. See also, Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 74–75; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 138; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 125. 

The second we pull alongside of this individual he raises 

an AK 47 and shoots at pointblank range, literally pointblank, inches. His gunfire impacts the entire right side of 

the vehicle. The ballistic glass and the armor proofing 

works, just like it is supposed to. 

He shoots through all the way around the right side, up 

in the back window, breaks through the exterior glass, 

which is just factory glass, and impacts the ballistic resistant glass on the inside, which holds. 

* * * 

So, at the same time this individual is shooting us with his 

AK 47, I don’t think it is him but another member of his 

group throws two grenades under our vehicle. I specify 

that they were grenades because they went off immediately as opposed to being a fuse-lit explosive like the 

gelatin bombs we discussed earlier. Those would have 

taken a few seconds for the fuse to burn out. We didn’t realize it at the time, but two of our tires had been blown 

out. 

So, as we pass this gun, possibly a full magazine of AK– 

47 fire at pointblank range and two grenades under our 

vehicle, and we continue on. We didn’t realize it at the 

time, but two of our tires had been blown out. 

We approach the intersection with the next major road, 

where the large group was positioned, and, to our relief, 

they are not even paying attention to what is going on 

down the road. They have their backs to us.295

As the Diplomatic Security Agents drove away from the Mission 

compound toward the Annex, they noticed they were being followed.296 The individuals following the agents detoured to a warehouse in the vicinity of the Annex near the parking area where 

attackers later staged the first attack on the Annex.297 One Diplomatic Security Agent described what happened when the team arrived at the Annex: 

Finally, we were able to turn, kind of get off the main road 

there where it was a lot quieter, and then we made our 

way to the Annex. Upon arrival at the Annex, you know, 

we pulled in, and immediately people came out and I 

parked the car, got out of the car, and you know, their eyeballs were about the size of saucers, just seeing the car, 

and seeing us. And immediately, they brought me into 

kind of a, you know, the kitchen area, which is where the 

med area was. And they just started pumping me, you 

know, with fluids, just chugging water, eating fruit, and 


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298Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 127. 299 Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 2338). 300 Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2219). 301GRS 2 Testimony at 53. 302 Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2219). 303 Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2219); see also Email 

to the DSCC Watch Team and the DSCC Mgmt. Team (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:59 PM) (on file with 

the Committee, C05409685). The Twitter account with handle @hadeelaish belonged to Hadeel 

al-Shalchi, a journalist for Reuters news. 304 Chief of Station Testimony at 101. 

my goal was just to get back up on my feet, get back out 

and keep fighting.298

The team of five Diplomatic Security Agents arrived with Smith’s 

body at the Annex at 11:23 p.m. [5:23 p.m. in Washington].299

Back at the Benghazi Mission compound, the GRS team were no 

longer facing direct fire. The GRS departed through the compound’s 

main gate and followed a different route to ensure no attackers 

were tailing them.300 They arrived at the Annex approximately 20 

minutes later and quickly took up fighting positions on the roofs 

of the Annex buildings.301

After the agents and the GRS departed the compound, attacks 

continued on the Mission compound with RPGs, small arms fire, 

and unknown explosions.302 A mix of armed and unarmed individuals re-entered the compound through the back gate and subsequently looted the armored vehicles, removed paper and gear from 

the TOC, reset fires, and stole an armored Land Cruiser.303

The First Attack on the Annex 

As the situation continued to unfold in Benghazi, the Diplomatic 

Security Agents on the ground were periodically reporting back to 

the tactical operations center in Tripoli about the events on the 

ground. The Tripoli Chief of Station discussed requests for a medical evacuation: 

So the initial question that I asked for our GRS team lead: 

Do they need a Medevac, and what Medevac assistance do 

they need? At that time they didn’t know, so that was one 

of our communications to AFRICOM was to put a warning 

order or we may be needing Medevac assistance. 

At that time also the location of—we had no indication— 

our main priority was the personnel at the—at the temporary mission facility and the whereabouts of the Ambassador.304

* * * 

A: I think there was a—and some of the decisions were an 

ongoing conversation that I had with our rep in Stuttgart 

was about do we need Medevac and where that Medevac 

would go. So initially in that, when we were still looking 

for the Ambassador and our team was at the airport, they 

just got—I didn’t say we wanted a medical—a Medevac at 

that point because we didn’t have any—I did have conversations with the GRS team lead in Benghazi: What is 

the status of your personnel? Do you need Medevac? And 


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305 Id. at 109. 306GRS 1 Testimony at 94. 307GRS 4 Testimony at 106–107. 308 Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0034). 

that answer was no at that time, and the Ambassador was 

unlocated. 

But what played into some of my calculus at that time was 

I didn’t want to send a U.S. aircraft in Benghazi and 

maybe have the same dynamic of getting off the airport 

and not knowing what were going to be the parameters of 

that situation. 

So that was—and the Defense Attache ́ was in that same 

conversation with elements in AFRICOM.305

Just before 12:30 a.m. [6:30 p.m. in Washington D.C.], individuals congregated and staged gun trucks at the far east intersection 

near the Annex. It was unclear to the agents at the Annex if these 

individuals were friend or foe. The GRS agents on the roof asked 

Annex management whether they were able to determine who was 

congregating outside of the Annex.306 The next wave of attackers 

then used the east field as cover and concealment to advance toward the Annex wall. 

[B]y that time, we had started to see people massing on 

that east side parking lot and starting to utilize that little 

house that had the family in it. They were coming through 

that front door. They would disappear where the front door 

was, and you could see them coming out the back door, 

and that’s when we’re trying to get our lights turned off, 

all the lights, get them off. 

Q: So were there floodlights looking out or lighting the 

base? 

A: Both. We were trying to get the ones looking in. We 

were trying to get those floodlights turned off. And the 

ones looking out, let them stay on. In the meantime, I’m 

calling on the radio going are we expecting friendlies from 

chief of base and our team leader. Are we expecting any 

friendlies? Are we expecting any friendlies? And I’m getting, I don’t know, maybe, I don’t know. In the meantime, 

they’re coming towards us, and I’m asking [redacted 

text], I said do you see any weapons? Because we’re not 

going to shoot anybody unless we see a weapon. And you 

could tell they’re moving tactically. They’re moving sideways. They’re playing hide and go seek. They don’t realize 

we have night vision. Eventually, I’m not going to call that 

we got bad guys coming.307

The first assault on the Annex itself began at 12:34 a.m. [6:34 

p.m in Washington D.C.], when attackers directed small arms fire 

at the Annex hitting the northeast portion of the property, where 

Annex Building 2 was located.308 An IED was thrown over the wall 

near the Annex north recreation area in the vicinity of a GRS offiVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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309GRS 1 Testimony at 94. See also, Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 

0036). 310GRS 1 Testimony at 94. 311 Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, from approximately 

0034 to 0045). 312 Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0036 and 0041, respectively). 313 Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, from approximately 

0040 to 0052). 314GRS 4 Testimony at 119–120. 315 Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0110). 316 Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, from approximately 

0110 to 0115). 317 Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, from approximately 

0110 to 0200). 318GRS 1 Testimony at 97–98. 

cer on the ground.309 One GRS officer described the beginning of 

the first attack. 

But then you could hear, like there’s a mass of cars that 

is forming. We’re trying to figure out if it’s 17 Feb. or if 

it was the police or who was it, you know. Of course, we 

got nothing back from the TL or the Chief of Base. 

But as I was walking the water back, something flew over 

the wall, exploded about 15 feet or so away from me. And 

at the same time, an RPG came up over the wall, and 

that’s when the first assault on our compound happened.310

For the next 10 minutes, rounds of small arms fire, RPG fire and 

IED explosions impacted the Annex near the northeast corner.311

Concurrently, starting at 12:41 a.m. [6:41 p.m. in Washington D.C.] 

the Annex took small arms fire and likely IED attacks from the 

east wall also aimed at Annex Building 2.312 Over the next 10 minutes, there were attackers that were visible along the east wall and 

an explosive impacted against the east side of the Annex.313

After being repelled from the first assault, attackers were still 

visible in the east field at 12:59 a.m.; however, GRS refused to fire 

on their location at this time because their position was too close 

to a residence where a local family lived including children.314

The Second Attack on the Annex 

After being overwhelmed in the first attack, the attackers regrouped with a more aggressive second attack. At 1:10 a.m., this 

second attack was directed at the Annex, with a RPG striking 

Building 2.315 The second attack included even heavier sustained 

fire and a larger number of attackers. 

Over the next five minutes, there was sustained and heavy small 

arms fire from the east perimeter wall, small arms fire from the 

northeast corner, RPG strikes from the east field, and sustained 

fire.316 The attackers retreated after taking heavy return fire from 

the Annex. One GRS agent described this attack:317

Q: Okay. So the second attack, what happened? 

A: It was a lot more force, lasted probably twice as long 

as the first one. I got a little bit of shrapnel from something. I got a bunch of shrapnel from the light. That was 

pretty much it. We just repelled that one. And that was it 

until 5:15 when the mortars came in.318


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319Officer A Testimony at 36–37. 320 Id. 

Local Libyans Find Stevens 

Shortly before the second attack on the Annex began, at approximately 1:00 a.m. [7:00 p.m. in Washington] local Libyans found the 

remains of Stevens in a bedroom in the main diplomatic building 

at the Benghazi Mission. One of the Libyans asked a member of 

the Libyan Army to help pull Stevens out of Villa C. A neighbor 

from a nearby compound who knew Stevens interceded and transported Stevens to the hospital. 

The Libyan Army officer who helped pull out Stevens’ remains 

kept the phone that had been with Stevens and began calling the 

numbers listed in the phone to report that an American was located at the hospital. These calls started around 2:03 a.m [8:03 

p.m. in Washington D.C.].319

I started receiving calls from somebody who claimed to 

have the Ambassador’s—well, he didn’t know that it was 

the Ambassador’s phone, but he was calling from the Ambassador’s phone, claiming that, you know, he had come in 

contact with some, what he suspected, Americans and 

found their phone, and he wanted to return the phone. So, 

at that point, I was also involved in trying to find out 

about the Ambassador’s fate at this point and how this individual was in possession of his telephone. 

Q: All right. So you said you received a call from somebody who allegedly had the Ambassador—— 

A: A Libyan, yes. 

Q: Okay. And how did that person reach out to you? How 

did they know to reach out to you? 

A: He used the Ambassador’s phone and dialed a phone 

number that was stored on the phone. And that phone on 

the other end belonged to one of the Diplomatic Security—— 

* * * 

So how did that first conversation go with the individual 

on the other end of the line? 

A: I tried to get as much information from him as possible. 

Initially, he was coy, and he said several Americans, and 

I said, okay, well, put them on the phone. And he said, 

well, they’re not around me right now. And that was kind 

of odd. And I asked him if they were injured or why can’t 

you put them on the phone. And eventually he said that, 

yeah, they are in the hospital, and they cannot talk right 

now.320

The Chief of Station described learning about Stevens’ location: 

Q: So at some point in the evening you learned the Ambassador is probably not being held hostage, is probably 


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321 Chief of Station Testimony at 122. 322 U.S. Dep’t of Defense Timeline. 323Special Operator Testimony at 52–53. See also, Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex 

(Sept. 11, 2012, 0158). 

deceased. Do you remember about when that was and 

what—how you learned that? 

A: I learned that—so I had two telephones for the two different Libyan cellular services. So I learned that from the 

Prime Minister’s office representative who I was in contact 

with. He previously said: Oh, we believe the Ambassador 

is at a hospital, we believe he’s unconscious, we believe— 

you know, can I speak with him? Oh, no. I’ll try to get 

someone to speak with him. That was that line. 

And then I got indications from the Libyan intelligence 

service, the President’s office, and the charge or the DCM 

at about the same time. We got indications at the same 

time base was getting someone to go to identify a person 

because we had a base officer in telephonic communication 

with someone that had the Ambassador’s phone. 

Q: Yeah. 

A: So during that whole time we were—knew the Ambassador’s phone was located at that hospital. We had people 

telling us the Ambassador’s at that hospital. We didn’t 

know the status of the Ambassador, so—but all of those 

things happened within a relatively narrow timeframe.321

Team Tripoli Arrives at Benghazi Airport 

At 1:30 a.m. [7:30 p.m. in Washington D.C.], Glen Doherty and 

the other members of Team Tripoli landed at the Benghazi Benina 

International Airport.322 Meanwhile at the Annex, there was a lull 

in the fighting.323 One of the Team Tripoli members explained to 

the Committee the steps taken to obtain transportation from the 

Benghazi airport to the Annex: 

Q: Was anyone present from the Libyan armed forces or 

local militia that you could liaison with upon arrival in 

Benghazi? 

A: Not as soon as we landed sir. 

Q: Okay. And you arrived at Benina airport? 

A: We did. 

Q: And what was the nature of activity going on at Benina 

at 02 in the morning? 

A: It was completely dead. We were the only plane that 

had landed in quite some time, it looked like, and the 

guard actually came out in his pajamas and asked us what 

was going on. 

Q: Okay. So there was no airport personnel. This was not 

a 24/7 airport? 


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324Special Operator Testimony at 52–53. 325 Id. at 55. 326 Id. at 55–56. 327 Chief of Station Testimony at 125. 328Special Operator Testimony at 52. 329 Id. at 58–59. 330 Request 1–004067 IntBook 6–044. 

A: I don’t think so, sir. It didn’t appear to be. Only one individual came out to meet us once we had landed, and it 

was clear that he had been sleeping before that.324

When Team Tripoli arrived at the airport, ‘‘the Ambassador was 

still missing.’’ 325 While trying to secure transport at the airport, 

Team Tripoli was receiving information Stevens was located at a 

hospital in Benghazi. One Team Tripoli member said, ‘‘One of the 

local militia had told us that he—they thought he was at the hospital. Reporting had indicated he was at the hospital.’’ 326 The 

Chief of Station added details about their concern regarding the information they were receiving: 

That whole atmosphere of getting drawn into that correspondence that our officer had with that individual who 

had the Ambassador’s phone had a lot of the hallmarks of 

some type of entrapment. It wasn’t straight up. It didn’t— 

it wasn’t: We have the Ambassador here, you want to come 

and get him. It was much more convoluted than that. So 

we were very leery of—that was just a very high security 

posture as we were going through.327

Based on their coordination and planning prior to leaving Tripoli, 

the Team expected to be met at the airport by elements of the Libyan Shield militia. When they arrived, however, no one was 

present at the airport.328 One of the Team Tripoli special operators 

described what they encountered: 

We didn’t have a mode of transportation that was ours, so 

we were depending on those local militias. So it took us 

that long to find one that was capable of taking us into 

town. Again, initially we were trying to go to the hospital, 

which we were all being told, ‘‘No, we can’t take you to the 

hospital. We can take you to the annex.’’ 

So that fight went on for a little while, with us thinking 

that he could possibly be at the hospital needing medical 

care. So we were pushing hard enough to go there that it 

prolonged our time at the airport. Then once we found out 

he was deceased, we had obviously gave that up, and they 

had no problem taking us to the annex.329

While at the airport, Team Tripoli was alerted that Stevens’ [redacted text] personal tracking device—was pinging ‘‘within 25 

meters of their current location on the airfield.’’ 330

Q: Okay. So I want to direct your attention to the first 

page of exhibit 1, the last bullet? 

A: Okay. 


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331Testimony of GRS Tripoli, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 32–35 (June 23, 2015) [hereinafter 

GRS Tripoli Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

Q: It reads: ‘‘Note: TF Green member informed [redacted 

text] that the AMBOs [redacted text]’’—does that mean 

[personal tracking device]? 

A: Correct. 

Q: ‘‘It was pinging, and its location was within 25 meters 

of their current location on the airfield. Several militia 

members and vehicles were on the airfield and vehicles at 

the time.’’ So just to be clear, how did you learn about that 

[personal tracking device] pinging? 

A: My TL told me at the time because when that militia 

drove up, [redacted text] and I were unpacking gear, and 

we were situating. And I was checking my gear and that’s 

when our TL came up and advised us what was going on 

in reference to the ping. 

Q: So the TF Green individual would have informed the 

TL and he told you? 

A: Could have been. 

Q: What was your assessment at the time of the significance of that attack? 

A: That someone was near the Ambassador, or at least recovered some of his gear or his phone or his [personal 

tracking device] system. Somehow they had his belongings. 

Q: And they were standing very close to your team? 

A: Correct. 

* * * 

Q: So obviously, you talked about how one of your primary 

missions was to locate the Ambassador. And then you 

learned while you were at the airport that the Ambassador’s [personal tracking device] is pinging within 25 meters of your current location. Did you or the other team 

members find that odd? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Can you elaborate on that? 

A: It was unusual that somebody had some of the Ambassador’s belongings. 

Q: Okay. 

A: Especially his [personal tracking device]. I don’t know 

if it was his cell phone pinging, how they got the ping, or 

his personal [tracking device], but it was odd that they had 

some of his equipment.331

For the next three-plus hours after their arrival in Benghazi, 

Team Tripoli attempted to secure transportation from the airport 

to the hospital. Because Team Tripoli did not have full awareness 

of the local militias operating in Benghazi, nor relationships with 


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332Special Operator Testimony at 56–57. 333 Id. at 57. 334 Id. at 62–63. 335 Id. at 55. 336 Id. 337 Id. 338 Id. at 51. 

local militias to contact for assistance, they relied on a Libya Shield 

official in Tripoli to vet the local militia elements that showed up 

at the airport offering assistance. Much of their time at the airport 

was spent identifying the ‘‘least of several bad options’’ as it related 

to choosing a militia for transport.332 The Team’s Tripoli contact 

recommended seeking transport with another branch of the Libya 

Shield, as the branch prearranged to transport them never arrived.333 One Team Tripoli member stated: 

Q: Did you have any sense during the 2 and-a-half hours 

that you spent at Benina airport that you were being prevented from departing the airport? Could you have left at 

any time from 02 to 0430? 

A: We didn’t have a mode of transportation that was ours, 

so we were depending on those local militias. So it took us 

that long to find one that was capable of taking us unto 

town. Again, initially we were trying to go to the hospital, 

which we were all being told, ‘‘No, we can’t take you to the 

hospital. We can take you to the Annex.’’ So that fight 

went on for a little while, with us thinking that he [the 

Ambassador] could possibly be at the hospital needing 

medical care. So we were pushing hard enough to go there 

that it prolonged our time at the airport. Then once we 

found out he was deceased, we had obviously gave that up, 

and they had no problem taking us to the Annex.334

The group that escorted Team Tripoli to the Annex was a branch 

of Libya Shield operating that night under [redacted text].335 According to a member of Team Tripoli, this was their ‘‘less bad’’ option for transport that night given the difficulty of trusting militias 

in a city where many have Islamist leanings and an anti-Western 

sentiment after the involvement of NATO in the Libya Revolution.336

Q: And how were you going to proceed? What was the nature of your transport from Benina to the Annex? 

A: The Libya Shield commander had several gun trucks 

that we were using, as well as some Land Cruisers, to get 

us to the Annex. 

Q: And this again, Libya Shield 2, the less bad element of 

the militia? 

A: Less bad, yes.337

Team Tripoli left the airport at approximately 4:30 a.m.338 A 

team member provided the Committee the following background information for their intended mission at the time, as it had 

transitioned from locating and potentially rescuing Stevens to an 


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339 Id. at 69–70. 340 Id. at 70. 341See Email from Cheryl D. Mills to Beth E. Jones et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 7:03 PM) (on file 

with the Committee, SCB0066272) (‘‘SVTC AT 7:30PM WITH WHITE HOUSE’’). 342See id. 343See id. 344 Email to Victoria Nuland, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 5:32 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0068365–67) (forwarding chain of emails regarding updates on the events in Libya). 

effort to start evacuating nonessential personnel from Benghazi 

back to Tripoli. 

Q: [W]hat did you understand about your mission as you 

were heading from Benina airport to the Annex? Was your 

mission then evacuation of nonessential personnel? 

A: It was nonessential personnel only prior to the mortar 

attack happening . . . we were going to take 14 personnel 

back with us to the airport, let the jet take off, take them 

back to Tripoli. We were going to come back to the Annex 

and help hold up with the GRS guys until further notice 

. . . the majority of those people [the GRS would have 

stayed there. Shooters, if you will.339 . . . [W]e did not 

make the decisions for that [airplane] to come back. We 

didn’t know how long we were going to have to stay at the 

Annex. We were under the understanding they wanted to 

stay. They did not want to leave. So we were just trying 

to get the nonessential personnel out to get further direction from Chief of Station back in Tripoli on what he wanted them to do . . . I believe it was the Chief of Base that 

wanted to keep some individuals there.340

THE WHITE HOUSE CONVENES A MEETING 

While Team Tripoli was urgently seeking transportation from the 

Benghazi airport to either the hospital or the Annex, Denis 

McDonough, the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs convened a secure video teleconference meeting at 

7:30 p.m. in Washington with the State Department and the Department of Defense.341 The State Department attendees included: 

Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff; Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Policy and Planning; Stephen D. Mull, Executive Secretary; Wendy R. Sherman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs; 

and Kennedy and the Secretary.342

The Defense Department was represented by Jeremy B. Bash, 

Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, and Tidd.343 The two 

representatives who normally would have participated in the meeting—the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy—did not do so that night. 

In the four hours since the initial attack on the Benghazi Mission 

compound, the Diplomatic Security Agents in Benghazi, with help 

from the team from the Annex, survived the initial onslaught, located the remains of their fallen colleague Smith, frantically 

searched for Stevens, escaped under heavy gunfire from the Mission compound to the Annex, avoided an ambush along the route, 

and arrived at the Annex only to withstand and repel additional attacks there.344


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345 Email from Jeremy Bash to Jacob J. Sullivan (Sept. 11, 2012 7:19 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, STATE–SCB0060705). 346 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan to Jeremy Bash, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 7:21 PM) (on file with 

the Committee, SCB0075439). 347Panetta Testimony at 32. 348 Id. at 33. 349 Id. at 34. 

Team Tripoli, after learning of the attack in Benghazi, quickly 

developed a plan to render assistance, secured private aircraft in 

Tripoli, packed gear, planned a mission, flew from Tripoli to 

Benghazi, and urgently negotiated with unknown militias seeking 

transportation to either the hospital or the Annex. 

By stark contrast, in those same four hours, principals in Washington had merely managed to identify forces that could potentially 

deploy to Libya and convened a meeting to discuss those forces. 

Despite the Secretary of Defense’s clear directive and his intention that forces would move and move quickly, no forces had yet 

moved. Over 13 hours after the attack began, the first force—the 

farthest away—deployed. It would take nearly 18 hours for the 

FAST team to move, and over 20 hours from the beginning of the 

attack before the CIF moved. 

Forces are ‘‘Spinning Up As We Speak.’’ 

Moments before the White House meeting began, Bash emailed 

several people including Mills and Sullivan, notifying them of the 

assets the Secretary had ordered to respond to the attacks. He 

wrote: 

After Consulting with General Dempsey, General Ham 

and the Joint Staff, we have identified the forces that 

could move to Benghazi. They are spinning up as we 

speak. They include a SOF element that was in Croatia 

(which can fly to Suda [sic] Bay, Crete) and a Marine 

FAST team out of Roda [sic], Spain. 

Assuming Principals agree to deploy these elements, we 

will ask State to secure the approval from host nation. 

Please advise how you wish to convey that approval to us. 

Burns/Nides/Sherman to Miller/Winnefeld would be my 

recommended course.345

Even though the Secretary had already issued the order to deploy the identified forces and testified he fully expected his order 

was being carried out at the time, the plan was to ‘‘work through 

this issue’’ during the White House meeting.346 As the Secretary 

reinforced: ‘‘I had the authority to deploy those forces. And I didn’t 

have to ask anyone’s permission to get those forces into place.’’ 347

The Secretary further said his approach was ‘‘we need to move 

them and move them as fast as we can in order to respond. So I 

wanted no interference with those orders to get them deployed.’’ 348

In fact, the Secretary added that during the meeting at the Pentagon, his orders were simultaneously being conveyed to those 

forces.349 He noted: ‘‘[T]hese are elite units, and the purpose of 


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350 Id. at 37. 351Miller Testimony at 63–64. Miller testified he attempted to participate in the meeting from 

his home, but was unable to connect to the call. 352 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan to Jeremy Bash, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 7:21 PM) (on file with 

the Committee, SCB0075439). 353Tidd Testimony at 23–24; see also, Email from Jacob J. Sullivan to Jeremy Bash, et al. 

(Sept. 11, 2012 7:21 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075439) (‘‘We should work through 

this issue in that venue.’’). 

these units is to move when I give the order to move, and that’s 

what I expected.’’ 350

Curiously, the two members of the Defense Department Bash 

identified in his ‘‘spinning up’’ email as the proper persons to ‘‘convey’’ ‘‘approval from the host nation’’—Winnefeld and Miller—were 

not part of the White House meeting. In fact, Winnefeld was not 

even at the Pentagon. He had left to return to his residence to host 

a dinner party for foreign dignitaries and testified he received one 

update on the events during the dinner. After the dinner concluded 

around 10 p.m., he went to the secure communications facility in 

his home. An hour later, the mortar attacks began. Likewise, Miller was not at the Pentagon due to an unexpected family emergency. He asked Bash to participate in the White House meeting 

in his stead.351

Purpose of Meeting 

Despite the Secretary’s expectation the assets he ordered to deploy would move as fast as possible in order to respond, the individuals who participated in the White House meeting, nevertheless, 

felt the need to ‘‘work through’’ the assets the Secretary had already ordered to deploy.352 At the time of the White House meeting, the final decision about which assets to deploy had apparently 

not been made, according to them, despite the Secretary’s recollection and testimony to the contrary. Tidd testified: 

Q: And at the time of the meeting, what was the status 

of the assets that you all discussed? Were they preparing 

to deploy? 

A: They were alerted. The final decision had not yet been 

made definitively, as I recall, but we came out of that 

meeting basically: send everything.353

Tidd described the purpose of the meeting convened by the White 

House as an opportunity to share information across agencies. 

It was an information exchange to cross-level what does 

everybody know, is there any new information. The intelligence community was obviously providing information on 

other things that were going on, other locations that State 

was providing information on, other embassies where they 

had concerns. FBI. It was a general kind of a roundtable 

and round robin of everybody going around and passing 

out what information they had, what did they know. And 

then what were the asks. And then an opportunity for us 

to be able to say — when we got to the military, we talked 

about these are the type of forces that we can deploy, and 


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354Tidd Testimony at 21–22. 355Mills Testimony at 47. 356Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y for Mgmt., State Dep’t, Tr. at 112 (Feb. 3, 

2016) [hereinafter Kennedy Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 357 Id. at 155. 358Winnefeld Testimony at 80–81. 359See Email from Jeremy Bash to Jacob J. Sullivan (Sept. 11, 2012 7:19 PM) (on file with 

the Committee, STATE–SCB0060705). 

here’s what we know, here’s what we think, and here’s 

what our recommendations are.354

Mills said essentially the same thing: ‘‘[T]he [White House meeting] was called because everyone was seeking both to exchange information and figure out how to coordinate resources to support our 

team.’’ 355 Kennedy said this about the White House meeting: 

The [meeting] was mainly, to the best of my recollection, 

simply a conforming of information, a sharing of information. Make sure everybody had the same understanding 

and everyone was doing whatever they could in their lane 

of responsibility to proceed.356

He elaborated: 

Conforming, conforming means, in effect, reconciling. That 

I have heard this, you have heard that, what have you 

heard? Trying to make sure that we all, meaning across 

the entire U.S. Government, had the clearest coherent understanding of what was going on in the fog of war.357

Winnefeld typically would have participated in the meeting that 

night. However, after being notified of the attacks, he departed the 

Pentagon that night to attend a dinner engagement. Despite not 

participating in the discussion, Winnefeld explained why the White 

House meeting would be called: 

[W]henever something like this happens, whether it’s a 

hostage rescue, or you name it, particularly an emergent 

event, there’s always a [meeting] like this, and there are 

a lot of really good points brought up by interagency partners about considerations and—in stream. They’re very 

useful events, and we can very quickly resolve questions, 

like, does anybody have any objections if we sent forces 

into Tripoli? My supposition here is that that was a very 

quickly resolved; nobody has objections.358

From the Defense Department’s perspective, it was an opportunity to notify the State Department and the White House of the 

assets it could deploy in response to the attacks as ordered by the 

Secretary and to seek concurrence.359 Winnefeld explained: 

[M]y sense is that the deputies sort of coordinated on what 

DOD intended to do. So the Secretary has decided he 

wanted to deploy the CIF and the [U.S. Based SOF] and 

the FAST platoons. That was exposed to the deputies in 


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360Winnefeld Testimony at 84. Winnefeld further explained that had there been a disagreement ‘‘the Secretary probably would have said: Look, get them moving anyway. And then he 

would be on the phone with the White House.’’ Id. at 79–80. 361 Email from State Dep’t Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to P_StaffAssistants & 

D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562037). 362 Email to Harold Hongju Koh, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 10:40 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05528017) (‘‘There is likely to be a deployment very quickly, possibly this evening.’’). 363 Email from State Dep’t Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to P_StaffAssistants & 

D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562037). 364Panetta Testimony at 23. 

the deputies SVTC, and they all concurred with that. 

... 360

Of course, Winnefeld did not participate in this particular White 

House meeting. Witnesses who actually were present and appeared 

before the Committee were surprisingly unable to recall details regarding the various issues and discussions during the White House 

meeting. 

The Committee was, however, able to uncover several emails 

from participants summarizing the meeting. In striking contrast to 

the Secretary’s testimony, one summary of the White House Meeting listed the theme of the meeting, not as deploying forces in an 

active tense, but as ‘‘getting forces ready to deploy’’ in a future 

tense.361 Another summary described the deployment of assets in 

response to Benghazi as ‘‘likely’’ and ‘‘possibly’’ that evening.362 According to these summaries, the conclusion from the meeting was 

that forces were not going to deploy ‘‘until order comes, to go to either Tripoli or Benghazi.’’ 363

But the Secretary was unequivocal the order had already come: 

President Obama, as the Commander in Chief, said do everything 

you can to help our people in Libya.364 As the Secretary of Defense, 

he ordered assets to deploy—active tense with no further explanation, amplification, or instruction needed. 

The two-hour ‘‘meeting’’—in which neither the Commander in 

Chief nor the Secretary of Defense participated—was in fact much 

more detailed and involved than witnesses suggested and presents 

a new perspective on what was happening and being discussed in 

Washington D.C. even while an Ambassador was missing and a 

second U.S. facility was under attack half a world away. 

Discussions During the 7:30 White House Meeting 

DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE 

The issue of securing host nation approval, the last aspect of 

Bash’s email, was discussed during the 7:30 White House meeting. 

According to a write-up of notes taken by Mull, the State Department emphasized any deployment of U.S. Forces into Libya needed 

approval from the Government of Libya. 

Overall theme: getting forces ready to deploy in case the 

crisis expands and a real threat materializes against Embassy Tripoli. DOD will send the details to U/S/Kennedy 

(i.e. plane numbers, troop numbers, airfield support needs, 

etc.) for us to make request to government of Libya (GOL). 


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365 Email from State Dep’t Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to P_StaffAssistants & 

D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562037). 366Testimony of Defense Attache ́, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Tr. at 113– 

114 (Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Defense Attache ́ 2014 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 367 Id. 368 Id. 369 Id. at 114. 370Defense Attache ́ Testimony at 159–160. 371See Email from Benjamin I. Fishman, Nat’l Sec. Council (Sept. 11, 2012 9:19 PM) (on file 

with the Committee, SCB000029–30). 

* * * 

Congressional angle: If any deployment is made, Congress 

will need to be notified under the War Powers Act . . . 

Libya must agree to any deployment.365

On the ground in Tripoli, the Defense Attache ́ had already begun 

working to obtain flight clearances from the Libyan government before the White House meeting even began.366 Initially, he notified 

the Libyan government of a potential request for flight clearances 

as the night progressed.367 Because he had given advance notice to 

the Libyan government that potential flight clearances would be 

needed, he fully expected the Libyan government to approve any 

formal request when it was made. He noted, however, that to submit a formal request, specific information about the tail numbers, 

expected arrival of the aircraft, the number of personnel, and types 

of weapons had to be conveyed to the Libyan government.368 Not 

only did a formal request have to be made, a representative of the 

Libyan government had to be available to receive the paperwork 

for that request. There was no Libyan representative on duty overnight.369 As to when formal approval was received, the Defense 

Attache ́ testified: 

Q: Can you recall when the actual—the relevant information that was needed, like tail numbers and things, when 

was that transmitted to the Government of Libya? 

A: I don’t. But I would also come back to the fact that we 

had a green light from the Government of Libya to bring 

it in. It was just a question of when we were going to know 

the specific information that goes into a standard flight 

clearance request. So it had to have been, I would say, 

sometime midmorning to noon on the 12th. It could have 

been, I would say, sometime midmorning to noon on the 

12th. It could have been a little bit after that. 

Q: And that’s when you received the relevant information 

you need to pass on, or what happened? 

A: Probably both. In the course of the morning, leading up 

to the afternoon, we got the information we required, and 

then we were able to subsequently transmit it to the Libyans.370

CIVILIAN CLOTHES 

A request for the FAST Platoon to wear civilian attire appears 

to have generated from Kennedy during the White House meeting.371 Kennedy, during his interview with the Committee, was unable to recall when the discussion regarding civilian attire was held 


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372Kennedy Testimony at 173. 373Tidd Testimony at 28. 374See State Dep’t Email (Sept. 11, 2012 10:40 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05528017) 

(‘‘[T]here was discussion of the option of entering in plainclothes. . . .’’). 375See id. (‘‘[The Joint Chiefs of Staff] explained . . . that the risks to the forces [] remaining 

in plainclothes increased as they transited from point of entry to the relevant location of action’’). 376 Email from State Dep’t Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to P_StaffAssistants & 

D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562037) (‘‘We 

made a request that any deployments should be in plain clothes to avoid any impression of a 

U.S. invasion of Libya.’’); see also State Dep’t Email (Sept. 11, 2012 10:40 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05528017) (‘‘Apparently Pat K expressed concern on the SVTC about Libyan reaction if uniformed US forces arrived in country in military aircraft’’); Email from Benjamin I. 

that evening, but provided the following information about the substance of the discussion: 

[Y]ou wanted to make sure that the steps we were taking 

would enhance the security of our personnel, not potentially diminish the security of our personnel. Our personnel had been consolidated in Tripoli in one location, 

and all of them were there with the multiplied security 

forces of both the prime building and the Annex building. 

And I recall this discussion, generally speaking, and it was 

determined that the delay was not going to be significant 

and it was better to have the forces arrive in civilian 

clothes[.] 372

Tidd elaborated on the State Department’s request for the FAST 

platoon to arrive in Libya in civilian clothing. He testified: 

Again, like I said, they wanted to minimize the signature 

that looked like a big military invasion, a big military arrival there. And the reason that I remember the discussion 

was I had to go back and find and make sure, as the FAST 

had moved out and was waiting for lift, and the question 

that I had to go back and ask AFRICOM was: in their 

rucksacks did they have civilian clothes that they could 

put on, or was this going to entail having to go back to 

their barracks and draw that equipment. They had what 

they needed, and so they didn’t have to go anyplace. 

At the [White House] meeting, I couldn’t speak for them. 

And I wanted to go back and verify that. Because what I 

wanted to know is: is it more important to get them there 

or to have the signature in civilian clothes? As it turned 

out, it didn’t matter, because they had the civilian clothes 

with them already.373

Tidd did not agree that requiring the FAST platoon to wear civilian clothes was a step that would enhance security.374 The Defense 

Department assessed the impact of the requirement as quite the 

opposite: it created an increased risk to the FAST platoon members 

as they traveled through Tripoli.375

Summaries of the White House meeting did not, in fact, highlight 

the potential security-enhancing benefit of the FAST platoon wearing civilian clothes. Instead, the benefit of having the FAST platoon 

wear civilian clothing was to cater to unexpressed Libyan government concerns about military appearances and to avoid ‘‘any impression of a U.S. invasion of Libya.’’ 376 As Benjamin J. Rhodes, 


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Fishman (Sept. 11, 2012 9:19 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB000029–30) (‘‘I don’t know 

why Pat Kennedy is so concerned about what extra securit y [sic] folks are wearing. Does that 

come from Greg [Hicks]? The time for being overly sensitive to Libyan concerns about military 

appearances seems to be over.’’). 377 Email from Benjamin I. Fishman (Sept. 11, 2012 9:19 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB000029). 378 Email from State Dep’t Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to P_StaffAssistants & 

D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562037). 379 Id. 

Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, 

stated in an email to his colleague at the end of the meeting: ‘‘[T]he 

time for being overly sensitive to Libyan concerns about military 

appearances seems to be over.’’ 377

The Plan from the Meeting 

Although the Secretary told the Committee he fully expected his 

order to deploy was the only step needed to move forces in response 

to the attacks, records obtained by the Committee reflect a different understanding by others on the night of the attacks. 

One email seems to indicate others may not have viewed the 

order as being as clear and immediate as the Secretary recalled. It 

read in relevant part: 

Per Amb. Mull, ROUGH notes from the 1930 [7:30 p.m.] 

EDT SVTC meeting: 

Overall theme: getting forces ready to deploy in case the 

crisis expands and a real threat materializes against Embassy Tripoli. DOD will send the details to U/S Kennedy 

(i.e. plane numbers, troop numbers, airfield support needs, 

etc.) for us to make requests to government of Libya 

(GOL).378

There were 10 Action items from the White House meeting: 

The first two action items in that email were redacted and not 

provided to the Committee. The next three items read as follows: 

3) Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST): about [redacted text] Marines, they need six hours to prepare. 

They’re currently at the Rota Air Base in Spain and 

will wait to deploy. Will not deploy until order comes to 

go to either Tripoli or Benghazi. We made a request 

that any deployments should be in plain clothes to 

avoid any impression of a U.S. invasion of Libya. 

4) Congressional angle: If any deployment is made, Congress would need to be notified under the War Powers 

Act. Counselor Mills is working with L and H on this 

and it may come through Ops. Libya must agree to any 

deployment. 

5) Efforts are continuing to locate Ambassador Stevens. 

A/S Beth Jones will work to reach out to the hospital 

to confirm the identity of the patient....379

Phrases such as ‘‘getting forces ready to deploy’’ and forces ‘‘will 

not deploy until order comes to go to either Tripoli or Benghazi’’ 


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380Panetta Testimony at 67. 381 Email from State Dep’t Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to P_StaffAssistants & 

D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562037). 382State Dep’t Email (Sept. 11, 2012 10:40 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05528017). 

do not reflect an imminent deployment of the assets as ordered by 

the Secretary and as he testified before the Committee. 

The declarative ‘‘Libya must agree to any deployment’’ is also inconsistent with what the Secretary testified to and similarly inconsistent with what the Secretary recalled President Obama telling 

him. At no point, according the Secretary of Defense, did a U.S. response to the attacks in Benghazi hinge on Libya agreeing with the 

actions ordered.380

Mull’s summary of the White House meeting is, however, more 

consistent with Tidd’s recollection of the meeting.381

Another email regarding the meeting with the White House 

reads in relevant part: 

All, I just got off a conference call with [State Department 

employee] who reported on a [White House meeting] this 

evening concerning the violence against USG facilities and 

personnel in Libya and Egypt, of which you likely have 

gotten separate notice. S[ecretary Clinton], Pat K[ennedy], 

and Beth Jones (possibly among others) attended for State. 

In short, there was a significant attack in Benghazi on the 

US consulate where the US Ambassador and 7 other USG 

employees were present[.] 

There is likely to be a deployment very quickly, possibly 

this evening, of forces to assist in Libya. Beth Jones is 

tasked with seeking consent of the GOL asap for entry into 

the country. Options under consideration for the deployment include: (1) a FAST team; (2) a [U.S.–Based 

SOF] . . . ; and (3) a Commander’s Force. . . . DOD indicated they would circulate additional information on the 

options/decisions in the morning and we will need to be 

prepared to do a quick War Powers assessment and probably report by COB tomorrow. 

* * * 

Apparently Pat K[ennedy] expressed concern on the [White 

House meeting] about Libyan reaction if uniformed US 

forces arrived in country in military aircraft; there was 

discussion of the option of entering in plainclothes, which 

JCS explained was possible but noted that the risks to the 

forces to remaining in plainclothes increased as they 

transited from point of entry to the relevant location of action.382

Another email framed the issue as follows: 

The U.S. military has begun notifying special units of likely deployment, with ultimate disposition pending State coordination with the Libyan government and final approval 

by the White House. 

State remains concerned that any U.S. military intervention be fully coordinated with the Libyan Government and 


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383Testimony of Jeremy Bash, Chief of Staff, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Tr. at 98–99 (Jan. 13, 

2016) [hereinafter Bash Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 384 Email from Jeremy Bash, Chief of Staff, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, to Jacob Sullivan, Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Policy, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 11, 2012 1919) (on file with the Committee: 

STATE–SCB0060705). 385See generally, U.S. Dep’t of Defense Timeline. 386 Id. 387 Id. 

convey Libyan concerns that [sic] about U.S. military presence, to include concerns that wheeled military vehicles 

should not be used and U.S. Military Forces should consider deploying in civilian attire.383

The plan described in this email was later conveyed to the Combatant Commands. While Bash’s ‘‘spinning up’’ email indicated 

these forces were prepared to go to Benghazi vice Tripoli, it was 

clear by the end of the White House meeting that no forces were 

going to Benghazi.384 It is worth noting that while this meeting 

was ongoing and even after it ended, Diplomatic Security Agents, 

the team from the Annex, and Team Tripoli were under attack at 

the Annex and Stevens was still missing. 

These emails confirm the understanding among the individuals 

participating in the White House meeting that deployment to 

Benghazi was not imminent. As the Defense Department timeline 

shows, none of the orders given to the assets that night contained 

an order to deploy to Benghazi.385 The FAST platoons were ordered 

to prepare to deploy, not to deploy.386 The CIF and the U.S. based 

SOF were ordered to deploy only to an intermediate staging base, 

not to Benghazi or Tripoli.387

In fact, once the decision to activate the U.S. based SOF was 

made, the CIF was no longer an option to deploy to Libya as its 

mission then became to prepare for the arrival of the U.S. based 

Special Operations Force at the intermediate staging base. 

Once the forces were ready to deploy, a subsequent execute order 

would then have to be given by the Secretary of Defense. This is 

inconsistent with the Secretary’s belief that no further order was 

necessary from either the President or himself. 

Admiral Tidd had this to say about deploying a FAST Team to 

Benghazi: 

We were looking at two FAST teams, but it very, very soon 

became evident that everybody was leaving Benghazi. And 

so I don’t remember if it was just before the [White House 

meeting] or during the [meeting] or just right after. By the 

time we came out of the [meeting], it was pretty clear that 

nobody was going to be left in Benghazi. And so the decision—I think, at the [meeting], there was some discussion—but as I recall, we weren’t going to send them to 

Benghazi, because everybody was going to be back in Tripoli by the time we could actually get them there. 

* * * 

And I think even at this point we knew that everybody 

had moved—they had moved from the temporary diplomatic facility, they moved to the Annex, and they were 

moving or going to be moving, if they had not already 


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388Tidd Testimony at 25–27. 389 Id. at 25–27. 

begun moving, from the Annex to the airport, and would 

be leaving at the airport as quickly as they could. 

So it was pretty clear we weren’t going to be able to get 

anything into Benghazi before the last people left. So, I 

don’t think we ever went beyond the notion of moving the 

FAST into—the FAST platoon into Tripoli.388

While it may have been ‘‘pretty clear’’ to Tidd that ‘‘nobody was 

going to be left in Benghazi,’’ it was not at all clear to those in 

Benghazi who were manning a rooftop exchanging gunfire with 

attackers.389 Furthermore, the Diplomatic Security Agents and 

team from the Annex had to fight their way even from the 

Benghazi Mission compound to the Annex a short distance away 

while Team Tripoli had to negotiate with unknown militias for 

transportation from the Benghazi airport to the Annex. So, how the 

principals in Washington were certain U.S. personnel in Benghazi 

were going to be leaving Benghazi and how they were going to be 

leaving is itself unclear. 

There is uncertainty attached to other statements made during 

the White House meeting too: 

‘‘State remains concerned that any U.S. military intervention be fully coordinated with the Libyan Government and 

convey Libyan concerns that [sic] about U.S. military presence, to include concerns that wheeled military vehicles 

should not be used and U.S. Military Forces should consider deploying in civilian attire.’’ 

‘‘DOD indicated they would circulate additional information on the options/decisions in the morning and we will 

need to be prepared to do a quick War Powers assessment 

and probably report by COB tomorrow.’’ 

‘‘Libya must agree to any deployment.’’ 

‘‘Overall theme: getting forces ready to deploy in case the 

crisis expands and a real threat materializes against Embassy Tripoli.’’ 

This sentence is illuminating on a number of levels, including: 

‘‘getting forces ready to deploy in case the crisis expands’’ begs the 

question of expanding how and where? At the time of the White 

House meeting, Sean Smith was dead, Ambassador Stevens was 

missing, and the remaining State Department personnel had to be 

rescued by the Team from the Annex while sustaining gunfire en 

route back to the Annex. Moreover the second clause in that sentence references a ‘‘real threat’’ materializing against ‘‘Embassy 

Tripoli.’’ The real threat at the time was and remained in 

Benghazi. 

Among the questions left even in the aftermath of investigating 

what happened before, during and after the attacks in Benghazi is 

how so many decision makers in Washington and elsewhere were 

unaware of the Annex in Benghazi and how the Washington decision-makers expected U.S. personnel remaining in Benghazi to 


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390 Email from Tidd (Sept. 11, 2012 8:53PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB001376). See 

also, Letter from Ashton B. Carter, Sec’y of Defense, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, House Select 

Committee on Benghazi, Apr. 8, 2015, providing an explanation regarding the unclassified 

timeline: 

Has the U.S Department of Defense identified any information that would warrant any 

adjustments, correction or modification to the unclassified timeline it provide to Congress on November 9, 2012? 

One Point of clarification: the unclassified timeline has the SecDef Vocal Order (VOCO) 

for moving response forces at 0000–0200. This authorization was relayed and recorded 

at 0239 for FAST and CIF and at 0253 for [the U.S. SOF]. This is not to imply that 

timing of the VOCO as reflected in the unclassified timeline is inaccurate, but rather 

that receipt of this vocal order at [sic] was at 0239 and 0253, respectively.’’). 391 Id. 392 Id. 393 Id. 

evacuate or defend themselves for a prolonged period of time without assistance. 

The Orders: Prepare to Deploy and Deploy to an ISB 

At 8:39 p.m., more than five hours after the attacks in Benghazi 

began and more than two hours after the Secretary gave his order 

to deploy, the Pentagon finally transmitted orders to the combatant 

commands regarding the FAST platoons, the CIF, and the U.S. 

Based Special Operations Force.390 Specifically, the FAST platoons 

were ordered to ‘‘prepare to deploy.’’ 391 The CIF and the U.S. 

Based Special Operations Force were ordered to deploy to an intermediate staging base.392 No asset was ordered to deploy to 

Benghazi.393

Tidd provided authorization for each of those forces to move in 

an email transmitting the orders at 8:53 p.m. [2:53 a.m. in 

Benghazi]. The email reads in relevant part: 

discussions at Deputies, and followed up between [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the Chairman—— 

[The Secretary of Defense] has directed deployment of the 

CIF to the [intermediate staging base] determined most 

suitable by AFRICOM . . . 

[The Secretary of Defense] has directed deployment of the 

[U.S. Based Special Operations Force] to the same [intermediate staging base] as the CIF. 

[The Secretary of Defense] has directed FAST to make all 

preps to deploy but hold departure until we are sure we 

have clearance to land in Tripoli. We’ll work with State to 

nail that down, but intent is to get security force augmentation into [Tripoli/Tripoli] (not Benghazi, at least not 

initially) ASAP. Embassy making efforts to move all 

[American citizens] from [Annex] Compound Benghazi to 

Tripoli, possibly using same [commercial] Air that 5-pax 

team arrived on. 

* * * 

Remember [the Secretary of Defense] holds final approval 

to deploy FAST, pending receipt of Tripoli country clearance. But the point is to get the Marines on the ground seVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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394 Id. 395Tidd Testimony at 33. 396Winnefeld Testimony at 85. Winnefeld further explained that had there been a disagreement ‘‘the Secretary probably would have said: Look, get them moving anyway. And then he 

would be on the phone with the White house.’’ Id. at 87. 397See Panetta Testimony at 32. Panetta elaborated, ‘‘My directions were clear; those forces 

were to be deployed, period. . . . So I wanted no interference with those orders to get them 

deployed.’’ Id. at 33. 398 Id. 

curing the embassy in Tripoli as rapidly as we can move 

them.394

Tidd testified about his email: 

I’m looking at the timelines here, and I’m—I am thinking 

that—that [Deputy Director for Operations] had a conference call with the various watch centers of the commands that are listed here as a result of the decisions that 

came out of the [White House] meeting. 

And so the things that you see upfront—the [Secretary of 

Defense] [vocal order], the things to move, and then also 

forwarded request for information from AFRICOM and 

EUCOM for the following—I am guessing at this point 

now, but I think this might have been in response to—I 

gave him a verbal dump from the Deputies Committee 

meeting. He had this conference call. This is a report back 

with the information from the conference call. And then I 

turned around and replied on top of that with subsequent 

information that had been provided from phone calls that 

I had had at the same time.395

Winnefeld also provided his understanding of Tidd’s email: 

All this is doing is reporting out what the Secretary has 

directed to do. And [Tidd] would not put this out unless 

the deputies had concurred with it. If the deputies had not 

concurred with the SecDef deciding to do these things, that 

would have been a big issue, but it wasn’t. The deputies 

obviously concurred, so [Tidd] put it out: Hey, this is now 

official; Secretary says do this.396

It is unclear why concurrence from anyone attending the White 

House meeting was needed. The National Command Authority, the 

lawful source of military orders, consists of two people: the President and the Secretary of Defense.397 Neither of them attended 

that meeting. Both the President and Secretary Panetta had already issued their orders. As the Secretary made clear: 

I had the authority to deploy those forces. And I ordered 

those forces to be deployed. And I didn’t have to ask anybody’s permission to get those forces in place.398

PREPARE TO DEPLOY 

The orders issued to the forces that night were different from the 

orders the Secretary gave earlier that evening. The Secretary had 

this to say about the orders he issued that night: 


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399 Id. at 49. 400Leidig 2014 Testimony at 64–65. 

Q: I just want to make sure this portion of the record is 

fair to you and that your testimony has the clarity that I 

think it has, but I’m going to give you an opportunity if 

I’m wrong. 

You did not issue an order to prepare to deploy. You issued 

an order to deploy. 

A: That’s correct. 

Q: So no one would have been waiting on you to issue a 

subsequent order? 

A: That’s correct.399

Leidig described the difference between a ‘‘prepare to deploy’’ 

order and an ‘‘execute’’ order: 

They are two very distinct orders in the military. The first 

is prepare to deploy. And that’s basically guidance from 

my boss, in this case, the Secretary of Defense and the 

Chairman, that you have permission to make every preparation necessary to execute this mission. But you do not 

have permission to actually to deploy them yet—you don’t 

have permission to execute the mission.400

In contrast, Miller testified his understanding was an order to 

deploy has no operational distinction from an order to prepare to 

deploy: 

The initial order was to deploy to forward basing in order 

to be able to then refuel if necessary, prepare to any additional degree necessary, which can largely be done in flight 

for these forces, to the extent that they weren’t already as 

they got on the plane, and then to deploy into Libya. 

[T]he order could have come in one of two ways, and it’s 

a technical difference that in this instance and in any 

other instance has no operational impact, one form of the 

order says deploy to the intermediate staging base and 

prepare to deploy into Libya, and that additional authorization will be given prior to deployment into Libya; a second says deploy to the intermediate staging base and proceed to Libya unless given direction not to do so. 

I don’t know which of those—I don’t recall which of those 

was in the order, but in any event, it’s well understood 

that no time should elapse awaiting. In other words, if the 

form was to go to the ISB, go to the intermediate staging 

base and then get additional authority, it’s incumbent on 

the commander to request that authority well in advance 

of when the force would be prepared to then deploy into 

Libya, and it’s incumbent on the Secretary of Defense and 

the team supporting him to ensure that he makes a timely 


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401Miller Testimony at 80–81. 402 Bash Testimony at 26–27. 403See Ham Testimony at 51–52. 

decision so that there’s not additional time added to the 

timeline.401

Bash considered the orders that night a distinction without a difference because the intent of the Secretary was clear: the forces 

were to move. 

This was a real-time, very fluid, very dynamic set of meetings in which the Secretary, with his senior military, uniformed military advisers, the Chairman, the Vice, and the 

combatant commanders and others, were making real-time 

decisions 

So I just want to set that context, because I’m sure some 

people could look at this and say: Why were these words 

used or that discussion or this phrase used, ‘‘prepare to deploy’’ or ‘‘deploy’’? My recollection was he was told of the 

situation, he was told about which units could respond, 

and he said: Go get them, do it, move. 

Q: So there would’ve been no further order necessary from 

him? 

A: Correct. 

Q: Wheels could have taken off and he would not have 

had to say another single, solitary word? 

A: Correct, and I believe that actually was the case. 

Q: All right. So he never amplified, clarified, withdrew, 

changed his instructions, which were deploy? 

A: He did not.402

Leidig, whom Ham described as his ‘‘most trusted advisor’’ and 

an ‘‘extraordinarily competent officer,’’ testified because he was 

moving forces between two combatant commands’ areas of responsibility he needed to receive a subsequent ‘‘execute’’ order to move 

the FAST Platoon into Libya.403

Q: At what point did you receive an order to execute? At 

what point did you have the authority to launch assets 

into Libya? 

A: We were never given an execute order to move any 

forces until we got to move in the C–17 to evacuate folks 

out of Tripoli later that next morning. There was never an 

execute order to move any forces from Sigonella into Africa 

or from Rota into Africa until later. So, I mean, we did get 

an order eventually to move the FAST team into Tripoli to 

provide security, but during that evening hour, that incident, there were no execute orders to move forces into our 

AOR. 


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404Testimony of Vice Admiral Charles J. Leidig, Deputy Commander for Military Operations, 

US Africa Command, Tr. at 45–48 (Apr. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Leidig 2016 Testimony] (on file 

with the Committee). But see, Leidig 2016 Testimony at 48 (Q: There was some discussion about 

the term ‘‘prepare to deploy’’ and an ‘‘execute order,’’ and I just wanted to ask you a couple questions about that. Would a lack of an execute order, or did a lack of an execute order on the 

night of the attacks ever slow down your forces? A: No.). 

* * * 

Q: You said that you were never given an execute order 

until later. Who provides that execute order? 

A: Execute order comes from the Secretary of Defense. So 

we were not given an—there was an order given to move 

forces to Sigonella. There was never an execute order 

given to move those forces into Libya. 

Q: And when you received the execute order later on to 

deploy the forces into Libya, the FAST platoon into Tripoli, 

and then the C–17 to evacuate the medically injured, do 

you recall how that order was conveyed? 

A: Do you mean, was it verbal, or was it in—usually in 

every case—I don’t know specifically for those, but normally it’s a VOCO, a vocal command, followed up by a 

written command. And so, in that case, it was probably 

both. It was probably a vocal command to get things moving, followed by a written command—— 

Q: And do you—— 

A: —but I don’t know for sure. 

Q: And do you recall the timeframe for when you received 

the vocal command to execute the movement of the FAST 

platoon into Tripoli and the—— 

A: No, I don’t recall. It’s on the timeline. 

Q: Do you recall if it was before or after the mortar attacks occurred? 

A: Oh, it was after. 

Q: Okay. Thank you. 

* * * 

Q: And just to be clear for the record, prior to receiving 

the vocal execute order, would you have—— 

A: Which vocal execute order? 

Q: For either of the assets that were deployed into Libya, 

the FAST platoon or the C–17, did you have the authority 

to move those assets into Libya prior to receiving that 

VOCO? 

A: No. I wouldn’t move those without a—without an order 

from the Secretary or the Chairman. They’re moving 

across COCOM boundaries. 

Q: Okay. Thank you.404

Ham’s recollection of the extent of the authority he had to move 

forces that night differed from Leidig and differed from the email 


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Tidd sent to the combatant commands relaying the Secretary’s 

order. 

Q: Can you explain what he means by the [Secretary of 

Defense] holding final approval to deploy FAST? 

A: I think it means what it says. That is different than my 

recollection. Again, my belief is the Secretary had given 

authority to me to do that. So I think this is the J3 issuing 

instructions, but my recollection is different than what 

Vice Admiral Tidd has written here. 

* * * 

Yeah. Right. The last sentence there I think is the important one. 

* * * 

A: ‘‘But the point is to get the Marines on the ground securing the embassy in Tripoli as rapidly as we can move 

them.’’ 

Q: Well, I think one thing that we would like to try to 

kind of marry up is, even on the timeline, the orders that 

were given to some of the—specifically the FAST platoon 

was a prepare-to-deploy order. And there has been testimony that a prepare-to-deploy order is different from a deploy order. Perhaps you can provide us what the distinction is and how that played out on this night. 

A: I can try to explain the distinction between the two. A 

prepare-to-deploy order simply is notifying a force that you 

must be prepared to deploy within a specified timeframe, 

so that you have to adjust your activities, whatever they 

may be, your personnel posture, your readiness, your 

training, the prestaging of equipment, depending on what 

the timeline is, so that you are prepared to deploy on the 

designated timeline. This is not an uncommon occurrence. 

* * * 

And a deploy order simply says, ‘‘Go now,’’ or whatever the 

specified timeframe is. So it’s prepare to deploy, ‘‘I think 

I may need you, so I want you to be ready.’’ A deploy order 

says, ‘‘I do need you. Deploy.’’ 

* * * 

So the three units that were of highest importance to me— 

the Commander’s In-extremis Force, the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team, and the [U.S.-Based SOF]—all already 

had prepared to—my understanding is all had prepared to 

deploy. They were already on various timelines to deploy. 

So that’s what I believe their status was. 

And my belief is that—and my recollection differs a bit 

from what Vice Admiral Tidd says—that when the Secretary made his decisions, my understanding of that was 

that the Secretary of Defense was transferring operational 


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405 Ham Testimony at 133–136. 

control to me for those forces for their deployment and employment. 

Q: So if the Secretary of Defense’s order was, in fact, ‘‘prepare to deploy’’ and not ‘‘deploy,’’ was there an additional 

step needed to be—did the Secretary of Defense have to do 

anything additional to deploy those forces? 

A: I don’t know because I’m not familiar with the specifics. 

Typically, in a prepare-to-deploy order, there is a designated official who can order that unit to deploy. It 

doesn’t always have to go back to the Secretary of Defense. 

It could be a combatant commander, it could be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, it could be a joint task force commander. But, in this particular case, I’m just not familiar 

with the specifics of the order.405

DEPLOY TO AN ISB 

The CIF, the force most capable of quickly responding to the attacks in Benghazi, was ordered instead to go to an intermediate 

staging base. Ham discussed this decision: 

Q: Sir, given the fact that the CIF was on the continent, 

per se, did you ever consider employing the CIF for the 

hostage-rescue mission or the NEO by sending them directly to either Benghazi or to Tripoli? 

A: I don’t recall specifically, but I feel confident in saying 

that, as we weighed the options, the various courses of action of how the Commander’s In-extremis Force might be 

employed, that there was some consideration to, you know, 

do they go somewhere other than the intermediate staging 

base. Should they go to Benghazi? Should they go to Tripoli? 

My recollection is that the situation was certainly evolving. And, as previously discussed, my view was the situation, after an initial spike, the fighting had largely subsided, that Benghazi was probably not the right place for 

them to go. Get them to the staging base, where we now 

have many, many options. 

One of the challenges, of course, is with a force like the 

Commander’s In-extremis Force, once you operationally 

employ it someplace—so if you were to deploy into any 

place and they’re on the ground, you now no longer have 

that force for other emergent contingencies. So we’re very 

careful about making a decision as to where to go. 

There are other complexities with inserting a force into 

Benghazi, to be sure, but, for me, it was, where’s the best 

place for that force to be right now? And, in my view, I believe that—you know, certainly supported and with recommendations from the AFRICOM operations and intelligence staff—that the best place for them would be at the 


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406 Id. at 93–94. 407Tidd Testimony at 24. 408 Id. at 22–23. 

intermediate staging base so that they would be well-postured for subsequent missions.406

Tidd testified one reason the CIF and the U.S. SOF were ordered 

to an intermediate staging base and not to Libya directly was due 

to concerns expressed by the State Department regarding the number of military personnel that would arrive in country.407 He testified: 

Q: Sir, was it your decision, then, to send them back to an 

ISB first? 

A: Yes . . . State was very, very concerned about what the 

footprint would look like in Tripoli. They didn’t want it to 

look like we were invading. 

That was the gist or that was the genesis of the discussion 

that occurred over whether or not when the FAST arrives 

at the airport in Tripoli—because they wanted to reinforce 

security at the embassy—but there was concern that it not 

have this image of a big, invading force. 

And we knew that the FAST, when it arrived, did not have 

its own mobility. The embassy was going to have to provide trucks and vehicles to move them from the airport to 

the embassy. And there was just concern of parading a 

bunch of trucks or buses full of Marines in uniform, what 

kind of image that would present, recognizing it was going 

to be daylight when they arrived.408

TEAM TRIPOLI NEGOTIATES TRANSPORTATION 

Team Tripoli left the airport at approximately 4:30 a.m. A team 

member provided the committee the following background information for their intended mission at the time, as it had transitioned 

from locating and potentially rescuing Stevens to an effort to start 

evacuating nonessential personnel from Benghazi back to Tripoli. 

Q: What did you understand about your mission as you 

were heading from Benina airport to the Annex? Was your 

mission then evacuation of nonessential personnel? 

A: It was nonessential personnel only prior to the mortar 

attack happening . . . we were going to take 14 personnel 

back with us to the airport, let the jet take off, take them 

back to Tripoli. We were going to come back to the Annex 

and help hold up with the GRS guys until further notice 

. . . the majority of those people [the GRS] would have 

stayed there. Shooters, if you will. . . . We did not make 

the decisions for that [airplane] to come back. We didn’t 

know how long we were going to have to stay at the 

Annex. We were under the understanding they wanted to 

stay. They did not want to leave. So we were just trying 

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409Special Operators Testimony at 65. 410 Id. at 61. 

ed them to do . . . I believe it was the Chief of Base that 

wanted to keep some individuals there.409

FINAL STAGES OF THE ATTACK 

Team Tripoli at the Annex 

After Team Tripoli secured transportation, it arrived at the 

Annex just after 5:05 a.m. Former U.S. Navy SEAL Glen A. 

Doherty, one of the members of Team Tripoli, immediately joined 

Tyrone S. Woods, Diplomatic Security Agent 4, and other GRS 

agents on the rooftops of the Annex buildings. Within 10 minutes 

of the arrival of Team Tripoli, a new small arms attack began. One 

member of Team Tripoli described the small arms attack: 

Once we had gotten to the annex, we called probably three 

minutes out, and the GRS Team Lead was actually out 

there to meet us with the gate open. We didn’t take any 

of the vehicles inside. We exited the vehicles and walked 

inside. 

We took the Libyan Shield commander inside with us so 

his guys would stay there, ultimately. Went directly to the 

main house where the TOC was. I think it was Building 

Three. Team leader started talking to chief of base, and I 

was talking to the [GRS Team Lead] on the security situation, wounded personnel, what did he need from us that he 

didn’t have already, and how we could help the security 

posture. 

Shortly after us being there, we were all sitting outside 

while we were talking about this on the front patio of 

Building Three. We had some sporadic gunfire over the top 

of Building Three, and immediately following, the first 

mortar round hit. I believe it went long, hit out in the road 

where our convoy had been. The gate is obviously closed 

to the compound now. Next one hit short just behind 

Building Three on the wall towards the warehouse. The 

other three or four mortars hit directly on top of Building 

Three.410

One GRS agent described the mortar attack: 

It was about 5:30 in the morning—the sun was just coming up—because me and Tyrone had been talking about, 

you know, if they’re going to attack us, it’s going to happen 

here shortly because usually the time to attack is right before the sun comes up. About that time, [Doherty] came up 

on the roof after the guys from Tripoli had came in. I 

never met [Doherty]. He walks over to Tyrone and says hi 

to Tyrone. They had worked together on the teams. Tyrone 

introduced him to me, said that he was a sniper. 

I told him: Well, that’s good. I hope we don’t need you, but 

it will be great having another rifle up here. 


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He had turned to walk away, and it was about that time 

that there was an explosion against the back wall, and 

there was a mortar that hit the top of the back wall, which 

from our building was maybe 8 or 10 yards from the building. 

[Agent 4] was in the corner where the ladder was at. Me 

and Tyrone were in the opposite corner facing out towards 

what we call Zombieland, and when that hit, small arms 

fire started coming from that direction, and Tyrone opened 

up with a machine gun. I started shooting with my assault 

rifle. I heard [Agent 4] yell out that he was hit. 

I kind of glanced over. I saw his shadow sitting because 

the wall at the top of our building was about 3 feet tall, 

so there was a box that you had to step on to get up on 

to the ladder. So he was—I saw his image or the silhouette 

of him sitting on that box, and he was holding his head. 

What went through my mind is that he’s breathing, so his 

heart is beating . . . 

We’re shooting. I kneel down to change magazines. As I 

come back up after changing magazines, the first mortar 

hits the top of the roof, hits almost directly into the wall, 

where the roof and the arc of the parapet or wall comes 

up, right into the corner of that. When that hit, it blew me 

back a little bit, knocked me back. I kind of caught myself. 

I saw Tyrone go down. . . . The mortar hit on my right. 

As I come up, I bring my arm up to grab my gun, and from 

about here down, it was kind of hanging off at a 90 degree 

angle. I continued to try to grab my gun. Another mortar 

hit, and I kind of glanced over my right shoulder, and I 

saw [Doherty] go straight down. . . . As I tried to keep firing, my weapon is pretty much inoperable. I can’t grab it 

with my hand. The third mortar hits and peppers me 

again with shrapnel. The best way I can describe it is it 

felt like I got stung by a thousand bees. At that point, I 

figured I might better get to cover because if another one 

comes, I’ll be lucky if I survive that. 

I kind of dove down to the wall, . . . and everything had 

went quiet. I kind of sat up and thought I was bleeding 

out because everything was wet around me. I realized that 

it was water because it was cold, and there was a water 

tank right there beside us that had gotten perforated. I 

don’t know what the timeframe was. 

I pulled out a tourniquet, and I was trying to get the tourniquet on. . . . At that point, I saw [GRS 1] come up over 

top of the roof, which I didn’t know it then—I saw a shadow come up, and at that point, he had at first put two 

tourniquets on [Agent 4]; one on his leg, one on his arm. 

Then he come over to me, and he was sitting there. He 

told me to quit messing with my arm because I was trying 

to put it back in place. He grabbed my tourniquet, put it 

on, stood me up, and asked if I could walk myself over to 


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411GRS 2 Testimony at 57. 412 Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0517.40). 413Special Operator Testimony at 61. 414 Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, from 0517 to 0519). 415Special Operator Testimony at 66. 

the ladder so he could tend to Tyrone and [Doherty], and 

I said, yeah. 

He had called for help on the radio, that we had wounded 

up there. By the time I got over to the ladder, there was 

three guys that had come up on the roof. I remember one 

later to find out it was one of the TF or the task force 

guys. He asked me if I could get off the roof. 

I said, ‘‘Yeah, I’m going to have to’’ because I knew they 

had to tend to the guys up there. So I kind of put myself 

up on the parapet, hooked my good arm around the ladder, 

and kind of scooted myself over. I ended up climbing down 

the ladder. 

I come around past the swimming pool to the front, and 

that’s when I ran into [GRS Tripoli]. [GRS Tripoli] walked 

me in, laid me down in the building, building 3, and he 

went back—I think at that time, he went back out to help 

up top. Everybody inside was just kind of looking at me. 

I told them somebody needs to cut my clothes off because 

I know I’m bleeding from other spots. [redacted text] 

case officer I was with earlier that night, [redacted text], 

asked me where the shears were. [redacted text] to cut 

my clothes off with. [redacted text] got those, come back, 

cut my clothes off. I wasn’t bleeding profusely from anything else; I just had a bunch of little holes in me that 

were kind of oozing blood. And later they came down. I 

think [GRS Tripoli] came in and gave me an IV. They finally got [Diplomatic Security Agent 4] off, and that was 

pretty much the night there.411

As GRS agents on Building 3 fired back in response to the new 

attack, a well-aimed mortar attack commenced on the Annex mortally wounding Woods and Doherty and severely wounding another 

GRS agent and one Diplomatic Security Agent.412

In total, six 81-millimeter mortars assaulted the Annex.413 Three 

mortars, including the first one, landed near the north perimeter 

wall. Three additional mortars landed on the roof of Building 3 

within one minute at 5:18 a.m. Overall, the six mortar attacks 

were launched within 1 minute and 13 seconds.414 A member of 

Team Tripoli testified: 

Once the mortar round—the first mortar round hit outside 

the gate where the convoy was, we saw the vehicles driving away, the gun trucks that were out there driving 

away.415

Libya Shield sub-commander, [redacted text], who was left behind during the mortar strike suggested, that attackers were wellaware that Team Tripoli was held up at the Benghazi airport while 

seeking transport and that the attackers may have planned an amVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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416Libya Rescue Squad Ran Into Fierce, Accurate Ambush, Reuters (Sept. 12, 2012; 17:11), 

http://www.reuters.com/article/libya-ambassador-battle-idAFL5E8KCMYB20120912. 417Officer A Testimony at 118. 418 Id. 

bush that coincided with the arrival of the Team Tripoli members 

at the Annex: 

‘‘It began to rain down on us. I really believe that this attack was planned. The accuracy with which the mortars 

hit us was too good for any regular revolutionaries.’’ 416

One witness told the Committee Libya Shield departed the 

Annex when the mortar strike began at the direction of an individual who was standing next to Abu Khattala during the attacks. 

He recounted what happened during the mortar attack: 

Q: When Team Tripoli arrived, were you outside? Were 

you inside? 

A: No, when they arrived, I was outside. 

Q: You were outside. Okay. And did you go inside at any 

point after they arrived? 

A: Yes. Luckily we went inside, because then the mortars 

landed. 

* * * 

Q: Did anybody from the Libyan Shield militia go inside 

as well? 

A: Yes. 

Q: All right. And can you explain the situation? 

A: When the Tripoli team arrived, they brought with them 

a commander of that force that escorted them from the airport to the Annex. 

Q: Okay. And he ended up going inside one of the villas? 

A: Yes. 

* * * 

I asked him to shut off his phone and stop talking on the 

phone after the mortar—especially specifically after the 

mortar landed. 

* * * 

He was talking to his force and wondering why they left 

him behind and informed them that we had just got hit 

with mortars, and he was trying to find out why they left 

him behind.417

The witness stated the Commander of the force was frantic and 

was ‘‘surprised that the attack took place when he thought that his 

force outside was securing the perimeter.’’ 418 He testified about the 

Commander’s actions: 

When he came inside, he was under the impression that 

the force that he brought with him, the commander that 


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419 Id. 420 Id. 421 CIA Document 1–004067 at 71. 422Special Operator Testimony at 82–83. 423DSCC Timeline. 

he left behind and his forces will secure the area. But 

when he called them on the phone, he realized they had 

departed the area. And he asked them, why did you depart 

the area? And they said that the commander of the militia, 

Wissam bin Hamid, gave them orders to return to their 

base on the other side of town. And he asked them, why 

are you going back to the base and leaving me behind? 

And they told him that, oh, we are going to get more weapons and more additional forces.419

Wissam bin Hamid was standing with Abu Khattala during the 

attack[.] 420

One GRS member of Team Tripoli provided his assessment of the 

mortar attacks in an after-action interview conducted by the CIA. 

The GRS member was: 

100% confident that the enemy was waiting for the QRF 

to arrive at the Annex so they could hit them upon arrival. 

Communication was given to local militias and police upon 

the arrival of the QRF team to Benghazi airport. Many 

Libyan militia members and police knew of the QRF 

team’s arrival and movement to the annex. 

He [was] confident it was a well-trained mortar team that 

hit the compound.421

A military member of Team Tripoli described his assessment of 

the mortar attacks that evening: 

Q: And so what’s your opinion on the skill of those who 

were actually employing the mortars that evening in the 

attack on the Benghazi Annex? 

A: I would say personally that it was probably a skilled 

mortar team. It’s not easy. And you, being a trained mortar man, know how hard that would be to shoot inside the 

city and get something on the target within two shots. 

That’s difficult. I would say they were definitely a trained 

mortar team or had been trained to do something similar 

to that . . . I was kind of surprised. I had not heard of or 

seen anybody or talked to anyone that had been trained on 

mortars at all [during my time in Tripoli]. So it was unusual.422

The mortar attack was reported at 5:32 a.m. and a medical evacuation was requested.423

One CIA agent discussed his actions: 

A: [M]inutes later is when we got attacked by the first few 

mortars. 

Q: And you were in the SCIF when the mortar attack happened? 

A: The initial, correct, yes, sir. 


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Q: Well, actually I was trying to go to the bathroom; so I 

put my gear back on, and we were all stacked at the front 

door, myself, the team leader, the two DOD personnel, and 

there were several more volleys of impacts on the building, 

mortar fire. And I heard small arms going out from our 

team, and then small arms coming in on our building. And 

as soon as it subsided, I asked for [GRS Agent] because 

. . . he had [s]ome of my gear . . . and that’s when he 

didn’t answer up. And that’s when one of the other GRS 

personnel said they were all down on the roof. So as soon 

as it subsided, we made our way to the roof. 

Q: Okay, and then what actions did you take at that 

point? 

A: I came around a few seconds after the main element 

. . . so I stepped back . . . and that’s when I was met 

halfway down the ladder by the GRS operator [GRS 2]. 

And I put my light on him because I heard a funny noise, 

and it was obvious that he was severely injured. And 

that’s when he came down on top of me. I noticed he was 

severely wounded, bleeding a lot and everything like that. 

* * * 

Well, they actually put bathroom tile outside there, and so 

it was real slick. He ended up falling on top of me, and I 

ended up hyperextending my leg to the rear. So now I’m 

injured, so I drug him out because we started getting hit 

by small arms fire. So I dragged him around the corner. 

I started putting a tourniquet on his arm. He was bleeding 

from his left arm. He had a hole in his neck, and he had 

a hole in his chest. 

So I put tourniquets on his arm and started patching up 

with the help of others from the shrapnel wounds. And it 

seemed like seconds later when I heard somebody say 

[GRS Tripoli] I have another one for you. That’s when the 

second State Department guy, [Agent 4] . . . came down. 

And I pushed [GRS 2] up on to the couch, and that’s when 

[Agent 4] was there. 

* * * 

So I readjusted the tourniquet on his right leg, put another 

one on his right leg, and ended up putting a tourniquet on 

his left arm and packing his neck with combat gauze to 

help stop the bleeding. I ended up starting an IV on him. 

And then I went back to [GRS 2], put an IV in him. That’s 

one of the State Department personnel—I don’t know who 

it was—had morphine, and I made the call to give [Agent 

4] morphine because he was in so much pain he started 

pawing at the tourniquets and the gauzes, some of the 

dressings I put on. And that seemed like seconds. 

During this process is when [redacted text] asked me to 

. . . contact Tripoli and give them a SITREP. That’s when 

I called Tripoli . . . [and] asked them for blood for [Agent 


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4] because I didn’t think he was going to make it much 

longer. 

* * * 

We had two severely injured, so I asked for blood, because 

I thought our plane, the one we rented, had taken off already. . . . And then, right after that, I went back in, 

made sure both patients were stable, and I worked on 

[Agent 4] more. I started another IV because he had 

sucked that one down so fast. And that’s when I went outside, and the sun was actually up. I know it doesn’t sound 

significant, but it was to me because I really felt with the 

sun up, it would give us time, room to breath, because 

hopefully it would drive away the attackers. 

I was still handling care of the patients . . . And I was in 

the back of the truck with the wounded GRS guy because 

I had no—there was no more room to sit inside a vehicle, 

so we put a stretcher in the back of a small truck. I 

jumped in the back with him and held on to him, and we 

drove out the gate; and that’s when we were met by several gun trucks and militia that were there to escort us. 

And we drove out, and it looked to be several militias or 

several different groups because it looked like they were 

trying to determine which way they were going to go to the 

airport. 

So there was a few minutes delay there before we actually 

started to drive towards the airport. And that’s when we 

made it back to the airport. And I loaded on a plane with 

the nonessential personnel, and the two wounded, and 

made it back to Tripoli where we landed in Tripoli because 

the hospital was close to the Tripoli airport. 

* * * 

I gave [Agent 4] another morphine on the plane. I adjusted 

[GRS 2] bandage. And then when I was moving [Agent 4] 

off the plane—we were bring him off without the stretcher 

because the stretcher was so big and the plane was so 

small—he stopped breathing, so I had to give him CPR. 

Got him back breathing, and that’s when the State Department nurse met me on the plane. . . . 

And then we loaded them on to an ambulance, and at that 

point, the ambulance took them to Afia Hospital in Tripoli. 

And I went back in a Suburban with all the other State 

Department personnel and gear. And that was it. I received a call from the flight medic from Ramstein, the military airlift, and I went over the view of what I did and 

what I gave them as far as tourniquets, morphine, and IV 

bags, how much, and the times and stuff. And that was it 

in reference to my medical service. 

Q: You said they asked if the patients were capable of 

going directly to Germany. Was that the request? 


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424Officer A Testimony at 37–46. 425 Email from Denis R. McDonough to Wendy R. Sherman, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 11:45 PM) 

(on file with the Committee, C05562167). 426 Id. 

A: I believe, yeah. And I said, no, they need to go to the 

hospital now. This is when I just got [Agent 4] breathing 

again. But I made the suggestion, you know, I remember 

they said can they wait for the Ramstein bird. And I was 

like no, because I really think [the agent] was going to die 

any minute. 

Q: We’re coming close to the end of our hour. This is the 

last question. Setting modesty aside, do you believe that 

[the agent] or [GRS 2] would have survived to make it to 

Tripoli without your intervention? 

A: No. 424

At the Time of the Mortar Attacks, 

No Asset was rn route to Libya 

At 11:45 p.m. in Washington [5:45 a.m. in Benghazi], Denis R. 

McDonough sent an email to Sullivan, Sherman, Rhodes, Bash, 

Winnefeld, and other high level representatives of the Executive 

Branch with the subject line, ‘‘Quick level set before we head into 

tomorrow AM SVTC.’’ 425 McDonough wrote: 

The situation in Benghazi remains fluid. Amb. Chris Stevens remains unaccounted for; one State Department officer is confirmed dead (next of kin notification is complete); 

five State Department officers are accounted for and at another USG compound in Benghazi, which had been taking 

fire earlier in the evening (until at least 2030 EDT). . . . 

Five DOD personnel arrived in Benghazi about an hour 

ago from Tripoli to reinforce security there. 

On our people in Libya, the Joint Staff is deploying three 

sets of teams into the region appropriate to the mission(s). 

* * * 

And on getting the video(s) in question taken down, I 

reached [out] to YouTube to ask them to take down two 

videos: one that was not developed by Pastor Jones but 

which he is promoting, and another—of him burning the 

Prophet in effigy—that he did film. Sec. Panetta has also 

reached out to Pastor Jones to ask him to pull down his 

video, knowing that even if YouTube takes the video down, 

Pastor Jones can put it up somewhere else....426

This McDonough email was sent more than six hours after President Obama and the Secretary first met to discuss the initial attack in Benghazi, more than six hours after the Commander in 

Chief said to do everything possible to help our people, more than 

five hours after the Secretary of Defense issued an order to deploy 

elements—active tense—and more than four hours after the Secretary’s Chief of Staff sent an email saying elements were ‘‘spinning up.’’ McDonough writes: ‘‘[T]he Joint Staff is deploying three 


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427 Email from Denis R. McDonough, Dep. Nat’l Sec. Advisor, Nat’l Sec. Council, to Wendy 

R. Sherman, Under Sec’y for Political Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 11:45 

PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562167). 428 Id. 429 Id. 430 Email from James A. Winnefeld, Jr., Vice Chairman, J. Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, to Benjamin J. Rhodes, Dep. Nat’l Sec. Advisor, White House, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012 1:40 

AM) (on file with the Committee, C05562167). 431 Id. 432 Id. 

sets of teams into the region appropriate to the mission(s).’’ 427 This 

‘‘deploying’’ was supposed to occur hours earlier at the order of the 

Secretary. 

Moreover, McDonough references ‘‘five DOD personnel arrived in 

Benghazi about an hour ago from Tripoli to reinforce security 

there.’’ 428 This reference to DOD personnel is noteworthy because 

this ‘‘asset’’ or ‘‘element’’ was not even on the list of ‘‘assets’’ and 

‘‘elements’’ provided to the Secretary of Defense. As discussed 

above, these individuals went to Benghazi from Tripoli at the direction of the Chief of Station in Libya, not at the order of anyone in 

Washington, D.C. 

By this time, both McDonough and the Secretary of Defense had 

made calls to have the YouTube video removed from the internet.429 Yet, none of the forces the Secretary ordered to deploy had 

actually moved. 

Moments after McDonough sent this email, word of the mortar 

attacks on the Annex would make its way through the State Department, the White House, and the Defense Department. 

At 1:40 a.m. in Washington, the assets the Secretary ordered to 

deploy more than six hours earlier had still not deployed, though 

Libya had finally given approval for assets to fly into Tripoli.430 At 

that time, Winnefeld emailed McDonough and others relaying to 

them diplomatic clearance had been obtained from Libya allowing 

the FAST platoon to fly into Tripoli.431 Of course, all State and CIA 

personnel had already evacuated the Annex in Benghazi, and the 

first aircraft evacuating the American personnel was preparing to 

depart for Tripoli within minutes. Winnefeld wrote: 

Two C–130s will move to Rota then Tripoli. One departs 

at 0600z, the other at 0700z. 3+40 transit time to Rota, 1 

hour load time. Estimated arrival at Tripoli is 1300z. We 

now have country clearances for Spain and Libya. Working 

to expedite movement (for example, faster load time than 

one hour), but not sure we can go faster now that aircrews 

are on the ramp.432

Winnefeld’s email meant this: Now that host nation approval had 

been obtained, the transport aircraft would depart Ramstein Air 

Base in Germany in 20 minutes to pick up the FAST team that 

was waiting in Rota, Spain. 

Evacuation to Benghazi Airport 

After the lethal mortar strikes, the team at the Annex was determined to evacuate all personnel. A member of Team Tripoli testified: 


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433Special Operator Testimony at 68. 434Special Operator Testimony at 69. 435DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0616); LMI insignia is printed on vehicles. 436TRIPOLI 27900, Sept. 19, 2012 [REQUEST 1–002982 to REQUEST 1–002991]. 437Officer A Testimony at 71. 438 Id. at 71–72. 439 Id. at 19–20. 440 Id. at 20. 441 Id. 

We decided that the situation we had was untenable to 

stay at the compound. We didn’t have enough shooters and 

there were too many wounded, and we were definitely 

going to lose our State Department wounded if we had 

stayed there much longer. So we were pushing to get out 

as fast as we could.433

A key issue remained in that, ‘‘There was no security vehicle, no 

gun trucks that would help us get to the airport. And we determined we could probably not make it with the vehicles we had inside the compound.’’ 434 At 6:16 a.m., a 50-vehicle motorcade arrived at the Annex to provide transport support by the Libyan Military Intelligence. The motorcade included technical, pick-up trucks 

retrofitted with mounted machine gun-like weapons.435

The forces that arrived at the Annex shortly after the mortar attacks were able to transport all State Department and CIA personnel safely to the airport. The forces, known as Libyan Military 

Intelligence, arrived with 50 heavily-armed security vehicles.436

Libyan Military Intelligence was not part of the Libyan government, nor affiliated with any of the militias the CIA or State Department had developed a relationship with during the prior 18 

months since the Libyan revolution took place.437 Instead, Libya 

Military Intelligence—whom the CIA did not even know existed 

until the night of the attacks—were comprised of former military 

officers under the Qadhafi regime who had gone into hiding in fear 

of being assassinated, and wanted to keep their presence in 

Benghazi as quiet as possible so as to not attract attention from 

the militias in control of Benghazi.438 In other words, some of the 

very individuals the United States had helped remove from power 

during the Libyan revolution were the only Libyans that came to 

the assistance of the United States on the night of the Benghazi 

attacks. 

The reason Libyan Military Intelligence was able to rescue the 

Americans from the CIA base after the mortar attacks—likely saving over two dozen lives—was due solely to the extraordinary efforts of Officer A, [redacted text] stationed in Benghazi. Officer 

A, [redacted text], spent a lot of time on the night of the attacks 

trying to secure help. In the early morning hours of September 12, 

a commander in the February 17 militia told Officer A that February 17 would be unable to protect the Base and that they were 

leaving.439 This commander referred Officer A to the National Police, who the commander said was taking over their duties. Officer 

A described the National Police as ‘‘next to helpless.’’ 440 An officer 

in the National Police told Officer A ‘‘There’s nothing I can do. . . . 

I cannot continue to secure the perimeter [of the Base].’’ 441


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442 Id. at 23–24. 443 Id. at 24. 444 Id. at 27. 445 Id. at 25–28. 446Special Operators Testimony at 71. 

After some convincing by Officer A, the police officer referred Officer A to a colonel in Libyan Military Intelligence.442 Officer A had 

never spoken to this individual before, nor was he even aware of 

Libyan Military Intelligence. Officer A first had a conversation 

with this individual around 4:30 am, and testified: 

And I immediately made contact with this commander. He 

asked how he could help, and I told him, again, our general location, and I said, you know, we need you to come 

and secure this area. He had an idea, at that point, of 

events happening in that part of the city, and he told me 

that he would need to put a big force together, he cannot 

just come with one of his—I mean, like, two or three vehicles, that he would need to put a large force together and 

for me to give him some time to put that force together.443

Immediately after the mortar attacks, Officer A called the colonel 

back and said, ‘‘[We] now really need you to come here.’’ 444 Within 

minutes, the 50-truck force from Libyan Military Intelligence arrived and all American personnel safely evacuated to the airport. 

The group that ultimately came to the rescue of and facilitated 

the evacuation of the Americans in Benghazi was not the Libyan 

Government the State Department had worked tirelessly to appease; nor was it the February 17 Martyrs Brigade, recommended 

by the Libyan Government and contractually obligated to provide 

security to the Mission Compound. Instead, the group that came to 

rescue the Americans that night, the Libyan Military Intelligence, 

was a group most U.S. Government personnel did not even know 

existed. This group, ironically, had close ties to the former Qadhafi 

regime—the very regime the United States had helped remove 

from power. It was also this group, not groups previously given 

credit by previous investigations, that came to the rescue of the 

Americans in those early morning hours —likely saving dozens of 

lives as a result. 

It was the hard work and ingenuity of a single CIA case officer 

that located and developed this evacuation lead—a witness no 

other committee of Congress interviewed and a witness the CIA 

was reluctant to allow the Committee to interview.445

Despite the ‘‘assurance’’ some principals in Washington had that 

U.S. personnel in Benghazi were evacuating earlier, it was not 

until the rescuing convoy actually arrived to at the Annex that the 

evacuation of all U.S. personnel was fully understood by those on 

the ground in Benghazi. 

Officer A described what happened after the Libyan Military Intelligence arrived: ‘‘We lined up the trucks in order of movement. 

And then everybody that was a non-shooter was in an up-armored 

vehicle, and all the shooters were in thin-skinned vehicles to be 

able to shoot out of their cars.’’ 446 After loading into the available 

vehicles at the Annex, at 6:34 a.m. the majority of Annex personnel 


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447DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0634). 448 Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0637). 449Testimony of [redacted text], Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 61–64 (Jun 19, 2015) [hereinafter [redacted text] Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 450See, U.S. Dep’t of Defense Timeline. 451Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 170–172. 452 U.S. Dep’t of Defense Timeline (estimating the times of arrival and departure). 453 U.S. Dep’t of Defense Timeline. 

and all the Diplomatic Security Agents evacuated in the LMI motorcade.447

A few minutes later, two GRS and two CIA Staff officers evacuated the Annex alone in a Toyota pick-up truck after an attempted 

destruction of the CIA equipment.448 One CIA personnel described 

the actions he took to destroy sensitive equipment: 

Q: So you said the last four folks there was yourself, [GRS 

5], it was the chief of base, it was the GRS team lead. Did 

you see any type of interaction between the GRS team lead 

and the chief of base, any argument? 

A: No, and actually I felt bad because once the stuff detonated—whew. 

* * * 

A: You know, I looked down and I was kneeling in a 

bunch of blood. I jumped in the truck, and the chief didn’t 

say a word, you know, but I was pretty happy, you know, 

because the device went off and smoke was already billowing out of the office. The door was jammed open, and 

so I was pretty thrilled about that, you know, and then I 

jumped in and said, let’s go, you know. And of course, the 

chief knew that [Woods] is dead, and anyway, it is—I felt 

bad about that. And then we took off and caught up with 

the rest of the convoy.449

AMERICANS IN BENGHAZI EVACUATE 

Evacuation to Tripoli 

The survivors and four Diplomatic Security Agents departed at 

7:31 a.m. local and landed in Tripoli at 8:38 p.m. local.450 The same 

private aircraft secured by Team Tripoli to come to the aid of those 

being attacked in Benghazi was the aircraft used to evacuate the 

first wave of Americans from Benghazi to Tripoli. 

At 8:25 a.m. GRS and one Agent 3 received the body of Stevens 

from individuals delegated by the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.451

The second aircraft, a C–130 provided by the Libyan Air Force, 

departed with the remaining security officers and the remains of 

Stevens, Smith, Woods, and Doherty at 9:54 a.m. and arrived in 

Tripoli at 11:33 a.m.452

Evacuation to Germany 

At 2:15 p.m. on September 12, a C–17 departed Germany en 

route to Tripoli to evacuate the Americans.453 This departure occurred over eight hours after the 6:05 a.m. AFRICOM order to deVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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454 Id. 455 Id. 

ploy the C–17 for use as part of the Medevac (medical evacuation).454

At 7:17 p.m. the C–17 departed Tripoli returning to Ramstein, 

Germany with the Benghazi-based U.S. personnel, non-essential 

U.S. Embassy State Department personnel and the remains of the 

fallen and arrived at 10:19p.m.455

FOUR DIED. OTHER LIVES UNDOUBTEDLY SAVED 

The initiative shown during the attacks by those on the ground 

in Benghazi and Tripoli not only embodied the service and sacrifice 

of those in military and the Foreign Service but undoubtedly saved 

the lives of other Americans. 

The Diplomatic Security Agents followed their training and responded appropriately after the Mission compound was attacked. 

The Diplomatic Security Agents showed heroism in their efforts to 

protect Sean Smith and Chris Stevens and to enter a burning 

building in search of their missing colleagues. 

Team Annex moved quickly and decisively to help fellow Americans at the Mission compound. Their actions during the night/early 

morning hours provided not only much needed intelligence about 

what was happening on the ground but also helped secure their 

State Department colleagues and saved the lives of fellow Americans. 

Likewise, Team Tripoli, which included military personnel based 

at the Tripoli Annex, acted with purpose, precision and ingenuity 

that night. The Secretary and the Joint Staff did not know those 

personnel were in Tripoli, much less were they considered as one 

of the potential assets to respond to the events in Benghazi. In fact, 

they represent the only military ‘‘asset’’ to reach Benghazi during 

the attacks. They deployed themselves because fellow Americans 

needed them. 

The creativity, valor and selfless sacrifice of the Diplomatic Security Agents, the team from the Benghazi Annex and Team Tripoli 

stand in some contrast to the discussions held during the White 

House meeting occurring at roughly the same time, half a world 

away, in the safe confines of the U.S. 

THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE 

ATTACK WAS INSUFFICIENT 

When the attacks in Benghazi began, the Defense Department 

was unprepared to respond. Despite there being a missing U.S. 

Ambassador, its response—from the start of the attack at 9:42 p.m. 

in Libya, to the amount of time it took for the forces to actually 

deploy late the next morning in Libya—at best illustrates a rusty 

bureaucratic process not in keeping with the gravity and urgency 

of the events happening on the ground. 

The decisions made earlier in the year by senior State Department officials to maintain a presence in Benghazi without adequate 

security forces and an inadequately fortified Mission compound 

contributed to what amounted to a worst case scenario of circumstances that would test the military’s preparedness and ability 


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456 U.S. Dep’t of Defense Timeline. 457Testimony of FAST Platoon Commander, U.S. Marines, Tr. at 35 (Sept. 2, 2015) [hereinafter FAST Commander Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

to respond. Nevertheless, the Defense Department did not pass the 

test. Whether this failure is shouldered by it alone, or rests in part 

on decisions made by the State Department in Washington D.C. or 

with the White House who presided over a two hour meeting where 

half of the action items related to an anti-Muslim video wholly 

unconnected to the attacks, is one of the lingering questions about 

Benghazi. 

To muster forces actually capable of responding to the second lethal attack in Benghazi, the Defense Department needed to overcome the ‘‘tyranny of distance.’’ From the moment the first attack 

occurred, the clock began to tick, and with each passing hour, the 

need to immediately deploy forces became more crucial. Any forces 

deployed by AFRICOM faced two inherent challenges. 

First, AFRICOM did not have a significant number of assigned 

forces. It had a standing arrangement with EUCOM to enable it to 

have access to EUCOM forces when a contingency arose. In essence, AFRICOM had to ask for help, creating another level of bureaucracy that ultimately played out in the orders to deploy forces. 

Second, since any force AFRICOM would use in response to the 

attack were EUCOM assets, those forces would deploy from bases 

in Europe, not Northern Africa. In fact, elements of the forces that 

were ordered to deploy, although based in southern Europe, needed 

C–130s or other transport aircraft to fly from central Europe to 

their location to transport them on to Libya. 

Of course, these challenges were known well in advance and 

came as no surprise. Whereas the facts and circumstances surrounding security related events in North Africa may change, the 

map and the time it takes to respond to the geographic challenges 

does not. 

Whether any of this was taken into account when no change in 

force posture was ordered on September 10 following the meeting 

with the President or on September 11 as the situation in Cairo 

unfolded is unclear. What is clear is the Secretary of Defense testified he was clear on both what the President ordered and what he 

ordered subsequent to the initial attack. Yet, no asset was ever ordered to respond to Benghazi and the decisions made—and not 

made—coupled with a lack of urgency in Washington D.C. delayed 

the response even, in some instances, with an Ambassador missing. 

The Forces did not Meet Timelines 

ISSUES WITH FAST DEPLOYMENT 

One of the FAST platoons ordered to deploy by the Secretary arrived in Tripoli at 8:56 p.m. local time [2:56 p.m. in Washington 

D.C.] the evening of September 12, nearly 24 hours after the attacks began.456 As military witnesses have posited on many occasions, the mission of a FAST Platoon is not hostage rescue but to 

‘‘put that layer of steel around a critical infrastructure of the 

United States to say to our enemy, ‘Don’t mess [with us].’ ’’ 457 Nevertheless, the timing of the FAST Platoon’s arrival is problematic. 

When the Secretary identified a FAST Platoon as an asset to deVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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458Panetta Testimony at 47–48. 459FAST Commander Testimony at 26. 

ploy and said ‘‘go,’’ one U.S. facility in Libya had already been attacked, Sean Smith had been killed, Chris Stevens was missing, 

and the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli was facing threats of another attack. The fact that nearly 24 hours elapsed until those forces actually arrived in Tripoli to reinforce the security there belies the expectations of the American people that the U.S. Military can and 

will move expeditiously. The Secretary said this on the time it took 

for forces to arrive in Libya: 

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you know it was going to take 23 

hours to get the first assets in country? 

A: No. 

Q: So what did you expect it was going to take? 

A: I knew it was going to take some time, just because of 

the preparedness for the units and then the time and distance involved. You know, you’ve heard the term ‘‘tyranny 

of time and distance,’’ and it’s tough in this area. 

* * * 

But I didn’t—and I assumed these units moved as quickly 

as possible and that, you know, we can get them in place 

as quickly as possible, recognizing that there is a time element that’s involved. And, you know, I understand the 

time element involved here just because of the nature of 

moving the military. 

I mean, as Secretary, I used to sit down with deployment 

orders all the time of units. And you go through a whole 

series of discussions about, you know, units that have to 

be deployed. And, normally, the timeframe to get these 

units deployed—it takes time. It takes time to put them on 

a plane. It takes time for them to locate, I understand 

that. But when you’re dealing with the kind of elite units 

we’re talking about here, my expectation is that they move 

as fast as they can.458

The Commander of the FAST Platoon testified he first became 

aware of the attack on the Mission compound in Benghazi through 

reports on Fox News.459 At the time, the FAST Platoon was stationed in Rota, Spain. 

So, that evening, I recall I was actually talking to my dad 

on Skype, watching the Armed Forces Network news channel, which rotates through news affiliates, and I think it 

was Fox News that night. And all of a sudden we see a 

consulate building on fire. 

As soon as I hung up with him, I got on the phone with 

my commanding officer, and we had a short talk. . . . And 

he said something more or less in the lines of, ‘‘Make sure 

you do your laundry and you got enough soap.’’ 


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460 Id. at 27. 461 Id. at 31–32. 

A couple of hours later, he was calling me, telling me he 

was going to go down to the commander of CTF 68, who 

is the higher headquarters of FAST Company Europe, and 

that I needed to start getting my Marines together. This 

was around midnight [local time in Rota, Spain], so it 

would be on September 12. 

Around midnight is when my platoon sergeant and I initiated the recall. 

* * * 

Q: Let’s back up a little bit. In terms of the Rota Naval 

Station, were there any air assets typically stationed at 

Rota? 

A: No, sir. No. What we always planned upon is primarily 

aircraft coming from Ramstein, because that’s where the 

preponderance of Air Force C–130s were[.] 460

Almost three hours after the FAST Platoon Commander initiated 

the recall order, which required his Marines to return to base, he 

received official notification at 2:39 a.m. [8:39 p.m. in Washington 

D.C.] the platoon was activated and he was to prepared to deploy. 

Q: When did you receive VOCO [vocal order] or a warning 

order that the FAST platoon was going to be mobilized? 

A: Around 0230 is when we got the official notification. So 

that was our official [redacted]. We already had some leadin to it, obviously. 

* * * 

Q: —was it at 0239? Does that sound familiar? 

A: Yes, sir. 

* * * 

Q: What were your specific orders at that time? 

A: Prepare my platoon to deploy to Libya. We didn’t know 

where exactly we were going, but we knew through open 

media sources of what was going on on the deck. 

At that time, we started to make contact with the embassy 

to gain S[ituational] A[wareness] of what was happening 

and what our potential mission would be.461

Three hours after he received official notification, at 5:45 a.m. 

local time [11:45 p.m. in Washington D.C.], the FAST Commander’s 

platoon was prepped and ready to deploy. 

Q: When was your platoon packed out and ready to get on 

a plane? 

A: I believe it was around 0545. I know it was before 6. 

Q: Obviously your company commander is aware of that. 


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462FAST Commander Testimony at 40. 463 Breedlove Testimony at 21. 464 Id. 465FAST Commander Testimony at 39–41. 466 Id. at 41. 467 Id. at 40–41. 468 Ham Testimony at 90. 

A: Yes, sir. 

Q: Did they notify anybody up the food chain that at 0545 

you’re ready to go? 

A: Yes, sir.462

Yet, another six hours would elapse before C–130s arrived in 

Spain to transport the FAST Platoon to Libya. General Philip 

Breedlove, the Commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe, which is the component command which owned the C–130s 

used to transport the FAST Platoon, told the Committee he began 

generating C–130s on his own initiative after learning about the 

attacks in Benghazi.463 Breedlove said repeatedly his C–130s were 

ready to deploy before he received official notification of deployment.464

The C–130s arrived six hours later, and the FAST Platoon loaded 

its gear within an hour.465 Yet, another three hours would elapse 

before the FAST Platoon departed for Libya.466 The FAST Platoon 

commander explained the cause of the delay: 

A: After we were loaded, which was around [1:00 p.m. 

local time], so about an hour after the C–130s were there, 

we still did not lift off until [4:00 p.m. local time] was 

when the first aircraft took off. 

* * * 

Q: Why was there another delay to get off the ground? 

A: So we were told multiple times to change what we were 

wearing, to change from cammies into civilian attire, civilian attire into cammies, cammies into civilian attire. 

There was also some talk of whether or not we could carry 

our personal weapons. I was basically holding hard and 

fast to the point where we were carrying our personal 

weapons. Like, we’ve got a very violent thing going on the 

ground where we’re going, so we’re going to be carrying 

something that can protect ourselves. 

But as far as what the Marines were wearing, that continually changed, and we had to make those changes inside 

of the aircraft.467

In fact, the FAST Platoon commander testified that during the 

course of three hours, he and his Marines changed in and out of 

their uniforms four times. Ham was not aware the FAST Platoon 

had been directed to change out of their uniforms until after the 

fact.468 When asked whether he had any explanation for why it 


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469 Id. at 91. 470Department of Defense’s Response to the Attack on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and 

the Findings of Its Internal Review Following the Attack, Hearing before the S. Comm. on Armed 

Services, 113th Cong. 66 (2013). 471Defense Attache ́ 2014 Testimony at 113–114. 472 Id. 473 Id. 474 Id. 475 Id. at 159–160. 

took so long for the FAST Platoon to arrive in Tripoli, he replied, 

‘‘I do not.’’ 469

Although Dempsey told the U.S. Senate that once forces began 

moving, ‘‘nothing stopped us, nothing slowed us,’’ it appears the 

U.S. Military’s response that night was delayed—because it started 

too late.470

Diplomatic Clearance 

On the ground in Tripoli, the Defense Attache ́ had already begun 

working to obtain flight clearances from the Libyan government before the White House meeting began.471 Initially, he notified the 

Libyan government of a potential request for flight clearances as 

the night progressed.472 Because he had given advance notice to 

the Libyan government potential flight clearances would be needed, 

he fully expected the Libyan government to approve any formal request when it was made. He noted, however, that to submit a formal request, specific information about the tail numbers, expected 

arrival of the aircraft, the number of personnel, and types of weapons had to be conveyed to the Libyan government.473 Not only did 

a formal request have to be made, a representative of the Libyan 

government had to be available to receive the paperwork for the request. There was no Libyan representative on duty overnight.474 As 

to when formal approval was received, the Defense Attache ́ testified: 

Q: Can you recall when the actual—the relevant information that was needed, like tail numbers and things, when 

was that transmitted to the Government of Libya? 

A: I don’t. But I would also come back to the fact that we 

had a green light from the Government of Libya to bring 

it in. It was just a question of when we were going to know 

the specific information that goes into a standard flight 

clearance request. So it had to have been, I would say, 

sometime midmorning to noon on the 12th. It could have 

been, I would say, sometime midmorning to noon on the 

12th. It could have been a little bit after that. 

Q: And that’s when you received the relevant information 

you need to pass on, or what happened? 

A: Probably both. In the course of the morning, leading up 

to the afternoon, we got the information we required, and 

then we were able to subsequently transmit it to the Libyans.475

An email from Winnefeld corroborates the Defense Attache ́’s 

recollection that the final relevant information needed to obtain 

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476 Email from Admiral James Winnefeld, Jr., Vice Chairman of the J. Chiefs of Staff, U.S. 

Dep’t of Defense, to Denis R. McDonough, Deputy Nat’l Sec. Advisor, White House, et al. (Sept. 

12, 2012 1:19 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05562167). 477Winnefeld Testimony at 51. 478 Id. at 90. 479 Id. at 30. 480See U.S. Dep’t of Defense Timeline (‘‘[At 7:57 PM EET t]he EUCOM special operations 

force, and associated equipment, arrives at an intermediate staging base in southern Europe’’). 481 CIF Commander Testimony at 58–59. Some forces that are required to move within a predetermined timeframe operate with a notification hour or ‘‘N-hour.’’ The N-hour is the estabContinued 

tember 12. In Washington, at 1:40 a.m. [7:40 a.m. in Libya] on September 12, Winnefeld wrote, ‘‘Understand we now have dip clearance for the FAST platoon in Tripoli.’’ 476 At least six hours had 

transpired between the time the Secretary ordered the deployment 

of forces and the Libyan Government approved deployment of those 

forces into Libya. Prior to this approval, no forces had begun moving. 

Winnefeld did not believe the timing of host nation approval from 

the Government of Libya prevented forces from moving.477 Rather, 

from his perspective, what most impacted the ability of the forces 

to move was the availability of airlifts coming from Ramstein, Germany.478 Notably, Winnefeld stated one lesson learned that night 

was the need to ‘‘synch up’’ force deployment timelines with airlift 

availability timelines.479 Nevertheless, the question still remains if 

the request for host nation approval from Libya was merely pro 

forma and did not delay deployment of forces, why did the forces 

not move until approval was obtained? 

PROBLEMS WITH CIF DEPLOYMENT 

Twenty-two hours after the initial attack in Benghazi began, the 

CIF landed at the intermediate staging base in Sigonella, Italy.480

On the night of the attacks, the CIF was located in Croatia participating in a training exercise. The CIF Commander provided the following information about his instructions that night: 

A: The initial guidance was—I can’t recall if someone said 

prepare to deploy or you will deploy. The notification we 

just operate under at all times, if you’re notified, we are 

operating under the premise that we are going to deploy. 

But no one ever specifically said you would; or that, we 

would. And as the situation progressed from initial notification around 02, through the early morning hours and 

throughout the next day, there were various updates along 

that timeline 

Q: And as the night progressed and the morning developed, at what point were you told you will deploy and this 

is the N Hour? At what point do you recall receiving an 

N Hour notification? Or did you receive one? 

A: I can’t recall the official N Hour notification that was 

set for official purposes. From my purview, when someone 

told me, that is when I started working off it at the tactical level so that we are prepared. 

So, from my recollection, it was in the middle of the night, 

but I can’t recall when the official N Hour was set.481


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lished time that essentially starts the clock ticking for when the forces are required to be airborne. 482 Id. at 63, 65. 483 Id. at 65–66. 484General Repass Testimony at 54. 485 Id. at 54–55 486 CIF Commander Testimony at 76. 

Notably, as he and his team were preparing after receiving their 

orders, the CIF Commander was receiving updates from his chain 

of command but never received any information about what was 

happening on the ground until he received word Ambassador Stevens had been killed.482 Despite the updates he was receiving, he 

was never told State Department personnel had evacuated to the 

Annex or even that the Annex had been struck by mortars and two 

more Americans were killed.483

The CIF faced several obstacles that slowed its ability to deploy. 

First, before they could execute, they had to have a fork-lift 

brought in from Zadar, Croatia, which was approximately 180 

miles away from their current location.484 Once the forklift arrived, 

the CIF was able to load their pallets of gear and ammunition, 

then make the two-hour journey to Zagreb International Airport, 

where they would await their follow-on transportation.485

Despite these logistical obstacles, the CIF was packed and ready 

to go at approximately 7:00 a.m. local time [1:00 a.m. in Washington D.C.]. Yet, it was nearly another three hours until it was 

airborne. The CIF Commander described the delay: 

A: So in terms of the air, my recollection, I did not—I was 

waiting on the aircraft. I wasn’t involved in the planning 

of the aircraft, is the best way to describe it. So I don’t recall the N Hour sequence for the air movement. It was— 

for us, we packed up every quickly and then we were waiting at the airfield. 

And my comms—I packed up my comms and everything. 

So once we were sitting at the airfield about seven o’clock 

in the morning on September 12th, I had limited communications with what was going on. I was just waiting for 

the aircraft to show up.486

* * * 

A: But none of us knew—we weren’t aware of the aircraft 

deploying time. On that set N Hour to move aircraft, I 

don’t recall what that was. 

Q: Do you recall any efforts to try to coordinate back with 

SOECUER headquarters to say, ‘‘Hey, is there an N Hour 

Sequence in effect? 

Were you tracking an N Hour sequence of any type or was 

it more of a deliberate deployment sequence? 

A: I was tracking—for me, as a ground assault force, the 

second I heard what was going on, that was kind of what 

I was tracking. And we moved as quickly as we could. And 

once we found out that the crisis was not what it was 

originally articulated in terms of a U.S. Ambassador or 

any Am[erican] cit[izen] missing, and that he was killed 


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487 Id. at 77–78. 488 Repass Testimony at page 29. 489 Id. at 49. 490 Id. at 62. 491 CIF Commander Testimony at 69. 492 Id. at 69–70. 493 Id. at 71. 

and nobody was—that crisis was no longer occurring as 

originally discussed, then it became deliberative. 

So from my perspective, at that point the crisis was no 

longer ongoing and it was more of a deliberate process. So 

the N Hour sequence, I hate to use the term irrelevant, 

but I didn’t know what my mission was going to be if there 

wasn’t a crisis that we were prone to look at.487

In support of its training exercise, the CIF’s two C–130 aircraft 

were located in Croatia.488 Based on reports regarding the attack 

in Benghazi, and well before receiving an order to deploy, at approximately midnight local time [6:00 p.m. in Washington D.C.] the 

commander of the aircraft placed his pilots and air crews in ‘‘crew 

rest’’ in anticipation of a potential mission.489 ‘‘Crew rest’’ is typically a 12-hour period in which the pilots and air crew rest prior 

to engaging in a mission. The 12-hour period can be waived to 

eight hours (or more in exigent circumstances). General Repass, 

the SOCEUR Commander, waived the crew rest to eight hours in 

order to facilitate the CIFs movement to the intermediate staging 

base at Sigonella, Italy.490

Once he received word of Stevens’s death, the CIF Commander 

testified the mission transitioned from a crisis action planning 

event to a deliberate planning event.491

Q: Why did it transition from a crisis action planning 

event to a deliberate planning event? What was the nature 

of what his death generated in terms of your planning sequence? 

A: From my recollection—and I wasn’t in constant communications about all of that; I just remember hearing that 

he was killed, and there were no reports of any other missing American citizens or any life, limb, or eyesight threats 

to American personnel in the original crisis point. Once we 

heard of that, and then from that point we knew we were 

going to an ISB, for sure. So there is no longer an in 

extremis, as we call it, crisis, and personnel are safe, for 

a matter of speaking, it became a much more deliberate 

planning cycle.492

* * * 

I was waiting for orders, to be honest with you, from that 

point forward, outside of deploying. I knew I was going to 

deploy. Aside from that, the scope of that deployment in 

terms of a mission statement, was still unknown.493

Once the U.S. based Special Operations Force was activated, the 

CIF—the closest military asset capable of quickly deploying to 

Benghazi—transitioned to a supporting role to help facilitate whatVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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494 Repass Testimony at page 60. 495 Id. at 70. 496 Ham Testimony at 91–92. 

ever mission was to be assigned to SOF forces.494 As such, the 

CIF’s primary responsibility was then to simply get to the intermediate staging base prior to the U.S. based Special Operations 

Force and assist them as required.495 The CIF was essentially relegated to being an enabler of the U.S. based SOF, unless they were 

subsequently tasked otherwise. 

Ham disagreed that the CIF’s sole role became to prepare for the 

U.S.-based Special Operations Force. He testified: 

Q: Did you anticipate as you did your planning that the 

Commander’s In-extremis Force was going to be relegated 

to being nothing more than enablers for the National Mission Force? 

A: In my view, that’s an incorrect characterization of the 

Commander’s In-extremis Force. 

* * * 

Q: [W]hat would be a more accurate characterization? 

A: Mr. Chairman, in my view, the Commander’s Inextremis Force, again, these are specially trained, 

equipped, prepared forces that can, as the name implies, 

conduct missions in extremis. [Redacted text] 

[Redacted text] but they can, in fact, accomplish that 

mission. 

And, Mr. Chairman, they do, in fact, have a mission to receive and prepare for arrival of the National Mission 

Force, but, in my view, their mission is much broader than 

just that. 

Q: I think the tension that we’re trying—particularly 

those of us who have never served before—the tension 

we’re trying to reconcile is, when General Repass testified—and he did a fantastic job, but one of the impressions 

we were all left with based on his testimony was, once the 

[U.S. SOF] was deployed, the CIF’s role then became to go 

to the ISB and await the [U.S. SOF], which, in effect, took 

them out of the realm of other assets that could deploy 

otherwise. That is a fair characterization of his testimony. 

And I’m just wondering whether or not you agree that, 

once both of those assets are put in place—the [U.S. SOF], 

it’s headed, it’s got a longer travel time than the CIF—that 

the CIF’s job was to go to the ISB and await the [U.S. 

SOF]? 

A: Mr. Chairman, I would say that that was one of their 

missions, certainly, to facilitate the arrival and the staging 

of the [U.S. SOF]. But, in my mind, that was an operational force that was available to me, a highly capable 

special operations force that was available.496


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497 Id. at 108. 498Panetta Testimony at 176–177. 

Even still, Ham believed the CIF’s failure to meet its timeline 

was not justified and was inexcusable: 

Though I know now in hindsight that had the CIF made 

its timelines, they would not have been in position to affect 

the outcome as things eventually played out on the 

ground, the reality is, they should have made their 

timelines. And that’s—there’s no excuse for that. They 

should have made their timelines. They should have been 

postured for subsequent use. As it turns out, they would 

not have been needed, but we didn’t know that at the time. 

So that, as I look back on this, the disappointment of the 

Commander’s In-extremis Force not meeting its timeline 

is, to me, significant, and I believe the steps taken by the 

command and by the Department of Defense after that 

have addressed that situation.497

The Secretary had this to say about the CIF’s deployment 

timeline: 

Q: Well that same unit then had to wait for aircraft till 

about if you look at the timeline here, 10:21 a.m. 

So that N-hour that was set at 11 o’clock east coast time 

on the night of the 11th, it was not until 11 hours later 

that EUCOM CIF was actually transported down to 

Sigonella from Croatia. 

Does that timeframe seem reasonable to you, given what 

you thought might be occurring in the region? 

A: I think it’s a legitimate area to ask why did it take that 

long.498

PROBLEMS WITH US SOF DEPLOYMENT 

The U.S. SOF force is required to deploy within a specific number of hours after the order to deploy is given. As reflected in the 

Defense Department’s timeline and after-action reviews, it actually 

took a significant amount of additional time to launch the U.S. 

SOF. Even given this delay, the U.S. SOF Force, which deployed 

from the United States, arrived at the staging base in southern Europe only an hour and a half after the CIF arrived. 

By the time CIF and the U.S. SOF Force landed at Sigonella, the 

crisis in Benghazi had ended. In fact, the units arrived in Sigonella 

nearly 12 hours after all U.S. personnel had evacuated from 

Benghazi. The assets ultimately deployed by the Defense Department in response to the Benghazi attacks were not positioned to arrive prior to the final lethal attack on the Annex. The fact that this 

is true does not mitigate the question of why the world’s most powerful military was not positioned to respond or why the urgency 

and ingenuity displayed by team members at the Annex and Team 

Tripoli was seemingly not shared by all decision makers in Washington. 


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499Winnefeld Testimony at 11. 

What was disturbing from the evidence the Committee found was 

that at the time of the final lethal attack at the Annex, no asset 

ordered deployed by the Secretary had even left the ground. Not a 

single asset had launched, save the military personnel from Tripoli 

who did so on their own accord and whose presence no one in 

Washington seemed aware of when discussing which assets to deploy. Nothing was on its way to Benghazi as a result of the Secretary’s initial order to deploy. 

More than 12 hours had passed since the first attack happened 

at the Mission compound, resulting in the death of Sean Smith 

(which was known) and Ambassador Stevens (which was not then 

known), yet in that time, the greatest military on earth was unable 

to launch one single asset toward the sound of the guns. 

The CIF’s response timeline and the U.S. SOF’s timeline exposed 

flaws in a process designed to ensure that when a crisis erupts, the 

military’s decision and deployment cycles will prove adequate to 

the challenge being confronted. 

The U.S. Government’s Response Lacked a Sense of Urgency 

Perhaps given the timing of the 7:30 p.m. meeting with the 

White House on September 11, shortly after all surviving State Department personnel had evacuated from the Mission compound to 

the Annex, there may have been a sense the worst of the attack 

was over. Indeed, Winnefeld stated when he was first briefed 

around 4:30 p.m. about the events in Benghazi, he recalled being 

told there had been an attack and the attack was over.499 The job 

left to be done was no longer a hostage rescue situation but was, 

at best, recovering Stevens from a hospital and, at worst, recovering Stevens’s remains. 

This sense, in fact, was false and should have been viewed as 

limited, if not false, at the time. As the participants of the White 

House meeting would soon learn, events were continuing to unfold 

on the ground in Benghazi. Those leaving the Benghazi Mission 

compound were attacked and ambushed en route to the Annex and 

once the Diplomatic Security Agents and Team Annex arrived at 

the Annex the attacks continued. Moreover, preparing for what 

could theoretically happen in Tripoli, or other cities and facilities 

was understandable. However, the lack of urgency in responding to 

what was actually happening on the ground in Benghazi is difficult 

to reconcile. 

Some may seek to argue a transferred focus onto Tripoli may explain why such topics as military attire, vehicles, and country 

clearances—topics that may seem irrelevant in a crisis situation— 

found their way into the discussions, and why other topics, such as 

deployment of the FEST, received short shrift. This belies the reality that—even as Bash indicated the assets were ‘‘spinning up’’ 

and the ensuing meeting took place—Ambassador Stevens was 

missing in Benghazi. There is no evidence news of his death had 

reached Washington D.C. Indeed, news of his death could not have 

reached Washington D.C. because it was not known at the time. 

So, pivoting toward a Tripoli security analysis and the possibilities 

of unrest and violence there is hard to reconcile with the reality of 


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500Tidd Testimony at 26. 501 Id. at 47. 

what had happened in Benghazi, what was currently happening in 

Benghazi, and tragically what was soon to happen in Benghazi. 

With the storming of the compound in Benghazi, the killing of 

Smith, and Stevens missing, discussing the nature of the vehicles 

to be used and the clothing to be worn by those seeking to provide 

aid seemed to place a disproportionate emphasis on how the Libyan 

government might respond. After all, the Libyan government was 

supposed to play an active role in preventing the attack in the first 

instance and certainly in responding afterward. 

In addition, a fair review of read-outs and summaries of the 

White House meeting suggest the focus had already moved away 

from responding to Benghazi and toward responding to Tripoli and 

the broader region. Expressing concern about how forces might be 

received in Tripoli seems difficult to reconcile with an actively hostile security situation ongoing in Benghazi. 

The U.S. Government’s Response Lacked Leadership 

THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT THOUGHT STATE WAS EVACUATING THE 

AMERICANS IN BENGHAZI 

The response to the attacks suffered from confusion and misinformation circulating between the agencies underscoring that no 

one effectively took charge of the U.S. Government’s response the 

night and early morning of September 11–12. From the Defense 

Department’s perspective, when the orders were issued, the plan on 

the ground was for the people in Benghazi, with the assistance 

from Team Tripoli, to make their way back to Tripoli. It would provide assets to augment the security in Tripoli where needed, and 

provide evacuation of the wounded and deceased. Several witnesses 

indicated that despite the Secretary’s orders, the plan was not to 

insert any asset into Benghazi; their understanding was that assets needed to be sent to Tripoli to augment security at the Embassy, and that the State Department was working to move the 

State personnel from Benghazi to Tripoli. 

Tidd confirmed this understanding of the response plan following 

the 7:30 meeting with the White House: 

By the time we came out of the [White House meeting], it 

was pretty clear that nobody was going to be left in 

Benghazi. And so the decision—I think at the [White 

House meeting] there was some discussion—but as I recall, we weren’t going to send them to Benghazi, because 

everybody was going to be back in Tripoli by the time we 

could actually get them there.500

He further added: 

On the evening, at the time that all of this was transpiring, our mindset, our sense was that everything was 

going to Tripoli, that no one was left—or no one would be 

left in Benghazi. So that—that’s—that was the mindset 

that we had.501


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502DSCC Timeline. 503 Email from Senior Advisor to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., to Susan 

E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012 10:37 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, SCB0051700). 504Special Operator Testimony at 69. 505See DSCC Timeline (‘‘[At 11:13 PM EDT] response team has arrived at the [redacted] 

Annex. Station is telling him all DS staff told to evacuate. [Redacted] has 3 people willing to 

stay behind. Director Bultrowicz stated no, DS will not evacuate all members due to the outstanding issue of the Ambassador.’’). 506See Email from Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff to the U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to Denis R. McDonough, Deputy Nat’l Sec. Advisor, White House (Sept. 12, 2012 12:12 

AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0051706) (‘‘we’re pulling everyone out of Benghazi [starting shortly]’’). 

Even the diplomatic security timeline of events reflected this was 

the plan as understood by individuals on the ground in Libya. At 

approximately 10:15 p.m. in Washington D.C., the Diplomatic Security Command Center received a call from the CIA Annex in Tripoli 

relaying the following information: 

The Response Team has been on the ground for approximately 60 minutes. They are waiting for to [sic] escort 

them to the [redacted] annex. 

* * * 

Once the six-member Response Team arrives they will 

have non-essential employees and the remains of Sean P. 

Smith depart.502

Word of the plan to evacuate the individuals from Benghazi 

seemed to spread throughout the State Department. Susan E. Rice, 

U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., received an email update on the events of the evening which read: ‘‘Apparently the Department is considering an ordered departure of some personnel 

from both Tripoli and Benghazi.’’ 503 One member of Team Tripoli 

also testified the plan, as he understood it, was to evacuate all nonessential personnel to Tripoli.504

Yet several other witnesses believed a very different plan was in 

place: No one was evacuating until Stevens was found.505

The Defense Department was working off of the premise everyone in Benghazi was being evacuated, others were clear that no 

one was leaving, and even State Department senior officials did not 

authorize the Diplomatic Security Agents to evacuate until Stevens 

was found. The Committee was also struck by the sheer number 

of government officials involved in the decision making the 

evening/early morning hours of September 11–12, who did not even 

know there was a separate U.S. facility in Benghazi referred to as 

the ‘‘Annex’’ or where the Annex was. 

The first time it is clear all agencies understood the people in 

Benghazi were evacuating to Tripoli was after the final, lethal mortar attack at 11:15 p.m. in Washington D.C., [5:15 a.m. in 

Benghazi]—and over seven hours after the initial attack.506

The lack of clarity on evacuation versus location of the missing 

Ambassador was not the only example of conflicting and confusing 

directives during the attacks and aftermath in Benghazi. 

The issue of military attire versus civilian clothes illustrated no 

one seemed to be taking charge and making final decisions. After 

the State Department request at the 7:30 p.m. White House meeting, the Defense Department began working the issue. Documents 


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507Landolt Testimony at 33–34. 

from the Defense Department show, and the FAST Platoon Commander testified it was well into the next afternoon on September 

12th before the final decision was made. He testified further the 

Marines changed in and out of uniform and civilian clothes several 

times because the orders kept changing. 

THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DID NOT ANTICIPATE 

ADDITIONAL ATTACKS IN BENGHAZI 

Several Defense Department witnesses testified that following 

the attack at the Benghazi Mission compound, they did not anticipate any additional attacks. Landolt explained: 

But you also have to remember that the first firefight was 

around midnight. We didn’t anticipate a second one at 5:00 

in the morning. 

* * * 

Q: In terms of, though, after the first attack, was there a 

sense that perhaps this thing had passed and the dust had 

settled and—- 

A: There was that sense. 

Q: Talk about that a little more. Was there a general 

agreement amongst yourself and General Ham and Admiral Leidig of that, well, we got through this thing with 

minimal damage? Or what was the process? What was the 

thought? 

A: Yeah, there was a sense that we needed more information, that it looked like the initial attack had ended. We 

had the one dead body on our hands, but we still had a 

missing Ambassador. And then the Embassy, through the 

DAT, was telling us that they were able to get a plane and 

they were going to fly people over. So I thought, okay, well, 

that will give us better situational awareness. So there 

was that lull where, Okay, let’s wait and see what happens 

here.507

Although the Defense Department did not anticipate an additional attack, the people on the ground in Benghazi most assuredly 

did. One GRS agent on the ground testified: 

Q: Was there a sense from you that something was building to something larger later in the evening? 

A: Yes. And what we were worried about was an even 

larger force with gun-mounted weapons, which are much 

larger, overtaking the compound. 

Q: Okay. But in terms of individuals with small arms, 

that’s something that you guys had sufficiently handled 

and were able to continue handling based on your defensive posture at the base? 

A: Right, but there was a limit to it. Like it’s not something that we could have done for days. I mean, we were 


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508GRS 5 Testimony at 65–66. 509 CIF Commander Testimony at 69. 510Winnefeld Testimony at 39–40. 511 Id. at 30–31. 

able to do it for as long as we could, but it wasn’t—there 

had to be something else. 

Q: Okay. Was there ever a sense throughout the evening 

that the attacks were over and there was sort of a calmness—— 

A: Absolutely not. 

Q: —around the base? 

A: No. There were lulls, which are normal, but no, none 

of us, and when I say ‘‘us,’’ the team, none of us thought 

it was over, no.508

THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT’S FOCUS SHIFTED 

FROM BENGHAZI TO THE REGION 

The Defense Department’s lack of comprehension of the events 

taking place in Benghazi, coupled with the emphasis on resolving 

potentially extraneous policy matters, hampered the administration’s subsequent plan to respond to those events and dictated the 

urgency with which forces moved that night. As the CIF commander testified, their movements that night transitioned from crisis action to deliberate planning.509 Winnefeld explained why: 

I think there are a number of factors in play. One, it 

wasn’t a matter of not having enough urgency, I think it 

was more a matter of posture, coupled with the fact the 

focus was on regional challenges, not on something additional was going to happen in Benghazi later that night. 

And so when there was not the perception of an immediate 

threat right there . . . people are going to operate safely.510

* * * 

And remember, the reason we were moving the CIF, we 

were moving it to, what, Sigonella. . . . It was not because they were going to Benghazi. 

* * * 

We were worried about the copycat attacks elsewhere in the 

region. And so I think they were more in a—it wasn’t a lack 

of urgency, but it was—you know, they keep safety in mind. It 

was, okay, there could be a copycat attack; we need to reposture ourselves in theater. Let’s do it, but let’s not kill ourselves 

doing it. 

You know, in 20/20 hindsight, if anybody had known there 

was going to be a second attack and that potentially the 

CIF could end up going there, maybe they would have 

asked that question that you’re asking. But again, their 

mindset was we’re moving the CIF to Sigonella because 

something else could happen in the region.511


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512Panetta Testimony at 23. 513 Email from Vice Admiral Kurt Tidd, Dir. of Operations, J. Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Dep’t of 

Defense, to Deputy Dir. of Operations, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 8:53PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB001376). 514Testimony of General David A. Petraeus, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 16 (Mar. 19, 

2016) [hereinafter Petraeus Testimony 2] (on file with the Committee). 

THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT’S RESPONSE LACKED URGENCY 

Finally, the coordination for and deployment of the assets identified and ordered deployed by the Secretary lacked any real sense 

of urgency. 

The Defense Department knew of the initial attack in Benghazi, 

which killed Sean P. Smith, less than an hour after the attack 

began. 

Two hours after this initial attack began, the Secretary had met 

with the President and been given all of the authority he believed 

he needed to ‘‘use all of the resources at our disposal to try to make 

sure we did everything possible to try to save lives there.’’ 512

Three hours after the initial attack began, Bash emailed senior 

leaders at the State Department to inform them of the assets that 

could be deployed in response to the attack. 

Five hours after the initial attack began, formal authorization to 

deploy the assets was issued. 

Instead of setting the N hour at the time the Secretary of Defense gave his order before Bash’s email, or even setting the N 

hour at the time orders were issued to the forces at 8:39 p.m., the 

Joint Staff coordinated with the U.S. SOF force to ask, ‘‘What 

would you like to set as N hour?’’ 513

Given the urgency of the Secretary’s intended deployment of 

these units and particularly in light of what was continuing to happen in Benghazi, this cannot be justified, particularly since it was 

already known the likelihood of further unrest in the region was 

significant. 

N hour was ultimately set at 11:00 p.m.—more than seven hours 

after the attacks in Benghazi began, more than four hours after the 

Secretary gave the order to deploy the forces, and more than two 

hours after that order was finally relayed to the forces. Though, 

Petraeus quipped to the Committee, ‘‘N hour has nothing to do 

with this whatsoever, with great respect. That is completely 

irrelevant[,]’’ the setting of the N hour was symptomatic of a larger 

lack of urgency in responding to the situation on the ground.514

Almost six hours after first learning of the initial attack on U.S. 

facilities in Benghazi, no asset had been deployed to Benghazi or 

Tripoli. Moreover, no asset ordered by the Secretary was even moving toward Benghazi or Tripoli aside from military personnel in 

Tripoli who mustered the ingenuity, courage, and resolve to ferry 

themselves toward danger. At the White House, McDonough knew 

at 11:45 p.m. the situation in Benghazi remained ‘‘fluid,’’ Stevens 

was still ‘‘unaccounted for,’’ and one State Department officer had 

been killed. He included this in his 11:45 p.m. email on September 

11. 

Despite the fact that more than six hours had lapsed between 

the time the first attack was known and the time of this email, 

McDonough was still speaking of assets ‘‘deploying’’ rather than assets deployed. If there is evidence McDonough placed calls or sent 


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emails inquiring about the status of the deployment, the White 

House has not shared that evidence with the Committee. Rather, 

what was learned is McDonough made mention of calling 

‘‘YouTube’’ to request the taking down of two videos, and he references having had the Secretary call ‘‘Pastor Jones to ask him to 

pull down his video.’’ Why McDonough had time to concern himself 

with ‘‘You Tube’’ videos while an Ambassador was missing and unaccounted for remains unclear. And why the Secretary of Defense 

was used to call ‘‘You Tube’’ and a ‘‘pastor’’ about a video—that had 

not and would not be linked to the attacks in Benghazi—rather 

than inquiring about the status of the asset deployment he ordered 

five hours earlier is also unclear. 

What is clear is the United States Government sent personnel 

into a dangerous post-revolution environment in Benghazi, Libya. 

Those sent displayed heroism and valor. They also displayed a 

sense of urgency in discharging the mission assigned to them. 

Chris Stevens had the urgency to travel to Benghazi because decisions needed to be made before the end of the fiscal year. Chris 

Stevens felt the urgency to assign himself to cover a one-week gap 

in the Principal Officer position in Benghazi. 

Those Americans assigned to work at a nearby Annex had the 

sense of urgency to fight their way onto the Benghazi Mission compound because a sister U.S. agency was under attack. Diplomatic 

Security Agents had the urgency to return time and time again 

into a burning building in search of Smith and Stevens. Diplomatic 

Security Agents and the team from the Annex no doubt felt the urgency when they fought their way from the compound to the Annex 

overcoming point-blank machine gun fire and grenade attacks. 

Team Tripoli sensed the urgency of what was happening in 

Benghazi and negotiated for private aircraft to race toward the 

danger in defense of fellow Americans. Tyrone S. Woods and Glen 

A. Doherty felt the urgency of defending a second U.S. facility 

against a series of coordinated attacks before ultimately being 

killed by precision mortar attacks. 

There was life and death urgency felt in Libya with split-second 

decisions being made: Do I fire on this crowd or not? Do we fire 

in the direction of a residence or not? Do we return to a smoke and 

fire engulfed building yet again in search of fallen colleagues? Do 

we go to the hospital to find Stevens or to the Annex? How do we 

fly from Tripoli to Benghazi? 

If that same degree of urgency was felt among the decision makers in Washington it is not reflected in the time within which decisions were made nor in the topics being debated in and around the 

deployment. 

The ‘‘tyranny of time and distance’’ may well explain why no U.S. 

military asset—save the bravery of the men serving in Tripoli— 

made it to Benghazi. It does not explain why no asset was even 

headed toward Benghazi. The ‘‘tyranny of time and distance’’ does 

not explain why Washington D.C. leaders were preoccupied with 

ancillary issues when they were responsible for sending our fellow 

Americans into harm’s way in the first instance. 

Half of the action items that emerged from the White House 

meeting convened in response to the killing of an American Foreign 

Service officer and an attack on an American diplomatic facility reVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00138 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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lated to a video. Half. There is more of a record of phone calls from 

White House officials to ‘‘YouTube’’ and a virtually anonymous 

‘‘pastor’’ than there were calls imploring the Defense Department 

to move with greater urgency. The preoccupation the administration felt with safeguarding the feelings of the Libyan government 

and dealing with an anti-Muslim video (which video prompted no 

change in force posture or readiness even after protests erupted in 

Cairo) is a foreshadowing of what would become an administration 

wide effort to conflate that same video with the attacks in 

Benghazi. 


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1 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Chelsea Clinton 

(‘‘Diane Reynolds’’) (Sept. 11, 2012, 11:12 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05795467). 2 Email from U.S. Dep’t of State, to S_CallNotes, (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:11 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05561911). 3 Email from Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy Nat’l Sec. Advisor for Strategic Commc’cs, Nat’l Sec. 

Council, to Dagoberto Vega, Special Ass’t to the President and Dir. of Broadcast Media, White 

House, et al. (Sept. 14, 2012, 8:09 PM) [hereinafter Rhodes Memo] (on file with the Committee, 

C05415285). 4Fox News Insider, Father of Benghazi Victim Reveals Journal Entry Documenting Meeting 

With Hillary, YOUTUBE (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMx0huMabos. 

PART II: 

Internal and Public Government 

Communications about the Terrorist 

Attacks in Benghazi 

‘‘Two of our officers were killed in Benghazi by an Al Queda-like 

[sic] group.’’ 

The Secretary of State to her daughter, September 11, 

20121

‘‘We know that the attack in Libya had nothing to do with the 

film. It was a planned attack—not a protest.’’ 

Summary of a statement by the Secretary of State 

to the Egyptian Prime Minister, September 12, 2012 2

‘‘To underscore that these protests are rooted in an Internet video, 

and not a broader failure of policy.’’ 

Benjamin J. Rhodes, defining one of the goals of Ambassador Susan E. Rice’s appearances on the Sunday news programs following the Benghazi attacks, 

September 14, 2012 3

‘‘I gave Hillary a hug and shook her hand, and she said we are 

going to have the filmmaker arrested who was responsible for 

the death of my son.’’ 

Diary entry of Charles Woods, father of Tyrone Woods, 

September 14, 2012 4


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5This deteriorating security environment is discussed in detail in Section III of the report. 

6Memorandum from James Bacigalupo, Regional Dir. of the Near East Asia Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State, to Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y for Diplomatic Sec., U.S. 

Dep’t of State (June 15, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05578316). 7 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 24, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25, U.S. 

Dep’t of State (June 14, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05388987). 8 Id. 

9 Id. 

The Security Environment 

The attacks in Benghazi did not occur in a vacuum. They took 

place amidst a severely deteriorating security situation in eastern 

Libya—a permissive environment where extremist organizations 

were infiltrating the region, setting up camps, and carrying out attacks against Western targets.5 In June 2012, State Department 

security officials were discussing ‘‘an active terrorist cell in 

Benghazi’’ that was ‘‘planning and implementing attack operations 

against western interests including the U.S. Mission in 

Benghazi[.]’’ 6 That same month another security official in Libya 

reported to Washington about the ‘‘increase in extremist activity’’ 

and described his ‘‘fear that we have passed a threshold where we 

will see more targeting, attacks, and incidents involving western 

targets.’’ 7 The official cited a series of recent attacks and noted 

that a source had warned of a ‘‘group attack’’ on an American facility.8 He specifically mentioned ‘‘[t]argeting [and] attacks by extremist groups particularly in the eastern portion of Libya,’’ where 

Benghazi is located.9

In the months leading up to September 11, 2012, several major 

security incidents had taken place in Benghazi against Western 

targets, including: 

• April 2, 2012: Attack on a United Kingdom [UK] armored vehicle; 

• April 6, 2012: Improvised Explosive Device [IED] attack on the 

State Department facility in Benghazi; 

• April 10, 2012: IED attack on the motorcade of the United Nations Envoy; 

• April 27, 2012: IED attack on a courthouse in Benghazi; 

• May 22, 2012: Rocket Propelled Grenade [RPG] attack on the 

International Committee for the Red Cross [ICRC] facility in 

Benghazi; 

• June 6, 2012: IED attack on the State Department facility in 

Benghazi; 

• June 11, 2012: RPG attack on the UK Ambassador’s motorcade; 

• June 12, 2012: RPG attack on the ICRC; 

• July 29, 2012: IED found at Tibesti Hotel; and 

• August 5, 2012: Attack on the ICRC facility. 

The threat environment in Benghazi was so severe that on September 11, 2012, on the anniversary of September 11, one Diplomatic Security agent in Benghazi feared an attack that night and 

was not planning on going to sleep. He testified: 


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10Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 1 [Agent 1], Diplomatic Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, Tr. at 49–50 (Mar. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Agent 1 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 11Matt Smith, Ex-SEALs, Online Gaming Maven among Benghazi Dead, CNN (Sept. 13, 2012, 

8:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/13/us/benghazi-victims. 12See, e.g., Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., et al., (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 

PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390691). 13See, e.g., id. 14Sara Lynch and Oren Dorell, Deadly embassy attacks were days in the making, USA Today, 

(Sept. 12, 2012, 8:36 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012/09/12/libyanofficials-us-ambassador-killed-in-attack/57752828/1. 15See, e.g., email from Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Erin Pelton, 

Dir. of Commc’cs and Spokesperson, U.S. Mission to the U.N. (Sept. 15, 2012, 7:18 PM) (on file 

with the Committee, C05622933). 16 Egypt Protesters Scale U.S. Embassy Wall, Take Flag, CBS/AP (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:16 PM), 

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/egypt-protesters-scale-us-embassy-wall-take-flag. 

You know, I wasn’t going to go to sleep that night. I was 

probably going to stay up throughout the night just because, one, it’s September 11, you know, and what was 

happening in Egypt. So if anything was to happen, it 

would happen late at night, early morning. So I wasn’t 

going to go to bed. I believe [Agent 2] was along the same 

mindset, but we hadn’t ratified whether, yes, this is what 

we are doing. It was just people are going to stay up. I had 

taken my weapon and ammunition and put it in my room. 

[Agent 2] had done the same thing. And I believe they 

had—[Agent 5] had his weapon with him as well in his 

room.10

Sean P. Smith, the Information Management Officer at the 

Benghazi Mission compound, also feared an attack, telling a community of online gamers shortly before the attack: ‘‘[A]ssuming we 

don’t die tonight. We saw one of our ‘police’ that guard the compound taking pictures.’’ 11

It was against this backdrop that the September 11, 2012 attacks 

against U.S. facilities in Benghazi took place. 

THE PROTESTS IN CAIRO 

In Cairo, Egypt earlier that day, approximately 2,000 protestors 

demonstrated outside the U.S. Embassy—a protest that began in 

the middle of the day.12 A handful of protestors scaled the embassy 

wall, tore down the American flag, and sprayed graffiti inside the 

compound.13 Some protestors were eventually removed by Egyptian 

police. No Americans were injured or killed in the event. 

In Cairo, protests had been planned for days in advance on social 

media as a result of a video posted on YouTube about the prophet 

Muhammad.14 On September 10, 2012, the CIA warned of social 

media chatter calling for a demonstration in front of the Embassy 

in Cairo,15 and Americans at the Embassy were sent home early 

due to the impending protests.16

Although the attacks in Benghazi occurred later on the same 

day, they had little else in common with the Cairo protests. Significant differences included: 


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17Sara Lynch and Oren Dorell, Deadly embassy attacks were days in the making, USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 2012. 18See, e.g., Testimony of Tripoli Chief of Station, Cent. Intel. Ageny, Tr. at 42–45, July 16, 

2015 [hereinafter Tripoli COS Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 19See, e.g., Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 

PM) [hereinafter 7:55 P.M. Rice Email] (on file with Committee, C053906910). 20See, e.g., Benghazi Accountability Review Board at 4, U.S. Dep’t of State [hereinafter 

Benghazi ARB]. 21 7:55 P.M. Rice Email, supra note 19. 22 Benghazi ARB, supra note 20, at 4. 23See, e.g., 7:55 P.M. Rice Email, supra note 19. 24 Benghazi ARB, supra note 20, at 4. 25 Email from James Bacigalupo, Regional Dir. of the Near East Asia Bureau of Diplomatic 

Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State, to DS–IP–NEA–RSO (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:13 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048896). 

• In Cairo, plans for the protest appeared on social media well 

before the actual demonstration.17 In Benghazi the attacks occurred without warnings on social media;18

• In Cairo, protestors did not brandish or use weapons.19 In 

Benghazi, attackers were armed with assault weapons, rocket 

propelled grenades, and sophisticated mortars;20

• In Cairo, protestors spray painted walls and did other minor 

damage.21 In Benghazi, the attackers burned down buildings 

and pounded U.S. facilities with mortars and machine gun 

fire;22 and 

• In Cairo, the protest was confined to a single location.23 In 

Benghazi, the attacks spanned nearly eight hours over two different locations.24

Diplomatic Security personnel in Washington D.C. recognized differences as well. At 5:13 p.m. on September 11, 2012 James 

Bacigalupo, Regional Director for Diplomatic Security, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, State Department, notified all regional security 

officers: 

Within the last few hours we have had one demonstration 

in which protestors infiltrated the perimeter of the compound in Cairo and an armed attack on our compound in 

Benghazi. Both are currently on-going and may be in response to the release of an anti-Islamic documentary and 

upcoming demonstration by Terry Jones this evening.25

The differences also were noted by senior State Department officials as well. Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, State Department, 

sent an email at 6:09 p.m. that included Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy 

Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Planning, State Department, 

and Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management, State 

Department, among others. Nuland wrote: 

[Please] put out as two separate statements to bullpen, 

asap. On record, me. 

We can confirm that our office in Benghazi, Libya has 

been attacked by a group of militants. We are working 

with the Libyans now to try to restore security. 

In Cairo, we can confirm that Egyptian police have now removed the demonstrators who had entered our Embassy 

grounds earlier. 


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26 Email from Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Elizabeth Dibble, Deputy 

Ass’t Sec’y in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 

6:09 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05578255). 

For [press] guidance, if pressed whether we see a connection between these two. 

We have no information regarding a connection between 

these incidents.26

WHAT BENGHAZI REPORTED DURING THE ATTACKS 

All five Diplomatic Security agents at the Benghazi Mission 

spoke with the Diplomatic Security Command Center while the attacks were ongoing. Agent 5, the Diplomatic Security agent who 

was with Smith and Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens 

during the attack, recounted his story: 

Okay, so the evening started with [Agent 4], [Agent 2] and 

I sitting at a table near the pool at the end of the night. 

Ambassador Stevens had come by and said, I’m going to 

bed. Sean Smith said the same thing and went, you know, 

went inside the villa, and we were just sitting out kind of 

relaxing at the end of the night. 

While we were talking, I started hearing some kind of 

chanting, I thought it was. So I told the others, you know, 

I told the other two, hang on. Just listen for a minute. And 

what we heard was chanting. And it was my impression 

that it was coming closer. You know, so immediately when 

I realized, you know, that this is a potential security incident, or a potential something, I said, you know, get your 

gear, right now. I ran into Villa C where the Ambassador 

and Sean Smith were and the other two ran in a different 

direction. 

I remember hearing the chants. I mean, they were fairly 

close already. I mean, yelling distance, which is pretty 

close especially in a city setting. So my impression is that 

I don’t have much time. So I ran right to my room, you 

know, put my helmet on, put my vest on, grabbed my 

weapons, my additional weapons, and I turned to lock the 

gate, and basically, it was a jail cell door with three locks 

on it. I locked all three locks. 

And at about that time, Ambassador Stevens and Sean 

Smith were coming out of their rooms. Sean Smith was already, you know, donning his helmet and vest. I guided 

them both into the safe haven, and I set myself up in the 

safe haven with—I was holding my M4. I had a pistol, a 

radio, a shotgun, and when we were, you know, when we 

were in there, I radioed the other guy, hey, we are all in 

the safe haven. 

I could hear outside explosions, yelling, chanting, screaming, gunfire, and I reported all of this on the radio just 

saying, this is what my senses are telling me. Then people 

started banging on the doors of the building, so I reported 

that. Hey, there is banging on the doors. They are trying 


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to come in, you know, we need immediate assistance. And 

there wasn’t any response on the radio. Shortly after that, 

to my recollection, the doors were blown open. And about 

70 individuals, you know, rushed into the building, all of 

them carrying AK–47s, grenades, RPGs, you know, a mixture throughout everyone. Different—there were a couple 

of different assault rifles. 

And with the number of individuals that came into the 

building versus me, I chose just to stay in the shadow that 

I was in. So I was partially in the safe haven, partially 

outside the safe haven. This area was, you know, there 

was a big shadow where I was sitting, and my view 

through the jail cell door was into the common area. So I 

could see where everybody was going, and they began 

breaking everything. I could just hear glass breaking. I 

could hear stuff being thrown around. I could hear furniture being moved. 

If I may just back up a little bit. When we made it into 

the safe haven, I handed my cell phone to the Ambassador. 

I said, call everybody on my cell phone. Call everybody 

that you know that can help us. At one point, I handed 

Sean Smith the shotgun, but just like me and everybody 

else that was in the safe haven, we were scared. But as 

a security professional with my military training and my 

agent training, I’m trained to remain more calm than a 

non-security professional. 

So I took the weapon back from him seeing that he was 

visibly shaken. And I just waited to see what was unfolding. I was on the radio the whole time updating, you know, 

whispering. Turned the volume way down, you know, hey 

guys, they are in the building. Shortly after that, two individuals came up to the jail cell door and took out their 

AK–47s, and they are beating on the jail cell door. They 

also had grenades on them. And I thought they were going 

to take the grenades off and pit them on the locks and 

blow the locks. 

So I tuned to the Ambassador, and said, you know, if they 

take their grenades off the door and put them on the locks, 

I’m going to start shooting. And when I go down, pick up 

the gun, and keep fighting. Thankfully, they didn’t put the 

grenades on the locks. And they just kind of turned away, 

and walked to a different, you know, part of the house that 

I couldn’t really see. 

And then slowly, people started to kind of trickle out. And 

then the lights started to kind of dim. My initial response 

or my initial thought was, well, they just knocked out the 

generators. You know, we have regular city power but we 

also have backup generators. So flickering would be a likely, you know, cause of this. But in reality, it was smoke. 

And it took me about, you know, two or three seconds after 

that to determine that it was smoke. 


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As soon as I realized it was smoke, I turned to the Ambassador and Sean Smith and said, we are moving to the 

bathroom. And at that time, grabbed the Ambassador, 

Sean Smith was right behind him and we started crawling 

towards the bathroom. It’s about a three- to four—meter 

crawl. And it only took seconds for us to reach—to reach 

the hallway that the bathroom was in. But by that time— 

seconds later, the smoke had already filled the entire room 

and I began basically army crawling like on my belly, and 

breathing though my hands like this, the last, you know, 

centimeter of air that was left. 

And as soon as it became that thick, no light was visible 

from the lights that were fully on. The sounds were, you 

know, crackling and breaking of things from heat. And so 

to lead them to the bathroom, I was saying, Come on guys, 

follow me. And I was slapping my hands on the floor, or 

you know, hitting stuff with my hands if I felt anything. 

Like come on, you guys, follow me. Come on. We are going 

to the bathroom. 

So I make it to the bathroom and nobody follows me in. 

The whole time I was slapping and saying, come on, follow 

me. My intention of going to the bathroom is because if we 

made it to the bathroom, I know there is a window that 

we can open. So what we would do is go into the bathroom, 

close the door, wet towels on the floor and open the window. And we could last, you know probably much longer 

in the bathroom than anywhere else in the house. 

But because nobody followed me in, I wasn’t going to close 

the door. So thinking about how I can better the situation, 

I open the window. And I thought that that could you 

know, provide some, you know, the lights in the bathroom. 

I could provide some light, or I could provide, you know, 

someplace with air and they could see that. But by opening the window, I stood up to open the window, and I 

thought my face was on fire. And I opened the window 

anyway and it just became a chimney and all the smoke 

started, you know, pouring out of the window and being 

sucked in my direction. 

Because at that point that—I started to pass out. I could 

feel myself becoming weak and just overcome with smoke 

and heat. So I got back on the floor, took off my M4, because crawling with a slung weapon is extremely difficult. 

It was getting hung up on things, and I didn’t want to be 

stuck in that building because of my M4. So I threw it in 

the bathroom, just left it there and started crawling towards my bedroom. And when I decided to do that, I was 

very clear to anybody else who could hear me, I’m moving 

to my bedroom. Come on guys, I’m moving to my bedroom. 

The whole time I’m hitting the floor, slapping, yelling. 

Come on, guys. Come on, you can do it. Let’s go. Let’s go. 

We are moving to my bedroom. 


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So I crawled to my bedroom. And as soon as I passed the 

threshold to my bedroom, you know, I had seconds left of 

life, essentially. And so I quickly went over to my window 

and started to crank open the metal shutters, but I was 

cranking the wrong way. So I had to turn back and crank 

it the other way. Then I had to open up the glass window, 

and then I had to pull a pin and push out this big metal 

gate. And as soon as I did that, I collapsed on to my little 

patio area. 

And around the patio area was, you know, maybe a 21⁄2- 

foot tall cinderblock wall. And as soon as I went out there, 

I just started taking fire immediately. I remember hearing 

explosions, which I equate to grenades. I remember feeling 

the cement exploding and hitting me in the face. And I remember the sounds. So after catching my breath, I jumped 

back into the building and I searched for the Ambassador 

and Sean Smith. I went as far as my threshold, and 

reached out into the—into the area we had just come from 

to see if I could feel anybody. But the smoke and heat were 

so intense that, I mean, the smoke was coming in though 

my eyes, even though they were closed. It was coming in 

through my nose. And I stayed in there until I could— 

physically couldn’t do it any more. 

When I was in the Navy, they engrain in you, 110 percent. 

And most people don’t think you can do 110 percent, but 

it’s part of my character. I do 110 percent and I stayed in 

there until—until I physically could not and mentally 

could not stay in there any longer. 

I went back out of the building, caught my breath on the 

patio again, immediately taking rounds, the same stuff, 

whizzing, you know, jumped back into the building, and I 

had intentions—you know, I was just thinking of any way 

that I could possibly signal them or let them know where 

I was besides yelling and slapping and hitting stuff. 

And I remembered that I had a lamp in my room, and I 

went over to my lamp and I turned on my lamp, thinking 

that they could see it in the smoke. But it didn’t turn on. 

And so I held it up to my eye to see if it was working, and 

I remember seeing a very faint glow when it was this 

close. I remember feeling the heat of the lamp, and I could 

just barely see the actual light from it. 

That’s how thick the smoke was. And I went back to my 

threshold, searched around, still yelling, still saying, 

‘‘Come on guys,’’ you know, to my bedroom. No response. 

Nothing. I went back out and caught my breath again, still 

taking rounds. And I went back in one or two more times 

to try and find them, and I couldn’t. The last time I went 

out, you know, I decided that if I went back into the building that I wasn’t going to come back out. The smoke and 

heat were way too powerful, and way too strong, and it 

was extremely confusing feeling my way in a smoke-filled 


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27Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 5 [Agent 5], Diplomatic Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, Tr. at 123 (Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Agent 5 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

building. And I didn’t want to get lost, and so I decided to 

climb up the ladder up to the roof. 

I climbed up the ladder, and pulled up the ladder behind 

me and that’s the moment that I knew that Ambassador 

Stevens and Sean Smith were probably dead. Immediately, 

upon getting up to the roof, I started radioing for my colleagues, you know, telling them the situation, you know, 

telling them my situation, you know, I am exhausted. I am 

completely exhausted. I gave everything I had. And I’m 

still thinking of ways to help, still thinking of ways to get 

the guys out. 

So I remember that we have a skylight in the top of the 

building, and so I, you know, we had a little stash of gear 

up on the roof. So I went over and I grabbed an M4 magazine and I climbed up on to this little platform which is 

near the window. But it’s protected by these metal bars. 

And I couldn’t break the window. But I remember yelling 

and hitting it as hard as I possibly could. 

The bad guys saw me up there, started shooting at me 

again. I remember seeing tracer fire right over my head. 

I remember hearing the whizzing of the rounds going past 

me. And so I climbed, you know, back down off the ledge 

and just got on the radio. ‘‘Hey, guys, I’m on a frying pan. 

This thing is hot. The smoke is coming out of the building 

and going right on to the roof. If I pick my head up I’m 

getting shot at, and I can’t—I can’t do this forever.’’ 

Finally, over the radio, [Agent 4] says, ‘‘[Agent 5], we are 

coming to get you.’’ You know, at that time a couple of seconds were gone, and he was like, ‘‘Hang on. Hang on. We 

are coming to get you’’ I don’t know how long I was up on 

the roof, but for me it was a while. 

Finally, the other guys came over in a fully-armored vehicle and parked right at the base of kind of my location and 

set up a small perimeter, called me down off the roof. I 

climbed down and they were all amazed to see me still 

alive. Just my condition was, you know, my face was black. 

My eyeballs were black. My nose was black. Everything I 

had was black. But as a security professional, I said, ‘‘Give 

me a gun.’’ [Agent 2] gave me a 9-millimeter pistol which 

I was a little unhappy about, but I took it anyway and 

stood—stood a position on the outside. 

And [Agent 4]—[Agent 4] and [Agent 1] tried to go inside 

the building and find them, but shortly after that, their report was way too hot, way too smokey. You know, we are 

going to get lost in there. Somebody is going to die if we 

keep this up.27


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28Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 3 [Agent 3], Diplomatic Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, Tr. at 77 (Oct. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Agent 3 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 29 Id. at 135–136. 

Agent 3, Diplomatic Security agent in charge at the Benghazi 

Mission compound, testified he was in constant contact with the 

Diplomatic Security Command Center: 

I was in the best position to see the attacks happen, unfold. I was in the TOC [Tactical Operations Center] at the 

special mission compound. I manned the cameras. You 

guys have seen the video. Any time you see the camera 

moving, that’s me. Subsequently, I was also in a position 

to review the cameras and be aware of all the situational 

awareness at the second compound, all of which I have 

shared. Much of the attack was passed in real-time 

through my phone to DS command center.28

Agent 3 also testified about what he saw: 

It was 9:42 at night, and I was wrapping up work and had 

some emails. My shift should have been done three or four 

hours earlier. I’m in the TOC office in the TOC building. 

I hear several, three to four, gunshots and an explosion 

that seemed substantially closer than what I heard earlier, 

which was the fireworks. The fireworks I kind of expected 

to happen every night at about 9:30 give or take. Initially 

I thought they were just a little bit late. 

So I get up. I go to the window, which is actually covered 

by two bookcases and has sandbags on the outside, so not 

to see anything, but actually to hear a little better I go to 

the window. I think I heard the shots or explosions first 

and then something more subsequent than that, either an 

additional explosion or additional gunfire, that sounded 

very close. I turn. I glance maybe a second, probably less, 

at the surveillance camera monitors and see a large group 

of personnel coming on. They’re already on the compound, 

effectively in the middle of compound C. Right where this 

small roundabout is, there’s a camera on a pole there. And 

I saw a large group. My original assessment was 16 to 20 

armed men, a couple of them with banners[.] 29

Agent 3 testified this information was being relayed back to the 

Diplomatic Security Command Center [DSCC]: 

We are relaying what is going on via the cameras, where 

slowly the barrack buildings [Villa C], which is one of the 

villas on the compound on the map, is set on fire, and then 

slowly those forces migrate over to our side, where they 

pin us in, basically, in both of our locations, in Villa B and 

the TOC building, where they proceed to gain entry into 

Villa B and attempt to kick the door in to the TOC building for 10 to 15 minutes. . . . [t]he situation on the 

ground was rough out there. There was heavy weapons. 

Some guys have grenades that have already gone off. Everybody is armed with either a pistol or a long gun. SomeVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00150 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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30 Id. at 145–146. 31 Agent 1 Testimony at 62. 32Testimony of [Agent 2], Diplomatic Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 100 (Mar. 19, 

2015) [hereinafter Agent 2 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 33 Id. at 102. 

body shows up at some point with, like, a bazooka. So it 

is tough.30

Diplomatic Security Agent 1 called the DSCC when attackers 

were attempting to break into the room where he and another 

agent had barricaded themselves. He testified: 

Q: You mentioned earlier that you used your BlackBerry 

to call the DS Command Center. When did you first call 

the DS Command Center during this sequence of events? 

A: So before they breached, when they made the first attempt, the first attempt they didn’t breach into the room 

yet. But it was imminent that they were going to breach 

and they were going to come in. So at that point we 

bunkered in and started to proceed making calls. So 

[Agent 2] was calling Tripoli and I called the Command 

Center. I believe it was 18 minutes after the attack.31

Diplomatic Security Agent 2 also spoke with the DSCC during 

the attacks. He testified: 

I stayed on the roof of that building for the majority of the 

night. I made several phone calls back and forth to the DS 

Command Center in D.C. relaying information. I also 

made phone calls to one of the Ambassador’s contacts to 

try to get some atmospherics about what was going on in 

the rest of the city, should we need to do a ground evac.32

Agent 2 told the Committee he was providing ‘‘general situational awareness’’ to the DSCC so they could ‘‘make accurate decisions.’’ He testified: 

A: Yeah. He wanted to know the status of the accountability of the Americans who were on post, specifically the 

Ambassador, what information we had. There were also 

additional reports coming in that the Ambassador might 

have been at a hospital in a burn unit and we were trying 

to verify the validity of those claims. And then just general 

situational awareness for the Command Center in D.C. 

Q: So your sense of kind of your—what you were doing 

there was kind of giving an ongoing as things were unfolding so that they would have the information to help assess 

how to continue responding? 

A: Yes. My intent was to provide them the information 

that I had so they had timely information so they could 

make accurate decisions.33


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34Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 4 [Agent 4], Diplomatic Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, Tr. at 85 (Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Agent 4 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 35 Id. at 144. 36 Id. at 155. 

Diplomatic Security Agent 4 testified it was his job to ‘‘immediately’’ contact the DSCC in the event of an attack.34 He testified 

about the beginning of the attack: 

Q: Would it be then an accurate description to describe 

the attack as sort of a stealth attack? 

A: It was very sudden. As I had mentioned, the only warning that I had that something was amiss was that—kind 

of that cry that I heard at the main gate. So it was very 

sudden.35

Agent 4 also testified of the attack: 

A: No, I never told them that there was a protest. 

Q: Was it your assessment that there was a protest? 

A: No. 

Q: Do you believe there was a protest? 

A: I don’t.36

At the Diplomatic Security Command Center, Charlene R. Lamb, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs, State Department, was monitoring the situation in real time and was aware 

of the reports coming in from the agents under attack in Benghazi. 

She testified she was in ‘‘constant contact’’ with the agents on the 

ground and had an ‘‘almost full-time connection’’ to them: 

A: I was in my office, and I received a phone call, I don’t 

remember if it was directly from the command center or if 

it was from the desk officer, but I received a phone call 

that notified me that there was a problem. 

Q: And that’s what they said, it was a problem? Did they 

elaborate? Did they tell you anything more? 

A: They said that they had the RSO on the phone and 

that the compound was under attack. And I didn’t ask any 

more questions. I believe I notified Scott Bultrowicz, [Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, 

State Department] and we both went down to the command center. 

* * * 

Q: And so once you learned of the attack, then what did 

you do? 

A: I had a liaison officer that worked for me who had employees that worked in the Annex there, so I immediately 

called him on my way down to the command center and 

asked him to join me in the command center. And when 

we went in there, we initially tried to assess the situation 

the best we could, and then we started working on trying 


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37Testimony of Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y for Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State, 

Tr. at 14–16 (Jan. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Lamb Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 38 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 27, U.S. Dep’t of State, to svcSMARTCrossLow (Sept. 12 

2012, 10:20 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05389586). 39 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 27, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 18, 2012, 1:16 PM) (on file 

with the Committee, C05390678). 40 Email from U.S. Dep’t of State to S_SpecialAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:34 PM) (on file with 

the Committee, C05578699). 41 Id. 42Lamb Testimony at 15. 

to identify security assets who could help them with the 

situation that was unfolding. 

Q: And what assets would those have been? 

A: Assets that were at the Annex facility. We made phone 

calls to Stuttgart, to AFRICOM [United States Africa 

Command] and EUCOM [United States Europe Command] 

to see if they had any assets in theater that were nearby 

that could possibly be drawn on for additional support. 

Q: And did you discuss those assets and deployment with 

PDAS [Principal Desputy Assistant Secretary] Bultrowicz 

or Under Secretary Kennedy? 

A: Yes. PDAS Scott Bultrowicz was in the room, he was 

on the phone with Pat Kennedy and Eric Boswell, and he 

was relaying information. As we were getting information 

in, he would relay it to them—— 

* * * 

Q: And was the DS command center your only source of 

information that night or were you in constant contact 

with the Annex as well via your liaison? 

A: Yes. My liaison had constant contact with the Annex. 

We had almost full-time connection to the DS agents that 

were on the ground, and then we were—you know, towards the end, we were getting information off of Twitter 

and public media. So those were our primary sources of information.37

A senior watch officer at the DSCC described the events as ‘‘a 

full on attack against our compound.’’ 38 The same individual also 

said there was ‘‘zip, nothing nada’’ when asked if there was any rioting in Benghazi reported prior to the attack.39

At 6:34 p.m. on September 11, 2012, the DSCC sent a ‘‘terrorism 

event information’’ to the Office of the Secretary.40 The update 

noted that ‘‘host nation militia forces have responded to the U.S. 

Consulate in Benghazi’’ and ‘‘were engaged with the attackers.’’ 41

Lamb testified information received by the DSCC—directly from 

all of the agents on the ground—was relayed to Kennedy.42 None 

of the Diplomatic Security agents on the ground reported anything 

about a protest in Benghazi. None of the Diplomatic Security 

agents on the ground reported anything about a video. 

Kennedy testified that he passed on information from the DSCC 

directly to Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton: 

I stayed in my office, except for the SVTC [Secure Video 

Teleconference] the chairman referred to, monitoring my 


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43Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 119 

(Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Kennedy Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 44 Email from OpsAlert@state.gov to S_Special Assistants, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 4:05 PM) (on 

file with the Committee, C05272001). 45 Email from OpsAlert@state.gov to S_SpecialAssistants, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 4:54 PM) (on 

file with the Committee, C05272001). 46 Email from OpsAlert@state.gov to S_SpecialAssistants, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:07 PM) (on 

file with the Committee, C05272001). 

telephone, monitoring my emails, and making telephone 

calls or coordinating activities as were required. . . . I 

went up several times to brief the Secretary on the latest 

information that I was receiving from Diplomatic Security, 

which was receiving it from the ground.43

KNOWLEDGE BY SENIOR STATE 

DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS 

At 4:06 p.m. in Washington D.C. on September 11, 2012, 24 minutes after the attacks began in Benghazi, the State Department 

Operations Center issued a widely disseminated email to Department officials, including the Office of the Secretary, indicating an 

attack was occurring. With the subject ‘‘U.S. Diplomatic Mission in 

Benghazi Under Attack,’’ the email stated: 

The Regional Security Officer reports the diplomatic mission is under attack. Embassy Tripoli reports approximately 20 armed people fired shots; explosions have been 

heard as well. Ambassador Stevens, who is currently in 

Benghazi, and four COM [Chief of Mission] personnel are 

in the compound safe haven. The 17th of February militia 

is providing security support.44

Forty eight minutes later, a 4:54 p.m. update email stated: 

Embassy Tripoli reports the firing at the U.S. Diplomatic 

Mission in Benghazi has stopped and the compound has 

been cleared. A response team is on site attempting to locate COM personnel.45

A 6:07 p.m. update email with the subject ‘‘Ansar al-Sharia 

Claims Responsibility for Benghazi Attack’’ stated: 

Embassy Tripoli reports the group claimed responsibility 

on Facebook and Twitter and has called for attack on Embassy Tripoli.46

Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission in Tripoli, was the 

United States’ highest ranking official in Tripoli at the time of the 

attacks in Benghazi. Hicks testified that he talked with Ambassador Stevens moments after the attack started: 

A: I punched the number that I did not recognize and 

called it back, to call it back, and I got Chris on the line. 

And he said, ‘‘Greg, we are under attack.’’ And I am walking outside, trying to get outside, because we have notoriously bad cell phone connectivity at our residence, and 

usually it’s better outside. So I say, my response is, 


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47Testimony of Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, Tr. at 18–19 (Apr. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Hicks Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 48 Id. at 81–82. 

‘‘Okay,’’ and I am about to say something else, and the line 

clicks. 

I try to reach him back on the—I begin walking immediately to our tactical operations center, because I knew 

that everybody would be gathering there, and I could then 

also summon everybody that needed to be at the—to begin 

the process of responding. And I am trying to call back on 

those numbers to reconnect, and not getting—either not 

getting a signal or not getting a response. 

Q: And did you ever make a connection with the Ambassador again? 

A: No. I never did. 

Q: That was the last you spoke to him? 

A: That was the last I spoke to him.47

Hicks also testified that Stevens would have reported a protest 

had one occurred prior to the attack: 

Absolutely, I mean, we’re talking about both security officers who know their trade, even though they are brand 

new, and one of the finest political officers in the history 

of the Foreign Service. You know, for there to have been 

a demonstration on Chris Stevens’ front door and him not 

to have reported it is unbelievable. And secondly, if he had 

reported it, he would have been out the back door within 

minutes of any demonstration appearing anywhere near 

that facility. And there was a back gate to the facility, and, 

you know, it worked.48

Throughout the course of the evening, Hicks was on the phone 

with Elizabeth Jones, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Near 

Eastern Affairs, State Department,who was in Washington D.C. at 

the time, updating her about the events on the ground in Benghazi. 

Jones testified: 

I sat down and called Greg Hicks and said, Tell me what 

is going on. I have this report from my special assistant, 

from the op[erations] center; what’s going on? He said, I 

talked to Chris 20 minutes ago. Chris called me. He said, 

We’re under attack. 

I said, What do you mean we’re under attack? He said 

there are people firing guns at us, firing weapons, firing at 

us. And I said, Where is Chris? 

He said—he said that the RSO [Regional Security Officer] 

told him that they had taken—that Chris had said, We’re 

going to the safe haven, and the regional security officer 

in Tripoli have reported, yes, the security officers in 

Benghazi had taken the ambassador to the safe haven. 


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49Testimony of Elizabeth Jones, Acting Ass’t Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 39–40 (July 11, 

2013) [hereinafter Jones Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

I said, Okay. You talked to him 20 minutes ago. Call him 

again. He said, I’ve been trying. He doesn’t answer the 

phone. 

I asked, Who else was in the—in the building, where was 

Chris exactly, who else was in the building. He explained 

that Sean Smith was, that’s the communicator, that there 

were three RSOs there and that they would—they were 

moving the two to the safe haven and that the others were 

trying to protect the building. 

I immediately notified by email as many people as I could 

think of off the top of my head on the Seventh Floor [senior State Department leaders], that I had spoken to Greg, 

that this is what the situation was, that—that I would 

continue to stay in touch with him. In the meantime, I had 

a secure call from my CIA counterpart saying the same 

thing, We’re hearing that Benghazi is under attack. I said, 

Is your annex under attack, which I knew to be a few minutes away. 

He said, No. And I continued to be in touch with him, 

the—my CIA colleague and my staff. I decided to not work 

out of my office initially but work closer to where the secure phone is, which is on the other end of the suite and 

stayed in very close touch with Greg essentially all night 

long till the next morning. 

The—what I did in the second phone call, I believe it was 

with Greg, I said, Okay. Who are you talking to in the Libyan government? 

He said, I’ve talked to—I’ve forgotten, the chief of staff of 

various of the senior people. 

I said, Talk to the President, talk to the Prime Minister, 

don’t just stay with the chief of staff. Talk to the senior 

people yourself and ask them for help. Tell them they’ve 

got to get their people up there, not—get their people up 

there to go over to the compound to render assistance to 

get the—get the attackers out of there, and I kept asking, 

Have you heard from Chris? Have you heard from Chris? 

No, we can’t find him. No, he’s not—no, he’s not answering. That was the first. And I don’t remember the timeline 

anymore. It seemed like forever, but it probably w[as]n’t 

that long.49

Jones testified that she spoke with Hicks throughout the 

evening, almost every ten minutes: 

Q: Okay. As the night wore on, was the phone just essentially left almost in permanent communication with Tripoli? 

A: Yes. 


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50 Id. at 79–80. 51See, e.g., Email from U.S. Dep’t of State to Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:32 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05391036). 

Q: I mean, do you have that capability that you have an 

open line that just essentially stays open, or is this—or 

calling every 5 or 10 minutes? I’m just curious how that 

works. 

A: Yeah. No, that’s a good question. I didn’t have an open 

line. 

We did two things. I stayed in my office with my front office team and with my staff assistants and with—Agent 1 

was there. We, at the same time, started a task force in 

the Operations Center, so the Libya desk officers were up 

there helping manage some of the more routine issues, getting the evacuation going, working with EX [logistics] on 

those kinds of issues and sort of doing the—helping us 

with the nuts and bolts on implementing the things that 

we were deciding that we needed to do. 

Because DS kept the open—Diplomatic Secretary kept an 

open line—actually, I don’t know that it was an open line. 

They had communication directly with the RSO. I basically 

worked primarily with Greg Hicks on his cell phone because that worked better in terms of Embassy communications and I could reach him wherever he was—wherever 

he was in the compound when he was moving around. So 

I communicated by my office manager dialing him directly 

on his cell phone. 

So it was not an open line, but it was—I don’t know that 

we talked every 10 minutes, but it seemed like it was 

every 10 minutes. It was close to that.50

After some of Jones’ discussions with Hicks, an assistant from 

the Office of the Secretary drafted emails about Jones’ conversations with Hicks. These emails were disseminated to senior officials 

within the State Department, including Sullivan, Nuland, and William J. Burns, the Deputy Secretary of State.51

At 4:49 p.m., just over an hour after the attacks began, an assistant in the Office of the Secretary wrote: 

Beth Jones just spoke with DCM Tripoli Greg Hicks, who 

advised a Libyan militia (we now know this is the 17th 

Feb brigade, as requested by Emb[assy] office) is responding to the attack on the diplomatic mission in Benghazi. 

The QRF [Quick Reaction Force] is in the compound, engaging the attackers, taking fire, and working its way 

through the compound to get to the villa, where Ambassador Stevens is in safe haven for extraction. The ARSO 

[Assistant Regional Security Officer] is also there in the 

compound. Greg spoke with Amb Stevens by phone 20 

minutes before my call (which was about ten minutes ago). 

Greg will talk to the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, and 

then speak with the Foreign Minister . . . Embassy is 


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52 Email from U.S. Dep’t of State to William J. Burns, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 4:49 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05391036). 53 Email from U.S. Dep’t of State to Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy 

Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:13 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05391036). 54 Email from U.S. Dep’t of State to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff & Counselor to the U.S. 

Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:32 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05391036). 

sending medical assistance to Benghazi to be on stand-by. 

More updates to follow.52

At 5:13 p.m. a new email was sent to the group. It stated: 

Just spoke again with Greg Hicks, who confirmed the 

party includes Ambassador Stevens plus three, not plus 

four. Hicks has been in contact twice with the Libyan 

President’s office and twice with the Libyan PM’s [Prime 

Minister’s] office; their offices assured him they are fully 

engaged and consider themselves personal friends of Ambassador Stevens. Hicks has been coordinating with the 

[CIA] who has learned from the QRF about the status of 

the compound—currently they are clearing the compound 

and working to access the party. I also urged Libyan Ambassador to the U.S. Aujali to engage on this immediately 

at the highest level.53

An email at 5:32 p.m., the first in the chain sent to Cheryl Mills, 

Chief of Staff and Counselor, State Department, stated: 

The fighting has stopped, DCM Greg Hicks just confirmed 

to me. He also confirmed one fatality: Sean Smith—a 

TDY’er from The Hague—has died. His body has been recovered. The five ARSO’s are accounted for, but they’re 

still trying to find the Ambassador. The Principal Officer’s 

residence is still on fire with toxic smoke. I have spoken 

to A/S [Assistant Secretary] Gordon and Liz Dibble is contacting the Charge at The Hague, [redacted text], to inform them.54

A 5:55 p.m. email to the same chain sent by an assistant in the 

Office of the Secretary stated: 

I just spoke again to Greg Hicks, who himself spoke again 

to the offices of the Libyan President and Prime Minister, 

asking them to provide firefighting equipment to the 

Benghazi compound. He said the PD shop at Embassy 

Tripoli has found postings on Facebook indicating that the 

‘‘Tripoli Council’’ plans to carry out an attack on Embassy 

Tripoli. He said he was promised increased police protection but it had not yet materialized. 

Greg said his team reports that the extremist group Ansar 

Al Sharia has taken credit for the attack in Benghazi. He 

heard reports that the February 17 Brigade is currently 

engaged in a running battle with Ansar Al Sharia; he 

asked the offices of the President and PM to pursue Ansar 

al Sharia. 


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55 Email from U.S. Dep’t of State to Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:55PM) (on file with the Committee, C05391036). 

On working to locate Ambassador Stevens, the RSO team 

and militia are still on compound, which is 50 acres—Greg 

expressed the hope that Ambassador Stevens is in hiding 

somewhere on the compound. The PO’s residence is still on 

fire.55

These emails consistently used the term ‘‘attack.’’ None of these 

emails mentioned anything about a protest. None of these emails 

mentioned anything about a video. 

Hicks also spoke directly with the Secretary while the attacks 

were still ongoing. He testified: 

A: No. I really didn’t get—you know, about 2:00 a.m. [8:00 

p.m. in Washington D.C.], the Secretary called—— 

Q: Okay. 

A: —along with—her senior staff was on the—— 

Q: Okay. Do you recall who was on that call? 

A: It was Wendy Sherman, Cheryl Mills, Steve Mull, Beth 

Jones, Liz—I am not sure whether Liz Dibble was on the 

phone or not at that time. I know Beth Jones was. Jake 

Sullivan. 

And so I briefed her on what was going on, talked about 

the situation. And at 2:00 a.m., of course, Chris [Stevens] 

is in the hospital, although the Libyan Government will 

not confirm that he’s in the hospital. All they will tell us 

is he’s in a safe place, or they will imply that he’s with us 

at the [Annex] facility, which, of course, we have to feed 

back to them and say, no, we don’t know where he is. It 

is a constant conversation, and I’m still talking to the 

same people. 

The Vice Minister of the Interior chimes in sometime before midnight. And I’m pressing him to get their firefighters to the building to put the fire out, assuming that 

if they go to put the fire out, that they will send some security people with the firefighters to protect the firefighters. We tried everything that we could. 

So we brief her on what’s going on. She asks, How can we 

help? And I said, Well, we could use some reinforcements. 

And we have—we know we have wounded. And—— 

Q: What was the answer? 

A: The answer was that the FAST team in Rota was being 

mobilized to come to Tripoli, and there would be a 

medevac flight coming down to pick up wounded. 

And then we discussed also whether we were going to— 

they asked me if we were going to stay in the residential 

compound. And I said, no, we needed to consolidate our facilities here, because we basically sent everybody we have 

to protect us to Tripoli to rescue them. 


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56 Hicks Testimony at 32–34. 57Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Statement on the Attack in Benghazi (Sept. 11, 2012), 

http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197628.htm [hereinafter September 

11 Statement]. 

Q: To? 

A: To Benghazi. Sorry. Benghazi. Apologies. And they 

said, good. 

Q: And how long does that call last? 

A: Ten minutes.56

None of the information coming directly from the agents on the 

ground in Benghazi during the attacks mentioned anything about 

a video or a protest. These first-hand accounts made their way to 

the Office of the Secretary through multiple channels quickly: 

through the Diplomatic Security Command Center; through the 

State Department Operations Center; through emails recounting 

Jones’ phone calls with Hicks; through Kennedy, who briefed the 

Secretary directly; and through Hicks himself during a phone call 

with the Secretary. 

THE SECRETARY’S STATEMENT 

The principal public statement from the U.S. government the 

night of the Benghazi attacks, September 11, 2012, came from the 

Secretary of State and was issued at 10:08 p.m. It stated in full: 

STATEMENT ON THE ATTACK IN BENGHAZI

I condemn in the strongest terms the attack on our mission in Benghazi today. As we work to secure our personnel and facilities, we have confirmed that one of our 

State Department officers was killed. We are heartbroken 

by this terrible loss. Our thoughts and prayers are with 

his family and those who have suffered in this attack. 

This evening, I called Libyan President Magariaf to coordinate additional support to protect Americans in Libya. 

President Magariaf expressed his condemnation and condolences and pledged his government’s full cooperation. 

Some have sought to justify this vicious behavior as a response to inflammatory material posted on the Internet. 

The United States deplores any intentional effort to denigrate the religious beliefs of others. Our commitment to religious tolerance goes back to the very beginning of our nation. But let me be clear: There is never any justification 

for violent acts of this kind. 

In light of the events of today, the United States government is working with partner countries around the world 

to protect our personnel, our missions, and American citizens worldwide.57

The decision for the Secretary to issue the statement appears to 

have been made earlier that evening during a 7:30 p.m. secure 

video teleconference [SVTC], a meeting hosted by the White House, 


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58 Email from Watch Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, to P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants 

(Sept. 11, 2012, 9:46 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562037). 59September 11 Statement, supra note 57. 60Testimony of Matthew Olsen, Dir., Nat’l Counterterrorism Center, Tr. at 17–18 (Feb. 16, 

2016) [hereinafter Olsen Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

that included senior officials from the State Department, Intelligence Community, and Defense Department to discuss the events 

unfolding in Benghazi. 

Rough notes from the White House meeting describe ten specific 

action items. One of these action items stated: 

The Secretary will issue a statement tonight condemning 

the attacks and stating an official American was 

killed. . . . S may issue another statement to distance the 

United States from the Pastor Jones video.58

The Secretary did not, however, issue two statements that 

evening. She issued one. And that single statement condemned the 

attack, stated an American was killed, and distanced the United 

States from an internet video. In doing so, the statement—specifically the language ‘‘[s]ome have sought to justify this vicious behavior as a response to inflammatory material posted on the Internet’’—appeared to connect, or at least conflate, the attacks in 

Benghazi with the video.59 This connection between the attacks 

and the video continued for over a week, leading the public to believe that a video-inspired protest led to the attacks that killed Ambassador Chris Stevens and Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen 

Doherty. 

The 7:30 p.m. White House meeting was convened to discuss the 

Benghazi attacks and included the Secretary of State and other 

high level officials from the State Department, Defense Department, and White House. The meeting, however, contained a great 

deal of discussion regarding the video. Matt Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, was a participant in the meeting. 

He testified: 

Q: Was there any discussion of sort of the video and 

Benghazi being linked on the call? 

A: I don’t remember specifically, you know, how we talked 

about it. I’m sure that we did, right, because we were—the 

fact is that it came—the discussion of taking the video 

down was part of our conversation in this call that was 

really focused on what was going on in Benghazi.60

Olsen also said: 

And in my own mind, at the time, I recall linking the two, 

you know, that this—we were thinking about what had 

happened in Cairo, we were thinking, okay, now this 

seems to be happening in Benghazi, and we’re worried 

about other, obviously, other diplomatic posts in the Middle East and North Africa. 

On that particular issue, one thing that I recall in thinking, again, sort of preparing for coming here, sort of trying 

to recollect as much as possible, one of the issues that 

Denis [McDonough] asked me—and I think Nick RasVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00161 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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61 Id. at 18. 62 Email from Watch Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, to P_StaffAssistants and 

D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05562037). 63See, e.g., Krissah Thompson and Tara Bahrampour, Obama renews call for religious tolerance after Koran-burning canceled, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2012 (‘‘Obama denied that his administration’s forceful intervention—Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates made a personal appeal to 

the Gainesville pastor, the Rev. Terry Jones—had unnecessarily drawn attention to the pastor’s 

plans.’’); and Obama criticizes Quran burning, Afghan attacks, NBC News, April 2, 2011, 

www.nbcnews.com/id/42396945/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/t/obama-criticizes-quranburning-afghan-attacks/#.V1oSrvkjrJaR (‘‘At least 10 people have been killed and 83 injured in 

the southern Afghan city of Kandahar, officials said on Saturday, on a second day of violent 

protests over the actions of extremist Christian preacher Terry Jones . . . ‘No religion tolerates 

the slaughter and beheading of innocent people, and there is no justification for such a dishonorable and deplorable act,’ Obama said.’’). 64 Email from Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 10:40 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05528017). 65 Email from DS Command Center to DSCC_C DS Seniors, DSCC_E TIA/PII, DSCC_E TIA/ 

ITA, and DS–IP (Sept. 12, 2012, 5:05 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05389586). 

mussen, my deputy, was there as well—was to see if we 

could work with—if we could contact Google to talk with 

them about enforcing their terms of service, which was the 

way that we often thought about offensive or problematic 

content.61

Five of the ten action items from the rough notes of the 7:30 p.m. 

meeting reference the video—including an item mentioning Leon E. 

Panetta, Secretary of Defense, and Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reaching out to ‘‘Pastor Jones’’ directly.62 For nearly two years the White House had been issuing 

public statements in the wake of actions committed by ‘‘Pastor 

Jones,’’ 63 although no connection at the time linked ‘‘Pastor Jones’’ 

or the video to the Benghazi attacks. 

Avril Haines, Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs, held a conference call after the 7:30 p.m. meeting. 

Rough notes from the call stated: 

There is likely to be a statement from S[ecretary Clinton] 

this evening addressing the violence and distancing the 

USG [United States government] from the videos that are 

believed to have instigated it (at least in part); while no 

one is sure of the cause, exactly, there is reportedly a new 

Terry Jones video threatening to burn Korans and a second film that includes a number of insulting statement 

about Mohamed.64

The fact the 7:30 p.m. White House meeting, which took place 

while Ambassador Stevens was considered missing and before Tyrone S. Woods and Glen A. Doherty were killed, was about the attacks in Benghazi but much of the conversation focused on the 

video is surprising given no direct link or solid evidence existed 

connecting the attacks in Benghazi and the video at the time the 

White House meeting took place. The State Department senior officials at the White House meeting had access to eyewitness accounts to the attack in real time. The Diplomatic Security Command Center was in direct contact with the Diplomatic Security 

Agents on the ground in Benghazi and sent out multiple updates 

about the situation, including a ‘‘Terrorism Event Notification.’’ 65

The State Department Watch Center had also notified Sullivan and 


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66 Email from U.S. Dep’t of State to Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy 

Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 4:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05561866). 67 Id. 68Testimony of Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, Tr. at 220 (Jan. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Sullivan Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

Mills that it was setting up a direct telephone line to Benghazi.66

There was no mention of the video from the agents on the ground. 

Hicks—one of the last people to talk to Stevens before he died— 

said there was virtually no discussion about the video in Libya 

leading up to the attacks. 

That did not, however, deter participants at theWhite House 

meeting—led by Denis McDonough, Deputy National Security Advisor to the President—from extensively discussing the video. 

As a result of the White House meeting, the Secretary of State 

issued a statement about the attacks later that evening. Rather 

than relaying known facts from those experiencing the attacks 

firsthand, however, the Secretary’s statement created a narrative 

tying the events in Benghazi to the video, despite a dearth of actual evidence. This was done by mentioning the video and the attacks in the same sentence: ‘‘Some have sought to justify this vicious behavior as a response to inflammatory material posted on 

the Internet.’’ 67

Sullivan testified about the decision to include that sentence in 

the statement: 

Q: Do you recall whose idea it was to include that sentence? 

A: I believe that it was my idea to include that sentence. 

It was either mine or Toria’s [State Department spokesperson] or a combination of the two of us, but I thought 

it was important to include that sentence. 

Q: And why is that? 

A: Well there are two aspects to this. One was we didn’t 

know the motivation of the actual attackers of Benghazi, 

so I didn’t want to say they did it because of the video, and 

so I chose the words very carefully to say that some have 

sought to justify it on that basis. 

But I thought it was really important for us to be able to 

express our views on the video and to say there is never 

any justification for violent acts of this kind, as well as to 

say we deplore efforts to denigrate the religious beliefs of 

others because I was deeply concerned that we could potentially face attacks on our embassies elsewhere. And, unfortunately, that’s exactly what happened.68

Sullivan did not say why it would not have been equally or even 

more important to denounce the video when it began circulating in 

the Middle East days earlier, or after the protests in Cairo where 

the link to the video was clear. Sullivan testified: 

I thought very hard about exactly how to formulate this. 

I didn’t want to say the attackers did this because of the 

video. That’s why I chose to use the phrase ‘‘justify,’’ beVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00163 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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69 Id. at 221. 70Testimony of Daniel B. Schwerin, Staff Assistant and Speechwriter, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. 

at 21 (Oct. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Schwerin Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

cause I just wanted to talk more generally about people 

who might justify the attack on the basis of the video. Who 

would those people be? They would be the kind of people 

that would go try to gin up protests elsewhere, whether in 

Benghazi again or in Tripoli or anywhere else around the 

region. 

And my first concern in getting this out was to do everything we could do to try to prevent further violence from 

happening. And I really thought it was important for the 

Secretary to get on the record on this issue. And in the 

days that followed, I thought it was important for her to 

continue getting on the record on this issue, especially as 

we dealt with these assaults on our embassies across the 

region. 

So I thought hard about this paragraph. I thought hard 

about making sure we formulated it in a way that was accurate to say that just some had sought to justify it. Obviously, we have all seen a lot of public reporting linking 

things as well. So this, to me, was an important paragraph 

to include in this statement.69

Sullivan apparently did not engage in nearly as much thought 

about the video when it first appeared online, or even when the 

U.S. Embassy was breached by protestors in Cairo earlier on September 11, 2012. Where there was a known connection to the video, 

Sullivan was silent. Where the video was not connected by even a 

scintilla of reliable evidence at the time, Sullivan thought it important enough to include. 

Dan Schwerin, Speechwriter, Department of State, helped draft 

the statement that went out that evening. Schwerin told the Committee the statement was intended to speak to a global audience. 

He testified: 

Q: You talked about speaking to a global audience. What 

did you mean by that? 

A: I mean any time the Secretary of State speaks, the 

world is listening. We had—it was a period of unrest 

across the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond; specifically, in the Muslim world, which was a source of concern; 

and how to lower that temperature and speak to that situation was an important issue. 

Q: Was that focused on the video? 

A: The video was the source of that unrest across the 

world in that period. And so, you know, lowering the temperature of that situation was one of our goals.70

While protests around the Middle East flared up in the following 

days, at the time of the Benghazi attacks the protest in Cairo represented the only instance of unrest. 


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71Testimony of Megan E. Rooney, Policy Advisor and Speechwriter, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. 

at 48–51 (Oct. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Rooney Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

Megan Rooney, Speechwriter, Department of State, also worked 

on the statement and told the Committee that it was a ‘‘commonsense conclusion’’ that the video somehow sparked what happened 

in Benghazi, because it had done so in Cairo. She testified: 

Q: Right. As you sit here today, do you recall anything 

generally about the conversation specific to the video that 

night? 

A: No. Only that we thought it belonged in the statement. 

Q: Do you recall why you thought it belonged in the statement? 

* * * 

A: . . . I believed that it played a role in sparking the 

events of that night. And that any sort of conversation 

about what had happened, and what has to happen now 

would have to be taken into account in some way. 

Q: Okay, just so I understand, it was your view that night 

that the video should be referred to in the statement because in your mind, the video had played some role in the 

attack in Benghazi? 

A: Yeah, in sparking them or triggering them or motivating some of the people that night. Yeah, yes. 

Q: And so you were kind of going back to your point about 

one of the goals for this speech was to explain to the American people what had happened. For that reason you wanted to refer to the video. Is that fair? 

A: Yeah. I would say that’s fair. 

Q: And as best you can, could you just tell us what you 

based that conclusion on, or that opinion that the video 

somehow sparked what occurred in Benghazi? 

A: Well, at the time it seems like the commonsense conclusion. You know, there was this incident happening in 

the same—not far from Benghazi, just a few countries to 

the—well, shoot, one country to the east. God, I’m failing 

on the geography—a nearby country, Cairo, Egypt, on the 

same day there was this protest that seemed—that was 

similarly targeting an American facility that similarly had 

our facility breached in this alarming way. And that 

seemed to be very clearly connected to this video since, 

again, I believe that not long before that protest broke out, 

the video had been broadcast on Egyptian news. So, you 

know, I was learning about what was happening in Egypt, 

and oh, look, the same day, something is happening at an 

American facility not far from there....71

The gist is: a statement connecting the video with the Benghazi 

attacks was included by a speechwriter because the ‘‘thought’’—half 

a world away—was that ‘‘commonsense’’ dictated it. But that same 


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72Testimony of Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy Nat’l Sec. Advisor for Strategic Commc’cs, Nat’l 

Sec. Council, Tr. at 50–51 (Feb. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Rhodes Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

commonsense would not dictate listening to and following the real 

time information being provided by eyewitnesses who survived the 

initial attack and were preparing for subsequent attacks. 

Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor to the 

President for Strategic Communications, spoke with Sullivan about 

the statement before it was released. Rhodes testified the sentence 

‘‘Some have sought to justify this vicious behavior as a response to 

inflammatory material posted on the Internet’’ was not about 

Benghazi but served to respond ‘‘to the general events taking place 

in the region as a whole.’’ 72 He also said: 

A: Again, our concern—one of our concerns was that we 

saw efforts to utilize the video to incite protests, including 

the type of violent protests that we saw in Cairo. And so 

I recall that we wanted to have messaging in the statement that sought to reduce tensions associated with the 

video. 

Q: So was this sentence not meant to convey anything regarding Benghazi and Libya? 

A: No, I don’t believe so. 

Q: You don’t think—this sentence was not about Libya in 

any way, shape, or form? 

A: Again, I believe that it was intended to address the 

broader context in the region. 

Q: So that’s what has me wondering. Then was there vicious behavior in other places that day? 

A: Yes. Certainly in Cairo. 

Q: But no—I mean, Pat Kennedy described Cairo as spray 

paint and rocks. Obviously, Benghazi was much different. 

So you’re saying that vicious behavior applies to Cairo but 

doesn’t apply to Benghazi? 

A: Again, I think it applies generally to the fact that we 

had indications that there were individuals who might 

seek to use this video to justify violence? 

Q: I’m asking about the two terms: vicious behavior. You 

said this sentence doesn’t apply to Libya in a general sense 

or Benghazi in a specific sense, but does apply to other 

events in the region; namely, Cairo. Is that accurate? 

A: Again, this is taking place in the context where we 

have a protest that turned violent at our Embassy in 

Cairo, and we have the attacks in Benghazi. The situation 

is fluid. There are indications that we are getting from the 

State Department that there are other actors who are 

seeking to incite people related to this video. And so one 

of the objectives in our messaging was to have a statement 

that, again, sought to minimize our association with this 

video. 


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73 Id. at 61–64. 74See Email from Benjamin Rhodes, Deputy Nat’l Sec. Advisor for Strategic Commc’cs, Nat’l 

Sec. Council, to Steven Warren, Spokesman, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:53 

PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562046) (‘‘[L]et the State Department’ statement be our 

[USG] comment for the night.’’). 75 Rhodes Testimony at 15. 

Q: And I understand you conveyed that is one of your objectives, but I’m specifically, again, just for the record, asking that sentence you said does not apply, is not meant in 

any way to convey anything about Libya, it’s about Cairo 

and the rest of the region. 

A: Again, it’s not intended to assign responsibility for 

what happened in Benghazi. It’s meant to describe the 

context of what happened, what’s happening in the region. 

Q: You mentioned context a couple of times here. When I 

look at context, I look at this document. The heading is 

‘‘Statement on the Attack in Benghazi.’’ Paragraph one: I 

condemn in the strongest way the attack on our mission 

in Benghazi. We are securing personnel and facilities. One 

of our officers was killed in Benghazi. Next paragraph: I 

have talked to the Libyan President. So everything in this 

document is about Libya and Benghazi except you’re saying this sentence doesn’t apply to Libya and Benghazi. 

A: Again, as I look at this statement, my recollection is 

one of the objectives was to convey that we were doing everything we could to secure our diplomats in facilities 

around the world. If you look, for example, at the last sentence of the statement, it’s intended to be about that general principle that we will work with partner countries 

around the world to protect our personnel, our missions, 

and our American citizens.73

Moreover, at Rhodes’ direction, the Secretary’s statement was the 

only statement issued on behalf of the United States government 

that night.74 This put additional emphasis on its contents. Rhodes 

told the Committee: 

A: You know, I recall telling my staff that that would be 

our comment for the night. So the people who work for me 

in the NSC press office, you know, everybody was being 

asked to respond to inquiries, and I remember determining 

that, you know, we would just have that one statement be 

our comment for the night. 

Q: What was the thinking behind that, have that one 

statement coming from the State Department be the sole 

statement from the U.S. Government? 

A: Again, my recollection is that this was an attack that 

had targeted our Ambassador, that it was appropriate for 

the Secretary of State to be speaking for the U.S. Government given that this had happened to people who worked 

in her department, and again, that made them the appropriate agency to issue a comment.75


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76 Email from U.S. Dep’t of State to S_CallNotes (Sept. 11, 2012, 11:34 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05561906). 77 Id. (‘‘[O]ur Ambassador, who you know, is missing.’’). 

The Secretary’s private comments, however, were different than 

her public comments. In a phone call with Libyan President Mohammed el-Magariaf at approximately 6:00 p.m. in Washington 

D.C., the Secretary did not mention the video nor did she connect 

the video with the attacks. A summary of the phone call is below: 

Secretary Clinton: Mr. President. 

Libyan General National Congress President Magarif: 

Your Excellency. 

S: I appreciate you taking my call at this late hour. 

M: No problem. It’s my duty. 

S: As you know, our diplomatic mission in Benghazi was 

attacked earlier this evening. We need your immediate 

help, as one of our diplomats was killed and our Ambassador, who you know, is missing. We have asked for the 

Libyan government to provide additional security to the 

compound immediately as there is a gun battle ongoing, 

which I understand Ansar al Sharia is claiming responsibility for. We also need to provide additional capacity for 

firefighting as there are reports that the principle officers 

residence has been bombed or set on fire. We believe that 

it is important for your government, as well as ours, to 

condemn this attack in the strongest possible terms and 

promise these criminals will be brought to justice. I also 

need you to help us secure our mission in Tripoli. We have 

serious threats on social media sites, like Facebook, and it 

is important that your government take all possible measures, in an urgent manner, to secure our facilities. We 

need you to have people who you are confident in, who will 

follow your direction, and that your government trusts to 

secure our compounds. 

M: Please accept my condolences for the death of the 

American at the compound and our sincere apologies for 

what has happened. We promise to find the criminals and 

bring them to justice. We will do our utmost to protect 

American buildings and every American citizen in Libya. 

We were just in the midst of an emergency meeting with 

the Prime Minister and all of his deputies to address this 

situation. 

S: If there is anything that you need or that I can do 

please do not hesitate to call me at any time, day or night. 

M: Thank you. 

S: Thank you. 

M: Good Night.76

In her call with the Libyan President, the Secretary mentioned 

a number of key facts not included in her public statement: that 

Stevens was still missing at the time;77 that the extremist organiVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00168 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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78 Id. (‘‘I understand Ansar al Sharia is claiming responsibility[.]’’). 79 Id. (‘‘[T]he principle officers residence has been bombed or set on fire.’’). 80 Id. (‘‘[I]t is important for your government, as well as ours, to condemn this attack in the 

strongest possible terms and promise these criminals will be brought to justice.’’). 81 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Chelsea Clinton 

(‘‘Diane Reynolds’’) (Sept. 11, 2012, 11:12 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05795467). 82 Id. 83Glenn Kessler, From video to terrorist attack: a definitive timeline of administration statements on the Libya attack, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 

fact-checker/post/from-video-to-terrorist-attack-a-definitive-timeline-of-administrationstatements-on-the-libya-attack/2012/09/26/86105782-0826-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_blog.html. 84Scott Neuman, U.S. Ambassador To Libya, Three Other Americans Killed in Benghazi Attack, NPR (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:45 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/09/12/ 

160992840/u-s-ambassador-to-libya-three-other-americans-killed-in-benghazi-attack. 

zation Ansar al Sharia had taken credit for the attacks;78 that the 

compound may have been bombed and set on fire;79 and that the 

administration intended to bring the perpetrators to justice.80 Significantly, she also did not mention the video she referred to in her 

public statement. 

The Secretary also sent a private email to her daughter that 

evening about an hour after her public statement. The email said: 

Two of our officers were killed in Benghazi by an Al 

Queda-like [sic] group: The Ambassador, whom I handpicked and a young communications officer on temporary 

duty w a wife and two very young children. Very hard day 

and I fear more of the same tomorrow.81

In that email, the Secretary states two individuals had been 

killed ‘‘by an Al Queda-like [sic] group.’’ 82 This key fact had been 

omitted from the Secretary’s public statement. In sharing this fact 

with her daughter, the Secretary acknowledged the attack—with a 

link to al-Qaeda—was in fact terrorism. In omitting this fact from 

her public statement, however, the Secretary sent a very different 

message to the public—a message that suggested a protest over the 

video. 

It was not until ten days later the Secretary told the American 

people the events in Benghazi were terrorist attacks.83

THE DAY AFTER THE ATTACKS 

The day after the attacks was a day of mourning for the families 

of the four Americans who lost their lives—Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens, Sean P. Smith, Tyrone S. Woods, and Glen A. 

Doherty. It was also a time of mourning and reflection for America. 

However, the day after the attacks also saw a marked difference 

in information shared by the administration with the American 

people compared with information shared by the administration 

privately. 

Public Statements Conflated the Video and the Attacks 

The following day brought additional press inquiries and additional statements. After the Secretary’s statement on the evening 

of September 11, two more Americans, Tyrone Woods and Glen 

Doherty, died in Benghazi as a result of the mortar attacks on the 

Annex.84


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85 Email from Bernadette M. Meehan, Deputy Spokesperson, Nat’l Sec. Council, to Benjamin 

J. Rhodes, Deputy Nat’l Sec. Advisor for Strategic Commc’cs, Nat’l Sec. Council, et al. (Sept. 12, 

2012, 8:14 AM) (emphasis original) (on file with the Committee, SCB000897). 86 Email from Mr. Rhodes to Ms. Meehan, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012, 8:31 AM) (on file with the 

Committee, SCB000897). 87See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 

2012/09/12/statement-president-attack-benghazi (‘‘While the United States rejects efforts to denigrate the religious beliefs of others, we must all unequivocally oppose the kind of senseless violence that took the lives of these public servants.’’). 88Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President 

on the Deaths of U.S. Embassy Staff in Libya (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2012/09/12/remarks-president-deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya. 

The administration needed to act quickly to ensure each agency 

was on the same page about how to message the attacks. At 8:14 

a.m. the morning after the attacks, Bernadette Meehan, Deputy 

Spokesperson, National Security Council, sent an email to nearly 

two dozen people from the White House, Defense Department, 

State Department, and intelligence community stating: 

Both the President and Secretary Clinton released statements this morning. Both are pasted below. Please refer to 

those for any comments for the time being. To ensure we 

are all in sync on messaging for the rest of the day, 

Ben Rhodes will host a conference call for USG communicators on this chain at 9:15 ET today....85

Rhodes responded, stating simply ‘‘If possible, let’s do this at 9 

to get a little ahead of potential statements by S[ecretary Clinton] 

and POTUS [the President] later this morning.86

The message emanating from the White House the morning after 

the attacks—similar to the message delivered by the U.S. government the night before through the Secretary’s statement—was that 

the video and the attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi would be 

mentioned in the same breath.87 This therefore served the purpose 

of continuing to connect the two issues. As a result, this created 

confusion among the American public and the press as to whether 

or not these two events were directly related. 

In the President’s statement announcing the deaths of four 

Americans, he referred to ‘‘efforts to denigrate the religious beliefs 

of others’’—i.e. the video—and the ‘‘senseless violence that took the 

lives of these public servants’’—i.e. the Benghazi attacks—in the 

same sentence.88 The statement, titled ‘‘Statement by the President 

on the Attack in Benghazi’’ read: 

I strongly condemn the outrageous attack on our diplomatic facility in Benghazi, which took the lives of four 

Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens. Right 

now, the American people have the families of those we 

lost in our thoughts and prayers. They exemplified America’s commitment to freedom, justice, and partnership with 

nations and people around the globe, and stand in stark 

contrast to those who callously took their lives. 

I have directed my Administration to provide all necessary 

resources to support the security of our personnel in Libya, 

and to increase security at our diplomatic posts around the 

globe. While the United States rejects efforts to denigrate 

the religious beliefs of others, we must all unequivocally 


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89 Id. 90Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President 

on the Attack in Benghazi (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/ 

12/statement-president-attack-benghazi. 91 Id. 

oppose the kind of senseless violence that took the lives of 

these public servants.89

Later that morning the President addressed the Nation in a televised address from the Rose Garden about the attacks. The President said in part: 

Yesterday, four of these extraordinary Americans were 

killed in an attack on our diplomatic post in Benghazi. 

Among those killed was our Ambassador, Chris Stevens, 

as well as Foreign Service Officer Sean Smith. We are still 

notifying the families of the others who were killed. And 

today, the American people stand united in holding the 

families of the four Americans in our thoughts and in our 

prayers. 

The United States condemns in the strongest terms this 

outrageous and shocking attack. We’re working with the 

government of Libya to secure our diplomats. I’ve also directed my administration to increase our security at diplomatic posts around the world. And make no mistake, we 

will work with the Libyan government to bring to justice 

the killers who attacked our people. 

Since our founding, the United States has been a nation 

that respects all faiths. We reject all efforts to denigrate 

the religious beliefs of others. But there is absolutely no 

justification to this type of senseless violence. None. The 

world must stand together to unequivocally reject these 

brutal acts.90

In the speech about the attacks, drafted by Rhodes and similar 

to the President’s statement about the attacks earlier in the morning, the President refers to ‘‘efforts to denigrate the religious beliefs 

of others’’ 91—i.e. the video. These comments, in a public address, 

gave a strong and continually reinforced impression to the public: 

the video was somehow linked to the attacks. 

The Secretary also made remarks about the attacks on the morning of September 12, 2012. She said in part: 

We are working to determine the precise motivations and 

methods of those who carried out this assault. Some have 

sought to justify this vicious behavior, along with the protest that took place at our Embassy in Cairo yesterday, as 

a response to inflammatory material posted on the internet. America’s commitment to religious tolerance goes back 

to the very beginning of our nation. But let me be clear— 

there is no justification for this, none. Violence like this is 

no way to honor religion or faith. And as long as there are 


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92Secretary Clinton Delivers Remarks on the Deaths of U.S. Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, 

DIPNOTE (Sept. 12, 2012), https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2012/09/12/secretary-clinton-deliversremarks-deaths-us-personnel-benghazi-libya. 93 Rooney Testimony at 35–36. 94 Jones Testimony at 79–80. 95 Rooney Testimony at 39. 

those who would take innocent life in the name of God, the 

world will never know a true and lasting peace.92

Rooney, who helped draft the speech, told the Committee it was 

geared towards the American people: 

We knew basically a few things that we wanted to accomplish. If indeed some people had died, we knew that we 

wanted to give her some material that she could say about 

them, so she could say gracious things about them, which 

we knew she would have wanted to do. We knew that we 

would want to give her some sort of a—something that she 

could say that would summarize what had happened, anticipating that, you know, if Americans were waking up 

and turning on their TV in the morning and their Secretary of State was standing there, that they would—one 

of the questions on their mind would be what, what happened. We wanted to be able to give her some language 

that would at least begin to answer that.93

The fact the speech served in part to answer a question on the 

minds of many Americans—‘‘what happened’’—is interesting because Rooney never talked with anybody in the Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs (NEA) while she was drafting the speech. The individuals in NEA had been on the phone all night with State Department personnel in Benghazi receiving real-time updates about 

what was transpiring.94 Rooney testified: 

Q: Did you speak to anybody in the NEA bureau about 

what had happened in the attacks? 

A: I don’t recall speaking to anyone in the NEA bureau. 

Q: Is that something you would have done? I mean, you 

talked earlier about the process. If you’re writing a speech 

about China, you go to—— 

A: Right. 

Q: —the China experts and ask them. I mean, did that 

happen that night with regard to Libya? 

A: No, I don’t think so. I don’t recall any conversation 

with anyone from—no.95

Instead, the only actual description in the statement of what had 

occurred in Benghazi was a late addition to the speech from Sullivan. Schwerin, who also worked on the speech, explained: 

A: He said, you know, we have to keep making edits. He 

didn’t tell me the substance of the conversations he had 

had, just that there were more edits to make. 

Q: Okay. What kind of edits? 


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96Schwerin Testimony at 36. 97See Email from Bernadette M. Meehan, Spokesperson, Nat’l Sec. Council, to Victoria J. 

Nuland, Spokesperson, Dep’t of State, & Patrick H. Ventrell, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State 

(Sept. 13, 2012, 9:17 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05527907) (Attaching transcript of the 

Interview of the President by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes). 98 Id. 

A: I can’t, you know, all these years later, tell you which 

sentences we changed, but the only thing that I remember 

is, I think the formulation ‘‘heavily-armed militants’’ we 

added that morning in his office. But I could not beyond 

that give you chapter and verse about what we changed.96

The public statements by the President and Secretary of State 

did not call the events in Benghazi a terrorist attack. 

The President also conducted an interview with Steve Kroft of 60 

Minutes that same morning. Kroft began the interview by asking 

the President about the attack and the President’s reluctance to 

call the attack a terrorist attack in his earlier Rose Garden remarks. Again, the President did not call what had transpired in 

Benghazi a terrorist attack: 

Q: Mr. President, this morning you went out of your way 

to avoid the use of the word ‘‘terrorism’’ in connection with 

the Libya attack. 

A: Right. 

Q: Do you believe that this was a terrorist attack? 

A: Well, it’s too early to know exactly how this came 

about, what group was involved, but obviously it was an 

attack on Americans. And we are going to be working with 

the Libyan government to make sure that we bring these 

folks to justice, one way or the other. 

Q: This has been described as a mob action, but there are 

reports that they were very heavily armed with grenades. 

That doesn’t sound like your normal demonstration. 

A: As I said, we’re still investigating exactly what happened. I don’t want to jump the gun on this. But you’re 

right that this is not a situation that was exactly the same 

as what happened in Egypt, and my suspicion is, is that 

there are folks involved in this who were looking to target 

Americans from the start.97

Later in the interview, the President raised the issue of the video 

while referring to the Benghazi attacks, implying the film was an 

‘‘excuse for violence against Americans’’ and conflating the two 

issues.98 The President said: 

And I do have to say that, more broadly, we believe in the 

First Amendment. It is one of the hallmarks of our Constitution that I’m sworn to uphold. And so we are always 

going to uphold the rights for individuals to speak their 

mind. On the other hand, this film is not representative of 

who we are and our values, and I think it’s important for 


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99 Id. 100 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, to Senior Dir. for Commc’cs and Public Diplomacy, Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:30 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05578214). 101Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Readout of the President’s 

Call with Egyptian President Morsi (Sept. 13, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/13/readout-president-s-call-egyptian-president-morsi. 102Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Readout of the President’s 

Call with Libyan President Magariaf (Sept. 13, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/13/readout-president-s-call-libyan-president-magariaf. 103 Email from U.S. Dep’t of State to S_CallNotes (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:11 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05561911). 104 Id. 

us to communicate that. That’s never an excuse for violence against Americans[.] 99

Private Statements Tell a Different Story 

While administration officials may have been in sync with their 

public messaging regarding the Benghazi attacks on September 12, 

the messages shared privately told a completely different story. 

Minutes before the President delivered his speech in the Rose 

Garden, Sullivan wrote in an email to Rhodes and others: 

There was not really much violence in Egypt. And we are 

not saying that the violence in Libya erupted ‘‘over inflammatory videos.’’ 100

Sullivan’s private acknowledgement differs notably from the consistent public remarks connecting the video and the attacks in both 

the President’s and the Secretary’s statements that day. 

On September 12, 2012, the President made separate phone calls 

to Libya President Mohamad Magariaf and Egyptian President 

Mohamed Morsi. In his phone call with the Egyptian President, the 

President ‘‘said that he rejects efforts to denigrate Islam, but underscored there is never any justification for violence against innocents and acts that endanger American personnel and facilities.’’ 101

This is a reference to the video, which was the cause of the protest 

against the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. 

In his phone call with the Libyan President, the President said 

the two countries ‘‘must work together to do whatever is necessary 

to identify the perpetrators of this attack and bring them to justice.’’ 102 Notably, however, President Obama did not make a reference to the video. 

The Secretary also had a phone call with an Egyptian leader, 

Prime Minister Hisham Kandil, on the afternoon of September 12. 

According to the call notes, the Secretary told the Prime Minister 

the following: 

We know that the attack in Libya had nothing to do with 

the film. It was a planned attack—not a protest. . . . Your 

[sic] not kidding. Based on the information we saw today 

we believe the group that claimed responsibility for this 

was affiliated with al-Qaeda.103

Not only did the Secretary tell the Prime Minister ‘‘the attack in 

Libya had nothing to do with the film,’’ she strengthened the statement by prefacing it with ‘‘we know.’’ 104 Such a definitive declaration made privately to another world leader stands in stark conVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00174 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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105Though some may claim that ‘‘vicious behavior’’ also occurred in Cairo, in the Secretary’s 

September 12 speech she specifically separates the ‘‘vicious behavior’’ from what transpired in 

Cairo by saying ‘‘this vicious behavior, along with the protest that took place at our Embassy 

in Cairo yesterday . . .’’ Secretary Clinton Delivers Remarks on the Deaths of U.S. Personnel 

in Benghazi, Libya, DIPNOTE (Sept. 12, 2012), https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2012/09/12/ 

secretary-clinton-delivers-remarks-deaths-us-personnel-benghazi-libya. 106 Email from Legislative Management Officer for Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to H_Egypt, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05580110). 107 Email from Legislative Management Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, to H_Egypt, et al. (Sept 

12, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562234). 108Middle East and North Africa Situation Report, Sept. 12, 2012, 0700 EDT (on file with 

CIA, REQUEST 17–0345 to REQUEST 0346). 109See Email to H_Egypt, et al. (Sept 12, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05562234) (answering question about whether the attack was under the cover of a protest, 

Kennedy responded ‘‘[n]o this was a direct breaching attack.’’). 110Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intel., Statement by the Director of Public Affairs 

for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/96-pressreleases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-of-public-affairs-onintelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-benghazi. 

trast to her speech earlier in the day to the American people where 

she mentioned the attack—‘‘this vicious behavior’’—in the same 

breath as the video—‘‘inflammatory material posted on the internet.’’ 105

Kennedy was also emphatic in privately conveying that no protests had occurred prior to the attack. In a separate, private briefing to congressional staff Kennedy was specifically asked whether 

this was ‘‘an attack under the cover of a protest.’’ 106 Kennedy, who 

oversaw the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and had ready access 

to real-time information from the Diplomatic Security agents on 

the ground in Benghazi, replied ‘‘[n]o this was a direct breaching 

attack.’’ 107

Kennedy’s assertions also aligned with the intelligence product, 

the Executive Update, produced by the CIA analysts earlier that 

day and shared with senior administration officials. That piece 

stated ‘‘the presence of armed assailants from the outset suggests 

this was an intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful 

protest.’’ 108 This piece—which was part of the President’s Daily 

Brief and likely discussed with the President’s Chief of Staff on 

September 13, 2012—is discussed at length in Appendix H. 

Whether or not a protest occurred prior to the attack was a significant fact at the time because the absence of a protest would 

clearly distinguish what happened in Benghazi from what transpired in Cairo. If it therefore became clear no protests occurred in 

Benghazi over the video, then the administration would therefore 

no longer be able to connect the two events in statements about 

Benghazi. 

Privately, Kennedy did not hesitate to explain no protests had occurred prior to the attack.109 Publicly, however, it took the administration more than two weeks to do so.110

SEPTEMBER 13 INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT 

On September 11 and September 12, public comments by administration officials had relied mainly on press reports and eyewitness 

accounts. On September 13 the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] 

published its first intelligence assessment exclusively regarding the 

Benghazi attacks. This assessment, known as a WIRe [World Intelligence Review] was the key intelligence piece produced by CIA anVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00175 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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111 Cent. Intel. Agency, Libya: Government Poorly Positioned to Address Attacks, World Intelligence Review, Sept. 13, 2012 [hereinafter September 13 WIRe] (on file with CIA, REQUEST 

17–0067 to REQUEST 17–0070). 112Testimony of Dir. of the Office of Terrorism Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 105 (Nov. 

13, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 113Testimony of Michael Morell, Deputy Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 39–41 (Sept. 28, 

2015) [hereinafter Morell Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 114MICHAEL MORELL, THE GREAT WAR OF OUR TIME: THE CIA’S FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM— FROM AL QA’IDA TO ISIS 217 (2015). 115 Id. 116Morell Testimony at 135. 

alysts immediately following the Benghazi attacks. It was titled 

‘‘Libya: Government Poorly Positioned To Address Attacks.’’ 111 As 

both Michael J Morell, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA)—an 

office of [redacted text] analysts focused on terrorism issues—acknowledge, this was the first time the analysts had coordinated a 

piece about the Benghazi attacks among the entire intelligence 

community. 

The OTA Director described the purposes of this piece to the 

Committee: 

This is something that by this point we would have been 

writing on a regular basis trying to sort out. . . . [T]o 

have done a WIRe would’ve been really the first time 

where we said we’re going to stand back, we’re going to 

really make sure this was fully IC coordinated. We’re 

going to work through this and say this is a more formal 

look. So I don’t believe it was tasked so much as it was 

time for us to really take a full look at where we were.112

Additionally, this particular piece was also included as part of 

the President’s Daily Brief [PDB]. 

Morell explained: 

Q: So the PDB staff would have edited this particular 

WIRe? 

A: Yes, because it was a PDB. 

Q: This particular WIRe was a PDB? 

A: Yes.113

As a PDB, this piece received wide distribution throughout the 

intelligence community. As Morell notes in his book, this piece 

‘‘would be published and shown to senior policy-makers and to Congress on the morning of September 13.’’ 114

This September 13 piece was the pivotal piece coming from the 

intelligence community for several reasons. One, it was the first 

time the analysts had taken a step back to assess what had actually occurred in Benghazi; two, this piece was widely distributed 

across the U.S. government;115 and three, Morell viewed this piece 

as the ‘‘assessment’’ of the analysts when he edited the talking 

points for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

two days later.116

Despite the September 13 piece being heavily vetted, going 

through the PDB process, and being widely distributed, the piece 

was rife with errors as the analysts themselves would later acknowledge. There were improper footnotes, poor and confusing 


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117Testimony of [redacted text] Team Chief, Ofice of Terrorism Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 52–53 (Feb. 10, 2016) [hereinafter [redacted text] Team Chief Testimony] (on file 

with the Committee). 118Morell Testimony at 50. 119The CIA notes that a September 15 WIRe ‘‘includes reporting that ‘members of an AASaffiliated group stated that they took advantage of a planned demonstration . . .’ ’’ However, 

citing a report is different than crafting an assessment. A report is just that, a report—citing 

information from somebody else. An assessment, however, is the collective thoughts of analysts 

after synthesizing multiple pieces of intelligence to reach an analytic conclusion. 

phrasing, and most importantly, headlines that were not supported 

by any text. The result was a very poorly written piece containing 

inaccurate information that was relied on by those analyzing, discussing, and messaging the Benghazi attacks. 

The focus of the September 13 piece was twofold: the ability of 

the Libyan government to respond to the attacks, and the fact extremists had participated in the attacks. A timeline of the attacks 

and the sequence of events leading up to the attacks were not discussed in the piece. Whether or not a protest occurred prior to the 

attacks was not a focal point of the piece, nor was it an issue the 

analysts found to be particularly germane. As the manager of the 

analysts who wrote the piece testified: 

A: We weren’t particularly concerned, worried about, or 

thinking about protests when we wrote this. 

Q: That was the next question I was going to ask you. 

Yeah. 

A: I want to make that very, very clear. Because in CTC 

[Counterterrorism Center] when something like this happens, we look at who do we think did it and are they about 

to do it again and is there anything we can do to stop it. 

So we did not think the question of protests was particularly germane to answering that question. In fact, it was 

fully probably a week. And we had several conversations 

among ourselves and even with more senior people in the 

DI [Directorate of Analysis] about, why in the hell would 

everybody care about protests? 

We just—we weren’t tracking on it because it wasn’t germane to what we were trying to do, which it doesn’t really 

excuse our sloppy work, particularly in that paragraph 

here. I mean the ticks are the ticks. They are based on reporting. But our assessment was just imprecisely written. 

We weren’t careful enough about it.117

The fact the piece was not focused on protests—nor did the analysts find the issue of protests germane—is ironic given this piece 

has received so much attention by Morell and others as supporting 

evidence that the analysts did in fact believe a protest had occurred.118 That is because this is the only intelligence assessment 

written by the CIA that can support the analytic line that a protest 

had occurred prior to the attacks.119

Further, it was put in the intelligence piece by accident—a mistake that was not caught during what was supposed to be a rigorous and airtight editing process. 

In his book, Morell says ‘‘[t]he September 13 piece—the first 

piece to go beyond a simple factual update—said four things. First, 


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120MORELL, supra note 114, at 218. 121 Id. at 218. 122 Id. (emphasis added). 123 Cent. Intel. Agency, Libya: Government Poorly Positioned to Address Attacks, World Intelligence Review, Sept. 13, 2012 [hereinafter September 13 WIRe] (on file with CIA, REQUEST 

17–0067 to REQUEST 17–0070). 124OTA Dir. Testimony at 128. 125September 13 WIRe, supra note 123. 

that the assault on the [Benghazi Mission compound] had been a 

spontaneous event that evolved from a protest outside the 

[Benghazi Mission compound].’’ 120 Except Morell is wrong. The 

piece did not say this at all. In fact, the exact language of the piece 

reads: ‘‘We assess the attacks on Tuesday against the US Consulate in Benghazi began spontaneously following the protests at 

the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against 

the Consulate and a separate US facility in the city.’’ 121 In his 

book, Morell alters the plain language of this piece, ‘‘began spontaneously following protests at the US Embassy in Cairo,’’ with the 

wording in his book, ‘‘a spontaneous event that evolved from a protest outside the [Benghazi Mission compound].’’ 122

On the first page of the September 13 piece, titled ‘‘Libya: Government Poorly Positioned To Address Attacks,’’ there is a single 

mention of ‘‘the early stages of the protest’’ buried in one of the bullet points.123 The Director of the Office of Terrorism Analysis acknowledged the supporting evidence for this statement was incorrect. She testified: 

Q: ‘‘I’m sorry. In the early stages of the protest’’—so a direct reference to a protest—— 

A: Yes. 

Q: ‘‘Benghazi’s top Ministry of Interior official personally 

ordered the withdrawal of Libyan Security Forces protecting the consulate saying he believed the action would 

avoid violence, according to the press reporting.’’ 

A: Correct. 

Q: And we talked about that earlier. 

A: Yes. 

Q: Just really quickly, flip back to footnote 16, can you 

read the date on footnote 16? What’s the date of that? 

A: That is 2012/09/04, so that would obviously be 

wrong.124

The article cited to support the mention of a protest in this instance was titled ‘‘Libyan Parliament Speaker, Interior Minister 

Discuss Country’s Security’’ and was from Doha Libya TV in Arabic 

from September 4, 2012.125 In other words, the analysts used an 

article from September 4, 2012—a full week before the lethal attacks—to support the premise that a protest had occurred just 

prior to the attack on September 11. A simple source check by the 

reader—or during any of the multiple levels of allegedly ‘‘rigorous’’ 

editing—would have caught the blatantly obvious error of relying 

on a news article from September 4 to support an event that occurred on September 11. 


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126OTA Dir. Testimony at 109. 127September 13 WIRe, supra note 123, at 2. 128 Id. 129 Id. 130Morell Testimony at 49. 

Yet it was not this mention of a protest in the piece that caught 

Morell’s attention. Rather, it was a headline on the following page 

titled ‘‘Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests.’’ This page 

was a text box, which the OTA Director described as: 

So a text box is material that we believe is related to the 

storyline, to the analytic—to the arc of the story but is 

something that we kind of separate out, because sometimes it doesn’t flow from the analytic argument but it’s 

information we think is important to include. So think of 

it as an adjunct to the piece.126

While the title of this text box was ‘‘Extremists Capitalized on 

Benghazi Protests,’’ nothing in the actual text box supports that 

title.127 The summary paragraph in the text box, through which 

the rest of the text box would flow, read: 

We assess the attacks on Tuesday against the US Consulate in Benghazi began spontaneously following the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct 

assault against the Consulate and a separate US facility 

in the city. Extremists with ties to al-Qa-ida were involved 

in the attacks, according to signals intelligence.128

There is no mention—or even hint—of any protest in Benghazi 

in that paragraph or in any other text in the text box. Rather, the 

only mention of a protest relates to what had transpired in 

Cairo.129

After a discussion of this document during their interviews with 

the Committee, both Morell and the OTA Director acknowledged 

this fact. Morell testified: 

Q: I’m trying to tie it all back to the headline—— 

A: Yep. 

Q: —‘‘Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,’’ I’m 

having a hard time understanding how that headline is 

supported by the evidence. 

A: Right. 

Q: So far, nothing in the actual text of the WIRe supports 

that, and so now we’re looking at each footnote, footnote 

29—source note 29, we’ve looked at the New York Times 

article, the body of the article doesn’t support that, just the 

headline, and now we’re looking at source note 30, ‘‘according to [redacted text].’’ You know, where in here does it 

support that but for collateral, is my question to you. 

A: And so—look, I don’t know the answer to your question, 

right, why they wrote it the way they did.130

The OTA Director testified: 


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131OTA Dir. Testimony at 110–12. 132 Id. at 112–13. 

Q: Okay. Let’s look at the first bullet point. . . . That’s a 

lengthy sentence. 

A: Not good trade craft. We try and make them shorter. 

Q: Is there anything in that sentence or that bullet point 

that denotes that there was a protest in Benghazi that you 

can see? 

A: ‘‘After hearing how protesters breached the’’—so, no, 

not in Benghazi. 

Q: Not in Benghazi, okay. 

Let’s look at the next tick. . . . 

Is there anything in that tick that mentions a protest in 

Benghazi? 

A: No. 

Q: All right. Let’s look at the third tick. . . . Is there anything in that tick that mentions a protest in Benghazi? 

A: No. 

Q: And then I’m just going to read the last paragraph 

here. . . . 

Is there anything in that paragraph that mentions the protest in Benghazi? 

A: No.131

The OTA Director also told the Committee the text box in the 

September 13 intelligence piece was not supposed to be about 

whether or not protests had occurred in Benghazi prior to the attack.132 Instead, it was supposed to focus on the involvement of extremists in the attacks. That was the point the analysts were trying to drive—extremists, not protests. This was true of the headline 

of the text box, too. The key word in that headline, according to the 

OTA Director, was ‘‘extremists,’’ not ‘‘protests.’’ She testified: 

Q: So the headline for this text box, ‘‘Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,’’ do you see any supporting evidence in the five paragraphs I’ve just read that support 

that headline? 

A: So the headline—and I admit that in retrospect, if I 

could go back and change this headline, I would. Because 

the headline, it was more meant to be about the, we know 

extremists were involved and less about whether or not 

there were protests. 

So if you look at this idea that the first, the topic sentence 

that talks—so, sorry, the second sentence, where the bullets are then following immediately after, about extremists 

with the ties to Al Qaeda were involved. We then go on in 

the first bullet to talk about we know that there was, you 

know [redacted text]. That bullet was to not only talk 

about AQIM but to also talk a little bit about motivation. 


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133 Id. at 112–13. 134 Id. at 135. 135 Id. at 112–113. 136 [Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 49, 136. 

The second bullet that talks about, you know, again, extremists, as we were calling at that point, Ansar al-Sharia 

in Benghazi claimed responsibility, and also talked about 

the timing that this was spontaneous, [redacted text]. So, again, this idea of preplanning, timing, and those involved. 

And the third bullet was, I think, meant to illustrate that 

this was a series that the extremists were involved at various points that was an opportunistic attack sequence, as 

we talk about. They took advantage of opportunities to attack U.S. facilities at various points throughout the night. 

So are those things directly supporting in the way we 

would like the title of this? No. Was it meant—and as I 

said, so if I could take back that title, I would. 

Q: Sure. ‘‘Extremists’’ is the key word in the title? 

A: Yes, not the protests.133

She later called the title of the text box the ‘‘unfortunate 

title,’’ 134 and, as the head of the Office of Terrorism Analysis, ultimately took responsibility for it.135

While there may have been no text in the text box to support the 

title, as it turns out, the title was intended to be something different. According to the manager of the analysts who wrote the 

piece, the title of the text box was supposed to be ‘‘Extremists Capitalized on Cairo Protests.’’ 136 That small but vital difference— 

from Cairo to Benghazi—had major implications in how people in 

the administration were able to message the attacks, and was used 

as support in the days and weeks after this piece was published for 

the claim that protests had occurred prior to the Benghazi attacks. 

Even worse, this mistake was not caught until more than a week 

later, when the analysts were updating their assessment. The manager of the analysts who wrote the piece testified: 

Q: The title here: ‘‘Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi 

Protests.’’ So we talked to [the OTA Director] about this. 

She called it an unfortunate title? 

A: It was a—we made a mistake. 

Q: Okay. So when you say ‘‘we made a mistake,’’ I mean, 

where—how would that have been—— 

A: So, God, how do I begin? 

* * * 

A: . . . So ‘‘Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests.’’ 

Benghazi was supposed to be Cairo. So—— 

Q: Okay. 

A: But let me explain that. So—and, frankly, it’s a mistake that we didn’t even notice until we published the 


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137 Id. at 48–49. 138 Id. at 54. 139Morell Testimony at 56. 140 Id. 

WIRe on the 24th, where I was talking to a senior person 

as he was reviewing it, and he was looking back and asking, I thought: Oh, my God, we were talking about 

Cairo.137

She also testified: 

Q: So I guess this is why I’m a little confused is you say 

in the title Benghazi should have been Cairo? 

A: The title probably should have read something like extremists motivated to attack in Benghazi because of protests in Cairo.138

In the end, Morell conceded the obvious—this piece could have 

been written better. He testified: 

Right. And if you want to get a bottom line from me, from 

me, I don’t think this was as well done as it could have 

been for a lot of reasons. I have reasons beyond yours as 

to why I don’t think this is as well done as it could be, and 

you’re pointing out some additional ones. So I don’t think 

it is as well done as it could have been.139

In addition to this piece being poorly written—conveniently, in a 

way relied on by senior administration officials with respect to a 

key point—it also contained sourcing inaccuracies. One of these 

was described above. The lack of attention paid to sourcing has implications on future pieces shared with the President and other 

senior executive branch officials.140 From papers in high school, 

theses in college, law review articles to scientific research, assertions made are expected to be properly documented with sources to 

support them. Yet when it comes to CIA analysts and pieces they 

write for the President, for some reason these footnotes do not receive the scrutiny they deserve. Morell explains: 

A: So context number two, right, is that analysts don’t 

spend a lot of time making sure that these footnotes 

match. Okay. They just don’t. They just don’t. 

Q: Is that a problem? 

A: It certainly is when you have a situation like this. 

Q: I’m a lawyer. I mean, if you’re writing a Law Review 

article, those things are going to be footnoted to death. 

A: Is it a problem? Yes. Is it a problem? Yes. So those are 

the few pieces of context, right, is they believed is what 

they believed, right? They had a set of—they believed they 

had a set of information, a set of data points that took 

them there. Third, I think you’ve got to be a little bit careful going through this sentence by sentence and source by 

source, because analysts aren’t as careful as they need to 

be. 


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141 Id. at 52–53. 142OTA Dir. Testimony at 106–08. 143See e.g. Morell Testimony at 50. 

Q: Why aren’t they as careful as they need to be? If you’re 

producing a piece for the [President], shouldn’t every sentence have a valid source note? 

A: Yes, absolutely. You’re absolutely right. I couldn’t agree 

with you more.141

The OTA Director also acknowledged there is not enough emphasis on making sure the footnotes, known inside the CIA as source 

attributions, are accurate—especially for pieces that become PDBs. 

She testified: 

A: The editing process would have differed for a PDB in 

that it would have also gone through an additional layer 

of review or several additional layers of review. So a WIRe 

ceases, the review ceases pretty much after the office director, as I said, except for some technical edits. 

A PDB, our process is more—there are additional levels 

that include a review within the organization we call 

PASS. There’s also then the DA [Directorate of Analysis] 

front office would have reviewed a PDB, and then it would 

also have gone to ODNI [Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence]. 

* * * 

Q: Okay. So there are more senior analysts that would review a PDB? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Does it undergo a certain extra level of rigor for attributing sources and making sure everything lines up properly? 

A: Attributing sources, not necessarily.142

Despite these myriad errors—the inaccurate title, the faulty 

sourcing, the lack of evidence in the text to support a headline— 

Morell and others have used this piece, and the title of the text box 

specifically, as the ‘‘assessment’’ of the analysts to buttress their 

statements that protests in Benghazi had occurred prior to the attacks.143 In fact, the title ‘‘Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests’’ alone does count as an ‘‘assessment’’ by the analysts. As the 

manager of the analysts testified: 

A: And our assessment—again, it’s embarrassing, it’s 

poorly done—was that they had—really the title as it stood 

was what our assessment was, but we didn’t explain it 

well—that they capitalized on these protests in Benghazi. 

Q: Okay. So your title is what the assessment was, but 

that’s not supported—and this is my analysis—not supported, Benghazi protests, by anything underneath—— 

A: That’s true. 


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144 [Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 55. 145 Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Opening Plenary 

of the U.S.-Morocco Strategic Dialogue (Sept.13, 2012), http://www.state.gov/secretary/ 

20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197711.htm. 

Q: —in the ticks. Okay. So is that actually an assessment, 

extremists capitalized on Benghazi protests, or is the assessment sort of the body under here, the paragraph, the 

three ticks, and then the final paragraph? 

A: Well, it’s all assessment. It’s just sloppily done. 

Q: Okay. So extremists capitalized on Benghazi protests, 

even though there’s no supporting evidence for that statement in this box—— 

A: Yeah. Like I said, we weren’t thinking about the protests or we would have been, frankly, far more careful 

about how we couched them.144

In other words, the title of the text box itself was an assessment 

by the analysts. That title was inaccurate. That title was an accident and was supposed to be something else entirely, but nobody 

caught it. The analysts were not even focused on the issue of protests. Yet it was that title the administration could point to—and 

ultimately relied upon—to say the analysts had assessed that protests had occurred prior to the Benghazi attacks. That title is the 

only analytic piece fully vetted by the intelligence community prior 

to Morell’s editing of the talking points and the appearance on the 

Sunday talk shows by Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, where she said protests had occurred 

in Benghazi. 

Nevertheless, despite the incorrect title and numerous other 

faults with the September 13 piece, there is still no assessment by 

the analysts that tied what transpired in Benghazi to the internet 

video. Even among the legion of mistakes made, the piece did not 

authoritatively connect Benghazi with protests or an internet 

video. 

THE CONFLATION CONTINUES 

While the inaccurate and poorly written CIA analysis on September 13 gave an opening for administration officials to claim protests had occurred prior to the Benghazi attack, the public connection and conflation by administration officials between Benghazi 

and the video continued. This occurred despite any assessment by 

the CIA analysts of the video playing a role in the Benghazi attacks. 

During her remarks at the opening plenary of the U.S.-Morocco 

strategic dialogue on September 13, 2012, the Secretary of State 

said there is ‘‘no justification, none at all, for responding to this 

video with violence. We condemn the violence that has resulted in 

the strongest terms.’’ 145 These comments were similar to prior public comments she had made regarding the video. 

A draft of the Secretary’s comments, however, shows an attempt 

to draw a stronger link between Benghazi and the video—something unsupportable by the intelligence at the time, and not part 

of the CIA’s assessment—than she stated publicly. A draft of the 


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146 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, to Daniel B. Schwerin, Speechwriter, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Sept. 13, 2012, 9:22 

AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB00100122). 147Benghazi was the only U.S. facility during this time period where terrorists killed an American government official. 148See Email from U.S. Dep’t of State to S_CallNotes (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:11 PM) (on file with 

the Committee, C05561911) (attaching notes from phone call with Egyptian Prime Minister). 149 Email from Operations Center, U.S. Dep’t of State to Prem G. Kumar, Dir. for Israeli and 

Palestinian Affairs, White House (Sept. 13, 2012, 12:29 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05562242). 150Press Release, Office of the Dir. of National Intel., Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. 

Consulate in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/96-pressreleases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-of-public-affairs-onintelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-benghazi. 151Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep’t 

of State (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/09/197729.htm. 152 Id. 

Secretary’s speech states: ‘‘But as I said yesterday, there is no justification—none—for responding to an Internet video with murder. 

We condemn the violence that has resulted in the strongest 

terms.’’ 146

This subtle change from the draft to her speech—from ‘‘murder’’ 

to ‘‘violence’’—is important. While some violence had occurred at 

other United States diplomatic facilities across the Arab World 

such as Cairo, murder had only occurred at one: Benghazi.147 By 

changing that one word, from ‘‘murder’’ to ‘‘violence,’’ the Secretary 

did not draw an irrebuttable, direct link between the video and 

Benghazi—a link she had told the Egyptian Prime Minister she 

knew did not exist 148—but instead continued to indirectly connect 

and conflate the two events to the American public, thus allowing 

her to claim she did not make a direct public connection between 

the video and the Benghazi attacks. 

That same day, Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Secretary of State for 

Management and Resources, had a meeting with the new Egyptian 

Ambassador to the U.S. According to a summary of that meeting, 

‘‘Nides said he understood the difference between the targeted attack in Libya and the way the protest escalated in Egypt.’’ 149

While this message was shared privately by the Deputy Secretary 

of State to the Egyptian Ambassador two days after the attacks, it 

was not until two weeks later that the administration finally 

shared this message publicly with the American people.150

At a press briefing later in the day on September 13, Nuland 

openly talked about the video while discussing the Benghazi attacks.151 At the briefing, she was asked whether any of the information she provided during the background briefing the day before 

had changed; said she did not have anything significantly different 

than what she had said privately on background.152 Yet when 

asked about the Benghazi attack, she answered the question, then 

pivoted to talking about the video: 

Q: Toria, can you tell us whether there’s been any 

progress towards determining whether the Benghazi attack was purely spontaneous or was premeditated by militants, and also whether there’s been any further determination about the extent to which the Cairo, Benghazi, 

and now Yemen attacks were related in some way other 

than just theme? 


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153 Id. 154 Id. 

A: Well, as we said yesterday when we were on background, we are very cautious about drawing any conclusions with regard to who the perpetrators were, what their 

motivations were, whether it was premeditated, whether 

they had any external contacts, whether there was any 

link, until we have a chance to investigate along with the 

Libyans. So I know that’s going to be frustrating for you, 

but we really want to make sure that we do this right and 

we don’t jump to conclusions. 

That said, obviously, there are plenty of people around the 

region citing this disgusting video as something that has 

been motivating. As the Secretary said this morning, while 

we as Americans, of course, respect free speech, respect 

free expression, there is never an excuse for it to become 

violent.153

While the question addresses Cairo, Benghazi, and Yemen, 

Nuland does not differentiate among the three events and instead 

notes ‘‘there are plenty of people around the region citing this disgusting video as something that has been motivating.’’ 154 Nuland’s 

failure to separate what transpired in Benghazi from what transpired in Cairo on the same day and Yemen one day later resulted 

in an administration official connecting again, publicly, Benghazi 

with the other two events—and thus Benghazi with the video. 

Two days after the attacks ended, September 14, Jay Carney, 

Press Secretary, White House, held a press briefing at the White 

House. Reporters pressed on whether the administration believed 

the events in Benghazi were a reaction to the video: 

A: Jake, let’s be clear, these protests were in reaction to 

a video that had spread to the region—— 

Q: At Benghazi? What happened at Benghazi—— 

A: We certainly don’t know. We don’t know otherwise. We 

have no information to suggest that it was a preplanned 

attack. The unrest we’ve seen around the region has been 

in reaction to a video that Muslims, many Muslims find offensive. And while the violence is reprehensible and unjustified, it is not a reaction to the 9/11 anniversary that 

we know of, or to U.S. policy. 

Q: But the group around the Benghazi post was well 

armed. It was a well-coordinated attack. Do you think it 

was a spontaneous protest against a movie? 

A: Look, this is obviously under investigation, and I don’t 

have—— 

Q: But your operating assumption is that that was in response to the video, in Benghazi? I just want to clear that 

up. That’s the framework? That’s the operating assumption? 

A: Look, it’s not an assumption—— 


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155Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, Office of the Press Secretary, The White 

House (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/14/press-briefingpress-secretary-jay-carney-9142012. 156 Email from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, to Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, et al. (Sept 14, 2012, 6:43 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05396788). 

Q: Because there are administration officials who don’t— 

who dispute that, who say that it looks like this was something other than a protest. 

A: I think there has been news reports on this, Jake, even 

in the press, which some of it has been speculative. What 

I’m telling you is this is under investigation. The unrest 

around the region has been in response to this video. We 

do not, at this moment, have information to suggest or to 

tell you that would indicate that any of this unrest was 

preplanned.155

In his response to a question about what happened at Benghazi, 

Carney switches gears to talking about the general unrest in the 

region as a whole—which was a result of the video. Carney does 

not distinguish the events in Benghazi from the events around the 

rest of the region thus connecting and conflating the two issues and 

again giving the impression that what happened in Benghazi happened as a result of the video. Carney is also asked twice whether 

or not a protest had occurred in Benghazi. Similar to his comments 

about the video, Carney talks about unrest in the region as a 

whole, conflating protests and Benghazi, and failing to distinguish 

Benghazi from what had transpired elsewhere in the region. 

Despite these public comments by senior administration officials, 

those on the ground in Libya knew otherwise. That same morning 

a public information officer from the Embassy in Tripoli sent an 

email to colleagues in Tripoli and at the State Department headquarters in Washington D.C. regarding ‘‘messaging on the attacks 

in Libya.’’ 156 The email said: 

Colleagues, I . . . want to share with all of you, our view 

at Embassy Tripoli that we must be cautious in our local 

messaging with regard to the inflammatory film trailer, 

adapting it to Libyan conditions. Our monitoring of the 

Libyan media and conversations with Libyans suggests 

that the film is not as explosive of an issue here as it appears to be in other countries in the region. The overwhelming majority of the FB [Facebook] comments and 

tweets we’re [sic] received from Libyans since the Ambassador’s death have expressed deep sympathy, sorrow, and 

regret. They have expressed anger at the attackers, and 

emphasized that this attack does not represent Libyans or 

Islam. Relatively few have even mentioned the inflammatory video. So if we post messaging about the video specifically, we may draw unwanted attention to it. And it is 

becoming increasingly clear that the series of events in 

Benghazi was much more terrorist attack than a protest 

which escalated into violence. It is our opinion that in our 

messaging, we want to distinguish, not conflate, the events 

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157 Id. 158Schwerin Testimony at 17. 159 Email from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, to Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, et al. (Sept 14, 2012, 6:43 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05396788). 160White House e-mails on 2012 attacks in Benghazi, Libya, Washington Post, http:// 

apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/white-house-e-mails-on-2012-attacks-in-benghazi-libya/ 

157. 161Testimony of Tripoli Chief of Station, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 129–31, 189 (July, 16, 

2015) [hereinafter Chief of Station Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 162 Id. at 122–123. 

tant extremists. I have discussed this with Charge Hicks 

and shares PAS’s view.157

The purpose of this email was to discuss messaging to the Libyan 

people—similar to the part of the Secretary’s September 11 statement where her aides noted she wanted to speak to the region to 

‘‘lower the temperature.’’ 158 What is significant about this email, 

however, is that in discussing messaging to the Libyans, the video 

is not emphasized at all—in fact the messaging on the ground in 

Libya sought to distinguish what happened from other countries.159

This again contrasts with the statements of senior administration 

officials, speaking to the American people, who consistently connect 

the video and Benghazi. 

THE TALKING POINTS 

The talking points provided by the CIA to the House Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence [HPSCI] on September 15, 2012 

were flawed. The individual who made the most substantial 

changes to those talking points was Michael Morell.160 While much 

has been written about these talking points and the flawed process 

undertaken to create them, this section focuses on what specific information Morell had at his disposal when he made the changes to 

the talking points, how this information affected his editing of the 

talking points, and subsequent portrayal of the talking points by 

others. 

Information from Tripoli 

While the September 13 WIRe represented an ‘‘assessment’’ that 

CIA analysts believed a protest had occurred prior to the Benghazi 

attack, CIA case officers and security personnel in Libya knew that 

was not the case. For the first two days after the attacks, the Chief 

of Station in Tripoli had been debriefing eyewitnesses to find out 

what happened and worked with his CIA counterparts—who had 

been in Benghazi—to contact their sources and collect as much information as possible about the attacks.161 The Chief of Station 

knew no protests or demonstrations occurred prior to the attack. 

None of the eyewitnesses he spoke with mentioned anything about 

protests.162 The Chief of Station testified he first learned that 

Washington D.C. created a narrative that protests had occurred 

around September 13 or 14: 

Q: I guess the first question would be, when did you first 

become aware that there was a belief back in Washington 

that the Benghazi attack was carried out without a significant degree of preplanning, and that the attack had somehow evolved from a demonstration at the consulate, or perVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00188 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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163 Id. at 178. 164The CIA told the Committee this part of the report ‘‘suggests the intelligence community 

had no information on which to base our initial assessment that a protest preceded the attacks 

on the State compound. To the contrary, a significant body of information available immediately 

following the attacks indicated that there was a protest.’’ This ‘‘significant body of information,’’ 

however, was almost exclusively press reporting, and with one exception, this information was 

not cited in either the September 13 or September 15 WIRe pieces. 

On September 16, 2012, at the direction of Michael Morell, the CIA analysts finally tackled the 

issue of protests head-on. They wrote: ‘‘We have contradictory reporting about whether nonviolent demonstrations occurred prior to the attack on the US Consulate. The Station’s assessment that there were no peaceful protests on the day of the attack is in contrast to other reports 

that peaceful protests preceded the violent assault.’’ As supporting evidence for this paragraph 

the analysts used only public news articles from the Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and 

National Public Radio—all of which were at least three days old—in addition to articles by Al 

Jazirah and the Guardian of London. They did not cite any intelligence reports, instead relying 

on the Internet. 165 Email from [EA to DDCIA] to DIR–EAs, (Sept. 14, 2012, 8:27 AM) (on file with the CIA, 

REQUEST 1–001673 to 1–001674). 

haps used a demonstration as cover? About three things 

there, but when did you first become aware of those misconceptions? 

A: I want to say it was when—probably the 13th or 14th 

we were asked to coordinate on that first intelligence report that came out. 

Q: Sure. 

A: We provided our edits or our contributions to that. 

They weren’t incorporated or included.163

This was just the first time—in what would become a pattern— 

of analysts and others at CIA headquarters relying on accounts 

from the press and other sources over that of America’s highest 

ranking intelligence officer in Libya.164

The earliest evidence the Committee has seen where the Chief of 

Station told CIA headquarters a protest did not occur in Benghazi 

came early in the morning on Friday September 14, 2012.165 A 

Worldwide Unrest Update sent to Morell’s assistants and chief of 

staff said: 

Tripoli: COS [Chief of Station] passed the following update 

being formulated by NE [Near East] now. 

1. Fighters were trained, not an undisciplined militia. 

State compound was an assult/probe [sic] vice flash 

mob. This is based on the observations of CIA officers 

who were in the fight assessing the fighting method of 

the attackers. 

2. Multiple militias and fluid political dynamics in 

Benghazi. Central government not able to project influence/power. 

3. Mortar attack was precise on base location. Per JSOC 

[Joint Special Operations Command] operation on the 

gorund [sic] one short, one long, two direct hits. Their 

assessment this was a well-trained group—not militia 

rabble. JSOC officer is training the Libyan Special 

Forces and noted that they are not as capable of preciVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00189 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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166 Id. 167Morell Testimony at 111. 168 Id. at 114–15. 169OTA Dir. Testimony at 130. 

sion mortar fire as was witness [sic] on 12 September.166

Morell explained the purpose of these Worldwide Unrest Updates: 

When the unrest began across the Muslim world as a result of the video, there was unrest, there were protests, 

the administration was deeply concerned about the prospect—possibility prospect of violence against U.S. facilities 

and U.S. persons. We were having daily deputies meetings 

to discuss the safety of Americans and the safety of U.S. 

facilities overseas, two a day deputies meetings, one in the 

morning and one at night. 

One of the things the director and I did—and I don’t know 

which one of us in particular did—one of us asked [redacted text] where there was unrest as a result of the 

video to do a daily update, right? This is the daily update 

from Tripoli for that day in response to that request.167

In other words, the daily updates were done for Morell, sent to 

his Executive Assistants, and written for his consumption. Despite 

this, Morell assumed the analysts received these updates as well. 

He testified: 

Q: Did this actually go to the analysts? 

A: I assume so. I assume so. 

Q: Okay. Why would you assume it went to the analyst if 

it was created for you? 

A: Because I believe all the updates—the updates were 

shared. I mean, that’s something we can check, okay, 

something we can check. 

Q: So you believe that this worldwide unrest update was 

shared with you? 

A: Absolutely. And something you can ask [the OTA Director].168

The Committee asked the OTA Director, if she received this document. She was not aware they did. She testified: 

At the time, I was not aware. I have since become aware. 

I believe this was part of the daily email that was being 

done at the behest of DD/CIA.169

The manager of the analysts who conducted the analysis also 

does not remember seeing this email. She testified: 

Q: Is this something that would have made it to your desk 

or your analysts’ desks? 

A: Not this email. . . . 


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170 [Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 61–62. 171Morell Testimony at 117–18. 172 Email from Tripoli Chief of Station, Cent. Intel. Agency, to [Office of Terrorism Analysis 

Analyst] (Sept. 14, 2012, 4:05 PM) (on file with the CIA, REQUEST 15–0005). 

Q: Okay. Under Tripoli it says ‘‘COS [Chief of Station] 

passed the following update being formulated by NE now.’’ 

And then there are seven, I guess, individual updates. 

Those seven updates in this format, is that something that 

would have been passed to your team? 

A: No, I’ve never seen this. 

Q: Okay. I’m just trying to understand—— 

A: Well, let me say, I don’t remember seeing it. And I 

don’t know that my team would have passed it. I do know 

[Chief of Station] was unhappy with our call on protests 

because——170

When asked about this specific Worldwide Unrest Update from 

the Chief of Station, Morell responded: 

A: So, look, the point is—the point is—the point is there 

is a flood of information coming in, right, and it’s not my 

job as the deputy director of CIA to assess all this stuff. 

Right? 

Q: Right. 

A: It’s the job of the analyst. So I’m looking at it from the 

perspective of, geez, is there anything here that’s going to 

lead me to raise questions with the analyst? 

Q: Okay. And was there anything in this particular email, 

the worldwide unrest update that caused you to raise 

questions with the analyst? 

A: So this is not the—this is not from the 14th. So, no.171

As noted earlier, the email was sent at 8:27 a.m. on September 

14, 2012. It is unclear why Morell did not acknowledge this fact. 

That afternoon, the Chief of Station also wrote an email directly 

to one of the analysts in the Office of Terrorism Analysis.172 That 

email, in response to a request to coordinate on talking points for 

a phone call for David Petraeus, Director, Central Intelligence 

Agency, on the Libya attack, said: 

We are verifying some of the events that took place in 

fornt [sic] of the State department facility with some of the 

embassy personnel. The RSO [Regional Security Officer] 

noted that he was not aware of a protest in front of the 

consulate (the DOS [Department of State] facility where 

the Ambo and the ARSO’s were staying. (could it have 

been the AAmerican [sic] corner?) We will be talking to the 

lead [redacted text] who was in Benghazi to obtain additional background. I also do not agree with the assessment 

that the attack was opportunistic [sic] in origin. The GRS 

Agents and xx operators on the scene noted that the fighters were moving and shooting in a fashion that indicated 

training—and set them apart for the militias fighters typiVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00191 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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173 Id. 174 Id. 175 [Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 68–69. 

cally found in Benghazi. Perhaps most compelling point 

was the comment by the [redacted text] who noted the 

percise [sic] and timing of mortar fire—one short, one long 

two direct hits. He noted that the Libyan special forces are 

unable to use mortars so effectively and that U.S. forces 

mortar company would be hard pressed to repeat the same 

performace [sic] as he witnessed in Benghazi. 

I am basing my assessment mostly on the data from the 

guys on the ground (not all source) and dealing with Libyan contacts. Thanks for letting [sic] have an opportunity to 

co[o]rd[inate].173

The Chief of Station noted he was relying on information from 

‘‘guys on the ground’’ and ‘‘Libyan contacts.’’ 174

Even though this email was written to an analyst, the analysts 

sent it up the chain. The manager of the analysts testified: 

Q: Okay. So this email is from chief of station to her. Do 

you recall whether or not she forwarded this to you or disseminated this—— 

A: Oh yeah. She forwarded it. Everything from the [Chief 

of Station] I saw. 

Q: So when you received this email, is this something you 

would have pushed up the chain? 

A: Oh, yeah. Chief of Station, you know, disagreeing with 

something is no small thing. I mean, the chiefs of station 

are not required for coordination. But we absolutely, and 

especially NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center], take 

into account what they have to say. 

Q: All right. So you sounded confident that you pushed 

this up the chain. I guess my question—— 

A: I don’t remember doing it, but, I mean, I would have. 

Q: Okay. And you would have sent that to? 

A: [OTA Director]. 

Q: [OTA Director]. Okay. 

A: And my boss, my—— 

Q: Okay. And you don’t know whether or not [the OTA Director] would have sent it on further? 

A: I’m sure [the OTA Director] would have sent it on further. But I don’t—well, I say that. I can’t be sure what any 

other person does. But [the OTA Director] has excellent 

judgment and a whole ton of bureaucratic savvy. So——175

The Chief of Station believes the email made its way up to 

Morell. He testified: 

Q: Do you know how high up the contents of your email 

outlining your inform[ation] made it? Beyond the person at 


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176 Chief of Station Testimony at 208–09. 177Morell Testimony at 119. 

CT that was coordinating it, do you have any idea? Did it 

make it to Mr. Morell, for example? 

A: I believe it made it to Mr. Morell. 

Q: Okay. 

A: Because this is one of the responses. The reason why 

I say that—— 

Q: Yeah. 

A: —it went—this was a response. He was aware of our 

view that either—so I have all—I don’t have any reason to 

doubt it didn’t make it to him. 

Q: Yeah. 

A: And his questions to us were consistent that he got this 

specific information or something like it.176

Morell, however, testified he does not remember receiving this 

email. He told the committee: 

Q: Okay. You don’t believe this is something that you 

have ever seen? 

A: Not that I remember.177

Drafting the Talking Points 

Petraeus testified the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence [HPSCI] did not ask for unclassified talking points when 

he met with them on September 14, 2012, but rather he offered to 

provide them to the Committee. Petraeus testified: 

A: Yeah. The Ranking Member asked: What can we say 

about this publicly? And so I said: Okay, we’ll come up 

with something for you. And, frankly, the thinking was we 

could do something very quickly, give it to him, he could 

have it that afternoon, and he could know what he could 

and could not say. 

Q: So your expectations were this was something that 

would be done internally at the CIA and knocked out 

quickly and sent over in the afternoon? 

A: Yeah, yeah. And, obviously, that would be inappropriate in the end because it would need to be sent through 

the intelligence community, so it had to be an IC. And 

then, of course, since it’s now going to be used publicly, 

then the respective public affairs offices of various organizations get involved. And then since it has overall government implications, then you end up having to get State 

and FBI. There’s security concerns and a variety of other 

issues that start to get factored in. So it became quite an 

involved process in the end. 

Q: But what was your understanding of how the process 

would evolve when the tasking was first issued by HPSCI? 


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178Testimony of David Petraeus, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 50–51 (Mar. 19, 2016) (on 

file with the Committee). 179OTA Dir. Testimony at 194–95. 180OTA Dir. Testimony at 197. 181September 13 WIRe, supra note 123. The September 13 WIRe said ‘‘We assess the attacks 

on Tuesday against the US Consulate in Benghazi began spontaneously following the protests 

at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the Consulate and a separate US facility in the city.’’ The first bullet point stated ‘‘We believe based on currently available information that the attacks in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at 

the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the US Consulate and subsequently its annex.’’ 

A: I’m not sure I had a very clear—yeah, staff come up 

with some talking points.178

The OTA Director accompanied Petraeus to the HPSCI meeting, 

and upon returning to her office, drafted an initial set of talking 

points. She testified: 

So as I said, the coffee was that morning. I immediately 

came back. And knowing the sense of urgency that the 

Members had, I took that as my, you know, top task was 

to get them talking points because they had all said they 

were going to be going out and speaking to the media and 

to constituents and they wanted to know what they could 

say. 

So I put together the talking points. And I wanted them 

to be reflective of what the Members, of course, had just 

heard. Thinking back on this now, I think part of this is 

I definitely had in my mind that the Members had heard 

a fuller explanation from the director, but that this was 

my attempt to try and say of what they had heard what 

could they say in an unclassified setting. 

So I drafted these talking points immediately after that. 

And then at 11:15, so it was pretty quickly, then circulated 

them to make sure that everyone agreed with both the 

content and that they were unclassified.179

The first draft of the talking points contained six bullet points. 

Nowhere in any of these six bullet points is a mention of demonstrations or protests in Benghazi. The OTA Director acknowledged that these six bullet points were factually accurate—both at 

the time they were crafted and today.180 The first bullet point was 

pulled almost verbatim from the September 13 WIRe, published 

the day before.181

The bullet points were: 

• We believe based on currently available information that the 

attacks in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the US Consulate and subsequently its annex. 

This assessment may change as additional information is collected and analyzed and currently available information continues to be evaluated. 

• The crowd almost certainly was a mix of individuals from 

across many sectors of Libyan society. That being said, we do 

know that Islamic extremists with ties to al-Qa’ida participated in the attack. 


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182Talking Points Timeline, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/Benghazi% 

20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last visited May 17, 2016). 183See Email from [National Clandestine Service Officer] to [Near East Division, et al.] (Sept. 

14, 2012, 2:52 PM) (on file with the CIA, REQUEST17–0443 to REQUEST 17–0449) (sending 

talking points to multiple offices within the CIA). 184 Email from [National Clandestine Service Officer] to [Near East Division, et al.] (Sept. 14, 

2012, 2:52 PM) (on file with the CIA, REQUEST 17–0443 to REQUEST 17–0449) (emphasis 

original). 185 Email from Dir., Office of Terrorism Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, to [National Clandestine 

Service Officer] (Sept. 14, 2012, 3:19 PM) (on file with the CIA, REQUEST 17–0443 to REQUEST 17–0449) (emphasis added). 

• Initial press reporting linked the attack to Ansar al-Sharia. 

The group has since released a statement that the its [sic] 

leadership did not order the attacks, but did not deny that 

some of its members were involved. Ansar al-Sharia’s facebook 

page aims to spread sharia in Libya and emphasizes the need 

for jihad to counter what it views as false interpretations of 

Islam, according to an open source study. 

• The wide availability of weapons and experienced fighters in 

Libya almost certainly contributed to the lethality of the attacks. 

• Since April, there have been at least five other attacks against 

foreign interests in Benghazi by unidentified assailants, including the June attack against the British Ambassador’s convoy. We cannot rule out that individuals had previously 

surveilled the US facilities, also contributing to the efficacy of 

the attacks. 

• We are working with Libyan authorities and intelligence partners in an effort to help bring to justice those responsible for 

the deaths of US citizens.182

The OTA Director sent these six talking points out for coordination with other offices within the CIA at 11:15 a.m.183 A member 

of the National Clandestine Service—the operators who work on 

the ground, as opposed to the analysts who sit at headquarters— 

asked: ‘‘Second tick says we know extremists with ties to AQ participated in the attack, which implies complicity in the deaths of 

the American officers. Do we know this?’’ 184 The OTA Director responds and says ‘‘Good point that it could be interpreted this way— 

perhaps better stated that we know they participated in the protests. We do not know who was responsible for the deaths.’’ 185

Given that no protests had occurred in Benghazi prior to the attack, this change had the effect of transforming the second bullet 

point from being accurate to being inaccurate. The OTA Director 

testified: 

Q: Sure. So I guess the way I read it is, you’re trying to 

appease legal, which is always a challenge, by saying 

that—you wanted to back off the fact you know they participated in the attack because you don’t want to interfere 

and potentially jeopardize the investigation, showing complicity to the attacks. So you altered it to we know they 

participated in protests at the time you believe they were 

protests. 

A: Correct. 


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186OTA Dir. Testimony at 205–06. 187See Email from [National Clandestine Service Officer] to [Near East Division, et al.] (Sept. 

14, 2012, 2:52 PM) (on file with the CIA, REQUEST 17–0443 to REQUEST 17–0449). 188See Talking Points Timeline, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/Benghazi% 

20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last visited May 17, 2016). 

Q: But you didn’t know for a fact that they [Islamic extremists with ties to al-Qa’ida] participated in the protests. 

You just knew that they were there. 

A: Right. 

Q: So the change went from being accurate to being inaccurate? 

A: Correct. 

Q: Okay and is that something you did solely on your 

own? 

A: Yes.186

In a subsequent email, the word ‘‘protests’’ was changed to ‘‘violent demonstrations’’ in that same bullet point.187 Those changes 

made it all the way through to the final version of the talking 

points, surviving the extensive deletions made near the end of this 

process by Morell.188

Shortly after this change was made, a meeting took place to discuss the talking points. The CIA’s ‘‘Lessons Learned’’ after action 

review described this meeting: 

At some point between 4–5 p.m., a group of officers from 

OCA [Office of Congressional Affairs] and OPA [Office of 

Public Affairs] met in OPA spaces to discuss the talking 

points. Those officers included C [Chief]/OCA, COS [Chief 

of Staff]/OCA, D [Director]/OPA, the Chief of OPA’s Media 

Relations Branch and two OPA spokespersons. Their efforts, over a period of approximately 30 minutes, culminated in a revised version of the talking points that was 

sent to CIA/COS and the DDCIA’s [Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency] office by OPA at 4:42 p.m. 

Participants in this group editing session agree that they 

did not have a complete picture of intelligence regarding 

the events in Benghazi to guide them. Group members 

were working under tremendous time pressure. All agree 

that they were focused on several important considerations, including ensuring that the talking points contained no information that could compromise sources and 

methods, and that nothing was said that could compromise 

the then-nascent FBI investigation by prematurely attributing responsibility for the attacks on any one person or 

group. 

The group had access to an e-mail from NCS [National 

Clandestine Service] noting that the original talking points 

statement that ‘‘we do know that Islamic extremists participated in the attack’’ implied complicity in the deaths of 

American officers. The original drafter of the talking 

points agreed that we did not know who was responsible 


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189Letter from Michael Morell, Deputy Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, to Sen. Richard M. Burr, S. 

Select Comm. on Intel., Lessons Learned From Formulation of Unclassified Talking Points re 

the Events in Benghazi, 11–12 September 2012 [hereinafter Lessons Learned] (Aug. 6, 2013) (on 

file with the Committee), at 4–5. 190OTA Dir. Testimony at 209–10. 191See Talking Points Timeline, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/Benghazi% 

20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last visited May 17, 2016). 

for the deaths and suggested that the language be changed 

to say ‘‘we know that they participated in the protests.’’ 

While the editing group did not make this change, ‘‘attacks’’ in the second bullet was changed to ‘‘violent demonstration,’’ effectively accomplishing the same purpose. 

In addition, the word ‘‘attacks’’ in the first bullet of the 

talking points was changed to ‘‘demonstrations.’’ The group 

also deleted reference in the second bullet to al-Qa’ida. The 

reasons underlying both changes are not clear, and participants in the editing session have incomplete recollections 

regarding the decision. Some have suggested that they believed the sentence was somewhat awkward and illogical 

as written, making reference to ‘‘attacks’’ ‘‘evolving into an 

assault,’’ with ‘‘attacks’’ and ‘‘assault’’ seeming to be synonyms. In addition to these changes, the group added two 

sentences about CIA product discussing threats, a statement noting that the investigation was ongoing, and several non-substantive word changes.189

The meeting did not include the OTA Director, the drafter of the 

original talking points, or any substantive experts on Benghazi. 

The OTA Director testified: 

Q: So how did we go from ‘‘attacks’’ in bullet point one at 

3:33 to ‘‘demonstrations’’ in bullet point one at 4:42? 

A: At some point in this process this entered into—it became opaque to me. At some point in this process, as I—— 

Q: I’m sorry. Were you comfortable with it occur[ing] that 

way given the fact that you were tasked with—— 

A: I didn’t know it was occurring. So when I say it was 

opaque to me, I did not know this was happening. 

At some point in this process, as I know you have seen 

from all this, there is a group from OPA, our Office of Public Affairs, our Office of Congressional Affairs, and others, 

took the talking points and made changes to them. And I 

was not consulted on those changes. So I cannot tell you 

how some of these changes took place. I was not involved. 

I was not consulted beforehand.190

That change in the first bullet point—from ‘‘attacks’’ to ‘‘demonstrations’’—also survived Morell’s extensive edits and was in the 

final version of the talking points.191

Around this same time, Morell first learned about the existence 

of the talking points. He testified: 

So there was a weekly meeting on Syria, followed by our 

three-times-a-week meeting on counterterrorism. In between those two meetings, the director’s chief of staff 


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192Morell Testimony at 124–25. 193 Id. at 128–29. 194 Id. at 126–28. 

walked up to me in the director’s conference room and 

said, here, you need to see these. You need to be aware of 

this, you need to get involved in this. I said, what’s this? 

And he explained the origin of the talking points and he 

explained kind of where they were in the process. I 

skimmed the talking points, and I immediately reacted to 

the warning language [language indicating that five prior 

attacks had ococurred in Benghazi against foreign interests]. . . . 

So I say to my EA [Executive Assistant], where is this in 

the process? And he said, it’s being coordinated. I say, 

okay, I will deal with it in the morning.192

Morell testified he did not edit the talking points that evening, 

nor did he speak with anybody about them.193 Instead, Morell edited them by himself the next morning, Saturday, September 15. He 

testified: 

So I come in the next morning and my—and the next 

morning, by the way, is a deputies meeting at eight. Family day at CIA—once a year you allow families to come on 

the compound, walk around, visit offices, et cetera, et 

cetera—is at nine. 

And first thing my EA tells me is that Denis McDonough, 

then the deputy National Security Advisor, wants to talk 

about—wants to talk about the talking points in the deputies meeting, and I say, okay. I have a conversation with 

General Petraeus about the talking points, and [Petraeus’ 

Chief of Staff] was there, and I believe he would—if he 

were here, he would agree with what I’m about ready to 

tell you, that I told Director Petraeus that the talking 

points were stuck, that the State Department was objecting to the warning language, and I told him that I agreed 

that the warning language should be taken out, and the 

Director didn’t say a word to me. He didn’t tell me that he 

was going to put it in, he didn’t say, keep—keep the warning language in there, I think it’s really important. He 

didn’t say anything. 

We do our family day stuff, which includes literally hundreds of people coming through my office and shaking 

hands with me, and the whole time I’m thinking these 

talking points are sitting on my desk, actually my EA’s 

desk. 

So when the family thing is done, I go and edit the talking 

points and I literally edit them in 5, 10 minutes and I fly 

through them. And as you know, I made a bunch of 

changes, and the most significant of which is taking out 

the warning language. So that’s kind of the—that’s kind of 

the story there.194


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195Peter Baker, et al., Diplomats’ Bodies Return to U.S., and Libyan Guards Recount Deadly 

Riot, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/15/world/middleeast/ 

ambassadors-body-back-in-us-libya-guards-recount-riot.html?_r=0. 196 Chief of Station Testimony at 218. 197Morell Testimony at 106. 

New Information on September 15 

When Morell edited the talking points on the morning of September 15, new information was fresh in his mind regarding the 

Benghazi attacks. That morning saw additional information written about Benghazi. A New York Times article was published that 

morning written by Peter Baker. It read in part: 

According to a guard at the compound, the attack began 

at about 9:30 p.m., without advance warning or any peaceful protest. ‘‘I started hearing, ‘God is great! God is great!’ ’’ 

one guard said. ‘‘I thought to myself, maybe it is a passing 

funeral.’’ (All the guards spoke on the condition of anonymity for their safety) 

‘‘Attack, attack,’’ the guard said as he heard an American 

calling over his walkie-talkie as the chants came closer. 

Suddenly, there came a barrage of gunfire, explosions, and 

rocket-propelled grenades.195

The Chief of Station found this article compelling. He testified: 

Q: They told them attack or they told them fire, so I 

mean—I don’t know if you knew that at the time, but I 

mean, in reading this, it seems like some of the folks being 

interviewed here only know things that someone who was 

there would know. Did you read this—— 

A: Oh yeah, I found this compelling.196

Morell, however, did not. He testified: 

Q: Are you familiar with Peter Baker at all? 

A: Yes, I believe I have met him. 

* * * 

Q: Okay. All right. Your assessment of the New York 

Times as a media organization? 

A: My assessment of The New York Times is that, like 

any media organization, it gets a lot of things wrong. And 

my assessment of The New York Times is that its reporting and editorials are fairly biased, in my view.197

Morell then said: 

Q: So the same paragraph we were talking about on page 

two, here is the New York Times citing one guard from the 

consulate. I mean, how would you assess that in terms of 

credibility from what the guard said reported in The New 

York Times article? 

A: How would I assess it? 

Q: How would you assess it? 


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198 Id. at 109. 199 Cent. Intel. Agency, Libya: Variety of Extremists Participated in Benghazi Attacks, World 

Intelligence Review, Sept. 15, 2012 (on file with CIA, REQUEST 17–0262 to REQUEST 17– 

0265). 200 Id. 201 Id. 202 Email from Tripoli Chief of Station, Cent. Intel. Agency, to [Morell Assistant] (Sept. 15, 

2012) (on file with the CIA, REQUEST 15–0011 to REQUEST 15–0022). 

A: Michael Morell? 

Q: Yes. 

A: I wouldn’t give it great credibility. 

Q: Okay. 

A: Right? I mean, it’s a data point. It’s a data point. It’s 

one guard. You don’t know who it is. You don’t know the 

conditions under which he was talking. I mean, it’s a data 

point. I wouldn’t discount it totally, but I wouldn’t say this 

is absolute fact.198

The CIA analysts published another WIRe that morning, September 15, with a new assessment.199 This piece, co-written with 

the National Counterterrorism Center, had two main focuses: the 

extremists who participated in the Benghazi attacks, and Libyan 

authorities placing a high priority on tracking down the perpetrators of the attack.200 Similar to the September 13 WIRe two days 

earlier, the notion of a protest and the discussion of a video were 

not central—or even minor—focuses of the piece. 

The first paragraph of the September 15 WIRe contains the sentence ‘‘The level of planning and exact sequence of events leading 

to the attack remain intelligence gaps.’’ 201 This indicates the analysts did not know definitively what had transpired prior to the attacks—perhaps whether or not protests in Benghazi had occurred, 

or the motivation or level of planning for the attacks—and signaled 

to the reader that information still needed to be gleaned about 

these events. 

Morell also reviewed an email from the Chief of Station on the 

morning of September 15. That email stated in part: 

INTEL: Station notes the following information from the 

past 24hrs, which strengthen Station’s assessment that 

the attacks were not/not spontaneous and not/not an escalation of protests. Press reports noted that at the time of 

the attack, circa 2130 local, guards posted at the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi and Libyans residing in the vicinity reported the absence of protests at the consulate and specific 

that the attack began without warning. A CIA officer on 

the scene noted that at approximately 2200 [10:00 p.m.], 

there was no sign of a protest at the Consulate. Libya General National Congress (GNC) President Magaryaf stated 

in an interview that the attacks were planned in advance 

by experienced individuals, most likely al-Qa’ida (AQ) and 

not former regime elements (FRE).202

Morell testified about receiving this email: 


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203Morell Testimony at 146–47. 204 Id. at 150. 205 Email from Chief of Staff to Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, to Michael Morell, Deputy Dir., Cent. 

Intel. Agency (Sept. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Dir. COS Email] (on file with the CIA, (REQUEST 

1–002167). 206Morell Testimony at 144. 207Dir. COS Email, supra note 205. 

I go through it, I read this, right, and the line in there 

about, we don’t think this was a protest, right, jumps out 

at me. Why did it jump out at me? Because the analysts 

believed there was a protest. So here I have my analysts 

saying there was a protest, and I’ve got my Chief of Station, a guy I’ve got a lot of confidence in, right, telling me 

there was no protest. 

The other thing that jumped out at me were that the reasons he gave . . . why he thinks there was no protest, the 

first is that there were press reports saying no protest, but 

what goes through my mind, right, is, look, I know that 

there’s press reports that say there were protests. 

Okay? . . . 

And then the next reason he gives is that a CIA officer on 

the scene noted that at approximately 2200, there was no 

sign of a protest at the consulate. And what goes through 

my mind then is, well, you know what, that’s—2200 is 20 

minutes after the attack started, right? Maybe everybody 

dispersed by then. What I react to now is that they didn’t 

get there at 2200. They got to the corner, they got to the 

corner of the street that the TMF [Benghazi Mission compound] was on at about 10 minutes after 10:00. They 

didn’t even—they didn’t get to the TM—to the front of the 

TMF itself until 2240, an hour after the attack started. So 

not compelling at all, right? 203

Morell also compared the language in this email from the Chief 

of Station to the language in the email the Chief of Station sent 

the day before. 

Q: So [the September 15 email] is stronger than the assessment given by the Chief of Station a day earlier? 

A: I certainly remember it that way.204

Morell likely reviewed another piece of intelligence the morning 

of September 15 titled ‘‘Observations from the 11–12 September, 

2012 Attacks Against the U.S. Consulate and a Separate Facility 

in Benghazi, Libya.’’ 205 Morell received this piece of intelligence in 

an email at 8:50 a.m. and testified that he ‘‘almost certainly would 

not have not read an email from the chief of staff [of the CIA].’’ 206

This email also noted there were ‘‘no signs of a protest’’ at 10:00 

p.m. in Benghazi—less than 20 minutes after the attacks began— 

according to a CIA officer at the scene.207

It was with this information fresh in his mind—the two September 15 emails and the September 15 WIRe—along with the 

September 13 WIRe and the September 14 email from the Chief of 

Station, that Morell edited the talking points. At the time he edited 

the talking points, he had seen at least two reports from the Chief 


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208Morell Testimony at 14. 209 Id. at 152–53. 210See, e.g., email from Dir., Office of Terrorism Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, to [NE Division] (Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with the CIA, REQUEST 17–0443 to 17–0444). 

of Station—and possibly more—indicating, in increasingly forceful 

language, that no protests had taken place. The analysts had not 

seen these emails. Morell therefore was the only person who had 

both the analytic assessments about Benghazi in addition to multiple emails from the Chief of Station—somebody Morell had 

worked closely with during the Arab Spring and recognized as an 

‘‘outstanding intelligence officer.’’ 208

It was incumbent on Morell to take all of this information at his 

disposal into account when he edited the talking points. Morell, a 

former intelligence analyst who rose through the ranks analyzing 

disparate information and formulating assessments, disagreed. He 

testified: 

A: It’s not my job, it’s not my job to be the analyst, right? 

It’s not my job to take all this information and come to an 

analytic conclusion. That’s the job of the analysts. So when 

I—look, and had I done that, had I played analyst, right, 

and started editing the talking points and started changing them to reflect what the COS said, the analysts would 

have protested, because they—at that moment, they still 

believed that there had been a protest. So for me to take 

it out because the COS said there wasn’t one would have 

gotten a reaction from the analysts. They would have seen 

me as politicizing analysis, all right? 

Q: How would that have politicized the analysis, the fact 

that you’re—— 

A: They would have seen it that way. 

Q: But you’re taking judgments from somebody that you 

had worked with very closely, somebody that you had 

deemed an exemplary intelligence officer. 

A: Look, managers at CIA don’t do analysis. When they 

are perceived to be doing the analysis, the analysts go 

nuts, right? Bob Gates was accused of that, other senior officials at CIA have been accused of that. Analysts go nuts 

when they think that managers are doing the analysis 

themselves, particularly when they disagree with the analysis. So the last thing I was going to do was change the 

analysts’ analysis, right? 209

Morell was not, however, creating an analytic assessment. Morell 

was editing talking points that would be used for public consumption. The process—and the product—is an inherently different one 

from internal CIA processes for formulating assessments. The analysts were not involved in the talking points process—only managers were.210 The analysts did not have the same emails Morell 

did from the Chief of Station—only Morell had those. 

Talking points—something the CIA rarely produces—are different from analytic assessments, which the CIA produces every 

day. Petraeus acknowledged this when he testified: 


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211Testimony of David Petraeus, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 62 (Jan. 6, 2016) (on file 

with the Committee). 212Testimony of Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Defense, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Tr. at 107 (Jan. 8, 

2016) (on file with the Committee). 213Karen DeYoung & Anne Gearan, Susan Rice withdraws as candidate for secretary of state, 

WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/susan-ricewithdraws-as-candidate-for-secretary-of-state/2012/12/13/17ad344e-4567-11e2-8e70- 

e1993528222d_story.html. 

I mean, that was where finally once it—this was not—certainly no longer a CIA document. It wasn’t even an intelligence community document, although that rightly should 

have been, and that’s why it went to the IC referral process, but then, of course, you know, it’s going to be interagency and not everyone has got a hand in this.211

The talking points were understood to be viewed as representative of an authoritative analytical assessment. As shown, however, 

this was not the case—no analysts worked on these talking points, 

as they were created and edited only by senior CIA managers and 

other senior officials in the administration. The distinction was 

never manifested on the document or otherwise made known to 

those relying on, or making representations based on, the talking 

points. 

No process was in place to create the talking points, and no analysis was required to create them. The only expectation was to 

produce accurate information to Congress for them to share with 

the American people. That being the case, Morell—the only person 

with the complete universe of information at his disposal—could 

have edited the talking points to reflect the most up-to-date information—or at the very least to caveat the talking points with a reflection that different views existed. Morell did neither of these 

things. 

Panetta—whom Morell worked for when Panetta was Director of 

the CIA—understands this concept well. He told the Committee: 

The last lesson I would tell you is don’t use talking points 

that don’t include language that makes very clear that the 

matter is under investigation and that these results are 

only preliminary. As former chief of staff, I’ve seen talking 

points, and I can understand how trouble can result as a 

result of that. I used to review those before anybody got 

a hold of them to make sure that they reflected what we 

wanted to inform the American people about, because the 

last thing you want to do is to mislead the American people.212

THE SUNDAY TALK SHOWS 

Perhaps as much as any other subject surrounding Benghazi, the 

appearance by Ambassador Rice on five Sunday morning talk 

shows following the attacks has been the most politically charged. 

After all, it was the fallout from her appearances that ultimately 

caused her to withdraw her name as a candidate—perhaps the 

leading candidate—to be the next Secretary of State.213 Yet little 

is known about why she was selected by the administration to represent the United States government on the shows, what she did 

to prepare for those talk shows, what materials she reviewed, who 


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214Testimony of Susan E. Rice, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Tr. at 30 (Feb. 2, 2016) 

[hereinafter Rice Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 215See Rhodes Testimony at 65–66 (stating Sec’y Clinton and Tom Donilon were first and second choices to appear). 216 Rhodes Testimony at 65–66. 217Meet the Press transcript for March 27, 2011, NBC News (Mar. 27, 2011), http://www. 

nbcnews.com/id/42275424/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/meet-press-transcript-march/#.VzoK0_ 

krJaQ; Face the Nation March 27, 2011 Transcript, CBS News (Mar. 27, 2011), http://www. 

cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/FTN_032711.pdf;‘This Week’ Transcript: Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates 

and Donald Rumsfeld, ABC News (Mar. 27, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/weektranscript-hillary-clinton-robert-gates-donald-rumsfeld/story?id=13232096. 

she spoke with to learn information about the attacks, and most 

significantly why she said what she said. 

It was not until two days before the shows, on Friday, September 

14, when Rice learned she would be appearing on behalf of the administration.214 She was the administration’s third choice to appear on the shows—the first being the Secretary of State and the 

second being Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President.215 Rhodes was the White House official responsible for reaching out to Rice and asking her to appear. He testified: 

A: I recall reaching out to Secretary Clinton first. 

* * * 

Q: Did you get an affirmative ‘‘no’’ or did you just not hear 

back? 

A: I don’t remember hearing back. 

Q: Did you call again and redouble your ask or did you 

move on to your second draft choice? 

A: I believe I moved on because I knew that she, again, 

does not regularly appear on Sunday shows. So I don’t remember thinking that it was likely that she would want 

to appear. 

Q: And who else would you have asked after Secretary 

Clinton? 

A: I remember asking Tom Donilon, the National Security 

Advisor. 

Q: And what was his response? 

A: He did not want to appear. And he too very rarely appeared on the Sunday shows. 

Q: All right. Who was number three? 

A: I believe it was Susan Rice, is my recollection.216

Although Rhodes testified the Secretary ‘‘does not regularly appear on Sunday shows,’’ she had in fact appeared on multiple 

shows on two separate occasions within a seven month period to 

discuss Libya. On March 27, 2011—barely a week after the United 

States supported the UN in imposing a no fly zone over Libya and 

authorizing all means necessary to protect civilians—the Secretary 

appeared on Meet the Press, Face the Nation, and This Week, to 

talk about the U.S. intervention in Libya, which was being promoted as a civilian protection and humanitarian mission.217 Seven 

months later—in the immediate wake of Qadhafi’s death—she apVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00204 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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218Meet the Press transcript for October 23, 2011, NBC (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www. 

nbcnews.com/id/45000791/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/meet-press-transcript-october/#.V1cU1 

9UrJaQ., Clinton Warns Iran: U.S. Committed to Iraq, ABC’s This Week (Oct. 23, 2011), http:// 

abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/video/interview-hillary-clinton-14796369; State of the Union with 

Candy Crowley, CNN (Oct. 23, 2011), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1110/23/ 

sotu.01.html., and Clinton Talks Iraq, Libya; Sen. Graham Challenges GOP Candidates; Bachmann Focused on Iowa, FOX News Sunday (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/onair/fox-news-sunday-chris-wallace/2011/10/23/clinton-talks-iraq-libya-sen-graham-challenges-gopcandidates-bachmann-focused-iowa#p//v/1234077958001. 219Testimony of Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff to the U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

Tr. at 123 (Sept. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Mills Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 220 Rhodes Testimony at 66. 221 Id. 222 Id. 223 Rice Testimony at 107–08. 

peared on Meet the Press, This Week, State of the Union, and 

FoxNews Sunday to talk about Qadhafi’s death and the path forward in Libya.218

Mills testified the decision not to appear on the Sunday shows 

was the Secretary’s: 

Q: Since the Secretary didn’t appear, who made the decision that she wasn’t going to appear? 

A: Well, she would always decide what she would do, if 

she was going to go on a show or not go on a show. 

Q: Okay. Were there recommendations that she took from 

you and others, such as Philippe Reines, Jake Sullivan, 

others? 

A: No. Candidly, the Secretary was so focused on what 

had happened to our team and what was happening in the 

region that I don’t know that there was a moment’s 

thought about it. She didn’t often go on the shows. And 

she was, understandably, very concerned about how we 

support our teams and the losses that we had incurred.219

When Rhodes learned the Secretary would not represent the administration on the talk shows, he then asked Donilon to appear.220 He also declined.221 Rice—Rhodes’ third choice for the 

task—accepted.222 In doing so, the administration selected someone 

to talk to the American people about the Benghazi attacks who was 

neither involved in the security of any U.S. facilities in Benghazi 

nor involved in any way with the operational response to the attacks. In fact, the administration selected an individual who did 

not even know there was a CIA presence in Benghazi, let alone the 

fact that two Americans had died there.223 She testified: 

Q: Did you learn between September 11 and September 16 

that were was a CIA presence in Benghazi? 

A: I think—no. I think I learned subsequently. 

* * * 

Q: So nobody told you between the dates of September 11 

and September 16 that two of the four Americans who 

were killed who were providing security actually worked 

for the CIA and not the State Department? 

A: Not that I recall. 


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224 Id. 225See Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:43 P.M.) 

(on file with the Committee, C05561948) (‘‘Today, you tweeted 7 times on the anniversary of 

the September 11 attacks, generating more than 600 retweets. By this measure, your twitter 

account had a big day—your second or third biggest since the start of the summer—and your 

volunteering pics got a few nice responses . . .’’). 226 Email from Special Ass’t to the Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Hillary R. Clinton 

(‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 14, 2012, 7:29 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0045306–SCB0045307). 227 Rice Testimony at 28; Mills Testimony at 138. 228 Rice Testimony at 28. 229 Rice Testimony at 26. 230 Id. 

Q: All right. 

Q: And you learned that subsequently? 

A: To the best of my recollection, I learned it subsequently.224

In selecting Rice to appear on the Sunday talk shows, Rhodes 

chose an individual with limited knowledge of, and presumably 

limited participation in, the administration’s reponse to the 

Benghazi attacks. Instead, while the attacks were happening, Rice 

was receiving—apparently in response to an email chain about the 

attack on the Benghazi Mission compound—a detailed update from 

staff about the number of retweets her Twitter account had generated.225

How Rice Prepped for the Shows 

On Friday, September 14, 2012, the Secretary’s calendar included a meeting with Rice.226 Both Rice and Mills testified they 

believed that meeting took place, even though neither had a specific recollection of it.227 That Friday meeting was a standing meeting between the Secretary and Rice that would take place when 

Rice was in Washington. 

Despite having no specific recollection of the meeting, Rice is confident she did not discuss the Sunday shows with the Secretary at 

the meeting.228 This is because Rice first learned of her possible 

appearance on the Sunday shows in the early afternoon of September 14, after the scheduled meeting. She testified: 

I received a phone call as I was in my car on my way to 

Andrews for the ceremony receiving our fallen colleagues. 

And in that phone call from Ben [Rhodes], I was asked 

whether it would be possible, if Secretary Clinton were unable to appear on the shows, if I could appear on the 

shows. It was a contingency question at the time. And I 

said that, you know, I had other plans for the weekend 

and that it would not be my preference but if they needed 

me and there was not an alternative that I would be willing to do it.229

Both the Secretary and Rice attended the return of remains ceremony at Andrews Air Force Base that afternoon, and later that 

day, Friday September 14, Rhodes called Rice back to inform her 

she needed to do the Sunday shows.230

Ambassador Rice did not begin preparing for the shows until the 

following day, Saturday September 15. Her staff, led by Erin 


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231Testimony of Erin Pelton, Dir. of Commc’cs and Spokesperson, U.S. Mission to the U.N., 

Tr. at 44 (Feb. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Pelton Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 232 Rice Testimony at 31. 233Pelton Testimony at 45. 234 Id. 

Pelton, Communications Director and Spokesperson, prepared a 

book of briefing materials for Rice.231 Rice testified she began reviewing these briefing materials on Saturday: 

Q: So let’s go forward to—did you do anything after speaking to Mr. Rhodes on Friday night to begin preparing? 

A: No. 

Q: What did you do the next morning to begin preparing? 

A: I reviewed briefing materials. 

Q: What briefing materials? Would that just be the same 

daily briefing materials that you received in the ordinary 

course, or was this different material? 

A: It was both. I received my daily intelligence briefing on 

Saturday morning, and I also began reviewing a briefing 

book that had been prepared by my staff for—in preparation for the Sunday shows.232

These briefing materials contained little to no information about 

the Benghazi attacks. Pelton testified that in gathering briefing 

materials for the Sunday shows she explicitly did not focus on 

Benghazi, anticipating materials pertaining to Benghazi would 

come at a later time. She said: 

Q: In your list of areas where you were attempting to collect the latest information, you left Benghazi out. Was that 

intentional, or were you just giving me some examples? 

A: I don’t recall preparing information about Benghazi. 

What I do recall is understanding that we would have access to talking points that would be provided by the intelligence community that were unclassified and consistent 

with our latest understanding of what had transpired in 

Benghazi.233

Pelton also testified she believed she would be receiving talking 

points regarding Benghazi that would not require her to seek out 

briefing materials about Benghazi on her own: 

Well, I recall that in the process of preparing Ambassador 

Rice between Friday and Saturday, September 14th and 

15th, that I was not focused on Benghazi because I was 

going to receive talking points that were appropriate for 

public use by the intelligence community. I don’t remember how I came to know that I was going to get those materials.234

While Pelton did not include any information specific to Benghazi 

in the briefing book, Rice recalled other material that was in the 

briefing book. She testified: 


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235 Rice Testimony at 33. 236 Rhodes Memo, supra note 3. 237Pelton Testimony at 42. 238 Rhodes Memo, supra note 3. 239See id. 240 Id. 

Q: As best you can, do you recall what was in that briefing 

book that your staff provided? 

A: I recall it included statements that other senior administration officials had made, including the President and 

the Secretary. I recall it including background Q&A and 

top-line themes covering the wide range of issues that we 

anticipated would come up on the shows: the protests that 

occurred all around the world that week; obviously, also 

what happened in Benghazi. 

And, also, because it was one week before the opening of 

the U.N. General Assembly in New York and Iran was expected to be a prominent issue, and Prime Minister 

Netanyahu’s visit also a prominent issue, I recall preparing for that discussion as well.235

The ‘‘background Q&A’’ and ‘‘top line themes’’ came from 

Rhodes.236 Pelton testified about how this information came about: 

A: I don’t recall all the specifics of our conversation [with 

Ben Rhodes]. However, I do recall at one point asking him 

to provide, for lack of a better term, a memo regarding the 

objectives of the Sunday show appearances. 

Q: How did he respond to you? 

A: He said he would write it. 

Q: And did he eventually deliver that to you? 

A: Yes.237

Rhodes delivered this memo at 8:09 p.m. on the evening of September 14 in an email with the subject ‘‘RE: PREP CALL with 

Susan: Saturday at 4:00 pm ET.’’ 238 The memo contained four bullet points under ‘‘Goals,’’ six bullet points under ‘‘Top-lines,’’ and 

contained five questions and suggested answers regarding the Arab 

Spring, protests, and Benghazi, and an additional four questions 

and suggested answers regarding Israel and Iran.239

The four bullet points under the ‘‘Goals’’ section of the memo 

were the following: 

To convey that the United States is doing everything that 

we can to protect our people and facilities abroad; 

To underscore that these protests are rooted in an Internet 

video, and not a broader failure of policy; 

To show that we will be resolute in bringing people who 

harm Americans to justice, and standing steadfast through 

these protests; 

To reinforce the President and Administration’s strength 

and steadiness in dealing with difficult challenges.240


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The second point was one of the most explicit directions from a 

senior administration official about the intent of the 

adminstration’s communications strategy. The Chairman had the 

following exchange with Rhodes about these bullet points during 

Rhodes’ testimony to the Committee: 

Q: How about number two? They are not numbered, but 

let’s just go second bullet, okay? ‘‘To underscore that these 

protests are rooted in an Internet video, and not a broader 

failure of policy.’’ What policy were you worried about 

being considered a failure? 

A: My recollection over the course of that week is that we 

were getting questions about whether this represented a 

failure of our policy in the Middle East and in response to 

the Arab Spring. 

Q: And you wanted to underscore the point that it wasn’t 

any of that, it was just a video. 

A: We were anticipating getting those questions, and we 

wanted to convey that, again, the protests were rooted in 

this video. 

Q: Were there other options other than just those two, a 

wholesale failure of the administration’s policy or an Internet video? Was there something else? Those are your only 

two options? 

A: Again, my recollection is that this reflects the way in 

which we were getting questions over the course of the 

week is it’s a failure of policy. And we were at the same 

time seeking to deal with the ongoing fallout from the 

video. So those were the factors in play. 

Q: I’m with you on wanting to explain to folks that it 

wasn’t a failure of policy. You essentially gave yourself two 

choices: an Internet video or a broader failure of policy. 

And my question is, were those your only two options? 

A: Again, that’s what I recall being the subject of discussion over the course of that week in terms of the questions 

we were being asked. 

Q: Well, with respect to Benghazi, it certainly would 

have—it’s possible that it was not just those two options, 

right? 

A: I’m not sure I understand the question. 

Q: With respect to what happened in Benghazi, you’re not 

limiting us to just those two options, right, a failure of policy or an Internet video? 

A: Again, I believe in this specific bullet I’m referring to 

the ongoing protests that are taking place across the Middle East which were very much still going forward on that 

Friday. 

Q: Right. But you agree—you knew Benghazi was going to 

come up when Ambassador Rice was going on the five Sunday talk shows? 


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A: Yes. 

Q: We haven’t had an ambassador killed since when? 

A: It had been a long time. I don’t remember specifically. 

Q: So you knew that that was coming up? 

A: I knew that was going to be one of the topics. 

Q: Right. And your third bullet, which isn’t numbered, but 

it’s number three, ‘‘To show that we will be resolute in 

bringing people who harm Americans to justice.’’ Can you 

think of a country where Americans were harmed other 

than Libya that she might have been asked about? 

A: That would principally, I believe, refer to Libya. 

Q: Okay. So you concede that the third item does apply to 

Libya. Let’s go back to the second one. How about the second one? Are we to have drawn a contrast between the second bullet and the third bullet, or are they all interrelated? 

A: Again, my recollection is she is going on to talk about 

several different issues: the attacks in Benghazi, the ongoing protests that were taking place across the Middle East, 

and issues related to Iran and Israel. And so these points 

refer to different elements of the topic. 

Q: Well, at the time, what did you think was the impetus 

for the attack in Benghazi? 

A: I did not have a judgment of my own at the time. I was 

going to rely on the information provided by the intelligence community. 

Q: Did the intelligence community mention an Internet 

video to you? 

A: The intelligence community at this point had suggested 

that it was an event that was motivated in part by the 

protests in Cairo. 

Q: That was a great answer to a question I didn’t ask. Did 

they mention the video? 

A: No, what I’m saying is, my recollection is they at that 

point had said that insofar as there was any connection it 

was more to the events in Cairo being a motivating factor 

for individuals. 

Q: Right. So you are preparing the Ambassador to go on 

five Sunday talk shows to talk about what you know is 

going to involve Benghazi and you don’t want her to be 

stuck with the option of a failure of your policy. So you 

give the option of the Internet video. And my question is, 

who in the intelligence community told you that the attacks in Benghazi were linked to the video? 

A: Again, I prepared these points on a Friday in which 

there were violent protests across the Middle East because 

of the video, a violent breach of our facility in Tunis, a violent breach of our facility at Khartoum, violence against an 


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241 Rhodes Testimony at 75–80. 242 Rhodes Memo, supra note 3. 

American restaurant in Lebanon, at the very least. So I 

very much was focused on the fact that there were ongoing 

protests, and one of the subjects that she was going to be 

asked about were those protests. So insofar as I’m referring to protests in the video, I’m referring to the many protests that were continuing to take place over the course of 

that week in response to the video. 

Q: So is it your testimony that the second bullet and the 

third bullet are totally unrelated? 

A: They’re referring to different elements of what she’s 

going to have to talk about on the Sunday shows. 

Q: So bullet number two was not about Libya or Benghazi 

at all. 

A: It was not intended to assign responsibility for 

Benghazi. 

Q: But yet you jump in the very next bullet to those who 

harm Americans. Can you see how someone reading that 

memo might be vexed? 

A: Well, again, these are several statements of principle 

up top that I think speak to, again, all—in different parts 

of the issues that she is going to have to address. And then 

you can see in the actual contents how we intended to respond to those individual questions and instances.241

The fact Rhodes concedes the third bullet point references Libya 

is important. The bullet point immediately prior references the 

video, allowing for easy connection and conflation of the video and 

the Benghazi attacks.242 This occurred in public statements by the 

administration prior to Rhodes’ memo, and, having seen this memo, 

Rice appeared to again connect the video and Benghazi the next 

day when she appeared on the talk shows. 

While this connection between the two events may have favored 

a particular narrative, even Rhodes admitted that he was not 

aware of any intelligence that existed to directly link the video to 

the attacks. He testified: 

A: And, again, my recollection of any connection to the 

video was indirect through the fact that the protests in 

Cairo may have been a motivating factor for the events in 

Benghazi. 

Q: Okay. So just to be clear, so there was no direct connection made between the video and the attacks in Benghazi 

from the intelligence community that you’re aware of at 

that time? 

A: That’s my recollection. I recall that there were public 

reports of protests that were—that would have been included in, you know, the information we were receiving. 

Q: But you certainly weren’t relying on those public reports, were you? 


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243 Rhodes Testimony at 106–07. 244 Rhodes Memo, supra note 3. 245 Rice Testimony at 38. 246Testimony of Rexon Y. Ryu, Deputy to the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Tr. at 83 (Aug. 

25, 2015) (on file with the Committee) [hereinafter Ryu Testimony]. 247 Rice Testimony at 39. 248WASH. SPEAKERS BUREAU, https://www.washingtonspeakers.com/speakers/biography.cfm? 

SpeakerID=6495. 249 Rhodes Testimony at 111. 250 Rice Testimony at 40. 251See, e.g. Ryu Testimony at 73–74. 252 U.S. launching apparent terrorist hunt in Libya, CBS NEWS (Oct. 18, 2012), http:// 

www.cbsnews.com/news/us-launching-apparent-terrorist-hunt-in-libya. 

A: We were relying on the intelligence community’s assessment, and the intelligence community’s assessment 

was that these were events that were motivated in part by 

the protests in Cairo.243

At 4:00 p.m. on Saturday September 15, 2012, a conference call 

was convened with Rice to discuss her appearance on the Sunday 

shows the following morning.244 Rice participated in this conference call from Columbus, Ohio, where she was spending the 

day.245 Rexon Ryu, Deputy to the U.S. Permanent Representative 

to the United Nations, State Department, testified there were no 

State Department people on the call: 

Q: Okay. Do you recall—so you said Ben Rhodes. Were 

there any individuals, other than the USUN individual, 

were there any other people from the State Department 

that participated in that call? 

A: There were no State Department people. 

Q: Do you recall if there were additional individuals from 

the White House that participated? 

A: Yes, there were.246

Rice testified David Plouffe, Senior Advisor to the President, was 

on the call.247 Plouffe had previously served as the campaign manager for the President’s 2008 presidential campaign.248 While 

Rhodes testified Plouffe would ‘‘normally’’ appear on the Sunday 

show prep calls,249 Rice testified she did not recall him being on 

prior calls and did not understand why he was on the call in this 

instance.250

No witness interviewed by the Committee was able to specifically 

identify State Department individuals on the call aside from Rice’s 

staff.251 In addition, nobody from the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], Department of Defense, or Central Intelligence Agency 

participated in the call, which apparently consisted of just a small 

circle of Rice’s advisors and communications staffers from the 

White House. 

At the time of her appearance on the talk shows, it had been announced the FBI would take the lead on the investigation into finding out what had occurred.252 The Department of Defense, along 

with White House operators, had been involved in sending troops 

towards Libya while the attacks were ongoing, and analysts from 

the Central Intelligence Agency had taken the lead on post-attack 

analysis of intelligence. The State Department had its compound in 

Benghazi attacked and, as such, it was the principal source of inVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00212 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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253 Rice Testimony at 39–40; Rhodes Testimony at 76–78. 254 Rice Testimony at 42. 

formation from eyewitnesses to the attack. The fact that no individuals from either the Defense Department or White House operators 

participated in the Saturday prep call therefore limited the information pertaining to Benghazi provided to Rice. Moreover, it does 

not appear Rice sought out any information about the attacks or 

worked to ensure that she had a full understanding of the events 

outside of the talking points she was provided. 

In addition, multiple witnesses testified Benghazi was barely 

mentioned on the prep call. This inattention is consistent with the 

lack of information pertaining to Benghazi in the briefing materials. Instead, Rhodes commented on the call that the CIA was preparing unclassified talking points pertaining to Benghazi, with the 

understanding that the talking points would be shared with Rice 

when they were completed.253 Rice testified: 

A: I don’t recall us talking about the CIA talking points. 

I recall being reminded that they were forthcoming and 

that we would be relying on them because they had been 

prepared for Members of Congress and they were our best 

distillation of what we knew at the time. 

Q: Okay. Who told you that? 

A: I’m not certain, but I believe it was Ben. And so we 

didn’t talk about Benghazi, in fact, on the phone call, as 

I remember. We just said that those were the points. 

Q: Let’s go into that a little bit more. If I understood you 

correctly, you said during this prep call for the Sunday 

talk shows you did not talk about the attacks in Benghazi 

at all. Is that correct? 

A: In any depth. I don’t have any recollection of talking 

about them in any depth.254

Rice also testified it was her understanding these talking points 

would be vetted and cleared by the CIA—in other words, manifesting the subtext the talking points represented an authoritative 

product. 

A: As I said, to the best of my recollection, it was Mr. 

Rhodes on the phone. 

Q: And to the best of your recollection, what did he—how 

did he characterize the CIA talking points? 

A: As being carefully vetted and cleared, drafted by the 

CIA, and provided—produced for the purpose of being provided to Members of Congress and, thus, what we would 

also utilize. 

Q: So, as far as you were concerned or as far as you understood, the CIA talking points represented the best information about the attacks in Benghazi at the time. 

A: Yes. That’s how I—that’s what I understood them to be, 

and that’s, in fact, what I knew them to be, because they 


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255 Rice Testimony at 45–46. 256 Rice Testimony at 157. 257September 13 WIRe, supra note 123 (emphasis added). 258Talking Points Timeline, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/ 

Benghazi%20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (emphasis added). 

mirrored very precisely the intelligence that I had also received.255

No CIA witness the Committee interviewed had any knowledge 

the HPSCI talking points were going to be shared with Rice to be 

used on the Sunday talk shows. 

As discussed above, Rice, the individual selected by the White 

House to represent the administration on the Sunday talk shows 

following the deaths of Ambassador Chris Stevens—the first U.S. 

Ambassador to be killed in the field since 1979—Sean Smith, Glen 

Doherty, and Tyrone Woods, was not a central figure in the creation or management of the Benghazi compound, or in the government’s response to the attacks. She was unaware at the time the 

CIA had a presence there and essentially relied on just three bullet 

points of material—that none of the authors of the bullet points 

knew would be provided to her—to discuss the Benghazi attacks on 

the Sunday talk shows. 

Rice took umbrage when she was confronted with the suggestion 

that her role was to simply parrot the talking points provided to 

her, testifying: 

A: Sir, as I said earlier, I did not have any knowledge of 

how these talking points were edited. 

* * * 

Q: I understand. So you were just the spokesman. You 

had been given something, and they told you: Go on out 

there and do your duty and repeat what you were provided. 

A: No sir. I was also a member of the President’s Cabinet 

and the National Security Council. I was a recipient of the 

most refined intelligence products. And I satisfied myself 

that what I had been asked to say in the unclassified 

points were consistent with what I had received in intelligence channels. Otherwise, I wouldn’t have said it.256

While Rice is mostly correct in noting the unclassified talking 

points were consistent with what she had received through intelligence channels, there was one major difference, as discussed 

above. What Rice received through intelligence channels said ‘‘The 

currently available information suggests that the attacks in 

Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the U.S. 

diplomatic post in Benghazi and subsequently its annex.’’ 257 Yet 

the unclassified talking points said ‘‘The currently available information suggests that the demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and 

evolved into a direct assault against the U.S. diplomatic post in 

Benghazi and subsequently its annex.’’ 258 That change—from ‘‘atVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00214 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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259 Rice Testimony at 50. 

tacks’’ to ‘‘demonstrations’’—significantly altered the meaning of 

the entire sentence. 

In her interview before the Committee, Rice maintained the 

claim that the talking points were similar to the analysis. In fact 

she had reviewed the two documents side by side ‘‘very recently.’’ 259 She testified: 

Q: And do you know how closely those products mirrored 

that bullet point? 

A: Virtually identical but not verbatim. 

Q: Okay. And do you know, if it was not verbatim, what 

the differences were between what you read—— 

A: I can’t tell you precisely, but if you—I do recall looking 

at them side-by-side and being comfortable that they 

were—well, at the time, I didn’t look at them side-by-side, 

but I knew from having seen intelligence as early as that 

previous morning, Saturday morning, that this was very 

consistent with our latest information. 

Q: And you have since looked at them side-by-side? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And you’re still comfortable that what was in the intelligence is virtually identical to what’s in that bullet point? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And do you recall how recently you looked at them 

side-by-side? 

A: Very recently. 

* * * 

Q: Sure. My question is you said that you looked at them 

recently side-by-side, correct? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And you were comfortable that what was in the finished intelligence is reflected here in this bullet point. 

A: Yes. 

Q: Okay. And did you recognize any differences between, 

looking at them side-by-side, what you saw in the intelligence versus what’s in the bullet point? 

A: Okay. So let me be precise. What’s in this bullet point 

closely mirrored a similar paragraph in the finished intelligence product that I received at the same time. I’m not 

saying this is the sum total of what I saw. 

Q: Sure. And you say it closely resembled or closely mirrored. My question is, what are the differences between 

what you reviewed and what’s in here? 

A: I don’t recall any substantive differences. 

Q: And you looked at this recently? 


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260 Id. at 49–51. 261Krishnadev Calamur, Susan Rice Says Benghazi Claims Were Based On Information From 

Intelligence, NPR (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/11/21/165686269/ 

susan-rice-says-benghazi-claims-were-based-on-information-from-intelligence. 262 Id. (‘‘When discussing the attacks against our facilities in Benghazi, I relied solely and 

squarely on the information provided to me by the intelligence community.’’). 

A: Yes.260

Despite the precision by Rice and the fact she had compared the 

documents side by side very recently, ‘‘attacks’’ and ‘‘demonstrations’’ are fundamentally different words with fundamentally different meanings. The specific language Rice received through intelligence channels relating to the attacks here was accurate, and 

what she read from the talking points based on demonstrations 

was not. The fact she testified she did not recall any substantive 

differences does not mean no substantive differences existed. 

What Rice Said on the Shows 

Despite Rice’s limited knowledge about the Benghazi attacks 

when she appeared on the Sunday talk shows, some of her comments were conclusory, some were based neither in evidence nor 

fact, and some went well beyond what even the flawed talking 

points indicated. Two months after she appeared on the talk shows, 

she stated publicly: 

When discussing the attacks against our facilities in 

Benghazi, I relied solely and squarely on the information 

provided to me by the intelligence community. I made 

clear that the information was preliminary and that our 

investigations would give us the definitive answers. Everyone, particularly the intelligence community, has worked 

in good faith to provide the best assessment based on the 

information available. You know the FBI and the State 

Department’s Accountability Review Board are conducting 

investigations as we speak, and they will look into all aspects of this heinous terrorist attack to provide what will 

become the definitive accounting of what occurred.261

A close examination of what Rice actually did say on each of the 

Sunday morning shows, however, along with the Committee’s interview with her, demonstrates she in fact went well beyond ‘‘solely 

and squarely’’ relying on the information provided to her by the intelligence community.262 In addition, several aspects of her 

Benghazi remarks—conflating the video with the attack, the status 

of the FBI investigation, the number of attackers, and the amount 

of security present at the State Department compound, to name a 

few—drifted even farther from the information provided to her by 

the intelligence community. An analysis of some of Rice’s comments 

is below. 

FACE THE NATION 

Face the Nation was unlike the other four shows in that Libyan 

President Mohamed el-Magariaf appeared on the show immediately 

prior to Rice. During his interview with Bob Schieffer, Face the Nation host, el-Magariaf, who hailed from Benghazi, attended univerVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00216 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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263 Rice Testimony at 147. 

sity there, and had deep ties to the city, said there was ‘‘no doubt’’ 

the attacks were preplanned. El-Magariaf said of the attack: 

Q: Was this a long-planned attack, as far as you know? Or 

what—what do you know about that? 

A: The way these perpetrators acted and moved, I think 

we—and they’re choosing the specific date for this so-called 

demonstration, I think we have no—this leaves us with no 

doubt that this was preplanned, determined—predetermined. 

Q: And you believe that this was the work of al-Qaeda and 

you believe that it was led by foreigners. Is that—is that 

what you are telling us? 

A: It was planned—definitely, it was planned by foreigners, by people who—who entered the country a few 

months ago, and they were planning this criminal act 

since their—since their arrival. 

Schieffer also asked President el-Magariaf about the FBI traveling to Benghazi to investigate the attacks: 

Q: Will it be safe for the FBI investigators from the 

United States to come in, are you advising them to stay 

away for a while? 

A: Maybe it is better for them to stay for a—for a little 

while? For a little while, but until we—we—we—we do 

what we—we have to do ourselves. But, again, we’ll be in 

need for—for their presence to help in further investigation. And, I mean any hasty action will—I think is not welcomed. 

Rice appeared immediately after President el-Magariaf on the 

show. She testified to the Committee she heard el-Magariaf say the 

attacks were preplanned, and even though his comments did not 

align with the talking points she was given, she was unconcerned. 

She testified: 

Q: My question was, how did you react to that? 

A: I was surprised. 

Q: And what did you do? Were you concerned that he may 

have known something that you did not know? 

A: I didn’t know what he knew. I knew what we knew and 

what the intelligence community’s current best assessment 

was. And so it was my responsibility to faithfully relay 

that and not make something up on the fly based on what 

he said.263

When asked about President el-Magariaf’s comments by 

Schieffer, though, Rice actually disagreed with him. She responded: 

Q: But you do not agree with him that this was something 

that had been plotted out several months ago? 


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264 ‘‘Face the Nation’’ transcripts, September 16, 2012: Libyan Pres. Magariaf, Amb. Rice and 

Sen. McCain, CBS NEWS (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nationtranscripts-september-16-2012-libyan-pres-magariaf-amb-rice-and-sen-mccain. 265September 13 WIRe, supra note 123; Rice Testimony at 42. 266Talking Points Timeline, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/ 

Benghazi%20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last visited May 17, 2016). 267 Hicks Testimony at 232. 

A: We do not—we do not have information at present that 

leads us to conclude that this was premeditated or 

preplanned. 

Q: Do you agree or disagree with him that al-Qaeda had 

some part in this? 

A: Well, we’ll have to find that out. I mean I think it’s 

clear that there were extremist elements that joined in 

and escalated the violence. Whether they were al-Qaeda 

affiliates, whether they were Libyan-based extremists or 

al-Qaeda itself I think is one of the things we’ll have to determine.264

Notwithstanding intelligence Rice had seen indicating that alQaeda extremists were involved in the attacks 265—and that the 

first draft of the HPSCI talking points also noted this fact 266—the 

fallout of Rice’s disagreement with President el-Magariaf was large. 

According to Hicks, the top American official in Libya at the time, 

Rice’s comments prevented the FBI from going to Benghazi for a 

number of weeks. He testified: 

Q: Do you think those statements had an effect going forward? What difference did those statements make? 

A: I think that they affected cooperation with the Libyans. 

I mean, I have heard from a friend who had dinner with 

President Magariaf in New York City that he was still 

angry at Ambassador Rice well after the incident. 

You know, the Libyan Government doesn’t have a deep 

bench. President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, 

Minister. After that, nah, not much there. Some ministries, yeah, you can go—it goes three deep, it goes down 

three layers. Most ministries it’s just the Minister. So if 

the President of the country isn’t behind something, it’s 

going to be pretty hard to make it happen. 

And I firmly believe that the reason it took us so long to 

get the FBI to Benghazi is because of those Sunday talk 

shows. And, you know, frankly, we never, ever had official 

approval from the Libyan Government to send the FBI to 

Benghazi. We stitched together a series of lower-level 

agreements to support from relevant groups, and we sat 

around in the meeting and we said, well, guys, this is as 

good as it gets in Libya. And we looked at the legat [legal 

attache ́] and said, call it in, this is your shot. Call it in to 

D.C. and see if they’re ready—if they’re willing to send a 

team. And that’s how—that’s how the FBI got to 

Benghazi.267


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268 ‘‘Face the Nation’’ transcripts, September 16, 2012: Libyan Pres. Magariaf, Amb. Rice and 

Sen. McCain, CBS NEWS (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nationtranscripts-september-16-2012-libyan-pres-magariaf-amb-rice-and-sen-mccain. 269Talking Points Timeline, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/ 

Benghazi%20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last visited May 17, 2016). 270See, e.g., Krishnadev Calamur, Susan Rice Says Benghazi Claims Were Based On Information From Intelligence, NPR (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/11/21/ 

165686269/susan-rice-says-benghazi-claims-were-based-on-information-from-intelligence. 

In her interview with Bob Schieffer, Rice also discussed the FBI 

investigation. She said: 

Q: Madam Ambassador, he says this is something that 

has been in the planning stages for months. I understand 

you have been saying that you think it was spontaneous? 

Are we not on the same page here? 

A: Bob, let me tell you what we understand to be the assessment at present. First of all, very importantly, as you 

discussed with the President, there is an investigation that 

the United States government will launch led by the FBI, 

that has begun and—— 

Q: (overlapping) But they are not there. 

A: They are not on the ground yet, but they have already 

begun looking at all sorts of evidence of—of various sorts 

already available to them and to us. And they will get on 

the ground and continue the investigation. So we’ll want 

to see the results of that investigation to draw any definitive conclusions. But based on the best information we 

have to date, what our assessment is as of the present is 

in fact what began spontaneously in Benghazi as a reaction to what had transpired some hours earlier in Cairo 

where, of course, as you know, there was a violent protest 

outside of our embassy—— 

In her comments Rice states the FBI has ‘‘already begun looking 

at all sorts of evidence.’’ 268 Yet nobody from the FBI or Justice Department was on the preparation call with her the day before the 

shows, and she did not know what evidence the FBI had already 

‘‘begun’’ reviewing, despite her claim that the FBI was doing so. In 

addition, she did not rely on the HPSCI talking points here when 

discussing the FBI investigation, as the talking points indicated 

only ‘‘the investigation is ongoing;’’ 269 earlier she claimed she had 

solely relied on those points when talking about Benghazi.270 The 

Chairman had the following exchange with her about this topic: 

Q: If you go back when the issue was first broached. 

‘‘Well, Bob, let me tell you what we understand to be the 

assessment at present. First of all, very importantly, as 

you discussed with the president, there is an investigation 

that the United States government will launch, led by the 

FBI that has begun.’’ Then your next comment is, ‘‘They 

are not on the ground yet but they have already begun 

looking at all sorts of evidence.’’ What were they looking 

at that you knew about? 

A: I didn’t know specifically what evidence, but I knew 

that the investigation had begun and that they would do 


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as they customarily do, try to gather as much evidence as 

possible. 

Q: They do customarily try to do that; you are correct. But 

your statement was, ‘‘They have already begun looking at 

all sorts of evidence.’’ Who told you that? 

A: I don’t recall exactly who told me that. 

Q: Do you know when you would have been told that? 

A: I don’t know exactly when but sometime between September 11th and September 16th. 

Q: And there was no one from law enforcement on the 4 

p.m. call? 

A: No, not to my knowledge. 

Q: Do you recall talking to anyone with the Bureau [FBI] 

before you went on the Sunday morning talk shows? 

A: No. 

Q: Well, this is what I’m trying to reconcile. If you didn’t 

talk to anyone with the FBI, who would have told you that 

they had all sorts of evidence? 

A: I didn’t say they had—‘‘they have begun looking at all 

sorts of evidence.’’ I was aware, as a senior U.S. policymaker, that we had announced there was an FBI investigation already underway and that that investigation 

would involve gathering and looking at all sorts of evidence. 

Q: All right. But you go on to say ‘‘already available to 

them and to us.’’ What evidence was already available to 

you? 

A: To me personally, none. 

Q: Then why would you have said ‘‘available to them and 

to us’’? 

A: I meant to the administration. 

Q: Do you know what was available to the administration? 

A: Not precisely at this point. 

Q: Not at this point or not at the point that you—— 

A: At the time. 

Q: You did not know at the time what evidence was available to the administration. 

A: That’s correct. 

Q: Then why would you say ‘‘already available to them 

and to us’’? 

A: Because I knew that we had already begun the process 

of gathering information, both from an intelligence side as 

well as from the law enforcement side. 

Q: All right. I’m with you on the intelligence side, but 

this—but I can’t find an interview that you conducted 


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271 Rice Testimony at 96–98. 

where you did not use ‘‘the FBI.’’ And what I’m trying to 

understand is what was the source of your information 

from the FBI. 

A: I didn’t have any specific information from the FBI. I 

was aware of and what I was trying to convey is that the 

FBI was in the process of beginning its investigation. 

Q: So if you were to say they already had begun looking 

at all sorts of evidence of various sorts already available 

to them and to us, in fact, you were not available—you 

were not aware of what evidence they had. 

A: I knew they were looking at intelligence among other 

sources of evidence.271

Rice used the imprimatur of the FBI as a highly respected law 

enforcement agency and then conflated the fact they had begun an 

investigation with her statement the Bureau was ‘‘already looking 

at all sorts of evidence.’’ In reality, Rice had no idea what the FBI 

was doing and where the investigation stood. The FBI would ultimately secure possession of the surveillance video from cameras on 

the Benghazi compound over a week later, but that video was not 

yet available to the Bureau—or the U.S. government—and once it 

became available, it impeached many aspects of the administration’s initial assessment about the attacks. 

Other evidence available to the Bureau at the time of Rice’s Sunday morning talk show appearances would have included eyewitness accounts from both State Department and CIA witnesses 

who survived the attacks. The administration either did not avail 

itself of these eyewitness accounts or completely ignored what 

these witnesses had to say. These accounts would contradict most 

of the administration’s initial public statements about both the existence of a protest and a link between the attacks in Benghazi and 

an internet video. 

Rice invoked the name of a premiere law enforcement agency, indicated all sorts of evidence was available to them and then proceeded to recite talking points that would later be utterly impeached by the information that was gathered by the Bureau. Currently, the FBI’s investigative position is reflected in both the 

charging instrument in U.S. v. Ahmed Abu Khattalah as well as 

various pre-trial motions. Instead of validating Rice’s comments, 

the FBI’s current assessment of what happened in Benghazi is closer to being the opposite of what Rice described on national television. 

When discussing the spontaneity of the attack, Rice also used definitive language about what had transpired. Such definitive language was not consistent with the HPSCI talking points. She had 

the following exchange with the Chairman about that comment: 

Q: ‘‘Our best current assessment, based on the information that we have at present, is that, in fact, what this 

began as, it was a spontaneous’’—what did you mean by 

‘‘in fact’’? 


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272 Id. at 101–102. 

A: What I meant was that what we understood to be the 

case at the time was as I described. It was spontaneous, 

not premeditated, et cetera. 

Q: But why would you use the—why would you use the 

phrase ‘‘in fact’’? Ranking Member Schiff took great pains 

to talk about all the qualifying language that you used. ‘‘In 

fact’’ strikes me as being more definitive than qualifying 

language. 

A: Given all the qualifiers that I put in here, I was not 

trying to convey that what I was saying was the last and 

final word on this. 

Q: Okay. What does the word ‘‘premeditated’’ mean to 

you? 

A: It means that whoever was involved had planned in advance to do what they did. 

Q: How much planning would need to have taken place for 

it to qualify as premeditated or preplanned? 

A: I don’t have a clear answer to that. 

Q: Well, you specifically said it was not preplanned and 

not premeditated. So I’m trying to get an understanding of 

how short a period of time something would need to be 

planned to not be preplanned or premeditated. What time 

period? 

A: I don’t have a definitive answer to that question. What 

I was trying to do, sir, is to convey, consistent with the 

talking points that this was, to the best of our understanding, a spontaneous reaction. And, to me, the antithesis of ‘‘spontaneous’’ is ‘‘preplanned or premeditated.’’ I 

was trying to say the same thing in a slightly different 

way.272

It is unclear why Rice used such definitive language when the 

talking points she reviewed and relied on did not use similarly 

strong language. 

THIS WEEK WITH GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS 

It was during her appearance on This Week when Rice made the 

clearest link between the video and the Benghazi attacks. She said: 

Q: It just seems that the U.S. government is powerless as 

this—as this maelstrom erupts. 

A: It’s actually the opposite. First of all, let’s be clear 

about what transpired here. What happened this week in 

Cairo, in Benghazi, in many other parts of the region . . . 

Q: Tunisia, Khartoum . . . 

A: . . .was a result—a direct result of a heinous and offensive video that was widely disseminated, that the U.S. 

government had nothing to do with, which we have made 


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273 ‘This Week’ Transcript: U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice, ABC News 

(Sept. 16, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-us-ambassador-united-nationssusan-rice/story?id=17240933. 274 Id. 275 Rice Testimony at 115–16. 

clear is reprehensible and disgusting. We have also been 

very clear in saying that there is no excuse for violence, 

there is—that we have condemned it in the strongest possible terms. 

But let’s look at what’s happened. It’s quite the opposite 

of being impotent. We have worked with the governments 

in Egypt. President Obama picked up the phone and 

talked to President Morsi in Egypt. And as soon as he did 

that, the security provided to our personnel in our embassies dramatically increased.273

In her comments, Rice stated ‘‘what happened this week in 

Cairo, in Benghazi, in many other parts of the region . . . was a 

result—a direct result—of a heinous and video that was widely disseminated.’’ 274 Nowhere in the HPSCI talking points—which Rice 

said she relied on ‘‘solely and squarely’’—is there a mention of a 

direct link to the video. In fact, there is no mention of a link to a 

video at all, and the Committee is not aware of any mention of a 

direct link to the video in any intelligence Rice reviewed prior to 

her appearance on This Week. In mentioning a direct link to the 

video, Rice strayed far beyond her talking points and provided incorrect information. 

Rice told the Committee she was not trying to use the talking 

points here, and may have misspoke. She testified: 

Q: Okay. We will go through those transcripts. But to the 

extent you were linking Benghazi and suggesting that 

there were protests there, your statement—and tell me if 

you disagree with this—your statement that what occurred 

in Benghazi was a result, and then for emphasis you say 

‘‘a direct result,’’ of the heinous and offensive video.’’ I 

mean, do you believe that you went a little bit beyond 

what was in the talking points in making that statement? 

A: I wasn’t even trying to utilize the talking points here. 

I was talking about what had happened around the world. 

That’s what I meant to be focused on. 

Q: So when you included Benghazi, did you—was that— 

did you misspeak? 

A: Quite possibly. 

Q: Because you would agree that, at the time you made 

this statement on Mr. Tapper’s show, the information you 

had did not—did not state that there was a direct connection between the video and what occurred in Benghazi. 

A: That’s right. And that’s why I was, I think, more precise in the other transcripts.275


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276 Id. at 166. 277MORELL, supra note 114, at 228–29. 

Rice later testified that she was ‘‘very careful’’ to link the video 

to what happened in Cairo. Despite her comments on This Week, 

Rice told the Committee: 

What I can say is that I—we have been through this, but 

I was very careful to link the video to what happened in 

Cairo and to other posts around the world. I did not say 

that the attack on Benghazi was directly caused by the 

video.276

Morell, a career CIA analyst who rose through the ranks to become Deputy Director and Acting Director, disagrees with Rice’s 

analysis of her own comments. Morell said that a ‘‘good bit of what 

she said was consistent with the CIA points, but she also said that 

the video had led to the protests in Benghazi. Why she said this 

I do not know. It is a question that only she can answer.’’ 277

Rice also stated on This Week that there was a ‘‘substantial’’ security presence at the United States ‘‘consulate’’ in Benghazi. She 

said: 

Q: Why was there such a security breakdown? Why was 

there not better security at the compound in Benghazi? 

Why were there not U.S. Marines at the embassy in Tripoli? 

A: Well, first of all, we had a substantial security presence 

with our personnel . . . 

Q: Not substantial enough, though, right? 

A: . . . with our personnel and the consulate in Benghazi. 

Tragically, two of the four Americans who were killed were 

there providing security. That was their function. And indeed, there were many other colleagues who were doing 

the same with them. 

It obviously didn’t prove sufficient to the—the nature of 

the attack and sufficient in that—in that moment. And 

that’s why, obviously, we have reinforced our remaining 

presence in Tripoli and why the president has very—been 

very clear that in Libya and throughout the region we are 

going to call on the governments, first of all, to assume 

their responsibilities to protect our facilities and our personnel, and we’re reinforcing our facilities and our—our 

embassies where possible... 

The State Department facility in Benghazi was not a consulate. 

The talking points provided to Rice about Benghazi did not mention anything about a consulate. In fact, the term ‘‘consulate’’ was 

specifically edited out of the talking points for accuracy before they 

were provided to Rice. A consulate is formally notified to the host 

government—something the Benghazi diplomatic post was not— 

and provides certain services to citizens. 

As a former Assistant Secretary of State, Rice knew there was 

a difference between a consulate and diplomatic post. She testified 


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278 Rice Testimony at 106. 279 Benghazi ARB, supra note 20, at 31–33. 280MORELL, supra note 114, at 229. 

to the Committee that she may have misspoke on this point and, 

with a statement of fact, acknowledged the difference: 

Q: So, following along, top of page 4, you say, ‘‘With our 

personnel and the consulate in Benghazi.’’ Was there a 

consulate in Benghazi? 

A: It was a diplomatic post. 

Q: Why did you say ‘‘consulate’’ if there was no consulate 

in Benghazi? 

A: I may have misspoke. 

Q: Okay. Is there a difference between a consulate and a 

diplomatic post? 

A: Yes, in fact, there is.278

In addition, the mention of a consulate may imply to some a 

stronger fortification than a diplomatic post, perhaps indicating an 

additional amount of security. While a ‘‘substantial security presence’’ is the point Rice was attempting to convey—and as the Accountability Review Board made clear—the security presence at the 

State Department facility in Benghazi was nowhere near substantial.279

Morell wrote in his book the ‘‘harder statement’’ for Rice to explain is why she ‘‘said that there was a ‘substantial security presence’ in Benghazi, as that point was not in either CIA or the White 

House talking points.’’ 280 Rice explained to the Committee about 

what she meant when she said there was a substantial security 

presence: 

Q: What did you mean, you said, ‘‘We had a substantial 

security presence with our personnel’’? 

A: I meant what I just said. 

Q: What does a substantial security presence mean to 

you? 

A: It means significant, more than one, more than two, 

more than three. 

Q: Did you have any indication of how many security personnel were actually with the State Department in 

Benghazi? 

A: Did I have any indication? 

Q: Did you have any indication at the time you made the 

comments how many State Department personnel, security 

personnel, were in Benghazi? 

A: I knew we had a Diplomatic Security presence. 

Q: Okay. 

A: I knew we had contractors. 

Q: Okay. 


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281 Rice Testimony at 103–05. 

A: I knew that two of the people who had been killed were 

there in a security capacity. 

Q: Okay. But in terms of ‘‘substantial security presence,’’ 

to you that means more than one individual? 

A: It means—it can—certainly means more than one. But 

it doesn’t mean—I wasn’t trying to say it means 10, it 

means 20, it means 50. It was substantial. 

Q: Is ‘‘substantial security presence’’ more than one? Is 

that—in all situations, does a substantial security presence mean more than one, or are you referring specifically 

to Benghazi in this case? 

A: I was referring to Benghazi. 

Q: Okay. 

A: But I was also making the point, as you’ll see subsequently, that it obviously didn’t prove sufficient to the attack. 

Q: Okay. So I just want to make sure I’m clear. ‘‘Substantial security presence,’’ in your mind, can mean two individuals. 

A: I didn’t say that. 

Q: You said more than one. 

A: I said more than one, more than two—we can keep 

going. I didn’t mean to imply.281

Rice was mistaken again in stating there were State Department 

security contractors in Benghazi. The security contractors who died 

in the Benghazi attacks worked for the CIA—and their job was to 

protect the CIA facility in Benghazi, not the State Department facility. Rice, whether intentionally or negligently, presented misleading information about the size of the security presence at the 

State Department facility in Benghazi. 

FOX NEWS SUNDAY 

Rice also characterized the level of security in Benghazi on Fox 

News Sunday—something that was not in her talking points. She 

said: 

Q: All right. And the last question, terror cells in 

Benghazi had carried out five attacks since April, including one at the same consulate, a bombing at the same consulate in June. Should U.S. security have been tighter at 

that consulate given the history of terror activity in 

Benghazi? 

A: Well, we obviously did have a strong security presence. 

And, unfortunately, two of the four Americans who died in 

Benghazi were there to provide security. But it wasn’t sufficient in the circumstances to prevent the overrun of the 


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282 Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against Americans in the Middle East, 

FOX NEWS SUNDAY (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chriswallace/2012/09/16/amb-susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-against-americans-middleeast#p//v/1843960658001. 283 Rice Testimony at 125. 284 Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against Americans in the Middle East, 

FOX NEWS SUNDAY (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chriswallace/2012/09/16/amb-susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-against-americans-middleeast#p//v/1843960658001. 

consulate. This is among the things that will be looked at 

as the investigation unfolds and it’s also why—— 

Q: Is there any feeling that it should have been stronger 

beforehand? 

A: It’s also why we increased our presence, our security 

presence in Tripoli in the aftermath of this, as well as in 

other parts of the world. I can’t judge that, Chris. I’m—we 

have to see what the assessment reveals. But, obviously, 

there was a significant security presence defending our 

consulate and our other facility in Benghazi and that did 

not prove sufficient to the moment.282

When asked about the use of the word ‘‘strong’’ versus ‘‘substantial,’’ as she said on This Week, Rice responded: 

Q: Okay. Just a couple more questions about your interview with Mr. Wallace. Your next response: ‘‘Well, we obviously did have a strong security presence.’’ What did you 

mean when you said ‘‘strong security presence’’? 

A: I think we had this exchange over another adjective I 

used. 

Q: That was ‘‘substantial.’’ I’m asking you about ‘‘strong.’’ 

A: The same answer applies. 

Q: Same answer? Okay. So more than one? 

A: That wasn’t my prior answer.283

In her appearance on Fox News Sunday¸ Rice noted ‘‘two 

of the four Americans who died in Benghazi were there to provide 

security. But it wasn’t sufficient in the circumstances to prevent 

the overrun of the consulate.’’ 284 This statement implies the two 

security officers who died were tasked with protecting the State 

Department facility. They were not; their job was solely to protect 

the CIA facility and CIA personnel. In reality the two she referenced—Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods—were killed because 

the inadequate security at the State Department facility in 

Benghazi was not sufficient to repel the initial attack thus necessitating aid from CIA contractors at the Annex in Benghazi and from 

Tripoli. 

In the case of Glen Doherty, not only was he not in Benghazi to 

provide security for the Benghazi Mission compound, he was not in 

Benghazi at all—at least initially. He left Tripoli to respond to the 

attacks in Benghazi precisely because State Department security 

proved inadequate. And neither Doherty nor Tyrone Woods were 

killed in the ‘‘overrun of the consulate.’’ As noted above, there was 


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285 Id. 286 Id. 

no ‘‘consulate’’ in Benghazi and the Benghazi Mission compound 

was ‘‘overrun’’ hours before Doherty and Woods were killed. 

Rice’s appearance on Fox News Sunday is also where she was imprecise—again—in discussing the FBI investigation. Specifically, 

she said: 

Q: Let’s talk about the attack on the U.S. consulate in 

Benghazi this week that killed four Americans, including 

Ambassador Chris Stevens. The top Libyan official says 

that the attack on Tuesday was, quote, his words 

’’preplanned.’’ Al Qaeda says the operation was revenge for 

our killing a top Al Qaeda leader. What do we know? 

A: Well, first of all, Chris, we are obviously investigating 

this very closely. The FBI has a lead in this investigation. 

The information, the best information and the best assessment we have today is that in fact this was not a 

preplanned, premeditated attack. That what happened initially was that it was a spontaneous reaction to what had 

just transpired in Cairo as a consequence of the video. People gathered outside the embassy and then it grew very 

violent and those with extremist ties joined the fray and 

came with heavy weapons, which unfortunately are quite 

common in post-revolutionary Libya and that then spun 

out of control.285

Significantly, Rice noted the ‘‘FBI has a lead in this investigation.’’ 286 This critical distinction may have incorrectly implied to 

some the FBI was making significant progress in the nascent investigation. The Chairman had the following exchange with Rice 

about this topic: 

Q: On one of the occasions, you said—this is to Chris Wallace—‘‘The FBI has a lead in this investigation.’’ How 

would you have learned that if you had not talked to the 

FBI? 

A: Because I was aware, as a senior policymaker, that the 

FBI has a lead role in conducting investigations in this circumstance and others like it. 

Q: But there’s a tremendous difference between the FBI 

has ‘‘the lead’’ and the FBI has ‘‘a lead.’’ ‘‘A lead’’ is a law 

enforcement term that we have a suspect, we have a lead. 

A: No, no, no. Excuse me. That was not what I was trying 

to say. I was saying they had the lead, as in the leadership 

role, not a lead on a suspect in the investigation. 

Q: All right. So at least with respect to that transcript, 

you intended the article ‘‘the’’ instead of the article ‘‘a’’ to 

modify the lead. You were not suggesting that they had a 

lead but that they were taking the lead in the investigation. 

A: That’s what I meant. 


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287 Rice Testimony at 95. 288 Id. at 146–147. 289 Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against Americans in the Middle East, 

FOX NEWS SUNDAY (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chrisContinued 

Q: Okay. All right.287

In her interview with the Committee, Rice said that in the future, perhaps a ‘‘no comment’’ regarding an FBI investigation 

would be more appropriate. She had the following exchange with 

the Chairman: 

Q: I guess this is what I am getting at, just from a broader perspective. We all hear, whether it’s Attorney General 

Holder, Attorney General Lynch, really anybody in the 

criminal justice realm just doesn’t comment on ongoing investigations. They don’t make comments and use qualifying predicates. They just say: Look, I don’t know. And I 

am not going to answer your question until the investigation is complete. Why not respond that way when you were 

asked on the Sunday morning talk shows? 

A: Sir, I wasn’t trying to qualify or characterize the investigation. I was trying to indicate that there was an investigation, that it was going to be thorough, and that it 

would reveal the best information as to what had transpired. 

Q: I am not challenging that. I am just saying instead of 

saying, ‘‘Our best assessment at this time is that it was 

not premeditated, not preplanned, that it was spontaneous,’’ one out of five references to the video, why not just 

say, ‘‘The investigation has just begun; we don’t know; and 

I am not going to guess’’? 

A: Because our intelligence community, in response to a 

request from HPSCI, had provided talking points along the 

lines that we have discussed multiple times now. And 

those talking points, which you and your colleagues would 

have gone out with, were more detailed than simply saying, ‘‘I don’t know.’’ 

Q: Right. But you and I both know in hindsight that the 

talking points, at least to some degree, were wrong. So I 

guess the lesson moving forward is maybe we should just 

say, ‘‘It’s an ongoing investigation, and I am not going to 

comment on it.’’ 

A: Maybe we should.288

Rice also said the following on Fox News Sunday: 

But we don’t see at this point signs this was a coordinated 

plan, premeditated attack. Obviously, we will wait for the 

results of the investigation and we don’t want to jump to 

conclusions before then. But I do think it’s important for 

the American people to know our best current assessment.289


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wallace/2012/09/16/amb-susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-against-americans-middleeast#p//v/1843960658001. 290 Rice Testimony at 125. 291See Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against Americans in the Middle 

East, FOX NEWS SUNDAY (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chriswallace/2012/09/16/amb-susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-against-americans-middleeast#p//v/1843960658001. 292 [Redacted text]. 293 [Redacted text]. 294 Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against Americans in the Middle East, 

FOX NEWS SUNDAY (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chriswallace/2012/09/16/amb-susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-against-americans-middleeast#p//v/1843960658001. 

Rice testified to the Committee about these comments: 

Q: But when you said, ‘‘We don’t see at this point signs,’’ 

did you mean to say that there were no signs, or did you 

mean to say that there was no conclusion that it was a coordinated, premeditated attack? 

A: I didn’t purport to draw any final conclusions at any 

point during these interviews. I was very careful to underscore that I was providing the current best information 

and that information could change.290

Rather than noting that no final conclusions had been drawn by 

the intelligence community about premeditation, however, Rice instead chose to state there were ‘‘no signs’’ at all of any 

premeditation.291 In this regard she not only went beyond the talking points she was provided, but she was also incorrect. 

In fact, multiple signs existed at the time she appeared on Fox 

News Sunday that the attack may have been premeditated. [redacted text] 292 Another piece of intelligence from September 13 

indicated that an attack was imminent—mere minutes away—and 

known by multiple parties.293 Rice could have made her point by 

simply saying ‘‘our current assessment is that the attack was neither coordinated nor premeditated.’’ Instead, she chose to go a step 

further and, inaccurately, state ‘‘we don’t at this point see signs 

this was a coordinated plan.’’ 294

MEET THE PRESS 

Rice’s comments on Meet the Press are perhaps the most egregious diversion from the talking points provided to her about 

Benghazi. She said: 

Well, let us—let me tell you the—the best information we 

have at present. First of all, there’s an FBI investigation 

which is ongoing. And we look to that investigation to give 

us the definitive word as to what transpired. But putting 

together the best information that we have available to us 

today, our current assessment is that what happened in 

Benghazi was in fact initially a spontaneous reaction to 

what had just transpired hours before in Cairo, almost a 

copycat of—of the demonstrations against our facility in 

Cairo, which were prompted, of course, by the video. What 

we think then transpired in Benghazi is that opportunistic 

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295Meet the Press September 16: Benjamin Netanyahu, Susan Rice, Keith Ellison, Peter King, 

Bob Woodward, Jeffrey Goldberg, Andrea Mitchell, NBC News (Sept. 16, 2012), http:// 

www.nbcnews.com/id/49051097/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/september-benjamin-netanyahususan-rice-keith-ellison-peter-king-bob-woodward-jeffrey-goldberg-andrea-mitchell/ 

#.Vzozl_krJaQ. 296See, e.g., Email from U.S. Dep’t of State, to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., 

et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390691); Email from Senior 

Advisor to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., U.S. Mission to the U.N., to Susan 

E. Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:41 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05561948); and Email from Senior Advisor to the U.S. Permanent Representative to 

the U.N., U.S. Mission to the U.N., to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., et al. (Sept. 

11, 2012, 11:53 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0051721). 297Meet the Press September 16: Benjamin Netanyahu, Susan Rice, Keith Ellison, Peter King, 

Bob Woodward, Jeffrey Goldberg, Andrea Mitchell, NBC News (Sept. 16, 2012), http:// 

www.nbcnews.com/id/49051097/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/september-benjamin-netanyahususan-rice-keith-ellison-peter-king-bob-woodward-jeffrey-goldberg-andrea-mitchell/#.Vzozl_ 

krJaQ. 298 Rice Testimony at 129–130. 

nately are readily available in post-revolutionary Libya. 

And it escalated into a much more violent episode. Obviously, that’s—that’s our best judgment now. We’ll await 

the results of the investigation. And the president has 

been very clear—we’ll work with the Libyan authorities to 

bring those responsible to justice.295

At the time of her appearance, Rice should have known what 

transpired in Benghazi was not a ‘‘copycat’’ of what had transpired 

in Cairo. On September 11, the day of the Cairo demonstrations 

and Benghazi attacks, she received frequent email updates about 

both events.296 Additionally, Rice received daily intelligence briefings from the CIA, and she received a briefing each day from September 12 to September 15. Out of scores and scores of intelligence 

products pertaining to Benghazi provided to the Committee, not a 

single one said what transpired in Benghazi was ‘‘almost a copycat 

of’’ what transpired in Cairo.297

Rice acknowledges that nowhere in the talking points was information indicating the Benghazi attack was a copycat of the Cairo 

protest. She testified: 

Q: Now, you would agree with me that nowhere in the 

CIA talking points does it describe what occurred in 

Benghazi and what occurred in Cairo as almost a copycat 

of each other? You would agree with me on that? 

A: I would agree with you on that. 

Q: So would you also agree with me that describing what 

occurred in Benghazi as almost a copycat of Cairo was 

really overstating what was known at the time and certainly overstating what was in the talking points? 

A: I don’t know that it was overstating or even misstating. 

But I would agree that the word ‘‘copycat’’ does not appear 

in the talking points.298

In a later portion of her Meet the Press appearance, Rice connected the video with the Benghazi attacks, as she had with other 

appearances on the talk shows. She said: 

Q: The president and the secretary of state have talked 

about a mob mentality. That’s my words, not their words, 

but they talked about the—the tyranny of mobs operating 


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299Meet the Press September 16: Benjamin Netanyahu, Susan Rice, Keith Ellison, Peter King, 

Bob Woodward, Jeffrey Goldberg, Andrea Mitchell, NBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2012), http:// 

www.nbcnews.com/id/49051097/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/september-benjamin-netanyahususan-rice-keith-ellison-peter-king-bob-woodward-jeffrey-goldberg-andrea-mitchell/ 

#.Vzozl_krJaQ. 300 Id. 301See Id. 

in this part of the world. Here’s the reality, if you look at 

foreign aid—U.S. direct foreign aid to the two countries involved here, in Libya and Egypt, this is what you’d see: 

two hundred million since 2011 to Libya, over a billion a 

year to Egypt and yet Americans are seeing these kinds of 

protests and attacks on our own diplomats. Would—what 

do you say to members of congress who are now weighing 

whether to suspend our aid to these countries if this is the 

response that America gets? 

A: Well, first of all, David, let’s put this in perspective. As 

I said, this is a response to a—a very offensive video. It’s 

not the first time that American facilities have come under 

attack in the Middle East, going back to 1982 in—in Beirut, going back to the Khobar Towers in—in Saudi Arabia, 

or even the attack on our embassy in 2008 in Yemen. 

Q: Or Iran in 1979. 

A: This has—this has happened in the past, but there— 

and so I don’t think that—that we should misunderstand 

what this is. The reason we provide aid in Egypt and in 

Libya is because it serves American interests because the 

relationships...299

In this part of the conversation, David Gregory, Meet the Press 

moderator, and Rice are discussing foreign aid to both Egypt and 

Libya. Gregory mentions both countries twice in the lead-in to his 

question. Rice responds and says to ‘‘put this in perspective . . . 

this is a response to a—a very offensive video. It’s not the first time 

American facilities have come under attack in the Middle 

East . . .’’ 300 She does not distinguish what happened in Libya to 

what happened in Egypt in her response, and ties the video to both 

incidents. After a brief interjection by Gregory, Rice mentions providing aid to both Libya and Egypt.301 Nowhere in Rice’s comments 

is Libya distinguished from Egypt, indicating she did not intend for 

her comment about the video to apply to just Egypt, but rather 

both countries. 

STATE OF THE UNION 

On State of the Union, Rice spoke of the number of attackers at 

the Benghazi Mission compound. Nowhere in the talking points— 

on which she said she solely and squarely relied—is there any 

mention of the number of protesters. Rice said: 

Q: But this was sort of a reset, was it not? It was supposed to be a reset of U.S.-Muslim relations? 

A: And indeed, in fact, there had been substantial improvements. I have been to Libya and walked the streets 

of Benghazi myself. And despite what we saw in that horVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00232 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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302State of the Union with Candy Crowley Interview with Susan Rice, CNN (Sept. 16, 2012), 

http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1209/16/sotu.01.html. 303 Rice Testimony at 121–22. 

rific incident where some mob was hijacked ultimately by 

a handful of extremists, the United States is extremely 

popular in Libya and the outpouring of sympathy and support for Ambassador Stevens and his colleagues from the 

government, from people is evidence of that...302

In her interview with the Committee, Rice acknowledged this information was not in the talking points and was unsure where she 

got the information about the number of attackers. She testified: 

Q: Now, you respond, ‘‘And indeed, in fact, there had been 

substantial improvements. I have been to Libya and 

walked the streets of Benghazi myself. And despite what 

we saw in that horrific incident where some mob was hijacked ultimately by a handful of extremists, the United 

States is extremely popular in Libya and the outpouring of 

sympathy and support for Ambassador Stevens and his 

colleagues from the government, from people is evidence of 

that.’’ 

Where did you get the fact that there was a handful of extremists that had hijacked what occurred in Benghazi? I 

mean, our understanding, even at the time, the information was that there were 20 attackers. That went—that 

number went to 50-plus, and then it went to over 100. 

Where did you get the number ‘‘a handful,’’ which, in my 

mind anyway, is about five? 

A: I don’t recall exactly where I got that from. 

Q: It’s not in the talking points, certainly. 

A: Talking points say that ‘‘the demonstrations in 

Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at 

the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the diplomatic post in Benghazi and subsequently its annex. There are indications that extremists 

participated in the violent demonstrations.’’ 

Q: That’s correct. But nowhere in what you just read does 

the CIA or the intelligence community attribute a number 

to the number of extremists that took place in—took part 

in the attacks, correct? 

A: Not in these talking points. 

Q: Okay. Do you believe that you received that information from another source? 

A: I don’t recall. 

Q: But you do believe somebody told you that? 

A: I don’t recall exactly how I acquired that information.303

Conveying a ‘‘handful’’ of individuals hijacked a mob had significant implications. By claiming only a handful of individuals, rather 


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304See Rhodes Memo, supra note 3 (‘‘[T]hese protests are rooted in an Internet video, and not 

a broader failure of policy.’’). 305 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 16, 2012, 12:22 PM) 

(on file with the Committee, SCB0045373). 306 Id. 307 Id. 

than a larger amount, were involved in the attack, Rice may have 

conveyed to the audience a sense that only a very small number 

of people were angry enough to attack the U.S. facility. Had Rice 

said more than a ‘‘handful’’ of people attacked the compound— 

which video evidence shows to be the case—she may have conveyed 

more widespread problems in Libya, potentially raising the very 

policy questions Rhodes strove so specifically to avoid in his September 14 briefing memo.304

While Rice was on message in the following clause of the sentence—‘‘the United States is extremely popular in Libya,’’ indicating a successful Libya policy—unfortunately, the United States 

evacuated its embassy in Tripoli in July 2014 and today does not 

have an official diplomatic presence in Libya. 

REACTIONS TO THE SUNDAY SHOWS 

The reaction to Rice’s comments on the Sunday talk shows was 

as divided as it was quick. Many felt Rice presented information 

not based in fact, while others believed she simply stuck assiduously to the talking points she had been given. 

‘‘Off The Reservation on Five Networks!’’ 

Even though the Secretary did not appear on the Sunday talk 

shows, she monitored what Rice said on those shows. As the transcript for each show became available late Sunday morning into 

early Sunday afternoon, Sullivan sent a copy of the transcript to 

the Secretary with an accompanying note. The first transcript he 

sent her was from This Week. Sullivan wrote: 

Here is Susan on this week. She wasn’t asked about 

whether we had any intel. But she did make clear our 

view that this started spontaneously and then evolved. 

The only troubling sentence relates to the investigation, 

specifically: ‘‘And we’ll see when the investigation unfolds 

whether what was—what transpired in Benghazi might 

have unfolded differently in different circumstances.’’ But 

she got pushed there. 

Waiting on other transcripts.305

This note from Sullivan is interesting for two reasons. First, he 

writes that Rice makes clear their ‘‘view that this started spontaneously and then evolved.’’ 306 Second, Sullivan expresses concern regarding Rice’s comment on the investigation, where she said ‘‘[a]nd 

we’ll see when the investigation unfolds whether what was—what 

transpired in Benghazi might have unfolded differently in different 

circumstances.’’ 307

The fact that Benghazi may have transpired differently—and not 

spontaneously as a result of Cairo, as intelligence indicated to be 

the case—contained serious policy implications. If Benghazi started 


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308 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 16, 2012, 2:38 PM) (on 

file with the Committee, SCB0045387). 309 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 16, 2012, 2:36 PM) (on 

file with the Committee, SCB0045390). 310 Email from Sec’y Clinton to Mr. Sullivan (Sept. 16, 2012, 2:39 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0045390). 311 Email from Erin Pelton, Dir. of Commc’cs and Spokesperson, U.S. Mission to the U.N., to 

Dagoberto Vega, Special Ass’t to the President and Dir. of Broadcast Media, White House, and 

Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy Nat’l Sec. Advisor for Strategic Commc’cs, Nat’l Sec. Council (Sept. 

16, 2012, 9:41 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05622905). 

spontaneously and then evolved—as Sullivan seemed to indicate he 

and the Secretary believed—that would indicate a similarity with 

other areas in the Middle East, where protests had transpired as 

a result of the offensive video. If, on the other hand, Benghazi transpired differently—as a premeditated terrorist attack, for instance—such a scenario would call into question whether the 

United States was defeating terrorism, and would raise doubts 

about the government’s policy towards Libya specifically, and perhaps the Middle East generally. The fact Rice raised this as a possibility appeared to be unsettling to Sullivan. 

Sullivan later passed on the transcript to State of the Union with 

an accompanying note saying ‘‘Nothing to this one.’’ 308 Sullivan 

also forwarded the transcript for Meet the Press, with an accompanying note simply saying ‘‘[g]ood.’’ 309 Just three minutes later, 

the Secretary responded and said ‘‘[p]ls remind Panetta NOT to 

mention Tunisia—in fact no specifics preferable.’’ 310 This may have 

been in response to the Meet the Press transcript, where moderator 

Gregory mentioned the evacuation of all but emergency personnel 

from diplomatic missions in Tunisia and Sudan, and that the Secretary of Defense has deployed forces to several areas to protect 

U.S. personnel. 

Almost immediately after Rice’s appearance on the shows, Pelton 

highlighted conflicting statements between Rice and Libya President el-Magariaf. At 9:41a.m. on Sunday, September 16, 2012 she 

wrote to Rhodes and others on the White House communications 

team: 

They open w Libyan President who says no doubt attack 

preplanned/predetermined. Says planned by foreigners. 

Says maybe better for FBI to stay away a little while 

though they need their help w investigation. She said in 

all other shows that no evidence this was premeditated, as 

we discussed. Just fyi.311

Pelton testified as to why she sent this email: 

Q: Do you recall having drafted this email? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And what was the—why did you write this email? 

A: I wrote this email to alert Ben that what the Libyan 

President had said on CBS was inconsistent with what 

Ambassador Rice had said on the other shows that we had 

already taped. 

Q: Did that inconsistency concern you? 


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312Pelton Testimony at 114–15. 313 Email from Ms. Pelton to Mr. Vega and Mr. Rhodes (Sept. 16, 2012, 9:41 AM) (on file with 

the Committee, C05622905). 314 [Redacted text]. 315 Hicks Testimony at 281. 

A: No. 

Q: Why not? 

A: Because what Ambassador Rice said reflected the best 

information that we had at the time.312

This email reflects the shortcomings of Rice’s preparation for the 

Sunday shows, which was reflected in some of her comments. As 

described above, on her Saturday prep call were people from her 

office and the White House messaging team. No subject matter experts about Benghazi were on the call nor was anybody from the 

intelligence community. Pelton wrote ‘‘no evidence this was premeditated, as we discussed’’ 313—likely indicating a discussion of 

this topic on the phone call the day before. This is a significant difference from simply saying ‘‘the current assessment does not indicate that this was premeditated.’’ In fact, as noted above, [redacted text] intelligence existed at that point indicating the attack may have in fact been premeditated.314

Rice’s comments on the Sunday talk shows were met with shock 

and disbelief by those closest to the facts of the situation. Subject 

matter experts with direct knowledge of the attacks expressed immediate concern about what Rice had said on the shows—and potential fallout as a result. Hicks—possibly the last person to talk 

with Stevens, and the highest ranking U.S. official in Libya on 

Sunday September 16, 2012—said he was not asked for any information in advance of Rice’s appearance on the show. He testified: 

Q: You became the charge on—— 

A: September 12th, 3 a.m. 

Q: And you are the senior U.S. official, senior diplomat in 

country starting September 12th. And you’ve testified you 

had constant contact with Washington. So, are you—as I 

understand what you are saying, before the Sunday 

show—series of appearances on the Sunday shows, you 

were not part of the preparation and planning? 

A: That’s correct. I was not. 

Q: You didn’t get a chance to review talking points? 

A: No, I did not.315

Hicks also testified about Rice’s appearance on Face the Nation: 

So Magariaf, at great personal risk to himself, goes to 

Benghazi to initiate an investigation and lend his own personal gravitas. Remember he’s from the Benghazi area 

himself. So he goes to lend his own personal gravitas and 

reputation to an investigation of what happens. And he 

gets on—and he is on these programs speaking from 

Benghazi, and he says this was an attack by Islamic extremists, possibly with terrorist links. He describes what 


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316 Id. at 83–84. 317 Email from Senior Libya Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Senior Advisor and Spokesperson, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Deputy Dir. for the Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. 

Dep’t of State & Deputy Dir. for Maghreb Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 17, 2012, 2:16 PM) 

(on file with the Committee, C05580618). 318 Email from [redacted text] to [redacted text], [redacted text] & [redacted text] 

(Sept. 17, 2012, 2:18 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05580618). 319 Email from [redacted text] to [redacted text], [redacted text] & [redacted text] 

(Sept. 17, 2012, 2:17 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05580618). 320 Email from [redacted text] to [redacted text], [redacted text] & [redacted text] 

(Sept. 17, 2012, 2:19 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05580618). 

happens. He tells the truth of what happened. And so, you 

know, Ambassador Rice says what she says, contradicting 

what the President of Libya says from Benghazi. 

There’s a cardinal rule of diplomacy that we learn in our 

orientation class, and that rule is never inadvertently insult your interlocutor. The net impact of what has transpired is the spokesperson of the most powerful country in 

the world has basically said that the President of Libya is 

either a liar or doesn’t know what he’s talking about. 

The impact of that is immeasurable. Magariaf has just lost 

face in front of not only his own people, but the world. 

And, you know, my jaw hit the floor as I watched this. I’ve 

never been—I have been a professional diplomat for 22 

years. I have never been as embarrassed in my life, in my 

career as on that day. There have been other times when 

I’ve been embarrassed, but that’s the most embarrassing 

moment of my career.316

Other subject matter experts within the State Department also 

recognized problems with what Rice said on the talk shows. State 

Department employees in Washington D.C. who had spoken with 

those on the ground in Libya after the attack were universal in 

their condemnation of Rice’s statements. The Senior Libya Desk 

Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, wrote: 

‘‘I think Rice was off the reservation on this one.’’ 317

The Deputy Director, Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, responded: ‘‘Off 

the reservation on five networks!’’ 318

The Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Bureau of 

Near East Affairs, State Department, wrote: ‘‘Yup. Luckily there’s 

enough in her language to fudge exactly what she said/meant.’’ 319

He also wrote: ‘‘WH [White House] very worried about the politics. This was all their doing.’’ 320

While Snipe may not have known exactly what ‘‘worried’’ the 

White House, he had extensive experience at the State Department, and had been in contact with the Embassy in Tripoli. Contrary to what Rice said on the talk shows, he did not believe any 

protests or demonstrations had occurred prior to the attacks. He 

testified: 

Q: And then you made a statement that, you know, based 

on your training and experience, essentially you had never 

seen anyone bring an RPG to a protest. 

A: I mean—— 


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321Testimony of Deputy Dir. for the Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 96–97 (Oct. 9, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 322Testimony of Deputy Dir. for Maghreb Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. 33–34 (Dec. 17, 

2015) (on file with the Committee). 323 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 30 (Sept. 18, 2012, 1:16 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390678). 

Q: Or that would be unusual. 

A: I think what I said was ‘‘bringing an RPG to a spontaneous protest.’’ I mean, I’ve been to Yemen before, and, I 

mean, knives, AK–47s, RPGs. I mean, that place is armed 

to the teeth, and I think people bring an RPG to the toilet 

sometimes. But when I said that, I was suggesting that, if 

you were spontaneously protesting, an RPG might necessarily not be the first thing you grab next to your car 

keys.321

The Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, State Department, was surprised of the connection made to the video. She testified: 

Q: Do you recall having any discussions with NEA about 

the substance of what was said on the talk shows and 

whether there was an agreement or disagreement with 

what was conveyed? 

A: Yes, ma’am. I recall that I was a little bit surprised. 

The description of what was said—and, again, I didn’t 

watch the program myself—it just sounded more definitive 

of what potentially had happened. But, again, I didn’t 

watch the show myself, and I didn’t read the full transcript. I was too busy that day to do that. 

Q: When you say you’re a bit surprised, what were you 

surprised regarding? 

A: I was surprised in the way that they were described in 

the press clips, that there was an indication that there was 

some connection to the anti-Muslim video of concern that 

had been circulating online, that there was some connection to that. In the press clips that I read, I remember seeing, like—okay. 

Q: And I think, before, you just said that that was a pretty definitive statement. 

A: In the way that I saw it excerpted in the press clips, 

it seemed like the connection had been made to the video 

more definitively.322

Diplomatic Security Agent 30, Diplomatic Security Command 

Center, State Department, was in the Diplomatic Security Command Center while the attacks transpired and aware of real-time 

information coming straight from Benghazi during the attack was 

asked if there was any rioting in Benghazi reported prior to the attack. His response was: ‘‘Zip, nothing nada.’’ 323


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324 Email from Deputy Dir. for Maghreb Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to James N. Miller, Under 

Sec’y of Defense for Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Defense (Sept. 17, 2012, 6:52 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05580200). 325 Email from Mr. Sullivan to Sec’y Clinton (Sept. 16, 2012, 12:22 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0045373). 

Circling the Wagons 

While many lower- and mid-level State Department employees in 

contact with the Embassy in Tripoli believed Rice went too far on 

the talk shows, senior officials at the State Department and White 

House did not appear to share that sentiment. Instead, these senior 

officials appeared concerned more about supporting Rice’s statements and ensuring any future statements on the attacks were disciplined than ensuring they were reflective of what had actually 

transpired. 

The day after Rice’s appearance, The Deputy Director, Office of 

Maghreb Affairs, sent an email summarizing a meeting with 

McDonough. She wrote: 

DNSA McDonough apparently told the SVTS [Secure 

Video Teleconference] group today that everyone was required to ‘‘shut their pieholes’’ about the Benghazi attack 

in light of the FBI investigation, due to start tomorrow.’’ 324

McDonough’s comments about the FBI investigation starting the 

following day stand in stark contrast with Rice’s statements the 

day before that the FBI had already begun collecting ‘‘all sorts of 

evidence’’ in their investigation and had ‘‘a lead.’’ In addition, 

McDonough’s remark about not commenting in light of the FBI investigation directly address the issue that Sullivan raised with the 

Secretary the day before—the troubling sentence by Rice that the 

FBI investigation could uncover ‘‘Benghazi might have unfolded 

differently in different circumstances’’ from other protests across 

the Middle East.325

That same day, during her daily press briefing, Nuland was 

asked by reporters to comment on the Benghazi attacks even 

though there was an FBI investigation. Nuland attempted to address the dichotomy between her refusal to talk about Benghazi 

and Rice’s willingness to do so on the Sunday shows. Nuland said: 

Q: Toria, in Friday’s briefing, Friday evening, you essentially stated that all questions concerning any aspect of the 

Benghazi attack—the circumstances surrounding it, the 

outcome of it, et cetera—would henceforth be directed by 

you to the FBI since it’s their investigation. 

And yet, on five Sunday shows yesterday, Ambassador 

Rice, who works for the same agency as you, was giving 

the latest U.S. assessment of how this event unfolded, specifically by saying we don’t believe it was premeditated or 

preplanned, and by saying that those with heavy arms and 

so forth showed up, in essence, as she put it, to hijack an 

ongoing demonstration. 

So my first question for you is: Given that Ambassador 

Rice is out there talking publicly about it and not referring 


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326Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep’t 

of State (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/09/197821.htm [hereinafter 

Nuland Sept. 17 Briefing]. 

Bob Schieffer and Chris Wallace and the rest to the FBI, 

may we consider that we can again begin asking you questions at this podium about the circumstances of the attack? If it’s fair for the Ambassador to discuss it, it should 

be fair in this room, correct? 

A: Well, let me start by reminding you that Ambassador 

Rice outranks me, as does my own boss, so she is often at 

liberty to say more than I am. And I guess that’s going to 

continue to be the case. 

What I will say, though, is that Ambassador Rice, in her 

comments on every network over the weekend, was very 

clear, very precise, about what our initial assessment of 

what happened is. And this was not just her assessment. 

It was also an assessment that you’ve heard in comments 

coming from the intelligence community, in comments 

coming from the White House. I don’t have anything to 

give you beyond that. 

She also made clear, as I had on Friday, that there is an 

ongoing FBI investigation. So frankly, I’m not sure that 

it’s useful to go beyond that. I’m not capable of going beyond that, and we’ll have to just see what the FBI investigation brings us. 

Q: You would acknowledge, however, that the account of 

the events, the preliminary account of the events that Ambassador Rice offered, diverges starkly from the account offered by the Libyan President, correct? 

A: Well, we’ve heard a number of different things from 

Libya. I would simply say that what—the comments that 

Ambassador Rice made accurately reflect our government’s 

initial assessment.326

Nuland also addressed a question as to whether or not protests 

had occurred outside the Benghazi compound. Her on-the-record response, in the wake of Rice’s talk show appearances, was markedly 

different from what she told reporters in an off-the-record briefing 

back on September 12. Nuland said: 

Q: And one last question, if I might, because Ambassador 

Rice spoke to this. She suggested that there had been an 

ongoing demonstration outside the Consulate or in the 

proximity of the Consulate in Benghazi that was, in essence, hijacked by more militant elements who came 

armed to the affair. I just want to nail this down with you. 

You are—you stand by this notion that there was, in fact, 

an ongoing demonstration? 

A: I’d simply say that I don’t have any information beyond 

what Ambassador Rice shared with you and that her asVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00240 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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327 Id. 328 Id. 329 Email from Media Spokesperson, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Tommy Vietor, Nat’l Sec. Spokesperson, Nat’l Sec. Council (Sept. 17, 2012, 4:01 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562137). 330 Id. 

sessment does reflect our initial assessment as a government.327

Nuland, similar to the President in his 60 Minutes interview five 

days prior, also refused to directly label what had occurred as a 

terrorist act. She said: 

Q: Simply on the basis of what Ambassador Rice has publicly disclosed, does the United States Government regard 

what happened in Benghazi as an act of terror? 

A: Again, I’m not going to put labels on this until we have 

a complete investigation, okay? 

Q: You don’t—so you don’t regard it as an act of terrorism? 

A: I don’t think we know enough. I don’t think we know 

enough. And we’re going to continue to assess. She gave 

our preliminary assessment. We’re going to have a full investigation now, and then we’ll be in a better position to 

put labels on things, okay? 328

Even the CIA appeared to take part in the effort to bolster Rice’s 

statements. Five days after the attack, a September 17, 2012 email 

exchange between officials at the White House, State Department, 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence [ODNI], and the CIA 

took place to craft a written response to questions posed by Fox 

News reporter Catherine Herridge about Rice’s statements the day 

before. The first draft of the response, which appears to have come 

from the CIA’s Office of Public Affairs, makes a number of 

misstatements—chiefly one in the first paragraph: 

Off the record, I reviewed the timeline of what is known 

now, of course realizing that there will be interviews of 

witnesses, people on the ground etc. . . . to get the down 

to the minute details. Like you, we have the attack kicking 

off reportedly after 9:30 PM with small crowds gathering 

during that 9:00–10:00 PM hour. It’s pretty clear, as we 

discussed, that there had been smaller protests during the 

day, nothing along the scale of what we saw in Cairo or 

later on in the week, but protests nonetheless.329

It is unclear what information, if any, the CIA public affairs officer relied on to claim ‘‘it’s pretty clear . . . that there had been 

smaller protests during the day’’ 330—no CIA intelligence product 

provided to the Committee contained any such information. 

Seven days after the attacks, on September 18, 2012, Meehan 

sent an email to Patrick Ventrell, Director, Office of Press Relations, State Department and Nuland about message discipline. Her 

email said: 

Focus today on reiterating that our initial assessment 

stands, and was based on information available. Keeping 


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331 Email from Bernadette M. Meehan, Spokesperson, Nat’l Sec. Council, to Victoria J. 

Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State & Patrick H. Ventrell, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (Sept. 18, 2012, 11:03 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05561843). 332Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep’t 

of State (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/09/197912.htm#LIBYA. 

hard line about now waiting for the investigation to run its 

course; we will of course provide info as it comes to light. 

No discrepancy between what Rice said and what State 

and WH said early on regarding preplanned attack.331

Nuland appears to have followed that guidance. In her daily 

press briefing later that day, Nuland said: 

Q: Any more information on the investigation, on the 

timeline? There continues to be some question about 

whether the protests had all but dissipated before the attack in Benghazi began, or whether or not the protest was 

robust and ongoing and this attack at least used it for 

cover. And there also continue to be, frankly, some apparent differences between the characterization here that it 

was a coordinated attack and Ambassador Rice’s assertion 

that it basically kind of grew out of the protest. 

A: Well, on your last point, I spoke to this extensively yesterday, making clear that Ambassador Rice was speaking 

on behalf of the government with regard to our initial assessments. I don’t have any more details beyond those that 

we’ve already shared, and I don’t expect to because I think 

all of the information is going to go to the FBI for their 

investigation, and when they’re completed, then we’ll have 

more information. 

Q: The idea that it grew—that the protest may have been 

used as cover, can you say whether or not the protest had 

basically dissipated when the attacks began? 

A: I personally have no more information than what I’ve 

given you, and I don’t think that we as a government will 

be talking about these details until the FBI has completed 

its investigation so that we don’t prejudice it.332

Carney also held a press briefing on September 18. During that 

briefing, he was asked about the conflict between Libyan officials 

and the administration as to what transpired in Benghazi—a conflict on full display on Face the Nation when Rice contradicted the 

Libyan President. Carney, like Rice on the talk shows, also connected the protests and violence across the region with the 

Benghazi attacks, linking the video to both events. He said: 

Q: I wanted to go back to the conflict between—the conflicting reports I guess between the administration and 

Libyan officials over what happened. On Friday, you 

seemed to cite that the videos were definitely part of it, 

but I get the sense that you’re backing away from that a 

little bit today. Is there something that you’ve learned 

since? 


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333Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, The White House (Sept. 18, 2012), https:// 

www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/18/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney9182012. 334 Email from Special Ass’t to the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Victoria J. Nuland, 

Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 19, 2012, 5:20 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0052773). 335 Email from Special Ass’t to the Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, to SWO-Cables (Sept. 19, 2012, 7:13 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0052812–SCB0052813). 

A: No, no. I think what I am making clear and what Ambassador Rice made clear on Sunday is that reaction to the 

video was the precipitating factor in protests in violence 

across the region. And what I’m also saying is that we 

have—we made that assessment based on the evidence 

that we have, and that includes all the evidence that we 

have at this time. 

I am not, unlike some others, going to prejudge the outcome of 

an investigation and categorically assert one way or the other what 

the motivations are or what happened exactly until that investigation is complete. And there are a lot of suppositions based on the 

number of weapons and other things about what really happened 

in Benghazi and I’d rather wait, and the President would rather 

wait, for that investigation to be completed. 

Q: So you’re not ruling out that—— 

A: Of course not. I’m not ruling out—if more information 

comes to light, that will obviously be a part of the investigation and we’ll make it available when appropriate. But 

at this time, as Ambassador Rice said and as I said, our 

understanding and our belief based on the information we 

have is it was the video that caused the unrest in Cairo, 

and the video and the unrest in Cairo that helped—that 

precipitated some of the unrest in Benghazi and elsewhere. What other factors were involved is a matter of investigation.333

Eight days after the attacks, on September 19, 2012, the Special 

Assistant to the Spokesperson, State Department, sent Nuland an 

email, possibly in response to a press inquiry, regarding Rice’s 

statements regarding security personnel on the Sunday shows. He 

wrote: 

This is the only piece I can find that could possibly be construed as the two security officials being there w/responsibility to protect the mission compound vice the annex. 

From the FOX News Sunday interview...334

Also on September 19, 2012, Sullivan drafted an ‘‘ALDAC’’—a 

worldwide cable to all U.S. embassies—approved by the Secretary 

in which guidance was given on ‘‘outreach and messaging’’ about 

the widespread violence in the Middle East.335 The cable continued 

to connect the attacks with the video: 

Since September 11, 2012, there have been widespread 

protests and violence against U.S. and some other diplomatic posts across the Muslim world. The proximate cause 

of the violence was the release by individuals in the 

United States of the video trailer for a film that many 


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336 Id. 337 Email from Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jennifer Rubin (‘‘J 

Rubin’’) (Sept. 20, 2012, 9:59 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05412001). 338 Rice Testimony at 149. 

Muslims find offensive. Diplomatic compounds have been 

breached in several countries including Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. In Benghazi, Libya four 

U.S. personnel were killed in the violence[.] 336

Even as late as September 20, 2012, Nuland was still supporting 

the claims made by Rice on the talk shows. When reporter Jennifer 

Rubin asked Nuland to comment on a CBS news report that ‘‘there 

was NO protest outside Libya embassy,’’ Nuland responded, ‘‘Off: 

this does not square with our info.’’ 337

In the week following her appearances on the Sunday talk shows, 

Rice remained publicly silent about her comments. Privately, however, she was ‘‘constantly interested’’ in new information about the 

attacks. She testified: 

Q: Did you have any conversations with anybody, either 

on the night of September 16th or at any day thereafter 

up to the point where you learned there were no protests 

in Benghazi, on the issue of whether or not President 

Magarief was correct or whether or not you were correct 

in saying that the attack was spontaneous? 

A: I don’t recall specific conversations, but I recall being 

constantly interested in understanding our evolving best 

assessment, with a mind to caring about its inconsistency 

with what I was—with what I said on the 16th.338

The absence of protests prior to the Benghazi attacks, however, 

remained a troubling issue for the administration. It was only a 

matter of time before this fact became widely known and disseminated publicly. Despite the best efforts by administration spokespersons to publicly support Rice’s comments, however, the truth ultimately emerged to show much of what she said on the talk shows 

was incorrect. 

THE SHIFT 

A week after the Benghazi attacks, administration officials began 

telling the public yet a different story. It started with Matthew G. 

Olsen, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. 

Matt Olsen’s Testimony on September 19 

On September 19, 2012, testifying before the Senate Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Olsen firmly stated 

that what happened in Benghazi was in fact a terrorist attack. 

Olsen also testified that individuals affiliated with al-Qaeda or alQaeda’s affiliates may have been involved in the attack. Olsen said: 

Q: So, let me begin by asking you whether you would say 

that Ambassador Stevens and the three other Americans 

died as a result of a terrorist attack. 


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A: Certainly on that particular question, I would say yes, 

they were killed in the course of a terrorist attack on our 

embassy. 

Q: Right. And do we have reason to believe at this point 

that that terrorist attack was preplanned for September 

11th or did the terrorists who were obviously planning it 

because it certainly seemed to be a coordinated terrorist 

attack just seize the moment of the demonstrations or protests against the film to carry out a terrorist attack? 

A: A more complicated question, and one, Mr. Chairman, 

that we are spending a great deal of time looking at even 

as we speak. And it’s a—it’s a—obviously, an investigation 

here is ongoing and facts are being developed continually. 

The best information we have now, the facts that we have 

now indicate that this was an opportunistic attack on our 

embassy. The attack began and evolved and escalated over 

several hours at our embassy—our diplomatic post in 

Benghazi. It evolved and escalated over several hours. 

It appears that individuals who were certainly well-armed 

seized on the opportunity presented as the events unfolded 

that evening and into the—into the morning hours of September 12th. We do know that a number of militants in 

the area, as I mentioned, are well-armed and maintain 

those arms. What we don’t have at this point is specific intelligence that there was a significant advanced planning 

or coordination for this attack. 

Again, we’re still developing facts and still looking for any 

indications of substantial advanced planning; we just 

haven’t seen that at this point. So, I think that’s the most 

I would say at this point. I do want to emphasize that 

there is a classified briefing for all of Congress that will 

take place tomorrow. 

Q: We’ll be there. Let me come back to what you said— 

that there was evidence or intelligence that, as you indicated broadly a moment ago, that in eastern Libya, in the 

Benghazi area, there were a number of militant or violent 

extremist groups. Do we have any idea at this point who 

was responsible among those groups for the attack on the 

consulate? 

A: This is the most important question that we’re considering. 

Q: Right. 

A: We are focused on who was responsible for this attack. 

At this point, I would say is that a number of different elements appear to have been involved in the attack, including individuals connected to militant groups that are prevalent in eastern Libya, particularly in the Benghazi area, 

as well. We are looking at indications that individuals involved in the attack may have had connections to al-Qaeda 

or al-Qaeda’s affiliates; in particular, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 


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339 Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing before the S. Committee on Homeland 

Security and Government Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Matthew Olsen, Dir., Nat’l 

Counterterrorism Center). 340Olsen Testimony at 55–57 (discussing how long and from what sources intelligence community knew of al-Qaeda connection). 341 Id. at 57–58. 342 Id. at 53–54. 

Q: Right. So that question has not been determined yet— 

whether it was a militant—or a Libyan group or a group 

associated with al-Qaeda influence from abroad. 

A: That’s right. And I would—I would add that what—the 

picture that is emerging is one where a number of different individuals were involved, so it’s not necessarily an 

either/or proposition. 

Q: OK. OK, good, well—— 

A: Again, as you know, the FBI is leading the investigation and that’s ongoing.339

Olsen’s testimony that what had transpired in Benghazi was a 

terrorist attack and that there may be links to al-Qaeda was the 

first time an administration official had stated either of those facts 

publicly. He said the attacks were ‘‘opportunistic’’ and did not mention anything about a video. Olsen responded to Chairman Joseph 

I. Lieberman’s questions directly, concisely, confidently, and factually. He did not couch his language, speculate, or go beyond the 

facts he knew. Additionally, what he said was accurate. Such factcentered testimony stands in stark contrast to Rice’s appearances 

on the talk shows. 

Olsen told the Committee he wanted to talk about the connection 

to al-Qaeda at the Senate hearing; a possible al-Qaeda connection 

was a large factor in the post-attack analysis occurring within the 

intelligence community—a fact the IC had known for nearly a 

week.340 Olsen testified: 

But my thought at the time was this is not overly sensitive, and it is the kind of information that I was concerned, if we didn’t—if I didn’t say this in response to a 

question about who was responsible for this attack, it 

would be an omission that would be glaring in the—you 

know, as, on, Congress Members, themselves, were aware 

of this, right? Some of them serving on HPSCI or SSCI 

may well have seen the reporting. So it seemed to me the 

right thing to do to avoid being, you know, viewed as not 

being as forthcoming as I could be, even if it went beyond 

what had been publicly stated. 

So that was my thinking at the time, why I thought that 

that was an important point to make and why I actually 

focused on it in advance of the hearings, so that folks 

would know that I was going to say it.341

Olsen knew at the time the administration had yet to publicly tie 

al-Qaeda to the Benghazi attacks. As such, he directed his head of 

legislative affairs to alert other Executive Branch agencies that he 

would likely make the connection at the hearing.342 Meehan 


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343 Email from Bernadette M. Meehan, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Victoria J. 

Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, & Patrick H. Ventrell, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (Sept. 19, 2012, 10:22 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05561987). 344 Id. 345September 13 WIRe, supra note 123. 346Olsen Testimony at 25. 

emailed Nuland about this possibility on the morning of the hearing. In an email with the subject ‘‘Change of Language per the 

call’’—perhaps an indication of coordination between how the 

White House and State Department were going to respond to press 

inquiries that day about Benghazi—Meehan wrote: 

I am rushing to Jay’s prep, and will circle up with the 

broader group after. But wanted to flag that Matt Olsen 

from NCTC will be on the Hill this morning . . . Wanted 

to flag that IF ASKED, Matt will use the line: 

There are indications some of the extremists involved in 

the attack may be linked to al-Qa’ida or its affiliates, but 

this assessment may change as additional information is 

collected and analyzed. In eastern Libya there are numerous armed groups, some of whom have al-Qa’ida sympathies. 

Flagging because it is an unclass session, so if he makes 

that statement, word will likely leak, and it is the first 

time someone from the USG will be saying that there 

might be a link to al-Qaeda. Ben and I discussed, and 

agreed that we refer questions to people involved in the investigation, note the investigation is still underway and no 

definitive conclusions yet, and if pressed, can point out 

there is no discrepancy with our original assessment because we always said our original assessment was based 

on info available at the time and that the investigation 

would provide further detail. 

Hopefully won’t come up, but wanted to flag just in 

case.343

In her email, Meehan mentions a conversation with Rhodes and 

notes that ‘‘if pressed, can point out there is no discrepancy with 

our original assessment because we always said our original assessment was based on info available at the time and that the investigation would provide further detail.’’ 344 What Meehan does 

not say is that the link to al-Qaeda was actually cited in the intelligence community’s original assessment.345 That was not new information, as Olsen acknowledged.346

Additionally, Meehan’s email—reflecting other public statements 

by administration officials up to that point—noted she and Rhodes 

‘‘agreed that we refer questions to people involved in the investigation.’’ Olsen told the Committee the investigation did not in fact 

prohibit him from talking about what had been learned up to that 

point. He testified: 

Q: Was there anything about the FBI investigation that 

prohibited you from either, A, saying it was a terrorist attack, or, B, drawing a link to AQIM? 


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347 Id. at 60. 348 Id. at 61–62 349 Id. at 100. 350 Id. at 50–51. 

A: No, nothing that I—no, I don’t—certainly not the question of whether it was a terrorist attack or the way I 

phrased the answer to the question on who was responsible—on the connections to—you know, potential connections to terrorist groups. 

Q: So if nothing about the ongoing investigation prohibited you from saying that, then why would others refer to 

the ongoing investigation when asked those very same 

questions? 

A: —You know, I, obviously, don’t know exactly why others. I do 

think there’s a range of reasonable, you know, approaches to this 

question. In other words, I don’t think there is one right approach.347

Olsen also testified his background as a prosecutor helps him 

create a fact-centered approach to sharing information. He said: 

Q: Sure. As a prosecutor, the facts are very important to 

you. A fact is a fact, and you’re going to share what that 

fact may be—is that fair to say?—as opposed to being concerned about public relations, in lack of a better phrase, or 

the impression people might get? 

A: That’s basically right, and that’s sort of—that is the approach of being a prosecutor in terms of reliance on facts. 

I’m not—I shouldn’t, you know, lead you to believe that 

I’m completely oblivious to—— 

Q: Of course 

A: —the public impression that you can leave and the importance that that has too.348

Even though Olsen wanted to state publicly that al-Qaeda sympathizers may have been involved in the attack, he did not plan on 

saying definitively that it was a terrorist attack. While Olsen knew 

from the outset it was a terrorist attack—‘‘all of those factors, you 

know, made it so that it was, to me, there was not really a question 

of whether it was a terrorist attack’’ 349—he testified he had not 

given it a great deal of thought, but when asked directly by Lieberman, the logical response was to acknowledge that it was a terrorist attack.350

Olsen recognized almost immediately after the hearing he may 

have made news with what he had said with respect to the events 

being a terrorist attack. He told the Committee he wrote an email 

to the White House alerting them of what he had said. Olsen testified: 

Q: So what were the repercussions of you saying it was a 

terrorist attack? 

A: So one of the things I did afterwards was I wrote an 

email to both John Brennan and Denis McDonough—you 

know, Denis was the Deputy National Security Advisor 


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351 Id. at 71–72. 352 Email from Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, 

Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, Cheryl D. Mills, Chief 

of Staff to the U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, & Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y for 

Management, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 19, 2012, 2:45 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05561975). 353Testimony of Bernadette M. Meehan, Spokesperson, Nat’l Sec. Council, Tr. at 28–29 (Dec. 

16, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 

and John was—John Brennan was the counterterrorism 

advisor—and explained to them—you know, I said something like, ‘‘I made some news today with my testimony. 

Here is why I testified that this was a terrorist attack,’’ 

was my thought process. And they wrote back to me, saying, ‘‘You did the right thing,’’ essentially, in emails that 

day. You know, ‘‘Understand you made the right points,’’ 

or something like that. 

But again, look, I was aware, again, in a way I hadn’t really been before that what I was testifying to was potentially 

newsworthy, and, in fact, it was. So that’s why I thought 

both let my press person think about what we need to do, 

ask him to think about what we may need to do, and then 

also, myself, reach out to John Brennan and Denis 

McDonough.351

Private reaction from senior officials at the State Department regarding Olsen’s testimony, however, appeared less supportive. 

Nuland wrote to Sullivan, Mills, and Kennedy: 

Fysa, and for Jake’s drafting exercise; NCTC also called it 

a terrorist attack today: I had demurred on that as had 

Jay, pending investigation.352

Sullivan called the White House to inform them he was unaware 

Olsen was going to testify it was a terrorist attack. Meehan testified: 

Q: Do you recall generally having any conversations with 

[Jake Sullivan] that week? Or in the immediate aftermath 

of the attack, that general period of September 2012? 

A: I do recall having one phone conversation with him. I 

don’t know whether it’s in the scope of the 4 to 5 days that 

we’re discussing. 

Q: Okay. What was discussed in that conversation? 

A: He raised that he had been unaware before Matt Olsen 

testified on the Hill, that Matt Olsen was going to make 

a link publicly to Al Qaeda in reference to the Benghazi 

attack. 

Q: Why did he raise that issue with you? 

A: I can’t say why I was the individual that he called. I 

don’t know.353

Even the Secretary expressed surprise at Olsen’s testimony. 

Olsen testified: 


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354Olsen Testimony at 82–83. 355 Remarks by the President at Univision Town Hall with Jorge Ramos and Maria Elena Salinas, Miami, FL, Sept. 20, 2012. 

Q: Yeah. Did anybody express to you that they were disappointed in what you said, they were perplexed by what 

you said, that what you said may have thrown a message 

off kilter? 

* * * 

A: . . . But, you know, to your question I did hear at one 

point—and I don’t remember exactly when—from Director 

Clapper that he’d heard from Secretary Clinton, you know, 

of some surprise about me saying that it was a terrorist 

attack. And he basically said—you know, I remember 

thinking he basically said, you know, ‘‘We’re saying what 

we see,’’ something like that. 

But I remember hearing from him. He told me directly— 

I think we were either in a car or getting ready to get in 

his car to come downtown—that he’d gotten a call or had 

heard from Secretary Clinton about surprise that one of 

his guys was talking about this being a terrorist attack.354

The day after Olsen’s testimony, September 20, 2012, the President participated in a town hall with Univision at the University 

of Miami. The President had the following exchange: 

Q: We have reports that the White House said today that 

the attacks in Libya were a terrorist attack. Do you have 

information indicating that it was Iran, or al-Qaeda was 

behind organizing the protests? 

A: Well, we’re still doing an investigation, and there are 

going to be different circumstances in different countries. 

And so I don’t want to speak to something until we have 

all the information. What we do know is that the natural 

protests that arose because of the outrage over the video 

were used as an excuse by extremists to see if they can 

also directly harm U.S. interests—— 

Q: Al-Qaeda? 

A: Well, we don’t know yet. And so we’re going to continue 

to investigate this. We’ve insisted on, and have received so 

far full cooperation from countries like Egypt and Libya 

and Tunisia in not only protecting our diplomatic posts, 

but also to make sure that we discover who, in fact, is trying to take advantage of this....355

The President said the government wanted to ‘‘discover who, in 

fact, is trying to take advantage of this.’’ It is unclear if ‘‘this’’ is 

a reference to the video, protests, or something else. However, no 

assessment from the CIA ever stated anybody was ‘‘trying to take 

advantage’’ of the video, or even that there was a direct link between the video and the Benghazi attacks. 

The President also stated, in response to a question that mentioned only Libya, the ‘‘natural protests that arose because of the 


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356 Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks with Pakistani Foreign 

Minister Hina Rabbani Khar before Their Meeting (Sept.25, 2012), http://www.state.gov/ 

secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/198060.htm. 357Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President 

to the UN General Assembly (Sept. 13, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/ 

09/25/remarks-president-un-general-assembly. 

outrage over the video were used as an excuse by extremists to see 

if they can also directly harm U.S. interests—.’’ This statement was 

made two days after the U.S. government obtained access to the 

video footage from the Benghazi Mission compound, which did not 

show a protest outside the Benghazi Mission compound prior to the 

beginning of the attacks. 

When asked if al-Qaeda was involved, the President responded 

‘‘we don’t know yet.’’ The day before, however, Olsen testified under 

oath before Congress the government was ‘‘looking at indiciations 

that individuals involved in the attack may have had connections 

to al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda’s affiliates; in particular, al-Qaeda in the 

Islamic Maghreb.’’ 

Two days after Olsen’s testimony, on September 21, 2012, the 

Secretary said for the first time publicly that what happened in 

Benghazi was a ‘‘terrorist attack.’’ 356

Four days later, on September 25, 2012, the President said, during remarks to the United Nations General Assembly: ‘‘There are 

no words that excuse the killing of innocents. There’s no video that 

justifies an attack on an embassy.’’ 357

It was not until the following day—a full week after Olsen made 

his comments and fifteen days after the attacks began—Carney finally acknowledged the President’s position was that a terrorist attack occurred. Carney said: 

Q: Can I ask one more—are criticizing the President for 

not classifying what happened in Benghazi as a terrorist 

attack, going as far as you did or the NCTC director. Can 

you respond to that and explain why that is? 

A: The President spoke eloquently I believe about the attack that took the lives of four Americans at the United 

Nations General Assembly, and I think made very clear 

that it is wholly unacceptable to respond to a video, no 

matter how offensive, with violence, and it is wholly unacceptable, regardless of the reason, to attack embassies or 

diplomatic facilities and to kill diplomatic personnel. 

The President—our position is, as reflected by the NCTC 

director, that it was a terrorist attack. It is, I think by definition, a terrorist attack when there is a prolonged assault on an embassy with weapons. 

The broader questions here about who participated, what 

led to the attack on the facility in Benghazi—all those 

questions are under investigation at two levels, by the FBI 

and by the Accountability Review Board established by 

Secretary Clinton to look at issues of security in Benghazi 

and security at other diplomatic facilities. 


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358Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jay Carney Aboard Air Force One en route Ohio, Office 

of the Press Secretary, The White House (Sept. 26, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/09/26/press-gaggle-press-secretary-jay-carney-aboard-air-force-one-en-route-oh. 359 Cent. Intel. Agency, Libya: Updated Assessment of Benghazi Attacks, World Intelligence 

Review, Sept. 24, 2012 (on file with CIA, IntBook29–076 to IntBook29–079). 360 Id. 361 Id. 362 Intelligence Note, Memorandum for Acting Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, Jan. 4, 2013 [hereinafter Analytic Line Review] (on file with CIA, REQUEST 17–0049 to REQUEST 17–0063). 363 [Redacted text]. 

So, let’s be clear, it was a terrorist attack and it was an 

inexcusable attack.358

September 24 Intelligence Assessment 

Two days before Carney finally acknowledged publicly that 

Benghazi was a terrorist attack, on September 24, 2012, the CIA 

published its new ‘‘assessment’’ about the Benghazi attacks, formally changing their old assessment which had been in place since 

September 13. In the September 24 piece, which was produced 

jointly with the National Counterterrorism Center, the analysts 

wrote ‘‘We now assess, based on new reporting, that the assault 

was deliberate and organized. Our most credible information indicates that there was not a protest ongoing at the time of the attack 

as first reported.’’ 359

The supporting intelligence used in this piece to support the new 

assessment was threefold. The first piece of intelligence was from 

September 19, 2012 and noted that attackers used fixed firing positions, capture or kill teams, and blockades to impede the escape of 

US personnel,’’ [redacted text] 360

The second piece of intelligence [redacted text] suggesting ‘‘the 

attack was put together at least several hours ahead of time.’’ 361

Although this piece of intelligence was available as early as September 15—one day before Rice went on the Sunday talk shows 

and nine days before the analysts published their updated assessment—an internal CIA after action review noted that this piece of 

intelligence was ‘‘not viewed as credible enough’’ at the time to outweigh other reporting, such as news reports.362

The third piece of intelligence [redacted text] noted simply that 

the attackers ‘‘also employed effective mortar fire against the Embassy annex later in the night after US return fire repulsed their 

initial ground assault.’’ 363 This piece of intelligence was formally 

available to analysts as early as September 14, and informally 

available to them as early as September 12. 

Additionally, perhaps the most credible—and definitive—piece of 

intelligence indicating no protest had occurred prior to the 

Benghazi attacks was the video footage from the closed circuit televisions at the Special Mission Compound in Benghazi. The CIA had 

access to analysis of this footage by the Libyan Intelligence Service 

as early as September 18, 2012, and those in the CIA who saw the 

video on that date concluded immediately no protest occurred prior 

to the attacks. This intelligence was not cited in the update assessment. 

The manager of the analysts testified the analysts began working 

on the piece before September 18. Given that fact—and that the information cited in the updated assessment as rationale for changVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00252 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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364 [Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 75–77, 92–95. 365 Id. at 75–77. 366 [Redacted text]. 

ing the assessment was available on September 14, September 15, 

and September 19—why did it take the CIA until September 24 to 

publish the piece? 

The answer appears to be the piece was held up in interagency 

coordination. The analysts did not want an interagency partner to 

file a formal dissent. The manager of the analysts testified: 

And, frankly, the WIRe that ran on the 24th actually got 

held up for 2 days in Coordination, trying to convince people in the IC [Intelligence Community], who hadn’t seen 

this video yet because it wasn’t back in country, that there 

were no protests.364

Other interagency partners—specifically the State Department— 

did not trust the Libyan government’s assessment of the video, 

even though CIA officials in Tripoli had seen the actual video footage and concurred with the assessment.365 This distrust held up 

interagency coordination of the piece for several days. It was not 

until September 24 when the actual video footage arrived at CIA 

headquarters, allowing for dissemination to other interagency partners.366

September 28 ODNI Statement 

On September 28, 2012, Shawn Turner, Director of Public Affairs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, released a 

statement on the intelligence related to the Benghazi terrorist attacks. That statement read in full: 

In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on U.S. personnel 

and facilities in Benghazi, Libya, the Intelligence Community launched a comprehensive effort to determine the circumstances surrounding the assault and to identify the 

perpetrators. We also reviewed all available intelligence to 

determine if there might be follow-on attacks against our 

people or facilities in Libya or elsewhere in the world. 

As the Intelligence Community collects and analyzes more 

information related to the attack, our understanding of the 

event continues to evolve. In the immediate aftermath, 

there was information that led us to assess that the attack 

began spontaneously following protests earlier that day at 

our embassy in Cairo. We provided that initial assessment 

to Executive Branch officials and members of Congress, 

who used that information to discuss the attack publicly 

and provide updates as they became available. Throughout 

our investigation we continued to emphasize that information gathered was preliminary and evolving. 

As we learned more about the attack, we revised our initial assessment to reflect new information indicating that 

it was a deliberate and organized terrorist attack carried 

out by extremists. It remains unclear if any group or person exercised overall command and control of the attack, 


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367Press Release, Office of the Dir. of National Intel., Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. 

Consulate in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/pressreleases/96-press-releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-of-public-affairs-onintelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-benghazi. 368Olsen Testimony at 119. 369Olsen Testimony at 67. 370Press Release, Office of the Dir. of National Intel., Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. 

Consulate in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/pressreleases/96-press-releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-of-public-affairs-onintelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-benghazi. 371See id. 372 Id. 373September 13 WIRe, supra note 123. 

and if extremist group leaders directed their members to 

participate. However, we do assess that some of those involved were linked to groups affiliated with, or sympathetic to al-Qa’ida. We continue to make progress, but 

there remain many unanswered questions. As more information becomes available our analysis will continue to 

evolve and we will obtain a more complete understanding 

of the circumstances surrounding the terrorist attack. 

We continue to support the ongoing FBI investigation and 

the State Department review of the Benghazi terrorist attack, providing the full capabilities and resources of the Intelligence Community to those efforts. We also will continue to meet our responsibility to keep Congress fully and 

currently informed. For its part, the Intelligence Community will continue to follow the information about the tragic events in Benghazi wherever it leads. The President demands and expects that we will do this, as do Congress 

and the American people. As the Intelligence Community, 

we owe nothing less than our best efforts in this regard, 

especially to the families of the four courageous Americans 

who lost their lives at Benghazi in service of their country.367

Even though the issue of protests was heavily debated in the 

public at the time, the statement does not specifically address 

whether or not a protest occurred prior to the attacks—doing so 

would have undercut Rice’s statements on the talk shows twelve 

days before. In addition, the issue of protests was not an ‘‘analytical focal point’’ 368 for the intelligence community and was more of 

a ‘‘subsidiary issue’’ to them.369

Rather, the statement only mentions it was a ‘‘deliberate and organized terrorist attack’’ 370—still leaving open the possibility protests may have occurred. The statement did not mention anything 

about the internet video, let alone any connection between the 

video and Benghazi attacks. The statement, issued by the intelligence community and not the White House or State Department, 

did not connect the two events.371

As public statements tend to be, this statement was carefully 

worded. It notes only the initial intelligence community assessment 

that it ‘‘began spontaneously following protests earlier that day at 

our embassy in Cairo.’’ 372 This wording can be directly tied to language in the September 13 WIRe.373 The statement does not say, 


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374Press Release, Office of the Dir. of National Intel., Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. 

Consulate in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/96-pressreleases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-of-public-affairs-onintelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-benghazi. 375 Email from Peter Velz, Media Monitor, White House, to DL–WHO-Press, et al. (Sept. 27, 

2012, 10:15 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305). 

however, the intelligence community ever assessed that protests or 

demonstrations had occurred prior to the Benghazi attacks—something repeatedly mentioned by Rice on the talk shows. That is because, aside from the errant title in the September 13 WIRe, the 

intelligence community never formally coordinated such an assessment in writing. 

The statement also says ‘‘[a]s we learned more about the attack, 

we revised our initial assessment to reflect new information indicating that it was a deliberate and organized terrorist attack carried out by extremists. . . . we do assess that some of those involved were linked to groups affiliated with, or sympathetic to alQa’ida.’’ 374

Given that the intelligence leading to the new assessment was 

more than a week old, and in some cases even older, why, then, 

did ODNI wait until September 28, 2012 to issue this statement? 

The answer lies in emails between senior administration officials. 

The genesis for ODNI’s statement occurred the day before as a 

result of a press report. The article, published on September 27, 

2012 said the following: 

URGENT: U.S. intelligence officials knew from Day One 

that the assault on the U.S. Consulate in Libya was a terrorist attack and suspect Al Qaeda-tied elements were involved, sources told Fox News—though it took the administration a week to acknowledge it. 

The account conflicts with claims on the Sunday after the 

attack by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan 

Rice that the administration believed the strike was a 

‘‘spontaneous’’ event triggered by protests in Egypt over an 

anti-Islam film. 

Sources said the administration internally labeled the attack terrorism from the first day to enable a certain type 

of policy response and that officials were looking for one 

specific suspect. 

In addition, sources confirm that FBI agents have not yet 

arrived in Benghazi in the aftermath of the attack.375

Upon seeing the article that morning, McDonough forwarded it 

to Robert Cardillo, Deputy Director, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Morell, and John Brennan, Counterterrorism 

Advisor to the President. McDonough wrote: 

Hey, guys, 

This is the third report making this assertion. Is this correct? 

Thanks, 


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376 Email from Mr.McDonough, to Mr. Cardillo and Mr. Morell (Sept. 27, 2012, 10:57 AM) (on 

file with the Committee, C05415305). 377 Email from Mr. Cardillo to Mr. McDonough, et al. (Sept. 27, 2012, 11:23 AM) (on file with 

the Committee, C05415305). 378Olsen Testimony at 100. 379Morell Testimony at 74. 380 Email from Mr. Olsen to Mr. Cardillo, et al. (Sept. 27, 2012, 12:12 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05415305). 381 Email from Mr. Cardillo to Mr. Olsen, Mr. McDonough, & Mr. Morell (Sept. 27, 2012, 7:47 

PM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305). 

Denis 376

Cardillo responded, including Olsen and Nick Rasmussen, Deputy Director, National Counterterrorism Center. Cardillo wrote: 

I am fairly sure the answer is ‘no.’ And I’ve asked Matt 

and Nick to lay out on a timeline the evolution of our IC 

assessments from 12 September on. They’re on cc so I’ll 

ask when that can be ready. Robert.377

It is unclear which assertion McDonough and Cardillo were referring to, although Olsen told the Committee he believed from the 

beginning the assault on the U.S. facilities in Benghazi was a terrorist attack,378 and Morell testified that ‘‘[i]n the minds of the 

[CIA] analysts from the get-go, this was a terrorist attack, and I 

think that is reflected in what they wrote.’’ 379

Olsen responded to the email, writing: 

AllAs Robert suggests, I think the best way to approach this 

is to review and memorialize exactly what we were saying 

from the onset of the attack going forward. We’ve got a 

chronological catalog of all finished intelligence on the attack. And we’ll put together today a time line summary 

that sets forth all key points and analytic judgments as 

they developed from 9/11 through the present. Nick and I 

will get started on the time line right away. 

—Matt 380

That evening, Cardillo responded. He sent his response to the 

group, but also included Turner and Rexon Ryu. Cardillo wrote: 

NCTC has already made great progress in documenting 

the chronology of what we knew and what we published. 

My reading of that draft is that we can easily debunk Fox 

and refute the hits on Susan’s statements on Sunday, 16 

Sep. As I read the laydown, her comments were consistent 

with our intel assessment at that time....381

McDonough responded to the email, and included Rhodes in the 

email chain. In his response, McDonough included another article 

from ABC News. The title of the ABC News article was ‘‘Some Administration Officials Were Concerned About Initial White House 

Push Blaming Benghazi Attack on Mob, Video’’ and read, in part: 

Even before Defense Secretary Leon Panetta contradicted 

the initial story about the attack on the U.S. consulate in 

Benghazi, Libya, today, Obama administration officials 


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382 Email from Mr. McDonough to Mr. Cardillo, Mr. Olsen, Mr. Rhodes, and Mr. Morell (Sept. 

27, 2012, 7:49 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305). 383 Id. 384 Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. McDonough, Mr. Olsen, Mr. Cardillo, and Mr. Morell (Sept. 

27, 2012, 7:52 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305). 385 Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. McDonough, Mr. Cardillo, Mr. Olsen, and Mr. Morell (Sept. 

27, 2012, 7:56 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305). 386 Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Cardillo, Mr. McDonough, Mr. Olsen, and Mr. Morell (Sept. 

27, 2012, 8:15 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305). 

told ABC News they were concerned after the White House 

began pushing the line that the attack was spontaneous 

and not the work of terrorists. . . . Panetta today said 

that the attack that killed four Americans on the anniversary of 9/11 was not only carried out by terrorists—it was 

pre-meditated. . . . 

The White House first suggested the attack was spontaneous—the result of an anti-Muslim video that incited 

mobs throughout the region. . . . 

But sources told ABC News that intelligence officials on 

the ground immediately suspected the attack was not tied 

to the movie at all. . . . 

As of Thursday afternoon, officials from the Obama administration were not even 100 percent certain that the protest of the anti-Muslim film in Benghazi occurred outside 

the U.S. diplomatic post.382

McDonough wrote of this article, ‘‘The piece immediately below 

led ABC World News Tonight today. It is really galling.’’ 383

Rhodes responded three minutes later. He wrote: 

I believe that we need something tomorrow. There is a 

narrative that is being aggressively pushed that the White 

House and Susan Rice deliberately misrepresented facts, 

which is being confirmed by anonymous intelligence 

sources and administration officials. In the absence of an 

affirmative statement that this has been an evolving set of 

facts guided by our increasing understanding of what took 

place, that narrative will only harden further. Already, it 

is a bell that is going to be very difficult to unring.384

In essence, Rhodes wanted to put out a statement not for the 

reason of informing the public about the updated intelligence assessment relating to the attacks, but to refute allegations Rice and 

the White House ‘‘deliberately misrepresented facts.’’ 385

Rhodes emailed the group again less than twenty minutes later, 

stating: 

Again, I believe we have a very credible case that all we 

have done is follow the facts and inform people of those 

facts, while prioritizing the need for investigations to run 

their course. However, that case is being lost amidst the 

leaks of information (correct and incorrect) and uninformed assertions coming from a variety of places.386

Two things about Rhodes’ response are noteworthy. One, he acknowledges some of the leaks are ‘‘correct,’’ although he does not 


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387 Id. 388 Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Cardillo, Mr. Olsen, Mr. McDonough, Mr. Morell (Sept. 28, 

2012, 10:43 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305). 389 Rhodes Testimony at 137. 390 Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Cardillo, Mr. Olsen, Mr. McDonough, Mr. Morell (Sept. 28, 

2012, 10:43 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305). 391 Rhodes Testimony at 137. 392Olsen Testimony at 117. 393 H. Res. 567 113th Congress Section 3(a)(3). 

identify which ones; and two, he writes ‘‘I believe we have a very 

credible case that all we have done is follow the facts.’’ 387 ‘‘Credible 

case’’ is hardly a definitive, full-throated defense of the administration’s handling of the public explanation for the attacks in 

Benghazi. 

The following morning Olsen emailed the group that he had provided a draft statement to Turner for eventual release. Rhodes responded, writing: 

Thank you for working this, as the most important thing 

is having a public baseline—informed by the facts—that 

we can all point to. We are well synched up with Shawn 

Turner as well.388

Rhodes testified to the Committee about his recollection of this 

statement: 

Well, my recollection is that there was an interest in providing a statement that clarified our understanding and 

the evolution of our understanding of the events in 

Benghazi that that statement was to be prepared by the 

intelligence community. I work with them in my coordinating role as they were preparing that statement.389

Rhodes’ email that they are ‘‘synched up’’ with Turner,390 and his 

testimony that he was in his ‘‘coordinating role’’ as the statement 

was prepared,391 serves as a reminder the White House played a 

central role in the drafting of this statement—a statement that, by 

Rhodes’ own admission, served not to inform the public but rather 

to push back against a narrative that the White House and Rice 

deliberately misrepresented facts. The statement itself, however, 

according to Olsen, was ‘‘speaking on behalf of the intelligence community at that point and not really beyond that.’’ 392 The White 

House’s involvement in the creation of the statement—through 

McDonough, Brennan, and Rhodes—continues to raise questions as 

to who ultimately controlled the message regarding Benghazi coming out of not just the intelligence community but the executive 

branch as a whole. 

THE LANDSCAPE 

The political import of the attacks on the presidential campaign 

of 2012 is not a subject of the committee’s investigation. Nevertheless, the House of Representatives did direct the Committee to investigate and study ‘‘internal and public executive branch communications about the attacks.’’ 393 It would be naı ̈ve to assume this 

or any administration’s public statements about a significant foreign policy event would be made without full awareness of the poVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00258 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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394October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript, COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES (Oct. 16, 2012), 

http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-16-2012-the-second-obama-romney-presidentialdebate. 395See, e.g., Tom Cohen, Obama makes war policy an election strength, CNN (Oct. 24, 2011), 

http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/24/politics/obama-foreign-policy. 396 Id. 397President Barack Obama, Speech at 2012 Democratic National Convention (Sept. 6, 2012). 398Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jay Carney en route Las Vegas, NV, Office of the Press 

Secretary, The White House (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/ 

09/12/press-gaggle-press-secretary-jay-carney-en-route-las-vegas-nv-9122012. 399 Con Coughlin, The Murder of the US Ambassador to Libya is a Wake-up Call for Obama, 

The Daily Telegraph (Sept. 12, 2012), http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/concoughlin/100180611/ 

murder-of-us-ambassador-is-a-wake-up-call-for-obama. 

litical effect of those statements. It is necessary to place the attacks 

and the administration’s statements about them in context. 

The Benghazi terrorist attacks occurred not only on the anniversary of the Sept 11, 2001 terrorist attacks but also in the middle 

of the 2012 presidential campaign. The first presidential debate 

was 22 days away and the election was 56 days away. The killing 

of a U.S. Ambassador in the line of duty—which had not occurred 

in 33 years—and three other Americans would inevitably become 

an issue in the campaign and even be discussed at the presidential 

debate on October 16, 2012.394

Prior to the attacks, the President and the Secretary of State 

took credit for the Administration’s record in the war on terror, the 

perceived success of the intervention in Libya, and the toppling of 

its dictator, Muammar Qadhafi.395 Nearly four years had passed 

without a significant incident at home or abroad, and killing 

Osama bin Laden represented an historic victory.396 The President 

pointed to these successes in his campaign, including in a speech 

five days prior to the attacks: 

In a world of new threats and new challenges, you can 

choose leadership that has been tested and proven. Four 

years ago, I promised to end the war in Iraq: We did. I 

promised to refocus on the terrorists who actually attacked 

us on 9/11. We have. We’ve blunted the Taliban’s momentum in Afghanistan, and in 2014, our longest war will be 

over. A new tower rises above the New York skyline, alQaeda is on the path to defeat, and Osama bin Laden is 

dead.397

The Benghazi attacks could certainly affect public perception of 

the administration’s record in the war on terror and the narrative 

of success in Libya. Almost immediately, the press began asking 

questions about whether Benghazi represented a failure of the 

President’s policies. In a press conference the day after the attacks, 

a reporter asked Carney directly: ‘‘Jay, is the U.S. doing something 

wrong policy-wise in Libya that brings this [the attack] on? Or is 

the policy fine, it’s just this particular event?’’ 398 One publication 

summed up the situation by saying, ‘‘with the American Presidential election only two months away, the murder of four Americans serving their government overseas could be a game changer 

so far as Mr. Obama’s re-election prospects are concerned.’’ 399

The attacks remained an issue throughout the campaign including at the second presidential debate where former Massachusetts 

Governor Mitt Romney used the attacks to question the administration’s Middle East policy generally: 


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400October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript, Commission on Presidential Debates (Oct. 16, 2012), 

http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-16-2012-the-second-obama-romney-presidentialdebate 401October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript, COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES (Oct. 16, 2012), 

http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-16-2012-the-second-obama-romney-presidentialdebate; Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President 

on the Deaths of U.S. Embassy Staff in Libya (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2012/09/12/remarks-president-deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya. 402Dylan Byers & MacKenzie Weinger, CBS under fire for withhold Obama’s Benghazi remarks, POLITICO (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2012/11/cbs-under-fire-forwithholding-obamas-benghazi-remarks-148513. 403 Id. 404 Id. 405 Id. 406 Id. 407 Helene Cooper, Obama’s Prep Session Goal: Don’t Repeat Mistakes of Last Debate, N.Y. 

TIMES (Oct. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/us/politics/a-serious-debate-prepsession-for-obama.html?_r=0. 

And this [the Benghazi attacks] calls into question the 

president’s whole policy in the Middle East. Look what’s 

happening in Syria, in Egypt, now in Libya. Consider the 

distance between ourselves and—and Israel, the president 

said that—that he was going to put daylight between us 

and Israel. 

We have Iran four years closer to a nuclear bomb. Syria— 

Syria’s not just a tragedy of 30,000 civilians being killed 

by a military, but also a strategic—strategically significant 

player for America. 

The president’s policies throughout the Middle East began 

with an apology tour and—and—and pursue a strategy of 

leading from behind, and this strategy is unraveling before 

our very eyes.400

Shortly after this statement, the candidates and the moderator 

debated whether the President called the Benghazi attacks a terrorist attack from day one.401 The President’s Rose Garden remarks were not his only public comments about the attacks on September 12. The President also taped a 60 Minutes interview the 

same day, which aired on September 23.402 During the interview 

the President said it was ‘‘too early to tell’’ when asked about his 

Rose Garden remarks and whether the attacks were terrorism.403

The question and the President’s answer were not included in the 

broadcast version because the interview was edited.404

Three days after the second debate, CBS posted additional portions of the 60 Minutes transcript from the interview with the 

President on September 12, 2012.405 The portion of the President 

refusing to call it a terrorist attack was still absent. It was not 

until November 6, 2012, two days before the election, when CBS 

finally posted publicly for the first time the entire transcript of the 

President’s interview on September 12, 2012.406

The President of CBS News at the time, David Rhodes, is the 

brother of Ben Rhodes, who helped prepare the President for the 

second debate.407 While Ben Rhodes denied to the Committee he 

talked with anybody at CBS prior to the September 23, 2012, airing of the President’s interview, he did not know whether others 

in the White House did. Rhodes also did not testify as to whether 


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408 Rhodes Testimony at 118–19. 409 Craig Unger, GOP’s October surprise?, SALON (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.salon.com/2012/10/ 

01/gops_october_surprise. 410See Email from Sidney Blumenthal to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t 

of State (Oct. 1, 2012, 9:30 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0045545) (‘‘Got done and published.’’). 411 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Oct. 1, 2012, 3:37 PM) 

(on file with the Committee, SCB0045545). 412Phone Call between Office of White House Counsel and Committee Staff (Jan. 30, 2016). 

or not he spoke with anybody at CBS after September 23, 2012, regarding the posting of the transcript to CBS’ website. He testified: 

Q: And you may recall there was some bit of controversy 

over the interview that was actually aired by CBS because 

it did not include a portion of the President’s remarks. Do 

you remember that? 

A: I have a recollection that there was some controversy 

about that, yes. 

Q: Did you or anybody else on your staff have any conversations with CBS about that 60 Minutes interview? 

A: I did not excuse me, what’s the in what time period are 

you talking about? 

Q: Prior to it airing? 

A: I did not have any conversations with CBS after the 

interview taped prior to it aired. 

Q: Did anybody on your staff? 

A: Generally, when we have interviews like that with the 

President, the contacts with the network are handled by 

the White House press in the communications office, not 

the NSC. 

Q: Do you know if any of those communications actually 

occurred? 

A: I don’t know.408

On October 1, 2012, the Secretary of State forwarded a Salon article titled ‘‘GOP’s October Surprise?’’ which alleged Romney 

planned to attack the President as weak on terrorism.409 Sidney 

Blumenthal emailed the article to the Secretary and took credit for 

it getting it ‘‘done and published.’’ 410 The Secretary forwarded the 

email to Sullivan with the instruction, ‘‘Be sure Ben knows they 

need to be ready for this line of attack.’’ Sullivan responded: ‘‘Will 

do.’’ 411

The White House told the Committee they would not allow the 

Committee to ask about this email during the Committee’s interview with Rhodes, citing executive privilege and noting that preparing for a debate was a ‘‘core executive function.’’ 412

MIXING INTELLIGENCE WITH POLITICS 

In the months after the Benghazi attacks, politics continued to 

play a role in assigning blame for what had occurred and who said 

what. In addition to the usual politics of Republicans and Democrats lobbing accusations at one another, however, a different, 


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413 Ed O’Keefe, Susan Rice, CIA director meet with GOP critics on Libya, WASH. POST (Nov. 

27, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/wp/2012/11/27/susan-rice-ciadirector-meet-with-gop-critics-on-libya. 414Morell Testimony at 202–203. 415MORELL, supra note 114, at 235. 

quieter, type of politics was taking place regarding Benghazi: internal politics. At the center of it all was Morell. 

The Setup 

On November 27, 2012, amid speculation the President would 

nominate her to become the next Secretary of State, Rice traveled 

to Capitol Hill to meet with three Senators to discuss her September 16 appearances on the Sunday talk shows.413 Accompanying Rice to that meeting was Morell, who was at the time Acting Director of the CIA. Morell described why he attended the 

meeting: 

Q: Can you just generally describe what the purpose of 

that meeting was? 

A: Yes. So I got a phone call from Denis McDonough, who 

was then the deputy national security advisor. He told me 

that—of course I knew from the media that Susan was 

under attack for what she had said on the Sunday shows. 

He told me that Susan wanted to go to the Hill and have 

conversations with her critics. He told me that the President wanted me to go along with her. He made very clear 

to me that my job in going along with her was to talk 

about the classified analysis, to talk about the talking 

points, and importantly, to show, to actually show the Senators the consistency between the talking points and the 

classified analysis. That’s what he told me my job was. 

And I said yes and I went.414

Morell agreed to the President’s request and attended the meeting with Rice. In his book, however, Morell wrote: ‘‘In retrospect, 

attending the meeting was a mistake. The meeting was inherently 

political, and by attending, I inserted myself into a political issue 

. . . That is not where an intelligence officer should be.’’ 415 Morell 

told the Committee: 

Q: Did you think your presence there was requested to insulate or protect Susan Rice in any way? 

A: I think my—I think my presence there was to show 

that what she said, right, about Benghazi was consistent, 

right, at least the protest, spontaneity part, right, was consistent with what the analysts really believed. 

Q: I guess what I’m trying to get at it, do you think in any 

way—I mean you’re a career analyst, you’re known or so 

I’ve heard you’re known around the community as a very 

straight shooting, as a straight shooter, you call it like you 

see it. So the fact that you were accompanying her—did 

you know if the Secretary of State at that point had announced that she was going to step down? Do you know if 

Susan Rice at that point—— 


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416Morell Testimony at 205–206. 417See, e.g., HPSCI White Paper Talking Points for Use with the Media at 63 (Sept. 14, 2012), 

https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/701145/white-house-e-mails-on-benghazi-talkingpoints.pdf. 418 Analytic Line Review, supra note 362. 419Lessons Learned, supra note 189. 420Morell Testimony at 208. 421 Id. 422 Briefing—The Hon. Robert S. Litt (Benghazi Documents), Hearing Before the H. Permanent 

Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. (2013). 

A: Yes, I believe so, right? I believe that was the whole 

point—in fact, that is what Denis said, right, her possible 

nomination to be Secretary of State was at risk, absolutely. 

Q: —So it was a very inherently political meeting—— 

A: Yes, it was. 

Q: —that you were inserting yourself or that you had been 

asked to—it was a very inherently political meeting that 

you had been asked to attend. 

A: Yes. But, again, I didn’t realize it at the time. I really 

didn’t. I didn’t know I was walking myself into this political setting.416

In addition to explaining to the Senators how Rice’s comments on 

the Sunday shows aligned with the intelligence at the time, 

Morell’s attendance at the meeting served another purpose—it kept 

him at the forefront of the controversy surrounding the Benghazi 

talking points. While Rice was the administration’s representative 

on the Sunday talk shows, Morell was the individual who edited 

the CIA talking points Rice says she relied on.417 Having public 

criticism targeted towards Morell, a career intelligence official, instead of Rice, a political appointee in a politically charged environment, could be beneficial for a potential Secretary of State nominee. 

The Execution 

In late 2012, Morell directed two internal CIA reviews take place 

regarding the talking points. One review, called the Analytic Line 

Review, went through each piece of CIA analysis after the 

Benghazi attacks to determine how strong the supporting evidence 

was for each of the analytic assessments.418 The second review was 

about ‘‘Lessons Learned’’ from the internal process of creating the 

talking points for HPSCI.419Morell wanted to send these two internal reviews to Congress.420

Morell sent only the Analytic Line Review to Congress, which 

was completed in January 2013. The White House would not allow 

him to send the other document—containing drafts of the talking 

points and the process through which they were drafted—to Congress, ‘‘citing executive privilege.’’ 421

On March 19, 2013, Robert S. Litt, General Counsel, Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, testified before HPSCI.422 At the 

hearing, Litt provided the HPSCI Members two packages of documents: one was a small package that contained each draft version 

of the talking points, showing which changes had been made from 


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423 Id. at 4. 424 Jake Tapper, et al., White House releases Benghazi e-mails, CNN (May 16, 2013), http:// 

www.cnn.com/2013/05/15/politics/benghazi-emails. 425MORELL, supra note 114, at 207. 426 Id. at 208–09. 

draft to draft; the other was a large package of roughly 100 pages 

that contained interagency emails regarding the drafting of the 

talking points. These documents were shared with the HPSCI 

Members, yet Litt claimed they were so sensitive that he took them 

back at the end of the briefing;423 Members therefore would be unable to keep the documents or make any copies. 

Two months later, on May 15, 2013, however, everything 

changed. The White House decided to release 100 pages of emails 

related to the talking points.424 These were the same emails Litt 

had provided to HPSCI two months prior yet took back at the end 

of the hearing. In conjunction with the release, the White House 

asked Morell to brief the press on the evolution of the talking 

points. Just as he had when he accompanied Rice to the November 

2012 meeting, Morell complied.425

Morell talked to the Committee about the White House’s decision 

to release these emails: 

Q: And so the fact that you were forbidden from sharing 

an assessment with Congress over the possibility of executive privilege and then all of a sudden the documents were 

released publicly, did that seem to you to be a pretty large 

turnaround? 

A: So, you know, I don’t remember, I simply don’t remember why, you know, why the shift, right, why all of a sudden the administration decided to release these publicly. I 

don’t remember being part of those discussions. I don’t recall being part of those discussions. So I don’t know why 

they decided all of a sudden to do it. 

Q: Do you think it might have been politically beneficial 

for them to all of a sudden release those documents? 

A: I think—I think—I’m speculating, now, okay, so speculating—I think that the criticism kept going up and up. 

The different theories about what was going on kept on expanding right, and the White House wanted to put that to 

rest by putting it all out there. That’s my guess. 

Q: Did they put it all out there when they released those 

talking points? 

A: Not in my view. 

Q: Can you elaborate on that? 

A: Sure. So 2014, mid-2014, I open the newspaper and I 

see Ben Rhodes’ talking points from the 15th of September, right, designed to prep Susan Rice for her Sunday 

shows. And I say to myself, I have not seen these things 

before. When I saw them in the media in mid-2014 it was 

the first time I ever saw them.426


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427 Id. at 217. 428 Email from [Tripoli [redacted text]] to [Near East Division] (Sept. 18, 2012, 1:14 PM) (‘‘I 

know that we all agree as time has passed the pieces are starting to unravel particularly where 

there was protests earlier that day—I think we can officially say now that there were none.’’) 

(on file with CIA, REQUEST 1–002940 to REQUEST 1–002943). 

The decision by the White House to release the talking points 

pertaining to HPSCI and not the talking points drafted by Rhodes 

had one major effect: it kept the spotlight on Morell—who became 

front and center of this release by briefing the press at the request 

of the White House—the CIA, and their role in shaping the talking 

points. It also kept the spotlight away from others. Morell acknowledged this in his testimony: 

Q: And you said you feel that they should have been released with the package of the CIA talking points. What 

are the implications that they were not released with the 

talking points, the package, and they’re coming out a year 

later? What does that mean? 

A: I don’t know, right, I don’t know, the counterfactual is 

hard to think through. I believe—I’m speculating now, 

okay—I believe there would have been less attention on 

CIA and more attention on the White House.427

Around the same time, Morell lobbied the White House to release 

video footage of the attack from the State Department compound 

in Benghazi. Morell, aware of the public debate over whether or not 

protests had occurred prior to attack, wanted the footage released 

to provide transparency to the American people so they could judge 

for themselves what had transpired and quell the political 

firestorm. After all, it was after a description of this video footage 

was shared with the CIA that CIA personnel began to definitively 

conclude no protest had occurred.428

In addition to Morell, James Clapper, Director, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, also wanted the surveillance tapes 

to be made public. The White House refused, however, and to this 

day, the tapes remain classified. Morell told the Committee: 

Q: So you had seen the videos of the TMF, you had seen 

NCTC analysis of the videos. Did you want those videos to 

be released as well? 

A: I did, I did. 

Q: And was there anybody who agreed with you that those 

videos should be declassified and released? 

A: Yes, the DNI agreed with me. 

Q: The DNI. When you say DNI, you’re talking about DNI 

Clapper? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Were those videos released? 

A: No. 

Q: Why did you want those videos released? 

A: Because look, my view, not only strongly today because 

of all of this, but even at the time, my view is when 


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429Morell Testimony at 210–11. 430Letter from Thomas B. Gibbons, Acting Ass’t Sec’y of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to Rep. Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Gov. Reform, U.S. 

House of Representatives (May 20, 2013) (on file with the Committee). 431Press Release, Judicial Watch, Benghazi Documents Point to White House on Misleading 

Talking Points (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/judicialwatch-benghazi-documents-point-white-house-misleading-talking-points. 

there’s—when there are questions about—when there are 

questions about what was done on a particular issue, particularly when there’s questions of impropriety, the best 

thing to do is to get everything out, the best thing to do 

is to get all the information you can out. Let the American 

people see it all and let the American people decide. 

You know, I thought the video—the NCTC analysis told 

the story of what actually happened that night and I 

thought the American people deserved to see it. 

Q: And who prevented the video from being publicly released? 

A: The White House—the White House never responded to 

the DNI and my repeated suggestions that it be released. 

Q: So you were acting director of the CIA at the time? 

A: Uh-huh. 

Q: And Mr. Clapper was the director for national intelligence. And you two repeatedly pushed the White House 

to release this video? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And they did not. 

A: Correct. 

Q: And instead they released the package, so to speak, 

they released the package—— 

A: I don’t remember the timing of our suggestion, right? 

But, yes, you’re absolutely right. 

Q: So they released the package and at the time they released the package they did not release [the Ben Rhodes 

talking points], which is—— 

A: The video. 

Q: They did not release the video. 

A: And they did not release [the Ben Rhodes talking 

points].429

The Fallout 

On April 17, 2014, the Rhodes talking points—which, in addition 

to the talking points provided to HPSCI and edited by Morell, were 

used by Rice to prepare for the Sunday talk shows—were released 

to Congress.430 Later that month, the talking points became publicized for the first time.431

Around the time of the November 27, 2012 meeting between Rice 

and the three Senators, Lieberman said of Ambassador Rice: 


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432 Ed O’Keefe, Susan Rice, CIA director meet with GOP critics on Libya, WASH. POST (Nov. 

27, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/wp/2012/11/27/susan-rice-ciadirector-meet-with-gop-critics-on-libya. 433Krishnadev Calamur, Susan Rice Says Benghazi Claims Were Based On Information From 

Intelligence, NPR (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/11/21/165686269/ 

susan-rice-says-benghazi-claims-were-based-on-information-from-intelligence. 434 Rhodes Testimony at 78. 435Morell Testimony at 216–217. 

I asked if she was briefed by the White House, the campaign, or the political operation, and she said she had seen 

no message points from the White House.’’ 432

As discussed above, Rice testified she only relied on the talking 

points provided to HPSCI when discussing Benghazi on the talk 

shows.433 Rhodes, however, conceded the third bullet point in his 

talking points—‘‘to show the U.S. would be resolute in bringing to 

justice people who harm Americans, and standing steadfast 

through these protests’’—applied only to Libya.434

Morell said he first learned about Rhodes’ talking points when he 

opened the newspaper. Morell, an intelligence officer for over three 

decades, also believed the talking points related to Benghazi. He 

told the Committee: 

Q: Okay. So let me take that first statement. You thought 

that these were related to Benghazi. I’m just reading 

through it here on the first page, I don’t see Benghazi listed. Why do you think that they were related to Benghazi? 

A: Two reasons. One is Benghazi was what was on everyone’s mind at the time. Benghazi had just happened, right, 

the previous Tuesday. This was the following Sunday, 

right, it was the kind of top-of-the-list issue. And two, 

the—there is a tick in here—let me find it—so the third 

tick under ‘‘goals,’’ third tick under ‘‘goals’’ says: ‘‘To show 

that we will be resolute in bringing people to harm Americans to justice.’’ That only happened in one place. 

Q: And that was in Benghazi? 

A: Yes.435

After learning of the existence of these talking points, Morell became bothered that Rhodes, a member of the National Security 

Council staff, had drafted what Morell viewed as a political document. Morell believes there should be a bright line between national security and politics, and he views the talking points drafted 

by Rhodes crossed that line. Morell testified: 

Q: Aside from the release of these talking points and the 

release of the package, is there anything in, at least under 

the goals and the top-lines, is there anything about this 

document that makes you uncomfortable as a CIA officer 

and career analyst? 

A: Yeah. So, as you know, I’m on the record on this, so the 

second goal, the second goal bothers me in two ways. The 

first way it bothers me is that it has a feeling of being political. It has a feeling of being political, right? Blame it on 

this, not on that, right? Just that concept of blame it on 


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436 Id. at 218–19. 437 Id. at 222–23. 

this and blame it on that, not don’t blame it on that, has 

a feeling of being political to me. 

Q: Ben Rhodes worked at the White House? 

A: Yes. 

Q: So what’s the problem if he writes something that—— 

A: Because Ben is on the National Security Council staff, 

right, and I believe, right, and there might be different 

views out there, but I believe, as a 33-year national security professional, that there should be a very, very sharp 

line between national security and politics. And I know 

that’s not always the case, but that’s what I believe, right? 

And I believe that that line was crossed here. That is a 

personal opinion, right? 

The second thing, right, the second thing I don’t like about 

that is the line, ‘‘not a broader failure of policy.’’ The President himself is on the record as saying that he has deep 

regrets about Libya. We all have deep regrets about Libya. 

And I talked earlier about the regrets that I have about 

what the intelligence community should have written prior 

to the intervention. There are policymakers have regrets 

about what we did and didn’t do in Libya, right, and the 

loss of stability there. 

And so, you know, I don’t think ‘‘and not a broader failure 

of policy’’ is correct as it relates to Benghazi, as it relates 

to Libya. You can have a debate about the rest of the region, but as it relates to Libya and Benghazi I don’t think 

that’s right.436

When asked about his central role in all of these events—the 

meeting with Rice at the White House’s request, briefing the press 

at the White House’s request after the release of the drafts of the 

HPSCI talking points, and being in the dark for nearly two years 

about the Rhodes talking points—Morell testified: 

Q: So we talked earlier about the meeting you had with 

Senators McCain, Graham, Ayotte. We talked about how 

the—at Denis McDonough’s request, perhaps the President’s request, we talked about how you briefed media 

members when the package was released. You have been 

beaten up for a year and you briefed media members at 

the request of the White House, is what I believe you said. 

Did you feel in any way used by the White House when 

you discovered that these talking points also existed and 

you were completely kept in the dark until the public 

found out about them? 

A: Look, I wish I would have known about them, okay, I 

wish I would have known about them.437


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438See, e.g., ‘‘Face the Nation’’ transcripts, September 16, 2012: Libyan Pres. Magariaf, Amb. 

Rice and Sen. McCain, CBS NEWS (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-september-16-2012-libyan-pres-magariaf-amb-rice-and-sen-mccain (‘‘. . . there 

is an investigation that the United States government will launch led by the FBI, that has 

begun and . . . they have already begun looking at all sorts of evidence of—of various sorts already available to them and to us.’’), and Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, Office 

of the Press Secretary, The White House (Sept. 18, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/09/18/press-briefing-secretary-jay-carney-9182012 (‘‘There is an ongoing investigation. 

The FBI is investigating. And that investigation will follow the facts wherever they lead.’’). 439See, e.g., Nuland Sept. 17 Briefing, supra note 326. 440Karen DeYoung, et al., U.S. captured Benghazi suspect in secret raid, WASH. POST (June 

17, 2014). 441Spencer Hsu, U.S. will not seek death penalty for accused ringleader in Benghazi attacks, 

WASH. POST (May 10, 2016). 442Gov’t’s Motion for Pretrial Detention at 5–9, U.S. v. Khatallah (E.D. Va July 1, 2014). 

THE FBI INVESTIGATION 

Throughout the days and weeks after the attacks in Benghazi, 

administration officials used the pending FBI investigation as both 

a sword and a shield. When convenient, officials such as Rice and 

Carney made reference to the FBI.438 When inconvenient, administration officials cited the ongoing FBI investigation as the reason 

they could not discuss certain matters.439 On at least one occasion, 

an administration official cited the FBI investigation as evidence of 

a fact even though the FBI investigation had hardly begun. 

It is worth nothing Ahmed Abu Khatallah was arrested in June 

2014.440 To date, he has still not been brought to trial. It was 23 

months after his arrest that the Justice Department announced the 

Department would not seek the death penalty for Khatallah.441

The Justice Department has, however, made certain legal filings 

wherein the government’s theory of the case—hence its understanding of provable facts—is on public display.442 The FBI investigation that administration officials claimed would definitively answer questions that emerged in the days and weeks after the attacks is still ‘‘ongoing’’—two years after a single suspect was arrested and nearly four years after Ambassador Chris Stevens, Sean 

Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty were killed. 


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1President Obama: Libya aftermath ‘worst mistake’ of presidency, BBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2016), 

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36013703. 2 Email from Sidney Blumenthal (‘‘Sid’’) to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’) (Aug. 22, 2011, 11:25 AM) 

(on file with the Committee, SCB0051597). 3 Corbett Daly, Clinton on Qaddafi: ‘‘We came, we saw, he died,’’ CBS NEWS (Oct. 20, 2011), 

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/clinton-on-qaddafi-we-came-we-saw-he-died. 4See Email from Policy Planning staff, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jake Sullivan, Dir. of Policy 

Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 29 2011, 5:01 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0060926–30) (attaching Note for the Secretary re: U.S. Interests in post-Qadhafi Libya). 

PART III: 

Events Leading to the Benghazi Attacks 

‘‘Probably failing to plan for the day after what I think was the 

right thing to do in intervening in Libya.’’ 1

The President, on what constituted the biggest mistake of his Presidency, April 10, 2016 

‘‘When Qaddafi is himself removed, you should of course make a 

public statement before the cameras wherever you are . . . You 

must establish yourself in the historical record . . . The most 

important phrase is ‘successful strategy.’ ’’ 2

Sidney Blumenthal to the Secretary of State, August 

22, 2011 

‘‘We came, we saw, he died.’’ 3

The Secretary of State after the death of Muammar 

Qadhafi, October 20, 2011 

‘‘The American people and the U.S. Congress will be understandably irritated if a revolution that the United States supported ends 

up spewing hatred or advocating violence against the United 

States.’’ 4

Jake Sullivan, August 29, 2011 Note for the Secretary, 

U.S. Interests in post-Qadhafi Libya 


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5Press Statement, Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Liberation of Libya 

(Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175999.htm. 6See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 24 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 (Dec. 15, 2011, 9:03 

AM) (on file with the Committee, C05388931) (discussing ‘‘US Mission Benghazi threat levels’’); 

see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO–14–655, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY: OVERSEAS FACILITIES MAY FACE GREATER RISKS DUE TO GAPS IN SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES, STANDARDS, 

AND POLICIES (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/products. 7See Security Incidents in Benghazi, Libya from June 1, 2011 to Aug. 20, 2012 (on file with 

the Committee); see also Benghazi Spot Report, EAC and Significant Event Timeline (DS/IP/RD) 

(on file with the Committee, C05394332). 

Introduction 

John Christopher Stevens arrived in Benghazi, Libya on April 5, 

2011, in the midst of a civil war. Stevens traveled to Benghazi from 

Malta by Greek cargo ship with $60,000 in currency and an eightmember Diplomatic Security protective detail. Also in the group 

was a junior reporting officer tasked with conducting political reporting, and two members of the Disaster Assistance Response 

Team from the United States Agency for International Development. Stevens’ only instruction was to begin establishing contact 

with Libyan opposition forces seeking to overthrow the government 

of the Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. There was no military support 

for Stevens’ arrival because of President Barack H. Obama’s ‘‘no 

boots on the ground’’ policy, no protocol and no precedent to guide 

his activities, and no physical facility to house him and his team. 

Stevens’ operation had an undefined diplomatic status and duration, and no authorized set of contacts to work with. He was asked 

to do a difficult job in a dangerous environment, and he courageously accepted the call. 

Although the civil war ended in August 2011 with the fall of 

Tripoli, Libya was not officially liberated until October 23, 2011, 

after the death of Qadhafi.5 Even then the security environment remained hazardous. In December 2011, the State Department’s own 

threat rating system considered Libya a grave risk to American 

diplomats.6 The situation deteriorated from there. In Benghazi 

alone, more than 60 major security incidents took place between 

January 1, 2012 and September 10, 2012. More than half of those 

security incidents occurred after April 6, 2012, the date of the first 

IED attack on the Benghazi Mission compound.7

As conditions worsened, the Benghazi Mission labored under an 

unusual, if not unprecedented, set of circumstances and conditions: 

• From the beginning, senior Obama Administration officials 

were divided about what degree of commitment to make in 

Libya. A principal objective was to limit military engagement: 

the administration’s ‘‘no boots on the ground’’ policy prevailed 

throughout the Benghazi Mission’s existence in Libya. Apart 

from ‘‘no boots on the ground,’’ U.S. policy remained indefinite 

and undefined throughout Stevens’ tenure in Benghazi. 

• After the Qadhafi regime fell, the administration sought to 

maintain a ‘‘light footprint’’ in the country, determined to avoid 

an extended state-building engagement. 

• Because the Benghazi Mission existed in a state of diplomatic 

uncertainty—never having a clearly defined status—it was not 

required to meet security standards applicable to permanent 

U.S. embassies. 


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8President Obama: Libya aftermath ‘worst mistake’ of presidency, BBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2016), 

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36013703. 9 Id. 

10Testimony of Benjamin I. Fishman, Director for North Africa and Jordan, National Sec. 

Staff, Tr. at 15–16 (Jan. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Fishman Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 11 Id. at 14; see generally, The Arab Spring: A Year of Revolution, NPR (Dec. 18, 2011, 9:24 

AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution. 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15See Testimony of Joan A. Polaschik, U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, Tr. at 18 (Aug. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Polaschik Testimony] (on file with the Committee) 

(‘‘Well, the uprising really started on February 17 in Benghazi. I believe it was a Thursday.’’). 16 Id. at 18. 

• Benghazi had no clear lines of authority to either Tripoli or 

Washington D.C. This delayed responses to Mission requests 

for physical security measures and personnel. 

• Senior officials in Washington D.C. did not heed intelligence 

detailing the rise of extremists groups in Benghazi and eastern 

Libya prior to September 11, 2012. 

In an April 10, 2016 interview, the President called ‘‘failing to 

prepare for the aftermath of the ousting of . . . Muammar Gaddafi 

. . . the worst mistake of his presidency.’’ 8 Expressing regret over 

‘‘failing to plan for the day after,’’ the President called Libya a 

‘‘mess.’’ 9 This section describes the events, decisions, and non-decisions that led to the terrorist attacks which killed Chris Stevens, 

Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty. 

STEPS TOWARD U.S. INTERVENTION IN LIBYA 

February-March 2011: Early Debates and Decisions 

The United States’ intervention in Libya took root during the 

Arab Spring, a series of anti-government protests and revolutions 

in the Middle East and North Africa occurring in late 2010 and 

early 2011.10 The protests, inspired by Tunisians, followed in Egypt 

and reached Yemen in late January of 2011.11 Tunisian President 

Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was removed on January 14, 2011, following a month of protests.12 In February 2011, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned.13 Four days later, on February 15, 

2011, Libyans staged their first demonstration in Benghazi.14 It 

evolved into an armed conflict two days later, as loyalists of Qadhafi attempted to quell the protests.15 A civil war then erupted. 

As Joan A. Polaschik, then Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. 

Embassy in Tripoli, described: ‘‘On Friday, in Tripoli, things started to get a little tense, sporadic gunfire. Then Saturday night, sustained gunfire, so we started having emergency action committee 

meetings that Sunday at the Embassy to talk about what our response should be.’’ 16

The President publicly addressed the conditions in Libya on February 23, 2011, stating: ‘‘Secretary Clinton and I just concluded a 

meeting that focused on the ongoing situation in Libya. Over the 

last few days, my national security team has been working around 

the clock to monitor the situation there and to coordinate with our 


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17 Jesse Lee, President Obama Speaks on the Turmoil in Libya: ‘‘This Violence Must Stop,’’ 

WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/02/23/presidentobama-speaks-turmoil-libya-violence-must-stop (providing full transcript of the President’s remarks). 18 Id. 19Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State & Janet A. 

Sanderson, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, The 

Suspension of United States Embassy Operations in Libya, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 25, 2011), 

http://www.state.gov/m/rls/remarks/2011/157173.htm. Jake Sullivan indicated in an August 21, 

2011 email to Cheryl Mills and Victoria Nuland ‘‘February 26—HRC directs efforts to evacuate 

all U.S. embassy personnel from Tripoli and orders the closing of the embassy,’’ but this date 

appears to be contradicted by the Department’s public statement the previous day. See Email 

from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief 

of Staff and Counselor to the U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, and Victoria J. Nuland, 

Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 21, 2011, 07:39 PM) [hereinafter Tick Tock on Libya 

Email] (on file with the Committee, SCB0045101). 20Polaschik Testimony at 19. The U.S. Government did not sever diplomatic ties with Libya. 

Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State & Janet A. Sanderson, 

Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, The Suspension of United States 

Embassy Operations in Libya, DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.state.gov/m/rls/ 

remarks/2011/157173.htm. Rather, Ambassador Cretz and his staff worked from Washington, 

D.C. on Libyan matters. Polaschik Testimony at 20–21. 21 Exec. Order No. 13566, 76 Fed. Reg. 11315 (Feb. 25, 2011). 22S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 1 (Feb. 26, 2011), 

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970 (2011). 23 Id. 24Tick Tock on Libya Email, supra note 19. 25 Id. 

international partners about a way forward.’’ 17 He called the violence ‘‘outrageous’’ and ‘‘unacceptable,’’ asserted the protection of 

American citizens was his highest priority, and added: ‘‘I have also 

asked my administration to prepare the full range of options that 

we have to respond to this crisis.’’ 18

The U.S. suspended operations at the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya 

on February 25, 2011.19 The suspension of operations and evacuation were important for reasons beyond the safety of the embassy 

personnel. Polaschik testified: 

I was very clear with the people on those policy planning 

discussions that I felt very strongly that the administration could not change its policy toward Qadhafi until we 

got all of the U.S. employees out safely because we did not 

have appropriate security at our Embassy in Tripoli. It 

met none of our State Department security standards.20

The same day, the President issued an Executive Order freezing 

the property in the United States of Qadhafi, his family members, 

and senior officials of the Libyan Government.21

On February 26, 2011, the international community responded 

with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, deploring 

‘‘gross and systematic violations of human rights’’ and demanding 

an end to the violence.22 The resolution also imposed an arms embargo and travel restrictions, froze the assets of Qadhafi and his 

inner circle, and referred the matter to the Prosecutor for the 

International Criminal Court.23

Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton made calls to foreign leaders to garner support for the resolution.24 She took an active role 

in mobilizing forces against the Qadhafi regime. Her staff described 

the efforts as ‘‘instrumental in securing the authorization, building 

the coalition, and tightening the noose around Qadhafi and his regime.’’ 25


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26Testimony of Sidney S. Blumenthal, Tr. at 67–68 (June 16, 2015) [hereinafter Blumenthal 

Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 27 Id. at 99. 28Daniel Drezner, ‘‘The Unbearable Lightness of Hillary Clinton’s Management Style,’’ the 

Washington Post (May 20, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/20/theunbearable-lightness -of-hillary-clintons-management-style. 29 Jesse Lee, President Obama Speaks on the Turmoil in Libya: ‘‘This Violence Must Stop,’’ 

WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/02/23/presidentobama-speaks-turmoil-libya-violence-must-stop (providing full transcript of the President’s remarks). 30 Email from Sidney S. Blumenthal (‘‘sbwhoeop’’) to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, 

U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 21, 2011, 10:32 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078044). 31 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, 

Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 21, 2011, 10:42 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078044). 32 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 22, 2011, 4:59 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0078044). 33 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, 

Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 22, 2011, 6:34 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0078044). 34 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Sidney 

Blumenthal (Feb. 22, 2011, 6:09 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078042). 35See Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 

‘‘jake.sullivan[REDACTED]’’ (Mar. 16, 2011, 9:29AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075861) 

(‘‘We are going to be actively engaged in New York today in discussions about the best course 

of action for the international community to take, including through the UN Security Council.’’). 

Unofficial Commentary and Advice 

During this period, the Secretary received extensive and regular 

communications from Sidney S. Blumenthal. Blumenthal frequently offered commentary about developments in Libya (as well 

as more general commentary about other matters)—passing on selfstyled ‘‘intelligence reports’’ prepared by Tyler S. Drumheller, a 

former official at the Central Intelligence Agency 26—and recommending various courses of U.S. action. Although Blumenthal had 

been rejected by the White House for employment at the Department of State, and admittedly had no knowledge about Libya,27

Secretary Clinton responded to his emails and in some cases forwarded them to her top policy aides and career foreign service officers in the Department for their reaction and comment. The Secretary described Blumenthal’s emails as ‘‘unsolicited.’’ 28

On February 21, 2011, two days prior to the President’s first 

public remarks on the matter,29 Blumenthal suggested the U.S. 

‘‘might consider advancing [a no-fly zone] tomorrow.’’ 30 The Secretary forwarded the email to her Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Planning, Jacob J. Sullivan, and asked: ‘‘What do you 

think of this idea?’’ 31 Sullivan replied: ‘‘[H]onestly, we actually 

don’t know what is happening from the air right now. As we gain 

more facts, we can consider.’’ 32 In response, the Secretary reflected 

on what Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, noted publicly more than a week later, asking Sullivan: 

‘‘I’ve heard contradictory reports as to whether or not there are 

planes flying and firing on crowds. What is the evidence that they 

are?’’ 33 The Secretary responded to Blumenthal: ‘‘We are looking at 

that for Security Council, which remains reluctant to ‘interfere’ in 

the internal affairs of a country. Stay tuned!’’ 34 When the U.N. resolution was ultimately introduced two weeks later, the U.S. strongly advocated for passage of the no-fly zone.35

On February 25, 2011, Blumenthal suggested other means of 

pressuring the Libyan leadership: 


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36 Email from Sidney S. Blumenthal (‘‘sbwhoeop’’) to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, 

U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 25, 2011, 7:16 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078066). 37 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, 

Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 26, 2011, 11:34 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078066). 38 Email from Sidney S. Blumenthal (‘‘sbwhoeop’’) to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, 

U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 26, 2011, 10:58) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078104). 39 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, 

Dir. of Policy Planning (Mar. 2, 2011, 7:18 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078121). 40 Email from Sidney S. Blumenthal (‘‘sbwhoeop’’) to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, 

U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 7, 2011, 10:29 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078150– 

0078153). 41 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, 

Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 7, 2011, 7:17 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0087150–0078153). 42 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 7, 2011, 7:22 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0077210). 43Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Meets in Paris With Libyan Rebel Leader, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 

2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/africa/15clinton.html. 44 Joby Warrick, Hillary’s war: How conviction replaced skepticism in Libya intervention, 

WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/hillaryswar-how-conviction-replaced-skepticism-in-libya-intervention/2011/10/28/ 

gIQAhGS7WM_story.html. 45 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, to James B. Steinberg, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Mar. 8, 2011, 8:13 PM) [hereinafter Libya 

Options Email](on file with the Committee, C05886430). 46 Id. 

Depending on the state of play within the U.N. Security 

Council, it might be useful to think about generating a 

statement from the UNSC that any officer or government 

official in the chain of command in Libya who is involved 

in deploying or using WMD would be subject to war crimes 

and crimes against humanity prosecution.36

The Secretary forwarded the suggestion to Sullivan, asking: 

‘‘What about including this in UNSCR?’’ 37 The following day, 

Blumenthal sent the Secretary another unofficial ‘‘intelligence’’ report that began with a note: ‘‘This report is in part a response to 

your questions. There will be further information coming in the 

next day.’’ 38 The Secretary forwarded the information to Sullivan 

with the request not to ‘‘share until we can talk.’’ 39

In a later email, Blumenthal suggested: ‘‘Someone should contact 

Mahmod Jipreel [Mahmoud Jibril]. He is balanced, level-headed 

and understands the situation well.’’ 40 The Secretary forwarded 

the note to Sullivan, indicating she thought ‘‘we’’ were reaching out 

to the individuals Blumenthal had suggested.41 Even though Jibril 

was on the list Blumenthal sent earlier, Sullivan responded: ‘‘I 

don’t know about this Jipreel fellow.’’ 42 It was the ‘‘hastily scheduled’’ and ‘‘behind closed doors’’ meeting between the Secretary and 

Jibril in Paris just one week later 43 that helped prompt the Secretary to become a leading advocate for Libyan intervention.44

‘‘Libya Options’’ 

On March 8, 2011, Sullivan sent an email titled ‘‘Libya Options’’ 

to senior State Department officials.45 In the email, he described 

the Department’s ‘‘preferred end-state in Libya, at the most basic 

level.’’ 46 The email spelled out five ‘‘successively more intrusive’’ 

strategic frameworks outlining various options against Qadhafi: 

1. Provide material support to the Libyan opposition but 

take no direct offensive action; 


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47 Id. A sixth option presented ‘‘focusing not on actions against Qadhafi but on a negotiated 

solution’’ was to ‘‘Leverage a stalemate into some kind of negotiated solution, or at least a process.’’ Id. 48 Id. 49 Id. 50See id. (sent from Philip H. Gordon on Mar. 9, 2011, 9:37 AM) (Philip Gordon stating ‘‘would 

also point out I don’t think we’ve ever established a NFZ anywhere where we didn’t go have 

to go in militarily and stay for a long time (Iraq, Bosnia, implicitly Afghanistan, Kosovo).’’). 51Kevin Sullivan, A Tough Call on Libya That Still Haunts, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2016), http:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2016/02/03/a-tough-call-on-libya-that-still-haunts. 52Libya Options Emails, supra note 45 (Sent from Philip H. Gordon on Mar. 9, 2011, 9:37 

AM) (Philip Gordon stating ‘‘would also point out I don’t think we’ve ever established a NFZ 

anywhere where we didn’t go have to go in militarily and stay for a long time (Iraq, Bosnia, 

implicitly Afghanistan, Kosovo).’’). 53 Id. 54See Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 

‘‘jake.sullivan[REDACTED]’’ (Mar. 16, 2011, 9:29AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075861) 

(‘‘Last night, the President led a meeting with his national security team on the situation in 

Libya and the way forward.’’); see also Kevin Sullivan, A Tough Call on Libya That Still Haunts, 

WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2016/02/03/a-tough-callon-libya-that-still-haunts. 

2. Provide material support to the Libyan opposition and 

take only that direct action which is nonlethal and designed to shape the theater rather than take the fight 

to Qadhafi; 

3. All options consistent with broad regional support and 

a clear legal basis; 

4. Offensive aerial options but no ground troops; and 

5. Whatever necessary to remove Qadhafi.47

In addition, Sullivan identified a number of immediate goals to 

be accomplished through intervention, something he noted was 

sent over to the National Security Staff. The immediate goal listed 

first was ‘‘to avoid a failed state, particularly one in which alQaeda and other extremists might take safe haven.’’ 48 Another immediate goal was ‘‘[w]e seek the prevention of an exodus of Libyans.’’ 49

The State Department and other top officials expressed concern 

about the options, especially establishing a no-fly zone without 

military intervention.50 For example, the Secretary of Defense, 

Robert M. Gates, the National Security Advisor, Thomas E. 

Donilon, and others ‘‘opposed military action, contending the 

United States had no clear national interests at stake and that operations could last far longer and cost more lives than anyone anticipated.’’ 51 A senior State Department official warned he did not 

‘‘think that we’ve ever established a NFZ [no fly zone] anywhere 

where we didn’t ultimately have to go in militarily and stay for a 

long time (Iraq, Bosnia, implicitly Afghanistan, Kosovo).’’ 52 The official suggested a better option would be to stand by, ‘‘not get 

pulled into more Middle East wars,’’ and gain a ‘‘better sense of 

what post use-of-force end state looks like.’’ 53

The President convened a meeting with his National Security 

Council to discuss the situation. Ultimately, he sided with the Secretary of State, who favored some level of intervention.54

Senior officials still cited complications. State Department policymakers did not see the question as simply one of how to ‘‘pressure 


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55 Email from Special Ass’t to Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. 

of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 28, 2011, 8:13 PM) [hereinafter Libya Q & A for 

S London Trip 32811] (on file with the Committee, SCB0075863–0075871). 56Libya Options Emails, supra note 45 (Sent from Philip H. Gordon on Mar. 9, 2011, 9:37 

AM). 57 Id. (Sent from Jacob J. Sullivan on Mar. 9, 2011, 10:33 AM) (emphasis in original). 58S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm# 

Resolution. 59Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Remarks 

by the President on the Situation in Libya (Mar. 18, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2011/03/18/remarks-president-situation-libya. 60 Id. 

and isolate Qadhafi.’’ 55 Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary of 

State for European and Eurasian Affairs, framed the situation as 

follows: 

As I noted, it seems to me fundamental [sic] initial decision for us is which is greater strategic priority: a) avoiding getting pulled into Libyan conflict and owning it; or b) 

bringing about quick end of Qaddafy regime. So far we 

have rightly sought to achieve both of these objectives at 

the same time but with each passing day, as regime gets 

upper hand, it is forcing us to choose between them. As 

Jim [Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg] pointed out it is always possible that developments on the 

ground force you later on to abandon such a first principle 

(as in Kosovo when two months of ineffective air strikes 

led us to reconsider the determination not to use ground 

forces) but knowing the objective in advance would help 

guide the operational decisions in the meantime. If it’s a) 

we need to be ultra-cautious about steps designed to make 

it look like we are doing something but will not prove decisive (NFZ); and if it’s b) we need to understand the risks 

and costs of establishing that as a redline.56

Sullivan concurred, saying: ‘‘[W]e have not already embraced objective (b)’’ and further responded: ‘‘I agree with you about the fundamental initial decision, although I don’t think it’s as simple as 

(a) or (b). It will inevitably be a calibration between the two. I 

agree with Jim that we can get drawn in some but not all the way, 

as long as we have a strong theory of the case to rest on.’’ 57

Implementing U.S. Policy 

A week later, on March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security 

Council adopted Security Council Resolution 1973, demanding an 

immediate ceasefire and authorizing member states to ‘‘take all 

necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated 

areas under threat of attack,’’ specifically including a no fly zone.58

On March 18, 2011, the President announced: ‘‘If Qaddafi does not 

comply with the resolution, the international community will impose consequences, and the resolution will be enforced through 

military action.’’ 59 He emphasized: ‘‘I also want to be clear about 

what we will not be doing. The United States is not going to deploy 

ground troops into Libya. And we are not going to use force to go 

beyond a well-defined goal—specifically, the protection of civilians 

in Libya.’’ 60 The President added: ‘‘Our focus has been clear: proVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00278 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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61 Id. President Obama further detailed what specific steps he believed Qadhafi needed to 

meet to comply with the resolution: 

The resolution that passed lays out very clear conditions that must be met. The United 

States, the United Kingdom, France, and Arab states agree that a cease-fire must be 

implemented immediately. That means all attacks against civilians must stop. Qaddafi 

must stop his troops from advancing on Benghazi, pull them back from Ajdabiya, 

Misrata, and Zawiya, and establish water, electricity and gas supplies to all areas. Humanitarian assistance must be allowed to reach the people of Libya. Let me be clear, 

these terms are not negotiable. 62 Id. Secretary Clinton’s staff later noted that, surrounding these events, Secretary Clinton 

‘‘participates in a series of high-level video and teleconferences. . . . She is a leading voice for 

strong UNSC action and a NATO civilian protection mission.’’ Tick Tock on Libya Email, supra 

note 19. 63Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President 

Pro Tempore of the Senate Regarding the Commencement of Operations in Libya (Mar. 

21, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/21/letter-president-regardingcommencement-operations-libya. 64 Id. 

tecting innocent civilians within Libya, and holding the Qadhafi regime accountable.’’ 61

To implement this policy, the President announced he had ‘‘directed Secretary Gates and our military to coordinate their planning, and tomorrow Secretary Clinton will travel to Paris for a 

meeting with our European allies and Arab partners about the enforcement of Resolution 1973.’’ 62 The next day, March 19, 2011, 

‘‘U.S. military forces commenced operations to assist an international effort authorized by the United Nations (U.N.) Security 

Council . . . to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and address 

the threat posed to international peace and security by the crisis 

in Libya.’’ 63

Two days later, on March 21, 2011, the President formally notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President 

Pro Tempore of the Senate of these operations.64 In his letter, the 

President stated the nature and purpose of these operations as follows: 

As part of the multilateral response authorized under U.N. 

Security Council resolution 1973, U.S. military forces, 

under the command of Commander, U.S. Africa Command, 

began a series of strikes against air defense systems and 

military airfields for the purposes of preparing a no-fly 

zone. These strikes will be limited in their nature, duration and scope. Their purpose is to support an international coalition as it takes all necessary measures to enforce the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. 

These limited U.S. actions will set the stage for further action by other coalition partners. 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized Member States, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and 

civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya, 

including the establishment and enforcement of a ‘‘no-fly 

zone’’ in the airspace of Libya. United States military efforts are discrete and focused on employing unique U.S. 

military capabilities to set the conditions for our European 

allies and Arab partners to carry out the measures authorized by the U.N. Security Council Resolution. . . . 


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65 Id. 

The United States has not deployed ground forces into 

Libya. United States forces are conducting a limited and 

well-defined mission in support of international efforts to 

protect civilians and prevent a humanitarian disaster. Accordingly, U.S. forces have targeted the Qadhafi regime’s 

air defense systems, command and control structures, and 

other capabilities of Qadhafi’s armed forces used to attack 

civilians and civilian populated areas. We will seek a 

rapid, but responsible, transition of operations to coalition, 

regional, or international organizations that are postured 

to continue activities as may be necessary to realize the 

objectives of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 

1973.65

While the President described the goal of the intervention in 

Libya as ‘‘well-defined’’ in his March 18, 2011 public remarks, the 

formal notification of the ensuing military operation to Congress 

left uncertainty and ambiguity in the eyes of some U.S. decisionmakers. Speaker John A. Boehner responded to the President by 

letter two days later on March 23, 2011, writing: 

It is my hope that you will provide the American people 

and Congress a clear and robust assessment of the scope, 

objective, and purpose of our mission in Libya and how it 

will be achieved. Here are some of the questions I believe 

must be answered: 

A United Nations Security Council resolution does not substitute for a U.S. political and military strategy. You have 

stated that Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi must go, consistent with U.S. policy goals. But the U.N. resolution the 

U.S. helped develop and signed onto makes clear that regime change is not part of this mission. In light of this 

contradiction, is it an acceptable outcome for Qadhafi to 

remain in power after the military effort concludes in 

Libya? If not, how will he be removed from power? Why 

would the U.S. commit American resources to enforcing a 

U.N. resolution that is inconsistent with our stated policy 

goals and national interests? . . . 

You have said that the support of the international community was critical to your decision to strike Libya. But, 

like many Americans, it appears many of our coalition 

partners are themselves unclear on the policy goals of this 

mission. If the coalition dissolves or partners continue to 

disengage, will the American military take on an increased 

role? Will we disengage? 

Since the stated U.S. policy goal is removing Qadhafi from 

power, do you have an engagement strategy for the opposition forces? If the strife in Libya becomes a protracted conflict, what are your Administration’s objectives for engaging with opposition forces, and what standards must a new 

regime meet to be recognized by our government? . . . 


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66Letter from John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives, to Barack H. 

Obama, U.S. President (Mar. 23, 2011), 

http://www.speaker.gov/UploadedFiles/POTUSLetter_032311.pdf. (also asking three specific 

questions relating to the military operation and its cost). 67Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State & Janet A. 

Sanderson, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, The 

Suspension of United States Embassy Operations in Libya, DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 25, 2011), 

http://www.state.gov/m/rls/remarks/2011/157173.htm. Jake Sullivan indicated in an August 21, 

2011 email to Cheryl Mills and Victoria Nuland ‘‘February 26—HRC directs efforts to evacuate 

all U.S. embassy personnel from Tripoli and orders the closing of the embassy.’’ This date appears to be contradicted by the Department’s public statement the previous day. See Email from 

Jake Sullivan, Dir. Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff to U.S. 

Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State and Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. State Dep’t (Aug. 

21, 2011, 07:39 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0051146). See Email from Phillip H. Gordon to James B. Steinberg, et al. (Mar. 23, 2011, 6:55 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0045016) (‘‘We are putting together S conference call with Juppe, Davutoglu and Hague tomorrow. Here is the outcome I think the call should seek to meet everybody’s redlines. 

[Redacted text. 68See Email from Donald Steinberg, U.S. Agency on Int’l Development, to Patrick F. Kennedy, 

Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 30, 2011, 10:12 AM) (on file with the 

Committee, SCB0095926) (‘‘As you know, we’re under instructions from NSS and State to get 

our DART staff into Benghazi so we can begin our humanitarian assessments of needs and infrastructure.’’). 69See Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Hillary 

R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 13, 2011, 10:55 AM) (on file with the 

Committee, SCB0045011) (‘‘They urged us to find some kind of language that would suggest 

moving in that direction, and I noted our decisions to suspend the operations of the Libyan Embassy, have S meet with Mahmoud Jabril of the Council and send a diplomatic representative 

to Benghazi.’’). 70Testimony of Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, Tr. at 24–25 (Dec. 8, 2015) [hereinafter Feltman Testimony] (on file with the 

Committee). 71See Benghazi: The Attacks and the Lessons Learned Before the S. Comm. on the Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. 9 (2013) (statement of the Hon. Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State); Terrorist 

Continued 

Because of the conflicting messages from the Administration and our coalition partners, there is a lack of clarity 

over the objectives of this mission, what our national security interests are, and how it fits into our overarching policy for the Middle East. The American people deserve answers to these questions. And all of these concerns point 

to a fundamental question: what is your benchmark for 

success in Libya? 66

Selecting Chris Stevens 

Notwithstanding the State Department’s decision to suspend operations at its Embassy in Tripoli and its efforts underway through 

the United Nations to impose a no fly zone,67 discussions were immediately under way between the White House and the Secretary 

and her advisors to return to Libya—specifically to Benghazi.68

These discussions included sending a ‘‘diplomatic representative’’ to 

serve as a liaison with the Transitional National Council [TNC], an 

opposition group headquartered in Benghazi hoping to emerge as 

the new Libyan government.69 Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, told the Committee ‘‘the TNC had asked in the meetings with Hillary Clinton 

for representation to be able to work directly on a continuing basis 

with the U.S. Government, which is why a decision was made to 

send a representative to Benghazi.’’ 70

The Secretary selected J. Christopher Stevens, a widely and 

highly respected career Foreign Service officer, to serve as the representative to the TNC.71 Stevens previously served as Deputy 


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Attack in Benghazi: The Secretary of State’s View Before the H. Comm. on the Foreign Affairs, 

113th Cong. 7–8 (2013) (statement of the Hon. Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State). 72J. Christopher Stevens Bio, ECON. POLICY J. (Sept. 12, 2012), http:// 

www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2012/09/j-christopher-stephens-bio.html (last visited June 7, 

2016). 73Testimony of Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 20 (Oct. 22, 2015) 

[hereinafter Clinton Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 74 Id. 21. 75 Id. 20. 76J. Christopher Stevens Bio, ECON. POLICY J. (Sept. 12, 2012), http:// 

www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2012/09/j-christopher-stephens-bio.html (last visited June 7, 

2016). 77The G8 is comprised of eight of the world’s major industrialized countries. 78See Email from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 

U.S. Dep’t of State, to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional National Council (Mar. 

11, 2011, 9:20 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0076601) (discussing Sec’y Clinton’s meeting with Mr. Jibril in Paris). 79 Id.; see also Email from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern 

Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. 

Dep’t of State (Mar. 13, 2011, 10:02) (on file with the Committee, SCB0076612) (communicating 

that Feltman had been asked to redirect Ambassador Stevens to Paris). 80See Email from Jacob Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, to himself on 

a personal email account (Mar. 16, 2011, 9:29 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075861). 81Testimony of Gene A. Cretz, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Tr. at 32 (Jul. 31, 2015) [hereinafter 

Cretz Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 82 Id. at 32–33. 

Chief of Mission, the Embassy’s number two post, in Tripoli from 

2007 through 2009.72 The Secretary told the Committee: ‘‘[w]hen 

the revolution broke out in Libya, we named Chris as our envoy 

to the opposition.’’ 73 ‘‘I was the one who asked Chris to go to Libya 

as our envoy.’’ 74 The Secretary told the Committee that Stevens 

‘‘was one of our Nation’s most accomplished diplomats.’’ 75 Stevens 

had been a member of the U.S. Foreign Service since 1991. He had 

previously served overseas as Deputy Principal Officer and Section 

Chief in Jerusalem; Political Officer in Damascus; Consular/Political Officer in Cairo; and Consular/Economic Officer in Riyadh. In 

Washington he had served as Director of the Office of Multilateral 

Nuclear and Security Affairs; a Pearson Fellow with the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Richard G. Lugar; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the 

State Department; and Iran desk officer and staff assistant in the 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.76

While attending the March 14, 2011 G8 foreign ministers meeting in Paris to discuss the Libyan crisis, 77 the Secretary arranged 

to have a separate meeting with Jibril, the leader of the Transitional National Council.78 She asked that Stevens be rerouted to 

join her and Ambassador Gene A. Cretz, the U.S. Ambassador to 

Libya, for the meeting with Jibril.79 As a result of the meeting with 

Jibril, the Secretary was convinced the United States should support the TNC in its efforts to become the new Libyan government.80

The decision to send a representative to the TNC was seen as 

both practical and symbolic. Ambassador Cretz explained the rationale for having a presence in Benghazi, telling the Committee 

‘‘the center of the revolution was in Benghazi. It was the place that 

the opposition . . . had centered around as its, in effect ‘capital.’ ’’ 81 He testified several other coalition partners established envoys in Benghazi and ‘‘so it was only natural’’ the U.S. have a presence there as well since the United States had a stake in the outcome of the Libyan revolution.82


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83 Email from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, to J. Christopher StevensJ. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional National Council (Mar. 11, 2011, 9:20 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0076601) (‘‘I know you 

have your travel accommodations set for Rome. But S staff would like you to join the Secretary 

and Gene Cretz for a mtg in Paris with Mahmoud Jabril.’’). Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, 

Diplomatic Sec. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 13 (February 10, 2015)[hereinafter Diplomatic 

Sec. Agent 6 Testimony] (on file with the Committee) (‘‘[W]hen I left Washington, I went to 

Rome. And in Rome, I was met by the Envoy, Chris Stevens.’’). 84 Email from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State to Joan 

A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Mar. 24, 2011, 9:55 

AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0095893–98) (discussing Stevens’ plan). 85 Email from Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Lee 

Lohman, Ex. Dir., Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, and Post Mgmt. Officer, 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 23, 2011, 5:14 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, SCB0091885). 86See Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, to William 

J. Burns, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 6, 2011, 3:48 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, SCB0095837–0095838) (discussing coordination with USAID and the situation in region). 87See Email from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Eric J. Boswell, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. 

(Mar. 15, 2011, 1:59 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0095877–0095879). 88See Email from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State 

(Mar. 15, 2011, 8:02 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0098178–0098179). 89See Email from Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Lee Lohman, Ex. Dir. Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, and Post Mgmt. 

Continued 

Delay 

The administration then made plans to send Stevens to 

Benghazi. Following the Secretary’s March 14, 2011 meeting in 

Paris with Jibril, Stevens did not return to the United States but 

remained in Europe to plan his entry into Libya.83 He traveled to 

Stuttgart, Germany to meet with General Carter F. Ham, commander of the United States Africa Command [AFRICOM], to discuss the trip into Libya, including any potential rescue operations.84 Stevens discussed travelling to Benghazi on a ‘‘helicopter 

to a coalition naval vessel that can go close to shore,’’ and then ‘‘zodiac transport from ship to shore’’ for ‘‘day trips only, returning to 

the naval vessel to RON [rest overnight].’’ 85

In addition to Stevens’ activities, the Secretary and her advisors 

were coordinating with United States Agency for International Development’s [USAID] Disaster Assistance Response Team to travel 

into Benghazi to assess firsthand the extent of the humanitarian 

crisis.86 On March 15, 2011, however, USAID ‘‘pulled the plug’’ because of security concerns.87 That same day, Stevens’ mission to 

Benghazi expanded: 

The latest . . . is now that 12–13 people are going into 

Libya near Benghazi. It’s John C. Stevens (lead), a JO (no 

name) who is fluent in Arabic, 10 DS agents (protective detail) and they are working on getting a Management Officer to go to do the admin/accounting work. There are at 

least 2 DOD military elements going along (SOC Forward 

types i.e. Special Forces). . . . Given how this has grown 

from our earlier discussions, I think $60,000 is needed 

rather than the $25,000 we initially thought. They are 

talking about this trip being up to 30 days.88

While Stevens was still in Europe coordinating his entry, the National Security Council ordered him to deploy ‘‘as soon as possible.’’ 89 For the next week, the State Department and AFRICOM 


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Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 23, 2011, 5:14 PM) (on file 

with the Committee, SCB0091885). See also Email from Special Ass’t, Office of Deputy Sec’y, 

U.S Dep’t of State, to Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 24, 

2011, 1:47 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075262). 90See Email from Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Ronald L. Schlicher, et al. (Mar. 24, 2011, 9:40 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0095893–94) (‘‘Per Chris’ emails, he would travel into Benghazi via zodiac or helicopter. All 

mil assets would be US, including comms and medic. Seals would participate in civilian dress— 

an initiative that could prove problematic with the TNC. Travel would be day trips. RON on 

the US naval vessel.’’). 91 Email from Janet A. Sanderson, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 26, 2011, 

12:02 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0094603) (‘‘Pat, AID Administrator talked to Bill 

Burns last night and requested Stevens Mission include one or two DART team reps.’’). 92 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, to William J. 

Burns, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 6, 2011, 3:48 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0095837–0095838). 93 Email from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State, to 

Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, and Joseph E. Macmanus, Exec. 

Ass’t, Office of the Sec’y (Mar. 30, 2011, 12:50 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0071180). 94 Id. 95 Id. 96 Clinton Testimony at 20–21. 97See Email to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 

30, 2011, 7:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0095929) (attaching Benghazi Party 

OPLAN at SCB0095929–35). 98 Id. 99 Clinton Testimony at 20; see also Email from Special Ass’t, Office of Deputy Sec’y, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, to Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Apr. 5, 2011, 

5:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0061086) (‘‘Chris explained his mission, making it 

clear that he would like to meet all members of the TNC and as many local council members 

as possible to understand the extent of the TNC’s support.’’). 

engaged in extensive planning to enter Benghazi using the military 

to augment the State Department Diplomatic Security Agents.90

Within a matter of days, Stevens’ team expanded again.91 Senior 

State Department officials made the decision to add two USAID 

workers, consistent with Secretary Clinton’s goal that the U.S. be 

seen as ‘‘visibly engaged on the humanitarian side.’’ 92

After weeks of planning, the Administration’s no boots on the 

ground policy kept military assistance from accompanying Stevens 

to Benghazi.93 On March 30, 2011, Kennedy informed other senior 

State Department leaders: ‘‘After over a week of joint planning . . . 

Mullen has decided that the ‘no boots on the ground in Libya’ policy precludes DOD assisting us in getting Stevens into Libya.’’ 94

Specifically, Admiral Mullen deemed the use of military assets— 

even in civilian dress—to be in violation of the President’s directive, and therefore forbade their use to get Stevens into Benghazi 

and assist in his protection there.95 With no military assets to assist, Stevens ‘‘found a way to get himself there on a Greek cargo 

ship, just like a 19th-century American envoy.’’ 96 Accompanying 

Stevens on the ferry to Benghazi was a junior reporting officer, two 

members of USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Team, and 

eight Diplomatic Security Agents.97

SETTING UP OPERATIONS IN BENGHAZI 

When Stevens arrived in Benghazi, he was authorized to stay for 

up to 30 days, security permitting.98 His job was to ‘‘begin gathering information and meeting those Libyans who were rising up 

against the murderous dictator Qadhafi.’’ 99 This was all the instruction he was given. ‘‘There was no protocol for how to move forward,’’ the Secretary said. ‘‘No past precedent to follow. No list of 

important figures to look out for. Chris had to work from scratch 


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100 Remarks, Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Prepared Remarks: Secretary Clinton Remarks at Swearing-In Ceremony for Chris Stevens, Ambassador to Libya (May 

14, 2012), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/05/197696.htm. 101Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 30–31. 102 Id. at 31, 49. 103See Testimony of Gentry O. Smith, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., Countermeasures, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 14–15 (Feb. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Smith Testimony] (on 

file with the Committee) (‘‘There would not be any security standards for a hotel, but security 

recommendations that are made during times that we’re in a hotel, a solid core door, just basic 

things that you would expect from even being in the States, solid core door, viewfinder, very 

good locking equipment on the door; in situations such as being overseas, to look for hotels 

where there would be a security presence from either the host country or that the hotel provide 

its own security and what are the security procedures that are followed at that hotel for its 

guests.’’). 104Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 32. 105Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 36 

(Feb. 26, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 106 Id. 107Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 31. 

to identify the key players on the ground and carve out his own set 

of rules for working with the opposition.’’ 100

Stevens’ early days and months in Benghazi were consumed by 

ongoing, concurrent concerns: contending with severe civil unrest; 

establishing a Mission compound; and meeting with officials from 

the Libyan insurgency and other nations. Stevens was expected to 

accomplish all of this with an uncertain diplomatic status. 

The Tibesti Hotel 

The lead Diplomatic Security Agent who traveled with Stevens 

into Benghazi testified: ‘‘[W]e tried to put a plan together as best 

we could. We didn’t even know where we were going to set up once 

we arrived. Once we arrived, we looked at a couple locations. But 

prior to going there, it was somewhat fluid because it was just the 

unknown.’’ 101

After spending the first night on board the Greek cargo ship, the 

Aegean Pearl, and evaluating different locations, Stevens decided 

to stay at the Tibesti Hotel.102 While State Department security 

rules do not apply to hotels,103 the Diplomatic Security Agents on 

the ground sought out locations with security advantages. The 

Tibesti Hotel had limited setback 104 and ‘‘rudimentary barriers to 

control access.’’ 105 ‘‘[T]here was [also] an attempt to provide perimeter security, but it wasn’t very robust.’’ 106 The lead Diplomatic Security Agent described the decision-making process: 

We went to see where the British were at, and they were 

kind of at a guest conference type center. It wasn’t really 

big, but it was moderate sized, maybe two or three stories, 

had a compound. It was down along the water, so we ruled 

that place out.107

He also testified: 

[W]e went to one other hotel where there were some other 

journalists were staying. I don’t recall the name of it, but 

it was a little bit smaller. It was right up against the highway. So we decided and it was a little bit closer to where 

the U.K. facility was, but we decided that wasn’t really a 

good place for us. And then we went to the Tibesti and 


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108 Id. at 32. 109 Id. at 32–33. 110 Id. at 33. 111See Email from Gene A. Cretz, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to Jeffery D. Feltman, Ass’t 

Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Apr. 10, 2011, 6:06 

AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0095985) (‘‘It appears that qadhafi forces are at the eastern and western gate of adjdabiyah and that there is a real possibility of the city falling.’’); see also Rob Crilly, Libya: rebels flee stronghold of Ajdabiya as Gaddafi closes net, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 

15, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8383872/ 

Libya-rebels-flee-stronghold-of-Ajdabiya-as-Gaddafi-closes-net.html. 112See Email from Patrick Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State, to 

James Steinberg, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Apr. 10, 2011) (on file with 

the Committee, SCB0095985). 113Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 99; see also Email from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under 

Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State, to Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in 

Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State (Apr. 10, 2011, 2:06 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0095970) 

(showing email exchange at the time). 114 Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (April 10, 2011, 10:14 AM) (on 

file with the Committee, SCB0045049) 

looked at that. At the time, there were some advantages 

for us to be there.108

* * * 

There were a lot of journalists there that would make it 

easier for—[sic] and others staying there that would make 

it easier for Mr. Stevens to communicate with these people 

without us having to make unnecessary movements all the 

time. And there was a little bit of security at that hotel, 

very minimal. There was a presence.109

He also testified: 

There wasn’t a formalized police—I mean, there was probably somebody that called himself a police chief. And then 

you had the military—somewhat of a military presence, 

you know—that really wasn’t focused on anything to do 

with our security. They had, you know, they were trying 

to fight the war. Then you had February 17, a militia that 

assisted us a little bit.110

Notwithstanding the minimal security advantages over other hotels, Stevens and the Diplomatic Security Agents remained concerned about the security vulnerabilities of the Tibesti Hotel. 

CIVIL WAR AND UNREST 

Five days after Stevens arrived in Benghazi, he and his group 

were nearly forced to leave. Qadhafi’s forces had regrouped around 

the city of Ajdabiya, approximately 100 miles south of Benghazi.111

Stevens and the lead Diplomatic Security Agent, were concerned 

about the security in Benghazi if Qadhafi took Ajdabiya.112 When 

asked why they did not depart Benghazi, the Diplomatic Security 

Agent in charge of the Mission told the Committee: ‘‘[W]e reexamined the issues, and at that time, we weren’t worried about what 

was happening in Benghazi. We were worried about the forces coming forward. So they must have stopped.’’ 113 Concerns about Stevens and his team’s security reached the Secretary.114

Nevertheless, the security situation in Benghazi remained precarious. On April 15, 2011, the Mission held an emergency action 


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115 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Command Ctr. (Apr. 15, 2011, 5:54 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05396062). 116Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 50 

(Apr. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 8 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 117Testimony of Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., Int’l Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 174 (Jan. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Lamb Testimony] (on file with 

the Committee). 118See Email to DSCC_C DS Seniors (Apr. 15, 2011, 5:54 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05396062). 119See Email to DSCC_C DS Seniors (Apr. 15, 2011, 5:54 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05396062). 120See Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Apr. 24, 2011, 10:25 AM) 

(on file with the Committee, SCB0045054) (forwarding email communicating Benghazi security 

update, hotels being targeted, cell arrested, increased security being sought, and may need to 

move out of hotel to villa). 121Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 39–42. 122Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 42. 

(Feb. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 9 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 123Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 Testimony at 49. 

committee [EAC] meeting ‘‘to address several security issues that 

occurred or reported during the past 12 hours. The meeting was 

called by Stevens and was attended by all members of the 

Benghazi Mission.’’ 115 An emergency action committee meeting is 

called ‘‘when there is an emergency or security incident, the committee will convene and discuss the incident as well as steps forward either to mitigate the incident or resolve the incident.’’ 116

Charlene Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic Security, 

International Programs, described EACs to the Committee: 

‘‘They’re usually chaired by the deputy chief of Mission. Sometimes 

they’re chaired and/or attended by the Ambassador. And then the 

core members, at a minimum, the core members of your post security envelope and intelligence if they are present.’’ 117

The April 15, 2011 EAC highlighted three discreet incidents including: (1) military grade explosives were found with the Tibesti 

Hotel as the identified target; (2) two explosives were detonated 

outside the El Fadeel Hotel—the hotel used by the U.N. and UK; 

and (3) a large fire and pillar of smoke was seen emanating near 

the Hotel Uzo—the hotel occupied by many international journalists.118 The EAC determined it would work with the Transitional 

National Council to focus on security.119

Less than 10 days later, on April 24, 2011, Stevens again considered whether it was safe enough to stay at the hotel. He informed 

State Department senior officials the Tibesti Hotel might not be 

safe enough in the long run and alternative facilities might be 

needed for a longer term stay.120

The Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground protecting Stevens and his team members described a high-risk security environment. The Agents spoke of explosions occurring near and around 

the Tibesti Hotel.121 They described constant gunfire, including ‘‘a 

small-caliber round [that] came through the dining room where 

[Stevens] and the Swedish Consul were having dinner’’ and ‘‘a 

round that went through the window of our command post room in 

the hotel.’’ 122 One Diplomatic Security Agent testified the car bomb 

explosions ‘‘reminded me of what I experienced in Kabul or 

Iraq. . . .’’ 123 Unlike Kabul or Iraq, however, there was no U.S. 

military presence in Libya. 

Security would remain tenuous through the summer. On June 

10, 2011, a credible threat to the Tibesti Hotel forced Stevens and 


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124See Email from Special Ass’t, Office of Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Thomas R. 

Nides, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 10, 2011, 6:58 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0074991) (discussing relocation from Tibesti Hotel); see also Email from Jacob J. 

Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, 

U.S. Dep’t of State (June 10, 2011, 4:01 PM)(on file with the Committee, SCB0045085). 125See Email to Benghazi Update (July 31, 2011, 10:35 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05394875) (communicating reports of General Yunus’ death). 126 Email from Special Ass’t, Office of Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Thomas R. Nides, 

Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Apr. 14, 2011, 6:48 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0075032). P is the designation for the Bureau of Political Affairs. D(S) is the designation 

for the Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg. 127Feltman Testimony at 42: 

Q: Okay. And then when you either prior to your trip or during your trip in May of 

2011, were there discussions about continuing the presence in Benghazi for an indefinite period of time, maybe not years but at least the foreseeable future? 

A: Yes, there were. And the discussions were, what’s the appropriate when I was there, 

part of our discussions were, what’s the appropriate platform for maintaining a presence for that period in Benghazi? 

Q: And by ‘‘platform,’’ do you mean number of personnel? 

his team out of the hotel and to a more secure location.124 In late 

July 2011, a leading opposition figure, General Abdul Fatah 

Younis—a former Qadhafi loyalist who defected earlier in 2011 to 

join the opposition—was assassinated in Benghazi.125

BENGHAZI MISSION: SUMMER 2011 

Despite the unrest and security concerns in April 2011, senior 

leaders at the State Department were discussing continuing Stevens’ diplomatic operation beyond the initial 30 days and into the 

summer of 2011. On April 14, 2011, a report was filed with Thomas 

Nides, the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources: 

NEA will be drafting a paper for Steinberg, which essentially will ask for an expanded scope of work for Stevens— 

which will allow him to stay in Libya for longer than (90 

days or more). Once NEA has some policy guidance about 

what Stevens should be seeking to accomplish in Libya, it 

will devise a plan for a new footprint on the ground—this 

will require needed resources and could shift the mission 

from an envoy situation to a more permanent presence. We 

will need to watch this closely and I’ve flagged for P and 

D(S) staff that you and Pat should be included in these 

discussions.126

Feltman explained to the Committee: 

It was more fluid . . . but it was certainly the idea was 

to be there more than a day or a week. The idea was to 

be there for long enough that we would have the type of 

insights into TNC thinking that you can’t get from a single 

meeting, that we would have the type of access to other decisionmakers in the TNC that you can’t have when you 

only are meeting with one or two persons. We needed 

somebody who could better understand what was happening, what was motivating the leadership of the TNC, 

what were they thinking. So the idea was not that this 

would necessarily be years and years and years but certainly more than a few weeks.127


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A: Number of personnel, communications, location. You know, at the time we were in 

a hotel 

Q: The Tibesti Hotel? 

A: The Tibesti Hotel. And so the discussion had already started about what were the 

alternatives to being in a place like that. 

Q: Okay. And had there been some review of compounds and villas at that time? 

A: Yes, it had started, and it was very difficult because there were not that many 

places available or appropriate. Id. at 43. 

See also Email from Special Ass’t, Office of Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Thomas R. 

Nides, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (May 5, 2011, 7:00 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0061070) (‘‘NEA sees Benghazi turning into an eventual EBO—and all that 

entails on resources, DS, OBO, and Interagency discussion.’’ (emphasis in original)). 128Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern 

Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t 

of State (June 10, 2011) [hereinafter June 10, 2011 Action Memo for Under Secretary Kennedy] 

(on file with the Committee, C05578649). 129See Email from Special Ass’t, Office of Deputy Sec’y, U.S Dep’t of State, to Thomas R. 

Nides, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 21, 2011, 8:12 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0061058) (discussing staffing concerns and issues). 130See id. (discussing staffing concerns and issues). 131 Email from William V. Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern 

Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional Nat’l Council 

(June 21, 2011, 12:08 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05409676). 

By the end of April 2011, the diplomatic team had increased to 

17 Americans consisting of ‘‘Stevens, one reporting/public diplomacy officer, one Information Management Officer who is also 

doing Management work, four USAID officers, and ten Diplomatic 

Security special Agents who comprise the protective detail for the 

mission.’’ 128 By the end of June 2011, security threats had forced 

Stevens and his team to relocate. The space constraints in the new 

locations forced the number of personnel in Benghazi to drop to 

nine, including five Diplomatic Security Agents.129 Staffing remained unchanged throughout the summer.130 William V. Roebuck, 

the Director of the Office of Maghreb Affairs, told Stevens: 

Other principals like Deputy Secretary Nides are operating 

under (and accept) the assumption that the mission will 

bulk back up to 17 as housing stabilizes and the security 

conditions permit. . . . I have the strong sense in any case 

that there would be little appetite for capping the mission 

at 9 people, given the equities the interagency has in the 

previously higher staffing figure.131

Notwithstanding the security threats and decreased staff, Stevens and his team faced increasing demands. According to 

Polaschik, who served in Benghazi in May 2011: 

Certainly, when I was there, I was working from, you 

know, 8 in the morning till midnight. And there were two 

reporting officers there. 

Just in terms of sustainability and getting the work done, 

8 in the morning until midnight is never a good recipe, 

and, also, when you’re trying to make sure that people are 

at a heightened state of alert that’s appropriate for a very 

fluid security environment. 

So it wasn’t a decision to say, oh, we need a long term 

presence. It was a decision that we don’t have the reVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00289 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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132Polaschik Testimony at 130. 133Testimony of Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, Tr. at 79 (July 23, 2015) [hereinafter Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya Testimony] (on file 

with the Committee). 134Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 Testimony at 95. 135 Id. 136See Email from Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Special 

Ass’t, Office of Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 13, 2011, 1:13 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0061059–0061060). 137 Email from Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (June 20, 2011, 9:04 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05393024) (‘‘We are treating the 

interim villa as hotel space—only 30–60 days while we wait for the upgrades to the Villa Compound to come online.’’); see also Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 (June 17, 2011, 6:19 AM) 

(on file with the Committee, C05408710) (‘‘We hope to have the ‘interim’ villa by next tuesday 

[sic].’’). 138Testimony of Physical Sec. Specialist, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. 

at 9 (Apr. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Physical Sec. Specialist Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

sources in place to get the work done that needs to get 

done.132

Move to Mission Compound 

With Washington’s interest in extending Stevens’ stay, he and 

his team searched for a new location—a challenging process in the 

middle of a civil war. The Post Management Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, testified: ‘‘Finding 

a place that met our security needs, where the rent was not completely outrageous due to the fact that we were in a war zone, that 

had required ingress and egress that met what security wanted 

. . . were all significant issues that had to be overcome.’’ 133

[T]he traditional . . . real estate agent just didn’t exist 

. . . there were other channels of information that we 

would leverage to help us identify what we were looking 

for. Because that was really the issue, was not a property 

per se, but a property that we had special considerations 

for.’’ 134

These difficulties were further complicated by Stevens’ team’s inability to find a ‘‘landlord that would be willing to cooperate with 

us and our specific needs. . . .’’ 135

As Stevens and his team searched for new property, they temporarily collocated with other U.S. personnel on the ground in 

Benghazi. Space constraints precluded maintaining this arrangement for the long term.136 On June 21, 2011, Stevens and his team 

moved to another interim site, while they narrowed their search for 

a suitable longer term location.137 They found a facility that had 

previously served as a ‘‘man camp’’ for personnel working for the 

oil industry but had been abandoned at the start of the civil 

war.138 The lead Diplomatic Security Agent at the time described 

the advantages of the camp: 

[I]t had an established perimeter. That perimeter also 

gave us setback from the road, setback being one of the 

critical elements that we were looking for given that issues 

that we had at the Tibesti Hotel with the explosion. 

It also was a hardened building. In other words, the mason 

area was significant enough that it would likely withstand 

rounds dropping down from the sky or, depending on the 


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139Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 Testimony at 93–94. 140Physical Sec. Specialist Testimony at 87–88. 141See Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, 22 U.S.C. § 4865 

(2012); and see also, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 12 FAH–6 H–511.1–511.6, OVERSEAS SECURITY POLICY

BOARD APPROVED POLICIES AND STANDARDS FOR ALL POSTS; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF- FICE, GAO–14–655, DIPLOMATIC FACILITY SECURITY: OVERSEAS FACILITIES MAY FACE GREATER

RISKS DUE TO GAP IN SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES, STANDARDS, AND POLICIES (2014). 142See Testimony of Eric Boswell, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t 

of State, before the H. Comm. On Oversight and Gov’t Reform,, Tr. at 65–66 (July 9, 2013) 

[hereinafter Boswell Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 143Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. 

at 193 (Feb. 5, 2016) [hereinafter Kennedy Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

trajectory of a particular round, it provided it afforded us 

additional protection because of the construction of that 

particular villa. 

It allowed us to control our access onto the compound. 

That was one of the big problems with the hotel, was we 

didn’t know who was coming and going. It was an active, 

operating hotel. And so they were there to make money, 

not to control the access necessarily for the Americans.139

Notwithstanding the search for a secure location, traditional security standards did not apply in Benghazi at the time. The physical security specialist in Benghazi testified: 

Q: You were advised that OSPB standards did not apply 

to Benghazi. Is that correct? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And when they didn’t apply to Benghazi, did that mean 

the city at large or did that mean a specific facility? 

A: That meant for our facility. 

Q: Okay. But the facility at that point in time was what? 

A: The facility that we were going to occupy as the platform was going to be the man camp.140

Federal regulation and State Department rules set out the security standards United States facilities located abroad are required 

to meet to keep Americans safe.141 Senior State Department officials, nevertheless, made the decision to exclude ‘‘temporary facilities,’’ such as Benghazi, from these security rules.142 Kennedy attempted to justify this exclusion: 

When we go into one of these temporary facilities, we take 

the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards— 

OSPB is how we refer to them—we take the OSPB standards as our goals . . . We treat the temporary facilities as 

if we were heading towards interim by using the OSPB 

standards as our goal.143

In addition to the OSPB security standards, the Secure 

Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act (SECCA), 

the applicable federal security law, provides among other 

things a diplomatic facility ensure: (1) all US Government 

personnel are located together in the new diplomatic facility; and (2) the diplomatic facility is located ‘‘not less than 

100 feet from the perimeter of the property on which the 


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144See Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, 22 U.S.C. § 4865 

(2012). 145 Email (June 20, 2011, 11:30 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05396431). 146 Email from Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., 

U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 1, 2011, 11:08 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05393020). 147 Id. 148See Email from Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic 

Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State, to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 & James Bacigalupo, Regional Director, 

Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 13, 2012) (on file with the Committee, 

C05411579) (‘‘[T]he decision was made to stay put when Villa B became an option and we 

stopped looking at the other properties.’’); see also Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent (July 04, 

2011, 3:59 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05394858) (‘‘We are currently referring to our current residence as Villa A and the neighboring property as Villa B.’’). 149See Email from Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic 

Sec., U.S. Dep’t, to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 24, et al. (Feb. 13, 2012, 7:52 AM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05411579). 150Summary of group interview with Physical Security Specialist and others (on file with the 

Committee, SCB0046921–0046923). 

facility is situated.’’ 144 With regard to Benghazi, however, 

the State Department Office of the Legal Adviser determined: [T]his facility would not fit within the definition of 

a ‘diplomatic facility’ under SECCA, which defines the 

term as an office that (1) is officially notified to the host 

government as diplomatic/consular premises or (2) houses 

USG personnel with an official status recognized by the 

host government. If the facility will not be notified to the 

host government then it will not be considered inviolable, 

and our personnel will not have any official status, then 

the facility would not meet the definition of a diplomatic 

facility under the statute.145

Without official security standards in place, Stevens and the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground worked with the landlord of 

the ‘‘man camp’’ to identify field expedient measures to improve the 

physical security of the camp. The needed security measures were 

contracted out to an individual situated in Benghazi.146 The physical security specialist on site wrote: 

The DS/PSP [physical security programs] funded PSD upgrade contract that was signed . . . was for $75,000 with 

a specific scope of work to be performed, fabricate two . . . 

vehicle gates, fabricate concrete jersey type barriers, string 

barbed wire and fabricate two vehicle drop arm barriers.147

Concerns about the owner’s title and relationship to the Qadhafi 

regime forced Stevens and his team to abruptly drop the ‘‘man 

camp’’ from consideration as a housing facility. With no alternative, 

Stevens and his team remained at the interim facility, also known 

as Villa A.148 Within days of the decision to remain in Villa A, a 

neighboring property, Villa B, was acquired.149 The physical security specialist in Benghazi at the time described the sequence of 

events: ‘‘That facility fell through on a Thursday, and on the Friday, Stevens sat down with the Villa A landlord, who brought 

along the owner of Villa B. Stevens especially liked Villa B and 

said he wanted A and B together.’’ 150

The decision made by Washington to exempt the proposed ‘‘man 

camp’’ site from the official security standards also applied to the 


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151See Physical Sec. Specialist Testimony at 134. 152 Id. 153Testimony Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 28 (Apr. 

2, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 154 Email from Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., 

U.S. Dep’t, to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 and James Bacigalupo, Regional Director, Bureau of 

Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 13, 2012, 7:52 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05411579). 

Mission compound.151 The same physical security specialist in 

Benghazi explained: 

Q: . . . you were told that OSPB standards and SECCA 

did not apply to the man camp; am I correct? 

A: Did not apply. 

Q: Did not apply. 

So was that analysis then sort of used as it relates to the 

villa compound? 

A: It carried over. 

Q: Carried over. So basically and correct me if I’m misstating this but the thought would be that exceptions and 

waivers to OSPB and SECCA do not apply in Benghazi, 

generally? 

A: When I was there, that’s the 

Q: Is that a fair characterization? 

A: That’s the guidance that I was given at that time.152

This decision to exclude the Mission compound in Benghazi from 

official security standards and rules was never formally communicated to the Diplomatic Security Agents who volunteered to serve 

in Benghazi. One Diplomatic Security Agent told the Committee: 

I was starting to understand then and what I learned 

later, that if you are a diplomatic facility within the State 

Department, you have physical security requirements that 

are in the FAM, the Foreign Affairs Manual. And it is a 

very detailed, large set of rules that you have to follow to 

operate a diplomatic facility. It requires you to have physical security standards that are typically going to be expensive and will take time to do. 

If you are in a non-diplomatic facility, there are no security standards. 

They don’t exist.153

The Committee also learned ‘‘Villas A and B owners were adamant about their residential properties not be[ing] altered by our 

then short term presence without their explicit approvals being obtained in advance.’’ To assuage the landlords concerns, security improvements to Villas A and B were minimal.154 According to the 

physical security specialist: 

[M]inor security improvements were discussed and authorized for B only, open a hole in the perimeter wall between 

Villa’s [sic] A & B wide enough for a roadway, install sevVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00293 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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155 Id. 156 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent to Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State, and Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 1, 2011, 6:32 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05393020). 157 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent to DS–IP–NEA (July 21, 2011, 3:22 PM) (on file with 

the Committee, C05396529). 

eral window grills on the small Villa B office annex and 

reposition several large manufacturing machines on the 

Villa B property to block the vehicle gates because all Mission vehicle activity was to be conducted from Villa A. The 

owners [sic] representative walked the property with us 

several times and he agreed to implement these minor security improvements as part of his fiduciary management 

responsibilities and dismissed other recommendations such 

as installing razor ribbon on existing perimeter walls were 

[sic] needed, installing shatter resistant window film and 

installing vehicle drop arm barriers. Post used available 

FAV SUV’s with maintenance issues (no working A/C) to 

block the Villa A vehicle gates. There was no PSD/PCB 

trip report prepared upon return because conditions on the 

ground were changing on a near daily basis and were discussed on conference calls and/or in email correspondence 

with concerned offices within WDC as to what Post was 

proposing and what was being considered an approved for 

the leased properties.155

Villa C, another residence, was acquired shortly after the residences located in Villas A and B. Although no security assessment 

was conducted on Villa C at the time, one of the Diplomatic Security Agents assessed ‘‘[n]o upgrades are needed for Villas A & 

C.’’ 156

As Stevens and his team finalized the acquisition of all three Villas in late July 2011, a Diplomatic Security Agent on the ground 

outlined to Washington D.C. a number of ‘‘security-related items,’’ 

needed to better protect the new compound:157

More agents required: Between the three compounds, we’re 

looking at roughly 15 acres of property to secure. This will 

require additional SAs [special agents] (up to five more) by 

early to mid-August. For REACT purposes, teams of 

agents will reside on all three compounds. Once resources 

permit, RSO [regional security officer] TOC [technical operations center] will be staffed 24/7. 

LGF [local guard force]: per the contract already in place 

with AQM, we’ll have 11 unarmed guard positions (all 24/ 

7). This includes a Shift Supervisor and 10 guard posts. 

Tripoli LGF commander will oversee day-to-day operations. LGF will be in place prior to occupancy. Guard Orders in draft—pending. 

Access control policy (drafted and approved by Envoy): Except for select VIPs, visitors will park outside the compound and enter on foot. Visitor/vehicles will be screened 

by LGF. Visitors/deliveries will be channeled to one access 


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158 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent to DS–IP–NEA (July 21, 2011, 3:22 PM) (on file with 

the Committee, C05396529). 159See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent to DS–IP–NEA (July 21, 2011, 3:22 PM) (on file 

with the Committee, C05396529) (mentioning that ‘‘[b]arring any issues, occupancy of villa B&C 

could be as early as Aug. 1.’’); see also Lease Agreement between [REDACTED] and the United 

States of America, STS–800–11–L–009 (Aug, 3, 2011) (on file with the Committee, C05394161) 

(showing term of lease beginning Aug. 1). 160 Id.; see also Letter (July 28, 2011) (on file with the Committee, SCB0047437–42) (authorizing three leases in Benghazi). 161Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 18 

(Apr. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 12 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

control point; remaining vehicle gates will be blocked using 

armored vehicles or similar. 

Compound Security/Internal Defense Plan: will incorporate 

DS [diplomatic security] agents, LGF, and TNC [Transitional National Council] armed guards. 

Designation of safe havens within each residential and office structure. 

Installation of TSS equipment/arrival of TDY install 

team—TBD. 

Relocation of RSO TOC from Villa A (current location) to 

Villa B office building. 

Request for additional TNC armed guards.158

The email introduces several specific elements related to security 

that later become significant. Already occupying Villa A, Stevens 

and his team took occupancy of Villas B and C on August 1, 

2011.159 On August 3, 2011, leases for all three villas were executed, forming what would become known as the Benghazi Mission 

compound.160

Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground described their impressions of the compound: 

When I arrived on the compound, it was 13 acres I remember this pretty vividly 13 acres. We occupied three dormitories, I will say. We named them Villa A, B, and C. 

There was a building that we considered as, you know it 

was referred to by, you know, us and the other folks there 

as the tactical operations center, also as the office. 

And then we had another outlying building on the 13 acre 

compound, which really was three separate, you know, 

residences, which housed the quick reaction forces I’ve described before, the 17th February guys, who also lived on 

compound with us.161

[I]t was not like the other compounds that I had seen. It 

appeared to be more of a low profile building, lower footprint than your typical embassy or consulate. It didn’t 

have the signs up saying ‘‘U.S. Embassy’’ or ‘‘Consulate.’’ 

It didn’t have some of the physical security features you 

would typically see at an embassy or consulate, such as 

Delta barriers or chicane. There wasn’t the host nation police presence, the military presence that you would find at 


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162Diplomatic Sec. Agent 8 Testimony at 41. 163See Email from U.S. Embassy Tripoli to Gene A. Cretz, U.S. Ambassador to Libya (Sept. 

7, 2011, 12:53 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390164) (‘‘. . . the TNC effectively took control of Tripoli in mid-August and has begun to establish its presence and authority in the city.’’). 164See id. (‘‘Approximately half of the TNC’s executive cabinet . . . is currently in Tripoli, 

joined by 15 of the TNC’s 42 council members.’’). 165 Id. 166 Email from William V. Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern 

Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Raymond D. Maxwell, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, and Elizabeth L. Dibble, Principal Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State, 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 20, 2011, 8:20 AM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05389443) (‘‘I am forwarding this to socialize Chris’ thoughts on the future of the 

Benghazi Mission, in light of our Embassy in Tripoli. He would like to conclude his service o/ 

a October 6 and return to Washington.’’). 167 Email from Elizabeth L. Dibble, Principal Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Sate, to Raymond D. Maxwell, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, William Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau 

of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, and Lee Lohman, Ex. Dir., Bureau of Near Eastern 

Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, et al. (Sept. 20, 2011, 6:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05389443) (‘‘I raised with Jeff [Feltman]. He thinks Chris needs to stay in Benghazi until Jalil 

has relocated more or less permanently to Tripoli. He also thinks we should not rush to shut 

down the operation there.’’). 168See Email from Senior Desk Officer for Libya, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional Nat’l 

Council (‘‘stevens chris’’) (July 27, 2011, 9:22 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05561961) (attaching draft staffing paper discussion of the role of the Mission); see also Email from Senior 

Desk Office for Libya, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to U.S. Embassy Tripoli, (Sept. 7, 2011, 1:02 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05390164). 169See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 

U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 

U.N.T.S. 261. 170 Email from Special Ass’t, Office of Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Thomas R. Nides, 

Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Apr. 5, 2011, 5:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0061086) (‘‘Chris explained his mission, making it clear that he would like to meet all members of the TNC and as many local council members as possible to understand the extent of 

the TNC’s support.’’). 171See Feltman Testimony at 27. 172See Cretz Testimony at 36. 

your typical embassy or consulate. So my impression was, 

it was a lower or a lower profile mission.162

Less than three weeks after leases were signed for the new Mission compound, Tripoli fell to opposition forces.163 Soon after the 

fall of Tripoli, elements of the TNC moved from Benghazi to Tripoli.164 Less than eight weeks after the Mission moved into its new 

compound, Embassy Tripoli reopened.165 At that time, Stevens requested his role as representative to the TNC conclude on or about 

October 6, 2011.166 He was asked to remain in Benghazi until the 

TNC’s relocation was complete later that fall.167

Uncertain Diplomatic Status 

Stevens’ Mission in Benghazi fell outside the normal realm, even 

extending to questions about its diplomatic status.168 Typically, a 

Mission and its staff are notified to the host nation under which 

they receive the full privileges and immunities afforded under 

international conventions.169 At the time Stevens and his team 

went into Benghazi to coordinate with the emerging Transitional 

National Council,170 however, the U.S. had not severed formal diplomatic relations with the Qadhafi regime.171 Gene A. Cretz remained the Ambassador to Libya, and he and a select number of 

his team were serving ‘‘in exile’’ in Washington D.C.172 Feltman explained: 


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173Feltman Testimony at 27–28. 174See Email from Special Ass’t, Office of Deputy Sec’y, U.S Dep’t of State, to Thomas Nides, 

Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Apr. 5, 2011, 5:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0061086) (‘‘Chris explained his mission, making it clear that he would like to meet all members of the TNC and as many local council members as possible to understand the extent of 

the TNC’s support.’’). 175See Email to SES–O_SWO; Tripoli Cooperation, SES–O (Apr. 10, 2011, 6:10 AM) (on file 

with the Committee, SCB0075057). 

Again, the overall goal was to try to limit the need for a 

military solution, to focus on a political solution, and convince Qadhafi that his time was over. So you close down 

the Embassy in Tripoli of course, we closed it down earlier 

for security reasons but you have no representation in 

Tripoli, but suddenly you have somebody in Benghazi. 

You know, psychologically, did this have an impact on Qadhafi’s thinking to realize that the U.K., the U.S., France, 

Italy, whole lists of countries no longer had representation 

in Tripoli, but they had representation in Benghazi. 

Now, the TNC, as I said, wasn’t a government at the time. 

You know, there’s certain attributes that a government 

has that we didn’t think they had achieved those attributes yet. They very much wanted to be recognized as 

the legitimate government of Libya, and I’m not sure that 

any country actually recognized them within that period as 

legitimate government. I don’t think they did. But it was 

important to show who which Libyans did the U.S. think 

were appropriate interlocutors at the time.173

Keeping Washington Informed 

While contending with the civil unrest and seeking a location to 

house his diplomatic mission, Stevens set out to meet with leaders 

of the fledgling TNC.174 He also met with other nations on the 

ground and leading rebel forces.175 Throughout his time in 

Benghazi in 2011 Stevens kept Washington informed of the ongoing developments. For example, on April 10, 2011, he reported to 

Washington: 

The situation in Ajadbiyah has worsened to the point 

where Stevens is considering departing Benghazi. The envoy’s delegation is currently doing a phased checkout (paying the hotel bills, moving some items to the boat etc.). He 

will monitor the situation to see if it deteriorates further, 

but no decision has been made on departure. He will wait 

2–3 more hours and then revisit the decision on departure. 

* * * 

The Brits report Qadhafi’s forces are moving from Sirte to 

Brega, which they interpret as preparation for another assault on Ajadbiyah today. 

He plans to discuss the situation further with the Brits, 

Turks, and the TNC to see if this is an irreversible situation. Departure would send a significant political signal, 

and would be interpreted as the U.S. losing confidence in 

the TNC. 


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176 Id. 177 Email from Staff Ass’t, Office of the U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jacob J. 

Sullivan, Dir. Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Apr. 25, 2011, 4:33 PM) (on file with 

the Committee, SCB0083338). 

Initial message to the TNC would frame the departure as 

due to security grounds and as a temporary measure only. 

Polaschik said she would discuss these developments with 

Ambassador Cretz. 

If the group departs, the contract for the boat stipulates 

they return to Greece. One scenario could be the group 

stages elsewhere for a few days.176

On April 25, 2011, Stevens reported the following: 

Political/economic developments: 

The TNC [Transitional National Council]: This week the 

Council will focus on strengthening its executive arm, the 

‘‘Crisis Management Committee,’’ by appointing coordinators (i.e. ministers) for defense, interior, and justice. They 

will also encourage the head of the Committee Dr. 

Mahmoud Jabril to remain in Benghazi and focus on managing the affairs of eastern Libya. He has been criticized 

for spending too much time abroad. 

Libyan Broadcasting: A number of Libyan contacts told us 

that Libyan State Television was disrupted in the early 

morning hours, possibly due to NATO airstrikes. Later in 

the day, however broadcasting resumed. 

Air bridge?[sic] The United Nations Humanitarian Air 

Service (UNHAS) is expected to begin regular passenger 

service in/out of Benghazi in the next week or so. Details, 

including its route, are being worked out. The flights 

would be available on a sign up basis to humanitarian and 

donor staff (UN, NGOs, and donor Missions). 

New passport and visa procedures: the TNC issued a press 

release from Colonel Saad Najm, the head of the immigration office, describing how the historically burdensome 

passport process will be eased. Colonel Najm said that his 

office would suspend issuing entry visas until the TNC 

could better secure the land and sea ports, and said that 

journalists crossing into Libya over land from Egypt will 

need to apply for visas at the border town of Msaed and 

have letters of endorsement from TNC media committee.177

In addition, Stevens reported back to the State Department on 

the security environment in Benghazi. 

Security situation: 

Benghazi: TNC member confirmed reports we received yesterday that TNC security forces had uncovered a cell of 

Libyans sent from Egypt to disrupt life in Benghazi by attacking hotels and even schools (schools have been closed 

since the mid-March attacks by loyalist forces). [The TNC 


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178 Id. 179 Email to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Aug. 22, 

2011, 6:54 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0045093). 

Member] said that Qadhafi relative Ahmed Qadhafadam 

who moved to Cairo after the revolution began was behind 

the effort. [The TNC Member] said he gave interviews to 

Egyptian TV channels last night complaining about this 

problem and calling on Egyptian authorities to stop it. According to press reports, TNC Chairman Abd al-Jalal 

asked Egyptian authorities to halt Qadhafadam’s efforts to 

raise funds to use against the rebels.178

On August 22, 2011, Stevens filed a report on the fall of Tripoli: 

TNC caretaker cabinet/members were up until 4am following events in Tripoli and discussing plans for the coming days. Tarhouni said the TNC has been in constant 

communication with its people in Tripoli, including both 

fighters and those entrusted with implementing the stabilization plans. Rebels in Tripoli, in coordination with the 

TNC, have begun to set up checkpoints inside the city and 

guard public buildings. 

TNC chairman Abd al Jalil and PM Jabril made statements to the media last night, urging people to refrain 

from revenge attacks and destruction of public buildings. 

There has so far been ‘no bloodbath’ or serious looting. 

The capture of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and Mohamed atQadhafi is significant. The TNC, including Abd al-Jalil 

himself, intervened with rebels surrounding Mohamed’s 

house to ensure that they didn’t harm him. They understood that it would be harmful to the revolution and the 

TNC if he were killed. These events were captured live by 

Al Jazeera in interviews with Mohamed. Both brothers are 

in rebel custody (at this time, it is unclear to us exactly 

who is holding them, however). 

Per Tarhouni, the next steps are: 1) find Muammar Qadhafi; 2) issue a statement announcing the end of the Qadhafi regime and the start of the interim period under the 

TNC (TNC staff have begun drafting this statement already); 3) insure the delivery of essential services and commodities (esp. addressing the acute shortages of fuel, children’s milk, and medication for blood pressure and diabetes); and 4) move the TNC to Tripoli. 

Regarding the move to Tripoli, Tarhouni said security arrangements would need to be made before they could send 

the TNC leadership to the capital. We have heard from another contact that some TNC members are already making 

plans to fly to Misurata and the Western Mountains, possibly as early as today, and from there drive to Tripoli.179


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180See Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya Testimony at 115. 181 Id. at 108. 182Polaschik Testimony at 28. 183 Id. at 30. 

As Stevens filed his reports, State Department personnel continued to monitor.180 The Post Management Officer, who handled logistics for Stevens’ mission, told the Committee: 

In the initial insertion period, we were speaking to the 

team on the ground on a regular basis, and we would say 

we will touch base with you again in X number of hours 

and have another phone call. 

I don’t know when we shifted to a regular schedule versus 

when we were just saying, okay, we’ve heard from you 

now. Okay. Let’s talk again in 6 hours once things have 

gone on. We’ll give you 8 hours and let you sleep, and then 

we’ll talk to you again, kind of thing.181

Polaschik reported: 

I saw my role as his [Stevens] backstop, because having 

been in a situation where the security environment was 

very fluid, and having limited resources, knowing that 

their communications setup was less than ideal as they 

were getting started, I thought it was very important for 

him to have a single point of contact that he could reach 

out to that could then communicate information, requests, 

et cetera; and also I personally felt very invested in what 

was happening, and I wanted to be there for him.182

Later in her testimony, Polaschik said: 

Quite early on, it looked as if Chris and team had just arrived. There was a moment when it looked like a city 

called Ajdabiya was about to fall to Qadhafi forces. I remember it was a Saturday, and I was on a conference call, 

and I remember talking to Chris and saying, are you sure 

you should stay? Because my perspective is very much 

with the events in Tripoli when we were evacuating fresh 

in my mind, things can change on a moment’s notice; I 

would feel much better if he would get out now. 

And Chris had, I think, a different tolerance for risk than 

I did. And he felt that the conditions on the ground were 

such that it was okay to stay. And, again, these were conference calls that involved a variety of actors in the State 

Department. I believe Op Center was on it and was probably documenting the call as well. So that was one instance. 

But in terms of the overall what is our future, I don’t remember the specifics, but I do remember an overall very 

strong impression from Chris that he felt it was important 

to stay, and the conditions were such that they should.183


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184See Fishman Testimony at 22 (‘‘[D]uring the intervention, we were trying, as mandated 

by the Security Council, to protect the civilian population of the Libyan people, and once their 

regime was collapsed, we were trying to, as we saw it, help the Libyans stabilize their country 

and support the interim authorities to do that.’’). 185See Email from Special Ass’t, Office of Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Thomas R. 

Nides, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 7, 2011, 7:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0074994) (discussing the TNC’s legitimacy). 186 Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks on Libya and Syria (July 

15, 2011), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/168656.htm. 187Fishman Testimony at 32. 188 Id. at 33–34. 189 Id. at 60. 190See Email from Senior Desk Officer to Libya, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional Nat’l 

Council (‘‘stevens chris’’) (July 27, 2011, 9:22 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05390164) (attaching draft staffing paper). 191 Email from William V. Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern 

Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Joan A. Polaschik State, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. 

Dep’t of State (July 18, 2011, 8:17 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05579345). 

Recognition of the TNC 

The discussion in the summer among senior officials in Washington also turned toward supporting the TNC to an even greater 

degree.184 The first step in supporting the emerging council was determining when and how to recognize them. Stevens reported to 

Washington earlier in June ‘‘substantial pockets of people in 

Benghazi and Eastern Libya . . . are questioning the TNC’s legitimacy.’’ 185 At the behest of the Secretary, the United States took 

the unprecedented step of formally recognizing the Transitional 

National Government on July 15, 2011,186 terming it the ‘‘legitimate representative of the Libya People,’’ 187 but not the legitimate 

government of Libya.188 Fishman explained the difference: 

A: That was how we could recognize the Libyan authorities as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people, 

which would in essence, derecognize the Qadhafi regime as 

the Government of Libya. 

Q: But did you draw a distinction between recognizing 

them as the representative of the Libyan people and recognizing them as the legitimate Libyan Government? 

A: I believe so, because they didn’t have a government at 

the time.189

Notwithstanding the United States’ decision to recognize the 

TNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan People, the 

State Department made clear ‘‘it did not intend to establish a formal diplomatic Mission in Benghazi.’’ 190 State Department officials 

were worried: 

[E]stablishment of a formal diplomatic mission in 

Benghazi would undermine this commitment [to a unified, 

free Libya with Tripoli as its capital] and send the wrong 

political message. Establishment of a formal diplomatic 

mission in Benghazi also would set off a chain of complex 

legal and administrative requirements that do not make 

sense for what is intended to be a short-term presence.191

While formally recognizing the Benghazi diplomatic mission may 

have created issues for Washington, especially if the mission were 

considered ‘‘short term,’’ there was a benefit to the TNC: the reVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00301 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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192Fishman Testimony at 60. 193 Id. at 33. 194 Blumenthal Testimony at 44. 195 Id. at 113. 196See Osprey Global Solutions, Capabilities Brief: Libya Citizens & LSM Initiatives, Osprey 

Global Solutions, at 71 [hereinafter Osprey Brief] (on file with Committee) (‘‘Citizens Initiative: 

Phase 2—Frozen Libyan—USA Funds’’). 197Scott Shane & Jo Becker, A New Libya, With ‘Very Little Time Left,’ N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 27, 

2016), 

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/libya-isis-hillary-clinton.html. 

198Osprey Brief, supra note 196, at 31–35 (presenting the ‘‘Citizens Initiative: Phase 1— 

Multi-Purpose Hospital Ship’’). 199 Id. 200 Email from Sidney Blumenthal (‘‘sbwhoeop’’) to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, 

U.S. Dep’t of State (July 14, 2011, 10:38 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078451); Email 

from Sidney Blumenthal (‘‘sbwhoeop’’) to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (July 14, 2011, 7:03 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078453). 201 Email from Sidney Blumenthal (‘‘sbwhoeop’’) to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, 

U.S. Dep’t of State (July 14, 2011, 10:38 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078451). 202 Email from Sidney Blumenthal (‘‘sbwhoeop’’) to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, 

U.S. Dep’t of State (July 14, 2011, 7:03 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078453). 203 Id. 

lease of previously frozen funds to them. Fishman told the Committee: 

Well, it led to this complicated process that allowed us to 

unfreeze some assets because the Central Bank and other 

financial institutions . . . still had their assets frozen 192

* * * 

[B]y recognizing the NTC [sic], as subsequently other countries did or previously and subsequently other countries 

did, we [the United States] were able to engage in the 

process where we were ultimately able to create a temporary funding mechanism where we could release some 

assets . . . to help defray their cost of running 

Benghazi.193

Private business also stood to gain from the unfreezing of Libyan 

assets. One such business was Osprey Global Solutions in which 

Sidney Blumenthal had a financial interest.194 According to Osprey’s Chief Operating Officer, the plan was for the United States 

to unfreeze the frozen Libyan assets.195 These assets could then be 

used by the new Libyan government to fund humanitarian assistance,196 an idea proposed by the Secretary herself.197

According to internal company documents, Osprey identified a 

300-foot hospital vessel—including a crematorium.198 Osprey provided to the Libyans details about this hospital ship, even down to 

the number of physicians on board (16), nurses (40), custodial and 

kitchen staff (18). Osprey also provided hard figures on how much 

it would cost to procure the ship, maintain the ship, and acquire 

medical equipment.199

On July 14, 2011—the day before the United States officially recognized the TNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan 

people—Blumenthal emailed the Secretary twice.200 One email contained the subject ‘‘H: IMPORTANT FOR YOUR MEETING. 

Sid.’’ 201 The other email contained the subject ‘‘Re: H: Pls call before you leave for Turkey. Important re your trip. Sid.’’ 202 That 

email contained the note ‘‘read the memo I sent you. Here it is 

again.’’ 203 The contents of both emails are identical:—Blumenthal 


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204 Id. 205 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State (July 14, 2011, 6:47 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078451). 

described Osprey and the funding issues associated with his venture. The emails read: 

You should be aware that there is a good chance at the 

contact meeting in Turkey the TNC ambassador to the 

UAE, a man you have not yet met, whose name is Dr. 

Neydah, may tell you the TNC has reached an agreement 

with a US company. The company is a new one, Osprey, 

headed by former General David Grange, former head of 

Delta Force. Osprey will provide field medical help, military training, organize supplies, and logistics to the TNC. 

They are trainers and organizers, not fighters. Grange can 

train their forces and he has drawn up a plan for taking 

Tripoli similar to the plan he helped develop that was used 

by the first wave of Special Forces in the capture of Baghdad. 

This is a private contract. It does not involve NATO. It 

puts Americans in a central role without being direct battle combatants. The TNC wants to demonstrate that they 

are pro-US. They see this as a significant way to do that. 

They are enthusiastic about this arrangement. They have 

held meetings with Grange in Geneva and Dubai this 

week, Tuesday and Wednesday, that concluded late last 

night (Wednesday). They have developed a good relationship. This is the group the TNC wants to work with. As 

I understand it, they are still working out funding, which 

is related to the overall TNC funding problems. 

Grange is very low key, wishes to avoid publicity and work 

quietly, unlike other publicity hungry firms. Grange is 

under the radar. 

Tyler, Cody and I acted as honest brokers, putting this arrangement together through a series of connections, linking the Libyans to Osprey and keeping it moving. The 

strategic imperative: Expecting Gaddafi to fall on his own 

or through a deus ex machina devolves the entire equation 

to wishful thinking. The TNC has been unable to train and 

organize its forces. The NATO air campaign cannot take 

ground. The TNC, whose leaders have been given to flights 

of fancy that Qaddafi will fall tomorrow or the day after, 

have come to the conclusion that they must organize their 

forces and that they must score a military victory of their 

own over Qaddafi that is not dependent solely on NATO in 

order to give them legitimacy.204

Upon receiving these emails, the Secretary forwarded one to Sullivan and said ‘‘Pls read and discuss w me at hotel. Thx.’’ 205 She 

also responded to Blumenthal. First she wrote: ‘‘I just landed and 


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206 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Sidney 

Blumenthal (‘‘sbwhoeop’’) (July 14, 2011, 6:31 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078454). 207 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Sidney 

Blumenthal (‘‘sbwhoeop’’) (July 14, 2011, 7:37 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078453). 208Sebnem Arsu & Steven Erlanger, Libyan Rebels Get Formal Backing, and $30 Billion, N.Y. 

TIMES (July 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/world/africa/16libya.html?_r=0. 209Osprey Global Solutions, Memorandum of Understanding (Aug. 24, 2011) (on file with 

Committee). 210 Id. 211Letter from David L. Grange to Andrew J. Shapiro, Asst. Sec’y for Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Jan. 4, 2012) (on file with Committee). 212 Id. 213Scott Shane & Jo Becker, A New Libya, With ‘Very Little Time Left,’ N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 27, 

2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/libya-isis-hillary-clinton.html. 

will call shortly.’’ 206 She followed with: ‘‘Got it. Will followup tomorrow. Anything else to convey?’’ 207

The following day, the United States formally recognized the 

TNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people, allowing the TNC to access $30 billion in Libyan assets held in the 

United States.208

On August 24, 2011, Osprey and the TNC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding that read, in part: 

Per meetings held 13 July and 20 Aug 2011 in Dubai with 

Dr. Aref Aly Nayed and in Amman on 23 and 24 August 

with Mohammad Kikhia, this agreement is entered into 

this 24th day of August 2011 between the National Transitional Council of Libya (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘NTC’’), 

now recognized by the United States Government of America as the legitimate and sole government of the Republic 

of Libya (ROL), and Osprey Global Solutions, LLC . . . 

The specific tasks—Scope of Work (SOW) the NTC desires 

to retain Osprey to perform include but are not limited to 

. . . Provide ship-to-shore (maritime) logistical support, 

advanced field hospital services and mobile command and 

control...209

The total cost in the Memorandum for the first year of Osprey’s 

services—to include the ‘‘multi-purpose 302’ ship’’—was $114 million.210

The head of Osprey, General David L. Grange, also wrote Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, 

regarding the hospital ship.211 In the letter Mr. Grange wrote Osprey was prepared to provide the following services: 

Provide ship-to-shore (maritime) medical and logistical 

support, advanced field hospital services and mobile command and control; this would include the immediate deployment of a hospital ship equipped with rotary wing 

assets...212

Ultimately the National Security Council rejected the hospital 

ship proposal.213

Senior Official Travel to Libya 

Despite the tenuous security environment in the summer of 

2011, senior officials from Washington D.C., including Feltman, 

William Roebuck, Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of 


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214 Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 21, 2011, 9:26 AM) (on file 

with the Committee, SCB0045090–92) (Ms. Abedin forwarding Mr. Feltman’s message to Sec’y 

Clinton). 215 Id. 216General Younis, a former Libyan interior minister under Qadhafi, defected to the rebel side 

when the revolution began and became the commander-in-chief of the rebel forces in Libya. 217 Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 21, 2011, 9:26 AM) (on file 

with the Committee, SCB0045090–92). 218See Feltman Testimony at 44–45. 

Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, and Fishman, traveled to 

Benghazi.214 Feltman wrote to the Secretary during his August 

2011 trip to Benghazi: 

I have joined our representative, Chris Stevens, in meetings with a large number of representatives from the TNC, 

civil society, UN organizations and NGOs, and diplomatic 

corps. While we had no idea our trip would correspond 

with the significant military advances in the east and start 

the coordinated Tripoli uprising dubbed ‘‘Operation Mermaid Dawn,’’ the timing gave us the opportunity to note 

the contrast between the relative bureaucratic quiet here 

compared to the hyped-up activity in western Libya.215

He also described the impact the assassination of General 

Younis, commander of the rebel forces, had on the security environment in Benghazi.216 He spoke of the ‘‘two realities of Libyan life 

that TNC officials had previously tried to downplay: tribes and militia . . . On reigning [sic] in the militia we heard no good answers.’’ 217

It was also during this trip to Benghazi Feltman discussed with 

Stevens the future of the Benghazi Mission: 

During the August trip, Chris and I talked about, frankly, 

our shared view that we needed to maintain a longer presence in Benghazi than the fall of Tripoli might otherwise 

suggest. I was in Benghazi when the battle for Tripoli 

began, and it was clear that this time, it was inevitable 

that Qadhafi was leaving Tripoli even though he wasn’t, of 

course, found and killed until later. 

And so Chris and I did talk in that August trip about the 

fact that both of us believed that we needed to maintain 

some kind of presence in Benghazi for the foreseeable future. We didn’t talk about how long, but given the history 

of Libya, given the history of the revolution, given the 

need for Benghazi to remain supportive of whatever government took form in Tripoli, we thought it was politically 

extremely important that we maintain some kind of presence in Benghazi beyond the fall of Tripoli.218

THE FALL OF QADHAFI 

With NATO airstrikes providing cover, by August 2011, the Libyan opposition was finally able to push back against Qadhafi’s 


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219See John F. Burns, NATO Bombs Tripoli in Heaviest Strikes Yet, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 

2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/world/africa/24libya.html. 220Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Jubilant Rebels Control Much of Tripoli, N.Y. 

TIMES (Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/world/africa/22libya.html. 221 Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 22, 2011, 7:07 AM) (on file 

with the Committee, SCB0045093) (forwarding update from Stevens in Benghazi). 222 Id. 223 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Huma Abedin, 

Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 22, 2011, 7:11 AM) (on 

file with the Committee, SCB0045095). 224 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Huma Abedin, 

Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State & Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y 

of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 22, 2011, 7:17 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0045097). 225 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor 

to U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State & Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec’y 

of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 22, 2011, 7:32 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078489) 226 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Cheryl D. Mills & Huma Abedin (Aug. 22, 2011, 7:16 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0078489). 227 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan 

& Huma Abedin (Aug. 22, 2011, 7:09 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078489). 228 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Cheryl D. Mills & Huma Abedin 

(Aug. 22, 2011, 7:27 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078489). 

forces.219 On August 21, 2011, rebels advanced into Tripoli.220 The 

next morning, Stevens provided an update to the senior leaders at 

the State Department on the events in Tripoli and the TNC’s urgent request for ‘‘essential . . . commodities.’’ 221 Stevens described 

the events unfolding and made the following request: 

Request for assistance: Tarhouni who also holds US citizenship said items listed above (gas, diesel, baby milk, and 

medicine) are urgently needed in Tripoli and recommend 

that USG ship items directly to Zawiya’s Port and publicize such assistance as soon as feasible (in coordination 

with the TNC). He said this would bring the US even more 

goodwill than it has already earned here.222

The Secretary responded to her staff five minutes later asking: 

‘‘Can we arrange shipments of what’s requested?’’ 223 Sullivan replied seven minutes later saying the NSS and Department of Defense were already pursuing the effort.224

The Secretary also told her inner circle she wanted to do a press 

event as it would be ‘‘[g]ood to remind ourselves and the rest of the 

world that this couldn’t have happened [without] us’’ 225 and ‘‘would 

be a great [opportunity] to describe all we’ve been doing . . .’’ 226

She and her staff discussed her traveling to Martha’s Vineyard to 

be seen with the President celebrating their Libyan success.227 Her 

top policy director commented: ‘‘It will show potus [President of the 

United States] not on vacation. He’s huddling with you. This must 

be a political boost, right?’’ 228

At about the same time, Blumenthal wrote: 

First, brava! This is a historic moment and you will be 

credited for realizing it. 

When Qaddafi himself is finally removed, you should of 

course make a public statement before the cameras wherever you are, even in the driveway of your vacation house. 

You must go on camera. You must establish yourself in the 

historical record at this moment. 


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229 Email from Sidney Blumenthal (‘‘Sid’’) to Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’) (Aug. 22, 2011, 11:25 

AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0051597). 230 Id. The phrase ‘‘leading from behind’’ came from a remark by an Obama advisor quoted 

in a May 2, 2011 article by Ryan Lizza in The New Yorker. Ryan Lizza, Leading from Behind, 

NYT (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/leading-from-behind. 231 Email from Hillary R. Clinton (‘‘H’’), Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 22, 2011, 3:46 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, SCB0051597). 232Tick Tock on Libya Email, supra note 19 (from Jacob J. Sullivan to Cheryl D. Mills & Victoria Nuland, forwarded to Sec’y Clinton, Aug. 22, 2011, 12:37 PM). 233 Id. 234See Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional Nat’l Council, to Jeffrey 

D. Feltman, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Aug. 

23, 2011, 11:29 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB00100119) (discussing TNC plans to relocate to Tripoli); see also Exec. Secretariat, Operations Ctr., Situation Report No. 14, Libya Task 

Force TFLY03 (Sept. 4, 2011, 4:00 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0074167) (‘‘The TNC’s 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs will move from Benghazi to Tripoli September 4 and will be housed 

in the Qadhafi-era MFA building.’’). 235See Email from Lee Lohman, Ex. Dir., Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Patrick Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 2, 2011) (on file 

with the Committee, SCB0096224) (‘‘Jeff send [sic] an email from Paris yesterday expressing 

frustration that we don’t have a presence in Tripoli.’’). 236 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 30, 2011, 

4:47 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0060918). 

The most important phrase is ‘successful strategy.’ 229

Later in the message, Blumenthal wrote: ‘‘Be aware that 

some may attempt to justify the flamingly stupid ‘leading 

from behind’ phrase, junior types on the NSC imagining 

their cleverness.’’ 230

The Secretary forwarded this message to Sullivan: 

Pls read below. Sid makes a good case for what I should 

say but it’s premised on being said after Q dies which will 

make it more dramatic. That’s my hesitancy since I’m not 

sure how many chances I’ll get.231

Sullivan had already developed a detailed timeline of events and 

actions to demonstrate the Secretary’s ‘‘leadership/ownership/stewardship of this country’s Libya policy from start to finish.’’ 232 He 

wrote: 

HRC has been a critical voice on Libya in administration 

deliberations, at NATO, and in contact group meetings— 

as well as the public face of the U.S. effort in Libya. She 

was instrumental in securing the authorization, building 

the coalition, and tightening the noose around Qadhafi and 

his regime.233

Limiting the Future U.S. Role 

With the rebels capturing Tripoli in August 2011 and Qadhafi 

nowhere to be found, the TNC started to shift its leaders and headquarters to Tripoli.234 As the situation in Libya appeared to stabilize, there was corresponding interest throughout the State Department and the administration to shift the focus back to Tripoli 

and reopen the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli as soon as possible.235 Sullivan asked: ‘‘[W]hat’s it gonna take to get a team on the ground 

in Tripoli?’’ 236 His colleague wrote back: ‘‘Exception to the BOG 

[boots on the ground] for Explosive Ordnance Detection and Marine 

FAST [Fleet Anti-terrorism security team.] An Ambassador to 


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237 Email to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, (Aug. 30, 2011, 

4:50 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0060918). 238See Email to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 29 2011, 

5:01 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0060926–30) (attaching Note for the Secretary re: 

U.S. Interests in post-Qadhafi Libya). 239 Id. 240 Id. The lack of post-Qadhafi planning is consistent with the President’s recent statement 

that his biggest foreign policy failure was not properly planning for post-Qadhafi Libya. The lack 

of planning is also in stark contrasts with statements by the Secretary that they did plan for 

post-Qadhafi Libya but it was ‘‘obstruction’’ by the Libyan people to the United States’ efforts 

that led to the failed state of Libya today. Barack Obama Says Libya Was ‘Worst Mistake of 

His Presidency, GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/12/ 

barack-obama-says-libya-was-worst-mistake-of-his-presidency. 241See Email to Jacob Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 29 2011, 

5:01 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0060926–30) (attaching Note for the Secretary re: 

U.S. Interests in post-Qadhafi Libya). 242 Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional Nat’l Council, to Deputy Dir. 

Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State et al. (Sept. 6, 

2011, 9:01 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05389443). 243Polaschik Testimony at 160. 

Libya who actually wants to go. Locking Pat Kennedy in a closet 

for long enough to actually take some real risks.’’ 237

As events unfolded in Tripoli, senior policy makers within the 

State Department discussed their goals for Libya, including: 1) 

bring the Lockerbie bomber to justice; and 2) recover the costs incurred in providing military and humanitarian aid to Libya; 3) recover and improve the position of U.S. Energy firms in Libya.238

The fourth and final goal was to counter Islamist extremists, noting that there was a need to ‘‘avoid allowing the most extreme and 

certainly violent Islamist groups to use the new Libyan government 

and civil society as a platform. The American people and the U.S. 

Congress will be understandably irritated if a revolution that the 

United States supported ends up spewing hatred or advocating violence against the United States.’’ 239

These policy goals did not address how the U.S. government 

would assist Libya in transitioning to a functioning government 

post-Qadhafi.240 Nor did they discuss any role the Mission in 

Benghazi might play in these efforts.241

Stevens wanted to maintain a presence in Benghazi for the short 

term, writing on September 6, 2011: ‘‘As the Dept stands up a Mission in Tripoli, the question arises as to how long to keep Mission 

Benghazi operating. I believe it would be prudent to maintain a 

small State-run presence here for at least 6 months.’’ 242

Polaschik also saw the benefits of maintaining a short-term presence in Benghazi. She testified: 

Qadhafi had just fled Tripoli. He was still on the loose, on 

the lam. We were not yet back in Tripoli. It wasn’t clear 

if or when the leadership of the transitional office or Council would transition from Benghazi to Tripoli, if they all 

would, what would be there. And given the critical role 

that Benghazi had played in the start of the revolution 

and the execution, so to speak, of the revolution and the 

leadership, of course it made sense to have a presence 

there for another 6 months.’’ 243

She elaborated: 

[S]ome officials from the Transitional National Council 

were beginning to shift to Tripoli. Others were still there, 


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244 Id. at 39–40. 245Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya Testimony at 174. 246 Note from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir., of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. to William 

J. Burns, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, and Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec’y of 

State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 28, 2011) (on file with the Committee, SCB0090954–59), (discussing parameters for U.S. engagement in post-Qadhafi Libya). 247 Id. 248 Id. 249 Id. 250 Id. 251 Id. 252 Id. 

so it was clear that there was going to be a period in which 

the political leadership of a free Libya, . . . the post-Qadhafi government was going to be in a variety of places; 

so we needed to make sure that we had the ability to touch 

them in both places, and from my perspective, it made a 

lot of sense to keep Chris there.244

The Post Management Officer for Libya testified closing the Mission was also an option: ‘‘In official conversations, as we met to discuss options related to the Benghazi footprint that was always one 

of the items that was out there as a potential decision point. As we 

were looking at security and others things, closure was always an 

option.’’ 245

Later in September 2011, Sullivan, Feltman, and William B. 

Taylor, the newly appointed head of the Middle East Transitions 

office, prepared a note for the Deputy Secretaries advocating U.S. 

involvement in Libya be significantly scaled back.246 Outlining the 

level of priority Libya now had within the State Department, they 

wrote: 

[P]ost-conflict stabilization in Libya, while clearly a worthy 

undertaking at the right level of investment, cannot be 

counted as one of our highest priorities. Strategically for 

us, Libya does not loom as large as Egypt and Syria.247

They cautioned: ‘‘We should not allow the momentum of our involvement to date in the Libyan revolution to determine our strategy for longer-term assistance.’’ 248 They emphasized ‘‘[t]his means 

that, for the United States, Libya must not become a state-building 

exercise.’’ 249 They defined the circumstances under which the U.S. 

should, or should not, intercede, and argued the U.S. should only 

assist when 1) the U.S. had a ‘‘unique’’ ability to provide a particular service; 2) the U.S. has a proven track record of success and 

Congress will provide funds; and 3) Libyans expressly request the 

U.S. to do so, ‘‘[e]ven if we feel the Libyan government or its people 

are making a mistake in not seeking our help. . . .’’ 250

According to these State Department officials, the highest priorities in Libya were to ‘‘secure weapons’’; ensure an ‘‘effective democratic transition’’; prevent ‘‘violent extremists’’ from ‘‘seizing control’’; and ‘‘ensuring a level-playing field for U.S. businesses.’’ 251

Medium priority goals were reconciling former regime elements 

into Libyan society and ‘‘create a judicial system.’’ 252 The lowest 

priority, according to these policy makers was to support a ‘‘broad 

program of economic reconstruction and diversification’’ and ensure 


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253 Id. 254See id. (‘‘The Administration has a primary interest in ensuring that others—the Libyans, 

the UN, the EU, and NGOs—take overall responsibility for post-conflict stabilization.’’). 

the Libyans have the ‘‘ability to maintain delivery of basic services.’’ 253

The sentiment of the memorandum was clear: Once the civil war 

was over and Qadhafi was removed from power, the United States 

would move on.254 The broad policies outlined by the senior State 

Department officials stood in direct contrast with what the State 

Department’s own experts on the ground in Libya knew was needed to support the country moving forward. 

In his interview with the Committee, Cretz described what he 

saw, knew, and believed needed to be done to stabilize Libya: 

Q: . . . what was your sense of what challenges? [sic] 

A: Well, number one, you know, Qadhafi ruled for 40 

years and didn’t allow the emergence of any institution 

that could rival his power and the influence of he and his 

small clique over the people and government of Libya, so 

consequently, after the fall, there really was nothing there. 

There was no institutions, you know, ministries. They 

never operated as a real government because Qadhafi 

ruled the roost. 

So my concerns were, number one that we needed to find 

a way to help them build their infrastructure in terms of 

developing independent and capable institutions. My second concern was that there had to be a way to end the 

strife among the militias and that involved getting a 

strong and capable central government. 

We had to deal with, you know, making sure that the oil 

resource, which was really the only resource that they depended on, was developed in a reasonable way and that 

the proceeds made their way back to the to the people of 

Libya. We had to ensure that there was a capable military, 

a capable counterintelligence, a counterterrorism capability as well. 

So these were all kind of concerns that I had mentioned. 

The borders were porous. There had to be some kind of 

way to establish a border regime. There was a continuing 

threat of weapons, which had been collected by the Qadhafi regime and then loose, you know, basically spread 

throughout the country and began to be making their way 

through the region in Africa, et cetera, so that had to be 

a way to get control of that, so there were a lot of problems 

in the post Qadhafi era. 

* * * 

Q: And with regard to the U.S., United States’ engagement, involvement, and to the extent you can recall, would 

you have recommended that the U.S. become more engaged, less engaged? I know that you’ve already said that 

you did not recommend that we leave altogether, but do 

you have a sense of whether you felt it was important for 


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255 Cretz Testimony at 145–47. 256Polaschik Testimony at 12–15: 

[When ‘‘] the Embassy evacuated to Washington, . . . we worked sort of in Embassy 

in exile . . . In August 2011, our official status as Embassy Tripoli expired because the 

State Department had run the course of the 180 days of evacuation status for Embassy 

Tripoli, so we created a new entity that we called the Libya cell. And the purpose of 

the Libya cell was to either staff the Mission in Benghazi if the situation continued and 

we needed to have our only representation in country in Benghazi because Qadhafi was 

still in Tripoli, or the Libya cell would serve as the nucleus of the group that would 

go back into Tripoli to reopen the Embassy.’’ Id. 257 U.S. ambassador Gene Cretz returns to Libya, USA TODAY (Sept. 21, 2011), http:// 

usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-09-21/us-reopens-libya-embassy/50491638/1. 258 Cretz Testimony at 89–91. 

us to increase our engagement as opposed to decrease our 

engagement? 

A: Well, I think it was critical that the United States continue to play a vital role. I mean, given our past history, 

given what we did on the intervention, and given the fact 

that there was a real affection for the United States in the 

country in the aftermath of what we had done along with 

the French and British and others to overthrow Qadhafi, 

and I would have liked to have seen a more robust program. 

But the truth of the matter was that when you don’t have 

a functioning government, how do you provide resources to 

that government when there’s no absorptive capacity? So 

this is the main problem that we ran into in the post war 

situation. You know, I can’t say that there was a huge appetite in Washington to put hundreds of millions of dollars 

into Libya, but I can say there was an interest in ensuring, 

you know, our role there, ensuring that this evolving nation developed in a democratic tradition. But the truth is 

that there was no absorptive capacity to receive assistance 

and to help develop the nation along that way.255

Embassy Tripoli Reopens: Impact on Benghazi Mission 

As senior State Department officials were discussing their goals 

for Libya, nearly seven months after its personnel were evacuated 

and one month after the fall of Tripoli, the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli 

raised the American flag and restarted operations.256 Cretz returned to Tripoli as Ambassador.257 The precarious security environment in Libya precipitated the need for 16 Security Support 

Team [SST] members from the Defense Department, eighteen 

members of the State Department’s own highly trained mobile security team, in addition to a temporary duty Diplomatic Security 

team, to protect the Ambassador and embassy personnel.258 The 

Administration’s policy of no boots on the ground once again 

shaped the type of military assistance that would be provided, with 

the Defense Department and the State Department going to great 

lengths to ensure the administration’s policy was not violated. The 

Executive Secretariats for both the Defense Department and State 

Department exchanged communications outlining the diplomatic 

capacity in which the Defense Department SST security team 


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259See Email from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Charlene R. Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., Int’l Programs, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, (Sept. 6, 2011) (on file with the Committee, SCB0096343); see also Email from Patrick 

F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State to Denis R. McDonough, Deputy 

Dir., Nat’l Sec. Council (Sept. 6, 2011, 12:32 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0096350) (‘‘I 

have confirmed . . . [Special Air Services] folks in Tripoli supporting the restart of their Embassy, in civilian clothes. Have also reconfirmed with NEA that civilian clothes [and thus SOF] 

is the way we have to go.’’). 260 Cretz Testimony at 83. 261See Email from Elizabeth L. Dibble, Principal Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Raymond D. Maxwell, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs, William V. Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Lee Lohman, Ex. Dir., Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. 

Dep’t of State et al. (Sept. 20, 2011, 6:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05389443) (discussing reasons for Special Rep. Stevens to remain in Benghazi). 

members would serve, which included wearing civilian clothes so as 

not to offend the Libyans.259

The increased security was important as fighting in Libya continued. Cretz described to the Committee: 

[I]n general, Tripoli was still in the throes—in September 

of 2011 was still in the throes of civil war. Tripoli had 

fell—had fallen. But there were still active pockets of resistance throughout the country from Qadhafi loyalists. 

The country had also begun to break down in anticipation 

of a victory over Qadhafi into the militias that, in fact, 

were fighting Qadhafi. The war against Qadhafi was not 

by a unified opposition army. 

It was made up of a militia. The jihadists had a militia. 

The people from Zintan had a militia. The people from 

Misrata had a militia. So in anticipation of the final victory, they were, in effect, fighting it out. 

In a sense, a lot of what we see today in Libya, they were 

fighting it out for a foothold to make sure that they got a 

piece of the pie—a piece of the power pie once things settled down. 

So the situation in Tripoli was very unsettled.260

With Embassy Tripoli officially reopened, and Benghazi’s future 

less than certain, Stevens asked the State Department to conclude 

his Mission on October 6, 2011, but he was asked to remain until 

Jibril, the interim Prime Minister, completed his relocation from 

Benghazi to Tripoli.261 Feltman described his ongoing conversations with Stevens about Benghazi’s future: 

The normal response would be once the government’s in 

Tripoli . . . , then you close down Benghazi. That would 

be sort of a normal response given the budget climate, 

given all the other complications. And so Chris and I 

would talk about did we really think this was essential. 

Why did we think it was essential. And it had to do with, 

again, the fact that Libya had been essentially a divided 

country before, where Benghazi had been neglected, oppressed even by Qadhafi, but yet Benghazi was where this 

uprising had begun. It was where the Libyan revolution 

had begun, so it was important that Benghazi feel part of 


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262Feltman Testimony at 58. 263 Id. at 46–47. 264See Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya Testimony at 131: 

At some point in the fall of 2011, we exchanged diplomatic notes with the new Government of Libya in whatever form that happened to be, and with the return of Ambassador Cretz, a Special Representative was not needed at that point, because we had our 

accredited Ambassador in Tripoli. So at that point, I believe, it when the term ‘Special 

Representative’ ceased to be used, but again, I don’t have specific recollection of the 

timeline. 265See Email from Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, and Senior 

Desk Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Oct. 17, 2011, 10:09 

AM) (on file with the Committee, C05528533) (discussing listing Benghazi team on diplomatic 

list). 266 Email to Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State 

(Nov. 9, 2011, 5:23 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05528533). 267 Email (May 18, 2011, 1:13 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05391797). 268 Email from Deputy Ex. Dir., Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Post 

Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, and Joan A. 

Continued 

this process. We felt that having a small diplomatic presence in Benghazi it would not be the Embassy. 

Clearly the Embassy would be accredited to the government in Tripoli but that that would keep our presence as 

well as the presence of others, because we were not the 

only ones looking at this, as well as the presence of others, 

would keep Benghazi as part of the political equation. Because if you didn’t have Benghazi feeling invested in what 

was happening in Tripoli, you had the risks of the country 

splitting again, is what we clearly thought.262

Feltman further testified why the State Department did not 

make the Benghazi Mission official, especially when operations resumed in Tripoli: 

So what we were trying to what Chris and I were trying 

to figure out was, how could we make a compelling enough 

argument that in the zero sum game that we have in 

terms of our budget and our resources, that we could find 

enough resources to keep Benghazi operating through the 

critical transition period? . . . 

[T]he type of budget support out of Congress we would 

need. This is a time when the U.S. reduces diplomatic 

presences, doesn’t expand them.263

Discussions also ensued over how to bring the personnel in 

Benghazi under the diplomatic umbrella of the Embassy in Tripoli 

without triggering formal recognition of the Benghazi office.264

Polaschik was aware of this issue and wanted to ensure that all 

personnel in Benghazi had the protections of the privileges and immunities accorded by the Vienna Convention.265 Listing personnel 

in Benghazi as a separate office was rejected, however, as ‘‘[t]he 

reference to the establishment of an office in Benghazi may raise 

congressional notification issues. . . .’’ 266 Earlier in the year, Kennedy, determined congressional notification was not needed because ‘‘the Hill knows we are there.’’ 267

Ultimately, it was decided to submit ‘‘one dip[lomatic] list for 

Tripoli, but noting on it that certain staff members will be performing their duties on a TDY basis in Benghazi.’’ 268 Thus, withVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00313 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State (Nov. 9, 2011, 7:08 PM) (on 

file with the Committee, C05528533). 269 Id. (‘‘[C]ertain staff members will be performing their duties on a TDY basis in Benghazi.’’). 270 Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional Nat’l Council, to William V. 

Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

Gene A. Cretz, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, and Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in 

Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State (Oct. 31, 2011, 3:08 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05394929). 271Feltman Testimony at 59. 

out formally notifying the new Libyan government of the Benghazi 

Mission, the personnel in Benghazi received diplomatic immunity 

only because the State Department told the Libyan government the 

personnel in Benghazi were actually assigned to Tripoli.269

Benghazi’s Future 

Senior officials in Washington discussed several options for 

Benghazi’s future operations. Stevens proposed two options to State 

Department officials in early September 2011 to continue the Mission: 

Slimmed down compound: Principal Office (FS–02 level) 

MGT/IRM and possibly one USAID/OTI officer (if they get 

requested funding). 4 DS. 1 admin LES [locally employed 

staff] plus guardforce. 

Consolidated to Villa A (combine lodging/offices; beds for 7 

plus 2 TDY [temporary duty] in living room; also possible 

to rent a small 1 bedroom house attached to Villa A belonging to same owner) 

Duration: through September 30, 2012 (3 months beyond 

projected TNC elections) 

Purpose: provide platform for POL/ECON [political/economic] reporting; PD and OTI programming; 

PM/Conventional Weapons collection effort in east; commercial outreach. 

Other Benghazi Missions: UNSMIL [United Nations Special Mission in Libya], EU and UK intend to maintain 

small branch offices for the next 6 months-one year. 

Italians and Turks have consulates. 

Virtual presence: End all 3 compound leases. Zero full-time 

State Department staff. Use hotels (as Spanish, Greek and 

foreign NGOs have been doing). Possibly leave FAV in 

Benghazi [redacted text] to support TDY travel in eastern Libya.270

Feltman described the discussions to the Committee ‘‘[t]hey [sic] 

were ongoing discussions . . . because we needed to muster our arguments. We needed to muster our rationale. We needed to feel 

confident ourselves that this was the right thing to do before we 

would propose something that was going to be, you know, financially difficult.’’ 271

The Post Management Officer for Libya further explained to the 

Committee closing the mission was an option. ‘‘In official conversations, as we met to discuss options related to the Benghazi footprint that was always one of the items that was out there as a poVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00314 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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272Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya Testimony at 174. 273See Memorandum to Cheryl D. Mills on Update on Tripoli Operations (Sept. 14, 2011) (on 

file with the Committee, C05578323) (discussing plans for activities in Benghazi through January 2012). 274Testimony of Eric J. Boswell, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t 

of State, before H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Tr. at 17 (July 9, 2013) [hereinafter 

Boswell Testimony] (on file with the Select Committee on Benghazi). 275Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 33– 

34 (May 21, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 13 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 276 Id. at 33. 

tential decision point. As we were looking at security and other 

things, closure was always an option.’’ 272 In September 2011, 

Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor, State Department, was 

likely briefed on a plan that would have closed Benghazi in January 2012.273

From a security standpoint, Eric Boswell, Assistant Secretary, 

Diplomatic Security, State Department, explained: 

Benghazi was originally envisaged at [sic] a short term 

thing. Our expectation in DS was that we were going to 

support Chris Stevens’ effort for 60 days, 90 days, and that 

once an embassy was reestablished in Tripoli, if that was 

the outcome of the civil war, once the—well, if the right 

side one [sic] in Tripoli, once an embassy was to be reestablished, we anticipated that Benghazi would go out of 

business. 

The Embassy was reestablished in September, but the 

NEA Bureau asked us to keep a little presence in 

Benghazi, so a little longer a little longer. [sic] It was really quite incremental. A little longer, a little longer.274

Benghazi’s uncertain future impacted Stevens and his team. The 

Diplomatic Security Agent in charge in the fall of 2011 testified: 

[W]e were still in this situation where we didn’t know how 

long Benghazi was going to be. Tripoli was kicking off. And 

so there was a lot of interest in supporting that. So we 

were trying to figure out—or headquarters was trying to 

figure out where to prioritize our deficiencies, if you want 

to call it that. So no one knows. 

I mean, we were planning for the worst, phasing people 

out and trying to figure out how best to support the mission there. If I remember correctly, with the Embassy 

being opened—it opened towards the latter part of my tenure there. So the Envoy lost his, quote-unquote, status because there was now an Ambassador in country. . . . I 

think they were going to bring in a political officer, probably my rank. I’m pretty sure he was my rank. He was 

going to be the foothold there in Benghazi for the short 

term, but no one knew how long.275

While Stevens and his team waited to learn their status, security 

resources to the Mission decreased.276 Stevens called an EAC meeting in October 2011 to evaluate the Mission’s security posture after 


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277 Email to Diplomatic Sec. Command Ctr. (Oct. 17, 2011, 12:18 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05389778). 278 Id. 279 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 13 to NEA–MAG–DL et al. (Oct. 20, 2011, 1:52 PM) (on 

file with the Committee, C05395038). 280 Email from [REDACTED] (Benghazi) to ‘Spot Reports,’ et al. (Nov. 1, 2011, 4:49 AM) (on 

file with the Committee, C05272056). 281 Id. 282Steven Lee Myers, In Tripoli, Clinton Pledges U.S. to a ‘Free Libya,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 

2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/world/africa/clinton-in-libya-to-meet-leaders-and-offeraid-package.html. 283 Id. 284 Clinton Testimony at 155–56. 285Feltman Testimony at 85. 286See NTC declares ’Liberation of Libya,’ AL JAZEERA (Oct. 24, 2011), http:// 

www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/201110235316778897.html; see also Press Release, The 

White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on the Declaration of 

Liberation in Libya (Oct. 23, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/23/statement-president-declaration-liberation-libya (‘‘On behalf of the American people, I congratulate 

the people of Libya on today’s historic declaration of liberation. After four decades of brutal dictatorship and eight months of deadly conflict, the Libyan people can now celebrate their freedom 

and the beginning of a new era of promise.’’). 287 NATO ends Libya mission, CNN (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/31/world/ 

Africa/libya-nato-mission. 

the fall of Sirte, Qadhafi’s birthplace.277 Stevens and the Diplomatic Security Agents were concerned about the ‘‘recent reduction 

in DS manpower (the departure of several Agents in past week who 

ha[d] not . . . been backfilled).’’ 278 Another EAC was held three 

days later to discuss ‘‘the current situation in Benghazi and to address possible developments . . . that may arise in the next 24 

hours.’’ 279 A little more than a week later, a member of the February 17 Martyrs Brigade [February 17] who worked on the Mission compound came under attack on his way home.280 That incident occurred approximately 500 meters from the compound.281

Qadhafi’s Death 

With the future of a U.S. diplomatic presence in Benghazi being 

debated and discussed, the Secretary traveled to Tripoli, Libya on 

October 18, 2011.282 During her day trip there, she met with members of the TNC, went to Tripoli University to meet with students, 

visited the medical center and the U.S. Embassy, and gave several 

speeches.283 She did not visit Benghazi even though Stevens was 

still there. She did ‘‘not recall’’ speaking with Stevens during her 

trip to Libya.284 Asked whether she discussed the future of the 

Mission there, Feltman, who traveled with the Secretary, told the 

Committee: 

If there were, it was quite light and in passage. She had 

a very, very busy schedule going to see a variety of Libyan 

officials, meeting with representatives of Libyan civil society, delivering a speech. It was a jam-packed day and it 

wasn’t the type of quiet time to have sort of policy discussions like that.285

Two days later, on October 20, 2011, Qadhafi was captured and 

killed attempting to escape from his hometown of Sirte. The TNC 

‘‘declared the liberation of Libya’’ and the revolutionary war officially ended on October 23, 2011.286 The NATO-led military action, 

Operation Unified Protector, formally ended a week later.287


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288 Corbett Daly, Clinton on Qaddafi: ‘‘We came, we saw, he died,’’ CBS NEWS (Oct. 20, 2011), 

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/clinton-on-qaddafi-we-came-we-saw-he-died. 289Press Release, U.S. Mission to the U.N., Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the U.N., Following Sec. Council Consultations on Libya (Nov. 28, 2011), http:// 

iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/11/ 

20111129113633su0.6971203.html?distid=ucs#axzz48qWq65Vj. 290Testimony of Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the U.N., Tr. at 134 (Feb. 2, 2016) 

(on file with the Committee). 291Defense chief Panetta visits Libya, USA Today (Dec. 17, 2011), http://usatoday30.usa 

today.com/news/world/story/2011-12-17/panetta-libya/52019842/1. 292See id. 293See Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional Nat’l Council, to Post 

Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Nov. 10, 2011, 

10:39 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0079464) (‘‘I’ll check in with you all myself when 

I’m back in [Washington D.C.] the week of Nov 21.’’). 294See Email from Gene A. Cretz, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff 

and Counselor to the U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Oct. 21, 2011, 4:50 AM) (on file 

with the Committee, SCB0045106). 295Polaschik Testimony at 40. 296 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 24 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 (Dec. 15, 2011, 9:03 AM) 

(on file with the Committee, C05388931). 297See ALEX TIERSKY & SUSAN B. EPSTEIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL42834, SECURING U.S. 

DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL ABROAD: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES 6 (2014). 298 Id. 299 Id. 

When informed of Qadhafi’s death, the Secretary said: ‘‘We came, 

we saw, he died.’’ 288

Approximately a month after Qadhafi’s death, Susan Rice, 

United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 

also traveled to Libya, including Benghazi.289 Despite ‘‘walk[ing] 

the streets of Benghazi,’’ Rice would not comment to the Committee 

on whether she visited the Mission compound in Benghazi.290 Less 

than a month later, in December 2011, Leon Panetta, the Secretary 

of Defense, traveled to Libya.291 Because of security concerns, Panetta’s time in Libya was brief and did not include a trip to 

Benghazi.292

FURTHER EXTENDING THE MISSION 

With Embassy Tripoli officially up and running, and the return 

of Cretz to Libya, Stevens departed Benghazi in late November 

2011.293 Before he left, however, he was asked to return as Ambassador. Cretz was informed of this change as well.294 According to 

Polaschik: ‘‘[I]t’s very inappropriate for someone sitting in country 

to be working in country. I mean, it’s an unusual situation. In 

order to be nominated and get through the congressional confirmation process, I think it was better for him [Stevens] to be here [in 

Washington].’’ 295 Stevens would remain outside of Libya from November 2011 until May 26, 2012. 

Security Remains Unstable 

Security continued to be unstable in December 2011. The Security Environment Threat List [SETL] rating for Libya was critical 

for political violence and high for terrorism and crime.296 SETL 

ratings are essential State Department tools in determining the 

countermeasures a facility must put in place to mitigate a 

threat.297 A critical rating is the most serious rating—indicating 

there is a grave impact to diplomats.298 A high rating indicates 

there is a serious impact on American diplomats.299 In late December 2011, right before holidays, there was open source reporting 

about a threat to western embassies located in Benghazi during 


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300See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 (Dec. 21, 2011, 8:50 

EST) (on file with the Committee, C05396082) (discussing reporting of threat to U.S. compound 

in Benghazi). 301See Principal Officer 1, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission 

in Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Dec. 23, 2011, 7:34 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05392213) (Distributing notes from EAC).). 302See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 Testimony at 19. 303 Id. 304 Id. at 25–26. 305See Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 26 (Apr. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 12 Testimony] (on file with the Committee) (‘‘[W]e identified 

some—you know, identified a contractor to come in and cut those window grilles off and then 

replace them with a system that was very, very, you know, rudimentary, but it worked.’’). 306Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 Testimony at 19. 307 Id. at 20. 308 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 to Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, 

Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t (Dec. 21, 2011, 12:27 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05396085). 309 Id. 

Christmas and New Year’s Eve in 2011.300 The Mission held an 

EAC led by the new Principal Officer to discuss its security posture 

in light of the threat and the overall security environment and to 

discuss the need for additional security resources.301

The incoming Diplomatic Security Agent in charge described the 

Mission compound when he arrived to the facility in late November 

2011.302 He told the Committee: ‘‘While I was in Benghazi . . . the 

compound was woefully inadequate in terms of physical security. 

There were a whole number of things that we didn’t have, and a 

lot of things that we did have were completely insufficient.’’ 303He 

observed: 

[O]ur perimeter security is nonexistent, we have walls 

with lattices that somebody can shoot through; we have 

walls with footholds people can climb over; we have a 4 

foot wall back here; we have no lighting. So all these physical security standards, especially around the perimeter of 

the building were completely insufficient, and we needed 

large amounts of money and this was going to take time, 

it was going to be expensive, but we needed this desperately to make this place safe.304

With normal security standards not applicable in Benghazi and 

a decreasing number of Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground, 

the incoming Diplomatic Security Agents were forced to request the 

most rudimentary measures to improve security on the compound.305 The Diplomatic Security Agent on the ground told the 

Committee: ‘‘[O]nce I became RSO, I started a flurry of requests 

asking for physical security upgrades.’’ 306 He further stated: ‘‘I put 

together a list of, call it a dozen requests in terms of guard platforms, sandbags, sent that out initially in kind of an informal 

email, because we didn’t have any ability to send cables.’’ 307

For example, on December 21, 2011, the Mission requested funding from Washington for 17 jersey barriers to serve as anti-ram 

barriers.308 The barriers were on sale from the British who were 

closing their compound in Benghazi and moving their operations 

back to their Embassy in Tripoli.309 A day later, the agent made 

another request for ‘‘some escape hatches in the iron window bars 


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310 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 to Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, 

Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t (Dec. 22, 2011, 6:09 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05388920). 311 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 to Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, 

Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t (Dec. 22, 2011, 7:19 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05388920). 312Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 Testimony at 45–46. 313 Email from J. Christopher Stevens to Principal Officer 1, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 15, 

2011, 1:14 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0079324). 314See Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern 

Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t 

of State (Dec. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Dec. 27, 2011 Action Memo for Under Secretary Kennedy] 

(on file with the Committee, C05261557) (recommending approval of continued U.S. presence in 

Benghazi through the end of calendar year 2012). 315 Id. 

on the villas.’’ 310 That same day, the Diplomatic Security Agent’s 

request was expanded to include: 

[A]dditional security measures that are desperately needed 

(lighting for areas of the compound that are completely 

dark, sandbags, platforms that we can place against the 

perimeter walls so we can see over them—we have significant blind spots in our video camera coverage, a guard 

shack for outside of the main entrance, etc).311

As Benghazi was requesting additional security measures, the 

Mission was experiencing significant shortages in Diplomatic Security Agents. A Diplomatic Security Agent on the ground at the time 

described his concern to the Committee: 

It was down to two agents, myself and one other agent. 

And as I was getting ready to depart, we were going to go 

to one agent. And if the staffing pattern remained the way 

it was, with our expected incoming agents, we were going 

to go down to zero agents. And that would have been 

around January 4th or 5th or so, we would go down to zero 

agents.312

These requests for security resources and personnel continued 

into the winter, spring, and summer of 2012. 

The Extension Memorandum 

When Stevens left Benghazi for the U.S. in November 2011, 

Washington still had not made a decision on the Mission’s future. 

A few weeks after he left Libya to return to the United States, Stevens asked the Principal Officer who replaced him in Benghazi 

about the status of the Mission, writing: ‘‘Also, just curious what 

you guys decided to do re: future of the compound.’’ 313

Discussions about Benghazi’s diplomatic future culminated in the 

Near Eastern Bureau’s decision to request an extension of the Mission for one year.314 This required the approval of Kennedy, and 

the Near Eastern Bureau prepared an extension memorandum for 

his approval.315 The Post Management Officer for Libya, of the logistics arm of the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, explained the purpose of the memo: 

[I]ts purpose is to establish the policy priority, that this is 

what we are going to be doing, and this is what we—we 

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316Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya Testimony at 65–66. 317See Feltman Testimony at 98. 318 Id. at 100–01. 319 Id. at 101. 320 Clinton Testimony at 160. 

ence is approved, and that some of these issues were dealt 

with to deal with the change in the presence. 

Without specific budgets dedicated to these facilities and 

to this process, there needed to be some sort of mandate 

to declare this is what we are doing, so that then, the relevant functional bureaus and regional bureau could then 

say, hey, we have this approval I am waving my document 

we have this approval, we need to find money to make this 

happen.316

On December 27, 2011, Feltman forwarded the final Action 

Memorandum to Kennedy requesting approval to extend the 

Benghazi Mission until the end of 2012.317 Feltman described the 

memorandum as reflecting ‘‘discussions with my bosses at the 

State Department about why Chris Stevens and I both thought 

that we needed to maintain a presence in Benghazi. . . . I was 

confident that we had done our best to build the consensus that 

would lead to a yes.’’ 318 When asked whether the Secretary was 

aware of the discussion about Benghazi’s future, Feltman testified 

he ‘‘had ready access to the secretary. I don’t think that anything 

that I would have put in any of these memos would have surprised 

her just because of the sort of ongoing discussion we had about the 

Arab Spring.’’ 319

The Secretary told the Committee: 

There were certainly meetings in which I was advised 

about the process being undertaken as to determine 

whether Benghazi should be extended. So, yes, I was 

aware of the process that was ongoing, and I was kept up 

to date about it.320

In his Action Memorandum, Feltman laid out the policy reasons 

to remain in Libya: 

A continued presence in Benghazi will emphasize U.S. interest in the eastern part of Libya. Many Libyans have 

said the U.S. presence in Benghazi has a salutary, calming 

effect on easterners who are fearful that the new focus on 

Tripoli could once again lead to their neglect and exclusion 

from reconstruction and wealth distribution and strongly 

favor a permanent U.S. presence in the form of a full consulate. They feel the United States will help ensure they 

are dealt with fairly. TNC officials have said some government agencies may shift their headquarters to Benghazi 

(such as the National Oil Company). Other government 

agencies and corporations already have their headquarters 

in Benghazi and will likely remain there for the foreseeable future. The team will be able to monitor political 

trends (Islamists, tribes, political parties, militias) and 

public sentiment regarding the ‘‘new Libya,’’ as well as report on the critical period leading up to and through 


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321Dec. 27, 2011 Action Memo for Under Secretary Kennedy, supra note 311. 322See Id. (signature date stamped); see also Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya Transcript at 178 

(‘‘[‘January 5th, 2012’] would indicate that that’s the day that action was taken on the memo.’’). 323Kennedy Testimony at 333–334. 324 Boswell Testimony at 17. 

Libya’s first post-Qadhafi elections. Programmatic benefits 

to a continued U.S. presence in Benghazi include building 

on USAID/OTI’s programs to strengthen civil society 

groups, media training, and capacity building in municipal 

councils. We should continue to engage with the populace, 

particularly with the large population of Libyan youth, an 

important and receptive audience with high expectations 

for the post-revolution period.321

On January 5, 2012, Kennedy approved the memorandum.322 He 

explained to the Committee: 

This document is essentially in a prime part and a secondary part. The prime part is that I am authorizing us 

committing to extend the lease on this facility through the 

end of calendar year 2012. And I am doing that because 

they have made representations to me that the facility is 

needed. My conversations with others of my peers indicated that no decision had yet been made about whether 

to make this operation permanent, continue at interim or 

close it. . . . And, then secondly, it also sets a ceiling on 

the number of personnel that will be assigned.’’ 323

Excluded from the discussions to extend the Benghazi mission for 

another year were senior officials from the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security. 

Boswell explained he was not involved, nor consulted, in the extension memorandum: 

When the memo came up regarding the—a memo from Assistant Secretary Feltman to Under Secretary Kennedy 

asking for the extension of the Benghazi mission for another year and asking the Under Secretary to make a couple of decisions about that, one, the overall decision to approve or disapprove, but also a second decision about what 

kind of property to maintain, I did not see that memo. 

That memo never got to me. It went up, I gather, on the 

23rd of December. It was signed off on by various parts of 

Diplomatic Security, including—the right parts of Diplomatic Security, including the Countermeasures Directorate. It was cleared by—as I found out in retrospect, it 

was—after the fact, it was cleared by my Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Countermeasures who was acting for Scott 

Bultrowicz.324

Gentry O. Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic Security, Countermeasures, confirmed to the Committee he cleared the 

extension memorandum on behalf of Diplomatic Security. He also 

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325 Email to Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State 

(Dec. 23, 2011, 3:27 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05578953). 326Smith Testimony at 75. 327 Id. at 73. 328Lamb Testimony at 221. 329See Dec. 27, 2011 Action Memo for Under Secretary Kennedy, supra note 311 (discussing 

staffing of Benghazi Mission). 330See id. (discussing programmatic benefits of continued Benghazi Mission). 331See id. (discussing the effect of ongoing Benghazi Mission). 

sonnel resources.’’ 325 When asked to explain his comment, Smith 

testified ‘‘it didn’t come from Countermeasures, it would not have 

been solely for physical security. So I would say that it was broader 

for the operations in Benghazi.’’ 326 He further stated; ‘‘The other 

seniors would have seen the memo as well and had an opportunity 

to comment based on its accuracy and maybe providing information 

for the document itself.’’ 327

Charlene Lamb told the Committee ‘‘I did not see it [the memorandum] until after the event in Benghazi.’’ 328

Purpose of Mission in 2012: Symbolic Nature of 

U.S. Presence in Benghazi 

With Embassy Tripoli reopened and Stevens back in Washington 

D.C. awaiting confirmation to become Ambassador to Libya, the 

Benghazi Mission continued its work through a series of ‘‘Principal 

Officers.’’ 329 The Principal Officers met with leaders of the local 

council, militia heads, foreign diplomats located in Benghazi, heads 

of businesses and non-governmental organizations, and regular 

Libyans.330 The Principal Officers reported to Washington D.C. 

their impressions of Benghazi and the state of eastern Libya.331

While the Mission continued to operate, it operated much differently than in 2011. As explained by Polaschik: 

A: Traditionally [Special Envoys] have been based in 

Washington, but I know in recent years there has been a 

special envoy presence in Jerusalem that reports to the 

Secretary of State. So it’s not unprecedented to have special envoy missions. 

That said, it is unusual to have a totally separate office in 

a country in which there is no other consulate or presence. 

So it was a bit of an odd duck. Let’s say it doesn’t fit the 

unusual [sic] State Department pattern, and it’s something 

that as DCM, I struggled with a bit, not in the early days, 

because it was just a different operation, I think, while 

Chris was there. Because of his stature, because of his experience, because of his reach back into the State Department, I think he had the ability to get resources and attention in a way that the people who followed him did not. 

I was able as DCM to have a good working relationship 

with Chris and all of his successors just because we made 

it work. But I did not—you know, in another country, if 

there’s a consulate per se, the principal officer or the consul general reports to the DCM, and the DCM has oversight for operations and hiring and resources and all of 

those issues. As DCM in Tripoli, I did not have that. 


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332Polaschik Testimony at 44–45. 333 Email from Principal Officer 1, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau 

of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 15, 2011, 1:11 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0079324–25). 334 Email from Principal Officer 1, U. S. Dep’t of State, to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 (Jan. 13, 

2012, 2:44 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05393569). 335 Email from Principal Officer 5, U.S. Dep’t of State, to U.S. Embassy Tripoli, et al. (Feb 

11, 2012, 5:29 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05409829). 336 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 24 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 12 (Feb. 11, 2012, 10:41 

AM) (on file with the Committee, C05411292). 

Q: Once Chris Stevens left in November of 2011 and was 

replaced by a series of principal officers, did that change 

then? 

A: The formal relationship? 

Q: In that principal officers then became more routine and 

report to you, and then you reported out to Washington? 

A: No. There was never a decision or a procedure put in 

place to have the Mission in Benghazi report to the Embassy in Tripoli. It was still something that was reporting 

directly to Washington, staffed by Washington. I had no 

say in the staffing decisions, resourced by Washington, et 

cetera. 

I played a supporting role. To the extent that I could, I 

made sure that I coordinated very regularly with the principal officers; and whenever they needed help on anything, 

I jumped in.332

Security Problems Continue 

The security environment also became a factor in the Principal 

Officer’s ability to meet reporting responsibilities. As early as December 2011 and throughout 2012, the Mission was forced to go on 

lockdown because of the lack of security personnel. This impacted 

the ability of the Principal Officers to do their jobs. For example, 

on December 15, 2011, the Principal Officer at the time recommended halting future non-security temporary duty assignments 

because of the lack of DS Agents on the ground.333 In January 

2012, the Principal Officer reiterated his concerns ‘‘the mission will 

be hard-pressed to support TDY’ers (much less higher-level visitors 

and out-of-town travel) unless we have better staffing. On that 

basis, we won’t be fulfilling what I understand our mission to 

be.’’ 334 Later, in February 2012, the incoming Principal Officer expressed similar concerns: ‘‘we will be all but restricted to compound 

for the vital February 12–18 timeframe. This will effectively leave 

us unable to do any outreach to Libyan nationals during the week 

and we will be extremely limited in the ability to obtain any useful 

information for reporting.’’ 335

On February 11, 2012, the lead Diplomatic Security Agent at 

Embassy Tripoli, informed Benghazi ‘‘substantive reporting’’ was 

not the Mission’s purpose.336 In an email to the diplomatic security 

agent in Benghazi, the Diplomatic Security Agent wrote: 

‘‘[U]nfortunately, nobody has advised the PO that Benghazi is there 


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337 Id. 338 Cretz Testimony at 88–89. 339See Benghazi Spot Report, EAC and Significant Event Timeline (DS/IP/RD) (on file with 

the Committee, C05394332). 340 Clinton Testimony at 41. 341Kennedy Testimony at 43. 342 Boswell Testimony at 18–19. 

to support [redacted text] operations, not conduct substantive reporting.’’ 337

These concerns were expressed throughout 2012. Cretz told the 

Committee: 

The various officers that were there felt that they from 

time to time didn’t that the Mission was not necessarily 

well staffed enough for them to be able to go out and do 

their reporting on a regular and aggressive basis. 

* * * 

I recall discussions with one or two of them at various 

times that said that, because of the requirement to protect 

the facility that it was difficult for them to go out because 

it required a certain level of accompaniment around the 

city.338

During this time, the Mission evaluated and communicated to 

Washington D.C. the severity of the security environment. The 

Mission held more than a dozen EAC meetings to evaluate the security environment; review tripwires and determine if any had 

been crossed; and to identify any necessary to steps to mitigate the 

threats.339 The Mission communicated the outcomes of the EACs to 

Washington D.C. but senior officials did not respond. The Secretary 

told the Committee: ‘‘There are millions of them, as you point out. 

They are sorted through and directed to the appropriate personnel. 

Very few of them ever come to my attention. None of them with 

respect to security regarding Benghazi did.’’ 340

Other State Department officers offered similar explanations. 

Kennedy told the Committee: 

The State Department gets thousands of cables a day. and 

some of them are brought to my attention, depending upon 

the nature. An example would be brought up potentially 

by one of my subordinate units, it might be brought up by 

a regional functional bureau that has an interest in the 

subject matter.341

Boswell testified: 

I think we followed the Libya situation very closely. Keep 

in mind, however, that it’s a big world out there, and we 

have 180 posts and some extremely high threat ones, so 

we spend a lot of time concentrating on the high threat 

ones. I would say Libya was one of them, but not the only 

one. There is Iraq, there’s Afghanistan, there’s Lebanon, 

there’s Yemen, there’s Pakistan, and all of those at one 

time or another were flashing pretty bright.342

Lamb told the Committee: 


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343Lamb Testimony at 254. 344Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 Testimony at 28. 345 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 14 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 (Jan. 2, 2012, 5:41 PM) 

(on file with the Committee, C05579142) (attaching ‘‘an Action Memo’’). 346 Id. 347See id. (‘‘Once a decision has been made on the size and location of Mission Benghazi’s 

compound—perhaps as soon as the coming week—RSO Benghazi will request additional security 

upgrade requests in support of that shift, and may request a TDY by a facility security expert 

to help scope them.’’). 

The RSO [Regional Security Officer] and the Ambassador 

are ultimately responsible for security at post. It is very 

unfortunate and sad at this point that Ambassador Stevens was a victim, but that is where ultimate responsibility lies. And it’s up to headquarters to provide resources 

when post asks for them, and it’s also up to Washington 

to make sure that we don’t have, you know, waste, fraud, 

and abuse of our resources, because we’re covering the entire world as well. So it’s you know, when you say who 

should be accountable, accountable for what? 343

The U.S.’ uncertain and shifting commitment in Libya affected 

the administration’s responses to security threats there. For instance, as detailed in Appendix F, an extensive set of security rules 

for permanent U.S. diplomatic facilities around the world did not 

apply to the temporary Benghazi Mission. The lack of security 

standards made Benghazi an anomaly among U.S. facilities located 

in Arab Spring countries, such as Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt. As 

one Diplomatic Security Agent put it: 

[I]f you are a diplomatic facility within the State Department, you have physical security requirements that are in 

the FAM, the Foreign Affairs Manual. And it is a very detailed, large set of rules that you have to follow to operate 

a diplomatic facility. It requires you to have physical security standards that are typically going to be expensive and 

will take time to do. 

If you are in a non-diplomatic facility, there are no security standards. They don’t exist. 

So it’s all or nothing.344

Requests for Additional Security Measures 

Without security standards in place to guide them, Diplomatic 

Security Agents were forced to make ad hoc requests for basic security measures. On January 2, 2012, the Benghazi Mission sent an 

Action Memorandum to Washington D.C. outlining field expedient 

security measures needed to secure the compound.345 The request 

included 17 jersey barriers, 500 sandbags, seven observation platforms, four guard posts, additional lighting, and egress locks on 

window bars.346 In addition, the Action Memorandum notified 

Washington D.C. that additional requests would be forthcoming as 

well as a request for a physical security specialist to help scope the 

security needs of the modified compound.347 The security request 

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348 Email from Mgmt. Officer/Information Mgmt. Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Post Mgmt. 

Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Principal Officer 1, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, Libya Mgmt. Issues (Jan. 5, 2012, 1:43 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0049988). 349See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 15 (Jan. 26, 2012, 3:59 

PM) (on file with the Committee, C05412127) (notifying that funding for some security measures 

had been obtained). 350See id. (noting that Action Memorandum items 3, 6, 8, and 9 had been funded, but not 

addressing the funding for other items). 351See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 12 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 & James Bacigalupo, 

Regional Director, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 13, 2012) (on file with 

the Committee, C05394247). 352 Id. 353 Id. 354See Email to Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., 

U.S. Dep’t (Feb. 23, 2012, 8:22 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05394287) (‘‘I just found a 

clause in our funding matrix that gives us the ability to support his request. There was early 

on talk about guard towers which we cannot support, however small booths to keep them out 

of the weather can be supported by our office.’’). 355See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 12 to Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t, and Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 (Mar. 1, 2012, 4:59 

AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0049970) (‘‘The current perimeter wall, which was inherited in the leasing agreement, is in poor condition . . .’’); Email from Physical Sec. Specialist 

(Mar. 1, 2012, 9:12 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0049971) (recommending funding for 

a temporary fence). 356 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 to Principal Officer 1, U.S. Dep’t of State (Jan. 13, 

2012, 10:05 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05411094) (‘‘We have submitted an Action Memorandum that if approved should significantly improve our ability to identify and obtain approvals for staffing Benghazi.’’). 

rimeter wall, including concrete and barbed wire.348 Funding for 

sandbags, lighting, door upgrades and drop arm barriers was approved on January 26, 2012.349 On the other hand, the request for 

observation platforms, guard booths, and escape hatches went 

unaddressed—as did the request for the help of a physical security 

specialist.350

On February 13, 2012, the Benghazi Mission asked Washington 

D.C. to reconsider those measures previously requested but not 

funded.351 In addition, the Mission made new requests to better secure the compound, including concertina wire, screens to obscure 

the compound, improvements to the perimeter wall, and . . . film 

for the compound windows.352 The Mission also reiterated its request for the help of a temporary duty physical security specialist 

in Washington D.C. to help scope needed upgrades.353

Funding for guard booths was approved on February 23, 2012.354

A critical request that went unaddressed until early March was a 

proposal to strengthen the compound’s perimeter wall.355 Modifications to the wall were not completed until May 21, 2012, almost six 

weeks after the first Improvised Explosive Device [IED] attack on 

the Benghazi Mission. 

Requests for Additional Diplomatic Security Personnel 

In addition to the requests for physical security measures, the 

Benghazi Mission made constant requests for Diplomatic Security 

Agents. Concerns about Diplomatic Security Agent staffing shortages in late 2011 and early 2012 precipitated the preparation of an 

Action Memorandum for Lamb’s approval.356 On January 10, 2012, 

an Action Memorandum described the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s responsibilities under the December 27, 2011 extension 

memorandum to provide five Diplomatic Security Agents for 

Benghazi and recognized the Diplomatic Security’s inability to 

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357Memorandum from Jim Bacigalupo, Regional Director, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. 

Dep’t of State, to DAS Charlene Lamb, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State (Jan. 10, 

2012) [hereinafter Jan. 10, 2012 Action Memo] (on file with the Committee, C05578986); see also 

Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 to Principal Officer 1, U.S. Dep’t of State (Jan. 13, 2012, 

10:05 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05411094) (‘‘We have submitted an Action Memorandum that if approved should significantly improve our ability to identify and obtain approvals for staffing Benghazi.’’); Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to 

Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 (June 5, 2012, 10:55 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05409979) 

(‘‘We’d feel much safer if we could keep two MSD teams with us through this period to provide 

QRF for our staff and PD for me and the DCM and any VIP visitors.’’). 358 Jan. 10, 2012 Action Memo, supra note 357; see Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. 

Ambassador to Libya, to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 (June 5, 2012, 10:55 AM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05409979) (Requesting increased security). 359See Testimony of James Bacigalupo, Special Agent in Charge/Regional Sec. Officer, Regional Sec. Office before the H. Comm. On Oversight and Gov’t Reform, Tr. at 17–18 (Sept. 4, 

2012) (on file with the Committee) (Discussing the Jan. 10 Action Memo). 

A: I believe it was January, maybe December/January timeframe we had talked about 

it in the office, and I think I was out on leave because my deputy I had seen a document that my deputy had sent up to Director Lamb, to DAS Lamb requesting we use 

the system that they use domestically to direct a certain number of agents from the 

field offices for assignments. We use that on protection. And we sent the memo up suggesting maybe we could use this mechanism for overseas. 

Q: Specifically for Libya or 

A: It was specifically for Libya. 

Q: And do you know what happened to that memo? 

A: It was never signed off on. 360See U.S. Dep’t of State, Cable, Request for DS TDY and FTE Support (Mar. 28, 2012) (on 

file with the Committee, SCB004625). But see U.S. Dep’t of State Cable, Tripoli—Request for 

DS TDY and FTE Support (Apr. 19, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0046263) (denying 

request). 361 Email from Spot Reports to DS Command, et al. (Mar. 15, 2012, 9:24 AM) (on file with 

the Committee, C05393455). 

provals for this many Agents on a continuing basis.’’ 357 The January 10, 2012 Action Memorandum requested Lamb approve efforts 

to ‘‘request assistance from Domestic Operations, so that personnel 

can be selected and directed from the Field Offices by the DS Command Center as well as authorize funding for five, 45 day ARSO 

TDYs in Benghazi from Feb.1 through September 30 at a total estimated cost of $283,050.’’ 358 The January 10, 2012 Action Memorandum was never approved by Lamb.359

On March 28, 2012, the Embassy in Tripoli made a request on 

behalf of Benghazi for ‘‘five TDY DS agents for 45–60 day rotations 

in Benghazi.’’ 360

Further Erosion of Security in 2012 

As the requests for measures and personnel continued, the security environment in Benghazi continued to deteriorate in 2012, 

with the incidents and attacks increasing in volume and in intensity particularly against westerners. 

One event occurred in March 2012: 

Mission personnel were detained at a vehicle checkpoint in 

the town of Rajma, approximately 15 km southeast of 

Benghazi International Airport. U.S. Mission Benghazi 

RSO personnel were there to conduct a site survey near 

the town of Rajma. Benghazi personnel were detained by 

17th February Martyrs Brigade militia members, had their 

identification temporarily confiscated, and were escorted 

back to Benghazi to a militia base.361


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362 Id. 363 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 16 to DS–IP–NEA, Principal Officer 2, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, and Diplomatic Sec. Agent 17 (Apr. 2, 2012, 4:17 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0048091). 364 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 16 to DS–IP–NEA (Apr. 6, 2012, 7:11 PM) (on file with 

the Committee, SCB0048088). 365 Id. 366 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 16 to DS–IP–NEA (Apr. 10, 2012, 1:12 PM) (on file with 

the Committee, SCB0048085). 367See U.S. Dep’t of State, Cable, Tripoli—Request for DS TDY and FTE Support (Apr. 19, 

2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0046263). 368 Id. 369 Email from OpsNewsTicker to NEWS-Libya (May 22, 2012, 9:06 AM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05392368). 

The situation was eventually resolved and the personnel released.362

On April 2, 2012, four days before the first IED attack on the 

Mission compound, the Mission reported: 

British Diplomatic Mission FAV [fully armored vehicle] 

was attacked by a mob of demonstrators. The vehicle was 

damaged but the occupants escaped injury. The demonstrators who numbered between one hundred (100) and 

two hundred (200) were members of the Traffic Police 

Force known as ‘‘Murur.’’ 363

On April 6, 2012, the Mission suffered its first IED attack when 

an IED was thrown over the perimeter wall.364 According to the 

spot report: ‘‘at approximately 2250 hours (GMT+2), the U.S. Diplomatic Mission Benghazi, Libya Compound came under attack. An 

IED was thrown over the perimeter walls and exploded within the 

compound grounds. No one was injured and damage was not visible.’’ 365

One Diplomatic Security Agent was on the ground at the time of 

the IED attack. 

Four days later, on April 10, 2012, the Mission reported ‘‘an IED 

was thrown at a four (4) vehicle convoy carrying the United Nations Special Representative to Libya, Ian Martin. No one was hurt 

in the explosion and no one has taken responsibility for the attack.’’ 366

The March 28, 2012 request for five Diplomatic Security Agents 

was rejected less than two weeks after the first IED attack on the 

Mission.367 In denying the request on April 19, 2012, Washington 

D.C. responded: 

DS will continue to provide DS agent support in Benghazi. 

DS/IP recommends that post continues [sic] its efforts to 

hire LES drivers for Benghazi to enable the DS TDYers to 

solely perform their protective security function. DS/IP 

also recommends a joint assessment of the number of DS 

agents requested for Benghazi to include input from RSO 

Tripoli, TDY RSO Benghazi, and DS/IP in an effort to develop a way forward.368

On May 22, 2012 ‘‘a rocket propelled grenade hit the offices of 

the International Committee of the Red Cross.’’ 369 The International Committee of the Red Cross offices were approximately 


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370 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Command Ctr. to DSCC E TIA/PII, DSCC E TIA/ITA & DS– 

IP–NEA (May 28, 2012, 5:08 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05391864). 371 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 18 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 17 et al. (May 28, 2012, 

5:36 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05392202). 372 John Christopher Stephens Nomination, PN1233, 112th Congress (Mar. 29, 2012) https:// 

www.congress.gov/nomination/112th-congress/1233 (confirmed on voice vote). 373See Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S Dep’t of State, Prepared Remarks at Swearing 

In Ceremony for Chris Stevens, Ambassador to Libya (May 14, 2012), http://www.state.gov/ 

secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/05/197696.htm. 

one kilometer from the Mission compound in Benghazi.370 Less 

than a week after the attack on the International Committee for 

the Red Cross, a Facebook post appeared threatening ‘‘to send a 

message to the Americans.’’ 371

Chris Stevens Becomes Ambassador 

The U.S. Senate received the President’s nomination of J. Christopher Stevens to be Ambassador of Libya on January 24, 2012. 

The Senate confirmed his nomination by voice vote on March 29, 

2012.372 Stevens was sworn in by the Secretary of State on May 

14, 2012.373

While in Washington D.C., Stevens met with various individuals 

including former State Department employee and author Ethan 

Chorin. Mr. Chorin told the Committee he discussed Benghazi with 

Stevens in March 2012: 

he [Stevens] said . . . essentially, Benghazi was not only 

the epicenter of the revolution, but a long-neglected part 

of the Libyan polity, and that the, essentially—what I got 

from him was that he was concerned that all of the attention was moving where—all of those factors that you mentioned, militarily, security-wise, medical, to the epicenter 

activities moving to Tripoli. And I believe what his point 

was, that he was afraid that the situation in Benghazi 

could degenerate as a result of that relative shift of the 

tension. 

And we both agreed that Benghazi was particularly important for one, the threat of potential future spread of extremist activity, as well as the fact that, you know, many 

of Libya’s thinkers, intellectuals, you know, people with 

high levels of education, also came from Benghazi, and 

that there was a sort of an, essentially, again, without putting words into his mouth, that Benghazi would be critical 

to future, to Libya’s future health as a unified state. 

* * * 

I mean, it was widely known, or believed at the time that 

either Ansar al-Sharia, or one of its affiliates was responsible for, or had some connection to the death of the assassination of Abdul Fatah Younis. I should actually correct 

that by saying that it wasn’t—it was an Islamist faction 

that that event was attributed to. But that’s the background to our conversation. So there was no explicit mentioning in the Washington conversation about specific 

names of individuals or groups, but it was clear that that 

was part of what he was concerned about. 


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374Testimony of Ethan D. Chorin, Tr. at 15–18 (Mar. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Chorin Testimony] 

(on file with the Committee). 375 Cretz Testimony at 89–90. 376 Email from Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission to Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 

SES–O; SWO-Cables; Dibble, Elizabeth; Maxwell, Raymond; NEA–MAG–DL; Burns, William; 

Sherman, Wendy; Nides, Thomas; Sullivan, Jacob; Feltman, Jeffrey (May 15, 2012, 10:26 AM) 

(on file with the Committee, C05395496). 

* * * 

He did say that he was very concerned that we were at a 

turning point, and that things could go badly quickly.374

Cretz, whose service concluded on May 15, 2012, communicated 

his concerns about the negative trends occurring in Benghazi prior 

to his departure and the need to maintain Department of Defense 

assets in Libya.375

In a classified cable sent on his last day, Cretz warned: 

Nothing threatens the success of the Libyan revolution 

more than the growing AQIM [al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb] links in Libya and the renewed activism of indigenous groups formerly repressed by Qadhafi. AQIM’s 

ability to move senior leaders in and out of Libya and to 

base them there for months at a time points to the real 

possibility that parts of Libya-particularly the eastern 

areas around Derna, which have historically been the 

source of Libya’s homegrown extremist—could turn into a 

safehaven for terrorists. While we have done some lifting 

with PM ElKeib to educate the new government of the 

risks, the Libyans are not fully on board with our concerns. We need to push more vigorously to convince them 

of the need to actively work with us to build the appropriate intelligence bodies.376

Cretz further told the Committee: 

[T]hose events in Benghazi in the spring of 2012 . . . it 

was a disturbing trend because, in Tripoli, we did not I did 

not see a piece of intelligence. I did not see any indication 

that the violence that was taking place was other than the 

product of the rival militias or whatever fighting it out for 

their piece of the pie. 

We never had any intelligence report, as I recollect, that 

specifically targeted U.S. or Western interests in Tripoli. 

Benghazi began to look like there was something going on 

there that was disturbing. 

* * * 

Well, my view was and I expressed this to General Ham 

and others, who was the head of AFRICOM at the time 

was that my belief was that we needed them, especially in 

Tripoli, because of the ongoing strife and, also, because the 

elections were going to be held in June. 

And I think our general sense was that this was going to 

be a time a real problematic time period because it was 

the first election and for some of the reasons I went over 

before: first election, a lot at stake. 


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377 Cretz Testimony at 86, 90–91. 378 Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 

7 (June 5, 2012, 10:55 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05409979); see Email to Post Mgmt. 

Officer for Libya, et al. (May 30, 2012, 11:20 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0080338) 

(regarding the arrival of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens); Email to SES–O, SWO Cables, 

NEA–MAG–DL (May 28, 2012, 2:18 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0079242) (regarding 

Tripoli Situation Report). 379 Id.; Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 18 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 17, et al. (May 28, 2012, 

5:36 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05392202). 380 Email from Principal Officer 2, U.S. Dep’t of State, to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, William V. Roebuck, Dir. 

Continued 

So I felt that, in order again, for us to be able to do the 

job that we needed to do to get out and to reassure people 

that we were there to in case we were going to bring in 

observers or something with the elections, that an SST 

component would be very, very important for us to maintain up until that time. 

* * * 

[T]here was a medical component. We had a Navy doctor 

for a period of time. They brought special skills. For example, we had a bomb that was a 10,000 pound bomb that 

was in the middle of the Benghazi compound where Qadhafi used to live and kids were playing on it every day. 

And I worked with our one of our SST people, and they 

had a bomb defusing expert. So we were able to work out 

a plan whereby we defused that bomb. So that kind of 

skill, the normal kind of skill I think that most DS agents 

wouldn’t possess, counter maybe counterterrorism skills. 

I can’t describe the level above which our—because our DS 

agents were very, very capable. But these guys just 

brought kind of a special force kind of set of skills to the 

game.377

Stevens returned to Tripoli, Libya as Ambassador on May 26, 

2012, presenting his credentials to Libyan Foreign Minister Ashour 

Bin Khyal on May 27, 2012.378

June 2012 

Less than ten days after Stevens’ return to Libya and a week 

after the Facebook threat, the Benghazi Mission compound came 

under attack for the second time in less than two months.379 On 

June 6, 2012, the Mission reported back to Washington D.C.: 

Approximately, one hour ago (3:30am) an IED exploded 

next to the front gate. Video camera footage shows a 4- 

door white pick-up truck in front of the gate, and local 

guards report seeing a man in ‘Islamic’ dress placing the 

IED at what appears to be the base of perimeter wall. The 

local guards sounded the duck and cover drill after seeing 

the man and smelling smoke. Approximately 5–6 minutes 

later the device exploded, creating a large hole in the perimeter wall. No one was injured and all personnel are accounted for.380


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Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 6, 2012, 

4:49 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05393187). 381 Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 

7 (June 5, 2012, 10:55 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05409979). 382 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya 

(June 6, 2012, 3:00 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05409979). 383See Testimony of Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, before H. Comm. on Gov’t Oversight & Reform, Tr. 50 (Apr. 11, 2013) [hereinafter 

Hicks Testimony] (on file with the Committee) (discussing the attack). 384 Email from Charlene R. Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., Int’l Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Eric J. Boswell, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., 

U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (June 11, 2012, 11:09 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05394418). 385 Id. 386Polaschik Testimony at 82–83. 387See Email from William V. Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya (June 11, 2012, 5:11 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05391335) (‘‘I’m getting quite concerned about the security situation for our folks 

in Benghazi . . . We are at a(possible) [sic] natural break . . .’’). 388 Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to William v. Roebuck, Dir. 

Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 12, 2012, 

10:52 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05409960). 

A day before the second IED attack on the Mission, Stevens requested the State Department’s own highly trained mobile security 

deployment (MSD) team remain in Tripoli through the end of the 

summer.381 More resources in Tripoli meant possibly more available resources to augment security in Benghazi. On the same day 

Benghazi was attacked for a second time, the Diplomatic Security 

Agent, who was the head of the MSD division, denied Stevens’ request to keep the State Department’s highly trained security personnel stating: ‘‘Unfortunately, MSD cannot support the request 

. . . we have two emerging requirements similar to Tripoli that requires the whole of our office essentially.’’ 382

Five days later, an RPG attack was launched on the United 

Kingdom Ambassador’s motorcade injuring two individuals.383 According to the Mission, ‘‘the UK Ambassador’s motorcade was attacked with an RPG and small arms fire in Benghazi, approximately three kilometers away from the US Mission.’’ 384 Concern 

was expressed the RPG attack was actually directed toward the 

U.S. Mission. Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs suggested to her colleagues and supervisors ‘‘it raises the 

question were they targeting the Brits or us and/or did we just 

lucky [sic] on this one?’’ 385 Polaschik told the Committee: 

I personally was very concerned that it might not have 

been targeted at the British Ambassador, but could have 

been targeted at us, given the location where it had occurred and given that we had been storing the British embassy’s vehicles on our compound. But it was unclear. It 

was very murky, difficult to determine exactly who was 

targeted.386

The pattern of violence—particularly against westerners raised 

some concern in Washington. On June 11, 2012, the Near Eastern 

Affairs regional bureau expressed concern about the security situation in Benghazi to Stevens—suggesting even a pause in staffing.387 Stevens agreed, indicating it would allow ‘‘our RSO team 

time in Benghazi (perhaps reduced in number) to continue to assess the threat environment and consider ways to mitigate.’’ 388

On June 12, 2012, Scott Bultrowicz, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic Security, opined after the attack on the 


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389 Email from Scott P. Bultrowicz, Principal Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic 

Sec., to Charlene R. Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., Int’l Programs, U.S. 

Dep’t of State (June 11, 2012, 1:05 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05388866). 390 Email from Ms. Lamb to Mr. Bultrowicz (June 11, 2012, 4:16 PM) (on file with the Committee. C05388866). 391See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 19 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25, James P. 

Bacigalupo, Regional Director, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State, and Diplomatic 

Sec. Agent (June 14, 2012, 11:40 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05388987) (summarizing 

staffing needs in light of prevailing security environment). 392 Id. 393 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 24 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 (June 14, 2012, 1:56 PM) 

(on file with the Committee, C05388987). 

UK ambassador’s motorcade ‘‘this along with last week’s incident 

is troubling.’’ 389 Lamb acknowledged: 

We are not staffed or resourced adequately to protect our 

people in that type of environment. We are a soft target 

against resources available to the bad guys there. Not to 

mention there is no continuity because we do everything 

there with TDY personnel. The cost to continue to do business there may become more challenging.390

On June 14, 2012, the Benghazi Mission held an Emergency Action Committee meeting to discuss the series of attacks and request 

additional DS staff.391 The Diplomatic Security Agent in Benghazi 

wrote to Washington D.C. expressing concern about the intensity 

and frequency of attacks: ‘‘Recent attacks have intensified in frequency with the active targeting of diplomatic personnel (e.g. the 

IED attack on the U.S. compound, the complex attack on the U.K. 

motorcade, and a recent rally by heavily armed Islamist militia 

members).’’ 392

That very day the Diplomatic Security Agent in charge in Tripoli 

underscored the concern raised by Benghazi stating ‘‘I fear that we 

have passed a threshold where we will see more targeting, attacks, 

and incidents involving western targets.’’ 393 He went on to list five 

major security incidents in and around Benghazi, including: 

06/12/2012—0350 hrs—RPG attack on the International 

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) compound in Misrata; 

06/11/2012—Attack on UK Ambassador’s convoy— 

Benghazi; 

06/08/2012 2345 hrs—Sabha—Two hand grenades targeted 

at marked UK vehicles outside of Sabha hotel. One detonated, damaged three tires and an oil pump. The second 

grenade failed to detonate; 

06/06/2012—U.S. Mission Benghazi was targeted by an 

IED which detonated causing damage to the exterior wall 

of the compound. The Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdul 

Rahman Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack; 

05/22/2012—International Committee of the Red Cross 

building attacked by RPG—in Benghazi. The Imprisoned 

Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman Brigades claimed responsibility on 27 May. The brigade accused the ICRC of attempting to convert internally displaced members of the 

Tawergha ethnic minority to Christianity. It called for the 

NGO to close its offices; and declared Libya to be an IsVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00333 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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394 Id. 395 Email from Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, to J. Christopher Stevens, 

U.S. Ambassador to Libya (June 13, 2012, 3:42 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0079249). 396 Clinton Testimony at 151. 397See Jomana Karadsheh, Liberal coalition makes strides in historic Libyan election, CNN 

(July 18, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/17/world/africa/libya-election. 

lamic state. It warned that the Americans would be targeted next.394

No additional resources were provided by Washington D.C. to 

fortify the compound after the first two attacks. No additional personnel were sent to secure the facility despite repeated requests of 

the security experts on the ground. In fact, the only inquiry from 

senior State Department officials about the trending violence 

against westerners was from Victoria Nuland, State Department 

Spokesperson, asking Stevens how to publicly message the incidents. Nuland wrote: 

I know you have your hands full but we’d like your advice 

about our public messaging on the spate of violence in 

Libya over the past ten days. 

Should we now move to something a bit sharper than calling on all sides to work it out? What cd/wd we say about 

whether the incidents are linked, why they are going after 

NGO and Western targets now, impact on electoral environment etc....395

This exchange is noteworthy. Stevens’ expertise was being sought 

on the messaging of violence in Libya as opposed to his expertise 

being sought on how best to protect against that violence. Moreover, while the Secretary and others were quick to praise Stevens 

and his dedication to Libya, they were also quick to note ‘‘[h]e [Stevens] definitely understood the risks. Yes.’’ 396

Saying Stevens ‘‘understood’’ the risks without also acknowledging he repeatedly tried to guard against and defend against 

those risks is unfortunate. Yes, it is clear Stevens knew the risks 

associated with his service in Libya from the moment he landed in 

Benghazi in 2011 on a chartered Greek boat until his final phone 

call to Gregory Hicks saying ‘‘we’re under attack.’’ Washington D.C. 

dismissed Stevens’ multiple requests for additional security personnel, while also asking for help in messaging the very violence 

he was seeking security from. 

Libyan Elections 

On July 7, 2012, the first post-revolution democratic elections in 

Libya occurred, largely without incident.397 Being in Benghazi during the first national elections was a priority for State Department 

officials. Feltman told the Committee: 

Libya is a big country. If we only had a diplomatic presence in Tripoli during those elections, I think we would 

have gotten a very distorted view of [sic] I was already 

gone from the State Department at this point, but I think 

it would have been a very distorted view if you are only 


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398Feltman Testimony at 64–65. 399Testimony of Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 14–15 (Mar. 26, 2015) [hereinafter Principal Officer 3 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

reporting what’s happening in Tripoli during something as 

critical as the first elections after Qadhafi’s fall.398

The Principal Officer in Benghazi at the time described the environment in Benghazi leading up to the elections: 

A: Broadly, the elections were the principal focus of attention. There was an international presence there, not just 

in Benghazi but across the country as these were nationwide elections. It was the object of great public focus. In 

the immediate run up to the election, there were a number 

of incidents. On election day itself, I was one of the international observers at polling stations in and around 

Benghazi. 

Q: When you said there were a number of incidents leading up to the election day, can you elaborate further on 

those? 

A: There were reports of attempts to ensure that polling 

stations did not open, for example. There were reports of 

attempts to interfere with ballots or ballot boxes, for example. 

Q: Were these interferences by one particular organization, or were there multiple organizations involved in 

these events? 

A: There were various allegations as to responsibility for 

the events. The prevailing theory at that time was that 

these were the efforts of separatist elements. I did not personally witness any of these events. I want to emphasize 

that these were largely based on reports in the media or 

elsewhere, and that in my contacts on election day, I did 

not see any effort to impede voters or to otherwise interfere in the process. 

Q: Okay. And following the election, what was the environment like, within the in the timeframe of a week after 

the election, what was the environment in Benghazi, 

Libya, like? 

A: There was euphoria, frankly, among most of the Libyans with whom I spoke. They felt that the elections had 

been successful in terms of their conduct. They thought 

that this demonstrated Libya’s ability to clear a very important hurdle. They felt that the election results themselves represented a consensus for moderate government. 

And the majority of my Libyan contacts then identified the 

formulation of a constitution as the next hurdle.399

Making Benghazi a Permanent Presence 

As he was awaiting ambassadorial confirmation and re-deployment to Libya, Stevens had lunch with Gregory N. Hicks, who had 


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400 Hicks Testimony at 7–8. 401 Id. at 7. 402 Id. 403 Id. at 7–8. 404 Id. at 15. 405 Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to the U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to Philippe I. Reines, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Communications, U.S. Dep’t of State, Cheryl 

D. Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor to the U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Jacob J. 

Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 12, 2012, 9:15 AM) (on file with the 

Committee, SCB0051754) (‘‘Tomorrow is also our first trip meeting for the libya oct trip which 

we need to discuss.’’); Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to the U.S. Sec’y of State, 

U.S. Dep’t of State, to William Burns, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 17, 2012, 

1:21 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0070473) (‘‘Before our Libya tragedy, we were also 

been selected to replace Polaschik as the Deputy Chief of Mission 

for Embassy Tripoli.400 They met in Washington D.C. to discuss 

their upcoming work together in Libya.401 Part of their discussion 

centered on the future of operations in Benghazi. Hicks described 

their conversation as follows: 

I met with Chris, Ambassador Stevens—I may refer to him 

as Chris, and if I say Chris, that’s who I am referring to 

after his confirmation. And he was, of course, very excited. 

And we talked about our plans for moving forward, you 

know, particularly our hope that we could normalize the 

Mission and bring families back to, you know, to Tripoli in 

the summer of actually, this coming summer, 2013. 

One of the things he said to me was that, in his exit interview with Secretary Clinton, she expressed the hope that 

we could make the special Mission in Benghazi a permanent constituent post. And Chris said that one of the first 

things he intended to do after his arrival was develop a 

proposal to move forward on that project.402

Hicks testified that shortly after he arrived in Libya on July 31, 

2012, he asked Stevens about the progress of making Benghazi permanent. He put it as follows: 

Timing was important in this, because we knew that in 

that particular fiscal year, which was I think 2012, fiscal 

year 2012, ending September 30th of 2012, we would probably be able to have the resources to do it. We could obligate the money to do that. 

When I arrived on July 31st, I was surprised that the 

cable had not gone to Washington at that time. And I 

asked Chris about it, and he said just that things had been 

much busier than he expected. 

And I basically said, well, we will you know, a friend of 

mine, a longtime friend of mine, at the time was principal 

officer in Benghazi. . . . [O]ne of the finest professional officers I know in the Foreign Service. And I told Chris that 

I would work with [him] to get the project started.403

Hicks also described discussions about the Secretary traveling 

back to Libya, perhaps in October 2012.404 Emails indicate senior 

State Department officials, including Mills, Sullivan, and Huma 

Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff, were preparing for a trip by the Secretary to Libya in October 2012.405 Hicks testified he and Stevens 


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considering stops in Libya and Jordan. Given the recent developments, what’s your sense about 

the wisdom of her going to the middle east?’’). 406 Hicks Testimony at 16–17. 407Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 21, Diplomatic Sec. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 

78–79 (May 19, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 21 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

wanted to have a ‘‘deliverable’’ for the Secretary for her trip to 

Libya, and that ‘‘deliverable’’ would be making the Mission in 

Benghazi a permanent Consulate. 

And I believe I transmitted the policy justification to 

Washington on August 31st. You know, we are only a 

month from the end of the fiscal year, so we have to get 

a [sic] or, we have to help Washington, the executive director’s office of the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau to put together a package to get it to Pat Kennedy for a decision 

by September 30th. Otherwise, we lose the money.406

August 2012 

In August 2012—roughly a month before the Benghazi attacks— 

security on the ground worsened significantly. After a temporary 

lull around the election, violence escalated. As the security environment deteriorated, security personnel declined. On July 9, 2012, 

Embassy Tripoli submitted another staffing request on behalf of 

the Embassy and Benghazi to Washington. Benghazi requested at 

least one permanently assigned Diplomatic Security Agent from 

Tripoli be assigned to Benghazi, as well as for Washington to send 

a minimum of three temporary duty Diplomatic Security agents. 

The Diplomatic Security Agent in charge in Benghazi at the time 

explained his reasoning for the Benghazi staffing request:407

With all the security situation on the ground going on and 

putting everything in place, and all the transition taking 

place in regards to American personnel leaving and coming 

in, and after discussion with the RSO and chief of Mission, 

this was a cable suggesting at that time this is what we 

need to maintain operations in the best safe manner as 

soon as possible. We wrote this cable on July 9, prior to 

the Ambassador leaving for Benghazi. 

At that time, MSD personnel were, [sic] when we started 

off with two teams; now there was less teams on the 

ground. Actually, I don’t believe there was any MSD team 

on the ground. There was just TDYers and two permanent 

ARSOs on the ground. This is in July. I’m sorry. I’m confused on the dates. Not September. This is July 9. So, at 

this time, we had another ARSO on the ground that was 

permanent and myself and the RSO. . . . 

* * * 

So we wrote this in July because all these elements were 

leaving. MSD was leaving. The SST team was leaving, or 

they were going to change their Mission from being in the 

Embassy to being outside of the Embassy so they could 

train the Libyan government military. So we came up with 

this as a suggestion, for example, in line 4, or paragraph 


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408 Id. 409Lamb Testimony at 245–46. 410Kennedy Testimony at 46. 411Testimony of Cheryl D. Mills. Chief of Staff & Counselor to the U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, Tr. at 72 (Sept. 2, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 

4, under the current arrangement, and this was the main 

one, 34 U.S. security personnel, the 16 SSTs, the 11 MSD, 

the 2 RSOs and 3 TDY RSOs, that was the number that 

we had there, and it was going to drawn [sic] down to 27. 

And we said: Wait, we’re basically losing people. We need 

people, specifically because security is not in the best position now. 

We requested weapons permits and weapons for the local 

ambassador bodyguard detail, and funding for security. 

Yes, and this was the cable that we sent out in concurrence with the Ambassador? [sic] 408

No response was received. Lamb attempted to explain the lack 

of response to the Committee. 

So when I read this cable in this format, . . . wrote it as 

a reporting cable in paragraph format, and it’s very hard 

to line everything up by the needs. So I asked the desk officer to have his [sic] . . . at the time was the person 

working with . . . [sic] for them to get on a conference call 

and to go through this cable, paragraph by paragraph, line 

by line, and to switch this into the format that shows how 

many people do you need for which activities, to support 

VIP visits, movement security, static security, a quick reaction force. Just tell me exactly what you need and then 

the numbers will pop out the other side showing what you 

need. 

And they sat down and they did this. And all of that was 

compiled into the response that unfortunately never went 

out. But my guidance to them was before that cable went 

up to Scott Bultrowicz and Eric Boswell, I wanted it to be 

pre approved at post, because I didn’t want to dictate to 

post their staffing needs, I wanted to support them. But in 

this format, it was not clear exact because they were coming up on the 1 year transition when everybody was going 

to leave post and the new team was going to come in, so 

I wanted it to be laid out, very clear, the current operating 

support that was being provided for security.409

Kennedy explained his involvement in the July 9, 2012 staffing 

cable and the decision to terminate the Department of Defense’s 

Security Support Team (SST) protective responsibilities in Tripoli. 

He told the Committee: ‘‘I consulted, as I said earlier, with the subject matter experts in this field, and after consulting with them, I 

responded no, we would not be asking for another extension.’’ 410

This is a much different description of Kennedy’s involvement than 

what Cheryl Mills described to the Committee. She described the 

Under Secretary as the person ‘‘who managed security related 

issues.’’ 411


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412See U.S. Embassy—Tripoli, Libya, Cable (July 9, 2012) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0049439–41) (discussing emerging threats in Benghazi) (requesting staffing changes). 413 Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to Principal Officer 3, U.S. 

Dep’t of State (Aug. 2, 2012, 2:45 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390855). 414See Email from OpsNewTicker to NEWS-Mahogany State Department (Aug. 5, 2012, 3:27 

PM) (on file with the Committee, C05397147). 415See id. (‘‘ICRC suspends work in Misrata, Benghazi after attack (Reuters)’’). 416See U.S. Embassy—Tripoli, Libya, Cable (Aug. 8, 2012) (on file with the Committee, 

C05262779) (discussing emerging threats in Benghazi). 417 Id. 418See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 8 Testimony at 50. 419 Id. 

Beginning in August, the number of security personnel in Embassy Tripoli was 34. Throughout August, security personnel left 

Embassy Tripoli. By the end of August, the number of security personnel at Embassy Tripoli dropped to six, excluding four members 

of the Defense Department’s SST who were no longer able to serve 

in an official protective capacity but were on site.412

Stevens initially planned to travel to Benghazi in early August. 

He cancelled the trip ‘‘primarily for Ramadan/security reasons.’’ 413

On August 5, 2012, the International Committee for the Red Cross 

[ICRC] suffered its fifth attack in less than 3 months.414 As a result, the ICRC suspended its operations in Benghazi and 

Misrata.415 On August 8, 2012, the Benghazi Mission reported the 

changing security environment and the anti-western sentiment 

back to Washington D.C.416 In particular, the report described: 

Since the eve of the elections, Benghazi has moved from 

trepidation to euphoria and back as a series of violent incidents has dominated the political landscape during the 

Ramadan holiday. These incidents have varied widely in 

motivation and severity. There have been abductions and 

assassinations, but there have also been false alarms and 

outright fabrications.417

With the violence continuing to escalate, the Benghazi Mission 

held an Emergency Action Committee meeting a week later to review the Mission’s tripwires, the lack of host nation support, and 

the overall security environment.418 Participating in the EAC were 

the Principal Officer, the Diplomatic Security Agent, and other U.S. 

government personnel on the ground in Benghazi.419

The Diplomatic Security Agent in charge explained to the Committee his concerns with the security environment: 

I had tried to get a contact within the Libyan security apparatus that I could liaise with, which is typical for RSOs 

wherever they’re posted around the world, and I had been 

unable to do that. I had requested police presence through 

a diplomatic note, but that had gone unanswered. I was resorting to, you know, flagging police cars down and talking 

to them to try and get them to stay, and that didn’t seem 

to work. 

There wasn’t any sort of information sharing, which is typical, or at least in my experience has been typical, at other 

embassies or consulates. Where, you know, we provide law 

enforcement security information to the host nation, they 

would then, in return, supply us information. 


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420 Id. at 59–60. 421 Id. at 60–61. 422 Id. at 89. 423 Id. at 90: 

‘‘It wasn’t new and novel in that I think it was . . . explained to me they had done 

something similar to this, I believe when they had the previous gelatina bomb incident 

at the front gate and they had labeled it as suspended operations, but, no, in my training and experience, I had not seen a suspended operations category before. . . . I had 

been to places where we had done lockdown, so to speak, for a set period of time, and 

this seems like a logical outflow of that idea.’’ 424 Cable, U.S. Embassy—Tripoli, Libya (Aug, 16, 2012) (on file with the Committee, 

C05261905). 425 Id. 426See id. 427See Information Memorandum from Beth Jones, Acting Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. State Dep’t (Aug. 

17, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05390124) (briefing Sec’y Clinton on the security situation in Libya). 428 Id. 429 Id. 

And then just the incident the fact [sic] that the prior incident we had with the gelatina or alleged gelatina bomb at 

the Mission had not been resolved, and it did not appear 

that local law enforcement was actively pursuing investigation of that, as well as their inability to pursue the 

possible hostile surveillance incident that was outside our 

south gate. 

All those things I just mentioned led me to believe that 

they didn’t have the ability/desire to prevent/mitigate 

threats.420

He explained the steps the Benghazi Mission took after the EAC 

‘‘as far as physical security . . . for instance, erect[ed] a, sort of, 

makeshift chicane outside the north gates or at least the main 

gate. [redacted text].’’ 421 One additional outcome of the EAC, the 

Diplomatic Security Agent described to the Committee, was a response tactic called suspended operations.422 Under suspended operations, all movements would be curtailed and post would conduct 

business from inside the compound only.423 The new status was 

created because personnel at the Benghazi Mission were already 

reduced to such levels that authorized and ordered departures were 

not applicable.424

The Benghazi Mission followed the EAC meeting with a cable 

back to Washington D.C. a day later.425 The cable described 1) the 

deteriorating security situation; 2) the departure of organizations 

such as International Committee on the Red Cross and a U.S. contractor; 3) the increase in hostile militias; 4) the lack of host nation 

support; and 5) the revisions made to the Mission’s tripwires.426

The cable also put Washington on notice a request for additional 

security measures would be sent through Embassy Tripoli. The request was made to Embassy Tripoli on August 23, 2012. 

A day after the EAC cable was sent to Washington D.C., the Secretary received an update on the security situation in Libya.427 The 

Secretary’s Information Memorandum described ‘‘an upward trend 

in violence—primarily but not exclusively in the east—since May,’’ 

and included a list of incidents such as the June 6 attack on the 

Mission, and the August 6 carjacking of American personnel.’’ 428

It noted ‘‘foreign residents of Benghazi have expressed concern 

about the risks living and working there.’’ 429 Finally, the memoVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00340 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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430 Id. 431See Memorandum from Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Aug 17, 2012 

Action Memo for the Secretary] (on file with the Committee, SCB0086134–36). 432 Id. 433 Id. 434Travel Warning—Libya, U.S. STATE DEP’T (Aug. 27, 2012) (on file with the Committee, 

C05261911). 435 Email to Gregory N. Hicks, et al. (Aug. 30, 2011, 1:59 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05397292). 436 Email from Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (Aug. 29, 2012, 6:01 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05390852). 437 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 8 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 (August 27, 2012, 11:49 

AM) (on file with the Committee, C05396772–73). 

randum noted ‘‘there is no coordinated organization behind the incidents.’’ 430 Absent from the Secretary’s Information Memorandum 

was any discussion about the U.S. facilities in Libya and their security posture, or of potential resources and personnel needed in 

light of the deteriorating security environment. 

The same day the Information Memorandum describing the security situation in Libya was sent to the Secretary, an Action Memorandum was also sent seeking her approval to designate Libya as 

an eligible country to receive funding from the Global Security Contingency Fund.431 The Secretary approved this designation and the 

release of $20 million to support Libya’s security sector on August 

23, 2012.432 The Global Security Contingency Fund is a joint fund 

between the State Department and DOD authorized by Congress to 

help fledgling countries ‘‘overcome emergent challenges through security and justice sector assistance to partner countries. State must 

fund 20 percent of each project. . . . The assistance proposed here 

[for Libya] is for the security sector. Congressional notification will 

be required before funds are transferred to GSCF and before initiating any activity.’’ 433

Less than 2 weeks after the Mission’s EAC—on August 27, 

2012—the U.S. issued a travel alert for Americans traveling to 

from and in Libya.434 Two days later, the Libyan government 

issued a ‘‘ ‘state of maximum alert as from today and until further 

notice’ in the eastern city of Benghazi.’’ 435

In his handover notes to his successor, the outgoing Principal Officer stated ‘‘we are treading water here. . . . We are, for example, 

on the fourth visit from an Embassy electrician of my brief tenure 

because we continue to repair rather than replace equipment.’’ 436

Similarly, in handoff notes to the incoming Diplomatic Security 

Agent, the departing Agent wrote about the dangerous environment in Benghazi, stating: 

there is nothing traditional about this post. Operating in 

a high threat environment where kidnappings, assassinations and bombings are weekly, if not daily occurrences, 

post enjoys neither the resources nor the host nation security support one would find at a similarly rated post. DS 

agents, for all intent purposes, are on their own.437

The only inquiry produced to the Committee from the Office of 

the Secretary to Stevens in August was an August 5, 2012 email 


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438See Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State, to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya (Aug. 5, 2012) (on file with the Committee, 

C05397147). 439 Id. 440 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, arts. 22, 29, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 

3227. 441Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 33. 442See Max Fisher, Libyan Militia’s Failed Security at Benghazi, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2012), 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2012/11/02/libyan-militias-failed-securityat-benghazi/(‘‘[T]he February 17 Brigade ‘eastern Libya’s most potent armed force,’ noting that 

it ‘nominally’ reports to the Libyan defense ministry. The command link between Tripoli’s senior 

leaders and on-the-ground militias has proven weak, but the central government still relies 

heavily on them.’’ (quoting a New York Times report)). 443See id. (‘‘[T]he central government still relies heavily on them.’’). 444See id. 445See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 Testimony at 37 (‘‘The security posture there was they had 

17th February Brigade militia personnel that were assigned to the hotel.’’). 446See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 34. 447See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 Testimony at 38–39. 448See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 35. 

from Sullivan asking: ‘‘What is the story here?’’ 438 regarding another RPG attack on the International Committee of the Red 

Cross.439

HOST NATION SECURITY: 

FEBRUARY 17 AND LOCAL GUARD FORCE 

At the time Stevens entered Libya in April 2011, there was no 

recognized government to provide security as required by international conventions.440 The Diplomatic Security Agent in charge 

of the initial entry into Benghazi described the lack of security resources. 

There wasn’t a formalized police I mean, there was probably somebody that called himself a police chief. And then 

you had the military somewhat of a military presence, you 

know, that really wasn’t focused on anything to do with 

our security. They had, you know, they were trying to fight 

the war. Then you had February 17, a militia that assisted 

us a little bit.441

February 17 Martyrs Brigade 

The February 17 Martyrs Brigade [February 17] was one of the 

largest militias operating in Benghazi and Eastern Libya.442 February 17 was instrumental in the success of the opposition forces, 

which eventually overthrew Qadhafi.443 The emerging TNC recognized February 17 as a quasi- host nation security force—endorsing 

their efforts to perform basic security functions typically performed 

by law enforcement.444 For example, the TNC used February 17 to 

provide security at the Tibesti Hotel where westerners, non-government organizations, and journalists stayed.445

The TNC recommended to Stevens and his team in April 2011 

the Mission deal with February 17.446 Despite being the alleged 

lead armed presence in Benghazi,447 Diplomatic Security Agents 

found February 17 to be undisciplined and unskilled.448 The Diplomatic Security Agent in charge told the Committee: 

[T]hey were very undisciplined. You know, people over 

there, a lot of them were not familiar with weapons, you 

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449 Id. 450Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 Testimony at 42. 451See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent to DS–IP–NEA (July 21, 2011, 3:22 PM) (on file 

with the Committee, C05396529) (‘‘[W]e currently have three guards on duty. Ideally, we get 

two per compound. . . .’’). 452Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25, Diplomatic Sec. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of State, before 

the H. Comm. On Oversight and Gov’t Reform, Tr. at 88 (Aug. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Diplomatic 

Sec. Agent 25 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 453 Email to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 19 (June 28, 2012, 1:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05389864); see also Email (Aug. 9, 2011, 12:41 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05396529) 

(discussing compensation for guards on the compound). 454See Email (June 28, 2012, 1:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05389864) (‘‘FPD ap- proves the increase in stipend payments [from $27 to $35 per day].’’). 455 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 to Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., Int’l Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 11, 2012, 1:25 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0050094–95). 456Diplomatic Sec. Agent 13 Testimony at 44. 457See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 to Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau 

of Diplomatic Sec., Int’l Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 11, 2012, 1:25 PM) (on file with 

the Committee, SCB0050094–95) (‘‘Currently we have three High Threat Trained TDY DS 

Agents on the ground and one TDY SST person.’’). 

ing Qadhafi’s rule. So we never could really count on them 

for much because they just didn’t have training. They were 

undisciplined. We just tried to see if we could get them to 

post at a couple of locations around the hotel at the entrance and in the parking lot, and to be around at night 

also in the parking lot.449

According to one of the Diplomatic Security Agents in charge, 

Stevens and his team relied on February 17 at the Tibesti Hotel 

‘‘only in a case where we specifically needed their help.’’ 450

When the Mission moved out of the Hotel, February 17 was retained to provide an additional armed security presence to Mission’s protective detail.451 According to the Libya Desk Officer in 

Washington D.C., February 17 ‘‘would assist . . . with our movements as well. So they would be in the vehicles, help . . . get 

through checkpoints, allow us to get VIP access to certain locations 

through their very status as 17th of February Martyrs Brigade, 

which held in high regard in Benghazi, after the fighting.’’ 452 The 

February 17 members who lived on the Mission compound received 

an initial stipend of $27/day for their services in addition to housing on the compound.453 The stipend was increased to $35 in June 

2012.454 In addition to the February 17 members on the Mission 

compound, a larger contingent of February 17 members lived in 

‘‘close proximity to the compound’’ and provided a potential additional response force.455

As the number of Diplomatic Security Agents dropped, the need 

for the February 17 members increased. The Diplomatic Security 

Agent in charge testified: ‘‘we only had three [February 17] at the 

time. So I was trying to befriend them, trying to get more activity, 

more interest, additional bodies, because three bodies on 24/7 is 

[sic] long days, long weeks.’’ 456 Eventually, another guard was 

added.457

February 17 maintained between three and four guards on the 

compound throughout 2012. They performed drills with the Diplomatic Security Agents and the local guard force and ‘‘all plans to 

defend the compound rely on heavily on both the immediate QRF 

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458 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 19 (June 17, 2012, 8:12 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05389864). 459Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 34– 

35 (Apr. 13, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 

leagues.’’ 458 February 17 members played critical roles during the 

first two attacks on the compound. At the time of the first IED attack on April 6, 2012, February 17 members supported the sole 

Diplomatic Security Agent on the ground. The Diplomatic Security 

Agent described February 17’s role to the Committee: 

I also called our QRF, basically reacted them. We had a 

plan: On a situation like that, they would take up positions throughout the compound. One of the positions would 

be outside of our building. As I stepped outside, one of the 

QRF members was already out there waiting for me. This 

is possibly, I don’t know, 3 minutes after the bombing. 

At some point, the guard finally activated the alarm. Our 

guard force had a push button alarm; in case of any attack, they would activate it. As I step outside, the QRF 

member is there. We cleared our way to the TOC. Went inside the TOC. I turn off the alarm, and I use our camera 

system to view or to try to determine if there was any 

other people, any other attackers in the compound. That 

took approximately 3, 4 minutes. 

I did not see anybody in our camera system. There are 

some blind spots, but we did have a pretty good system 

throughout the compound. I thought that with that, I 

would be able to determine something, something blatant, 

something that would really stand out. 

Afterwards, I stepped outside of the TOC. I had two QRF 

members with me, and we commenced on clearing the 

compound. 

While we were doing that, I heard two shots. It sounded 

to me like rifle fire, something bigger than an M4, which 

is what I had. So I thought initially that it was shooting 

in the compound. One of the QRF members received, if I 

am not mistaken, a call that told him that a third QRF 

member was outside and had detained someone.459

At the time of the second IED attack on June 6, 2012, February 

17 provided support to the three Diplomatic Security Agents on the 

ground. One of the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground during that attack testified: 

[t]he February 17th Martyrs Brigade showed up in a matter of minutes. Then from there we set up a perimeter outside on the street. As we had this large hole in our wall, 

we wanted to push our security perimeter back even further. We set up the large hole I mean set up the perimeter, sorry; and then from there, once that perimeter was 

set up, I went with one of our QRF guys [redacted text]. 

And we went there and secured the rest of the compound. 


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460Testimony Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 50–61 

(Mar. 24, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 461 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 19 (June 17, 2012, 8:12 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05389864). 462Diplomatic Sec. Agent 8 Testimony at 26. 463 Email from Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep’t of State, to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, & Gregory Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission to Libya (Aug. 12, 2012, 5:56 AM) 

(on file with the Committee, C05411463) (asking if ‘‘it is the right signal to send to have a contract with a militia rather than a more usual arrangement with local authorities (the SSC? The 

Army?) to provide our security? Should we try to readjust to a government-government relationship given the political transition.’’). 464 Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to Principal Officer 3, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, & Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 

12, 2012, 1:05 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390836). 465See Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 5 to Regional Sec. Officer (Sept. 9, 2012, 11:31 

PM) (on file with the Committee, C05396013). 466 Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 (Sept. 8, 2012, 9:29 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05396013). 467See id. 

As there was a security incident at the front of our compound, we had lost attention and lost visibility on other aspects of our compound. So, before we decided to let the 

principal officer out of the safe haven and call the all clear, 

we went through, me with my M4, him with his AK 47, 

and we just moved through the compound making sure nobody else had entered and there were no other devices. 

After that was done, we called the all clear.460

Following the June attack, the Diplomatic Security Agents on the 

ground wanted to increase the number of quick reaction force on 

the compound. However, February 17 declined expressing ‘‘concern 

with showing active open support for the American’s [sic] in 

Benghazi.’’ 461 Beginning in August, the Diplomatic Security Agent 

in charge expressed concerns about the trustworthiness of those 

February 17 on the compound. He told the Committee ‘‘I think we, 

or at least I assumed that he was sharing information with Brigade 

about what he was doing on the compound and what we were 

doing.’’ 462 Days later, the Principal Officer at the time expressed 

concerns about February 17 to Stevens and suggested moving more 

to a ‘‘government-government relationship.’’ 463 Stevens responded 

‘‘we should be in line with the GOL policy/law on this. What do the 

local police and SSC leadership recommend.’’ 464

Two days before the Stevens’ trip to Benghazi in September 2012 

the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground were informed February 17 members on the compound would no longer support the 

Benghazi Mission’s off-compound movements—unless the Mission 

was willing to increase their stipend.465 In discussing the situation 

with Embassy Tripoli, one of the Diplomatic Security Agents described the move as ‘‘part of a power struggle between the government and brigades over security functions in Benghazi.’’ 466 Nevertheless, the Diplomatic Security Agent expressed concern about the 

Benghazi Mission’s ability to move throughout the city and easily 

gain access to the VIP areas of the airport.467 The issue remained 

unresolved at the time Stevens traveled to Benghazi, with the Diplomatic Security Agents using other U.S. government personnel on 

the ground in Benghazi to support Stevens’ off compound movements. 


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468Diplomatic Sec. Agent 13 Testimony at 51. 469Diplomatic Sec. Agent 8 Testimony at 15. 470 Id. at 15–16. 471See Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 19 to Agent 21 (June 7, 2012, 8:08 AM) (on file 

with the Committee, C05393670). 472See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 to Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau 

of Diplomatic Sec., Int’l Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0050094–95). 473See FN 83, Part I. 474 Benghazi Intelligence Review: Office of the Director of Nat’l Intel., Oct. 22, 2012. 

Local Guard Force 

In addition to the armed presence provided by February 17, 

Benghazi relied on an unarmed local guard force [LGF] to protect 

the compound. The local guards were stationed 24/7 around the perimeter of the compound as an ‘‘outer ring . . . to give a perception 

of security.’’ 468 ‘‘Local guards provide[d] access control essentially 

for visitors as well as us moving on and off the compound, and they 

also serve as the first line of defense in the event of an attack or 

some other sort of security incident would happened on the 

premise.’’ 469 In particular, 

they are checking badges, they are checking license plates, 

that sort of thing. They’ll often itemize—the vehicles to 

make sure there aren’t explosives in the vehicles. If something were to happen, for instance, a mob or bomb or some 

sort of scenario like that, they have the IDNS pendants, 

which sound our alarm, and then they also have radios so 

they are instructed to call out a certain thing, DS agents, 

to alert us what type of attack it is and where they are.470

The LGF consisted of 20–25 local guards who rotated in shifts of 

five to staff unarmed guard posts around the compound.471 A 

Guard Force commander oversaw the performance of the guard 

members who participated in drills and other security operations 

led by the Diplomatic Security Agents and those February 17 on 

compound. After the second attack on the compound in June 2012, 

the Benghazi Mission temporarily increased the number of local 

guards stationed around the compound at night to eight.472 On 

September 11, 2012, there were five local guard force members on 

duty.473

AN ‘INTELLIGENCE FAILURE’ 

Intelligence Community Reporting on 

Deteriorating Environment 

As security in Benghazi and Libya deteriorated throughout 2012, 

the intelligence community’s reporting on the burgeoning terrorist 

environment and the inability of Libyan leaders to curtail the terrorists activities increased in volume and became more alarming 

and specific in content. As the Office of the Director of National Intelligence told Congress, ‘‘[T]he IC [intelligence community] monitored extremist activities . . . and published more than 300 disseminated intelligence reports and finished analytic assessments— 

for a range of policy makers, the military, and operators—related 

to Western interests in the region between 1 February and 10 September [2012].’’ 474 Recipients of these intelligence reports included 


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475 Clinton Testimony at 49. 476Kennedy Testimony at 121. 477 Benghazi Intelligence Review: Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intel., Oct. 22, 2012. 478Libya: AQIM’s Persistent Efforts, J. Chiefs of Staff, J. Intel., Feb. 23, 2012. 

senior government officials such as the Secretary of State, who was 

briefed daily on the intelligence being collected and reported regarding Benghazi and Libya. The Secretary testified: 

Every morning when I arrived at the State Department, 

usually between 8:00 and 8:30, I had a personal one on one 

briefing from the representative of the Central Intelligence 

Agency, who shared with me the highest level of classified 

information that I was to be aware of on a daily basis. I 

then had a meeting with the top officials of the State Department every day that I was in town. That’s where a lot 

of information, including threats and attacks on our facilities, was shared. I also had a weekly meeting every Monday with all of the officials, the Assistant Secretaries and 

others, so that I could be brought up to date on any issue 

that they were concerned about. During the day, I received 

hundreds of pages of memos, many of them classified, 

some of them so top secret that they were brought to my 

office in a locked briefcase that I had to read and immediately return to the courier. And I was constantly at the 

White House in the Situation Room meeting with the National Security Advisor and others.475

Kennedy, who was responsible for the security of diplomatic facilities overseas, testified he also received daily intelligence briefings. 

A: I received a notebook every morning. 

Q: And that is a compilation of what? 

A: Compilation of intelligence material from throughout 

the intelligence community, as well as from the State Department’s own Bureau of Intelligence and Research. 

Q: As you sit here today, do you recall receiving anything 

that week that related to the attacks in Benghazi? 

A: I don’t recall anything specific, but I also am sure that 

there was something in one of the reports from one of the 

agencies about Libya.476

The reports and assessments issued by the intelligence community painted Libya as a country descending into chaos as 2012 wore 

on. As early as February 2012, ‘‘[T]he Community was noting disturbing trends regarding the ability of Islamic extremists to exploit 

the security situation in Libya.’’ 477

On February 23, 2012, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported: 

[Redacted text].478


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479 [Redacted text]. 480 [Redacted text]. 481 [Redacted text]. 482 Extremist Progress Toward a Safe Haven in Libya, Cent. Intel. Agency, Feb. 29, 2012. 483 Id. 484 Id. at 2. 485 [Redacted text]. 486 [Redacted text]. 487Terrorists Using Local Camps and Militias for Future Operations, Defense Intel. Agency, 

Mar. 21, 2012. 488 Id. 

The same day, the Central Intelligence Agency issued a report titled [redacted text] 479 [redacted text] 480 [redacted text].481

A week later, on February 29, 2012, the Central Intelligence 

Agency published an assessment titled ‘‘Extremist Progress Toward 

a Safe Haven in Libya.’’ The assessment noted ‘‘[t]he progress of 

two decentralized, al-Qa’ida—aligned groups in Libya and their 

ability to operate with relative ease throughout many areas of the 

country suggest Libya is emerging as a terrorist safe haven.’’ 482

The Central Intelligence Agency assessed: 

[T]he decimation of national-level security agencies—which 

during the Qadhafi regime made Libya a hostile environment for extremists—have allowed al-Qa’ida—associated 

extremists, including previously Pakistan-based al-Qa’ida 

members and al-Qa’ida members and al Qa’ida in the 

Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), to procure weapons 

and develop networks in line with the goals al Qa’ida senior leaders to establish a permanent presence in Libya.483

* * * 

AQIM’s ability to procure a stable supply of newer, more 

reliable Libyan arms will almost certainly enhance AQIM’s 

ability to counter regional security services and conduct 

high-profile attacks against local or Western interests.484

By mid-March 2012, the Central Intelligence Agency reported 

[redacted text] 485 [redacted text].486

On March 21, 2012 the Defense Intelligence Agency published a 

report titled [redacted text]. It stated: 

[Redacted text] that these trends and current security 

situation, if unchecked, will allow al-Qaida and affiliated 

groups to establish a safehaven within a year.487

The Defense Intelligence Agency further stated: 

[Redacted text] that militia groups with al-Qaida connections will increasingly adopt an anti-western ideology in 

the next few months [redacted text] that while theses 

terrorist-aligned militias remain decentralized and possess 

disparate goals, al-Qaida and AQIM will be unable to unite 

them and harness their potential in the next few 

months.488

Less than three weeks after the Defense Intelligence Agency’s report on the potential for attacks against Western targets, the State 

Department compound in Benghazi was attacked by an Improvised 

Explosive Device (IED). An IED was thrown over the compound’s 


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489Libya: Emerging Destination for Foreign Fighter Training, Cent. Intel. Agency, Apr. 12, 

2012. 490Terrorism, Libya: Terrorists Seeking Expanded Influence, Activity, Defense Intel. Agency, 

Apr. 12, 2012. 491J2 Intelligence and Knowledge Development, Libya: Al-Qaeda Intent to Target U.S. Aircraft 

in Libya, U.S. Africa Command, Apr. 19, 2012. 492 U.S. Dep’t of State, Cable, Tripoli-Request for DS TDY and FTE (Apr. 19, 2012). 493Libya: 17 February Brigade, U.S. Army Nat’l Ground Intel. Ctr., Apr. 25, 2012. 494 Id. 495Libya: Continued Militia Autonomy Jeopardizing Transition, Cent. Intel. Agency, Apr. 27, 

2012. 496 Id. 

perimeter wall. At the time, only one State Department Diplomatic 

Security Agent was at the Mission compound. 

Less than a week after the first attack on the State Department 

compound, the Central Intelligence Agency published an intelligence piece titled ‘‘Libya as an emerging destination for foreign 

fighter training.’’ 489 The same day, the Defense Intelligence Agency issued an intelligence piece reporting ‘‘al-Qaeda and al-Qaida in 

the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are expanding their contacts with political figures, terrorists, and militia groups in 

Libya.’’ 490

AFRICOM issued its own assessment a week later, reporting [redacted text] 491 That same day AFRICOM issued its assessment 

the U.S. was a target in Libya, the State Department denied 

Benghazi’s request to have five Diplomatic Security Agents deployed in order to better secure the Mission’s compound.492

The U.S. Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center issued an 

intelligence piece on the 17 February Brigade.493 At the time, 

members of February 17 were housed on the State Department’s 

compound in order to augment the State Department’s security 

personnel at the Mission compound, and a larger contingent of February 17 members resided near the State Department compound. 

In its assessment, the National Ground Intelligence Center reported: 

[Redacted text].494

Two days later, the CIA assessed ‘‘[K]ey militia blocs will most 

likely remain reluctant to give up their organizational autonomy 

because of fear of local rivals, distrust of the Transitional National 

Council, and competition for leadership of newly formed government institutions.’’ 495 The report further noted: ‘‘[T]he continued 

existence of dozens of autonomous militias could undermine Libya’s 

transition by engaging in violence, seizing national infrastructure, 

subverting election procedures or using coercion to influence the 

political process.’’ 496

As the deteriorating security environment accelerated in late 

spring 2012, AFRICOM reported on the security vacuum created by 

the Transitional National Council’s inability to reign in the competing militias. AFRICOM assessed ‘‘Al-Qaida and its affiliates will 

attempt to capitalize on the turmoil in Libya to garner recruits, 

mobilize popular Western support, and establish an operational 


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497J2 Network Analysis of Extremists Operating in Libya, U.S. Africa Command, May 16, 

2012. 498 Id. 499Libya: Weak Security Allowing Al-Qa’ida Associates To Become Entrenched, Office of Terrorism Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, May 22, 2012. 500Terrorism: AQ Bolstering Presence and Influence in Libya, Defense Intel. Agency, May 30, 

2012. 501 Brief Notes, Terrorism, Defense Intel. Agency, June 6, 2012. 502Libya: Attack on British Diplomatic Convoy Underscores Risks to Western Interests, Office 

of Terrorism Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, June 11, 2012. 503Polaschik Testimony at 84–85. 504Terrorism, Libya: Terrorists Now Targeting U.S. and Western Interests, Defense Intel. Report, June 12, 2012. 505 Id. 

presence in Libya to threaten U.S. and Western interests in the Region.’’ 497 AFRICOM further reported [redacted text].’’ 498

On May 22, 2012, the CIA reported ‘‘the eastern city of Darnha, 

a religiously conservative and historically marginalized areas that 

was a disproportionate source of Libyan freedom fighters during 

the Iraq war, is the center of extremist activity in Libya, in part 

[redacted text].’’ 499 Darnah was located approximately 180 miles 

from Benghazi. Also on May 22, 2012 the International Committee 

for the Red Cross (ICRC) was attacked in Benghazi by a rocket propelled grenade (RPG), the first of five attacks that would occur 

against the ICRC in and around Benghazi during the summer 

2012. 

On May 30, 2012, in an assessment titled ‘‘Terrorism: AQ Bolstering Presence and Influence in Libya,’’ the Defense Intelligence 

Agency stated [redacted text] 500

On June 6, 2012, less than a week after the Defense Intelligence 

Agency’s reported on al-Qaeda-associated groups planning to 

launch near term attacks, the State Department compound in 

Benghazi was attacked again by an IED for the second time in less 

than two months. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, 

[redacted text] 501

On June 11, 2012, the Central Intelligence Agency assessed the 

‘‘rocket propelled grenade (RPG) and small-arms attack in 

Benghazi . . . on the British Ambassador’s convoy—the third attack on a Western diplomatic target that week—highlights the vulnerability of Western interests posed by the permissive security environment in Libya.’’ 502 Some within the State Department felt the 

Benghazi Mission compound was the intended target.503

The increased number of attacks against Western targets in May 

and June 2012 led the Defense Intelligence Agency to ‘‘assess with 

high confidence growing ties between al-Qaida regional nodes and 

Libya-based terrorists will increase the terrorists’ capabilities. We 

expect if the current security vacuum persists, attacks against U.S. 

and Western interests in Libya (including operations in Tripoli) 

will increase in number and lethality.’’ 504 On June 12, 2012 a Defense Intelligence Agency assessment titled ‘‘Terrorism, Libya: Terrorists Now Targeting U.S. and Western Interests’’ stated: 

[Redacted text].505

A June 18, 2012 Defense Intelligence Agency report titled ‘‘Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More Attacks, Terrorist Safe Haven in 

Libya’’ assessed: 


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506Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More Attacks, Terrorist Safe Haven in Libya, Defense Intel. 

Agency, June 18, 2012. 507First Stage of Libya’s Transition: Key Drivers and Potential Outcomes, Directorate of Intel., 

Cent. Intel. Agency, June 18, 2012. 508 Id. 509Libya: Recurring Internal Violence Highlights Security Challenges Facing Successor Government, Office of Middle East and North Africa Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, June 26, 2012. 510 Id. 

[Redacted text].506

A June 18, 2012 CIA report issued the same day gave a broader 

assessment of the variables that would: 

most likely . . . affect the first stage of Libya’s transition 

and the runup to the planned July 2012 National Assembly election. . . . [T]hese variables can be summed into 

two drivers: the level of effectiveness of the interim government and militias’ cooperation with the interim government. Wildcards, including possible attacks by former Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi loyalists or al-Qa’ida-affiliated extremists could also impact events.507

The CIA assessment further provided ‘‘an attack on interim government officials or infrastructure by loyalists of former Libyan 

leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and his family or al-Qa’ida-associated 

extremists could undercut the transition’s progress depending on 

the scope. [Redacted text] on the near-term intentions and capabilities of these groups.’’ 508

On June 26, 2012 the Central Intelligence Agency reported: 

repeated clashes in the past few months underscores the 

interim government’s weak nationwide presence and crisis 

management capabilities, almost certainly tarnishing public perceptions of its authority and highlighting the many 

security challenges that will face Libya’s post-election government. . . . The government’s attempts to stop recurring internal violence often rely on the intervention of local 

actors whose efforts help stabilize the situation but leave 

the underlying causes unresolved. The Transitional National Council (TNC) has made little progress toward implementing national reconciliation measures aimed at addressing fissures stemming from last year’s conflict and 

Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi’s 42 years in 

power.509

The Central Intelligence Agency’s assessment further noted: 

[G]overnment still possesses few cohesive and professional 

Army and police units because many militias are reluctant 

to disarm, and its nascent security bodies lack the leadership and organizational capacity to rapidly integrate thousands of poorly disciplined fighters. Many militias that 

have received official sanction to act as security units almost certainly remain at best loosely controlled by national leaders.510

The Defense Intelligence Agency reported the same day: 


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511 Id. 512J–2 Intelligence and Knowledge Development, Theater Analysis Report, U.S. Africa Command, June 26, 2012. 513 Id. 514 J–2 Intelligence and Knowledge Development Theater Analysis Report, North Africa: 

Growing Threat from Al-Qaeda Affiliated Extremists to Western Interests, U.S. Africa Command, July 3, 2012. 515 Id. 516 Id. 

if the current security vacuum persists, attacks against US 

and Western interests in Libya will increase in number 

and lethality. While specific targets of future terrorist attacks are unknown, the DoD presence at US diplomatic facilities and DoD Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets operating in Libyan airspace may be considered as potential targets. According to AFRICOM’s 

JPERSTAT, as of 21 June 12, . . . [t]he Terrorism Threat 

Level in Libya is SIGNIFICANT.511

In addition to both the Central Intelligence Agency’s and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s assessment, AFRICOM issued its own 

assessment of the security environment in Libya, reporting: 

[Redacted text].512

AFRICOM further assessed: 

[Redacted text]. 

* * * 

[Redacted text].513

By July 3, 2012, AFRICOM had assessed: 

[Redacted text].514

AFRICOM further pointed to Libya as a [redacted text] 515

In addition to the threats associated with the formal alQaida affiliates, there is a growing threat to Libya-based 

Western interests from individuals inspired by al-Qaida’s 

ideology with limited or no direction from the organization 

itself. These individuals or cells are the most likely to conduct attacks, however they are more likely to be unsophisticated or disrupted by local authorities.516

AFRICOM emphasized: 

[N]o single group likely conducted the series of anti-Western attacks in Libya since 22 May 2012. On 12 June 2012, 

individuals attacked the International Committee of the 

Red Cross (ICRC) office in Misrata, wounding the landowner’s son and seriously damaging the building. On 11 

June 2012, rocket propelled grenades (RPG) fired from an 

elevated position attack a three-vehicle convoy carrying 

the British Ambassador to Libya. Two passengers in the 

lead vehicle were injured. On 6 June, a crude improvised 

explosive device (IED) detonated adjacent to the main gate 

of the U.S. Mission Benghazi compound, causing no casualties and minor damage to the compound’s wall. The 


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517 Id. 518Libya: Al-Qa’ida Establishing Sanctuary, Cent. Intel. Agency, July 6, 2012. 519 Id. 520 [Redacted text] Defense Intel. Agency, July 19, 2012. 521 Adam Goldman, Former Guantanamo detainee implicated in Benghazi attack, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2014. 522 Id. 523 Id. 524J2—Intelligence and Knowledge Development, Theater In-Brief, U.S. Africa Command, July 

25, 2012. 525J2—Intelligence and Knowledge Development, Theater In-Brief, U.S. Africa Command, Aug. 

1, 2012. 

‘Brigades of Captive Umar Abd-al-Rahman’ claimed responsibility for a 22 May rocket-propelled grenade attack 

on the Benghazi office of the ICRC and the 6 June attack 

on the U.S. Mission Benghazi.517

On July 6, 2012, the Central Intelligence Agency issued its own 

assessment that al-Qaeda was establishing a sanctuary in Libya. 

In particular, the report assessed ‘‘Eastern Libya, particularly the 

city of Darnah, provides extremists with the space to plot and train 

operatives.’’ 518

The report further pointed out [redacted text] 519

The Defense Intelligence Agency was reporting: 

[Redacted text] conflict zones or instability provide 

venues for reengagement [redacted text].520

In fact, Abu Sufian bin Qumu, a former Guantanamo Bay 

detainee who was released back to Libya in 2007, became 

the ‘‘leader of the Ansar Al-Sharia in the city of 

Darnah.’’ 521 According to the same report, ‘‘Qumu trained 

in 1993 at one of Osama bin Laden’s terrorist camps in Afghanistan and later worked for a bin Laden company in 

Sudan, where the al-Qaeda leader lived for three 

years.’’ 522

It was widely reported ‘‘[M]ilitiamen under the command 

of Abu Sufian bin Qumu . . . participated in the attack 

that killed U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and 

three other Americans.’’ 523

On July 25, 2012, AFRICOM reported on the spate of attacks on 

Westerners in eastern Libya. AFRICOM assessed [redacted 

text].’’ 524

On August 1, 2012, AFRICOM assessed, ‘‘Benghazi’s level of violence has escalated following the 7 July 2012 elections; extremists 

with unknown affiliations are likely targeting foreign and government interests following Islamist groups’ poor showing in the elections. Degraded security, which follows recent efforts to establish 

a regular police force in Benghazi, is also likely a factor.’’ 525

The same day, the Central Intelligence Agency issued its assessment of an attack on the Libyan military intelligence agency 

headquartered in Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency reported: 

[T]he attack yesterday against the Libyan military intelligence headquarters in Benghazi underscores how unidentified assailants are exploiting the permissive security enVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00353 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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526Libya: Recent Attacks Highlight Persistent Threats in Eastern Libya, Office of Terrorism 

Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, Aug. 1, 2012. 527 Id. 528J2-Intelligence and Knowledge Development, Theater In-Brief, U.S. Africa Command, Aug. 

15, 2012. 529Libya: Terrorists to Increase Strength During Next Six Months, Defense Intel. Agency, 

Aug.19, 2012. 530 Id. 531Libya: Proliferation of Training Camps Aiding Extremist Networks, Office of Terrorism 

Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, Aug. 23, 2012. 532 Id. 533Terrorism: AQIM Growing Diverse Network in Libya, Office of Terrorism Analysis, Cent. 

Intel. Agency, Aug. 27, 2012. 

vironment to conduct surveillance and attacks. . . . We do 

not know who was responsible for the strike, and most of 

the recent attacks do not appear to be linked.526

The assessment restated: 

[Redacted text].527

On August 15, 2012, AFRICOM reported the ‘‘threat from extremist groups in Libya remains significant to Western interests.’’ 528

On August 19, 2012 the Defense Intelligence Agency reported 

[redacted text].’’ 529 The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed: 

[Redacted text].530

On August 23, 2012, the Central Intelligence Agency published 

an assessment finding ‘‘Al-Qa’ida-affiliated groups and Libyan militias with extremist ties increasingly are exploiting the permissive 

security environment in Libya—particularly in the east—to establish training camps, providing these groups with controlled areas 

in which to improve their operational capabilities.’’ 531 The Central 

Intelligence Agency’s assessment noted again ‘‘the proliferation of 

training camps in eastern Libya is likely to continue unabated absent significant improvements in the technical capabilities, source 

networks, and infrastructure [redacted text].’’ 532

On August 27, 2012 the Central Intelligence Agency was reporting: 

Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is 

weaving itself into a variety of Libyan extremist circles almost certainly to encourage neighboring extremists to 

work in concert toward shared goals and increase its influence there. We assess [redacted text], that AQIM seeks 

a durable presence in Libya because it views itself as the 

natural jihadist leader for North Africa [redacted 

text].533

On August 29, 2012, the Central Intelligence Agency painted 

Libya as a country in chaos, reporting: 

[A]ttacks by disparate individuals and groups since April 

against foreign and government targets in Libya underscore Tripoli’s inability to prevent and respond to assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings. This violence highVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00354 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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534Libya: Struggling to Create Effective Domestic Security Systems, Office of Middle East and 

North Africa Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, Aug. 29, 2012. 535J2-Intelligence and Knowledge Development, Libya: Extremism in Libya, Past, Present, and 

Future, U.S. Africa Command, Sept. 5, 2012. 536 Id. 537 Id. 538 Id. 539 Clinton Testimony at 41–42. 540Kennedy Testimony at 169–170. 

lights the magnitude of reform challenges facing the new 

government. [redacted text].534

On September 5, 2012, AFRICOM reported ‘‘Libya-based extremists continue to fuel regional terror groups’ operations outside the 

country through training, recruitment, and facilitation. Libya-based 

extremists, most notably al-Qa’ida and its adherents, will continue 

efforts to establish themselves in Libya, taking advantage of the 

chaotic security environment. Unimpeded these groups may become 

capable of planning and launching terrorist attacks abroad.’’ 535

AFRICOM further highlighted a [redacted text] 536 ‘‘The report 

stated the best case scenario in Libya was a ’Divided al-Qaida Organization.’ ′′ 537 ‘‘AFRICOM assessed ’this scenario is likely only if 

the Western-backed Libyan government is able to effectively disarm extremist militias and exercise control over the majority of 

Libyan territory.’ ′′538

The intelligence community’s assessment depicted Libya, eastern 

Libya, and Benghazi as emerging terrorists’ strongholds posing a 

threat to Western interests. Even with two IED attacks on the 

State Department’s compound, senior government officials believed 

more intelligence was needed before any step could be taken to 

strengthen security at the United States facilities in Benghazi. 

The Secretary told the Committee although she was fully briefed 

and aware of the dangers in Libya ‘‘there was no actionable intelligence on September 11 or even before that date about any kind 

of planned attack on our compound in Benghazi.’’ 539

Kennedy told the Committee ‘‘with additional information, we 

would have known—we would have known more, we would have 

executed a different security program, because the risks would 

have been pegged at a higher level.’’ 540

It is not clear what additional intelligence would have satisfied 

either Kennedy or the Secretary in understanding the Benghazi 

Mission compound was at risk—short of an attack. The intelligence 

on which Kennedy and the Secretary were briefed daily was clear 

and pointed—Al Qa’ida, al Qa’ida like groups, and other regional 

extremists took refuge in the security vacuum created by the Libya 

government and its inability to take command of the security situation. 

It is these same groups that were responsible for the spate of attacks against Western interests throughout the spring and summer 

of 2012. Yet, the risks to the State Department compound in 

Benghazi were never mitigated. They were only exacerbated by the 

fact senior officials within the State Department failed to prepare 

for a worst case scenario in Benghazi. The Benghazi Mission compound not only lacked the resources to ensure the facility physically was secure but failed to ensure enough security personnel 

were on the ground to carry out the security program. 


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541Testimony of Leon E. Panetta, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Tr. at 111 (Jan. 8, 2016) 

[hereinafter Panetta Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 542Morell Testimony at 82–83; Morell Testimony at 211–212; Morell Testimony at 277. 543 Although Tom Donilon set up a post-Qadhafi task force to handle issues relating to postconflict strategy, the group became entrenched with managing the intervention and unable to 

devote time to extensive stabilization planning. It did produce plans in conjunction with a Libyan reconstruction team, but it was unclear to what extent the plans were used. See CHRIS- TOPHER S.CHIVVIS, TOPPLING QADDAFI at: LIBYA AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL INTERVENTION

143–44. (2014) [hereinafter CHIVVIS, TOPPLING QADDAFI]. 544 Id. at 60; see also Aaron David Miller, Obama’s 21st Century War, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 

5, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/05/obamas_21st_century_war. 545Press Release, NATO, NATO Sec’y Gen. Statement on the End of Libya Mission (Oct. 28, 

2011), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_80052.htm. 546 CHIVVIS, TOPPLING QADDAFI, supra note 522, at 164–68. 547Lucy Madison, Obama Congratulates Libya on Liberation, CBS NEWS (Oct. 23, 2011), 

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-congratulates-libya-on-liberation. Despite the fact that the 

Administration justified the intervention under the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, advocates for this approach such as Samantha Power, Secretary Clinton, and Susan Rice failed to 

act on rhetoric from those who helped write the U.N.’s 2001 Responsibility to Protect Report. 

Authors of the report emphasized that the doctrine embraced the ‘‘responsibility to rebuild.’’ See 

Jayshree Bajoria & Robert McMahon, The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention, 

BACKGROUNDER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 12, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/humanitarian-intervention/dilemmahumanitarian-intervention/p16524. 

The volume of intelligence regarding extremist activities in eastern Libya in the spring and summer of 2012, in addition to the 

spate of attacks by these groups against Western interests in 

Benghazi, was substantial. This intelligence was provided regularly—if not daily—to Kennedy, the Secretary, and others who 

made decisions with respect to Libya policy and the security of the 

Benghazi Mission compound and should have manifested substantial risk that could readily have been inferred. 

Although this intelligence was available, the analysis was not directed to potential direct threats to U.S. personnel in Libya or 

Benghazi or the potential consequences of having that many extremists in Libya with respect to U.S. interests. 

PRE-ATTACK WARNING 

In his interview with the Committee, Panetta bluntly stated his 

view ‘‘an intelligence failure’’ occurred with respect to Benghazi.541

Former CIA Deputy Director Michael J. Morell also acknowledged 

multiple times an intelligence failure did in fact occur in this respect prior to the Benghazi attacks.542 This was not necessarily the 

result of one or two specific instances of inaction, but instead reflected a general lack of planning for a post-Qaddafi environment 

that began with the U.S. intervention in Libya. 

After the fall of Qadhafi, both the NATO Secretary General and 

the President explained that democracy-building efforts would be 

up to the Libyans 543—justified by language in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, prohibiting the presence of an ‘‘occupying force’’ in Libya.544 NATO declared it was concluding the 

operation ‘‘in a considered and controlled manner,’’ yet acknowledged ‘‘they [Libyans] still have a lot of work to do—to build a new 

Libya, based on reconciliation, human rights, and the rule of 

law.’’ 545 NATO demonstrated a hands-off approach to post-conflict 

stabilization, leaving Libyans to sort out post-conflict stabilization.546 At the same time, the President praised the alliance on its 

successes in Libya, but stated the TNC, the nominally sovereign 

governing authority of the new Libya, would manage Libya’s postconflict governance and democracy-building effort.547


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548See, e.g., CHIVVIS, TOPPLING QADDAFI, supra note 522, at 183; William Maclean, If Libyan 

Rebels Win, Can They Rule?, REUTERS, (Aug. 21, 2011, available at), http://in.reuters.com/article/ 

2011/08/21/idINIndia-58891320110821 (last visited Feb. 18, 2016); Jason Pack & Haley Cook, 

Beyond Tripoli’s Grasp, MAJALLA, (Oct. 3, 2013, available at), http://www.majalla.com/eng/2013/ 

10/article55245761 (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 549 CHIVVIS, TOPPLING QADDAFI, supra note 522, at 94–95, 183. After the conflict, the State 

Department was more concerned with Security Council politics in the debate on how to respond 

to the war than transferring frozen Qaddafi regime funds to the TNC for post-conflict stabilization. See id. at 164. 550 Id.; e.g., Armed Groups in Libya: Typology & Roles, SMALL ARMS SURVEY, RESEARCH NOTES

(June 2012), available at 

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/ 

SAS-Research-Note-18.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 551 Biggest Success? NATO Proud of Libya Op Which Killed Thousands, RT (Oct. 28, 2011), 

http://rt.com/news/nato-libya-operation-success-999/(last visited Feb. 18, 2016) [hereinafter 

NATO Proud of Libya Op]; Max Boot, Libya’s problems are far from over, L.A. Times (Aug. 24, 

2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/24/opinion/la-oe-boot-libya-20110824. 552 Jayshree Bajoria, The Perils of Libyan Nation Building, WORLD POST, (Apr. 7, 2011), http:// 

www.huffingtonpost.com/jayshree-bajoria/the-perils-of-libyan-nati_b_846080.html. 553 NATO Proud of Libya Op, supra note 529. 554Mike Krever, West Should Have Put Boots on the Ground in Libya, Says Former Prime 

Minister, CNN (Mar. 25, 2014), http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/03/25/west-should-have-putboots-on-the-ground-in-libya-says-former-prime-minister. See also Raphael Cohen & Gabriel 

Scheinmann, Lessons from Libya: America Can’t Lead From Behind, TIME (Feb. 15, 2014), http:// 

ideas.time.com/2014/02/15/lessons-from-libya-america-cant-lead-from-behind/; Stanley Kurtz, Assessing Libya, NAT’L REVIEW ONLINE (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/ 

275181/assessing-libya-stanley-kurtz. 555Fred Burton & Samuel Katz, 40 Minutes in Benghazi, VANITY FAIR, (Aug. 2013), http:// 

www.vanityfair.com/politics/2013/08/Benghazi-book-fred-burton-samuel-m-katz. 556 CHIVVIS, TOPPLING QADDAFI, supra note 522, at 143–46. 557Pamela Engel, How one major failure allowed ISIS to exploit the chaos in its newest 

hotspot, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-libya-rise-2016-1. 558The U.S. House Select Committee on Benghazi, Hearing 4—Part 1: Testimony from Former 

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—10/22/2015 (EventID=104082), YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2015), 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABFWjZxCAAg; The U.S. House Select Committee on 

Benghazi, Hearing 4—Part 2: Testimony from Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton— 

10/22/2015 (EventID=104082), YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.youtube.com/ 

watch?v=0hvl1LpZp3Q [collectively hereinafter Benghazi Hearing 4]. 

The TNC proved unable to exercise meaningful control over the 

country.548 After the conflict, Libya faced a growing number of 

kata’ibas—armed rebel groups not connected with rebels in 

Benghazi.549 The rise of these groups distorted efforts to govern 

from Benghazi, and led to factions within the nation’s leadership 

as a whole.550 With tens of thousands of Libyans dead and hundreds of thousands displaced,551 the country needed new a constitution, civil, social, and political institutions, economic management, and management of its oil wealth.552 As NATO and its partners left Libya, some questioned whether the destruction in Libya 

would translate into compromising regional security.553

The Obama Administration opted to forego the use of military 

forces to stabilize a post-civil war Libya—an approach described by 

former Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan as exercising ‘‘bad judgment.’’ 554 The State Department exercised its own version of a 

light footprint, ‘‘expeditionary diplomacy,’’ in an attempt to quickly 

normalize its presence in a country with institutions devastated by 

more than 40 years of dictatorship, regional strife, and war.555 The 

administration also chose to forego post-war planning.556

In the aftermath of a multilateral intervention, Libya has erupted into chaos, with both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and 

the Levant using Libya as a safehaven.557 While the Secretary of 

State testified, without specifics, there were a ‘‘number of documents’’ prepared regarding planning for a post-Qadhafi Libya,558

Morell said otherwise: 


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559Michael Hirsh, ‘Here’s What I Really Worry About,’ POLITICO (May 11, 2015), http:// 

www.pollitico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/Michael-Morell-interview-cia-impending-terror-attack117821#ixzz4BHB4izvu. 560 Anne Marie Slaughter, War with Iran is the only alternative to a deal, USA TODAY (Aug. 

20, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/08/20/bombing-iran-only-alternative-dealcolumn/31940869/(emphasis added). 561Morell Testimony at 82. 562 Id. 563 Id. at 83. 564 Clinton Testimony at 177. 565See Request for SST Extension from U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Libya, to Sec’y of State, U.S. 

Dep’t of State (Feb. 12, 2012, 11:58 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0049743–48). 566Morell Testimony at 277. 567 Id. 

One of the problems was not going into it with a very detailed plan for how you were going to maintain stability 

. . . We never really had a conversation around the table 

about ‘what’s going to happen, how’s it going to look?’ The 

intelligence community never wrote that paper . . . That 

conversation was not as rich and rigorous as it should 

have been.559

That view is supported by Anne Marie Slaughter, former Director of Policy Planning, State Department, when she wrote: 

It is so much easier to pound our chests and declare that 

the United States bestrides the world like a colossus and 

should be able to dictate any outcome it wants. That is no 

longer true, if it ever were. We found that out the hard 

way by . . . toppling a government in Libya without any 

idea of what might come next.560

Morell told the Committee Libya was unique among countries involved in the Arab Spring because it was the only place where the 

United States made a choice to push the Arab Spring forward.561

As a result, according to Morell, the intelligence community should 

have furnished the President a plan projecting likely conditions in 

Libya after the fall of Qadhafi.562

Morell attributes the failure to provide predictive intelligence to 

multiple parties across the spectrum: the intelligence analysts, the 

leadership of the intelligence community, and even the decisionmakers—including the President and the Secretary of State—for 

not asking those questions and fostering a conversation about what 

would need to be done to maintain stability in a post-Qadhafi 

Libya.563 The Secretary pushed back on this point when she testified: ‘‘[W]e can do all the planning we want in Washington, but it’s 

very important to ask the Libyans both what they want and what 

they expect from us, and so we had an ongoing dialogue that lasted 

over many months.’’ 564 Her testimony, however, referred to the 

events after Qadhafi fell, (for example, Nides visited Libya in January 2012, nearly a year after the initial U.S. intervention) and not 

prior to the U.S. intervention.565

In describing this intelligence failure, Morell described to the 

Committee an additional ‘‘intelligence analytic issue.’’ 566 He noted 

that in authoritarian societies, such as Qadhafi-era Libya, the personality of the leader is ‘‘everything,’’ personal relationships with 

individuals in the rest of the government are ‘‘everything,’’ and institutions in that government are all personality-based.567 The inVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00358 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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568 Id. 569 Id. 570 Here’s What I really Worry About, supra note [559] (emphasis added). 571 Counterterrorism Efforts, C-SPAN (May 18, 2015), http://www.c-span.org/video/?326104-1/ 

former-cia-deputy-director-michael-morell-counterterrorism-efforts&start=1060. 572See Panetta Testimony at 119–20. 573 Id. at 71–72. 

stitutions themselves are empty without the leadership, and when 

the leader goes away, the institutions simply break down.568 Morell 

contended the Intelligence Community did not fully appreciate 

these factors in the case of Libya.569 Instead, as he noted, the U.S. 

instead viewed itself as a ‘‘beacon of democracy’’ without understanding what was next: 

It’s ingrained in us, this desire to spread democracy to the 

rest of the world. I think people’s weaknesses flow from 

their strengths, in organizations and countries. One of our 

strengths is seeing ourselves as a beacon for democracy. It 

becomes a weakness when we try to impose it on societies 

that aren’t ready for it. I think of Iraq, Gaza, Afghanistan 

and Libya. I think it’s probably both a failure of intelligence and a failure of policy, in two different administrations.570

While the CIA took this dangerous security environment seriously—they sent out a physical security specialist to review its 

compound in Benghazi and apply immediate upgrades—this analysis all occurred too late to enact meaningful change inside Libya 

and prevent this threat from emerging and eventually establishing 

a stranglehold on the country. No predictive analysis occurred 

within the intelligence community on the front end of the U.S. 

intervention regarding what might occur if Qadhafi were to lose 

power. No assessment was made that a power void may be exploited by al Qa’ida and other extremist organizations, and it was 

this front-end intelligence failure that contributed to the Benghazi 

attacks. 

An additional critical question is why the United States did not 

have a specific, tactical warning about the attack. Morell addressed 

this issue when he spoke of what he calls ‘‘battlefield intelligence’’: 

. . . so that you’re picking up everything, from a signals 

perspective and from a humint [human intelligence] perspective. I think the only way to have avoided Benghazi is 

to have that kind of intelligence footprint over the top of 

them . . . the real lesson about Benghazi is how do we 

protect American diplomats, how do we protect American 

intelligence officers, how do we protect American servicemen and women overseas moving forward, in what is a 

very, very dangerous world.571

Secretary Leon Panetta, himself a former Director of the CIA, 

also testified about the failure in Benghazi to have the kind of intelligence that would have tipped off U.S. personnel about a specific attack.572 Panetta labeled this the ‘‘most important missing 

element’’ regarding Benghazi,573 and said it should be the first lesson learned about the attacks—improving the intelligence to make 


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574 Id. at 119–20. 575Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Readout 

of the President’s Meeting with Senior Administration Officials on Our Preparedness and 

Security Posture on the Eleventh Anniversary of September 11th (Sept. 10, 2012), https:// 

www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/10/readout-president-s-meeting-senioradministration-officials-our-prepared. 576 Id. 577Panetta Testimony at 10. 578 Id. at 10–11. 579Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 93. 580 Email from Assistant Regional Sec. Officer (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:00 pm) (on file with the Committee, C05271656). 581The posting by Sean Smith read, ‘‘Assuming we don’t die tonight. We saw one of our ‘police’ 

that guard the compound taking pictures.’’ See, e.g., Lindsay Wise, Libya attack victim: ‘assuming we don’t die tonight . . . ,’ SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 13, 2012. 

sure our personnel are aware there is going to be an imminent attack.574

This issue is discussed further in the classified annex to the report, as well as addressing the question of why U.S. government 

officials did not have what proved to be sufficient, specific, tactical 

warning about the Benghazi attacks. 

The day before the Benghazi attacks, the President convened a 

phone call with senior administration officials concerning America’s 

preparedness and security posture on the anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks.575 A readout of the meeting notes the 

‘‘[p]rincipals discussed specific measures we are taking in the 

Homeland to prevent 9/11 related attacks as well as steps taken to 

protect U.S. persons and facilities abroad, as well as force protection.’’ 576 Panetta testified there was concern on the call about the 

anti-Muslim video that was coming out, and there was a specific 

discussion regarding Tripoli, among other cities in the region.577

Given the lack of any pre-attack force movement toward North Africa and the Middle East in the wake of the call—especially given 

the concerns about the video and the forewarning regarding protests in Cairo 578—there appeared to be no indications an attack in 

Benghazi, or anywhere else in the region, was anticipated. 

Nevertheless, on the morning of September 11, one of the local 

guards at the TMF witnessed a man, believed to be a police officer, 

in the second story of a building across the street looking into the 

State Department facility and taking photographs.579 Stevens was 

briefed about the incident,580 and Sean Smith referenced the incident just hours before the attacks began on an online gaming 

site.581


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PART IV: 

Compliance with Congressional 

Investigations 

‘‘But now that I am the secretary and I am responsible to you and 

the Congress, I can promise you that if you’re not getting something 

that you have evidence of or you think you ought to be getting, we’ll 

work with you. And I will appoint somebody to work directly with 

you starting tomorrow . . . To have a review of anything you don’t 

think you [have] gotten that you’re supposed to get. Let’s get this 

done with, folks.’’ 

Secretary of State John F. Kerry (April 2013—one 

year before the creation of the Select Committee on 

complying with congressional questions about the 

Benghazi attacks.) 

‘‘This is the most transparent administration in history.’’ 

President Barack Obama (February 2013) 

‘‘Four Americans lost their lives in Benghazi, and this White House 

has gone to extraordinary lengths to mislead, obstruct, and obscure 

what actually took place.’’ 

Speaker John A. Boehner (May 2014—after the White 

House failed to produce Benjamin J. Rhodes’ memo 

to Congress.) 

‘‘I want the public to see my email.’’ 

Secretary Hillary R. Clinton (March 2015—after 

published reports her emails and other public records 

were returned to the State Department 18 months 

after she left office.) 


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1McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927). 

2Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). 

3McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175. 4http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/02/09/obama-administration-least-transparentepa-state-doj-clinton-benghazi-column/80050428. 

COMPLIANCE WITH CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 

Introduction 

Congress’s authority to oversee and investigate the Executive 

Branch is a necessary component of legislative powers and to maintain the constitutional balance of powers between the branches. As 

the Supreme Court held in 1927: ‘‘[T]he power of inquiry—with 

process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to 

the legislative function.’’ 1 Similarly, the Supreme Court held: ‘‘The 

power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the 

legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries 

concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed 

or possibly needed statutes.’’ 2

When needed information cannot easily be obtained—or if government agencies resist—Congress has legitimate cause to compel 

responses: 

A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in 

the absence of information respecting the conditions which 

the legislation is intended to affect or change, and where 

the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information—which not infrequently is true—recourse must 

be had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught 

that mere requests for such information often are 

unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered 

is not always accurate or complete, so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.3

These principles of congressional oversight have been severely 

tested during the Committee’s investigation. The administration’s 

frequently stated pledge to comply with ‘‘all legitimate oversight requests’’ is often a hollow prelude followed by delay or refusal to respond to legitimate inquiries. Other congressional committees have 

reported similar delay and obstruction.4 The administration’s resistance to this Committee has been especially troubling. The families of the four Americans murdered in Benghazi and the American 

public deserve to hear the whole truth in a timely fashion. The 

same government that asked J. Christopher Stevens, Sean P. 

Smith, Glen A. Doherty and Tyrone S. Woods to serve selflessly 

and sacrificially delayed and obstructed an investigation into what 

happened in Benghazi before, during, and after their deaths. 

The discussion below details the Select Committee’s two-year 

battle to obtain documents and access to witnesses necessary to understand what happened in Benghazi. The administration’s intentional failure to cooperate with this and other congressional investigations warrants changes in congressional rules and amendments 

to law in order to ensure the Executive Branch cooperates with 

congressional investigations and the American people know what 

their government does on their behalf and with their money. 


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5 Eli Lake, Clinton Can Thank Obama for Her Benghazi Headache, Bloomberg (Oct. 6, 2015), 

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-10-06/clinton-can-thank-obama-for-her-benghaziheadache. 6See H. Res. 567, 113th Cong., § 3(a)(6) and (7) (2014). 

7See id. § 5(a) (‘‘Any committee of the House of Representatives having custody of records in 

any form relating to the matters described in section 3 shall transfer such records to the Select 

Committee within 14 days of the adoption of this resolution. Such records shall become the 

records of the Select Committee.’’). 

The House of Representatives established the Committee in large 

part because of this administration’s delay and obstruction of prior 

congressional investigations.5 The House specifically directed the 

Committee to examine ‘‘executive branch activities and efforts to 

comply with Congressional inquiries’’ into the Benghazi terrorist 

attacks and to recommend ways to improve Executive Branch compliance with congressional oversight.6 The detailed nature of this 

section is intended to reflect the breadth of the Committee’s investigation and the lengths to which the administration went to delay 

and obstruct the investigation. It also provides a factual record so 

readers can judge for themselves the responsiveness of Executive 

Branch agencies and how this lack of responsiveness not only 

thwarted efforts to find facts but also contributed to the time it 

took to acquire those facts ultimately uncovered. 

Building the Committee’s Record 

The discovery and production of all relevant, material documents—and other tangible evidentiary items—is an essential foundation for substantive hearings, public and private, as well as constructive witness interviews. Examining witnesses without knowledge of and access to all relevant information is unproductive, time 

consuming, and inefficient. The logical chronology of serious investigations is to gather physical evidence and documents prior to 

questioning witnesses. Not only do the documents serve as a source 

and foundation for the subsequent interview, they also provide witnesses with the information needed to refresh recollections or put 

testimony in perspective. Serious investigators understand the logical chronology of access and interview. Regrettably, so too do those 

seeking to undermine investigations. 

REVIEW OF EXISTING DOCUMENTS

When established in May 2014, the Committee—consistent with 

the directive in H. Res. 567—sought to obtain all relevant documents from the five House committees previously investigating the 

terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi.7

While previous committees of Congress did investigate certain 

aspects of Benghazi, no committee investigated all aspects of 

Benghazi. The House Armed Services Committee focused on Defense Department matters and relied almost exclusively on briefings and public hearings. The Armed Services Committee did not 

investigate State Department issues, intelligence community issues 

or White House involvement in the drafting and editing of the public responses after the attacks. The House Permanent Intelligence 

Committee focused on intelligence issues and did not investigate 

Defense or State Department issues. Additionally, the Intelligence 

Committee interviewed some witnesses in groups, which is generally disfavored as an investigatory tool. 


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8 Chairman Trey Gowdy, Interim Progress Update, H. SELECT COMM. ON BENGHAZI 3 (May 8, 

2015), http://benghazi.house.gov/sites/republicans.benghazi.house.gov/files/Interim%20Progress 

%20Update%2005-08-15.pdf. [hereinafter Interim Progress Update]. 9 Id. 

10 Id. 11See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Julia E. Frifield, 

Assistant Sec’y of State for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, (Sept. 30, 2014) (on file with the 

Committee). 12Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of State for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Nov. 24, 2014) (on file with the Committee); Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of State for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Dec. 9, 2014) (on file with the 

Committee). 

The Accountability Review Board [ARB] was a State Department 

investigative entity which did not have jurisdiction over the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], or the 

White House. In addition, there is no transcript from any interview 

conducted by the ARB, making it impossible to know which questions were asked, of whom, and what the precise responses were. 

The absence of transcripts requires the reader to simply take the 

word of those drafting the report. 

The failure to honor congressional requests for information and 

the silo effect of committees being confined to certain jurisdictional 

lanes is what prompted John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House, 

and ultimately the House of Representatives, to form a select committee with broad investigatory authority across all jurisdictions 

and across all facets of what happened in Benghazi before, during 

and after the deadly attacks. 

The Select Committee’s broader jurisdiction is reflected in the 

fact this Committee interviewed 107 witnesses, 81 of whom had not 

been questioned previously by any committee of Congress. These 

witnesses came from all parts of government, including the White 

House, the CIA and Defense and State Departments. It is reflected 

in the more than 75,000 pages of new documents to which no other 

committee of Congress had access. In addition, the Committee’s investigation discovered emails not previously uncovered from senior 

government officials including the emails of Stevens and of Hillary 

R. Clinton, the Secretary of State, and her senior staff. 

When the Committee came into existence in May 2014, it 

accessed approximately 50,000 pages of reports, interview transcripts, depositions, hearing transcripts, memoranda, classified and 

unclassified documents, and other information not cited or used by 

the standing committees in their investigations.8 The Committee 

reviewed and evaluated the documents page by page.9 This review 

took place from July 2014 to October 2014. 

Among these materials—many of which were duplicates—were 

25,000 pages so heavily redacted as to be useless to investigators.10

This prompted the Committee to ask the State Department to reproduce the material in less-redacted form.11 The resulting document productions were delivered in two installments—November 

24, 2014, and December 9, 2014.12

INITIAL DOCUMENT REQUESTS TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES 

The Committee also sought information through the pending document requests of previous committees. The State Department had 

yet to comply with two outstanding congressional subpoenas issued 


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13Subpoena issued by H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform to John F. Kerry, Sec’y of 

State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinafter OGR Document subpoena] (seeking approximately 25,000 pages of documents referenced in Assistant Sec’y Thomas Gibbons’ March 

29, 2013 letter). 14Subpoena issued by H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform to John F. Kerry, Sec’y of 

State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinafter OGR ARB Subpoena] (seeking documents 

related to State Dep’t’s ARB findings regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the attacks in Benghazi). 15 Interim Progress Update, supra note 8, at 4. 16 Id. 17Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of State for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Aug. 11, 2014) (on file with the Committee). 18Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, Sec’y 

of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, (Nov. 18, 2014) (on file with Committee). 19See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, 

Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 4, 2014) (on file with the Committee) (The first of two 

similarly cited letters requesting interviews of four agents serving in Benghazi the night of the 

attacks); see also Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John 

F. Kerry, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 4, 2014) (on file with the Committee) (The 

second of two similarly cited letters requesting interviews of eighteen agents and principal officers who served in Benghazi). 

in 2013—one subpoena dealt specifically with ARB documents.13

The other subpoena dealt with documents previously reviewed by 

congressional investigators but possession of the documents remained with the State Department limiting full and useful access 

to the information.14 These subpoenas were and remained legally 

binding on the State Department and did not need to be reissued 

at that time.15 Since those existing subpoenas remained valid, the 

Committee gave them priority.16 The State Department produced 

15,000 pages of new documents to the Committee on August 11, 

2014.17

A review of these 15,000 pages of emails and documents, coupled 

with the 25,000 pages of less-redacted text, revealed significant 

gaps in the information needed to determine what happened in 

Libya before, during and after the attacks that led to the murder 

of four Americans. For instance, this production contained few 

emails between and among the State Department’s senior staff. 

The email traffic did not reflect roles played in the decision-making 

process as it related to the U.S.’s intervention into Libya in 2011, 

the Special Mission to Benghazi in April 2011, the extension of the 

Benghazi Mission into 2012, the night and early morning hours of 

September 11–12, 2012, and the post-attack period. Moreover, 

there were significant gaps in information that could be filled only 

by interviewing eyewitnesses and other individuals on the ground 

in Benghazi as well as witnesses who were in Washington DC in 

the days and months leading up to the attacks on September 11– 

12, 2012. 

On November 18, 2014, the Committee sought specific documents 

and communications relating to Benghazi and Libya for 11 top 

State Department officials, including the Secretary and her senior 

staff.18 The Committee also requested to interview more than 20 

State Department witnesses, all of whom spent time on the ground 

in Benghazi, including four diplomatic security agents who survived the September 11–12 attacks.19

The Committee sent information requests in the fall of 2014 to 

the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence 


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20See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John O. Brennan, 

Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with the Committee); Letter from Trey Gowdy, 

Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Michael S. Rogers, Dir., Nat’l Sec. Agency (Nov. 

19, 2014) (on file with the Committee); Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. 

on Benghazi, to David R. Shedd, acting Dir., Def. Intel. Agency (Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with 

the Committee); Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to James 

R. Clapper, Dir., Nat’l Intel. (Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with the Committee). 21See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to James B. Comey, 

Jr., Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Dec. 4, 2014) (on file with the Committee); Letter from 

Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Denis R. McDonough, White House 

Chief of Staff (Dec. 29, 2014) (on file with the Committee). 22See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, 

Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (July 31, 2015) (on file with Committee). 23 Interim Progress Update, supra note 8, at 3. 24Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, and Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Member, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi to John F. Kerry, Sec’y of State, U.S. 

Dep’t of State and John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (October 8, 2014) (on file with 

the Committee). 25 Id. 

Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.20 In 

December 2014, the Committee sent information requests to the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] and the White House.21

The Committee issued three additional subpoenas to the State 

Department (detailed below) and made nine individual document 

requests.22

Committee document requests resulted in approximately 75,420 

pages of new material: 

• The State Department produced approximately 71,640 pages of 

documents not previously provided to Congress. 

• The CIA produced 300 pages of new intelligence analyses. 

• The White House produced 1,450 pages of emails. 

• Sidney S. Blumenthal produced 179 pages of emails. 

• The FBI produced 200 pages of documents. 

• The Defense Department produced 900 pages of documents. 

• The National Security Agency produced 750 pages of documents. 

It is important to rebut a frequent talking point. The number of 

documents produced is in isolation meaningless without knowing 

the relevance of the documents actually produced and the number 

of relevant documents not produced. An agency that compliments 

itself on the number of pages provided to investigators when it 

alone knows the number of relevant pages withheld is engaged in 

propaganda, not transparency. 

MEETINGS, BRIEFINGS, AND PUBLIC HEARINGS 

The Committee’s first priority was to hear from the families of 

the four murdered Americans in the Benghazi attacks.23 These 

meetings offered the families an opportunity to be heard, to pose 

questions and concerns to the Committee, and to provide their insights. The Chairman also requested briefings from agencies to discuss survivorship benefits to ensure the families received the benefits to which they were entitled.24

The Committee held more than two dozen classified and unclassified briefings with Executive Branch agencies.25 For example, the 

Committee met with the State Department to evaluate the events 


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26 Id. 27 Id. 28 H. SELECT COMM. ON BENGHAZI, https://benghazi.house.gov/hearings (last visited May 10, 

2016). 29 Hearing 1 Before the H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 113th Congress (2014), Hearing 2 Before 

the H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 113th Congress (2014). 30See 22 U.S.C. § 4831 (2005). 31 INDEPENDENT PANEL ON BEST PRACTICES, DEP’T OF STATE, 1 (Aug. 29, 2013). 32 Id. 33See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of State, Special Review of the Accountability Review 

Board Process: Report No. ISP–I–13–44A, 39–42 (Sept. 2013), https://oig.state.gov/system/files/ 

214907.pdf. 34See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of State, Compliance Followup Review of the Special 

Review of the Accountability Review Board Process: Report No. ISP–C–15–33, 39–42 (Aug. 2015), 

https://oig.state.gov/system/files/isp-c-15-33.pdf. 35 Id. 36 Id. 37See Hearing 3 Before the H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 114th Congress,(2015). 38 H. Res. 567, 113th Cong., § 3(a)(6) (2014). 

prior to and during the September 11–12, 2012, attacks, including 

viewing video footage of the attacks.26 The Committee also met 

with the Justice Department and the FBI on the capture of Ahmed 

Abu Khatalla and to view additional footage of the attacks.27

The Committee held only four public hearings.28 The first and 

second public hearings—on September 17, 2014, and December 1, 

2014—examined the State Department’s efforts to protect U.S. facilities and personnel currently serving abroad.29 Immediately following a significant event resulting in serious injury or loss of life, 

the State Department is required by law to convene an ARB to investigate and make findings and recommendations to protect 

against similar occurrences in the future.30 Consequently, the Committee’s first hearing focused on the State Department’s implementation of the ARB’s recommendations as well as those recommendations issued by the Independent Panel on Best Practices. The Independent Panel consisted of independent experts who were asked to 

evaluate the State Department’s security platforms in high-risk, 

high-threat posts.31

The Committee’s second public hearing also allowed the Committee to examine the shortcomings identified by the State Department’s Office of the Inspector General [OIG] and the Department’s 

efforts to remedy these deficiencies.32 The OIG’s first report, issued 

in September 2013, contained 20 formal and eight informal recommendations.33 The OIG conducted a compliance follow-up review 

from January 15 through March 18, 2015,34 and in August 2015 reissued one recommendation to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

and the Overseas Buildings Operations.35 The OIG called on the 

State Department to ‘‘develop minimum security standards that 

must be met prior to occupying facilities located in designated high 

risk, high threat locations and include these minimum standards 

for occupancy in the Foreign Affairs Handbook.’’ 36

The third public hearing on January 27, 2015, was necessary because of continuing compliance problems with Executive Branch 

entities.37 The Committee’s authorizing resolution directed it to: 

‘‘[c]onduct a full and complete investigation and study and 

issue a final report of its findings to the House regarding: 

• executive branch activities and efforts to comply with 

Congressional inquiries into the attacks...38 [and] 


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39 Id. § 3(a)(7). 40Meeting between H. Select Comm. on Benghazi staff and U.S. Dep’t of State representatives 

(February 27, 2015). See also, email from Philip G. Kiko, Staff Director and Gen. Counsel, H. 

Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Julia Frifield, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t 

of State (March 23, 2015, 6:50 PM) (on file with the Committee). 41 Hearing 4 Before the H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 114th Congress (2015). 42Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to David E. Kendall, 

Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly LLP (Mar. 19, 2015) (on file with the Committee). It is important to note that the Committee offered to take Secretary Clinton’s testimony in an interview 

setting. The former Secretary elected to provide her testimony to the Committee in a public setting. See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi to David E. Kendall, 

Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly LLP (Mar. 31, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 

• recommendations for improving executive branch cooperation and compliance with congressional oversight 

and investigations . . .’’ 39

The administration attempted to the narrow the Committee’s investigation and repeatedly asked it to prioritize discovery requests.40 While the Committee refused to narrow its investigation—the scope of which was mandated by the House of Representatives—the Committee did accommodate the administration’s requests to prioritize. This accommodation resulted in the administration disregarding discovery requests that were not prioritized 

and accusing the Committee of being preoccupied with the witnesses and documents that were prioritized. 

The Committee’s fourth public hearing was held on October 22, 

2015, to receive testimony of the Secretary, a necessary fact witness who oversaw the State Department before, during, and after 

the Benghazi terrorist attacks.41 The Secretary had yet to be examined by any investigative panel or congressional committee with access to her emails and other relevant information.42

The Committee’s preference for private interviews over public 

hearings has been questioned. Interviews are a more efficient and 

effective means of discovery. Interviews allow witnesses to be questioned in depth by a highly prepared member or staff person. In 

a hearing, every member of a committee is recognized—usually for 

five minutes—a procedure which precludes in-depth focused questioning. Interviews also allow the Committee to safeguard the privacy of witnesses who may fear retaliation for cooperating or whose 

work requires anonymity, such as intelligence community 

operatives. 

Both witnesses and members of Congress conduct themselves differently in interviews than when in the public glare of a hearing. 

Neither have an incentive to play to the cameras. Witnesses have 

no incentive to run out the clock as long-winded evasive answers 

merely extend the length of the interview. Likewise, Members have 

no need to interrupt witnesses to try to ask all their questions in 

five minutes. Perhaps more importantly, political posturing, selfserving speeches, and theatrics serve no purpose in a closed interview and, as a result, the questioning in interviews tends to be far 

more effective at discovering information than at public hearings. 

For these reasons, nearly all Executive Branch investigations are 

conducted in private and without arbitrary time constraints. This 

is no less true in a Legislative Branch investigation, yet the manner in which the media portrays these investigations is starkly different. 


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43Michael S. Schmidt, Cheryl Mills, Advisor to Hillary Clinton, Testifies on Benghazi and 

Email Practices, NY Times (September 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/hillaryclinton-email-benghazi.html?_r=0. 44Letter to John F. Kerry, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chmn., H. Select 

Comm. On Benghazi (July 31, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 45 Interim Progress Update, supra note 8, at 4. 46OGR ARB Subpoena, supra note 14. 47Subpoena issued by H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, Sec’y of State, U.S. 

Dep’t of State (Jan. 29, 2015). 48See Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of State for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Feb. 13, 2015) (on file with 

the Committee). 49See Comm. Internal Memorandum on State Dep’t Records Production. 50See Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of State for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Apr. 15, 2015) (on file with 

the Committee). 51See Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of State for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Apr. 24, 2015) (on file with 

the Committee). 

No witness interviewed by the Committee complained of poor 

treatment or a lack of professionalism during these interviews. In 

fact, witnesses who had no incentive to compliment the Committee 

did just that, such as Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor, 

State Department, and Huma M. Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff, 

State Department.43

The Department of State 

Notwithstanding the productions eventually made, the State Department’s compliance posture toward the Committee was poor. 

The Department failed to comply in full with the nine document requests and three subpoenas.44 Instead, Department officials deflected and delayed their responses, engaged in a pattern of obstruction, and furnished productions and witness interviews slowly—significantly impeding the Committee’s investigation and development of a complete record. 

RESPONSE TO SUBPOENAS FOR DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE 

ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD 

As described earlier, two subpoenas issued by Congress to the 

State Department in 2013 had yet to be satisfied when the Select 

Committee was formed.45 One of these subpoenas dealt specifically 

with documents pertaining to the ARB.46 Though Congress had 

been asking for the documents for almost two years, the State Department failed to produce a single document. The Committee emphasized the importance of these documents by reissuing a new 

subpoena for the 114th Congress. Immediately following the January 27, 2015 compliance hearing, the Committee issued a new subpoena for documents reviewed by the ARB.47

The State Department’s first production to the Committee consisted of a four-page interview summary for a witness who was 

scheduled to appear before the Committee the following day.48 The 

State Department maintained this posture over the next several 

weeks with one or two ARB summaries, totaling 38 pages, provided 

less than a week before the Committee’s interviews.49 It was not 

until April 15, 2015, the State Department produced approximately 

1,700 pages of documents.50 On April 24, 2015, the Department 

produced another approximately 2,600 pages of documents.51


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52See Letter from the Thomas B, Gibbons, acting Assistant Sec’y of Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, to Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Aug. 23, 2013) 

(on file with H. Select Comm. on Benghazi). 53See Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of State for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Apr. 24, 2015). 54Testimony of William Fischer, Chief Records Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 66 (June 

30, 2015) [hereinafter Fischer Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 55 Id. 

It remains unclear whether production for the January 28, 2015 

subpoena is complete. Notwithstanding the more than 4,300 pages 

produced to the Committee, previous statements made by the State 

Department to Congress revealed the ARB reviewed ‘‘approximately 7,000 State Department documents, numbering thousands 

of pages.’’ 52 Moreover, the State Department withheld a number of 

documents from the Committee based on ‘‘executive branch confidentiality interests,’’ an administration-constructed privilege not 

recognized by the Constitution.53

REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS OF THE SECRETARY AND OTHER SENIOR 

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS 

While the State Department produced 15,000 pages of new documents to the Committee on August 11, 2014, there were significant 

and material omissions. This production contained few emails sent 

to or received by the State Department’s senior staff. In fact, the 

production included only eight emails sent or received by the Secretary from two email addresses: ‘‘HDR22@clintonemail.com’’ and 

‘‘H.’’ This was the first time the State Department produced emails 

from the Secretary. It was also the first time the Committee became aware the Secretary used a private email account to conduct 

State Department business during her tenure. The Committee was 

not informed at the time, or at any time until immediately before 

media reporting, of the extent to which the Secretary relied on private email and a private server to conduct State Department business, or the ongoing discussion between the State Department and 

the Secretary and her representatives regarding the return of 

records. 

For example, at the time the State Department produced these 

15,000 pages of documents, which included these eight emails and 

pledged a ‘‘new relationship with the Committee,’’ it was known 

within the State Department that the Secretary’s email records 

were not on site.54 The Chief Records Officer testified: 

Q: One of the things that we wanted to talk with you 

about was when you first became knowledgeable or aware 

that all or part of Secretary Clinton’s records were not on 

premises with the State Department. And can you tell us 

when that was? 

A: The end of July 2014. 

Q: And how did you become aware that some of her 

records were not on premises? 

A: I was getting ready to enter my new position and one 

of my colleagues mentioned that in FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] litigation the issue had come up, but I had 

no idea about the full circumstances.55


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56 July 2, 2014 meeting between Comm. Staff Director Philip G. Kiko and State Dep’t Chief 

of Staff David E. Wade. 57Office of the Inspector General, ‘‘Office of the Sec’y: Evaluation of Email Records Management and Cybersecurity Requirements,’’ at 17–18, footnote 75, (May 26, 2016) (on file with the 

Committee). 58 Carol D. Leonning and Rosalind S. Helderman, State Department’s Account of email requirements differs from Clinton’s, Washington Post (September 22, 2015), https:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/politics/state-departments-account-of-e-mail-request-differs-fromclintons/2015/09/22/54cd66bc-5ed9-11e5-8e9e-dce8a2a2a679_story.html (‘‘He [Senator Johnson] 

cited a July 23, 2014, email in which employees at Platte River Networks, the private company 

that was then maintaining her server, discussed sending copies of Clinton’s emails overnight 

to Cheryl Mills, a long-time Clinton advisor.’’). 59See, e.g., Letter from Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 

to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 13, 2012) (on file with the Committee). 

Unknown to the Committee and the public, the State Department and the Secretary were taking remedial action to recover her 

emails from her private server because of the Committee’s investigation.56 According to the State Department’s own Inspector General: 

[i]n May 2014, the Department undertook efforts to recover potential Federal records from Secretary Clinton. 

Thereafter, in July 2014, senior officials met with former 

members of Secretary Clinton’s immediate staff, who were 

then acting as Secretary Clinton’s representatives. At the 

meeting, her representative indicated that her practice of 

using a personal account was based on Secretary Powell’s 

similar use, but Department staff instructed Clinton’s representatives to provide the Department with any Federal 

records transmitted through her personal system. On August 22, 2014, Secretary Clinton’s former Chief of Staff 

and then-representative advised Department leadership 

that hard copies of Secretary Clinton emails containing responsive information would be provided but that, given the 

volume of emails, it would take some time to produce.57

In July 2014, Mills contacted Platte River Networks, the company contracted to maintain the Secretary’s server, to request the 

Secretary’s emails be pulled and sent to her overnight.58

The Committee did not publicize the existence of the eight emails 

identified from the Secretary’s private email account, for myriad 

reasons. The Committee believed these eight emails might represent the beginning of a full production. There also existed the 

possibility of an explanation other than what was eventually 

learned. These eight emails could have reflected the Secretary’s episodic use of personal email, as other administration officials had 

done,59 and a more complete production of state.gov emails could 

be forthcoming. Of course, while the Committee did not have access 

to all salient facts in the summer of 2014, the State Department 

did. The State Department knew then it did not have possession 

of her public records as these records were not turned over at the 

end of the Secretary’s tenure. The State Department knew then it 

was in no position to comply with congressional inquiries or FOIA 

requests related to the Secretary’s emails because it did not have 

custody or access to the full public record. According to a recent report by the State Department’s own Inspector General: 


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60 ‘‘Office of the Sec’y: Evaluation of Email Records Management and Cybersecurity Requirements,’’ supra note 69 at 17–18. 61 Id. 62See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, 

Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Nov. 18, 2014) (on file with the Committee). It is also important to note that this letter was accompanied by instructions typically found in subpoenas describing in greater detail the documents and communications sought and the definitions to be 

applied to the instructions. See id. 63See id. 

In early June 2013, Department staff participating in the 

review of potential material for production to congressional 

committees examining the September 2012 Benghazi attack discovered emails sent by the former Policy Planning 

Director via his Department email account to a personal 

email address associated with Secretary Clinton. In ensuing weeks, partly as a result of the staff’s discovery, Department senior officials discussed the Department’s obligations under the Federal Records Act in the context of 

personal email accounts. As discussed earlier in this report, laws and regulations did not prohibit employees from 

using their personal email accounts for the conduct of official Department business. However, email messages regarding official business sent to or from a personal email 

account fell within the scope of the Federal Records Act if 

their contents met the Act’s definition of a record. OIG 

found that the Department took no action to notify NARA 

[National Archives and Records Administration] of a potential loss of records at any point in time.60

At the time the Committee was formed in May 2014, the State 

Department was already actively seeking the return of the former 

Secretary’s emails.61

The Committee moved forward by issuing its November 18, 2014 

document request to the State Department to obtain a clearer understanding of the role the Secretary and her senior staff played 

prior to, during, and after the terrorist attacks.62 The Committee 

made clear the Secretary and her senior staff’s documents and 

emails were necessary to facilitate her testimony before the Committee.63 The decision to focus on obtaining these documents was 

the direct result of the Committee Minority’s repeated request to 

move up the Secretary’s appearance. 

Very senior officials are traditionally interviewed last rather 

than first so the questions can be informed by as much information 

as possible. This is standard operating procedure in Executive 

Branch investigations. The Committee Minority expressly asked 

that the Secretary’s appearance be moved up in the order of witness interviews and pledged in the process to help secure all relevant emails and documents in order to make that a reality. If 

there is any evidence Minority Committee members attempted to 

secure access to relevant documents or facilitate the production of 

documents, the Committee is not aware of it. Instead, the Committee Minority enjoyed the best of all worlds: complain about the 

Secretary not being interviewed while relying on the State Department to delay, obstruct, and withhold production of the very documents needed to facilitate the interview. 


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64Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to David E. Kendall, 

Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly LLP (Dec. 2, 2014) (on file with the Committee). 65Letter from David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly LLP to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Dec. 29, 2014) (on file with the Committee). 66 Id. 67See Letter from Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff to the Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 5, 2014) (on 

file with the Committee). 68See Id. 69 Id. 

The State Department did not disclose the fact that it did not 

have possession of the Secretary’s emails, nor that it had been 

working with the Secretary for the previous seven months to secure 

their return. The Committee also asked the Secretary for documents and emails. On December 2, 2014, the Committee wrote 

David E. Kendall, the Secretary’s attorney, requesting all of the 

Secretary’s emails related to Benghazi and Libya from her private 

email account.64 Knowing the actions already taken by his law firm 

and Mills to identify and return the former Secretary’s emails to 

the State Department, Kendall did not respond until December 29, 

at which time he referred the Committee back to the State Department.65 Kendall stated ‘‘[the State Department] is in a position to 

produce any responsive emails.’’ 66 This ‘‘who’s on first’’ routine orchestrated between the Secretary’s private counsel and the State 

Department, which is ostensibly an apolitical governmental diplomatic entity, is shameful. It was not merely Congress and the people it represents who were misled and manipulated, the State Department and the Secretary’s email arrangement undoubtedly delayed access to information on what happened to four brave Americans in Benghazi and the government’s response before, during and 

after the attacks. The manner in which the Secretary communicated during her tenure, the manner in which those records were 

housed during and after her tenure and the manner in which the 

public record was self-scrutinized and self-selected makes it impossible to ever represent to the families of those killed in Benghazi 

that the record is whole. 

Notwithstanding the Committee’s December 2, 2014 request to 

Kendall, Mills informed the State Department within a matter of 

days that she was producing 55,000 pages of the Secretary’s emails 

from her personal account.67 On December 5, 2014, Mills wrote the 

State Department that the emails were being produced to help the 

Department ‘‘meet its requirements under the Federal Records 

Act.’’ 68 Mills’ letter did not disclose that all of the Secretary’s work 

was conducted on a private email account and server. The letter 

did not disclose the form in which the 55,000 pages of emails were 

being produced. It did not disclose how the emails were being delivered to the State Department. The Committee would later learn 

that, on the same day Mills sent her letter to the State Department, a State Department records official was directed by his supervisor to pick up and transport hard copies of the Secretary’s 

emails from Kendall’s law firm, Williams and Connolly in Washington DC, back to the State Department.69

Despite receiving the Secretary’s emails on December 5, 2014, 

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70 Id. See also, Letter from Julia Frifield, Ass’t Secretary of State, Legislative Affairs, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, (February 13, 2015) 

(on file with the Committee). 71See Hearing 3 Before the H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 114th Congress (2015). 72Michael S. Schmidt, Hillary Clinton Used Personal Email Account at State Dept., Possibly 

Breaking Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/us/politics/hillary-clintons-use-of-private-email-at-state-department-raises-flags.html?_r=0. 73See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to David E. Kendall, 

Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly LLP (Mar. 3, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 74See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Dan Brown, 

Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Web.com (Mar. 3, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 

mittee until February 13, 2015.70 The Department also resisted 

scheduling witness interviews in December 2014 and January 

2015. The Department’s compliance posture resulted in the Committee’s third public hearing, held on January 27, 2015. The State 

Department did not, however, produce a witness of sufficient seniority to make commitments on behalf of the Department.71

In fact, the State Department did not respond to the Committee’s 

November 18, 2014 document request until February 13, 2015. At 

the time, the State Department produced approximately 847 pages 

of the Secretary’s emails in paper copies. The State Department 

still refused to disclose important, relevant facts such as: the Secretary’s emails were not on the State Department’s network; the 

Secretary did not provide electronic copies of her emails; and the 

Secretary’s attorneys—not the State Department—determined 

which emails would be returned to the Department. 

It was not until February 27, 2015, the State Department disclosed to the Committee these facts, days before The New York 

Times would disclose the circumstances.72 Even then, the State Department failed to disclose the fact that the Secretary used a private server. The Committee learned this fact through subsequent 

press reports. 

Once the Committee learned the State Department had been 

complicit in the non-production of the Secretary’s emails, it issued 

two preservation letters; one was issued to the Secretary 73 and the 

other to Web.com,74 the registrar of the domain name 

Clinton@clintonemail.com. This was necessary to ensure relevant 

information in the parties’ possession was preserved. The letters 

requested the Secretary and Web.com: 

1. Preserve all email, electronic documents and date (‘‘electronic records’’) created since January 1, 2009, that can be 

reasonably anticipated to be the subject to a request for production by the Committee. For the purpose of this request, 

‘‘preserve’’ means taking reasonable steps to prevent the 

partial or full destruction, alteration, testing, deletion, 

shredding, incineration, wiping, relocation, migration, theft 

or mutation of electronic records, as well as negligent or intentional handling that would make such records incomplete or inaccessible; 

2. Exercise reasonable efforts to identify and notify former employees and contractors who may have access to such electronic records that they are to be preserved; and 

3. If it is the routine practice of any employee or contractor to 

destroy or otherwise alter such electronic records, either: 

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75See Chairman Gowdy’s letters, supra notes 73 and 74. 76Subpoena issued by H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Hillary R. Clinton, former Sec’y of 

State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 4, 2015). 77Letter from David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly LLP to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Mar. 27, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 78 Id. 

plete and accurate duplicates or copies of such records, suitable for production if requested.75

THE SECRETARY IS SUBPOENAED 

On March 4, 2015, a day after the Committee issued two preservation letters, the Committee issued two additional subpoenas. The 

first compelled production from the Secretary of any documents 

and communications responsive to the November 18, 2014 letter 

still in her possession.76 The Secretary, through her attorney, Kendall, responded to the Committee’s subpoena on March 27, 2015. In 

his letter, Kendall informed the Committee: 

With respect to any emails from Secretary Clinton’s 

‘hdr22@clinontonemail.com’ account, I respond by stating 

that, for the reasons set forth below, the Department of 

State—which has already produced approximately 300 documents in response to an earlier request seeking documents on essentially the same subject matters—is uniquely positioned to make available any documents responsive 

to your requests. 77

Kendall further told the Committee: 

Secretary Clinton is not in a position to produce any of 

those emails to the Committee in response to the subpoena 

without approval from the State Department, which could 

come only following a review process. On March 23, 2015, 

I received a letter from Under Secretary of State for Management (attached hereto) confirming direction from the 

National Archives and Records Administration that while 

Secretary Clinton and her counsel are permitted to retain 

a copy of her work-related emails, those emails should not 

be released to any third parties without authorization by 

the State Department. . . . Thus, while the Secretary has 

maintained and preserved copies of the emails provided to 

the State Department, she is not in a position to make any 

production that may be called for by the subpoena.78

The State Department was unmoved by the location of public 

records during the Secretary’s tenure or for nearly two years thereafter until the Committee insisted on their production. The State 

Department then orchestrated a sophomoric scheme of letters to 

have these records returned to the State Department. Once this 

was accomplished, the State Department, previously uninterested 

in the location, security or fullness of this public record, jealously 

guarded—indeed prevented—the production of the Secretary’s 

records to Congress. 

The State Department made two productions subsequent to February 13, 2015. The Committee received 105 email exchanges from 

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79Letter from Julia Frifield, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 

Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (June 25, 2015) (‘‘In a limited number 

of circumstances, we did not locate in the tens of thousands of pages of email provided by Secretary Clinton the content of a handful of communications that Mr. Blumenthal produced.’’) 80See Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of State for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Sept. 25, 2015) (on record with the 

Committee). 81 Email from Eric Schneider, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Dana Chipman, Chief Counsel, Sel. 

Comm. On Benghazi (January 8, 2016,) (on file with the Committee). 82 Id. 83See Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of State for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Feb. 26, 2016). 

cant because it was made only after a non-government witness provided 179 additional pages of email exchanges with the Secretary 

on June 12, 2015. 59 of the emails produced by the non-government 

witness had never been provided by the State Department to the 

Committee despite the fact these emails were clearly responsive to 

previous requests and fully within the jurisdiction of the Committee. Moreover, the State Department did not have in its possession, in full or in part, 15 email exchanges produced by the nongovernment witness—calling into question the completeness of 

their records from the Secretary.79 This means that not only was 

the State Department refusing to produce emails from the Secretary that were unquestionably relevant to this Committee’s investigation, it also laid bare the Secretary’s assurance that all public records had been returned to the State Department. Neither of 

those assertions was true. 

The State Department made its third production to the Committee—1,899 pages of the Secretary’s emails—on September 25, 

2015. In its letter accompanying the emails, the State Department 

noted ‘‘it had re-reviewed Secretary Clinton’s 2011–2012 emails 

and today is providing materials in advance of the Secretary’s appearance before the Committee on October 22, 2015.’’ 80

The Committee’s interest in the Secretary’s emails is limited to 

their relevance in the investigation of the Benghazi attacks. Her 

exclusive use of non-official email and a private server for all official communications may raise concerns beyond the scope of this 

Committee’s purview related to Federal records and transparency 

laws and national security concerns, but jurisdiction for those matters lies either with the Inspector General, the courts, other committees of Congress, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 

Justice Department. 

Simply put, the Committee has an obligation to seek and acquire 

all relevant information consistent with its jurisdiction. Part of securing that relevant information involved accessing public records, 

regardless of where and by whom those records were held. 

On January 8, 2016, the Department notified the Committee of 

yet more responsive documents located in the Office of the Secretary.81 These documents had been ‘‘overlooked’’ by the State Department.82 On February 26, 2016—20 months after the Committee was formed—the State Department produced approximately 

1,650 additional responsive documents.83

The odyssey that became the Secretary’s email arrangement was 

fully the result of decisions she made in concert with others at the 

State Department. Had she used state.gov or employed a method 

of preserving public records other than simply hiring private legal 

counsel to store, vet, and disclose these public records, this would 


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84Subpoena issued by H. Select Comm. on Benghazi to John F. Kerry, Sec’y of State, U.S. 

Dep’t of State (Mar. 4, 2015). 85See Lauren French, Gowdy: Not backing off subpoena of Clinton emails, POLITICO (Mar. 5, 

2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/house-committee-benghazi-clinton-email-subpoena115795. 86See Letters from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to Huma Abedin, William J. Burns, Jeffrey D. Feltman, Cheryl Mills, Thomas Nides, Philippe 

Reines, Susan E. Rice, Jacob J. Sullivan (March 11, 2015). 87Subpoena issued by H. Select Comm. on Benghazi to John F. Kerry, Sec’y of State, U.S. 

Dep’t of State (Aug. 5, 2015). 88 Email from Philip Kiko, Staff Director, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Julia Frifield, Ass’t 

Sec’y of State for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (March 23, 2015, 6:50 PM) (‘‘let me 

Continued 

never have become an issue for the Committee. The Committee 

knew in the summer 2014 the Secretary used private email to conduct at least some official business and never disclosed this fact 

publicly. The Committee’s interest was in accessing the relevant 

and responsive material needed to accomplish the job it was assigned to do. Moreover, of the more than 100 witnesses the Committee interviewed only one was exclusively connected with her 

method of producing and preserving emails—Bryan Pagliano, a 

Special Advisor to the State Department. Pagliano’s interview was 

short when he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. Pagilano was an important witness who could have 

spoken to the fullness of the Committee’s record. The Secretary’s 

server was reportedly down during two key time periods identified 

during the Committee’s investigation—August 2011 and October 

2012. 

On April 8, 2016, the Committee received another production of 

approximately 1,150 pages of emails from Sean Smith’s email account as well as emails sent to and from senior leaders stored in 

the Office of the Secretary. On May 5, 2016, the Committee received yet again another production from the State Department of 

approximately 405 pages of documents from the Office of the Secretary. 

Subpoena for 7th Floor Principals’ Documents and 

Communications 

The second subpoena issued in the aftermath of the disclosure of 

the Secretary’s email arrangement was issued on March 4, 2015, 

and sought documents and communications from the remaining ten 

senior staff officials identified in the Committee’s November 18, 

2014 letter. More than three months after the Committee first 

issued its request for these documents, the State Department had 

yet to produce a single document.84 A day after issuing this subpoena, the Committee learned the State Department did not start 

archiving emails of its senior officials until February 2015.85 The 

Committee later learned Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary for 

Management, State Department, wrote to several senior officials 

identified in the Committee’s March 4, 2015 subpoena seeking the 

return of all work related emails conducted on private accounts.86

The State Department also kept this second Kennedy letter a secret.87

Notwithstanding the specificity and clarity of the documents and 

communications sought by the March 4, 2015 subpoena, the State 

Department protested the breadth of the Committee’s request.88 To 


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reiterate that the subpoena is clear as to what communications and documents the Committee 

is seeking’’). 89 Id. 90 Email from Philip Kiko, Staff Director, to Julia Frifield, Ass’t Sec’y of State for Legislative 

Affairs (April 22, 2015, 1:03 PM). 91 James Rosen, Documents show State Dep’t missed target date for special Benghazi unit, Fox 

News, May 6, 2016, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/05/06/documents-show-state-department-missed-target-date-for-special-benghazi-unit.html. 92Phone call between Philip Kiko, Staff Director, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, and Julia 

Frifield, Ass’t Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (May 2015). 93Memorandum from Philip G. Kiko, Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H. Select Comm. on 

Benghazi, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (June 2, 2014) [hereinafter 

June 2 Staff Memo] (on file with the Committee) (summarizing the members meeting with State 

Dep’t Chief of Staff Jon Finer). 94 Id. 

help set priorities, the Committee offered guidance to State Department officials, at their request. For example, on March 23, 2015, 

the Committee identified four individuals and four discrete timeframes to which the Department could focus its initial efforts.89

On April 22, 2015, the Committee again provided guidance outlining a production plan complete with specific individuals and discrete timeframes for the State Department.90 No documents were 

produced. 

It is worth reiterating that what may appear, at first blush, to 

be a lack of competence on behalf of the State Department now appears fully intentional and coordinated. Delaying the production of 

documents sought by letter, informal request, or subpoena has decided political advantages for those opposing the investigation and 

those in control of the necessary documents and witness access. 

Asking the Committee for ‘‘priorities’’ or date and time restrictions 

is calculated to reduce the scope of the investigation—the very 

thing Committee Minority members asked for in the fall of 2014— 

and causes the investigation to be drawn out needlessly. 

This is an overtly political calculation and has become the typical 

playbook for an administration that once praised itself for its 

‘‘transparency.’’ 

In an effort to speed the production of documents, the Committee 

worked to advance the State Department’s $2.4 million reprograming request made to the Committees on Appropriations of both 

the House and the Senate to create a ‘document review unit’ to 

help facilitate the production of documents relevant to the Committee’s investigation.91 The Committee was informed 12 full-time employees would be assigned to the ‘document review unit,’ as well as 

new technology, to respond to congressional requests. The Committee was told its requests would be the ‘document review unit’s’ 

highest priority.92 To the contrary, after the House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations approved the Department’s reprogramming request, State Department staff did nothing to expedite Committee requests for documents.93 State Department officials would not disclose how the reprograming request was being 

implemented, how many employees were assigned to the unit, or 

whether these individuals were also assigned to respond to FOIA 

requests. Nor would the officials describe how document requests 

would be produced with the new technology.94


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95Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of State for Leg. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 

Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (May 22, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 96See June 2 Staff Memo, supra note 93. 97 Id. 98 Id. 99 Id. 100See id. 101Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Jonathan Finer, 

Chief of Staff & Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 4, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 102 Id. 

IMPASSE WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT 

On May 22, 2015, more than two months after the March 4, 2015 

subpoena, the State Department finally produced approximately 

1,200 pages of emails to and from Mills. The documents in this production, however, covered less than a quarter of the timeframes 

sought and contained less than one-tenth of the contents sought in 

the subpoena. Furthermore, the State Department withheld documents, telling the Committee ‘‘a small number of documents implicate important Executive Branch institutional interests and are 

therefore not included in this production.’’ 95 The State Department’s continued refusal to produce relevant documents delayed 

the Committee’s interview schedule. 

Like other investigations, the Committee planned to interview 

senior level officials within the State Department before interviewing the Secretary. Consequently, delaying document productions for these senior officials in turn delayed the interviews of the 

same senior officials, which in turn delayed the interview of the 

Secretary. It is readily apparent this was by design and presented 

the Committee with a ‘Catch-22’: either interview senior State Department officials, including the Secretary, without the benefit of 

the documents needed for a constructive conversation, or postpone 

those interviews pending document production and be criticized for 

taking too long. 

Recognizing neither public reproach nor the Committee’s support 

for the State Department’s reprogramming request would compel 

the Department to action, the Committee had few alternatives— 

other than contempt of Congress (dependent on Executive Branch 

enforcement) or time-consuming litigation. On June 2, 2015, the 

Committee met with Jonathan Finer, Chief of Staff and Director of 

Policy Planning, State Department, to discuss the impasse.96

With Finer, the Committee made it clear it was necessary to review documents prior to moving forward with interviews.97 The 

Committee members personally emphasized to Finer the emails 

from a number of former senior State Department officials were 

necessary to have constructive conversations with witnesses.98 The 

delays in producing documents thus delayed interviews.99 While 

Finer would not agree to a production schedule, he did agree the 

State Department would make a substantial production within 30 

days.100 The meeting and agreement were memorialized in a subsequent communication sent to Finer.101 In its letter, the Committee 

defined ‘‘substantial’’ as ‘‘producing,’’ within 30 days, ‘‘all documents and emails . . . described in phase one in our April 22, 2015 

communication.’’ 102


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103Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, Sec’y 

of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (July 10, 2015) (on file with the Committee) (‘‘While the meeting 

may have motivated the Dep’t to produce roughly 3,600 pages of documents on June 30, 2015, 

more than 2,000 of those pages—representing nearly 57 percent were nothing more than basic 

press clippings. . . .’’). 104 Id. 105Letter from Julia Frifield, Ass’t Sec’y for Leg. Affairs, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select 

Comm. on Benghazi (June 30, 2015) (on file with the Committee) (‘‘In addition, a small number 

of documents implicate important Executive Branch institutional interests and therefore are not 

included in this production.’’). 106Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, Sec’y 

of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 12, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 107 Id. 108 Id. 109 Interview with [Agent 17], Accountability Review Bd. (Oct. 30, 2012) (on file with the committee State-SCB0098607). 110Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, Sec’y 

of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (July 10, 2015) (on file with the Committee) (one of two similarly 

cited letters). 

The ‘‘substantial production’’ of documents never materialized, 

further delaying the interview schedule. Instead, on June 30, 2015, 

the State Department produced 3,600 pages of emails, more than 

2,000 pages of which were press clippings available chiefly on the 

internet.103 The production also focused almost exclusively on two 

individuals for one month after the terrorist attacks, with a scattering of documents from other timeframes.104 Moreover, the State 

Department continued its pattern of withholding documents based 

on what it described as ‘‘Executive Branch institutional interests.’’ 105 No other productions arrived for almost another month. 

On July 29, 2015, the State Department produced approximately 

8,000 pages of documents, many of which were press clippings or 

duplicate emails. 

OTHER DOCUMENT REQUESTS MADE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT 

In addition to seeking enforcement of the March 4, 2015 subpoena, the Committee issued a number of additional requests for 

information from the State Department. On June 12, 2015, the 

Committee sought the remaining ARB documents.106 The Committee requested a list of all documents being withheld and the justification for withholding.107 The Committee also sought 11 discrete 

items referenced in the ARB documents.108 The Committee requested a response by July 8, 2015. Roughly seven months later, 

on February 25, 2016, the Committee received a four-page document responsive to the June 12, 2015 request.109

On July 6, 2015, the Committee wrote the State Department 

seeking an update on compliance with the March 4, 2015 subpoena. 

No response was received. 

On July 10, 2015, the Committee wrote the Department again 

expressing concern with the anemic productions made and the Department’s lack of candor with regard to the private email use of 

former senior officials.110

The Committee followed this letter with an email highlighting 

the State Department’s inaction in five areas: 

1. scheduling of interviews; 

2. producing private emails relating to the Committee’s jurisdiction sent or received by former senior officials; 


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111See Email from Philip G. Kiko, Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 

to Julia Frifield, Catherine Duval, and Austin Evers, (July 14, 2015) (on file with the Committee) (Regarding compliance and requests). 112Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, Sec’y 

of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (July 31, 2015) (on file with Committee). 113 Id. 114 Id. 115 Id. 116See infra Appendix J for a complete listing of requests and subpoenas for documents as 

well as productions received pursuant to request or subpoena. 117Letter from the Thomas B. Gibbons, acting Assistant Sec’y of Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Aug. 23, 2013) 

(on file with the Committee) (stating the ARB reviewed approximately 7,000 documents totaling 

thousands of pages). 118See letters from Julia Frifield, Ass’t Sec’y of State for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (February 13, 2015, April 24, 

2015, May 22, 2015, and June 30, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 

3. an accounting of the missing documents, including those 

withheld for executive branch confidentiality interests; 

4. producing the remaining aspects of phase one of the March 

4, 2015 subpoena; and 

5. failing to acknowledge the receipt of the previous letters.111

JULY 31, 2015 DEMAND LETTER 

The State Department’s untenable posture, coupled with an abject lack of meaningful response to the Committee’s outstanding 

subpoenas and requests, led to a demand letter on July 31, 2015.112

The letter was a precursor to contempt of Congress action, and reflected the Committee’s serious belief the State Department was intentionally impeding the investigation’s progress.113

The Committee outlined the pattern of concealment and delay 

employed by the State Department.114 The Committee noted the 

State Department’s actions with regard to the Committee’s questions about production of the Secretary’s emails.115

The Committee eventually received, in several tranches, document productions subsequent to the July 31, 2015 demand letter. 

Documents responsive to the March 4 subpoena were produced on 

August 21 and August 28, 2015; September 18, 2015; October 5, 9, 

and 15, 2015; November 6 and 24, 2015; December 31, 2015; January 21, 2016; February 26, 2016; April 8, 2016; and May 5, 2016. 

In addition, the Committee received throughout the fall of 2015 

and the early winter of 2016 approximately 9,000 pages of emails 

from Stevens’ email never before produced.116

The Committee never received full productions of emails from the 

accounts of Under Secretary Wendy R. Sherman, Deputy Secretary 

William J. Burns, or Assistant Secretary Jeffrey D. Feltman—all of 

whom were listed in the November 18, 2014 document request and 

the March 4, 2015 subpoena. The State Department never produced all relevant documents reviewed by the Accountability Review Board.117 Finally, the State Department still has not fully 

complied with the August 5, 2015 subpoena. 

The State Department also withheld documents citing ‘‘important 

Executive Branch institutional interests’’ or ‘‘important Executive 

Branch confidentiality interests’’ on four separate occasions.118 The 

Committee repeatedly sought additional information on the withheld documents, including the nature and number of documents 

withheld and the basis in law for withholding them. On June 12, 


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2015, July 8, 2015, and July 31, 2015, the Committee wrote the 

State Department seeking additional information. The Committee 

also met with State Department representatives to discuss the status of the June 12, 2015, July 8, 2015, and July 31, 2015 requests 

multiple times, including as late as June 2016. To date, the State 

Department has yet to account for the withheld documents. The 

State Department’s refusal to provide the Committee with information by which to make reasonable judgements regarding the Department’s decisions to withhold documents from Congress and, ultimately, from the American people is yet another example of the 

Department’s pattern of concealment. 

WITNESSES 

The Committee interviewed 57 witnesses from the State Department, 50 who had never been interviewed by Congress, including 

four senior leaders, three Ambassadors, 19 Diplomatic Security 

agents, four principal officers, and 20 State Department personnel. 

On December 4, 2014, the Committee requested the State Department make available for transcribed interviews the eyewitnesses to the attack: the Diplomatic Security agents deployed to 

Benghazi and the Principal Officers responsible for political reporting. The State Department resisted scheduling interviews for nearly two months. It was not until January 27, 2015 and the threat 

of subpoenas the State Department began to contact the individuals sought by the Committee. 

The Committee sought the testimony of senior State Department 

officials including those who were not interviewed by the ARB. 

This included Mills, Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and 

Director of Policy Planning, and Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations. While the Committee sought to schedule these 

interviews in May 2015, the State Department’s failure to produce 

relevant documents delayed these interviews until early September 

2015. The delay in scheduling these interviews in turn necessarily 

delayed the Secretary’s testimony. 

The Committee interviewed senior leaders within the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security and the regional Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs—the two bureaus with oversight responsibility for security, 

personnel and policy in Benghazi. The Committee interviewed Kennedy who oversees the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in addition 

to the Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Countermeasures and 

International Programs, Gentry O. Smith and Charlene R. Lamb. 

The Committee interviewed Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs, State Department; Gene A. Cretz, 

Ambassador to Libya; and Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. 

Finally, the Committee interviewed those individuals who served 

as Libya desk officers and were responsible for addressing the dayto-day needs of the Benghazi Mission, including physical security, 

policy decisions, and logistics relating to Benghazi, Libya. 

The Department of Defense 

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119Letter from Stephen C. Hedger, Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Def., 

to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (April 28, 2016) (on file with the Committee). 120Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Ashton B. Carter, 

Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Apr. 8, 2015) (on file with the Committee) (first of three similarly cited letters); Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Ashton 

B. Carter, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Apr. 8, 2015) (on file with the Committee) (second 

of three similarly cited letters); Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on 

Benghazi, to Ashton B. Carter, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Apr. 8, 2015) (on file with the 

Committee) (third of three similarly cited letters). 121Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Ashton B. Carter, 

Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Apr. 8, 2015) (on file with the Committee) (one of three similarly 

cited letters). 122 Id. 123Letter from Michael J. Stella, acting Assistant Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Trey 

Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Apr. 24, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 124Letter from Stephen C. Hedger, Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Def., 

to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (May 21, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 125 Id. 

tigation culminating in a factually deficient letter from a political 

appointee deliberately mischaracterizing efforts to obtain access to 

witnesses. 

The witnesses produced by the Defense Department, both active 

duty and retired, were cooperative and provided significant new 

material to the Committee. Identifying those witnesses, locating 

those witnesses, scheduling their appearances before the Committee and responding to subsequent Committee requests generated by these documents and witness interviews became mired in 

coordinated partisan responses from a Defense Department political appointee.119

DOCUMENTS 

As required by the resolution creating the Select Committee, the 

House Armed Services Committee provided records in July 2014. 

Following a review of the information provided by the Armed Services Committee, the Select Committee submitted requests to the 

Defense Department on April 8, 2015 seeking documents and 

records not previously provided to the Armed Services Committee.120 The Select Committee’s document request consisted of 12 

categories, including a copy of the video of the attack in Benghazi, 

un-redacted copies of documents provided pursuant to a court order 

in litigation under FOIA, and copies of the force laydown for U.S. 

Africa, Europe, and Central combatant commands on September 

10, 11, and 12, 2012.121 The Select Committee also requested assistance in answering 27 questions regarding actions taken by the 

Defense Department immediately prior to, during, and immediately 

after the attacks.122

On April 27, 2015, the Defense Department responded to the 

Committee’s request providing copies of the force laydown from the 

respective combatant commands and indicating it would provide 

‘‘responsive documents not previously provided on a rolling basis’’ 

to the Committee.123 On May 21, 2015, the Defense Department 

provided 175 pages of classified documents, as well as 551 pages 

of un-redacted documents provided pursuant to a court order under 

FOIA litigation.124 The Defense Department declined to provide 36 

pages that ‘‘contain[ed] intelligence community or potential target 

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126 Id. 127 Id. 128See Letter from Ashton B. Carter, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (July 28, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 129See Email from Philip G. Kiko, Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 

to William Hudson, Dir. of Cong. Investigations, Dep’t of Def. (Feb. 5, 2016, 17:19 EST) (on file 

with the Committee). 130See id. 131 Id. 132Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Ashton B. Carter, 

Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def. (July 22, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 133 Id. 

fidentiality concerns associated with executive branch deliberations.’’ 126 At the time of the Defense Department’s letter, Committee staff had received briefings on and reviewed the drone footage on two occasions.127 The Defense Department did not indicate 

whether it would provide a copy of that footage to the Committee. 

As to five of the Committee’s requests, it indicated its review was 

ongoing. 

On July 28, 2015, the Committee received the Defense Department’s classified response to the Committee’s 27 questions.128 Over 

the following months, the Defense Department provided briefings 

to the Committee and made witnesses available. It did not, however, furnish any additional documents. 

On February 5, 2016, Committee staff met with Defense Department staff regarding the outstanding document requests.129 During 

this meeting the Committee requested an updated list of all air assets situated in the Africa and Europe combatant commands’ areas 

of responsibility, and whether any assets had not been disclosed 

due to special access programs. The Committee also requested documents referring or relating to communications the Defense Department may have had with any foreign militaries concerning coordination or assistance in response to the attacks and any photographs taken by Defense Department personnel during a trip to 

Benghazi in October 2012.130 The Committee also renewed its request for a copy of the video feed from the night of the attack.131

The Defense Department failed to respond to the Committee’s request. 

In total, the Defense Department provided nearly 900 pages of 

additional documents not previously provided to Congress. 

WITNESSES 

The Committee interviewed 24 witnesses from the Defense Department. Of these witnesses, 17 had never been interviewed by 

Congress regarding the attacks in Benghazi. 

Initially, the Defense Department identified and scheduled witnesses at the Committee’s request. For example on July 22, 2015, 

the Committee requested the Defense Department make available 

the Commander of the Commander’s In-Extremis Force [CIF] on 

September 11, 2012.132 The Committee had been unable to identify 

this individual and four other individuals by name, but provided 

details of their position during the relevant time-frame.133 The Defense Department identified the five individuals and scheduled 

their interviews. 

After the initial five witnesses were interviewed and the Committee reviewed the documents provided by Defense Department, 


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134 Email from Mac Tolar, Senior Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to William Hudson, 

Dir. of Cong. Investigations, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Feb. 9, 2016, 1:32 PM) (on file with the Committee). 135 Email from Mac Tolar, Senior Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to William Hudson, 

Dir. of Cong. Investigations, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Feb. 26, 2016, 17:00 EST) (on file with the Committee). 136See Email from Mac. Tolar, Senior Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to William Hudson, Dir. of Cong. Investigations, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Mar. 9, 2016, 12:23 EST) (on file with the 

Committee) (reiterating interview request); See also Email from Mac Tolar, Senior Counsel to 

Mr. Hudson (Mar. 24, 2016, 16:56) (on file with the Committee) (reiterating interview request). 137 Email from Philip G. Kiko, Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 

to Stephen Hedger, Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Legis. Affairs (Mar. 25, 2016, 11:37 AM) (on file 

with the Committee). 138Letter from Stephen C. Hedger, Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Def., 

to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (April 28, 2016) (on file with the Committee). 139See Email from Mac Tolar, Senior Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Philip G. 

Kiko, Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (May 20, 2016, 11:47 EST) 

(on file with the Committee) (indicating receipt of all relevant names). 

the Committee requested an additional eight witnesses on February 5, 2016. The Committee also requested an interview with the 

individual who served as the pilot for the aircraft that transported 

the CIF.134 On February 26, 2016, the Committee requested the 

Defense Department make the individuals who piloted the drone on 

September 11–12, 2012 that flew over Benghazi and Tripoli available for interviews.135

The Committee reiterated both of these requests on March 9, 

2016 and March 24, 2016.136 The Defense Department indicated it 

was experiencing difficulty in tracking down records which could 

identify the individuals who piloted the aircraft and had not made 

progress in meeting the Committee’s requests. Consequently, on 

March 31, 2016, the Committee met with Elizabeth L. George, Deputy General Counsel, Legislation, Defense Legal Services Agency, 

Defense Department, regarding the outstanding requests. The Defense Department was informed the Committee would issue subpoenas should the Defense Department not provide the names of 

the pilots immediately.137

For the next several weeks, Committee staff sought continued cooperation from the Defense Department. However, on April 28, 

2016, Stephen Hedger, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs sent an inaccurate and misleading letter to the 

Chairman regarding the Committee’s requests.138 Not surprisingly, 

that letter was leaked to the press the following day and was on 

the Committee Minority’s website. Among many of the inaccuracies, the letter stated the Defense Department had expended ‘‘significant resources’’ to locate an individual the Committee had requested to interview who was identified as ‘‘John from Iowa’’ and 

who had called in to The Sean Hannity Show radio program in 

May 2013. During the call, the individual identified himself as one 

of the sensor operators of a drone that flew over Benghazi during 

the attacks. The Committee requested to interview this person during the meeting on March 31. As of the date of Hedger’s letter, the 

Defense Department had failed to provide the names of all the pilots and sensor operators, including ‘‘John from Iowa’’ that had operated the drone on the September 11 and September 12, 2012. Finally, almost a month after Hedger’s letter, the Defense Department provided all names of both the pilots and the sensor operators.139 The Committee benefited from hearing the testimony of the 


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140Testimony of Sensor Operator 1, Tr. at 16–17, June 9, 2016 [hereinafter Sensor Operator 

1 Transcript] (on file with the Committee). See also, Letter from Stephen C. Hedger, Assistant 

Sec’y of Def. for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. 

on Benghazi (April 28, 2016) (on file with the Committee). 141Subpoena to Stephen C. Hedger, Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

Def., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (June 15, 2016) (on file with the Committee). 142 H. Res. 567, 113th Cong., § 5(a) (2014). 143Letter from Mike Rogers, Chairman, H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intel., to John O. Brennan, 

Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (May 8, 2014) (on file with the Committee). 

witnesses. These individuals were able to provide the Committee 

first-hand accounts of their mission that night, the capabilities of 

the drone, what information was being relayed up the chain of command, and the information they were focused on gathering. The 

video feed from those drones provided one point of reference for the 

Committee during its investigation. The witnesses provided another. 

Despite Hedger’s complaint that the Department had expended 

‘‘significant resources’’ to identify ‘‘John from Iowa’’ to ‘‘no avail,’’ 

the Department had actually identified ‘‘John from Iowa’’ within 

hours of his call in 2013, and had reprimanded him for his actions.140 Because of Hedger’s representation that ‘‘significant resources’’ had been used to find this witness, the Committee issued 

a subpoena to Hedger to explain what resources had actually been 

used, and why the Defense Department was unable to respond to 

a Congressional request in a timely manner.141

The Central Intelligence Agency 

The Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] ultimately provided a significant volume of material and witnesses to the Committee, including SameTime messages not previously or generally made 

available to Congress. Nevertheless, the Committee’s work was unnecessarily delayed with respect to documents, witnesses, and 

other basic requests. 

READ-AND-RETURN DOCUMENTS 

When the House of Representatives passed the resolution creating the Committee, it required that ‘‘[a]ny committee of the 

House of Representatives having custody of records in any form relating to [the Benghazi attacks] shall transfer such records to the 

Select Committee within 14 days of the adoption of this resolution. 

Such records shall become the records of the Select Committee.’’ 142

As a result of the resolution, the Chairman of the Intelligence 

Committee wrote to John O. Brennan, Director, CIA, noting the Intelligence Committee had possession but not custody of records provided by the CIA on a read-and-return basis. Therefore, the Chairman of the Intel. Comm. believed he did not have the authority to 

transfer these records to the Committee as otherwise required by 

the resolution. The Chairman, nonetheless, asked the CIA to make 

these records available to the Select Committee.143

This transmittal is intended to facilitate the CIA’s ability 

to respond to any future requests for these materials from 

the new Select Committee. I expect you will maintain 

these materials at CIA Headquarters in a manner such 


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144 Id. 145See Email from Mary K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Christopher Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Nov. 19, 2014, 14:23 EST) (on 

file with the Committee). 146 Id. 147 Email from Christopher Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Mary 

K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency (Dec. 8, 2014, 13:57 EST) (on file with 

the Committee). 148 Email from Mary K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Christopher 

Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Dec. 8, 2014, 15:10 EST) (on file with 

the Committee). 149Letter from Mike Rogers, Chairman, H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intel., to John O. Brennan, 

Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (May 8, 2014) (on file with the Committee). 150 Email from Christopher Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi to Mary 

K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency (Dec. 11, 2014, 10:47 EST) (on file 

with the Committee). 151 Email from Mary K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency to Christopher 

Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Dec. 15, 2014, 10:33 EST) (on file with 

the Committee). 152 Email from Christopher Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Mary 

K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency (Jan. 8, 2015, 11:19 EST) (on file with 

the Committee). 153 Email from Mary K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Christopher 

Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Jan. 12, 2015, 15:55 EST) (on file with 

the Committee). 154 Interim Progress Update, supra note 8, at 5. 

that they could be easily and promptly provided to the Select Committee.144

In July of 2014, the Intelligence Committee provided its records 

to this Committee, including more than 400 pieces of intelligence 

relating to Benghazi and Libya from 2012, and other reports and 

correspondence. After acquiring the requisite security clearances 

and reviewing these documents, on November 19, 2014 the Committee asked that it be able to review the read-and-return records 

the Intelligence Committee had given back to the CIA.145 The CIA 

responded, noting it was ‘‘working to try to set up a time next week 

when we could make the materials available.’’ 146 The CIA did not 

make the materials available the following week. 

On December 8, 2014, the Committee reiterated its request.147

The CIA responded: ‘‘we are in the process of organizing and page 

numbering the documents so that they are ready for your team to 

review. I’ll check in with the folks who are working on that to see 

if we can make it all available next week.’’ 148 This hardly squared 

with what the Intelligence Committee Chairman requested of the 

CIA.149

The Committee made a third request, on December 11, 2014, to 

review these documents.150 The CIA’s Office of Congressional Affairs responded on December 15, 2014, noting they would ‘‘reach 

out’’ to the Committee staff that would be reviewing the documents.151 The CIA never contacted the Committee. 

The Committee made a fourth request on January 8, 2015.152 On 

January 12, 2015, the CIA responded noting they ‘‘have this request as a priority action. We are currently processing the documents. . . . We hope to have them ready for you in a couple of 

weeks.’’ 153

It was not until the Committee’s January 27, 2015 public compliance hearing with Neil L. Higgins, Director of Congressional Affairs, CIA, that the CIA finally granted the Committee access to 

these documents.154 This was nearly three months after the ComVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00387 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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155 Id. at 9. 156 Id. 157 Email from Mary K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Dana K. 

Chipman, Chief Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi et al. (Apr. 17, 2015, 9:16 EST) (on file 

with the Committee). 158 Id. 159 Id. 160Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John O. Brennan, 

Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Apr. 28, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 161 Id. 162 Id. 

mittee first requested access to these documents—documents the 

CIA had already produced to the Intelligence Committee and had 

been set aside specifically for this Committee’s access.155 Having to 

schedule and conduct public hearings on matters of compliance 

with requests for clearly relevant documents is a waste of time and 

resources. 

In finally gaining access to these documents, the Committee discovered the records consisted of more than 4,000 pages of 

emails.156 The CIA had never indicated they were withholding such 

a large volume of material from the Committee. Reviewing this material necessitated the redirection of Committee time. The CIA, 

however, would only allow four Committee staff to review these 

records during normal business hours at CIA Headquarters in 

McLean, Virginia. These restrictions unnecessarily limited the 

Committee’s access to the materials and significantly and unnecessarily increased the time needed to review the documents. 

In addition, the CIA would not allow Committee staff to retain 

notes made while reviewing these documents, or even take notes 

back to Committee offices to discuss with Committee members.157

The CIA required Committee staff to keep their notes locked in a 

safe at CIA headquarters.158 The CIA eventually offered to allow 

Committee staff to take their notes back to Committee offices—but 

only if CIA staff first reviewed those notes and applied various 

redactions to them.159 This demand raised serious separation of 

powers concerns and would have compromised the investigation to 

allow the subject of an investigation to review and redact the notes 

of its investigator. 

The CIA placed none of these onerous and punitive restrictions 

on the Intelligence Committee’s access to these same materials, 

which the CIA provided to it to keep in its own offices at the Capitol. 

NEW DOCUMENT REQUESTS 

After a review of the more than 4,000 pages of ‘read and return’ 

documents at the CIA, the Committee issued a new document request to the CIA on April 28, 2015.160 This request was for 26 specific categories of information to help the Committee better understand the CIA’s activities in Benghazi, its response to the attacks, 

and the analytic processes undertaken in the wake of the attacks.161 This document request included SameTime messages, 

emails, operational cables, and intelligence reports.162

The CIA resisted this request. In a May 15, 2015 telephone call 

with the Committee Chairman, David S. Cohen, the Deputy Director of the CIA, expressed concern ‘‘with both the breadth and some 

of the types of documents requested,’’ and claimed ‘‘fulfilling the reVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00388 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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163See Email from Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Dana K. 

Chipman, Chief Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (May 15, 2015, 10:23 EST) (on file with 

the Committee). 164Memorandum from Dir., Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Chief Counsel and 

Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, July 8, 2016 (on file with Cent. Intel. Agency, 

REQUEST 15–001 to REQUEST 15–0004). 165 Email from employee, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Cent. Intel. Agency (Sept. 14, 2012 4:05 PM) 

(on file with the Committee, REQUEST 15–0005). 166Subpoena issued by H. Select Comm. on Benghazi to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. 

Agency, (Aug. 7, 2015). 167 Id. 168 Id. 169 Id. 170 Id. 171See, e.g., Testimony of employee, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. 97–100 (July, 16, 2015) (on file 

with the Committee). 

quest could take many months of work.’’ 163 Additional meetings between the Committee and the CIA took place to discuss the request, and it was not until July 8, 2015, two-and-a-half months 

after the Committee’s document request, that the CIA produced additional documents pursuant to this request.164

The results of the document production were underwhelming. 

The CIA delivered only a smattering of material from four general 

categories. One of the documents was a critical email the CIA had 

previously withheld from the Committee even though it had been 

shared with the Intelligence Committee.165 This document changed 

the Committee’s understanding of what information was shared 

with Washington from Tripoli in the wake of the attacks—crucial 

for understanding how the CIA created its post attack analysis. 

The document production also consisted of cables shared with the 

Intelligence Committee but not given to this Committee. 

Because of this insufficient document production and the withholding of clearly relevant information, on August 7, 2015, the 

Committee issued a subpoena to the CIA.166 This subpoena was 

straightforward and asked for six specific sets of documents. These 

documents included specific intelligence assessments written by 

CIA analysts in the wake of the attacks.167 The subpoena demanded the production of ‘‘supporting material’’ for these assessments.168 Up to that point the CIA had refused to produce that material, in addition to refusing to produce the assessments with accompanying footnotes. It therefore was impossible for the Committee to understand what material the analysts used to form the 

basis for their subsequent assessments. 

The subpoena also demanded production of additional documents 

relating to the unclassified talking points requested by the Intelligence Committee on September 14, 2012.169 Previously, the CIA 

had refused to produce any additional documents relating to the 

talking points not already in the public domain, claiming it was the 

responsibility of the Office of Director for National Intelligence to 

produce documents, even though the documents in question were 

all internal to the CIA. 

The subpoena also demanded production of SameTime messages 

from individuals within certain offices in the CIA.170 Prior witness 

testimony revealed CIA employees relied heavily on SameTime 

messages the night of the attacks and in the immediate aftermath, 

as these were more efficient than typing emails.171 Simply reviewing the emails previously produced by the CIA, therefore, would 


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172Letter from Rachel Carlson Lieber, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Dana K. 

Chipman, Chief Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 173 Id. 174 Id. 175Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John O. Brennan, 

Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Jan. 13, 2016) (on file with Committee). 176 Id. 177Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John O. Brennan, 

Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Nov. 4, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 178Subpoena issued by H. Select Comm. on Benghazi to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. 

Agency, (Aug. 7, 2015). 179 Id. 180Letter from John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Feb. 9, 2016) (on file with the Committee). 181 Id. 

not tell the full story of what happened the night and early morning hours of the attacks. 

On August 28, 2015, the CIA responded to the subpoena.172 The 

CIA produced in full the specific intelligence assessments with supporting material.173 The CIA also produced additional material relating to the Intelligence Committee talking points, but objected to 

producing SameTime messages, arguing that the CIA ‘‘does not 

produce SameTime messages to Congress because doing so would 

have serious negative consequences on CIA’s work.’’ 174 This is a 

striking assertion. To suggest the entity that both created and 

funds the CIA and must provide oversight for myriad reasons cannot have access at some level to the work done by the CIA is staggeringly arrogant. In reality these SameTime messages were both 

highly relevant and highly probative and fundamentally changed 

the Committee’s understanding of information previously provided 

to the Committee. This is precisely why Congress must be able to 

access this information and precisely why the CIA was so resistant 

to providing it. 

A review of the documents ultimately produced by the CIA and 

subsequent witness interviews necessitated additional document 

requests to the CIA. The Committee first attempted to request 

these documents informally. The CIA did not produce them. As a 

result, on January 13, 2016, the Committee sent a letter to the CIA 

formally requesting additional documents.175 This request included 

two specific operational cables referenced repeatedly during witness interviews, an additional piece of intelligence analysis from 

after the attacks, and information regarding intelligence given to 

senior policymakers 176—the subject of a previous formal request 

from the Committee to the CIA.177

The CIA ignored this request. As a result, the Committee issued 

a second subpoena on January 20, 2016.178 This subpoena demanded the production of the two specific operational cables in addition to information regarding intelligence given to senior policymakers.179

On February 9, 2016—after months of the Committee applying 

pressure to produce documents and the possibility John O. Brennan, Director, CIA could be held in contempt of Congress for withholding documents—the CIA finally relented.180 The CIA agreed to 

produce SameTime messages to the Committee and came to an 

agreement on access to the two specific operational cables.181

While the CIA claimed the SameTime messages would not 

change the Committee’s understanding of the facts of Benghazi, 


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182See Testimony of employee, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. 43, 46 (Nov. 13, 2015)] (on file with 

the Committee). 183 Email from Rachel Carlson Lieber, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intel. Agency, to H. Select 

Comm. on Benghazi (Jan. 7, 2016, 10:23 EST) (on file with the Committee). 184See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Jan. 13, 2016) (on file with Committee) (on file with the Committee). 

some of the contents of these messages were quite valuable. As a 

result of the delays—the Agency took more than nine months to 

fulfill the Committee’s request—the Committee lost an opportunity 

to question some witnesses specifically about these messages. In 

addition, some of the messages implicated agencies outside the CIA 

and did in fact change the Committee’s understanding of certain 

facts—something the CIA, with its stove-piped view of the 

Benghazi landscape, likely would not have known. 

WITNESSES 

The Committee interviewed 19 CIA witnesses during the course 

of its investigation. The Committee understood these witnesses 

needed flexibility and, in some cases, anonymity. The Committee 

delayed important interviews to ensure personnel would not take 

time away from mission-critical duties overseas. On one occasion, 

the Committee participated in a secure video teleconference with a 

witness overseas, and on another occasion the Committee waited 

until a witness was between tours of duty so the interview would 

not interfere with intelligence activities. The Committee also provided copies of interview transcripts to the CIA so they could have 

them in their offices rather than reviewing them in the Committee 

offices. 

Although the Committee never issued subpoenas to any CIA witnesses, and all appeared voluntarily, the CIA initially refused to 

produce some witnesses—including the manager of the analysts. 

Instead, the CIA produced the former head of the Office of Terrorism Analysis, who was unable to answer granular questions 

about how the analytic assessments were drafted and what specific 

intelligence the analysts relied on.182 Outstanding questions remained after that interview, and it was apparent the Committee 

needed to speak to the first-line manager of the analysts. The CIA 

refused to produce this witness, dubbing the individual a ‘‘junior 

analyst’’ despite a decade of experience at the CIA.183 Only after 

the Committee proposed issuing a subpoena for the witness’s deposition did the CIA agree to produce the person voluntarily for an 

interview.184 This witness proved highly probative, which regrettably, may be why the CIA was reluctant to allow the interview in 

the first instance. 

A similar situation occurred involving a senior employee in 

Benghazi. The CIA initially refused to produce this individual, who, 

given his portfolio in Benghazi, was the only person who could 

speak to a number of different topics and allegations. After the CIA 

agreed to produce him for an interview, the CIA kept pushing the 

date of the interview further into the future. Not until the Chairman issued a subpoena and was preparing to serve it did the CIA 

set a date for this individual’s interview. This witness also provided 

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185 Email from Mary K. E. Maple, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Heather Sawyer, Minority Chief Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi et al (April 22, 2015, 9:19 EST) (on 

file with the Committee). 186See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Jan. 13, 2016); Email from Rachel Carlson Lieber, Deputy General Counsel, Cent. Intel. Agency, to H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Jan. 18, 2016), and Subpoena to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, (Jan. 20, 

2016) (on file with the Committee). 187 Email from Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Minority Staff Dir., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 

to Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency (Oct. 17, 2015, 19:02 EST) (on file 

with the Committee). 188 Email from Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Susanne 

Sachsman Grooms, Minority Staff Dir., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Oct. 17, 2015, 19:44 EST) 

(on file with the Committee). 189 Email from Heather Sawyer, Minority Chief Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to 

Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency (Oct. 19, 2015, 20:47 EST) (on file 

with the Committee). 190 Email from Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Susanne 

Sachsman Grooms, Minority Staff Dir., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Oct. 17, 2015, 19:44 EST) 

(on file with the Committee). 

sions drawn by other committees of Congress and fundamentally 

reshaping the Committee’s understanding of critical factors. 

The Committee is also aware of concerns regarding the accuracy 

of certain specific witness testimony before the House Intelligence 

Committee. The Committee carefully reviewed relevant testimony 

and information and questioned witnesses about this testimony, 

but was unable to definitively resolve the issue. 

DISPARATE TREATMENT 

While the Committee spent months trying to acquire new documents from the CIA, the Committee Minority members had no 

such difficulty. One day before the Committee’s first interview with 

a CIA witness, the CIA emailed the Committee alerting it that ‘‘[i]n 

response to a request for specific cables from the minority, we have 

added three documents’’ to the documents at the CIA available for 

review.185 Neither Committee Minority members nor the CIA informed the Committee such a request had been made until the CIA 

obligingly fulfilled it. In contrast, the CIA refused to produce two 

specific cables requested by the Committee until a subpoena was 

issued.186

Again on October 17, 2015—just five days before the Committee’s 

hearing with the Secretary—an email was sent on behalf of Committee Minority members to Higgins seeking information regarding 

a classification issue.187 The CIA responded 42 minutes later—on 

a Saturday night.188

Two days later Committee Minority members asked the CIA to 

review seven transcript excerpts from two witness interviews for 

classification review.189 The CIA completed these reviews and returned the transcripts in just 40 hours.190

When the Committee asked the CIA to conduct a classification 

review of witness transcripts, however, the CIA refused. As the 

Chairman noted in a letter to Brennan on January 13, 2016: 

The Agency has indicated it will not conduct a classification review of transcripts of previous Committee interviews but has provided no reason why it is unable to perform this review, which must be performed by the Executive Branch. The refusal to conduct this review threatens 

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191Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John O. Brennan, 

Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Jan. 13, 2016) (on file with Committee). 192 Email from Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Philip G. Kiko, 

Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Mar. 22, 2016) (on file with the 

Committee). 193 Id. The CIA acknowledged in a March 4, 2016 meeting that it had simply ‘‘assumed’’ the 

Committee would do this, without ever once asking with the Committee. This mistaken assumption perhaps contributed to the CIA’s hardened posture in refusing to review witness transcripts 

for classification and sensitivity purposes. 194Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Denis R. 

McDonough, White House Chief of Staff (Dec. 29, 2014) (on file with the Committee). 195See, e.g., Letter from Buck McKeon, Chairman, H. Armed Servs. Comm., et al., to the 

President (Oct. 19, 2012) (on file with the Committee); and Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, 

H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, and Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Nat’l 

Sec., to the President (Oct. 19, 2012) (on file with the Committee). 196Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Denis R. 

McDonough, White House Chief of Staff (Dec. 29, 2014) (on file with the Committee). 197Letter from W. Neil Eggleston, White House Counsel, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select 

Comm. on Benghazi (Jan. 23, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 198Letter from Jennifer O’Connor, Deputy White House Counsel, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, 

H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Feb. 27, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 

tional independence of the Committee’s final report, as 

well as the ability of the American people to review transcripts of unclassified interviews. This matter must be resolved promptly to enable the Committee to undertake the 

process of preparing its final report 191

The CIA responded to this letter on March 22, 2016—more than 

two months later—following a meeting on the topic between the 

Committee and the CIA. In its response, the CIA said a classification review of the transcripts would be ‘‘lengthy and laborious.’’ 192

The CIA also reiterated its view the Committee should share its report in advance with the CIA, something the CIA noted was ‘‘critically important.’’ 193 This delayed the Committee’s final report because the Committee cannot release information without having it 

cleared for classification purposes and the Executive Branch solely 

conducts this review. 

The White House 

DOCUMENTS 

The Committee sent a document request to the White House on 

December 29, 2014.194 While this was not the first time Congress 

had asked the White House for information regarding Benghazi,195

it did mark the first time Congress asked the White House for documents. The request consisted of 12 categories, including documents regarding the U.S.’s continued presence in Libya, the response to the attacks, the YouTube video, the Intelligence Committee talking points, and the administration’s explanation of the 

attacks.196

On January 23, 2015, the White House objected to some Committee requests, but did commit to ‘‘be in a position to begin sharing documents by the end of February.’’ 197

On February 27, 2015, White House staff met with Committee 

staff to discuss the requests. At the meeting the White House produced 266 pages of emails to and from White House staff related 

to Benghazi—the first emails and documents produced to Congress 

by the White House about Benghazi.198 These emails, however, 

were heavily redacted. As a result, the White House and Committee reached an agreement regarding redactions, and on March 


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199Letter from Jennifer O’Connor, Deputy White House Counsel, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, 

H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Mar. 16, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 200Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to W. Neil Eggleston, 

White House Counsel (Apr. 23, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 201 Id. 202See Letter from Jennifer O’Connor, Deputy White House Counsel, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (May 11, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 203See Letter from Jennifer O’Connor, Deputy White House Counsel, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (June 19, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 204See Letter from Jennifer O’Connor, Deputy White House Counsel, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (July 17, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 205Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to W. Neil Eggleston, 

White House Counsel (Aug. 7, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 206 Id. 207See Letter from Jennifer O’Connor, Deputy White House Counsel, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with the Committee) 208See Email from Jennifer O’Connor, Deputy Counsel, White House Office of the Chief Counsel, to Dana K. Chipman, Chief Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi et al (Sept. 10, 2015, 

14:53 EST) (on file with the Committee). 209Letter from from Jennifer O’Connor, Deputy White House Counsel, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Oct. 5, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 210Letter from Jennifer O’Connor, Deputy White House Counsel, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, 

H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Oct. 27, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 211Letter from Jennifer O’Connor, Deputy White House Counsel, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, 

H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Nov. 12, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 

16, 2015, the White House produced these documents with the 

redactions removed.199

On April 23, 2015, the Committee Chairman wrote to the White 

House again,200 giving priority to specific categories of documents 

from the Committee’s December 29, 2014 request.201 As a result, 

the White House made additional document productions on May 

11, 2015;202 June 19, 2015;203 and July 17, 2015.204

On August 7, 2015, the Chairman wrote a third time to the 

White House 205 addressing documents responsive to the Committee’s December 29, 2014 request which were being withheld by the 

White House.206 Subsequently, the White House produced additional documents on August 28, 2015.207

On September 9, 2015, White House staff met with Committee 

staff and made progress on satisfying the Committee’s requests for 

information.208 The White House briefed the Committee on a specific request, and a path forward was set to identify remaining documents addressing specific categories of information important to 

the Committee. Additional meetings were held in a classified setting, on October 5, 2015;209 October 27, 2015;210 and November 12, 

2015.211 Each meeting was accompanied by a document production 

from the White House. 

In total, the White House made nine productions of documents 

to the Committee. To be clear the White House did not provide all 

of the information the Committee requested but the Committee 

was granted access to information no other congressional committee accessed. 

WITNESSES 

The Committee interviewed four witnesses from the White 

House. On January 21, 2016, three senior White House officials, W. 

Neil Eggleston, Counsel to the President; Nicholas L. McQuaid, 

Deputy Counsel to the President; and Donald C. Sisson, Special Assistant to the President; flew to Charlotte, North Carolina, to meet 

with the Chairman and discuss details regarding these witness 


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212Press Briefing by Press Sec’y Josh Earnest, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House 

(Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/21/press-briefing-presssecretary-josh-earnest-3182016. 213See Testimony of Susan E. Rice, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Tr. (Feb. 2, 2016) 

(on file with the Committee); Testimony of Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy Nat’l Security Advisor 

for Strategic Communications, Nat’l Security Council, Tr. at 50–51 (Feb. 2, 2016) (on file with 

the Committee). 214 H. Res. 567, 113th Cong., § 4(a) (2014). 215Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to W. Neil Eggleston, 

White House Counsel (Mar. 16, 2016) (on file with the Committee). 216 Id. 217Letter from Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Trey Gowdy, 

Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (April 28, 2016) (on file with the Committee). 

interviews.212 The White House and the Committee honored the 

confidentiality of the meeting and the discussions. 

Susan E. Rice, National Security Advisor, and Benjamin J. 

Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, then testified before the Committee.213

ACCESS TO COMPARTMENTED PROGRAMS 

Over the course of nearly a dozen interviews with the State Department, the Defense Department, and CIA personnel, witnesses 

consistently refused to answer questions related to certain allegations with respect to U.S. activities in Libya even though the House 

specifically gave the Committee access to materials relating to intelligence sources and methods.214 Most of these questions related 

in some way to allegations regarding weapons.215 These refusals 

meant significant questions raised in public relating to Benghazi 

could not be answered. 

At the meeting between the Chairman and the White House in 

Charlotte, N.C., in January 2016, the Chairman told Eggleston the 

Committee would need to review any and all relevant special access programs that might relate to U.S. government activities in 

Libya. On March 16, 2016, the Committee formalized its request 

for this access in a letter to Eggleston: 

With this letter, I am also including a classified attachment detailing specific testimony received by the Committee establishing the need to further clarify what specific activities the U.S. government may have conducted, 

and/or authorized, in Libya in 2011 and 2012. . . . You 

are in a unique position to help us make sure the record 

is complete. In order to accomplish this, however, the Committee requires your assistance. I therefore write to formally request access to all special access programs regarding U.S. activities in Libya in 2011–2012.216

The letter contained a classified attachment detailing specific 

testimony from senior and line personnel from the State Department, CIA, and the Defense Department, all of whom did not respond fully to questions from the Committee during their interviews due to access issues. Some of the testimony provided raised 

substantial further questions in light of the record available to the 

Committee. The administration ultimately did not provide the requested access.217


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218Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to W. Neil Eggleston, 

White House Counsel (June 7, 2016) (Reproduced in Appendix C). 219Letter from W. Neil Eggleston, White House Counsel to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select 

Comm. on Benghazi (June 25, 2016) (on file with the Committee). 220WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43072, COMMON QUESTIONS ABOUT FEDERAL

RECORDS AND RELATED AGENCY REQUIREMENTS 2 (2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/ 

R43072.pdf (citing 44 U.S.C., Chapters 21, 29, 31, and 33). 221 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012). Conversely, non-record materials are broken down into three categories: (1) library and museum material (2) extra copies of documents; and (3) stocks of publications and processed documents—such as catalogs, trade journals, and other publications that are 

QUESTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT 

In the summer of 2014, the Chairman first discussed sending 

questions to the President with Eggleston. In the January 2016 

meeting, the Chairman again raised with Eggleston the possibility 

of sending questions to the President. The Chairman offered Eggleston the opportunity to review and comment on the questions in 

advance as well as to provide the documentary basis behind each 

question. 

Despite this offer by the Chairman, in the three months following that meeting, the White House repeatedly rebuffed offers 

from the Committee to meet and discuss the questions. On June 7, 

2016, the Chairman sent to Eggleston a list of 15 questions for the 

President regarding the Benghazi attacks.218 None of these questions had ever been directly addressed by the White House publicly, and for most of the questions the President is the only person 

able to answer the question. The full text of the letter with the 

questions is reproduced in Appendix C of this report. 

On June 25, 2016, Eggleston responded that he had advised the 

President not to answer the Chairman’s questions. Specifically, 

Eggleston noted ‘‘implications’’ for the constitutional separation of 

powers and wrote ‘‘if the President were to answer your questions, 

his response would suggest that Congress has the unilateral power 

to demand answers from the President about his official acts.’’ 219

Eggleston did not explain how voluntary responses would suggest 

that Congress could compel answers nor did he mention prior interviews—such as on 60 Minutes on September 12, 2012, and on 

Univision on September 20, 2012—where the President discussed 

the Benghazi attacks. 

COMPLIANCE WITH RECORD-KEEPING LAWS AND 

REGULATIONS 

The Federal Records Act 

The Federal Records Act [FRA] ‘‘governs the collection, retention, 

preservation, and possible destruction of federal agency records’’ by 

Federal agencies. 220 Federal records include: 

[A]ll books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, or other documentary materials, regardless of physical form 

or characteristics, made or received by a federal agency under federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business 

and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its 

legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, proceedings, operations or other activities of the 

government or because of informational value of the date within 

them.221


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received from other government agencies, commercial firms, or private institutions. 36 C.F.R. 

§ 1222.14 (2009). The FRA was most recently amended in 2014 to address: 

‘‘[T]he rapid migration over the last several decades toward electronic communication 

and recordkeeping, federal recordkeeping laws are still focused on the media in which 

a record is preserved, not the information that constitutes the record itself. To correct 

this flaw, this legislation will shift the onus of recordkeeping onto the record and not 

the media it is contained in as a way to better enable NARA, and other agencies, to 

handle growing amounts of electronic communication.’’ 

H. REP. NO. 113–127, at 5 (2013). That amendment was introduced by Ranking Member Cummings (D-MD). H.R. 1233, 113th Cong. (2013). 222 44 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012). 223 44 U.S.C. § 3102 (2012). 224 44 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012). 225 36 C.F.R. § 1222.22 (c) (2015). 226 36 C.F.R. § 1236.22 (b) (2015). 227 5 FAM 414.1 (2015). 228 5 FAM 414.3–1(8) (2015). 229 5 FAM 422.2(3) (2015) (emphasis added); see also 5 FAM 443.1 (establishing principles governing email communications) and 5 FAM 754(h) (requiring users to review 5 FAM 443 for responsibilities for handling email correspondence). 230See August 11, 2014 document production from the State Dep’t which included eight emails 

sent to or received by the Secretary. 

The FRA requires each agency head to ‘‘make and preserve 

records.’’ 222 Each agency head must ‘‘establish and maintain an active, continuing program for the economical and efficient management of the records of the agency’’ including ‘‘effective controls over 

the creation and over the maintenance and use of records in the 

conduct of current business.’’ 223 Additionally, each agency head 

‘‘shall establish safeguards against the removal or loss of 

records.’’ 224

The details of implementing an agency’s record management program are set out in Federal regulations. Agencies must maintain 

‘‘adequate documentation of agency business’’ that ‘‘[m]ake possible 

a proper scrutiny by Congress.’’ 225 The regulations require 

‘‘[a]gencies that allow employees to send and receive official electronic mail messages using a system not operated by the agency 

must ensure that federal records sent or received on such systems 

are preserved in the appropriate agency recordkeeping system.’’ 226

The State Department’s own records management policies reinforce the statutory and regulatory requirements. According to the 

Foreign Affairs Manual: ‘‘[T]he Secretary is required to establish a 

Records and Information Life Cycle Management Program in accordance with the Federal Records Act.’’ 227 Objectives of the program include fulfilling official requests from Congress,228 as well as 

ensuring ‘‘[t]he recording of activities of officials of the Department 

should be complete to the extent necessary to . . . [m]ake possible 

a proper scrutiny by Congress and duly authorized agencies of the 

Government of the manner in which the functions of the Department 

have been discharged.’’ 229

The State Department’s Record Keeping 

The Committee first became aware of the Secretary’s use of a 

non-official email account for at least some official business on August 11, 2014, when the State Department produced to the Committee eight emails to or from the Secretary.230 These emails indicated the Secretary used a private email account to communicate 


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231See id. Some of the emails were identified by the address with domain name 

‘‘@clintonemail.com.’’ Other emails were designated simply as ‘‘H.’’ 232See Fischer Testimony at 66, in relevant part: 

Q: Okay. One of the things that we wanted to talk with you about was when you first 

became knowledgeable or aware that all or part of Secretary Clinton’s records were not 

on premises with the State Dep’t. And can you tell us when that was? 

A: The end of July 2014. 233 ‘‘Office of the Sec’y: Evaluation of Email Records Management and Cybersecurity Requirements,’’ supra note 69 at 17–18. 234See Memorandum from ‘‘M—Patrick F. Kennedy’’ to 7th Floor Principals 1 (Aug. 28, 2014) 

(on file with the Committee). 235See id. at 3. 236See id. 

about official government business.231 Well before the State Department made this production of eight emails, it was abundantly 

clear the State Department knew the complete universe of responsive documents and emails was not housed or situated on State Department servers.232

The State Department was aware—as early as June 2013—of the 

Secretary’s use of personal email for official business and the detrimental effect on responses to Congress and obligations under the 

Federal Records Act, yet the Department said nothing.233 The 

State Department was actively retrieving the Secretary’s official 

emails in May 2014—the same time the Committee was formed— 

still the Department said nothing. 

Seventeen days after producing eight of the Secretary’s emails, 

the State Department, through Kennedy, issued a memorandum to 

State Department principals reiterating the obligation that departing senior staff have to ensure the timely return of records, including email.234 Specifically, Kennedy’s memorandum referenced a 

‘‘policy in place since 2009 . . . to capture electronically email accounts of the senior officials listed in Tab 1 as they depart their 

positions.’’ 235 The memorandum attached the relevant Foreign Affairs Manual provisions including those related to email records.236

During questioning by the Chairman, Kennedy testified about the 

memorandum: 

Q: On August the 28th, you issued a memo to a whole 

host of people, subject: ‘‘Senior Officials’ Records Management Responsibilities.’’ I want to make sure he gets a copy 

of that so he’s looking at the same thing I’m looking at. 

And we can mark it as committee exhibit 13 here. Does 

that look familiar? I’m not going to go through the whole 

thing with you. I just want to. . . . 

A: Yes, sir, this is familiar. This is something that we did 

in response to a NARA program that we call journaling 

but NARA’s official name is Capstone. 

Q: And what prompted you to promulgate this memo? 

A: NARA’s program. 

Q: I thought you and I had established that NARA rule 

had taken place the fall of 2013. 

A: The journaling effort, Mr. Chairman, I cannot remember the exact date and how my people had worked this 

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237Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. 

at 259–61 (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Kennedy Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 238See Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., Dep’t Notice 2014_10_115: A Message from Under Sec’y for Management Patrick F. Kennedy regarding State Dep’t Records Responsibilities and Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.archives.gov/press/ 

press-releases/2015/pdf/attachment2-department-notice.pdf; Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of 

State for Mgmt., Cable to Field: State Dep’t Records Responsibilities and Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF

STATE (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2015/pdf/attachment3-cableto-the-field.pdf. 239See Letter from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to former Sec’ys Madeline Albright, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Hillary Clinton. (Oct. 

28, 2014) (on file with the Committee). It’s important to note that because of a drafting error, 

Cheryl D. Mills letter was sent on November 12, 2014. See Letter from Patrick F. Kennedy, 

Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State, to Cheryl D. Mills. (Nov. 12, 2014) (on file 

with the Committee). 240See Fischer Testimony, supra note 54, at 32–33. 241See Letter from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S Dep’t of State 

to Cheryl D. Mills. (Nov. 12, 2014) (on file with the Committee). 

thing that I’m just reading this now to see if anything else 

reminds me. Chairman, if I am slow, I am slow. But I have 

Q: Having spent the day with you, you will never convince 

me that you are slow. You will never convince me of that. 

If you would look at page 3 for me, kind of in the middle, 

it’s a bullet that starts, ‘‘As a general matter.’’ 

A: Yes. 

Q: ‘‘As a general matter.’’ I’ll let you read the rest of that. 

You can read it for the record whenever you feel comfortable. 

A: Yes, sir, I am ready. 

Q: Will you read that for us, for the court reporter? 

A: ‘‘As a general matter, to ensure a complete record of 

their activities, senior officials should not use their private 

email accounts for (e.g., Gmail) for official businesses. If a 

senior official uses his or her private email account for the 

conduct of official business, she or he must ensure that 

records pertaining to official business that are sent from or 

received on such email account are captured and maintained. The best way to ensure this is to forward incoming 

e mails received on a private account to the senior official’s 

State account and copy ongoing messages to their State account.’’ 237

Less than six weeks later, Kennedy sent another State Department announcement restating the obligations of employees to preserve records.238 Less than 10 days later, on October 28, 2014, 

Kennedy sent a letter to four former Secretaries of State. That letter sought the return of Federal records, ‘‘such as an email sent or 

received on a personal email account while serving as Secretary.’’ 239 The letter emphasized that ‘‘diverse Department records 

are subject to various disposition schedules with most Secretary of 

State records retained permanently,’’ a fact that was confirmed in 

the Committee’s interview with William Fischer, Chief Records Officer, State Department.240 Because of a typographical error, the 

State Department did not send the letter to Mills until November 

12, 2014.241


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In response to a Committee member, Kennedy told the Committee: 

A: Yes, sir. This was in response to a National Archives 

and Records Administration new policy that they had put 

out. 

Q: Uh-huh. And the letter came from you? 

A: The letter came from me, yes, sir. 

Q: And 

A: It went to the representatives of I believe it was four 

previous Secretaries of State. 

Q: Why did it go to the representatives? 

A: That was just a decision that we would write the representatives because it would more likely get the kind of 

attention, immediate attention, if we sent it to the representatives. And I personally knew all the representatives 

of Secretary Powell on forward. And so I would write them 

because I would make sure that they would take it would 

not get lost, potentially, in the junk mail category. 

Q: Okay. And just give me in your words, so I don’t have 

to reread and go through this letter in your words, what 

were you trying to accomplish exactly with this letter? 

What were you concerned about? 

A: We wanted to make sure that we had in our possession 

any Federal record that had been created during their tenure that we might not have in our possession. 

Q: Uh-huh. 

Q: And what prompted you to write the letter when you 

wrote it? 

A: It was basically the NARA, the NARA. 

Q: Rule? 

A: The NARA rule. 

Q: And when was the NARA rule promulgated, do you recall? 

A: I believe that it was in late 2013. 

Q: If it was late 2013, why did you wait until late 2014 

to write the letter? 

A: Because this is when I received it, sir. 

Q: When you received what? 

A: When my staff called this to my attention. 

Q: Can you see how the timeline might appear to have 

been influenced by other factors? Are you at least open to 

the optics of a congressional committee continuing to ask 

for her emails, and none are forthcoming, and the State 

Department says not one word about not having her 

record? 


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And I will say again for the record, for the court reporter, 

because this may be a new court reporter. The person 

that’s currently assigned to aid Congress in collection of 

records, Mr. Snyder, could not be more professional and 

easy to work with and fair. And if it’s no, it’s no, and if 

it’s yes, it’s yes, but at least we have an answer. Previous 

to Mr. Snyder, it was not that way. 

So we ask, and we hear crickets. And then we see these 

letters from you to all the way back to John Jay and Alexander Hamilton saying, can you please produce records. 

And the rule was promulgated a year before you sent the 

letter, Ambassador. 

A: Mr. Chairman, I absolutely understand your concerns 

and absolutely agree that your request for records rang 

some bells in the State Department. Absolutely. 

Q: That’s what I’m getting at. 

A: But, you know, if we wanted to hide something, I would 

have never sent this letter. 

Q: Well, there are two ways to look at that. You sent the 

letter to more than just the Secretary, which was a very 

good way to deflect attention onto other Secretaries of 

State, even though the ones that you [sic] some of the ones 

you dealt with in the past never sent you an email. Now, 

the letter does say records and not just emails, I will grant 

you that. 

A: That is correct, sir. 

Q: But it is curious why you would wait years and years 

and years to make sure the public record is complete. 

Meanwhile, you’re getting FOIA requests and congressional inquiries and a host of other things. And yet you 

wait until our committee is in the throes of asking for her 

emails for this letter to be sent. 

Can you see how that would look suspicious? 

A: I can see how it looks suspicious, but, Mr. Chairman, 

I acted after discussion with my colleagues. You know, you 

called something to our attention, and we thought, ‘‘We 

could have a problem here.’’ We are now in the email era 

at the State Department. And the email era of the State 

Department, access to the Internet, et cetera, et cetera, essentially goes back only to let’s see goes back to about late 

19—— 

Q: Whenever Al Gore invented it. All right. I’m going to 

turn it back over to Jim. 

A: So that we went back to the period of time before Secretaries of State who were, in the opinion of myself and 

others in the State Department, in the Internet email era. 

And so we went to those four Secretaries of State—— 

Q: I’m with you. 


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242Kennedy Testimony at 252–57. 

A: —to make sure that we had your concerns. We also had 

the NARA concerns. And it seemed to be a rational decision to reach out across the board, because it was only 

going back 

Q: But you would concede you had been getting FOIA requests and you had gotten other congressional inquiries, 

none of which prompted you to write this letter. 

A: This is the first time it had been brought to my attention. 

Q: And you’ve said ‘brought to your attention.’ Who specifically brought this to your attention? 

A: I don’t remember. I think it was some combination of 

our records officers and the Bureau of Legislative Affairs. 

Q: All right. You wrote Ms. Mills, among others. 

A: Yes. 

Q: Did you have any conversations, correspondence, 

emails, face to face meetings with Ms. Mills prior to sending this letter? 

A: Not on this subject. 

Q: So, out of the cold blue air, you sent Ms. Mills a letter 

saying, essentially, ‘Send Secretary Clinton’s emails back 

to the State Department,’ no warning? 

A: I also sent Peggy Sefarino, who was going I wrote who 

I regarded to be the senior staff officers for four 

Q: And you’re saying Ms. Mills had no notice that this letter was coming. 

A: I did not call her and tell her it was coming, sir. And 

I am unaware of anyone else who may have called her. 

Q: Did you meet with her and tell her it was coming? 

A: No, sir, I did not. 

Q: The other three designees for the three previous Secretaries of State, did you communicate with them in any 

fashion prior to them receiving the letter on behalf of the 

Secretary of State? 

A: No, sir, I did not. 

Q: And just to be clear, with your question from Chairman 

Gowdy, you said you did have conversations with Cheryl 

Mills prior to this letter being sent? 

A: Not about this topic, sir. Every once in a while, I would 

see Cheryl Mills at a social function. I think I even had 

lunch with her once, discussing old business not related to 

Secretary I had worked with Cheryl Mills for 4 years.242

Less than five weeks after receipt of Kennedy’s letter, Mills 

wrote back to the State Department indicating she was making 


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243Letter from Cheryl D. Mills to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. 

Dep’t of State (Dec. 5, 2014) (on file with the Committee). 244See Fischer Testimony, supra note 54, at 85. 245Letter from Cheryl D. Mills to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., U.S. 

Dep’t of State (Dec. 5, 2014) (on file with the Committee). 246 Id. 247 Id. 248 Id. 249Letter from Julia Frifield, Ass’t Sec’y of State for Leg. Affairs, State Dep’t, to Trey Gowdy, 

Chmn., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (June 25, 2015) (on file with the Committee) (‘‘In a limited 

number of circumstances, we did not locate in the tens of thousands of pages of emails provided 

by Secretary Clinton the content of a handful of communications that Mr. Blumenthal provided. 

Those communications . . . are documents Bates-numbered in Blumenthal products. . . .’’). 250See id. 251Testimony of Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 280 (Oct. 22, 

2015) (on file with the Committee). 252See id. at 323 where Chairman Gowdy states ‘‘when I asked the State Department about 

ten days ago, what is the source of that figure, they shrugged their shoulders.’’ 

55,000 pages of emails sent or received on the Secretary’s private 

email account available to the State Department.243 The emails 

were not enclosed with the letter. The Committee would learn later 

State Department officials were sent to pick up the emails at the 

law firm of the Secretary’s attorney, Williams and Connolly.244

In her December 5, 2014 letter to Kennedy, Mills stated: 

Like Secretaries of State before her, Secretary Clinton at 

times used her own electronic mail account when engaging 

with other officials. On matters pertaining to the conduct 

of government business, it was her practice to use the officials’ government electronic mail accounts. Accordingly, to 

the extent the Department retains records of government 

electronic mail accounts, it already has records of her electronic mail during her tenure preserved within the Department’s record keeping systems.245

Notably, this was the first time the phrase ‘‘it was her practice 

to use the officials’ government electronic emails accounts’’ was 

used.246 Mills further explained in her letter ‘‘to the extent the Department retains records of government electronic mail accounts, it 

already has records of her electronic mail during her tenure preserved within the Department’s record keeping systems.’’ 247 Mills 

letter did not address how emails sent both to and from a personal 

email account would be captured for federal records purposes.248 In 

fact it would be difficult to provide to such an explanation since the 

Committee’s investigation uncovered work-related emails that were 

sent to and from personal email accounts that were never produced 

to the State Department.249

Collectively, the statements above served as an attempt to shift 

the burden of the Secretary’s recordkeeping responsibilities to other 

government officials and the State Department.250 This was apparent in further statements consistently made by the Secretary speculating that ‘‘the State Department had between 90–95 percent of 

all the ones that were work related. They were already on the system.’’ 251 Not only could the State Department not confirm the percentage provided by the Secretary it did not know where the percentage she used originated.252

On March 9, 2015, the Secretary revealed her attorneys deleted 

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253Zeke J. Miller, Transcript: Everything Hillary Clinton Said on the Email Controversy, TIME

(Mar. 10, 2015), http://time.com/3739541/transcript-hillary-clinton-email-press-conference/. 254See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly (Mar. 19, 2015) (on file with the Committee) (‘‘[F]ormally 

requesting Secretary Clinton make her server available to a neutral, detached and independent 

third party for immediate inspection and review.’’); see also Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, 

H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly (Mar. 31, 

2015) (‘‘[W]e . . . urge the Secretary to reconsider her position and allow a neutral, detached, 

and independent arbiter ensure the public record is complete and all materials relevant to the 

Committee’s work have been provided to the Committee.’’). 255See Letter from David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Mar. 27, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 256See Letter from James M. Cole, Partner, Sidley Austin, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (June 12, 2015) (enclosing production of documents related to Mr. 

Cole’s client, Sidney S. Blumenthal). 257See Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of State for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (June 25, 2015) (on file with 

the Committee). 

related’’ emails.253 Neither the State Department nor the Committee could verify no work-related emails were deleted by the Secretary’s attorneys or that all of her emails related to Benghazi and 

Libya were actually produced to the Committee. Concerned about 

the completeness of the record, the Chairman requested, on March 

19, 2015 and again on March 31, 2015, that the Secretary make 

the email server available to a neutral third party for inspection 

and review.254 The requests were rejected.255 The Committee’s concern was confirmed on June 12, 2015 when a non-government witness produced approximately 150 emails and memos sent to or received by the Secretary. 256 Approximately 89 of these emails had 

never been produced to the Committee. The State Department 

could not locate 15 of them either in full or part.257 This is significant for at least two reasons. First, it confirms suspicions the State 

Department failed to produce relevant, probative information to the 

Committee until confronted with the reality the Committee had 

accessed the information through separate channels. In other 

words, the State Department denied until they were caught. Secondly, this undermines the argument of the Secretary that all of 

her work-related emails were produced to the State Department. 

Clearly, these 15 emails are work related and equally clearly they 

were not produced to the State Department. What remains unknown is whether these emails were lost while housed on the Secretary’s private server or whether the Secretary’s attorneys 

screened these emails out when they self-selected which records 

would be deemed official and which would be deemed personal. Regardless, relevant and probative information the public was entitled to review as public records was withheld. 

The fact the Secretary used and maintained a private email account and server for all of her work-related emails prevented the 

State Department from executing its responsibilities under the 

FRA and the implementing regulations and policies. 

The use of private email for official business was not confined to 

the Secretary. As noted previously, the Committee also discovered 

that Mills, Abedin, and Sullivan all made use of private email for 

official business. Compounding the problem of recovering these 

records, the State Department did not archive emails sent to or 


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258See Lauren French, Gowdy: Not backing off subpoena of Clinton emails, POLITICO (Mar. 

5, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/house-committee-benghazi-clintonemail-subpoena-115795. 259 April 10, 2015 meeting between State Dep’t officials and Comm. staff. 260Testimony of John Bentel, Director, Executive Secretariat, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 37 

(June 30, 2015)(on file with the Comm.). 261 Bentel Testimony at 51. 262 Email from Philip G. Kiko, Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 

to Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec’y for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Apr. 18, 2015, 3:39 PM). 263Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, Sec’y 

of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (July 31, 2015) (on file with Comm.). 264See conversations between State Dep’t personnel and Comm. staff. 265Kennedy Testimony at 211. 

from senior staff in the Secretary’s office during the Secretary’s 

tenure.258

Beginning in early March 2015, the Committee sought additional 

information on the Department’s records management activities. 

The Committee requested briefings on the State Department’s 

record keeping activities as it related to both the Secretary and her 

senior staff. On March 17, 2015, the Committee met with representatives from the National Archives and Records Administration to better understand their role in the State Department’s 

record keeping practices. On April 10, 2015, the Committee met 

with Katie Stana, Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, 

State Department, to understand the recordkeeping apparatus in 

place for the Office of the Secretary.259 In addition, the Committee 

interviewed John Bentel, Director of the Office of Information Resource Management for the Executive Secretariat, to understand 

the technology and systems the Secretary and other senior officials 

used. When asked about the Secretary’s exclusive use of private 

email and server, the Director testified he became aware when it 

came out in the papers.260 He further testified he did not know 

whether the State Department’s general counsel was consulted.261

The Committee sought to better understand the State Department’s record keeping practices, including additional information 

on compliance with existing Federal regulations and State Department policy on April 18, 2015.262 In particular, the Committee requested the State Department respond to 27 questions raised regarding the Secretary’s email usage. The Committee emphasized 

the importance in getting answers to the questions by including 

them as part of the July 31, 2015 demand letter to Kerry.263 When 

asked about the status of a State Department response, the State 

Department indicated the OIG would respond to the questions.264

In a January 14, 2016 meeting, the OIG revealed it had not seen 

the questions until the week of January 5, 2016, contrary to the 

assertions made by State Department officials. In fact, the OIG 

suggested at the meeting the Committee would be best served by 

asking the State Department to respond to the questions. 

The questions were subsequently posed to Kennedy on February 

3, 2016, who was surprised by the questions. Kennedy testified, 

when asked about the volume of emails produced to the State Department: ‘‘[a]gain, I don’t remember when I learned for [sic] it, 

and that is not, as I said, this is not a subject I prepared for, for 

this interview.’’ 265

The Committee’s experiences with the State Department’s 

records management and retention practices are consistent with 

findings by the OIG. It should be noted the position of Inspector 


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266 Byron Tau & Peter Nicholas, State Dep’t Lacked Top Watchdog During Hillary Clinton 

Tenure, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/state-department-lacked-topwatchdog-during-hillary-clinton-tenure-1427239813. 267Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of State,Inspection of Bureau of Administration, Global 

Information Services, Office of Information Programs and Services: Report No. ISP–I–12–54, 1 

(Sept. 2012), https://oig.state.gov/system/files/199774.pdf. 268 Id. 269See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of State, Review of State Messaging and Archive 

Retrieval Toolset and Record Email: Report No. ISP–I–15–15, 1 (Mar. 2015), https://oig.state.gov/ 

system/files/isp-i-15-15.pdf. 

General [IG] was vacant during the Secretary’s entire tenure forcing the OIG to operate without a permanent IG and often without 

an acting IG.266 A permanent IG may have had the independence 

and standing to intervene on these records issues sooner. In September 2012, the OIG found that State Department’s Office of Information Program Services, the office responsible for records management practices: ‘‘do[es] not meet statutory and regulatory requirements.267 Although the office develops policy and issues guidance, it does not ensure proper implementation, monitor performance or enforce compliance.’’ 268

Despite an upgrade in 2009 to spur the preservation of emails as 

official records, the OIG found in March 2015: 

State Department employees have not received adequate 

training or guidance on their responsibilities for using the 

system to preserve ‘record emails.’ In 2011, employees created 61,156 record emails out of more than a billion emails 

sent. Employees created 41,749 in 2013. . . . Some employees do not create record emails because they do not 

want to make the email available in searches....269

In its May 2016 report, the OIG found: 

The Federal Records Act requires appropriate management and preservation of Federal Government records, regardless of physical form or characteristics, that document 

the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, 

and essential transactions of an agency. For the last two 

decades, both Department of State (Department) policy 

and Federal regulations have explicitly stated that emails 

may qualify as Federal records. 

As is the case throughout the Federal Government, management weaknesses at the Department have contributed 

to the loss or removal of email records, particularly records 

created by the Office of the Secretary. These weaknesses 

include a limited ability to retrieve email records, inaccessibility of electronic files, failure to comply with requirements for departing employees, and a general lack of oversight. 

OIG’s ability to evaluate the Office of the Secretary’s compliance with policies regarding records preservation and 

use of non-Departmental communications systems was, at 

times, hampered by these weaknesses. However, based on 

its review of records, questionnaires, and interviews, OIG 

determined that email usage and preservation practices 

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270 ‘‘Office of the Sec’y: Evaluation of Email Records Management and Cybersecurity Requirements,’’ supra note 69 at Introduction. 271 Interim Progress Update, supra note 8, at iii. 

taries and that, accordingly, compliance with statutory, 

regulatory, and internal requirements varied as well. 

OIG also examined Department cybersecurity regulations 

and policies that apply to the use of non-Departmental systems to conduct official business. Although there were few 

such requirements 20 years ago, over time the Department 

has implemented numerous policies directing the use of 

authorized systems for day-to-day operations. In assessing 

these policies, OIG examined the facts and circumstances 

surrounding three cases where individuals exclusively 

used non-Departmental systems to conduct official business.270

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The necessity and importance of Congress’s oversight authority 

is obvious. Given the administration’s lack of responsiveness in 

most regards and slow and uneven responsiveness in all regards, 

the Committee makes the recommendations below. 

Restoring the Congressional Contempt Power 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

• House and Senate rules should be amended to provide for mandatory reductions in appropriations to the salaries of federal officials held in contempt of Congress. 

• The criminal contempt statute should be amended to require the 

appointment of a special counsel to handle criminal contempt 

proceedings upon the certification of a contempt citation against 

an Executive Branch official by the House or Senate. 

• Expedited procedures for the civil enforcement of congressional 

subpoenas should be enacted to provide timely judicial resolution 

of disputes. 

ANALYSIS 

As the Chairman noted in the May 8, 2015 Interim Progress Update: 

Compelling compliance with subpoenas requires either the 

cooperation of the Executive Branch—particularly the 

United States Attorney—the very entity from which we 

seek the information and an unlikely ally, or pursuing document production from the Executive Branch via civil contempt, a laborious, slow process and counterproductive to 

the goal of an expeditious investigation.271

This remark concisely describes the dilemma all congressional 

committees face when demanding information from the Executive 

Branch. This state of affairs also results, in part, from Congress’s 

failure to adapt the law and its own internal rules to changed circumstances. The recommendations above would restore to Congress 


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272 E.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 228–29 (1821) (holding that the House has the inherent power to punish a private citizen for contempt). 273 Id. 274See id. 275See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935). 276See Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 78 (D.D.C. 2008). 277 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194. 278 2 U.S.C. § 194. 279 2 U.S.C. § 192, see 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (regarding the maximum fine). 280Morton Rosenberg, When Congress Comes Calling: A Primer on the Principles, Practices, 

and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry, THE CONST. PROJECT 16 (2009), http:// 

www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/WhenCongressComesCalling.pdf. 281 Id. 282Letter from Karl R. Thompson, Acting Ass’t Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t 

of Justice, to Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney for D.C. (June 16, 2014). 283See id. 

an effective and useful ability to compel compliance from the Executive Branch. 

Contempt of Congress has long been recognized as a necessary 

and inherent component of the legislative power.272 Without the 

power to find individuals in contempt, Congress would have no 

means by which to command compliance with its subpoenas and 

punish obstruction.273 For much of our history, Congress wielded 

the power to enforce a finding of contempt by imprisoning noncompliant individuals—often referred to as the ‘‘inherent’’ contempt 

power.274 Congress last used this power in 1935.275 It has been 

called ‘‘unseemly’’ and few would advocate a return to the practice 

in the current hyper-partisan political environment where even the 

issuing of subpoenas draws howls of protest.276

Congress first enacted criminal contempt procedures in 1857 as 

an alternative to its inherent power to imprison.277 Under the 

criminal contempt statute, the House or Senate may cite an individual for contempt of Congress and certify the citation to the U.S. 

Attorney for the District of Columbia whose ‘‘duty’’ it is to present 

the contempt citation to a grand jury.278 Criminal contempt is pun- ishable by a fine of up to $100,000 and up to one year in prison.279

The criminal contempt statute was, in practice, the sole enforcement mechanism for Congress after 1935 and was used or threatened with some frequency against senior Executive Branch officials 

beginning in 1975.280 Invoking the criminal contempt statute generally resulted in full or substantial compliance with subpoenas.281

During recent administrations, the threat of criminal contempt 

has been insufficient to compel Executive Branch compliance. A recent opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel within the Justice Department likely ended any remaining usefulness the criminal contempt statute had in compelling compliance by Executive Branch 

officials. In June 2014, the Office of Legal Counsel advised the U.S. 

Attorney for D.C. that the U.S. Attorney retains prosecutorial discretion not to present a criminal contempt citation to a grand jury 

despite a statutory ‘‘duty’’ to present.282 In other words, U.S. Attorneys must substitute their judgment for the judgment of the House 

or Senate of the United States.283 While the merits of the Office 

of Legal Counsel opinion are open to debate, as a practical political 

matter it is unlikely future administrations would reverse an opinion so obviously favorable to their interests. As a result, an Executive Branch official appointed by the President has discretion 

whether to hold another Executive Branch official—likely appointed by the same President—accountable for failing to comply 


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284See id. 285See Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 108 (D.D.C. 2008) (ordering 

Miers to testify before and produce requested materials to Congress). 286See Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform v. Lynch, No. 12–1332 (ABJ), 2016 WL 225675, 

at *16 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2016) (granting the Comm.’s motion to compel the Justice Dep’t to 

produce documents). 287Press Release, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, House Asks Federal Court to Rule 

Against Attorney General’s Stonewalling in Fast and Furious (Aug. 13, 2012), https://oversight.house.gov/release/house-asks-federal-court-to-rule-against-attorney-generals-stonewallingin-fast-and-furious. 288Lynch, 2016 WL 225675, at 16. 289Press Release, H Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Chaffetz Statement on Fast and 

Furious (Apr. 8, 2016), https://oversight.house.gov/release/chaffetz-statement-fast-furiousdocuments. 290For example, House Rules prohibit the inclusion of provisions changing existing law in a 

general appropriations bill and such provisions may be objected to and ruled out of order. See 

Rules of the H. of Representatives, Rule XXI, cl. 2(b) (114th Cong.). A similar rule could be applied to any provision appropriating funds that would go to the salary of a Federal official held 

in contempt. 

with a congressional subpoena.284 The conflict is obvious and impossible to avoid. Regardless of the merits of a U.S. Attorney’s decision not to present a congressional contempt citation to a grand 

jury, the decision will be colored by that conflict of interest. 

Because of the deficiencies of the inherent power and criminal 

enforcement of contempt, Congress has turned to civil enforcement 

of its subpoenas with mixed success. While civil enforcement has 

led to the testimony of officials 285 and the production of a privilege 

log and substantial numbers of previously withheld documents,286

Congress must accept very lengthy delays in order to pursue this 

enforcement option. In its investigation of ‘Operation Fast and Furious,’ the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee 

Chairman filed a civil action against the Justice Department in August 2012 to compel the production of documents.287 Three and a 

half years later, in January 2016, a Federal district court judge ordered the Justice Department to produce withheld documents,288

and in April 2016, the Justice Department finally produced the documents to Congress.289 An enforcement tool requiring three and a 

half years simply to get a district court order is unacceptable. 

While Congress retains its constitutional authority to hold recalcitrant witnesses in contempt of Congress, this authority no longer 

compels prompt, if any, compliance. All three enforcement mechanisms—inherent powers, criminal charges and civil enforcement— 

have questionable usefulness today and are largely dependent upon 

other branches of government agreeing with or pursuing the cause 

and remedy. The administration’s obstruction of congressional oversight is the inevitable and predictable result. The three recommendations above would restore Congress’s ability to enforce its 

subpoenas through its inherent constitutional authority, through 

criminal law and through civil enforcement. 

Restoring Congress’s inherent powers to enforce its subpoena 

must be the first priority. It is the only mechanism solely within 

Congress’s discretion. The inherent power can be restored through 

simple rules changes in the House. The House should change its 

rules to allow a point of order against any appropriations measure, 

including conference reports, and continuing resolutions, that 

would fund the salary of a Federal official held in contempt of Congress.290 The House should establish a high bar for waiving the 

point of order. 


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291Pub. L. No. 112–74, § 713, 125 Stat. 928, 931 (2012). 292Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev.—Application of Section 713 of the Fin. Servs. and Gen. 

Gov’t Appropriations Act, 2012 (Reconsideration), B–325124.2, 2016 WL 1319698 (Comp. Gen. 

Apr. 5, 2016). 293See 28 C.F.R. § 600 (2015) (establishing grounds for appointing a special counsel). 

Congress could provide for nearly automatic sanctions against officials held in contempt of Congress, if it included triggering language in an appropriations statute. Under section 713 of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 2012, 

no appropriation in any bill is available to pay the salary of a Federal official who prevents another Federal official from communicating directly with Congress.291 This rider, which is continued 

every year, was the subject of a recent ruling by the Government 

Accountability Office holding that two officials of the Housing and 

Urban Development Department violated section 713 and that 

these officials should be required to pay back wages earned while 

they were in violation.292

A rider similar to section 713 could be included in annual appropriations disallowing the use of any appropriation to pay the salary 

of a Federal official held in contempt of Congress. Such an approach would trigger immediate and automatic sanctions when an 

official was held in contempt by Congress. 

Because the inherent power can be exercised at Congress’s sole 

discretion, the House should establish procedures to ensure the legitimacy of actions pursuant to the power. These procedures should 

provide for the transparent consideration of timely objections to 

congressional subpoenas, should require the production of a privilege log, and should require the appearance of the responsible Federal official at a hearing held to consider objections to the subpoena. 

As noted above, criminal contempt proceedings against Executive 

Branch officials are subject to the discretion of the U.S. Attorney 

for D.C., and raise significant conflict of interest concerns. The Justice Department already has regulations in place for appointing a 

special counsel in situations presenting a conflict of interest.293 The 

criminal contempt statute should be amended to require the appointment of special counsel pursuant to the Justice Department’s 

own regulations whenever the House or Senate presents a criminal 

contempt citation against an Executive Branch official. This 

amendment would provide Congress some assurance prosecutorial 

discretion in contempt matters would be exercised without the appearance of a conflict of interest and should put recalcitrant Federal officials on notice they cannot assume a political ally will ignore a criminal contempt citation. 

Finally, the House has increasingly resorted to civil enforcement 

of its subpoenas. While this mechanism has resulted in substantial 

compliance, it has also resulted in lengthy delays. This delay is 

often an unacceptable tradeoff. To increase the usefulness of civil 

enforcement, the House should consider a bill to require a threejudge panel in civil enforcement actions related to congressional 

subpoenas with direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the threejudge panel. This would ensure more timely resolution of these actions. An investigation delayed by years of legal deliberations does 

not allow Congress to make timely legislative decisions. 


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294See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). 295See, e.g., Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of State for Legis. Affairs, Dep’t of 

State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter 

Frifield Transmittal Letter] (on file with the Comm.). Use of the ‘‘Sensitive but Unclassified’’ 

designation differs from the broader phenomenon described here—which is not even founded in 

administrative practice—but strongly illustrates the nature of the problem. 296 As one example, in a September 25, 2015 letter to the Comm. transmitting emails from 

the Sec’y, the Dep’t stated ‘‘these documents should be handled differently from prior productions’’ even though they had not actually been determined to be classified and review was ongoing. It requested informally for other documents—which had not been properly classified—to be 

Continued 

These three recommendations each have limitations and drawbacks, but together they would provide Congress with a far more 

robust ability to compel cooperation than it has today. It is not acceptable for Congress to simply acquiesce to Executive Branch obstruction. It is Congress’ constitutional responsibility to create, 

fund, and oversee Executive Branch agencies. Congress cannot effectively uphold its responsibilities under the Constitution without 

the power to ensure compliance with requests for information and 

witnesses. 

Classification Determinations 

RECOMMENDATION 

• Agencies should make express classification determinations with 

respect to documents and materials provided to congressional 

oversight committees in accordance with relevant laws and Executive Orders. 

ANALYSIS 

The Committee encountered significant practical delays and obstacles to its work arising from the need to quickly develop institutional capabilities to properly handle, work with, and protect classified information. While these difficulties to some degree are inherent in the rapid establishment of a new Committee with jurisdiction for national security matters, the Executive Branch exacerbated these challenges with its repeated efforts to declare certain 

material should be ‘‘treated as classified’’ even though it had not 

actually made any administrative determination the material in 

question met the standards necessary to designate it as classified 

or followed the process set out and required by Executive Order 

and relevant regulation to actually designate the material as classified.294

The Legislative Branch recognizes the role of the Executive 

Branch, in accordance with authorities provided under the Constitution and by Congress itself, to determine whether and how national security information should be classified and follows such determinations. Absent an express determination by the Executive 

Branch or other indication or awareness material is derived from 

properly classified information, Congress must treat information as 

unclassified to further the goal of congressional oversight and the 

responsibilities of the House to the public.295

During the course of this investigation, Executive Branch agencies regularly acted in a manner inconsistent with both principles 

by providing information (both documents and interviews) to the 

Committee with the request the Committee treat it as classified,296


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treated as classified. Id. Similarly, the Department asked for certain interviews to be conducted 

in a classified environment even though the anticipated subject matter had previously been unclassified. 297 Exec. Order No. 13526, for example, expressly provides: ‘‘Information may be originally 

classified under the terms of this order only if all of the following conditions are met.’’ The stated conditions include specific procedures for identifying and marking classified information ‘‘in 

a manner that is immediately apparent.’’ 298 Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, §§ 1.7(1), (2). 299Morton Rosenberg, When Congress Comes Calling: A Primer on the Principles, Practices, 

and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry, THE CONST. PROJECT 11 (2009), http:// 

www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/WhenCongressComesCalling.pdf. 300 Id. 

even though it had not made any actual determination with respect 

to the classification of any of the material under the relevant authorities and procedures.297 Although such requests may be considered in the context of efforts to facilitate Committee access to the 

material, there is no legal, administrative, or procedural foundation 

for such a request. National security information should either be 

properly classified in accordance with clearly stated procedures or 

treated as unclassified. There is no cognizable middle ground. 

Sensitive information can be protected without resort to such arbitrary treatment, as it has been under the Committee’s voluntary 

agreement with the State Department to protect certain types of 

personal and operational information. The unfounded efforts of the 

Executive Branch to create new categories of information control 

posed significant obstacles to the Committee’s work—both in handling and using the material and in presenting it to the American 

people. It is important to note the question here is not alleged 

‘‘over-classification,’’ but rather failure of the Executive Branch to 

properly classify the information in question at all. The former is 

a subjective assessment of whether material should be classified 

and how. The latter represents attempts by the Executive Branch 

to control information without following the relevant law or procedure to classify it or, even worse, to control information that 

doesn’t fit within its lawful classification authorities at all. Further, 

Executive Order 13526 clearly provides material cannot be classified to ‘‘conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative 

error’’ or ‘‘prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or 

agency.’’ 298

Improving Oversight and Investigations within the House 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

• The House should amend its rules to authorize all committees to 

take depositions. 

• The House should amend its rules to require committees to establish oversight subcommittees. 

ANALYSIS 

Congressional depositions allow Members and staff, as authorized by a committee, to interview witnesses under oath and, if necessary compel interview testimony by subpoena.299 The ability to 

interview witnesses in private allows committees to gather information confidentially and in more depth than is possible under the 

five-minute rule governing committee hearings.300 This ability is 

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301 E.g. This committee conducted 107 interviews in the course of its investigation. Interviews 

frequently lasted over three hours. This number of witnesses and depth of questioning would 

be nearly impossible in a hearing setting. 302 H. Res. 6, 110th Congress § 502 (2007). 303 Rosenberg, supra note 299, at 11, 82. See, e.g., H. Res. 507, 105th Congress (1998) (Providing deposition authority to the Comm. on Education and Workforce for an investigation relating to the International Brotherhood of the Teamsters). 304 H. Res. 5, 114th Congress § 3 (b) (2015) (The Comms. on Energy and Commerce, Financial 

Services, Science, Space and Technology, and Ways and Means). 305 H. Res. 579, 114th Congress (2016). 306 162 CONG. REC. H41 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2016) (letter submitted for the record Rep. Smith). 307 162 CONG. REC. H39 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2016) (letter submitted for the record Rep. Hensarling). 

tion.301 Committees rely on voluntary interviews to gather information and conduct investigations. If a witness refuses to be interviewed or if the witness’s employer—often the Executive Branch— 

refuses to allow the interview, however, most House committees 

have no recourse. 

At the beginning of the 110th Congress, the Majority, the House, 

controlled by a Democratic majority, amended its rules to authorize 

the taking of depositions by members and staff of the Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform.302 Prior to the 110th Congress, depositions had been authorized by the House only for specific investigations.303 This standing deposition authority applied 

only to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. In 

the current Congress, the House authorized the taking of depositions by four additional committees.304 The authority was initially 

limited to 2015 but was extended to 2016 after its successful implementation in 2015.305 Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on 

Science, Space and Technology, noted: 

During this session there are numerous instances of the 

Committee obtaining documents and voluntary interviews 

because of its deposition authority. In fact, as the following 

examples show, many key interviews and documents 

would likely not have been obtained without the Committee’s ability to compel on-the-record interviews in a private 

setting.306

Jeb Hensarling, Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, 

similarly noted: 

Deposition authority continues to be critical to the Committee’s oversight of an Administration that has been 

markedly indifferent to the Committee’s subpoenas and 

voluntary information requests.307

Given the successful implementation of deposition authority in 

the 114th Congress to four additional committees, the House 

should amend its rules to extend the authority to all of its committees. 

The small size of committee staffs in comparison to the Federal 

agencies they oversee necessarily limits the ability of committees to 

oversee the agencies within their jurisdictions. In addition, committees are already busy wrestling with major reauthorizations and reform plans. As a result, committees sometimes struggle to devote 

sufficient resources to oversight. 


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308 Rules of the H. of Representatives, Rule X, cl. 2(b)(2) (114th Cong.). 309 H. Comm. on Agric., H. Comm. on Educ. & Workforce, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, H. 

Comm. on Judiciary, H. Comm. on Small Bus., and H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure. 310See, e.g., Joel A. Mintz, Agencies, Congress and Regulatory Enforcement: A Review of EPA’s 

Hazardous Waste Enforcement, 18 ENVTL. L. 683, 706 n. 57 (1988). 311See supra discussions regarding State Department’s record-keeping at 54–66. 312Majority Staff of H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Behind the Curtain of the 

Healthcare.gov Rollout, 113TH CONG. 1, 17 (Sept. 17, 2014), https://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Healthcare-gov-Report-Final-9-17-14.pdf. 313Letter from the members of H. Comm. on Science, Space, and Tech. to Lisa Jackson, 

Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Jan. 23, 2013), https://science.house.gov/news/letters/committee-letter-epa-administrator-jackson-re-alias-emails-january-23-2013. 314See Letter from members of H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform to President Barack 

Obama (July 27, 2015), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/2015-07-27- 

UPDATED-JC-to-Obama-WH-Koskinen-Resignation.compressed.pdf. 315Press Release, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Oversight Comm. Presses Energy 

Sec’y on False Denials, Improper Use of Non-official Email Accounts in Solyndra Loan Program 

(Aug. 15, 2012), https://oversight.house.gov/release/oversight-committee-presses-energysecretary-on-false-denials-improper-use-of-non-official-email-accounts-in-solyndra-loan-program. 

House Rule X, clause 2(b)(2) requires standing authorizing committees with more than 20 members to either establish an oversight subcommittee or to require its subcommittees to conduct oversight.308 As all House subcommittees have an obligation to conduct 

oversight within their assigned jurisdictions, this rule is little more 

than an exhortation to establish an oversight subcommittee. Of the 

15 committees to which the rule applies, six did not establish oversight subcommittees in the 114th Congress.309

While some committees, such as the Committee on Energy and 

Commerce, have a decades-long record of active oversight,310 not 

every committee in the House has acted accordingly. An oversight 

subcommittee ensures that at least one subcommittee chair and the 

staff of that subcommittee will be singularly focused on oversight 

of the agencies and programs within the full committee’s jurisdiction. 

Reforming Record-Keeping Laws 

RECOMMENDATION 

• Congress should consider strengthening enforcement authorities 

and penalties under the Federal Records Act related to the use 

of non-official email accounts and non-official file-hosting services 

for official purposes. 

ANALYSIS 

The State Department’s failure to adhere to Federal law and its 

own policies governing record management significantly impeded 

the committee’s investigation.311 Even more important, these failures delayed the flow of information to the families and loved ones 

of those killed and injured in Libya and delayed that information 

being made available to the public. 

These failures are not indigenous to this Committee and will be 

familiar to congressional investigators of the Centers for Medicare 

and Medicaid Services,312 the Environmental Protection Agency,313

the Internal Revenue Service 314 and the Energy Department.315

The destruction of records, use of private email and email aliases, 

and failure to retain records has impeded multiple congressional 

investigations over the years. These concerns reach back to prior 

administrations as well. This is not a political issue; it is a legal, 


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316 Blake Neff, VIDEO: In 2007, Hillary Said Secret Emails ‘Shredded’ the Constitution, DAILY

CALLER (Mar. 4, 2015), http://dailycaller.com/2015/03/04/video-in-2007-hillary-said-secret-emailsshredded-the-constitution. 

constitutional, and branch equity issue. In 2007, the Secretary— 

then Senator—denounced ‘‘secret White House email accounts’’ 

after senior White House officials were found to have conducted 

some official business over political email accounts.316 In this Committee’s investigation, the Secretary’s unusual email arrangement, 

her senior staff’s use of non-official email accounts, and the State 

Department’s own lack of fidelity to the record maintenance rules, 

all delayed and in some instances prevented the Committee from 

accessing official records necessary to conduct a thorough investigation. 


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PART V: 

Recommendations 

Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi 

Recommendation: The Executive Branch should provide for a 

central planning and coordination mechanism (likely within an existing entity) for interagency threat assessment and tracking for 

‘‘force protection’’ of U.S. facilities abroad as well as planning, operations, and response to potential attacks. 

The coordinating organization should provide for: 

• A clear designation of ‘‘who is in charge’’ of managing and following up on response in emergent situations as well as the 

roles and responsibilities of involved departments and agencies. 

• Clear and prompt timeline milestones for resolution of policy 

issues potentially impacting response to emergent situations. 

• Clear and real-time identification of all potential U.S. Government assets potentially positioned to respond to emergent 

threats. 

• A mechanism for prompt consideration of potential waivers to 

existing policy or other constraints potentially limiting immediate response to an emergent situation. 

• Joint training exercises with all agencies present in high 

threat foreign locations as well as with the host nation’s external quick reaction force for emergency and exfiltration plans. 

• Interoperability and improved communication during contingencies. As one example, on the ground security personnel 

need to be able to communicate directly with operational military personnel in a crisis to coordinate surveillance and response. 

• Relevant agencies (including the State Department, combatant 

commands, and the Central Intelligence Agency) need to be involved in each agency’s emergency action plans to ensure situational awareness as well as that each agency’s facilities, capabilities and response role is known. Where capability on the 

ground is insufficient and the Defense Department cannot respond immediately, the State Department and other agencies 

can adjust their respective plans to allow backup local or regional resources to be identified ahead of time. 


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• Agencies on the ground need to plan for standby military support before a crisis in high threat environments, including 

where feasible support from U.S. allies. In addition, the coordinating body should provide for a specific mechanism to know 

and understand assets and capabilities actually available at 

any given time. 

As an example, a Commander’s in Extremis Force has now been 

stood up in Africa, but additional assets available for contingency 

in high threat environments as well as response times and capabilities should be known to relevant agencies as part of emergency 

planning. If U.S. resources are not available because of distance, 

the lack of assets for immediate response should be incorporated in 

emergency planning with an anticipated timeline for response. 

Recommendation: Diplomatic Security personnel and or Security 

Protection Specialists should maintain a state of readiness to 

counter potential attacks at all times in high threat environments. 

• Agents should be armed or have ready access to defensive 

weapons at all times. 

• Additionally, Diplomatic Security Agents and Security Protection Specialists should maintain a 24-hour armed quick reaction force [QRF] capability in all high threat environments 

manned using internal resources when available. 

• When sufficient internal resources are not available, staffing 

for a QRF should be clearly coordinated in advance with potential responders. Planning should also provide for support and 

a definitive timeframe for response from other U.S. government resources such as Mobile Security Detachments, Site Security Teams or Fleet Antiterrorism Support Teams [FAST]. 

When U.S. government assets are not available, planning 

should consider whether contractors might provide enhanced 

capability. 

Recommendation: Operational planners should carefully review 

whether a heightened posture is warranted on anniversaries of the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks or other politically significant 

dates such as Inauguration Day in light of available analysis and 

threat intelligence. 

Recommendation: Military planners should review current and 

future operational planning to prevent recurrence of specific operational issues identified in the response to the Benghazi attacks. 

These include: 

• Ensure that aircraft aligned with response forces maintain the 

ability to meet specified timelines contained in the relevant 

concept plans or operations plans. 

• Ensure adequate—and actionable—planning and resources for 

lift and mobility capabilities necessary for response. 

• Enhance the capability of Marine FAST to conduct full-scope 

combat operations. 

• Maintain a minimum anticipated timeline to respond to any 

terrorist attack in the Middle East, North Africa, or Central 

Asia. 


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Recommendation: The Committee supports funding the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Security Training Center as the Department needs a dedicated training facility. The Department also 

should ensure its personnel satisfactorily complete requisite 

courses. A security professional should never go to a warzone or 

high threat environment feeling unprepared to defend themselves 

and their principal officer. 

Internal and Public Government Communications About the 

Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi 

Recommendation: The drafting and editing of talking points and 

other political communications for policymakers is not an intelligence function. Intelligence agencies and officials should not be 

drawn into the creating or editing of talking points and other political or policy communications. 

• Further, intelligence analysts should generally not produce 

products other than analytical products adhering to proper analytical tradecraft. Other officials—such as legislative or public 

affairs, non-analyst management, and White House Staff— 

should not be involved in the production of any product to be 

used or represented as the product of analytical tradecraft. 

Each stream of material must be kept separate and independent. 

• Further, when communicating with the public, senior executive 

branch officials and spokespersons should carefully distinguish 

analysis of intelligence and other agencies from policy judgments, ‘‘spin,’’ opinion and interpretations extrapolated from 

intelligence analysis by White House staff, political appointees, 

or senior officials outside the Intelligence Community. Such 

materials may be derived from properly produced analytical 

material when distinguished in this manner. 

Recommendation: An additional step of quality control should be 

instituted in the review process for analytic products to ensure analytical products accurately reflect the views of analysts consistent 

with proper analytical tradecraft or are otherwise properly 

caveated. 

• Further, where senior analysts responsible for briefing the 

President substitute their judgment for the consensus views of 

line analysts in the President’s Daily Brief, the material 

should be appropriately caveated and accompanied by the consensus view of line analysts. 

• Further, a formal mechanism should be put into place to memorialize irregularities arising from significant analytical disagreements or tradecraft deviations, including notification to 

the Congressional intelligence committees. 

Recommendation: Claims in analytic products should be supported by substantial evidence, and analysts should clearly understand and place sourcing into context. Open source material should 

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on open source materials, they should be clearly noted as such. As 

a corollary, while crisis reporting may require flexibility in sourcing 

and analysis, emergent reporting known to be uncertain or developing should be properly disclosed and caveated. 

Recommendation: Law governing Accountability Review Boards 

[ARBs] should be amended to limit the influence of the Secretary 

of State and offices with potential conflicts of interest in the selection of members and to provide for broader distribution and reporting to Congress with respect to ARB reports or significant findings 

therein. More specifically: 

• Members of ARBs should be appointed in a manner that ensures an independent and objective review of incidents implicating potential accountability. 

• The scope of review for ARBs should include all relevant, nonpolicy conduct of all personnel potentially involved in incidents, 

including senior officials. 

• ARBs should be independent of outside influence up to the 

point of making recommendations. 

• ARB proceedings should be conducted in a manner to ensure 

appropriate recordkeeping of evidence and support for findings 

and recommendations. 

• If deciding officials disagree with recommendations of ARBs, 

require them to memorialize reasons in writing. 

• All ARB reports or in exceptionally sensitive circumstances significant findings of ARB reports should be provided to Congress. 

• ARB reports should presumptively be produced in an unclassified format, and wherever possible a version outlining core 

findings and issues unrelated to personnel actions should be 

made public. 

• A clear mechanism should be developed to separate personnel 

accountability from ‘‘lessons learned’’ and general corrective actions following attacks. 

• Within the State Department, coordination, oversight and support to an ARB should be provided by a secretariat or other office independent from the secretariats most likely to be reviewed during an ARB proceeding. 

Recommendation: For an ARB review, the State Department 

must affirmatively search for all relevant records, including 

archived records and records of senior leaders. 

Recommendation: The ARB implementing statute should be 

amended to allow an assessment of personnel failures not rising to 

the level of a ‘‘breach of duty.’’ 

Recommendation: Relevant Executive Branch agencies should 

consider and develop an appropriate long-term framework to provide for appropriate survivor benefits to the families of Americans 

killed in the line of duty in response to issues identified in the 

aftermath of the Benghazi attack. 

Recommendation: Family members of Americans killed in the 

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cies where one does not already exist. Such liaisons should be expressly chartered and empowered to act as advocates for family 

members in—resolving or explaining benefits issues, and providing 

as much information as possible (including specific information on 

request) sought by family members. Where classification issues 

exist, Departments and agencies should consider providing limited 

security clearances regarding relevant information pertaining to 

the fate of family members. 

Events Leading to the Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi 

Recommendation: The Executive Branch should provide Congress 

with a clear statement of intentions, rationale, plan and strategy 

(including objectives, contemplated method of execution, and contemplated completion strategy) when entering into major new overseas engagements. Such a statement should also state contemplated results and potential consequences of major initiatives. 

Recommendation: No facility shall remain in an unofficial status 

for more than 180 days without the express and direct approval of 

the Secretary of State. 

Recommendation: The State Department should comply with the 

requirements of the Overseas Security Protection Board and the 

standards provided for in the Secure Embassy Construction and 

Counterterrorism Act for all premises/facilities occupied for more 

than 30 days, whether official or unofficial. 

Recommendation: The State Department should identify a specific funding source for immediate security upgrades for posts in 

high threat areas. 

Recommendation: The Intelligence Community and the State Department should specifically recognize and improve collection of intelligence related to civilian ‘‘force protection’’ issues at facilities 

abroad, particularly with respect to high threat posts. 

• This process should include more express recognition and 

prioritization of collection requirements with respect to threat 

warning and response within the National Intelligence Priorities Framework. 

• This process should include more express coordination and integration with strategic and tactical force protection collection 

and analysis already conducted by Defense Intelligence Agency 

and other military intelligence agencies. 

Compliance with Congressional Investigations 

Recommendation: House and Senate rules should be amended to 

provide for mandatory reductions in appropriations to the salaries 

of federal officials held in contempt of Congress. 

Recommendation: The criminal contempt statute should be 

amended to require the appointment of a special counsel to handle 

criminal contempt proceedings upon the certification of a contempt 

citation against an Executive Branch official by the House or Senate. 

Recommendation: Expedited procedures for the civil enforcement 

of congressional subpoenas should be enacted to provide timely judicial resolution of disputes. 


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Recommendation: Agencies seeking to control public dissemination of information provided to Congress should make express classification determinations with respect to documents and materials 

provided to congressional oversight committees in accordance with 

relevant laws and Executive Orders. 

Recommendation: The House should amend its rules to authorize 

all committees to take depositions. 

Recommendation: The House should amend its rules to require 

committees to establish oversight subcommittees. 

Recommendation: Congress should consider strengthening enforcement authorities and penalties under the Federal Records Act 

related to the use of non-official email accounts and non-official 

file-hosting services for official purposes. 


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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 

I. The First Victim of War is Truth: The administration 

misled the public about the events in Benghazi 

Officials at the State Department, including Secretary Clinton, 

learned almost in real time that the attack in Benghazi was a terrorist attack. With the presidential election just 56 days away, 

rather than tell the American people the truth and increase the 

risk of losing an election, the administration told one story privately and a different story publicly. They publicly blamed the 

deaths on a video-inspired protest they knew had never occurred. 

II. Last Clear Chance: Security in Benghazi was woefully 

inadequate and Secretary Clinton failed to lead 

The State Department has many posts but Libya and Benghazi 

were different. After Qhaddafi, the U.S. knew that we could not 

count on host nation security in a country where militias held significant power. The American people expect that when the government sends our representatives into such dangerous places they receive adequate protection. Secretary Clinton paid special attention 

to Libya. She sent Ambassador Stevens there. Yet, in August 2012, 

she missed the last, clear chance to protect her people. 

III. Failure of Will: America did not move heaven and earth 

to rescue our people 

The American people expect their government to make every effort to help those we put in harm’s way when they find themselves 

in trouble. The U.S. military never sent assets to help rescue those 

fighting in Benghazi and never made it into Libya with personnel 

during the attack. And, contrary to the administration’s claim that 

it could not have landed in Benghazi in time to help, the administration never directed men or machines into Benghazi. 

IV. Justice Denied: The administration broke its promise to 

bring the terrorists to justice 

After the attacks, President Obama promised ‘‘justice will be 

done.’’ There is no doubt our nation can make good on that commitment. Yet, almost four years later, only one of the terrorists has 

been captured and brought to the United States to face criminal 

charges. Even that terrorist will not receive the full measure of justice after the administration chose not to seek the death penalty. 

The American people are owed an explanation. 


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V. Unanswered Questions: The administration did not 

cooperate with the investigation 

Despite its claims, we saw no evidence that the administration 

held a sincere interest in helping the Committee find the truth 

about Benghazi. There is a time for politics and a time to set politics aside. A national tragedy is one of those times when as a nation we should join together to find the truth. That did not happen 

here. So while the investigation uncovered new information, we 

nonetheless end the Committee’s investigation without many of the 

facts, especially those involving the President and the White 

House, we were chartered to obtain. 


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1President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan 

(June 22, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-wayforward-afghanistan. 2See United States v. Ahmed Salim Faraj Abu Khatallah, No. 14–CR–00141 (D.D.C filed Oct. 

14, 2014), Indictment at 6, (hereafter ‘‘Khatallah Indictment’’). 3During her testimony before the Committee Secretary Clinton testified, ‘‘We knew that the 

attack was over. We knew that our diplomatic security team had to evacuate from the compound to the CIA annex, and we were in a frantic search to find Ambassador Stevens.’’ Hearing 

INTRODUCTION 

Yet tonight, we take comfort in knowing 

that the tide of war is receding. 

Barack Obama

President of the United States 1

The writer F. Scott Fitzgerald once observed, ‘‘Show me a hero 

and I will write you a tragedy.’’ The September 11, 2012 Benghazi 

attack showed America not one but many heroes—among them 

Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Tyrone Woods, Sean Smith, and 

Glen Doherty. The story of Benghazi is their tragic story—which 

ultimately is the story of four deaths that never should have happened. America owes its people—especially those that work to advance our interests and the interests of freedom around the 

world—its utmost protection. We failed those Americans in 

Benghazi. 

This is not only the tragic story of two men who died trying to 

bring freedom to the people of a foreign nation and two others who 

died trying to save them. It is also the story of a State Department 

seemingly more concerned with politics and Secretary Clinton’s legacy than with protecting its people in Benghazi. It is the story of 

how the best military in the world never reached Benghazi with 

men or machines, leaving fellow Americans to fight, and die, alone. 

And it is the story of an administration so focused on the next election that it lost sight of its duty to tell the American people the 

truth about what had happened that night. 

For the men on the ground in Benghazi, the terrorist attack 

began at 9:42 p.m. and the threat continued for hours until the 

planes carrying them and the bodies of the four murdered Americans left Benghazi. For the terrorists the attack was also continuous. It was a plan executed in multiple phases that began at the 

State facility. It continued when the terrorists ambushed the Americans en route to the Annex. The attack continued with multiple assaults on the Annex culminating with deadly mortar fire. According 

to the Department of Justice, the mission was willful, deliberate, 

malicious, and premeditated—a coordinated assault aimed at killing or kidnapping America’s ambassador.2

Those in Washington decided that once the initial attack at the 

State compound had ended and our men moved to the Annex, the 

enemy had retreated as well. For those fighting for their lives in 

Benghazi that night, however, it was one long battle for survival. 

But the terrorists did not retreat. This view from Washington that 

the fight had ended is a lapse in judgment that may well haunt our 

nation for years to come. At the same time Secretary Clinton appears to have concluded that the attack was over, the men on the 

ground knew better.3 In the end, two men died from smoke inhalaVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00426 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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4 Before the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, 

114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State) (emphasis added). Secretary Clinton’s certainty about the attack contrasts with the view of those on the ground, where 

one of our men described the situation after arriving at the Annex, ‘‘everybody takes a position 

to support what we have in store, which we don’t know what it is at this point. We are not 

sure. We don’t know if the fight is over or if it is going to be longer.’’ Transcript of Deposition of DS Agent #3 before Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 113th Cong. 164 (emphasis added) (on file with the Committee). 

tion at the State Department’s compound during an initial attack 

involving dozens of extremists. Two more died from mortar fire at 

the end of a continuous, hours-long siege by approximately a hundred heavily armed and highly trained fighters at the CIA Annex. 

Yet, beyond those basic facts other important questions required 

answers: 

• Why were diplomats stationed in Benghazi in the first place 

and, more importantly, why did they stay as it became more 

and more dangerous? 

• Why did the State Department ignore multiple requests for 

help from the team in Benghazi, leaving them to fend for 

themselves in a facility that was no match for a well-organized 

assault? 

• Why did the U.S. military do almost nothing to help and why 

did it take them so long to arrive in Libya and never prepare 

assets to arrive in Benghazi? 

• Why did the administration mislead the American people 

about the nature and cause of the attack? 

• Why, now almost four years later, has only one of the dozens 

of terrorists who murdered four of our countrymen faced American justice? 

Our Democrat committee colleagues suggest all questions about 

Benghazi have already been asked and answered by earlier congressional investigations and the State Department’s Accountability Review Board. While we recognize the contributions some of 

those other investigations made to our understanding of Benghazi, 

the questions above and other questions remained, both in our 

minds and in the minds of many Americans. 

We had a duty to seek the entire truth. If we learned nothing 

new, we would be the first to admit it—and the time and resources 

devoted would have amounted to a small price to pay to close this 

chapter once and for all. Yet, our confidence grew that there was 

more to be learned even as the administration stonewalled at virtually every turn. Our confidence grew even more with each new 

revelation including the revelation of Secretary Clinton’s unprecedented and exclusive use of a private e-mail account and server. 

Unfortunately, the administration’s efforts to impede the investigation succeeded, at least in part. The White House in particular 

left large holes in the investigation by denying the Committee access to documents and witnesses—often hiding behind vague notions of ‘‘important and longstanding institutional interests of the 


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4Letter from W. Neil Eggleston, White House Counsel, to Rep. Trey Gowdy, Chairman, Select 

Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (‘‘the Committee’’) 

(Jan. 23, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 5For example, the report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

concluded that ‘‘Ambassador Rice’s September 16 public statements about the existence of a protest, as well as some of the underlying intelligence reports, proved to be inaccurate.’’ See INVES- TIGATIVE REPORT ON THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON U.S. FACILITIES IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA, SEP- TEMBER 11–12, 2012 (report by Chm. Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger, Members, H. 

Perm. Select Comm. on Intel.) (Comm. Print 2014). 6 E-mail from Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, State Dep’t, Near Eastern Affairs 

Bureau to various (Sept. 17, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05580618). 7Transcript of Interview of DS Agent #10 at 22 (on file with the Committee). 

Executive Branch.’’ 4 And so the Committee ended its work without 

having spoken to anyone in the White House Situation Room that 

night. Nor did we receive all email communication between White 

House staffers concerning the attack—all off limits to Congress according to White House lawyers. Compounding the problem, the 

White House refused to identify any of the documents it had withheld. If the administration had a sincere interest in cooperating 

with the Committee’s investigation, as it stated repeatedly, we saw 

no real evidence of it. 

And so we leave the Committee much the same way we joined 

it—knowing that Congress and the American people did not get 

every relevant fact from this administration. Nevertheless, we did 

learn more. Much more. 

Most significantly, the administration consistently blamed flawed 

information from the U.S. Intelligence Community, primarily the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for its public misstatements 

about Benghazi—with the President, Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Rice, and others blaming a video-inspired protest that had 

never taken place in Benghazi.5 But flawed intelligence is no excuse for officials who knew better, and we now know that key leaders did. Secretary Clinton in particular learned quickly that 

Benghazi amounted to an organized terrorist attack, not a spontaneous demonstration turned violent. Yet, Secretary Clinton and the 

administration told one story privately—that Benghazi was a terrorist attack—and told another story publicly—blaming a video-inspired protest. The misleading public statements led concerned 

State Department staffers to describe Ambassador Rice as ‘‘off the 

reservation’’ and another to add the ‘‘[White House was] very worried about the politics.’’ 6 A national tragedy, however, is not a time 

for politics; it is a time to set politics aside and do one’s duty. 

We also learned that by September 11, 2012 the security situation in Benghazi had deteriorated significantly. Months before the 

attack one State Department diplomatic security agent viewed the 

situation as a ‘‘suicide mission’’ where ‘‘there was a very good 

chance that everyone was going to die.’’ 7 Yet, the facility remained 

open—even as other countries and organizations departed. And yet 

no one could give a satisfactory explanation for why the State Department remained. While we may never know for certain exactly 

why the State Department left Benghazi open in the face of such 

dangerous conditions, the most plausible answer is troubling. Secretary Clinton pushed for the U.S. to intervene in Libya, which at 

the time represented one of her signature achievements. To leave 

Benghazi would have been viewed as her failure and prompted unwelcome scrutiny of her choices. But when faced with a dire situation in Libya, Secretary Clinton had an obligation to act. And she 


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8Staff of H. Armed Services Comm., 113th Cong., Majority Interim Report: Benghazi Investigation Update (Comm. Print 2014) at 19. 9See Press Release, Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President 

on the Death of Muammar Qaddafi (Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 

2011/10/20/remarks-president-death-muammar-qaddafi. 

had a clear chance to do so in August 2012 when presented with 

the facts in a memo from Assistant Secretary Beth Jones that 

painted a bleak picture of conditions in Libya. Yet, she failed to 

lead. 

Finally, we learned troubling new details about the government’s 

military response to the attack. Until now the administration has 

led us to believe the military did not have assets—men or machines—close enough or ready enough to arrive in Benghazi in time 

to save lives. As one earlier committee put it, ‘‘given their location 

and readiness status it was not possible to dispatch armed aircraft 

before survivors left Benghazi.’’ 8 The first asset to arrive in 

Libya—a Marine ‘‘FAST’’ platoon—did not arrive until nearly 24 

hours after the attack began. What is troubling is that the administration never set in motion a plan to go to Benghazi in the first 

place. It is one thing to try and fail; it is yet another not to try at 

all. In the end, the administration did not move heaven and earth 

to help our people in Benghazi, as Americans would expect. The 

contrast between the heroic actions taken in Benghazi and the inaction in Washington—highlights the failure. 

In 2011, the President boasted that ‘‘[w]ithout putting a single 

U.S. service member on the ground, we achieved our objectives [in 

Libya.]’’ 9 With parts of Libya now terrorist safe havens, it is difficult not to look back on that claim and the claim ‘‘the tide of war 

was receding’’ as little more than wishful thinking. The same wishful thinking may have also influenced decisions the administration 

made in Libya and set the background against which four Americans died. Yet, wishes are no match for facts—nor the basis for a 

sound foreign policy. The facts remain and the tide of war goes in 

and out. And it was still rising in Libya in September 2012 as Secretary Clinton and the President stood idle. 

What follows are the views of two members of this Committee. 

We choose to add these additional views not to question the Committee’s full report. Rather, we write separately to highlight those 

facts and conclusions uncovered by our investigation that we consider most important to a full understanding of the tragedy that is 

Benghazi. 


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10 Benghazi: The Attacks and the Lessons Learned Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 

113th Cong. at 28 (2013) (testimony of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State), http:// 

www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1301/23/se.01.html). Oddly, even well after the fact Secretary 

Clinton continues the false narrative by leaving out of her answer any reference to it having 

been a planned terrorist attack. 

The statement that begins this section—the first casualty of war is truth—is typically attributed to the late California Senator Hiram Johnson (1866–1945), albeit in a slightly different 

form. 11See Khatallah Indictment at 6. 

I. The First Casualty of War Is Truth: How the 

administration misled the public about the Benghazi attack 

Was it because of a protest? Or was it because of guys out 

for a walk one night and decided they would go kill some 

Americans? What difference at this point does it make? 

Hillary Rodham Clinton

Secretary of State 10

It began the night of September 11, 2012 and continued for nearly two weeks after. The administration made statements about 

Benghazi that led the public to believe the attack began spontaneously as a protest over an anti-Islamic video circulating on the 

Internet. It was, they said, the same video that had sparked demonstrations in Cairo earlier that day. The first statement came 

from Secretary Clinton. More would follow, from the President, 

from Ambassador Rice, and from others. Each seemed to blame the 

murders on a video and a protest. 

Yet, in truth, no protest had occurred in Benghazi that night. 

And even today no clear link between the video and the attack exists. In fact, in the criminal indictment against Ahmed Salim Faraj 

Abu Khatallah (hereafter ‘‘Abu Khatallah’’)—the only person prosecuted thus far for taking part in the attack—the government does 

not mention the video or a protest. Rather, it blames the attack on 

revenge for U.S. intelligence collection efforts in the area—a far different explanation than America received in the immediate aftermath of the attack.11

Did the administration mislead the public because it worried a 

terrorist attack might affect the upcoming election? Or did it simply rely on flawed and changing information from the U.S. Intelligence Community as the administration has maintained? Some 

critics may say the question alone is evidence of the Committee’s 

alleged partisan agenda. Others may defend the misstatements as 

little more than election-year ‘‘spin’’—something for which the public might fault both parties. 

For her part, Secretary Clinton simply dismissed the issue—‘‘at 

this point, what difference does it make?’’—in her now famous exchange with Senator Johnson. Yet, the truth is always important. 

It is especially so during times when we as a nation must face a 

crisis—and mourn one—together and to learn from it. Instead of 

sharing that truth, the administration concealed it. And in doing 

so it misled the American people for political gain. When that happens, whether by Republicans or Democrats, it does, should, and 

always will make a difference. 


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12For example, just 5 days before the attack, the President in his nationally-televised speech 

said the following about the war on terror: 

In a world of new threats and new challenges, you can choose leadership that has been 

tested and proven. Four years ago I promised to end the war in Iraq. We did. I promised to refocus on the terrorists who actually attacked us on 9/11, and we have. We’ve 

blunted the Taliban’s momentum in Afghanistan, and in 2014, our longest war will be 

over. A new tower rises above the New York skyline, al-Qaeda is on the path to defeat, and Osama bin Laden is dead. 

President Barack Obama, Speech to Democratic National Convention (Sept. 6, 2012) (emphasis 

added), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/06/160713941/transcript-president-obamas-conventionspeech). 13See, e.g., Craig Unger, GOP’s October Surprise? Source reveals ‘‘Jimmy Carter Strategy’’ to 

make Obama Seem weak on defense in campaign’s final month, Salon (Oct. 1, 2012), http:// 

www.salon.com/2012/10/01/gops_october _surprise/. 14 Con Coughlin, The murder of the US ambassador to Libya is a wake-up call for Obama, 

THE TELEGRAPH, (Sept. 12, 2012). 

A. 56 DAYS 

The terrorist attack in Benghazi came during a critical time for 

the President. He faced an increasingly difficult re-election bid as 

polls showed his lead over Republican presidential nominee Mitt 

Romney narrowing. The President had few clear successes to highlight from his first term and the economy had yet to recover fully. 

The political landscape left little room for error—or bad news. 

If one bright spot existed in the President’s record, nearly four 

years in office had passed without a significant terrorist incident 

at home or abroad and killing Osama bin Laden represented an important accomplishment—one the President and his team 

trumpeted often.12 As Vice President Biden put it just days before 

the attack, ‘‘Osama bin Laden is dead, and General Motors is 

alive.’’ It was a powerful political argument, but the tide of war 

continued to roll in. 

September 11, 2012 threatened to take the President’s national 

security argument away. The Romney campaign and others seized 

on the attack as evidence of a failed policy and criticized the administration’s seeming refusal to call the attackers terrorists. To 

many, Benghazi represented a potential October surprise that 

could impact the President’s re-election bid.13 As one publication 

put it, ‘‘with the American Presidential election only two months 

away, the murder of four American diplomats could be a game 

changer so far as Mr. Obama’s re-election prospects are concerned.’’ 14

The President had a political problem. And his advisors saw it 

immediately. In fact, the election entered the discussion before the 

attack even ended. Sometime before 10:35 p.m. on the night of September 11, 2012, Victoria Nuland, the State Department’s spokesperson, sent an email to two other high level Clinton aides, Jacob 

Sullivan and Phillipe Reines: 

This is what Ben [Rhodes] was talking about. 

‘‘I’m outraged by the attacks on American diplomatic missions in Libya and Egypt and by the death of an American 

consulate worker in Benghazi. It’s disgraceful that the 

Obama Administration’s first response was not to condemn 


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15 E-mail from Victoria Nuland, State Dep’t Spokesperson, to Jacob Sullivan, State Dep’t Deputy Chief of Staff and Phillipe Reines, State Dep’t Deputy Assistant Secretary for Communications (Sept. 11, 2012) (emphasis added) (on file with the Committee, C05412104). 16When asked on the night of the attack whether he knew ‘‘of any connection between what 

had occurred in Cairo and what had occurred in Benghazi,’’ Rhodes testified, ‘‘I did not, other 

than the fact that both events took place in proximity to one another.’’ See Transcript of Interview of Benjamin Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, 

White House National Security Council at 13 (Feb. 2, 2016) (on file with the Committee). 17 ROBERT F. GATES, DUTY 518 (2014). 18 Nancy A. Youssef, Hillary’s Libya Post-War Plan was ‘‘Play It by Ear,’’ Gates Says, (Oct. 

20, 2015, 8:00 p.m.), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/10/20/hillary-s-libya-post-warplan-was-play-it-by-ear-gates-says.html. 

attacks on our diplomatic missions, but to sympathize with 

those who waged the attacks.—Mitt Romney’’ 15

The ‘‘Ben’’ in Nuland’s email was Benjamin Rhodes, the White 

House National Security Council’s Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communications and one of the President’s top 

aides. The ‘‘this’’ was the accompanying ‘‘Tweet’’ issued from the 

Romney campaign attacking the administration’s handling of the 

situation. In short, the national security crisis turned into a political problem almost immediately. 

And so on this highly charged political stage—just 56 days before 

the presidential election—events forced the administration to make 

a choice about what to tell the American people: Tell the truth that 

heavily armed terrorists had killed one American and possibly kidnapped a second—and increase the risk of losing the election. Say 

we do not know what happened. Or blame a video-inspired protest 

by tying Benghazi to what had occurred earlier in the day in Cairo. 

The administration chose the third, a statement with the least factual support but that would help the most politically.16

While the attack loomed largest, and most immediately, for the 

President and his reelection bid, he was not alone in having a 

choice to make—or with something to lose. Secretary Clinton would 

have seen her reputation and legacy—and possibly 2016 election 

prospects—tied to what had just occurred in Benghazi as well. 

Secretary Clinton was the administration’s chief proponent of 

U.S. Libya policy and pushed for the President to join the NATO 

coalition to topple Qhaddafi. According to then-Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates, who opposed intervention, others who pushed to intervene—including Ambassador Rice and Ben Rhodes—are the 

same people who later worked to mislead the public about the attack.17

While that effort succeeded and Qhaddafi is gone, most now 

agree that the Libya intervention failed, in large part because of 

inadequate planning for a post-Qhaddafi Libya. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said later, the administration was 

‘‘playing it by ear’’ after Qhaddafi’s fall.18 So instead of a burgeoning democracy growing from the Arab Spring, we now have a 

terrorist safe haven growing in its place. 

Secretary Clinton rarely mentions Libya now. Yet, early on her 

advisors pointed to Qhaddafi’s ouster and her role as a historic foreign policy success. In August 2011, Secretary Clinton’s Deputy 

Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Jacob Sullivan described her 

role as no less than the ‘‘leadership/ownership/stewardship of this 

country’s Libya policy from start to finish’’ and that she was ‘‘inVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00432 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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19 E-mail from Jacob Sullivan to Cheryl Mills, State Dep’t Chief of Staff (Aug. 21, 2011) (on 

file with the Committee, SCB0075905). 20 E-mail from Sidney Blumenthal to Hillary Rodham Clinton (Aug. 22, 2011) (emphasis 

added) (as we now know and as Secretary Gates has pointed, out the day after Qhaddafi fell 

called for far more planning than ‘‘whatever’’) (on file with the Committee, BLU–094). 21See Transcript of Press Conference, Statement of Victoria Nuland, State Dep’t Spokesperson 

(Sept. 17, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05394583). 

strumental in securing the authorization, building the coalition, 

and tightening the noose around Qadhafi and his regime.’’ 19

Secretary Clinton’s longtime friend and advisor Sidney Blumenthal described the success in even loftier terms: 

First, brava! This is a historic moment and you will be 

credited for realizing it. 

When Qaddafi himself is finally removed, you should of 

course make a public statement before the cameras wherever you are, even in the driveway of your vacation house. 

You must go on camera. You must establish yourself in the 

historical record at this moment. 

The most important phrase is: ‘‘successful strategy.’’ 

* * * 

Then you can say whatever on future policy—but only 

after asserting the historic success and explaining the reasons why. 

This is a very big moment historically and for you. History 

will tell your part in it. You are vindicated. But don’t wait, 

help Clio now.20

It is too soon to know how Clio—the goddess of history—will ultimately treat Secretary Clinton’s push to intervene in Libya. What 

we do know is that when given a chance to tell the truth to the 

American people, she did the opposite. It began at 10:08 p.m. in 

Washington on the night of the murders—before the attack had 

even ended. 

B. OUT OF THE FOG: TELLING ONE STORY PRIVATELY 

AND ANOTHER STORY PUBLICLY 

Some blame the ‘‘fog of war’’ for the administration’s 

misstatements about Benghazi. While it is true officials in Washington did not have all the facts, the President, Secretary Clinton, 

and other senior leaders had enough information to conclude almost immediately that Benghazi and Cairo were very different. 

Benghazi was a terrorist attack and Cairo a large protest that had 

been publicized in advance on social media and that the State Department prepared for and expected.21

The information the President, Secretary Clinton, and other senior leaders had included detailed information about the sophisticated nature of the attack, the weapons used, the complexity of the 

attack, and the hours-long duration of the siege that spanned two 

locations. For example, one State Department official was told that 

night by a witness in Benghazi that the attackers who fired the 


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22Transcript of Interview of Charlene Lamb, Assistant Sec’y of State for Diplomatic Security 

for International Programs at 46–47 (Jan. 7, 2016). 23Transcript of Deposition of DS Agent #3 before House Comm. on Oversight and Government 

Reform at 231 (Oct. 8, 2013) (on file with the Committee). 24 Id. at 165. At approximately 4:38 p.m. the State Dep’t Operations Center appears to have 

set up a direct line to Benghazi. See E-mail to Jacob Sullivan, Cheryl Mills, and Secretary Clinton’s Executive Assistant (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05561866). 25Transcript of Interview of Gregory Hicks, Deputy in Charge of Mission in Libya before H. 

Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform at 18 (Apr. 11, 2013). 26Transcript of Interview of Beth Jones, Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs 

before House Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform at 38–39 (July 11, 2013) (‘‘He said 

. . . Greg Hicks has called. Ambassador Stevens is in Benghazi. He called and said, ‘We’re 

under attack.’’’). 27See Dep’t of State, Watch Log, Operations Center (Sept. 11, 2012) (showing call at 7:05 p.m. 

between Hicks and Secretary Clinton, Deputy Secretary Thomas Nides, Under Secretary Patrick 

Kennedy, Under Secretary Wendy Sherman, Chief of Staff Cheryl Mills, Deputy Chief of Staff 

and Director Jacob Sullivan, Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, and Acting Assistant Secretary for 

Near Eastern Affairs Beth Jones (on file with the Committee, C05872462). 

mortar launcher had significant training and were ‘‘not just persons off the street lobbing in mortars.’’ 22

Significantly, the information known in Washington included reports from a number of eye witnesses on the ground in Benghazi— 

often in near real time—who remained in almost constant contact 

with officials in Washington during the attack. None of those eye 

witnesses mentioned a protest or the video. 

One of those witnesses saw the attack begin in real time while 

watching the Benghazi compound’s security monitors inside the facility’s tactical operations center. Up to that point, no protests had 

occurred and all was calm. When asked later about whether a protest had occurred, he said, ‘‘No. There was nothing out there up 

until, well, up until there was. I had been out of the gate at 8:30 

that night. We had had personnel leaving the compound, and they 

drove away from our compound and didn’t report anything, and I 

spoke with them subsequently, there was nothing out there.’’ 23

That same witness updated officials in Washington every 15 to 30 

minutes throughout the night—giving the State Department virtually a front row seat to the attack.24

The Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, Gregory Hicks, who was 

in Tripoli at the time of the attack, spoke to Ambassador Stevens 

last. As terrorists swarmed the Benghazi compound, Ambassador 

Stevens managed to call Hicks and said, simply, ‘‘Greg, we are 

under attack.’’ 25 No mention of a protest. No mention of the video. 

Hicks relayed this same information to Acting Assistant Secretary 

for Near Eastern Affairs (‘‘NEA’’) Beth Jones 26 and also spoke to 

Secretary Clinton and other top State Department officials that 

night.27 When asked later whether he would have expected Ambassador Stevens and the security officers in Benghazi to report a protest if it had occurred, Hicks said: 

Absolutely, I mean, we’re talking about both security officers who know their trade, even though they are brand 

new, and one of the finest political officers in the history 

of the Foreign Service. You know, for there to have been 

a demonstration on Chris Stevens’ front door and 

him not to have reported it is unbelievable. And secondly, if he had reported it, he would have been out the 

back door within minutes of any demonstration appearing 


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28Transcript of Interview of Gregory Hicks before H. Comm. on Oversight and Government 

Reform at 81–82 (emphasis added) (on file with the Committee). 29 E-mail from DS Agent #30 to DS Agent (Sept. 18, 2012) (on file with the Committee, 

C05390678). 30 E-mail from DS Agent #30 to various (Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the Committee, 

C05389586) 31 E-mail from Victoria Nuland, State Dep’t Spokesperson to Jacob Sullivan, Patrick Kennedy, 

Patrick Ventrell, Bernadette Meehan, National Security Council, Assistant Press Secretary 

(Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB000471). 

anywhere near that facility. And there was a back gate to 

the facility, and, you know, it worked.28

Days later, one member of the State Department’s Diplomatic 

Security Command Center on duty the night of the attack was 

asked by a colleague whether a protest had been reported prior to 

the attack. His response left little doubt: ‘‘Zip, nothing nada.’’ 29

That same person in a ‘‘Terrorism Event Notification’’ emailed out 

the morning of September 12, 2012 described the event just as 

clearly: ‘‘It was a full on attack against our compound in 

Benghazi.’’ 30 Again, no mention of a protest. No mention of the 

video. 

All of the information coming into the State Department that 

night and in the days that followed from the witnesses pointed to 

a terrorist attack. There is no evidence that any of the accounts 

blamed a video-inspired protest or, in fact, any protest at all. Moreover, this attack did not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it came toward 

the end—not the beginning—of a long list of terrorist and other violence aimed at the U.S. and other interests in Libya and 

Benghazi—a history of violence well known to senior State Department officials. 

Officials also recognized very quickly the differences between 

what had occurred in Cairo in response to the video and what occurred in Benghazi. As one official put it the night of the attack, 

‘‘We can confirm that our office in Benghazi, Libya has been attacked by a group of militants [and] [i]n Cairo, we can confirm 

that Egyptian police have now removed the demonstrators. . . .’’ 31 That line between Benghazi and Cairo, however, 

would soon be blurred and then erased completely. 

Notwithstanding clear evidence of a terrorist attack in Benghazi, 

Secretary Clinton began to connect Cairo and Benghazi in the 

public’s mind almost immediately even as she and others admitted 

privately the two were unrelated. It began at 10:08 p.m. on the 

night of the attack—before the attack had even ended—with Secretary Clinton’s statement condemning the attack. Other statements would follow as well that week. As shown in the following 

timeline of administration statements, the administration told two 

different stories, one publicly that connected the attack to the video 

and protests in Cairo and another privately that recognized it was 

a terrorist attack. 

C. PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE TIMELINE 

9/11—Public Statements 

Secretary Clinton’s 10:08 p.m. Statement on the Attack in 

Benghazi: 


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32Press Statement, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Statement on the Attack in 

Benghazi (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/ 

197628.htm). 33See The Secretary’s Call Sheet for Libyan General National Congress President Mohammed 

al Magariaf (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05580497). 34 Notes of Secretary Clinton’s Call with Mohammed al Magariaf (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with 

the Committee, C05561906). 35 E-mail from Hillary Rodham Clinton to ‘‘Diane Reynolds’’ (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the 

Committee, C05794191). 36 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in 

Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/ 

197654.htm). 37See E-mail to Victoria Nuland, Deputy Secretary William Burns, Wendy Sherman, Jacob 

Sullivan, Patrick Kennedy, Cheryl Mills, and others (Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05391027). 

‘‘I condemn in the strongest terms the attack on our mission in 

Benghazi today. * * * Some have sought to justify this vicious behavior as a response to inflammatory material posted on the Internet.’’ 32

9/11—Private Statements 

Secretary Clinton’s Call Sheet for call with President of 

Libya Mohammed al Magariaf at 6:49 p.m.: 

Under heading Purpose of Call’’ notes that ‘‘Secretary should 

urge Mr. Magariaf to respond urgently to the attack against 

the U.S. Mission Benghazi, and security threats against U.S. 

Embassy Tripoli.’’ No mention of a protest or video.33

Summary of Call between Secretary Clinton and President Magariaf: 

‘‘[O]ur diplomatic mission was attacked[.] . . . [T]here is a gun 

battle ongoing, which I understand Ansar as-Sharia [sic] is 

claiming responsibility for.’’ 34 No mention of protest or video. 

Secretary Clinton’s E-mail to daughter at 11:23 p.m.: 

‘‘Two of our officers were killed in Benghazi by an Al Quedalike [sic] group[.]’’ 35

9/12—Public Statements 

Secretary Clinton’s Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya morning of September 12, 2012: 

‘‘We are working to determine the precise motivations and methods 

of those who carried out this assault. Some have sought to justify 

this vicious behavior, along with the protest that took place at our 

Embassy in Cairo yesterday, as a response to inflammatory material posted on the internet.’’ 36

9/12—Private Statements 

Summary of Discussion between Acting Assistant Secretary Beth Jones and Libyan Ambassador Aujali at 9:45 

a.m.: 

‘‘I told him that the group that conducted the attacks—Ansar 

Al Sharia—is affiliated with Islamic extremists.’’ 37

Jacob Sullivan in e-mail to embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan: 


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38 E-mail from Jacob Sullivan to Benjamin Rhodes and others (Sept.12, 2012) (emphasis 

added) (on file with the Committee, SCB0066195). 39 Notes of Secretary Clinton’s Call with Egyptian Prime Minister Hesham Kandil (Sept. 11, 

2012) (emphasis added) (on file with the Committee, C05561911). 40 E-mail from Joy E. Drucker to various (Sept. 13, 2012) (forwarding notes from call between 

Patrick Kennedy and congressional staff that began at 6:30 p.m. September 12, 2012) (on file 

with the Committee, C05580110). 

‘‘There was not really violence in Egypt [and] ‘‘we are not saying that the violence in Libya erupted ‘over inflammatory 

videos.’’’ 38

Secretary Clinton’s Statements to Egyptian Prime Minister Kandil at 3:04 p.m.: 

‘‘We know that the attack in Libya had nothing to do with 

the film. It was a planned attack—not a protest. . . . Based 

on the information we saw today we believe the group that 

claimed responsibility for this was affiliated with al-Qaeda.’’ 39

Under Secretary Patrick Kennedy to congressional staff 

briefing: 

When asked whether ‘‘this [was] an attack under the cover of 

a protest’’ Kennedy said, ‘‘No the attack was a direct breaching 

attack.’’ More to the point, he was then asked whether ‘‘we believe [this was] coordinated with [the] Cairo [protests] to which 

Kennedy responded, ‘‘Attack in Cairo was a demonstration. 

There were no weapons shown or used. A few cans of spray 

paint.’’ 40

9/13—Public Statements 

Secretary Clinton’s Morocco Remarks: 

‘‘I also want to take a moment to address the video circulating 

on the Internet that has led to these protests in a number of 

countries. * * * 

To us, to me personally, this video is disgusting and reprehensible. 

It appears to have a deeply cynical purpose: to denigrate a great 

religion and to provoke rage. But as I said yesterday, there is no 

justification, none at all, for responding to this video with violence. 

* * * 

Violence, we believe, has no place in religion and is no way to 

honor religion. Islam, like other religions, respects the fundamental 

dignity of human beings, and it is a violation of that fundamental 

dignity to wage attacks on innocents. As long as there are those 

who are willing to shed blood and take innocent life in the 

name of God, the world will never know a true and lasting 

peace. It is especially wrong for violence to be directed 

against diplomatic missions. . . . 

* * * 

I wanted to begin with this statement, because, as our Moroccan 

friends and all of you know, this has been a difficult week at the 

State Department. I very much appreciate, Minister, the condolences your government expressed to our Embassy in Rabat. And 

even though that tragedy happened far away in Benghazi, 


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41 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks at Opening Plenary of the United States– 

Morocco Strategic Dialogue Washington, D.C. Wednesday, September 13, 2012, http:// 

www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197711.htm. 42 E-mail from State Dep’t Operations Officer to State Dep’t Official (Sept. 13, 2012) (on file 

with the Committee, C05562242). 43Transcript of White House Press Conference, Jay Carney, White House Spokesperson (Sept. 

14, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/14/press-briefing-press-secretaryjay-carney-9142012). 44 E-mail, Benjamin Rhodes to David Plouffe, White House Political Advisor, Jay Carney, 

White House Spokesperson, Erin Pelton, aide to Amb. Susan Rice, and others (Sept. 14, 2012 

at 8:09 p.m.) (on file with the Committee, C05415285). 45See Fox News Insider, Father of Benghazi Victim Reveals Journal Entry Documenting Meeting With Hillary, YOUTUBE (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMx0huMabos. 46See Fox Business, Benghazi Victim’s Mom: Hillary Needs to Tell Me the Truth! (Mar. 10, 

2016) (available here http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/03/10/benghazi-victims-momhillary-needs-to-tell-me-truth.html). 

we found a reminder of the deep bounds that connect Morocco to the United States.’’ 41

9/13—Private Statements 

Summary of call between State Department Deputy Secretary Thomas Nides and Egyptian ambassador to U.S.: 

‘‘Nides said he understood the difference between the targeted 

attack in Libya and the way the protest escalated in 

Egypt.’’ 42

9/14—Public Statements 

White House Spokesman Jay Carney during press conference 

answering question about Benghazi: 

‘‘We have no information to suggest that it was a preplanned attack. The unrest we’ve seen around the region has been in reaction 

to a video that Muslims, many Muslims find offensive. And while 

the violence is reprehensible and unjustified, it is not a reaction to 

the 9/11 anniversary that we know of, or to U.S. policy.’’ 43

E-mail from White House Advisor Benjamin Rhodes: 

Under heading ‘‘Goals’’ he wrote ‘‘To underscore that these protests 

are rooted in an Internet video, and not a broader failure of 

policy[.]’’ 44

Return of remains ceremony statement to father of Tyrone 

Woods recorded in diary: 

‘‘I gave Hillary a hug and shook her hand, and she said we are 

going to have the filmmaker arrested who was responsible for the 

death of my son.’’ 45

Return of remains ceremony statement to mother of Sean 

Smith: 

‘‘We were nose-to-nose at the coffin ceremony. She told me it was 

the fault of the video. I said ‘are you sure?’ She says ‘yes, that’s 

what it was . . . it was the video.’’’ 46

9/14—Private Statements 

E-mail from State Department press officer in embassy in 

Tripoli, Libya: 

‘‘Colleagues, I mentioned to Andy this morning, and want to 

share with all of you, our view at Embassy Tripoli that we 

must be cautious in our local messaging with regard to the inflammatory film trailer, adapting it to Libyan conditions. . . . 


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47 E-mail from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Libya to Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, NEA-Libya Desk, Gregory Hicks, Deputy in Charge 

of Libya Mission, and others (Sept. 14, 2012 at 6:43 p.m.) (on file with the Committee, 

C05396788). 48 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Weekly Address: Carrying on the Work of 

Our Fallen Heroes (Sept. 15, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/15/ 

weekly-address-carrying-work-our-fallen-heroes. 49 E-mail from State Dep’t officer to S_CallNotes (Sept. 15, 2012) (notes of call between Secretary Clinton and Libyan Prime Minister-elect Abu Shagur) (on file with the Committee, 

C05561908). 50Transcript of Interview of Amb. Susan Rice on Fox News Sunday with Chris Wallace (Sept. 

16, 2012). 51 E-mail from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Libya to Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, Senior Libyan Desk Officer, Near Eastern Affairs 

Bureau, and others (Sept. 16, 2012) (attacking Tripoli Media Report for Sept. 16, 2012) (on file 

with the Committee, C05396830). 

Relatively few [Facebook comments and tweets] have even 

mentioned the inflammatory video. So if we post messaging 

about the video specifically, we may draw unwanted attention 

to it. And it is becoming increasingly clear that the series 

of events in Benghazi was much more terrorist attack 

than a protest which escalated into violence. It is our 

opinion that in our messaging, we want to distinguish, 

not conflate, the events in other countries with this wellplanned attack by militant extremists. I have discussed 

this with Charge Hicks and he shares PAS’s view.’’ 47

9/15—Public Statements 

President’s Weekly Address titled ‘‘Carrying on the Work of 

Our Fallen Heroes’’ muddles Benghazi and protests in other 

countries: 

‘‘This tragic attack takes place at a time of turmoil and protest in 

many different countries. I have made it clear that the United 

States has a profound respect for people of all faiths. We stand for 

religious freedom. And we reject the denigration of any religion— 

including Islam.’’ 48

9/15—Private Statements 

Secretary Clinton’s call with Prime Minister-Elect of 

Libya: 

Makes no mention of either a protest or the video.49

9/16—Public Statements 

Ambassador Rice on Fox News With Chris Wallace 

‘‘But we don’t see at this point signs this was a coordinated plan, 

premeditated attack.’’ 50

9/16—Private Statements 

Excerpt from Embassy Tripoli Media Report September 

16, 2012 

‘‘[T]here is evidence that suggests that the second confrontation at the UM mission’s safe house could not have happened 

without insider knowledge or some degree of organization. This 

goes against statements that the attacks were not carried out 

by a single group but by an angry multitude protesting[.]’’ 51

9/17—Public Statements 

Excerpt from State Department Daily Press Briefing: 


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52State Dep’t of State, Daily Press Briefing—September 17, 2012, Victoria Nuland, State 

Dep’t Spokesperson, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/09/197821.htm. 53See E-mail from Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA to Spokesperson, NEA, 

Senior Libyan Desk Offier, NEA, Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, NEA (Sept 17, 

2012) (emphasis added) (on file with the Committee, C05580618). 54Michael Morell, Former Acting Director and Deputy Director of the CIA, Written Statement 

for the Record before the H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intel. (April 2, 2014). 55 E-mail from DS Agent #30 to DS Agent (Sept. 18, 2012) (on file with the Committee, 

C05389586). 

‘‘Ambassador Rice, in her comments on every network over the 

weekend, was very clear, very precise, about what our initial assessment of what happened is. . . . I don’t have anything to give 

you beyond that.’’ 52

9/17—Private Statements 

Excerpt from e-mail discussion between members of NEA 

press office about what to say about attack: 

NEA Press Officer Suggested the following language: 

‘‘The currently available information suggests the demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the 

protests of the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct 

assault[.]’’ 

Senior Libya Desk Officer, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau 

responding to suggested language: 

‘‘I really hope this was revised. I don’t think we should go 

on the record on this.’’ 53

9/18—Public Statements 

Excerpt from White House Press Briefing by Press Secretary 

Jay Carney: 

. . . I would point you to what Ambassador Rice said and others 

have said about what we know thus far about the video and its influence on the protests that occurred in Cairo, in Benghazi 

and elsewhere.’’ 

9/18—Private Statements 

Deputy Director of CIA Michael Morell in written statement to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: 

‘‘The critically important point is that the analysts considered 

this a terrorist attack from the very beginning.’’ 54

E-mail exchange between State Department security officers commenting on news article titled ‘‘White House sees 

no sign Libya attack premeditated’’: 

DS Agent #30: ‘‘Can you believe this?’’ 

DS Agent: ‘‘Was there any rioting in Benghazi reported prior 

to the attack?’’ 

DS Agent #30: ‘‘Zip, nothing nada’’ 55

9/19—Public Statements 

From ‘‘ALDAC’’—a worldwide cable—from Secretary Clinton 

to all U.S. Embassies drafted by Deputy Chief of Staff Jacob 

Sullivan: 


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56 E-mail from Sullivan Assistant to various (attaching ‘‘Immediate ALDAC for transmission’’ 

drafted by J Sullivan 9/19/2012 noting approval by ‘‘S: The Secretary’’) (Sept. 2012) (on file with 

the Committee, SCB0052811) (emphasis added). 57Press Release, Remarks by the President at Univision Town Hall with Jorge Ramos and 

Maria Elena Salinas (Sept. 20, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/20/ 

remarks-president-univision-town-hall-jorge-ramos-and-maria-elena-salina (emphasis added). 

‘‘Since September 11, 2012, there have been widespread protests 

and violence against U.S. and some other diplomatic posts across 

the Muslim world. The proximate cause of the violence was the 

release by individuals in the United States of the video trailer 

for a film that many Muslims find offensive. Diplomatic compounds 

have been breached in several countries including Libya, Egypt, 

Tunisia, and Yemen. In Benghazi, Libya four U.S. personnel 

were killed in the violence[.]’’ 56

The administration, including Secretary Clinton, knew that Benghazi was a terrorist attack—from witness accounts, from their understanding of the history of violence in Benghazi, and from the nature of the well-planned, complex attack. Yet, they led the public 

to believe the video and a protest were to blame in Benghazi. 

9/20—Public Statements 

Excerpt from interview of the President on Univision Town 

Hall: 

In response to the question, ‘‘We have reports that the White 

House said today that the attacks in Libya were a terrorist attack. 

Do you have information indicating that it was Iran, or al-Qaeda 

was behind organizing the protests?’’ the President answered, 

‘‘[W]e’re still doing an investigation[.] . . . What we do know is 

that the natural protests that arose because of the outrage 

over the video were used as an excuse by extremists to see if they 

can also directly harm U.S. interests[.]’’ 57

Secretary Clinton has since blamed her statements on changing 

information received from U.S. intelligence reports. She and others 

have claimed that the 10:08 p.m. statement was not meant to ascribe a motive to the attack. Yet, Sullivan knew the morning of 

September 12th—based on the press release from the embassy in 

Kabul—that people had heard it exactly that way. Moreover, 

whether or not the intelligence information changed, Secretary 

Clinton’s public and private statements remained consistent—publicly tying Benghazi and Cairo together and privately recognizing 

the violence in Benghazi was a terrorist attack with nothing to do 

with a protest or video. 

Moreover, to the extent any intelligence analysis incorrectly reported on a protest or a video in connection with Benghazi, Secretary Clinton and other State officials, who knew better, simply 

ignored them. As just one example, in her conversation September 

15, 2012 with the president of Libya, Secretary Clinton made no 

mention of anything in the CIA talking points that administration 

officials later claimed were the best assessment available at the 

time, and those talking points made no mention of a video in connection with Benghazi. In short, Secretary Clinton and the administration knew better than to rely on flawed intelligence reports. 

Intelligence assessments may have changed. News reports may 

have changed. But the eye witness accounts remained the same— 


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58See Talking Points Timeline, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/ 

Benghazi%20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf. 59 Id. 

and not one said a protest had occurred. Yet, once Secretary Clinton and Ben Rhodes set the message, the truth became an afterthought. 

D. AMBASSADOR RICE FACES THE NATION 

On September 16, 2012, Ambassador Susan Rice appeared on 

five Sunday talk shows and blamed Benghazi on the video. She 

took the brunt of the criticism for doing so when it finally became 

public that no protest had occurred. It is now clear, however, that 

connecting the video to Benghazi started far sooner. It began with 

Secretary Clinton’s 10:08 p.m. statement the night of the attack. 

Rice, however, compounded the deception. And while Secretary 

Clinton and others blurred the line between Cairo and Benghazi, 

Ambassador Rice erased it completely. 

Ambassador Rice now claims that she did not blame the video for 

what occurred in Benghazi. The plain wording of what she said, 

however, refutes her testimony to the Committee. She also claims 

that she simply relied on the flawed CIA talking points. But even 

a casual reading of those talking points shows that she went far 

beyond what the CIA prepared—in a way that helped the President 

politically. 

The original draft of the CIA talking points included key information that would have at a minimum pointed to the possibility of 

a planned terrorist attack. For example, the initial draft referred 

to knowing that ‘‘Islamic extremists with ties to al-Qa’ida’’ had 

taken part in the attack, that ‘‘there had been at least five other 

attacks’’ previously, and that they could not rule out that ‘‘individuals had previously surveilled the U.S. facilities.’’ 58 By the final 

draft, however, officials had stripped out all of that and other information. It then read simply: 

The currently available information suggests that the demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by 

the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into 

a direct assault against the U.S. diplomatic post and subsequently its annex. There are indications that extremists 

participated in the violent demonstrations. 

This assessment may change as additional information is 

collected and analyzed and currently available information 

continues to be evaluated. 

The investigation is ongoing, and the U.S. Government is 

working w/Libyan authorities to help bring to justice those 

responsible for the deaths of U.S. citizens.59

The talking points in their final form make no mention of the 

video. Nevertheless, and with no discernable basis for doing so, 

Ambassador Rice drew that inaccurate connection. On Meet the 

Press she said ‘‘putting together the best information we have 

available to us today our current assessment is that what happened in Benghazi was in fact initially a spontaneous reaction to 


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60Transcript of Interview, Amb. Susan Rice on Meet the Press (Sept. 16, 2012). 61Transcript of Interview of Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau at 89 (July 29, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 62Transcript of Interview of Acting Assistant Sec’y of State NEA Beth Jones before H. Comm. 

on Oversight and Government Reform at 138–139 (July 11, 2013) (on file with the Committee). 63 E-mail from a State Dep’t Senior Policy Advisor to Amb. Susan Rice and others (Sept. 11, 

2012) (on file with the Committee, C05390691). 64 Internal Transcript, Interview of the President by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes at 2 (Sept. 12, 

2012) (on file with the Committee, C05527907). 65 Id. 

what had just transpired hours before in Cairo, almost a copycat 

of—of the demonstrations against our facility in Cairo, which were 

prompted, of course, by the video.’’ 60

The statement Rice made was false. The ‘‘best information’’ available at the time—from the witnesses on the ground—pointed directly to a pre-planned, complex terrorist attack. Many within the 

State Department came to that conclusion quickly as well. For example, a Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, ‘‘My opinion, that night, was simply that this 

was a terrorist attack.’’ 61 Likewise, Assistant Secretary of State 

Beth Jones testified that ‘‘there was discussion about was it a demonstration, was it an attack? And I knew very well that the Embassy [in Tripoli] believed it to be an attack. I believed it to be an 

attack.’’ 62

No one—and certainly not the CIA or the broader U.S. Intelligence Community—had described Benghazi as a copycat of Cairo. 

In fact, knowing what they knew at the time it is hard to imagine 

how the two events could have been more different. On the very 

night of the attack, Ambassador Rice herself received an e-mail 

that described the Cairo protests as ‘‘2000 protestors in total. 20 

got to the top of the wall, 10 got inside the perimeter—they tore 

down the flag and sprayed graffiti inside the compound. They went 

after employee cars as well.’’ 63 No one used or showed a weapon 

in Cairo and no American was hurt. In short, Benghazi was not 

‘‘almost a copycat’’ of what occurred in Cairo and Ambassador Rice 

knew it. 

Ambassador Rice’s ‘‘copycat’’ claim was particularly troubling in 

light of the fact that the President said virtually the opposite just 

days earlier. In an interview with Steve Kroft of 60 Minutes on 

September 12, 2012 he was asked, ‘‘This has been described as a 

mob action, but there are reports that they were very heavily 

armed with grenades. That doesn’t sound like your normal demonstration.’’ 64 To which the President responded, ‘‘As I said, we’re 

still investigating exactly what happened. I don’t want to jump the 

gun on this. But you’re right that this is not a situation that 

was exactly the same as what happened in Egypt, and my suspicion is, is that there are folks involved in this who were looking 

to target Americans from the start.’’ 65 It is troubling that this portion of the President’s answer was deleted from the show that aired 

on September 23, 2012 and was not made public until just days before the election. 

Similarly, on CNN’s State of the Union Ambassador Rice, almost 

indignant, insisted ‘‘[f]irst of all, let’s be clear about what transpired here. What happened this week in Cairo, in Benghazi, in 

many parts of the region . . . was a result—a direct result of a 


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66Transcript of Interview, Amb. Susan Rice on CNN State of the Union (Sept. 16, 2012). 67Transcript of Interview of Amb. Susan Rice at 102 (February 2, 2016), (on file with the 

Committee). 68See US ‘had no actionable intelligence’ over Benghazi attack, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 10, 

2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africa andindianocean/libya/9597738/US-hadno-actionable-intelligence-over-Benghazi-attack.html. 69See E-mail from Assistant Regional Security Officer (Sept. 11, 2012) (‘‘We received word 

from our local guards that this morning they observed a member of the police force assigned 

to the [Benghazi] Mission at a construction site across the street from our main gate taking pictures of our compound. I briefed the [Ambassador.]) (on file with the Committee, C05271656). 70See Transcript of Interview of Amb. Susan Rice at 39 (February 2, 2016) (Rice testified ‘‘I 

don’t recall us talking about the CIA talking points’’ and ‘‘we didn’t talk about Benghazi, in fact, 

on the phone call, as I remember’’) (on file with the Committee). 71 E-mail from Senior Libyan Desk Offier, NEA to NEA Press Officer (Sept 17, 2012) (on file 

with the Committee: Doc# C05580617). 72 Id. 

heinous and offensive video that was widely disseminated.’’ 66

Again, nowhere in the talking points did the U.S. Intelligence Community blame the video for what occurred in Benghazi let alone describe it as a ‘‘direct result’’ of the video. When confronted with 

this, Ambassador Rice seemed to deny the meaning of the very 

words she used, claiming that she did not ‘‘intend[] to include[] 

Benghazi in that statement[.]’’ 67

Nor did Ambassador Rice—or anyone else from the administration—tell the full story. In fact, they only told the half that helped 

politically. For example, the administration claimed publicly there 

was no ‘‘actionable intelligence’’ prior to the attack—suggesting the 

attack was spontaneous.68 However, it failed to disclose that at the 

time significant gaps existed in U.S. intelligence collection in Libya 

that made it virtually impossible to have picked up such warnings 

in the first place. It also failed to highlight the casing incident that 

had occurred the morning of the attack just outside the Benghazi 

compound.69 The administration also failed to disclose the long history of terrorist violence in Benghazi—information that would have 

placed the Benghazi attack into its proper context. 

Nor did Ambassador Rice show any sincere interest in finding all 

of the facts—or as she put it—the best information available before 

going on the Sunday talk shows. In fact, her preparation session 

the day before, which included Benjamin Rhodes and White House 

political adviser David Plouffe—appeared to spend very little time 

on Benghazi at all.70

On Monday, September 17, 2012, some State Department officials reacted with shock to Ambassador Rice’s claims. Specifically, 

the Department’s NEA Bureau press department—the experts on 

Libya—reacted with disbelief. The discussion began with NEA’s 

Senior Libyan Desk Officer reacting to draft press guidance that 

quoted the CIA talking points by saying, ‘‘I really hope this was revised. I don’t think we should go on the record on this.’’ 71 This led 

to the Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, NEA saying, 

‘‘Not sure we want to be so definitive[,]’’ 72 which led to the following e-mail exchange: 

NEA Spokesperson: 

The horse has left the barn on this, don’t you think? Rice 

was on FIVE Sunday Morning shows yesterday saying 

this. Tough to walk back. 

Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA: 


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73 E-mail from Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA to Spokesperson, NEA, 

Senior Libyan Desk Offier, NEA, Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, NEA (Sept 17, 

2012) (emphasis added) (on file with the Committee, C05580618). 74See, e.g., Transcript of Interview of Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA at 

89 (‘‘Q: So let me make sure I’m clear. So your opinion on the night of the attack, when you 

were at the State Department, your opinion was that it was a terrorist attack? A: Correct.’’) 

(on file with the Committee). 75See E-mail from NEA press officer to Bernadette Meehan and others (Sept. 17, 2012) (on 

file with the Committee, C05578291). 76 Id. 

[Nuland] planned on walking it back just a bit, though. 

Senior Libyan Desk Officer, NEA: 

I think Rice was off the reservation on this one. 

Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA: 

Yup. Luckily there’s enough in her language to fudge exactly what she said/meant. 

NEA Spokesperson: 

Off the reservation on five networks! 

Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA: 

[White House] very worried about the politics. This was all 

their doing.73

Although these individuals may not have seen the CIA talking 

points prior to Rice’s appearances, they did know what had occurred in Benghazi based on their vantage point that night.74

The exchange also highlights another important issue. Toward 

the end of the exchange the NEA Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications describes it as ‘‘luck’’ that Ambassador Rice had said 

enough to ‘‘fudge’’ what she meant. A national crisis is no time to 

fudge the truth; it is a time to find it and to tell it. But what we 

found here is just the opposite. And for those who appear to have 

known the truth—such as Secretary Clinton—the American people 

waited in vain for them to correct Ambassador Rice’s misleading 

public statements. 

Possibly most troubling is the evidence suggesting the State Department may have changed its public statements to match Rice’s 

claims. Specifically, on September 17, 2012, a State Department 

Press Officer in the NEA Bureau circulated a document entitled 

‘‘NEA Press Guidance Libya: Update on Investigation on Attack in 

Benghazi,’’ 75 a document intended as guidance for public comments 

about the attack. In the original draft it said that ‘‘we have not 

seen any signs that the attack . . . in Benghazi was other than 

premeditated or coordinated.’’ In a later draft, however, ‘‘other 

than premeditated or coordinated’’ morphed into ‘‘other than spontaneous.’’ The document produced by the State Department to the 

Committee still contained the insertion (in bold) and deletions (in 

bold strikethrough) under the heading ‘‘Key Points’’: 

We will continue to wait for the findings of the ongoing 

FBI investigation before reaching a final conclusion, but at 

this preliminary stage, time, we have not yet seen any 

signs that the attack on our consulate in Benghazi was 

other than spontaneous. premeditated. coordinated.76


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77Transcript of Interview of DS Agent #10 at 22–23 (April 2, 2015) (recounting conversation 

with DS Agent #25 who was the desk officer for diplomatic security in the Near Eastern Affairs 

Bureau). 

No one asked about it could explain the change. The change— 

from the truth to a known false statement—is troubling. 

Secretary Clinton and others in the State Department clearly 

knew the truth about Benghazi almost immediately. Yet they only 

shared that information with others privately, including with Secretary Clinton’s daughter. Publicly they told a very different 

story—one in line with Ben Rhodes’s instruction to blame the video 

and not a failure of the President’s policy. In doing so, the President and Secretary Clinton put politics ahead of the truth. The four 

victims deserved better. And the American people deserved better. 

II. Last Clear Chance 

In August 2012 it did not take an expert to see that the State 

Department facility in Benghazi should have been closed if additional security was not to be provided. The location and the risk 

demanded Secretary Clinton’s attention. The Benghazi facility was 

wholly unique and there is no evidence that Secretary Clinton 

asked her experts—let alone Ambassador Stevens who she personally chose for the position—the hard questions. The robust host-nation security forces that the United States takes for granted in 

other countries did not exist in Libya. Rather, competing militias— 

some friendly, some not—filled the vacuum left by 40-plus years of 

Qhaddafi’s rule. And escalating violence against the U.S. compound 

and others in Libya—230 incidents since June 2011 alone—made 

a terrorist attack all but inevitable. These were the facts known in 

August 2012. And in August 2012 Secretary Clinton had the last, 

clear chance to provide adequate protection or, failing that, to close 

the facility and pull our people out. She did neither. 

A. THE ‘‘WILD EAST’’: POST-QHADDAFI BENGHAZI 

I told him that this was a suicide mission; that there was 

a very good chance that everybody here was going to die; 

that there was absolutely no ability here to prevent an attack whatever. * * [H]hesaid, ‘‘everybody back here in 

D.C. knows that people are going to die in Benghazi, and 

nobody cares and nobody is going to care until somebody 

does die.’’ 

State Diplomatic Security Agent #10 77

According to the Diplomatic security agent quoted above, he had 

this exchange with the State Department’s desk officer for diplomatic security in the region that covered Libya, shortly after he arrived in Benghazi on temporary assignment as the regional security officer. The conversation did not occur days before the attack. 

It did not occur a month before the attack. Rather, he gave the 

warning nearly nine months before September 11, 2012 shortly 

after he arrived in Benghazi. Nor was his the only warning. 

In June 2012, a second Benghazi security official reported on the 

‘‘increase in extremist activity’’ in Benghazi and described his ‘‘fear 


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78 E-mail from DS Agent #24 to DS Agent #25 (June 14, 2012) (on file with the Committee, 

C05388987). 79 Id. 80 Id. 81 Id. (‘‘LES bodyguard assigned to the Ambassador’s Protection Detail informed the RSO that 

he was asked about specific security questions concerning the embassy by an individual that 

he believed was an extremist.’’). 82 E-mail from Diplomatic Security Agent 16 to DS–IP–NEA (Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the 

Committee, SCB0048085). 83 E-mail from OpsNewsTicker to NEWS-Libya (May 22, 2012, 9:06 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05392368). 84 E-mail from Principal Officer 2, U.S. Dep’t of State, to John C. Stevens, U.S. Ambas-sador 

to Libya, Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, William V. Roe-buck, Dir. Office 

of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 6, 2012, 4:49 AM) 

(on file with the Committee, C05393187). 85See Mohamed al-Tommy and Hadeel al-Shalchi, Gunmen Attack Tunisian Consulate in 

Benghazi, Reuters (Jun. 18, 2012, 19:03), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-gunmen-tunisia-idUSBRE85H1V620120618 86Memo from Regional Director, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, Diplomatic Security at 44 

(June 15, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048161). 87See Blast and Jailbreak Rock Libya’s Benghazi, AlJazeera (Aug. 1, 2012) (available at http:// 

www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/08/201281818 48269 995.html). 88 Iran Red Crescent Team ’Kidnapped’ in Libya, AlJazeera (Jul. 31, 2012), http:// 

www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/07/201273120552473238.html. 89See Steven Sotloff, The Bomb Attacks in Libya: Are Gaddafi Loyalists Behind Them?, Time 

(Aug. 24, 2012), http://world.time.com/2012/08/24/the-bomb-attacks-in-libya-are-gaddafi-loyalistsbehind-them/. 

that we have passed a threshold where we will see more targeting, 

attacks, and incidents involving western [sic] targets.’’ 78 The official also listed a series of very recent attacks and noted that a 

source had warned of a ‘‘group attack’’ on an American facility.79

He specifically mentioned ‘‘[t]argeting [and] attacks by extremist 

groups particularly in the eastern portion of Libya[.]’’ 80 These 

warnings contained troubling information about possible terrorists 

trying to learn information about U.S. facilities.81

The list of incidents in Benghazi that were reported back to 

Washington was long. And it told a compelling story of a city on 

the brink. To anyone aware of the conditions, it was not a matter 

of ‘‘if’’ but rather ‘‘when’’ a terrorist attack on the U.S. compound 

would occur. The list ran the gamut from minor to major incidents, 

including a rocket attack on the British ambassador’s convoy that 

prompted withdrawal of British personnel from the city. The incidents included: 

• April 10, 2012 explosive device hits U.N. convoy in Benghazi 82

• May 22, 2012 rocket propelled grenade attack on the International Red Cross facility, which included a warning that 

‘‘Americans would be targeted next’’ 83

• June 6, 2012 attack on U.S. mission in Benghazi 84

• June 18, 2012 armed attackers storm Tunisian Consulate 85

• June 11, 2012 rocket attack on the British ambassador 86

• July 27, 2012 attempted bomb attack on Tibesti Hotel in 

Benghazi, the hotel used by the State Department during Revolution 87

• July 31, 2012 seven Iranian-citizen International Committee of 

the Red Crescent workers abducted 88

• August 20, 2012 small bomb thrown at Egyptian diplomat’s vehicle parked outside of the Egyptian consulate 89


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90 E-mail from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Libya to Amb. Christopher Stevens (Sept. 

11, 2012) (on file with the Committee). 91This is the number of facilities identified by Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security 

Gregory Starr in his testimony before the Committee in 2014. Transcript of Hearing 1 H. Sel. 

Comm. on Benghazi Testimony of Gregory Starr at 97 (Sept. 17, 2014). 

Without this background one could, in theory, jump to the mistaken conclusion that the terrorist attack in Benghazi and the protests in Cairo were connected in time and in cause. But the State 

Department and the NEA Bureau in particular knew this history 

all too well. For those people, it was against this backdrop that 

they quickly saw Benghazi for what it was: a terrorist attack, not 

a protest. 

Nor did this escalation in violence escape the notice of American 

policy makers or the U.S. Intelligence Community. Intelligence analysts produced numerous reports on the growing terrorist threat 

centered in Benghazi—yet the State Department did nothing. 

Again, why? And so even though the security problems in Benghazi 

appear to have been well known to State Department officials at 

the time, no one acted in any meaningful way to protect the 

Benghazi facility let alone to get the people out. The question remained: Why? 

Although the agent’s warning quoted at the section heading 

could not have been clearer, it was ignored even as the situation 

in Benghazi went from bad to worse. The situation became so grave 

that it prompted one State Department official to dub Benghazi the 

‘‘wild east.’’ Sadly, the humor foreshadowed the horror to come as 

he made this statement in an e-mail sent to Ambassador Stevens 

just hours before his death.90

Some blame the deplorable security conditions in Benghazi on 

the facility’s ‘‘made up’’ State Department designation. To them, 

the fact the Department labeled the facility ‘‘temporary’’ excused 

shortcomings in the compound’s physical security. A ‘‘temporary’’ 

designation enabled the facility to skirt a host of written internal 

security requirements that applied to more permanent locations. 

We also learned it was an improvised designation not used at any 

of the State Department’s other 275 facilities around the world.91

The requirements this designation avoided cover everything from 

setbacks to perimeter wall heights to razor wire placement. Standards that, had the State Department complied with them, would 

have given the Benghazi staff a fighting chance that night. 

In trying to excuse the security conditions in Benghazi, some 

have argued that it would have been impossible to comply with the 

State Department’s internal requirements in Benghazi. That may 

be true, but it is also irrelevant. The suggestion that a facility’s 

label should dictate whether men and women have adequate security of course makes no sense. 

It makes no sense because it ignores a critical requirement applicable to all facilities regardless of whether it will stand for a day, 

a year, or a decade. The facility’s label did not trump commonsense. Nor did it blind officials to the deadly attack that to trained 

professionals appears to have been all but inevitable, as the security agent quoted above observed months before. In other words, 

the State Department cannot hide behind its regulations. It had an 


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92 E-mail from former ambassador to Yemen to Beth Jones, Acting Assistant Secretary for 

NEA (Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05391021). 93 Id. 94Transcript of Testimony of Gregory Hicks, Deputy in Charge of Mission Embassy Libya, before H. Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight at 15 (April 11, 2013). 

obligation to act yet did far too little to secure the facility. The 

question, again, was why? 

The same question came from the former Ambassador to Yemen, 

who the day after the attack observed: 

People are bound to ask how we can send unarmed civilian 

diplomats to conduct [U.S. government] business into a region with no local security forces to rely on, only a handful 

of lightly armed [diplomatic security] agents serving as 

close protection team, and a couple dozen local militiamen 

of questionable pedigree with AK–47’s providing perimeter 

security.92

It was a question that the ambassador himself could not even answer: ‘‘I would suggest that we begin to think now of how we explain/justify our presence in these non-permissive environments.93

To most Americans, the time to think about justifying a presence 

in Benghazi and other dangerous places should have come before, 

not after, Americans have died. 

So the question remained, what was so important in Benghazi 

that it meant risking the lives of Americans in what many appeared to view as a suicide mission? It is true that American diplomats cannot hide inside bunkers. That we can never eliminate all 

risk in diplomacy. That Benghazi was the seat of the revolution 

and home to important anti-regime leaders. And that the United 

States was not alone in seeing a good reason to be there, as other 

Western countries had done the same. Yet, other Western countries 

left and the U.S. stayed. So while all this may be true, it still begs 

the essential question: Why Benghazi? The answer that best fits is 

politics. 

B. PUTTING POLITICS AHEAD OF PEOPLE: FAILING TO CLOSE THE 

BENGHAZI COMPOUND 

It remains unclear why a State Department presence in Benghazi was so important. What is clear, however, is keeping a facility open there was important to Secretary Clinton. In addition, on 

this matter, many questions remain and much classified information was withheld from the Committee. 

In his interview with Secretary Clinton prior to confirmation as 

ambassador to Libya, Secretary Clinton told Ambassador Stevens 

that she hoped that Benghazi would become a permanent post. In 

late July 2012, Ambassador Stevens discussed the issue with his 

Deputy Chief of Mission Gregory Hicks. According to Mr. Hicks, 

during their discussion Ambassador Stevens said that Secretary 

Clinton might travel to Libya again, possibly in October,94 and that 

Stevens wanted to have a ‘‘deliverable’’ for her trip. That ‘‘deliverable’’ was to make the mission in Benghazi permanent. 

No matter how important a presence in Benghazi was—to Secretary Clinton, to the State Department, to the United States—it 


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95 Information Memo for the Secretary from Acting Assistant Secretary Beth Jones, NEA 

(Aug. 17, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05390124). 96 Id. 97 Id. 98 Id. 99 Id. 100 Id. 101 Id. 102 Id. 

should have become very clear that the risks of staying without 

more security outweighed any possible benefit. 

On August 17, 2012, Secretary Clinton received a document titled ‘‘Information Memo for the Secretary.’’ The memo did not pull 

punches. Under the somewhat benign heading ‘‘Uptick in Violence, 

Primarily in Eastern Libya’’ it said, ‘‘Since May, there has been a 

spike in violent incidents, including bombings, abductions, assassinations, and car-jackings.’’ 95 The memo, from Acting Assistant 

Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Beth Jones, is quoted at length 

here: 

• ‘‘While unpredictable security conditions restrict the movement 

of U.S. government personnel, they have not limited our assistance work.’’ 96

• ‘‘The attachment lists the major events, which include a June 

6 bombing at the U.S. Mission in Benghazi and an August 6 

attempted car-jacking of embassy personnel in Tripoli.’’ 97

• ‘‘Recently, foreign residents of Benghazi have expressed concern about the risks of living and working there.’’ 98

• ‘‘In response to five attacks since May, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) withdrew its personnel from 

Benghazi and Misrata in early August[.] The ICRC country director believes international organizations in Libya have underestimated the recent rise in violence out of a shared sense 

of optimism.’’ 99

• ‘‘The variety of the violence points to the overall lack of effective security institutions, particularly in the east.’’ 100

• ‘‘The distance from the already weak central security services, 

feelings of marginalization from the central government, and a 

history of lslamist extremism in some eastern towns all seem 

to contribute to a permissive environment where disparate motivations for violence have found fertile ground in which to germinate. The national Supreme Security Council—a post-revolutionary coalition of militia elements cobbled into a single force 

and designed to provide interim security in Benghazi—has had 

limited success as a stabilizing force.’’ 101

• ‘‘The government seems largely unable to gather intelligence in 

advance of attacks and central security services appear intimidated by the local militias, in some cases tacitly ceding their 

authority. Some actors see the weak response from the government and feel they can act with increasing impunity. The 

sense of lawlessness encourages spoilers, predators, and other 

disruptive players to escalate their actions.’’ 102


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103 Id. 104 Id. 105Transcript of Hearing 4 before the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 

Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (hereafter referred to as ‘‘the Committee’’), 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State). 106Transcript of Hearing 4 before the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 

Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (hereafter referred to as ‘‘the Committee’’), 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State). 

• ‘‘Benghazi was once palpably safer than Tripoli [but] . . . lawlessness is increasing. . . . Despite the urgency, however, the 

government’s response is likely to continue to be hesitant and 

tentative[.]’’ 103

• ‘‘Despite the worrisome aspects of this increase in violence, 

there is no coordinated organization behind the incidents. . . . Nonetheless, the likelihood of more widespread violence is 

strong if Libya’s political leaders are unable to demobalize [sic] 

militias and strengthen the government’s security institutions.’’ 104

Despite the colorless bureaucratic language, the Beth Jones 

memo nevertheless painted a harrowing picture of conditions in the 

eastern part of Libya where Benghazi is located. Many of the words 

truly jump at the reader— ‘‘urgency,’’ ‘‘lawlessness,’’ ‘‘unpredictable,’’ ‘‘lack of effective security,’’ ‘‘limited success,’’ ‘‘widespread violence,’’ ‘‘act with increasing impunity.’’ The list of specific incidents 

attached to the memo brought that picture into even starker relief. 

When Secretary Clinton was asked about the Beth Jones memo 

during her Committee interview she deflected, ‘‘Well, I think that, 

again, there was no recommendation based on any of the assessments, not from our State Department experts, not from the intelligence community, that we should abandon either Benghazi or 

Tripoli.’’ 105

In the beginning and possibly into the summer of 2012, the situation in Benghazi may have represented one that called out for 

State Department security experts or the Intelligence Community 

to speak up. But by August 17, 2012, it had become a situation 

that now demanded leadership by the Secretary of State herself— 

leadership that did not sit back and wait for a recommendation. 

Just as she had shown—in the words of Jacob Sullivan—‘‘leadership/ownership/stewardship’’ on the decision to go into Libya, it 

was now time for her to show that same leadership and upgrade 

the facility or get our people out—even if it meant criticism from 

those who opposed the intervention in the first place. She had the 

last, clear chance to order an immediate closure of the Benghazi facility yet did nothing, and four Americans died. 

During her testimony before the Committee, Secretary Clinton 

almost scolded the Republican members: 

You know, I would imagine I’ve thought more about what 

happened than all of you put together. I’ve lost more sleep 

than all of you put together. I have been racking my brain 

about what more could have been done or should have 

been done.106

For one that had spent so much time thinking about what happened, it seems that the answer should have been obvious. 


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107Transcript of Interview of Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Defense at 57 (Jan. 8, 2016). 108Transcript of Interview of Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Defense at 24 (Jan. 8, 2016). 109Transcript of Interview of Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Defense at 42 (Jan. 8, 2016). 110 Id. at 48. 111See Dep’t of State, Watch Log, Operations Center (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05872462). 

III. Military Response: Could we have done more? 

I just say, do it. Take the hill. They take the hill. 

Leon Panetta

Secretary of Defense 107

The U.S. military never reached Benghazi. Not only did it not get 

to Benghazi, it did not get to Libya during the 7-plus hours of the 

ongoing attack. The only support unit that did arrive in Tripoli— 

the Marine ‘‘Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support Team’’ or ‘‘FAST’’ 

team—was anything but fast, and arrived in Libya nearly 24 hours 

after the attack had begun and 16-plus hours after the attack 

ended. In fact, it did not take off until almost 12 hours after the 

attack ended. Why? Although a Department of Defense drone circled overhead in Benghazi during much of the attack, the military 

never sent an armed drone that could possibly have changed the 

course of events during the hours-long siege, especially as terrorists 

pounded the Annex with mortar fire. An armed drone never came. 

Why? 

Like many Americans, the picture we saw of what happened in 

Benghazi clashed with our experience and expectations. The brave 

men and women who serve this country are the greatest fighting 

force on earth with a capability second to none. We as Americans 

have grown to expect these men and women to do the near impossible. And time and again they not only meet our expectations, they 

surpass them. In fact, we saw examples of exactly that heroism on 

the ground in Benghazi that night. 

Our brave soldiers were ready, willing, and able to fight for their 

fellow countrymen but leaders in Washington held them back. If 

they had been given the chance they would have, we have no 

doubt, as Secretary Panetta said, ‘‘taken that hill.’’ 

In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary of Defense Panetta said that at about 6:00 p.m. on September 11th after meeting 

with the President, he ordered three assets to deploy: one Marine 

Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support Team or ‘‘FAST’’ team, one Commanders In Extremis Force or ‘‘CIF,’’ and one hostage rescue team 

based in the United States. He was clear: ‘‘My orders were to deploy those forces, period.’’ 108

After his meeting with the President, which lasted less than 30 

minutes, Secretary Panetta had no further contact with the President that night.109 None. It is hard to accept that the Commander 

in Chief and the Secretary of Defense had no further contact during the entire unfolding crisis. Possibly just as startling is that Secretary Panetta and Secretary Clinton did not speak at all 110 and 

Secretary Clinton did not speak to the President until approximately 10:30 p.m., over six hours after the terrorist attack began 

and approximately five hours after a U.S. ambassador went missing.111 Secretary Clinton spoke to CIA Director David Petraeus at 


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112 Id. 113 All times Eastern. 114 All times shown are Eastern time, which is 6 hours behind local time in Benghazi. 

approximately 5:38 p.m. but not again that night.112 The meeting 

(denoted ‘‘M’’) and calls (denoted ‘‘C’’), or lack thereof, between the 

four principals—President Obama, Secretary Clinton, Secretary Panetta, and Director Petraeus—looked like this: 113

We cannot help but contrast the picture painted by the above 

with the all hands on deck depicted in the now-famous photo of the 

President, Secretary Clinton, Defense Secretary Gates, Director of 

National Intelligence Clapper, and other officials huddled in the 

Situation Room during the Osama bin Laden raid. Benghazi should 

have merited the same level of attention and urgency. 

Until now, the public has been told that the military could not 

have reached Benghazi in time to help—either with jet planes, 

armed drones, or personnel. Had we seen aircraft in the air flying 

toward Benghazi—flying toward the sound of gunfire as the military often says—only to be recalled mid-flight after hearing that 

the Americans had left Benghazi safely, we may have been willing 

to accept that explanation. But the fighter planes and armed 

drones never left the ground. And, as the chart below shows, the 

transport planes carrying the FAST, CIF, and hostage rescue team 

did not leave until hours after the attack was over. 

The attack began at 9:42 p.m. in Benghazi, 3:42 p.m. in Washington. It does not appear that Secretary Panetta heard about the 

attack until sometime after 4:32 p.m. when the National Military 

Command Center was notified and he did not discuss the matter 

with the President until approximately 5:00 p.m. From 3:42 p.m. 

until approximately 10:00 a.m. the next day—nearly 18 hours—no 

manned U.S. military plane flew on a mission toward Libya. When 

the first plane did take off with a Marine FAST platoon it did not 

take off until hours after the attack ended and flew to an intermediate country. The timeline of significant events compared to 

when the military assets took off and arrived included the following:114


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We are now convinced, contrary to the administration’s public 

claim that the military did not have time to get to Benghazi, that 

the administration never launched men or machines to help directly in the fight. That is very different from what we have been 

told to date. And the evidence is compelling. 

For example, FAST platoons, as of September 2012, were typically used to reinforce embassy security and operated from a fixed 

location within an embassy. FAST platoons did not deploy with 

their own vehicles, so they were dependent on other means for 

ground mobility. In other words, the FAST team was not sent to 

help in the fight at the CIA Annex. The question then became what 


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115Letter from Stephen C. Hedger, Dep’t of Defense, Office of Legislative Affairs to the Hon. 

Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Sel. Comm. on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack 

in Benghazi (Apr. 28, 2016) (emphasis added) (on file with the Committee). 

was sent. And the answer appears to be nothing. None of the three 

assets that Secretary Panetta ordered to deploy were intended to 

join the fight against terrorists at the Annex. 

An asset that could have made a difference would have been 

armed drones. And as the Committee learned, it would have been 

relatively fast and easy to arm a drone. To date, however, the Committee has not received a detailed inventory of all armed drone assets available that night from the Department of Defense. While 

we understand that because of time and distance armed drones 

may not have arrived in time that does not alter the fact that we 

did not try. 

The military has failed to provide a clear, specific inventory of 

every armed aircraft—whether manned or unmanned—that could 

have flown to Benghazi during the 7-plus hours from the beginning 

of the attack to the mortar rounds hitting the CIA Annex. Instead, 

the military has insisted that the Committee simply accept the 

word of senior military officers, some without firsthand knowledge 

of the events, as an adequate substitute for actual eye witnesses. 

One of the clearest examples of the Department of Defense’s attempt to impede the investigation involved one of its legislative affairs officers, Stephen C. Hedger. Mr. Hedger, appearing to work 

hand-in-hand with the minority members, wrote a stinging letter 

to the Committee attacking it on multiple fronts—attacks that 

quickly found their way into a Democrat press release. The letter 

even went so far as to imply that the Committee’s investigative requests had somehow impaired our national defense. 

The most troubling aspect of the letter was the criticism that the 

Committee had asked for witnesses that ‘‘seem unnecessary even 

for a comprehensive investigation[.]’’ While it is rare for the subject 

of an investigation to decide which witnesses are relevant, the Department of Defense felt otherwise. One of the supposedly ‘‘unnecessary’’ witnesses was known to the Committee only as ‘‘John from 

Iowa’’—the pseudonym he used when he called into a talk show to 

discuss the attack. He had operated the video and other sensors on 

a Predator drone that circled over Benghazi the night of the attack. 

Given his bird’s eye view, the Committee believed he could provide 

valuable insight into what the Department of Defense knew and 

therefore could have, and possibly should have, done to help that 

night. 

Mr. Hedger responded to the request with what bordered on sarcasm—describing the Committee’s request as one ‘‘to interview an 

individual identified as ‘John from Iowa’ who described himself as 

a Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) camera operator on a talk radio 

show, where he described what he allegedly saw in the video feed 

from the night of the attack.’’ In short, Mr. Hedger made the request sound like the Committee was chasing crackpots. To drive 

the point home he then added, ‘‘The Department has expended significant resources to locate anyone who might match the description of this person, to no avail.’’ 115

As it turns out, Mr. Hedger’s claim was completely false according to information provided by the witness himself, who the DeVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00455 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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116See E-mail from State Dep’t Operations to various (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05562037). 

partment of Defense eventually produced. Mr. Hedger’s false and 

misleading claim, was one of the more troubling examples of the 

Department of Defense’s failure to cooperate fully, although not the 

only one. 

What has also emerged is a picture of the State Department eating up valuable time by insisting that certain elements of the U.S. 

military respond to Libya in civilian clothes and that it not use vehicles with United States markings. Both restrictions appear to 

have been concessions to the Libyan government that did not want 

an identifiable U.S. military presence on the streets of Libya. We 

will never know exactly how long these conditions delayed the military response but that they were even a part of the discussion is 

troubling. 

And at the same time the State Department appeared to waste 

time on what our soldiers would wear, it also appeared to waste 

time and focus on the YouTube video that the administration 

would later blame, falsely, for the attack. It has emerged that during an emergency call at 7:30 p.m. on the night of the attack involving Secretary Clinton and other high-level officials from the 

Department of Defense, State Department, and CIA that a full five 

of the eleven action items from the meeting related to the video.116

One such item had Secretary Panetta calling Pastor Terry Jones 

to ask him to take down the video. At this critical moment, with 

lives at risk in Benghazi and military assets sitting idle, it is difficult to imagine a worse use of the Defense Secretary’s time than 

to call Pastor Jones about a video having nothing to do with the 

attack. Rather than diverting the Secretary of Defense’s attention, 

every effort should have been made to marshal assets that could 

have gone to Benghazi. 

We cannot say whether the military could have saved lives in 

Benghazi. We can say with certainty that our nation’s leaders did 

not move heaven and earth to send military help with the urgency 

that those Americans deserved. We will never know if a more vigorous, comprehensive, and urgent response could have saved lives. 


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117President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Deaths of U.S. Embassy Staff 

in Libya (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/remarks-president-deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya. 118Letter from W. Neil Eggleston to Hon. Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Sel. Comm. on the 

Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (Jan. 23, 2015) (on file with the 

Committee). 119 It is worth noting that Abu Khatallah’s capture demonstrated the capacity of the United 

States to execute a complex mission in a hostile place to bring a terrorist to justice. It is equally 

certain that the Obama administration’s decision to treat Abu Khatallah and other terrorists 

as ordinary criminals—affording them the full panoply of legal protections available under U.S. 

law—has made it harder to capture Abu Khatallah’s co-conspirators. That is because the decision denies our Intelligence Community the time and tools necessary to develop facts that might 

help to apprehend the others responsible. That may, in turn, explain, why dozens and dozens 

of Abu Khatallah’s co-conspirators remain at large. 

IV. Justice Denied 

We will not waver in our commitment to see that justice is 

done for this terrible act. And make no mistake, justice will 

be done. 

Barack Obama

President of the United States 117

The President made this promise the day after the attack. Secretary Clinton did much the same. In January 2015, White House 

Counsel W. Neil Eggleston said something very similar in a letter 

to the Committee where he claimed ‘‘[t]he Administration’s focus 

since the attacks has been . . . an unwavering commitment to 

bring to justice those responsible for harming Americans[.]’’ 118 The 

words of the President and his lawyer were resolute and they were 

strong. But in the end they were just that, words. 

Almost four years have passed since four Americans were killed 

by radical Islamic terrorists in Benghazi. As of the writing of this 

report, only one man—Ahmed Abu Khatallah—has been indicted 

and brought to the United States to face charges.119 To the Committee’s knowledge, no others have been taken into U.S. custody, 

let alone arrested and prosecuted. Secretary Clinton said, almost 

two years after the murders, ‘‘there’s a lot we don’t know about 

what happened in Benghazi.’’ That may be true, but the United 

States does know the identity of many of the attackers. Yet, the resources devoted to bring them to justice have proven inadequate. 

President Obama also claimed that Khattallah ‘‘will now face the 

full weight of the American justice system.’’ To us, that means facing the full measure of punishment for killing four Americans. Yet, 

the administration has chosen—for reasons it refused to provide 

Congress—not to seek the death penalty in this case. 

And so as we near the fourth anniversary of the attack, the 

American people, at a minimum, are owed an explanation for the 

administration’s failure to bring more of those responsible to justice. 

V. Notes on the Investigation 

For the past two years the Committee pressed for full and complete answers to the important questions left in Benghazi’s wake. 

The American people—and especially the families of the victims 

and those injured—deserved nothing less. 


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120 Nancy Pelosi, House Democratic Leader, Pelosi Statement on House Vote on Select Committee on Benghazi (May 8, 2014), http://www.democraticleader.gov/newsroom/pelosi-statementhouse-vote-select-committee-benghazi/. 

We approached the investigation believing facts were nonpartisan. We knew some hoped the investigation would expose Secretary Clinton and President Obama for serious wrongdoing. Still 

others hoped, and in fact decided, that the investigation would find 

nothing—and they did their best to tarnish the Committee’s reputation in case something damaging did emerge. But we suspected 

the vast majority of Americans simply wanted the truth, whatever 

it may look like, to come out in full. 

We had hoped that Democrats on the Committee would join this 

effort as full partners and that the administration would cooperate 

with our work. That Republicans and Democrats would feel the 

weight of history, and the loss of four fellow Americans, and set 

aside partisan differences in favor of a joint search for the truth. 

If that had happened, it would not have been without precedent as 

we saw during the 9/11 Commission investigation. Yet, Minority 

Leader Pelosi set the tone early, even before the first witness was 

sworn in, and made clear that a truly bipartisan effort would never 

happen: 

Our nation deserves better than yet another deeply partisan and political review. It is disappointing that Republicans blocked a proposal offered by Democrats on the 

House floor today to ensure that this committee is truly bipartisan and fair—a proposal that would have allowed 

Democrats a real and equal voice on the committee, including on the issuance of subpoenas, the manner in which 

witnesses would be questioned and deposed, and the specific protocols governing how documents and other information would be obtained, used, and potentially released 

by the committee. 

It is clear that House Republicans will do anything to divert attention away from their failed leadership and donothing record. As they work to feed the most conspiracyobsessed elements of their base, millions of Americans are 

languishing thanks to Republicans’ refusal to act on the 

urgent business before our nation: renewing emergency 

unemployment insurance, raising the minimum wage, and 

creating jobs.120

It bears mentioning that the Democrats on the Committee could 

have asked for witnesses or documents but in the end asked for one 

witness and a handful of documents. In other words, we offered 

them the ‘‘real and equal voice on the committee’’ that Minority 

Leader Pelosi demanded, but they fell silent when it came time to 

do the work. 

The Democrats on the Committee did not, however, fall completely silent. When they were not attacking the Republicans, they 

paid lip service to the notion of a bipartisan investigation. Ranking 

Member Cummings called for just that type of investigation during 

the first hearing, invoking the same slogan that Minority Leader 

Pelosi used and, of course, that President Obama had used before 


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her: ‘‘Too often over the past two years, the congressional investigation into what happened in Benghazi has devolved into unseemly 

partisanship. We are better than that.’’ In fact, we are better. But 

in the end they were just words. 

The Democrats on the committee, showed little interest in seeking the truth and routinely turned the investigation into political 

theater. We had hoped for more from members that included two 

former criminal prosecutors. Instead, the Democrats and their staff 

spent the bulk of their time trying to discredit the Republican-led 

committee and leveling baseless personal attacks. The attacks were 

often ugly, always without merit, and unfailingly partisan and did 

nothing to advance the cause of finding the full and complete truth 

about Benghazi. 

VI. Conclusion 

In the end, the administration’s efforts to impede the investigation succeeded, but only in part. The minority members’ and their 

staff’s efforts to impede the investigation succeeded also, but again 

only in part. And although we answered many questions, we could 

not do so completely. What we did find was a tragic failure of leadership—in the run up to the attack and the night of—and an administration that, so blinded by politics and its desire to win an 

election, disregarded a basic duty of government: Tell the people 

the truth. And for those reasons Benghazi is, and always will be, 

an American tragedy. 

MR. JORDAN. 

MR. POMPEO. 


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APPENDIX A: 

Resolution Establishing the 

Select Committee on the Events 

Surrounding the 2012 

Terrorist Attack in Benghazi 


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APPENDIX B: 

Significant Persons and Organizations 

Persons 

Abedin, Huma—Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for the Secretary of State, Department of State 

Bargathi, Abdul Salam—Leader of the Preventative Security Brigade, childhood friend of Abu Khattala 

Bash, Jeremy—Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense 

Blumenthal, Sidney—Friend and Confidant of Secretary Hillary R. 

Clinton 

Boswell, Eric—Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security/ 

Director of the Office of Foreign Missions, Department of State 

Breedlove, Philip M.—General, United States Air Force; Commander of the U.S. Air Forces Europe/U.S. Air Forces Africa, Department of Defense 

Brennan, John Owen—Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, and Assistant to the President, White House 

Bukatef, Fawzi—Leader of the February 17 Martyrs Brigade, the 

group that housed a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) at the Benghazi 

Mission compound 

Bultrowicz, Scott—Director, Diplomatic Security Service and Principal Deputy Secretary of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 

Department of State 

Burns, William—Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State 

Carney, Jay—Press Secretary, White House 

Chorin, Ethan—Author and Chief Executive Officer, Perim Associates 

Clapper, James R.—Lieutenant General, Director, Office of National Intelligence 

Clinton, Hillary R.—Secretary of State (January 2009 until February 2013), Department of State 

Cretz, Gene Allan—Ambassador to Libya (December 2008 until 

May 2012), Department of State 

Dempsey, Martin E.—General, United States Army; Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (October 2011 until September 2015), 

Department of Defense 


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Dibble, Elizabeth—Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State 

DiCarlo, Rosemary—Deputy Permanent Representative (to Susan 

Rice), then the Permanent Representative to the U.S. Mission to 

the United Nations, Department of State 

Doherty, Glen Anthony—Contractor, Global Response Staff (GRS), 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Donilon, Thomas E.—National Security Advisor to the President, 

White House 

Duval, Catherine—Senior Advisor, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, 

Department of State 

Evers, Austin—Advisor, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, Department 

of State 

Feltman, Jeffrey—Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 

Affairs (until May 2012), Department of State 

Fishman, Benjamin—Member of the National Security Council, 

White House 

Flynn, Michael—Lieutenant General, United States Army; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of Defense 

Frifield, Julia—Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, 

Department of State 

Gharabi, Mohammad—Leader of the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade 

Gibbons, Thomas B.—Acting Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs, Department of State 

Gordon, Philip—Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian 

Affairs Department of State 

Ham, Carter—General, United States Army; Commander of U.S. 

Africa Command, Department of Defense 

Hamid, Wissam bin—Commander, Libya Shield Brigade 

Hicks, Gregory—Deputy Chief of Mission, Libya, Department of 

State 

Jones, Elizabeth—Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State 

Kelly, John—General, United States Army; Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense 

Kelly, Thomas—Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, 

Department of State 

Kennedy, Patrick F.—Under Secretary for Management, Department of State 

Kerry, John—Secretary of State (February 2013 to present), Department of State 

Khattala, Ahmed Abu—Founded Obeida Ibn al-Jarra Militia, in 

U.S. custody for his suspected involvement in the Benghazi attacks 

Koh, Harold—Legal Advisor, Department of State 

Lamb, Charlene—Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department 

of State 


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Landolt, Richard B.—Rear Admiral, United States Navy; Director 

of Operations and Cyber, U.S. Africa Command, Department of 

Defense 

Leidig, Jr., Charles J.—Vice Admiral, United States Navy; Deputy 

to the Commander for Military Operations, U.S. Africa Command, Department of Defense 

Litt, Robert S.—General Counsel, Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence 

Lohman, Lee—Executive Director, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs/ 

Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Department of State 

Losey, Brian—Rear Admiral, United States Navy; Commander of 

Special Operations Command (SOC) Africa, Department of Defense 

Macmanus, Joseph—Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State, 

Office of the Secretary, Department of State (from May 2012 

until November 2012) 

Magariaf, Mohamad Yousef—President, General National Congress 

of Libya 

Maxwell, Raymond—Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of 

State 

McDonough, Denis—Deputy National Security Advisor, White 

House 

Meehan, Bernadette—Assistant Press Secretary for the National 

Security Council, White House 

Mills, Cheryl D.—Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Secretary of 

State, Department of State 

Mordente, Patrick—General, United States Air Force; Director of 

Operations (J3) for the U.S. Transportation Command 

(TRANSCOM), Department of Defense 

Morell, Michael—Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency 

Mull, Stephen—Executive Secretariat, Office of the Secretary of 

State, Department of State 

Mullen, Michael—Admiral, United States Navy; Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff/Vice Chairman, Benghazi Accountability Review Board 

Nides, Thomas—Deputy Secretary of State for Management and 

Resources, Department of State 

Nuland, Victoria J.—Spokesperson, Department of State 

Obeidi, Fathi—Lieutenant commander in a branch of Libyan 

Shield/Commander of Special Operations for Libya Shield 

Olsen, Matthew—Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

Pagliano, Bryan—Special Advisor, Bureau of Information Resource 

Management, Department of State 

Panetta, Leon—Secretary of Defense (July 2011 until February 

2013), Department of Defense 

Pelton, Erin—Communications Director and Spokesperson for Ambassador Susan Rice, Department of State 

Petraeus, David—Director, Central Intelligence Agency 


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Pickering, Thomas R.—Chairman, Benghazi Accountability Review 

Board 

Polaschik, Joan—Deputy Chief of Mission for Tripoli, Libya (2009 

until June 2012), Department of State 

Reines, Philippe—Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, 

Department of State 

Repass, Michael S.—Major General, United States Army; Commander, Special Operations Command (SOC) Europe, Department of Defense 

Rhodes, Benjamin—Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and 

Speechwriting, White House 

Rice, Susan E.—U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Department of State 

Roebuck, William—Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State 

Ryu, Rexon—Deputy to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Department of State 

Sanderson, Janet—Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern 

Affairs, Department of State 

Shapiro, Andrew—Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Department of State 

Sherman, Wendy—Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State 

Smith, Gentry—Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Countermeasures, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State 

Smith, Sean—Information Management Officer, Department of 

State 

Starr, Gregory—Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security (November 2013 to present), Department of State 

Steinberg, James—Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State 

Stevens, John Christopher—U.S. Representative to the Libyan 

Transitional National Council/Ambassador to Libya (May 2012 

until September 2012), Department of State 

Sullivan, Jacob J.—Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy 

Planning, Department of State 

Taylor, William—Special Coordinator for Middle Eastern Transitions, Department of State 

Thompson, Mark—Deputy Coordinator, Operations Directorate, 

Bureau of Counterterrorism, Department of State 

Tidd, Kurt—Vice Admiral, United States Navy; Director of Operations (J3) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense 

Ventrell, Patrick—Acting Deputy Spokesperson, Department of 

State 

Winnefeld, Jr., James—Admiral, United States Navy; Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense 

Woods, Tyrone Snowden—Contractor, Global Response Staff (GRS), 

Central Intelligence Agency 


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Zeya, Uzra—Chief of Staff to Deputy Secretary Burns, Department 

of State/ Executive Secretary, Benghazi Accountability Review 

Board 

Entities 

al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)-al-Qa’ida affiliate 

al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)-al-Qa’ida affiliate 

Ansar al-Sharia-Benghazi (AAS-B)—Previously led by the now-deceased Mohammed Ali al-Zahawi, now officially designated as a 

foreign terror organization 

Ansar al-Sharia-Darnah (AAS-D)—Darnah branch of AAS headed 

by former Guantanamo detainee Abu Sufyan bin Qumo 

Blue Mountain Group (BMG)—British company providing unarmed 

guards used for static security at the Mission 

Blue Mountain Libya—Libyan Partner of BMG, signed joint venture with BMG 

February 17 Martyrs Brigade—The purported largest militia group 

in Benghazi, headed by Fawzi Bukatef. The group supplied a 

four man team of local militiamen to serve as the Quick Reaction 

Force (QRF) at the Benghazi Mission 

Libyan Air Force—The entity that provided the C-130 that evacuated the second set of Americans from Benghazi (this included 

the uninjured CIA Protective officer, one DS agent, and the remains of the four deceased) 

Libya Shield—An umbrella organization of militias to support Libyan Army initiatives throughout the country, the separate Libya 

Shields were not always cohesive and not all worked in the best 

interests of the Libyan Army and Libyan government writ-large 

Libyan Military Intelligence—The group that helped Americans 

evacuate from the Annex to the Benghazi airport after the mortar attacks early on September 12th 

Mohammad Jamal Network—Group leadership historically affiliated with al-Qa’ida Senior Leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri; other 

affiliations to AQIM and AQAP 

Obeida Ibn al-Jarra Militia—Islamist militia led by Ahmed Abu 

Khattala, a breakaway faction from Ansar al-Sharia-Benghazi 

(AAS-B) 

Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade—A small militia that also operated 

under the Libya Shield umbrella; at the time of the attacks, the 

militia was in possession of kidnapped Iranian hostages 

Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman Brigades—Islamist militia based in 

Benghazi, Libya 

Supreme Security Council—A quasi-government organization involved in security and policing matters in Benghazi, now defunct 


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APPENDIX C: 

Questions for the President 

June 7, 2016 

W. Neil Eggleston 

Counsel to the President 

The White House 

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 

Washington, D.C. 20500 

Dear Neil: 

Shortly after the formation of the Select Committee on the Events 

Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, Libya, you and 

I spoke on the phone. During that conversation I informed you the 

Committee would not compel an interview with the President and 

the Committee was familiar with and would respect the Executive 

Privilege attached to certain communications with the President. I 

also told you the Committee would send written questions to the 

President at the culmination of our investigation. I assured you 

these questions would not be publicized at the time they were sent 

and furthermore the questions would be limited to information that 

could not be obtained from other sources. 

At our meeting in Charlotte, N.C. in January of 2016, I further offered to show you the questions in advance and provide the underlying testimony that gave rise to the question. In other words, each 

of these questions has an evidentiary basis rooted in either documents or other testimony, and I was willing to show you the questions and the foundation for the questions. 

While I would have been pleased to meet with you again, the reality is we would have gone over the same ground previously visited. The Executive Branch would, perhaps, argue sending questions to the President is ‘‘unprecedented’’ and would create a ‘‘constitutional crisis.’’ The Legislative Branch would argue several 

prior Committee Chairmen sent an extensive set of questions to the 

President regarding Benghazi, the President has answered media 

inquiries about Benghazi without a ‘‘constitutional crisis,’’ and the 

President is uniquely situated to answer these questions. In fact, 

he is the only person who can answer some of these questions. 

As such, below are fifteen questions for the President regarding the 

Benghazi attacks. Thank you in advance for a reply to these questions no later than June 17, 2016. 


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Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Trey Gowdy 

Chairman 

Begin attachment 

Questions for the President 

1. The White House issued a readout of your meeting with senior 

administration officials on September 10, 2012, indicating ‘‘specific measures’’ had been taken to ‘‘prevent 9/11 related attacks.’’ What were these specific measures, and how did these 

specific measures differ from specific measures taken on prior 

anniversaries of September 11? 

2. When did you first learn a U.S. facility in Benghazi, Libya, had 

been attacked? What were you told, and by whom? Were you 

informed Sean Smith had been killed during the initial attack? 

3. What orders or direction, if any, did you give to Secretary of 

Defense Leon Panetta upon learning of the initial attack? Did 

you or anyone at your direction ever modify, withdraw, alter, 

or amplify the initial orders or direction you gave to Secretary 

Panetta? 

4. What were you told about Department of Defense assets in the 

region that could respond specifically to Benghazi? Did you ask 

for or receive a list of military or paramilitary assets in the region that could respond to Benghazi during the pendency of the 

attacks? 

5. Were you subsequently kept informed about the initial attack, 

subsequent attacks, and/or efforts to either send military assistance or evacuate U.S. personnel? By whom? 

6. When did you learn Ambassador Christopher Stevens was 

missing, and who informed you? Were you kept informed on efforts to locate Ambassador Stevens, and if so, by whom? When 

did you learn Ambassador Stevens was dead, and who informed you? 

7. [Classified] 

8. Were you aware that prior to any military asset moving to respond to the attacks the State Department expressed concerns 

to the White House about the number of military assets going 

into Libya? 

9. When did you learn of a mortar attack that killed Tyrone 

Woods and Glen Doherty? Who informed you? 

10. Were you aware of any efforts by White House and Department of Defense officials during the evening of September 11, 

2012, and into the early morning hours of September 12, 2012, 

to reach out to YouTube and Terry Jones regarding an antiVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00476 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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Muslim video? What specifically connected the attacks in 

Benghazi to this anti-Muslim [sic] video, and why weren’t these 

efforts made after the protests in Cairo, Egypt? 

11. When did you learn individuals associated with terrorist organizations participated in the attack on the U.S. facilities in 

Benghazi, Libya? 

12. Did you receive the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) on September 12, 2012 and September 13, 2012? If so, who provided 

you with the PDB? 

13. Have you ever viewed surveillance footage from the cameras 

(or other sources) located at the U.S. facilities in Benghazi depicting the attacks? Will you declassify this footage so the 

American people can see for themselves what transpired? 

14. Did you authorize a covert action or covert operation to provide 

lethal assistance to Libyan rebels? 

15. [Classified] 


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APPENDIX D: 

Significant Events in Libya 

Prior to the Attacks 

February 22, 2011—Embassy Tripoli is evacuated because of 

emerging civil war. 

On or around March 11, 2011—Decision made to send a representative to Benghazi to liaise with the emerging transitional national council [TNC]. Hillary R. Clinton, Secretary of State, asks 

J. Christopher Stevens to serve as Representative to the TNC. 

April 5, 2011—Stevens enters Benghazi and stays at the Tibesti 

Hotel. 

April 10, 2011—Stevens and team contemplate leaving Benghazi 

because of security concerns. 

June 10, 2011—Stevens and team leave Tibesti Hotel and stay 

temporarily with other U.S. government personnel in Benghazi. 

June 21, 2011—Stevens and team relocate to an interim facility 

later known as Villa A. 

July 15, 2011—U.S. recognizes the TNC as the ‘‘Legitimate Representative of the Libyan People.’’ 

August 3, 2011—Stevens and team sign leases for Villas A, B, and 

C. 

August 21, 2011—Tripoli falls. 

August 22, 2011—The Secretary takes credit for events in Tripoli. 

August 30, 2011—The Secretary’s staff want team in Tripoli as 

soon as possible. 

September 22, 2011—The U.S. Embassy in Tripoli reopens and 

Gene A.Cretz resumes position as U.S. Ambassador to Libya. 

October 18, 2011—The Secretary travels to Tripoli but not 

Benghazi. 

October 20, 2011—Muammar Qadhafi executed. 

October 23, 2011—Libya officially liberated. 

On or around November 20, 2011—Stevens leaves Benghazi. 


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November 21, 2011—First principal officer arrives in Benghazi to 

replace Stevens. 

December 27, 2011—Extension Memorandum drafted by the Bureau of Near East Affairs sent to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management, State Department, outlining continued 

operations in Benghazi. The memorandum was approved on January 5, 2012. 

December 2011—Diplomatic Security agent staffing concerns in 

Benghazi. 

February 2012—Life Services contract cancelled in Benghazi. 

February 2012—Local Guard Force service contract awarded to 

Blue Mountain Group. 

March 28, 2012—U.S. Embassy in Tripoli requests additional staff 

including five Diplomatic Security agents for Benghazi Mission 

compound. 

April 2, 2012—Attack on United Kingdom [UK] armored vehicle. 

April 6, 2012—First improvised explosive device [IED] attack on 

the Benghazi Mission compound. 

April 10, 2012—IED attack on the motorcade of the United Nations Special Envoy. 

April 19, 2012—Washington, D.C., denies request for five Diplomatic Security agents to be assigned to Benghazi Mission compound. 

May 14, 2012—Stevens sworn in as Ambassador to Libya. 

May 22, 2012—Rocket propelled grenade [RPG] attack on International Committee of the Red Cross 

May 26, 2012—Stevens returns to Libya. 

May 28, 2012—Threat to Benghazi Mission compound posted on 

Facebook. 

June 2012—Blue Mountain Group issues with Libyan partner. 

June 5, 2012—Stevens requests State Department mobile security 

deployment [MSD] team remain in Tripoli. 

June 6, 2012—Stevens requests MSD team. 

June 6, 2012—Second IED attack on the Benghazi Mission compound. 

June 11, 2012—RPG attack on UK Ambassador motorcade 

June 14, 2012—Emergency Action Committee [EAC] held in 

Benghazi. 

June 15, 2012—U.S. Embassy in Tripoli again requests five Diplomatic Security agents for Benghazi Mission compound. Washington, D.C., never responds. 


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July 7, 2012—First national democratic elections held in Libya. 

July 9, 2012—U.S. Embassy in Tripoli requests to either maintain 

or replace departing U.S. security personnel with high threat 

trained Diplomatic Security agents. The Embassy tells Washington, D.C., if you send three agents to the Benghazi Mission 

compound the Embassy will also send a regional security office. 

Washington, D.C., never responds to the request. 

August 5, 2012—International Committee of the Red Cross attacked for fifth time shutting down Red Cross operations in both 

Benghazi and Misrata, Libya. 

August 15, 2012—Benghazi holds EAC on deteriorating security 

situation and requests ability to collocate with other U.S. government personnel. 

August 27, 2012—U.S. issues travel alert for Libya. 

August 29, 2012—State of Maximum Alert issued for Benghazi. 

Alert suspended on September 2. 

August 30, 2012—Both the Principal Officer and Diplomatic Security agent in charge depart Benghazi. There is a gap in coverage 

by the Principal Officer until September 15, 2012. Also, no Diplomatic Security agents volunteered to secure the compound during 

fall 2012. The Benghazi Mission compound was down to two Diplomatic Security agents. An agent is rerouted from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli to the Benghazi Mission compound bringing the 

number to 3. 

August 30, 2012—U.S. Embassy in Tripoli sends one Diplomatic 

Security agent to ensure three agents are assigned to the 

Benghazi Mission compound. 

On or around August 30, 2012—Stevens sends Political/Economic 

Officer, U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, State Department, to Benghazi 

Mission compound to cover reporting the first week in September. Stevens himself will cover duties beginning on September 10, 2012. 

September 6, 2012—Benghazi Mission compound requests presence of Supreme Security Council police from September 10–15. 

September 8, 2012—February 17 Martyrs Brigade tells Diplomatic Security agents it will no longer support off–compound 

moves. 

September 8, 2012—Principal Officer holds meeting with local militia and is told they cannot guarantee the safety of the Benghazi 

Mission compound. 

September 10, 2011—Stevens arrives with two Diplomatic Security agents. 

September 11, 2012—The attacks begin. 


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APPENDIX E: 

Security Incidents In Libya 

From the outset, the security environment in Benghazi was precarious. Stevens’ mission to Benghazi began in the midst of a civil 

war—with Benghazi serving as the home to the opposition and 

rebel forces. Notwithstanding the civil war’s end in August 2011 

with the fall of Tripoli and later Libya’s liberation on October 23, 

2011, the security environment in Libya, including Benghazi, remained tenuous. At the time the Benghazi mission was extended 

in December 2011, the State Department’s own threat rating system considered Libya to be a grave risk to American diplomats. 

The security environment only deteriorated from there. The Diplomatic Security agents on the ground tracked the security incidents 

in Libya between 2011 and 2012. Documents prepared by the 

agents tracking security incidents are included below. 


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1Testimony of Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, Tr. at 47 (Aug. 8, 2015) [hereinafter Feltman Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 2Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y for Management, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 

18 (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Kennedy Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

APPENDIX F: 

Deterioration of Mission 

Compound Security 

Overview 

The decision by State Department senior officials to leave the 

Benghazi Mission in an undefined status left it without typical security measures and a dedicated funding stream that would otherwise apply to official overseas posts. Benghazi’s security posture 

was further eroded by other factors such as constant equipment 

failures and insufficient quantities of personal protection equipment. Furthermore, notwithstanding the insufficient number of 

Diplomatic Security Agents sent to Benghazi, intervening factors 

such as problems with the Libyan visa system further limited the 

number of Diplomatic Security Agents deployed to Benghazi. 

Funding Issues 

The Benghazi Mission’s requests for even the most basic security 

measures were impacted by the lack of dedicated funding made 

available by the State Department. Senior officials within the State 

Department were well aware of the funding implications associated 

with continuing the Benghazi Mission into 2012. Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 

testified: 

What we were trying to . . . figure out was, how could we 

make a compelling enough argument that in the zero sum 

game that we have in terms of our budget and our resources, that we could find enough resources to keep 

Benghazi operating through the critical transition period? 

[sic] 1

Patrick F. Kennedy, the Under Secretary of State for Management, testified: ‘‘OBO has the funding authority . . . for our permanent facilities. . . . It [funding authority for temporary facilities] ranges between the regional bureau in which the facility is located or the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.’’ 2 To that end, there 

was awareness at the senior level that the Benghazi Mission’s limited duration prevented it from receiving any type of dedicated 


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3Summary of group interview with Physical Security Specialist and others (on file with the 

Committee, SCB0046921) (‘‘OBO is precluded from funding upgrades to short term leases, so 

it did not fund upgrades in Benghazi.’’). 4Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 

U.S. Dep’t of State, to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y for Management, U.S. Dep’t of State 

(Dec. 27, 2011) (on file with the Committee, C05261557). 5Summary of group interview with Physical Security Specialist and others (on file with the 

Committee, SCB0046922) (‘‘nontraditional DS funding was identified for Benghazi.’’). See also 

Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. 

at 80 (April 2, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Security Agent 10 Testimony] (on file with the 

Committee) (‘‘In terms of funding issues for programmatic stuff and security upgrades, . . . you’re not going to get the money because Pat Kennedy hasn’t given you guys any money. So 

there’s no money at all that exists for the security budget for Benghazi. Every single penny you 

get we have to take from some other operational budget from some other office somewhere.’’). 6Testimony of Gentry O. Smith, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 

Countermeasures, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 76 (Feb. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Smith Testimony] 

(on file with the Committee); 

Q: Let me ask you this. As the DAS for Countermeasures, were you concerned about 

the ability to fund sufficiently the physical security measures needed to secure the facility? 

A: It had not become an issue for me yet at that time, based on, as we spoke of in 

the first hour, the sources that were providing funds for the operation, particularly from 

the physical security side. You had Physical Security Programs, you had International 

Programs, you had OBO, and then you had the regional bureau as well. 

Q: You said it had not been a concern at that time. Did it ever, did funding for physical 

security upgrades ever become an issue for you or a concern of yours? 

A: No. 7 Email from Physical Security Specialist, Physical Security Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security, U.S. Dep’t of State (Jan. 12, 2012 6:29 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05397166). 8 Id. 

9 Email from Physical Security Specialist, Physical Security Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Diplomatic Security Agent 24, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Feb. 

15, 2012 2:39 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048394). 

funding for its physical security needs from the State Department’s 

Overseas Building Office [OBO], the office responsible for funding 

security measures.3

The December 27, 2011 Action Memorandum, approved by Kennedy, outlining the future operations of the Benghazi Mission for 

another year would have been an appropriate place to address the 

funding limitations within the OBO; and to designate a funding 

source to ensure the Benghazi Mission’s security needs were met 

in 2012.4 The Action Memorandum’s failure to address the issue 

forced nontraditional funding sources to be identified, with quick 

turnaround, in order to respond to Benghazi Mission’s basic security needs.5

Gentry O. Smith, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

Countermeasures, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, testified funding 

was never an issue for physical security.6 Nevertheless, on January 

12, 2012, the physical security desk officer was informed ‘‘OBO/SM 

. . . advised . . . they cannot provide the funding’’ for the security 

requests.7 As a result, the State Department’s physical security 

specialist was forced to locate other offices within the Department 

to find the funds the Benghazi Mission needed.8 On February 15, 

2012, the physical security desk officer explained to the Benghazi 

Mission ‘‘how the funding process normally works . . . with short 

term leases in place at Benghazi, OBO/SM cannot get involved due 

to OBO policy . . . funding security upgrades would have to be 

identified from other sources (DS).’’ 9

The Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground described the impact the lack of funding had on the Mission. 

I was told that the only way that we can get you security 

upgrades is if they basically don’t cost anything and we 


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10Diplomatic Security Agent 10 Testimony at 27. 11Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

Tr. at 24 (Apr. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Security Agent 12 Testimony] (on file with the 

Committee). 12 Id. at 21. 13Summary of group interview with Physical Security Specialist and others (on file with the 

Committee, SCB0046921). 14 Email from Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep’t of State 

(Aug. 29, 2012, 6:01 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05390852). 15Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

Tr. at 46 (Mar. 12, 2015) [Hereinafter Diplomatic Security Agent 15 Testimony] (on file with 

the Committee) (‘‘I was asking for things that were not just readily available in Benghazi. And 

it wasn’t I could go to the drop arm store. There wasn’t one. So they would have to be locally 

procured and then put together.’’). 16 Email from Regional Dir. for Security Engineering, Cairo, Egypt, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 

Travel Specialist, Cairo, Egypt, U.S. Dep’t of State, and Security Engineering Officer, U.S. Dep’t 

of State (Jun. 11, 2012 12:00 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05392482). 17 Id. 

can, sort of, you know, steal a couple bucks here and there 

from other pots of money, that there is no budget for 

Benghazi.10

If we had the money at post and if I had the money at 

post, you know, if I was able to spend the money you 

know, I’m an official for the U.S. Government. I’m entrusted with a lot as a DS agent. You know, I wanted the 

ability to go ahead and perform work, pay for that work, 

and then on the back end be able to tell people, ‘This is 

what I spent it for,’ and be able to you know, justify it that 

way, because it just made sense in my mind. Not necessarily I don’t know if that’s the appropriate way to do it, 

but for me, that was some of my frustration.11

Further complicating the funding issue was the fact that 

Benghazi was a cash economy. Diplomatic Security Agents on the 

ground told the Committee ‘‘it was a cash economy at the time, so 

that money had to get to us before we could identify contractors 

and work to be under way.’’ 12 Yet, even getting the money to Libya 

was a problem. State Department officials indicated: ‘‘[s]ince it 

[Benghazi] was not a post, it had no formal designation in Department systems, and no electronic way to get the fund transfers.’’ 13

Technical Equipment 

The security challenges at the Mission compound were not limited to the rudimentary security measures that were being requested by the Diplomatic Security Agents or the challenges with 

funding the requests. The Benghazi Mission was constantly requesting assistance with routine items such as door locks, monitors, batteries, radios, and cameras.14 More often than not the 

Benghazi Mission sought help fixing constant equipment malfunctions. 

The challenges with finding, installing, and fixing the equipment 

were exacerbated by the fact it could not be done locally.15 The 

Benghazi Mission was dependent on ‘‘the Cairo engineering center 

. . . [which had] responsibility for US Missions in Libya.’’ 16 When 

the U.S. Embassy in Cairo was not available, other embassies, such 

as Frankfurt, ‘‘augment[ed] the Cairo team.’’ 17 Thus, notwithstanding the logistics of getting into Benghazi, the Benghazi Mission was subject to the U.S. Embassy in Cairo’s schedule as well 


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18 Email from Information Management Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Diplomatic Security 

Agent 15 (Jan. 11, 2012, 10:28 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05392732). 19 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 15 to Diplomatic Security Agent 24 (Jan. 31, 2012 

7:32AM) (on file with the Committee, C05410045). 20 Email from Information Management Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 1, 2012 4:08 AM) 

(on file with the Committee, C05395451). 21See id. 22 Email to Deputy Ex. Dir., Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 21, 2012 

2:09 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05393043). 23 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 17 to Diplomatic Security Agent 24 (Apr. 21, 2012 

10:20 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05409948). 24 Id. 25 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 19 to Security Engineering Officer, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (Jun. 6, 2012, 5:07 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05392482). 

as that of other embassies. For example, in early January 2012, 

Benghazi Mission personnel requested the assistance of the Electrical Security Officer [ESO] in Cairo to, among other things, help 

decommission Villa A and install equipment in Villas B and C.18

The ESO could not travel to Benghazi until February 26, 2012 to 

assist with the requests.19

Compounding the equipment challenges was the Benghazi Mission’s constant need for technical assistance throughout 2012. For 

example, in early February 2012, the Benghazi Mission sought help 

from the Radio Program Branch in Cairo for new radio equipment 

because ‘‘DS [Diplomatic Security] Washington has requested that 

the majority of radio equipment initially brought into Benghazi 

now must be returned.’’ 20 This was preceded by a request for, 

among other things, replacing the radio antenna and repeater.21

This was followed by a request in late February 2012 to help again 

with radio repeaters. The Benghazi Mission wrote: 

[T]he government authority in Libya responsible for allocating/assigning radio frequencies has declined our current 

frequencies in use and has provided us with an ‘‘acceptable’’ frequency range for use. As a result, we need to replace the current radio repeaters at site (Benghazi and 

Tripoli) with repeaters that will accommodate the frequencies that the Libyan government has agreed to let us 

use.22

In late April 2012, after the first improvised explosive device 

[IED] attack on the perimeter wall at the Mission compound, 

Benghazi had problems with much of its security equipment, including: the loud speaker, the itemizer, walk-through metal detector, and camera 1.23 In addition to fixing the malfunctioning equipment, the Mission sought help procuring additional equipment to 

strengthen the security on the compound such as a camera to 

screen the C-gate; monitors in [quick reaction force] QRF bungalow, and locks for doors. Finally, the Benghazi Mission needed 

help relocating its lighting around the perimeter.24

In June 2012, the second IED attack on the Mission compound 

damaged not only the perimeter wall but also cameras and the secondary metal detector. The Benghazi Mission sought help from the 

U.S. Embassy in Cairo to fix the damage but also sought help with 

the installation of additional cameras to strengthen security.25

Three weeks later, power surges in Benghazi damaged the ‘‘voltage 

regulator and 220–110V transformer,’’ shutting all of the Benghazi 

Mission’s technical equipment down and necessitating the need for 


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26 Id. 27 Email from Information Management Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Security Engineering 

Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State (Jun. 25, 2012, 9:23 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05392482). 28 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 26 to Security Engineering Officer, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (Aug. 6, 2012 2:58 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390265). 29See email from Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep’t 

of State (Aug. 29, 2012 6:01 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05390852). 30 Id. 31 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 8 to Diplomatic Security Agent 23 (Aug. 23, 2012 

2:44 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390126–C05390127). 32 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 15 to Diplomatic Security Agent 25 (Jan. 24, 2012 

9:38PM) (on file with the Committee, C05393735). 33 Email to Diplomatic Security Agent 15 (Jan. 29, 2012 1:56 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05412863). 34 Id. (‘‘It is not exactly what you asked for but is what we could get together to get up to 

you. We believe the original order that was made is mixed in with the commo [sic] equipment 

that needs to get up to you. We’ll have to open the crates to see if your original order is included.’’). 

technical help from Cairo again.26 Because the U.S Embassy in 

Cairo couldn’t make the trip, the post in Frankfurt Germany sent 

personnel and equipment to make the necessary repairs.27

Later, in August 2012, the Benghazi Mission sought the assistance of Cairo to fix additional malfunctioning equipment, including: 

seeking a new Immediate Distress Notification System [IDNS], old 

pendants for the current IDNS system, camera and monitors for its 

technical operations center and Villa Safe Haven, additional cameras with visibility outside the compound walls, upgraded critical 

cameras for night vision, louder IDNS system and a hardened 

[technical operations center] TOC door.28

The constant malfunctions frustrated personnel on the ground.29

In his turnover notes, the departing principal officer in Benghazi 

told his replacement: ‘‘[t]he tendency has been to conduct triage in 

the interim. We are, for example, on the fourth visit from an Embassy electrician of my brief tenure because we continue to repair 

rather than replace equipment.’’ 30

On August 23, 2012, the Benghazi Mission requested additional 

technical equipment to help secure the compound. The request included an expert to analyze the loss of exterior lighting, new IDNS 

panel and pendants, weapons cabinet, better personal tracking device software, disintegrator if post increases its footprint, belt-fed 

crew-served weapon with bi-pod, CS gas canisters, badging machine, computer program to make access requests and computer at 

the guard house to view the approved access requests, an additional itemizer and an alarm system for the office villa.31

Protective Equipment 

The Benghazi Mission was constantly securing adequate supplies 

of protective equipment for personnel in 2012. For example, on 

January 24, 2012, the lead Diplomatic Security Agent on the 

ground requested additional helmets, vests and [e]scape hoods after 

an insufficient number were sent to the Benghazi Mission.32 The 

U.S. Embassy in Tripoli acknowledged it mixed up the Benghazi 

Mission’s request for the equipment.33 In sending the protective 

equipment to Benghazi, the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli stated: ‘‘It’s 

not exactly what you asked for but is what we could get together 

to get up to you.’’ 34

In early February 2012, the Benghazi Mission requested ballistic 

vests, ballistic plates, complete personal medical kit, radio wires 


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35 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 12 to Diplomatic Security Agent 25 (Feb. 5, 2012 

6:42 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05394222). 36 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 25 (Feb. 14, 2012, 8:54 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05393444). 37See Id. 38 Email to Diplomatic Security Agent 25 (Mar. 5, 2012 11:27 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05393444). 39 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 19 to Diplomatic Security Agent 24 (Jun. 24, 2012 

11:28 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05411697). 40 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 24 to Diplomatic Security Agent 19, (Jun. 24, 2012) 

(on file with the Committee, C05411697). 41Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, Libya Desk Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 17 

(Aug. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony] (on file with the Committee) (‘‘[A]t the time it was Acting Regional Director . . . to come to that number. I don’t 

know specifically what was his thinking on the matter, but I know in the summer of 2011 they 

were down to five agents for several months, so that was the in Benghazi that was the lowest 

number that was on the ground in Benghazi that I’m aware of at that time timeframe prior 

to December of 2012.’’). 42See Department of State, Accountability Review Board for Benghazi Attack of September 

2012, December 19, 2012, at 31. 

with pig tail, low profile holster, magazine pouches, low profile 

chest vest, individual GPS, flashlight, strobe, multi-tool, camel pak 

hydration system, and go bags.35 With one Diplomatic Security 

Agent arriving without luggage and protective equipment in 

Benghazi, the Mission was concerned future Diplomatic Security 

Agents would also arrive without their personal protective gear. 

Further prompting the request was an incident that occurred on 

the compound while the Diplomatic Security Agent was without 

[his] equipment.36 To ensure this didn’t happen again, the 

Benghazi Mission sought to have additional equipment at the 

ready.37 The equipment was not sent until March 2012.38

Additional requests for personal protection equipment were made 

on June 24, 2012, three weeks after the second attack on the facility. The request first went to Washington D.C. and then to the U.S. 

Embassy in Tripoli for a response.39 The Embassy in Tripoli responded it had some items but that the others ‘‘will have to be post 

procured.’’ 40

Security Staffing and the Mission 

In addition to physical security, the Benghazi Mission’s security 

deficiencies extended to State Department’s unwillingness to commit the number of personnel needed to adequately secure the compound and personnel. The December 27, 2011 Action Memorandum 

authorized five Diplomatic Security Agents to serve at the 

Benghazi Mission compound.41 It was the expectation of those personnel on the ground that five Diplomatic Security Agents would 

be deployed to secure the compound. 

Yet Benghazi ‘‘achieved a level of five DS Agents (not counting 

Defense Department provided temporary duty [TDY] Site Security 

Team personnel sent by the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli) for only 23 

days between January 1 and September 9, 2012.’’ 42 Efforts to secure five Diplomatic Security Agents were either ignored or dismissed. As a result, the Benghazi Mission did not have five Diplomatic Security Agents on the Mission compound during the first 

IED attack on April 6, 2012. The Benghazi Mission did not have 

five Diplomatic Security Agents on the compound during the second IED attack. The Benghazi Mission did not have five Diplomatic 


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43 Benghazi Party Ops Plan (March 30, 2011)(on file with the Committee, SCB0095930)(‘‘DOD 

provide QRF for security and medical extraction’’). 44See Action Memorandum For DSS Director Jeffrey W. Culver (June 30, 2011)(on file with 

the Committee, C05579256). 45Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

Tr. at 20 (Feb. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Security Agent 6 Testimony] (on file with the 

Committee). 

Security Agents at the time Ambassador Stevens arrived at the 

Mission compound on September 10, 2012. 

PROTECTIVE DETAIL—OFFICE OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION 

Because of the Defense Department’s ‘‘no boots on the ground’’ 

policy, military security assets were only available in emergency 

circumstances.43 Hence, only State Department Diplomatic Security Agents traveled with J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Representative to the Transitional National Council [TNC] and his team into 

Benghazi. The Diplomatic Security Agents accompanying Stevens 

and his team needed certain skills for the Benghazi Mission in 

order to conduct ‘‘protective security functions.’’ 44 The Diplomatic 

Security Agent in charge of Stevens’ protective detail described the 

qualifications of his team. 

A: I think it was pretty much people were selected because of their skill sets. You know, they spent, they spent 

time to make sure they had the right team makeup. And, 

for example, my shift leader . . . , he had, I would estimate he had been on Diplomatic Security for eight years. 

He had some advanced training on a mobile training team 

where they it’s a tactical team that the State Department 

has. He was on that team, and they trained for like nine 

months. 

Q: Is that known as the MSD [mobile security deployment]? 

A: MSD. 

Q: Okay. 

A: And anybody else on the team either had prior military 

experience, which I think all but two had prior military experience, and they had all gone through the State Department’s high threat training. 

Q: Okay. 

A: As I recall. 

Q: Okay. And you had too? 

A: Yes. 

Q: To your knowledge, was that a requirement that everyone have this high threat tactical course prior to going? 

A: I think that was a requirement as far as the boss’ 

thought when they were trying to put the team together, 

you know, that they wanted people to have that experience.45


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46See Memorandum from Exec. Dir., NEA–SCA/EX, to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of 

State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State (Apr. 15, 2011) (on file with the Committee, C05390734); 

see also email from SMART Core (Apr. 19, 2011, 12:17 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05390733). 47See Diplomatic Security Agent 6 Testimony at 14 (‘‘I was on a 60 day TDY, but I think 

I spent less than 45 days in Benghazi because I know I did. I spent 30 some days in Benghazi 

because it took time for us to get there.’’). See also, Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, 

Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 25 (Feb. 26, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Security Agent 7 Testimony] (on file with the Committee) (‘‘[T]he first team that went 

in, the Dignitary Protection team that went in, it was a thirty day Mission.’’). 48Diplomatic Security Agent 7 Testimony at 26 (‘‘I would say that when they recognized that 

the Mission was viable and that they were going to continue it, they started to look for a replacement knowing that the agreement was that the agent in charge was going to do 30 days. 

So then they thought, okay, now we need to find somebody to continue on.’’). 49 Id. at 25. 50 Email Diplomatic Security Agent to DS–IP–NEA (Jul. 21, 2011, 3:22 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05396529). 51Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

Tr. at 24 (May 21, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Security Agent 13 Testimony] (on file with the 

Committee). 52See email from Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

to John C. Stevens, U.S. Representative to Transitional National Council, William V. Roebuck, 

Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Post ManTwo additional Diplomatic Security Agents traveled to Benghazi 

in late April 2011 to augment the Stevens’ protective detail. The 

two additional Diplomatic Security Agents brought the total number of Agents to ten.46 The Diplomatic Security Agents assigned to 

the Stevens’ protective detail served in temporary capacities contingent on the Mission’s duration.47 When senior State Department 

officials made the decision to extend Stevens’ Mission in Benghazi 

beyond the initial 30-day mark, the next Diplomatic Security Agent 

team rotated in for another 30–45 days.48 The incoming Diplomatic 

Security Agent in charge described the process: ‘‘The first team 

that went in, the Dignitary Protection team that went in, it was 

a 30-day Mission, and they were in need of an agent in charge to 

go in and take over from that agent in charge and to continue on 

the Mission.’’ 49

The number of Diplomatic Security Agents dropped from ten to 

five when Stevens and his team were forced to leave the Tibesti 

Hotel and find other accommodations. When Stevens and his team 

relocated to Villas A, B, and C in early August 2011, additional 

Diplomatic Security Agents were needed again to secure the 13 

acre compound. The Diplomatic Security Agent in charge informed 

Washington D.C.: 

[m]ore agents required: Between the three compounds, 

we’re looking at roughly 15 acres of property to secure. 

This will require additional SAs (up to five more) by early 

to mid-August. For REACT purposes, teams of agents will 

reside on all three compounds. Once resources permit, 

RSO TOC will be staffed 24/7.50

By mid-September, the Mission had increased back to ‘‘10 bodies 

[DS agents] on compound.’’ 51

SHIFT IN SECURITY POSTURE FROM A PROTECTIVE DETAIL TO 

A QUASI-RSO PROGRAM 

By mid-September 2011, efforts were also under way to restart 

operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. Predictably, resources 

and personnel shifted away from the Mission in Benghazi back to 

the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli.52 This precipitated a number of conVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00546 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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agement Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (Sept. 18, 2011, 11:54 AM)(on file 

with the Committee, C05395962)(stating ‘‘and when can we get . . . here’’). 53Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 18. 54Diplomatic Security Agent 13 Testimony at 28–29. 

versations about the Benghazi Mission’s future. At the time the 

U.S. Embassy in Tripoli restarted operations, the Benghazi Mission’s security posture changed from that of a protective detail to 

a regional security officer [RSO] program, a program similar to 

those implemented in embassies and official posts located abroad.53

Unlike the protective detail that focused primarily on the security 

of Stevens and his team using U.S. security assets, the new security posture would be overseen by a rotation of volunteer Diplomatic Security Agents. In addition, the Benghazi Mission focused 

more on employing host nation support for security, including 

using the February 17 Martyrs Brigade as a QRF team and employing an unarmed local guard force [LGF]. The Diplomatic Security Agent in charge in September described his response when 

learning about the change in security: 

When I got solicited to go out, I was supposed to be the 

agent in charge of this detail. So I assumed as you know, 

you don’t want to do that too often that the 10 would be 

part of my bodyguard staff and that’s all I would have to 

deal with. 

So when I got close to the drop date or the day I arrived, 

they basically said, ‘‘We don’t know how long we’re going 

to be here. So we’re going to make you the RSO, and we’re 

going to make your number two the AIC,’’ at which time 

I tried to get back on the airplane. 

But, nonetheless, it was myself and my number two. Rank 

wise, he was senior. He did more of the movement portion 

with Ambassador Stevens, but I did the overall security 

aspects of the job, access control and all the policy crap.54

When asked to describe the caliber of host nation support available, he told the Committee: 

[W]e were a quasi RSO office at best, so meaning Benghazi 

was unique in the fact that Benghazi really didn’t know 

who they were either. . . . They were still jockeying to figure out who was going to be in power and who wasn’t. 

So, normally speaking, you would have already known that 

when you go into an environment. If you were going to establish yourself or an embassy, you’d already know who 

your minister of security is or who your DOD counterparts 

would be. 

There it was a little different because you had different I’ll 

say tribal, for lack of a better term. But you had different 

groups there and sects that you were trying to figure out 

who were friendly and who weren’t. 

And, I mean, for all intents and purposes, we thought everybody was friendly at that time. But, from my perspective, we didn’t want to befriend one group versus somebody 


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55 Id. at 43–44. 56 Id. at 32. 57 Id. at 33–34. 

else without you know, we didn’t want to cause an international incident. 

At the time, 17 Feb. had already stepped up and said that 

they were going to be the point people for diplomatic interests or security purposes under this function. 

So my interest while I was there was trying to plus that 

contingent up because knowing they only had a local guard 

force contingent of 10 people or 12 or whatever it was, unarmed and poorly equipped and poorly trained, I wanted 

at least some firepower. At least I could put them to at 

least have a presence. 

But we only had three at the time. So I was trying to befriend them, trying to get more activity, more interest, additional bodies, because three bodies on 24/7 is long days, 

long weeks.55

The change in security posture together with the reopening of 

the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli left the Diplomatic Security Agents on 

the ground uncertain about their future in Benghazi and their ability to do their jobs. The Diplomatic Security Agent in charge in 

September testified: 

As we downsized to a lesser number, it’s more difficult to 

run, keep up with the off tempo. That’s where the 10 bodies kind of helped because, with additional bodies there, I 

could farm them out to support USAID interests or the 

MANPAD guy or . . . and what have you. But as you start 

reducing those resources, then you have to prioritize your 

Missions.56

* * * 

[W]e were still in this situation where we didn’t know how 

long Benghazi was going to be. Tripoli was kicking off. And 

so there was a lot of interest in supporting that. So we 

were trying to figure out or headquarters was trying to figure out where to prioritize our deficiencies, if you want to 

call it that. So no one knows. 

I mean, we were planning for the worst, phasing people 

out and trying to figure out how best to support the Mission there. If I remember correctly, with the Embassy 

being opened it opened towards the latter part of my tenure there. So the Envoy lost his, quote unquote, status because there was now an Ambassador in country. . . . I 

think they were going to bring in a political officer, probably my rank. I’m pretty sure he was my rank. He was 

going to be the foothold there in Benghazi for the short 

term, but no one knew how long.57

As Stevens closed out his time in Benghazi, the number of Diplomatic Security Agents assigned to secure the Benghazi Mission 


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58See id. at 72. See also Memorandum from Regional Director, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 

U.S. Dep’t of State, to Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Int’l Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Oct. 24, 2011) (on file with the Committee, C05391928). 59Memorandum from Regional Director, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State 

to Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Int’l Programs, 

U.S. Dep’t of State (Oct. 24, 2011) (on file with the Committee, C05391928). 60 Id. 61Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 18–19. 62 Id. 63Memorandum from Regional Dir., Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 

Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Int’l Programs, U.S. 

Dep’t of State (Oct. 24, 2011) (on file with the Committee, C05391928). 

continued to decrease. By the end of October 2011 the number of 

Diplomatic Security Agents assigned to secure the Benghazi Mission decreased to six.58 By the end of November 2011, as Stevens’ 

was departing, the number of Diplomatic Security Agents assigned 

to the Benghazi Mission was expected to drop to three.59

Diplomatic Security personnel responsible for staffing overseas 

posts including Benghazi recognized early on the problems associated with finding Diplomatic Security Agents available to serve in 

Benghazi. With a protective detail, the Diplomatic Security Command Center could direct Diplomatic Security Agents to serve on 

a temporary basis. Under a RSO program, temporary duty positions were filled by volunteers.60 The desk officer in charge of staffing in Benghazi testified: 

The Mission in . . . September, October, the Mission in 

Benghazi changed essentially from a protection Mission, 

which was run by our dignitary protection unit here in 

Washington, to a more traditional RSO program management position, which pushed it back into DS/IP’s, my office’s realm. 

So at that time the mechanism to get agents changed, they 

have a task oriented system, we have a it’s hard to describe, but it’s a system where basically we get volunteers 

to go. It’s usually the high threat posts. And our system 

is, generally we cover traditionally we cover one RSO position like over a summer transition or during a break. It 

was very difficult for us to get the type of numbers on kind 

of a continuous basis through the volunteer system.61

* * * 

Typically we just cover the gaps, but we did do occasionally we would do particularly in the beginning of Arab 

spring, it was very busy, and we had to find TDY support. 

But generally it wasn’t near that number. It was never 

near that number. And it was for a much shorter timeframe, usually only one or two 60 to 30 day deployments 

for agents.62

To address the emerging issue, the desk officer drafted an Action 

Memorandum for the approval of Charlene Lamb, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Programs in the Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security.63 The October 24, 2011 Action Memorandum described the emerging problems associated with identifying enough volunteer Diplomatic Security Agents to serve 30–45 

day rotations in Benghazi on a consistent basis and identified soluVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00549 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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64 Id. 65Testimony of Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Int’l Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 77–78 (Jan. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Lamb Testimony] (on file 

with the Committee). 66 Id. at 92. 67 Id. at 92–93. 68 Id at 93. 

Q: But, specifically, this request for $47,000, do you recall whether that was approved? 

A: Yes. 

Q: That was approved? 

A: It would yes. 69Memorandum from Regional Dir., Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U. S. Dep’t of State, to 

Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Int’l Programs, U.S. Dep’t 

of State (Oct. 24, 2011) (on file with the Committee, C05391928). 

tions including deploying Diplomatic Security Agents through the 

Diplomatic Security Command Center as had been done previously.64 When asked by the Committee whether the October 24, 

2011 Action Memorandum was approved, Lamb testified: 

I had actually requested that they draft this memo because it’s very easy for people to take for granted when 

there’s a need for TDY people, they don’t take the budget 

into consideration. And when we don’t have full time positions authorized, this TDY money is coming out of the 

international program’s budget. And at $9,000 per agent 

for 45 days on a continual basis for a year, this money 

adds up very, very quickly and depletes the budget that I 

have for worldwide TDY assignments. So I wanted this to 

be documented and I wanted to be able to forward this forward and to go to the DS budget people to make sure that 

we had appropriate funding, and that they knew we were 

going to need additional funding, should this TDY status 

continue for a long period of time.65

* * * 

I’ll be honest, there were so many operational things going 

on, my intent with this memo was to get this into the 

hands of the budget people and to have the budget people 

work together to come up with a solution to get the money 

that was needed.66

* * * 

We never ran we never ran out of money to the point 

where we said, okay, we can’t send anybody else, there’s 

no more money. We never went anti deficient with funding. So the Department, collectively, between DS, financial 

personnel, and the Department, we were always funded for 

these types of posts.67

When asked by the Committee directly whether funding was approved for five, 45-day assistant regional security officer [ARSO] 

TDYs in Benghazi, Lamb testified: ‘‘yes.’’ 68 However, the October 

24, 2011 Action Memorandum, which outlined proposed solutions 

including funding for five Diplomatic Security Agents, was never 

signed.69 The desk officer testified: 

A: I identified the problem immediately because you can 

see the staffing chart as was coming down. So when I took 


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70Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 20. 71Lamb Testimony at 89. 

over the program in October, I immediately had conversations with my direct supervisors, and we generated an action memorandum with numerous recommendations on 

how we thought or I thought we could alleviate this problem. 

Q: And was this just specifically focused on Benghazi or 

A: I believe it was Libya centric—— 

Q: Libya. 

A: But I can’t remember if it was Benghazi specific. 

Q: And do you recall the timeframe that that actual 

memorandum circulated? 

A: The date was mid to late October of 2011. 

Q: And was that ever signed? 

A: It was approved by my immediate supervisors. 

Q: Did that help alleviate the concerns? 

A:It was not approved through their superiors, so it never 

Q: So where did it stop? 

A: It stopped, as far as I know, at the I don’t know where 

it went. I know it went up to the Deputy Director/DAS 

level. Which one of them looked at it or which one didn’t, 

I don’t know. 

Q: Did you ever understand why it didn’t get approved at 

that level? 

A: No, I did not.70

Lamb informed the Committee that Kennedy was aware of the 

funding issues associated with staffing the Mission in Benghazi. 

Q: So is it fair to say that Pat Kennedy was aware of the 

funding issues that were associated with the TDYs in 

Benghazi? 

A: It would he, during his regular staff meetings when we 

discussed all of the Tripoli and Benghazi issues, he was 

aware, and he had financial people there from his staff 

that reported to him directly. 

Q: So he was shifting resources as it relates to . . . 

A: If it was necessary, he would not hesitate to do that.71

STAFFING SHORTAGES—DECEMBER 27 ACTION MEMORANDUM: 

FUTURE OF BENGHAZI OPERATIONS 

By December 2011, Diplomatic Security Agent staffing in 

Benghazi was a problem. Two Diplomatic Security Agents secured 

the 13 acre compound in mid-December. Without reinforcements 

from Washington D.C. there was every expectation it would drop 


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72Diplomatic Security Agent 10 Testimony at 41–42. 73 Id. 74 Email from Principal Officer 1, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Post Management Officer for Libya, 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 15, 2011, 1:11 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05391603). 75 Action Memorandum from Jeffrey Feltman, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern 

Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State 

(Dec. 27, 2011) (on file with the Committee, C05261557). 76See id. See also Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 17 (‘‘at the time it was Action 

Regional Director to come to that number. I don’t know specifically what his thinking on the 

matter, but I know in the summer of 2011 they were down to five agents for several months, 

so that was the—in Benghazi—that was the lowest number that was on the ground that I’m 

aware of at that time timeframe prior to December of 2012 [sic].’’). 

to one and then to zero in January.72 One of the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground expressed his concerns: 

It was down to two agents, myself and one other agent. 

And as I was getting ready to depart, we were going to go 

to one agent. And if the staffing pattern remained the way 

it was, with our expected incoming agents, we were going 

to go down to zero agents. And that would have been 

around January 4th or 5th or so, we would go down to zero 

agents.73

The principal officer who replaced Stevens also alerted Washington D.C. about the impact of the shortages in Diplomatic Security Agents in December 2011. He wrote: 

[o]n a much more serious matter, something I flagged for 

Bill [Roebuck] yesterday on the phone, but pledged to send 

the details. We’re going to be short on the RSO end of 

things from December 19 through the end of the year. 

During that period, we will be down to just 2 A/RSOs or 

the practical equivalent thereof. . . . 

What this all means is that all non-DS TDYs to Benghazi 

should be discouraged through the end of the year for sure 

(and we’re still pretty limited the first week of January as 

the new folks get spun up), as even the basic movements 

are going to overextend us. . . . 

We are a little too close to being down to a single agent 

here if arrival dates (or visa issuance?) slips to the right 

. . . and if we’re going to need to extend anyone here (one 

of whom has already done so), we need to get that sorted 

out sooner rather than later. Also, it’s a little curious to 

hear about DS intensions to staff Benghazi with a RSO 

and 4 A/RSOs, while at this rate, we won’t hit that target 

during my first two months here.74

At the time Benghazi Mission was experiencing shortages in Diplomatic Security Agents, the December 27, 2011 Action Memorandum was being circulated for approval. The Action Memorandum acknowledged ‘‘Diplomatic Security’s current presence consists of two Special Agents, with an additional three slots currently 

unfilled’’ and attributed the unfilled slots ‘‘to budget constraints 

and the reduced footprint.’’ 75 The Action Memorandum authorized 

a ‘‘full complement of five Special Agents.’’ 76 Kennedy provided a 

different interpretation to the Committee: 


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77Kennedy Testimony at 301. 78 Id. at 302. 79Lamb Testimony at 224. 80 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 15 to Diplomatic Security Agent 12 (Jan. 27, 2012, 

11:10 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05411094). (‘‘U/S Kennedy stated there should be 5 

agents here and I agree.’’). 81 Action Memorandum from Jeffrey Feltman, Ass’t Sec’y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern 

Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y for Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of State 

(Dec. 27, 2011) (on file with the Committee, C05261557). 82 Email from Special Ass’t to the Ass’t Sec’y for Diplomatic Security, Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Post Management Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. 

Dep’t of State (Dec. 23, 2011, 3:27 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05578953). 83Lamb Transcript at 221 (‘‘I did not see [the Action Memorandum] until after the event in 

Benghazi.’’). See also Gentry O. Smith at 75 (Feb. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Smith Testimony] (on 

file with the Committee) (‘‘[I]t didn’t come from Countermeasures, it would not have been solely 

for physical security.’’). 

It says eight U.S. direct hire employees and two slots for 

political military and USAID. So that’s 8, plus 2 is 10, of 

which 5 are substantive or management and 5 are Diplomatic Security. So you have five to protect five.77

* * * 

How many people the Near East Bureau, looking at what 

was going on, how many people the Near East Bureau ultimately decided to deploy, kind of a cost benefit analysis. 

How much activity are they going to do? How much reporting do they want to do? That’s a call made by the Near 

East Bureau. My point is that you judge the number of 

Diplomatic Security on two factors. It’s the facility and the 

number of sorties that you need to make out into the 

city.78

Lamb described Diplomatic Security’s responsibilities to provide 

five Diplomatic Security Agents in Benghazi as ‘‘kind of the cap of 

what the bureau was asking . . . Kennedy to approve. What 

they’re saying is, at the most, we’re not going to exceed this staffing level in Benghazi.’’ 79 Others such as the Diplomatic Security 

Agents on the ground and the principal officers they were protecting saw Diplomatic Security’s staffing obligations as five Diplomatic Security Agents for Benghazi.80

Though the effect of budget constraints on Diplomatic Security 

Agents assigned to the Benghazi Mission was known well before 

the decision to extend the Benghazi Mission, the December 27, 

2011 Action Memorandum was silent on a funding solution.81 The 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security cleared the December 27, 2011 Action Memorandum with the ‘‘comment that this operation continues 

to be an unfunded mandate and a drain on personnel resources.’’ 82

Neither Gentry O. Smith, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Diplomatic 

Sec., Countermeasures, U.S. Dep’t of State, whose office was responsible for ensuring security standards and adequate physical security measures were in place at the Benghazi Mission and who 

cleared the Action Memorandum for Diplomatic Security, nor Lamb 

whose office was responsible for staffing, had any recollection of 

why the comment was made.83

REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENTS 

Concerns about Diplomatic Security Agent staffing shortages 

going into 2012 precipitated another Action Memorandum for 


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84 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 25 to Principal Officer 1, U.S. Dep’t of State (Jan. 

13, 2012, 10:05 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05411094) (‘‘We have submitted an Action 

Memorandum that if approved should significantly improve our ability to identify and obtain 

approvals for staffing Benghazi.’’); Action Memorandum for DAS Charlene Lamb (January 10, 

2012) (on file with the Committee, C05578986). 85 Id. 86 Id. 87See Testimony of James Bacigalupo, Regional Dir., Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, Tr. at 17–18 (Sept. 4, 2013) (on file with the Committee). 

A: I believe it was January, maybe December/January timeframe we had talked about 

it in the office, and I think I was out on leave because my deputy I had seen a document that my deputy had sent up to Director Lamb, to DAS Lamb requesting we use 

the system that they use domestically to direct a certain number of agents from the 

field offices for assignments. We use that on protection. And we sent the memo up suggesting maybe we could use this mechanism for overseas. 

Q: Specifically for Libya or—— 

A: It was specifically for Libya. 

Q: And do you know what happened to that memo? 

A: It was never signed off on. 88See email from Principal Officer 5, U.S. Dep’t of State, to U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, et al. 

(Feb. 11, 2012, 5:29 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05409829). See also email from Principal 

Officer 1 to Diplomatic Security Agent 25 (Jan. 17, 2012, 8:38 AM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05411094). 89See id. 90 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 24 to Joan Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in 

Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 6, 2012, 11:05 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05411434) 

(‘‘From DS HQ (DAS Lamb and MSD Director) has indicated, they are not in favor of pulling 

MSD out of Tripoli to support from Benghazi and from what I understand they are keeping the 

staffing in Benghazi at 3–4 agents. DS HQ continues to complain about Benghazi being an unfunded mandate and there are no agents or funds to support it, so I doubt anything is going 

Lamb’s approval.84 The January 10, 2012 Action Memorandum 

highlighted Diplomatic Security’s responsibilities under the December 27, 2011 Action Memorandum to provide five Diplomatic Security Agents for Benghazi and recognized the Offices’ inability to 

‘‘identify, seek necessary approvals and obtain the required visa approvals for this many agents on a continuing basis.’’ 85 The January 

10, 2012 Action Memorandum requested Lamb approve efforts to: 

request assistance from Domestic Operations, so that personnel can be selected and directed from the Field Offices 

by the DS Command Center as well as authorize funding 

for five, 45 day ARSO [assistant regional security officer] 

TDYs [temporary duty] in Benghazi from Feb.1 through 

September 30 at a total estimated cost of $283,050.86

The January 10, 2012 Action Memorandum was never approved.87

Without a mechanism to identify a constant pool of Diplomatic 

Security Agents to serve in Benghazi, the Mission continued to experience shortages. The principal officers on the ground expressed 

concern back to Washington D.C. about the impact the Diplomatic 

Security Agent staffing shortages was having on the security of the 

compound, in addition to their reporting obligations.88 Moreover, 

the principal officers were concerned about the vulnerabilities created by the shortages in relation to the overall security environment in Benghazi. For example, the principal officer was concerned 

only two Diplomatic Security Agents were scheduled to be at the 

compound during the upcoming February 17th anniversary.89 With 

no option available within Diplomatic Security, members of the Defense Department’s SST who were currently deployed to the U.S. 

Embassy in Tripoli offered to travel to Benghazi to address the 

Diplomatic Security Agent shortage.90 SST agents deployed to the 


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to change unless the status of Benghazi is formalized. SST has indicated that they would be 

willing to support.’’). 91See Benghazi DS and SST TDY staffing for Jan. 2012-September 11 (on file with the Committee, C0539433). 92Testimony of Post Management Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, Tr. at 165–166 (Jul. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Post Management Officer Testimony] 

(on file with the Committee). 

Benghazi Mission compound on three more occasions: March 27–30, 

2012, April 12–27, 2012, after the first attack, and June 9–23, 

2012, after the second attack.91

On February 16, 2012, Joan Polaschik, the Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, met with Lamb to discuss among other things the 

staffing issues in Benghazi. According to personnel in the meeting: 

Joan essentially briefed Charlene on the situation in Tripoli, primarily because that’s where Joan was currently 

serving. They then discuss Benghazi some. And Joan was 

primarily seeking to get clarity from Charlene on DS’ plan 

moving forward for security in both Tripoli and Benghazi. 

During the meeting, there was what appeared to be a different policy set forward by Charlene about our security 

posture in Benghazi that advocated for local hire drivers 

and only one armed DS officer per vehicle with some reference to maybe in the future, once people had the foreign 

affairs counter threat training, some individuals could potentially self-drive. That seemed very different from what 

the previous stated policy of having two DS in any vehicle 

leaving the compound in Benghazi. It seemed a significant 

difference in policy, which raised alarm bells.92

The policy change made by Lamb to cap the number of Diplomatic Security Agents assigned to the Benghazi Mission at three 

was confirmed by the desk officer responsible for staffing in 

Benghazi. 

A: In mid-February, in conversations with DAS Lamb, it 

became quite she made it quite apparent that she wanted 

three agents on the ground in Benghazi. From that time 

on, I was attempting to get three agents into Benghazi at 

all times. 

Q: How did you I mean, you said she made it clear. How 

did that become clear to you that was her position? 

A: I don’t specifically remember. I believe the on or about 

February 16th we were preparing for DCM from Tripoli to 

come in for a meeting on security related issues, and at 

that time I specifically recall the conversation about the 

number of agents in Benghazi. So that’s the last thing I 

can recall specifically? 

Q: Can you elaborate on that conversation? 

A: Certainly. While discussing RSO staffing in Libya, the 

topic came up in Benghazi, and DAS Lamb became aware 

of the fact that two of the agents were essentially excuse 

me their primary duty was driving the movement team vehicle. And traditionally overseas posts, the vast majority of 


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93Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 23–24. 94 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 12 to Diplomatic Security Agent 25 (March 14, 2012, 

11:02 PM)(on file with the Committee, C05411904). 95 U.S. Dep’t of State, Cable, Request for DS TDY and FTE Support (March 28, 2012) (on file 

with the Committee, SCB004625–27). 96 Id. 

them, their drivers are provided by the post. They’re locally engaged staff drivers. So she wanted to alleviate that 

program or that duty, so to speak, in her mind. That was 

one of the factors. There could have been more. That was 

the factors that she made known to me and my superiors.93

The policy change was not communicated to the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground or other State Department personnel 

who nonetheless believed five Diplomatic Security Agents were 

needed to adequately secure the Benghazi Mission. For example, 

the lead Diplomatic Security Agent in Benghazi at the time wrote: 

I’ve enjoyed four agents for six days now and it’s been a 

treat to allow agents to properly turnover programs with 

one another. We’ll be back down to three tomorrow and 

then 2 on March 21 . . . Having been here for six weeks 

now, I’ve had to deal with two Principal Officers who expect five DS agents to accommodate their travel, maintain 

the security integrity (and programs) on the compound.94

Further to same, on March 28, 2012, Embassy Tripoli made a request on behalf of Benghazi for ‘‘five TDY Diplomatic Security 

agents for 45–60 day rotations in Benghazi.’’ Advocating for the 

Benghazi Mission, Gene A. Cretz, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, wrote 

in his cable to Washington D.C:95

This number is required to ensure that we have an appropriate USDH [direct hire] presence to protect our 

COMSEC; support the two long term USDH TDYers, and 

support an increasing number of program/assistance TDY’s 

from both Tripoli and Washington. The number of TDY’ers 

in Benghazi is expected to increase in the run up to the 

elections. Embassy Tripoli is in the process of recruiting 

four LES drivers and an RSO LES SPSS, which will support operations in Benghazi. Post also plans to deploy a 

TDY RSO from Tripoli once expanded permanent staffing 

is established and stabilized. Once these positions are 

filled; Post anticipates requiring fewer TDY DS agents to 

support Benghazi. Although an LGF contractor has begun 

operations in Benghazi, initial discussions regarding contractor-provided armed close protection/movement support 

does not appear viable based on complications regarding 

GOL firearms permits. Currently, the LGF contractor is 

able to obtain only short term (48–72 hr) firearms permits 

for specific VIP visits.96


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97See Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 12 to Diplomatic Security Agent 25 (Mar. 21, 

2012, 8:03 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0049976) (‘‘[W]e are down to 2 agents in 

Benghazi which stifles movements and puts [us] in bad shape on compound.’’). 98See Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 25 to Post Management Officer for Libya, Bureau 

of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, et al. (Mar. 20, 2012, 9:09 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, SCB0049977) (‘‘I just went to the Libyan Embassy and was told that their ‘system’ 

was down. They could not check the status of currently approved visas nor do anything having 

to do with visas. When asked when the system may be back up, the clerk told me that there 

was no way of telling when (or if) it will be up at any point in the future. ‘It is being worked 

on’ is what I was told.’’). 99Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 34–35. 

VISAS 

At the time the March 28, 2012 staffing request was sent to 

Washington D.C., the number of Diplomatic Security Agents at the 

compound dropped to two. 97

Notwithstanding Lamb’s decision to limit the number of Diplomatic Security Agents serving at the Benghazi Mission to three, 

those Diplomatic Security Agents who were available to deploy 

were prevented from traveling because they could not get visas 

from the Libyan Government.98 Thus, the pool of Diplomatic Security Agents available to serve was further limited. The desk officer 

in charge of staffing in Benghazi described the problem with the 

Libyan visa system: 

When they first initiated it, it was a surprise to us, we 

weren’t aware it was going to happen. So basically you 

went from airport visas where you just kind of show up 

and was having to see if you had the right passport and 

you get stamped. And then you go to a visa process where 

they weren’t quite ready yet, this end in at the Embassy 

to issue visas. So it was very confusing. They didn’t have 

their process down. The bureaucracy wasn’t working too 

well in their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we call it the 

MFA, and back here in Washington. And that was in the 

December 2011 timeframe. 

That kind of got sorted out in the early January 2012 

timeframe and it did that way the process at least, it 

would take 2 or 3 weeks, but as long as we know the process, we can usually work around it. 

And then it collapsed again in that end of March/April 

timeframe, and that one was pretty significant. That one 

was much longer, and it was difficult, and they were essentially, to my knowledge, they were changing from a 

they were using stamps before. This is probably too much 

detail for you guys, but and then they went to foils, and 

they didn’t have the foils, so they had to get the foils, no 

one had the foils. I mean, it was convoluted. . . . 

It actually got longer after the foil issue was resolved. So 

it was probably it usually took me about 6 weeks to get 

from identified to out there, and 4 weeks of that would be 

about for the visa process. I tried to get the visas in 1 

month before the departure date, and that was standard 

until basically 9/11.99


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100See Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 25 (Apr. 7, 2012, 2:56 PM) (on file with the 

Committee, C05392858). 101See Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 24 to Principal Officer 2, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

and Deputy Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State 

(Apr. 7, 2012, 9:10 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05409502). 102 Email (Apr. 6, 2012, 8:28 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05409502). 

The visa delays prevented two Diplomatic Security Agents from 

traveling to the Benghazi Mission in late March and early April.100

As a result, only one Diplomatic Security Agent was on the compound at the time of the first IED attack.101 On April 6, 2012, an 

‘‘IED was thrown over the perimeter wall at 1650 EDT/2250 

Benghazi.’’ 102 The single Diplomatic Security Agent described the 

sequence of events to the Committee: 

Shortly after I went inside, I know the principal officer 

and the IMO had already retired. I was sitting there, and 

I just turned on the TV, and I heard a very loud explosion. 

And, as I told you before, you heard explosions throughout, 

but you would know by the force of this explosion, not only 

the noise but also the way it rocked the building, I knew 

that it was inside the compound. 

At that point, I was sitting in the living room. I had my 

weapons with me. I did not have my vest. I ran into my 

bedroom, grabbed my vest. I spoke to the IMO and to the 

principal officer. I instructed them to allow me out, lock 

themselves lock the door and lock themselves in the safe 

haven. I had an extra pistol and an extra shotgun. I left 

it there for them. I left two radios. One that is communication for them and me and communications for them and 

the Annex building. I told them that I would be [in] constant contact with them on the radio or on the phone; if 

they did not hear from me, then to contact the Annex 

building for assistance. 

I also called our QRF [quick reaction force], basically reacted them. We had a plan: On a situation like that, they 

would take up positions throughout the compound. One of 

the positions would be outside of our building. As I stepped 

outside, one of the QRF members was already out there 

waiting for me. This is possibly, I don’t know, 3 minutes 

after the bombing. 

At some point, the guard finally activated the alarm. Our 

guard force had a push button alarm; in case of any attack, they would activate it. As I step outside, the QRF 

member is there. We cleared our way to the TOC. Went inside the TOC [technical operations center]. I turn off the 

alarm, and I use our camera system to view or to try to 

determine if there was any other people, any other 

attackers in the compound. That took approximately 3, 4 

minutes. 

I did not see anybody in our camera system. There are 

some blind spots, but we did have a pretty good system 

throughout the compound. I thought that with that, I 

would be able to determine something, something blatant, 

something that would really stand out. 


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103Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

Tr.at 30–32 (April 13, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Security Agent 16 Testimony] (on file with 

the Committee). 104See Email from Principal Officer 2, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Diplomatic Security Agent 24 

and Deputy Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State 

(April 7, 2012, 3:25 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05409502). 

Afterwards, I stepped outside of the TOC. I had two QRF 

members with me, and we commenced on clearing the 

compound. 

While we were doing that, I heard two shots. It sounded 

to me like rifle fire, something bigger than an M4, which 

is what I had. So I thought initially that it was shooting 

in the compound. One of the QRF members received, if I 

am not mistaken, a call that told him that a third QRF 

member was outside and had detained someone. 

* * * 

There was a third QRF member, [redacted text], who 

was outside of the compound and had detained two Libyan 

nationals. Eventually I found out that he’s the one who 

fired the two shots. It is common; it is standard operating 

procedure for Libyans to shoot warning shots, and that is 

what he did. 

So we were clearing the compound when I learned that he 

was outside and he was possibly engaged with the 

attackers. I kept one of the QRF members guarding the 

entry to our house. I communicated with the principal officer that everything was still okay; we are still clearing. I 

went outside, and [redacted text] had two people on the 

ground. 

Shortly afterwards, reinforcements from the 17th February 

Militia arrived. They took them away. I requested from the 

militia to provide a security ring outside of the compound. 

I made contact with the Annex building. And I asked them 

to hold off on sending reinforcements to prevent a blue on 

blue situation the Militia did not know who they were; 

they did not know who the Militia were but to be on standby in case we needed additional assistance. 

At that time, all QRF members and myself cleared the 

whole compound. It took us several hours to do so. We did 

not find evidence of any other intruders, attackers, enemy 

on the grounds. I went back inside, and I briefed the principal officer as to what had taken place. She and I then 

commenced our notifications to D.C. and our report writing.103

The principal officer in Benghazi expressed concern to the lead 

Diplomatic Security Agent in Tripoli ‘‘had the attack been even 

slightly less amateur, I don’t know what we would have done.’’ 104

Less than two weeks after the first IED attack on the Benghazi 

Mission compound occurred, Washington D.C. rejected the March 


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105 U.S. Dep’t of State, Cable—Tripoli, Request for DS TDY and FTE Support (April 19, 

2012)(on file with the Committee, SCB0046263). 106See id. 107See Benghazi DS and SST TDY staffing for Jan. 2012-September 11 (on file with the Committee, C0539433). 108See id. 109 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 24 to Diplomatic Security Agent 25 (June 14, 2012, 

1:56 PM)(on file with the Committee, C05391830). 110 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 18 to Diplomatic Security Agent 17 (May 28, 2012, 

5:36 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05392202). 111Testimony of Principal Officer 2, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 109 (Mar. 13, 2015) [hereinafter 

Principal Officer 2 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

28, 2012 request to deploy five Diplomatic Security Agents to 

Benghazi.105 In denying the request, Washington D.C. stated: 

DS will continue to provide DS agent support in Benghazi. 

DS/IP recommends that post continues its efforts to hire 

LES drivers for Benghazi to enable the DS TDYers to solely perform their protective security function. DS/IP also 

recommends a joint assessment of the number of DS 

agents requested for Benghazi to include input from RSO 

Tripoli, TDY RSO Benghazi, and DS/IP in an effort to develop a way forward.106

Throughout the remainder of spring 2012, the number of Diplomatic Security Agents deployed to the compound never exceeded 

three.107 Half the time, there were only two Diplomatic Security 

Agents.108 During this time, the security environment in Benghazi 

started to deteriorate. Less than one week before Stevens returned 

to Tripoli as the Ambassador in May 2012, a rocket propelled grenade [RPG] attack occurred on the International Committee of the 

Red Cross.109 The International Committee of the Red Cross was 

located approximately one kilometer from the Benghazi Mission. A 

‘‘vague Facebook post claiming responsibility for the RPG attack’’ 

also indicated it was ‘‘preparing to send a message to the Americans.’’ 110

On June 6, 2012, a week after the threat to the Mission compound, the Benghazi Mission was attacked for a second time. An 

IED along the Benghazi Mission’s perimeter wall—blowing a hole 

‘‘6 feet by 4 feet,’’ large enough for an individual to walk 

through.111 At the time of the second IED attack, three Diplomatic 

Security Agents were on the ground. A Diplomatic Security Agent 

on the ground at the time described the attack to the Committee: 

Around 3:00 in the morning, give or take 20, 30 minutes, 

the imminent danger and notification system alarm went 

off, affectionately called the duck and cover alarm. That 

woke all of us up. I got up. I put on my armor, grabbed 

my weapon, got dressed of course, and then went outside 

to find out what was going on. I go outside, and I see a 

bunch of our I see our local Guard Force members around 

the front of the gate making, gesturing with their hands, 

you know, towards their nose. I did not speak Arabic. At 

the time they did not speak English, so, that’s how we 

communicated. I believe at the time during that shift there 

was one person that didn’t speak English. So, you know, 

I started smelling; then I had this distinct smell, not like 

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112Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 59–61 (Mar. 

24, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Security Agent 22 Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 113 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 25 to Diplomatic Security Agent 21 (Jun. 7, 2012, 

3:03 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05391125). 

ever. Come to find out, you know, 5 minutes later that it’s 

a fuse. 

But at that point so I asked everyone to start backing 

away from the wall. Then as I back away, that’s when the 

bomb detonates. 

From there it knocked me down. Ears were ringing. I get 

up with the local guards. We run back. There are some 

sandbags right there at the corner. Get behind those sandbags, point my M4 at the hole in the wall and wait for any 

follow up attack that may occur. And that was the 

And no follow up attack did occur, so after that the February 17th Martyrs Brigade showed up in a matter of minutes. Then from there we set up a perimeter outside on the 

street. As we had this large hole in our wall, we wanted 

to push our security perimeter back even further. We set 

up the large hole I mean set up the perimeter, sorry; and 

then from there, once that perimeter was set up, I went 

with one of our QRF guys [redacted text] And we went 

there and secured the rest of the compound. 

As there was a security incident at the front of our compound, we had lost attention and lost visibility on other aspects of our compound. So, before we decided to let the 

principal officer out of the safe haven and call the all clear, 

we went through, me with my M4, him with his AK–47, 

and we just moved through the compound making sure nobody else had entered and there were no other devices. 

After that was done, we called the all clear.112

Two days after the second attack on the compound the number 

of Diplomatic Security Agents dropped to two.113 Five days later, 

on June 11, 2012, an RPG attack was launched on the UK Ambassador’s motorcade. Some speculated the RPG was directed toward 

the Mission given the proximity of the attack to the Mission Compound. Polaschik testified: 

A: There were two main reasons. One was the physical location of the attack. It occurred, I believe, on Venezia 

Street, which is right by our compound. And it was actually, as I understood it, not having been there at the time 

of the attack, close by our rear exit from our compound. 

And, also, given the fact that we had been storing British 

armored vehicles on our compound, again, if someone had 

been watching, you know, did they know for sure whether 

that was British or American. 

Also, around the same time, a figure named Abu Yahya is 

it Abu Yahya al Libi? a senior Al Qaeda operative, had 

been killed, I believe, in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. 

So I was—— 


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114Testimony of Joan Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. 

at 95–96 (Aug. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Polaschik Transcript] (on file with the Committee). 115Security Incidents in Benghazi, Libya, from June 1, 2011- Aug. 20, 2012 (on file with the 

Committee); see also Benghazi Spot Report, EAC and Significant Event Timeline (DS/IP/RD) (on 

file with the Committee, C05394332). 116See Benghazi DS and SST TDY staffing for Jan. 2012-September 11 (on file with the Committee, C0539433). 117 Email from Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Int’l Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Scott Bultrowicz, Principal Deputy Sec’y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State (Jun. 11, 2012, 4:16 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

C05388866). 118 Email from John C. Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to Diplomatic Security Agent 7 

(Jun. 5, 2012, 10:55 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05409979). 119 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 7 to John C. Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya 

(Jun. 6, 2012, 3:00PM) (on file with the Committee, C05409979). 

Q: By the U.S. Government? 

A: Correct. 

Q: In a drone strike or something like that? 

A: Correct. In some U.S. operations. So, given that he was 

a Libyan, I was concerned whether or not there could have 

been some retaliatory action taken by Al Qaeda, you know, 

for that act. So it was murky. There were a lot of things 

that were unclear, but I was concerned that there could 

have been links to the U.S. Government. 

Q: At that time, in June of 2012, the Brits were storing 

their vehicles and their weapons on the U.S. compound, 

the Benghazi compound; is that correct? 

A: Correct.114

In fact, between the first attack on the Benghazi Mission on 

April 6 and June 2012, there were more than 21 separate incidents 

in Benghazi.115 While a member of the Defense Department’s SST 

was temporarily diverted to bolster security after the series of attacks against the Mission compound and U.K. Ambassador’s motorcade, Diplomatic Security Agent staffing never increased to five.116

The sequence of attacks raised enough concern in Washington D.C., 

for Lamb to acknowledge to her supervisors there were not enough 

resources diverted to Benghazi. 

We are not staffed or resourced adequately to protect our 

people in that type of environment. We are a soft target 

against resources available to the bad guys there. Not to 

mention there is no continuity because we do everything 

there with TDY personnel. The cost to continue to do business there may become more challenging.117

Washington D.C. did nothing to provide additional resources or 

personnel. For example, a day before the second IED attack on the 

Mission compound, Stevens requested the support of the State Department’s highly trained mobile security deployment team to remain in Tripoli through the end of the summer.118 More resources 

in Tripoli meant possibly more available resources at the Benghazi 

Mission. However, on the day of the second IED attack against the 

Benghazi Mission on June 6, 2012 the request was denied.119

On June 14, 2012, eight days after the second IED attack on the 

compound, the Diplomatic Security Agent in charge sent a staffing 


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120 Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 19 to Diplomatic Security Agent 25, James 

Bacigalupo, Regional Dir., Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State (Jun. 14, 2012, 

11:40 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05393692). 121Memorandum from James Bacigalupo, Regional Dir., Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, to Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Int’l Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, (Jun. 15, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05578316). 122 Id. 123Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 42–43. 124 Id. 

request to Diplomatic Security requesting ‘‘five DS agents be deployed to secure the facility, with a MSD team on standby.’’ 120 One 

day later, on June 15, 2012, an Action Memorandum requesting 

five additional staff for Benghazi was directed to Lamb for approval.121 The Action Memorandum described ‘‘the uncertainty of 

the security situation in Benghazi and the fact that their appears 

to be an active terrorist cell in Benghazi, Libya planning and implementing attack operations against western interests including 

the U.S. Mission in Benghazi.’’ 122 No response was ever received.123 The desk officer responsible for staffing in Benghazi described his role in developing the Action Memorandum.124

A: The RSO in Benghazi also requested and received additional local guard support, which was the Blue Mountain 

Group. So they had additional guards on at night. And 

then the RSO in Benghazi, they requested me for additional staffing, RSO staffing, agents staffing. 

Q: How did that request come in? 

A: I believe we definitely talked on the phone and then he 

sent an email to follow up with that. But first we spoke 

on the phone and then we sent an email. 

Q: And what was the number requested or—— 

A: Sure. 

Q: How did that proceed when that after that request 

came in? 

A: Certainly. The number he requested at the time was I 

think he said five agents, and he specified a timeframe 

through the election period, which was going to be probably in a month, so on or about I think it was earlier 

scheduled it was early July, so roughly about a month, and 

then he recommended having four agents remain at the 

compound. 

Q: Based on your experience, just from a personal perspective, did you support that number or support that assessment? 

A: Yes. Not only did I support it, I sent it to the RSO for 

clearance as well, which he supported fully, and I drafted 

an action memorandum stating the RSO’s request. 

Q: And what happened to that action memorandum? 

A: It was approved by my direct supervisors, and then it 

was upstairs for a while. And we didn’t hear anything. We 

felt it urgent enough, my supervisor scheduled a meeting 

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125 Id. 126 U.S. Dep’t of State, Cable, Request for Extension of TDY Security Personnel (July 9, 2012) 

(on file with the Committee, SCB0049439). 127Testimony Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 

78–79 (May 19, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 

sentially the long and short of it, the memo was denied for 

additional resources, personnel wise. 

Q: Can you walk us through that in a little more detail? 

How long was it upstairs? So your immediate supervisor, 

that would be Mr. Bacigalupo? 

A: At that time it was James Bacigalupo, correct. 

Q: So he approved this action memorandum, and then it 

would go to Charlene Lamb. Is that correct? 

A: It went to I know it was in I don’t know where it went 

in between. Probably to her staff assistants or the deputy 

prior to her. But it definitely made it to her because that’s 

who we had the meeting with. 

Q: And how long was it up there before the meeting? 

A: I think the memo actually didn’t get sent up until after 

the incident with the UK protective detail, so it was probably mid-June, June 15th, I believe, the date on the memo. 

So I think it was late that week. Maybe June 18th. I can’t 

recall it specifically.125

Concerned about the impending loss of security personnel and 

the deteriorating security environment in Tripoli and in Benghazi, 

the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli sent a staffing request to Washington 

D.C.126 The July 9, 2012 staffing request included a request for a 

minimum of four additional Diplomatic Security Agents for the 

Benghazi Mission—which would be comprised of at least one permanently assigned Diplomatic Security Agent from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, as well as a minimum of three temporary duty 

Diplomatic Security Agents identified by Washington D.C. The Diplomatic Security Agent in charge in Benghazi in July explained his 

reasoning for the request.127

With all the security situation on the ground going on and 

putting everything in place, and all the transition taking 

place in regards to American personnel leaving and coming 

in, and after discussion with the RSO and chief of Mission, 

this was a cable suggesting at that time this is what we 

need to maintain operations in the best safe manner as 

soon as possible. We wrote this cable on July 9, prior to 

the Ambassador leaving for Benghazi. 

At that time, MSD personnel were, when we started off 

with two teams; now there was less teams on the ground. 

Actually, I don’t believe there was any MSD team on the 

ground. There was just TDYers and two permanent 

ARSOs on the ground. This is in July. I’m sorry. I’m confused on the dates. Not September. This is July 9. So, at 

this time, we had another ARSO on the ground that was 

permanent and myself and the RSO. 


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128 Id. at 79. 129 Id. at 80. 

* * * 

So we wrote this in July because all these elements were 

leaving. MSD was leaving. The SST team was leaving, or 

they were going to change their Mission from being in the 

Embassy to being outside of the Embassy so they could 

train the Libyan government military. So we came up with 

this as a suggestion, for example, in line 4, or paragraph 

4, under the current arrangement, and this was the main 

one, 34 U.S. security personnel, the 16 SSTs, the 11 MSD, 

the 2 RSOs and 3 TDY RSOs, that was the number that 

we had there, and it was going to drawn down to 27. And 

we said: Wait, we’re basically losing people. We need people, specifically because security is not in the best position 

now. 

We requested weapons permits and weapons for the local 

ambassador bodyguard detail, and funding for security. 

Yes, and this was the cable that we sent out in concurrence with the Ambassador? 128

Again, going based on the numbers of agents that were 

going to Benghazi while we were averaging one, two, or 

three, and we never actually had five, we’re suggesting: 

Hey, international programs, how about you making sure 

that we always have three, and we’re going to put a permanent RSO on the ground, and that would give us at 

least four if you cannot provide us with enough TDYers to 

do the job. That’s basically why we went with that number. It was an average of the amount of agents that we 

had at any time at that post.129

No response was received. Lamb explained the lack of response 

to the Committee: 

So when I read this cable in this format, [redacted text] 

wrote it as a reporting cable in paragraph format, and it’s 

very hard to line everything up by the needs. So I asked 

the desk officer to have his . . . at the time was the person working with [redacted text] for them to get on a 

conference call and to go through this cable, paragraph by 

paragraph, line by line, and to switch this into the format 

that shows how many people do you need for which activities, to support VIP visits, movement security, static security, a quick reaction force. Just tell me exactly what you 

need and then the numbers will pop out the other side 

showing what you need. 

And they sat down and they did this. And all of that was 

compiled into the response that unfortunately never went 

out. But my guidance to them was before that cable went 

up to Scott Bultrowicz and Eric Boswell, I wanted it to be 

pre approved at post, because I didn’t want to dictate to 

post their staffing needs, I wanted to support them. But in 

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130Lamb Testimony at 245–246. 131 Id. at 248. 132Kennedy Testimony at 46. 133Testimony of Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor to the U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, Tr. at 72 (Sept. 2, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 134Testimony of Gregory Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, Tr. at 13–14 (Apr. 11, 2013, U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Gov’t Reform) 

(on file with the Committee); see also Cable from Embassy Tripoli to U.S. Dep’t of State (Jul. 

9, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0049439). 135 Email from Deputy Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 27, 2012, 

4:47PM) (on file with the Committee, C05394203). 

ing up on the 1 year transition when everybody was going 

to leave post and the new team was going to come in, so 

I wanted it to be laid out, very clear, the current operating 

support that was being provided for security.130

She further explained: ‘‘And just because it didn’t get sent out 

with a cable number on it, I am testifying to you that everything 

in that cable was followed through and carried out.’’ 131

Kennedy explained his involvement in the July 9, 2012 staffing 

cable and the decision to terminate the Defense Department’s SST 

protective responsibilities at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. He testified to the Committee: ‘‘I consulted, as I said earlier, with the subject matter experts in this field, and after consulting with them, I 

responded no, we would not be asking for another extension.’’ 132

This is a much different description of Kennedy’s involvement than 

what Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Secretary 

of State, described to the Committee. She described the Under Secretary as the person ‘‘who managed security related issues.’’ 133

Additional resources were never sent to Tripoli or Benghazi, despite the requests of the security professionals on the ground. Beginning in August, the number of security personnel at the U.S. 

Embassy in Tripoli was 34. By the end of August, the number of 

security personnel at Embassy Tripoli dropped to six Diplomatic 

Security Agents.134 In Benghazi, the number of Diplomatic Security Agents continued to fluctuate. By August, the desk officer responsible for staffing in Benghazi conveyed to the Regional Bureau 

‘‘DS has had no volunteers for Benghazi for the upcoming few 

months . . . DS’s plan is to maintain 3 DS staff in Benghazi at all 

times by drawing on Tripoli’s resources.’’ 135

On September 1, 2012, a Diplomatic Security Agent, who was 

originally scheduled to serve at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, arrived at the Benghazi Mission to serve as the Diplomatic Security 

Agent in charge. With the addition from Tripoli in early September 

2012, three Diplomatic Security Agents secured the Benghazi compound, including on the morning of September 10, 2012 prior to 

Stevens’ arrival. 


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1 Eastern Daylight Time (Washington, DC) and Eastern European Time (Benghazi) are used. 

APPENDIX G: 

Timeline of Significant Events 

During the Attacks 

Tuesday, September 11, 2012 1

EDT/EET 

3:42 pm/9:42 pm—First attack on the Benghazi Mission compound 

begins. 

4:21 pm/10:21 pm—The White House Situation Room convenes a 

meeting. 

4:32 pm/10:32 pm—The National Military Command Center 

[NMCC] at the Pentagon is notified of the attacks. 

5:00 pm/11:00 pm—Secretary of Defense, Leon E. Panetta, and 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin E. Dempsey, meet 

with the President at the White House. 

5:10 pm/11:10 pm—The first Drone arrives in Benghazi. 

5:23 pm/11:23 pm—All State Department personnel evacuate to the 

Benghazi CIA Annex. Ambassador Christopher Stevens is unaccounted for. 

5:38 pm/11:38 pm—The Secretary of State calls David H. Petraeus, 

Director, Central Intelligence Agency. 

6:00 pm/12:00 am—The Secretary of Defense convenes a meeting at 

the Pentagon. 

6:49 pm/12:49 am—The Secretary of State calls the Libyan President. 

6:58 pm/12:58 am—Gregory Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission, Tripoli, reports another mob gathering at Annex. 

7:05 pm/1:05 am—The Secretary of State holds a conference call 

with Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff, State Department, Patrick F. 

Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management, State Department, 

Gregory Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission, Libya, Stephen Mull, 

Executive Secretariat, State Department, Thomas Nides, Deputy 

Secretary for Management and Resources, Jacob Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Director, Office of Policy Planning. 


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7:19 pm/1:19 am—Jeremy Bash, Chief of Staff, Department of Defense emails potential response forces to Jacob Sullivan, Cheryl 

Mills, and others. 

7:30 pm/1:30 am—Team Tripoli arrives at the airport in Benghazi. 

7:30 pm/1:30 am—The White House convenes a meeting via secured teleconference video with representatives from the State 

Department, the Defense Department, and the intelligence community on the U.S. response to the attacks in Benghazi. 

7:40 pm/1:40 am—The Embassy in Tripoli receives a call from a 

missing Diplomatic Security Agent phone about an American at 

the hospital. 

8:30 pm/2:30 am—NMCC holds a conference call with AFRICOM, 

EUCOM, CENTCOM, TRANSCOM and the four services about 

the military response to Benghazi. 

8:39 pm/2:39 am—The NMCC conveys authorization to the FAST 

to prepare to deploy and the CIF to move to an intermediate 

staging base. 

8:53pm/2:53 am—The NMCC conveys formal authorization to deploy the U.S. Based Special Operations Force to an intermediate 

staging base. 

9:57 pm/3:57 am—Bash emails Sullivan and asks, ‘‘Any word from 

the hospital?’’ 

10:27 pm/4:27 am—The President calls the Secretary of State. 

10:34 pm/4:34 am—The Diplomatic Security Command Center at 

the State Department issues an update that Libyans have confirmed Stevens is in a hospital and has been killed. 

10:39 pm/4:39 am—Kennedy sends a photo of Stevens from Twitter 

to Mills. 

11:00 pm/5:00 am—The established N-hour. 

11:05 pm/5:05 am—Team Tripoli arrives at the Annex in Benghazi. 

11:17 pm/5:17 am—The first mortar hits the Annex in Benghazi. 

11:38 pm/5:38 am—The Secretary of State emails: ‘‘Cheryl told me 

the Libyans confirmed his death.’’ 

11:41 pm/5:41 am—Diplomatic Security Command Center reports 

mortar fire at the annex and new injuries to the American personnel. 

11:45 pm/5:45 am—A McDonough email notes the Secretary of Defense called Pastor Jones. 

Wednesday, September 12, 2012 

12:05 am/6:05 am—AFRICOM orders a C–17 aircraft to prepare to 

deploy to Libya. 

12:12 am/6:12 am—Mills informs McDonough ‘‘we’re pulling everyone out of Benghazi.’’ 


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1:00 am/7:00 am—The CIF is ready to deploy 

1:19 am/7:19 am—Admiral James Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, emails we ‘‘now have dip clearance for 

FAST platoon to Tripoli . . .’’ 

1:31 am/7:31 am—The first plane leaves from the Benghazi airport 

with the survivors en route to Tripoli. 

1:40 am/7:40 am—Winnefeld sends another email: ‘‘first airplane 

departs Ramstein at 0600z [2:00 am/8:00 am]’’ 

2:25 am/8:25 am—Steven’s death is confirmed when the security officers from CIA and the State Department receives his body. 

∼ 4:00 am/10:00 am—The second plane provided by the Libyan Air 

Force departs with all remaining U.S. personnel in Benghazi for 

Tripoli. 

∼ 6:00 am/12:00 pm—A C–130 aircraft arrives at Rota Spain to 

transport the FAST to Tripoli. 

∼ 7:00 am/1:00 pm—The FAST completes loading the C–130 aircraft and is ready to depart. 

8:15 am/2:15 pm—The C–17 aircraft departs Germany to Tripoli to 

evacuate Americans. 

∼ 10:00 am/4:00 pm—The FAST departs Rota Spain en route to 

Tripoli. 

∼ 10:00 am/4:00 pm—The CIF’s C–130 aircrafts arrive at the airport. 

∼ 11:00 am/5:00 pm—The CIF departs en route to the intermediate 

staging base. 

∼ 2:00 pm/8:00 pm—CIF arrives at an intermediate staging base. 

2:56 pm/8:56 pm—FAST platoon arrives in Tripoli. 

3:28 pm/9:28 pm—The Special Operations Force deployed from the 

U.S. arrives at the intermediate staging base. 

4:19 pm/10:19 pm—The C–17 aircraft with Americans evacuated 

from Tripoli arrives in Germany. 


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The following timeline, the ‘‘Comprehensive Timeline of Events— 

Benghazi,’’ provides further detail about the events that occurred 

during the attack. This is a timeline of events compiled by the 

State Department using information obtained from the DVR footage of the Benghazi Mission compound and the Annex, as well as 

interviews, and logs maintained at the Tactical Operations Center 

at the Embassy in Tripoli and at the Diplomatic Security Command Center. 

The Committee makes this timeline available to the public with 

the following corrections: 

• Time stamp 0503.00: The ‘‘unidentified LN Motorcade’’ was not 

February 17 Martyrs Brigade. It was the Libya Shield. 

• Time stamp 0614.00: The motorcade that arrived was the Libyan Military Intelligence. 


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The following timeline, the ‘‘Timeline of Department of Defense 

Actions September 11–12, 2012,’’ provides further detail about the 

Defense Department actions that occurred during the attack. This 

is a timeline of events compiled by the Defense Department. The 

timeline does not disclose when the forces were ready to deploy or 

when those forces actually moved. 


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1MICHAEL MORELL, THE GREAT WAR OF OUR TIME: THE CIA’S FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM— 

FROM AL-QA’IDA TO ISIS 217 (2015) [hereinafter MORELL]. 2Testimony of Michael Morell, Deputy Dir., Central Intelligence Agency, Tr. at 25 (Sept. 28, 

2015) [hereinafter Morell Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 3MORELL, supra note 1, at 218. 4Morell Testimony at 28. 

APPENDIX H: 

The September 12 Situation Report 

and the President’s Daily Brief 

The very first written piece produced by CIA analysts regarding 

the Benghazi attacks was an overnight Situation Report written 

very early in the morning on September 12, 2012. This piece included the line ‘‘the presence of armed assailants from the outset 

suggests this was an intentional assault and not the escalation of 

a peaceful protest.’’ While that line was correct—the attacks were 

an intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest— 

Michael Morell, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 

noted it was a ‘‘crucial error that [came] back to haunt [the CIA].’’ 1

This was an error, according to Morell, because that line was not 

written by analysts but rather a ‘‘senior editor’’ who ‘‘believed there 

needed to be some sort of bottom line’’ in the piece.2 Morell labeled 

it a ‘‘bureaucratic screw-up’’ and claims that since similar language 

did not appear in the CIA assessment the following day, September 

13, it was evidence to critics that ‘‘the intelligence community was 

politicizing the analysis.’’ 3

Though Morell learned this information second-hand 4 and put it 

in his book, the Select Committee spoke directly to individuals with 

first-hand accounting of the events. In reality, the ‘‘senior editor’’ 

was the Executive Coordinator of the Presidential Daily Brief; she 

included the language about the intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest; and this ‘‘bureaucratic screw-up’’ resulted in this individual taking the piece to the White House, presenting it to Jacob Lew, Chief of Staff to the President, and delivering it to an usher to give to the President. 

Insertion of the Language 

The Executive Coordinator described to the Committee when she 

first saw the September 12 update: 

A: So the analysts came in to brief me—I don’t remember 

what time that was, but my guess is probably somewhere 

between 3 and 4. And the piece that he gave to me was 

much longer than this. 


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5Testimony of the President’s Daily Briefer, Office of Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Tr. at 24–26 

(Apr. 29, 2016) [hereinafter PDB Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

And we had a difference of opinion on one piece of the intelligence. He believed that this was a spontaneous event 

and was not open to the idea that it wasn’t a spontaneous 

event. And I disagreed because, you know, I had 20 years 

of Army experience. You know, this is the military person 

in me. And I said, I just can’t buy that something that’s, 

you know, this coordinated, this organized, and this sophisticated was something that they just, you know, did 

on, you know, the spur of the moment. I said, we have to 

consider the fact that that might not be the case. 

He had a lot of good arguments. You know, it was the anniversary of 9/11, there was the video in Cairo, there were 

a number of other things happening that, you know, would 

seem to suggest that it was spontaneous. But just being 

military and seeing, you know, what we were seeing in the 

traffic, I was like, I don’t think that this is—I don’t think 

we can discount the possibility that this was a, you know, 

coordinated, organized, preplanned attack. 

Q: When you say when you were seeing what you were 

seeing in the traffic, what does that mean? 

A: So the things they were talking about, how organized 

that it was, in the press reporting. There was a lot of press 

that was coming back and talking about, you know, like, 

how they were breaching and, you know, like, how it was 

sort of phased, right? It was coming across to me, reading, 

you know, the open press at the time, that this was a 

phased attack. And I would be very surprised if a phased 

attack was something that was just, all of a sudden, you 

know, ‘‘Hey, guess what? Let’s go have an attack today because these other things are happening.’’ I don’t think 

that—that just didn’t make sense to me.5

While the analyst believed it was a spontaneous event, given her 

experience the Executive Coordinator believed the piece needed to 

leave open the possibility that something else occurred other than 

a spontaneous event. She testified: 

Q: You said there was a disagreement between you and 

the analyst. A piece came in; it was lengthy. You wanted 

to cut it down because that’s what you normally do. Can 

you describe a little bit more about the disagreement that 

you had? 

A: Well, that was really it. Like, he was pretty convinced 

that this was a spontaneous attack, that it was, you know, 

as a result of this confluence of events—the 9/11 anniversary, the video being released, the protest in Cairo. [redacted text]. 

And, to me, that wasn’t enough. I was like—like I said, 

just my gut feeling. I said, we need to leave the door open 


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6 Id. at 28. 7Testimony of [redacted text] Team Chief, Office of Terrorism Analysis, Central Intelligence 

Agency, Tr. at 32 (Feb. 10, 2016) [hereinafter [redacted text] Team Chief Testimony]. 8 Id. at 100–101. 

for the possibility that it might not have been spontaneous.6

The manager of the analysts testified that her analysts did not 

agree with this approach and that the disagreement with the Executive Coordinator became hostile: 

The POTUS coordinator, according to my two analysts, 

who I trust and continue to trust, was that they got into 

an argument, which is highly unusual, with the POTUS 

coordinator, that was actually quite hostile. And she insisted that based on her personal experience of 15 or however many years as a captain in the Air National Guard, 

that there was no way that was true.7

According to the manager of the analysts, none of her analysts 

believed the sentence regarding an intentional assault should have 

been included. The manager testified: 

A: And so the POTUS coordinator inserted this sentence 

because she felt strongly that it was an intentional assault 

against our consulate. 

Q: And—— 

A: But there was no—nothing to base that on, no reporting. 

Q: And that view is the view of that single editor. Is that 

right? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Was there anyone—any of the analysts on your team 

that thought that sentence should have been included? 

A: No. 

Q: And the reason your team and your analysts felt so 

strongly was because there was no reporting to support 

that. Is that correct? 

A: Correct. We just—you can’t make a call without an evidentiary base to support it.8

However, without solid evidence pointing in either direction— 

spontaneous or not—the Executive Coordinator was sure to be 

careful with her language. She merely wanted to leave open the 

possibility that it was an intentional assault and the language she 

chose reflected that possibility—not a conclusion. She told the Committee: 

Q: —your choice of the word ‘‘suggests,’’ is that to couch 

it—— 

A: Yes. 


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9PDB Testimony at 37. 

10 Id. at 29. 11 Id. at 26. 

Q: —to say that this may have happened, as opposed to it 

definitively happened? 

A: Correct. 

Q: Okay. And was that a deliberate —— 

A: It was leaving the door open that this is what it suggests, but that doesn’t mean this is what it is.9

The analysts and the Executive Coordinator were not able to 

reach a consensus on the language in the piece. The analysts, who 

went up to the 7th Floor of the CIA headquarters to brief the Executive Coordinator on the piece, returned to their desks. The Executive Coordinator testified: 

Q: Okay. And was there a resolution between you and 

him—— 

A: Not really. 

Q: —on how to proceed? 

A: No. 

Q: No. Okay. So how did your conversation or interactions 

with him end? 

A: I told him I would think about, you know, what he had 

said. And I said, you know, I will to talk to somebody.10

The Executive Coordinator, however, did not make the decision 

to include the language of an intentional assault on her own, and 

she did not do it in a vacuum based solely on her experience. Members of her staff, which numbered roughly 15, talked with individuals outside CIA headquarters about what was going on. She told 

the Committee: 

Q: In terms of picking up the phone and calling anybody 

outside of the building, is that something you did to acquire information? 

A: We did. Yes.11

She also discussed the matter with another analyst who had expertise in regional issues. The Executive Coordinator testified: 

We had—I was very lucky because we had another—we 

had a MENA analyst that was a PDB briefer. She was the, 

I want to say, the SecDef briefer. And so I went over and 

I talked to her and I said, ‘‘Hey, this is what the analyst 

says. Here’s my opinion. You know, what are your 

thoughts, having covered this area, you know, pretty extensively in your career?’’ And she agreed with me. 

We discussed it, we had a conversation about it and—you 

know. And so I made the decision to change the wording 


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12 Id. at 29. 13Testimony of Dir. of the Office of Terrorism Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, Tr. at 

23 (Nov. 13, 2015) [hereinafter OTA Director Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 14Morell Testimony at 25. 15PDB Testimony at 41. 

to make sure that we at least addressed the possibility 

that this was a planned attack.12

She also testified: 

A: There was a lot of discourse about this at the PDB. I 

mean, the other PDB briefers and I, that’s the only resource I have at the time. And I never would make an assessment all on my own and just be like, this is it. I mean, 

we would do—— 

Q: I understand. 

A: We talk about it, we’re sounding boards for each other. 

So there was a lot of discussion. And, yes, I’m sure that 

the supervisor of the young man who wrote this, we had 

that conversation. Like, are you sure that this is what you 

want to say. And yes, when I wrote this, I didn’t feel like 

I was saying you’re wrong and I’m right. All I was trying 

to do was say, look, we need to leave the door open in case 

this is not a spontaneous attack. We want to be able to 

wait until there’s more information, and so that’s why I 

use the word ‘‘suggests.’’ I didn’t say this is an intentional 

assault. It suggests that it is. 

The manager of the analysts who disagreed with the Executive 

Coordinator, however, concedes that the Executive Coordinator was 

right with her analysis. She testified: 

Q: And she was right? 

A: In the event, yes, she was right.13

Similarly, Michael Morell concedes the sentence was accurate. 

He testified: 

Q: So the sentence ended up being accurate? 

A: Yeah. Absolutely.14

The President’s Daily Brief 

When the Executive Coordinator finished inserting the accurate 

sentence regarding the ‘‘intentional assault and not the escalation 

of a peaceful protest’’ into the September 12 piece, she put it into 

the ‘‘book’’ she prepared each day for the President and his Chief 

of Staff.15 This ‘‘book’’ is otherwise known as the President’s Daily 

Brief, or the PDB. 

Normally, upon completion of the PDB, the Executive Coordinator would travel to the White House, brief the Chief of Staff, and 

if the President required a briefing, she would brief the President. 

She testified: 

So during the weeks that I produced the PDB, I would 

produce it, and then they would drive me to the White 


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16 Id. at 6. 17 Id. at 41. 

House, and I would produce—or I would brief Jack Lew 

first, who was the Chief of Staff. And if the President required a brief during that day or chose to take a brief, 

then I would give him a brief, and if not, then his briefer— 

then the DNI would brief him. 

When we were on travel, I always briefed the President. 

That was my responsibility whenever we would fly.16

On September 12, 2012, the morning after the Benghazi attacks, 

the Executive Coordinator—the individual presenting the President 

with his Presidential Daily Brief—traveled to the White House. 

That day, however, she did not present the PDB to the President.17

Instead, she gave it to an usher. She testified she presented the 

PDB—with the accurate sentence regarding the ‘‘intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest’’—to Lew: 

A: So it depends. If we’re traveling, then I present it to 

the President personally. And if he has questions—usually 

the only questions he usually asks—— 

Lawyer. We’re not going to talk about what the President 

said or your conversations with him. 

A: Okay. So if we’re in town and we’re not traveling then 

I bring it to the White House, and I personally brief Jack 

Lew. And I hand the President’s book to the usher, and 

the usher presents it to the President. 

Q: So normally in Washington, when you’re here in town, 

you’re not sitting across from the President, him looking at 

the book, and he may be asking you questions? 

A: No. 

Q: How did it happen on the 12th that day? 

A: I was here. So we were not traveling yet. We were in 

D.C. So I would have—I had a driver, and the driver 

drives me to the White House. I drop off the book first 

with the usher and then I go down and I brief Jack Lew. 

Q: Okay. And what time was that on the 12th? 

A: So we always arrive by 7:00, and so it would’ve been 

around 7:00. I mean, I’m assuming around 7:00. 

Q: So that day at 7:00, the booklet that has been put together, you take it to the White House, you visit with Jack 

Lew and then someone walked it into—— 

A: No. First we give the brief to the usher. So my driver 

drops me off at the front gate. I go through—— 

Q: You actually physically hand the document—or the material. 

A: Yeah, I physically hand the material to the usher and 

then I walk back down with my briefcase and go see Jack 

Lew and wait for him and then I brief him. 


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18 Id. at 66–67. 19Morell Testimony at 25. 20 [Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 30–31. 21OTA Director Testimony at 43. 

Q: Okay. And with Mr. Lew, did you talk about this 

SITREP? 

Lawyer: We’re not going to discuss what specific information was provided to any White House staff in any PDB. 

Q: But you did talk with Mr. Lew that day? 

A: I did.18

Fallout 

Morell labeled the insertion of the language by the Executive Coordinator a ‘‘bureaucratic screw-up.’’ This language made it into a 

piece that was put in the President’s Daily Brief, which was briefed 

to Lew, and possibly shared with the President. Such a ‘‘bureaucratic screw-up,’’ therefore, has far reaching implications if it occurs with any regularity. 

Michael Morell told the Committee that what occurred was a ‘‘big 

no-no.’’ He testified: 

She was, I’m told, a long-time military analyst with some 

expertise in military matters, no expertise in North Africa 

and no expertise in this particular incident. She added 

that, right? That’s a no-no, that’s a no-no in the review 

process business.19

The manager of the analysts who disagreed with the Executive 

Coordinator called what occurred an analytic ‘‘cardinal sin.’’ She 

testified: 

What she did was, frankly, in the analytic world, kind of a cardinal sin. I mean, the job of the POTUS coordinator—so we had the 

two analysts stay overnight. Their job is to copy edit these things 

and make sure that if there is some analysis in there, that the evidentiary techs sort of hang together; that it actually makes sense 

because it does go to the—it’s a big deal. I mean, it goes to very 

senior policymakers. So——20

The OTA Director also said that what occurred was a problem: 

Q: Okay. Is that a problem that the senior DNI editor had 

the final sign-off on this as opposed to the analysts, and 

that person is inserting something in there that the analysts adamantly disagree with? 

A: In my personal view, yes.21

Despite this ‘‘bureaucratic screw-up’’—which occurred in relation 

to the Benghazi attacks, one of the few, if only, times in history 

outside scrutiny has ever been applied to the PDB process—Morell 

and others at the CIA told the Committee this occurs infrequently. 

Morell testified: 

Q: So from my perspective, I’m very new to this arena, it 

seems like it’s a problem that you have these rigorous 

processes in place, and on this particular occasion a piece 


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22Morell Testimony at 25–26. 23 [Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 30–31. 24 [Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 35–36. 25Morell Testimony at 26. 

is going before the President and somebody inserts a sentence that substantively changes the meaning of a bullet 

point without any additional review by the analysts who 

wrote the piece. 

A: Yes. You’re absolutely right. 

Q: That’s a problem in your eyes as well? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And how often does something like that occur? 

A: Not very. You know, in my experience, once or twice a 

year.22

The manager of the analysts who disagreed with the Executive 

Coordinator testified: 

Q: Is that something that in your 8 years prior you had 

ever seen or heard of happening? 

A: No.23

She also testified: 

A: Oh, I’m sure I did, yeah. I mean, it was unheard of and 

it hasn’t happened since. 

Q: Okay. 

A: It’s a big deal.24

Morell, himself once the head of the PDB staff, told the Committee how he would have responded if a senior editor had made 

such a substantive edit over the objections of the analysts: 

A: And this—you know, I ran—I’ve ran the PDB staff, 

right, as part of the jobs I had. I would have reprimanded, 

orally reprimanded, not in a formal sense, right—— 

Q: Sure. 

A: —called this person in my office and said, you know, 

what happened? And if it turned out to be exactly what I 

just explained to you, I would have said, don’t ever do that 

again.25

Morell also suggested how to ensure such a ‘‘bureaucratic screwup’’ doesn’t happen in the future. He told the Committee: 

Q: Is there any way to prevent these types of insertions by 

senior reviewers in the future? 

A: Well, I said, it doesn’t happen very often, right. 

Q: But it happened in this case, though. 

A: So it’s not a huge problem, right, it doesn’t happen very 

often. The way you prevent it is twofold, right? You make 

it very clear when somebody shows up to the PDB staff 


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26 Id. at 27. 27PDB Testimony at 38. 28 Id. at 31. 

what their responsibilities are and what their responsibilities are not, you’re not the analyst. And, two, when something—when something does happen, even something very 

minor, right, you make it very clear then that they overstepped their bounds. That’s how you prevent it.26

The Executive Coordinator, however, has a different point of 

view than Morell, the OTA Director, and the manager of the analysts. She did not view this as a ‘‘bureaucratic screw-up’’ at all, but 

rather exactly the job she was supposed to be doing. She acknowledged the disagreement with the analysts the night of the 

Benghazi attacks, testifying: 

Q: Okay. And I know we talked about it, but how unusual, 

I guess, was this disagreement, this type of disagreement? 

A: It was pretty unusual. Most of the time, we were able 

to, you know, just sort of agree on language, and they’ll 

gave you a face like, ‘‘Okay,’’ they’ll roll their eyes, they’ll 

be like, ‘‘All right, you know, that’s not as strong of language as I would like.’’ But, you know, a lot of times, you 

know, we soften the language because we just don’t know 

for sure. So, you know, we’ll change from, you know, ‘‘believe with high confidence’’ to—I’m like, do you really believe with high confidence, or do you really think that’s 

maybe medium confidence? 

And I sort of saw my role as, you know, like, a mentor because I’d been in intelligence for 20 years. So a lot of 

times, you know, I would tell the analysts, you know, this 

is good tradecraft, but it will be better analysis if you take 

into consideration these things which you may or may not 

have considered.27

However, the fact that she inserted language into the piece was 

not a ‘‘no-no’’ or a ‘‘cardinal sin,’’ but rather something that was ultimately her decision, not the analysts’. This directly contradicts 

what Morell said about the Executive Coordinator overstepping her 

bounds. She testified: 

But I do know that, you know, when I talked to [senior 

CIA official], you know, in the interview process and also, 

you know, subsequent to that, he basically said that you’re 

the PDB briefer, you are the last, you know, line of defense 

and, you know, it’s your call. So if there’s something in 

there that, you know, bothers you, you know, coordinate it 

out, and then if you can’t come to an agreement, it’s your, 

you know, responsibility. So I did not take that lightly.28

Since it was a responsibility she did not take lightly, she only 

modified such language when there was ample evidence to support 

it. She told the Committee: 


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29 Id. at 26. 30 Id. at 44. 31 Id. at 43–44. 

But yes. I mean, we don’t—I rarely ever—in fact, I can’t 

remember any time that I’ve ever made, you know, a call 

just based on press reporting, so I’m sure there was other 

intelligence.29

Perhaps as a result of the direction she was given during her 

interview, the Executive Coordinator experienced no fallout or reprimand as a result of her actions the night of the Benghazi attacks. 

She testified: 

Q: Okay. Were you told by anybody never to do that 

again? 

A: No. 

Q: Okay. Were you told by anybody that what you did was 

a big no-no? 

A: No.30

As a matter of fact, she and her PDB colleagues agreed that her 

actions—inserting the language about the intentional assault and 

not the escalation of a peaceful protest—were the right call. She 

testified: 

Q: Okay. So you said you have a roundtable. I mean, who 

is comprised, just roughly, of that roundtable? 

A: So it’s all the PDB briefers. Some weren’t there because 

a lot of times their principals, like, keep them there or, you 

know, they don’t get back in time. But also it’s whoever— 

it’ll be either [CIA individual] or [State Department individual] or [DIA individual] that’s leading it. 

Q: So I just want to make sure I understand your testimony correctly. You were told by someone at the roundtable that the analysts were upset, but you say that’s too 

harsh a word—— 

A: Yeah. 

Q: —for lack of a better word. 

A: I can’t think of a better—it was somewhere in between, 

like, upset and—— 

Q: Sure. Sure. 

A: Yeah. 

Q: There was discussion. It seemed to be—the consensus 

was that it was the right call. 

A: Yes. 

Q: Okay. The consensus by those at the roundtable. 

A: At the roundtable, yes.31

One of the briefers at the roundtable was an analyst who came 

from the Middle East and North African desk at the CIA, and was 


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32 Id. at 42. 33OTA Director Testimony at 43. 

a colleague of the analysts who disagreed with the Executive Coordinator the night of the attack.32

The testimony received by the Committee on this topic presents 

a dichotomy between two parties. On the one hand, CIA personnel 

present a picture that what occurred was a major error and breach 

of protocol. On the other hand, the Executive Coordinator, who 

works for ODNI, testified she was told when she took the job that 

she had the final call on language in analytic pieces, though changing substantive language was something exercised judiciously. 

Since the Benghazi attacks, the analysts have been instructed to 

stay with the PDB editors until the final piece is with the ODNI 

official.33 Given how the situation unfolded early in the morning of 

September 12, 2012, it is unclear how this new guidance would 

have altered that particular outcome. 

Two of the first pieces produced by the CIA analysts in the wake 

of the Benghazi attacks contained errors either in process or substance. Both of these pieces became part of the President’s Daily 

Brief. While the Committee only examined intelligence pieces regarding the Benghazi attacks, discovering errors in two pieces—on 

successive days, on one single topic—that became part of the President’s Daily Brief is extremely problematic for what should be an 

airtight process. Whether these errors are simply a coincidence or 

part of a larger systemic issue is unknown. The September 12 

piece, along with the egregious editing and sourcing errors surrounding the September 13 WIRe, discussed in detail above, raise 

major analytic tradecraft issues that require serious examination 

but are beyond the purview of this Committee. 


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1Out of security and privacy concerns, the Committee has not used the names of certain executive employees, and has, instead, used the person’s title or some other descriptor to identify 

the person. For example, given security concerns facing Diplomatic Security agents who serve 

around the world—often in dangerous places—the Committee assigned numbers to these agents. 

Throughout the report, and in this appendix, the Committee listed the person’s title or position 

held during the relevant time period. 

APPENDIX I: 

Witnesses Interviewed by the Committee 

State Department Officials 

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENTS 

Of the more than 50 agents who served temporary assignments 

of approximately 30–45 days in Benghazi, 19 were interviewed.1 Of 

this 19, four were agents who survived the attacks on September 

11, 2012, and who had not been previously interviewed by any committee of Congress. The fifth survivor had been interviewed previously by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 

The five agents from Diplomatic Security who were in Benghazi 

on the night of the attacks deserve the enduring gratitude of all 

Americans for their heroic efforts on the night of the attacks. The 

Committee commends their dedication to their country, the selflessness shown to their colleagues, and the bravery and astuteness 

they demonstrated during the attacks. 

Fifteen other agents interviewed by the Select Committee served 

in Benghazi between April 2011 and September 2012. Each agent 

served at different times and therefore was able to provide the 

Committee with insight on the continuing spectrum of security 

challenges faced in Benghazi during the 18 months the United 

States maintained a presence. The Committee notes that these 

agents, as well as those not interviewed, served in Benghazi under 

difficult circumstances. Their ability to protect U.S. government 

personnel under such circumstances is a testament to the commitment each has to this country and to their colleagues. They all deserve our thanks. 

Apart from those who served in Benghazi, the Committee interviewed other agents and employees of the Diplomatic Security 

Service. One agent was in the Diplomatic Security Command Center on the day of the attacks. Another agent coordinated staffing 

assignments for Benghazi, among other things. The Committee 

interviewed the former Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs who was involved in staffing the Benghazi Mission. The Committee also interviewed two persons who dealt with 

the physical security of the facilities, one was a physical security 


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specialist and the other was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Countermeasures in 2011–2012. 

Attack Survivors 

Diplomatic Security Agent #3—Interviewed by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on October 8, 2013: 

The fifth agent present in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. This 

Special Agent joined Diplomatic Security in 2009 and his first permanent or long-term overseas assignment was as an Assistant Regional Security Officer to Embassy Tripoli. He arrived in Tripoli in 

June 2012 and on August 30, 2012, was sent to Benghazi to be the 

head agent, or Acting Regional Security Officer. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #1—March 6, 2015: Joined Diplomatic Security as a Special Agent in 2011 after eight years in the 

U.S. military, where he specialized in explosives disposal. Arrived 

in Tripoli in mid-August 2012 for a 60 day assignment. Traveled 

with Stevens and another agent to Benghazi on September 10, 

2012. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #4—March 16, 2015: Joined Diplomatic Security as a Special Agent in 2010 after serving approximately five years in the Army. He arrived in Benghazi in early to 

mid-August for a temporary assignment. He was on the roof at the 

Annex as the attacks continued and was severely injured by mortar 

fire. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #2—March 19, 2015: Joined Diplomatic Security as a Special Agent in 2011 following seven-and-ahalf years in the Army. Arrived in Tripoli in early August for a 

temporary assignment. Traveled with the Ambassador and another 

agent to Benghazi on September 10, 2012. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #5—April 1, 2015: Joined Diplomatic 

Security as a Special Agent in 2011 following five years with the 

Navy, where he specialized in search and rescue operations. Arrived in Benghazi in early August for a temporary assignment. Secured the Ambassador and Sean Smith in the makeshift safe haven 

when the attacks began. 

Other Agents Assigned in Benghazi 

Diplomatic Security Agent #6—February 10, 2015: Headed the 

protective detail for Stevens when Stevens first went into Benghazi 

in April 2011. The agent met up with Stevens in Europe in midMarch and then traveled to Benghazi in early April and remained 

there until early May 2011. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #9—February 12, 2015: Along with 

another agent, was sent to join the initial protective detail approximately two weeks after Stevens and his team arrived in Benghazi, 

bringing the number of agents in Stevens’s protective detail up to 

10. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #27—February 19, 2015: Was the 

second agent sent to join the initial protective detail approximately 

two weeks after Stevens team arrived in Benghazi, bringing the 

number of agents in Steven’s protective detail up to 10. 


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Diplomatic Security Agent #18—February 24, 2015: Joined Diplomatic Security in 1999 following ten years of prior military service. This agent was sent to Benghazi in late October 2011 for approximately 55 days to be the lead security agent. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #7—February 26, 2015: A Special 

Agent since 1986, and in 2011 was the Director of the State Department’s specialized tactical unit in Diplomatic Security, known 

as Mobile Security Deployment. This agent went to Benghazi in 

early May 2011 to take over as head of Stevens’ protective detail, 

replacing the initial agent-in-charge. He was in Benghazi when the 

initial search for a State Department diplomatic and housing compound began. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #15—March 12, 2015: Joined Diplomatic Security in 2001 and went to Benghazi in early January 

2012 until mid-February. This agent was in Benghazi for the first 

anniversary of the revolution. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #22—March 24, 2015: A Special 

Agent since 2012, he was in Benghazi from late May through the 

end of July 2012. He was present for the second attack against the 

compound wall, the attack against the British Ambassador, and the 

Libyan elections. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #10—April 2, 2015: A Special Agent 

since 2009, this agent went to Benghazi for six weeks from late November 2011 through the end of the year. Before he left, there was 

a real concern that no agents would be in Benghazi in early January. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #12—April 9, 2015: A Special Agent 

since 2006 following service in the Marine Corps. This agent was 

temporarily assigned in Benghazi from early February through 

March 2012. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #16—April 13, 2015: Joined the Diplomatic Security Service in 2011 following both service in the Marine Corp and as a Special Agent with other federal law enforcement agencies. This agent was temporarily assigned to Benghazi 

from early March through mid-April 2012. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #8—April 15, 2015: Special Agent 

with the Diplomatic Security who was in Benghazi from the end of 

July 2012 to the end of August 2012 as the Acting Regional Security Officer or lead agent. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #21—May 19, 2015: A Special Agent 

with Diplomatic Security since 2003, was permanently assigned to 

Tripoli in summer 2012. In August 2012, he covered Benghazi for 

a short period of time and was back in Tripoli on the night of the 

attack. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #13—May 21, 2015: A Special Agent 

since 1999 with former Marine Security Guard experience, was 

temporarily assigned to Benghazi from mid-September 2011 to late 

October. Initially he had 10 agents in his detail to protect Stevens 

and his staff. 


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Diplomatic Security Agent #17—August 21, 2015: A Special 

Agent since 1997, she was assigned to Benghazi as the lead agent 

from early April to the end of May 2012. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #29—April 28, 2016: This agent was 

part of the initial eight-member protective detail for Stevens, arriving in Benghazi on April 5, 2011. 

Headquarter Special Agents 

Lamb, Charlene—January 7, 2016: Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for International Programs, Diplomatic Security. The International 

Programs section manages programs and policies that protect the 

Department of State’s missions and personnel overseas. 

Smith, Gentry—February 25, 2016: Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Countermeasures, Diplomatic Security. The Countermeasures 

section is responsible for all the physical and technical security requirements for all U.S. diplomatic missions, both domestic and 

overseas, as well as manages the diplomatic courier operations for 

the State Department. 

Physical Security Specialist—April 6, 2016: A Special Agent 

with Diplomatic Security until retirement in 2001, he returned to 

Diplomatic Security as a contractor working as a physical security 

specialist with agents assigned overseas, including Libya, on implementing physical security projects. 

Diplomatic Security Agent #30—August 19, 2015: A Special 

Agent with Diplomatic Security since 2001, was assigned to the 

Diplomatic Security Command Center [DSCC] from 2011 through 

2013 as the senior watch officer. The DSCC operates around the 

clock to monitor and report threat information concerning all U.S. 

diplomatic facilities worldwide. 

PRINCIPAL OFFICERS WHO SERVED IN BENGHAZI 

Following the departure of Stevens from Benghazi in late November 2011, the State Department sent a series of Foreign Service 

officers to Benghazi to conduct outreach with the rebel leaders and 

report on the political, economic and security situation in the eastern portion of Libya. The Committee interviewed four of the six individuals who served as the ‘‘Principal Officer’’ in Benghazi. Three 

who served the longest periods of time, ranging from 60–100 days, 

were interviewed. The fourth interviewed was in Benghazi for 13 

days in early September 2012, and returned to Tripoli before the 

attacks. 

Principal Officer #1—March 3, 2015: A Foreign Service officer 

since 1998, who was temporarily assigned to Benghazi from November 2011 to February 2012. Principal Officer #1 was the first 

principal officer assigned following the departure of Stevens from 

Benghazi. 

Principal Officer #2—March 13, 2015: A Foreign Service officer 

since 2003 who was temporarily assigned to Benghazi from early 

March to mid-June 2012. This officer was present when an explosive was detonated at the compound wall and when there was an 

assassination attempt made against the British Ambassador. At 


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times, the officer was protected by a single Diplomatic Security 

agent. 

Principal Officer #3—March 26, 2015: A Foreign Service officer 

since 1991, he temporarily served as the Principal Officer in 

Benghazi from July through August 2012. He was present for the 

Libyan elections and then witnessed and reported on the declining 

security environment in Benghazi that followed. 

Principal Officer #4—May 8, 2015: A Foreign Service officer 

since 2002, he went to Tripoli in June 2012 on a permanent assignment to be the political reporting officer. He served as the Principal 

Officer in Benghazi from September 1 through September 10, 2012, 

departing Benghazi on the morning of September 11. He returned 

to Tripoli and was present in the operations center during the attacks and following the attacks, met with the surviving agents. 

EMBASSY TRIPOLI 

Cretz, Gene—July 31, 2015: Ambassador to Libya from December 

2008 through May 2012. Returned to Washington, D.C., in December 2010 due to personal security concerns and returned to Libya 

in September 2011. 

Polaschik, Joan—August 12, 2015: Deputy Chief of Mission for 

Libya from 2009 through mid-June 2012. With the departure of 

Ambassador Cretz in December 2010, she was the highest ranking 

Foreign Service officer in Libya, known as the Charge ́ d’Affaires or 

Charge ́. 

Hicks, Gregory—April 14, 2016: Deputy Chief of Mission for 

Libya, arriving in Libya on July 31, 2012. 

‘‘MAIN STATE’’ OFFICIALS 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 

Feltman, Jeffrey—December 8, 2015: Assistant Secretary of State 

for Near Eastern Affairs from August 2009 until his retirement in 

May 2012. In February 2008, he was appointed the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and 

as of December 2008, served concurrently as Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau. 

Maxwell, Raymond—March 8, 2016: Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Office of the Maghreb Affairs. 

The Maghreb Affairs Office, known as NEA/MAG, covers foreign 

policy issues for the North Africa countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. 

Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau—December 17, 2015: A Foreign Service officer since 

1999, served as the Deputy Director for the Office of Maghreb Affairs within the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, known as NEA/ 

MAG, from 2011 to 2013. NEA/MAG was responsible for oversight 

and coordination of diplomatic activities of the U.S. Government 

within the countries in the region. 

Senior Libyan Desk Officer, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Near 

Eastern Affairs Bureau—November 18, 2015: A career Foreign 


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Service officer, served as the Senior Libya Desk officer in the Office 

of the Maghreb Affairs within the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, 

known as NEA/MAG, from 2011 to 2014. NEA/MAG was responsible for diplomatic policy issues arising in the North Africa countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. 

Spokesperson, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau—October 9, 2015: 

A career Foreign Service officer who served as the spokesperson for 

the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau from 2011 to 2013. 

Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Near Eastern 

Affairs Bureau—July 29, 2015: A career Foreign Service officer 

who, in 2012, served as deputy spokesperson for the Near Eastern 

Affairs Bureau and then transitioned in the Bureau to be the Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications. 

Post Management Officer for Libya—July 23, 2015: From 2010 

through June 2012, was the Post Management Officer or logistical 

officer for Libya within the Executive Office in the Near Eastern 

Affairs Bureau, known as NEA/SCA/EX. From 2011 through June 

2012, this officer focused nearly exclusively on Libya matters. The 

Post Management Officer reports to the Executive Director or ‘‘EX’’ 

who is charged with overseeing all administrative and management 

activities for the bureau and for Foreign Service posts in the region 

and develops and executes programs for the bureau in support of 

substantive policy decisions. 

U.S. Mission to the United Nations 

DiCarlo, Rosemary—August 11, 2015: From 2008 until retirement in September 2014, held various positions for the State Department at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. The U.S. Mission to the United Nations [USUN] serves as the United States’ 

delegation to the United Nations. At the time of the Benghazi attack, was the Deputy Permanent Representative (to Susan Rice), 

then the Permanent Representative to the USUN. 

Ryu, Rexon—August 25, 2015: Deputy to the U.S. Ambassador to 

the United Nations, Susan Rice, and directed the Ambassador’s 

Washington office at the State Department. 

Pelton, Erin—February 11, 2016: At the time of the Benghazi attacks, was the communications director and spokesperson for the 

U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, where she 

had been in that position less than two months. Immediately prior 

to this position, was director of communications and assistant press 

secretary for the National Security Council at the White House. 

Speechwriters 

Dan Schwerin—October 9, 2015: Speechwriter for the Secretary 

of State between 2009 and early 2013. 

Megan Rooney—October 9, 2015: Speechwriter for the Secretary 

of State between 2009 and early 2013. 


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Records Management 

Agency Records Officer—June 30, 2015: At the time of the interview was the Division Chief of the Records and Archives Management Division and was the designated agency records officer for the 

Department of State. 

Director, Information Resource Management, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Secretary—June 30, 2015: Until his retirement in November 2012, was the Director of the Office of Information Resource Management within the Office of the Secretary’s 

Executive Secretariat, where he oversaw the information technology division exclusively used by the Office of the Secretary and 

senior leaders within the State Department. 

Pagliano, Bryan—September 5, 2015: From May 2009 to February 2013, was a special advisor within the information technology section known as the Information Resource Management 

Bureau for bureaus and offices other than the Office of the Secretary. He continued to work as a contractor for the State Department until March 2016. 

CONTRACTORS 

Sterling Contractor #1—February 26, 2016: Worked for Sterling 

International (now Sterling Global Operations) in Libya on a weapons removal and abatement program for the State Department. 

Was in Benghazi on the night of the attacks. 

Sterling Contractor #2—March 31, 2016: Worked for Sterling 

International (now Sterling Global Operations) in Libya on a weapons removal and abatement program for the State Department. 

Was in Benghazi on the night of the attacks. 

Locally Employed Staff—March 22, 2016: Was a contract employee in Benghazi, Libya for the State Department. 

OTHER 

Contracting Official—August 27, 2015: A procurement and contracting specialist at the State Department, who in May 2012 

began supporting Diplomatic Services and local guard programs. 

This official was involved in management of the contract with Blue 

Mountain Group for local guard service in Benghazi. 

Managing Director, Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation—March 4, 2016: Since 1997, has been with 

the Office of Management, Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation, an 

office that works directly for the Under Secretary for Management. 

Since 1999, has been assigned the duty of managing the Accountability Review Board [ARB] process. This official has worked on 11 

ARBs, including the Benghazi ARB. 

SENIOR LEADERS 

Mills, Cheryl—September 3, 2015: Chief of Staff and Counselor to 

the Secretary of State from May 2009 until February 2013. 

Sullivan, Jacob—September 4, 2015: Served as Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Policy for the Secretary of State beginning in January 


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2009 and also served as the Director of Policy Planning beginning 

in February 2011. He left the State Department and both positions 

in February 2013. 

Abedin, Huma—October 16, 2015: Served as Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Operations for the Secretary of State from January 2009 

through February 2013. 

Nides, Thomas—December 16, 2015: Joined the State Department 

in January 2011 to serve as the Deputy Secretary for Management 

and Resources, a position he held until February 2013. Similar to 

a chief operating officer, the Deputy Secretary for Management and 

Resources has overall responsibility for resource allocation and 

management activities at the State Department. 

Rice, Susan—February 2, 2016: From January 2009 until July 

2013, served as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 

Nations and a member of the President’s Cabinet. The U.S. Mission 

to the United Nations serves as the United States’ delegation to 

the United Nations. 

Kennedy, Patrick—February 3, 2016: Has been the Under Secretary for Management since 2007 and has been a career Foreign 

Service officer since 1973. The Under Secretary for Management is 

responsible for finances, budgets and contracting, resources (both 

personnel and facilities), logistics, and security for Department of 

State overseas and domestic operations. 

OTHER COMMITTEES’ ACTIVITIES 

The Select Committee also had available transcripts of hearings, 

briefings, and interviews from other committees, including interview transcripts from: 

Bacigalupo, James—Regional Director, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

Boswell, Eric—Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security 

Bultrowicz, Scott—Director, Diplomatic Security Service and Principal Deputy Secretary of State for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

Dibble, Elizabeth—Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs 

Diplomatic Security Agent #3—Special Agent, Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Regional Security Officer in Benghazi, Libya 

Diplomatic Security Agent #19—Special Agent, Bureau of Diplomatic Security who served temporarily in Benghazi 

Diplomatic Security Agent #23—Special Agent, Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Regional Security Officer in Tripoli, Libya on 

the night of the attacks 

Diplomatic Security Agent #24—Special Agent, Bureau of Diplomatic Security and former Regional Security Officer in Tripoli, 

Libya 


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Diplomatic Security Agent #25—Special Agent, Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Libya Desk Officer, International Programs, 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

Hicks, Gregory—former Deputy Chief of Mission, Libya 

Jones, Elizabeth—Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs 

Lamb, Charlene—Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

Lohman, Lee—Executive Director, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 

Maxwell, Raymond—Deputy Assistant Secretary for Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 

Mullen, Michael (Adm.)—Vice Chairman, Benghazi Accountability 

Review Board 

Nuland, Victoria—Spokesperson, Department of State 

Pickering, Thomas—Chairman, Benghazi Accountability Review 

Board 

Roebuck, William—Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs 

Special Assistant to Under Secretary Patrick Kennedy 

Sullivan, Jacob—Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Director, Office of Policy Planning 

Intelligence Community Officials 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY—to be inserted following classification review 

Headquarters 

Petraeus, David—January 6, 2016, and March 19, 2016: Director 

of the Central Intelligence Agency from September 2011 to November 2012. At the time of the attacks, the CIA had personnel in 

Benghazi and Tripoli. The CIA’s Annex facility in Benghazi was attacked on September 11–12, 2012, following the attack on the State 

Department facility. 

Morell, Michael—September 28, 2015: Joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1980 and was its Deputy Director from May 2010 

to August 2013. At the time of the attacks, the CIA had personnel 

in Benghazi and Tripoli. The CIA’s Annex facility in Benghazi was 

attacked on September 11–12, 2012, following the attack on the 

State Department facility. Deputy Director Morell edited the highly 

criticized talking points that were developed after the attacks. 

Director, Office of Terrorism Analysis—November 13, 2015: 

The Office of Terrorism Analysis, part of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, develops and disseminates analytical pieces regarding known and suspected terrorist acts and actors. OTA developed and disseminated analytical reports immediately after the 

Benghazi attacks. 


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Chief of Operations, Near East Division—December 10, 2015: 

Head of the CIA’s headquarter coordination and support office for 

operations in the Middle East and Africa, which included Libya. 

Team Chief, Office of Terrorism Analysis—February 10, 2016: 

Leader of the team that produced analytical pieces. Was involved 

in the Benghazi post-attack analytical reporting. 

Benghazi 

GRS #1—May 22, 2015: A member of the Global Response Staff 

[GRS] who responded to the State Department facility when it was 

attacked and was present when the Annex facility was attacked. 

GRS #2—May 27, 2015: A member of the GRS who was present 

when the Annex facility was attacked. 

GRS #3—May 29, 2015: A member of the GRS who responded to 

the State Department facility when it was attacked and was 

present when the Annex facility was attacked. 

GRS #4—March 1, 2016: A member of the GRS who responded to 

the State Department facility when it was attacked and was 

present when the Annex facility was attacked. 

GRS #5—May 24, 2016: A member of the GRS who responded to 

the State Department facility when it was attacked and was 

present when the Annex facility was attacked. 

GRS-Team Lead—April 19, 2016: The leader of the Benghazi 

Global Response Staff [GRS] who responded to the State Department facility when it was attacked and was present when the 

Annex facility was attacked. 

Chief of Base—November 19, 2015: The head of the U.S.-based intelligence group at Benghazi Base who was present for the attacks 

on September 11–12, 2012. 

Deputy Chief of Base—June 4, 2015: The second-in-command of 

the U.S.-based intelligence group at Benghazi Base and was 

present for the attacks on September 11–12, 2012. 

Officer A—March 2, 2016: Part of the U.S.-based intelligence 

group at Benghazi Base and was present for the attacks on September 11–12, 2012. 

Officer B—April 23, 2015: Part of the U.S.-based intelligence 

group at Benghazi Base but who had traveled from Benghazi on 

the morning of September 11, 2012. 

Officer C—June 19, 2015: Part of the U.S.-based intelligence 

group at Benghazi Base and was present for the attacks on September 11–12, 2012. 

Tripoli 

GRS Tripoli—June 23, 2015: A member of the Tripoli-based Global Response Staff (GRS) who became part of Team Tripoli and responded to Benghazi when the State Department facility attacked 

and was present when the Annex Base in Benghazi was attacked. 


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Chief of Station—July 16, 2015: A Chief of Station is the lead 

CIA official stationed in a foreign country and is responsible for the 

U.S.-based intelligence group. 

Other 

CIA Official—June 2, 2015: In September 2012, this official was 

serving in Europe on the night of the attacks and played a role in 

responding to the attacks. 

The Select Committee also had available to review information 

from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence including transcripts of hearings, briefings, and interviews of agency 

heads, senior officials and other individuals from the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, National Counterterrorism Center, Department of State, Department 

of Defense, National Security Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Olsen, Matthew—February 16, 2016: Director of the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) from August 2011 through July 

2014. A part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 

NCTC oversees analysts from other federal agencies, including the 

CIA, the FBI, and the Department of Defense to collect, analyze 

and disseminate counterterrorism threat information and intelligence. 

ODNI Analyst—April 29, 2016: Was involved in the production of 

the first analytical piece generated in the wake of the Benghazi attacks. 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Flynn, Michael (Lt. Gen)—September 29, 2015: Served as the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency at the time of the attack. 

Provided information on the intelligence picture before and after 

the attack. 

Tripoli Analyst—November 10, 2015: An analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency who was assigned in Tripoli and present 

in Tripoli during the attacks and was involved in intelligence collection and reporting in Libya. 

Department of Defense 

Panetta, Leon—January 8, 2016: Served as the Secretary of Defense at the time of the attacks. He provided information on the 

President’s direction to him, which forces he ordered to deploy, and 

when he gave the order to deploy those forces. 

Bash, Jeremy—January 13, 2016: Served as Chief of Staff to the 

Secretary of Defense and was a liaison between the Defense Department and the State Department. He provided information 

about which forces were identified to be deployed on the night of 

the attack. He also participated in a meeting with the White House 

and the State Department on the evening of September 11. 


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Breedlove, Philip M. (Gen.)—April 7, 2016: Served as the Commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe at the time of 

the attacks. He provided information regarding the available transport aircraft on the night of the attack, when those aircraft were 

ordered to deploy, and when those aircraft deployed. 

Ham, Carter (Gen.)—June 8, 2016: Served as Commander for 

Military Operations United States Africa Command [AFRICOM] at 

the time of the attacks. He provided insight into the decisions 

made at the Pentagon and AFRICOM regarding the attacks. 

Kelly, John (Gen.)—March 23, 2016: At the time of the attacks, 

served as the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. 

Provided information regarding meetings and decisions made at 

the Pentagon in response to the attack. 

Landolt, Richard B. (Rear Adm.)—May 5, 2016: Served as Director of Operations and Cyber, United States Africa Command 

(AFRICOM) at the time of the attacks. He provided information regarding meetings and decisions made at AFRICOM. 

Leidig, Jr., Charles J. (Vice Adm.)—April 22, 2016: At the time 

of the attacks, served as Deputy Commander for Military Operations United States Africa Command [AFRICOM]. He provided information regarding meetings and decisions made at AFRICOM. 

Losey, Brian (Rear Adm.)—June 16, 2016: Served as Commander, Special Operations Command-Africa in September 2012. 

He provided information regarding meetings and decisions made at 

SOC-AF. 

Miller, James (Ph.D.)—May 10, 2016: At the time of the attacks, 

served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, a principal advisor 

to the Secretary of Defense on matters of national security and defense policy. 

Mordente, Patrick (Gen.)—April 28, 2016: Served as Deputy Director of Operations and Plans at TRANSCOM in September 2012. 

He provided information regarding the C-17 aircraft that evacuated 

the wounded and deceased from Tripoli. 

Repass, Michael S. (Maj. Gen.)—April 15, 2016: Served as the 

Commander of Special Operations Command Europe at the time of 

the attack. He provided information regarding when the Commander’s in-Extremis Force [CIF] was ordered to deploy, when it 

deployed, and any delays in deploying the CIF. 

Tidd, Kurt (Adm.)—April 4, 2016: Served as the Director of Operations (J3) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Provided information regarding when the forces were ordered to deploy, who set the Nhour for those forces, and any issues he was made aware of regarding those forces deploying. N-hour specifies a time that commences 

formal notification to a rapid response unit and requires deployment within a specified time. 

Winnefeld, Jr., James (Adm.)—March 3, 2016: Served as the 

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the attack. 

He provided information regarding the Pentagon’s response to the 

attack. 


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CIF Commander—August 26, 2015: The Commander’s inExtremis Force [CIF] is at a Combatant Commander’s disposal for 

rapid deployment. The CIF Commander provided information about 

when his team received their orders, when they were ready to deploy, and when they left Croatia for Libya. 

C-17 Pilot—March 16, 2016: Piloted the C-17 aircraft that was deployed from Ramstein Airbase to Tripoli, Libya to evacuate US personnel. He provided information regarding when he received his orders, and when he deployed. 

Defense Attache ́—June 17, 2016: Served as Defense Attache ́, U.S. 

Embassy Tripoli, Libya, in September 2012. 

Drone Pilot #1—May 25, 2016: This remotely piloted aircraft pilot 

operated a remotely piloted aircraft, commonly known as a drone, 

over Benghazi during the attacks. 

Drone Pilot #2—May 25, 2016: This remotely piloted aircraft pilot 

operated a remotely piloted aircraft, commonly known as a drone, 

over Benghazi during the attacks. 

FAST Commander—September 2, 2015: The Marine Corps’ Fleet 

Antiterrorism Security Team [FAST] is a special operations team 

on standby to respond to US government interests and to temporarily augment existing security. The FAST Commander was in 

charge of the FAST Team ordered to deploy to Tripoli. He provided 

information about when his team received their orders, when they 

were ready to deploy, and when they actually deployed. 

Sensor Operator #1—June 9, 2016: Operated the sensor controls 

on a remotely piloted aircraft, commonly known as a drone, flown 

over Benghazi during the attacks. 

Sensor Operator #2—June 9, 2016: Operated the sensor controls 

on a remotely piloted aircraft, commonly known as a drone, flown 

over Benghazi during the attacks. 

DOD Special Operator—September 22, 2015: One of two Special 

Forces operators who responded as part of Team Tripoli to 

Benghazi as the attacks occurred and were present at the Benghazi 

Base when the mortar attacks occurred. 

The Select Committee also had available to it transcripts of hearings, briefings, and interviews from other committees, including 

interview transcripts from: 

Ham, Carter (Gen.)—Commander for Military Operations, United 

States Africa Command [AFRICOM] 

Landolt, Richard B. (Rear Adm.)—Director of Operations and 

Cyber, AFRICOM 

Leidig, Jr, Charles J. (Vice Adm.)—former Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations, AFRICOM 

Losey, Brian (Rear Adm.)—former Commander, Special Operations 

Command—Africa [SOCAFRICA] 

Tidd, Kurt (Vice Adm.)—Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff 


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Zobrist, Scott (Brig. Gen.)—Wing Commander, 31st Fighter Wing, 

Aviano Air Base, Italy 

White House 

Fishman, Benjamin—January 12, 2016: A staff member of the 

National Security Council who, beginning in April 2011, handled 

Libya matters and who continuously coordinated with the State 

Department, including Envoy/Ambassador Stevens, and other executive branch agencies regarding Libya. 

Meehan, Bernadette—December 18, 2015: Deputy Spokesperson 

for the National Security Council (NSC) at the White House at the 

time of the attack. A Foreign Service Officer with the State Department since 2004, was detailed, meaning on loan to, the National 

Security Council (NSC) as of July 2012. 

Rhodes, Benjamin—February 2, 2016: Assistant to the President 

and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Speechwriting. 

Other 

Blumenthal, Sidney—June 16, 2015: Longtime friend and confidant of Hillary R. Clinton. Blumenthal sent her numerous ‘‘intelligence reports’’ and other advice on Libya. 

Chorin, Ethan—March 10, 2016: Co-director of a non-profit organization that envisioned building relationships between U.S. medical centers and Benghazi medical centers who was in Benghazi at 

the time of the attack. He was to meet with Ambassador Stevens 

on September 12, 2012. He is also a former State Department Foreign Service Officer who had been assigned to Libya in 2004–2006 

and is an author on books and articles on Libya. 


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APPENDIX J: 

Requests and Subpoenas for Documents 

State Department 

September 20, 2012—Letter from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [OGR] to Hillary R. Clinton, Secretary of State, requesting seven categories of documents pertaining to the Benghazi attacks: 1) Benghazi security situation; 2) 

threat assessment for US personnel; 3) preliminary attack site exploitation; 4) pre-attack warnings; 5) evidence supporting or contradicting Rice statement blaming video; 6) evidence supporting or 

contradicting Magariaf’s statement that attacks were premeditated; 

7) attack information. 

The State Department provided OGR eight batches of documents 

totaling 25,000 pages on a ‘‘read and return’’ basis. OGR was allowed to review the documents, but custody and control of the documents, which were returned to the Department at the end of each 

day, was retained by the Department. 

December 13, 2012—Letter from OGR to the Secretary requesting 

information on, among other things, whether the Secretary used 

personal email for official business. 

The State Department’s written response on March 27, 2013, did 

respond to the question regarding the Secretary’s use of personal 

email for official business. 

August 1, 2013—Subpoena from OGR to State Department for 

records previously produced on a ‘read and return’’ basis. The subpoena required copies of these documents previously provided on a 

‘‘read and return’’ basis. 

The State Department produced 25,000 pages of heavily redacted 

documents to OGR, with the last installment being produced on 

April 17, 2014. 

August 11, 2014—Letter from the State Department to the Committee accompanying the production of approximately 15,000 pages 

of documents never before produced to Congress. This production 

included eight emails sent to or from ‘‘H’’ or HDR22@ 

clintonemail.com. This production also excluded documents involving purported ‘‘institutional interests.’’ 


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According to the State Department, this production fulfilled compliance with OGR’s September 20, 2012, request and OGR’s August 

1, 2013, subpoena for ‘‘reading room’’ records. However, as the 

Committee later determined, responsive records of senior leaders 

were not included in any production, revealing notable gaps in the 

records of the Secretary of State and other senior leaders. 

September 30, 2014—Letter to the State Department formalizing 

prior informal requests for lesser redacted versions of documents 

provided to OGR only on a ‘‘read and return’’ basis. The letter also 

requests production of any Administrative Review Board [ARB] 

documents requested by Congress. 

November 18, 2014—Letter to the State Department requiring 

production of the records of the Secretary and ten senior leaders. 

The specific request was for ‘‘any and all documents and communications referring or relating to policies, decisions, or activities regarding: (1) security of the United States facility in Benghazi that 

was attacked on 9.11.2012 (the ‘‘Special Mission’’); (2) the State Department’s decision to open or maintain the Special Mission; (3) the 

attacks on the Special Mission on 9.11.2012; or (4) weapons located 

or found in, imported or brought into, and/or exported or removed 

from Libya, authored by, sent to, or received by [one of the named 

individuals].’’ 

The State Department produced only 847 pages of the former Secretary of State’s emails and other documents before subpoenas 

were issued on March 4, 2015, commanding production of these 

records. Following the issuance of the subpoena, additional records 

were produced. In all, the Committee received just over 42,000 

pages of documents to and from the Secretary of State and senior 

leaders. However, not all records were produced. 

November 24, 2014—Letter from the State Department accompanying the production of the first set of less-redacted ‘‘reading 

room’’ documents. 

December 2, 2014—Letter to David Kendall, attorney for the Secretary, requesting production of official documents in her custody. 

In response, on December 29, 2014, Kendall informed the Committee that the Secretary returned records to the State Department 

and the State Department would be providing any relevant records 

to the Committee. The Secretary produced no records to the Committee. 

December 4, 2014—Letter to the State Department requesting 

interviews of four agents who survived the attacks in Benghazi and 

who have not been previously interviewed by a congressional committee. 

It took the State Department until March-April 2015 to schedule 

interviews for these agents. 


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December 4, 2014—Letter to the State Department requesting 

interviews of 18 agents and four principal officers who served in 

Benghazi before the attacks. 

The State Department did not begin to schedule interviews until 

February 2015. 

December 9, 2014—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of the second and final set of less-redacted 

‘‘reading room’’ documents previously reviewed by the OGR. 

The total of the two productions was approximately 25,000 pages 

of documents. 

December 17, 2014—Letter from the State Department acknowledging receipt of document and interview requests and requesting 

that the Committee prioritize its requests. 

December 29, 2014—Letter from the Secretary (via attorney) stating the State Department, not the Secretary, will comply with 

Committee’s December 2, 2014, request for any official records personally retained by the Secretary. 

January 28, 2015—Subpoena for ARB documents with cover letter. Note: The Committee subpoena was identical to an OGR subpoena previously issued on August 1, 2013. 

The request was fulfilled according to the State Department by production of documents on April 15 and 24, 2015, of approximately 

4,300 pages. However, the Committee sent a letter to the State Department on June 12, 2015, regarding various missing documents. 

A missing four-page interview report was subsequently delivered 

on February 25, 2016. The State Department previously claimed 

the ARB had reviewed over 7000 documents totaling thousands of 

pages. 

February 13, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying the production of 895 pages of emails and documents, including approximately 847 pages of emails to and from the former 

Secretary of State; approximately four pages relating to the January 28, 2015, subpoena, and approximately 43 pages of documents 

omitted from previous productions. 

March 3, 2015—Letters sent from the Committee to registrar of 

domain name and internet service provider used by the Secretary 

ordering the preservation of relevant records. 

March 4, 2015—Subpoena from the Committee to the State Department for records of ten senior officials for documents referring 

or relating to: (1) Libya; (2) Libyan weapons programs; (3) 

Benghazi attacks; (4) post-attack statements for years 2011–2012. 

The State Department produced records of senior leaders, however, 

the production did not include records for all ten senior leaders 


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named in the subpoena and the prior request. Moreover, the productions covered only discrete time frames, not the two-year time 

period called for by the requests. Additionally, the State Department affirmatively stated it was withholding relevant documents 

that pertained to ‘‘executive interests.’’ 

Approximately 39,875 documents were produced on these dates: 

May 22, 2015 

June 30, 2015 

July 28, 2015 

Aug. 21, 2015 

Aug. 28, 2015 

Sept. 3, 2015 

Sept. 18 2015 

Oct. 5, 2015 

Oct. 9, 2015 

Oct. 15 2015 

Nov. 6, 2015 

Nov. 24, 2015 

Dec. 31, 2015 

Jan. 21, 2016 

Feb. 26, 2016 

April 8, 2016 

1,199 pages 

3,636 pages 

8,254 pages 

7,452 pages 

4,703 pages 

110 pages 

1,090 pages 

193 pages 

3,456 pages 

122 pages 

812 pages 

2,789 pages 

2,448 pages 

886 pages 

1,650 pages 

1,075 pages 

March 4, 2015—Subpoena from the Committee to the Secretary 

(via her personal attorney) for documents referring or relating to: 

(1) Libya; (2) Libyan weapons programs; (3) Benghazi attacks; (4) 

post-attack statements for years 2011–2012. 

Notwithstanding the State Department’s claim that it had produced all relevant records and ‘‘erred on side of inclusion’’ when it 

produced 847 pages of records on February 13, 2015, additional 

productions of official records of the former Secretary of State were 

produced by the State Department: 

June 10, 2015 

June 25, 2015 

Sept. 25, 2015 

1 page 

105 pages 

1,899 pages 

March 26, 2015—Letter to the State Department reiterating demand for ARB documents; reiterating demand for records of senior 

leaders; and outlining State Department’s hindrance of Committee’s efforts to obtain additional information and answers to basic 

questions on records management. A briefing on records management is requested within two weeks. 

March 27, 2015—Letter from the Secretary’s attorney regarding 

purported inability to comply with subpoena. Enclosed was a letter 

from Under Secretary for Management Patrick Kennedy sent on 

March 23, 2015, to the Secretary affirming any official records belong to the State Department. Letter also contains a disclosure that 

all information during the requested time period on the Secretary’s 

server had been deleted. 


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April 15, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying 

the first production of ARB records consisting of approximately 

1758 pages of documents. 

This production was in response to January 28, 2015, subpoena 

from the Committee and its predecessor subpoena issued by the 

House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on August 1, 

2013. 

April 24, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying 

production of a second set of ARB records consisting of approximately 2,523 pages. The letter explains that, in the view of the 

State Department, this completes compliance with ARB subpoena(s). 

The two productions of documents totaling just over 4,300 pages 

conflicts with a letter from the State Department to the House 

Oversight and Government Reform Committee stating that the 

ARB reviewed over 7000 documents totaling thousands of pages. 

Upon review of the documents provided to the Committee, a letter 

was sent June 12, 2015, outlining missing documents and requesting additional productions. However, only one missing interview 

summary consisting of four pages was produced ten months later 

on February 25, 2016. 

May 11, 2015—Letter from the Committee to the State Department requesting interviews with head of information technology for 

the Executive Secretariat during 2011–2012 and with the Agency 

Records Officer within next ten days. 

These two interviews were ultimately conducted on June 30, 2015, 

more than a month later. 

May 14, 2015—Letter to the State Department that the Department’s lack of production of relevant documents is the reason the 

Committee will be unable to interview the Secretary in a timely 

manner. 

May 15, 2015—Letter from the State Department in response to 

the Committee’s May 14, 2015, letter, detailing compliance to date 

and incorrectly asserts that the Committee narrowed the subpoena’s demand. 

May 19, 2015—Letter to Sidney Blumenthal requesting records regarding Libya and the State Department from September 11–30, 

2012. 

Superseded by the Committee request on May 29, 2015, for a larger time frame. 

May 19, 2015—Letters to Cheryl Mills, Jacob Sullivan, Philippe 

Reines, Susan Rice, Huma Abedin (via her attorney) & Caitlin 

Klevorick for records related to Libya and the State Department 

from September 11–30, 2012. 


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Superseded by the Committee request on May 29, 2015, for larger 

time frame. 

For the initial limited time frame, on July 2, 2015, Cheryl Mills 

produced 30 pages and Jacob Sullivan produced 38 pages to the 

State Department for review by the State Department before production to the Committee. 

May 22, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying 

production of approximately 1,199 pages of Cheryl Mills emails and 

documents. 

May 29, 2015—Supplemental letter to Sidney Blumenthal via his 

attorney for records sent to the executive branch from 2011 to 

2012. 

On June 12, 2015, 179 pages of documents were produced to the 

Committee. 

June 1, 2015—Supplemental letter to Huma Abedin via attorney 

for records from 2011 to 2012. 

On July 9, 2015, Huma Abedin via her attorney notifies the Committee that 338 pages were sent by Abedin to the State Department for further review and for compliance with the requests of the 

Committee. 

June 2, 2015—Committee Member meeting with Jon Finer, Chief 

of Staff, State Department to discuss lack of document production 

by the State Department. Additional request made of the State Department for all emails/records of Ambassador Stevens for 2011– 

2012 as well as for emails of Sean Smith. 

Ambassador Stevens records were produced on the dates listed 

below in the approximate number of pages listed below: 

Oct. 5, 2015 

Oct. 9, 2015 

Oct. 16, 2015 

Oct. 20, 2015 

Oct. 21, 2015 

Nov. 6, 2015 

Nov. 24, 2015 

1,370 pages 

1,828 pages 

2,587 pages 

1,296 pages 

866 pages 

344 pages 

647 pages ——————————————— 

Total pages: 8,939 

By agreement, a select portion of Sean Smith records were reviewed and approximately 175 pages were produced on April 8, 

2016. 

June 4, 2015—Letter to the State Department confirming an 

agreement reached that the State Department would substantially 

comply with outstanding requests. Substantial compliance defined 

as completion of the first phase of production of senior leader 

records within 30 days. 


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June 9, 2015—Supplemental letters sent to Cheryl Mills, Jacob 

Sullivan, Philippe Reines via attorneys to produce records related 

to Libya from 2011 and 2012. 

June 10, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying 

production of one email, initially discovered in the production of 

Cheryl Mills records but was not in the production of Secretary 

Clinton’s records. The State Department acknowledged the email 

was previously produced by the Secretary to the State Department 

but omitted from prior production to the Committee. 

June 12, 2015—Sidney Blumenthal via his attorney produces approximately 179 pages of email exchanges with the Secretary regarding Libya. 

Of the 81 email exchanges produced, 59 were email exchanges not 

contained in prior production of Secretary Clinton’s emails by the 

State Department in February 2015. 

June 12, 2015—Letter from the Committee to the State Department detailing documents missing from the ARB productions. The 

letter provides list of additional discrete documents needed. The 

letter further requests a privilege or Vaughn index detailing documents withheld and precise reasons for not producing relevant 

records. 

The only additional record produced was a four (4) page interview 

summary. The privilege log was never produced. 

June 19, 2015—Email from the Committee to the State Department requesting explanation and production of documents provided 

by Sidney Blumenthal that were not among documents in the State 

Department’s production on February 13, 2015, of Secretary Clinton’s records. 

State Department produced an additional 105 pages of records in 

response to this inquiry but acknowledged it was unable to locate 

15 email exchanges between the former Secretary and Mr. 

Blumenthal that Mr. Blumenthal produced to the Committee. 

June 25, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying 

production of approximately 105 additional Secretary Clinton email 

exchanges with Sidney Blumenthal regarding Libya. The letter further discloses, however, the State Department was unable to locate 

nine entire exchanges between Secretary Clinton and Sidney 

Blumenthal and was unable to locate an additional six email exchanges where significant portions were omitted. 

June 30, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying 

the production of approximately 3,636 pages of emails to and from 

Jacob Sullivan, Cheryl Mills, and Susan Rice. 


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More than half of production consisted of press clippings. The remaining substantive emails were primarily for one month time 

frame, September 11, 2012, to October 12, 2012. 

July 2, 2015—Letters from the personal attorney for Mills and 

Jacob regarding production of documents to the State Department 

for limited time period of September 11–30, 2012, recounting that 

30 pages for Mills and 38 pages for Sullivan were returned to the 

State Department. Acknowledges that a further production to be 

done by July 27, 2015, for larger time frame in the second request 

from the Committee. 

July 6, 2015—Email exchange between the Committee and the 

State Department outlining several issues: 1) request for production of letters sent by Kennedy to senior officials seeking return of 

official records retained in personal email accounts; and 2) inquiry 

as to an expected production of the first phase of documents of senior leaders. 

Response from the State Department received the next day, July 

7, 2015, summarily stating the State Department is working on all 

requests. 

No response to the request for the letters from Kennedy to senior 

leaders until a subpoena was issued on August 5, 2015, for these 

records. The records were produced on August 6, 2015. 

July 8, 2015—Letter from the Committee to the State Department 

regarding documents intentionally withheld from the Committee. 

The letter requests a privilege log or ‘‘Vaughn Index’’ outlining details of ‘‘Executive Branch confidentiality interest’’ for withheld documents from productions made on April 24, 2015, May 22, 2015, 

and June 30, 2015. 

Despite repeated assurances that summary was being prepared detailing the documents withheld and the precise reason for withholding, no summary was ever received. 

July 9, 2015—Letter from attorney for Huma Abedin regarding 

338 pages of documents pertaining to Libya produced by her to the 

State Department for further review by the State Department for 

production to the Committee. 

July 10, 2015—Letter from the Committee to the State Department seeking information regarding allegations of retaliation 

against a whistleblower. 

Letter received on October 9, 2015, in response. 

July 27, 2015—Letter from the State Department regarding a 

scheduled July 29, 2015, hearing on State Department document 

production and promising ‘‘meaningful production of several thousand pages to the Committee. 


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July 28, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying 

production of approximately 8,254 pages of documents of senior 

leaders. 

August 5, 2015—Subpoena issued to the State Department seeking the March 11, 2015, letter from Kennedy to the ten senior officials identified in the Committee’s March 4, 2015, subpoena and 

the emails submitted to the State Department as a result of the 

March 11, 2015, letter from the State Department to the senior officials. 

These items were previously requested by letter on July 6, 2015, 

but request was ignored. Production of the letter from Kennedy 

subsequently occurred on August 7, 2015, following issuance of the 

subpoena. Official records found in the personal email accounts of 

Sullivan and Mills subsequently produced to the Committee. 

August 7, 2015—Production of correspondence between Kennedy 

and former senior leaders requesting return of official records 

maintained on personal email accounts. 

August 21, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 7,452 pages of documents of 

senior leaders. 

August 28, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 4,703 pages of senior leaders 

records including a classified portion. 

September 3, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 110 pages of emails from Sullivan from his personal email account. 

September 18, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 1,090 pages of emails from 

senior leaders. 

September 22, 2015—Email to the State Department outlining 

documents needed prior to October 22, 2015, hearing. 

September 25, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 1,899 pages of emails from 

the Secretary. 

October 5, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 1,563 pages of documents, including approximately 1,370 pages of Stevens emails and approximately 193 pages of documents from senior leaders. 

October 9, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 3,456 pages, including emails 


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from the personal email accounts of Mills, Sullivan, and Abedin regarding Libya and additionally approximately 1,828 pages of Stevens emails. 

October 15, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 122 pages of Abedin emails. 

October 16, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 2,587 pages of Stevens emails. 

October 20, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 1296 pages of Stevens emails. 

October 21, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 866 pages of Stevens emails. 

November 6, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 344 pages of Stevens emails 

and approximately 812 pages of Kennedy emails. 

November 24, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 647 pages of Ambassador Stevens emails and approximately 2789 pages of Under Secretary 

Kennedy emails. 

December 31, 2015—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 2448 pages of Under Secretary Kennedy emails/documents. 

January 21, 2016—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 866 pages of Under Secretary 

Kennedy emails. 

February 25, 2016—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 4 pages consisting of one 

missing ARB interview summary. 

February 26, 2016—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately 1,640 pages of documents of 

former Secretary Clinton and emails from senior leaders, recently 

discovered from the Office of the Secretary. 

February 26, 2016—Letter from the State Department accompanying production of approximately ten pages of emails of Cheryl 

Mills previously withheld from the Committee. 

April 8, 2016—Letter from the State Department accompanying 

production of approximately 1,146 pages of documents of former 


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Secretary Clinton and emails from senior leaders, recently discovered from the Office of the Secretary. 

May 5, 2016—Letter from the State Department accompanying 

production of approximately 405 pages of documents recently discovered from the Office of the Secretary. 

Department of Defense 

April 8, 2015—Letter to the Defense Department requesting briefings on Operation Jukebox Lotus, Operation Oaken Lotus, Defense 

Department personnel’s 1208 mission in Libya, EUCOM/ 

AFRICOM’s Commander’s in-Extremis Force [CIF], and others. 

April 8, 2015—Letter requesting answers to 20 questions (57 subparts) pertaining to 1) heightened alert/deployment status for various U.S. military forces or assets; 2) commands or orders, given, 

rescinded, or status and manner of compliance. 

April 8, 2015—Letter to the Defense Department requesting production of: 1) Defense Department documents/communications relating to the Benghazi attack; 2) After-action reports on the attack; 

3) documents sent to Defense Department (excluding DIA) relating 

to the attack; 4) documents relating to orders or commands given 

to defend against the attacks or rescue Americans in Benghazi; 5) 

documents relating to the preparation to respond to such orders or 

commands; 6) documents relating to the recission or cancellation of 

such orders or commands; 7) copy of the Predator video on the 

night of the attack; 8) documents relating to the Annex attack; 9) 

unredacted versions of the 486 pages of AFRICOM-related documents produced to Judicial Watch; 10) AFRICOM AOR Force 

Laydown slides; 11) EUCOM AOR Force Laydown slides; 12) 

CENTCOM AOR Force Laydown slides. 

April 27, 2015—Letter from the Defense Department in response 

to the three April 8, 2015, letters stating the Defense Department 

will schedule briefings requested; will answer questions posed; and 

will provide documents requested. Defense Department included 

one slide in response to items 10, 11, 12 of document request. 

May 21, 2015—Letter from the Defense Department on status of 

document request and production of 726 pages of documents, including: 1) Defense Department documents/communications relating to the Benghazi attack are pending production; 2) 175 pages 

produced on the after-action reports on the attack; 3) documents 

sent to the Defense Department (excluding DIA) relating to the attack has been referred to DIA for production; 4) documents relating 

to orders or commands given to defend against the attacks or rescue Americans in Benghazi is pending production; 5) documents relating to the preparation to respond to such orders or commands 

is pending production; 6) documents relating to the rescission or 

cancellation of such orders or commands is pending production; 7) 

a copy of the Predator video on the night of the attack was made 


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available for staff review; 8) documents relating to the Annex attack is pending production; 9) 551 pages (which includes some 

withheld pages) but includes unredacted versions of the 486 pages 

of AFRICOM-related documents produced to Judicial Watch; 10) 

AFRICOM AOR Force Laydown slides have been previously provided; 11) EUCOM AOR Force Laydown slides have been previously provided; 12) CENTCOM AOR Force Laydown slides have 

been previously provided. 

July 28, 2015—Written answers received to questions in letter 

sent January 7, 2016, pertaining to 1) heightened alert/deployment 

status for various U.S. military forces or assets; and 2) commands 

or orders, given, rescinded, or status and manner of compliance. 

January 7, 2016—Letter from Defense Department accompanying 

the production of 61 pages in response to the Committee’s April 24, 

2015, request. Letter notes that another 54 pages of relevant documents have been withheld based on an assertion of ‘‘longstanding 

Executive Branch interests.’’ 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

November 19, 2014—Letter to NSA Director requesting production of all finished intelligence analysis products regarding Libya. 

April 28, 2015—Letter to NSA Director requesting specific documents, including: certain NSA reports, Critical Intelligence Communications (CRITIC) messages, attack-related documents, NSA 

collection requirements for Libya, NSA activities related to the 

NIPF. 

May 11, 2015—Letter from NSA acknowledging receipt of April 28, 

2015, letter. 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

November 19, 2014—Letter to DIA Director requesting production 

of all finished intelligence analysis products regarding Libya. 

April 23, 2015—Letter to DIA Director requesting production of: 

1) ‘‘DCTC’s Benghazi Binder’’ containing timeline of terrorist 

events and acts against western interests; 2) DCTC’s DIA intelligence reports on the attacks; 3) photos/videos of Benghazi mission/annex and related document; 4) analysis of social media covering Benghazi; 5) documents relating to video-conferences in September 2012 pertaining to Libya; 6) documents/communications regarding responsibility for the Benghazi attack; 7) documents and 

communications regarding the Benghazi attacks sent to or from the 

White House Situation Room, the National Military Command 

Center, or the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center. 


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May 8, 2015—Letter from DIA accompanying production of a binder of materials in response to the April 23, 2015, request. The letter notes that some documents still in clearance process. 

Central Intelligence Agency 

November 19, 2014—Letter from the Committee requesting ‘‘all 

finished intelligence analysis products regarding Libya’’ issued between 9/11/2012 and 12/31/2012. 

April 28, 2015—Letter from the Committee requesting production 

of the following documents or communications, including reports, 

cables, emails, and instant messages, relating to the Benghazi attacks: 1) to or from Tripoli Station; 2) between Tripoli Station and 

the State Department; 3) to or from Benghazi Base; 4) to or from 

Director Petraeus or his immediate staff; 5) to or from Deputy Director Morell or his immediate staff; 6) to or from CIA Operations 

Center. 

The letter also requested production of documents or communications relating to: 7) development of a 9/13/2012 WIRe article; 8) development of a 9/15/2012 WIRe article; 9) CIA’s strategic priorities 

in Libya; 10) security situation in Benghazi; 11) vulnerability assessments of Benghazi Base; 12) CIA personnel and AFRICOM; 13) 

eyewitness accounts of the attack; 14) final report produced and 

referenced in 1–001405; 15) Team A/Team B analysis of the attacks; 16–19) specific document requests; 20) February 17 Martyrs 

Brigade; 21) unclassified HPSCI talking points; 22) cables regarding the Benghazi attacks; 23) Tripoli Station SIGINT strategy; 24) 

Ambassador Stevens Benghazi trip; 25) FBI trips to Benghazi following the attacks; and 26) cables requested by Secretary Clinton 

or Chief of Staff Cheryl Mills. 

August 7, 2015—Subpoena to CIA for document production of: 1) 

Same Time (instant) messages relating to the Benghazi attacks 

sent to or from a) Director, b) Deputy Director, c) OTA, d) Ops/NE 

division, d) MENA, e) Tripoli Station; 2) unclassified HPSCI talking points; 3) development of a 9/13/2012 WIRe article; 4) development of a 9/15/2012 WIRe article; 5) development of a 9/12/2012 

MENA Situation Report; 6) development of a 9/12/2012 Libya Spot 

Commentary. 

November 4, 2015—Letter from the Committee requesting production of a ‘‘list of all intelligence products from the BIR 

[Benghazi Intelligence Review] that were included in the PDB 

[President’s Daily Brief] between February 2012 and November 

2012.’’ 

January 13, 2016—Letter from the Committee outlining areas of 

noncompliance: 1) Same Time Chats (instant messaging) requested 

in the August 7, 2015, subpoena; 2) outstanding document requests 

from the August 7, 2015, subpoena, including, a) initial analysis of 

the attacks, b) critical cable written in the aftermath of the attacks, 

c) intelligence regarding the deteriorating security situation in 


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Benghazi, d) specific cable reflecting calls made on the night of the 

attack and related records; 3) refusal to certify compliance with 

talking points request; 4) outstanding witness interview requests (4 

referenced); 5) access to information about certain CIA activities; 

and 6) classification review of interview transcripts. 

White House 

December 29, 2014—Letter from the Committee to White House 

Chief of Staff requesting 12 categories of documents pertaining to 

Libya and the Benghazi attacks, specifically documents pertaining 

to: 1) Libya policy; 2) attack response; 3) the President’s actions 

and communications; 4) identities and content of communications 

of others with President about attacks; 5) identities and content of 

communications of White House staff about attacks; 6) persons 

present in White House Situation Room on September 11–12, 2012; 

7) movement logs, photographs, etc. of President on evening of September 11, 2012; 8) drafts, notes, revisions to President’s Rose Garden remarks made on 9/12/2012; 9) documents pertaining to public 

response/messaging about the attacks; 10) documents pertaining to 

protests at U.S. overseas facilities; 11) documents pertaining to the 

video, Innocence of Muslims; 12) documents related to the President’s meeting on September 10, 2012, with Senior Administration 

Officials in preparation for the 9/11 anniversary. 

January 23, 2015—Letter from White House stating that other 

Executive Branch agencies are in best position to respond to document requests. The letter further complains that request is broader 

than the Committee’s mandate. The letter outlines how the requests intrude ‘‘on longstanding Executive Branch confidentiality 

and other institutional interests.’’ The letter asserts the White 

House will begin producing documents by February and welcomes 

further discussion on how to narrow the requests made. 

February 27, 2015—Letter from the White House accompanying 

the production of approximately 266 pages of documents responsive 

to the December 29, 2014, request. 

March 17, 2015—Letter from the White House accompanying the 

re-production of approximately 266 pages of documents with lesser 

redactions. 

April 23, 2015—Letter in response to White House position on 

scope of mandate of the Committee and the Committee requests, 

including that the White House cannot rely on productions by other 

agencies to fulfill its obligation to respond to a congressional request; disagrees with the narrow interpretation of scope of the 

Committee’s mandate; and requests that future productions give 

priority to certain areas (Items 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11 from December 29, 

2014, letter) and further give priority to certain specific time 

frames. 


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May 11, 2015—Letter from the White House accompanying the reproduction of approximately 203 pages of documents. 

May 19, 2015—Letter from the Committee requesting production 

of any email communications to or from a personal address regarding Libya from National Security Advisor Susan Rice. 

June 19, 2015—Letter from the White House accompanying the 

re-production of approximately 266 pages of documents responsive 

to requests. 

July 17, 2015—Letter from the White House accompanying the reproduction of approximately 340 pages of documents responsive to 

requests. 

August 7, 2015—Letter to White House resetting priorities: compliance has not been achieved notwithstanding lapse of 7 months; 

many documents produced have been publically available press 

clippings; and the White House needs to identify what documents 

will be produced and what documents it will refuse to produce and 

the precise legal basis for non-production. 

August 28, 2015—Letter from the White House accompanying the 

re-production of approximately 247 pages of documents responsive 

to requests. 

October 5, 2015—Letter from the White House accompanying the 

re-production of approximately 34 pages of documents responsive to 

requests. 

Meeting/briefing between the Committee staff and White House 

counsel staff regarding production of documents. 

October 27, 2015—Letter from the White House accompanying 

the re-production of approximately 47 pages of documents responsive to requests. 

November 12, 2015—Letter from the White House accompanying 

the re-production of approximately 48 pages of documents responsive to requests. 

March 16, 2016—Letter formally requesting ‘‘access to all special 

access programs regarding U.S. activities in Libya’’ specifically in 

reference to ‘‘weapons trafficking, weapons diversion, and the monitoring of weapons transfers.’’ 

White House forwarded the letter to the Central Intelligence Agency for response. Response received on April 28, 2016. 


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1 Convening of an Accountability Review Board, 77 Fed. Reg. 60741 (Oct. 4, 2012), Pub. Notice 

8052. 2 Id. 

3 22 U.S.C. § 4831 et seq. and 12 FAM 030. 4 Id. 

5 12 FAM 013. Objective. 

APPENDIX K: 

Analysis of Accountability Review Board, 

House Armed Services Committee and 

House Permanent Select Intelligence 

Committee Reports 

Was the Accountability Review Board Independent 

and Comprehensive? 

INTRODUCTION 

On October 3, 2012, the Secretary of State announced the formation of a panel known as the Benghazi Accountability Review 

Board [ARB].1 The five member ARB was charged with examining 

‘‘the circumstances surrounding the deaths of personnel assigned in 

support of the U.S. Government Mission to Libya in Benghazi, 

Libya, on September 11, 2012.’’ 2 Federal law and State Department procedures outline the process for convening and conducting 

an ARB investigation—a process typically overseen by career personnel.3 Notwithstanding the processes already in place, the Secretary’s senior staff oversaw the Benghazi ARB process from start 

to finish. The senior staff’s participation ranged from selecting the 

ARB members to shaping the ARB’s outcome by editing the draft 

final report. The decisions to deviate from longstanding processes 

raise questions about the ARB’s independence, thoroughness, and 

therefore the fullness of their findings of accountability. 

BACKGROUND 

Accountability Review Boards are designed to play a critical role 

in ensuring the State Department learns from past incidents so as 

to ensure future security and safety related incidents can be prevented. According to the State Department, the ‘‘ARB process is a 

mechanism to foster more effective security of U.S. missions and 

personnel abroad by ensuring a thorough and independent review 

of security-related incidents.’’ 4 Through its investigations and recommendations, the Board seeks to determine accountability and 

promote and encourage improved security.’’ 5


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6 22 U.S.C. § 4834(a). 

7 Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, Accountability and 

Acceptance of Risk, 1 (1985) http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/inman [hereinafter Inman Report]. 8 22 U.S.C. § 4831 through 4835. 

9OIG Special Review of the Accountability Review Process, ISP-I-13-44A, 10 (September 2013) 

(‘‘Within the 14-year period covered by this review [1998-2012], a significant number of securityrelated incidents, more than 222 in all, were not subject to [ARB] consideration.’’), found at 

https://oig.state.gov/system/files/214907.pdf. 10Testimony of Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 269 (Sep. 3, 2015) 

[hereinafter Mills Testimony] (on file with the Committee) (‘‘It was my impression that ARBs 

are supposed to have an enduring life, meaning that the learnings that came from those ARBs 

should be acted on and implemented’’). 

By law, Accountability Review Boards are charged with examining five aspects of an incident, including: 

1. The extent to which the incident or incidents with respect 

to which the Board was convened was security related; 

2. Whether the security systems and security procedures at 

that mission were adequate; 

3. Whether the security systems and security procedures were 

properly implemented; 

4. The impact of intelligence and information availability; and 

5. Such other facts and circumstances, which may be relevant 

to the appropriate security management of United States 

missions abroad.6

Prior to 1986, no formal mechanisms were in place to examine, 

review, and make recommendations after significant incidents involving State Department facilities of personnel. Following several 

attacks against U.S. missions in the 1980s, the State Department 

created an independent review panel to examine the incidents. The 

Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, chaired by Admiral Bobby 

Inman, issued its report in 1985. Concerned that the State Department did not consistently examine serious and significant incidents 

as did other federal agencies, the Panel recommended the ‘‘Secretary of State [be required] to convene a Board of Inquiry with 

powers of establishing accountability in all cases involving terrorism or security related attacks that result in significant damage 

and/or casualties to United States personnel or property.’’ 7 The Advisory Panel’s recommendation to establish the Accountability Review Board was adopted by the State Department and later incorporated in the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act 

of 1986.8

Since 1986, nineteen (19) ARBs have been convened to review 

the most significant attacks against U.S. diplomatic personnel or 

facilities.9 The findings and recommendations of each ARB investigation are in effect cumulative. Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff and 

Counselor to the Secretary of State, explained to the Committee, 

‘‘ARBs . . . have an enduring life, meaning that the learnings that 

came from those ARBs should be acted on and implemented.’’ 10

Two significant ARBs convened subsequent to 1986 were those 

formed in the aftermath of the August 7, 1998, dual terrorist attacks in the east African cities of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and 

Nairobi, Kenya. 

Speaking on behalf of both East African ARB panels, ARB Chairman William Crowe wrote former Secretary of State Madeline 


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11Letter from Admiral William J. Crowe, to Madeline Albright, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (Jan. 8, 1999) (on file with the Committee). 12 Id. 13 Report to the Congress on Actions Taken by the Department of State In Response to the 

Program Recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings 

in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, 14 (April 1999), http://fas.org/irp/threat/arb/ 

accountability_report.html. 14 Id. at 29–30. 

Albright expressing concern about the Department’s commitment 

to security:11

[H]ow similar the lessons were to those drawn by the 

Inman Commission over 14 years ago. What is most troubling is the failure of the U.S. government to take the necessary steps to prevent such tragedies through an unwillingness to give sustained priority and funding to security 

improvements. 

We are advancing a number of recommendations that deal 

with the handling of terrorist threats and attacks, the review and revision of standards and procedures to improve 

security readiness and crisis management, the size and 

composition of our missions, and the need to have adequate and sustained funding for safe buildings and security programs in the future. We recognize that the Department of State and other U.S. government agencies are already making adjustments and taking measures to enhance the protection of our personnel and facilities abroad. 

It is clear, however, that much more needs to be done.12

Two recommendations identified by the East African ARBs were 

directed specifically to the Secretary of State: 

Recommendation #4: The Secretary of State should personally review the security situation of embassy chanceries 

and other official premises, closing those which are highly 

vulnerable and threatened but for which adequate security 

enhancements cannot be provided, and seek new secure 

premises for permanent use, or temporary occupancy, 

pending construction of new buildings.13

Recommendation #13: First and foremost, the Secretary of 

State should take a personal and active role in carrying 

out the responsibility of ensuring the security of U.S. diplomatic personnel abroad. It is essential to convey to the 

entire Department that security is one of the highest priorities. In the process, the Secretary should reexamine the 

present organizational structure with the objective of clarifying responsibilities, encouraging better coordination, and 

assuring that a single high-ranking officer is accountable 

for all security matters and has the authority necessary to 

coordinate on the Secretary’s behalf such activities within 

the Department of State and with all foreign affairs USG 

agencies.14


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15 12 FAM 032. 16 12 FAM 032.1. 17Testimony of the Managing Director, Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 20 (Mar. 4, 2016) [hereinafter M/PRI Managing Director Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 18 Email from the M/PRI Managing Director, U.S. Dep’t of State to Eric Boswell, Ass’t Sec’y 

of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, Beth Jones, Acting Ass’t Sec’y of 

State, U.S. Dep’t of State, et. al (Sept. 19, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0049611) (‘‘The 

Under Secretary from Management asked M/PRI to get the ARB/PCC together today to provide 

a recommendation to the Secretary as to whether to convene an ARB in response to the September 11, 2012 attack in Benghazi, Libya. Due to conflicting schedules we are conducting the 

vote via email.’’). 19M/PRI Managing Director Testimony at 24. 20Memorandum from M/PRI Managing Director, U.S. Dep’t of State, to the Sec’y of State, 

(Sept.19, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05456350) (‘‘The Permanent Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Accountability Review Boards (ARB) was asked on September 19, 2012 to examine the recent incident, and has recommended that you convene an ARB to examine this incident.’’). 21 Id. 

BENGHAZI ARB 

Decision to Convene an Accountability Review Board Panel 

The Secretary convened the Benghazi ARB on the recommendation of the State Department’s permanent coordinating committee 

[PCC], a seven member committee with convening authority.15

State Department procedures provide ‘‘the ARB/PCC will, as quickly as possible after an incident occurs, review the available facts 

and recommend to the Secretary to convene or not convene a 

board.’’ 16 The Managing Director for the State Department’s Office 

of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation [M/PRI] and the 

Chair of the ARB/PCC, explained: 

[W]e put together . . . some facts as we know it, about the 

incident. We tell our director. He contacts the legal adviser, who is not a voting member but is there to provide 

advice to the PCC, and Diplomatic Security and the regional bureau. And we say hey, this looks to us like it 

meets the criteria, I’m going to call the PCC together. And 

it’s the chairman’s right to assemble this group.17

After the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facility on September 11, 

2012, the ARB/PCC did not meet in person but discussed the situation by email.18 The Managing Director of M/PRI explained: 

A virtual meeting, we do that on incidents that we think 

do not need the PCC to meet. That is our standard operating procedure. But since this was well known by everyone in the Department, we felt comfortable in doing it electronically.19

The PCC agreed an ARB should be convened and made the recommendation to the Secretary on September 19, 2012.20 In making 

the recommendation, the PCC noted: 

Should you agree to this recommendation, we will prepare 

the appropriate appointment letters for the Chair and proposed members of the ARB, the letters to the Congress and 

notifications to the public via the Federal Register announcing your decision.21


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22 Id. 23Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y for Management, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 

278 (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Kennedy Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 24M/PRI Managing Director Testimony at 29 (A list of potential board members was not forwarded to the Secretary for approval). 25 Id. at 27. 26Mills Testimony at 137. 27 Email from William Burns, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Cheryl D. Mills, 

Chief of Staff, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sep. 15, 2012, 1:09 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0057846). 

The Secretary approved the PCC’s recommendation to convene 

the ARB the same day.22

Selection of the ARB Panel 

‘‘The law requires four nominees [to be selected] by the Secretary 

of State and one nominee by now the Director of National Intelligence.’’ 23 State Department procedures outline the process for selecting State Department representatives to the Board once a decision to convene an ARB has been made. The procedures specify ‘‘[i]f 

the ARB PCC recommends that the Secretary convene a board, it 

will forward a list of potential board members to the Secretary for 

approval.’’ However, the Benghazi ARB/PCC did not prepare a list 

of prospective board members, nor did it share a list of candidates 

with the Secretary as required by State Department procedures.24

The Managing Director who also served as the ARB/PCC Chair, explained to the Committee: 

Q: Did you put together a list of names to recommend to 

be members of the ARB? 

A: I don’t believe I did. 

Q: Okay. Why not? 

A: Well, because they went for option two and did more of 

the celebrity approach as I would say. As I mentioned earlier, they got Ambassador Pickering, who I consider to be 

in that category as Ambassador Crowe, for when he was 

chosen for Nairobi Dar.25

The PCC did not prepare or send a list of prospective members 

to the Secretary because the senior staff were already in the process of identifying panelists to serve. 

As Mills told the Committee, ‘‘I worked with Under Secretary 

Kennedy and Deputy Secretary William Burns in identifying who 

might be talent that could actually serve in this role.’’ 26 Talent 

would later be defined as individuals who would understand the 

Secretary’s narrative of expiditionary diplomacy. On September 15, 

2012, William Burns, Deputy Secretary of State, recommended Ambassador Pickering to the ARB. 

In an email to Mills, Burns wrote: 

On arb, I’d suggest Pickering in addition to Armitage. 

They’re both very experienced and fair minded and understand entirely demands of expeditionary diplomacy.27

On September 18, 2012, Burns informed Mills and Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management, that ‘‘Tom Pickering is willing to chair. . . . He liked very much the idea of inVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:02 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 022867 PO 00000 Frm 00629 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HRPT848.XXX HRPT848

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28 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, to William Burns, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 18, 2012, 9:35 AM) 

(on file with the Committee, SCB0057775). 29 Biography of Admiral Mike Mullen, U.S. Navy (Jul. 12, 2013), http://www.navy.mil/ 

navydata/bios/navybio.asp?bioID=11. 30Foreign Affairs Policy Board, U.S. Dep’t of State, http://www.state.gov/s/p/fapb/. 31Mills Testimony at 138. 32Kennedy Testimony at 265. 

cluding Mike Mullen.’’ 28 Admiral Michael Mullen retired as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 1, 2011.29 At the 

time they served on the Benghazi ARB, both Mullen and Pickering 

were also members of the Secretary’s Foreign Affairs Policy Advisory Board. 

The Foreign Affairs Policy Board was launched in December 2011 to provide the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretaries of State, and the Director of Policy Planning with 

independent, informed advice and opinion concerning matters of U.S. foreign policy. The Board serves in a solely advisory capacity, with an agenda shaped by the questions 

and concerns of the Secretary. Its discussions focus on assessing global threats and opportunities; identifying trends 

that implicate core national security interests; providing 

recommendations with respect to tools and capacities of 

the civilian foreign affairs agencies; defining priorities and 

strategic frameworks for U.S. foreign policy; and performing any other research and analysis of topics raised by 

the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretaries, and the Director of Policy Planning.30

The Foreign Affairs Policy Advisory Board’s formation occurred 

contemporaneously with the decision to extend the operations in 

Benghazi as well as the restart of operations in Tripoli. 

Mills explained her communications with ARB panelists Mullen 

and Catherine Bertini: 

I reached out to, I believe Admiral Mullen myself. . . . 

And, I reached out to, I believe, Cathy Bertini, who had 

been recommended to us by the Under Secretary of Management.31

Kennedy described his role in the selection of the ARB panel 

members to the Committee: 

I had met Catherine Bertini when I was one of the alternate representatives to the United Nations and she was at 

the United Nations as the she was I think at that point 

the senior American serving in the United Nations Headquarters Secretariat. So I worked with her on a professional basis because I was representing the United States 

and she was a senior official within the United Nations. I 

did not recommend her for the position. 

I provided one name, Richard Shinnick. That was the only 

name that I was solicited and asked to provide a suggestion for, in effect, a type of expertise.32


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33 Id. at 278. 34 Email from Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Stephen Mull, 

Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretariat, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 28, 2012, 2:37 PM) (on 

file with the Committee, SCB0057607) (‘‘Catherine Bertini agreed to serve on the ARB panel 

today’’). See also Email from Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 

Catherine Bertini, Accountability Review Board Member (Sept. 28, 2012, 2:28AM) (on file with 

the Committee, SCB0054582) (‘‘[I]f you could tomorrow, I would welcome connecting with you.’’ 

From Bertini ‘‘Thank you for reaching out to me. I am pleased to say Yes to your request and 

I very much look forward to contributing to the work of the panel on this critically important 

issue’’). 35 Id. (‘‘Dick Shinnick has accepted as the fifth member of the Panel’’). 36Mills Testimony at 138. 37 Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, to William Burns, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 18, 2012, 9:35 AM) 

(on file with the Committee, SCB0057775) (containing exchange from William Burns to Cheryl 

Mills and Patrick Kennedy). 

Kennedy explained further: 

A: As I said earlier, I was asked only to make one recommendation name somebody who was not in the State 

Department but knew a lot about Secretary of excuse me 

Department of State construction activities. So I made one 

recommendation and I made no recommendations for any 

of the other four. 

I was advised, because I also head the unit that publishes the 

names in the Federal Register, I was advised that the selections 

were Pickering, Mullen, Turner, I think it was, Bertini and 

Shinnick. 

Q: And so did Cheryl Mills ask you for that, or did Jake 

Sullivan? Or who asked you for—— 

A: Cheryl Mills asked me for the name of someone who 

knew about State Department facilities management and 

construction. 

Q: And did she share with you who the other members 

who she was thinking about 

A: No. 

Q: appointing? 

A: No. I was informed who the selections were.33

On September 28, 2012, Mills shared with Kennedy, Stephen 

Mull, the Executive Secretariat, Uzra Zeya, the ARB executive secretary, and Burns about Catherine Bertini agreement to participate as an ARB member.34 Within hours of Bertini’s acceptance, 

Kennedy shared with Mills and Mull the additional news: ‘‘Dick 

Shinnick has accepted as the fifth member of the panel.’’ 35

The Intelligence Community recommended Hugh Turner, a 

former CIA deputy director, to serve as the intelligence Community’s representative.36 Burns spoke early on with Michel Morrell, 

Deputy Director of the CIA, and Robert Cardillo, Deputy Director 

of ODNI about their choice of representatives on the ARB panel— 

reporting back to the Mills and Kennedy ‘‘they will coordinate on 

a nominee.’’ 37

As panelists confirmed their participation on the ARB, Mills 

shared the information with the Secretary. For example, within 

minutes after sharing the news about Catherine Bertini with the 


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38 Email from Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to H (Sept. 28, 

2012, 2:46 PM) (Subject: FYI) (on filed with the Committee, SCB0045509). 39Mills Testimony at 141. 40 12 FAM 032.3b. 41 Email from Managing Director, Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation 

to Stephen Mull, Exec. Sec’y, Office of the Secretariat, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 25, 2012, 7:58 

AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0093148). 42M/PRI Managing Director Testimony at 32. 43 Id. at 33. 

senior staff, Mills also relayed the news to the Secretary.38 Mills 

explained to the Committee: 

We certainly apprised her that it looked like we had a team of 

five that represented a balance of those who understood diplomacy, 

who understand national security, who understood what it meant 

to operate in environments that were insecure, and that we 

thought the balance of who we had identified met that criteria.39

ARB Executive Secretary 

The senior staff’s involvement in the ARB process also extended 

to selecting the Executive Secretary to the ARB. According to the 

State Department’s regulations, the Executive Secretary to the 

ARB is considered to be part of the ARB staff and ‘‘serves to coordinate and facilitate the work of that Board.’’ 40 On September 25, 

2012, the Managing Director wrote Mull and his Deputy: 

I would appreciate knowing how this ARB is going to work 

since it is not going in the normal way. Can we talk this 

morning or tomorrow morning about the roles and responsibilities? 41

The Managing Director explained to the Committee: ‘‘I was a little bit concerned about being behind the tide.’’ 42 ‘‘I was hungry for 

information myself.’’ 43 She described her normal responsibilities 

with regard to selecting the Executive Secretary to the ARB: 

A: [W]hat I normally do is go to our H.R. Bureau and see 

who is available at the senior ranks to take on a function 

such as this. 

Q: And what does the Executive Secretary to the ARB do? 

A: They arrange the meetings. They make sure that the 

board has access to the Department for interviews and, 

you know, because usually these people are removed from 

the Department, you know, they’re retirees, they’re unfamiliar with the Department’s ways. So in sitting in on the 

interviews, the exec sec would know who they should contact next, who this leads them to in a bureau. So they act, 

as I call it, the bridge from the ARB to the building. 

Q: And in the 10 prior ARBs that you had been involved 

in, as the ARB officer, had you made the selection of the 

executive secretary? 

A: I wouldn’t say made the selection. I nominated people 

in the past, sure. 

Q: And had they been selected then? 


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44 Id. 45 Email from Stephen Mull, Exec. Sec’y, Office of the Secretariat, U.S. Dep’t of State, to William Burns, Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 21, 2012, 8:45 AM) (Subject: re: Uzra/ARB) 

(on file with the Committee, SCB0057773). 46Mills Testimony at 194. 47 Email from William Burns, Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of 

Staff and Counselor, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 22, 2012, 1:37 PM) (on file with the Committee, 

SCB0057772). 48Testimony of Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Chairman, Benghazi Accountability Review 

Board, before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, Tr. at 52 (Sept. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Pickering Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 49Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., Department Notice, Convening of Accountability Review Board to Examine the Circumstances Surrounding the Deaths in Benghazi, 

Libya on September 11, 2012. U.S. Dep’t of State (on file with the Committee, SCB0050689). 

A: Yes, normally.44

On September 21, 2012, Mull informed Burns about Mills’ decision to select Burns’ Chief of Staff for the position of Executive Secretary to the ARB. He wrote to Burns: 

Hi Bill, Cheryl [Mills] asked me to talk to Uzra about the 

possibility of her serving as Exec Sec for the ARB through 

the end of November. She seemed very reluctant, but 

Cheryl agreed that Uzra had all the right qualities. Uzra 

asked to hold off giving a decision until she talked to you, 

so she’ll be seeking you out on this today. 

Steve Mills recounted a different version of events to the Committee: 45

She [Uzra] was recommended by Deputy Secretary Burns. 

She had been his chief of staff. She also, I thought was a 

good recommendation in the sense that Deputy Secretary 

Burns is well-respected and well-regarded in the building. 

He’s the most senior foreign service officer. And she, in 

being his chief of staff, when she reached out to people, 

when she did that, people responded.46

On September 22, 2012, Burns conveyed Uzra Zeya’s decision to 

serve as Executive Secretary to Mills stating: 

Hi, 

Uzra has agreed to serve as Exec Secretary of ARB. She’ll 

call Steve to let him know. 

We talked at length about this, and she is comfortable 

with decision, for all the right reasons. She’ll do a great 

job.47

Documents Reviewed By the ARB 

The ARB panel’s primary sources of information were documents 

and witness interviews.48 Documents were collected from State Department personnel with ‘‘information relevant to the Board’s examination of these incidents.’’ 49 Even before the ARB was convened, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs, with oversight from Mills, 

put in place a system to transmit, store, and review documents relevant to the myriad requests for information, including Congress, 


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50Testimony of the Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 112 (Dec. 17, 2015) [hereinafter NEA Deputy Director Testimony] (on file with the Committee). See also Mills Testimony at 150 (‘‘I had been managing, 

as you know, our response effort and collaborating with our leadership team on Benghazi in particular.’’). 51 NEA Deputy Director Testimony at 105. 

Freedom of Information [FOIA], and the ARB.50 The Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, described the process for submitting documents: 

A: There was a request to produce documents . . . I think 

that we were given, you know, kind of the general search 

terms to look for and scan in our computer and files. 

Q: So you eventually, did you produce a PST file, or did 

you produce hard copies in response to that request? 

A: We produced hardcopies in response to that request. 

Q: So you physically would have identified the documents 

that were responsive, printed them out from your computer, and then handed that stack over to somebody? 

A: That’s what I recall.51

The Deputy Director further elaborated on her role and the role 

of other individuals within the State Department in reviewing and 

identifying relevant documents: 

A: I received a call from our Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary [Elizabeth Dibble] in NEA. It was Columbus 

Day weekend. I recall it because I changed my plans for 

the weekend very quickly as a result of her request. And 

she noted that I believe it was a group in H, was the Legislative Affairs Bureau, was reviewing all of the—was preparing documents to be provided for, I thought it was the 

ARB, and then whatever subsequent use, presumably congressional review or whatever the case may be. But I 

wasn’t sure. They were going through the documents for 

release, and she said could I join the group the following 

day and look at, you know, kind of looking whether we 

needed to redact any sensitive information. That was my 

role to help in the release of those documents, and she indicated that night, you know, depending on how big of a 

task it is, could you help me setting up a work flow like 

other officers from NEA who could be involved in, you 

know, going through and looking for sensitive information 

that we might recommend for redaction. 

Q: And you said, you recall that it was Columbus Day 

weekend? 

A: Or close to Columbus Day weekend, because I had 

plans to see my brother that I cancelled. 

* * * 

It had started before that weekend, but DAS Dibble 

learned of it, or she realized there wasn’t an NEA participant on that Saturday, so she called me and I went in the 

following morning, yeah. 


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52 Id. at 101. 53Testimony of Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State for Diplomatic Security, Int’l Programs, Tr. at 108 (Jan. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Lamb Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 54Mills Testimony at 182. 

Q: And did you go any other days other than that Saturday morning? Were you also there on Sunday? Did you 

continue on Monday? 

A: I went in on Sunday and Monday and then through 

that first week, and then I helped develop a rotation 

schedule for other colleagues from NEA to kind of make 

sure we had an NEA colleague. There were colleagues 

from DS and IRM. You know, other subject matter experts 

were in the room as well, kind of looking and looking at 

documents for I can’t recall how long that lasted, but I 

helped develop the work schedule. 

* * * 

I was primarily focused myself on redacting names and titles of individuals who were private citizens, either Libyan, American, U.N. staff, other internationals who were in 

Libya doing work, because they were talking to American 

diplomats. That’s a sensitive thing that could endanger 

people if that’s generally known in some circumstances. So 

that’s primarily what I was recommending redacting. And 

then I also recommended redacting the names of junior 

people who were drafting emails or cables as well.52

Mills’ involvement in the process was described by Charlene 

Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 

Lamb testified: 

She [Mills]—it was my understanding, she was responsible 

for getting all of the documents that were being requested 

in—and compiled in, you know, organizing the documents 

so they made sense, and making sure nothing got left out. 

Because Mills is not a security expert, she had a lot of questions 

about security policies, procedures, you know, what was routine, 

what was done under exigent circumstances. So there were several 

DS [Diplomatic Security] people there, not just myself, that were 

working to help bring all these documents together and to answer 

questions that she had.53

Mills told the Committee certain documents were set aside for 

her specific review. As she told the Committee: 

The documents I would see were documents where the 

team had looked through them and thought that there was 

a subset that I should see. Those typically meant that they 

were sharing new information, new facts, or other information that they thought was important for the senior leadership to know.54


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55Mills Testimony at 142–147. 56Letter from Thomas B. Gibbons, Acting Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Leg. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, to Hon. Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Aug. 23, 

2013) (on file with the Committee). 

* * * 

I acknowledge I was pushing pretty hard for them to get 

them out the door because our goal was to try to do that. 

Mills explained the ARB’s access to these documents: 

They [ARB] were looking at records already being assembled in response to a request that had already been posed 

to our department by Members of Congress, as well as 

they had their own individual interviews that they were 

conducting where they might ask for records or materials 

that they felt would be relevant that they came to have 

knowledge of. 

* * * 

Separate and apart from that, the ARB could both reach 

to the Administration Bureau to be able to access any of 

those records that were being collected, which would have 

been records regarding anything related to the night of 

September 11 and 12. And, they could also initiate their 

own requests for documents. 

They [the Administration or ‘‘A’’ Bureau] were the actual 

repository and kept copies of everything and they would 

only make copies to allow other individuals to review them 

as opposed to disturb their copy set. 

* * * 

Their [ARB] mechanisms were threefold, if I really think 

about it. One, obviously, they could reach out to the A Bureau and say, we want to look at all of them or we want 

to look at documents of this nature. Two, they could make 

requests. Three, they would ask, as our reviews were going 

on of records, were there any records that were relevant 

that they should be either looking at or that they would 

be at least apprised of. And so that was another mechanism that they had. And so those could be collected to 

them if that’s what they reached to ask for. They might 

have asked for that on a particular subject matter; has 

anybody seen anything on this topic or that topic? 

But those were the three ways that they could get it, with 

each of those being avenues for them to be able to ascertain whatever information they believed they needed, because people didn’t have visibility into how they were making those judgments.55

According to the State Department, the ARB reviewed more than 

7,000 documents numbering thousands of pages as part of its investigation.56 Excluded from the ARB panel’s review were documents and emails sent to or by the Secretary or her senior staff. 

As the Secretary told the Committee: 


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57Testimony of Hillary R. Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Tr. at 321–322 (Oct. 

22, 2015) [hereinafter Clinton Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 58This number excludes the approximately 4,300 pages of documents produced to the Committee. 59Sullivan Testimony at 82. 60 April 10, 2015 meeting with the Director of the Office of Executive Secretariat. 61 Id. 62 Id. 63 22 U.S.C. 4833(c) (the statute contemplates that ARB records will become publically available following the conclusion of its work). 64 August 1, 2013 subpoena to John F. Kerry, Secretary of State seeking all documents provided by the Department of State to the Accountability Review Board convened to examine the 

facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11–12, 2012 attacks on U.S. facilities in 

Benghazi, Libya and all documents and communications referring or relating to ARB interviews 

or meetings, including but not limited to notes or summaries prepared during and after any 

ARB interview or meeting. 65See January 28, 2015 subpoena issued to John F. Kerry seeking: 

Continued 

I don’t know what they [the ARB] had access to. I know 

that, during the time I was at the State Department, there 

was certainly a great effort to respond to your predecessor, 

Congressman Issa’s inquiries. And many thousands of 

pages of information was conveyed to the Congress.57

The ARBs access to information from the Secretary and her senior staff was extremely limited. The nearly 3,000 pages of emails 

from the Secretary were made available only to the Committee 

with productions occurring on February 13, 2015, June 25, 2015, 

and September 25, 2015—well after the conclusion of the Benghazi 

ARB. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the ARB had access to 

the more than 60,000 pages of senior leader records produced separately to the Committee during its investigation.58 This was further corroborated by Jacob Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Planning, who told the Committee: 

Q: Did you provide any documents to the ARB? 

A: I don’t think they asked me for any documents, so I 

don’t think I provided any.59

The State Department informed the Committee, Department 

records for senior officials are stored separately.60 This includes a 

separate email system, which until February 2015 did not have 

archiving capability.61 Unless separate searches were conducted by 

State Department personnel on these systems and personnel saved 

their emails, senior leader emails and records would not have been 

accessible by the ARB panel.62

Subpoena for ARB documents 

Like previous Congresses, the Committee sought access to the 

underlying documents reviewed by the ARB to better understand 

the ARB panel’s review and findings. The documents sought are required by law to be physically separated and stored by the State 

Department and should be easily accessible by the State Department.63 Congress issued its first subpoena for documents reviewed 

by the ARB on August 1, 2013.64 No documents were produced. On 

January 28, 2015, the Committee reissued the subpoena for ARB 

documents.65


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1. ‘‘all documents and communications produced by the Department of State to the Accountability Review Board (‘‘ARB’’ or the ARB) convened to examine the facts and circumstances 

surrounding the September 11–12, 2012 attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi Libya. 

2. All documents and communications referring or relating to the ARB interviews or meetings, including but not limited to, notes or summaries prepared during and after any ARB 

interview or meeting.’’ 66Letter to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, from Julia E. Frifield, Ass’t 

Sec’y of State for Leg. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb.13, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 67 H. Select Comm. on Benghazi Internal Working Document (on file with the Committee). 68Letter to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, from Julia E. Frifield, Ass’t 

Sec’y of State for Leg. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, (Apr. 24, 2015) (on file with the Committee). 69Letter from Thomas B. Gibbons, Acting Ass’t Sec’y, Leg. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Aug. 23, 2013). 70 Id. 71Letter to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, from Julia E. Frifield, Ass’t 

Sec’y of State for Leg. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Apr. 24, 2015 (on file with the Committee). 72Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Briefing on the Accountability Review Board Report (Dec. 

19, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/202282.htm (‘‘We interviewed more than a 

hundred people, reviewed thousands of documents, and watched hours of video. We spoke with 

Almost two and a half years after Congress issued its first subpoena in 2013, the State Department for the first time produced an 

ARB record—a four page interview summary for a witness who was 

scheduled to appear before the Committee the following day.66 The 

State Department maintained this posture over the next several 

weeks with the production of one or two ARB interview summaries, 

totaling 38 pages, each provided less than a week before the Committee’s interviews.67 It was not until April 15, 2015, the State Department produced a larger trove of ARB documents consisting of 

1,758 pages. On April 24, 2015, the State Department produced another 2,523 pages of documents. Accompanying the April 24, 2015, 

production was a letter stating: 

[t]his production, together with our production on April 15, 

2015, constitutes our delivery of ARB documents that were 

physically set aside following the ARB’s completion and 

archived. In addition to these materials, the Department 

searched for and included in this production, as responsive 

to your subpoena’s second a request, a small number of 

interview summaries that had not been stored within 

these physically set aside files.68

Although the State Department produced 4,319 pages to the 

Committee, previous statements by the State Department that the 

ARB reviewed ‘‘7,000 State Department documents numbering 

thousands of pages’’ suggest the Committee does not have all the 

documents reviewed by the ARB.69 Moreover, the State Department by its own admission withheld a number of documents from 

the Committee. On April 24, 2015, the State Department informed 

the Committee ‘‘a small number of documents’’ were being withheld 

because of ‘‘executive branch confidentiality interests.’’ 70 The State 

Department’s basis for withholding the documents was a concocted 

administrative privilege—one made up entirely by the Administration and not recognized by the Constitution.71 The State Department has yet to explain the discrepancy. 

Witness Interviews 

The ARB interviewed more than 100 people.72 However, neither 

the Secretary, nor her inner circle, were interviewed by the ARB. 

Mullen offered this explanation: 


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people who were on the scene in Benghazi that night, who were in Tripoli, who were in Washington. We talked to military and intelligence officials, including to many State Department personnel, and to experts who do not work for the United States Government.’’). 73Testimony of Admiral Michael Mullen, Vice Chairman, Accountability Review Board, before 

the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Tr. at 26–28 (Jun. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Mullen Testimony] (on file with the Committee). 

Q: And, there was no interview of Deputy Secretary Nides 

or Secretary Clinton? 

A: There was not. 

Q: And was there any discussion as to at what level the 

interviews would not take place at? For example, was 

there a common—excuse me, I’ll start over. Was there a 

decision by the board not to interview Mr. Nides? 

A: There was early on a discussion, and certainly I had a 

discussion, private discussion with Ambassador Pickering 

about at least my expectation, and I would say this was in 

the first couple weeks, that this certainly could present the 

requirement that we would have to interview everybody up 

the chain of command, including the Secretary, and he 

agreed with that. So the two of us had sort of set that 

premise in terms of obviously depending on what we 

learned over time, and our requirement to both affix both 

responsibility and accountability per se were, again, based 

on the facts as we understood them. So there was a consensus, and it was a universal consensus over time that we 

did the interviews we needed to do and that we didn’t do 

the interviews we didn’t do, which would have included 

the ones obviously that we didn’t do, which were Nides 

and Burns and Secretary. 

* * * 

Q: So it’s fair to say the board decided it didn’t need to 

interview Cheryl Mills or the Secretary about events that 

night? 

A: No. And I think to your point about Ms. Mills and the 

Secretary, it was really through the, both the discussions 

with so many people that we interviewed and the affirmation and the validation of what happened that evening, including the conversation the Secretary had with Mr. Hicks, 

that we just didn’t, we didn’t see any need to clarify that, 

we knew that had happened. We were comfortable in the 

case of Mr. Hicks that he was walking us through what 

had happened. So there just wasn’t any further need to go 

anywhere else.73

Senior Staff Communications with the ARB Members 

In addition to selecting members of the ARB and its staff, identifying and reviewing documents, Mills played a peculiar role during 

the ARB’s investigation. Within days of the ARB’s start, Mullen 

reached out to Mills to express concerns about Lamb’s testimony 


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74Mills Testimony at 184. 75 Id. at 23–24. 76 Id. at 173. 

before Congress.74 Mullen explained his reasons for contacting 

Mills: 

Shortly after we interviewed Ms. Lamb, I initiated a call 

to Ms. Mills to give her—what I wanted to give her was 

a head’s up because at this point she was on the list to 

come over here to testify, and I was—so from a department representation standpoint and as someone that led a 

department, I always focused on certainly trying to make 

sure the best witnesses were going to appear before the department, and my reaction at that point in time with Ms. 

Lamb at the interview was—and it was a pretty unstable 

time. It was the beginning, there was a lot of unknowns. 

To the best of my knowledge, she hadn’t appeared either 

ever or many times certainly. So essentially I gave Ms. 

Mills a head’s up that I thought that her appearance could 

be a very difficult appearance for the State Department, 

and that was—about that was the extent of the conversation.75

Mills did not recall the conversation about Lamb, telling the 

Committee: 

A: I don’t recall it [the conversation with Admiral Mullen], 

but I would have no reason to believe that he wouldn’t be 

accurate about that. 

Q: Okay. He related that he told you that Charlene Lamb 

was not going to be a good witness for the State Department. Does that ring a bell with you? 

A: No, because if I was aware of that, I might have been 

thoughtful about that in all the ways of which—how we 

could best communicate information. But I don’t dispute 

that. I’m sure that if that’s his memory that he would be 

accurately reflecting what he recalls.76

Weeks later, Mullen reached out again to Mills and the Secretary 

to discuss the ARB’s work to date. Mullen explained: 

So shortly after we met, first couple weeks there were 

some there were some things that we could see early that 

we thought it was important that the Secretary of State 

know about, not so much in terms of what had happened, 

but steps that we thought she might want to take initially 

as opposed to wait weeks or months to see the results of 

the board. So we put together a list of—and I honestly 

can’t remember the number, but somewhere between 10 

and 20 recommendations for her to take a look at immediately. So, for example, one of them clearly, because there 

was a fire issue, was consider getting breathing 

apparatuses out to high threat posts immediately. So there 

were things like that, and we sent that list up, and to the 

best of my knowledge, that’s something that Ambassador 


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77Mullen Testimony at 25. 78Mills Testimony at 187–188. 

Pickering either handed, transmitted to Ms. Mills and the 

Secretary. 

At the end of the ARB we met with Secretary Clinton for 

about 2 hours to give her a briefing on what we had come 

across, and at least at that point, and we hadn’t finished 

or signed it out, but at least the major recommendations 

that we had concluded up to that point. The only other 

State Department employee that was in the room with 

Secretary Clinton then was Ms. Mills.77

Mills confirmed the meeting with Pickering and Mullen: 

In the course of their investigation, we had one briefing 

where they stepped through where they were in their process—and, by that, the other person who was briefed was 

the Secretary—that they stepped through where they were 

in their process and that they anticipated being on time 

and what their own assessments were, but that they had 

not come to conclusions yet about accountability. So this 

was basically a briefing before they had stepped through 

their accountability elements.78

Editing the Report 

Mills also described Pickering and Mullen’s outreach as they 

were drafting their final report: 

A: And then, as they were preparing their report, they 

reached out to say, ‘‘We have a draft of the report.’’ They 

shared that draft with me. I shared back my observations 

of instances where there were issues or facts that I 

thought were relevant for their consideration. They took 

them, or they didn’t. Ultimately, they had to make that 

judgement. 

Q: So you reviewed the draft before it went public, before 

it was released? 

A: Well, the draft before it went to—ultimately, it goes to 

the Secretary—— 

Q: Right. 

A: —and then it actually gets—we made a determination 

to release it. ARBs are not always released publicly, but 

the Secretary had said she wanted to release this one publicly. 

Q: And can you tell me the extent of edits that you and/ 

or the Secretary made to the report? 

A: The Secretary didn’t. And the Secretary did not, at 

least to my knowledge, review a draft. 

Q: So Secretary Clinton didn’t review it; you just reviewed 

it. 

A: I reviewed the draft. That’s correct. 


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Q: All right. And were there—you said there was some 

suggestions. So what were the edits, what were the 

changes that you asked the ARB to make? 

A: I can’t tell you that were the different issues now, because that’s obviously too long away. But basically what I 

stepped through was, if there was information that we had 

that didn’t seem to be reflected there, I would flag that. If 

there were other reactions or observations I had, I would 

share that. And that’s what I would have done. 

Q: So I just want to be clear. First, you reviewed it. Second, you said there are changes that need to be made, and 

you gave those changes to the ARB. Is that right? 

A: No. 

Q: Okay. Well, then tell me what’s right. 

A: Okay. I reviewed it, and I identified areas where I either saw that there was, from my perspective, based on 

where I was sitting, information that wasn’t present, information that might be different, or other factors that I 

thought were relevant for their consideration in deciding 

what went in the document. And they then made their 

own judgement. 

Q: Well, that sounds like changes. 

A: I certainly—— 

Q: So you suggested changes? 

A: I certainly made recommendations for places where I 

thought there were inaccuracies or misstatements or other 

information that might not be fully reflective of what the 

information was that was there. I certainly made those, 

yes. 

A: You reviewed it, and you recommended changes. It was 

up to them whether they implemented the changes or included them in the—— 

A: Yes. Recommend changes or flagged areas where I 

thought there might be inaccuracies. 

Q: Change this, delete that, that kind of—that kind of—— 

A: No. 

Q: I just want to be clear. 

A: Oh. Thank you. 

Q: All right? 

A: I appreciate that. 

Q: You recommended changes. Then what happened? Did 

they do it or not? 

A: So some they took probably, and some they didn’t. My 

impression is that—— 


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79 Id. at 187–191. 80 Email from Thomas Nides, Deputy Sec’y of State for Management and Resources, U.S. Dep’t 

of State, to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff, U.S. Dep’t of State (Nov. 3, 2012 12:26 PM) (on file 

with the Committee, SCB0058538). 81 Email from Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Thomas Nides, Deputy 

Sec’y of State for Management and Resources, U.S. Dep’t of State (Nov. 3, 2012 1:10 PM) (on 

file with the Committee, SCB0058537). 82 Unclassified Benghazi Accountability Review Board, U.S. Dep’t of State [hereinafter Unclassified ARB]. 83See Finding # 5, id., at 7; see also Classified Accountability Review Board, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, at 10 [hereinafter Classified ARB]. 84See Statement of Admiral Mullen, U.S. Dep’t of State, Briefing on the Accountability Review 

Board Report (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/202282.htm; see also 

Statement of Ambassador Thomas Pickering, U.S. Dep’t of State, Briefing on the Accountability 

Review Board Report (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/202282.htm. 85 Id. 

Q: Why is there a ‘‘probably’’ there? I mean, the final report—you didn’t look at the final report? The Secretary 

looked at it. 

A: I did look at the final report, but what I didn’t have is 

an errata sheet and say, ‘‘Oh, that’s not there. Oh, this is 

there.’’ I didn’t do that, so that’s why I don’t have a frame 

of reference.79

Mills’ peculiar role in the ARB investigation extended beyond the 

selection of members to approving senior State Department officials 

meeting with the ARB. On November 3, 2012, Thomas Nides, Deputy Secretary of State, sought approval from Mills for the ARB’s request to meet with him. On November 3, 2012, Nides wrote Mills 

‘‘I assume this is a y.’’ 80 Mills responded ‘‘Y’’.81

Accountability of State Department Personnel 

Among the 29 recommendations made to the State Department, 

the ARB found: 

Systematic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the State 

Department (‘‘the Department’’) resulted in a Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi 

and grossly inadequate to deal with the attack that took 

place.82

The ARB identified one official from the Bureau of Near Eastern 

Affairs and three officials from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

at fault for Benghazi security failures. Notwithstanding their finding of inferior performance in these two bureaus, the ARB ‘‘did not 

find reasonable cause to determine that any individual U.S. government employee breached his or her duty,’’ 83 the performance 

standard set out in law. A breach of duty must rise to ‘‘willful misconduct or knowingly ignor[ing] his or her responsibilities.’’ 84 The 

Board noted that poor performance does not ordinarily constitute 

a breach of duty that would serve as a basis for disciplinary action 

but is instead addressed through the performance management 

system.85

Mills shared with the Committee her reaction upon learning of 

the ARB’s findings on personnel: 


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86Mills Testimony at 192. 87 Email from William Burns, Deputy Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Cheryl D. Mills, 

Chief of Staff and Counselor, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 18, 2012, 7:26 PM) (Subject: Fw: DS) 

(on file with the Committee, SCB0045827). 88 Email from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec’y for Management, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Cheryl 

D. Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 13, 2012,10:12 AM) (on file with 

the Committee, SCB100920). 

What I do recall is that they had made determinations 

around personnel, and I recall one of them being surprising to me, and I told her [the Secretary] that I was 

surprised that they had made a conclusion about one particular individual.86

Emails between Burns and Mills suggest others were surprised 

by the ARB’s finding with regard to personnel. On December 18, 

2012, Burns wrote to Mills: 

Hi, 

Went down to talk to Eric this evening but missed him. 

Sent him note, and will follow up tomorrow. Also had long 

talk with Pat. He’s coping, but as you well know its not 

easy.87

Emails between Kennedy and Mills indicate discussions were underway to reassign staff as an eventual, or perhaps even preventative, response to the ARB’s finding. On December 13, 2012, five 

days before the ARB report was released, Kennedy proposed to 

Mills a staffing change dealing with three of the four individuals 

ultimately named in the ARB, all of whom were under Kennedy’s 

supervision. His plan called for placing two individuals identified 

by the ARB with the Office of Foreign Missions. The third individual under Kennedy’s supervision would have been responsible 

for security at non-high threat posts. Unsure of the plan, Kennedy 

wrote: 

Cheryl 

As we discussed, I’m sending along my first-cut on staffing 

Still playing with it 

But think its worth a gut check 

Regards 

Pat 88

Notwithstanding Kennedy’s proposal, all four individuals were 

placed on administrative leave and eventually reinstated within 

the State Department. Lamb described her experience to the Committee: 

A: We were put on four State Department employees were 

put on administrative leave for a short period of time. 

Q: Right. With pay or without pay? 

A: With pay. 

Q: And was there any due process for you to go through 

to what was the due process measures? They come to you 

State Department comes to you and says, you’re going to 


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89Lamb Testimony at 106–107. 

be suspended on administrative leave not suspended on 

administrative leave for 4 weeks. Was there some kind of 

due process rights that you had when that was first given 

to you? 

A: I was not given any guidance. 

Q: They didn’t tell you had any way to appeal that or anything? 

A: No. 

Q: Okay. And who told you that? Who told you that you 

were going to be suspended? Or you were going you were 

going to be on a 4 week administrative leave? 

A: Eric Boswell. 

Q: All right. And when he told you that, he didn’t say 

there’s tell me how he gave it to you, he told you that information. 

A: He called me and Scott Bultrowicz in, and he said that 

we were to be out of the building by the end of the business day, and that we were on administrative leave. 

Q: And did you ask him what was your response? I think 

I would say, really? Can I talk to anyone? Can I give my 

side of the story or 

A: No, I Scott and I have been around DS a long time. 

And, I mean, we’ve seen this process, and we knew that 

there were administrative things that people were looking 

into, and we just said, yes, and did as we were told. 

Q: And then how were you notified that you were you 

were when you could come back? Did you know right 

ahead that today you are going to leave and you can come 

back to a date in the future? What did they tell you? 

A: We were sent a letter telling us when to report back to 

duty. 

Q: Okay.89

While the ARB’s findings of accountability extended to three individuals within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the findings 

were limited. The ARB correctly assessed the State Department’s 

inadequate security posture at the Benghazi Mission both in terms 

of its physical security as well as the lack of security staffing. However, the ARB failed to distinguish between responsibility for security staffing and responsibility for physical security. This confusion 

is reflected in the Chairman of the ARB’s testimony: 

Q: So the decisions about additional physical security, who 

were those made by? 

A: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 

* * * 

Q: How high up did they go? 


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90 Ambassador Thomas Pickering Testimony at 153. 91 Unclassified ARB, supra note 81, at 30. 92See U.S. Dep’t of State, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review Fact Sheet, http:// 

www.state.gov/documents/organization/153109.pdf. 93Leading Through Civilian Power, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, U.S. 

Dep’t of State, at 72 (2010). 

A: To Assistant Secretary Boswell principally, but to [Deputy Assistant Secretary] Charlene Lamb in fact.90

Contrary to the Chairman of the ARB’s understanding, responsibility for the physical security of the Benghazi Mission did not fall 

within the Office of International Programs but within the Office 

of Countermeasures and the relevant offices under its purview. 

Moreover, the decisions to exclude the Benghazi Mission from the 

physical security rules were generally made at the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs and Under Secretary for Management levels. The Benghazi ARB described ‘‘the flawed process by 

which Special Mission Benghazi’s extension until the end of December 2012 was approved,’’ determining it was ‘‘a decision that did 

not take security considerations adequately into account.’’ 91 Yet, 

the ARB failed to ascribe responsibility to those who drafted and 

approved the Benghazi Mission’s 12 month extension. 

The Benghazi ARB’s failure to recognize deficiencies at the highest levels of the State Department’s leadership is curious. As stated 

above, the State Department has been told repeatedly by past 

ARBs that change is needed both in its culture and with respect 

to security. Following two of the most significant terrorist attacks 

in State Department history, the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy bombings in 1998, the ARB described steps the State Department should take to bolster the security of facilities abroad; chief 

among them, the application of the security rules at U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad. The State Department rejected these past 

ARB recommendations and excluded the Benghazi Mission from 

the security rules. 

Furthermore, it is ironic that in the summer of 2009 the State 

Department conducted a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review, which was intended to be a ‘‘sweeping review of diplomacy 

and development, the core missions of the State Department and 

USAID.’’ 92 The report came out in December 2010 and was lauded 

as a ‘‘sweeping assessment of how the Department of State’’ could 

‘‘become more efficient, accountable, and effective in a world in 

which rising powers, growing instability, and technological transformation create new threats, but also new opportunities.’’ 93 The 

report cautioned that the State Department must change in order 

to: 

[I]nstitute procedures to integrate security and risk management into every stage of policy and operational planning in Washington and the field. Including security considerations in the design and development of policy and 

programs from the outset will make it easier to find effective ways to mitigate risk. We will also ensure Diplomatic 

Security Regional Directors are more actively and regularly involved in regional bureaus’ policy development so 

there is a shared understanding between those responsible 


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94 Id. 95 House Armed Services Committee, Majority Interim Report: Benghazi Investigation Update, 

at 3 (Feb. 2014) (on file with the Committee). 

for ensuring security and those responsible for developing 

and implementing policy.94

Yet the State Department maintained the status quo and rejected the findings of this report. In fact, every ARB review has 

concluded that the State Department needs a significant change in 

its culture and organizational structure to improve security. Lasting and significant change must be directed from the top. 

House Armed Services Committee Majority Interim Report: 

Benghazi Investigation Update 

Between September 2012 and April 2014, the House Armed Services Committee conducted its own review of the events surrounding 

the September 11–12, 2012, terrorist attacks, including the days 

leading up to and following the attacks. Specifically, the Armed 

Services Committee looked at the military’s role: ‘‘the response of 

the Department of Defense’’, ‘‘what preparations the U.S. military 

had made for the possibility of an attack’’, and ‘‘what arrangements 

have subsequently been put in place to minimize the possibility of 

a similar occurrence.’’ 95 In February 2014, the Armed Services 

Committee issued a ‘‘Majority Interim Report: Benghazi Investigation Update’’ outlining its findings to date. At the time of its interim report, the Armed Services Committee had conducted seven 

classified briefings, two public hearings and one transcribed witness interview. Based on the information obtained, it issued six 

findings in its February 2014 report: 

1. In assessing military posture in anticipation of the September 

11, 2012 anniversary, White House officials failed to comprehend or ignored the dramatically deteriorating security situation in Libya and the growing threat to U.S. interests in the 

region. Official public statements seem to have exaggerated 

the extent and rigor of the security assessment conducted at 

the time. 

2. U.S. personnel in Benghazi were woefully vulnerable in September 2012 because a.) the administration did not direct a 

change in military force posture, b.) there was no intelligence 

of a specific ‘‘imminent’’ threat in Libya, and c.) the Department of State, which has primary responsibility for diplomatic 

security, favored a reduction of Department of Defense security personnel in Libya before the attack. 

3. Defense Department officials believed nearly from the outset 

of violence in Benghazi that it was a terrorist attack rather 

than a protest gone awry, and the President subsequently permitted the military to respond with minimal direction. 

4. The U.S. military’s response to the Benghazi attack was severely degraded because of the location and readiness posture 

of U.S. forces, and because of lack of clarity about how the terrorist action was unfolding. However, given the uncertainty 

about the prospective length and scope of the attack, military 


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96 Id. at 2. 97 Id. at 1. 98 Id. 99 Id. at 4. 100 Committee on Armed Services: Benghazi Materials, p. 5. 101 Id. at 7. 

commanders did not take all possible steps to prepare for a 

more extended operation. 

5. There was no ‘‘stand down’’ order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi. 

However, because official reviews after the attack were not 

sufficiently comprehensive, there was confusion about the 

roles and responsibilities of these individuals. 

6. The Department of Defense is working to correct many weaknesses revealed by the Benghazi attack, but the global security situation is still deteriorating and military resources continue to decline.96

SCOPE LIMITATIONS: MAJORITY INTERIM REPORT 

Notwithstanding its findings, the Armed Services Committee acknowledged at the outset the limitations of its report stating ‘‘This 

report should be considered one component of continuing comprehensive Benghazi related oversight underway in the House of 

Representatives.’’ 97 Moreover, the Armed Services Committee recognized the scope of its review of the terrorist attacks was limited, 

stating, ‘‘[i]n keeping with the committee’s jurisdiction, however, 

this document addresses only the activities and actions of personnel in DOD.’’ 98 Finally, the report acknowledged ‘‘the committee’s inquiry continues’’, ‘‘staff . . . [will] interview additional witnesses in coming weeks, including individuals who were involved 

in responding to the Benghazi events and other officials. Some individuals who have already provided information will appear for further questioning and clarification.’’ 99 The Armed Services Committee conducted eight transcribed interviews after releasing the 

interim report.100 The last transcribed interview occurred in April 

2014, one month prior to the Select Committee’s formation. 

CONTENT LIMITATIONS: MAJORITY INTERIM REPORT 

The value of information obtained was necessarily limited. Public 

hearings and briefings typically do not lend themselves to uncovering new facts or witnesses. The Defense Department was positioned to influence the content of information presented in these 

settings. As a result, the Armed Services Committee was limited in 

its understanding of the policies and procedures that contributed to 

the military’s posture prior to and its response during the September 11–12, 2012, attacks. 

For example, the Armed Services Committee had not conducted 

transcribed interviews of the top military officials prior to its 2014 

report to understand the discrepancies in the discussions that took 

place during the September 10, 2012, meeting with the White 

House regarding the nation’s preparedness and security posture on 

September 11, 2012.101 It did not interview Secretary Panetta to 

discuss his December 2011 trip to Libya, his understanding of the 


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102 Id. at 16. 

Benghazi Mission compound, and his role in the military’s response—specially why only one asset made it to Libya more than 

24 hours after his verbal order to deploy the Commander’s in 

Extremis Force, special operations forces located in the United 

States, and two Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams including one 

to Benghazi and one to Tripoli.102 Further, it did not interview 

many military personnel on the ground at the installations and intermediate staging bases in Europe to understand the orders given 

and status of assets on September 11–12, 2012. Finally, the Armed 

Services Committee did not have access to other agency documents 

referencing military discussions that could shed light on issues relating to military planning and operations prior to and during the 

attacks. 

Broadly speaking, the Armed Services Committee predominantly 

confined its inquiry to whether the military had assets close 

enough to have ‘‘made a difference’’ in Benghazi. Further, it did not 

have access to new information with respect to assets potentially 

available outside of then-established military planning for such 

contingencies. Nowhere does the Armed Service Committee’s report 

consider: Was Benghazi ever part of the military’s response? Why 

did it take the military so long to get to Tripoli? What assets received orders to deploy? Why did it take so long to put U.S. forces 

into motion? And, most basically, whether it is accurate to state no 

assets could have arrived in time for the second fatal attack on the 

annex? 

SELECT COMMITTEE’S INVESTIGATION 

The Select Committee sought to answer these and other important questions based on all the evidence presented not just the 

facts as presented by Defense Department. At the Select Committee’s insistence, it conducted 24 interviews, 16 of whom had never 

been interviewed. The Select Committee also received approximately 900 pages of documents never before produced to Congress. 

The Select Committee’s insistence on additional information was 

met with opposition from the Defense Department, a department 

seemingly more used to dictating the terms of congressional oversight. From the perspective of the Defense Department, the Select 

Committee should have been satisfied with the witnesses and documents it provided. For example, the Defense Department chided 

the Committee for wanting to speak to a low-level service member 

that may have evidence contradicting the Department’s version of 

events. In the Department’s view, however, ‘‘locating these types of 

individuals are [sic] not necessary since such claims are easily dismissed by any one of the multiple high-level military officers already interviewed.’’ The Select Committee, however, was not in the 

business of accepting the word of anyone single person, ‘‘high-level 

military officers’’ or otherwise. The Select Committee was interested in finding and confirming facts wherever those facts emerged 

to understanding the truth about the military’s role on the night 

of September 11–12, 2012. 


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The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

Chairman’s Report 

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released 

its report to the public on November 21, 2014. The report was limited in scope, its focus narrowly aimed at reviewing the performance of the Intelligence Community related to the deaths of four 

Americans in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. The Select Committee, having the benefit of time, breadth of inquiry and resources 

has identified facts that contradict a key, overly broad conclusion 

contained in the Chairman’s report. Namely, the Chairman’s report 

asserted that there was ‘‘no evidence of an intelligence failure.’’ 

The Select Committee received testimony from two senior Obama 

Administration officials who stated that in their view an ‘‘intelligence failure’’ had taken place with respect to Benghazi. 

Further, the Select Committee received testimony with respect to 

not one, but two, important analytical tradecraft irregularities that 

career line analysts uniformly described as significant and gave 

rise to important concerns. Both directly impacted significant analysis with respect to Benghazi, including an assessment given to the 

President of the United States. This too was a significant intelligence failure. 

The Intelligence Committee interviewed less than one-third of 

the CIA personnel on the ground that night in Benghazi—twothirds of whom held the exact same position. It did not interview 

key witnesses who would have helped it better understand the 

overall CIA mission in Benghazi and its response to the attacks, including analytical issues in the wake of the attacks. The Intelligence Committee did not interview any of the CIA analysts at 

headquarters. The Select Committee’s interviews with these analysts allowed it to draw conclusions about the errors of the products 

produced by the analysts involved in drafting. 

Finally, the Chairman’s report draws several conclusions about 

the analytical assessments done by the CIA. As described previously in this report, the Select Committee received testimony 

with respect to two separate serious analytical tradecraft incidents 

with respect to Benghazi: sloppy analytical work gave rise to key 

fallacies of the Administration’s talking points with respect to the 

attack, and another incident where the President’s briefer substituted her own personal assessment for the properly coordinated 

and vetted work of line analysts in the President’s Daily Brief. 

In short, the Select Committee has had access to and received 

evidence from numerous witnesses and documents that the Intelligence Committee never obtained. It has had the time and resources to inquire into the intelligence efforts before, during and 

after the attacks in Benghazi. This Committee believes this report 

provides a truly thorough review of the intelligence community’s 

performance related to the attacks. 


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APPENDIX L: 

Biographies of Glen A. Doherty, 

Sean P. Smith, J. Christopher Stevens, 

and Tyrone S. Woods 

Glen A. Doherty 

Glen Doherty (born 1970) was a personal security specialist serving in Libya. He was raised in Massachusetts and joined the Navy 

SEALS in 1995 and became a paramedic and sniper specializing in 

the Middle East. He responded to the attack on the USS Cole in 

2000 and served two tours in Iraq. After a decorated Navy career, 

Mr. Doherty worked as a private security contractor in a number 

of countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. 

Sean P. Smith 

Sean Patrick Smith (born 1978) was an Information Management 

Officer with the United States Foreign Service. He lived in The 

Hague, Netherlands and was on temporary duty to Benghazi in 

September 2012. 

Smith previously served in the Air Force, where he spent six 

years as a ground radio maintenance specialist, including a deployment to Oman. Smith was awarded the Air Force Commendation 

Medal. 

Smith was an only child and grew up in San Diego. As a Foreign 

Service employee, he lived in The Hague, Netherlands, with his 

wife and two children. 

He was posthumously awarded the Thomas Jefferson Star for 

Foreign Service on May 3, 2013. 

J. Christopher Stevens 

Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens (born 1960) served as U.S. 

Ambassador to Libya from May 2012 to September 2012. He had 

previously served in Libya as the Deputy Chief of Mission from 

2007 to 2009 and as the Special Representative to the Libyan Transitional National Council from March 2011 to November 2011. Stevens also served overseas in Jerusalem, Cairo, and Riyadh. 

While in Washington, Stevens served as Director of the Office of 

Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs; Pearson Fellow with the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee; special assistant to the 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs; Iran desk officer; and staff assistant in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. 


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Prior to joining the Foreign Service in 1991, Ambassador Stevens 

was an international trade lawyer in Washington, DC. From 1983 

to 1985 he taught English as a Peace Corps volunteer in Morocco. 

He was born and raised in northern California. He earned his 

undergraduate degree at the University of California at Berkeley 

in 1982, a J.D. from the University of California’s Hastings College 

of Law in 1989, and an M.S. from the National War College in 

2010. He spoke Arabic and French. 

Tyrone S. Woods 

Tyrone Woods (born 1971) was a personal security specialist in 

Libya. He was a highly decorated Navy SEAL for almost twenty 

years, serving in various locations, including Iraq. After his retirement in 2010, he protected U.S. facilities around the world. 

Woods was raised in Portland, Oregon, and was an avid runner, 

surfer, and car enthusiast in addition to being a registered nurse 

and certified paramedic. He is survived by his wife and three sons. 


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758 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-114.eps
759 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-115.eps
760 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-116.eps
761 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-117.eps
762 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-118.eps
763 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-119.eps
764 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-120.eps
765 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-121.eps
766 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-122.eps
767 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-123.eps
768 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-124.eps
769 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-125.eps
770 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-126.eps
771 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-127.eps
772 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-128.eps
773 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-129.eps
774 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-130.eps
775 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-131.eps
776 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-132.eps
777 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-133.eps
778 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-134.eps
779 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-135.eps
780 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-136.eps
781 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-137.eps
782 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-138.eps
783 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-139.eps
784 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-140.eps
785 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-141.eps
786 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-142.eps
787 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-143.eps
788 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-144.eps
789 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-145.eps
790 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-146.eps
791 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-147.eps
792 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-148.eps
793 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-149.eps
794 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-150.eps
795 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-151.eps
796 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-152.eps
797 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-153.eps
798 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-154.eps
799 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-155.eps
800 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-156.eps
801 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-157.eps
802 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-158.eps
803 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-159.eps
804 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-160.eps
805 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-161.eps
806 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-162.eps
807 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-163.eps
808 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-164.eps
809 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-165.eps
810 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-166.eps
811 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-167.eps
812 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-168.eps
813 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-169.eps
814 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-170.eps
815 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-171.eps
816 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-172.eps
817 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-173.eps
818 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-174.eps
819 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-175.eps
820 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-176.eps
821 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-177.eps
822 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-178.eps
823 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-179.eps
824 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-180.eps
825 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-181.eps
826 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-182.eps
827 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-183.eps
828 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-184.eps
829 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-185.eps
830 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-186.eps
831 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-187.eps
832 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-188.eps
833 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-189.eps
834 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-190.eps
835 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-191.eps
836 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-192.eps
837 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-193.eps
838 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-194.eps
839 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-195.eps
840 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-196.eps
841 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-197.eps
842 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-198.eps
843 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-199.eps
844 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-200.eps
845 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-201.eps
846 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-202.eps
847 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-203.eps
848 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-204.eps
849 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-205.eps
850 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-206.eps
851 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-207.eps
852 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-208.eps
853 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-209.eps
854 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-210.eps
855 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-211.eps
856 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-212.eps
857 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-213.eps
858 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-214.eps
859 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-215.eps
860 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-216.eps
861 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-217.eps
862 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-218.eps
863 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-219.eps
864 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-220.eps
865 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-221.eps
866 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-222.eps
867 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-223.eps
868 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-224.eps
869 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-225.eps
870 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-226.eps
871 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-227.eps
872 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-228.eps
873 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-229.eps
874 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-230.eps
875 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-231.eps
876 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-232.eps
877 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-233.eps
878 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-234.eps
879 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-235.eps
880 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-236.eps
881 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-237.eps
882 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-238.eps
883 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-239.eps
884 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-240.eps
885 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-241.eps
886 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-242.eps
887 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-243.eps
888 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-244.eps
889 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-245.eps
890 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-246.eps
891 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-247.eps
892 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-248.eps
893 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-249.eps
894 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-250.eps
895 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-251.eps
896 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-252.eps
897 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-253.eps
898 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-254.eps
899 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-255.eps
900 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-256.eps
901 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-257.eps
902 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-258.eps
903 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-259.eps
904 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-260.eps
905 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-261.eps
906 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-262.eps
907 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-263.eps
908 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-264.eps
909 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-265.eps
910 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-266.eps
911 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-267.eps
912 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-268.eps
913 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-269.eps
914 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-270.eps
915 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-271.eps
916 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-272.eps
917 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-273.eps
918 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-274.eps
919 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-275.eps
920 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-276.eps
921 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-277.eps
922 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-278.eps
923 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-279.eps
924 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-280.eps
925 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-281.eps
926 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-282.eps
927 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-283.eps
928 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-284.eps
929 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-285.eps
930 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-286.eps
931 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-287.eps
932 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-288.eps
933 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-289.eps
934 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-290.eps
935 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-291.eps
936 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-292.eps
937 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-293.eps
938 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-294.eps
939 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-295.eps
940 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-296.eps
941 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-297.eps
942 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-298.eps
943 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-299.eps
944 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-300.eps
945 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-301.eps
946 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-302.eps
947 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-303.eps
948 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-304.eps
949 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-305.eps
950 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-306.eps
951 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-307.eps
952 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-308.eps
953 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-309.eps
954 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-310.eps
955 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-311.eps
956 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-312.eps
957 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-313.eps
958 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-314.eps
959 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-315.eps
960 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-316.eps
961 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-317.eps
962 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-318.eps
963 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-319.eps
964 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-320.eps
965 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-321.eps
966 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-322.eps
967 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-323.eps
968 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-324.eps
969 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-325.eps
970 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-326.eps
971 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-327.eps
972 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-328.eps
973 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-329.eps
974 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-330.eps
975 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-331.eps
976 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-332.eps
977 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-333.eps
978 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-334.eps
979 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-335.eps
980 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-336.eps
981 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-337.eps
982 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-338.eps
983 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-339.eps
984 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-340.eps
985 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-341.eps
986 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-342.eps
987 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-343.eps
988 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-344.eps
989 

Æ 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with HEARINGMView1-345.eps