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NORTH KOREA’S PERPETUAL PROVOCATIONS:

ANOTHER DANGEROUS, ESCALATORY

NUCLEAR TEST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 14, 2016

Serial No. 114–230

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GRACE MENG, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Victor Cha, Ph.D., senior adviser and Korea chair, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies ........................................................................................... 5

Mr. Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia, The Heritage 

Foundation ............................................................................................................ 13

Sue Mi Terry, Ph.D., managing director, Bower Group Asia ............................... 27

Mr. David Albright, president and founder, Institute for Science and International Security .................................................................................................. 38

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Victor Cha, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................. 7

Mr. Bruce Klingner: Prepared statement .............................................................. 15

Sue Mi Terry, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................. 29

Mr. David Albright: Prepared statement ............................................................... 40

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 60

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 61

The Honorable Matt Salmon, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Material 

submitted for the record ...................................................................................... 62

The Honorable Grace Meng, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 67

(1)

NORTH KOREA’S PERPETUAL PROVOCATIONS: 

ANOTHER DANGEROUS, ESCALATORY 

NUCLEAR TEST 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:27 p.m., in room 

2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. I apologize for both of us being a little bit tardy. 

We had the Foreign Minister from Burma, who was here to meet 

with the chairman of the full committee, and we were asked to attend. So, thanks for being so patient. I really appreciate you not 

leaving. 

The subcommittee will come to order. Members present will be 

permitted to submit written statements to be included in the official hearing record. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

Last Friday, North Korea conducted its fifth and most powerful 

nuclear test to date. This latest provocation coming just weeks 

after they fired off three additional missiles during the G-20 summit in China. While U.S. and United Nations sanctions have undoubtedly hurt the North Korean economy, Kim Jong-un continues 

to willingly and belligerently defy U.N. Security Council resolutions 

as well as international norms. Clearly, he is not fazed by the administration’s so-called plan of strategic patience, and so continues 

with his childlike behavior that endangers much of the world. The 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, under the leadership of 

Chairman Royce, has taken the lead to address this intransigence. 

While we have already taken bold steps in increasing sanctions, 

clearly, more must be done. We are here today to identify and work 

toward proactive policy solutions that will put an end to the provocations of this rogue regime. Enough is enough. 

As good as the additional sanctions have been, without China’s 

enforcement, it will never be enough. I would like to hear from our 

panel on how to best engage China on this issue. We have been 

talking about this for a very, very long time, and it doesn’t seem 

like we have gotten them properly motivated. We have talked to 

2

some of our allies about the same issue. And, frankly, China’s almost nonintervention in this issue is very, very frustrating. We 

would love to hear any thoughts you might have on how we can 

get them a little bit more excited about getting more involved. 

China prefers the status quo in North Korea rather than risk a 

flood of North Korean refugees and a shared border with the 

Korea-U.S. alliance. Some experts even worry that China may use 

its enforcement of U.N. Security Council resolutions and diplomatic 

assistance as a wedge, forcing South Korea to choose between 

China and the United States as its main partner on the peninsula. 

The international community at large is alarmed at China’s indifference to date over North Korean provocations, especially with nuclear detonations so near its own border. Even North Korea’s willingness to embarrass China by upstaging the G-20 ceremonies with 

a nuclear test has not yet led to real action by China. 

The administration has appeared to make some progress on our 

trilateral engagement with Korea and Japan, our two closest allies 

in East Asia. The House recently passed my legislation, which was 

cosponsored by Mr. Sherman, to encourage further dialogue and cooperation between our nations, with particular emphasis toward 

the North Korean threat. I will be very interested to hear from our 

panel on the potential for further cooperation from South Korea 

and Japan on how we might best work together to address North 

Korea’s dangerous behavior. 

The United States recently convened its annual joint military exercises with South Korea. The U.S. flew two bombers over South 

Korea to provide some reassurance to our friends in Seoul, but I 

am not sure these messages resonate with Pyongyang. We all know 

that there are few options to instill real change from within North 

Korea, but waiting it out will not solve anything. We need a 

proactive approach. 

Most agree that getting information to the people of North 

Korea, unfiltered by the current regime, would greatly benefit the 

people of North Korea and aid efforts to diminish the stranglehold 

Kim has over the nation. I have legislation that passed through 

this subcommittee that would provide an overdue update and enhancement of those efforts. Boosting the information flow in North 

Korea would cripple Kim Jong-un where he is most vulnerable, and 

that is in the realm of reality. 

Again, sanctions efforts have been a huge focus in Congress, but 

due to China’s lack of resolve, they seem to have little practical impact. I would like to determine what we can do to take it to the 

next level. What other chokepoints can we squeeze to shut off funding to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions? Cutting off access to financial messaging systems, such as SWIFT, was a successful strategy 

to induce compliance with Iran, and we should pursue the same 

strategy toward North Korea, in my belief. The rogue regime 

should not have access to the international financial system. 

As if its other activities weren’t reason enough to cut off its financial messaging access, North Korea has been identified as the 

likely culprit of a serious hack on SWIFT earlier this year, in 

which the culprits stole $81 million from Bangladesh’s central 

bank. For that reason, I am working on legislation to end North 

3

Korea’s access to interbank financial transfers to prevent further 

abuses and reduce funding to North Korea’s nuclear program. 

Time and again, North Korea has proven that, so long as it is 

able, it will continue to advance its nuclear program, for both internal domestic strength as well as international bargaining power. 

While the United States has shown a willingness to negotiate with 

North Korea when it takes even modest steps toward 

denuclearization, North Korea has shown no interest—zero interest—in maintaining international norms. This cycle cannot continue, and we cannot strategically wait with a potential catastrophe looming. 

I look forward to a frank discussion with our witnesses on what 

to do next with this rogue regime. 

And I would like to recognize the ranking member for his opening statement, and then we will go to you, the witnesses. Thank 

you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding these hearings. To amplify your reason why we were both late, we met with 

the Foreign Minister of Burma, also known as Myanmar, who happens to be Aung San Suu Kyi, one of the most inspirational women 

in the world. And, some would say, the de facto head of state of 

an important nation in Southeast Asia. 

I want to thank you for holding these hearings as we look at 

North Korea’s fifth test overall. Its second test conducted just this 

year. The bomb’s yield is estimated to be as much as 20 kilotons 

or even more. And, if accurate, that would mean that the test involved a bomb with at least twice the yield of any other bomb tested by North Korea. We used to have the luxury of saying the North 

Koreans just want to get our attention; they just want some this 

or that concession. That is why they tested the missile; that is why 

they tested the nuclear explosive device. We can no longer just 

view North Korea as an annoying, petulant child. It is clear that 

North Korea is testing missiles and bombs for the purpose of developing warheads and ICBMs that can be put together and can reach 

our allies and, ultimately, the continental United States. The testing they are engaging in is necessary to achieve that goal. The fact 

that North Koreans have greatly increased the tempo of their testing is consistent with the view of an all-out effort to achieve these 

frightening capacities. 

We need to approach this problem with both a clenched fist and 

an open hand. As to the clenched fist, we can have sanctions on 

North Korea and its leaders, but these will be significant but not 

enough to change its policy unless we have the cooperation of 

China. China is North Korea’s lifeline, whether it is food, whether 

it is oil, whether it is trade, whether it is money, whether it is hard 

currency. China is North Korea’s window to the world and the provider of the financial services that they need. China needs to realize that there will be consequences well beyond our current targeted sanctions on this or that business entity if it continues to do 

business as usual with North Korea. China needs to understand 

that if North Korea uses its nuclear weapons, we will blame not 

only the regime in Pyongyang but also the regime in Beijing. China 

needs to know that it risks a serious change in relationship with 

the United States if it does not assist us in this effort. It cannot 

4

assume that it will always have access to the United States market 

the way it does now. And, there are those who say that it is unthinkable to link the trading relationship with the foreign policy relationship. I think it is time to think the unthinkable. But, what 

we are likely to do is just keep doing what we have been doing, 

which has been very ineffective in stopping North Korea’s efforts. 

At the same time, we need an open hand. We should be discussing with North Korea a nonaggression pact, if they are still 

seeking one. We should be discussing with China that if there was 

a unification of the Korean Peninsula, something I don’t think is 

going to happen anytime soon, but that if that were to happen, that 

the United States would not take military advantage of that, that, 

if anything, there would be a smaller American military presence 

on the Korean Peninsula and that it would not be north of the 38th 

parallel. 

And, we should explore whether some of our sanctions on North 

Korea could be reduced or eliminated, at least for a while, if there 

were very intrusive inspections to enforce a regime that froze its 

nuclear program. The idea of accepting, even for a while, that 

North Korea keeps what it has may sound like a departure from 

orthodoxy. But, every year, they have more, and it would be a good 

year if they did not increase their nuclear capabilities. 

I should point out that North Korean nuclear doctrine seems to 

call for having about 12 usable nuclear weapons to defend their 

country. They will soon have a 13th, and it may go on eBay. Not 

exactly on eBay, but once they get a certain number, they can 

think of selling the next one. If it is sold, it will not be for tens 

of millions of dollars; it will be for billions of dollars. Fortunately, 

there is no terrorist organization in the world that can provide that 

amount of money, but I can think of one or two states that would 

like to have nuclear weapons that could muster billions of dollars. 

And, I am going to continue my effort to convince the Chinese Government that they should not allow nonstop flights between 

Pyongyang and Tehran that don’t stop for fuel in China. It is always good to get more fuel, and it is always good for the Chinese 

Government to be in a position to know what is on the plane. 

What is more likely is we are just going to keep doing what we 

are doing. We will talk at China, but we won’t do anything that 

forces them to change their policy. And we will be back here, unfortunately, without our chairman in the years to come—unless you 

want to do a third iteration of your congressional career to hold 

hearings—and by then, we may be talking about testing an ICBM 

that has proven to go thousands of miles. I don’t want to be here 

to do that, but I am not moving to Arizona, so if it does happen, 

I will be here to see it. 

And, I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. I thank you. 

In the interest of time, we would like to move to the witnesses, 

and upon your conclusion, we will have questions by the members 

of the panel up here. 

You have all testified before Congress before, but let me just remind you that, with our lighting system, when it is green, you are 

good as gold; when it turns amber, you have got a minute left; 

5

when it is red, please finish. I know we have a lot of questions, a 

lot of interest. This is a very pressing issue and pressing time. 

First of all, we have Dr. Cha, senior adviser and Korea chair at 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Mr. Bruce 

Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage 

Foundation; we have Dr. Sue Mi Terry, managing director of Bower 

Group Asia; and Mr. David Albright, the president and founder of 

Institute for Science and International Security. 

We thank the panel for joining us today to share their experience 

and expertise. 

And, Dr. Cha, we will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF VICTOR CHA, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND 

KOREA CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. CHA. Thank you, Chairman Salmon, Representative Sherman, and committee members. 

North Korea is shaping up to be the number one security threat 

for the next U.S. Presidency. Since 2009, there have been 62 ballistic missile and nuclear tests, versus 17 ballistic missile and nuclear tests during the Clinton and Bush administrations. So, there 

has been a steep change, and neither of the candidates have really 

addressed this issue. This issue is going to hatch in the next administration. 

What the North Koreans want—as Representative Sherman said, 

we used to think they wanted attention and that is why they did 

these sorts of things. That is clearly not what we are talking about 

anymore. In my opinion, they are trying to demonstrate, to the best 

of their ability, a survivable nuclear capability. And, they are trying to do that, at least signal that, before the next U.S. President 

comes into office. 

And I think we have more provocations to come. The data that 

we are collecting at CSIS on our Beyond Parallel Web site, which 

we will be releasing soon, indicates that they like to do things in 

a specified window around U.S. Presidential elections. So, I expect 

that there is more to come. 

The threats are obvious, and I think both Chairman Salmon and 

Representative Sherman have spoken to these. And, I particularly 

want to emphasize the horizontal proliferation threat. I mean, their 

statements are talking about standardizing a weapons design. The 

suggestion is that the next step is production. And, if they do 

produce scores of missiles, nuclear-tipped missiles, there is only one 

thing that they can do with them, and that is to sell them. History 

has shown that they have sold every finished weapon system they 

have ever developed, whether it is missiles to Pakistan and Iran, 

whether it is a nuclear design for a 5-megawatt reactor to Syria, 

or even discussions with Saddam Hussein at one point, except Saddam was not ready to pay for anything yet. 

Unfortunately, we are going to go back to the usual playbook: 

Angry statements from the United Nations, perhaps another Security Council resolution. 

The sanctions are not doing the things that we want them to do. 

They are not retarding the program. They are not forcing the North 

Koreans back to the negotiation table. And they are not—even 

6

though this is an unspoken aspect of sanctions—they are not causing the regime to be unstable. So the current pattern is not working. 

So, what should we do? I mean, I will offer some ideas. I don’t 

know if they are new ideas, but I will offer some ideas. The first, 

and I think foremost, is that we need to deploy THAAD on the Korean Peninsula. Both the South Korean people and U.S. forces on 

the peninsula are naked without it. And, I know this is shaping up 

to be a controversial issue in South Korea, but this is not a political 

issue, even though it is being played as political in South Korea. 

This is a national security issue. 

Second, I think we can do more in terms of sanctions. We can 

certainly boost or turbocharge the sanctions. We can close the loophole in 2270 when it comes to the sectoral measures, coal and these 

sorts of things. We can ban fuel exports to North Korea. We can 

ban the overseas labor exports. As Chairman Salmon said, we can 

do something with SWIFT. We can designate Air Koryo for violating the U.N. ban on importing luxury goods and bulk cash transportation. We can try to ban North Korean transactions in other 

foreign currencies, including the RMB. So there are a number of 

sanctions that we could do. 

I also want to draw attention to the importance of continuing to 

focus on trying to implement the U.N. Commission of Inquiry recommendations, including discussion in the U.N. Security Council 

about holding North Korean leaders responsible for human rights 

abuses. 

I do agree that we can’t do all of this without leaving open some 

sort of diplomatic path. Otherwise, we are just headed on a path 

to war. And, so I think, in this regard, China should convene a fiveparty meeting. When we created the Six Party Talks, that was the 

purpose, was to have five-party meetings in which we could talk 

with the Chinese and others about more coordination on contingency planning. 

Finally, let me say that I think we do need to engage China more 

on sanctioning, but I think we also need to engage them on thinking about the overall direction of the leadership in North Korea 

and how we might be able to effect change there. This problem, as 

we can see, based on the number of tests they have been doing, 

really coincides with the assumption of power of this leadership, 

this new young leadership. And, as long as that is there, this is 

going to continue to be a problem. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cha follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Klingner. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BRUCE KLINGNER, SENIOR RESEARCH 

FELLOW FOR NORTHEAST ASIA, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. KLINGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sherman, and distinguished members of the panel. It is truly an 

honor to be asked to appear before you again on such an important 

issue to U.S. national security. 

North Korea’s repeated violations of U.N. resolutions have led to 

a new international consensus on the need for stronger, more comprehensive sanctions. The enhanced punitive measures are welcome, if long overdue, but their utility is dependent on complete 

and forceful implementation. 

This year, Congress passed the North Korea Sanctions and Policy 

Enforcement Act, which had a major impact by inspiring or pressuring others to implement long overdue measures on North Korea. 

The act increased U.S. leverage at the U.N. Security Council. It led 

other nations to undertake similar actions or to wean themselves 

away from business dealings with Pyongyang. And it led the 

Obama administration to finally designate North Korea as a primary money laundering concern and target several North Korean 

entities, including Kim Jong-un, for human rights abuses. Yet, 

more can and needs to be done. 

Besides the Obama administration’s policy of timid 

incrementalism of sanctions enforcement, another major problem, 

as you have identified, is China. In March, China agreed to U.N. 

Resolution 2270, which has been touted as the toughest to date. 

That is true, but as has been the case with every previous resolution, it was watered down due to the demands of Beijing. And Chinese banks and businesses seemed to be pulling back from North 

Korea early in 2016. However, China took similar action after 

every previous North Korean nuclear test, and each time, China 

temporarily tightened trade and bank transactions with Pyongyang 

only to subsequently reduce enforcement and resume normal economic trade within only a few months. For years, China has been 

an enabler of North Korean misbehavior at the U.N. 

China’s reluctance to strongly pressure its ally provides 

Pyongyang a feeling of impunity, which encourages it only toward 

further belligerence. The effectiveness of international sanctions is 

hindered by China’s weak implementation. 

The economic noose is now tightening on the North Korean regime, and it faces a perfect storm of conditions that make it more 

vulnerable to economic pressure. The regime is facing a reduced 

flow of hard currency due to the increased financial sanctions; the 

increasing pariah status of the regime that is scaring away business partners; decreased global prices for resource commodities, 

which is a major North Korean export; the slowing Chinese economy; and South Korea ending its involvement in the failed Kaesong 

joint economic venture, which had generated nearly a quarter of 

North Korea’s foreign trade. 

Now, how to respond to North Korea? The international community should take all possible measures to cut off the flow of money 

into North Korea and substantially increase pressure on the reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:52 Nov 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\091416\21543 SHIRL
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gime. In my written testimony, I have provided a lengthy list of 

specific recommendations, and I will highlight a few here. 

There are additional measures we can take, but as important is 

fully implementing all the measures and the powers that we already have. But some of the steps, as you have already alluded to, 

are imposing secondary sanctions and penalizing entities, particularly Chinese financial institutions and businesses that trade with 

those on the sanctions list. Imposing secondary sanctions could 

have a chilling effect on Chinese economic engagement with North 

Korea. To date, the Obama administration has not sanctioned a 

single Chinese entity for facilitating North Korean prohibited behavior. 

Compel the removal of North Korea from the SWIFT financial 

transfer network, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman. The Obama 

administration and the European Union pressured the Belgianbased hub for electronic financial transactions to disconnect sanctioned Iranian banks in 2012. We should do the same with North 

Korea. 

We should also work to ban North Korean overseas workers exploited in highly abusive conditions. North Korea has an estimated 

60,000 to 100,000 workers overseas, earning the regime an estimated $300 million to $400 million a year. We should also increase 

information operations, through overt and covert means, to promote greater North Korean exposure to the outside world to have 

a long-term corrosive effect on the regime. 

The U.S. and its allies must also implement measures to defend 

themselves against the spectrum of North Korea’s military threat. 

As Mr. Cha has pointed out, we should deploy the THAAD ballistic 

missile defense system in South Korea. It is better than anything 

Korea has or will have for decades to defend against North Korean 

land-based missiles. We should also urge South Korea to deploy 

sea-based ballistic missile defense against the submarine missile 

threat from North Korea. Currently, Seoul has no systems to defend itself against an SLBM. We should also augment allied antisubmarine warfare capabilities. North Korea’s apparent ability to 

evade allied submarine detection systems is worrisome. 

And, finally, we should fully fund U.S. defense requirements. The 

U.S. military is smaller today than it was on 9/11. 

In conclusion, at present, any offer of economic inducements to 

entice North Korea to abandon its nuclear arsenal is an ill-conceived Wile E. Coyote plan with little chance of success. Sanctions 

and targeted financial measures may take time to have an impact 

on the regime’s financial condition. In the near term, however, such 

measures enforce U.S. and international law, impose a penalty on 

violators, and constrain the inflow and export of prohibited items 

for the nuclear missile programs. The difficulty will be maintaining 

international resolve to stay the course. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klingner follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Dr. Terry. 

STATEMENT OF SUE MI TERRY, PH.D., MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

BOWER GROUP ASIA 

Ms. TERRY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you on this very difficult problem. 

North Korea is a very personal issue for me. My entire paternal 

side of the family came from the north, and I have personally witnessed the pain of divided families. 

In the aftermath of the fifth nuclear test, again, the community 

of Korea watchers is divided as to what the next steps should be. 

As a number of North Korea experts argue, sanction strategy as a 

policy of U.S. policy is no longer working, and it is time to return 

to negotiations with North Korea even without preconditions. 

Other experts call for ratcheting up more pressure against the Kim 

regime by enforcement of sanctions and other measures, such as information warfare, even if it means potentially risking escalation 

by the regime or even potentially risking instability. 

I actually believe that if there is any chance at all that North 

Korea would ever entertain the idea of ever giving up nuclear 

weapons program, it would be only because we have made it so 

that the Kim regime is facing a very stark choice between keeping 

its nuclear arsenal and regime survival. 

Victor and Bruce Klingner just laid out before you—as they laid 

out, I agree that this ratcheting up pressure must begin with 

tougher sanctions and, more importantly, better enforcement. As 

you have heard, we have just not done that yet. It is premature to 

argue that sanctions are not working, or it has failed. Until February of this year, we did not even have comprehensive sanctions 

against North Korea. We finally have stronger sanctions in place, 

but for sanctions to work, it needs to be enforced. 

Here again, the chief problem has been China. China is still reluctant to enforce—to implement the U.N. sanctions. There are 

many examples of China’s noncompliance, and I point out some of 

this in my written testimony. 

President Obama has also yet to fully use the broad powers that 

the Congress has given him to penalize any Chinese companies or 

banks for continuing to do business with North Korea. Confronting 

Kim Jong-un credibly depends on getting bankers in China and 

other countries to comply with the sanctions, which means a credible threat of secondary sanctions is necessary. 

In addition to enforcement of sanctions, the next steps are to 

close existing loopholes and add even more individuals and entities 

to the list. You have heard what some of them could be both by 

Victor and Bruce. That includes banning labor and disconnecting 

North Korean banks from SWIFT system. 

Beyond sanctions, I think there are other actions that we can 

take to ratchet up pressure, including: Promoting human rights in 

North Korea, seeking ways to increase information dissemination 

into the north, and finding ways to give Internet access to North 

Korean citizens. North Korea should also be placed back on the 

28

State Sponsors of Terrorism list. I know you have discussed this 

with both speakers in the past. 

Now, even as we push for enforcement of sanctions and 

ratcheting up pressure on the Kim regime, I am very aware that 

these measures could also fail and no amount of pressure may 

change the regime’s calculus. Nonetheless, after more than two decades of dealing with North Korea, I think we are left with very, 

very few options. And if we manage to enforce sanctions, including 

secondary sanctions, over a sustained period of time, I think this 

will be the first time we decisively raised the stakes, the cost for 

Kim Jong-un in pursuing the nuclear weapons program. And this 

might, just might, make him reconsider his policies. If it doesn’t 

and the critics of sanctions policy are right, that even the strictest 

enforcement of sanctions will not make the Kim regime reconsider 

its nuclear program. Even so, I believe enforcement of sanctions 

and a containment policy are the right next steps, even as we leave 

the door open for engagement down the road. In addition to sending a message to other rogue regimes about the cost of flouting 

international law, I think these pressures could also weaken Kim 

Jon-un’s grip on power. And while they might at some point precipitate instability, potential instability, I believe that this is an 

outcome that we should welcome, not fear, because over the longer 

term, we should really be pursuing a policy of unification of the two 

Koreas. 

Let me just conclude with this point. While Kim Jong-un’s hold 

on power appears to be firm right now, I think there is a growing 

sign of discord among the elite class. We have recently seen an increasing rate of defection by very high-ranking elites. All these frequent purges and executions of high-level elites may help strengthen Kim Jon-un’s rule in the short run, but all this heavy-handed 

rule is more likely to corrode long-term elite support for Kim. 

This is, again, where the sanctions enforcement will help. The 

more we intensify economic pressure against the Kim regime, the 

more we shake the confidence of the elites, the more that Kim 

Jong-un will be left vulnerable, as he will have less foreign currency to underwrite the lifestyle of the elites, whose support is essential in maintaining his grip on power. And at the end of the 

day, it is when Kim Jong-un is facing really an abyss, he might finally choose to disarm, or, failing that, it may be that the North’s 

policy will only change if a different leadership fundamentally 

emerged. Tightening the sanctions screws now, I think, will hasten 

that day. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Terry follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Albright. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, PRESIDENT AND 

FOUNDER, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL 

SECURITY 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sherman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, for 

holding this hearing. 

North Korea’s recent nuclear test, its second this year, demonstrates its resolve and commitment to developing a nuclear arsenal able to strike its enemies. Reversing that growing threat must 

be a greater U.S. priority. This test, its largest to date, combined 

with a number of recent ballistic missile tests, should lead the 

United States and its partners to accept that North Korea can 

strike its neighbors with nuclear weapons, and it is making 

progress on building a long-range nuclear-capable force. 

Diplomatic efforts so far have proven inadequate to stop North 

Korea’s progress. However, when agreements were reached, they 

improved transparency over North Korea’s nuclear programs, 

slowed its progress, and led to fewer regional provocations by the 

regime. In short, negotiating with North Korea is a strategy that 

can yield both short- and long-term gains. The United States needs 

to reinvigorate its efforts to seek the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal for sure. 

With regards to that endeavor, it has to be recognized that China 

is not going to deliver North Korea’s denuclearization. Unless 

China dramatically changes its current policies, it is not going to 

institute sanctions or other measures that it views as risking the 

collapse of the North Korean regime. Although we at my institute 

support increasing pressure on China to apply more effective sanctions on North Korea, the United States cannot rely on China to 

press hard enough to get North Korea to make significant nuclear 

concessions. The United States needs to find additional ways to influence North Korea, including direct negotiations. 

At my institute, we are still assessing the recent test, but based 

on North Korea’s statements and the yield of the test, we preliminarily assessed that North Korea may have a family of relatively 

reliable miniaturized fission weapons with a destructive force rivaling the size of the Hiroshima blast that can use plutonium or 

weapons-grade uranium and fit on a number of ballistic missiles. 

North Korea’s statement after the test implies that North Korea 

could have learned to use weapons-grade uranium in what it has 

called the standardization of the nuclear warhead. This opens the 

path to building a large number of miniaturized nuclear weapons 

using weapons-grade uranium. North Korea is likely to be able to 

produce considerably more weapons-grade uranium than plutonium 

and in ways that largely escape our current detection. 

Taking account of the recent tests, my institute estimates that 

North Korea has about 12 to over 20 nuclear weapons. We believe, 

over the next 5 to 10 years, it can significantly increase the number of weapons. 

There remains plenty of room to improve and strengthen the 

sanctions on North Korea. To my institute, the immediate priority 

39

is the United States sanctioning Chinese companies involved in 

providing controlled or sensitive goods to North Korea. The U.S. 

Government should use its authority to sanction illicit actors in 

China that supply North Korea’s nuclear missile and other nuclear 

programs. In addition, in order to prevent the further expansion of 

North Korea’s nuclear programs, more coordination is needed 

among allies to thwart North Korea’s overseas purchases for its nuclear and missile programs. It is also useful to step up sanctioning 

of banks and financial institutions involved in business with North 

Korean nuclear missile and military programs. 

Reestablishing meaningful negotiations with North Korea will 

not be easy, but it should be a major U.S. priority. How to achieve 

meaningful denuclearization negotiations, and what they should 

cover requires much deeper study, but any negotiation should be 

premised on a firm commitment to achieve North Korean 

denuclearization and avoid in any way legitimizing North Korean 

nuclear weapons. These negotiations should include broader initial 

declarations of its uranium and plutonium pathways to the bomb 

and provide access to nuclear sites outside of the Yongbyon complex. 

Moreover, the negotiations cannot focus only on the nuclear program. They will need to ratchet back North Korea’s ballistic missile 

programs and resolve regional security issues. Finally, North Korea 

must commit to not proliferate abroad and not to engage in nuclear 

and missile cooperation with Iran or other countries. 

Congress has an important role in establishing U.S. sanctions 

and sanctions policy on North Korea, and it should encourage the 

administration to use its authorities given in the North Korea 

Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016. It should also explore more ways to encourage China to apply sanctions on North 

Korea. However, as I have said, the United States should not depend solely on China. It also needs to develop other ways to influence North Korea to denuclearize. Engaging North Korea has historically shown that it yields limitations and more transparency 

into North Korea’s nuclear activities compared to a policy of ignoring the threat while it grows. Combined with greater efforts to rein 

in its illicit activities and addressing regional security concerns, 

changing the status quo of North Korea’s ongoing dangerous provocations is possible. New thinking is needed to reengage this dangerous regime and start the process of achieving denuclearization. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I appreciate the witnesses’ comments. 

The United States has engaged in negotiations with North Korea 

in the past from time to time during the Bush administration. We 

agreed to certain lifting of sanctions at the commitment that Korea 

would do certain things. We lifted the sanctions, started the flow 

back into North Korea, and quickly found out that it was a ruse. 

They went back to doing exactly what they did before. 

While, Mr. Albright, I don’t discount the importance of diplomacy 

and negotiations, I don’t think most of us are very trustful that 

Kim Jong-un is an honest broker and that he is somebody that we 

can count on to keep his word once he gives it. I think that the 

sanctions that we have employed heretofore, both by the United 

States and the international community at large, have been largely 

unsuccessful in getting any kind of change or desired change from 

North Korea. And, I am increasingly believing that China’s intransigence on the issue is becoming more and more frustrating. On 

one hand, they loudly proclaim that they are just as committed to 

stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea as 

the rest of us are, but yet they are really not doing that which they 

can to make change. 

The chief reason is, as I have talked with some of our Chinese 

diplomats, they say it is their concern that there will be a flood of 

refugees over the China border if they impose the kind of sanctions, economic and otherwise, that would really motivate North 

Korea that it could implode their economy. So, there is a fear of 

that. 

I am not sure that I buy that. In fact, I kind of almost feel like, 

on one side, they are saying, ‘‘Don’t do it’’; on the other side, you 

know, they are allowing many of their companies to provide the 

wherewithal to increase that nuclear program. 

I would really like to explore more ideas. I mean, we have talked 

about the deployment of THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, which 

I strongly support. In fact, we just passed a bill that I and Brad 

Sherman authored dealing with trilateral relationship between us, 

Japan, and South Korea, but also strong language in there about 

the deployment of THAAD on the Korean Peninsula. So, on one 

hand, that, you know, is a step in the right direction, but China 

is also using all their political influences to pressure China—or, excuse me, pressure Seoul not to do that. In fact, that is probably one 

of the biggest sources of political blowback that they are getting to 

getting it done, because South Korea counts on China very heavily 

in their economic projections and economic strength. So that kind 

of pressure from China is very inordinate. 

What are some of the other things that we can do to get China 

to the table? I agree with targeted sanctions against Chinese companies that are in the mix, you know, with this Chinese—or excuse 

me, this North Korean proliferation. But Mr. Sherman has suggested at times past—I think it is kind of provocative—maybe we 

should be looking at other potential economic sanctions against 

China because of their lack of interest in getting this done. And I 

am asking, you know, what are your thoughts on that? Are those 

possible motivators? 

The other thing that I am wondering is—I know when it was 

said during the campaign, a lot of people got real excited, but what 

47

is the likelihood that China and South Korea at some point in time, 

if North Korea develops a really robust nuclear program and it is 

proven to be reliable, what is the likelihood that South Korea and 

Japan, those two entities, might start looking at their own nuclear 

programs in a defensive realm? Those are my thoughts. 

And, Dr. Cha, would you maybe start off your response? 

Mr. CHA. Thank you, Chairman. I will try to address a couple of 

these. I think they are all very important points, and I think you 

have framed the policy problem quite well. 

Let me just say, on negotiations, as someone who participated in 

the last set of negotiations, the 2005-2007 Six Party Agreed Framework, I know what that rabbit hole looks like. And it will start out 

with—in terms of what we could get. It will start out with a ban 

on—they will self-declare a testing ban as long as we are in talks 

with them. And then, if we are lucky, we might get a freeze on operations at the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon. I think that will 

be about as far as we can get during the course of negotiations. 

That freeze won’t be verifiable in the sense that they won’t let 

the IAEA in, I don’t think. And, of course, it won’t include anything 

outside of Yongbyon, even the one facility that they have said is a 

uranium facility at Yongbyon. So I think it is going to be—so we 

have been down that rabbit hole. And it will do something, but, at 

best, it is a holding position and a suboptimal holding position. So 

I am also one for negotiations, but it is going to be very difficult. 

On what we should do, I mean, I think there are two areas of 

vulnerability that we should press on. With regard to China, China 

doesn’t respond to what North Korea does. China responds to what 

the United States does in response to North Korea. And whether 

it is secondary sanctioning or even something that is a little bit 

more radical, including possibly altering the disposition of our 

forces on the peninsula in a way that makes our overall capabilities 

more robust but makes our forces less vulnerable. That would be 

something China would take notice of. 

And, with regard to North Korea, you have already hit on it. 

Both of you have hit on it, and that is the information issue. That 

is what they see as a vulnerability. But, the thing is, either of 

these things entails more risk on the part of the United States and 

our policies on this issue. What we see thus far, what we all find 

so distasteful, the current position, is because we have generally 

been quite risk-averse when it comes to dealing with this problem. 

But, it has grown so out of control that some of these other measures we might consider that press on vulnerabilities of both China 

and North Korea are there, but it requires us being willing to take 

on more risk. 

Mr. SALMON. I am going to yield to the next question, but the 

risk of the status quo is far worse than anything that you are talking about as far as what those risks entail, I believe. The risk of 

just allowing it to go as it is going right now is a very frightening 

venture, and I think that if we are doing risk assessment, you got 

to take that into account as well. 

Mr. Lowenthal. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I would like to follow up on your questioning now. After listening, I find this fascinating. 

48

I have heard a lot about, you know, China and China’s intransigence and lack of compliance to really helping, especially in terms 

of—and then the response of, what kinds of pressure can we put 

on? 

What about other kinds of alternatives? I am not really understanding very well the role of China in the sense that, is there a 

way that we can enlist China as a partner, not as an adversary in 

this relationship, but as a partner in terms of what does China fear 

about North Korea’s weakness? Does China need North Korea 

strong, or would they like to see something different, and what are 

they frightened of? And what does China want in all of this? I am 

not hearing, what would China want in something like this? Because I am just hearing one side, what we want, what we do. And 

I agree with that. But what does China want in this relationship, 

and are they frightened of something? I would like to kind of understand more if we are really talking about other kinds of alternatives. Anybody? 

Ms. TERRY. Yes. I would like to just discuss some of the points 

that the chairman and you have just made. And China, just briefly 

to go over your point, I think economic sanctions, trade, it is all 

good, but there is no political will in the Obama administration. So 

I think we really need to still focus on the secondary sanctions and 

target Bank of China, Bank of Daedong, Chinpo Shipping, and so 

on. 

Regarding your point about what does China fear, I think part 

of what we can discuss with China is that China fears instability 

in the Korean Peninsula. China fears unification ultimately, because it does not want a pro-U.S. unified Korea with potential U.S. 

forces on the——

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Is that an obstacle, or could that be a potential 

for us to have discussions with them? 

Ms. TERRY. This is somewhat controversial, but I would like to 

argue that—in terms of trying to help come up with creative thinking is, say, if you can engage and try to have a candid discussion 

with China. It would be very difficult to do so, but—not only about 

the nuclear program, but the potential instability and potential 

unification scenarios. And, we might have to make that kind of 

grand bargain where we do sort of promise to reduce U.S. troop 

presence or even it has to be, post-unification, pulling U.S. forces 

out. But, that is something that we could consider in addition to 

just sort of trying to pressure China. 

I just want to get back to your point about South Korea and 

Japan arms race. I think that is a very big concern, that if we let 

nuclear North Korea happen, ultimately, I think there will be an 

instability in the region. Because South Korea is already talking 

about bringing tactical nuclear—some South Koreans are—bringing 

tactical nuclears back to South Korea, and they will cause arms 

race both by South Korea and Japan. 

Mr. KLINGNER. I would just add, Mr. Albright pointed out the exponentially growing North Korean threat. We have had what to 

some were sudden unexpected revelations that ‘‘gambling was 

going on in the casino,’’ in that missiles that had been under development for years had success, and that shocked people. So now you 

49

have this new fear that the threat is real. It would be humorous 

if it weren’t disturbing. 

So we have a submarine-launched ballistic missile which had a 

breakthrough. The intermediate-range missile had a breakthrough. 

Guam is now under direct threat. So it is a question of, are we serious or not? There are things we can do at the U.N. We should push 

for eliminating what is called the ‘‘livelihood purposes’’ loophole on 

the ban on North Korea’s export of resources. The loophole is bigger than the ban. 

With regard to China, I think they don’t want a crisis on their 

border, but their behavior is only creating the conditions that will 

bring about that crisis. The Obama administration and the Bush 

administration have had conversations with China, trying to explain that their reluctance to pressure their ally is only bringing 

about the crisis they don’t want, and it is only going to cause the 

U.S. and its allies to take responsive measures that they won’t like. 

So we can try to induce their cooperation, but when we talk 

about secondary sanctions on China, we can almost sort of toss 

that off, but it is actually very, very important, because what it can 

do is actually induce Chinese banks and businesses to do things 

that the government doesn’t want them to do. 

We saw that back in the mid-2000s with Banco Delta Asia. The 

Chinese Government didn’t want Bank of China to cut off North 

Korea. The Bank of China knew it could be susceptible under U.S. 

law to being precluded from access to the U.S. financial system. So 

the Bank of China, in essence, told the government: Well, we hear 

you, but we have to disagree. We have to cut off North Korea. Otherwise, the Bank of China could face sanctions. So if we were to 

sanction even one Chinese entity, it would send a very strong signal to the others. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Could I add to that? Is there still time? Because 

I think it is very important that the enforcement of the existing 

sanctions be done rather than—I mean, it is important to look for 

new ones. I mean, maybe there is a silver bullet out there and 

maybe SWIFT is potentially that. 

But at the same time, it is critical to send a message to China, 

because another issue with China is that on a lot of these exports 

to North Korea, it claims it is just a big large developing country 

that can’t manage its own system. And, I think, there is some truth 

to that. There are hundreds of thousands of companies licensed for 

export in China. And even if you take a European country, some 

of the smaller ones, you are talking about hundreds or 1,000 companies that can do that. So the control issues are profound. 

But I think that that also creates an opportunity, that China 

doesn’t support these exports, but it is not going to do anything. 

And I think the U.S. can play a very important role in sending a 

signal into China that it needs to do it. And I think it is critically 

important at this time to enforce the sanctions that this Congress 

has passed. And there are companies in China that are known to 

deal with North Korea, and strong cases can be made that they are 

violating the sanctions and the U.S. should actually sanction them. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

General Perry.

Mr. SHERMAN. I would ask for 1 minute. 

50

I want to address this issue what I think China would want. I 

mean, they would prefer if North Korea didn’t have a nuclear program, but that is not high on their list. They would like to continue 

trade. That is not the highest thing on their list. The purpose of 

sanctions is to force the regime to change its policy by creating regime-threatening sanctions, and China does not want this regime 

threatened. 

And the one thing that they don’t want——

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Because of——

Mr. SHERMAN. Because they could see, if this regime implodes, 

two very bad things happen for China: Millions of very poor North 

Koreans move north as refugees. And then you might see a unification under the South Korean Government. And unless we promise 

otherwise and unless they can believe the promise, an American 

military, not on the 37th, 38th parallel, but right up on their border. So, they don’t want an American Army on their border. They 

don’t want the implosion of the regime. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. I agree with all those things that you are saying, but could that be the basis of a discussion? 

Mr. SHERMAN. It ought to be, but I will yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thanks. Congressman Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Cha, you suggested a new posture or profile for the United 

States military in South Korea. Can you be specific? 

Mr. CHA. Well, I think there is more that we can do in terms of 

missile defense, not just one THAAD battery, but more than one. 

My colleague Bruce referenced sea-based platforms in terms of missile defense. SM3, I think that is another name. And these sorts 

of things will both create better defense of the peninsula and get 

China’s attention. 

Mr. PERRY. What about land-based force? 

Mr. CHA. So that is the next piece. 

Mr. PERRY. And other than missile defense, seagoing missile defense, what about seagoing? 

Mr. CHA. Seagoing missile defense——

Mr. PERRY. No, other than missile defense. But I am talking 

about more robust naval posture. Is that——

Mr. CHA. Yes. I think that, both in Japan and in Hawaii and in 

Guam, and then the land-based forces on the Korean Peninsula. I 

mean, there is an argument—I am not necessarily advocating this 

argument, but there is an argument that could be made in the 

sense that those forces traditionally have been a tripwire for a second conventional ground invasion. That is not going to happen 

again. And in that sense, the tripwire concept may not be relevant 

anymore. There are other ways to defend and maintain the 

strength of the U.S. extended deterrence on the peninsula that 

don’t require a tripwire and that also don’t leave forces vulnerable 

to chem, bio, or a nuclear attack from the north. 

Now, you know, this is not the forum in which to get into details 

on things of that nature. But, all I am saying is that we should be 

willing to discuss new things, as the chairman said, new ideas, that 

make sense in terms of our defense against a nuclear North Korea, 

but also that are things that can create enough concern in the case 

51

of China that they might be willing to change their own risk assessment of pressuring North Korea. 

Mr. PERRY. What is South Korea’s—how would they view or how 

would they be interested in increasing those postures, ground 

forces, sea-based——

Mr. CHA. I think there would be a great deal of interest in things 

that augment the capabilities, both U.S. and combined capabilities. 

The ground troops would be a very controversial issue for them, 

just because there is a legacy issue there. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Mr. CHA. And that would be very controversial. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. And then one final question from a messaging 

standpoint or information operations, like the Voice of America, et 

cetera, how robust is our capability now? Is it used to the fullest 

extent? What can be done to increase that, or should that be increased? And, does it have any effect at all? 

Mr. CHA. It definitely has an effect. Defector testimony shows, 

not—well, 100 percent of defectors, but defector testimony suggests 

close to 80 or 90 percent of people inside North Korea have had exposure to a foreign radio broadcast. 

This is really a question of resources, I think. The more resources 

that can be put to this, the more you can enhance that capability. 

I mean, there is a hardware issue there too, in terms of, you know, 

where can you bounce these things off? So, I guess you could say 

that the tube is kind of small, but there is still a lot more that can 

go into that tube that would have an impact. 

Mr. PERRY. What would be North Korea’s response to increasing 

the volume on that? No pun intended. 

Mr. CHA. I think the regime would be very sensitive to it. And 

this is a bigger vulnerability I think for them than THAAD, for example. 

Mr. PERRY. When you say ‘‘very sensitive,’’ I mean, I am sure 

they don’t want any of it. They don’t like what there is now, and 

they are going to like it less if we do more, but what is our risk 

in doing more? 

Mr. CHA. There is a risk. 

Mr. PERRY. What is that risk? 

Mr. CHA. Well, in the past, when the South Koreans increased 

information coming across the border, the North Koreans have 

threatened to take out the speakers. So there is that risk. There 

is the risk that they could respond in anger and shell an island. 

There is definitely a risk to it. 

But my point is that these sorts of strategies will necessarily entail more risk. Otherwise, we remain stuck in the current cycle 

that we are in. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks. Mr. Chairman, I yield. 

Ms. TERRY. Can I add a quick comment to that? I spent a lot of 

time debriefing North Korean defectors. I think information dissemination is one of the keys we have that we can use against the 

North Korean regime. The risk is that they are going to get angry, 

but so what? I mean, we are looking for ways to work here. Monopoly on information is one of the pillars of the regime’s stability. 

This is how they were able to survive for this long. So I think findVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:52 Nov 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\091416\21543 SHIRL
52

ing ways to try and disseminate information into the north is critical for us. 

And we have got to find ways to open the Internet to the people 

of North Korea—I know we have been sort of working on that—so 

they can have access to information, they can communicate freely 

with their South Korean brethren and so on. I think there are ways 

to maybe work with Google and Facebook to pilot their global initiative in North Korea. I think we need to increase the range and 

power of TVs and AM broadcasting to North Korean audiences and 

so on. We can work on covert ways. We can work with the intelligence community to find covert ways. Whatever we can to get information into North Korea, I think, is one of the things that we 

can actually pursue. 

Mr. PERRY. Dr. Terry, doesn’t that all have to be covert? I mean, 

we can broadcast as much as we want. We can facilitate some way 

for them to see the Internet. But if you don’t have the hardware 

and if it is punishable by death to be caught viewing these 

things——

Ms. TERRY. Sure. Even in overt ways. I think overt ways, covert 

ways. I am just emphasizing the importance of trying to get information into North Korea. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We have seen how hard currency sanctions were more successful 

than other sanctions in the past. Can you comment on whether or 

not you think those types of sanctions would be as effective or more 

effective today, and, if so, why or why not? 

Mr. KLINGNER. I think it is first important to point out the multiple objectives that sanctions and targeted financial measures 

have. Some have said people are already impatient: ‘‘Well, it has 

been 4 months. Sanctions haven’t worked. Let’s go back to diplomacy,’’ which had 20 years of failure. 

But even before it changes North Korea’s behavior, it is enforcing 

U.S. Law. It is imposing a penalty or pain on those that violate our 

law and U.N. resolutions. It constrains or puts in place measures 

to constrain the inflow of items for their prohibited nuclear missile 

programs, including money from illicit activities. It puts into place 

measures to reduce the risk of proliferation. And then, five, the 

most difficult in conjunction with all your instruments of national 

power, it is trying to alter their behavior. 

So I would say on four of the five, the sanctions have already 

been successful to some degree. The fifth is the most difficult. But 

when we have a very small country with very few avenues of access 

to the outside world—and that is mainly China—it is I think a better target than Iran. 

Some would say: ‘‘Well, you can’t sanction Iran, because it is so 

big, it is so connected with the world, it has got oil, et cetera; go 

after North Korea.’’

Well, now that we had pressure on Iran, which brought about the 

negotiations, now people are saying: ‘‘Well, that worked because it 

was so big and so well-connected; it won’t work with North Korea.’’

I would argue the opposite. 

Ms. GABBARD. Interesting. 

53

Mr. CHA. May I add? 

Ms. GABBARD. Dr. Cha. 

Mr. CHA. So I would agree with what Bruce said. I think there 

are two issues when we are talking about these currency sanctions. 

I don’t know, Representative Gabbard, if your question is suggesting this. But one of them is—however it is—is to reduce the 

North Koreans to having to carry suitcases of cash if they want to 

do any sort of transaction. So that is one. And that is the proliferation findings. 

The other part—and this is the part that I am not sure if your 

question is—is the freezing of their assets and accounts overseas 

because that is a different—that is directly linked to the leadership, right. And that could have a very big impact on how this 

leadership thinks and addresses and behaves. And so, whatever 

sanctions the committee is working, whatever legislation, I think 

these are the two objectives. We want to reduce them to having to 

carry suitcases of cash, and then we also want to be able to target 

those assets that we think are connected to the leadership wherever they are. So——

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Mr. Albright. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yeah. I think one of the problems, though, is that 

China resists these kinds of sanctions. I mean, their view is, if you 

close off the financial system to North Korea, and it is concentrated 

in certain Chinese banks, it will collapse the state. So you immediately run into this problem where they just don’t cooperate. 

But at the same time, we don’t really know what is going to happen. And I think it is, again, an argument why we need to get the 

administration to enforce the existing sanctions and target some of 

these banks, target some of these entities, and then let’s see what 

happens. 

One thing—I don’t know, I don’t want to take your time, but I 

think, on the engagement, I don’t think that we have to accept 

crumby conditions of engagement, shutting down 5-megawatt reactor—I forget the other condition you gave. I mean, we simply say: 

No, it is not enough. 

And even I was engaged in the discussions on the—before the 

Leap Day Deal, and North Koreans were willing to shut down and 

stop the centrifuges at the Pyongyang centrifuge plant. Who knows 

if they would have followed through. But even that is not enough 

today. We need to have more than that if there is going to be a 

negotiation. So I think it is up to us to sculpt the engagement, not 

to accept kind of the pitiful things that North Korea may offer initially. 

Ms. GABBARD. I think that is the remaining question. I don’t 

have time for it now, but, you know, people have raised getting 

back to the negotiating table, setting the conditions to be able to 

make that possible, but then addressing the chairman’s point about 

the lack of trust in actually being able to execute knowing that 

there has to be truly enforceable consequences to noncompliance in 

that situation. 

So thank you all for being here. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Sherman. 

54

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, if we are going to achieve our political objectives for the foreign policy establishment, et cetera, here in this 

country, we need to do two things: First, don’t make compromises, 

and don’t admit how weak our position is. And, second, cling to the 

idea that we are somehow going to completely disarm North Korea 

of all nuclear weapons. And then, third, when we fail to achieve 

our objectives, which has been true this entire century, just shrug 

it off, and as long as you don’t propose any radical change in policy, 

the foreign policy establishment will say you know what you are 

talking about. And the fact that we have totally failed to slow down 

this program doesn’t mean that we haven’t achieved the political 

objectives of all telling each other that we know what we are talking about. 

If I gather from your testimony, China is loath to accept regimethreatening sanctions on this regime, and this regime is not going 

to eliminate its nuclear program unless it faces regime-threatening 

sanctions. The question here is, is this a regime willing to settle 

for 10 to 15 nuclear weapons and a lot of monitoring? Because we 

know that they won’t give up all of their nuclear weapons unless 

they face regime change and regime endangerment. 

Will they, just to avoid pressure and get along with China, accept 

a world in which they are a limited nuclear state? I am not saying 

that we would make this concession, but how would that look from 

their standpoint? 

Mr. Albright. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think they would be interested. I mean, I would 

be scared to make that kind of concession. It could be very damaging in the region, but I take your point. And I would say 

that——

Mr. SHERMAN. Are you predicting that, I mean, when you close 

your eyes and think of the world 15 years from now, do you think 

that North Korea will have a greater or lesser nuclear capacity 

than they have today? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, I feel that they are going to have a greater, 

but we have to be guided by denuclearization in order to ensure——

Mr. SHERMAN. It would be nice to cling to denuclearization, but 

as I think you predict, I think as most of us would predict, if we 

keep doing what we have been doing, we are going to get a very 

similar result, but I want to——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I am just afraid we are going to get that result 

if we do accept 15 deliverable nuclear weapons. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay, keep in mind, unless the regime is truly 

threatened and close to falling, they are not going to give up their 

10 to 15 weapons because they feel they need those to defend themselves from us. And keep in mind, when they asked for a nonaggression treaty, the response from Vice President Cheney was no 

because we contemplate aggression. 

So it is not like I would expect them to completely. But I want 

to go to a much smaller issue, not that it is a small issue, and that 

is state sponsor of terrorism designation. The first issue is, is this 

legally justified? One could argue that, you know, long ago, North 

Korea kidnapped people. They kidnapped people to make movies. 

They kidnapped people to get advice on Japanese etiquette. They 

55

kidnapped people, and some would say, well, that happened a long 

time ago so you can’t call them a state sponsor of terrorism. But 

they haven’t released them. So it is a continuing act of terrorism. 

They haven’t returned their bodies if they died of natural or unnatural causes. So maybe that is a continuing act of terrorism. 

But I will ask Dr. Cha, what is the most recent act of terrorism 

other than continuing to hold these hostages committed by the 

North Korean regime? 

Mr. CHA. I would focus on cyber. The attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yeah. I haven’t studied the statute, but is that 

something that justifies designating a state as a state sponsor of 

terrorism? 

Mr. CHA. I think it does. I mean, the administration defined it 

as cyber vandalism, I think, or cybercrime, but there was the destruction of hardware. There was a taking of information. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. So it is a strong legal argument whether 

you look at kidnapping movie actors and directors, or vandalizing 

movie software. 

But now let’s look at the policy. Is it good policy to designate 

North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism? Does that move us in 

the direction of limiting this regime? 

Mr. Albright. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think it is useful to consider. I mean, it was a 

big goal of theirs to be taken off the list. So it certainly argues to 

threaten to put them back on. I mean, again, I don’t know the legal 

aspect of this and whether cyber attack is terrorism. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Klingner and Dr. Terry. 

Mr. KLINGNER. I think if you look at 18 U.S. Code section 2331 

and the definitions there of what constitutes international terrorism, I think the Sony hack and the threats of ‘‘9/11-style attacks’’ against a population, and these threats were to intimidate 

and coerce a population, influence a policy of government, et cetera; 

I think that in and of itself fulfills it. 

In my testimony in January, I included a list of other acts that 

they have done, including attempts against——

Mr. SHERMAN. Good. So that is in our record. And, Dr. Terry, 

would designating them be good foreign policy. I will ask for a 

quick answer. 

Ms. TERRY. Yes. I absolutely agree. I think it would be largely 

symbolic, to be honest, but North Korea was very keen on getting 

off that list, as Victor knows. They tried very hard. It truly bothered them, so I think it is useful. I think it is a leverage that we 

can use against North Korea, and I do think they have done a lot 

of things, including repeated assassination attempts and kidnapping attempts on humans. So there is a whole list of reasons why 

they can be put back on the list. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Just to conclude, I think we need to bring a lot 

more effort and settle for a much smaller objective. We have been 

trying to see a completely nonnuclear North Korea and somehow 

achieve that without doing anything that ruffled anybody’s feathers, here or Beijing. What we ought to be is settling for less and 

being willing to ruffle some feathers to get even that limited objective. We should be willing to tax Chinese exports to the United 

56

States. We should be willing to build the Voice of America towers. 

We should be willing to list them as a state sponsor of terrorism. 

They need a hell of a lot more carrots and a hell of a lot more 

sticks if we are even going to get them to something that most of 

you would say would be an unacceptable solution. 

It is just much better than what is likely to happen if we do 

nothing. I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

being here. I come here as a member of this committee and subcommittee and also as the co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on 

Korea. 

Let me begin by expressing my skepticism about the efficacy of 

sanctions. Up here, when we want to condemn, cite, punish bad behavior, almost always we invoke sanctions as if, well, that will 

deter the behavior. And I don’t know—a former colleague of yours, 

Dr. Cha, Gary Hufbauer, wrote a very thoughtful book years ago 

on the history of sanctions and how effective they are and raised 

a lot of questions. You know, in some cases, they seemed to have 

had the desired effect, but usually, it is combined with some other 

external thing so that at the margins, whoops, the sanctions really 

made it hurt—oil prices plummeting or whatever it may be. 

In and of themselves, it is very difficult to create a regime that 

really can squeeze to the point where we get the desired outcome 

and the intended target—you know, it renounces its undesirable 

behavior. 

And I am just concerned here that, with respect to North Korea, 

I don’t think we have—I mean, it is not apparent to me that we 

have a lot of options. I have noticed, for example, in the printed 

media now we are talking now about, well, maybe we can try to 

get countries to send back North Korean workers to deny North 

Korea that capital, that foreign exchange. 

You mentioned, Dr. Cha, well, maybe we could target leadership 

through certain sanctions. So Kim Jong-un can’t, you know, access 

Courvoisier. His father seemed to like Courvoisier, as I recall. But 

if we are reduced to that, just how effective, I mean, shouldn’t we 

be realistic about what sanctions can and cannot do? And it just 

seems to me that we are, remember, the goal here is to give up 

that nuclear ambition and destroy those existing 15 nuclear weapons or whatever number. I mean, that is our goal. It may or may 

not be achievable, but what sanction provides that tradeoff, from 

the North Korean point of view? 

Mr. CHA. Well, I have no disagreement with you, Congressman, 

about the inefficacy of sanctions thus far. I think where the policy 

debate really is, is that lack of efficacy because sanctions in general 

don’t work or because we haven’t done enough? And for many in 

the policy community, and I think for this administration, the answer right now is we haven’t done enough because when we compare the sanctions on DPRK versus those on Iran, the Iran sanctions were much more comprehensive than what we are seeing on 

DPRK. So I think that is where the administration is now and that 

is where they have been pushing. 

57

Having said that, I would agree with you. I mean, I think the 

sanctions are meant to do one of three things, and none of them 

are happening. They are supposed to either bring the North back 

to the table, which they haven’t done. They are supposed to retard 

the growth of the program, which it hasn’t done. Or, it is supposed 

to destabilize the regime. And it hasn’t done any of these three 

things. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I will just say, when I commended Gary 

Hufbauer’s book, that was pre-North Korea sanctions, I think, and 

he really raised a broader question, not about these sanctions with 

this regime, but sanctions in general. What kind of foreign policy 

really are sanctions? And they are of dubious value. I mean, sometimes they seem to have helped, but it is not clear you can single 

them out and say: That was dispositive. Rhodesia comes to mind. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Can I add one? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, and then we have got to go because we have 

got votes. 

Mr. KLINGNER. There is a difference between sanctions and targeted financial measures. And the smart sanctions that have been 

done in the last 10 years are very different from what traditional 

trade sanctions have been. And a book I would commend would be 

‘‘Treasury’s War,’’ by Juan Zarate, a former Treasury Department 

official, which articulates the very strong differences. 

You know, it is only this year that we actually have as many 

North Korean entities being sanctioned as Zimbabwe entities. So it 

took a number of years just to get to the level of Zimbabwe. And 

then, on the efficacy of diplomacy, some would say, well, North 

Korea builds nuclear weapons when we are not talking to them. 

That is true. They also build nuclear weapons when we are talking 

to them, and they also build nuclear weapons when they sign 

agreements never to build nuclear weapons and when they promise 

to give up the weapons that they promised never to build in the 

first place. We have had four agreements where they would never 

build weapons and four to give up those weapons, including the 

Leap Day agreement, which was a very low bar, and they broke 

that one. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. You know, I would just add, in the nuclear area, 

sanctions have——

Mr. SALMON. We have 4 minutes before we have to vote. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. I would just say, I think sanctions can 

work in the nuclear area better. But you can’t do it alone. And I 

would agree with you. You have to have more. 

Mr. SALMON. I thank the panel. I thank the committee members 

and appreciate all of the insight. 

This meeting is adjourned, thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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