United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

INFORMATION 

TECHNOLOGY 

Critical Factors 

Underlying Successful 

Major Acquisitions 

October 2011 

GAO-12-7 
 United States Government Accountability Office 

Highlights of GAO-12-7, a report to 

congressional committees 

October 2011 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 

Critical Factors Underlying Successful Major 

Acquisitions 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Planned federal information technology 

(IT) spending has now risen to at least 

$81 billion for fiscal year 2012. As 

GAO has previously reported, although 

a variety of best practices exists to 

guide their successful acquisition, 

federal IT projects too frequently incur 

cost overruns and schedule slippages 

while contributing little to missionrelated outcomes. Recognizing these 

problems, the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) has launched 

several initiatives to improve the 

oversight and management of IT 

investments. 

GAO was asked to identify (1) federal 

IT investments that were or are being 

successfully acquired and (2) the 

critical factors that led to the successful 

acquisition of these investments. To do 

this, GAO interviewed agency officials 

from selected federal departments 

responsible for each investment. 

In commenting on a draft of GAO’s 

report, three departments generally 

agreed with the report. OMB and the 

other departments either provided 

minor technical comments, or stated 

that they had no comments at all. 

What GAO Found 

According to federal department officials, the following seven investments were 

successfully acquired in that they best achieved their respective cost, schedule, 

scope, and performance goals. 

Investments Identified as Successful by Federal Departments 

Department Investment 

Commerce Decennial Response Integration System 

Defense Global Combat Support System-Joint, Increment 7 

Energy Manufacturing Operations Management (MOMentum) Project 

Homeland Security Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 

Transportation Integrated Terminal Weather System 

Treasury Customer Account Data Engine 2 (CADE 2) 

Veterans Affairs Occupational Health Record-keeping System 

Source: Agency data. 

Department officials identified nine common factors that were critical to the 

success of three or more of the seven investments. 

Common Critical Success Factors

1 Program officials were actively engaged with stakeholders. 

2 Program staff had the necessary knowledge and skills. 

3 Senior department and agency executives supported the programs. 

4 End users and stakeholders were involved in the development of requirements. 

5 End users participated in testing of system functionality prior to formal end user acceptance 

 testing. 

6 Government and contractor staff were stable and consistent. 

7 Program staff prioritized requirements. 

8 Program officials maintained regular communication with the prime contractor. 

9 Programs received sufficient funding. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. 

Officials from all seven investments cited active engagement with program 

stakeholders as a critical factor to the success of those investments. Agency 

officials stated that stakeholders regularly attended program management office 

sponsored meetings; were working members of integrated project teams; and 

were notified of problems and concerns as soon as possible. 

Implementation of these critical factors will not necessarily ensure that federal 

agencies will successfully acquire IT systems because many different factors 

contribute to successful acquisitions. Nonetheless, these critical factors support 

OMB’s objective of improving the management of large-scale IT acquisitions 

across the federal government, and wide dissemination of these factors could 

complement OMB’s efforts. 

View GAO-12-7 or key components. 

For more information, contact David A. 

Powner at (202) 512-9286 or 

pownerd@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-7 

Contents 

Letter 1 

Background 3

Seven IT Investments Were Reported as Being Successfully 

Acquired 10

Nine Factors Were Commonly Identified as Critical to the Success 

of Major IT Investments 19

Concluding Observations 29

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 30

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 32 

Appendix II Critical Success Factors 34 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 52

Tables 

Table 1: IT Investments Identified as Successful by Federal 

Departments 10

Table 2: Commonly Identified Critical Success Factors across 

Seven Successful IT Investments 19

Table 3: Decennial Response Integration System (DRIS)—Critical 

Success Factors 34

Table 4: Global Combat Support System-Joint (GCSS-J)—Critical 

Success Factors 38

Table 5: Manufacturing Operations Management Project 

(MOMentum)—Critical Success Factors 40

Table 6: Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI)—Critical 

Success Factors 42

Table 7: Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS)—Critical 

Success Factors 45

Table 8: Customer Account Data Engine 2 (CADE 2)—Critical 

Success Factors 47

Table 9: Occupational Health Record-keeping System (OHRS)—

Critical Success Factors 50

 IT Acquisition Success Factors 
Abbreviations 

CADE Customer Account Data Engine 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CIO chief information officer 

CMMI® Capability Maturity Model® Integration 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency 

DRIS Decennial Response Integration System 

ESC executive steering committee 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

GCSS-J Global Combat Support System-Joint 

IRS Internal Revenue Service 

IT information technology 

ITIM Information Technology Investment Management 

ITWS Integrated Terminal Weather System 

LPR License Plate Reader 

MOMentum Manufacturing Operations Management Project 

NARA National Archives and Records Administration 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

NPOESS National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

System 

OHRS Occupational Health Record-keeping System 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

RFID Radio Frequency Identification 

SEI Software Engineering Institute 

WHTI Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 

VA Department of Veterans Affairs 

VHA Veterans Health Administration 

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Page ii GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

Page 1 GAO-12-7 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

October 21, 2011 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

 and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper 

Chairman 

The Honorable Scott Brown 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 

 Government Information, Federal Services, 

 and International Security 

Committee on Homeland Security 

 and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Planned federal information technology (IT) spending has now risen to at 

least $81 billion for fiscal year 2012. As we have previously reported, 

federal IT projects too frequently incur cost overruns and schedule 

slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes.1 Given the 

size of these investments and the criticality of many of these systems to 

the health, economy, and security of the nation, it is important that federal 

agencies successfully acquire these systems—that is, ensure that the 

systems are acquired on time and within budget and that they deliver the 

expected benefits and functionality. 

This report responds to your request that we: 

1. Identify federal IT investments that were or are being successfully 

acquired. 

 1

See, for example, GAO, Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing 

and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making, 

GAO-09-564 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009); and Secure Border Initiative: DHS 

Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program, GAO-10-340 

(Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2010). 

 IT Acquisition Success Factors 
 

2. Identify the critical factors that led to the successful acquisition of 

these investments. 

To address our first objective, we interviewed the chief information 

officers (CIO) and other acquisition and procurement officials from 

selected departments in order to identify one mission-critical, major IT 

investment2 that was, preferably, operational, and that best achieved its 

cost, schedule, scope, and performance goals. 

To address our second objective, we interviewed officials responsible for 

each investment and asked them what critical factors led to the 

investment’s success. We then categorized the critical success factors 

and totaled the number of times each factor was mentioned by the 

department and agency officials. In order to identify common critical 

success factors, we generalized critical success factors that were 

mentioned by three or more investments. We also compared the critical 

success factors to the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) 25 

Point Implementation Plan to Reform Federal Information Technology 

Management3 in order to determine whether those critical success factors 

support OMB’s efforts. 

We conducted our work from December 2010 through October 2011 in 

accordance with all sections of GAO’s Quality Assurance Framework that 

are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and 

perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to 

meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work. We 

believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis 

conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions in 

this product. Further details of our objectives, scope, and methodology 

are in appendix I. 

 2

The Office of Management and Budget defines a major IT investment as a system or an 

acquisition requiring special management attention because it has significant importance 

to the mission or function of the agency, a component of the agency, or another 

organization; is for financial management and obligates more than $500,000 annually; has 

significant program or policy implications; has high executive visibility; has high 

development, operating, or maintenance costs; is funded through other than direct 

appropriations; or is defined as major by the agency’s capital planning and investment 

control process. 

3

OMB, 25 Point Implementation Plan to Reform Federal Information Technology 

Management (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 9, 2010). 

Page 2 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

Investments in IT can enrich people’s lives and improve organizational 

performance. For example, during the last two decades the Internet has 

matured from being a means for academics and scientists to 

communicate with each other to a national resource where citizens can 

interact with their government in many ways, such as by receiving 

services, supplying and obtaining information, asking questions, and 

providing comments on proposed rules. 

Background 

While these investments have the potential to improve lives and 

organizations, federally funded IT projects can—and have—become 

risky, costly, unproductive mistakes. As we have described in numerous 

reports and testimonies,4 although a variety of best practice 

documentation exists to guide their successful acquisition, federal IT 

projects too frequently incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while 

contributing little to mission-related outcomes. 

IT Acquisition Best 

Practices Have Been 

Identified by Industry and 

Government and Promoted 

by Legislation 

IT acquisition best practices have been developed by both industry and 

the federal government. For example, the Software Engineering Institute5

(SEI) has developed highly regarded and widely used guidance6 on best 

practices such as requirements development and management, risk 

management, configuration management, validation and verification, and 

project monitoring and control. In the federal government, GAO’s own 

research in IT management best practices led to the development of the 

Information Technology Investment Management (ITIM) Framework,7

 4

See, for example, GAO-09-564; GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address 

Testing and Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk, 

GAO-10-158 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2010); GAO-10-340; and FEMA: Action Needed 

to Improve Administration of the National Flood Insurance Program, GAO-11-297 

(Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2011). 

5

The Software Engineering Institute is a federally funded research and development 

center operated by Carnegie Mellon University. Its mission is to advance software 

engineering and related disciplines to ensure the development and operation of systems 

with predictable and improved cost, schedule, and quality. 

6

See, for example, Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Capability Maturity 

Model®

 Integration for Development (CMMI-DEV), Version 1.3 (November 2010); and 

Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Capability Maturity Model®

 Integration for 

Acquisition (CMMI-ACQ), Version 1.3 (November 2010). 

7

GAO, Executive Guide: Information Technology Investment Management, A Framework 

for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity, GAO-04-394G (Washington, D.C.: March 

2004). 

Page 3 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

which describes essential and complementary IT investment 

management disciplines, such as oversight of system development and 

acquisition management, and organizes them into a set of critical 

processes for successful investments. 

Congress has also enacted legislation that reflects IT management best 

practices. For example, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, which was 

informed by GAO best practice recommendations,8 requires federal 

agencies to focus more on the results they have achieved through IT 

investments, while concurrently improving their IT acquisition processes. 

Specifically, the act requires agency heads to implement a process to 

maximize the value of the agency’s IT investments and assess, manage, 

and evaluate the risks of its IT acquisitions.9 Further, the act establishes 

chief information officers (CIO) to advise and assist agency heads in 

carrying out these responsibilities.10 The act also requires OMB to 

encourage agencies to develop and use best practices in IT acquisition.11

Additionally, the E-Government Act of 2002 established a CIO Council, 

which is led by the Federal CIO, to be the principal interagency forum for 

improving agency practices related to the development, acquisition, and 

management of information resources, including sharing best practices.12

Consistent with this mandate, the CIO Council established a Management 

Best Practices Committee in order to serve as a focal point for promoting 

IT best practices within the federal government. 

IT Acquisition Success Factors

 8

GAO, Executive Guide: Improving Mission Performance Through Strategic Information 

Management and Technology: Learning from Leading Organizations, GAO/AIMD-94-115 

(Washington, D.C.: May 1994). See also, GAO, Managing Technology: Best Practices 

Can Improve Performance and Produce Results, GAO/T-AIMD-97-38 (Washington, D.C.: 

January 1997); and Executive Guide: Measuring Performance and Demonstrating Results 

of Information Technology Investments, GAO/AIMD-98-89 (Washington, D.C.: March 

1998). 

9

40 U.S.C. § 11312. 

1040 U.S.C. § 11315. 

1140 U.S.C. § 11302(f). 

1244 U.S.C. § 3603. The Federal CIO is the presidential designation for the Administrator 

of the OMB Office of E-Government, which was also established by the E-Government 

Act. 44 U.S.C. § 3602. 

Page 4 GAO-12-7 
 

We have often reported on a range of acquisition management 

weaknesses facing federal IT investments—including problems relating to 

senior leadership, requirements management, and testing. For example, 

for the investments described below, we have identified acquisition 

weaknesses, and have reported on significant cost increases and 

schedule delays. Additionally, each of these investments was ultimately 

cancelled or significantly restructured as a result of agency reviews 

conducted in response to acquisition weaknesses, cost increases, and 

schedule delays. 

Prior GAO Work Has 

Identified IT Acquisition 

Management Weaknesses, 

Cost Increases, and 

Schedule Delays on 

Troubled Investments 

 In June 2009, we reported that an executive committee for the 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS)—a program jointly managed by the Department of 

Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the 

Department of Defense, and the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration—lacked the membership and leadership needed to 

effectively and efficiently oversee and direct the program.13

Specifically, the Defense committee member with acquisition authority 

did not attend committee meetings and sometimes contradicted the 

committee’s decisions. Further, the committee did not track its action 

items to closure, and many of the committee’s decisions did not 

achieve desired outcomes. To address these issues, we 

recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the key committee 

member to attend and participate in committee meetings. Additionally, 

we recommended that the heads of the agencies that participate in 

the committee direct the committee members to track action items to 

closure, and identify the desired outcomes associated with each of the 

committee’s actions. 

Further, we reported that the launch date for an NPOESS 

demonstration satellite had been delayed by over 5 years and the cost 

estimate for the program had more than doubled—from $6.5 billion to 

about $15 billion.14 In February 2010, a presidential task force 

decided to disband NPOESS and, instead, have the agencies 

undertake separate acquisitions. 

 

IT Acquisition Success Factors

 

13GAO-09-564. 

14GAO, Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address 

Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data, GAO-10-558 

(Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010). 

Page 5 GAO-12-7 
 

 Since 2007, we have reported on a range of acquisition weaknesses 

facing the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Secure Border 

Initiative Network—also known as SBInet. For example, in January 

2010, we reported that DHS had not effectively managed key aspects 

of the SBInet testing program such as defining test plans and 

procedures in accordance with important elements of relevant 

guidance.15 In light of these weaknesses, we made recommendations 

to DHS related to the content, review, and approval of test planning 

documentation. 

In May 2010, we reported that the final acceptance of the first two 

SBInet deployments had slipped from November 2009 and March 

2010 to September 2010 and November 2010, respectively, and that 

the cost-effectiveness of the system had not been justified.16 We 

concluded that DHS had not yet demonstrated that the considerable 

time and money being invested to acquire and develop SBInet was a 

wise and prudent use of limited resources. The Secretary of 

Homeland Security ordered a departmentwide assessment of the 

SBInet program; the Secretary’s decision was motivated in part by 

continuing delays in the development and deployment of SBInet

capabilities and concerns that the SBInet system had not been 

adequately justified by a quantitative assessment of cost and benefits. 

Based on the results of the assessment, in January 2011, the DHS 

Secretary decided to end SBInet as originally conceived. 

 In May 2010, we reported that after spending $127 million over 9 

years on an outpatient scheduling system, the Department of 

Veterans Affairs (VA) has not implemented any of the planned 

system’s capabilities and is essentially starting over.17 After 

determining that the system could not be deployed, the department 

terminated the contract and ended the program in September 2009. 

We concluded that the department’s efforts to successfully complete 

the system had been hindered by weaknesses in several key project 

management disciplines and a lack of effective oversight that, if not 

 15GAO-10-158. 

16GAO-10-340. 

17GAO, Information Technology: Management Improvements Are Essential to VA’s 

Second Effort to Replace Its Outpatient Scheduling System, GAO-10-579 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 27, 2010). 

Page 6 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

addressed, could undermine the department’s second effort to replace 

the scheduling system. We recommended that the department take 

action to improve key processes, including acquisition management, 

requirements management, system testing, implementation of earned 

value management, risk management, and program oversight. 

 In June 2011, we reported that end users18 were not sufficiently 

involved in defining requirements for the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency’s (FEMA) National Flood Insurance Program’s 

insurance policy and claims management system.19 After conducting 

an assessment of the program prompted by problems identified in end 

user testing, FEMA leadership cancelled the system because it failed 

to meet end user expectations. This decision forced the agency to 

continue to rely on an outdated system that is neither effective nor 

efficient. In order to avoid the root causes of this program’s failure, we 

recommended that for future related modernization attempts, DHS 

should ensure that key stakeholders are adequately involved in 

requirements development and management. 

Additionally, we have previously reported on investments in need of 

management attention across the federal government. For example, in 

April 2011, we reported20 on the visibility into federal IT investments 

provided by the IT Dashboard—a publicly available website that displays 

detailed information on federal agencies’ major IT investments, including 

assessments of actual performance against cost and schedule targets 

(referred to as ratings) for approximately 800 major federal IT 

investments.21 Specifically, we reported that, as of March 2011, the 

Dashboard provided visibility into over 300 IT investments, totaling almost 

$20 billion, in need of management attention. We noted that 

 272 investments with costs totaling $17.7 billion had ratings that 

indicated the need for attention, and 

IT Acquisition Success Factors

 18End users are the individuals or groups who will operate the system for its intended 

purpose when it is deployed. 

19GAO-11-297. 

20GAO, Information Technology: Continued Improvements in Investment Oversight and 

Management Can Yield Billions in Savings, GAO-11-511T (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 12, 2011). 

21Available at http://www.itdashboard.gov.

Page 7 GAO-12-7 
 

 39 investments with costs totaling $2.0 billion had ratings that 

indicated significant concerns. 

OMB Has Several 

Initiatives Under Way to 

Improve the Oversight and 

Management of IT 

Investments 

OMB plays a key role in helping federal agencies manage their 

investments by working with them to better plan, justify, and determine 

how much they need to spend on projects and how to manage approved 

projects. 

In June 2009, OMB established the IT Dashboard to improve the 

transparency into and oversight of agencies’ IT investments. According to 

OMB officials, agency CIOs are required to update each major investment 

in the IT Dashboard with a rating based on the CIO’s evaluation of certain 

aspects of the investment, such as risk management, requirements 

management, contractor oversight, and human capital. According to 

OMB, these data are intended to provide a near real-time perspective of 

the performance of these investments, as well as a historical perspective. 

Further, the public display of these data is intended to allow OMB, 

congressional and other oversight bodies, and the general public to hold 

government agencies accountable for results and progress. 

In January 2010, the Federal CIO began leading TechStat sessions—

reviews of selected IT investments between OMB and agency 

leadership—to increase accountability and transparency and improve 

performance. OMB has identified factors that may result in an investment 

being selected for a TechStat session, such as—but not limited to—

evidence of (1) poor performance; (2) duplication with other systems or 

projects; (3) unmitigated risks; and (4) misalignment with policies and 

best practices. 

OMB officials stated that as of June 30, 2011, 63 TechStat sessions had 

been held with federal agencies. According to OMB, these sessions 

enabled the government to improve or terminate IT investments that were 

experiencing performance problems. For example, in June 2010, the 

Federal CIO led a TechStat on the National Archives and Records 

Administration’s (NARA) Electronic Records Archives investment that 

resulted in six corrective actions, including halting fiscal year 2012 

development funding pending the completion of a strategic plan. Similarly, 

in January 2011, we reported that NARA had not been positioned to 

identify potential cost and schedule problems early, and had not been 

Page 8 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

able to take timely actions to correct problems, delays, and cost increases 

on this system acquisition program.22 Moreover, we estimated that the 

program would likely overrun costs by between $205 and $405 million if 

the agency completed the program as originally designed. We made 

multiple recommendations to the Archivist of the United States, including 

establishing a comprehensive plan for all remaining work, improving the 

accuracy of key performance reports, and engaging executive leadership 

in correcting negative performance trends. 

Drawing on the visibility into federal IT investments provided by the IT 

Dashboard and TechStat sessions, in December 2010, OMB issued a 

plan to reform IT management throughout the federal government over an 

18-month time frame.23 The plan contains two high-level objectives: 

 achieving operational efficiency, and 

 effectively managing large-scale IT programs.24

To achieve these high-level objectives, the plan outlines 25 action items. 

According to OMB officials, they have taken several actions pursuant to 

this plan. For example, pursuant to Action Item Number 10—development 

of an IT best practices collaboration platform—in April 2011 the CIO 

Council launched an IT best practices collaboration website.25 According 

to OMB, this portal provides federal program managers with access to a 

searchable database of program management best practices in order to 

promote interagency collaboration and real-time problem solving related 

to IT programs. The portal contains links to case studies by federal 

 22GAO, Electronic Records Archive: National Archives Needs to Strengthen Its Capacity 

to Use Earned Value Techniques to Manage and Oversee Development, GAO-11-86 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan.13, 2011). 

23OMB, 25 Point Implementation Plan. 

24The plan also outlines five subordinate goals. The high-level objective of achieving 

operational efficiency aligns with the goal of applying light technology and shared 

solutions (e.g., cloud computing, shared services across the government and 

consolidation of multiple organizations’ data centers). The high-level objective of 

effectively managing large-scale IT programs aligns with the other four goals: 

strengthening program management; aligning the budget process with the technology 

cycle; streamlining governance and improving accountability; and increasing engagement 

with industry. 

25Available at http://www.cio.gov/bestpractices/. 

Page 9 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

agencies demonstrating the use of best practices in managing large-scale 

IT systems. For example, a recent case study posted by the Social 

Security Administration outlined efforts to develop a cadre of highly 

skilled, trained, and qualified program managers to promote the success 

of its investments. 

According to federal department officials, the following seven investments 

best achieved their respective cost, schedule, scope, and performance 

goals. 

Table 1: IT Investments Identified as Successful by Federal Departments 

Seven IT Investments 

Were Reported as 

Being Successfully 

Acquired 

Dollars in millions 

Department Managing agency Investment 

Total estimated 

life-cycle costs

Commerce Census Bureau Decennial Response 

Integration System 

$1,050.0 

Defense Defense Information 

Systems Agency 

Global Combat Support 

System–Joint 

Increment 7 

$249.9 

Energy National Nuclear 

Security 

Administration 

Manufacturing 

Operations 

Management Project 

$41.3

Homeland 

Security 

U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection 

Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative 

$2,000.0

Transportation Federal Aviation 

Administration 

Integrated Terminal 

Weather System 

$472.5

Treasury Internal Revenue 

Service 

Customer Account 

Data Engine 2 

$1,300.0

(Transition States 1 

and 2)

Veterans Affairs Veterans Health 

Administration 

Occupational Health 

Record-keeping 

System 

$34.4

Source: Agency data. 

The estimated total life-cycle cost of the seven investments is about $5 

billion. Six of the seven investments are currently operational. The 

following provides descriptions of each of the seven investments. 

Page 10 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

Commerce Decennial 

Response Integration 

System 

The U.S. Census Bureau is the primary source of basic statistics about 

the population and economy of the nation and is best known for the 

decennial census of population and housing. The most recent decennial 

census was conducted in 2010. Between March and August 2010, the 

Census Bureau provided assistance to respondents and captured their 

response data via paper and telephone agent to allow sufficient time for 

post-capture processing, review, and tabulation. The Decennial 

Response Integration System (DRIS) provided a system for collecting and 

integrating census responses from forms and telephone interviews. 

Specifically, DRIS integrated the following three primary functions: 

Investment Details

Department of Commerce—U.S. Census 

Bureau

Number of users:

Over 10,000 call center agents and paper 

data capture staff between May and July 2010

Acquisition start date:

October 2005 (prime contract award)

Operations start date:

February 2010 

Total estimated life-cycle costs:

$1,050.0 million through fiscal year 2011 

Acquisition costs: 

$505.6 million as of June 2011

Operational costs: 

$536.2 million as of June 2011

Fiscal year 2012 funding request: 

N/A

Source: Agency data.

 Paper data capture: Processed paper census questionnaires sent by 

mail from respondents. The system sorted the questionnaires and 

captured data from them, which were turned into electronic data. 

 Telephone questionnaire assistance: Provided respondents with 

assistance in understanding their questionnaire, and captured 

responses for forms completed over the phone. This function utilized 

interactive voice response as the initial contact mechanism with an 

option to speak with call center representatives if needed. 

 Coverage follow up: Contacted a sample of respondents by telephone to 

determine if changes should be made to their household roster as 

reported on their initial census return with the goal of ensuring that every 

person in the United States is counted once and in the right place. 

To help carry out the 2010 Decennial Census, the government engaged a 

contractor to design, build, test, deploy, implement, operate, and maintain 

the systems, infrastructure, staffing, procedures, and facilities needed for 

DRIS. The DRIS contract was divided into three primary phases. Phase 1 

included the development, testing, deployment, implementation, and 

support of the DRIS components needed for a 2008 Census Dress 

Rehearsal. Phase 2 included the nationwide deployment of the DRIS 

components and full-scale production operations of the paper data 

capture, telephone questionnaire assistance, and coverage follow up 

functions for the 2010 Census. Phase 3 is to address post-2010 Census 

DRIS component disposition and data archiving. Phase 3 was to be 

completed in September 2011. For purposes of our report, we focused 

only on the first two phases of DRIS because the DRIS system was being 

acquired during these phases. 

In October 2009, we reported that DRIS fully implemented the key 

practices necessary for a sound implementation of earned value 

Page 11 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

management—a project management approach that, if implemented 

appropriately, provides objective reports of project status, produces early 

warning signs of impending schedule delays and cost overruns, and 

provides unbiased estimates of anticipated costs at completion.26

Additionally, we reported that, as of May 2009, the DRIS contractor was 

experiencing a cumulative cost underrun and was ahead of schedule; 

however, the life-cycle cost estimate for DRIS had increased from $574 

million to $946 million. This cost increase was mostly due to increases in 

both paper and telephone workloads. For example, the paper workload 

increased due to an April 2008 redesign of the 2010 Census that reverted 

planned automated operations to paper-based processes and required 

DRIS to process an additional estimated 40 million paper forms. 

Defense Global Combat 

Support System-Joint 

Increment 7 

The Global Combat Support System-Joint (GCSS-J) Increment 7 is a system 

that supports military logistics operations that provide military personnel with 

the supplies and information they need to accomplish their missions. GCSSJ combines data, such as the location and quantity of a particular resource, 

from multiple authoritative data sources (e.g., Asset Visibility, Joint Operation 

Planning and Execution System, and Global Decision Support System) and 

analyzes the data to provide information needed by logistics decision 

makers. The end users of the system are the logisticians at the various 

Combatant Commands, which are made up of representatives from multiple 

branches, each having a geographical or functional responsibility.27

According to Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) officials, the 

analyses generated by the system enable the commanders of the 

Combatant Commands to rapidly make critical decisions, and to plan, 

execute, and control logistics operations. Additionally, the system provides 

other end users with single sign-on access to the individual data sources. 

The diverse end user group, combined with a wide spectrum of data, 

provides a unified supply chain for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 

forces in a given area, which is to help eliminate inefficiencies and provide a 

more useful view into the supply chain. 

Investment Details

Department of Defense—Defense 

Information Systems Agency

Number of users:

20-30 joint warfighter logistician users; 13,000 

single-sign-on users

Acquisition start date:

December 2007 

Operations start date:

March 2009 (deployment of initial operational 

capability for Increment 7) 

Total estimated life-cycle costs:

$249.9 million for Increment 7 through fiscal 

year 2014 

Acquisition costs: 

$74.7 million for Increment 7 as of June 2011

Operational costs: 

$61.1 million for Increment 7 as of June 2011

Fiscal year 2012 funding request: 

$40.9 million for Increment 7

Source: Agency data.

 26GAO, Information Technology: Agencies Need to Improve the Implementation and Use 

of Earned Value Techniques to Help Manage Major System Acquisitions, GAO-10-2 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2009). 

27The Combatant Commands are U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. 

European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Northern 

Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. 

Transportation Command. 

Page 12 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

DISA started GCSS-J in 1997 as a prototype. The system is being 

developed incrementally using Agile28 software development—

specifically, the Scrum methodology.29 DISA is currently developing and 

deploying major releases for Increment 7. A total of five major releases 

were planned within Increment 7; Releases 7.0 and 7.1, which were 

implemented in March 2009 and December 2009 respectively, were the 

subject of our review. 

To date, according to DISA, Increment 7 releases have improved 

performance and provided new capabilities and enhancements to existing 

capabilities. For example, the system provides real-time information about 

road conditions, construction, incidents, and weather to facilitate rapid 

deployment of military assets. 

Energy Manufacturing 

Operations Management 

Project 

The Manufacturing Operations Management (MOMentum) Project aims to 

replace a suite of aging mission-essential shop floor, manufacturing 

control systems at the Y-12 National Security Complex30 that support the 

National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Program. The shop floor at the Y-12 complex is 

responsible for the construction, restoration, and dismantling of nuclear 

weapon components. The core software currently used in the shop floor 

manufacturing control systems was deployed in the mid-1980s and will no 

longer be supported by the vendor on its current hardware platform 

beginning in 2012. 

Investment Details

Department of Energy—National Nuclear 

Security Administration

Number of users:

350 shop floor users

Acquisition start date:

January 2009 

Operations start date:

September 2010 (deployment of phase 1)

Total estimated life-cycle costs:

$41.3 million through fiscal year 2030 

Acquisition costs: 

$6.6 million as of June 2011

Operational costs: 

$137,000 as of June 2011

Fiscal year 2012 funding request: 

$6.1 million

Source: Agency data.

The MOMentum Project has two phases. Phase 1, which was the subject 

of our review, was implemented in September 2010, and is a deployment 

 28Agile software development is not a set of tools or a single methodology, but a 

philosophy based on selected values, such as prioritizing customer satisfaction through 

early and continuous delivery of valuable software; delivering working software frequently, 

from every couple of weeks to every couple of months; and making working software the 

primary measure of progress. For more information on Agile software development, see 

http://www.agilealliance.org. 

29Scrum is one of several methodologies that are used to implement Agile software 

development. Scrum emphasizes developing software in increments and producing 

segments of functionality that are tested by, and demonstrated to, users. 

30The Y-12 National Security Complex, located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, is the National 

Nuclear Security Administration’s site for conducting enriched uranium activities, 

producing uranium-related components for nuclear warheads and bombs, and processing 

nuclear fuel for the Navy. 

Page 13 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

of the Production Planning module of SAP31 for manufacturing planning 

and scheduling. Phase 2 is to include the deployment of the 

Manufacturing Execution module of SAP software and support the 

execution of production schedules on the shop floor. Phase 2 is 

scheduled to be completed in September 2013. The implementation of 

the system is expected to save $6 million annually, reduce cycle times for 

manufacturing, remove dependencies on obsolete technology and 

unsupported software, and reduce administrative errors and product 

deviations, among other things. 

Homeland Security 

Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative 

To facilitate inspections at the nation’s 330 air, sea, and land ports of 

entry, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) requires all 

citizens of the United States and citizens of Canada, Mexico, and 

Bermuda traveling to the United States as nonimmigrant visitors to have a 

passport or other accepted document that establishes the bearer’s 

identity and citizenship to enter the country from within the Western 

Hemisphere.32 In order to implement WHTI at the land border while 

limiting its impact on the public, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) engaged a contractor to procure and deploy technology—including 

Radio Frequency Identification, License Plate Reader, and Vehicle 

Primary Client33 technologies. These technologies help to provide CBP 

officers with law enforcement and border crossing history information for 

each traveler and vehicle. Initial operating capability was achieved in 

September 2008 when these technologies were deployed to two ports of 

entry. Full operating capability was achieved in June 2009 when the 

WHTI technology was deployed to 37 additional ports of entry. The 39 

total ports of entry are high-volume land ports with 354 traffic lanes 

supporting 95 percent of land border traffic. After reaching full operating 

Investment Details

Department of Homeland Security—U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection

Number of users:

10,000 U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

officers at vehicular ports of entry

Acquisition start date:

February 2007 

Operations start date:

September 2008 (initial operating capability), 

June 2009 (full operating capability)

Total estimated life-cycle costs:

$2.0 billion through fiscal year 2019 

Acquisition costs: 

$343.2 million as of June 2011

Operational costs: 

$255.4 million as of June 2011

Fiscal year 2012 funding request: 

$80.2 million

Source: Agency data.

 31SAP is a company that develops commercial software under the same name. This 

software consists of multiple, integrated functional modules that perform a variety of 

business-related tasks. 

32Sec. 7209, Pub. L. 108-458, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

(Dec. 17, 2004), as amended; 8 U.S.C. § 1185 note. The WHTI program for land and sea 

ports of entry became effective on June 1, 2009, under a joint DHS and State Department 

final rule, 73 FR 18384, April 3, 2008. For purposes of our report, we focused only on DHS 

efforts to deploy WHTI at land ports of entry. 

33According to CBP, the Vehicle Primary Client integrates vehicle and traveler information, 

conducts queries to law enforcement databases, and provides vehicle, traveler, query 

result, and crossing history information to the CBP officer. 

Page 14 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

capability, the program’s scope was expanded to include deployment of 

technology and processes to outbound operations, inbound pedestrian 

processing, and border patrol checkpoint processing.34 For purposes of 

our report, we focused on the program’s efforts to achieve full operating 

capability at 39 land ports of entry. 

In October 2009, we reported that WHTI fully met 6 of the 11 key 

practices for implementing earned value management and partially met 

the remaining 5 practices.35 Practices not fully met included, for example, 

a master schedule with activities that were out of sequence or lacked 

dependencies. Nevertheless, we reported that according to program 

officials, the WHTI contract was completed on time and on budget. We 

recommended that the department modify its earned value management 

policies to be consistent with best practices, implement earned value 

management practices that address identified weaknesses, and manage 

negative earned value trends. 

Additionally, in June 2010, we reported that program officials anticipated 

total funding shortfalls for the second phase of the program (which is 

outside of the scope of our review) for fiscal years 2011 through 2015.36

Further, we reported that schedule delays for a CBP effort to upgrade 

local and wide area network bandwidth capacity at ports of entry could 

jeopardize program performance, particularly in terms of response times. 

Nonetheless, we noted that actual response times exceeded the 

expected performance levels from June 2009 to June 2010. We did not 

make any new recommendations at that time. 

 34These efforts are now referred to as the Land Border Integration program. 

35GAO-10-2. 

36GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex 

Acquisitions, GAO-10-588SP (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010). 

Page 15 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

Initially operational since April 2003, the Federal Aviation Administration’s 

(FAA) Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) provides weather 

information to air traffic controllers and flight support personnel. ITWS 

receives observation and forecast data from the National Weather 

Service and combines them with data from FAA terminal sensors and 

sensors on nearby aircraft to integrate weather hazard information for air 

traffic controllers, air traffic managers, and airlines. This information is 

presented to end users in one integrated display. According to FAA, a 

prototype ITWS solution was deployed to four airports beginning in 1994. 

Based on those successful prototypes, FAA engaged a contractor in 1997 

to design, develop, test, and deploy the ITWS system. The system was 

deployed to its first site in 2003; deployments to other sites continued 

through August 2010. 

Transportation Integrated 

Terminal Weather System 

Investment Details

Department of Transportation—Federal 

Aviation Administration

Number of users:

2,210 air traffic controllers and flight support 

personnel

Acquisition start date:

April 1995 

Operations start date:

April 2003 (initial operating capability), August 

2010 (full operating capability)

Total estimated life-cycle costs:

$472.5 million through fiscal year 2029 

Acquisition costs: 

$296.1 million as of June 2011

Operational costs: 

$24.0 million as of June 2011

Fiscal year 2012 funding request: 

$5.21 million

Source: Agency data.

According to FAA officials, one main advantage of ITWS is that it can 

provide a 60-minute forecast that can anticipate short-term weather 

changes (such as tornadoes, thunderstorms, hail, and severe icing) that 

could result in airplane delays or diversions to other airports, which affect 

the capacities at the airports. The pre-ITWS system did not have the 

capability to do this. According to FAA, the implementation of ITWS 

increases terminal airspace capacity by 25 percent in certain weather 

conditions and serves to maintain capacity when it would otherwise be lost. 

Treasury Customer 

Account Data Engine 2 

The Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) Business Systems Modernization

program, which began in 1999, is a multibillion-dollar, high-risk, highly 

complex effort that involves the development and delivery of a number of 

modernized tax administration and internal management systems, as well 

as core infrastructure projects. These systems are intended to replace the 

agency’s aging business and tax processing systems, and provide 

improved and expanded service to taxpayers and internal business 

efficiencies for IRS. One of the cornerstone projects since the inception of 

the Business Systems Modernization program has been the Customer 

Account Data Engine (CADE), which was slated to modernize taxpayer 

account processing through replacement of the legacy Individual Master 

File, a 40-year old sequential, flat-file37 master file processing system for 

individual taxpayers. In August 2008, IRS began defining a new 

 37A flat-file is a database system in which each database contains only one file, which is 

not linked to any other file. Flat-files are considered to be outdated technology. 

Page 16 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

strategy—referred to as CADE 2—which would build on the progress that 

the current CADE processing platform had created and leverage lessons 

learned to date. 

Investment Details

Department of the Treasury—Internal 

Revenue Service

Number of users:

64,000 employees

Acquisition start date:

June 2009 

Operations start date:

January 2012 (estimated completion date for 

Transition State 1) 

Total estimated life-cycle costs:

$1.3 billion for Transition States 1 and 2 

though 2024 

Acquisition costs: 

$152.7 million as of June 2011

Operational costs: 

None because the program is not yet 

operational

Fiscal year 2012 funding request: 

$209.5 million

Source: Agency data.

IRS plans to deliver CADE 2 functionality incrementally through three 

phases: (1) Transition State 1, (2) Transition State 2, and (3) Target 

State. 

Transition State 1 consists of the following two projects: 

 Daily processing: This project is to enable IRS to process and post all 

eligible individual taxpayer returns filed and other transactions by 

updating and settling individual taxpayer accounts in 24 to 48 hours 

with current, complete, and authoritative data, and provide employees 

with timely access. 

 Database implementation: This project is to establish the CADE 2 

database, a relational database38 that will house data on individual 

taxpayers and their accounts; develop a capability to transfer data 

from the Individual Master File to the database; and provide for the 

access of data from the database to downstream IRS financial, 

customer service, and compliance systems. 

In April 2011, IRS completed the Transition State 1 detailed design 

phase, which includes activities such as documenting the physical design 

of the solution. For purposes of this report, we focused only on the IRS’s 

efforts on Transition State 1 through the completion of the detailed design 

phase. 

In March 2011, we reported that although IRS had taken some positive 

steps on defining benefits, estimating costs, and managing risks for 

CADE 2, it did not fully identify and disclose the CADE 2 costs and 

benefits.39 Specifically, we reported that 

 although IRS had identified benefits for the first phase of CADE 2, it 

had yet to set quantitative targets for 5 of the 20 identified benefits, 

 38A relational database is a system comprised of multiple files, which can be linked to 

each other. 

39GAO, Taxpayer Account Strategy: IRS Should Finish Defining Benefits and Improve 

Cost Estimates, GAO-11-168 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2011). 

Page 17 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

and had yet to finalize the benefits expected in Transition State 2 or 

define related quantitative targets; 

 although IRS’s process for developing preliminary life-cycle cost 

estimates was generally consistent with best practices, the agency did 

not perform all practices associated with credible cost estimates; 

 the schedule for delivering the initial phase of CADE 2 was ambitious; 

and 

 IRS’s process for managing the risks associated with CADE 2 was 

generally consistent with best practices. 

Our recommendations included (1) identifying all of the benefits 

associated with CADE 2, setting the related targets, and identifying how 

systems and business processes might be affected, and (2) improving the 

credibility of revised cost estimates. 

Veterans Affairs 

Occupational Health 

Record-keeping System 

During the development of the National Flu Plan, which was released in 

2006, the White House Homeland Security Council directed VA to 

develop an employee health tracking and management system. 

According to VA officials, the need for this system became urgent due to 

the threat of pandemic influenza in 2007. As a result, the Veterans Health 

Administration (VHA), working with VA’s Office of Information and 

Technology, developed the Occupational Health Record-keeping System 

(OHRS). According to VA officials, OHRS was divided into two 

increments. The first increment consisted of a minimum feature set which 

represented the functionality that would provide the agency with the 

largest return on investment. The first increment became operational in 

September 2009. The second increment was intended to add functionality 

to the minimum feature set and to address any remaining requirements. 

For purposes of our report we focused on the first increment—VA’s efforts 

to acquire the minimum feature set. OHRS was developed using Agile 

software development—specifically, the Scrum methodology. 

Investment Details

Department of Veterans Affairs—Veterans 

Health Administration

Number of users:

2,000 VHA health care providers

Acquisition start date:

September 2007 

Operations start date:

September 2009 (Increment 1) 

Total estimated life-cycle costs:

$34.4 million through fiscal year 2015 

Acquisition costs: 

$11.1 million through June 2011

Operational costs: 

$1.5 million through June 2011

Fiscal year 2012 funding request: 

$12.2 million

Source: Agency data.

OHRS serves as the electronic health record system specifically for VA 

employees. OHRS provides the end users (i.e., VHA employees who 

work in occupational health offices at VHA healthcare facilities) the ability 

to collect and monitor clinical data on its employees (e.g., specific 

immunizations and medical training) and generate reports. Additionally, a 

VA official stated that OHRS allows physicians to document a number of 

health issues related to the workforce, including training and infectious 

Page 18 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

disease management. Among other things, the information in this system 

is used to allocate staff to appropriate patient care assignments. For 

example, the system can identify whether a provider has received a 

vaccine for a certain illness and is therefore able to treat a patient with 

that illness. 

Nine factors were identified as critical to the success of three or more of 

the seven IT investments. The factors most commonly identified include 

active engagement of stakeholders, program staff with the necessary 

knowledge and skills, and senior department and agency executive 

support for the program. These nine critical success factors are 

consistent with leading industry practices for IT acquisitions.40 Table 2 

shows the nine factors, and examples of how agencies implemented 

them are discussed below. 

Nine Factors Were 

Commonly Identified 

as Critical to the 

Success of Major IT 

Investments 

Table 2: Commonly Identified Critical Success Factors across Seven Successful IT Investments 

Investments 

Critical success factors DRIS GCSS-J MOMentum WHTI ITWS CADE 2 OHRS 

1 Program officials were actively engaged with 

stakeholders. 

X X X X X X X 

2 Program staff had the necessary knowledge and 

skills. 

X X X X X X 

3 Senior department and agency executives 

supported the programs. 

X X X X X X 

4 End users and stakeholders were involved in the 

development of requirements. 

X X X X X 

5 End users participated in testing of system 

functionality prior to formal end user acceptance 

testing. 

X X X X X 

6 Government and contractor staff were consistent 

and stable. 

X X X X 

7 Program staff prioritized requirements. X X X X 

8 Program officials maintained regular 

communication with the prime contractor. 

X X X X 

9 Programs received sufficient funding. X X X 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. 

IT Acquisition Success Factors

 40See, for example, SEI, CMMI®

 for Acquisition and GAO-04-394G. 

Page 19 GAO-12-7 
 

Officials from all seven selected investments cited active engagement 

with program stakeholders—individuals or groups (including, in some 

cases, end users) with an interest in the success of the acquisition—as a 

critical factor to the success of those investments. Agency officials stated 

that stakeholders, among other things, reviewed contractor proposals 

during the procurement process, regularly attended program 

management office sponsored meetings, were working members of 

integrated project teams,41 and were notified of problems and concerns 

as soon as possible. For exampl

Program Officials Were 

Actively Engaged with 

Stakeholders 

e: 

 

 Census officials stated that the DRIS stakeholders were members of 

the integrated project team. Their responsibilities as members of the 

team included involvement in requirements development, participation 

in peer reviews of contractual deliverables, and review of contractor 

proposals. 

 IRS officials told us that consistent and open communication with 

internal and external stakeholders has been critical to the success of 

CADE 2. For example, IRS officials told us that they regularly report 

progress made on CADE 2, as well as risk information on the program 

to oversight bodies, IRS executives, and IRS internal stakeholders. 

In addition, officials from two investments noted that actively engaging 

with stakeholders created transparency and trust, and increased the 

support from the stakeholders. For example, NNSA officials noted that 

notifying MOMentum stakeholders of potential issues as soon as they 

were identified helped to foster transparency and trust; this included 

getting stakeholders’ approval to use a cost- and schedule-tracking 

approach that was not the agency’s policy, but which ultimately saved the 

program money and time. Additionally, CBP officials noted that 

communication with the WHTI stakeholders was greatly enhanced by the 

use of a consistent message that described, for example, the goals of the 

program, deployment plans, privacy implications of the Radio Frequency 

Identification infrastructure, and impact of the program on select groups 

crossing the border, including U.S. and Canadian children and Native 

 

41OMB defines an integrated project team as a multi-disciplinary team led by a project 

manager responsible and accountable for planning, budgeting, procurement, and life-cycle 

management of the investment to achieve its cost, schedule, and performance goals. 

Team skills include budgetary, financial, capital planning, procurement, user, program, 

architecture, earned value management, security, and other staff as appropriate. 

Page 20 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

Americans. CBP officials stated that this standardization created a 

consistent, unified vision and ensured that the message stayed on 

course. 

Consistent with this factor, relevant guidance42 calls for programs to 

coordinate and collaborate with stakeholders in order to address their 

concerns and ensure that they fulfill their commitments. Active 

engagement with stakeholders increases the likelihood that the program 

will not encounter problems resulting from unresolved stakeholder issues. 

Program Staff Had the 

Necessary Knowledge and 

Skills 

Officials from six of the seven selected investments indicated that the 

knowledge and skills of the program staff were critical to the success of 

the program. This included knowledge of acquisitions and procurement 

processes, monitoring of contracts, large-scale organizational 

transformation, Agile software development concepts, and areas of 

program management such as earned value management and technical 

monitoring. For example: 

 IRS officials stated that the Treasury Secretary utilized his critical 

position pay authority43 to hire executives for CADE 2 who had 

demonstrated success in managing large-scale transformation efforts 

in accordance with best practices. Specifically, IRS officials stated that 

the CADE 2 program manager was previously responsible for the 

design, development, and implementation of several major global 

information technology solutions for a major corporation. 

 CBP officials explained that a factor critical to the success of the 

acquisition was that almost every member of the team working on 

WHTI had a good understanding of acquisitions—some even held 

acquisition certifications—in addition to their understanding of 

program management. According to those officials, these skills 

contributed to effective program oversight of the WHTI contractors 

through all phases of the acquisition, not just during contract award. 

 42See, for example, SEI, CMMI®

 for Acquisition and GAO-04-394G. 

43Critical position pay authority allows department leadership to set the rate of basic pay 

for a given critical position. 

Page 21 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

Additionally, officials from three of the seven investments also cited the 

use of subject matter experts’ knowledge in their cognizant areas as a 

contributing factor to their programs’ successes. For example, VA officials 

stated that the OHRS program relied extensively on the subject matter 

experts’ occupational health experience—treating them as part of the 

development team and including them in decision making. Two 

investments in our sample even went one step further—by selecting the 

program manager from the end user organization as opposed to an 

individual with an IT background. For example, NNSA officials stated that 

they used a project manager from the end user organization as opposed 

to an individual from the department’s information technology office. This 

individual had decades of experience managing shop floor control 

systems. As a result, he was well aware of how the work on the shop floor 

is done and focused on safely delivering the necessary functional 

requirements to the end user. 

Leading guidance also recognizes that programs should ensure that 

program staffs acquire the knowledge and skills needed to perform the 

project.44 Individuals who have developed the knowledge and skills 

needed for the programs are more likely to perform their roles effectively 

and efficiently. 

Senior Department and 

Agency Executives 

Supported the Program 

Officials from six of the seven selected investments identified support 

from senior department and agency executives45 as critical to the success 

of their programs. According to those officials, these senior leaders 

supported the success of these programs in various ways, such as by 

procuring funding, providing necessary information at critical times, 

intervening when there were difficulties working with another department, 

defining a vision for the program, and ensuring that end users participated 

in the development of the system. For example: 

 The WHTI program manager told us that the former DHS Deputy 

Secretary reached out to another department in order to finalize a 

memorandum of understanding that would be used to share 

 44See, for example, SEI, CMMI®

 for Acquisition. 

45The term “senior department and agency executives” is used in this report to describe 

officials that are in the department’s or agency’s organizational structure, and which reside 

at a level above that of the programs in our sample. 

Page 22 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

information on passports and passcards needed for WHTI. According 

to the WHTI program manager, prior to the Deputy Secretary’s 

involvement, the other department’s efforts to collaborate on this issue 

were not meeting the schedule requirements of the WHTI program. 

That official told us that after receiving the necessary support from the 

other department, CBP was able to more rapidly query that 

department’s data. 

 IRS officials explained that endorsement for CADE 2 has come from 

the highest levels of the organization. In particular, those officials told 

us that the IRS Commissioner has made CADE 2 one of his top 

priorities. IRS officials told us that the Commissioner, through, for 

example, his keynote speech at a CADE 2 town hall meeting for IRS 

employees, has provided a clear and unwavering message about 

CADE 2. This speech and other activities have unified IRS 

employees, driven change, and removed barriers that can often 

impede programs of this magnitude. 

In our experience,46 strong leadership support can result in benefits to a 

program, including providing the program manager with the resources 

necessary to make knowledge-based, disciplined decisions that increase 

the likelihood of their program’s success. 

End Users and 

Stakeholders Were 

Involved in the 

Development of 

Requirements 

Officials from five of seven selected investments identified the 

involvement of stakeholders—including end users—in the requirements 

development process as a factor that was critical to the success of their 

programs. For example: 

 Census officials told us that the DRIS program management office 

collaborated extensively with the stakeholders and the contractor to 

develop requirements. For example, program management office 

personnel, contractor staff, and the stakeholders all worked together 

to analyze the requirements in order to ensure they were understood, 

unique, and verifiable. 

 46See, for example, GAO-04-394G and GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is 

Key to Planning and Executing Stable Weapon Programs, GAO-10-522 (Washington 

D.C.: May 6, 2010). 

Page 23 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

 VA officials told us that an OHRS end user identified a set of 

requirements for an occupational health system 3 years prior to the 

initiation of OHRS development efforts. Those officials told us that the 

developers worked closely with the OHRS end user representative to 

ensure that those requirements were still valid once the program was 

initiated, given the length of time since the requirements were initially 

identified. 

Relevant industry guidance recognizes the importance of eliciting end 

user needs and involving stakeholders in requirements development.47

When stakeholders and end users communicate their requirements 

throughout the project life cycle, the resulting system is more likely to 

perform as intended in the end user’s environment. 

End Users Participated in 

Testing of System 

Functionality Prior to 

Formal End User 

Acceptance Testing 

Officials from five of the seven selected investments identified having the 

end users test and validate the system components prior to formal end 

user acceptance testing for deployment as critical to the success of their 

program. For example: 

 DISA officials told us they used a virtual site to connect developers 

and end users in online testing of evolving software repeatedly during 

the development of GCSS-J. Using the tool, the developers were able 

to record the sessions, which was helpful in addressing defects 

identified during testing. 

 CBP created a fully functional test lab facility for the WHTI program at 

a mock port of entry test facility constructed at an old private airport in 

Virginia. Using this facility, they were able to test the software that 

was being developed and the hardware that was being proposed. 

Additionally, a core end user group was established and brought to 

the facility multiple times a year during the acquisition to test the 

forthcoming technology. 

Similar to this factor, leading guidance recommends testing selected 

products and product components throughout the program life cycle.48

Testing of functionality by end users prior to acceptance demonstrates, 

 47See, for example, SEI, CMMI®

 for Acquisition. 

48See, for example, SEI, CMMI®

 for Acquisition. 

Page 24 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

earlier rather than later in the program life cycle, that the functionality will 

fulfill its intended use. If problems are found during this testing, programs 

are typically positioned to make changes that are less costly and 

disruptive than ones made later in the life cycle would be. 

Government and 

Contractor Staff Were 

Consistent and Stable 

Officials from four of the seven selected investments stated that 

government and contractor organizations’ personnel were consistent and 

stable. For example: 

 DISA officials indicated that the longevity of the program management 

office and contractor staffs has been a contributing factor to GCSS-J’s 

success. For example, the longevity of the staff contributed to them 

becoming subject matter experts in their areas of responsibility. 

 CBP officials explained that key program management office staff 

remained consistent throughout the WHTI program. In addition, 

according to a CBP official, the staffs genuinely liked to work with one 

another and were able to collaborate effectively. 

This factor is consistent with relevant guidance that espouses the 

importance of having adequate and skilled resources.49 In particular, 

having consistent and stable staff can allow teams to keep pace with their 

workload, make decisions, and have the necessary accountability. 

Program Staff Prioritized 

Requirements 

Officials from four of the seven selected investments cited the 

prioritization of requirements as enabling the efficient and effective 

development of system functionality. For example: 

 FAA officials told us that ITWS end users presented the development 

team with a “wish list” of requirements that would help them 

significantly. Those officials told us that end users and developers 

prioritized those requirements by balancing importance to the end 

users with the maturity of the technology. FAA officials stated that 

prototypes of these new requirements were developed and evaluated 

by end users in the field and were ultimately implemented in the initial 

operating capability for ITWS. 

 49See, for example, SEI, CMMI®

 for Acquisition and GAO-04-394G. 

Page 25 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

 DISA officials explained that during development, GCSS-J end user 

representatives met with the GCSS-J program office and the GCSS-J 

developer twice a week for between a full and a half day in order to 

identify and prioritize requirements. Those officials explained that this 

frequent interaction was necessary because of the short development 

iterations (4 to 5 weeks), at the end of which useable functionality was 

presented to the end users for review. The frequent prioritization 

ensured that the functionality most critical to the end user 

representative was developed, and could be deployed sooner than 

functionality of less importance. 

Consistent with leading guidance, having prioritized requirements guides 

the programs in determining the system’s scope and ensures that the 

functionality and quality requirements most critical to the end users are 

deployed before less-desired requirements.50

Program Officials 

Maintained Regular 

Communication with the 

Prime Contractor 

Officials from four of the seven selected investments indicated that 

regular communication between the program management office and the 

prime contractor was critical to the success of the program. This 

communication was proactive in that there were regularly scheduled 

meetings between the program management office and the prime 

contractor, with an expectation of full and honest disclosure of problems. 

For example: 

 Census officials stated that the DRIS program management office 

took a proactive, “no surprises” approach to communicating with the 

contractor. For example, on a monthly basis, the program 

management office formally documented the technical performance of 

the contractor based on the relevant elements of the work breakdown 

structure51 and the award fee plan.52 These reports were provided to 

the contractor, who in turn used the feedback to improve its technical 

performance. In addition, DRIS program managers and their 

 50See, for example, SEI, CMMI®

 for Acquisition. 

51The work breakdown structure is a document that defines in detail the work necessary to 

complete a program’s objectives. 

52Award fees are an amount of money which a contractor may earn in whole or in part by 

meeting or exceeding subjective criteria stated in an award fee plan typically related to 

areas within quality, technical ingenuity, cost-effective management, program 

management, and other unquantifiable areas. 

Page 26 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

contractor counterparts met weekly to discuss significant issues. DRIS 

officials emphasized that the expectation of open communication and 

trust from senior leadership fostered an environment where issues 

could be freely discussed with the contractor. 

 CBP officials stated that during the deployment of the WHTI 

technology to the ports of entry, the program management office held 

daily conference calls with the contractor to ensure proper 

coordination and the rapid resolution of problems. For example, 

during deployment to one port of entry it was determined that the 

electric system that provided power to the lanes was not adequate. 

This problem was quickly identified, responsibility for resolving it was 

assigned, and the issue was quickly resolved. 

Additionally, Census and VA officials stated that ensuring a positive, nonadversarial relationship between the prime contractor and the program 

management office was critical to the success of the investment. Census 

officials noted that both the government and the contractor staff 

recognized that the only way for the program to succeed was for both 

parties to succeed. 

Consistent with this factor, leading guidance recognizes the importance of 

communication between program officials and the contractor 

organizations.53 Implementation of this critical success factor enables 

programs to ensure that requirements are understood and risks and 

issues are identified and addressed earlier rather than later in the 

process, thereby increasing the likelihood that the delivered system will 

meet its intended purpose and resulting in less costly and less disruptive 

changes and work efforts. 

Programs Received 

Sufficient Funding 

Officials from three of the seven selected investments explained that 

sufficient funding for the programs contributed to the success of those 

investments. Officials from two of the investments attributed funding to 

strong congressional support; in a third case, officials cited strong 

leadership from senior agency and program officials as being a factor. For 

example: 

 53See, for example, SEI, CMMI®

 for Acquisition. 

Page 27 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

 The WHTI program manager stated that the WHTI program received 

the requested funding from Congress for the 2 years leading up to the 

June 1, 2009, mandated implementation date. Additionally, that official 

told us that Congress provided 2-year money, that is, money that 

could be obligated over a period of 2 years. Officials told us that the 2-

year money gave the program great flexibility to accommodate the 

inherent complexities and expenditures incurred in a multiyear 

deployment, and to adapt to inevitable modifications in deployment 

requirements (that is, additional sites, lanes, and functionality). 

 IRS officials told us that the IRS Commissioner helped the CADE 2 

program obtain funding. For example, those officials told us that the 

IRS Commissioner spoke with congressional representatives 

frequently in order to sustain interest and support for CADE 2. 

Relevant guidance recognizes the importance of sufficiently funding IT 

investments.54 Investments that receive funding commensurate with their 

requirements are better positioned to ensure the availability of needed 

resources, and therefore, deliver the investment within established goals. 

The nine commonly identified critical success factors are consistent with 

OMB’s 25-point plan to improve IT management and oversight. In 

particular, one high-level objective of the plan—effectively managing 

large-scale IT programs—aims to improve areas that impact the success 

rates of large IT programs across the federal government. As part of this 

high-level objective, the plan addresses the importance of ensuring that 

program management professionals have extensive experience and 

training, defining requirements by engaging with stakeholders, and 

providing senior executives with visibility into the health of their IT 

programs. These principles of effective IT management are reflected in 

the commonly identified critical success factors. For example, as 

previously mentioned, six of the seven agencies identified the knowledge 

and skills of program staff and five of seven agencies cited the 

involvement of end users and stakeholders in the development of 

requirements as critical to the success of their IT investments. 

While our analysis of critical success factors identified by agencies 

resulted in nine commonly identified factors, agencies also identified 

 54See, for example, SEI, CMMI®

 for Acquisition. 

Page 28 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

additional factors as contributing to the success of their investments. For 

example: 

 Agile software development: DISA officials stated that the use of Agile 

software development was critical to the success of the program. 

Among other things, Agile enhanced the participation of the end users 

in the development process and provided for capabilities to be 

deployed in shorter periods of time. 

 Streamlined and targeted governance: IRS officials told us that in 

comparison to other IRS business systems modernization projects, 

the governance model for CADE 2 has been streamlined. For 

example, those officials stated that the CADE 2 governance structure 

includes an executive steering committee that, in contrast to other 

programs at IRS that utilize an executive steering committee, is 

dedicated solely to the CADE 2 program. IRS officials told us that this 

gives an added measure of accountability and responsibility for the 

successful outcome of the program. 

 Continuous risk management: VA officials stated that the risk 

management strategy that the program used was critical to its 

success. According to the VA officials, risks were identified at daily 

team meetings and mitigation strategies were developed. Furthermore 

an official explained that risk management is built in the Agile software 

development process by, for example, involving the end user early 

and often to ensure that the requirements were as thoroughly vetted 

as possible. 

Several of these factors are also consistent with best practices, such as 

the critical factors relating to risk management and governance. The full 

list of critical success factors and how agencies implemented them are 

presented in appendix II. 

Although the critical success factors identified by the seven agencies 

were cited as practices that contributed to the success of their 

acquisitions, implementation of these factors will not necessarily ensure 

that federal agencies will successfully acquire IT systems because many 

different factors contribute to successful acquisitions. Nevertheless, the 

examples of how agencies implemented the critical success factors may 

help federal agencies address the well-documented acquisition 

challenges they face. Moreover, the critical success factors in this report 

also support OMB’s objective of improving the management of largeConcluding 

Observations 

Page 29 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

scale IT acquisitions across the federal government, and wide 

dissemination of these factors and how agencies implemented them 

could complement these efforts. 

We received written, e-mail, or verbal responses on a draft of this report 

from all seven departments in our review as well as OMB. These 

responses are summarized below. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

 The Acting Secretary for the Department of Commerce provided 

written comments. The department stated that the report provides a 

good overview and assessment of governmentwide critical factors and 

elements that led to the successful acquisition of IT investments. The 

department also provided technical comments, which we incorporated 

as appropriate. 

 An acquisition analyst from the Department of Defense CIO 

Acquisition Directorate, writing on behalf of the department, provided 

an e-mail, which stated that the department had no comments on the 

draft report. 

 The Director of the NNSA’s Office of Internal Controls, responding on 

behalf of the Department of Energy, provided an e-mail stating that 

they agreed with the report and had no further comments. They also 

noted that the department is committed to supporting OMB’s objective 

of improving the management of large-scale IT acquisitions, and that 

wide dissemination of the factors in our report could complement 

OMB’s efforts. 

 The Director of DHS’s Departmental GAO/Office of Inspector General 

Liaison Office provided written comments. In its comments, the 

department noted that it remains committed to continuing its work with 

OMB to improve the oversight and management of IT investments to 

help ensure that systems are acquired on time and within budget, and 

that they deliver the expected benefits and functionality. The 

department further stated that it will use this report to enhance and 

improve the factors critical to the successful acquisition of the 

department’s investments, such as creating a structured training 

program to assist in obtaining certification in the program 

management career field, and conducting reviews to provide insight 

into the cost, schedule, and performance of IT investments. The 

Page 30 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
 

department also provided technical comments, which we incorporated 

as appropriate. 

 The Deputy Director of Audit Relations within the Department of 

Transportation’s Office of the Secretary provided an e-mail with 

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

 A program analyst within the Office of the Chief Information Officer for 

the Department of the Treasury, writing on behalf of the department, 

provided an e-mail, which stated that the department had no 

comments on the draft report. 

 The Department of Veterans Affairs Chief of Staff provided written 

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

 A policy analyst from OMB’s Office of E-Government and Information 

Technology, speaking on behalf of OMB, provided verbal technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from 

the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to 

interested congressional committees; the Director of OMB; the 

secretaries and agency heads of the departments and agencies 

addressed in this report; and other interested parties. In addition, the 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff members have any questions on the matters discussed 

in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 

may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 

David A. Powner 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Director, Information Technology 

 Management Issues 

Page 31 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 32 GAO-12-7 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Our objectives were to (1) identify federal information technology (IT) 

investments that were or are being successfully acquired and (2) identify 

the critical factors that led to the successful acquisition of these 

investments. 

To address our first objective, we selected 10 departments with the 

largest planned IT budgets as reported in the Office of Management and 

Budget’s (OMB) fiscal year 2011 Exhibit 53. Collectively, these 

departments accounted for 88 percent of the federal government’s 

requested total IT budget for fiscal year 2011. We then asked the chief 

information officers (CIO) and other acquisition and procurement officials 

from the departments to select one major, mission-critical1 IT investment 

that was, preferably, operational and that best achieved its cost, 

schedule, scope, and performance goals. Seven departments2—the 

Departments of Defense, Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, 

Transportation, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs—identified successful 

IT investments.3 Collectively, these departments accounted for 73 

percent of the planned IT spending for fiscal year 2011. 

To address our second objective, we interviewed officials responsible for 

each investment, asking them to identify and describe the critical factors 

that led to their success, and to provide examples where possible. We 

validated our understanding of the factors and examples collected during 

the interviews by providing written summaries to agency officials to 

ensure that their information was accurately portrayed. Because of the 

open-ended nature of our discussions with officials, we conducted a 

content analysis of the information we received in order to identify 

common critical success factors. We then totaled the number of times 

 

1

We defined a mission-critical IT investment as one that furthered the specific mission of 

the department and as such would be unique to that department. For example, we did not 

accept an offer by a department to review the successful development and 

implementation of its home website, as all federal departments have home websites. 

2

The three departments that were unable to identify an IT investment that met the criteria 

for this engagement were the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, 

and Justice. The Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services each 

identified systems that they stated met our criteria; however, GAO did not agree that the 

systems selected were mission critical. Justice stated that it had identified an investment 

that met our criteria; however, it was unable to locate key documentation and evidence 

needed for our review. 

3

We did not independently validate the successful aspects of the investments identified for 

our review by the departments. 

 IT Acquisition Success Factors 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 33 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors

each factor was mentioned by department and agency officials, choos

to report on the critical success factors that were identified by three or 

more investments. This resulted in our list of nine commonly iden

critical succes

ing 

tified 

s factors. We then compared these nine critical success 

factors to leading industry practices on IT acquisitions, such as the 

’s 

s factors 

uires that we plan and 

perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to 

 in 

 

Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI) Capability Maturity Model®

Integration (CMMI®) for Acquisition, the Project Management Institute’s A 

Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, and GAO

Information Technology Investment Management: A Framework for 

Assessing and Improving Process Maturity.

4 Finally, we compared the 

nine commonly identified critical success factors to OMB’s 25 Point 

Implementation Plan to Reform Federal Information Technology 

Management5 in order to determine whether those critical succes

are related to the high-level objectives found in the plan. 

We conducted our work from December 2010 through October 2011 in 

accordance with all sections of GAO’s Quality Assurance Framework that 

are relevant to our objectives. The framework req

meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work. We 

believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis 

conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions

this product. 

 

ton, D.C.: March 2004). 

 Dec. 9, 2010). 

4

SEI, CMMI® for Acquisition, Version 1.2 (Pittsburgh, Pa., November 2007); Project 

Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK 

Guide), 4th ed. (Newtown Square, Pa. 2008); and GAO, Information Technology 

Investment Management: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity, 

GAO-04-394G (Washing

5

OMB, 25 Point Implementation Plan to Reform Federal Information Technology 

Management (Washington, D.C.:
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Page 34 GAO-12-7 

Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

The following seven tables provide a description of critical success factors

identified by officials with each of the investments in our sample. 

Table 3: Decennial Response Integration System (DRIS)—Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Work breakdown structure-driven program 

organization of 

t 

e. 

The DRIS work breakdown structurea

 created a set of commonly understood terms, 

which facilitated communication across the program. As a result, clear lines 

communication and responsibility were established within and across the 

government and contractor program offices. Further, Census officials told us tha

DRIS program management documentation, including the program’s schedule, 

requirements, and risks, aligned with the program’s work breakdown structur

Open communication with contractor throug

regular reviews 

This supports the commonly identified critic

success factor: Program officials maintaine

regular communication with the prime contra

 discuss 

program office 

formally documented and communicated the technical performance of the DRIS 

e 

h 

al 

d 

DRIS program managers and their contractor counterparts met weekly to

significant issues. Census officials emphasized that the expectation of open 

communication and trust from senior leadership fostered an environment where 

issues could be freely discussed with the contractor. The DRIS 

ctor. 

prime contractor on a monthly basis. The contractor used this feedback to improv

its performance. In addition, the contractor invited Census officials to attend 

working cost review meetings prior to submitting its monthly contract performance 

reports.b

 Census officials noted that this provided program staff with valuable 

insight into the contractor’s performance. 

Involvement of stakeholders in integrated p

teams 

This supports the commonly identified critic

success factor: Program officials were activ

engaged with stakeholders. 

lation 

le, the development of requirements, and review of the prime contractor’s 

deliverables. 

roject 

al 

ely 

DRIS stakeholders—such as Census’s Population Division, which uses census 

data to create products like current population estimates and future popu

projections—were members of the DRIS integrated project teams. As part of their 

responsibilities as members of these teams, stakeholders were heavily involved in, 

for examp

Government and prime contractor collaboration According to Census officials, the contractor structured its program management 

office to reflect the major areas of the program’s work breakdown structure, and 

then the government structured its program management office to mirror the 

contractor’s. Those officials told us that the mirror organizational structures and 

corresponding staffing positions resulted in clear lines of responsibility and 

communications between the two organizations. Additionally, there was a clear 

understanding that if the prime contractor did not succeed, the Census would in 

turn not succeed. Further, Census officials told us that the prime contractor adopted 

the same work ethic and recognized the importance of the DRIS program to the 

census. This partnership resulted in open communication between the prime 

contractor and program officials. 

Government participation in contractor working 

meetings 

The DRIS program office staff participated in the DRIS prime contractor’s working 

meetings. For example, Census officials participated in the prime contractor’s 

internal integrated baseline reviews.c

 Most notably, during these reviews, both the 

the 

. 

program office and an independent division of the prime contractor assessed 

adequacy of the contractor’s proposed performance measurement baselines. 

Census officials stated that this gave the DRIS program office the opportunity to 

hear the DRIS prime contractor’s internal criticism of the proposed DRIS baselines

 

 

 IT Acquisition Success Factors 
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Page 35 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors

Critical success factor Description 

Stabilized funding stream 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

that it 

requested for DRIS. These officials attributed the level of funding to strong 

congressional support for the program. success factor: Programs received sufficient 

funding. 

The program consistently received the amount of funding from Congress 

Consistent and stable staff with prior knowledge 

l 

staff 

nt and stable.

office consisted of officials who dedicated all of their time to the DRIS 

ted 

m 

This supports the commonly identified critica

success factor: Government and contractor 

were consiste

The program 

program. Additionally, those officials told us that many of the key Census officials in 

the DRIS program were involved in the 2000 Census. Census officials explained 

that the experienced staff provided expertise in the areas of paper capture 

technology and operations, quality assurance, call center tools and operations, and 

acquisitions and contract surveillance. Moreover, those officials stated that the 

DRIS prime contractor had experience on the 2000 Census. Census officials sta

that the contractor’s prior experience contributed to a stable paper capture syste

for DRIS and staff that were familiar with Census operations. 

Early focus on managing risk Risks were identified and mitigation strategies were prepared early in the 

acquisition in order to help define criteria for evaluating the proposals put forth by

the potential DRIS developers. For example, the DRIS program identified 

information security as a significant risk to the acquisition. Consequently, program 

officials required potential developers to discuss information security issues during 

their oral presentations before the DRIS Source Selection Board. 

Contract with properly aligned incentives The DRIS prime contract utilized an award feed contract that included clear monetary 

incentives for the contractor to support a successful census. For example, Census officials 

stated that issues with the DRIS prime contractor’s technical performance—one of the 

factors considered in the award fee structure—were quickly addressed by the prime 

contractor. Risk areas for the program were a factor used to determine the incentives. 

Contract with clearly defined program phases Census officials explained that because the DRIS project had three distinct phases 

covering a number of years, they created a contract that could evolve over time to 

address changes without the program being locked into one approach early on. As 

a result, they created a contract that could evolve to incorporate changing 

requirements, integrate the results of early testing, and provide a cost and schedule 

measurement baseline that could be updated in order to measure performance. 

Cross training of business and technical staff 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Program staff had the necessary 

knowledge and skills. 

d 

Program officials that held a technical role on the DRIS program were trained in 

business skills, and officials that held a business role on the program were traine

in technical skills. Those officials noted that the technical training consisted of 

mostly on-the-job learning; the business training was a combination of classroom

and on-the-job learning. 

Program office and stakeholder involvement in 

requirements development 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

nts. 

success factor: End users and stakeholders 

were involved in the development of 

requireme

The DRIS program management office, stakeholders, and the contractor 

collaborated extensively to develop the DRIS requirements. For example, those 

officials told us that the program office, stakeholders, and the prime contractor 

analyzed the DRIS requirements to ensure that all parties had a common 

understanding of the requirements, that each requirement was unique, and that 

each requirement was verifiable. 

Program staff trained in contracting and earned 

value management 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

uccess factor: Program staff had the necessary 

ledge and skills. ained in earned value management,f

 source selection evaluations, and technical 

onitoring as appropriate. Many of the staff held program management 

ertifications form the Census Bureau’s project management training program. 

s

know

Census officials stated that all DRIS program staff that performed surveillance on

the prime contractor (i.e., oversight of the services being performed by the 

contractor) were trained as contracting officer’s technical representatives.e 

Additionally, those officials told us that DRIS program office officials were also 

tr

m

c

 
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Operational metrics drove activities y 

ed to 

nsus. 

The program office and the prime contractor were unified in their efforts to satisf

the DRIS operational metrics because those metrics represented what need

be done to ensure the success of the Ce

Incremental releases of requests for proposals Census officials stated that they released sections of the DRIS request for 

proposals in draft form in order to allow for questions from prospective contractors 

and early feedback from DRIS stakeholders, including those involved in investment 

approval at the Census Bureau and the Department of Commerce. Those officials 

explained that the incremental releases and subsequent comments gave the 

program office an early opportunity to understand possible DRIS approaches. This 

also allowed the program to obtain the investment approvals and award the 

contract on schedule. 

Defined forums for resolving risks and issues 

sis, an overarching 

m lowerEach of the DRIS program’s many meetings served a purpose and was held 

according to a defined schedule. For example, on a weekly ba

DRIS integrated project team met to discuss issues that were elevated fro

level integrated project teams. Additionally, the purpose of each meeting was well 

known, and the participants were clearly defined. As such, those officials told us 

that DRIS team members knew where issues should be discussed and did not 

need to scramble to schedule meetings when an issue arose. 

Focus on data quality Data quality was important from the very beginning of DRIS. For example, during 

the source selection process, the DRIS program management office provided a 

standard test deck of completed Census paper questionnaires to all potential 

developers and required them to use their prototype solution to scan this test deck 

in order to demonstrate the accuracy of their proposal. During the presentations,

each potential developer had to discuss the data quality results from their 

demonstration. Additionally, an independent contractor was hired to perform 

independent verification and validation on the operational results of the DRIS prime 

contractor’s paper data capture during the 2010 Census. 

Establish and update systems acquisition 

processes 

 Census officials explained that they took steps to 

 their 

hat 

, on an annual basis, the DRIS program office 

Census-wide organizational systems acquisition processes had not been 

developed when DRIS was being acquired. In the absence of agency guidance, the 

DRIS program implemented processes from the following sources: Capability 

Maturity Model® Integration, best practices learned from the 2000 Census; the 

Seven Steps to Performance Based Contracting; relevant GAO reports; and the 

DRIS prime contractor’s processes. The flexibility to tailor the program 

management processes to meet the program’s specific needs contributed to the 

successful implementation of processes such as risk management and change 

management. Additionally,

update and modify DRIS systems acquisition processes in order to ensure

quality. Specifically, the DRIS staff performed a “gap analysis” of the processes t

they did have in place and identified processes that they needed to add. In many

cases they decided to use the prime contractor’s processes to fill the gaps. They

also implemented a process quality assurance effort that examined one process 

each month to ensure that they were following the process and to solicit ideas for 

improving the process. In addition

hired an independent support contractor to review its quality assurance process in 

order to identify potential areas of improvement to the overall program. 

Effective change control process Census officials stated that two factors led to a change process that allowed the 

program to effectively control change: (1) the clear understanding of the current

baseline and (2) having a change control process that was integrated with the 

contractor’s process and which did not include unnecessary steps. Those officials 

added that the DRIS program performed a detailed review of each proposed 

change regardless of whether it was within or outside of the scope of the program. 

Page 36 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Stopped work to replan due to contract funding 

 the contract and worked with the 

asized 

After the identification of a misalignment between Census and the prime 

contractor’s anticipated contract funding soon after the DRIS prime contract was 

awarded, the program office stopped all work on

prime contractor to replan the work to be performed. Census officials emph

that it was important to stop all work so that the necessary attention and focus 

could be devoted to developing the replan, instead of trying to do both tasks at 

once. 

Support contractor staff provided crucial skill sets 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Program staff had the necessary 

knowledge and skills. 

Census officials stated that the DRIS contractor support staff provided skill sets that 

were not fully possessed by the government staff, including systems architecture 

and information security. 

Senior leadership support 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Senior department and agency 

executives supported the program. 

o 

e 

DRIS officials stated that involvement from Census senior leadership contributed t

the success of DRIS. For example, the division chief of the Decennial Systems 

Contract Management Office (outside of the program management office), provided

valuable information during development and testing. In addition, the Census 

Comptroller provided support on issues pertaining to the DRIS budget. Further, th

head of the Acquisition Division helped with key pre-award and contract 

management challenges. 

 Source: 

a

The w

progra

b

The co

progra st 

and sc

examin

c An int rformance measurement 

baseline is adequate and r

d “Costfixed a

determ

e

Contra hat 

contrac

contrac

clause

f Earne , 

provide

delays

GAO analysis of agency data. 

ork breakdown structure is a document that defines the work necessary to complete a 

m’s objectives. 

ntract performance report is the primary report of cost and schedule status and provides 

ms with information needed for effective program control. In particular, the report provides co

hedule variances, based on actual performance against the plan, which can be further 

ed to understand the causes of any differences.

egrated baseline review is held to validate that the contractor’s pe

ealistically portrays all authorized work according to schedule. 

plus-award-fee” contracts provide for the reimbursement of allowable costs, plus a base fee, 

t the contract’s inception (which may be zero) and an award amount that the government 

ines to be sufficient to motivate excellence in performance.

cting Officer’s Technical Representatives review contractor performance regularly, ensure t

tual milestones are met and standards are being maintained, conduct regular inspections of

tor deliverables throughout the contract period, and ensure that all contract conditions and 

s are acted upon. 

d value management is a project management approach that, if implemented appropriately

s objective reports of project status, produces early warning signs of impending schedule 

 and cost overruns, and provides unbiased estimates of anticipated costs at completion.

Page 37 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Table 4: Global Combat Support System-Joint (GCSS-J)—Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Stakeholder support 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Program officials were actively 

engaged with stakeholders. 

ous involvement of stakeholders in requirements development. A senior 

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) officials explained that stakeholdera

support was critical to the successful implementation of Agile software 

development.b This support was critical because Agile introduced practices that 

were different from the traditional approach. For example, Agile required the 

continu

official participated in the requirements development process and also provided 

incentives for other stakeholders to participate as well. 

Functional sponsor involvement in requirements 

identification and prioritization 

two commonly 

d 

requirements.

t at the beginning of each sprintc the Functional 

Requirements Working Group, consisting of representatives from the functional 

This supports the following 

identified critical success factors: End users an

stakeholders were involved in the development 

of requirements and Program staff prioritized 

DISA officials indicated tha

sponsor, the program management office, and the contractor, met to identify which 

requirements were to be addressed in the release. During development the group 

also met twice a week for a half to full day. 

Agile software development practices cal to the 

mong other things, Agile enhanced the participation of 

development process and provided for capabilities to be 

DISA officials stated that the use of Agile software development was criti

success of the program. A

the end users in the 

deployed in shorter periods of time. 

Mission-focused testing 

This supports the commonly identified critica

success factor: Users participated in testing 

system functionality prior to formal user 

acceptance. 

 stated that testing the system based on its ability to allow end users 

he 

ed in the development process. 

IT Acquisition Success Factors

l 

of 

to perform operational tasks in support of a realistic mission was critical to the 

program’s success. An example would be listing all of the individual steps required 

to load a weapon. Additionally, having the end users participate in testing at t

end of each sprint helped to keep end users involv

DISA officials

Integration of Agile characteristics into 

operational testing 

s 

DISA officials stated that integrating Agile software development characteristics into 

their operational testing was critical to the success of the program. Specifically, 

after the release went operational, the operational testers continued to collect 

metrics on system performance by reviewing system logs, metrics, help desk 

reports, remedy tickets, and problem reports to identify areas for further evaluation. 

For example, even though the system may have gone through the testing 

processes successfully, if there were an abnormally large number of end user call

a day on a certain issue during operations, the operational testers would look at 

their testing processes to see if there was something that they missed and how 

they could improve testing procedures in the future. In this way, operational testing

was never “over.” 

Review board oversight According to the DISA officials, because of the Agile software development 

process, the program underwent more frequent reviews that resulted in a more 

valid indicator of the status of the release. More frequent reviews allowed the 

GCSS-J stakeholders the benefit of participating frequently in the decision-making 

process, permitting real-time resolution of issues and problems and thus enabling 

the rapid release of functionality. Additionally, the officials indicated that they were 

able to decrease the turnaround time for certain tasks because the Milestone 

Decision Authorityd

 had been delegated to DISA, as opposed to being at the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense level. 

Page 38 GAO-12-7 
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Delegation of accountability and authority DISA officials indicated that there was empowerment to perform tasks at the lowest 

mple, the program management office was able to add pages 

ed 

level. For exa

indicating the changes that had been made to the Test and Evaluation Master Plan 

instead of creating a new document for each release. Additionally, according to the

officials, changes to the testing process resulted in the testing period being reduc

from 6 to 8 months to 2 months. 

Government and contractor organizations 

experienced limited turnover 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

the 

r 

e staff 

’s data. 

success factor: Government and contractor staff 

were consistent and stable. 

A DISA official noted that the longevity of the team contributed to the success of 

program. The official noted that many of the civilian staff are with the program “fo

life,” and that the support and development contractors also have been with the 

program for a long time. Additionally, the longevity of the team resulted in th

becoming subject matter experts in supporting and managing the program. For 

example, the Systems Design and Development Branch Chief has been with the 

program since 1998, and her initial duties focused on analyzing and understanding 

how the data the system obtained could be used. As a result, she is now a subject 

matter expert for issues related to the system

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. 

a

A stak

intende

b

Agile s

selecte of 

valuabl quently, from every couple of weeks to every couple 

of mon

orma

prin

ble

d

A Mile

entry in

eholder is an individual or group with an interest in the success of an organization in delivering

d results and maintaining the viability of its products and services. 

oftware development is not a set of tools or a single methodology, but a philosophy based on 

d values, such as prioritizing customer satisfaction through early and continuous delivery

e software; delivering working software fre

ths; and making the delivery of working software the primary measure of progress. For more 

tion on the Agile framework, see http://www.agilealliance.org. 

t is a block of time during which the software development team works to create a potentially 

 piece of functionality. GCSS-J’s sprints lasted 20 days. 

stone Decision Authority is an acquisition official with the authority to approve a program’s 

inf

c

A s

usa

to the next phase of the acquisition process. 

Page 39 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Table 5: Manufacturing Operations Management Project (MOMentum)—Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Project manager experience with business 

processes 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

ssary cording to the officials, this gave them the ability success factor: Program staff had the nece

knowledge and skills.

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) officials stated that the use of a 

project manager from the end user organization with decades of experience on the 

shop floor and an awareness of how the work on the shop floor is done was critical 

to the success of the program. Ac

to ensure that the requirements were fully understood prior to the implementation of 

the technology. 

Project team empowerment NNSA officials stated that the project team was empowered to take prudent risks, 

suggest new and improved approaches to meeting the required deliverables, and 

minimize activities that did not add value. For example, the team members were 

allowed to continue doing work while requirements were pending approval by the 

oversight board. 

Developer flexibility forts—and associated cost, 

schedule, and scope commitments—were defined and managed at the highest 

flexibility provided the developers with the ability to use 

NNSA officials noted that the project’s discrete work ef

possible level. This 

whatever solutions and practices they thought were best to meet the needs of the 

end user. 

Project team and contractor communication

This supports the commonly identified critic

success factor: Program officials maintaine

regular communications with the prime 

contractor.

al 

d 

According to NNSA officials, the potential risks of the developer’s enhanced 

flexibility were balanced by increased communication with the project team. 

Specifically, the project managers from the government and developer met every 

week; the integrated project teama

—which consisted of both government and 

developer staff—met multiple times each week; and the full MOMentum team, 

including government and developer staff, as well as other stakeholders, met 

quarterly. 

Commercial off-the-shelf software compatibi urchase the commercial off-the-shelf 

software package that was most compatible with their existing system was a critical 

success factor. Although other commercial off-the-shelf packages might have 

provided superior functionality, NNSA officials determined that it would have been 

more difficult to integrate those other packages with their existing system. 

lity NNSA officials stated that the decision to p

Early acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf 

software 

NNSA officials stated that the early acquisition of the commercial off-the-shelf 

software contributed to their success in two ways. First, because they were able to 

purchase the software during a time that the vendor was offering lower than normal 

prices, they were able to save millions of dollars on the purchase price and related 

licensing fees. Second, had they not acquired the software early, they would have 

developed their solution using a different software product, and then would have 

migrated that solution onto the intended software product once it was purchased. 

The early acquisition enabled NNSA to avoid having to migrate the solution from 

one product to another, thus saving time and money. 

Prioritized requirements 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Program staff prioritized 

requirements.

The program’s requirements were divided into three tiers based on mission need. 

This allowed the program officials to prioritize the requirements and adjust the 

scope of the program based on the capabilities of the software. According to NNSA 

officials, the first tier contained mission-essential requirements, the second tier 

contained requirements that would only be completed if funds were available after 

tier one requirements were satisfied, and the third tier contained requirements that 

were not mission critical and would only be met if the commercial off-the-shelf 

software addressed them without any custom coding. 

Page 40 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Knowledge and experience of project team According to an NNSA official, the SAPb team at Y-12 is cited for their su

This supports the commonly identified critical 

sary 

perior 

n SAP literature due to the complexity of the implementation and its 

success factor: Program staff had the neces

knowledge and skills. 

performance i

low operating costs. Additionally, the core SAP development team at Y-12 has 

been working together for over a decade as the result of limited turnover. 

Proactive communications with stakeholders 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Program officials were actively 

engaged with stakeholders. dditionally, the transparency contributed to a collegial, non-toxic 

According to an NNSA official, proactive communications with stakeholders led to 

increased transparency. This transparency led to alternative and tailored 

approaches being reviewed and approved by stakeholders prior to their 

implementation. A

work environment. 

Tailored independent reviews based on 

project risk 

xpert in the commercial software product used for the project 

According to an NNSA official, instead of having a large, comprehensive review of 

the entire program, they brought in a number of expert consultants to conduct 

smaller, targeted reviews of the portions of the program that had the highest risks. 

For example, an e

helped the program to validate the team’s approach for modifying the software. 

Consequently, the program was able to limit changes to the software; this 

decreases the risk of a commercial product being modified to the point that it 

becomes a one-of-a-kind, customized solution that is no longer supported by new 

releases of the vendor’s product, thus becoming costly to maintain. 

Business owner participation in requirements

ts. 

’ 

t 

development 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: End users and stakeholders 

were involved in the development of 

requiremen

According to an NNSA official, including the business owners in requirements

development ensured that the system requirements addressed the end users

needs and that program funding would be spent on things that would contribute to 

meeting those needs. NNSA officials stated that obtaining feedback from the end 

user was facilitated by having end user representatives serve on the investmen

review board. 

Early end user validation of functionality 

success factor: Users participated in testing of 

system functionality prior to formal user 

acceptance. 

 officials stated that the end users’ early testing of the system’s 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

MOMentum

interfaces and functionality was critical to the success of the investment. 

Specifically, the program used conference room pilots to allow stakeholders to 

validate that the developers had captured all of the requirements and that the 

implementation of the requirements in the software was adequate. This allowed 

feedback to be received early in the design process where mistakes or 

misinterpretations could be corrected more economically than if they were 

discovered later during formal system testing. 

 Source: 

a

The O

team le

and life

Team s

earned

b

SAP is are consists 

of multi

GAO analysis of agency data. 

ffice of Management and Budget defines an integrated project team as a multi-disciplinary 

d by a project manager responsible and accountable for planning, budgeting, procurement 

-cycle management of the investment to achieve its cost, schedule, and performance goals. 

kills include budgetary, financial, capital planning, procurement, user, program, architecture, 

 value management, security, and other staff as appropriate. 

 a company that develops commercial software under the same name. This softw

ple, integrated functional modules that perform a variety of business-related tasks. 

Page 41 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Table 6: Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI)—Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Leadership exhibited urgency and commitment 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

y 

p 

 2009. 

ty 

success factor: Senior department and agenc

executives supported the programs.

According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials, senior leadershi

committed to implementing WHTI at land and sea ports of entry by June 1,

The WHTI program manager stated that this deadline resulted in greater 

involvement of senior Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and CBP 

leadership. For example, the program manager told us that a former Depu

Secretary reached out to another agency when that agency’s efforts to collaborate 

on an issue were not meeting the schedule requirements of the WHTI program. 

That official told us that after receiving the necessary support from the other 

department, CBP was able to more rapidly query that department’s data. 

Congressional support through funding 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Programs received sufficient 

funding.

ar 

told 

e 

The WHTI program manager stated that the WHTI program received the requested 

funding from Congress for the 2 years leading up to the June 1, 2009, 

implementation date. Additionally, that official told us that Congress provided 2-ye

money, that is, money that could be obligated over a period of 2 years. Officials 

us that the 2-year money gave the program great flexibility to accommodate th

inherent complexities and expenditures incurred in a multiyear deployment, and to 

adapt to inevitable modifications in deployment requirements (that is, additional 

sites, lanes, and functionality). 

Program office control of WHTI budget HTI 

his arrangement reduces business sponsor 

CBP officials explained that the WHTI program budget was controlled by the W

program manager. Those officials stated that the WHTI program manager agreed 

on spending limits with the CBP offices that supported WHTI (e.g., facilities and 

technology) and monitored the expenditures. In contrast, CBP officials explained 

that funds are traditionally allocated to the CBP offices that support programs by 

the CBP Office of Administration. T

oversight and control. 

Program manager leadership CBP officials explained that the WHTI program office was led by an experienced

program manager. Those officials explained that the WHTI program manager 

created the necessary environment for the team to succeed. One official added th

the WHTI program manager’s leadership inspired the WHTI team. 

at 

Program office knowledge 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Program staff had the neces

knowledge and skills.

y member of the WHTI team had a 

good understanding of acquisitions (demonstrated by some staff holding acquisition 

ogram management. Further, those officials told us that the 

ne official attributed the 

CBP officials explained that the WHTI program was supported by experienced staff 

members. CBP officials stated that almost ever

sary certifications) and pr

team always had two members who were knowledgeable on a particular issue—

one team member was responsible for the issue and the other was a backup in the

event that the primary member was not available. These skills contributed to 

effective program oversight of the WHTI contractors through all phases of the 

acquisition, not just during contract award. Moreover, o

unity of the team and the commitment to work collaboratively to the respect that 

each team member had for others. 

Program office staff familiarity and stability 

This supports the commonly identified critic 

success factor: Government and contractor taff 

were consistent and stable.

CBP officials stated that many team members worked together on previous 

projects. As a result, those officials said that these team members already knew 

each other’s role, skills, and work style, and this familiarity enabled the program 

office to quickly perform at a high level. Those officials added that key staff 

members—such as the WHTI technical leader—remained consistent throughout 

the WHTI program. The low turnover of WHTI program staff helped to maintain that 

high performance. Moreover, according to a CBP official, the staff genuinely liked to 

work with one another and were able to collaborate effectively. 

al

 s

Page 42 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Stakeholder involvement CBP officials told us that the WHTI int

IT Acquisition Success Factors

This supports the commonly identified critical 

egrated project team was formed before the 

 planning efforts and well before the initiation of development efforts. 

ld with 

was 

success factor: Program officials were actively 

engaged with stakeholders.

completion of

According to CBP officials, the WHTI integrated project team was composed of 

numerous stakeholders such as legal support and representatives from 

budget/finance. CBP officials added that the team was formed prior to acquisition 

and development efforts, and weekly and later biweekly meetings were he

high participation rates. Those officials stated that the integrated project team 

a decision-making body—not just a mechanism for the WHTI program office to 

communicate with stakeholders. 

Consistent message when communicating about 

the program 

retary 

minology 

CBP officials told us that everyone in DHS and CBP—including the DHS Sec

and CBP Commissioner—adhered to WHTI’s consistent message and ter

when communicating with Congress, the media, and the American public. This 

consistent message was used to describe, for example, the goals of the program, 

deployment plans, privacy implications of the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 

infrastructure, and impact of the program on select groups crossing the border, 

including U.S. and Canadian children and Native Americans. 

Daily coordination with the prime contractor 

during deployment 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

ined 

ntractor.

success factor: Program officials mainta

regular communication with the prime co

CBP officials explained that key WHTI officials participated in a 9:00 a.m. daily 

teleconference with the contractor while WHTI was being deployed to ensure 

proper coordination and the rapid resolution of problems. CBP officials explained 

that this daily coordination was necessary given that deployment had a significant 

impact on port-of-entry operations; namely, each lane was taken offline for 1 to 2 

days while the infrastructure was deployed. For example, an official told us that the

electric system which provided power to the lanes at a port of entry was not 

adequate. This official said that the issue was identified and raised during the daily 

morning conference, someone was assigned to begin working on the problem 

during that meeting, and the issue was resolved. 

Prioritization of planning CBP officials explained that their initial instinct given the aggressive implementatio

timeline was to focus on technical solutions, developmental efforts, and 

deployment. However, those officials stated that the WHTI program began with, 

and completed, key planning efforts which eventually secured the success of the 

program. Examples of these planning efforts include policy changes

n 

, regulatory 

requirements, and process reengineering changes. 

Well-planned acquisition approach; active 

contract management 

CBP officials explained that the program obtained extensive input from potential 

contractors on WHTI requirements as a result of those potential contractors’ review 

of the draft statement of work for the WHTI design, procurement, testing, and 

deployment of the RFID/ License Plate Reader (LPR) infrastructure. Those officials 

stated that questions from the potential contractors improved the quality of the 

request for proposals and the resulting contract. Additionally, CBP officials 

explained that they utilized a fixed-price structure for the above-mentioned contr

Those officials said that this structure reduced the government’s risk of realizing 

cost overruns. Further, CBP officials stated that the contracting officer for that 

contract was colocated with program

act. 

 office officials. As a result, CBP officials 

explained that the contracting officer was fully aware of operational issues and 

requirements, provided needed guidance, and expedited contract modifications. 

Page 43 GAO-12-7 
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Testing prior to deployment 

ormal user 

acceptance.

y 

se test 

t 

., 

and license plate types were used to test the LPR 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Users participated in testing of 

system functionality prior to f

CBP officials explained that the program’s testing prior to deployment was critical to

the success of the WHTI program. In particular, those officials stated that the LPR 

and RFID design and performance were tested at a mock port-of-entry test facilit

constructed at an old private airport in Virginia. CBP officials said that the

lanes with RFID and LPR infrastructure were used to optimize the system so that i

(1) would be able to detect multiple RFID cards in one vehicle within that lane, and 

(2) would not be overly sensitive as to detect RFID cards from other lanes. 

Additionally, those officials explained that numerous vehicle speeds, models (e.g

sedans, sports cars, SUVs, etc.), 

and associated camera technologies. Further, according to CBP officials, tests 

were done in all weather and lighting conditions to ensure the cameras could 

capture acceptable images under all circumstances. Moreover, those officials told 

us that a group of core end users was brought to this facility to test the forthcoming

technology. As a result, CBP officials explained that when many of these end users 

returned to their ports of entry, they became advocates for the WHTI technology. 

Funding for public outreach of the significant 

he 

 WHTI program manager, 

order. 

CBP officials stated that they believe that Congress’s recognition

social and cultural changes required of U.S. and Canadian citizens to successfully

implement WHTI led Congress to appropriate funding for an effective 

communications and outreach campaign to increase awareness about new 

requirements for travel documents. CBP officials stated that this campaign, which 

relied on professional advertising media (e.g., TV, print, radio, and billboard 

advertising) provided by a private public relations firm, was something that normally 

would not be funded for a federal program, but was critical in obtaining buy-in from 

the local border communities and the traveling public, thus ensuring the success of 

the program. CBP officials explained that WHTI deployed millions of dollars in 

technology; however, if travelers did not obtain RFID-enabled travel documents, t

technology would be underutilized. According to the

because of these outreach efforts, WHTI had a compliance rate of 90 percent on the 

first day that WHTI documents were required to be presented at the land b

Just-in-time operational and technical training 

th 

sers were fully prepared to 

CBP officials told us that the end users were trained just prior to, during, and 

immediately after, deployment. Those officials noted that even after the lanes were

accepted by CBP officials at the ports of entry, WHTI program officials stayed wi

the end users for 5 to 7 days to ensure that the end u

use the system. Those officials told us that by the time WHTI was fully 

implemented, over 10,000 officers had been trained in new operating procedures, 

application use, and familiarization with the new lane equipment and travel 

documents. 

 Source: GAO analysis of agency data. 

Page 44 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Table 7: Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS)—Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Program manager leadership Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) officials told us that having ITWS program 

manager leadership that was organized, firm, and had integrity contributed to 

making ITWS successful. For example, those officials told us that the former 

program manager vigorously defended the program’s budget when presenting it to 

senior management. 

Support of senior leadership 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Senior department and agency 

executives supported the program.

e 

ll as 

FAA officials explained that the FAA Joint Resources Council and Executive 

Council provided good support for the program. For example, individuals on thes

councils provided advice and guidance regarding acquisition procedures as we

fostering the development of leadership skills. 

Consistency of program manager 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

and contractor 

ble.

success factor: Government 

staff were consistent and sta

The program retained the same program manager for 7 years to oversee the 

development and deployment of the system, which provided continuity. 

Development and prioritization of requirements 

This supports the following two commonly 

identified critical success factors: End users 

and stakeholders were involved in the 

development of requirements and Program 

staff prioritized requirements. 

evelopment 

or 

te 

ers and 

FAA officials told us that ITWS end users in Orlando presented the d

team with a “wish list” of requirements that would help them significantly. F

example, the end users identified the need for forecasts at 10-, 20-, and 60-minu

intervals. In addition, the requirements were prioritized by a team of end us

developers based on balancing their importance to the end users and the maturity 

of the technology. 

Testing of prototypes 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Users participated in testing of 

system functionality prior to formal user 

acceptance.

FAA officials stated that conceptual displays for future ITWS capabilities were 

presented to end users in the field. Those officials explained that these efforts 

helped to ensure that the end users’ needs would be addressed by the operational 

ITWS solution. 

Regular stakeholder involvement 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Program officials were actively 

engaged with stakeholders.

The ITWS program involved stakeholders (e.g., air traffic controller labor 

representatives, field users, National Weather Service, Department of Defense) by 

inviting them to meetings every other week. Through these meetings, the former 

program manager explained that the program was able to obtain the stakeholder 

buy-in to the ITWS program. 

Alignment of knowledge/expertise with tasks 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Program staff had the 

necessary knowledge and skills.

m manager stated that he took steps to ensure that his staff could 

me to the ITWS program. For example, that official told us that 

he utilized support contractors that were dedicated to the ITWS program. 

The former ITWS program manager explained that tasks were assigned to 

individuals who possessed the requisite knowledge and skills. Additionally, the 

former progra

dedicate all of their ti

Expectations and rewards for success The former ITWS program manager stated that he provided the ITWS teams with a 

clear vision, objectives, and expectations during meetings. Additionally, that official 

told us that he instituted reward programs to provide incentives for the staff to be 

creative and get things done quickly. 

Communication between the program 

management office team and the program 

manager 

The former ITWS program manager told us that he encouraged the team to share 

all information with him—both successes and problems. That official told us that 

this environment made him aware of problems early; as a result, he was able to 

mitigate the impact of those problems before it became severe. 

Continuous schedule management The former ITWS program manager explained that he relied heavily on the program 

schedule in order to manage the program. That official added that he ensured that 

the official responsible for maintaining the program’s schedule was present during 

all of the team’s meetings. 

Page 45 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Understanding of personality types The former program manager for IT

This supports the commonly identified critical 

ad the 

WS stated that the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 

 his ability to successfully lead the program. Specifically, that official 

success factor: Program staff h

necessary knowledge and skills.

contributed to

told us that his training in the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator area helped him to 

understand how to communicate effectively with individuals of different types, which 

individuals were the best fit for a particular assignment, and who was the right 

person to contact to get things done on time. 

 Source: GAO analysis of agency data. 

Page 46 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Table 8: Customer Account Data Engine 2 (CADE 2)—Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Senior leadership support 

This supports the following two co

IT Acquisition Success Factors

mmonly 

identified critical success factors: Senior 

department and agency executives supported 

the programs and Programs received suffici

funding. 

ld 

e, his keynote speech at a CADE 2 

 IRS employees, has provided a clear and unwavering 

message about CADE 2, which has unified IRS employees, driven change, and 

removed barriers that can often impede programs of this magnitude. Additionally, 

those officials told us that the Commissioner has helped the program obtain funding 

for CADE 2 by speaking with Congress to sustain interest and support for the 

program. In addition to support from the Commissioner, IRS officials stated that 

they have received guidance and support from the IRS Chief Technology Officer 

since the program’s inception. For example, those officials said that CADE 2 

leadership meets with the Chief Technology Officer on a monthly basis to discuss 

the program. 

ent town hall meeting for

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) officials explained that endorsement for CADE 2 

has come from the highest levels of the organization. In particular, the IRS 

Commissioner has made the program one of his top priorities. Those officials to

us that the Commissioner, through, for exampl

Right mix of people 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Program staff had the necessary 

knowledge and skills. 

IRS officials stated that CADE 2 leadership contains an appropriate mix of 

government executives that have been recruited from within and outside of IRS. 

Those officials explained that individuals recruited from inside IRS provide 

institutional knowledge and expertise on current legacy and past modernization 

efforts, enterprise architecture, enterprise IT operations currently in place, tax 

administration processes, and general administrative procedures such as hiring 

and budget formulation. With regard to CADE 2 executives that were recruited from 

external sources, IRS officials stated that the Treasury Secretary utilized his 

authority to authorize critical pay positionsa

 for CADE 2. Officials stated that those 

executives have come into the IRS with demonstrated success in managing largescale transformation efforts in accordance with best practices. For example, those 

officials told us that the CADE 2 program manager was previously responsible for 

the design, development, and implementation of several major global information 

technology solutions for a major corporation. 

Right-sized governance model IRS officials told us that in comparison to other IRS business system modernization 

projects, the governance model for CADE 2 has been streamlined. For example, 

those officials stated that the CADE 2 governance structure includes an executive 

steering committee (ESC). This committee consists of senior executives from 

Modernization and Information Technology Services, business partners, and the 

Department of the Treasury, and serves as an oversight group that ensures the 

program stays aligned with the IRS strategic plan and approves decisions with 

significant organizational or external impact. IRS officials explained that, in contrast 

to other programs at IRS that utilize an ESC, the CADE 2 ESC is dedicated solely 

to the CADE 2 program. Those officials told us that this gives an added measure of 

accountability and responsibility for the successful outcome of the program. 

Additionally, IRS officials explained that because the ESC is dedicated solely to 

CADE 2, there is only one layer of governance below it—the Governance Board. 

This board consists of Associate Chief Information Officers from CADE 2 

Applications Development, Enterprise Operations, Enterprise Services, and the 

business modernization executive from the business partner. The board ensures 

that objectives are met, decisions and issues are resolved in a timely manner, risks 

are managed appropriately, and the expenditure of resources allocated is fiscally 

sound. According to IRS officials, having only one layer of governance below the 

ESC enhances accountability and streamlines decision making and management of 

risks and issues. In addition to the two previously mentioned bodies, the CADE 2 

program utilizes advisory councils for guidance and assistance in key areas. 

Page 47 GAO-12-7 
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Program office as system integrator According to IRS officials, CADE 2 is the first program of its size and magnitude 

 has acted as the integrator and program manager over the 

, 

on 

. 

where the IRS

acquisition since its inception. Consequently, those officials told us that there is a 

great deal of pride within IRS because employees, rather than outside contractors

are in charge of the integration and management of this substantial technology 

investment. Officials explained that IRS has established clear lines of authority and

accountability between the CADE 2 program office (integrator), the business 

partners, and the delivery partners (i.e., the organizations within IRS Modernizati

and Information Technology Services directly responsible for the CADE 2 projects)

Those officials noted that the program manager brought in a coach to drive the 

program office, delivery partners, and business partners to improve leadership and 

communication skills. 

Integrated project management processes 

ing 

y have developed a program life-cycle framework for the CADE 2 

cts, and 

y, 

—

 to 

t 

IRS officials explained that, as the CADE 2 integrator, they have established a 

program framework for ensuring integration of the two projects—daily process

and database implementation—at the program level. Specifically, those officials 

stated that the

program, which includes clearly defined life-cycle phases, milestones, artifa

reviews. IRS officials noted that this framework enables the program office to 

manage the CADE 2 projects in a coordinated and integrated manner. Additionall

those officials told us that they have enhanced program management processes

such as risk management, scheduling, and requirements management—in order

account for integration at the program level. For example, IRS officials stated tha

they use a software tool to manage their requirements. Those officials told us that, 

using this tool, they now trace requirements from design through testing. 

Project planning to set solid program foundation IRS officials explained that they established four key documents in the early stages

of the program: (1) a program charter, which defines the mission and goals of the 

CADE 2 program; (2) a solutions architecture, which describes the existing and 

target business processes and solutions architecture; (3) a program roadmap, 

which describes IRS’s plan to transition from the current state to the Target State 

for CADE 2; and (4) a program management plan, which describes the practices 

and principles used to manage the program. Those officials explained that these 

four documents kept the team focused, and provided stability and guidance for the 

program. 

Establishment of key milestones and decision 

points 

ort to 

 at 

IRS officials stated that during an early milestone for Transition State 1, the IRS

Chief Technology Officer asked the program to clearly define the path that IRS 

needed to take in order to fully implement the first transition state within the 

planned time frame. This definition included a framework of activities which 

includes go/no-go decision points, deep dive reviews, independent readiness 

reviews, and internal confidence assessments using a confidence scoring 

methodology to fully inform assessments. IRS officials noted that these activities 

included reviews by parties external to IRS. Those officials told us that the eff

define the framework drove the program to plan more proactively for deployment

the completion of logical design review. IRS officials stated that this early 

deployment planning was beneficial because it provided accountability, drove 

contingency planning, and enhanced risk management. 

Page 48 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Consistent and open communication 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: Program officials were actively 

engaged with the stakeholders. 

S 

s, and 

ADE 

ude: plans, progress made, risk mitigation strategies, and 

IRS officials explained that they regularly report the status of CADE 2 internally to IR

employees working on the program, delivery and business partner executive

stakeholders. For example, those officials told us that feedback forums have been 

established for employees and stakeholders to submit questions and obtain 

clarifications on the program. Further, in anticipation of the forthcoming changes 

associated with the January 2012 deployment of the Transition State 1 solution, IRS 

established a communications working group to coordinate and collaborate on C

2 and related IRS programs. Those officials explained that this open environment has 

quashed secrets and hidden agendas. Additionally, IRS officials stated that CADE 2 

information is frequently shared with entities external to IRS, including oversight 

bodies, audit entities, and external tax advisory groups. Examples of the types of 

information provided incl

information relating to the program’s cost, schedule, and scope. 

Use of existing contracts IRS officials stated that because significant time is required in order to establish a 

new contract, IRS has utilized existing contracts to support CADE 2. Those 

contracts are used for activities such as program management support and 

technical support. Those officials noted that the use of existing contracts allowed 

the IRS to achieve economies of scale for large purchases. Additionally, IRS 

officials stated that they have been able to take advantage of the skills and 

expertise of contractors that have worked on the current program. For example, 

contract personnel with experience in creating the database that supports the 

current program are supporting the development of the database that will support 

CADE 2. 

 Source

a

Critic

: GA

a

critical 

O analysis of agency data. 

l position pay authority allows department leadership to set the rate of basic pay for a given 

position. 

Page 49 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Table 9: Occupational Health Record-keeping System (OHRS)—Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Project team/end user representative 

partnership 

This supports the following two commonly 

identified critical success factors: Program 

officials were actively engaged with 

stakeholders and Program staff had the 

necessary knowledge and skills. 

am 

Veterans Affairs (VA) officials stated that the project was jointly owned by the end 

users and the project team. The end user representative was involved in daily te

status meetings, various requirements development activities, and lessons-learned 

reviews. She was involved in decision making for things such as user interface 

screens and user training. As a result, the end user representative was treated as 

part of the project team instead of as a customer who would only be involved at the 

beginning or the very end of the project. 

Senior leadership support 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

artment and 

ted the programs.

f 

gic 

s 

RS.

success factor: Senior dep

agency executives suppor

VA officials noted that senior leadership involvement was critical to the success o

the acquisition. In particular, the Chief of the Office of Public Health and 

Environmental Hazards (located within the Veteran’s Health Administration (VHA)) 

was committed to the success of the program and helped the program get its 

funding. Additionally, the Chief Consultant of the Occupational Health Strate

Healthcare Group allowed the end user representative to devote a significant 

amount of her time to OHRS. Furthermore, the VA Chief Information Officer and hi

staff participated in the early discussions regarding the need to implement OH

Requirements development, prioritization, 

and analysis 

This supports the following two commonly 

identified critical success factors: End users 

and stakeholders were involved in the 

development of requirements and Program 

staff prioritized requirements.

s 

on of these requirements, the end user representative and six 

tter experts analyzed the requirements to ensure that they 

lso stated that the priorities of the requirements were initially defined, then 

reviewed and changed throughout the project development life cycle. For example, 

at times it was discovered that there were requirements that needed to be 

implemented in conjunction with other requirements due to dependencies that were 

discovered later during the development. 

VA officials stated that the end user representative identified a set of requirement

for an occupational health system 3 years prior to the initiation of OHRS 

development efforts. This was critical to the success of the program because the 

team did not have to start requirements development from scratch. Prior to the 

implementati

additional subject ma

were still valid given the length of time since they were initially identified. A VA 

official a

Early end user testing of functionality 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

success factor: End users participated in 

testing of system functionality prior to formal 

user acceptance.

The end user representative tested functionality on a daily basis, approved features 

when they were completed at the end of each sprint, and formally approved 

products prior to their release. The team was able to complete quality assurance 

testing more quickly because the end user representative tested the product prior 

to the system going through more formal quality assurance testing. 

Continuous risk management VA officials stated that the risk management strategy that the program used was 

critical to its success. According to the VA officials, risks were identified at daily 

team meetings, and mitigation strategies were determined by the program 

management office when possible. Furthermore an official explained that risk 

management is built into Agile software development.a

 For example, by involving 

the end user early and often, VA decreased the risk that the end user would not be 

satisfied with the final product. 

Early involvement of implementation staff VA officials stated that bringing a member of the VA team who performs final 

testing and deployment onto the OHRS team early contributed to the success of 

the program. Specifically, those officials told us that the process of final testing and 

deployment was completed sooner for OHRS than some other VA systems. 

Page 50 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix II: Critical Success Factors 

Critical success factor Description 

Constant tracking of progress VA officials stated that they used standardized software tools to measure and track 

progress of the work being done, and the associated schedule and cost. For 

example, the team used a software tool called “VersionOne” to track the daily 

progress of the development team in addressing program requirements and testing 

software. In addition, they used another software tool called “TeamPlay” to 

measure the project’s major milestones, costs, and earned value on a weekly and 

monthly basis. The ability to manage progress contributed to the investment’s 

success. 

Project team knowledge 

This supports the commonly identified critical 

ff had the 

of VHA programs, skill sets, and desire to be on an Agile team contributed to the 

ed 

ing 

success factor: Program sta

necessary knowledge and skills. 

VA officials indicated that the selection of team members based on their knowledge 

success of the program. For example, VA officials explained that the entire team—

including the end user representative—was trained in Agile software development. 

Those officials noted that this training was reinforced by the team’s use of an Agile 

“coach”—an individual that audited the team’s Agile processes and who provided 

suggestions that improved the team’s performance. Additionally, VA officials stat

that the end user representative trained the OHRS technical staff on issues relat

to occupational health and why implementation of OHRS was important. 

Relationship with contractor 

al 

Program officials maintained 

This supports the commonly identified critic

success factor:

regular communication with the prime 

contractor.

VA officials stated that the partnership between the government and contractor 

contributed to the success of the program. An official stated that the contractor and 

the program management office staff (in addition to the end user) met daily, which 

ensured they were all kept apprised of the program’s status. Moreover, an official 

stated that the relationship between the program office and the contractor was not

adversarial, which was necessary for the blended team of contractor, end user, and 

VA information technology staff to be successful. 

Definition of performance measures Performance measures were defined in the contract and were used by both the 

program management office and the contractor. 

Inclusion of the contractor in planning and 

scheduling 

According to VA officials, including the contractor in the planning and scheduling of 

deliverables contributed to the success of the program because it helped to ensure 

that the deliverables were on time. 

 Source: 

a gile s

ecte

aluabl e 

 mon

informa

GAO analysis of agency data. 

oftware development is not a set of tools or a single methodology, but a philosophy based on 

d values, such as prioritizing customer satisfaction through early and continuous delivery of 

e software; delivering working software frequently, from every couple of weeks to every coupl

ths; and making the delivery of working software the primary measure of progress. For more 

tion on the Agile framework, see http://www.agilealliance.org. 

A

sel

v

of

Page 51 GAO-12-7 IT Acquisition Success Factors
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 52 GAO-12-7 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

 IT Acquisition Success Factors 

David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov

In ad

Direc

Paya

Acknowledgments 

G

dition to the contact named above, Deborah A. Davis (Assistant 

tor), Kaelin P. Kuhn, Lee McCracken, Thomas E. Murphy, Jamelyn 

n, and Andrew Stavisky made key contributions to this report. 

AO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(311238)
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