alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5255 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 5255

 To amend MAP-21 to provide that certain station projects are eligible 
for funds under the program for transit-oriented development planning, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 22, 2019

  Mr. Brown of Maryland (for himself and Mrs. Wagner) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation 
                           and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend MAP-21 to provide that certain station projects are eligible 
for funds under the program for transit-oriented development planning, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Maximizing Our Redevelopment and 
Efficiency for Transit Oriented Development Act'' or the ``MORE TOD 
Act''.

SEC. 2. TRANSIT-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING PROJECTS.

    Section 20005(b) of MAP-21 (49 U.S.C. 5303 note) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1)--
                    (A) in subparagraph (A) by inserting ``, or a 
                covered station project'' before the period; and
                    (B) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(C) Covered station.--The term `covered station' 
                means a station servicing a fixed guideway system that 
                was constructed with, or otherwise received, Federal 
                funding.''; and
            (2) in paragraph (2)--
                    (A) in subparagraph (A) by inserting ``and 
                equitable'' after ``enhance''; and
                    (B) in subparagraph (D) by inserting ``, inclusive, 
                and mixed-income'' after ``mixed-use''.

SEC. 3. ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.

    Section 5338(a)(2)(B) of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking ``2020'' and inserting ``2019''; and
            (2) by inserting ``, $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2020, 
        $21,000,000 for fiscal year 2021, $22,000,000 for fiscal year 
        2022, $23,000,000 for fiscal year 2023, $24,000,000 for fiscal 
        year 2024, $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2025, and $26,000,000 
        for fiscal year 2026,'' before ``shall be available''.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-1394
CHAREL DANIELL, Plaintiff - Appellant, versusTHE OLD LINE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA; UNITED SERVICES LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; STANDARD MARKETING, INCORPORATED; BUDGET TERM BROKERS; KEITH KLIMA; RANDY MURRAY, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, District Judge. (CA-94-512-5-BR) Submitted: November 7, 1996 Decided: November 18, 1996 Before RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Charel Daniell, Appellant Pro Se. George Jerald Oliver, Matthew Woodruff Sawchak, SMITH, HELMS, MULLISS & MOORE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order dismissing her discrimination in employment and contract claims. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Daniell v. The Old Line Life Ins. Co. of Am. , No. CA-94-512-5-BR (E.D.N.C. Feb. 28, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
§ 19.285 Proof determination of distilled spirits. ( a ) *Proof.* Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, when the proprietor is required to gauge distilled spirits, the proprietor must determine the proof in accordance with the procedures prescribed in part 30 of this chapter, Gauging Manual.
( b ) *Use of Initial proof.* After a proprietor has determined the proof of distilled spirits in accordance with the procedures in part 30 of this chapter, a proprietor may use the initial determination of proof when required to make a later gauge at the same plant. However, a proprietor must determine the proof again when: ( 1 ) A bottling tank gauge is required by § 19.353;
( 2 ) A gauge for tax determination is required by § 19.226; or
( 3 ) In any case where the proof may have changed.
(26 U.S.C. 5559)
428 P.2d 985

#### Manuel CHAVEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gaynor E. ATKINSON, Preston Strunk a/k/a Preston Colby and Western Surety Company, a corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 28.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

May 26, 1967.

Rozier E. Sanchez and Eugene E. Klecan, Albuquerque, for appellant.

John P. Duffy, Farlow & Duffy, Albuquerque, for appellees Atkinson and Western Surety Co.

Preston Strunk, pro se.

OPINION

WOOD, Judge.

Atkinson is a justice of the peace and Western Surety Company is his surety. Atkinson issued a writ of execution directed against the goods and chattels of plaintiff. The writ was given to Strunk for service. The amended complaint seeks damages for assault, battery and false arrest alleged to have been committed by Strunk while serving the writ. It is alleged that Atkinson acted beyond the scope of his authority in giving the writ to Strunk for service and that Atkinson knew or should have known that Strunk was not authorized to serve the writ.

Summary judgments were entered in fav- or of Atkinson and Western Surety Company. The action against Strunk is pending in the trial court.

Plaintiff seeks reversal of the summary judgments. He contends that Atkinson and his surety are liable for the alleged wrongful and illegal actions of Strunk because Atkinson’s actions were in excess of his authority as a justice of the peace.

We do not reach this contention. If there can be any liability on the part of Atkinson and his surety under the facts alleged, such liability would be dependent upon the establishment of the acts alleged to have been committed by Strunk; thus, determination of the issues between plaintiff and Strunk will affect the final determination *131of the issues between plaintiff and the dismissed defendants.

In this situation, the present appeal is premature. The summary judgments are not presently appealable because they are not final judgments (§ 21-2-1(5) (1), N.M. S.A.1953) nor orders which practically dispose of the merits of the action (§ 21-2-1 (5) (2), N.M.S.A.1953). Klinchok v. Western Surety Company of America, 71 N.M. 5, 375 P.2d 214 (1962); Lopez v. Hoffman, 77 N.M. 396, 423 P.2d 429 (1967); Platco Corp. v. Colonial Homes, Inc., 78 N. M. 35, 428 P.2d 9.

The appeal is dismissed.

It is so ordered.

HENSLEY, C. J., and SPIESS, J., concur.
<PAGE>   1


                                                                Exhibit 23.1



                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in this Annual Report on Form 10-K
of Morgan Stanley Group Inc. of our report dated January 7, 1997, included in
the 1996 Annual Report to Shareholders of Morgan Stanley Group Inc.

Our audits also included the financial statement schedule of Morgan Stanley
Group Inc. listed in item 14(a). This schedule is the responsibility of the
Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion based on our
audits. In our opinion, the financial statement schedule referred to above,
when considered in relation to the basic financial statements taken as a whole,
presents fairly in all material respects the information set forth therein.

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-3 No. 333-18005, Form S-3 No. 333-01655, Form S-3 No. 33-58611, Form
S-3 No. 33-51413, Form S-8 No. 333-08571, Form S-8 No. 33-13177, Form S-8 No.
33-37652, Form S-8 No. 33-18184, and Form S-8 No. 33-42464) of Morgan Stanley
Group Inc. and in the related Prospectuses of our report dated January 7, 1997,
with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of Morgan
Stanley Group Inc. included and incorporated by reference in this Annual Report
on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended November 30, 1996.



New York, New York
February 27, 1997
HVACMOTORSDIRECT CURRENT(DC)U FRAMEMOTORSBRAKEMOTORSVECTORDUTYINVERTERDUTYMULTI-SPEEDTHREE PHASEC-FACE SINGLE &THREE PHASEEXPLOSIONPROOFSEVEREDUTYGEN. PURPOSETHREE PHASEGEN. PURPOSESINGLE PHASE



# www.emersonmotors.com 15 ® 

### APPLICATIONS: Designed for fans, blowers, tools, conveyors, pumps and general industrial equipment. 216



### FEATURES:

Reversible Rotation * Cradle Mount * Continuous Duty * F1 Assembly * 40C Ambient Rated *

Voltage List Catalog Number Frame "C" Dim. (inches) Multiplier Symbol Ship Wt (lbs) Notes HP RPM 

# Resilient Base Full Load Amps SF 6308 4.6/2.3 25 18 10.7 $144 115/230 48 1/4 1800 DS-3FMP 1.00 T14CA2P9 5.6/2.8 24 21 11.4 $176 115/230 56 1800 DS-3FMP 1.00 T13CA2J9 7.6/3.8 22 11.4 $231 115/230 56 1/3 1800 DS-3FMP 1.00 T12CA2P9 9.0/4.5 24 24 11.4 $238 115/230 56 1/2 1800 DS-3FMP 1.00 T34CA2P9 11.4/5.7 24 30 13.2 $289 115/230 56 3/4 1800 DS-3FMP 1.00 T1CA2P9 13.6/6.8 24 32 13.2 $325 115/230 56 1 1800 DS-3FMP 1.00

Note 24 Note 25 Non-protected Automatic Reset Thermal Overload Protector 

# General Purpose Single Phase Totally Enclosed Fan Cooled (TEFC) Capacitor Start
(No. 78-CC-0844

#### Charles Hill, Claimant, *v.*State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Opinion filed April 6, 1979.*

Polos, C.J.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that the property in question was lost while in the actual physical possession of the State of Illinois, and that the State is liable as a bailee for the return of the property.

The record herein establishes that on December 20, 1976, while confined at Stateville Correctional Center, Claimant had in his possession a General Electric Clock Radio for which he paid $19.97. On that date the radio was taken from him by a guard, because it was playing too loud. The disciplinary committee denied him the use of the radio for 60 days, and at the end of the 60-day period, the radio could not be found.

*776This Court held in *Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1,*deciding that the State has a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard and return an inmate’s property when it takes actual physical possession of such property during the course of the transfer of an inmate between penal institutions.

While bailment is ordinarily a voluntary contractual transaction between bailor and bailee, various types of constructive and involuntary bailments have been recognized:

> “A constructive bailment can be created between an owner of the property and one in possession thereof.” *Chesterfield Sewer & Water, Inc., v. Citizens Insurance Co. of New Jersey, et al., 57 Ill. App.2d 90, 207 NE2d 84.*

In *Chesterfield,*the Court quotes from *Woodson v. Hare, 244 Ala. 301, 13 So2d. 172, at 174,*as follows;

> “An actual contract or one implied in fact is not always necessary to create a bailment. Where, otherwise than by mutual contract of bailment, one person has lawfully acquired the possession of personal property of another and holds it under circumstances whereby he ought, upon principles of justice, to keep it safely and restore it or deliver it to the owner, such person and the owner of the property are, by operation of law, generally treated as bailee and bailor under a contract of bailment, irrespective of whether or not there has been any mutual assent, express or implied, to such relationship.”

The loss or damage to bailed property while in the possession of the bailee raises a presumption of negligence which the bailee must rebut by evidence of due care. The effect of this rule is not to shift the ultimate burden of proof from the bailor to the bailee, but simply to shift the burden of proceeding or going forward with the evidence.

At the trial of the cause the State presented no testimony to explain the failure of the institution to return Claimant’s items of property to him, and presented no testimony of its freedom from negligence.

Respondent has conceded liability in this matter, *777and has presented no testimony to explain the loss of Claimant’s property.

It is therefore ordered that Claimant be, and hereby is awarded the sum of $19.97.
(No. 73-CC-396

#### Damarin, Kuhle, Suhre, Inc., Claimant, *vs.*State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

*Opinion filed July 19, 1973.*

Damarin, Kuhle, Suhre, Inc., Claimant, pro se.

William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.
§ 19.239 Form of payment. ( a ) *General.* The proprietor must pay the tax due on spirits when filing a return on form TTB F 5000.24, Excise Tax Return. The remittance for the tax must accompany the return and may be in any form that is authorized by § 70.61 of this chapter and acceptable to the appropriate TTB officer. Exception: This does not apply to payments that must be made by EFT. For EFT payments see § 19.240.
( b ) *Consequences of default.* If a check or money order tendered in payment of taxes is not paid on presentment, or if the taxpayer is otherwise in default in payment, then any remittance made during the period of default must be either in cash or by an acceptable certified instrument. The proprietor must continue to pay in cash or by certified instrument as long as the proprietor remains in default, and until the appropriate TTB officer finds that accepting a check will not jeopardize the revenue.
( c ) *Certified instruments.* Acceptable certified instruments include certified checks, cashier's checks or treasurer's checks drawn on any bank or trust company incorporated under the laws of the United States, or under the laws of any State, Territory or possession of the United States, or a money order, as provided in § 70.61 of this chapter.
( d ) *Payment of taxes.* The proprietor must make checks or money orders payable to “Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau”.
(26 U.S.C. 5061, 6311)
#### § 19.282 General requirements for gauging and measuring equipment.

A proprietor is required to perform periodic gauges of the spirits, wines, and alcoholic flavorings at the plant. A proprietor must have accurate and readily usable gauging and measuring equipment as required by this part and part 30 of this chapter. At any time, TTB may require that the proprietor's gauges be performed in the presence of, and be verified by, a TTB officer. In addition, TTB may disapprove the use of any equipment, or the proprietor's means of gauging, if TTB finds that it is not sufficiently accurate or suitable for the gauges and measurements to be made.

(26 U.S.C. 5006, 5204)
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                               JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                 MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                             8,643
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    528,475
<ALLOWANCES>                                      19,649
<INVENTORY>                                      363,180
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 937,281
<PP&E>                                           485,461
<DEPRECIATION>                                   186,211
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1,274,262
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            733,515
<BONDS>                                                0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                           5,098
<OTHER-SE>                                       511,004
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1,274,262
<SALES>                                          581,378
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 581,378
<CGS>                                            342,295
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                          0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                     0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   38,854
<INCOME-TAX>                                           0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               61,915
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                      38,854
<EPS-BASIC>                                         0.01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       0.01


</TABLE>
###### Editorial Note on Part 17

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 17 appear by T.D. ATF-436, 66 FR 5470, 5471, Jan. 19, 2001.

#### § 17.143 Notice for monthly claims.

If the manufacturer has notified the appropriate TTB officer, in writing, of an intention to file claims on a monthly basis instead of a quarterly basis, and has filed a bond in compliance with the provisions of this part, claims may be filed monthly instead of quarterly. The election to file monthly claims shall not preclude a manufacturer from filing a single claim covering an entire quarter, or a single claim covering just two months of a quarter, or two claims (one of them covering one month and the other covering two months). An election for the filing of monthly claims may be withdrawn by the manufacturer by filing a notice to that effect, in writing, with the appropriate TTB officer.
<PAGE>
 
                                 EXHIBIT 10.18


                           SUNGARD DATA SYSTEMS INC.
                      SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPANY'S
                LONG-TERM EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN


In 1994, SunGard Data Systems Inc. established a long-term incentive
compensation plan for the chief executive officers of its operating business
groups.  The principal purposes of this plan are to further align the interests
of the group chief executive officers with those of the Company's stockholders
and to further reward successful performance.

The plan involves the grant of long-term executive incentive compensation awards
that will allow each group chief executive officer to earn options to purchase
shares of the Company's common stock, based upon the cumulative growth in his
group's operating income over three years.  Stock options earned under the
awards will be nonqualified options (i.e., will not qualify as incentive stock
options for tax purposes), will be granted as of the first trading day after the
end of the three-year incentive period, will have a term of ten years beginning
on the date of grant, will be fully vested beginning on the date of grant, and 
will be fully exercisable no later than six months after the date of grant.

The number of stock options that may be earned under each award will depend upon
whether the cumulative operating income growth during the three-year incentive
period reaches certain minimum or goal targets.  If the minimum target is not
achieved, then no options will be earned.  If actual results are between the
minimum and goal targets, then the number of option shares will be determined by
interpolation, and the exercise price will equal the average of the last
reported sale prices of the Company's common stock on the first ten trading days
of the incentive period. If the goal target is exceeded, then the number of
option shares will be the goal amount, and, in lieu of additional cash
compensation, the exercise price will be reduced depending upon the amount by
which the goal target was exceeded, subject to a minimum price.

Effective for 1996, this long-term incentive compensation plan was extended, on
very similar terms, to also cover corporate officers (excluding the Chief
Executive Officer), business unit presidents and certain other key employees.

The Company currently plans, but will have no legal obligation or commitment, to
continue granting similar long-term executive incentive compensation awards to
the group chief executive officers, corporate officers (excluding the Chief
Executive Officer), business unit presidents and certain other key employees on
an annual basis, subject to approval or discontinuation by the Compensation
Committee of the Company's Board of Directors.
389 P.2d 403

#### Francis L. WITT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARCUM DRILLING COMPANY, Employer, and Traders & General Insurance Company, Insurer, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 7340.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Feb. 10, 1964.

*467Heidel & Swarthout, C. Gene Samberson, Lovington, Kermit E. Nash, Hobbs, for appellant.

Neal & Neal, Hobbs, for appellees.

NOBLE, Justice.

Plaintiff (appellant) while an employee of defendants (appellees) sustained an injury resulting in the amputation of his left arm below the elbow. This appeal is from a judgment denying workmen’s compensation benefits.

The trial court made only two findings of fact; one found the extent of the injury and the second that:

> “The injury to the plaintiff did not arise out of his work, but did occur at a time which [sic] he was using a machine tool in violation of and contrary to instructions given him by his supervisor.”

Violation of specific instructions which limit the scope or sphere of work which an employee is authorized to do bars recovery of workmen’s compensation for an injury so sustained. Walker v. Woldridge, 58 N.M. 183, 268 P.2d 579.

Findings must be construed most strongly in support of the judgment, Martinez v. Scott, 70 N.M. 354, 374 P.2d 117; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 70 N.M. 11, 369 P.2d 398; Viramontes v. Fox, 65 N.M. 275, 335 P.2d 1071; Morrison v. Rodey, 65 N.M. 474, 340 P.2d 409; Totah Drilling Co. v. Abraham, 64 N.M. 380, 328 P.2d 1083, and the facts found by the trial court are the facts upon which the case rests in the appellate court, unless they are set aside as not having substantial support in the evidence. State ex rel. Bliss v. Davis, 63 N.M. 322, 319 P.2d 207; Rogers v. Stacy, 63 N.M. 317, 318 P.2d 1116; Lumpkins v. McPhee, 59 N.M. 442, 286 P.2d 299. It therefore follows that the judgment should be affirmed if the challenged finding has substantial support. It would serve no useful purpose to detail the evidence. Suffice it to say that we have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that there is evidence which substantially supports the finding by the trial court.

The conclusions of law adopted by the trial court follow from the facts found. We *468find no merit to the contention that they are erroneous.

Since recovery of compensation is a prerequisite to the allowance of attorney fees plaintiff’s request for such fees must be denied.

Finding no error the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

It is so ordered.

CARMODY and CHAVEZ, JJ., concur.