UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT

TERRY N. TAYLOR,

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

TULSA WELDING SCHOOL; 

UNIVERSITY OF TULSA HOSPITAL; 

WINNEBAGO COUNTY STATES 

ATTORNEY; ROCKFORD POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; MICHAEL IASPARRO, 

U.S. Attorney; CITY OF ROCKFORD; 

DOMINIC IASPARRO, Chief Detective; 

DETECTIVE GRARRETT; SGT. OWEN; 

RICHARD MEYERS, Sheriff; DONALD 

GASPARINI, Sheriff; WINNEBAGO 

COUNTY STATES ATTORNEY OFFICE; 

PAUL LOGLI; RON WHITE; KATHY 

ZENOFF; JUDGE PENNIMAN; GLORIA 

M. LIND; WINNEBAGO COUNTY 

CLERKS OFFICE; JOHN SAWYER, 

Winnebago County Coroners Office; GARY 

PUMILA, Winnebago Public Defender 

Office; RUNDY WILT; TERRY DECK, 

Attorney; PAUL FLYNN, Attorney; 

CAROL BROOK, Federal Public Defender; 

TERRANCE LICHTENWALD, 

Psychiatrist; ROSEMARY COLLINS, 

Judge; JUDGE NELSON; RICHARD A. 

POSNER; JUDGE FRANK H. 

EASTERBROOK; WILLIAM WILLIE 

LEAVY, Federal Officer; MICHAEL HILL, 

a/k/a Michael Dupree; RANDY BOX; 

JAMES FLINT; GREG PERRY; LORI 

GUTH; HENDERSON SIMMON; BILL 

HARRIS; MONTAL WILLIAM; TERRY 

No. 14-5093

(D.C. No. 4:14-CV-00321-JHP-FHM)

(N.D. Okla.) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 17, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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DELAMETER; JAMMIE L. BIELEFIELT; 

CHERYL GRIFFEN; KAREN SPICKLER, 

a/k/a Karen Stanfields; BOB GATSON; 

KIMBERLY SUE GRIFFEN; SAMMY 

ANDERSON; WINNEBAGO COUNTY 

JAIL AND SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; 

RULPHFIELD HUDSON; P.G. 

REINHARD, 

Defendants - Appellees.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

Terry N. Taylor, a federal prisoner appearing pro se,1

 appeals the district court’s 

dismissal of his civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and denial of his motion to 

direct the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to release his medical records. He also seeks 

reconsideration of his motion to this court to appoint counsel. Exercising jurisdiction 

 

*After examining Appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination 

of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not 

binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and 

collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. 

R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Because Mr. Taylor is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. 

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also United States v. 

Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e must construe [a pro se litigant’s] 

arguments liberally; this rule of liberal construction stops, however, at the point at which 

we begin to serve as his advocate.”). 
-3- 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court and deny his motion to appoint 

counsel. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Mr. Taylor is a federal prisoner incarcerated in Jesup, Georgia. In his complaint, 

he alleges the following facts. In 1987, Mr. Taylor participated in a jury trial in 

Winnebago County, Illinois. A district attorney for the State of Illinois encouraged him 

to turn his life around, suggested he attend the Tulsa Welding School (TWS), and gave 

him the school’s information. Mr. Taylor decided to enroll at TWS, and as part of the 

admission process, underwent an eye exam at the “University of Tulsa Hospital” (UTH).2

 

Mr. Taylor contends the exam caused him to lose his vision and that the trial, the district 

attorney’s referral, and the exam were part of a conspiracy to cover up a failed attempt by 

federal officers to kill him.3

 In addition to his complaint, Mr. Taylor filed a motion for 

the district court to order the BOP to release the records for his eye exams from 2005 to 

2008. 

 2

 The district court determined there is no “University of Tulsa Hospital.” We 

assume Mr. Taylor underwent an eye exam after enrolling at TWS and will refer to the 

facility that conducted the exam as “UTH.” The actual identity of the facility is 

immaterial to our disposition because Mr. Taylor acknowledges it was not a state actor 

for purposes of § 1983. 

3

 We limit our discussion to the claims presented on appeal. Nearly all of the 

events described in Mr. Taylor’s initial complaint are alleged to have occurred in Illinois; 

the only events alleged to have taken place in Oklahoma are Mr. Taylor’s experiences at 

TWS and UTH. The district court determined venue was inappropriate for the alleged 

§ 1983 violations occurring outside of the Northern District of Oklahoma. 
-4- 

 The district court dismissed with prejudice Mr. Taylor’s § 1983 complaint against 

TWS and UTH under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted. First, the court noted the complaint failed to allege TWS or UTH 

acted under color of state law as required by § 1983. Second, the court determined the 

claim would be barred by the two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in 

the State of Oklahoma. Because Mr. Taylor’s claims against TWS and UTH were his 

only claims originating in the district, the court found venue was improper for the 

remaining claims against multiple defendants and dismissed them without prejudice.4

 

The court also denied his motion to order the BOP to release the records of his eye 

exams. 

On appeal, Mr. Taylor asked this court to appoint counsel, arguing that he is 

legally blind and will not have adequate, effective, or meaningful access to the courts 

unless provided with representation. We declined to consider the request until the case 

was fully briefed and we could consider his arguments on appeal. Mr. Taylor has moved 

for reconsideration of his motion to appoint counsel. 

Mr. Taylor raises four issues in this appeal: (1) whether TWS and UTH may be 

 4

 On appeal, Mr. Taylor attempts to connect another event to Oklahoma—which 

we address below—but does not otherwise dispute the district court’s venue 

determination. 
-5- 

held liable for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damaging his vision,5 (2) whether 

venue is proper in the Northern District of Oklahoma for his fraud claim against a 

psychologist who allegedly lives and works in Oklahoma, (3) whether the district court 

erred in denying his request to release medical records pertaining to his eye exams,6

 and 

(4) whether we should appoint counsel on his behalf. For the reasons below, we affirm 

the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Taylor’s complaint and denial of his motion to direct 

the BOP to release his medical records. We deny Mr. Taylor’s motion to appoint 

counsel. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. § 1983 Claims 

“The legal sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law, and a Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal is reviewed de novo.” Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 

2009). A complaint will survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if it alleges a plausible 

claim for relief, which requires that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right 

to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007). The allegations in the complaint for a conspiracy claim must be based on 

 5

 Mr. Taylor also seeks review of the district court’s determination that his claims 

are time-barred. We address this in our substantive discussion of his § 1983 claims. 

6

 Mr. Taylor’s motion seeks eye exam records from 2005 to 2008. On appeal, he 

seeks eye exam records from 2005 to 2007. Our reasoning on this matter applies in either 

case. 
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“enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 

illegal agreement.” Id. at 556. Applying these standards, we agree with the district court 

that Mr. Taylor has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

First, Mr. Taylor’s allegations are purely speculative. He alleges the district 

attorney gave him the information for the welding school, that the welding school took 

him for eye exams, and that the eye exams made him legally blind. Even viewed in the 

light most favorable to Mr. Taylor, see Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098, the facts Mr. Taylor has 

presented do not credibly suggest the district attorney, TWS, and UTH acted in concert to 

blind Mr. Taylor and cover up a conspiracy in Illinois. 

Second, Mr. Taylor has not alleged the defendants acted under color of state law. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. He agrees TWS and UTH are private actors. He nevertheless argues 

the district attorney’s involvement in the alleged conspiracy is sufficient to make the 

welding school and hospital liable under § 1983. This argument is unavailing. Mr. 

Taylor does not allege the district attorney acted under color of state law when she 

suggested he attend the welding school. He does not allege she gave him the information 

about the school pursuant to her official duties, instructed or otherwise compelled him to 

move to Tulsa and begin the welding program, or exerted any control over the events that 

allegedly occurred after he enrolled at the school. Furthermore, Mr. Taylor’s brief on 

appeal is unresponsive to the district court’s determination that the district attorney’s 

referral would not make the subsequent acts by the welding school or hospital state 

actions for the purposes of § 1983. TWS and UTH are not state actors and cannot be 
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sued under § 1983. 

Finally, Mr. Taylor’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. We have 

determined that Oklahoma law sets the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims at two 

years. Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999); Okla. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 95(3). As the district court noted, the statute of limitations for Mr. 

Taylor’s claim expired in 1990, nearly 25 years ago. Mr. Taylor is not entitled to 

equitable tolling; neither his time in prison nor the 90 days he alleges he was 

institutionalized have prevented him from filing numerous other lawsuits against the 

defendants named in his complaint, and they do not justify his failure to file his complaint 

with the district court here until 2014. 

B. Venue for Fraud Claim 

Mr. Taylor argues on appeal the district court also should have considered his 

fraud claim against Jammie L. Bielefielt,7

 who allegedly lives and works in Oklahoma 

and concealed her identity and position as the chief psychologist of the BOP to defraud 

Mr. Taylor into marriage in 1994. 

The district court correctly deemed venue improper for this claim. Mr. Taylor’s 

initial complaint states that he and Ms. Bielefielt married in Illinois. The complaint gives 

no indication she lived or worked in Oklahoma at that time or that venue in the Northern 

 7

 Ms. Bielefielt’s name is spelled differently throughout Mr. Taylor’s filings; we 

spell her name as it appears on the caption. 
-8- 

District of Oklahoma would be proper for any reason. In subsequent filings, Mr. Taylor 

suggests Ms. Bielefielt may currently work for the BOP in Oklahoma City and El Reno. 

But Mr. Taylor’s claim against Ms. Bielefielt arose from an allegedly fraudulent marriage 

performed in Illinois, and not from conduct in Oklahoma. And even if Ms. Bielefielt 

currently lives in Oklahoma City or El Reno, both cities are in the Western District of 

Oklahoma, making venue in the Northern District of Oklahoma improper.8

 See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1391(b). 

C. Motion to Release Medical Records 

On appeal, Mr. Taylor asserts the district court should have ordered the BOP to 

release his medical records from 2005 to 2007 because they would assist him in proving 

his claims.9

 The district court determined these records would not assist with Mr. 

Taylor’s case because his claims are barred by the statute of limitations. We agree and 

affirm the district court’s denial of his motion. 

D. Motion to Appoint Counsel 

Mr. Taylor finally seeks reconsideration of his motion to this court for 

appointment of counsel. When determining whether to appoint counsel, we consider 

 8

 Even if we had venue, we would conclude Mr. Taylor has not stated a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. He has not alleged facts that make his claim plausible 

and has not demonstrated why his claim is not time-barred when the marriage occurred in 

1994. 

9

 Mr. Taylor does not explain why he considers the district court’s analysis faulty. 
-9- 

“‘the merits of the litigant’s claims, the nature of the factual issues raised in the claims, 

the litigant’s ability to present his claims, and the complexity of the legal issues raised by 

the claims.’” Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting 

Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1991)). For the reasons detailed above, 

Mr. Taylor’s claims lack merit, and appointing counsel at this stage would not compel a 

different result. We decline to appoint counsel in this matter. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons detailed above, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. 

Taylor’s § 1983 claim and denial of his motion to direct the BOP to release his medical 

records. We deny his motion to appoint counsel. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge