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1 

" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

112TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

2011

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE TRANSITION 

IN AFGHANISTAN 

A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT 

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 19, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

WILLIAM C. DANVERS, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v 

Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1 

Appreciating the Challenges of Central Asia ........................................................ 3 

Central Asia’s Role in Supplying U.S. and Coalition Troops in Afghanistan ..... 5 

Striking a Balance between Security and Political Priorities .............................. 7 

Translating the New Silk Road Vision into a Strategy ........................................ 9 

Assessing the Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative ....................................... 11 

Securing Central Asia’s Southern Borders ............................................................ 12 

APPENDIXES

Appendix I.—English Language Training ............................................................. 17 

Appendix II.—Remembering Osh ........................................................................... 18 

Appendix III.—Tajikistan: A Closer Look ............................................................. 19 

Appendix IV.—Total U.S. Budgeted Assistance to Central Asia, Pakistan, 

and Afghanistan, FY 2001–2010 (millions) ........................................................ 20 

Appendix V.—U.S. Budgeted Peace & Security Assistance vs. Total Assistance 

to Central Asia, FY 2001–2010 (millions) .......................................................... 21 

Appendix VI.—U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY 2001–2010 .......................... 22 

Appendix VII.—Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan .......................................................................... 23 

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC, December 19, 2011. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: This report by the committee’s majority staff 

is part of an ongoing examination of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and the broader region. It takes a close look at the link between developing a comprehensive Central Asia strategy and U.S. 

initiatives to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan and the 

region. It is based on a field visit by the committee’s majority staff 

to Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan in October 

2011, as well as extensive staff meetings with experts and policymakers in Washington, D.C. 

Central Asia is critical to the outcome in Afghanistan. The 

Northern Distribution Network and Manas Transit Center play 

vital roles in supporting NATO and U.S.-led coalition operations. 

Going forward, the challenge for the United States is to strike a 

balance between its short-term, war-fighting needs and long-term 

interests in promoting a stable, prosperous, and democratic Central 

Asia. 

Given the U.S. strategic interests at stake, this report provides 

constructive and timely recommendations for the Obama administration as it works to use our resources to achieve core U.S. policy 

objectives. 

Sincerely, 

JOHN F. KERRY, Chairman. 

(V)

(1) 

1See Appendix III for a discussion on militancy in Tajikistan. 

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE TRANSITION 

IN AFGHANISTAN 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Central Asia, which includes the countries of Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is on the 

frontlines of the war in Afghanistan. Three of the five countries 

share a long and porous border with Afghanistan, and the region 

is bound to its southern neighbor by ties of ethnicity, culture, history, politics, and language. They are also connected by flows of 

militant groups and illicit narcotics. Of all Afghanistan’s neighbors, 

the greatest focus has rightly been on Pakistan, whose internal dynamics have the most profound effect on regional stability. But 

what happens in Central Asia will also affect the outcome in Afghanistan. 

As the United States plans for the 2014 transition, Central Asia 

will continue to play a critical role in stabilization efforts and our 

broader regional strategy. Central Asian countries facilitate the 

movement of troops and non-lethal supplies into Afghanistan. 

Kazakhstan provides robust economic and humanitarian aid and 

recently hosted a meeting of the International Contact Group in 

the lead-up to the Bonn conference. Several countries, notably 

Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, are exporting cheap 

electricity, and Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have expressed interest in helping advance a peace process in Afghanistan. 

The legacy of the Soviet Union’s precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan looms large in the minds and perspectives of leaders in 

Central Asia. Leaders in the region want to see a stable Afghanistan, one that does not fall prey again to the abusive practices of 

the Taliban. However, they are looking for reassurance that the 

United States and its partners have a political strategy to end the 

war and bring lasting peace. Officials with many governments told 

committee staff they fear the transition will increase drug trafficking and leave behind a security vacuum that extremist groups, 

such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic 

Jihad Union (IJU), are eager to fill. Tajikistan remains the weakest 

link in Central Asia, and instability there would affect the entire 

region.1

The U.S. role in Afghanistan is changing, but Washington should 

repeatedly stress that its engagement is not ending. Afghanistan’s 

neighbors fear the 2014 security transition and withdrawal of coalition forces could mean abandonment. The United States must keep 

working to change the narrative by making it clear that we will 

2 

protect our long-term interests in the region. The top priority is regional stability, and that is why 2014 will mark the beginning of 

a new phase of U.S. engagement in the region. The U.S. military 

will continue to work with the Afghan National Security Forces to 

prevent the return of terrorist safe havens. Much as it is doing in 

Iraq, the United States will remain vigorously engaged on security, 

governance, and economic and social development. 

American strategy is focused on Central Asia in part as a response to the challenges of transiting supplies through Pakistan for 

the Afghan war. Since 2009, the United States has increasingly relied on a series of commercial air and ground routes called the 

Northern Distribution Network (NDN) that carry non-lethal supplies from Europe to U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan 

through Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The NDN is a 

critical component in supporting coalition operations in Afghanistan and requires support from countries like Uzbekistan. In 

Kyrgyzstan, the United States relies on the Manas Transit Center 

as the premier air mobility hub for operations in Afghanistan. The 

Transit Center is the entry and exit point for virtually all coalition 

forces in Afghanistan and is a major and vital mission. Maintaining the Center requires active diplomatic and policy engagement 

with Kyrgyzstan’s leadership. 

Building political support in Central Asia for coalition efforts in 

Afghanistan has been challenging. In many cases, the United 

States is forced to rely on highly corrupt, authoritarian governments in countries whose populations are suspicious of U.S. intentions. Russia has deep ties in this region and fears American military encirclement. For their part, Chinese strategists are leery of 

permanent U.S. bases on China’s border, but they are even more 

nervous about the risk of instability in Afghanistan should the 

United States and its partners fail to help stabilize the country. 

To strengthen U.S. engagement with Central Asian countries, 

the Obama administration has launched Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABCs) that meet regularly and provide an important 

platform for discussions on a range of issues from security to 

human rights. The administration is complementing this high-level 

political engagement with the ‘‘New Silk Road’’ (NSR) initiative, a 

vision of regional economic integration that it hopes will connect 

Afghanistan with its neighbors in South and Central Asia. The administration is also focused on combating drug trafficking, which 

poses a serious threat to regional stability, through new regional 

programs such as the Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative. 

Known as CACI, this initiative seeks to build task forces throughout the region to share sensitive information and coordinate joint 

operations. 

As the United States prepares for the 2014 transition in Afghanistan and continues to engage with countries in Central Asia, this 

report offers three overarching recommendations for U.S. policy: 

(1) Strike a balance between security and political priorities in 

Central Asia. As the United States increases security cooperation with the countries of Central Asia to support efforts in Afghanistan, it must also lay the foundation for a long-term 

strategy that sustains these gains and protects U.S. interests 

in the region. Security assistance has an important role to 

3 

2See Appendix I for a discussion on expanding English language training in Central Asia. 3See Appendixes II and III for a discussion on the 2010 violence in Osh, Kyrgyzstan and militancy in Tajikistan. 

play, but the United States should continue promoting political 

and economic reform by making greater investments where 

possible in democracy and governance, public health, economic 

assistance, and English language training.2 Given the tight fiscal climate, the administration should consider using existing 

Afghanistan resources on cross-border projects that promote regional stability for Afghanistan and its neighbors. It should 

also prioritize and increase assistance to Tajikistan and 

Kyrgyzstan, given their fragility and importance for broader 

regional stability.3

(2) Translate the New Silk Road (NSR) vision into a working 

strategy for the broader region beyond Afghanistan. This will 

require identifying needs, available resources, U.S. comparative advantages, and the economic reforms regional governments must take to support increased trade and investment. 

Connecting Central to South Asia via Afghanistan will be challenging in light of the barriers to continental transport and 

trade, including the lack of regional cooperation. NSR will not 

be a panacea for Afghanistan’s economic woes, but it offers a 

vision for the region that has the potential to foster private 

sector investment if projects are prioritized and steps are taken 

to create an enabling environment. The United States can play 

a vital role by supporting political and economic reform and 

leveraging its resources. 

(3) Link the regional Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative 

(CACI) with bilateral initiatives that offer traction, given the 

constraints on regional cooperation. CACI provides an important vision for reform and information sharing to tackle narcotics trafficking in the region. While there is demand for such 

an initiative among local agencies with a mandate to combat 

the drug trade, significant challenges remain. Regional cooperation has a checkered history in this part of the world. 

Corruption is widespread and prospects for the task forces remain unclear, given the lack of political will. The administration should consider piloting the task forces in countries where 

they stand the greatest chance of success, which will require 

a comparative regional assessment of efforts to combat the 

drug trade. It should also scale up cross-border operations between Central Asian and Afghan law enforcement and military 

officials, including joint training activities. 

APPRECIATING THE CHALLENGES OF CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia occupies a unique position on the map, sitting at 

the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Given its history, politics, and 

culture, a regional strategy should take into account the following 

realities: 

• Central Asian states have similarities, but they are not homogeneous. While countries such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan can trade on massive energy reserves, others like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are fragile states that rely on external reVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:29 Dec 19, 2011 Jkt 066166 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\CENTRAL ASIA AN
4 

sources for their survival. Border security varies greatly. 

Tajikistan’s borders are largely ‘‘green’’ zones, allowing militants and narcotics to flow virtually unimpeded across them. 

Uzbekistan is contiguous to all other Central Asian states and 

Afghanistan. It maintains highly controlled borders, including 

land mines along its border with Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan is the 

lone parliamentary democracy in an otherwise autocratic region, but its institutions are brittle and ethnic tensions simmer 

just beneath the surface. 

• Key Central Asian militant groups are based in Pakistan and 

fight in Afghanistan. Groups such as the Islamic Movement of 

Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), which trace 

their roots to Central Asia, are based in North Waziristan, 

Pakistan. They have conducted attacks in Afghanistan and 

have ties to the Taliban and Haqqani network. Both groups 

continue to pose a threat to stability in Afghanistan. Central 

Asian governments fear that these groups, which entertain ambitions of establishing a caliphate in Central Asia, will thrive 

as the United States draws down its military presence in Afghanistan. 

• Weak political will and limited capacity facilitate narcotics 

flows. According to U.S. officials, an estimated 30 percent of 

narcotics flow from Afghanistan to Russia via Central Asia, 

mostly through Tajikistan. Despite multiple initiatives, counternarcotics efforts have been hampered by rampant corruption, weak political will, limited human capacity, and porous 

borders. Russia, China, Iran, and the European Union all 

share American concerns about the narcotics flows, creating 

potential for greater cooperation and coordination. 

• Russia and China maintain a strong presence in Central Asia. 

China, in particular, is extending its economic reach, while 

Iran, South Korea, India, Japan, and Turkey are also playing 

greater roles. Russia is attempting to expand its influence 

through a network of military bases, commercial agreements, 

and new political alliances, and may redeploy Russian troops 

to the Tajik-Afghan border as the United States draws down 

in Afghanistan. China is consolidating its economic and political power in Central Asia through no-strings-attached lending policies, financial investments, and infrastructure projects. 

Its export-import bank extended a $5 billion line of credit to 

Kazakhstan’s state-owned Development Bank and an additional $5 billion to Kazmunaigaz, a state-run gas company. 

China provided Turkmenistan with a $4.1 billion loan to develop the vast South Yolotan gas field and is responsible for 

several major energy and transport projects in Tajikistan. 

• Regional rivalries within Central Asia lead to zero-sum thinking. Regional rivalries such as those between Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon and Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov are endemic in Central Asia. There is a growing trust 

deficit among its political leaders, many of whom see international relations as a zero-sum game. Governments seem to 

care less about growing the pie and more about how big their 

slice will be, making regional initiatives difficult to pursue. 

5 

• Key countries lack enabling economic environments. Tajikistan, 

Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are some of the toughest places 

to do business in the world. Corruption is rife throughout the 

region and institutional and bureaucratic obstacles create systemic delays. For example, the World Bank’s 2012 Doing Business report finds that it takes 71 days to export an item from 

Uzbekistan and 92 days to import one, compared to an average 

of 10 and 11 days, respectively, for Organization for Economic 

Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Without a 

serious reform commitment, governments in the region will 

have a difficult time implementing economic initiatives that 

link Central and South Asia. 

• Human rights are a pressing concern. The State Department’s 

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices consistently document serious human rights problems throughout the region. 

Progress will depend on public pressure and quiet, persistent 

engagement that emphasizes the economic and social benefits 

of respecting fundamental human rights. Uzbekistan, in particular, will require a careful balancing of priorities, given its 

central role in supporting the Northern Distribution Network 

(NDN). It has made some modest progress in recent years such 

as allowing the International Committee of the Red Cross 

(ICRC) to visit prisons. Unfortunately, such steps continue to 

be overshadowed by the country’s significant human rights 

concerns, including torture in pre-trial detention facilities, imprisonment of human rights defenders, forced child labor in the 

cotton fields, and government restrictions on religious freedom. 

Nevertheless, it is in the United States’ interest to engage with 

such admittedly authoritarian countries on the full range of bilateral priorities, including security, good governance, human 

rights, trade, and investment. 

• Governments are cracking down on religious freedom. Islam is 

flourishing in Central Asia, but countries such as Tajikistan 

are limiting its free expression by monitoring Friday sermons, 

recalling students studying at religious institutions abroad, 

and prohibiting most children under the age of 18 from attending religious services at mosques. These restrictions, along 

with a stifling political climate and limited economic opportunities, could drive many organizations underground. This threatens to radicalize a younger population whose active participation in society is vital to promoting economic growth, political 

reform, and moderation. 

CENTRAL ASIA’S ROLE IN SUPPLYING U.S. AND COALITION

TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN

Since 2009, the United States has steadily increased traffic on 

the NDN, a major logistical accomplishment that has resulted in 

a series of commercial air and ground routes that supply NATO 

and U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Close to 75 percent of ground 

sustainment cargo is now shipped via the NDN. According to U.S. 

Transportation Command, an estimated 40 percent of all cargo 

transits the NDN, 31 percent is shipped by air, and the remaining 

29 percent goes through Pakistan. 

6 

The NDN comprises three principal land routes: one stretching 

from the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti, through Baku, Azerbaijan, across the Caspian Sea, and into Central Asia; one from the 

Latvian port of Riga through Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; 

and a final route that originates in Latvia and travels through Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and passes into Afghanistan via 

Tajikistan. An estimated 70 percent of cargo transiting the NDN 

enters at Uzbekistan’s Hairaton Gate. 

The NDN has allowed the United States to diversify its supply 

routes into Afghanistan, instead of relying solely on Pakistan for 

transit. Whereas in 2009, about 90 percent of U.S. non-military 

supplies for Afghanistan transited through the Pakistani port city 

of Karachi, today, more non-lethal cargo is shipped to Afghanistan 

via the NDN than through Pakistan. 

The NDN is not a perfect substitute for the current supply routes 

in Pakistan. The NDN only allows for one-way transit of goods to 

Afghanistan, though discussions are reportedly underway to expand the NDN to support two-way transit of cargo leaving Afghanistan via the northern routes. The NDN also only allows for the 

transit of non-lethal supplies, such as cement, lumber, blast barriers, septic tanks, and matting. Sensitive and high-technology 

equipment is transported by airlift. Moreover, the NDN is not 

cheap. It costs roughly an additional $10,000 per twenty-foot container to ship via the NDN instead of Pakistan. But airlifting supplies directly into Afghanistan remains the most expensive option, 

which costs an estimated $40,000 more per twenty-foot container, 

according to U.S. Transportation Command. 

In addition to the NDN, the United States relies on the Manas 

Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan as the premier air mobility hub for 

operations in Afghanistan. The Transit Center is the entry and exit 

point for virtually all coalition forces. The Center enables critical 

missions, including aerial refueling and medical evacuations. About 

13 million pounds of cargo transit the Center each month, and it 

consumes one million gallons of fuel every two days. In short, this 

is a major and vital mission. 

Keeping Manas operational has been a challenge. In 2006, 

Kyrgyzstan requested a significant increase in lease payments from 

the United States for use of Manas. A settlement was reached later 

that year, including an announcement that the United States 

would provide $150 million in total assistance and compensation. 

In 2009, Kyrgyzstan’s then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced that he intended to close Manas, reportedly bowing in 

large part to pressure from the Russians who offered Bakiyev a 

mixture of loans and grants for budget stabilization. The United 

States concluded a five-year agreement with Kyrgyzstan in 2009 to 

keep operations running, increasing its rent payment from $17.4 

million to $60 million per year. However, suspicions in Kyrgyzstan 

regarding the U.S. presence at Manas run deep, and the Transit 

Center is frequently part of domestic public debate. 

Besides supporting the NDN and Manas Transit Center, most 

governments in Central Asia have granted U.S. and coalition forces 

over-flight rights. Russia has permitted over-flights since 2009, and 

Kazakhstan signed an air transit agreement with the United 

States in 2010. 

7 

4See Appendixes II and III for a discussion on the 2010 violence in Osh, Kyrgyzstan and militancy in Tajikistan. 5See Appendix I for a discussion on expanding English language training in Central Asia. 6The $186.2 million figure includes funds from the AEECA account and other Function 150 

programs. For more information, see: Jim Nichol, ‘‘Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,’’ Congressional Research Service, RL33458, October 12, 2011, p. 53. 

STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN SECURITY

AND POLITICAL PRIORITIES

As the United States increases security cooperation with the 

countries of Central Asia to support efforts in Afghanistan, it must 

also lay the foundation for a long-term strategy that sustains these 

gains and protects U.S. interests in the region. 

Achieving our security goals and promoting good governance and 

human rights are not mutually exclusive. In fact, security and political engagement are complementary strategies that are more 

likely to be effective when pursued together. For example, promoting economic reforms that focus on removing barriers to continental transport and trade will not only benefit local economies; it 

will also help support the NDN. The NDN, in turn, can drive economic reform as local economies work to improve purchasing standards and local governments cooperate to keep the NDN up and 

running. 

Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, the Manas Transit Center provides 

vital support to U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan. It 

also promotes stability through its theatre security cooperation division, which helps build ties with the local community through humanitarian assistance, military-to-military operations, and social 

cultural operations. Kyrgyzstan recently participated in the first 

peaceful and democratic transition of power in Central Asia, and 

the United States is actively supporting its democratic transition. 

Through investments in parliamentary strengthening and public 

health, good governance and economic growth, we have managed to 

promote political reform as we continue operations at the Manas 

Transit Center. 

Striking the right balance between U.S. security and political priorities will require greater investments in U.S. civilian assistance. 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most fragile states in the region 

and U.S. assistance there can make a real difference.4 The United 

States should consider increasing its investments in democracy and 

governance, public health programs, economic assistance, and 

English language training5 to augment its security assistance. 

Civilian assistance for all countries in Central Asia was $186.2 

million in FY 2010 and is on a downward trajectory.6 Peace and 

security assistance to the region, which includes funds from the national defense 050 account and smaller amounts from the foreign 

assistance 150 account, increased from $70 million in FY 2001 to 

$257 million in FY 2010, though it too may actually be declining. 

Overall, U.S. assistance to the countries of Central Asia is relatively small compared to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In FY 2010, 

for example, total U.S. assistance to Central Asia, including both 

the function 150 and 050 accounts, amounted to just under three 

8 

7See Appendixes IV, V, and VI for budget numbers and charts. 

percent ($436.24 million) of what we spent in Afghanistan ($14.78 

billion). 7

Given the tight fiscal climate in the United States, the administration should consider using existing Afghanistan resources on 

cross-border projects that promote regional stability to the benefit 

of both Afghanistan and its northern neighbors. For a relatively 

small amount of money, such projects can reinforce cooperation between Afghanistan and Central Asian states and deliver immediate 

results. These projects could include: 

• Scaling up cross-border electricity projects, such as Pamir Energy. This public-private partnership supplies electricity to an 

estimated 85 percent of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous 

Oblast in Tajikistan as well as to several districts in northern 

Afghanistan; 

• Expanding joint training sessions between Afghan and Tajik 

military and law enforcement officials at the U.S.-funded facility in Khorog and the National Border Guard Academy in 

Dushanbe, as well as considering similar programs between 

Uzbek officials and their Afghan counterparts; 

• Implementing cross-border community border guarding programs, including more targeted training for populations living 

on the border, organizing joint training study tours, focusing 

on community policing and cross-border training of border 

guards and Ministry of Interior police in the region on vehicle 

inspection best practices, crime scene evidence gathering, 

emergency response, human rights, and interrogation and 

interview techniques; 

• Promoting cross-border working groups with provincial governments in Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 

Tajikistan, strengthening sub-national governance on both 

sides of the border; 

• Funding cross-border initiatives to tackle multi-drug resistant 

and extensively resistant tuberculosis (TB). The Central Asian 

states have some of the highest rates of TB in the world. 

Cross-border initiatives could help control TB infection rates 

and spur innovative and sustainable programming; 

• Encouraging cross-border health programs by facilitating the 

exchange of medical professionals; 

• Facilitating exchanges between women-led Tajik and Afghan 

non-governmental organizations. Tajikistan has experienced 

civil war in the recent past and its people are familiar with the 

challenges and opportunities of reconciliation. Women, in particular, can play a critical role in laying the groundwork for a 

comprehensive peace process; 

• Integrating Afghanistan’s youth into existing programs in Central Asia that promote economic development, such as Junior 

Achievement programs, and expanding vocational training opportunities to teach vocational and agricultural skills to populations on the border to provide economic opportunities and 

help stabilize the region; and 

9 

• Supporting American-style summer camps for Afghan and Central Asian youth similar to the successful Camp America model 

in the Isfara and Rasht regions of Tajikistan. The curriculum 

can include sports, English language, leadership, critical thinking, and team building, with a focus on addressing the roots 

of terrorism before they take hold in regions vulnerable to extremism. 

TRANSLATING THE NEW SILK ROAD VISION INTO A STRATEGY

The United States has a vested interest in promoting regional 

economic integration, which could catalyze political reform and reinforce efforts to stop illicit traffic and militant activity at Afghanistan’s borders. As cited in a World Bank report, landlocked countries can face average growth rates that are about 1.5 percentage 

points lower because of transaction costs and other inefficiencies 

such as unpredictability in transportation time. 

In July 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced 

the New Silk Road (NSR) initiative, a long-term economic vision 

to transform Afghanistan into a hub of transport and trade, connecting markets in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central 

Asia. Some of the proposed NSR projects include completing the 

Afghan Ring Road; establishing rail links between Afghanistan 

and Pakistan; completing the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-PakistanIndia (TAPI) pipeline; and creating a regional electricity market by 

establishing a transmission line between Central Asia and South 

Asia (CASA-1000). 

NSR requires U.S. leadership, not necessarily an infusion of new 

U.S. funds. It will instead involve cooperation from multilateral development banks, foreign donors, regional governments, and the 

private sector. NSR has been enthusiastically welcomed by governments in Afghanistan and Central Asia who want to connect to 

markets in Europe and Asia and appreciate American attention to 

their economic challenges. 

However, connecting Central to South Asia via Afghanistan will 

be challenging in light of the barriers to continental transport and 

trade, including the lack of regional cooperation. NSR will not be 

a panacea for Afghanistan’s economic woes, but it does offer a vision for the broader region that could foster private sector investment if projects are prioritized and steps are taken to create an enabling environment. The United States can play a vital role by supporting political and economic reform and leveraging its resources. 

Going forward, the administration should consider the following 

questions in implementing NSR: 

• What are the right priorities and timelines? How is the United 

States prioritizing projects and coordinating with multilateral 

donors and foreign companies who are already vested in this 

effort? Should the United States cast a broad net, or focus on 

a few specific projects that stand the greatest chance of success? How do we implement quick-impact projects that show 

results, while focusing on the longer-term conditions that create an enabling economic environment? 

• What is the right balance between ‘‘hardware’’ and ‘‘software’’? 

One study cited by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute estiVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:29 Dec 19, 2011 Jkt 066166 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\CENTRAL ASIA AN
10 

mates that about 60 percent of the time required to ship goods 

from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan through Kazakhstan to Novosibirsk, 

Russia is spent at two border crossings, comprising 64 percent 

of the total cost. What is the right balance between ‘‘hardware’’ 

projects like big-ticket infrastructure and ‘‘software’’ improvements such as customs and legal reforms that focus on removing barriers to continental transport and trade? 

• Should NSR be regional or continental in scope? South and 

Central Asia are part of a broader continental economy. How 

can the United States augment its relationships in Central 

Asia to include allies such as Japan, South Korea, and India? 

The United States has engaged in policy discussions with these 

countries on Central Asia. How can we build on relationships 

with partners and allies to secure international support for 

trade and investment in Central Asia? 

For NSR to succeed, the administration should incorporate lessons learned from previous U.S. attempts to promote regional economic integration in Central Asia. In 2006, the State Department 

advanced a vision to link Central Asia with Afghanistan, Pakistan, 

and India, while also expanding continental trade. The United 

States also signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 

(TIFA) with the countries of Central Asia in 2004. These initiatives 

were promising, but the same obstacles that stymied progress then 

still exist in Central Asia today, including lack of regional cooperation, corruption, inhospitable business climates, regional rivalries, 

and the unfavorable cost differential between continental and maritime trade. 

This report recommends the following six-pronged approach for 

NSR: 

(1) Appreciate the region’s challenges: Internal divisions, corruption, and poor business climates limit prospects for regional integration. A NSR strategy must take into account the differences among the Central Asian states, as well as their 

shared past. The region has yet to develop a culture of private 

enterprise and evolving one will take time. Bringing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the rest of South Asia into the fold will 

make attracting private sector investment all the more necessary, and all the more challenging. 

(2) Get local buy-in: Local governments need to do their part, enacting the kind of macroeconomic reforms that will be required 

for regional integration to take shape. The United States and 

other partners can aid this effort through capacity-building 

programs and technical assistance. 

(3) Engage the private sector: NSR is intended to be locally owned 

and privately financed, spurring completion of several major 

energy and infrastructure projects across the region. What is 

needed now is a strategy for engaging the private sector, given 

the hesitation of investors to commit to a region where incomes 

are low, political risks are high, and the logistical challenges 

are great. 

(4) Focus on software: NSR is a generational vision for the entire 

region. It should not simply be a means to cope with the ecoVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:29 Dec 19, 2011 Jkt 066166 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\CENTRAL ASIA AN
11 

nomic impact of transition in Afghanistan. Creating an enabling environment for private sector-led, export-oriented 

growth by removing the impediments to continental transport 

and trade, including customs and legal reforms, trade facilitation, and border management, should be an urgent priority. 

(5) Get real results quickly: Most of the projects envisioned under 

the new strategy will take three to ten years to yield results. 

However, there are some projects that can deliver in the near 

term, demonstrate the potential of this strategy, and help 

broaden political support to sustain longer-term U.S. engagement. At the tactical level, for example, the United States 

could speed implementation of a few ‘‘demonstration projects,’’ 

such as using its convening power to open a transport corridor 

between Central Asia and the port of Gwadar in Pakistan. 

(6) Communicate intentions clearly: The United States should be 

mindful of creating expectations that cannot be fulfilled. A 

strategic communications strategy should clearly articulate 

how NSR will be implemented, what role the United States 

and other donors will play, what steps regional governments 

must take, how projects are being prioritized, the timeframe 

for implementation, and how the private sector is engaged. 

This strategy should also take into account the most effective 

means of communicating in these countries. 

ASSESSING THE CENTRAL ASIA COUNTERNARCOTICS INITIATIVE

Militant activity and a lack of economic opportunity are not the 

only threats to regional stability. Drug trafficking and the corruption that it creates pose an equally serious challenge. Afghanistan 

is the epicenter of the drug problem. Production of opium decreased 

in Afghanistan by almost 50 percent in 2010, according to the 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), but prices 

have proved less elastic. This has allowed the Taliban and other 

criminal actors to exploit stockpiles from earlier harvests to maintain high profit margins. Drugs have become a source of income for 

insurgent groups, with the Taliban reaping tens to possibly hundreds of millions of dollars each year from the drug trade. 

In June 2011, the State Department launched a new $4.1 million 

initiative known as ‘‘CACI,’’ or the Central Asia Counternarcotics 

Initiative, to build local capacity and stimulate regional cooperation 

on counternarcotics. CACI seeks to establish vetted units and build 

counternarcotics task forces in the five Central Asian countries, 

linking them with existing task forces in Russia and Afghanistan. 

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the State 

Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) will implement the initiative. 

CACI provides an important vision for encouraging greater reform and information sharing across the region. As one U.S. official 

put it, ‘‘we are planting a seed with CACI,’’ which could eventually 

grow into an effective investigative network for sharing information 

and conducting joint operations across the entire supply chain. 

While there is demand for such an initiative among local agencies with a mandate to combat the drug trade, significant challenges remain. Regional cooperation has a checkered history in this 

12 

part of the world. Central Asia is home to a wealth of regional organizations and initiatives, many of which have failed to achieve 

their stated goals. Corruption is widespread and prospects for the 

vetted units remain unclear, given the lack of political will in several Central Asian countries. 

To succeed, CACI will need to be coordinated across a range of 

interagency and intergovernmental counternarcotics initiatives. In 

FY 2010, the United States spent an estimated $69 million on 

counternarcotics in Central Asia through various Defense Department and State Department security assistance programs. The 

international community and regional organizations have also devoted considerable resources to the counternarcotics effort and 

launched a variety of initiatives, including the UNODC’s Paris 

Pact-mandated ‘‘Rainbow Strategy,’’ the NATO-Russia Council 

Project on Counternarcotics, and various initiatives within the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). 

Going forward, the administration should consider: 

• Applying regional labels to new initiatives with caution, given 

the structural constraints on regional cooperation in Central 

Asia; 

• Piloting vetted units in countries where they stand the greatest chance of success, which will require a comparative regional assessment of efforts to combat the drug trade; 

• Scaling up cross-border operations between Central Asian and 

Afghan law enforcement and military officials, including joint 

training activities; and 

• Investing in informal working groups, like the Northern Route 

Working Group (NRWG), to improve information sharing and 

coordinate joint operations and regional and international 

counternarcotics efforts. The NRWG was established in 2010 to 

coordinate joint counternarcotics investigations in northern Afghanistan. It is composed of the Russian Federal Drug Control 

Service, Tajikistan Drug Control Service, Kyrgyzstan Drug 

Control Service, and DEA Country Offices in Dushanbe, Kabul, 

and Moscow. 

SECURING CENTRAL ASIA’S SOUTHERN BORDERS

To support counternarcotics efforts, the United States should 

continue to shore up the borders between Central Asia and Afghanistan. Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan is particularly long, porous, and thinly guarded. Unmanned sections are known as ‘‘green 

borders,’’ where virtually anyone can cross by river raft, donkey, or 

truck. Some areas of the border are protected by fences and border 

patrols, but many sections are left wide open. 

According to officials in the region, most smuggling occurs at official points of entry and there is credible evidence that Tajik authorities look the other way, with some actively facilitating the 

drug trade. Tajik authorities told committee staff they make seizures about three to four times a year, with the last significant seizure in Dushanbe at the end of 2009, when the Tajik Ministry of 

Interior reportedly seized a large shipment of drugs coming from 

the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. 

13 

Cross-border cooperation between Tajikistan and Afghanistan 

leaves room for improvement. Weak local government and corruption on both sides of the border are obstacles to effective border 

management. The Government of Tajikistan has relations with the 

Afghan border police, including regular meetings. They have agreements in place on exchanging information, but effective joint cooperation must be strengthened. 

The United States is actively working with the Tajik government 

to improve border security. It is constructing or refurbishing border 

guard facilities, providing training for Tajik and Afghan border 

guards at a U.S.-funded facility in Khorog, and implementing programs on police reform, rule of law, judicial training, prosecutorial 

training, trafficking in persons, domestic violence, and drug demand reduction. The United States also provides basic equipment 

to Tajik border guards. 

There are three steps the United States could take to build on 

its efforts to improve border security in Tajikistan and the wider 

region: 

• Improve and share data collection: It is hard to have a genuine 

discussion and debate about the narcotics problem when our 

local partners lack publicly accessible and consistent information on the drug trade. According to Tajik Ministry of Interior 

estimates, they seize about 70 to 80 percent of all drugs that 

pass through Tajikistan each year, with only 10 percent of 

drugs produced in Afghanistan transiting Central Asia. The 

UNODC estimates that as much as 25 to 30 percent of the 

drugs produced in Afghanistan transit Central Asia. Experts 

estimate that roughly five to ten percent of these flows are 

seized. 

• Get back to brass tacks: Establishing elite investigatory units, 

as envisioned under CACI, is a long-term goal. In the near 

term, the United States should also focus on the basics, working with the Government of Tajikistan to improve standards 

and facilities for interrogations, as well as to provide modern 

communications equipment, rations, and vehicles for border 

guards, customs service, and law enforcement agencies. 

• Increase Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) staff: DEA 

maintains only a handful of narcotics officers in Central Asia. 

By contrast, there are 81 DEA officers in Afghanistan. The administration should consider a modest increase in DEA’s staff 

in Central Asia, given the volume of narcotics that transits the 

Northern Route and the challenges of coordinating an effective 

response. 

(15) 

APPENDIXES 

(17) 

Appendix I.—English Language Training 

Across Central Asia, the English language is barely heard. This 

should concern the United States for three reasons: (1) fewer 

English-speakers means fewer opportunities for bilateral engagement, (2) fewer opportunities for engagement means less influence, 

and (3) less influence means reduced opportunities for trade and 

investment, as well as meaningful dialogue on human rights and 

legal reform. 

English language training is important for other countries, too. 

Conversational fluency in the English language is critical to participating in peacekeeping missions and joint military exercises, to 

say nothing of reaping the benefits of globalization. It is why countries like Kazakhstan have invested in English language training, 

with the ambitious goal of becoming trilingual in Kazakh, Russian, 

and English in 10 years. The United States should seize the opportunity and expand English language training throughout the region. 

Increasing support for English language training in Central Asia 

would complement existing U.S. outreach efforts. Public diplomacy 

programs like the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) program have 

played an important role in fostering people-to-people exchanges 

for high school students from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. The United States also teaches 

English through the International Military Education and Training 

(IMET) program, annual Fulbright scholarships, English Language 

Fellowship and Specialist programs, and the Peace Corps. 

Unfortunately, the Peace Corps’ footprint in Central Asia is getting smaller. The Uzbekistan program ended in 2005, and the 

Peace Corps recently suspended its program in Kazakhstan, leaving just 89 volunteers in Kyrgyzstan and 25 in Turkmenistan. 

Tajikistan does not have a Peace Corps program, despite high-level 

interest from the United States. 

Expanding English language training requires unity of effort to 

succeed, particularly in a constrained fiscal environment. There is 

room for creativity in partnering with the private sector. For instance, in cooperation with the State Department, American companies could leverage their resources to bolster English language 

opportunities in Central Asia. This could be achieved with a minimal start-up investment from the U.S. Government. Public-private 

partnerships like the U.S.-Kazakhstan Public-Private Economic 

Partnership Initiative (PPEPI) have delivered results. We should 

apply this model to our English language programs in Central 

Asia. 

18 

Appendix II.—Remembering Osh 

The ghosts of the 2010 violence in Kyrgyzstan, during which 

clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks left nearly 500 dead 

and hundreds of thousands displaced, still haunt the streets of Osh 

in the heart of the Ferghana Valley. Charred buildings and halfempty markets are stark reminders of the tensions that simmer 

just beneath the surface. Kyrgyzstan has taken some positive steps 

since the ouster of former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev last April, 

with credible parliamentary elections in October 2010, and a presidential election this fall. But much work remains to be done to consolidate Kyrgyzstan’s democratic transition. 

Reconciliation initiatives have been slow to get off the ground. 

Officials have pledged reforms to encourage better inter-ethnic relations. But throughout the country, an uneasy fear pervades discussion of the future. 

Kyrgyzstan’s halting strides toward democracy underscore the 

fragility of Afghanistan’s northern flank. Many of the Central 

Asian countries labor under the constraints of artificially imposed 

borders and mismanagement of natural resources. The Ferghana 

Valley, which spans the countries of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 

Uzbekistan, is one of the most densely populated and ethnically diverse areas in the world. It has been a hotbed of violence and instability, as well as a fertile recruiting ground for militant groups. 

Ferghana’s diversity, economic potential, and local governance 

structures are sources of strength. But these rays of light have 

been overshadowed by social and cultural conflict. 

Remembering Osh is less a call to action than a caution against 

the tendency to assume we can ‘‘fix’’ what ails Central Asia. The 

United States can help, and in many respects, U.S. assistance can 

make a real difference. In Osh, for example, the United States 

could put more dollars behind youth sports centers and joint economic initiatives for ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, as well as mobile 

health clinics that provide psychosocial support for families of the 

victims of last year’s violence. But ultimately, it is the people of 

Central Asia that must lead the way to reconciliation, economic 

growth, and political reform. 

There is reason for hope. In Tokmok, a small town to the east 

of Bishkek, an elderly gentleman proudly cast his vote in this 

year’s presidential election. ‘‘Do you want to know whom I’m voting 

for?’’ he asked his compatriots, to which they responded with cries 

of ‘‘No, No.’’ The gentleman raised his voice: ‘‘I’m voting for peace 

and stability in Kyrgyzstan.’’ 

19 

Appendix III.—Tajikistan: A Closer Look 

Tajikistan is a weak state in a dangerous neighborhood. It lacks 

resources and shares a widely porous and vulnerable border with 

Afghanistan. Corruption is rife, and the country’s institutions are 

brittle, raising concerns about its ability to manage political, economic, and humanitarian shocks. 

Militant ambushes against a convoy of government troops and a 

suicide bombing in the northern city of Khujand last year exposed 

Tajikistan’s vulnerability to growing extremism at home and armed 

incursions from across the border in Afghanistan. Much of what 

passes for terrorist activity in the country may be local in nature, 

driven by those who have grown dissatisfied with electricity shortages, unemployment, corruption, abusive interrogation methods, 

and religious persecution. The IMU and other militant groups occasionally infiltrate the country, and there is some evidence to suggest that Tajikistan’s northern Isfara district is at risk of becoming 

a haven for extremists. In the final analysis, however, the specter 

of Islamic radicalism may be a self-inflicted wound. 

Islam is flourishing in Tajikistan. Yet the government is limiting 

its free expression by monitoring Friday sermons, prohibiting most 

children under the age of 18 from attending religious services at 

mosques, and recalling students pursuing religious studies at institutions abroad. Government restrictions on religious expression, 

coupled with a lack of economic opportunity, could drive many organizations underground. This threatens to radicalize a younger 

population whose active participation in society is vital to promoting economic growth, political reform, and moderation. 

For Central Asia to remain part of the solution for Afghanistan 

and not the problem, its governments must address the shortcomings in their domestic security regimes. In addition to the 

human and social costs, the presence of radicalized and alienated 

populations in Central Asia could present the Taliban and other 

militant groups with ample opportunity to regenerate and spread 

their message from across the border. 

20 

Appendix IV.—Total U.S. Budgeted Assistance to Central 

Asia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, FY 2001–2010 (millions) 

Sources: For Afghanistan, FY 2002–2010, see: Curt Tarnoff, ‘‘Afghanistan: U.S. 

Foreign Assistance,’’ Congressional Research Service, R40699, August 19, 2011, p.16. 

For Afghanistan, FY 2001, see: Kenneth Katzman, ‘‘Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,’’ Congressional Research Service, November 22, 

2011, RL30588, p. 75. For Pakistan, see: Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, 

‘‘Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,’’ Congressional Research Service, R41856, November 4, 2011, pp. 20–21. Data on total U.S. budgeted assistance to Central Asia 

compiled for Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff by Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service. 

Notes: Estimates for Afghanistan include total budget function 050 and function 

150 assistance, FY 2001–2010. Estimates for Pakistan include total security and 

economic assistance, excluding Coalition Support Funds, FY 2001–2010. Estimates 

for Central Asia include assistance reported by all agencies and programs, FY 2001– 

2010. 

21 

Appendix V.—U.S. Budgeted Peace & Security Assistance vs. 

Total Assistance to Central Asia, FY 2001–2010 (millions) 

Source: Data on total U.S. budgeted assistance and Peace and Security (P&S) assistance to Central Asia compiled for Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority 

staff by Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the Congressional 

Research Service. 

Notes: Peace and Security assistance includes Department of Defense funding for 

combating weapons of mass destruction, counternarcotics, and stabilization operations and security sector reform (Section 1206); Department of Energy funding for 

combating weapons of mass destruction; and Department of State funding for International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing 

(FMF), Non-Proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), 

and Assistance to Eastern Europe and Central Asia (AEECA) funding for counterterrorism, transnational crime, counternarcotics, stabilization operations and security sector reform, combating weapons of mass destruction, and conflict mitigation 

and reconciliation. 

22 

Appendix VI.—U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY 2001–2010 

Table 1: Total U.S. Assistance Budgeted for Central Asia, FY 2001–2010 

(millions of dollars, by fiscal year) 

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 

Kazakhstan ............................................ 80.01 97.4 97.88 111.00 84.91 80.06 165.55 179.52 219.02 157.9 1273.25 Kyrgyzstan ............................................. 43.07 94.47 53.85 55.25 55.23 43.34 71.25 71.23 111.74 117.53 716.96 Tajikistan .............................................. 76.48 136.34 48.71 53.01 65.69 42.81 48.44 67.33 65.60 82.99 687.4 Turkmenistan ........................................ 12.57 18.93 10.98 10.42 18.94 10.44 19.84 16.83 20.78 28.25 167.98 Uzbekistan ............................................. 48.33 224.14 90.77 84.25 78.28 49.30 35.90 38.33 48.55 37.36 735.21 Regn. ..................................................... 7.57 13.88 9.99 3.41 4.67 5.23 7.59 6.66 25.61 12.21 96.82 

Total .................................................. 268.03 585.16 312.18 317.34 307.72 231.18 348.57 379.9 491.3 436.24 3677.62 

Source: Data on total U.S. budgeted assistance to Central Asia compiled for Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff by Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian 

Affairs at the Congressional Research Service. 

Notes: Estimates for Central Asia include assistance reported by all agencies and programs, FY 2001–2010. 

Table 2: U.S. Budgeted Peace & Security Assistance for Central Asia, FY 2001–2010 

(millions of dollars, by fiscal year) 

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 

Kazakhstan ............................................ 36.66 47.63 51.67 73.75 56.00 50.35 139.8 155.5 187.6 137.72 936.68 Kyrgyzstan ............................................. 6.55 38.62 11.28 12.33 17.44 13.27 18.78 37.57 42.23 48.62 246.69 Tajikistan .............................................. 0.75 21.6 1.62 7.88 28.99 10.00 17.49 30.48 25.50 31.48 175.79 Turkmenistan ........................................ 1.87 7.73 1.16 0.97 8.98 2.17 5.72 5.90 8.71 13.0 56.21 Uzbekistan ............................................. 24.27 82.53 39.18 41.62 43.43 28.67 17.82 26.82 33.98 25.95 364.27 Regn. ..................................................... 0.30 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.91 0.68 3.60 2.13 19.21 0.75 27.7 

Total .................................................. 70.4 198.1 105.0 136.5 155.7 105.1 203.2 258.4 317.2 257.52 1807.34 

Source: Data on U.S. budgeted peace and security assistance to Central Asia compiled for Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff by Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian 

and Eurasian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service. 

23 

Appendix VII.—Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 

Source: Jim Nichol, ‘‘Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for 

U.S. Interests,’’ Congressional Research Service, RL33458, October 12, 2011, p. 54, 

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33458.pdf. 

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