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External Research Associates Program Monograph

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

IN THE RUSSIAN AIRBORNE FORCES:

THE LESSONS OF THE GEORGIAN CONFLICT

Rod Thornton

December 2011

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ISBN 1-58487-519-4
iii

FOREWORD

The airborne divisions are undoubtedly the most 

impressive formations within the Russian army. The 

troops of the airborne forces (VDV) are the best trained 

and most professional in the army. Unlike their Western airborne counterparts, they are capable of fielding 

both armored personnel carriers and artillery assets. 

That affords them additional battlefield protection and 

firepower. VDV forces also have shown themselves—

as in the 2008 war with Georgia—able to respond very 

quickly in crisis situations. Indeed, the airborne troops 

performed very creditably overall in Georgia. Such 

disciplined and professional airborne forces will likely 

form the vanguard of any interventionary operation beyond Russia’s borders. Other than Georgia, the last time 

VDV forces were employed operationally abroad was in 

Kosovo in 1999. It was there at Priština International Airport that VDV troops had a potentially explosive showdown with British paratroopers. That may not be the 

last time lead elements of U.S. or North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) forces come face-to-face with the 

VDV. Given that such confrontations cannot be ruled 

out in the future, Russia’s current airborne forces need 

to be understood.

This monograph examines the VDV and seeks to 

highlight what makes its formations such noteworthy 

potential allies or opponents. In particular, the monograph looks at the process of organizational change that 

the VDV has undergone since the war with Georgia.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ROD THORNTON lectures at the University of 

Nottingham in the United Kingdom (UK). He previously spent 9 years in a British Army infantry regiment, including 3 years in Northern Ireland and 1 year 

as a Serbo-Croat interpreter in Bosnia (1992-93). He has 

lived and worked in both Moscow and Sarajevo. Dr. 

Thornton taught for 5 years at the UK’s Joint Services 

Command and Staff College (working for King’s College London), which included guest lecturing at the 

NATO Defense College in Rome. He is the author of 

Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the 21st Century (2007) and is currently working on a book with 

Dr Bettina Renz on Russian military modernization. 

After leaving the army, he began an academic career 

that included a degree in Russian and led eventually 

to a Ph.D. focusing on comparative peacekeeping operations. 

vii

SUMMARY

This monograph considers the recent history of 

organizational change in the Russian airborne forces 

(VDV). In particular, it looks at how the VDV has 

changed since the end of Russia’s conflict with Georgia in 2008. The VDV, a force much admired in the 

Russian news media and society, has, in fact, escaped 

fairly unscathed during the comprehensive reform 

of the Russian army more generally over the last few 

years. In large part this has been because of the personality of the current head of the VDV, LieutenantGeneral Vladimir Shamanov. Close to Prime Minister 

Vladimir Putin, Shamanov—a “‘maverick”—has used 

his political connections to help ward off many of the 

cuts and reforms that the rest of the army has been 

subject to. He has managed to keep the basic structure 

of the VDV intact, while also dealing with a number 

of problematic issues related to manning, equipment, 

and training regimes within his organization. This 

monograph points out the level of professionalism in 

the VDV (shown during the Georgian war). But it also 

highlights the fact that, while some battalions within 

the VDV will be very effective and well-trained, other 

battalions will not. Thus it is difficult to judge precisely how battle-ready the VDV divisions now are. Ultimately, this monograph seeks to establish just what 

sort of Russian airborne forces U.S. or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops may one day 

have to either work alongside of or, indeed, face in 

some sort of confrontation.

1

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

IN THE RUSSIAN AIRBORNE FORCES:

THE LESSONS OF THE GEORGIAN CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION 

In June 1999, hard on the heels of the ceasefire ending the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 

war with Yugoslavia over Kosovo, British and Russian paratroopers raced each other to reach and seize 

for themselves the airport at the Kosovan capital, 

Priština. Arriving at the same time, the two groups 

indulged in an uneasy stand-off. Lieutenant-General 

Mike Jackson, the overall commander of the British 

forces and an ex-paratrooper himself, was ordered by 

his superior, General Wesley Clark, the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to block the runway in order to prevent the arrival of more airborne troops from Russia. 

General Jackson demurred, famously stating: “Sir, I’m 

not starting World War III for you. . . .”1

Such a confrontation may be unusual, but it could 

happen again. This was the kind of meeting—airborne 

against airborne—that is very likely to repeat itself if 

the vanguard of a U.S. or other NATO force comes up 

against the lead elements of another state in a conflict 

situation or as part of a multinational interventionary 

operation. This was the situation at Priština. 

The Russian troops present at Priština were from 

the Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska2

 (VDV). It is these 

VDV forces who will, likely as not, form the spearhead of any Russian military intervention abroad—be 

it in actual conflict or in some type of peace support 

or peacekeeping operation. These will be Russia’s best 

combat troops. It is important, then, from a U.S. and 
2

NATO perspective, that these frontline Russian forces 

be understood and appreciated: their strengths, weaknesses, structures, equipment, degree of professionalism, and overall fighting potential. It is important too, 

across a wider perspective in academia and among 

military organizations more generally, that a valid assessment be made of the current capabilities of and 

problems faced by Russia’s most elite combat arm of 

service. This is particularly important in the wake of 

the quite-substantial changes that have occurred in 

the VDV recently. Specifically, this monograph will 

examine the changes that have been introduced since 

the war with Georgia in 2008. This conflict acted as a 

catalyst for change across the entire Russian military. 

In analyzing these changes in the VDV, this monograph concentrates on two specific questions: How 

did the changes come about, and what do they ultimately mean for the operational efficiency of Russia’s 

airborne forces? 

This monograph will begin by examining the degree of organizational change the VDV has undergone 

since the end of the Cold War. A fundamental issue 

here is the institutional backing the VDV could derive 

from political patronage. Of particular note in this regard is the relationship that developed between the 

VDV commander, Vladimir Shamanov, and President 

Vladimir Putin. Then we shall consider the VDV’s participation in the war with Georgia. The VDV came out 

of this conflict with its structure basically intact—unlike the Russian ground forces. But some changes did 

result, and this monograph goes on to look at these 

changes in terms of equipment, manning, readiness, 

and air transport. The overall conclusion from this examination of Russia’s VDV is that despite the many 

obstacles it has faced, it has emerged in the post-Geor-
3

gian-war era as a competent and well-drilled force. It 

is on a par with analogues in the West. 

THE ESTEEMED VDV

The VDV—be it in the Soviet era or now in the 

new Russia—has always been a source of pride in the 

country. The exploits of its forces have been trumpeted by the domestic news media, and thus, the public 

likewise holds the forces in high esteem, particularly 

since the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-89). The 

“blue berets” are portrayed as tough, aggressive, welltrained, and efficient. They have the best equipment, 

their officers are substantially better paid than those 

in the regular army, and they are provided with the 

highest-quality conscripts. The elite VDV is presented 

as something of a model—certainly when set against 

the example of the Russian military more generally, 

which tends to be characterized domestically as beset 

by waste, corruption, torpor, and general inefficiency. 

Consequently, Russia looks up to its VDV, and there 

are many reasons it should.3

The changes this organization has undergone over 

the last 2 years have increased its capabilities. If ever 

there is a repeat of the Priština incident, then any 

commander of NATO forces might think to adopt the 

same cautious approach as General Jackson. The VDV 

can represent a substantial foe. 

THE VULNERABILITY TO CHANGE OF THE 

POST-COLD WAR AIRBORNE FORCES 

In the immediate post-Cold War era, there seemed 

to be no strategic logic for maintaining Russia’s airborne forces. In traditional Soviet thinking, VDV 
4

troops were only to be used for deep interdiction operations. The end of the Cold War, however, removed 

the rationale for such operations and thus the raison 

d’etre for the VDV itself.4 Hence, to a large extent ever 

since 1991, the VDV has been struggling to weave for 

itself a specific role within the fabric of the Russian 

military. For without such a role, the VDV was becoming vulnerable, if not to outright disbandment, then 

at least of major reorganization, redesignation, or absorption into other arms of service. Given that it was a 

well-trained, mobile force with a strong esprit de corps

and fighting potential, there were many within the 

Russian military who were casting acquisitive eyes at 

the prize airborne troops.

One element of the VDV’s vulnerability lay with 

the fact that it was a separate arm of service. Its formations are not subject to the control of the military 

districts in which they are based.5

 Rather, the VDV 

is the strategic reserve of the commander-in-chief of 

the armed forces, i.e., the president himself (currently 

Dimitri Medvedev).6

The rationale for absorption into the ground forces, 

in particular, was based upon the fact that in the immediate post-Cold War era, the VDV seemed to lack 

not only a strategic role, but also an operational one. 

There was the basic weakness, for instance, of relying upon forces delivered by troop-transport aircraft 

into any modern combat zone—where air defense 

would presumably be very effective. What, then, was 

the utility of airborne forces?7

 The VDV troops were 

also considered to be too lightly armed and therefore 

lacking battlefield survivability. This was held to be 

true, despite the fact that, in contrast to Western airborne forces, VDV units possessed armored personnel carriers (APCs) and other armored vehicles. But 
5

the airborne models lacked the measure of armored 

protection boasted by the armored vehicles employed 

by the Russian ground forces. A further reason for the 

ground forces to take over the VDV began to emerge 

as the 1990s progressed. VDV troops were spending 

more and more of their time fighting separatists in 

Chechnya. Their presence there as elite infantry was 

much appreciated, and they proved to be very effective in this counterguerrilla role. But long tours of 

duty in Chechnya meant that little training time was 

being devoted to their principal mission as airborne or 

air-assault forces. Their particular skills in this regard 

therefore atrophied, and they came to be regarded 

more and more simply as infantry soldiers, albeit elite 

ones. So, the logic ran, why were they not part of the 

ground forces? This particular susceptibility of the 

VDV image was, moreover, exacerbated by the withdrawal of Russian operational forces from Chechnya 

in 2005. That year, all nonspecialized VDV units finally left the republic. The last to leave, in 2006, were the 

spetsnaz troops of the VDV’s 45th Separate Reconnaissance Regiment. The exodus of the airborne forces’ 

role in Chechnya opened the door to re-thinking their 

status, to more considered reflection as to their future 

role and purpose.8

This post-Cold War debate over the future of the 

VDV was conducted against a background of massive cutbacks in the Russian military overall. In the 

early 1990s, with the national economy desperately 

strapped for cash, the armed forces were subject to 

substantial retrenchment. The major military costsaving measures introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in 

the 1980s were continued by President Boris Yeltsin in 

the 1990s. During this latter period, however, the VDV 

was sheltered to a large degree by the fact that General 
6

Pavel Grachev, formerly of the Soviet airborne forces, 

had been appointed Defense Minister—serving from 

1992 to 1996. While he oversaw an overall reduction 

in military personnel of some 1,122,000,9 Grachev did 

not wield his ax against the VDV; in fact, he increased 

its strength somewhat by adding a heavy tank regiment to the 104th Airborne Division (now disbanded). 

He wanted the VDV to continue to be independent, 

remaining the principal strike force of the Russian 

military—and he felt that such a status could be preserved only by adding such extra firepower.10

A succession of Russian presidents has also been 

loath to tinker too much with the VDV. As the supreme 

commander’s reserve, the VDV is, at least nominally, 

operating under the orders of the president himself. 

No Russian president would be enthusiastic at the 

prospect of having the airborne forces absorbed into 

a body that he could not so easily direct—such as the 

ground forces. 

Grachev, though, came to be replaced as Defense 

Minister by a man who took a view opposite to that 

of the airborne general. General Igor Rodionov (with 

an armored forces background) put the defense emphasis on classical heavy forces. Basically, Rodionov 

tried to crush the airborne forces, reducing their overall numbers and dissolving the 104th’s “flying tank” 

regiment.11

Rodionov was removed in 1997. Yeltsin and his 

economic technocrats were looking for cheaper defense options than those provided by Rodionov’s 

preference for Soviet-style mass. The political hierarchy wanted smaller, more flexible forces. Rodionov 

was replaced by General Igor Sergeyev who, as the 

former head of the Strategic Rocket Forces, favored 

the cheaper defense option of relying mostly on the 
7

country’s nuclear arsenal. He had no time for mass. 

Sergeyev brought the military still further down in 

size so that it stood at only 1.2 million by January 1999. 

But Sergeyev was trying to push through too many 

changes that targeted the largest power bloc within 

the Russian military machine—the ground forces. 

Size patently mattered to the generals of the ground 

forces. Any overall manpower cuts meant, of course, 

that fewer generals would be needed; such generals 

thus had a vested interest in opposing the proposed 

changes. The pressure told, with Sergeyev being ousted in March 2001 and replaced as Defense Minister by 

Sergei Ivanov, the choice of the new president, Vladimir Putin. 

Putin, like Gorbachev and Yeltsin before him, 

wanted a smaller, more cost-effective military. Ivanov 

was nominally the first-ever nonmilitary Russian/Soviet Defense Minister (formerly in the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopastnosti12 [KGB], so he was technically not a civilian either). Putin, likewise ex-KGB, liked 

to appoint (and to surround himself with) ministers 

with the same bureaucratic/cultural background as 

himself—hence, the general preponderance of exKGB/Federal Security Bureau (FSB)13 personnel in the 

Russian political hierarchy. But this meant that Ivanov lacked a power base within the military itself, and 

found it expedient to take the line of least resistance in 

his particular reform proposals. He perforce pushed 

a ground forces agenda. The size of the military was 

thus stabilized for a time, and further cuts were halted.14

Given that Ivanov could not really push through 

the reforms that Putin wanted to see, he was replaced 

by Anatoliy Serdyukov in 2007. Serdyukov, the former head of the Tax Ministry (and a true civilian), was 
8

seen as a man who would have the dexterity to target 

the military’s Achilles heel—its internal corruption 

and still-excessive size. Putin felt able to promote this 

total outsider, Serdyukov, into such a role because the 

President was by now more confident in his own position and less reliant on old comrades from the security 

services. The role of Putin and Serdyukov in reshaping the military and, in particular, the VDV, will be 

discussed later. 

CHANGES IN THE VDV PRIOR TO THE WAR 

WITH GEORGIA

It was against this post-Cold War background 

that the need for overall cuts in the Russian military 

caused a new VDV to take shape. The organization 

was subject to change, but the changes being made 

were being driven largely by the rationale that smaller 

was better. While the Russian military as a whole suffered greatly in this immediate post-Soviet shake-up 

and retrenchment process, the VDV itself suffered 

considerably less. The reductions that did take place 

did not really represent any major rethinking as to the 

airborne forces’ contribution to the defense of Russia. 

There are, however, with regard to the actual changes 

that did take place within the VDV before the conflict 

with Georgia, two factors worthy of particular note—

structure and manning.

Structure.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the VDV 

was reduced in size from seven divisions to five (leaving 35,000 personnel). Two divisions were lost because 

they found themselves marooned on the territories of 
9

the newly independent states. Of the five divisions left 

on Russian territory, only the 104th was disbanded 

(and even it was eventually resurrected to become the 

31st Separate Airborne Brigade, still based in the same 

city, Ulyanovsk). This left at the time four airborne divisions: the 7th (Novorossiysk); the 76th (Pskov); the 

98th (Ivanovo), and the 106th (Tula). (For more details 

on these formations, see the Appendix.) These formations did not, however, escape the cuts completely. 

Each division lost an airborne regiment, leaving two 

instead of three. Hence, the current troop strength of 

these four divisions stands at only some 5,000 each. 

Another VDV unit to be formed in the wake of the 

Soviet collapse was the 45th Separate Reconnaissance 

Regiment (Kubinka, Moscow). This is a special operations (i.e., spetsnaz) unit within the VDV. Roughly 700 

strong, it is subordinated to the VDV Military Council, but on operations actually becomes subordinate to 

the Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye15 (GRU). The 

GRU, directed by the General Staff, is the military’s 

foreign intelligence service. 

In terms of the VDV’s training centers, these have 

remained at Ryazan (the city known as the home of 

the airborne forces) and at Omsk. 

In 2006, a further structural reorganization of the 

VDV resulted in a redesignation of formations. The 

98th and 106th divisions remained in the airborne role, 

i.e., they retained the capability to air-drop personnel 

into operational zones. The 7th and 76th divisions and 

the 31st Separate Brigade, however, were redesignated as air assault, i.e., they would merely be airlifted 

into operational zones (by aircraft or helicopter). One 

battalion, however, in both the 7th and the 76th has 

remained parachute-trained. The 7th Division also received the additional designation of “Mountain,” as 
10

in Air Assault (Mountain) Division.16 But this division 

has little to indicate that it has changed in any specific 

way to conduct operations in mountainous areas. The 

7th and 76th were also reinforced by additional selfpropelled artillery units, significantly increasing their 

organic firepower assets.17

The 31st Separate Airborne Brigade lost its organic 

APCs and artillery assets. The troops in this brigade 

(in contrast to the VDV divisions, which still have 

APCs and artillery—see Appendix) are now akin to 

Western airborne forces in that they are expected to 

operate largely on foot.

Manning.

In the mid-1990s, the professionalization of the 

Russian military began. This was in line with the 

general sentiment felt across a host of post-Cold War 

armies—including those in Western Europe—that 

mass was no longer a prerequisite for the conduct of 

modern warfare. Technology, not mass, was becoming 

regarded everywhere as the principal force multiplier. 

Militaries today are seen to require less manpower, 

but the manpower that they do have needs to be more 

highly trained than previously. The new technologies 

coming into service have to be operated by skilled 

personnel. These skills can be honed only over several 

years of professional service. This means, of course, 

that short-service conscripts are no longer needed. 

They have neither the motivation nor the skill-sets to 

man the modern military organization. 

These same sentiments were also evident in Russia. Many in the military realized which way the 

wind was blowing and that the country’s conscriptbased military was becoming an anachronism. From 
11

the early 1990s onwards, reform was being discussed 

by senior officers on the General Staff. These “were 

led primarily by the goal of making the structure of 

the armed forces resemble the structure of the armed 

forces of the most militarily developed states as much 

as possible.”18 Political leaders concurred. They were 

also anxious to reduce the burden of conscription on 

Russian society, and to reap the electoral benefits of removing such a generally unpopular institution. Thus, 

the professionalization of the military was seen as the 

way forward—having volunter recruits sign on for a 

specific contract period (3 years), and to be reasonably 

well paid to do so. 

There were those, of course, who held opposing views. Moving from a mass-conscript military 

to a smaller professional one naturally meant fewer 

jobs for officers—including generals. There were also 

those within the military who said that China should 

be looked upon as the prime candidate for Russia’s 

future opponent. If it was, then mass would be needed 

to counter the mass that the Chinese would undoubtedly deploy. 

This process of professionalizing the Russian military began tentatively back in the mid-1990s. But it 

took on a firmer shape only when, in 2002, the 104th 

Regiment of the 76th Airborne Division (as it was then 

known) was chosen to be the first Russian military 

formation to be fully manned by contractees or, in 

Russian, kontraktniki.

19 This process was intended to 

spread to the rest of the 76th, and then to the other 

VDV divisions. The plan was that by the end of 2007, 

all of the VDV divisions—except for the 106th—were 

to be 90 percent manned by kontraktniki.

20

This was the situation with regard to the VDV and 

to the process of change more generally within the 
12

Russian military prior to the 2008 war with Georgia. 

The situation can be characterized as one in which the 

VDV was in the forefront of the Russian army’s professionalization process. It was also being protected 

from radical change by the facts that it had such a high 

public profile and that it was favored by influential 

individuals—including presidents of Russia. It is this 

aspect of the VDV’s supporters and their role in the 

process of change that the next section will consider.

CHANGE: THE ROLE OF THE VDV 

COMMANDER

The role of individual senior officers in the process 

of change in military organizations is prominent in 

the literature on the subject. In such literature, a single 

very senior officer, desiring some form of significant 

change in his military organization, is not capable on 

his own of generating the requisite momentum for that 

change. The vested interests are just too powerful. The 

guardians of the status quo within any organization, 

comfortable as they are with established structures, 

systems, and procedures, will always stand in opposition to significant change. Such change will undermine their individual stakes within the organization, 

and throw into question the skill-sets that saw them 

promoted to high rank in the first place.21

Those individual senior officers who do oppose 

the status quo are often referred to in the literature 

as “mavericks,” originally a term of opprobrium but 

today in most organizational studies a term of respect. 

Authors such as Barry Posen examine the role of such 

mavericks in generating change in military organizations. The only way, it is noted, that such men can effect the changes they want is by allying themselves 
13

with those in the political world of a like mind, civilian leaders who also want to see the changes but who 

cannot get them adopted against opposition from 

within the military they are nominally supposed to 

direct. These civilian masters can form, say Posen and 

others, a symbiotic relationship with the maverick 

officer. Together they can force through the changes 

they both want. Historical examples abound. General 

Heinz Guderian in the German army of the 1930s was 

supported in his views on Blitzkrieg by Chancellor 

Adolf Hitler. For another, Air-Chief Marshal Hugh 

Dowding, the head of British Fighter Command in the 

1930s, was able to persuade the Royal Air Force to invest less in bombers and more in fighters (a decision 

that ultimately saved Britain in 1940), only by gaining the support of an important minister, Sir Thomas 

Inskip. Other examples are Billy Mitchell and Hyman 

Rickover in the United States, and Brigadier Charles 

de Gaulle in 1930s France. Posen observes that neither 

party—maverick nor civilian—can push through major change without, as he puts it, “a kind of partnership.”22

The fact that the VDV is the traditional strategic 

reserve of the Russian president has always meant 

that the VDV already had a kind of built-in partnership with at least one powerful civilian master. Thus, 

whichever officer was commanding the VDV in postSoviet Russia tended to have enough political support 

to ward off threats of the VDV’s absorption into the 

ground forces. He could also put forward his own 

ideas as to what should happen to the organization 

and at least gain a respectful hearing. Moreover, the 

sheer force of personality of a succession of commanders of the VDV during the 1990s and 2000s—assisted by the general public popularity of the airborne 
14

troops—has also helped. Overall, this has led to a situation in which the head of the VDV had come to assume an importance—when it comes to the process 

of change in the Russian army—all out of proportion 

to his rank (lieutenant-general, in this case—which is 

only a two-star rank in Russia). The position of this 

particular arm of service commander is thus well-nigh 

unique in terms of the study of change in military organizations more generally. 

The various recent heads of the VDV have all been 

figures of some note—in the political realm as well as 

the military. The VDV was led for many of the postSoviet years (1996-2003) by the high-profile Lieutenant-General Georgiy Shpak. He was later to become a 

regional governor. During his tenure, Shpak managed 

to fend off perhaps the most serious post-Cold War attempt to absorb the VDV into the ground forces, made 

by the then Chief of the General Staff (CGS) General 

Anatoliy Kvashnin. Shpak actually went to President 

Putin to argue his case, and this obviously had the required effect.23

Shpak was then followed by Aleksandr Kolmakov 

(2003-2007), who, on retirement, became a Deputy 

Defense Minister. Then came Valerii Yevtukhovich 

(2007-2009). He was to clash with the current (2011) 

CGS, General Nikolai Makarov, over the use of mobile rapid-reaction forces specifically—Yevtukhovich’s own airborne forces. Makarov, coming from 

the ground forces and ever conscious of the potential 

political clout of the head of the VDV, was naturally 

of a mind to clip the institutional wings of this arm 

of service and make it more amenable to his and the 

General Staff’s control.24 Yevtukhovich, lacking the 

political support he might have expected, lost out in 

this particular battle and was retired early against his 
15

wishes.25 Being commander of the VDV made one influential, it seems, but not omnipotent.

Vladimir Shamanov.

The current head of the VDV is Lieutenant-General 

Vladimir Shamanov. He is a man with more than a degree of clout and influence, a man worthy of study. He 

has played a particularly influential role in the process 

of organizational change in the VDV, and will probably continue in that vein. 

Shamanov took command of the airborne forces 

in May 2009. Twice designated a Hero of the Russian 

Federation, he has been described as “a Personality 

with a capital ‘P’” 26 and as “definitely the most colorful military leader in the armed forces.”27 Indeed, his 

career has been clouded by a series of misdemeanors 

that have landed him in various degrees of hot water. 

However, there is a general feeling within Russia that 

having a VDV commander with some color is no bad 

thing; indeed, it is to be welcomed. Tough military 

formations like the VDV should have a tough commander, even if his past is somewhat checkered.

Shamanov has had an interesting military career. 

He joined the military in 1978, and after VDV officer 

training school, he first commanded an artillery platoon in the 76th Division, and then a company at the 

Ryazan Airborne School.28 When he was with the 76th 

Division, Shamanov was noted as being a good company commander by the man then in charge of this 

division (and later to command the VDV itself), General Shpak. Shpak wanted Shamanov to be promoted 

straight to battalion commanding officer (CO), skipping the usual Russian promotion ticket-punch, an interim command appointment of deputy battalion CO. 
16

But no other division in the VDV would accept him at 

that level and so, in an unusual departure from rigid 

protocol, Shamanov was given command of a battalion in his own 76th Division. 

Another unusual aspect of Shamanov’s postings is 

that he never served in Afghanistan during the Soviet 

operation there (1979-1989). Given the intensive use 

of airborne units in this conflict, his absence was very 

rare among the community of airborne officers. The 

fact that he was not an Afghantsy left him at the margins of that clique of VDV (and also of ground forces) 

officers who served there. Many of his future senior 

officers would come to look down on Shamanov because he was not, in essence, “one of them.”

Shamanov left the 76th for the Staff College at 

Frunze, where he graduated in 1989. By 1990 he was 

deputy commander of the 300th Regiment in the 98th 

Airborne Division in Kishinev (now Chisinau in Moldova). The commander of this regiment was Colonel 

Kolmakov (later also to take command of the VDV). 

Shamanov was noted as not being a success in the 

98th, principally because he was not an Afghantsy. Still, 

he was promoted again in 1991 and departed to take 

over the 328th Regiment in the now-disbanded 104th 

Division. While in this post, he applied to attend the 

prestigious General Staff Academy, again at Frunze. 

His superior officer, however, refused to approve the 

transfer, and Shamanov punched him in the face!29

During the First Chechen War in 1994, he was Chief 

of Staff of the 7th Airborne Division. In March 1995, 

still in Chechnya, Shamanov was appointed to head 

an operational task force within the division. While 

in this post, charges were brought against him in relation to an operation undertaken by his forces in neighboring Ingushetia in October 1995. Here his troops, 
17

mistakenly thinking that the airport at Sleptovsk had 

been seized by rebels, had landed by helicopter and 

launched an immediate attack in force. The random 

shooting they engaged in resulted in the death of a 

taxi driver. Charges against Shamanov were dropped 

following a Duma amnesty. 

Shamanov’s next promotion was to take him out 

of the VDV when he became, also in October 1995, the 

deputy commander of the Chechnyan forces while 

double-hatting as the deputy commander of the North 

Caucasus Military District’s 58th Army.

His luck continued when he was (finally) sent to 

the General Staff Academy in July 1996. His absence 

from Chechnya during the ensuing period meant that 

he was not tainted—as much as other military officers 

were—by the embarrassing withdrawal of Russian 

troops from most of Chechnya after the Khasavyurt 

Accords of August 1996. This agreement with the 

Chechens had been negotiated by Yeltsin against the 

wishes of many in the military. 

Shamanov graduated from Frunze in 1998 and was 

then appointed chief of staff and deputy commander of 

the 20th Army based in the Moscow Military District. 

Almost immediately, however, he was dispatched to 

the Caucasus, again to double-hat as commander of 

both the 58th Army and the West Group of Forces of 

the Joint Contingent of Federal Troops in the North 

Caucasus. He later assumed command of the whole 

Joint Contingent.30

Shamanov’s greatest triumph was as the principal 

architect of the success of the Second Chechen War of 

1999-2000, a war in which the Chechen opposition was 

crushed much more quickly and brutally than in the 

first conflict. This resumption of the war in Chechnya 

in 1999 had suited many in the military who wanted 
18

revenge against the Chechens and for the humiliation 

of their withdrawal in 1996. It also suited the man who 

rode to the presidency of Russia on the back of this 

same military victory—Vladimir Putin. He, as prime 

minister in 1999, had been the principal political 

mover (President Yeltsin was by then ailing) toward 

a reengagement in Chechnya. The fact that this new 

war was over so quickly gave Putin immense political leverage, easily enough to ensure his success in 

the presidential elections of 2000. The new president 

was thus extremely grateful, among other victorious 

military figures, to Shamanov.31 The general was also 

lauded in other quarters, and continues to bask in the 

acclaim. 

Shamanov’s reputation in a military sense lies in 

the fact that he was seen in Chechnya as someone who 

got the job done. The problem with this approach is 

that he tended to let firepower dominate in engagements to the detriment of any discrimination between 

combatants and noncombatants. Shamanov, however, 

seems not to be overly concerned about the civilian 

casualties his methods caused. To him, a war was a 

war—his operational techniques would be the same 

whether the war was conventional or counterguerrilla.

Shamanov’s combat philosophy in Chechnya was 

certainly not approved of in certain military quarters. 

His superior, Colonel-General Gennadiy Troshev, 

who commanded the Defense Ministry Group of Forces in Chechnya, rebuked Shamanov for being barbaric 

and for using excessively forceful methods. Troshev 

had earlier commanded the East Group of Forces in 

the First Chechen War and had himself consciously 

avoided the indiscriminate assaults that Shamanov 

preferred. But whereas Troshev’s approach had led 

to costly delays in that first war, Shamanov, with his 

methods, had met with no such delays in the second.32
19

Other senior officers took issue with Shamanov. 

General Aslanbek Aslakhanov,33 acting as an adviser 

to President Putin, called him a “butcher.” And when 

Colonel-General Viktor Kazantsev, who was then Shamanov’s superior as North Caucasus Military District 

Commander, had tried to rein him in, he received the 

reply: “It is not for you to teach me!’34

Shamanov, moreover, was allegedly implicated in 

a massacre by Russian forces that took place at AlkhanYurt in Chechnya in 1999 (although Shamanov actually received one of his Hero of the Russian Federation 

decorations at this action). In an interview with the 

journalist Anna Politovskaya (later to be murdered), 

Shamanov said that he “regarded the wives and children of militants as the same bandits [as their husbands and fathers] and was surprised that someone 

might think differently.” Shamanov was also later to 

speak out in support of Colonel Yuriy Budanov, an 

officer who had been found guilty, in a notorious case 

in Russia, of strangling a Chechen girl.35 Additionally, 

the European Court of Human Rights has said that 

he is responsible for very serious human right violations.36 The Nobel Laureate for Peace, physicist Andrei Sakharov, also added his accusations, including 

that Shamanov has a serious xenophobic streak.37

Shamanov is thus no angel and no respecter of authority. He appears not to be concerned about inflicting casualties, whether they are those of the enemy, 

noncombatants, or even his own men. He also seems 

to prefer the use of overwhelming firepower, rather 

than more-nuanced ways of achieving military success. He is a man who carries with him some serious 

war crimes baggage.38

This, then, is Vladimir Shamanov’s “colorful” past. 

Despite the general opprobrium he has generated 
20

with regard to his activities in Chechnya, he has always been protected by Putin, who owed Shamanov. 

Shamanov had achieved the results that essentially 

brought Putin to the presidency. But even Putin’s 

power has its limits, and he has not always been able 

to protect his general. In August 2000, for instance, the 

military hierarchy managed to have its way, forcing 

Shamanov into early retirement. Officially, Shamanov 

had left both Chechnya and the military for “health 

reasons.”39

Putin was still able to step in and help Shamanov. 

The president, to all intents and purposes, in November 2000 handed him the post of governor of Ulyanovsk 

oblast (or region). This was not a role that Shamanov 

overly welcomed. As he later put it, “I found myself 

[in] the post of Ulyanovsk oblast governor somewhat 

against my will.”40

It was no surprise that Shamanov was not a success 

as a governor. He was accused of trying to govern the 

oblast as if he were running a regiment. In 2004, he recorded an approval rating of just 3 percent.41 He then 

moved on in November 2004 to become an assistant to 

the then prime minister, Mikhail Fradkov, advising on 

social welfare issues with regard to service personnel. 

In 2006, and working in the same field, he became an 

adviser to Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. Shamanov, 

having thus operated on the staffs of both the Prime 

Minister and the Defense Minister, was able to gain 

invaluable political experience.

It was during his stint in the Ministry of Defense 

that Shamanov met President George Bush in March 

2007 in the Oval Office. This meeting caused consternation among civil rights activists at the time. Afterward, and revealing perhaps his xenophobic streak, 

Shamanov compared the United States to Nazi Germany.42
21

Vladimir Shamanov, despite his tainted past, was 

to be called back into the military by presidential 

edict in November 2007. He was given the important 

position of Director of Combat Training.43 It seemed 

apparent that Serdyukov had been brought back by 

Putin to help the newly appointed Defense Minister, 

Anatoliy Serdyukov. As a civilian, and former head 

of the Tax Ministry at that, he was having trouble, not 

unexpectedly, trying to push through his reform plans 

against the considerable opposition by the aforementioned corpus of conservative generals, particularly 

those on the General Staff. Shamanov was brought in, 

it seems, to provide some of the muscle that would 

help see Serdyukov’s desired changes through.44

Shamanov’s reinstatement seems to be the firstever case in post-Soviet Russia of a senior officer, once 

retired, returning to uniform.45 It is an indication of 

just how much Putin values him. The logic of bringing him back, from Putin’s point of view, is obvious. 

Shamanov is one of the trusted Chechen generals who 

helped Putin to power in the first place. To bring him 

back into such a powerful position made sense, not 

only in terms of helping Serdyukov, but also in that 

Shamanov would doubtless remain loyal to Putin. 

Shamanov, of course, is not popular within the mainstream military itself. This is due to several factors: 

his non-Afghantsy status; his many misdemeanors; his 

brutal record in Chechnya, and the fact that he comes 

from a VDV (and not a mainstream ground forces) 

background. Herein lies his worth to Putin. There exists in this case a classic divide-and-rule relationship in 

terms of civil-military relations: the politician chooses 

a military figure (Shamanov) for a high command post 

whose power base comes mainly from the man who 

appointed him (Putin), and not so much from within 
22

the military organization itself. Such officers as Shamanov, because they owe their position to political 

masters and not to their standing in the military, are 

then pliable: they can be manipulated by the politicians. In turn, Shamanov has power—but power that 

drives only from his political backing. When this political power is added to his media-generated public 

popularity, he gains the individual capacity to usher 

through the types of changes within the military that 

both he and, more importantly, his political masters 

want. Quite major changes can then be achieved by 

this partnership.

This same logic applied when Shamanov was appointed head of the VDV in May 2009 (another political decision) and remains there as of this writing. As a 

non-Afghantsy head of the VDV, he is still something 

of an outsider even within his own organization—so 

he is still looking to civilian masters for support, rather than within the organization.

Shamanov remains a popular military figure with 

the public. Of course, despite all his indiscretions, 

his reputation probably does him little harm as the 

head of the airborne forces. A little “personality,” as 

has been stated, is expected of someone leading what 

are considered to be the Russian Federation’s shock 

troops: the all-action, no-nonsense, and decisive VDV. 

Elements of the Russian news media—media that 

carry considerable coverage of military issues—have 

played up this image. They tend to stress the efficiency and toughness of the VDV vis-à-vis the rest of the 

military—that of inefficiency, torpor, and general ineptitude. The influential military newspaper, Krasnaya 

Zvezda, is particularly fawning in its constant praise 

of Shamanov. Thus, the paratroopers’ leader is portrayed as the man of action whose merely venial sins 

are seen in an understanding light.
23

But even in his post as VDV commander, controversy still continues to dog Shamanov. In October 2009, he 

ordered a squad of his VDV troops (spetsnaz personnel 

from the 45th Separate Reconnaissance Regiment) to 

be sent to a company owned by his son-in-law—who 

stood accused of murder—in order to impede a police investigation into the crime. Shamanov’s phone 

conversation ordering in the squad was recorded by 

a newspaper. However, despite receiving an official 

reprimand, Shamanov was to keep his job.46 He had 

powerful friends. The partnership remained intact.

CHANGE AND THE WAR WITH GEORGIA

Traditionally, major change in military organizations comes on the heels of wartime experience. Combat provides the stress test that highlights problems 

that normally remain hidden in peacetime. Mere exercises cannot normally bring such problems to light, 

because military exercises tend to have an inbuilt capacity to prove the worth of existing structures and 

standard operating procedures. The most recent stress 

test for the Russian military obviously came in the 

conflict with Georgia in August 2008. It is not our intention here to discuss this war in any great detail, but 

the lessons learned both by the Russian armed forces 

in general and by the VDV in particular are worthy of 

brief note. 

The weaknesses of the military as a whole became 

obvious. Methodologies, as well as tactics, techniques, 

procedures, and equipment, were all revealed in a 

negative light, as is often the way with a military—

such as Russia’s—that had not fought a war against 

a symmetrical opponent for some considerable time. 
24

The issues raised mostly related to the initial readiness to move, command and control procedures, and 

interservice and interarm cooperation. On the whole, 

the VDV troops themselves were seen to have performed well in the conflict. However, this did not prevent the VDV, along with the rest of the military, from 

coming under pressure to conduct significant reforms 

in light of the Georgian experience.

The conflict with Georgia began in South Ossetia. 

South Ossetia is technically a part of Georgia. This 

country had gained its independence in 1991 after the 

break-up of the Soviet Union, and the new government in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, was then faced 

with separatist pressures of its own. The regions of 

Abkhazia on the Black Sea coast, and South Ossetia on 

Georgia’s northern border with Russia, both pushed 

for autonomy. Violence ensued. Both Abkhaz and Ossetes looked to Russia at that time for help in breaking away from Tbilisi’s grip, and Moscow, for various 

reasons of its own, agreed to provide assistance in the 

form of peacekeeping troops. This move tended to 

thwart Georgia’s unification efforts. By 1993, with the 

help of these Russian peacekeepers—who had basically muted both conflicts—Abkhazia and South Ossetia had achieved their de facto autonomy. However, 

both regions still remained part of Georgia in the eyes 

of the international community.

Conflict broke out again on the night of August 

7-8, 2008, when Georgian forces bombarded Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. This was followed 

by a movement into the enclave by Georgian ground 

troops and their seizing of Tskhinvali. Russia was not 

prepared to allow the action to succeed, if for no other 

reason than some of the Russian peacekeeping troops 

had been killed in the initial bombardment and fighting. Moscow claimed that it had to react.
25

Troops from the 58th Army ground forces stationed 

just over the border with Georgia were called into action, as was the VDV. The Russian plan was to launch 

a two-pronged assault against Georgian forces—one 

through South Ossetia and another through Abkhazia 

(which had not been attacked by Georgia). In South 

Ossetia, a number of VDV elements were involved: 

the 104th and 234th regiments of the 76th Division, 

and the 217th Regiment of the 98th Division (although 

none were parachuted into the area). The then head of 

the VDV, Lieutenant-General Valeriy Yevtukhovich, 

commanded the forces in South Ossetia. 

Two battalions of the 76th had taken less than 24 

hours from initial call-out at their base in Pskov to 

deploy 2,000 kilometers (km) and to arrive in Beslan 

in North Ossetia (part of Russia proper). These battalions had then moved into South Ossetia even before elements of the 58th Army’s 42nd and 19th Motor 

Rifle Divisions—based nearby in Chechnya and North 

Ossetia respectively—had done so. Thus, it was these 

VDV battalions (although lacking armor) that were in 

the vanguard of the Russian move against Georgian 

forces. Moreover, spetsnaz troops of the 45th Separate 

Reconnaissance Regiment had moved into position so 

quickly that they were actually involved in the original defense of Tskhinvali against Georgian troops.47

One of the problems created by the very mobility and speed of the VDV units was the fact that they 

tended to lack adequate force protection. Russian 

aircraft could not completely eliminate the air threat 

coming from the Georgians, and the VDV units did 

not have enough organic anti-aircraft assets. The VDV 

had also moved too far ahead of the protection that 

would have been provided by any ground forces’ anti-aircraft shield. Russian aircraft could not be called 
26

in by the VDV to strike ground targets, since there was 

no means of ground-to-air communication. Moreover, 

while VDV troops found themselves in the van of the 

Russian assualt, they were advancing without proper 

reconnaissance capabilities.48

In the Abkhaz sector, some eight VDV battalions 

were deployed there within 5 days of the commencement of hostilities. No entire brigade or division was 

present, so that there were simply battalion groupings 

operating more or less independently of each other.49

Only four battalions from the 7th Air Assault Division 

actually engaged in combat. A battalion tactical group 

from the 31st Separate Airborne Assault Brigade was 

also present, but took no part in the fighting. In Abkhazia, as distinct from the South Ossetian front, there 

were hardly any ground forces troops nearby who 

could assist the VDV. The role of the VDV in this sector was thus completely crucial.50 It was here, in Abkhazia, that Vladimir Shamanov comes to assume a 

prominent role.

The first VDV unit to become involved in combat 

in Abkhazia was a battalion from the 108th Regiment 

of the 7th Division. This had been based at the port of 

Ochamchira as the standby rapid-reaction battalion to 

support the Russian peacekeeping units in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This battalion took up positions on August 8 on the (as yet) quiet border between 

Abkhazia and Georgia. 

Alerts went out elsewhere. At 3:00 p.m. on August 8, another battalion of the 108th Regiment based 

at Novorossiysk on the Black Sea was given orders 

to embark on landing ships that were waiting in the 

port. This battalion left its barracks at 7 p.m., but then 

became stuck in holiday traffic. Problems were then 

encountered in getting the troops aboard the amphibi-
27

ous landing ships. Boarding ships was not something 

these airborne troops had ever trained for or practiced. The ships eventually set sail at 4:30 a.m. the next 

day.51 Another battalion, this from the 247th Regiment 

of the 7th Division (based at Stavropol), was delayed 

as it tried to move south because rail transport was not 

available at the local station on August 9. Deeper in 

European Russia, at Ulyanovsk, the airlift of a battalion from the 31st Separate Air Assault Brigade had to 

wait. Aircraft priority had been given to transporting 

troops to North Ossetia, not to Abkhazia. 

When the conflict with Georgia began, Shamanov 

was still Director of Combat Training. He was now assigned (it is not clear exactly by whom) command of 

the group of airborne forces that were being sent to 

Abkhazia.52 This was a very unusual change of role 

for any senior Russian officer. Shamanov received his 

orders at 1:00 p.m. on August 9 to fly from Moscow 

to Abkhazia. When he arrived later that day, the only 

troops present were the three battalions of the original 

Russian peacekeeping troops; the standby VDV battalion from Ocamchira; and some special forces from 

the 45th Separate Reconnaissance Regiment. A number of the latter had already crossed over into Georgia 

proper and had subsequently called in an air strike— 

using communications available only to spetsnaz forces—that destroyed a Georgian GRAD (BM-21) battery (which had not fired). Other personnel from this 

regiment destroyed Georgian aircraft on the ground 

at Senaki and captured the port of Poti, where patrol 

boats were destroyed.53

Shamanov, on arrival, was faced with several problems, not the least of which was the fact that his own 

and his units’ communications were poor. He could 

not, for instance, get in touch with the landing ships 
28

that were heading across the Black Sea from Novorossiysk with the battalion from the 108th Regiment. 

He established contact eventually after his messages 

were forwarded by naval units. This battalion finally docked at Ochamchira on August 10 at 6:30 a.m., 

and the troops disembarked to join the other battalion from this regiment; that is, the standby unit for 

the peacekeepers. Both battalions were in position by 

noon in an encampment in the Tqvarch’eli district of 

Abkhazia.54

Communication problems were endemic among 

all Russian forces operating in both Abkhazia and 

South Ossetia. This was a result not only of the fact 

that the Georgians could jam Russian radio traffic, 

but also that communications—both within units and 

between echelons—was weak. Russian forces lacked 

not only a network-centric capability (NCC), but also 

sufficient tactical radios at section/squad level.55 This 

overall inability to communicate, and its adverse effects upon functional command-and-control, could 

have had profound consequences. For example, one 

VDV battalion from the 76th Division, out of radio contact and operating independently and without orders, 

had crossed from South Ossetia into Georgia proper 

and was bearing down on the undefended Georgian 

capital, Tbilisi. This had caused the government there 

to flee. If this battalion had reached the city, it could 

have produced major strategic consequences (including possible NATO involvement in the war). Luckily, 

the battalion was stopped when a senior commander 

caught up with it in a jeep and ordered it to halt.56

Other deficiencies were noted by Shamanov. His 

men lacked the night-vision aids that would enable 

them to fight in darkness. There was a shortage of 

sniper rifles and reconnaissance assets—especially 
29

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). There was a dearth 

of target-acquisition equipment and laser designators 

that would have allowed the VDV troops, for instance, 

to accurately guide ordnance from aircraft (which, in 

the main, they could not communicate with anyway). 

The tracked vehicles used by the VDV proved susceptible to landmines. While such vehicles did provide 

for an increased degree of mobility, they were not 

sufficiently armored to provide protection against the 

Georgian tanks and anti-tank weapons. This problem 

with the vehicles, when added to the general shortage 

of anti-aircraft and anti-tank capabilities, meant that 

VDV forces lacked both punch and protection.

However, despite all the glitches and equipment 

failings, what was clearly apparent was the high level 

of professionalism displayed by these VDV troops. 

Their units had responded quickly; they had deployed 

to the theater in good order; they had fought well; and 

they were noticeably better trained than the troops of 

the Russian ground forces they were operating alongside.57

PROPOSED STRUCTURAL CHANGES 

IN THE VDV

In the wake of the war with Georgia, the general 

pace of Russian military reform—which had, prior to 

the conflict, been moving at a glacial pace—increased 

exponentially. With the military’s overall weaknesses exposed by the conflict, the resistance of the conservative generals to reform more or less collapsed. 

The new look that Defense Minister Serdyukov had 

long sought was now finally allowed to take shape. 

With regard to the echelons comprising the military 

hierarchy, the previous command and control ar-
30

rangement, working downward, of Military DistrictArmy-Division-Regiment, now came to be replaced 

by the simpler and less cumbersome Military DistrictOperational Command-Brigade (although the six 

Military Districts were, in turn, to be replaced by just 

four Strategic Commands in October 2010).58 Command and control throughout the Russian military 

should now, theoretically, be more streamlined: there 

are fewer command layers. It is the creation of the brigade, however, that is the most important innovation. 

In the U.S. and British armies, moves had begun back 

in the early 1990s to abandon the division in favor of 

the brigade as the basic independent tactical unit. It 

seemed that the brigade structure was more suited to 

the demands of the post-Cold War interventionary 

tasks that were becoming more prevalent for Western militaries. But in Russia, such a change had been 

resisted by the vested interests on the General Staff.

The war with Georgia, however, had finally forced 

the naysayers to see the light. The brigade—smaller, 

easier to control, and with greater flexibility—was 

the arrangement of choice for the conduct of the fastpaced maneuver warfare that was now de rigueur for 

any competent large army—including that of Russia. 

The lumbering division was seen as a dinosaur. It was 

unwieldy and inflexible, with assets routinely needed 

at the front line being hoarded at the divisional level. 

The brigade, as even the generals of the ground forces 

now realized, was the way forward.59

Thus, the division came to be eliminated from the 

Russian ground forces’ order of battle. Starting in 

late 2008, the 203 ground force divisions were melted 

down to just 83 brigades. Of course, these old divisions were seldom in any sense fully manned and 

ready to conduct operations (most of them being just 
31

cadre formations60). The 83 new brigades, on the other 

hand, are all—perhaps optimistically—slated to have 

full complements and to be in a state of permanent 

readiness. 

In line with this reorganization of the ground forces, the VDV divisions were to be restructured in the 

same way—basically signaling an end to the VDV as a 

separate arm of service. The four VDV divisions were 

also to be reorganized into brigades, with one division, the 106th at Tula, to be disbanded completely by 

December 1, 2009. This airborne division was chosen 

as the one to be cut, since it had the fewest kontraktniki in its ranks.61 Two scenarios were put forward for 

what was supposed to happen with its regiments. In 

the first, they were to be redeployed to the other airborne divisions.62 In the second, they were to be divided up and their units and subunits distributed to the 

Military Districts, where they would form the nucleus 

of new (non-VDV) rapid-reaction helicopter-borne 

air assault brigades. One of these brigades would be 

stationed in each of the (then) six Military Districts. 

In preparation for such scenarios, recruitment for the 

106th was halted in early 2009, and many of its officers 

began to be assigned elsewhere.63

The remaining divisions—the 7th, 76th, and 98th—

were to be reorganized into brigades and distributed 

among the Military Districts.64 The aim was to ensure 

that the quick-reaction capability and fighting potential of the VDV forces would be available all across 

Russia, and not just in the west of the country where 

all the VDV divisions were based. The strategic implications of such a move were quite profound. In 

essence, the VDV would no longer be controlled by 

the politico-military center, and its formations would 

come under the command of the individual Military 
32

Districts. It also, in strategic terms, meant that if Russia’s best combat forces—the VDV—were not to be 

based in the west of the country, then the political and 

military elite must no longer be looking at NATO as a 

potential enemy, but rather more toward China.65

These moves to break up the VDV were, however, 

stymied in May 2009 when Shamanov was appointed 

VDV commander in succession to Yevtukovich. The 

latter had been sacked basically because he was objecting to the breakup of the VDV. But Shamanov also 

objected to the proposed changes. Much of his particular argument lay in the fact that the VDV was already 

ahead of the curve in that many of the requisite structural adjustments demanded of the ground forces had 

already been made in the VDV. Former Commander in 

Chief (CINC) VDV Kolmakov had already introduced 

many of the changes that were only now coming to the 

ground forces in the wake of Georgia. Kolmakov had 

made his airborne battalions more independently selfsustaining by providing them with reconnaissance 

platoons and artillery assets that had previously been 

held at division level. In another move that reflected 

Western military practice, the VDV had, since the First 

Chechen War, been fighting not as regiments, but as 

reinforced battalions.66 (Shamanov himself sees the 

battalion as the optimal tactical unit for the conduct 

of modern warfare.67) Moreover, Shamanov argued 

that the VDV already had only four levels of command—VDV Military Council/division/regiment/

battalion—an arrangement that took orders swiftly 

right down to the tactical level. Thus, he said, there 

was no specific logic to converting the VDV divisions 

into brigades.68

Since he was arguing that the VDV was one step 

ahead of the ground forces in terms of the required 
33

structural changes, Shamanov was able to make a convincing argument to the Ministry of Defense that the 

VDV should remain as it was. But his true leverage 

in halting such changes was not his argument but his 

political patron. The General Staff was hardly likely to 

go against the wishes of someone making such apparently sound arguments, and someone who was also 

a favorite of Putin (although he was by now only the 

prime minister to Medvedev’s president). The proposed radical changes to the VDV were thus cancelled 

just after Shamanov took up his position of CINC 

VDV.69

As an individual, Shamanov had the power to basically bring the proposed restructuring of the VDV to a 

halt: Yevtukovich could not stop the changes, whereas 

Shamanov could. The VDV could keep its divisional/

regimental arrangement, and was not to adopt the brigade system or be split up. Indeed, the process went 

into reverse. In May 2009, orders went out that the 

106th Division was not to be disbanded after all, and 

those of its units, subunits, and officers that had gone 

elsewhere were ordered to return to Tula.70 Moreover, 

Shamanov now had licence to shape the VDV as he 

saw fit. He was given “carte blanche . . . by the country’s military-political leadership for the development 

of the VDV.”71 Given this freedom and incorporating 

the lessons of the conflict with Georgia as he saw them, 

Shamanov streamlined the VDV divisions. Now each 

of the four divisions, whether airborne or air assault, 

was to have the same basic structure: two combat regiments, an artillery regiment, a surface-to-air missile 

(SAM) regiment, a combat engineer battalion, a signal 

battalion, a maintenance battalion, a logistics support 

battalion, and a medical company.72 The presence of a 

SAM regiment (with Strela-10 systems), in place of the 
34

previous SAM battalion, represented a strengthening 

of the divisions in terms of their anti-aircraft capability.73 Another change was that each division would 

now have a reconnaissance battalion instead of just a 

company. This came about when it was realized that 

Russian divisions overall and particularly in the VDV 

(given the fact that its troops would normally represent vanguard elements) did not devote enough capacity to reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering.74

According to Pavel Popovskikh, the former VDV 

Chief of Intelligence, the airborne forces have traditionally underestimated the need to “look over the 

hill.” He points out that in a U.S. Airborne Division, 

some 20-25 percent of its personnel would be devoted 

to reconnaissance (in the form of SIGINT, ELINT, aerial, and tactical). In contrast, when he left the VDV in 

1997, only about 8-9 percent of the divisions’ strength 

was reconnaissance-oriented. This was at a time when 

a VDV division still had its own reconnaissance battalion. When these battalions came to be replaced 

by mere companies, the divisional manpower then 

devoted to reconnaissance came to represent, notes 

Popovskikh, only some 4-5 percent of the total. Such 

a deemphasis of the reconnaissance role was the result, continues Popovskikh, of a general lack of awareness in the VDV at that time of the fluidity of modern 

warfare and of the need to find and mark targets. One 

particular result of this mentality, and a major issue in 

the war with Georgia, was the almost complete lack of 

UAVs—both large and small—within the VDV, and 

also within the Russian military more generally.75

There was still the matter of the Military Districts/

Strategic Commands needing some airborne presence. Although there were now to be no actual VDV 

brigades based within or to be controlled by them, 
35

the idea that the ground forces should have their own 

heliborne air assault brigades still had traction. The 

VDV was now asked by Defense Minister Serdyukov 

to help train the ground forces personnel that were 

due to man these brigades. It was hoped that the VDV 

would inculcate in such trainees something of the 

prized “airborne spirit.”76

Shamanov now envisages a strategic scenario 

whereby, if Russia were to come under attack by a land 

incursion, there would be four layers of land-based 

defense. The first line would be represented by the 

border troops. Then there would be the local Military 

District/Strategic Command’s VDV-trained rapid-reaction air assault brigade. Next on the scene would be 

the real airborne forces, the VDV, who would arrive to 

assist this brigade. The final defense line would consist of the local ground forces’ motor-rifle brigades.77

Though Shamanov fought off a complete restructuring of his arm of service, this is not to say that the 

VDV has been left totally untouched by the postGeorgia reforms. The VDV has lost control of some of 

its support services—medical and personnel—which 

have now been, to use a word that has made its way 

into the Russian language, outsourced.78 However, 

despite these minor setbacks, Shamanov, to all intents 

and purposes, has won. By sheer force of personality (but with obvious political support), it seems he 

has managed to convince the Ministry of Defense, the 

General Staff, and other political figures that their proposed changes, as far as the VDV was concerned, were 

ill-conceived. Moreover, he had not only prevented 

his organization from being cut up and parceled out; 

he had also made it stronger, with more assets, not 

fewer.79
36

POST-GEORGIA CHANGES IN THE VDV

Beyond the actual structural reform that the VDV 

saw in the wake of the conflict with Georgia, other 

changes were also apparent. Some of these changes 

had long been sought and finally came to be pushed 

through because of the catalytic effect generated by 

the war. Other changes came about as a direct result 

of the inefficiencies that the conflict brought to light. 

These changes can be examined under the headings of 

communications, combat vehicles, unmanned aerial 

vehicles, and training regimes.

Communications.

For a military formerly wed to the idea that radios 

could be utilized only by officers, and with the heritage that famously relied on flag-based semaphore to 

pass messages between individual armored vehicles, 

the changes that have occurred since the conflict in 

Georgia in terms of command and control within the 

VDV can be seen as quite profound. In response to the 

communication failures exhibited in Georgia, especially given the strategic consequences that could have 

occurred because of them, something of a revolution 

has taken place. It is now the aim for all individual 

troopers in the VDV to be issued an Aveduk tactical 

radio with a range of some 10km.80

Another issue highlighted for the VDV—and for 

the rest of the Russian armed forces as a whole—was 

the lack of certain network technologies now taken for 

granted in Western militaries. Given that the Russian 

army is short of even basic radios, it is no surprise that 

it also lacks any network-centric capability (NCC). 

The fact that this army has been incapable of linking 
37

all levels of command—from the general at the very 

top down to the corporal on the frontline—was made 

readily apparent in Georgia. The Russian army clearly 

needs to develop its own network-centric (in Russian, 

setetsentricheskiy) capability.

The high-tech systems that make up any NCC cannot be acquired overnight. Russia’s domestic militaryindustrial complex is struggling to produce the necessary systems. The satellite array that has to be part of 

any NCC is not yet up to the mark. The GLONASS

(Global’naya Navigatsionayya Sputnikovaya Sistema) system (the Russian equivalent of the Global Positioning 

System) has been subject to numerous glitches—the 

principal one being the failure of a number of the array’s orbiting satellites. 

Progress is being made, however. New GLONASS

satellites are being launched to replace those that have 

been lost, and new systems are being supplied to the 

military that can help generate an NCC, (although it 

has been estimated that it will be at least 5 years before 

Russian forces have a NCC to match that currently 

available to U.S. forces).81

The VDV has been the initial recipient over the last 

year or so of the requisite technologies to set up an 

NCC. In March 2010, the 76th Division conducted a 

small, tactical-level exercise during which the new Sozvezdiye tactical command-and-control system was first 

utilized. It established links between the GLONASS

system, frontline forces, UAV operators, indigenous 

artillery, and other assets. The next VDV formation 

slated to receive Sozvezdiye is the 7th Air Assault Division.82
38

Combat Vehicles.

The organizational culture of the VDV has always 

favored the use of heavy equipment. Whereas paratroopers in the West have looked to operate with as 

few encumbrances as possible, going in with only 

some light reconnaissance vehicles, the VDV has 

tended to stress survivability in the combat zone, 

rather than portability to the combat zone. This difference comes about because of the inheritance of the 

Soviet military’s Cold War thinking. The psychology 

was that VDV troops should be able to defend themselves for an appreciable period of time after having 

been dropped behind enemy (i.e., NATO) lines before 

being relieved by advancing ground forces. The key 

element thus was survivability. Hence, we see the use 

by the VDV of APCs with a variety of weapon attachments, and of small self-propelled and towed artillery 

pieces. Shamanov supports the survivability concept. 

He has noted that there is a lack of heavy equipment 

in his divisions and wants to correct this. The fact that 

he has already increased the SAM component of his 

divisions is evidence of his thinking.83 There will always be a tension inherent in this philosophy. Such 

vehicles and weapons must be light enough to be both 

air-portable and parachutable while still maintaining 

a modicum of battlefield punch and protection. 

For some 30 years, the BMD (Boyevaya Mashina Desanta84) series of tracked APCs (with aluminum armor) 

has fulfilled the role of VDV troop transport/protection. These vehicles can be air-dropped on pallets. The 

4-12 parachute canopies attached to such pallets are 

assisted by rockets, which act as brakes for the last few 

feet before landing. Occasionally, in exercises in the 

Soviet period, the crews of the BMDs would also be 
39

dropped while inside their vehicles. This was naturally quite a dangerous enterprise. The thinking was that 

the vehicles, once on the ground, needed to become 

immediately operational. Dropping crew and vehicle 

together obviates the time-consuming marriage of 

crews to vehicles (dropped separately, they can end 

up hundreds of meters apart).85

In April 2010, for the first time in 7 years, three 

BMD-2 vehicles were air-dropped with personnel inside them (driver and commander). There is also now 

some discussion of dropping BMDs, not only with 

their driver and commander, but also with their entire 

troop complement (six troopers).86 The latest drop of 

vehicles occurred in March 2011, when 12 were parachuted by elements of the 106th—but without crews.87

No VDV personnel or vehicles were dropped during the war with Georgia. All the airborne men and 

materiel arrived in theater, either by transport aircraft, 

ship, or train. Personnel were then delivered to contact areas in their unit vehicles unaccompanied by any 

ground force tanks. 

Shamanov has expressed disappointment with the 

performance of the VDV’s tracked combat vehicles 

(they are all tracked) during the war. His disappointment extended to the latest variant BMD-4 (armed 

with a 100mm gun and with better armor than the 

BMDs 2 and 3). The BMD-4 had first been introduced 

in 2004, and was slowly coming to replace the older 

vehicles. Shamanov’s reservation concerning any 

BMD variant in Georgia was their immobilization if 

their tracks were damaged—by mines in particular. 

Wheeled APCs, on the other hand, are known to be 

able to sustain a good deal of damage before losing 

overall mobility. The BMD-4 also had a problem with 

its engine, noted even before Georgia, which was 
40

prone to catch fire. (This same engine is also used in 

other Russian APCs: the BTR-90, the BMP-3, and the 

BMD-3.) Shamanov, warning that he would refuse to 

accept any more BMD-4s with its current engine, explained that the BMD-4 in Georgia did “not fully meet 

mobility and safety requirements.”88

The BMD-4 is also suffering from efforts to get the 

right balance between portability and survivability. 

Shamanov has an issue with the excessive weight of 

the BMD-4 (15 tons) and the fact that recent upgrades 

of the older BMD-3s have pushed up their weight (to 

13 tons). This has ripple effects in terms of their portability, amenability to being air-dropped, and overall 

strategic reach of the VDV. The extra weight means 

that the workhorse transport aircraft, the Il-76 (NATO 

name Candid, can carry only two such vehicles and has 

its operating radius reduced (and this in an air force 

that also has a very poor air-to-air refueling capability.) 

APCs are not the only source of weight problems. 

The VDV divisional upgrade from SAM battalions to 

SAM regiments (using SA-10M3s on a BMD-3 hull) 

will naturally add yet more overall weight.89 This 

makes the divisions even less portable.90 Weight has 

also been added in the form of new guns. Artillery of 

some description has always figured in Russian airborne formations, and the 2S9 Nona-S 120mm selfpropelled mortar (on a BMD-3 hull) has been present 

for some time. Since 2006, however, the VDV has begun to augment these with the 2S25 Sprut-D 125mm 

self-propelled artillery/anti-tank gun. This gun is the 

same as the one on the T-72 and T-80 tanks. The SprutD (also based on a BMD-3 hull) is currently used 

by both the 76th and 98th Divisions. It is both amphibious and (technically) air-droppable, but like the 
41

BMD-4 cannot yet be dropped until the necessary 

parachute technology is developed to deal with its 

weight.91 Two Sprut-Ds can be carried by an Il-76. Shamanov has stated that since the Il-76 can carry only 

two such systems (and not three, as he would like), 

then the Sprut-D will not figure in the first wave of 

any airlift of Russian paratroopers.92

There is another problematic aspect of the VDV’s 

vehicles. While they are becoming heavier, they are 

also coming to be outfitted with more sensitive electronics. These do not react well to being air-dropped. 

Such upgrades are happening at a time when Russia 

has lost a good deal of organizational memory of and 

expertise in parachute technology—including those 

related to pallet construction and to the rocket retardants that apply braking. All have been adversely 

affected, as with many other Russian military industries, by the fact that the company that formerly made 

parachutes and associated equipment is now, after 

the breakup of the Soviet Union, no longer in Russia. 

The VDV is currently waiting for domestic parachute 

manufacturers to catch up in producing equipment 

that will allow the newer vehicles to be air-dropped.93

And the VDV will wait. It will not follow Western 

military practice and accept that armored vehicles 

should not be air-dropped. Parachutability appears to 

be something of a “sacred cow” to the organizational 

culture of the VDV.

Much of the problem with the weight of such vehicles as the BMD-4 and the Sprut-D comes from the 

tracks and associated mechanics. Wheeled vehicles, 

of course, represent a lighter option, and an increasingly tempting one—given the fact that they can also 

maintain mobility after mine or Improvised Explosive Device (IED) strikes. Shamanov has said that his 
42

reconnaissance units will soon start to receive, as replacements for the BMDs, the GAZ-2975 Tigr APC (4 x 

4).94 This vehicle was recently accepted into service by 

both the ground forces and the troops of the Interior 

Ministry (the Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del’—MVD).

Shamanov also admires the French VBL (Véhicule Blindé Léger—4 x 4) and VAB (Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé—6 

x 6) family of vehicles and wants to see similar models—or even licence-built VBLs and VABs—produced 

in Russia. The Italian firm IVECO is also producing 

the LMV M65 4 x 4 vehicle for the Russian generalpurpose forces, with some going to the VDV. Licenced 

production of the LMV M65 will soon begin at the facilities of the Russian truck firm, Kamaz.95

Here Shamanov is exhibiting a facet of his philosophy that is not apparent among many Russian generals—a willingness to accept (despite his xenophobic 

streak) that, when it comes to getting the best equipment for his VDV, it may need to come from abroad.96

Such purchases of foreign equipment have caused no 

little controversy in Russia. There has always been a 

supposition that the Soviet Union/Russia was capable 

of producing the world’s best military equipment. But 

this sentiment has been supplanted to a large degree 

by the recent realization that, in order for the Russian 

military to modernize quickly, a shortcut must be taken in sourcing. Russian industry is simply incapable 

of producing domestically at this time the kinds of 

military technologies that the services need. 

While following Western conventions in coming to 

accept wheeled APCs, VDV leaders do agree that they 

can fully commit to wheeled variants. The thinking 

here is that Russia’s army, including its airborne forces, 

may be called upon to operate in areas, particularly in 

the east of the country, where the road system is very 
43

poor. In such circumstances, tracked vehicles would 

provide far greater mobility than wheeled—a factor 

that is not really an issue in Western military thinking. 

In fact, Shamanov’s concern over the issue is such that 

he is contemplating equipping those units designed to 

operate predominantly in the west of Russia (such as 

the 76th) with wheeled vehicles, while those that are 

destined to go east (possibly in a confrontation with 

China) are given tracked vehicles.97

Certainly, the VDV has been well-supplied with 

new vehicles in recent years. During 2009, the airborne forces received more than 700, including 100 

upgraded BMD-2s, 18 Nona-S, and 600 trucks.98

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

The lack of UAVs was significant across the whole 

range of Russian units involved in Georgia. Basic reconnaissance was hampered, as was the ability to observe in order to direct fire for artillery and aircraft. 

The Russians were, in many cases, fighting blind.99

The Georgians did have UAVs, and Russian forces 

found that they had no counter to them. Anti-aircraft 

artillery systems such as the ZSU-23 (effective vertical 

range 1.5km) could not engage Georgian UAVs, like 

the Hermes, because they operated at too great a height 

(above 3,000m). And heat-seeking SAMs, such as the 

SA-18 Igla portable air-defense system (or MANPAD), 

could not bring them down because they were unable 

to lock on to such a small target. Georgia’s UAVs thus 

operated with impunity.100

Great efforts have since been made by the Russian 

military to procure more UAVs. Russian industry, 

however, has been very slow to develop workable systems, despite a good deal of investment being made in 
44

recent years. The dearth of domestic UAVs has forced 

the Russian military once again to look abroad, and a 

number have been bought from Israel. The VDV has 

been at the forefront of the move to adopt such UAVs, 

and VDV troops have now started to train on Israeli 

drones (Bird-Eye 400, I-View MK150, and Searcher Mk 

II). These UAVs are destined for the VDV divisional 

reconnaissance battalions.101

The inability of the VDV to bring down UAVs in 

Georgia also elicited some novel thinking. Shamanov 

has resurrected an idea from the Soviet era of VDV 

forces employing manned hang-gliders. One-man 

versions could act, he believes, in a reconnaissance 

role—operating silently and carrying an individual 

who could see a whole vista, and not just a television screen’s limited image—such as with UAVs.102

Shamanov also wants to see combat motorized 

hang-gliders. These were also first employed by the 

Soviet military and, indeed, were used by Georgian 

forces during the original Abkhazia-Georgia conflict 

in 1992-1993. Shamanov envisages the VDV having 

several hundred of these paraplanes (or microlites), 

with some having both pilot and gunner. The gunner would be present principally as a means to shoot 

down the types of small UAV that proved invulnerable to Russian countermeasures in Georgia.103

Other Equipment.

To make up for other shortfalls, more night-vision 

and laser-designation equipment is being provided 

to the VDV. British and Australian sniper rifles have 

also been procured. Russian industry cannot, it seems, 

machine the barrels of such weapons to a high-enough 

standard.104 And Shamanov, in an apparent desire to 
45

match the Israeli airborne forces’ ability to generate 

40km of controlled horizontal aerial movement from 

the point of any parachutist’s deplaning, has purchased sport parachutes for some of his troops that 

will provide for at least 20-30km of flight.105

Training Regimes.

Apart from training with newly acquired technologies, one specific new regime to emerge since Georgia 

relates to the boarding of naval vessels. The 7th Air Assault Division at Novorossiysk is practicing embarking and disembarking from amphibious landing ships 

three times a year.106 Senior officers from the division 

have also developed closer links with staff from the 

Black Sea Fleet, notably during an exercise called Kavkaz-2009 (Caucasus-2009).107 Interestingly, although 

not directly linked to the Georgia experience, in August 2010 the 98th Division exercised what would be 

expected of any initial intervention mission—i.e., an 

air-drop of a reinforced battalion (800-strong) with 32 

combat vehicles. Moreover, given the recent Russian 

interest in the Arctic region, Shamanov has discussed 

carrying out a drop in the types of polar conditions 

that would be expected in that region.108

As noted, the VDV is also being called on to train 

ground forces troops. This is apparent not only in the 

fact that VDV personnel are currently training those 

destined for the ground forces’ new air assault brigades; it has also resulted in the VDVs’ noncommissioned officer (NCO) training school at Ryazan being 

tasked to produce, not just the VDVs’ own NCOs, 

but those of the ground forces as well. Currently at 

Ryazan, 100 VDV NCOs are being trained alongside 

some 200 from the ground forces.109
46

MANNING IN THE VDV

Unlike the ground forces, which have had the 

number of their officers reduced substantially over the 

past 2 years or so, the VDV has escaped serious cuts. 

Few, if any, VDV officers have found themselves redundant. But the 35,000-strong VDV, despite its high 

profile and popularity, has not escaped entirely. It is 

not immune to the same sort of rank-and-file manning 

problems that currently face the Russian military more 

generally. Such issues are affecting, and will continue 

to affect for some time into the future, the operational 

capabilities of the VDV. 

The original moves, begun by President Yeltsin in 

the mid-1990s, to convert the Russian military in toto

from one based on conscription to one based only on 

professional—i.e., volunteer—service, has officially 

failed. Not enough young men have been recruited. 

The principal hindrances were the poor pay offered 

and the lack of suitable accommodations. While recruitment began quite well in the early stages of the 

program, it tailed off once the realization dawned that 

promises were not being kept. Subsequent rates of recruitment after the first flush of enthusiasm were poor. 

Moreover, once those on contracts understood what 

they had let themselves in for, they lost any desire to 

sign on for a second 3-year contract. The vast majority 

of kontraktniki resigned as soon as they had completed 

their service. And, to cap it all, the government started to withdraw funding from the professionalization 

process. Although arms of service such as the VDV 

were able 3 or 4 years ago to achieve formations almost completely manned by kontraktniki, they have 

now had to go back to relying for a good proportion 
47

of their manpower on conscripts. The original hopeful target that the whole of the VDV would be fully 

manned by professionals by 2011 has turned out to be 

a pipedream.110

A further problem for the VDV, and for the whole 

Russian military as well, was that Putin in search of 

electoral popularity started to reduce the conscript 

term of service incrementally, from 2 years down to 

just 1. The next step would have been for it to disappear completely. Both Yeltsin and Putin had, after all, 

expected that once enough kontraktniki were taken on 

and a fully professional military formed, there would 

no longer be a need for conscripts. So the reduction 

to just 1 year of service was seen merely as a stepping 

stone on the road to conscription’s total abolition. 

Thus, the real-world consequences of having a 1-year 

term were not really considered. Now, however, with 

the process of professionalization having stalled, the 

military is stuck with these 1-year conscripts, the worst 

of both worlds. First, there are not enough kontraktniki

on which to build an efficient, well-trained professional military. What the armed forces do have is lots 

of 1-year conscripts—but these cannot be brought up 

to any real degree of proficiency. For an arm of service 

such as the VDV, with its vaunted swagger, skill, and 

fighting spirit, having so many of these short-service 

conscripts means it faces great difficulty maintaining 

these particular qualities. 

The VDV has now had to accept the principle of 

mixed manning, i.e., kontraktniki and conscripts working alongside each other within units. But here the 

VDV is in a better position than the ground forces. For 

the VDV has come to be favored in that the commissariats, where recruitment takes place, have begun to 

send to the airborne forces a greater proportion of those 
48

men who are still signing on as kontraktniki. Thus, the 

ranks of the VDV still contain a greater proportion of 

kontraktniki than is apparent now in the ground forces. 

The figure currently quoted is that about 30 percent 

of the manpower of the VDV as a whole are on contracts.111 The commander of the 76th Division said in 

December 2010 that some 40 percent of his particular 

unit were kontraktniki.

112

But a fall from 90 percent manning by kontraktniki

in 2007 to just 30 percent now is certainly bound to 

have adversely affected the combat effectiveness of 

the VDV. Indeed, a further problem is raised by legal constraints. Most conscripts are legally proscribed 

from taking part in combat operations on Russian territory (e.g., Chechnya) or abroad.113 This leaves the 

VDV in something of a quandary when preparing for 

missions.

Shamanov does not see mixed manning working in 

his service. He notes that “it is impossible to combine 

the two; we can only go . . . one way or the other.”114

But even Shamanov cannot alter the underlying realities. 

Another problem generated by the 1-year term is 

personnel churning. This comes from the fact that if 

the conscript term is halved, to maintain the size of 

the military double the number of conscripts must be 

called up in the twice-yearly draft. Twice the number 

must then leave their units at the same time. At this 

writing, every 6 months the VDV is losing some 20-

25 percent of its manpower and replacing it with new 

conscripts who have undergone only 3 months’ training. In the spring of 2010, some 9,500 conscripts were 

absorbed by the VDV, while the same number left. It 

was the same in the fall of 2010. So roughly a third 

of the manpower of the VDV is turning over every 6 
49

months. Such churning is bound to create disruption 

and to degrade unit cohesion.115

The problems the VDV is currently suffering are 

reflected in the comment of Colonel Igor Vinogradskiy, the commander of the 76th Division. He has 

talked honestly of issues related to morale and discipline within his division. “We,” he says darkly, “are 

not able to achieve satisfactory internal order in the 

subunits.”116

Much of this internal problem is due to a lack of 

NCOs. With the 1-year term, it is virtually impossible 

to develop satisfactory NCOs from them. They serve 

only for 9 months in a unit and can gain only shallow 

experience in that brief period. Add to this a situation 

in which some, if not indeed many, of the kontraktniki

are actually societal misfits who have escaped unemployment and/or rural backwardness by signing on. 

They do not make good NCO material. So where are 

the NCOs to come from?

The overall situation will be mitigated to a large 

degree by the arrival in 2011 of the first tranche of 

NCOs to graduate from the newly established NCO 

training school at Ryazan. This school was originally 

set up to alleviate one of the major problems with the 

current conscript system—the inability to generate junior commanders. The 3-year course is for those kontraktniki who want to become NCOs. Thus, the VDV 

is currently being denuded of NCO material from its 

kontraktniki ranks, because any of the recent kontraktniki intake who want to become NCOs are actually 

spending 3 years away at Ryazan! Shamanov has said 

that, given the mixed-manning situation and with the 

expected Ryazan-NCO intake, his airborne forces will 

be as good as they can get by 2015—within the limitations forced by mixed manning.117
50

Shamanov has also voiced another positive. Since 

twice the number of young men are now being called 

up compared with a few years ago in order to compensate for the 1-year term, the conscript net has been 

cast wider. This, in turn, means that the VDV is receiving better human material. Even well-educated 

men who had previously been exempt from the draft 

are now being called up. Indeed, some 10 percent of 

the VDV’s spring 2010 draft had received a university 

education. This is a considerable boon, especially as 

it is happening at a time when the VDV is receiving 

more and more technologically sophisticated pieces 

of equipment. Such equipment needs operators with 

skill and intelligence.118

In terms of officers, the VDV has managed to reduce its ratio of officers to other ranks. The 4,500 VDV 

officers make up approximately 10-13 percent of total 

manpower, producing an officer/other-rank ratio of 

about 1:6.119 But 400 of these officers are actually filling in for the absent NCOs. Shamanov says that of the 

14,000 NCO posts in the VDV, only half are currently 

filled.120 Again, this situation should be improved by 

the arrival of the first increment of the Ryazan-trained 

NCOs, though their numbers are limited. Ryazan will 

produce for the VDV only some 100 or so NCOs every 

year.

READINESS OF THE VDV

The actual readiness of any particular unit or 

formation is a topic of continual concern in Russian 

military circles. Since the ground force units took so 

long to become operational in the Georgian conflict, 

response times have now come to be seen as the prime 

criterion in judging unit efficiency. The mantra of per-
51

manent readiness is blithely used to describe the state 

of virtually all Russian army formations, including the 

83 new ground force brigades. To the Russians, this 

means that they can be on their way out of their barracks gates within 1 hour of any call to move. Obviously, such a claim must be viewed with skepticism—

even professional Western militaries already on alert 

status would have trouble moving so quickly. British 

experience, for instance, suggests that any battalion 

designated to be the army’s spearhead unit (and there 

would be only one at any particular time) would be 

expected to move out of its barracks within 24 hours, 

certainly not in 1. The idea that an entire army can be 

on the move within an hour of being ordered to do so 

is basically ridiculous. 

The VDV seems to have a better appreciation of 

the difficulties involved when it comes to readiness 

issues. This is a result of the fact that these units are 

more likely to be called into immediate action than 

are units of the ground forces. The VDV’s Military 

Council has decreed that in each division, and in the 

31st Separate Airborne Brigade, either one parachute 

or one air-assault battalion should be a first-to-engage 

battalion (batalyon pervoocherednogo primeneniya). 

These are on very short notice to move. Shamanov 

has himself stated that these battalions should have 

the best available equipment; have the division or 

brigade’s most experienced personnel; and should be 

at least 70 percent manned by kontraktniki.

121 Beyond 

these five battalions, Shamanov has also made clear 

that a further four battalions will be at permanent 

readiness. His definition of this term is more readily 

credible—given that such units would have at least 12 

hours to assemble.122
52

The quid pro quo for this arrangement is that the 

other VDV battalions will have poorer equipment; 

will carry a greater proportion of conscripts; and will 

undoubtedly have weaker training regimes. They 

will, moreover, naturally suffer a decline in morale, 

generated by the fact that they are being designated 

in effect as second-class units. Thus, there will be a 

qualitative difference evident between the various 

battalions within any VDV division. 

AIRCRAFT FOR THE VDV

There have been some recent changes in terms of 

the availability of aircraft for the VDV. Such changes 

are not specifically linked to the conflict in Georgia, 

but they are nevertheless noteworthy. 

The transport aircraft that delivers the VDV to operational zones where paratroopers make their jumps 

is normally the Il-76, an air force asset. These aircraft 

are made available for major training exercises and 

operations. From the reaction times in transporting 

VDV troops to the Georgian theater in 2008, there 

seems to be little difficulty in the air force accommodating the VDV—in reaction times, if not in actual lift 

capacity. Currently, the air force has the capability of 

lifting only one VDV regiment (plus equipment) at a 

time (the air-dropping of a VDV company and its six 

BMD APCs requires six Il-76s).123

The airborne forces also make use of other aircraft, 

both fixed-wing and rotary. In the last year or so, the 

use of these aircraft by the VDV has become a matter 

of some debate. 
53

Fixed-Wing.

While Shamanov has accomplished much in terms 

of preserving and expanding the VDV, he has not always managed to get his own way. Despite his having powerful civilian backers, the Ministry of Defense 

and the General Staff are on occasion able to thwart 

his wishes. This is certainly the case with the training 

aircraft used by the VDV.

VDV personnel use the Il-76 to conduct parachute 

training during major exercises. Some 35,000 jumps 

were made from such aircraft during 2009. However, 

for less high-profile training, the VDV normally used 

the venerable An-2 and An-3 (both bi-planes and both 

designated Colt by NATO). In 2009, 154,000 jumps 

were made from such machines. Unlike the Il-76s, 

which have always been air force assets, these An-2s 

and An-3s were, until very recently, subordinated to 

the VDV command. They were thus constantly available for training purposes. If bad weather meant that 

on any particular day these aircraft could not fly, they 

would always be available the next day. However, in 

late 2009, in an efficiency drive that Shamanov had 

tried to prevent, the seven squadrons of An-2s and 

An-3s and three airfields were handed over to the 

command of the air force. This move has naturally had 

a deleterious effect on the VDV’s training regimes. For 

while the aircraft could still be booked for any particular day, any cancellations due to inclement weather 

now mean that they have to be re-booked for some 

other time when the air force can again make them 

available. There is no flexibility in this new system.124

Shamanov is currently seeking to bring these air assets back under the control of the VDV, or at least of 

the ground forces.125
54

There seems to be some sympathy for the VDV’s 

position. While it remains unclear whether he can regain control of the training aircraft, Shamanov says 

that CGS Makarov has given the nod to the formation of a transport aviation brigade that would be 

subordinated to the 31st Separate Airborne Brigade 

at Ulyanovsk. This would mean that this formation, 

the lightest in the VDV and thus the one most easily 

transported by air, will have immediate lift always on 

hand.126

There are also other positive noises, in VDV terms, 

being made. Under the current “new look” program 

for overall military modernization, there is a plan for 

the period 2011-2020 to make available to the VDV 

newly upgraded Il-76s; a number of the massive An124 Ruslans (NATO, Condor); and 30-40 of the new An70s (currently only at the prototype stage).127 Such are 

the promises being made. But as Shamanov ruefully 

comments, “This is planned; whether or not it happens is not for me to decide.”128

Rotary-Wing.

In 1990, all Russian military helicopters were 

transferred from air force control to that of the ground 

forces.129 This seemed logical at the time. However, in 

2003, an Mi-26 transport helicopter was shot down in 

Chechnya (killing 121). As punishment, perhaps, all 

helicopters (some 2,000, along with 10 bases) were 

transferred from the ground forces back to the air 

force. This handover has affected the VDV. Much of 

the logic of redesignating the 7th and 76th Divisions 

as “air assault” in 2006 was that they were to be provided with helicopters by the ground forces for the 

assaults. The machines used would be Mi-8s (NATO, 
55

Hip) for transport, and the attack element would come 

from either Ka-52 Alligators (NATO, Hokum) or Mi28N Night Hunters (NATO, Havoc). But no such helicopters have yet been made available by the air force, 

and certainly none were transferred by the air force 

to the VDV. Much of the issue here relates to the fact 

that, since moving to the air force with its fast-jet culture, the helicopter fleet has come to be neglected. The 

air force command seems not to know what to do with 

it, and the fleet is not efficiently run. If Shamanov can 

get his way—which it seems might just happen—then 

the VDV will come to have much more control over 

at least a portion of the helicopter fleet. This should 

lead to a marked increase in the fighting potential of 

the 7th and 76th Divisions (although they would be 

minus their heavy equipment in any major heliborne 

lift).130

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The Russian army has been subject to some quite 

radical changes in recent years, especially since the 

war with Georgia in 2008. The ground forces have had 

difficulty coping with the nature and degree of change 

that they have been asked to undergo. And while the 

VDV has likewise undergone changes, these have been 

limited and sometimes even positive, in terms of actually increasing the assets available to it. In essence, the 

VDV has not been reduced in size and has retained its 

basic structure. This strictly limited degree of change 

appears to be principally due to the influence of one 

individual, Vladimir Shamanov, whose role has been 

seminal. Indeed, his influence on the process of change 

in a major military organization seems to have been 

one of the most pronounced by any individual officer 
56

in any country during the last century, and certainly 

in Russia.

Moreover, it is not out of the question that Shamanov may become the next CGS—succeeding Makarov—particularly if Putin becomes president once 

more.131 The latter may want one of his favorite generals in charge of his military. This means that Shamanov would basically be relying for support on Putin and public opinion. In opposition would be senior 

officers in the Defense Ministry, the General Staff, and 

the ground forces. Shamanov’s position would be 

such that he could not actively oppose any changes 

that Putin might want to see. He would be in thrall to 

him, especially given the fact that Shamanov’s checkered past provides all kinds of convenient excuses for 

him to be removed by Putin. 

Shamanov has been weakened by recent events. 

His use of airborne troops to interfere with the criminal investigation into his son-in-law’s behavior damaged him. He has also been physically weakened by 

a car crash in September 2010 that left him hospitalized for several months (his driver died). Several of 

his opponents in the military are now pointing to his 

infirmity as a reason to force him into retirement. Shamanov’s departure would weaken the VDV and make 

it more vulnerable to a takeover. At the moment, both 

the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff do not 

hold the VDV in high regard—both ignored the August 2010 celebrations to mark the 80th anniversary 

of the founding of the airborne forces. There are also 

suggestions that CGS Makarov may take over from 

Serdyukov as Defense Minister. If he does, the VDV 

may very well be absorbed into the ground forces, and 

thus undoubtedly be degraded as a fighting force.132
57

But as of this writing, the Putin-Shamanov bond 

still seems strong. The Russian leader visited Shamanov in the hospital on the day of his car crash.133

If Shamanov is appointed to the top military job in 

Russia, this may set alarm bells ringing in the West. 

His aggressive nature, his approach to the conduct of 

warfare, his history of moral and ethical lapses, and 

his xenophobic streak are not welcome qualities in a 

Russian CGS, as viewed from a Western perspective. 

There are a number of more general conclusions 

that can be drawn from this analysis of change in the 

VDV: 

• The VDV forces are the best-trained, most proficient, and most aggressive combat troops of 

any large formations in the Russian military.

• VDV formations/units have quick-reaction 

times when called upon to conduct operations.

• The VDV will gain more combat power in absolute terms (with increases in firepower) over the 

next few years, but it will also become slightly 

less mobile overall because of increased weight.

• As the VDV starts to receive NCOs from the 

Ryazan training school (from 2011 onward), 

the quality of the VDV units will increase (but 

these NCOs will be few in number).

• The VDV should soon be in receipt of a helicopter force, which will increase its fighting potential.

There are certain capabilities of the VDV troops 

that need to be highlighted and considered:

• The VDV will shortly have an NCC capability, 

which should qualitatively increase the divisions’ operational effectiveness.
58

• VDV forces will be the first to arrive—in any 

numbers—in any intervention operation beyond Russia’s borders. The first troops to arrive will probably be those of the GRU spetsnaz

or from the VDV’s own 45th Separate Reconnaissance Regiment (which will be under GRU 

control). But both will be present only in small 

numbers and without armor.

• The first wave of VDV troops to arrive in operational zones from any of the four divisions, 

or from the 31st Separate Air Assault Brigade, 

will be qualitatively better than any follow-on 

battalions from these same divisions or the brigade. This falloff in quality applies to all the 

VDV divisions—whether inserted by parachute 

or conventionally by airlift.

• The “first-to-engage” battalions will be a match 

for Western forces; the follow-on battalions will 

more than likely not be.

• If a conventional airlift of VDV forces is conducted into an operational zone and no vehicles 

arrive with the troops, those troops will more 

than likely be from the 31st Separate Airborne 

Brigade.

• If a parachute drop in any numbers is made in 

an intervention operation, it will probably be 

by troops from the 98th or 106th Airborne Divisions.

• VDV troops will normally be expected to arrive 

with their armored vehicles—either by conventional airlift or by being air-dropped. These 

troops would then have more firepower and 

protection than any Western airborne forces 

operating in the same locale.
59

• If VDV vehicles are dropped on pallets, they 

may, if their crews are inside, be ready to fight 

immediately.

• More wheeled vehicles will soon begin to appear in the inventories of the VDV divisions.

• VDV troops will soon be in receipt of better 

equipment at the tactical level, which will qualitatively increase their fighting potential (British sniper rifles, for instance).

In terms of policy implications with regard to Russia’s VDV, U.S. military planners should be aware of 

several. Russia under Putin is a country that wants to 

take its place in the forefront of world affairs. Such a 

desire will inevitably result in occasional Russian military interventions abroad. These will likely involve 

the VDV. The professionalism of these troops will give 

any Russian leader the capacity and confidence to send 

troops abroad to protect Russian interests. These forces require little preparation time before deployment, 

especially when they “‘go in light,”i.e.,without their 

heavy equipment. Intelligence assets may find it difficult to pick up signs that they are about to move prior 

to any deployment. Once dispatched, VDV troops can 

very quickly become operational on the ground. They 

will exhibit efficiency and esprit de corps. They may 

be aggressive, but this will be tempered by their discipline; they are not loose cannons. VDV forces may 

also operate with their heavy equipment. This will 

involve more preparation time and a greater logistics 

footprint, thus providing Western intelligence with 

more warning. However, if the VDV troops do “go 

in heavy,” they will likely be more than a match for 

any Western forces that find themselves in the same 

operational zones. While such VDV troops will lack 
60

for air cover, they will have quite sophisticated air defense assets.

This having been said, a good proportion of the 

VDV troops will be short-service conscripts. They will 

not be highly skilled. It remains to be seen what effect 

the longer-service members of the VDV can have on 

the ability of these conscripts. It must not be forgotten 

that the quality of the VDV forces will drop in any 

situation in which they require reinforcement. Followon units will be less able.

 Russian VDV troops may very well be sent abroad 

in the not-too-distant future, perhaps employed if 

the Arab Spring continues to spread. This movement 

threatens Russian interests in the Middle East. Moscow has already lost out to the West in Libya, and will 

want to cut its losses. It is very likely to want to prevent the same happening in Syria. That may be the 

next role for the VDV.

ENDNOTES

1. General Wesley Clark, Waging Modern Warfare, Oxford, UK: 

Public Affairs, 2001, p. 398.

2. Literally, “Air Landing Forces.”

3. Aleksandr Stepanov, “They Ended Up in a Bad Way! Defense Ministry Begins Elimination of Airborne Troops,” Nasha 

Versiya, October 31, 2010, p. 3.

4. Mikhail Lukin, “All the Airborne Troops,” KommersantVlast, August 2, 2010, p. 6.

5. In Russian, the term armiya means all the armed services, 

not just the army. So the VDV is part of the armiya, but is not part 

of the ground forces. 
61

6. Being in such a position, the VDV has its own coordinating 

staff in the shape of its Military Council (although the VDV can 

still be directed by the General Staff). Interview with LieutenantGeneral Vladimir Shamanov, Boss Magazine, July 15, 2010, quoted 

in BBC Monitoring World Media Monitor, BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol 

160710 nn/osc.

7. Stepanov.

8. Lukin.

9. In 1988, the Soviet military had a personnel strength of 

roughly 5,100,000. By 1997, this was down to 1,700,000.

10. Nikolai Pavlovskiy, “Goodbye, Soviet Army,” Boss Magazine, February 15, 2010, quoted in BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol 010310 

emergency/osc.

11. Sergey Ishchenko, “Russia: Formation of New Strategic 

Command Seen as Secondary to Bigger Problems,” December 8, 

2010, Svobodnaya Pressa website, available from BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol 111210 nn/osc.

12. Literally, “Committee for State Security.”

13. The Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), or Federal Security Service, is the principal successor organization to the old 

KGB.

14. Pavlovskiy.

15. Translated as “Main Intelligence Directorate.” In recent 

military reforms, all spetsnaz units were removed from GRU 

control to that of the ground forces. Therefore, they were operationally subordinate to the headquarters of whichever Military 

District they were based in. Soon, though, spetsnaz units, including the VDV’s 45th Separate Reconnaissance Regiment, will be 

returned to GRU control. “Under Whom is the Spetsnaz to Operate?” March 23, 2011, Argumenti Nedeli website, available from 

BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol 250311 nn/osc.
62

16. Vladimir Mukhin, “The Reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Cannot Master New Methods of Fighting Fully,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 24, 2010, p. 6.

17. Lukin.

18. Sergey Volkov, “Through Trial and Error: Analysis of 

Experience in Creating the Modern Russian Army,” VozdushnoKosmicheskaya Oboron, March 16, 2010, available from BBC Mon 

FS1 FsuPol 270410 nn/osc.

19. See Rod Thornton, “Military Organizations and Change: 

The ‘Professionalization’ of the 76th Airborne Division,” Journal of 

Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 17, No.3, 2004, pp. 449-474.

20. Lukin.

21. Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: 

Lessons from Peripheral Wars, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 

1994; Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military 

Doctrine Between the Wars, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1997; Kimberley Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization 

Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991, Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1993; Jeffrey Legro, Cooperation Under 

Fire, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995; Stephen Rosen, 

Societies and Military Power, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 

1996; Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and 

Germany between the World Wars, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 

Press, 1984.

22. Posen, pp. 208-213.

23. Stepanov.

24. Nikolai Poroskov, “Irreconcilable Differences,” Vremya Novostey, May 7, 2009, available from www.vremya.

ru/2009/78/4/228672.html.

25. Roger McDermott, “General Shamanov Appointed as 

Commander of the Russian Airborne Forces,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 105, June 2, 2009.
63

26. “They Are Creating A Heaven-Sent Commander for Reform,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, July 31, 2009, p. 5.

27. By the military correspondent, Aleksandr Sladkov, in the 

“Military Programme,” Rossiya 1 TV, April 24, 2010, available 

from BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol va.

28. Vladimir Voronov, “Politics: Shamanov’s Day,” Profil, 

June 8, 2009, available from BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol sv/ocs. 

29. Mikhail Lukanin, “They Have Given all of the Airborne 

Troops to General Shamanov,” Trud, May 26, 2009, p. 4.

30. Aleksandr Chuikov, “Shaman Has Gone to the VDV,” Argumenty Nedeli, May 28, 2009, available from www.argumenti.ru/

politics/ni85/40422/.

31. Lukanin.

32. Voronov. 

33. He was a general in the Interior Ministry forces.

34. According to General Gennadiy Troshev, who was present; Voronov.

35. Russian News Room, “Governor of Ulyanovsk Region Has 

Signed a Request on Pardoning Yuriy Budanov,” May 26, 2009, 

available from news.russiannewsroom.com/details.aspx?item=1708.

36. Human Rights Watch, “Russia: Investigate General Who 

Got Promotion,” May 28, 2009, available from www. hrw.org/en/

news/2009/05/27/russia-investigate-general-who-got-promotion.

37. Maura Reynolds, “Russia’s ‘Cruel’ Soldier Comes Home,” 

Los Angeles Times, January 19, 2001, p. 6.

38. Voronov.

39. Ibid.

40. Interview with Shamanov, Boss Magazine.
64

41. Chuikov. 

42. Voronov. 

43. Technically, he was Chief of the Russian Federation Armed 

Forces Main Combat Training and Troop Service Directorate.

44. Dale Herspring and Roger McDermott, “Serdyukov Promotes Systemic Russian Military Reform,” Orbis, Vol. 54, No. 2, 

2010, pp. 284-301.

45. Voronov.

46. RIA Novosti, “Russian Prosecutor Finds No Criminal 

Grounds to Probe Airborne Troops Commander,” October 9, 

2010, available from BBC Mon FS1 MCU 091009 hb/mk.

47. Lukin.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Statement by Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov to 

RIA Novosti News Agency, May 25, 2010, quoted in “Commander Says Russian Airborne Troops to Remain Separate Combat 

Arm,” available from BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol sv.

52. Konstantin Rashchepkin and Andrei Lunev, “Interview 

with Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov,” Krasnaya Zvezda, 

August 1, 2009, p. 3.

53. Vadim Udmantsev, “What Intelligence Means to the Russian Forces,” Moscow Segodnya.ru, April 30, 2009, available from 

BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol sv/osc.

54. Konstantin Rashchepkin, “In the Abkhazia Direction,” 

Krasnaya Zvezda, August 8, 2009, p. 4.
65

55. Report by Interfax-AVN military news agency website, 

July 29, 2009, available from BBC Mon FS1 Fsu/Pol gv.

56. Udmantsev. 

57. Stepanov. 

58. The six Military Districts were Moscow, Leningrad, North 

Caucasus, Urals, Siberian, and Far Eastern. The Strategic Commands are West, East, South, and Central. These new commands, 

though, are still being referred to as Military Districts. 

59. Pavlovkiy.

60. Russian divisions, as per the Soviet model, were mostly 

mere shells during peacetime. That is, they had a cadre of officers 

and warrant officers who, along with just a few soldiers, maintained empty bases with their stored equipment. Such cadre divisions would be filled out only in times of tension after recalled 

reservists had been mobilized.

61. Chuikov. 

62. Rashchepkin and Lunev.

63. Victor Baranets, “The Airborne Troops Have Been Hit by 

Reform: The Airborne Troops Tula Division May be Disbanded,” 

Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 25, 2008, p. 4.

64. The other existing VDV formation was already a brigade: 

the 31st Separate Airborne Brigade (at Ulyanovsk).

65. Ptichkin. 

66. Rashchepkin and Lunev.

67. Ibid.

68. Nikolai Poroskov, “Landing in Defense Minister’s Rear,” 

Vremya Novostey, May 28, 2009, available from www.vremya.

ru/2009/91/4/230067.html.
66

69. Stepanov.

70. Viktor Baranets, “VDV Commander Lieutenant-General 

Vladimir Shamanov: I Never Asked for Assignments for Myself,” 

Komsomolskaya Pravda, June 1, 2009, p. 2. 

71. “They Are Creating A Heaven-Sent Commander for Reform.”

72. Lukin.

73. Viktor Litovkin, “Unified State Exam in the Serdyukov 

Manner,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, June 26, 2009, p. 7.

74. “They Are Creating A Heaven-Sent Commander for Reform.”

75. Udmantsev. 

76. Baranets, “VDV Commander Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov.”

77. Interview with Shamanov on Ekho Moskvy radio, July 31, 

2010, available from BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol ibg.

78. Shamanov to RIA Novosti.

79. Ibid.

80. “Airborne units received more than 700 units of military 

hardware in 2009,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, January 

15-21, 2010, p. 9. While a welcome stride forward for the VDV, the 

Aveduk is not the lightest of radios, and Shamanov, while welcoming its introduction, prefers new equipment to be as light as possible. He wants the total weight carried by his men in advances to 

contact to be no more than 25-30 kilograms (55-66 pounds), such 

as “on 5-6 km accelerated marches in difficult conditions.” Shamanov, quoted in report by Interfax-AVN military news agency 

website, July 29, 2009, available from BBC Mon FS1 Fsu/Pol gv.

81. RIA Nosvosti, “Russian Rokot Carrier Rocket Orbits Three 

Satellites,” September 8, 2010, available from www.en.rian.ru/science/20100908/160511442.html.
67

82. Mukhin.

83. Interview with Shamanov on Rossiya 24 News Channel, 

August 1, 2010, quoted in BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol sv.

84. Literally, “combat vehicle of the airborne.”

85. The VDV vehicles and equipment that are slated to be 

air-dropped are fitted with homing beacons so that their crews, 

dropped separately, can “marry up” with them.

86. Gennadiy Nechayev, “A Technical Leap,” Vzglyad, June 9, 

2010, available from BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol (ydy)/osc. 

87. Six BMD-2s, three 2S9 Nona artillery pieces, a GAZ-66 

truck, and a refueling vehicle. Viktor Khudoleyev, “Russia’s 

Army: 21st Century,” Krasnaya Zvezda, March 18, 2011, p. 5.

88. Nechayev. The VDV currently has an experimental batch 

of 10 BMD-4s, one each in 10 separate battalions. “Prospects for 

Rearmament and Reform of the VDV,” Voyennoye Obozreniye

website, February 14, 2011, available from BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol 

10211 em/osc.

89. The SA-10M3s began to be delivered in December 2010. 

They are replacing the ZSU-23s. “Prospects for Rearmament and 

Reform of the VDV.”

90. Interfax-AVN Military News Agency, July 26, 2010, available from BBC FS1FsuPol iu.

91. RIA Novosti, “Russian Paratroopers to Get New Weaponry—Commander,” July 29, 2009, available from en.rian.ru/military_news/20090729/155665326.html.

92. Rashchepkin, “About the Quick Reaction Forces.”

93. Ibid.

94. RIA Novosti, “Russian paratroopers to get new weaponry.”
68

95. Ibid.

96. Nechayev. 

97. Konstantin Rashchepkin, “The Winged Infantry’s New 

Appearance,” Krasnaya Zvezda, April 21, 2010, p. 9.

98. “Airborne units received more than 700 units of military 

hardware in 2009.”

99. See Carolina Vendil Pallin and Fredrik Westerlund, “Russia’s War in Georgia: Lessons and Consequences,” Small Wars and 

Insurgencies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2009. 

100. Denis Telmanov, “Georgian Drones Forced Russian Airborne Troops to Change to Hang Gliders,” Gazeta.ru, May 27, 

2010, available from BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol 010610 nn/osc.

101. Shamanov to RIA Novosti.

102. Rashchepkin, “The Winged Infantry’s New Appearance.”

103. Telmanov.

104. Aleksandr Golts, “Russian Military-Industrial Complex 

Needs Major Restructuring, Reform,” website of Yezhednevnyy 

Zhurnal, August 31, 2009. p. 3.

105. Shamanov to RIA Novosti.

106. Ibid.

107. “They Are Creating A Heaven-Sent Commander for Reform.”

108. Interfax-AVN Military News Agency, July 26, 2010, available from BBC Mon FS1FsuPol iu.

109. Baranets, “VDV Commander Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov.”
69

110. Aleksandr Golts, “Not A Step Forward,” Vremya Novostey, August 31, 2009, available from BBC Mon FS1 Fsu/Political 

020909.

111. Untitled, Interfax-AVN Military News Agency, November 6, 2010, available from BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol va.

112. Colonel Igor Vinogradskiy, available from Ekho Moskvy

radio, December 11, 2011, available from BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol ibg.

113. Conscripts who have served for more than 6 months or 

who are graduates can serve in operations. Untitled, InterfaxAVN Military News Agency, November 6, 2010.

114. Interview with Shamanov, Boss Magazine. 

115. Ptichkin. 

116. Igor Smorodin, “What is Making the Division Commanders Unhappy?” Pskovskaya Pravda, November 26, 2009, available 

from BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol 081209 em/osc.

117. Ptichkin. 

118. Interview with Shamanov on Rossiya 24.

119. Vinogradskiy, available from Ekho Moskvy radio.

120. The Russian word serzhant tends to mean a range of NCO 

positions, not just sergeant per se.

121. Shamanov to RIA Novosti.

122. Dimitriy Litovkin, “The Blue Berets Will Be Reinforced 

by Drones,” Izvestiya, July 29, 2009, p. 8.

123. Shamanov to RIA Novosti.

124. Vadim Solovyev, “Airborne Troops’ Hands are Tied,” 

Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, January 22, 2010, p. 3.
70

125. Ptichkin. 

126. Interview with Shamanov, Boss Magazine. 

127. The An-124 is akin to the C-5, but larger. The An-70 is 

analogous to the European A400M. There is nothing on the horizon that can replace the workhorse An-2/An-3s. Spare parts for 

this fleet are running out, and even some of the operational fluids 

used in such aircraft are no longer manufactured. 

128. Shamanov to RIA Novosti.

129. Volkov. 

130. Mukhin.

131. Voronov. 

132. Ivan Konev, “Minister Jumps Without a Parachute,” Argumenty Nedeli, October 20, 2010, available from BBC Mon FS1 

FsuPol 211010 mk/osc.

133. Stepanov.
71

APPENDIX

FORMATIONS AND UNITS

IN THE RUSSIAN AIRBORNE FORCES

There are 34-35,000 personnel in the VDV (4,000 officers). Each division has a strength of roughly 5,000. 

VDV HQ (MOSCOW)

Commander in Chief Gen-Colonel Vladimir 

 Shamanov.

Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Nikolay Ignatov

7TH GUARDS AIR ASSAULT (MOUNTAIN) 

DIVISION

Based at Novorossiysk (on Black Sea), commanded by 

Colonel Aleksandr Vyaznikov 

Regiments.

108th Air Assault Regiment (Novorossiysk)

247th Air Assault Regiment (Stavropol)

1141st Artillery Regiment (Anapa)

Support Units.

3rd SAM Regiment (Novorossiysk)

629th Engineer Battalion (Starotitarovskaya stanitsa)

743rd Signal Battalion (Novorossiysk)

6th Maintenance Battalion (Novorossiysk)

1681st Logistic Support Battalion (Anapa)

76TH AIR ASSAULT DIVISION

Based at Pskov (Northwest Russia). Commanded by 

Colonel Igor Vinogradskiy 
72

Regiments.

104th Air Assault Regiment (Pskov)

234th Air Assault Regiment (Pskov)

1140th Artillery Regiment (Pskov)

Support Units.

4th SAM Regiment (Pskov)

656th Engineer Battalion (Pskov)

728th Signal Battalion (Pskov)

7th Maintenance Battalion (Pskov)

1682nd Logistic Support Battalion (Pskov)

98TH AIRBORNE DIVISION

Based at Ivanovo (300kms northeast of Moscow). 

Commanded by Colonel Aleksey Ragozin.

Regiments.

217th Airborne Regiment (Ivanovo)

331st Airborne Regiment (Kostroma) 

1065th Artillery Regiment (Kostroma)

Support Units.

5th SAM Regiment (Balino)

661st Engineer Battalion (Ivanovo)

674th Signal Battalion (Ivanovo)

15th Maintenance Battalion (Ivanovo)

1683rd Logistic Support Battalion (Ivanovo)

106TH AIRBORNE DIVISION

Based at Tula (200kms south of Moscow). Commanded by Colonel Vladimir Kochetkov.

By the end of 2011, the current bases of the units of 

the 106th will close, and they will all be then accommodated at one facility in Tula.
73

Regiments. 

51st Airborne Regiment (Tula)

137th Airborne Regiment (Ryazan)

1182nd Artillery Regiment (Naro-Fominsk)

Support Units.

1st SAM Regiment (Naro-Fominsk)

388th Engineer Battalion (Tula)

731st Signal Battalion (Tula)

43rd Maintenance Battalion (Tula)

1060th Logistic Support Battalion (Slobodka)

31ST SEPARATE AIR ASSAULT BRIGADE

Based at Ulyanovsk (South-West Russia). Commanded by Colonel Dmitry Glushenkov.

Units.

54th Air Assault Battalion (Ulyanovsk)

91st Air Assault Battalion (Ulyanovsk)

116th Air Assault Battalion (Ulyanovsk)

45TH SEPARATE RECONNAISSANCE 

REGIMENT

Based at Kubinka (near Moscow). Acting commander, 

Lieutenant Colonel Vadim Gridnev.

Source: Mikhail Lukin, “All the Airborne Troops,” 

Kommersant-Vlast, August 2, 2010.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. Rod Thornton

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil