United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 00-1722

DAVID WILSON,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

DONALD SHUMWAY

in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New Hampshire

Department of Health and Human Services,

PAUL GORMAN

in his official capacity as Director of the Division of

Behavioral Health Services,

CHESTER BATCHELDER

in his official capacity as Superintendent of the 

New Hampshire Hospital,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Boudin, Chief Judge,

Torruella, Circuit Judge,

and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge.

Pamela Jermyn-Kaley, with whom Ronald K. Lospennato, were on

brief, for appellant.

Daniel J. Mullen, with whom Philip T. McLaughlin, Attorney General

and Andrew B. Livernois, Assistant Attorney General, were on brief,

for appellees.
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September 10, 2001
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Appellant David Wilson sued

various officials in charge of New Hampshire's mental health system

alleging constitutional and statutory violations relating to the

authority of his court-appointed guardian to approve the administration

of anti-psychotic drugs without Wilson's consent. On a motion for

summary judgment, the district court dismissed the suit for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We

affirm.

BACKGROUND

David Wilson suffers from mental illness which has been

diagnosed as, among other things, paranoid schizophrenia. On

February 6, 1997, following an incident in which Wilson apparently

threatened a neighbor with a loaded gun, the Merrimack County Probate

Court of New Hampshire ordered Wilson to be involuntarily confined to

New Hampshire Hospital for up to three years. While under such

confinement, the State petitioned the Belknap County Probate Court to

appoint a guardian for Wilson, due primarily to Wilson's refusal to

take the anti-psychotic medication Haldol as recommended by his

psychiatrists. Among the responsibilities sought to be assumed by the

guardian were decisions relating to Wilson's living arrangements and

medical treatment options. The probate court granted this request on

May 19, 1997. In re Guardianship of David Wilson, No. 1997-0171

(order) [hereinafter Guardianship I].
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On March 20, 1997, Wilson filed a pro se complaint in the

federal court in New Hampshire seeking injunctive relief and monetary

damages. The crux of his charge was that the forced administration of

anti-psychotic medication violated his constitutional rights. The

magistrate judge assigned to review Wilson's complaint dismissed most

of the claims except for those alleged under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

On November 10, 1997, Wilson was conditionally discharged

from New Hampshire Hospital. This discharge has since been revoked

several times due to refusal of medication, depression, and suicidal

ideation, resulting in admissions to either New Hampshire Hospital or

Cypress Center. Because of Wilson's continued refusal to take antipsychotic medication, his guardian has approved the forced

administration of Haldol to Wilson.

On December 23, 1997, Wilson filed a Petition to Terminate

Guardianship in Belknap County Probate Court pursuant to N.H. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 464-A:39 II. Concurrently, he filed an Assented to Motion

to Stay Proceedings in the federal district court pending a

determination on the motion to terminate the guardianship. On June 8,

1998, the probate court denied Wilson's Petition to Terminate

Guardianship, finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that:

(a) David Wilson continues to be incapacitated.

(b) Guardianship is necessary as a means of

providing for the ward's continuing care,
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supervision and rehabilitation. (c) There are no

available alternative resources which are

suitable with respect to the ward's welfare,

safety and rehabilitation. (d) Guardianship is

appropriate as the least restrictive form of

intervention consistent with the preservation of

the ward's civil rights and liberties. 

In re Guardianship of David Wilson, No. 1997-0171 at 2 (order)

[hereinafter Guardianship II]. In addition, the court held that Wilson

continued to be incapable of exercising the rights that had been

assigned to the guardian in the initial determination. As such,

Wilson's guardian retained the authority to make decisions regarding

his medical treatment, including the administration of anti-psychotic

medication. Wilson's notice of appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme

Court was denied on January 29, 1999.

Subsequent to the second guardianship determination, the

voluntary stay was lifted from the federal lawsuit, and Wilson filed an

amended complaint naming as defendants: Donald Shumway, in his official

capacity as the Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Health

and Human Services, Paul Gorman, in his official capacity as Director

of the Division of Behavioral Health Services, and Chester Batchelder,

in his official capacity as Superintendent of New Hampshire Hospital.

The claims were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans

with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq., and invoked

Wilson's rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
1 A full explanation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will be provided

in the Discussion section of this Opinion.

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More specifically, Wilson alleged that the forcible

administration of anti-psychotic medication: (1) violated his right to

personal privacy and bodily integrity; (2) violated his right to

freedom of speech and association; (3) violated his right to

substantive due process; (4) deprived him of his ability to make an

informed judgment regarding anti-psychotic medication based on his

mental illness, thus not affording him the benefit of New Hampshire

law, in violation of the ADA; and (5) violated his right to procedural

due process in not giving him notice and a hearing prior to the forced

medication. Wilson requested a preliminary and permanent injunction

preventing the defendants from forcibly medicating him unless a serious

and immediate physical threat to himself or others existed, a judgment

declaring that defendants' actions violated the above enumerated

constitutional rights and the ADA, attorneys fees, and any other

appropriate relief.

The district court dismissed Wilson's case, holding that,

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,1 the federal court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to rule on the substance of his claims. Wilson v.

Shumway, No. Civ. 97-099-B, 2000 WL 1499469 (D.N.H. May 8, 2000) (mem.

and order). The district court characterized Wilson's federal action

as an "attempt[] to appeal adverse rulings in the state guardianship
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proceedings." Id. at *1. Examining the proceeding in the probate

court, the district court noted that Wilson had asked the probate court

to determine whether vesting the decisionmaking power regarding

medication in a guardian violated Wilson's rights under the First

Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the ADA. Thus, "Wilson's

primary argument in the probate court was that the guardianship denied

him his rights under the Constitution and the ADA to refuse antipsychotic medication." Id. at *2. The district court went on to find

that the claims that had been asserted in the federal case were

"inextricably intertwined" with those that were litigated in the

guardianship proceeding, because a favorable decision would require the

district court to conclude that the probate court had erred in its

opinion. Id. Citing First Circuit precedent, the district court

further held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 claims.

DISCUSSION

Our review of a dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction is de novo. Corrada-Betances v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 248

F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2001).

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from two Supreme

Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and,

six decades later, District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
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460 U.S. 462 (1983). In Rooker, the Court was asked to declare a

judgment of the Indiana state courts null and void as a violation of

the Contract, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United

States Constitution. The Court affirmed the district court's

conclusion that jurisdiction was lacking, stating that: "Under the

legislation of Congress, no court of the United States other than this

court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment

[of a state court] for errors of that character." Rooker, 263 U.S. at

416.

The Feldman case expanded in some significant ways upon the

relatively non-controversial principle that only the Supreme Court has

jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts. The plaintiffs, Marc

Feldman and Edward Hickey, Jr., had both sought admission to the

District of Columbia bar. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 465, 471. Standing in

their way was an admissions rule requiring applicants to have graduated

from an ABA-approved law school, id. at 464; Feldman had pursued an

apprenticeship-type program with a practicing attorney in Virginia, id.

at 465, while Hickey had attended a non-accredited law school, id. at

470. After being denied admission by the Committee on Admissions of

the District of Columbia Bar, Feldman petitioned for a waiver of the

requirement to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. at 465-

66. Hickey also petitioned for a waiver. Id. at 471. Both requests

were denied in per curiam orders. Id. at 468, 472.
2 The Court held that the proceeding was judicial, rather than

administrative or ministerial, reversing the conclusion of the D.C.

Circuit that the denials of waiver were not judicial in nature. Since

there is no claim that the probate court determination was anything but

a judicial proceeding, we treat it as such in this appeal.

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Feldman and Hickey then filed suit in federal district court

challenging the denials of their waiver petitions and the

constitutionality of the admission rule. Id. The district court

dismissed the complaint, holding that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit reversed, Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1981),

and appeal followed to the Supreme Court.

After making a preliminary determination that the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals' denials of the waiver petitions were

judicial proceedings,2 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 479, the Supreme Court held

that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review issues that were

either resolved by the waiver decisions or "inextricably intertwined"

with those issues that were decided:

If the constitutional claims presented to a

United States District Court are inextricably

intertwined with the state court's denial in a

judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff's

application for admission to the state bar, then

the District Court is in essence being called

upon to review the state court decision. This

the District Court may not do.

Id. at 482 & n.16. On the other hand, the district court did have

subject matter jurisdiction over the general constitutional challenge
3 E.g., Sheehan v. Marr, 207 F.3d 35, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding

adjudication of appellant's federal ADA suit not barred by prior state

involuntary retirement proceeding); Hill v. Town of Conway, 193 F.3d

33, 39-40 (1st Cir. 1999) (affirming lack of subject matter

jurisdiction); Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de P.R., 917 F.2d 620,

628-29 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming jurisdiction over a "general"

constitutional challenge to a statutory requirement of bar membership).

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to the bar admission rule, provided that no review of Feldman or

Hickey's individual denials resulted. Id. at 486. The Supreme Court

remanded the case for a determination on the merits on the issue of

whether the requirement that Bar members have degrees from ABA-approved

schools was unconstitutional. Id. at 487-88.

Following the parameters of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as

articulated by the Supreme Court and this circuit,3 we proceed to the

question of whether Wilson's federal claims are "inextricably

intertwined" with those of the state probate court proceeding, or if

any general challenges to New Hampshire's guardianship laws have been

presented.

B. Deconstructing Wilson's Federal Lawsuit

Not surprisingly, Wilson characterizes his federal claims as

involving general constitutional challenges to New Hampshire's

procedure for permitting a guardian to authorize the involuntary

administration of anti-psychotic drugs to a ward. First, Wilson

emphasizes that he is not contesting the appointment of a guardian by

the probate court. Instead, he argues that the current statutory

scheme relating to involuntary medication lacks constitutionally-
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guaranteed procedural due process mechanisms. Specifically, Wilson

claims that before a recommendation that a ward be forcibly medicated

can be submitted to a guardian for authorization, a ward is entitled

to: (1) notice that such a recommendation will be made, with legal and

factual reasons for the recommendation explicitly provided; (2) notice

of a right to a hearing before an impartial arbiter in which the need

for medication must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) notice

of the right to be represented by counsel at that hearing.

Appellees, in contrast, interpret Wilson's federal complaint

as nothing more than a thinly-veiled attack on the state guardianship

proceeding. Because Wilson's federal complaint focuses on forcible

medication as applied to him, and seeks personal, rather than general,

relief, appellees charge that Wilson's claim of a "general" challenge

is merely an attempt to avoid the Rooker-Feldman bar to jurisdiction.

Finally, appellees argue that the injury Wilson complains of would not

exist if not for the probate court's determination that guardianship

was appropriate. His federal case, then, seeks to undo the

consequences of the state court judgment, and such jurisdiction is

prohibited under Rooker-Feldman.

After reviewing the arguments of both sides, as well as

Wilson's amended complaint, we conclude that the district court was

correct in dismissing Wilson's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In

so holding, we are unpersuaded by Wilson's claim that he has mounted a
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general constitutional challenge to the New Hampshire provisions for

authorizing the involuntary administration of anti-psychotic drugs. We

turn first to the non-procedural claims alleged in Wilson's complaint,

and then proceed to his primary appellate argument.

Most of the claims asserted in Wilson's federal lawsuit are

obviously barred by the Rooker-Feldman principle that lower federal

courts lack jurisdiction to review decisions of the state courts.

Wilson implicitly concedes as much by not addressing them in his brief

to this Court. Among the "disputed issues of law" submitted to the

probate court in Wilson's pre-trial statement were "[w]hether an order

of guardianship which denies Mr. Wilson his right to refuse

psychotropic medication discriminates against him . . . contrary to the

Americans with Disabilities Act," and "violates the First Amendment,

and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment." These arguments presented to the state probate court

essentially mirror those made in Wilson's federal amended complaint.

The district court thus properly refrained from deciding whether the

forcible administration of drugs to Wilson violates the Constitution

and/or the ADA, because retaining jurisdiction would have put the

district court in the position of reviewing the probate court's

decision. See, e.g., Wang v. N.H. Bd. of Registration in Med., 55 F.3d

698, 703 (1st Cir. 1995).
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Turning to the main argument that Wilson asserts on appeal:

that his federal suit includes a general allegation that a ward is

constitutionally guaranteed certain notice and procedures, we examine

Wilson's amended complaint to determine whether a general

constitutional challenge arguably not barred by Rooker-Feldman was

actually made. See Patmon v. Mich. Sup. Ct., 224 F.3d 504, 510 (6th

Cir. 2000); Stern v. Nix, 840 F.2d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 1988). To open

his complaint, Wilson states that the purpose of his lawsuit is "to

enjoin the administration of psychotropic or other mood altering

medications against his will," and that forcing him to take those drugs

violates his rights under the Constitution. As for the specific

procedural due process violation claim, Wilson again couches his

allegations in personal and individual terms. See Patmon, 224 F.3d at

510. The substance of Wilson's claims reference the personal

circumstances of his case, that given his ability to make an informed

choice about whether or not to consent to medication, forcible

administration violates his constitutional rights. See Musslewhite v.

State Bar of Tex., 32 F.3d 942, 947 (5th Cir. 1994). Similarly, all of

the relief sought would only impact Wilson individually: an injunction

preventing the defendants from forcibly medicating him and a judgment

declaring that defendants' acts violated Wilson's constitutional rights

and his rights as guaranteed by the ADA. Finally, any reference to the
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allegedly offending New Hampshire regulation is wholly absent from

Wilson's complaint. See Patmon, 224 F.3d at 510.

"This is about substance, not about form." Musslewhite, 32

F.3d at 947. It is fairly obvious that Wilson's arguments to this

Court and in his appellate brief represent an attempt to carve a

general constitutional challenge out of his federal lawsuit in order to

escape the jurisdictional bar of Rooker-Feldman. Cf. Stern, 840 F.2d

at 212-13 ("as the proceedings continued, the veneer of the 'general

challenge' became increasingly thin"). Wilson has not brought any such

general challenge to the New Hampshire policies and practices governing

involuntary administration of anti-psychotic medication, but instead

seeks only to remedy his current guardianship situation. See Patmon,

224 F.3d at 510. This issue has been considered and resolved in the

New Hampshire court system and cannot be re-litigated here.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Wilson claims that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not be

applied to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While acknowledging

that this circuit has dismissed § 1983 suits pursuant to RookerFeldman, Wang, 55 F.3d at 703, Wilson urges us to overrule this

precedent for the reason that § 1983 has its own jurisdictional

provision granting original jurisdiction to the federal district

courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). We are not persuaded by this argument
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and decline to reverse our prior determination that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine is applicable to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the district court dismissing the case for

lack of federal court jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

is affirmed.