2013 IL 115473

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 115473)

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ROXANA COMMUNITY

SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1, Appellant, v. THE POLLUTION

 CONTROL BOARD et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed November 21, 2013.

JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride,

and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Burke took no part in the decision.

OPINION

¶ 1 The issue in this case is whetherthe appellate court ruled correctly

when it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by

the Board of Education of Roxana Community School District No. 1

(the Board of Education) from decisions of the Pollution Control

Board which denied the Board of Education’s petitions to intervene

in 28 separate proceedings for certification of certain facilities as

“pollution control facilities” and granted the subject certifications.

The basis for the appellate court’s ruling was that judicial review of

a Pollution Control Board decision to issue, refuse to issue, deny,

revoke, modify or restrict a pollution control certificate is governed

by section 11-60 of the PropertyTax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-60 (West

2010)). Under that provision, appeals must be filed in circuit court,

not the appellate court, and can only be brought by applicants for or
holders of the certificates, classifications into which the Board of

Education did not fall. 2012 IL App (4th) 120174-U.

¶ 2 One justice dissented. He believed the Board of Education should

have been permitted to prosecute this appeal pursuant to section 41

of the Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS 5/41 (West 2010)),

which permits appeals directly to the appellate court by, inter alios,

“any party adversely affected by a final order or determination of the

Board.” 

¶ 3 Following entry of the appellate court’s judgment, the Board of

Education petitioned this court for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315

(eff. Feb. 26, 2010). We granted the petition. For the reasons that

follow, we now affirm.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 The facts necessary for resolution of this appeal are

straightforward and undisputed. A company known as WRB

Refining, LP (WRB), owns the Wood River Petroleum Refinery in

Madison County. Following major renovations to the refinery, WRB

submitted separate applications to the Illinois Environmental

Protection Agency (IEPA) pursuant to section 11-25 of the Property

Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-25 (West 2010)) to have 28 of the

refinery’s systems, methods, devices, and facilities certified as

“pollution control facilities” within the meaning of section 11-10 of

the Code (35 ILCS 200/11-10 (West 2010)). WRB sought those

certifications because, if approved, they would result in a preferential

tax assessment of the subject systems, methods, devices and facilities.

See 35 ILCS 200/11-5, 11-15, 11-20 (West 2010).

¶ 6 WRB filed its 28 applications in October of 2010. The following

August, the IEPA recommended to the Pollution Control Board that

it approve two of WRB’s certification requests. The Board accepted

the IEPA’s recommendations and certified the two entities at issue as

pollution control facilities. 

¶ 7 Shortly thereafter, the Board of Education filed separate petitions

for leave to intervene in the two proceedings where certification had

been granted. The Board of Education argued that the particular

applications submitted by WRB failed to satisfy statutory

requirements under the Property Tax Code and that it had a legally

cognizable interest in challenging the sufficiency of the applications

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because issuance of the certifications would ultimately deprive it of

tax revenue. 

¶ 8 The Pollution Control Board considered and denied the Board of

Education’s petitions to intervene, reasoning that because the

certifications in the two matters had already been issued, the Board

of Education’s petitions were now moot. The Board of Education

asked the Pollution Control Board to reconsider that decision. While

the requests to reconsider were pending, the IEPA recommended that

the Pollution Control Board also approve WRB’s applications to

certify the remaining 26 systems, methods, devices, and facilities as

“pollution control facilities.” 

¶ 9 Before thePollution Control Board took action in these remaining

26 cases, the Board of Education filed petitions for leave to intervene

in each of them. Those petitions, filed in December of 2011, were

premised on the same arguments asserted by the Board of Education

in the initial two cases. 

¶ 10 Both the IEPA and WRB objected, arguing that under the

statutory and regulatory scheme governing certification of pollution

control facilities, the Board of Education had no right to intervene.

The Board of Education responded by filing a joint reply addressed

to all 28 proceedings. In that reply, the Board of Education challenged

the Pollution Control Board’s view that its petitions to intervene in

the initial two cases were moot. It also argued that it possessed a

legallycognizable basis for intervening and that the Pollution Control

Board had authority under the law to permit it to intervene. In

addition, it took issue with the substance of the Pollution Control

Board’s decision to issue pollution control facility certifications in the

initial two proceedings. 

¶ 11 In a detailed and unanimous order entered January 19, 2012, the

Pollution Control Board denied reconsideration. Within the time

permitted by law, the Board of Education sought administrative

review of the Pollution Control Board’s decision in the appellate

court pursuant to section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection

Act (415 ILCS 5/41 (West 2010)). In the interim, the Pollution

Control Board entered a separate order, also detailed and also

unanimous, denying the Board of Education’s petitions to intervene

in the remaining 26 proceedings and grantingWRB’s applications for

pollution control facility certification in each of those cases. The

Board of Education sought administrative review of that decision as

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well, and, on the Board of Education’s motion, the appellate court

consolidated both appeals.

¶ 12 As noted at the outset of this opinion, the appellate court, with

one justice dissenting, dismissed the Board of Education’s

consolidated appeal on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to

consider it. The appellate court opined that section 41 of the Illinois

Environmental Protection Act, the provision invoked by the Board of

Education in seeking direct administrative review by that court, was

inapplicable here. Section 41 is the general provision for judicial

review of final decisions of the Pollution Control Board, and it

provides that such appeals may be brought by, inter alios, “any party

adversely affected by a final order or determination of the Board.”

The appellate court noted, however, that the legislature has

promulgated a separate and more specific provision for appeals in

proceedings involving the Pollution Control Board’s “issuance,

refusal to issue, denial, revocation, modification or restriction of a

pollution control certificate,” which is the type of proceeding from

which this appeal emanated. That provision is section 11-60 of the

Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-60 (West 2010)). By its terms,

section 11-60 authorizes appeals from such decisions only by

applicants for or holders of pollution control facility certificates who

are aggrieved by the Board’s decision. The Board of Education is

neither an applicant for or holder of a pollution control facility

certificate. Moreover, such appeals are subject to the regular

provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et

seq. (West 2010)). Unlike section 41 of the Illinois Environmental

Protection Act, there is no mechanism for bringing such appeals

directly to the appellate court. They must be initiated, instead, in the

circuit court. 735 ILCS 5/3-104 (West 2010).

¶ 13 In the appellate court’s view, section 11-60 of the Property Tax

Code rather than section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection

Act must take precedence in cases such as this for two basic reasons.

First, to hold otherwise would mean that the court “would be

essentiallydisregarding the specific and narrow guidance provided by

section 11-60,” a course that would not only run afoul of the “long

held principle that the appellate court must construe a statute as a

whole so that no part is rendered meaningless or superfluous,” but

could also “produce absurd results in that it could conceivably allow,

at a minimum, applicants seeking a pollution-control-facilities

certification to engage in forum shopping any potential appeal in

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either the circuit court or appellate court.” 2012 IL App (4th)

120174-U, ¶ 25. Second, applying section 11-60 of the Property Tax

Code rather than section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection

Act to proceedings such as these, which were brought under the

Property Tax Code, is compelled by the “well-settled axiom of

statutory interpretation that the general must yield to the specific.” Id.

¶ 26.

¶ 14 One justice dissented. Contrary to his colleagues in the majority,

he believed that the Board of Education should be permitted to appeal

pursuant to section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act.

He would have allowed the appeal, reversed the Pollution Control

Board’s decisions, and reversed and remanded to the Pollution

Control Board with directions to grant the Board of Education’s

petitions for leave to intervene and to conduct further hearings on the

merits. 2012 IL App (4th) 120174-U, ¶ 45 (Appleton, J., dissenting).

¶ 15 ANALYSIS

¶ 16 In its appeal to our court, the Board of Education argues that the

appellate court’s jurisdictional analysis was incorrect as a matter of

law and that section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act

provides a proper basis for challenging the Pollution Control Board’s

decisions through direct appeal to the appellate court, as the

dissenting justice had reasoned. It then goes on to assert that the

Pollution Control Board erred when it denied the Board of Education

permission to intervene in the pollution control facility certification

proceedings, that the Pollution Control Board erred when it

concluded that the Board of Education’s petitions to intervene in the

first two proceedings were moot, and that the Pollution Control Board

erred in certifying the subject facilities as pollution control facilities.

¶ 17 We begin with the question of the appellate court’s jurisdiction.

Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal

presents a question of law which we review de novo. Gardner v.

Mullins, 234 Ill. 2d 503, 508 (2009); In re A.H., 207 Ill. 2d 590, 593

(2003). In this case, we agree with the appellate court’s conclusion

that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Board of Education’s

appeals. We do so, however, based on different reasoning.

¶ 18 It is undisputed that under the statutory scheme implemented by

the General Assembly, the Board of Education’s only direct path to

the appellate court for administrative review of the Pollution Control

Board’s decisions in these 28 cases is through section 41 of the

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Illinois Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS 5/41 (West 2010)).

Unless the Board of Education can avail itself of that statute, its

appeal is doomed, for the appellate court has jurisdiction to review

administrative decisions only as provided by law (Ill. Const. 1970,

art. VI, § 6; Town & Country Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution

Control Board, 225 Ill. 2d 103, 121 (2007); People ex rel. Madigan

v. Illinois CommerceComm’n, 394 Ill. App. 3d 382, 386 (2009)), and

the only other mechanism for obtaining judicial review of decisions

by the Pollution Control Board in administrative proceedings

involving certification of pollution control facilities is section 11-60

of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-60 (West 2010)). As the

appellate court here noted and as we have just pointed out, the

express terms of that statute authorize appeals in such proceedings

only by applicants for or holders of pollution control facility

certificates who are aggrieved bythe Board’s decision, categories into

which the Board of Education does not fall, and, in any case, such

appeals must be brought in circuit court. There is no statutory

authorization for litigants to skip ahead and go directly to the

appellate court. 

¶ 19 While the appellate court majority in this case was of the view

that section 11-60 of the PropertyTax Code leaves no room for resort

to section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act in cases

involving certification of pollution control facilities, we need not go

that far in resolving the particular case before us today. That is so

because even if section 41 were not completely supplanted by section

11-60 with regard to appeals in such cases, it still would be of no aid

to the Roxana Board of Education here.

¶ 20 Section 41 provides for appeals by “[a]ny party to a Board

hearing, any person who filed a complaint on which a hearing was

denied, any person who has been denied a variance or permit under

this Act, any partyadverselyaffected bya final order or determination

of the Board, and any person who participated in the public comment

process under subsection (8) of Section 39.5 of this Act.” 415 ILCS

5/41 (West 2010)). In its arguments before our court, the Board of

Education contends that it falls within the fourth of these categories

and qualifies as “any party adversely affected by a final order or

determination of the Board.” It does not. Our court has specifically

held that to be a “party” within the meaning of the fourth category of

section 41, one must have been an actual party of record in the

underlying proceedings before the Board. Lake County Contractors

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Ass’n v. Pollution Control Board, 54 Ill. 2d 16, 21 (1973); People v.

Pollution Control Board, 113 Ill. App. 3d 282, 291 (1983), rev’d on

other grounds sub nom. Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 102 Ill. 2d 119 (1984). This is consistent with the

general rule that administrative review is limited to parties of record

before the administrative agencies and then only when their rights,

duties or privileges are adversely affected by the decision. See, e.g.,

Williams v. Department of Labor, 76 Ill. 2d 72, 78 (1979); Robinson

v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 130 Ill. App. 3d 509, 512-13

(1985). Because the Board of Education was denied leave to intervene

in these proceedings, it is not and cannot be deemed to have ever been

a party to the litigation. In re Veatch, 93 Ill. App. 3d 413, 415 (1981).

Accordingly, the fourth clause of section 41 could not afford it any

basis for seeking administrative review in the appellate court.1

¶ 21 In urging the exercise of jurisdiction, the dissenting appellate

court justice argued that this matter might actually fall within the

third clause of section 41, which permits appeals by “any person who

filed a complaint on which a hearing was denied,” but that contention

is without merit. The Board of Education did not file a “complaint on

which a hearing was denied.” It did not file a complaint at all. In civil

matters, a “complaint” is generally understood to mean the initial

pleading that starts an action, states the basis for the plaintiff’s claim,

and sets forth the demand for relief. Black’s Law Dictionary 323 (9th

ed. 2009). The proceedings at issue here were initiated by

applications for pollution control facility certificates. Those were

filed by WRB, not the Board of Education. The Board of Education

simply requested leave to intervene. There is no meaningful sense in

which a petition to intervene can be considered a complaint. The

contrary view taken by the appellate court in Citizens Against the

In Reed-Custer Community Unit School District No. 255-U v. 1

Pollution Control Board, 232 Ill. App. 3d 571 (1992), a panel of the

appellate court relied on the fourth clause of section 41 to assert

jurisdiction over a school district’s appeal of the Pollution Control Board’s

denial of its attempt to revoke a company’s pollution control facility

certification. Significantly, the appellate court did not consider whether the

law permitted third parties to seek revocation of a certificate, and no

challenge was raised to its jurisdiction under section 41. It istherefore scant

authority for the Board of Education’s position in this case. In any event,

to the extent that it is inconsistent with our holding today, it is overruled. 

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Randolph Landfill (CARL) v. Pollution Control Board, 178 Ill. App.

3d 686, 692 (1988), is untenable, and we reject it.

¶ 22 The dissenting appellate court justice’s interpretation of the law

must be rejected for another reason as well. Although he contends

that appeals in certification proceedings are properly brought directly

to the appellate court when they are prosecuted by third parties, he

does not dispute that when the appeal is brought by an actual

applicant for or holder of a certificate, it must be pursued in circuit

court. 2012 IL App (4th) 120174-U, ¶ 40 (Appleton, J., dissenting).

The dissenting justice’s approach would thus create a situation in

which the particular court to which an appeal must be brought would

differ depending on the particular litigant who brought it. 

¶ 23 We are unaware of any other situation in Illinois law where this

occurs, and we can conceive of no sound reason why the legislature

would possibly have wanted to create such a dual-track system with

respect to appeals in pollution control facility certification

proceedings. We therefore agreewith the appellate court majoritythat

such a construction of the law would yield absurd results and must be

rejected. 

¶ 24 Finally, and in any case, a court’s refusal to entertain an appeal

from the denial of petitions to intervene in administrative proceedings

cannot be error if the entity seeking to appeal had no right to

intervene to begin with. In this case, the Board of Education failed to

show that it had any such right. Under the law, the question of

whether a system, method, construction, device, building, etc.,

qualifies as a pollution control facility within the meaning of section

11-10 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-10 (West 2010)) is

a technical one between the entity seeking certification and state

regulatory officials. See 35 ILCS 200/11-20, 11-25, 11-30 (West

2010). The General Assembly made no provision for involvement of

any other parties in the certification process. Nor has the Pollution

Control Board. There is nothing in the applicable administrative

regulations authorizing participation by third parties in the pollution

control facility certification process. See 35 Ill. Adm. Code 125.200

to 125.216 (2005). 

¶ 25 We recognize, of course, that legitimate concerns may arise when

the only parties permitted to participate in the regulatory process are

regulators and the companies theyregulate. That, however, is a matter

for the General Assembly. The responsibility for the wisdom of

legislation rests with the legislature, and courts may not rewrite

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statutes to make them consistent with the court’s idea of orderliness

and public policy. People v. Carpenter, 228 Ill. 2d 250, 270-71

(2008).

¶ 26 We must also point out that under this state’s property tax system,

taxing bodies such as the Board of Education have been given some

voice in how certified pollution control facilities within their borders

are ultimately taxed. It is simply not at the certification stage. It

comes later, when the Department of Revenue actually assesses the

value of those facilities. At that point, any person aggrieved by the

assessment may apply for review and correction of the assessment

and ask for a hearing on the matter. 35 ILCS 200/8-35(a) (West

2010); 86 Ill. Adm. Code 110.110 (1996). That stage had not yet been

reached in this case. Even if it had, review in such proceedings lies in

the circuit court. The law does not authorize direct review by the

appellate court, as the Board of Education sought here. 35 ILCS

200/8-40 (West 2010).

¶ 27 CONCLUSION

¶ 28 Forthe foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellate court did not

err when it dismissed the Board of Education’s appeal for lack of

jurisdiction. In light of this conclusion, there is no need to address the

Board of Education’s remaining arguments. The judgment of the

appellate court is affirmed.

¶ 29 Affirmed.

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