UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4738

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SEAN BISHOP,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District 

Judge. (8:99-cr-00255-DKC-1)

Submitted: August 27, 2015 Decided: August 31, 2015

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part, affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Robin M. Earnest, EARNEST LAW PRACTICE, Riverdale, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Kristi 

O’Malley, Assistant United States Attorney, Conor Mulroe, 

Special Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Sean Bishop seeks to appeal the district court’s judgment 

revoking supervised release and sentencing him to 12 months’ 

imprisonment, followed by 40 months’ supervised release. The 

Government contends that Bishop’s appeal is moot because he has 

completed his term of imprisonment. For the following reasons, 

we dismiss Bishop’s appeal of his sentence of imprisonment and 

affirm the term of supervised release.

“The doctrine of mootness originates in Article III’s case 

or controversy language,” and we lose jurisdiction over any 

portion of an appeal that becomes moot. Incumma v. Ozmint, 507 

F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 2007) (alterations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “[A] case is moot when the issues 

presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally 

cognizable interest in the out-come.” Id. at 286 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “If an event occurs while a case is 

pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to 

grant any effectual relief . . . to a prevailing party, the 

appeal must be dismissed . . . .” Id. (brackets and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Here, Bishop’s completion of his term of imprisonment 

during the pendency of this appeal rendered his challenge to the 

prison term moot, and we dismiss that portion of his appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction. But we do possess jurisdiction over 
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Bishop’s challenge to the reasonableness of his term of 

supervised release because he is still serving that portion of 

his sentence, and we proceed to that issue.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a 

sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United 

States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We “will 

affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory 

maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). When considering a challenge to the 

reasonableness of a sentence, we first consider the procedural 

reasonableness of the sentence, including whether the district 

court properly calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range, and 

then consider its substantive reasonableness in light of the 

“totality of the circumstances” and the applicable 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2012) factors. United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792

F.3d 416, 423, 425 (4th Cir. 2015). When reviewing the 

substantive reasonableness of a term of supervised release, we 

may apply a presumption of reasonableness where the imposed term 

falls within the Sentencing Guidelines range. Id. at 425. 

Finally, because Bishop did not object to the imposed term of 

supervised release before the district court, we review only for 

plain error. Webb, 738 F.3d at 640-41.

We conclude that the district court did not plainly err in 

imposing a 40-month term of supervised release. Subtracting the 
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prison terms Bishop served for supervised release violations, 

the district court was statutorily authorized to impose a 40-

month term of supervised release and this term fell within the 

policy statement range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1), (h) (2012). 

Bishop does not rebut the reasonableness of the term. U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.2(a)(1) (2013).

Accordingly, we dismiss as moot Bishop’s appeal of his 

sentence of imprisonment, and affirm the district court’s 

judgment with respect to Bishop’s term of supervised release. 

In light of the district court’s excusable neglect finding, we 

deny the Government’s motion to dismiss Bishop’s appeal as 

untimely. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED IN PART

AFFIRMED IN PART