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LIBYA’S TERRORIST DESCENT:

CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 27, 2016

Serial No. 114–225

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Federica Saini Fasanotti, Ph.D., non-resident fellow, Center for 21st Century 

Security and Intelligence, Foreign Policy Program, The Brookings Institution ........................................................................................................................ 5

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, senior editor, Long War Journal, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ............................................................................................ 12

Mr. Benjamin Fishman (former Director for North Africa, National Security 

Council) ................................................................................................................. 27

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Federica Saini Fasanotti, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................... 8

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn: Prepared statement ........................................................... 14

Mr. Benjamin Fishman: Prepared statement ........................................................ 27

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 46

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 47

(1)

LIBYA’S TERRORIST DESCENT:

CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Cook presiding. 

Mr. COOK. Subcommittee will come to order. Without objection, 

all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions and 

extraneous materials for the record subject to the length limitation 

in the rules. 

Since the U.S.-led NATO intervention in 2011, Libya has completely spiraled out of control and has become a regional and international security threat. 

Five years ago, the regime of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi 

helped us fight against international terrorism. This is not to say 

that Gaddafi was a good guy. He was a ruthless dictator who sponsored terrorism in the 1980s. 

But Gaddafi eventually realized that he was the target of terrorists himself and he changed course to side with us against the cancer of terrorism. 

By 2008, U.S. military leaders were calling Libya a top U.S. ally 

in combating transnational terrorism. Fast forward to today, and 

Libya is a virtual incubator of terrorist groups, hosting all stripes 

of jihadi organizations including ISIS and al-Qaeda. 

Unfortunately, it was U.S. policy that transformed Libya into the 

complete failure that it is today. 2011 we decided to intervene in 

Libya and establish no-fly zones to aid Libyan rebels plotting 

against Gaddafi. 

Under the safety of the no-fly zone we imposed, Islamic terrorist 

groups long subdued under Gaddafi’s regime sprung up, amassed 

weapons, training and military experience. 

Gaddafi was ultimately killed in October 2011. Within days, 

NATO and U.S. forces packed up and left Libya to its own devices. 

It appears that our own Libyan policy at the time was to remove 

Gaddafi. There was little planning regarding what to do the day 

after. 

Gaddafi’s ouster unleashed chaos in the country. Long-simmering 

political, regional and ethnic divisions suddenly emerged and set 

Libya on a path toward disaster. 

2

The country has never recovered. Even the administration says 

that Libya failed due to our lack of forward thinking. Earlier this 

year, the President admitted that his administration did not have 

a plan for post-Gaddafi Libya and he said this was his biggest regret as President. 

Dangerous terrorist groups popped up almost immediately to fill 

the power vacuum created by NATO’s intervention. Ansar alSharia, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Libya, emerged shortly after 

Gaddafi’s ouster began, deeply entrenching itself in Libya’s society 

by providing social services. 

But this did not—this organization did not stop with building 

schools. They recruited, they armed and trained terrorist fighters 

intent on carrying out the group’s ultimate goal—imposing Islamic 

law on the country. 

These fighters were among those who attacked the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi in 2012, killing Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three of his colleagues. 

By 2014, the security situation in Libya had gotten even worse. 

It became apparent that the country’s warring factions were not 

going to unite anytime soon. 

Sensing an opportunity, ISIS announced the establishment of a 

Libyan affiliate at the end of 2014 and soon began consolidating 

power around the coast city of Sirte. 

From there, ISIS quickly expanded east, west, and south. Terrorists set up checkpoints along the coast and within over a year ISIS 

managed to hold over 200 kilometers of territory along the Libyan 

coast. 

By the beginning of 2016 reports indicated that ISIS was redirecting recruits and even senior leaders to Libya. It appeared 

that ISIS was creating what many called a fallback caliphate 

where it could retreat to in case it was pushed out of Syria and 

Iraq. 

Pentagon estimates suggest the group’s ranks in the country 

quickly swelled to nearly 7,000 fighters. It became apparent that 

the U.S. needed to target ISIS in Libya as well as in Syria and 

Iraq. 

In August 2016, the U.S. expanded what was until then a very 

limited air strike campaign with the intention of dislodging the terrorists from their stronghold of Sirte. 

By September, the U.S.-backed operation pushed into the last 

ISIS-held areas of Sirte and freed the city from the reign of terror. 

But this by no means defeated ISIS in Libya. 

Libya remains an ideal foothold for terrorist groups of all kinds 

and ISIS’ removal from Sirte will not be the end of the group. Until 

we can devise a truly comprehensive long-term strategy to stabilize 

Libya and defeat the terrorists hiding there, Libya will continue to 

threaten regional and international security. 

Treating the symptoms while ignoring the underlying disease 

will not solve our problems. ISIS, al-Qaeda, and others will continue to operate at Europe’s doorstep and menace the free world. 

The time has come for America to lead again. Until we do, the 

world will remain at risk. 

I will now turn to the ranking member, Congressman Keating 

from Massachusetts, for his opening statement. 

3

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Colonel. I’d like to thank Chairman 

Poe for calling this hearing and we share a concern for the situation on the ground in Libya and I appreciate the attention we are 

affording the issue. 

I’d also like to thank my colleague, Colonel Cook, for joining us 

as chair today as well as our panel for joining us to discuss the 

topic at hand. 

The situation in Libya remains very fluid and complex. While the 

topic of this hearing will focus on the risk or growth of terrorist organizations in the country, I think it’s important that we examine 

the challenges of the interim Libyan government and the lack of 

a clear strategy from international partners, which contributes to 

the continued instability. 

Since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, Libya has witnessed pervading 

and varying levels of instability and civil war resulting from the 

lack of a strong united government. Libyans and the international 

community have witnessed a number of interim governments from 

the General National Congress to the House of Representatives and 

now, since December of last year, the Government of National Accord—the GNA. 

However, the GNA is struggling to build legitimacy and public 

support in August. The Libyan House of Representatives conducted 

a vote of no confidence on the new interim government and according to political agreement that created the GNA their House must 

approve the GNA cabinet before assuming office. 

Additionally, the GNA has so far been unable to provide basic 

services and address long-term issues in Libya such as chronic 

power and water outages, inflation, a liquidity crisis and a lack of 

security. 

This brings me to the concern today—the rise of ISIL inside the 

country. As we have seen, since its formation in 2014, ISIL is able 

to metastasize in places which lack a strong civil society or central 

government and in Libya the group has managed to establish itself 

wherever rival militias have not already carved out territories for 

themselves. 

The group has proven capable of launching domestic attacks and 

Libya’s proximity to states such as Tunisia, which struggle with 

the flow of foreign fighters, make the country an easy destination 

for extremists. 

Fortunately, there has been some success against ISIL by GNA, 

which has been aided by U.S. air support. In Sirte, for example, 

anti-ISIL forces have been largely effective in driving out militants 

from the city. 

However, Sirte is just one area and there are still large swaths 

of land in the south and the west in which ISIL is afforded freedom 

of movement. 

Operation Odyssey Lightning and ISIL’s defeat will only succeed 

as long as GNA is able to capitalize on these security gains and the 

government’s gains. 

The question remains what should our role be, that of the United 

Nations in helping the situation in Libya. I hope during the course 

of this hearing we examine what can be done both militarily and 

diplomatically to combat ISIL but also improve their fragile government in Libya. 

4

With that, Mr. Chairman, I’ll yield back. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Congressman Keating. 

I now recognize Representative Zeldin from New York for 1 

minute. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Chairman, and I thank all the witnesses 

who are here for this important hearing. I was recently in Iraq and 

I had a chance to meet with some of our commanders on the 

ground. 

One interesting observation that was made is that here in the 

United States we often talk about Iraq, Syria, Libya in that order. 

The observation that was shared to me is that in many respects we 

should be talking about Libya, Syria, Iraq, in that order, and the 

commanders were explaining why—that right now in Iraq we have 

a strategy to win. 

It’s tenuous. It can turn. In Syria, my own personal observation—not to put any words into those commanders’ mouths is that 

we seem like maybe we have a strategy to run in place at best as 

far as Syria goes. 

But if we eliminated ISIS from Iraq and even eliminated ISIS 

from Syria, what I am concerned about is that Libya right now can 

easily pop up as a new command and control node. So thank you 

for holding this hearing. It’s really important for us to talk about 

the situation on the ground in Libya. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Congressman Zeldin. 

Congressman Wilson from South Carolina, 1 minute. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate Chairman 

Ted Poe for convening this timely and important hearing. It is sad 

that since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 a dangerous vacuum has emerged in Libya with numerous, regional and ideological 

actors competing for power. 

Perhaps more dangerously, the past 5 years has given the Islamic State the opportunity to dramatically increase its presence 

and influence. 

I am grateful that recently in August the United States began 

operation Odyssey Lightning, which is aimed at destroying ISIS 

along the Libyan coast. 

As we have seen throughout its existence, ISIS is a cancer and 

when it has presence in a country or region there is only oppression and violence. The only way to have a free Libya is the removal 

of ISIS. 

It’s important that we have a free and stable government for the 

people of Libya. I urge promotion of the General National Congress, a foundation for a democratic transition. 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses. I yield back. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

By the way, I just got a flash message from Judge Poe. He says 

Cook, you talk too much, and make sure—by the way, I was going 

to let you talk for 15 minutes each but he said only keep it 1 

minute. 

So just to let you know that was not my call. I am only kidding 

on that, by the way. 

Without objection, all of the witnesses’ prepared statements will 

be made part of the record. I ask that each witness please keep 

your presentation to more—no more than 5 minutes, and I will inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:31 Nov 01, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\092716\21676 SHIRL
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troduce each witness and then give them time for opening statements. 

Dr. Federica Fasanotti—I hope I got that correct—is a non-resident fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence of the foreign policy program of the Brookings Institute. 

Her field of work and research have focused on Libya, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Thank you for joining us. 

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and senior editor of the Long War Journal, 

which focuses on counter terrorism and related issues. 

Mr. Benjamin Fishman is an adjunct fellow with RAND Corporation’s International Security and Defense Policy Center. Previously 

he served as the Director for North Africa at the National Security 

Council. 

Doctor, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF FEDERICA SAINI FASANOTTI, PH.D., NONRESIDENT FELLOW, CENTER FOR 21ST CENTURY SECURITY 

AND INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM, THE 

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Ms. FASANOTTI. Okay. Chairman Cook and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today. It’s an honor for me to be before you and I’m happy to answer to any question you may have for me after. 

Libya’s persistent fragmentation is what is most worrying today. 

Internal divisions are the product of decades of Gaddafi’s reckless 

governing. He played his citizens off of each other and kept them 

isolated from the rest of the world and also deprived them of any 

political institution that could keep the country united and stable 

after he was gone. 

Libyan history shows that Libyans have long been divided regionally and locally. Tribes have a long history of fighting one another. 

Today, the Libyan state remains immature and those ancient divisions have only gotten worse. At the end of Gaddafi’s time in 

power there were from 100 to 300 armed militia groups. Now there 

are, according to a European study, about 1,600 militias, gangs and 

criminal groups. 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1917 put an arms embargo on 

Libya but today there are more than 20 million weapons circulating in the country of only 6 million people. External powers who 

have intervened in Libya have actually worsened the polarization 

and made reconciliation less likely. 

It is well known that countries such as Egypt and Emirates have 

been supporting the toppled government and on the other side 

Qatar and Turkey did the same with the GNC in Tripoli. 

The state of affairs is still going on. Even now that thanks to the 

UNSMIL mediation in Tripoli, it’s been established a Government 

on National Accord, presumably recognized by most of international actors. 

After the 2011 revolution and international intervention, there 

were few sustainable political options. Social frictions increased in 

the aftermath of the Gaddafi overthrow and the country’s economic 

fabric eroded. 

6

All these only radicalized the insurgency. The situation in Libya 

is so compromised that it can be difficult to provide meaningful policy prescriptions. 

But I must emphasize that Libya’s dramatic downward slide is 

extremely dangerous for the West and the West should do everything it can to ensure improvement of the situation. In a territory 

stretching like Alaska are active various shades of Islamic terrorism from the Muslim Brotherhood to al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Sharia, 

ISIS. 

The absence of any state structure has turned the country into 

an incubator of terrorism ready to act as a trigger for the whole 

continent. 

In the nomadic tradition and experience gained during the 

Italian domination, handed down from generation to generation, 

has provided to the Libyans the ability to survive and recover 

strength even after the heaviest defeats. 

In my opinion, there are three key challenges we have to address—the security situation, the severe economic downturn, and 

deeply fractured politics. These factors are all intertwined and you 

cannot tackle one if you have not invested in the other. 

First, security—Libya is a country at war today. Criminals and 

their networks are increasingly organized. The state police are 

powerless even when they exist and the armed forces no longer exists as a coherent entity. 

The problem of criminals and militias is connected to the huge 

amount of weapons. So the first thing to do is try to diminish them. 

One policy could be to consider a weapons buyback program 

which has actually been implemented in Afghanistan in recent 

years even though in Libya the situations presents many, many 

different differences. 

In the medium term, it is essential that the Libyan armed forces 

and national security forces and the local police be fundamentally 

revered. 

Second, the economy—before the revolution, Libya’s oil-based 

economy was functional and pretty stable. Today, it is in shambles. 

The country’s gross domestic product fell from $74.76 billions of 

dollars in 2010 to $29.15 billions in 2015 in part because Libya exported 1.6 million barrels of oil per day in 2010 and only exported 

240,000 barrels of oil per day in August 2016. 

The inflation is at almost 30 percent. Youth unemployment is at 

48 percent and the banking system is on the brink of collapse. In 

the short term, Libya must manage fiscal spending pressures while 

restoring and improving basic public services. 

In the long term, Libya needs to develop a more diversified market-based economy that goes beyond the oil and gas sector. But in 

the limited term, Libya should invest in new management of oil 

and gas revenues to ensure they are using the best interest of the 

whole country. 

The private sector will only be able to reenter the Libya market 

once the security situation is stabilized. But then it can help create 

sustainable jobs and wealth. 

For the unemployed, targeted intervention should seek advanced 

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trepreneurship programs, something that Gaddafi never did but 

which Libya need in order to have a competitive workforce. 

Third, Libya’s fractured politics—although there has been some 

progress in forming national unity government in Libya, unity is 

today a rather inapplicable word for the country. 

Friction between various political actors remain high. One approach to consider is helping Libyans build a confederal state divided into three large regions, for example—Tripolitania, 

Cyrenaica, and Fezzan. 

While a united Libya is preferable, of course, it might be not possible after years of civil war and entrenched hatreds. 

So I propose something seemingly paradoxical—deconstructing to 

construct, which may have the best chance of providing Libyans 

with a deeper stability. Regional governments could better protect 

local interests in security, economic reconstruction, and governance. 

The international community should have the Libyans start from 

the bottom, emphasizing local solutions, supporting local actors. 

The system does not exclude the role of the central government. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fasanotti follows:]

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Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

Our next witness, Mr. Joscelyn. 

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR EDITOR, 

LONG WAR JOURNAL, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, Congressman, thank you for having me here 

today to testify before you. Last time I testified on Libya specifically was before Homeland Security in April 2011 and I testified 

then that we should be wary the jihadis will take advantage of the 

political vacuum and the uprisings and expand their presence. 

Little did I know that within just days before I testified actually 

Osama bin Laden had received a memo in his compound in 

Abbottabad, Pakistan that specifically outlined how they were 

going to send operatives who had been freed from custody in Iran 

and elsewhere to Libya to take advantage of the uprisings and they 

were going to establish their beachhead in Libya. 

So al-Qaeda actually very much saw what was going on in Libya 

as an opportunity to expand their operations and they did so. I am 

going to start by talking about the Islamic State, which is sort of 

the hot brand of the moment but then I am going to come back to 

al-Qaeda. 

As you said, Congressman Zeldin, Libya is crucially important 

for the Islamic State. Earlier this year in May, Abu Muhammad al 

Adnani, who was the Islamic State spokesman, was killed in August, actually mentioned Sirte as one of the top three cities on the 

Islamic State’s priority list. 

He mentioned it alongside Raqqa and Mosul as sort of key areas 

under the organization’s control. The good news today is that Sirte 

is on the verge of falling, that basically local Libyan forces backed 

by American air strikes in our Operation Odyssey Lightning have 

absolutely dislodged the Islamic State from much of the city and 

the surrounding areas. 

The bad news is we don’t really know, or at least I don’t know, 

how many forces the Islamic State has throughout Libya in its entirety. There is others that mentioned there are other areas in the 

south, in Benghazi and elsewhere, the Islamic State continues to 

operate. 

My suspicion is that they’ve basically redeployed some of their 

forces from Sirte, which they are on the verge of losing entirely, to 

other areas in Libya. 

So the key question in Libya is the key question that comes in 

Iraq and Syria as well—what comes next after they lose their safe 

haven. We know that the Islamic State is still able to maintain a 

prolific insurgency, conduct massive terrorist attacks within the 

country and will be able to sort of continue to facilitate sort of the 

movement of its operatives. 

The Islamic State—something I call ISIS fever has sort of infected our coverage of jihadi groups. There is no about that ISIS 

has grown substantially and is a big problem. I am not discounting 

that. But it also obscures in some ways what’s going on in the 

other side of the jihadi coin with al-Qaeda. And I saw a documentary, for example, earlier this year on PBS Frontline, which was 

excellent in many ways, which focused on ISIS in Benghazi. 

13

And if you’d watched this documentary you would have thought 

that the only jihadi game in Benghazi was the Islamic State when 

in fact by our count the Islamic State is probably less than 10 percent of jihadi operations in Benghazi currently. 

And al-Qaeda has in fact established front groups in Libya 

through which they are operating to this day. Going back to 2011-

2012, remember the rise of Ansar al-Sharia. 

Well, the big meme on Ansar al-Sharia is it really isn’t al-Qaeda, 

right. Well, that was all theater. It was all false. 

In fact, when the head of Ansar al-Sharia, Muhammad alZawahi, was killed, al-Qaeda came out with a statement saying in 

fact he had met with Osama bin Laden personally in the 1990s and 

adopted al-Qaeda’s methodology then and in fact he was personally 

eulogized by Ayman al-Zawahiri. 

And there are now designations by the U.N. and just voluminous 

material on the fact that Ansar al-Sharia was, in fact, and is a 

front group for al-Qaeda and their operations, in particular, alQaeda and the Islamic Maghreb. 

But what I’d say to that—an additional point of that is there are 

other organizations in Libya today that are connected to al-Qaeda. 

What we do in Long War Journal is what I call nerd analysis 

where we track operatives and what they are saying and propaganda—those sorts of things—to try and detect sort of the hints of 

al-Qaeda’s presence—that they are very keen to hide, I would say. 

And as we have this hearing today, keep in mind that the Islamic State declared its presence in Sirte as a new sort of one of 

its trio of capitals for its operations. Al-Qaeda has not done the 

same thing in Libya or elsewhere. This is by deliberate design. 

Al-Qaeda looks at what the Islamic State is doing and it said 

well before even the Islamic State’s rise and say if you prematurely 

declare an Islamic State and then you can’t hold it you have discredited this idea not only amongst jihadis but also amongst the 

Muslim population and therefore al-Qaeda is basically looking at 

the loss of Sirte and is looking at the loss of territory in Syria and 

Iraq and then saying, we told you so. 

This is the message we see because we track in Arabic and other 

languages on a day to day basis that’s going out right now and they 

are saying it in Libya itself as well. 

And so as that warning was expressed by Ayman al-Zawahiri 

and other al-Qaeda leaders, I have no doubt that they are looking 

to take advantage of the fact the Islamic State is losing ground in 

Libya as well. 

Now, this doesn’t mean that al-Qaeda is this sort of 10-foot ogre 

in Libya. They are not. But they have taken their lumps as well 

and they’ve lost quite a bit of personnel in the war in Libya. 

But as we move forward in this hearing I just wanted to keep 

in mind that just because group doesn’t call itself al-Qaeda doesn’t 

mean it isn’t al-Qaeda and that al-Qaeda is still very present in 

Libya to this day. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:]

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Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Fishman. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BENJAMIN FISHMAN (FORMER DIRECTOR 

FOR NORTH AFRICA, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL) 

Mr. FISHMAN. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you 

this afternoon. I appreciate this committee’s attention to Libya because I believe it remains an important issue for U.S. policy and 

often it is poorly understood. 

My written testimony goes into further details about this but I’d 

like to highlight just one common misrepresentation. That is if we 

had left well enough alone, Gaddafi would have returned to his reformed, albeit peculiar, personality. 

For those on this committee on terrorism who have not been, I 

urge you to visit the Pan Am 103 Memorial Cairn at Arlington National Cemetery or participate in the annual memorial there on December 21. 

Among other moving tributes, you will see students at Syracuse 

University—current students—reading out the names of the victims including 35 Syracuse students who were returning home for 

Christmas. 

When I imagine Gaddafi left in power after facing down an uprising in Benghazi, together with his refusal to negotiate anything, I 

see the man capable of ordering the Pan Am 103 attack, not some 

humbled strawman—strongman. 

Instead of the fragile state that Libya has become, Libya most 

likely would resemble Syria today and most sides of the conflict 

could be strongly anti-Western. 

I acknowledge that the U.S. and our allies made some errors in 

handling the post-conflict environment in Libya. There should have 

been greater involvement with our Libyan partners from day one 

to help them establish a basic form of governance and security 

after the 2011 revolution. 

But the truth is Libya’s leaders didn’t want or know how to accept international assistance despite our efforts to help before the 

security breakdown started emerging and the civil war broke out 

on 2014 when delivering assistance became less viable. 

Now we face a situation where Libya is divided among many factions. The good news is that a unity government, the Government 

of National Accord, has been formed and there are ongoing efforts 

to help strengthen that government’s legitimacy and credibility. 

There is also a dialogue in place to solidify agreement for the 

unity government, and as my old boss, Ambassador Dennis Ross, 

says about the Middle East, when the parties are talking directly 

it strongly reduces the probability of violence. 

The process won’t be easy but at least it’s underway and the 

GNA has strong international backing from the West and the region. 

ISIS and terrorism emanating from Libya remains a current serious concern—the primary reason for holding this hearing. But 

here, there is actually good news to report. 

After ISIS built a so-called government—governate in Libya in 

the city of Sirte, establishing their Islamic police and executing 

28

clerics and other dissidents, local Libyan forces began an offensive 

against Sirte this summer. 

With the support of U.S. air power, Sirte has been virtually liberated from ISIS and we have proven repeatedly through air strikes 

and capture operations in Libya that the U.S. is capable of doing—

capable and interested in sustaining these sorts operations. 

The militias from Misrata suffered heavy casualties but they 

took on the mission themselves. Now, instead of ISIS directing its 

fighters to Libya, there’s no such governate to fall back to in North 

Africa. 

This is not to say that the threat has been vanquished. Terrorism from Libya will evolve and cells will likely be established in 

Libya’s southern desert or, more worrisome, the foreign fighters 

who made up the bulk of the Sirte contingent may repatriate, posing an especially serious threat to Tunisia. That is why we need 

to continue to expand our support to the region’s only democracy 

to emerge from the Arab Spring. 

In sum, Libya faces many serious challenges. But I must emphasize it is not Syria. It hasn’t seen nearly the scale of the violence 

in Aleppo alone. Nor is it Yemen. Both countries pose far greater 

threats to regional security and to U.S. interests in the homeland 

and overseas. 

I still believe Libya has a chance to realize the vision of the 2011 

revolution and we should do whatever we can together with our allies to assist the Libyans to achieve this goal. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fishman follows:]

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Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

My first question I want to ask is—and I know that you’re all 

experts on Libya but I want to get your feelings about Egypt because, obviously, Egypt has had problems in the Sinai. 

They’ve had a history in the past going back quite a few years 

now where they almost went to war or were at war with Libya in 

the past. 

But Islamic extremists in Libya would that cause a military or 

at least a diplomatic reaction from el-Sisi, in your opinion? Anybody? Doctor? 

Ms. FASANOTTI. Yes. I think that it’s possible that, for example, 

Egypt intervene in Libya and not so late. So at the moment, I 

think Egypt is acting any way in Libya—giving arms, weapons, 

money—and General Haftar has been many times in Cairo to have 

meetings with not only el-Sisi but all of the most important politicians of Egypt. 

And so I think that it’s very—Libya, it’s one of the—it’s the interest of Egypt at the moment and, yes, I think it’s possible that they 

can intervene, even in an open way, not just like nowadays. 

Mr. COOK. Well, I want to switch gears a little bit because we 

have a NATO conference coming up and some of us, both Democrats and Republicans, are part of that NATO Parliament. 

And in the past, the Mediterranean members of NATO have been 

very, very nervous about what went on, obviously, in Tunisia and 

then Libya. 

Now, I know that subject is going to come up. Do you have any 

advice on how we can handle that in terms of NATO being involved 

in this since they’re very, very concerned about the refugee situation but also different terrorist groups just to the south of them? 

Ms. FASANOTTI. Well, it’s difficult to answer to this question because it’s—the situation is so articulated and so complex that every 

answer would be not enough. 

But if you analyze—I think that we should start analyzing the 

situation right now in Cyrenaica, for example, which is strictly connected to Egypt, and in many months—not so many, Cyrenaica has 

now a kind of military government very similar to the el-Sisi one 

so which is, at the same time, different from the Tripolitania one—

the GNA. 

Mr. COOK. Let me jump around a little bit more because, you 

know, I, for one, and I think a lot of the members of the committee 

are very, very nervous about what’s going to happen about alQaeda and I think it’s going to be a huge target because it’s oilrich and I just—looking at a map and reading some of Churchill’s 

commentaries on World War II at El Alamein, which is Egypt. 

But the geography seems to be against the terrorists, if you will, 

in terms of outside allies and what have you. Can you comment on 

that as to how al-Qaeda, anybody, could develop there because 

they’ve obviously had a setback there, whether this will continue. 

Yes, sir. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, I think the fact of the matter is, going back 

to 2011 we’ve documented both al-Qaeda and then ISIS using 

Libya facilitation networks to influence the situation all the way 

through Egypt into the Sinai—in fact, arms shipments, that kind 

of thing, where they’ve actually been able to get through, even 

35

though the Egyptian government has cracked down on a number 

of occasions and I will give you one stunning example. 

There’s a guy named Hisham al-Ashmawy who is actually a 

former Egyptian special forces officer who is actually one of the biggest al-Qaeda operatives in North Africa. If you meet with the 

Egyptians, they know, certainly, very well who Ashmawy is because he’s actually targeted for assassination some senior Egyptian 

officials including the chief prosecutor for the Egyptian state was 

killed by him. 

This is a very dangerous guy. He operates in Libya all the way 

into Egypt and, in fact, the Islamic State blames him for kicking 

them out of Derna because Ashmawy actually organized the jihadi 

resistance in Derna to the Islamic State and actually, the Islamic 

State put out a most wanted poster for him because they want him 

dead. That’s how much—how dangerous he is. 

So here’s a guy and his network, who is both dangerous to both 

the Egyptian state and the Islamic State and is in fact an al-Qaeda 

operative. So I think that tells you quite a bit about what he’s 

doing. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

If you’d be so kind, if you have any background literature on that 

you could provide to the committee——

Mr. JOSCELYN. Sure. Absolutely. 

Mr. COOK [continuing]. And we can distribute to the members. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Egyptians will know very well who he is. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

All right. I’m going to turn to the ranking member, Congressman 

Keating, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

Earlier, this month General Haftar seized three oil fields—oil 

terminals—major oil terminals and they’re just about 50 miles east 

of Sirte. 

Now, what do you suppose—maybe Mr. Fishman could lead 

this—what do you suppose this might mean in terms of the peace 

process? 

What about the signed deal to resume oil exports, in particular, 

in terms of these actions and do you think there’s—I was in the—

I was in Tunisia just a few months ago discussing things with our 

Libyan team and I’m just curious about what your feelings are 

about General Haftar, just going on—you know, going along on his 

own or any option about him working with us instead of independently. 

I know there’s a lot of questions but basically his action this 

month—the oil terminals—what it means in terms of the deal to 

resume oil exports and how does it affect the peace process and do 

we ever get him to somehow cooperate? 

Mr. FISHMAN. Thank you. And it also relates to the—Mr. Cook’s 

questions about Egypt because Egypt has a prominent role in influencing General Haftar. 

To summarize and perhaps to simply—the greatest—the greatest 

asset to ridding Libya of terrorism, ISIS, al-Qaeda, whatever the 

threat may be, is to form a stable and unified government and 

that’s what our administration has been trying to do for the last 

3 years—plus years. 

36

That’s what the U.N.-backed process has been trying to do and 

that’s what our major European and regional allies have been trying to do with this GNA. 

The problem is with Haftar and some of his allies he’s been, shall 

we say, the main opponent of forming a unity government because 

he’s holding out for some high-ranking post or some regional position within that government and, obviously, the oil and the seizures of the oil fields give him more leverage to hold out further. 

So in summary, Haftar is an obstacle. It’s very hard to influence 

him. That’s especially since he’s made recent military progress. The 

problem is the Western factions—and we can go into this in more 

detail—are adamantly opposed to any of his contributions and the 

rubber meets the road where Egypt continues to support him. 

And so in brief, I just—we need to find a formula through our 

Egyptian allies to help negotiate some kind of——

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. Mr. Joscelyn. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. The question you asked, Congressman, is the one 

that I knew was going to be asked at this hearing and the one that 

I think is the trickiest one to answer for these reasons. 

I actually agree with a lot of what Mr. Fishman said. I think the 

simple fact of the matter is that Haftar is in fact one of the key 

guys who has taken the fight to the jihadis in Benghazi and Derna 

and elsewhere. 

They complain about him all the time so I know he’s doing a 

good job with killing them, you know. Unfortunately, I think his 

bombing campaigns also are indiscriminate at times, you know, 

and you can see areas of Benghazi and elsewhere that are sort of 

levelled. 

You know, we do see reports, too. For example, there was a helicopter that was down in Benghazi earlier this year. There were 

conflicting reports about whether or not it was actually shot down 

by the jihadis or crashed on its own accord. 

Be that as it may, it confirmed that French special forces and 

Western special forces are also involved with him. It’s not just the 

Egyptians but there are other Western forces that are there and so 

this becomes very tricky. 

But by the same token, on the other side of the coin, what Mr. 

Fishman has outlined I think is right—that he’s the political wild 

card and if you want a stable Libya in the future and you want 

to actually try and figure out a way to basically tamp down this 

and provide a long-term political solution for the jihadi insurgency, 

then he provides down side risks in that regard as well. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay. I just had a quick question, having just been 

there. 

Tunisia is extremely fragile. Could you tell me why you think, 

from a pro rata basis or per population member basis, that it has 

the highest participation in foreign terrorist fighters? 

Is it economic? I’ve heard on the ground different theories as to 

why that country of all, the last remaining democratic country 

there, why that’s so involved and so high a proportion of foreign 

terrorist fighters. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. It’s going back to the height of Iraq war. Both Tunisia and Libya on a per capita basis contributed more foreign 

37

fighters to the fight—jihadis—than basically anybody and it’s a 

complicated story as to why. 

I think radicalization, of course involves many different factors. 

But the bottom line is—and I wouldn’t underestimate this—there 

is a facilitation network in Tunisia that they were able to use to 

send these fighters at different various facilities and, you know, 

some of the mosques have been radicalized and have given in to 

this sort of ideology, and that was a—played a major role in this. 

Now, you know, just to go back to my original opening statement. 

Here in Tunisia is a great example of how AQIM, al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb and al-Qaeda play the Tunisian game. 

They had group called the Uqba bin Nafi battalion, which was 

in fact an al-Qaeda front group—AQIM front group—that fights 

there. 

They had some losses when it comes to the Islamic State but, 

again, this is another time when an organization didn’t use the alQaeda brand name, was actually answering up the chain of authority to al-Qaeda and, you know, initially was misidentified as just 

a local group. 

And the reason why I say that’s important is because we 

shouldn’t let them play the local game. Don’t allow al-Qaeda jihadis 

or any jihadis to pretend that they represent Tunisian or they represent Libyans or any of them. 

That’s why it’s important to expose them because their game is 

to say no, no, we represent the locals here and our—big part of our 

strategy has to be say, no, you don’t. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. COOK. Congressman Zeldin. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One of the many reasons why we have the greatest military in 

the world is our use of the after action report where we will very 

specifically give three sustains and three improves. 

As we look back on these last few years of U.S foreign policy in 

Libya, whether it is tactically, operationally, strategically, if you 

can share what’s working—specifically what’s working that we 

need to continue and/or specifically what are we not doing that we 

should be or maybe what we are doing but not doing it well. 

So I want to turn over my 41⁄2 minutes to you to talk specifically 

about what we are doing that’s working and what we are—what we 

need to improve upon. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Okay, I will start. 

You know, I don’t know if I can give you three and three but I’d 

say, you know, we do—we should find some encouragement in the 

recent military efforts in Sirte, for example. I mean, I think that 

that coalition that came is relying primarily on Libyan local forces 

from the Sirte and militiamen to take the fight to Islamic State 

that has worked to a large degree. 

I would say there that although the local Libyan forces are doing 

the bulk of the fighting on the ground, I’d point you to a Washington Post article that came out recently that said, for example, 

the American special forces are in fact there helping them and if 

you look at the press reporting very carefully this is sort of the secret of Libya that I don’t think is really emphasized enough. 

38

There are probably four Western nations that have special forces 

footprints inside Libya today fighting. That’s the U.S., the U.K., 

Italy, and France. And so this is very much a sort of special forces 

war and once you started thinking about it that way it becomes a 

little bit different. 

I think that we’ve been very good at sort of, you know, recently 

combatting Islamic State but my big concern is in the long run how 

do we have something—you know, if you go back to counter insurgency in Iraq and Syria, Congressman, where you just visited in 

Iraq, it’s clearing and then holding. 

And, you know, this gain over the long run, you know, clearing 

is a lot easier sometimes than is holding, you know, and this is 

where building long-term, you know, established political institutions becomes the key thing and I don’t know at this point—we’ve 

made some progress with the GNA—the Government National Accord—and others and they deserve more support. But I’m skeptical 

about what the long-term holds in that regard. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Anybody else like to add? 

Mr. FISHMAN. I think I agree with Thomas about the CT effort 

that has been made recently and I point back to the targeted capture operations against Abu Anas al-Libi and Abu Qatada who is 

responsible for the—one of the men responsible for the attack on 

our diplomatic facilities. 

That brings up a sensitive issue because I think where we’ve 

been less successful in interacting across the region in—particularly in conflict zones is gaining access to the right people to do the 

right political reporting and implementing programs that these 

fragile governments need and that, unfortunately, has played into 

the politics back here but also more—there are people in the government whose careers are built in serving in conflict zones and we 

visited them in the military and civilian roles. 

And one of our deficits in Libya particularly—you just mentioned 

that you visited our Libya team in Tunis. Well, they’re in Tunis 

and they don’t have access to—they have phone access to Libyans. 

They have access to Libyan expats. But they’re not on the ground. 

They’re not—they’re not feeling the heartbeat of Tripoli, and 

until we can solve this issue, I think, of getting our diplomats to 

find the right balance between serving in hardship and moving effectively, we are not going to be able to, I think, serve as effective 

interlocutors as we could. 

Our European counterparts do a better job of it because they’re 

more low profile. But, certainly, they don’t have the political clout 

that needs to be happening. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Doctor, we only have a few seconds left. Was there 

anything, very quickly, you wanted to add before we ran out of 

time? 

Ms. FASANOTTI. Yes. I think we should try to understand much, 

much better the tribes and the internal divisions of Libya because—can I—can I go? 

Mr. ZELDIN. Finish your sentence. Go ahead. 

Ms. FASANOTTI. Even though it’s perfectly right, the idea of controlling the terrain with military operations and so on, the problem 

still exists and it’s a problem that exists since centuries. And now 

39

without any kind of government it’s impossible to solve otherwise. 

So I think this. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you. Thank you for the extra time, Chairman. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

Congressman Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Well, a country of 6.5 million people, about 160 

tribes, 1,600 militias, about 90 percent of the economy is oil—plummeting oil prices, no central government. What a mess. I mean, 

really, what—and then you have the Islamic State there as well. 

These militias are made up, presumably, of—and it’s a majority 

Sunni Muslim country. So they’re probably al-Qaeda affiliates? Enlighten me. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I mean, the—the al-Qaeda groups are—you can 

distinguish them from the vast majority of the militias. The militias a lot of times—and this is where I objected to some of the alQaeda groups being called militias back in 2011 and 2012 because 

they weren’t. 

You know, they were—they were very insidious. No, there are a 

lot of militias that do local security work, which is what you’re 

talking about, which are a much more local power base and this 

is where Libya is a fractured society, as the doctor said. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Wait a minute. How do you—how do you distinguish between what militias do in Syria, for example, and militias 

that are a local security group? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, no. This is—this is part of the challenge, absolutely. But I would say this. What I’d say is of the—I think 1,600 

is the number you used, something along those lines. 

Mr. HIGGINS. That’s what——

Mr. JOSCELYN. Right. Somewhere along those lines. We—I mean, 

obviously, we don’t have perfect information on Libya. I’m not 

claiming I do. 

But we track it very carefully and I can tell you that, you know, 

we don’t see—you know, the vast majority of those militias as far 

as we can tell from open source information appear to be sort of 

local security groups. They’re not involved in sort of the jihadi insurgency activities. 

Now, Congressman, to your point, however, you know, going back 

through time, some of the militias did get entangled with Ansar alSharia and others and that’s where it became complex in Benghazi 

and elsewhere. 

But, you know, I think if you’d taken that 1,600 number, my 

guess is, and it’s an informed guess, most of those are local security 

forces. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. But it’s still a country of only 6.5 million 

people so it’s relatively small. It is—you don’t have a Shi’a-Sunni 

divide as you have in Syria, as you have in Iraq, because 97 percent are Sunni Muslims. 

What are the dividing lines? These tribes or——

Ms. FASANOTTI. It’s—can I? It’s a question of history and ancient 

times, and of course, the tribes are still—if you—if we analyze the 

tribes one century ago, we can see that they are still in the same 

place of the 1926, for example, and the frictions of those tribes are 

still the same because, for example, Misrata, which is a tribe of the 

40

Tripolitania, and Zintan, which everyone knows because Zintan militias, they are still fighting. So nothing has changed in this way. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Who finances the militias? 

Ms. FASANOTTI. Sorry? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Who finances the militias? 

Ms. FASANOTTI. Some—many, in many ways. They can finance——

Mr. HIGGINS. They, presumably, tax the people over which they 

are providing security for? 

Ms. FASANOTTI. Maybe. Yes. 

Mr. HIGGINS. So that’s a source of revenue? 

Ms. FASANOTTI. Yes. 

Mr. FISHMAN. Actually, I don’t mean to interrupt but——

Mr. HIGGINS. Jump in. 

Mr. FISHMAN [continuing]. Many of them are financed from the 

state itself and that’s the paradox of how to solve this problem because after the——

Mr. HIGGINS. Solve the problem to what end? 

Mr. FISHMAN. Getting the militias to form up in a coherent security service that answer to a state authority and instead this is 

called DDR, Defense, Deconstruction—or Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reconstruction—sorry—and it’s a common process in 

counter insurgency and it just hasn’t taken off in Libya in part because there were poor decisions early on by the Libyan government 

to incorporate the militias as, basically, state actors, and all the 

while they are earning their salaries effectively holding the state 

hostage to persist in this—the civil war. 

And so you’re—I just want to make one more point about your 

Islamist association with the militias. The civil war was initiated 

by a large faction that’s pro-Islamist and a large faction that’s antiIslamist. 

It’s implying things but in general and so I don’t know whether 

the percentage is 50/50, 60/40, 70/30, whatever. But a lot of those 

militias reject the premise of Islamists and those primarily are the 

ones who helped kick out ISIS from Sirte. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. Congressman Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fishman, you’re—are you with RAND now? 

Mr. FISHMAN. I’m an adjunct there so I’m not officially part of 

the organization. I just help them with various projects. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. And before doing that, you were at—were you 

at State? 

Mr. FISHMAN. I was at the International Institute for Strategic 

Studies. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. And before that State? 

Mr. FISHMAN. The NSC at the White House, then at State. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. And before that? 

Mr. FISHMAN. State. 

Mr. PERRY. What’s that? 

Mr. FISHMAN. State Department. 

Mr. PERRY. Before that State Department. 

Mr. FISHMAN. Mm-hmm. 

Mr. PERRY. How—when did you start at the State? 

41

Mr. FISHMAN. 2009. 

Mr. PERRY. 2009. Before that? 

Mr. FISHMAN. I was in graduate school at Washington Institute 

for Near East Policy. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. So I’m looking through your submission here 

and it says misrepresentation one—we should never have gone into 

Libya in the first place. The threat was not significant to the U.S. 

or the Libyan population. Gaddafi could have been placated. That’s 

misrepresentation one, right? 

Mr. FISHMAN. That’s what I submitted. 

Mr. PERRY. And then misrepresentation two—NATO and the 

U.S. abandoned Libya after the intervention. There should have 

been a stabilization force assembled to restore security. That’s two, 

correct? 

Mr. FISHMAN. Correct. 

Mr. PERRY. Makes it easier. So just out of curiosity, what was 

your position regarding the United States intervention, if you want 

to call it that, in Iraq? 

Mr. FISHMAN. In Iraq? 

Mr. PERRY. Yes. 

Mr. FISHMAN. You mean in 2003? 

Mr. PERRY. Yes. 

Mr. FISHMAN. I was—contemporaneously I was supportive of the 

intervention in Iraq. 

Mr. PERRY. I’m sorry. I didn’t—you what? 

Mr. FISHMAN. I supported it as a college student. 

Mr. PERRY. You supported the intervention in Iraq? 

Mr. FISHMAN. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. And so you’re supporting the intervention in 

Libya because you’re saying that there’s a misrepresentation. We 

should have never gone into Libya in the first place. 

But I’m wondering if there was a plan post-Gaddafi—if there was 

a plan for governance at State, at the National Security Council for 

the follow-on operation in Libya once Gaddafi was gone. 

Mr. FISHMAN. There were many, many discussions at both an 

agency level, interagency level, international level about how to 

help stabilize the Libyans. 

Mr. PERRY. But was there a plan? Not just a discussion but was 

there a plan? This is, what, 2000—this—essentially the overthrow 

of Gaddafi occurred fall of 2011, right? 

Mr. FISHMAN. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. So it had been going on——

Mr. FISHMAN. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. It had been leading up to that for some 

time but was there a—and we were involved and——

Mr. FISHMAN. We had stabilization planning documents and the 

nature of the fall of the regime led to the fact that those plans had 

to change on the fly. 

Mr. PERRY. Were you—were you privy to those plans? 

Mr. FISHMAN. Some, but not all of them. 

Mr. PERRY. So are you familiar with Presidential Study Directive 

11? 

Mr. FISHMAN. You have to remind me. 

42

Mr. PERRY. Okay. So it’s a classified document. You can find 

some open source information. I’m happy to provide what we know 

for you. 

But it’s essentially changing decades of United States policy in 

favour of authoritarian rulers such as Gaddafi for the sake of stability in the region in North Africa and the Middle East and 

partnering with the—with the local population in overthrowing 

those governments in—for the sake of democracy and partnering 

specifically with the Muslim Brotherhood in that effort. 

Are you familiar with that? Did that play into your——

Mr. FISHMAN. I don’t recall any such directive and I recall a similar study about supporting reform in the region. But it was certainly——

Mr. PERRY. Well, what drove who you partnered with or who you 

worked with? What determined that effort? How was that defined 

for you? 

Mr. FISHMAN. In the Libya circumstance? 

Mr. PERRY. Sure. Libya is one of—by the way, one of the target 

countries in Presidential Study Directive 11—Libya, Syria, Yemen, 

Egypt. All the failed ones are delineated and specifically named, according to open source. 

Mr. FISHMAN. I think that your—if I recall correctly, and it was 

several years ago, that document referred to how we can support 

gradual change for institutional reform in countries that you 

named who we thought assessed to be long-term threats to stability 

if you—if the authoritarian regimes continued as they were. 

And you saw as a result we didn’t push—we didn’t push Tunisia 

to rid themselves with Ben Ali. The Ben Ali regime portrayed it 

that those offenses——

Mr. PERRY. I’m sorry, sir. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

Congresswoman Kelly. 

Ms. KELLY. Doctor, in your statement you discuss restructuring 

the Libyan armed forces, national security forces and local police. 

How do you envision countries like the United States or other 

outside actors assisting in this effort without—I know there was a 

comment we do have special forces there without committing more 

and more and more troops. What military ideas do you have? 

Ms. FASANOTTI. Well, I—still, I don’t have any clear idea of this. 

Mine is just a suggestion, knowing the country, and so of course, 

in my opinion we should intervene in a more systematic way because you cannot—I think that security, like economy and politics, 

are profoundly restricted to the other. 

So I think that we have to invest, first of all, as I was telling 

before, in the security, of course, because if you don’t have security 

you cannot work. 

But on the other side, we have to invest even in all these incredible divisions that Libya has because Libya is not only what we 

talk right now about or we said about Islamist, non-Islamist, militias, different militias, militias in Tripoli, militias in Benghazi, in 

Derna and so on. But there are the tribes and then there are diversity at an ethnic level. 

43

So Arabs—because we talk about Shi’a and Sunni but here we 

have atavistic divisions in terms of ethnicities. So Arabs were the 

Bedouins and Berbers, Tuareg, Amazigh, and Toubou. 

So in this way, I think, yes, of course we should invest in the disarming, for example, because we cannot have, frankly, 6 million 

people and almost at minimum 20 million weapons. 

Ms. KELLY. Do you think outside forces, depending on who it is, 

would further divide Libya? Because you talk about all the tribes 

and the different groups already. Do you think it’s the United 

States that should intervene or——

Ms. FASANOTTI. This is a very difficult answer because Libyans 

are really particular, even in this way, because they do not want 

to be touched by anyone. 

They want, of course, to decide for themselves and I can understand them, of course. And so all—what I see is that all this continues in interventions open or—not opened by the international 

community. At the moment, did not obtain anything. So——

Ms. KELLY. Welcome to jump in. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Oh, geez. This is a very complex question. I don’t 

know—I don’t have all the answers. I will just say this. 

The—on the other side of the coin, when you talk about Western 

intervention or assistance, I will tell you what the al-Qaeda jihadis 

are doing, which is that they’re organizing themselves against that. 

And so what they in their propaganda, and we’ve seen this as a 

major theme, they’re holding up Omar Al-Mukhtar, who was—in 

the first half of the 20th century resisted Italian, you know, forces 

in Italy. 

Ms. FASANOTTI. Yes, a hero. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Yes, hero. What’s happening now is, and I see 

this in the videos—I see this in the magazines that they put out 

in Arabic and in different languages—al-Qaeda is trying to portray 

him as sort of this ancestor of theirs in Libya and they’re trying 

to rally forces around his image to say that they’re also resisting 

sort of Western interference. 

So, for example, when this French—this helicopter carrying three 

French special forces officers went down in Benghazi earlier this 

year, immediately that became a flashpoint where the so-called 

Grand Mufti of Libya—he’s not really but that’s how he—what he’s 

called—immediately comes out and says this proves that France 

and the West is intervening here in Libya and we need to rally our 

forces on the jihadi and Islamist side against any outside interference. 

And so it’s a complex dynamic. That’s only one factor, of course, 

in all of this. But I can tell you that there are people on the other 

side thinking about that and never to forget that. 

Mr. FISHMAN. Just in 2 seconds—that’s why our planning, as 

well as it was done, ran into easy or specific opposition by the interim leaders, as I noted at the beginning, whether it was on security issues or economic issues, and legally you can’t deploy troops 

for security reasons. 

You can’t deploy technical assistance if the government doesn’t 

sign an agreement and much like the Iraq issue with the withdrawal of our troops, we didn’t have agreement from the Libyans. 

Ms. KELLY. I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

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Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

What I want to do is thank the panellists for being here today. 

I want to thank the members and just want to also second my 

prayers and thoughts are with Judge Poe, the chairman, and hope 

that he gets better. 

And I want to thank the member from Buffalo and the one from 

Massachusetts for being civil today toward each other, knowing 

that there’s a big game at stake. Counsellors are standing by and 

I’ve given them a copy of Kumbaya, which they will memorize before the next hearing. 

But I do want to thank everybody, and right now this subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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