****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modificationandtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears onthe Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service andinthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TYRICE D. EDGE (AC 34903)
Alvord, Bear and Borden, Js.* Argued April 22—officially released May 20, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Damiani, J. [judgment]; Cremins, J. [motion

to withdraw plea].)
Carlos E. Candal, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant). EmilyGranerSexton, specialdeputyassistantstate’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was MaureenPlatt, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).Opinion PER CURIAM. The defendant, Tyrice D. Edge, appeals from thejudgment ofthe trial court dismissing his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The dispositive question is whether the court improperly concluded that it lackedjurisdiction to consider the merits ofthat motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The relevant facts are undisputed. In September, 2011, the defendant was arrested and charged with one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation ofGeneralStatutes § 53a-70, onecountofsexualassault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a, and one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21. At the time ofhis arrest, the defendant was on probation following his 2001 guiltypleato certain narcotics offenses, forwhich he received atotal effective sentence offifteenyears of imprisonment, execution suspended after eight years, with five years of probation.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant on May 11, 2012, pleaded guilty, pursuant to the Alford doctrine,1toonecountofriskofinjurytoachildinviolation of § 53-21 (a) (2). At the plea hearing, the court thoroughly canvassed the defendant concerning his plea, afterwhich it accepted the guiltyplea. Whenthe defendant then elected to waive his right to the preparation of a presentence investigation and report, the court proceeded to sentence the defendant, consistent with the terms ofthe plea agreement, to a term of eighteen years of incarceration, execution suspended after five years, with ten years of probation.
The defendant thereafter filed a motion to withdraw that guilty plea on May 21, 2012. The court heard argument on the motion on June 27, 2012, during which counsel for the defendant stated that ‘‘[e]ssentially, there are two bases forthe withdrawal ofthe plea. One isthat [the defendant] advisesmethathewasnotaware that he could not withdraw his plea once the plea was accepted. Additionally, and more importantly, [the defendant] wrote me a letter recently, indicating that at the time that he entered the pleas he was under the influence ofsome medication that was administered to him at Walker Correctional Institution, that he suffered from periods of anxiety, depression, confusion, delusions, disorientation, and many other side effects, making him unable to understand fully the ramifications of the guilty plea.’’ After noting various affirmative responses of the defendant and his counsel during the plea canvass, the court ultimately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the court dismissed the motion to withdraw, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the defendant claims that his plea ‘‘was not knowingly and intelligently entered’’ in violationof his right to due process. The state responds, as a threshold matter, that the court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the defendant’s motion to withdraw. We agree with the state. Adeterminationregarding atrial court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction is a question of law over which our review is plenary. State v. DeVivo, 106 Conn. App. 641, 644, 942A.2d 1066 (2008). Itiswellestablishedthat‘‘the jurisdiction of the sentencing court terminates once a defendant’s sentence has begun, and, therefore, that court may no longer take any action affecting a defendant’s sentence unless it expresslyhas been authorized to act.’’ Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 30, 37, 779 A.2d 80 (2001). Likewise, Practice Book § 39-26 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] defendant may notwithdraw his orherpleaafterthe conclusion of the proceeding at which the sentence was imposed.’’ As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘once

adefendant’s sentence is executed, the trial courtlacks jurisdiction to entertain any claims regarding the validity of that plea in the absence of a statute or rule of practice to the contrary.’’ State v. Das, 291 Conn. 356, 368, 968 A.2d 367 (2009); see also State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 764, 776 n.14, 894 A.2d 963 (2006) (‘‘Practice Book § 39-26merelyrecognizesthegeneralorcommonlaw grant of jurisdiction, regulates the procedure by which that jurisdiction may be invoked, and acknowledges that, absent a legislative grant, jurisdiction does not continue indefinitely, once invoked, but, rather, terminateswiththe conclusion oftheproceeding atwhich the sentence is imposed’’). This bedrock principle applies with equal force to motions to withdraw guilty pleas predicated, like the one in the present case, on an alleged deprivation of a defendant’s ‘‘constitutional right to due process of law because his original plea

. . . was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary

. . . .’’ State v. Dyous, 307 Conn. 299, 334–35, 53 A.3d 153 (2012). Bound by that precedent, we conclude that the court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction

overthe defendant’smotiontowithdrawhis guiltyplea.
The judgment is affirmed.

* The listing ofjudges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

1 ‘‘Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt

. . . but consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of proceeding to trial.

. . . A guilty plea under theAlford doctrine is ajudicial oxymoron in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry ofa guilty plea nevertheless.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 285 Conn. 556, 558 n.2, 941 A.2d 248 (2008).