ARMY PACIFIC 

PATHWAYS

Comprehensive 

Assessment and 

Planning Needed to 

Capture Benefits 

Relative to Costs and 

Enhance Value for 

Participating Units

Report to Congressional Committees

November 2016

GAO-17-126

United States Government Accountability Office

Revised November 30, 2016, to add additional language to the highlights page from the 

body of the report, in order to provide more context about the costs of Pacific Pathways. 

The corrected section should read: “For fiscal year 2015, the three Pathway operations 

cost a total of $34.5 million—about twice as much as the combined costs of those same 

named exercises prior to Pathways. However, the forces and equipment provided under 

Pathways were more than double in many categories. USARPAC officials stated that 

Pathways builds readiness at multiple command echelons; increases exercise 

complexity for partners, such as by providing more equipment to exercises; supports the 

rebalance of forces to the Pacific with a persistent forward presence; and allows the 

Army to experiment with capabilities.”
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-126, a report to 

congressional committees

November 2016

ARMY PACIFIC PATHWAYS

Comprehensive Assessment and Planning 

Needed to Capture Benefits Relative to Costs 

and Enhance Value for Participating Units

What GAO Found

U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), the Army’s component command in the AsiaPacific region, has identified Pacific Pathways costs and taken steps to assess 

some associated benefits, but it has not conducted an analysis that fully 

assesses the initiative’s benefits relative to costs. Pacific Pathways is an initiative 

that combines three to four exercises with partner nations—exercises that were 

previously conducted as stand-alone events—into an integrated operation to 

strengthen relationships with allies and build readiness by rehearsing 

deployment tasks (see figure below). For fiscal year 2015, the three Pathway

operations cost a total of $34.5 million—about twice as much as the combined

costs of those same named exercises prior to Pathways. However, the forces 

and equipment provided under Pathways were more than double in many 

categories. USARPAC officials stated that Pathways builds readiness at multiple 

command echelons; increases exercise complexity for partners, such as by 

providing more equipment to exercises; supports the rebalance of forces to the 

Pacific with a persistent forward presence; and allows the Army to experiment 

with capabilities. Units that have participated in Pacific Pathways have assessed 

some of these benefits, but USARPAC has not conducted a comprehensive

analysis that demonstrates the initiative’s value, which could better inform 

Department of Defense decision-makers as they consider budgetary trade-offs. 

Comparison between the Concepts of Operation for Stand-Alone Exercises Prior to Pacific 

Pathways and Exercises Conducted as Part of Pacific Pathway 16-1 

The Army has taken steps to plan for Pacific Pathways as a cohesive operation, 

but challenges remain in synchronizing planning efforts and incorporating 

training objectives of supporting units, such as units that provide transportation

support to the operations. USARPAC has developed some Pathways-specific 

planning guidance, among other things, but it continues to experience challenges 

in synchronizing planning across participating organizations and in ensuring that 

decisions made for individual exercises are aligned with the broader objectives of 

the Pathway operation. Also, USARPAC has not established an approach to 

seek out and integrate supporting units’ training objectives in the design of

Pacific Pathway operations. Without taking action on these issues, USARPAC 

may continue to experience challenges executing the Pathway operations as 

cohesive operations and could miss opportunities to enhance the value of Pacific 

Pathways as a venue for real-world training across the region.

View GAO-17-126. For more information, 

contact Cary Russell at (202) 512- 5431 or 

russellc@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

In accordance with the shift in U.S. 

strategy and rebalance of military 

forces to the Asia-Pacific, USARPAC 

has turned its focus toward rebuilding 

its expeditionary readiness. To this 

end, USARPAC launched the Pacific 

Pathways initiative in 2014, in which it 

deploys a battalion-sized task force for 

approximately 90 days to conduct a 

series of exercises in the Asia-Pacific

for the purpose of enhancing readiness 

and strengthening relationships with 

allies, among other things. As of 

September 2016, USARPAC had

completed six Pathway operations.

House Report 114-102 accompanying 

a bill for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016

included a provision for GAO to review 

the Pacific Pathways initiative. This 

report examines the extent to which 

the Army has (1) assessed the costs 

and benefits of Pacific Pathways; and 

(2) synchronized plans and 

incorporated training objectives of 

supporting units to maximize the 

training value for all participating Army 

forces. GAO reviewed documents and 

data and interviewed relevant officials 

involved in Pacific Pathways.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that USARPAC 

conduct a comprehensive analysis of 

Pathways’ benefits in light of its costs, 

better synchronize planning, and 

integrate supporting units’ training 

objectives. DOD partially concurred 

with the first recommendation and 

concurred with the other two. DOD 

said that USARPAC understands the

strategic benefits and a comprehensive 

analysis is not needed. GAO believes 

that this recommendation is still valid, 

as discussed in this report.
Page i GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Letter 1

Background 5

Army Has Identified Pacific Pathways Costs and Benefits, but Has 

Not Comprehensively Assessed Them 11

The Army Faces Challenges in Synchronizing Planning for Pacific 

Pathways as a Cohesive Operation and Incorporating the 

Training Objectives of Supporting Units 25

Conclusions 38

Recommendations for Executive Action 39

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39

Appendix I Departments and Organizations That GAO Interviewed 44

Appendix II Key Department of Defense (DOD) Organizations That Have 

Participated in Pacific Pathways 46

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 47

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 53

Tables

Table 1: Pacific Pathway Operations Conducted as of September 

2016 9

Table 2: Cost Comparison of Fiscal Year 2015 Pacific Pathway 

and Pre-Pacific Pathway Exercises 12

Table 3: Force Package Comparison of Pacific Pathway and PrePacific Pathway Exercises 13

Table 4: Assessment of Pacific Pathway 15-1 Activities That 

Accomplished Mission Command Tasks 17

Figures

Figure 1: Comparison between the Concepts of Operation for 

Stand-Alone Exercises Prior to Pacific Pathways and 

Exercises Conducted as Part of Pacific Pathway 16-1 8

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Figure 2: Helicopters Loaded on Vessel during Pacific Pathway 

16-1 16

Figure 3: Examples of Training Benefits Identified by Officials in 

Sustainment Units and Operational Headquarters during 

Pacific Pathway 16-1 19

Figure 4: Comparison between Force Package Sizes for Foal 

Eagle/Key Resolve Before versus During Pacific 

Pathways 20

Figure 5: Timeline of Key Planning Events for Pacific Pathway 16-

2 33

Figure 6: Key DOD Organizations That Have Participated in 

Pacific Pathways 46

Abbreviations

BCT Brigade Combat Team

DOD Department of Defense

USARPAC U.S. Army Pacific

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Page 1 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

November 14, 2016

Congressional Committees

In accordance with the shift in U.S. strategy and rebalance of military 

forces to the Asia-Pacific region that was first set forth in 2011,1 the Army 

has increased its presence in the Pacific by about 30,000 soldiers and 

civilians, and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)—a component command of 

U.S. Pacific Command—has turned its focus toward rebuilding its 

expeditionary readiness and deployment capabilities.2 USARPAC 

identified its exercise program with partner nations—which according to 

USARPAC had atrophied for almost a decade due to force requirements 

in Iraq and Afghanistan—as both a vehicle for innovation and an 

opportunity for U.S. Army forces to re-engage in the region through a 

more robust presence. To this end, USARPAC launched the Pacific 

Pathways initiative in 2014, combining multiple pre-existing exercises with 

partner nations into integrated operations—each operation referred to as 

a Pathway—for the purposes of enhancing the readiness of participating 

forces, strengthening relationships with allies, and providing a crisis 

response option to the combatant commander. Additionally, according to 

USARPAC and I Corps officials,3 Pacific Pathways is intended, in part, to 

serve as a rehearsal for how the Army may operate in the Pacific during a 

contingency, including how it integrates with joint and international 

partners and moves its forces. As of September 2016, USARPAC had

completed six Pacific Pathway operations to date, and it planned to 

complete a seventh in October 2016. Each Pathway operation deploys a 

battalion-sized task force—or about 400 to 900 personnel—for

approximately 90 days to conduct a series of exercises. The capabilities 

of these Pacific Pathways task forces (hereinafter referred to as the “task 

 1

The White House, Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament (Nov. 17, 

2011).

2

U.S. Pacific Command is one of six geographic Unified Combatant Commands of the 

United States Armed Forces. The command’s mission includes enhancing stability in the 

Asia-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, responding to contingencies, and 

deterring aggression, among other activities. 

3 I Corps is an operational headquarters under the command of U.S. Army Pacific that is 

tasked with planning Pacific Pathways.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

forces”) are tailored to the requirements of the exercises that occur within 

the Pathway operation, and are structured around a brigade combat team 

headquarters and a maneuver battalion.4 They also include other units 

with specialized capabilities, such as aviation or engineering units, 

depending on the types of exercises that will be conducted in the 

operation. For example, one of the exercises conducted within a Pathway 

operation included a live fire training event with Army and Thai forces, as 

well as other training activities focused on humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief.

House Report 114-102 accompanying a bill for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 includes a provision for us to 

review the Pacific Pathways initiative.5 For this report, we examined the 

extent to which the Army has (1) assessed the costs and benefits of 

Pacific Pathways; and (2) synchronized plans and incorporated training 

objectives of supporting units to maximize the training value of Pacific 

Pathways for all participating Army forces.

To determine the extent to which the Army has assessed the costs and 

benefits of Pacific Pathways, we analyzed and compared USARPAC cost 

and force package (that is, personnel and equipment) data, examined 

budgetary documentation, and reviewed briefings and white papers on 

Pacific Pathways that detailed elements of the concept and individual 

Pathway operations. We used exercise cost and force package data from 

2013, which was the year immediately prior to the execution of the first 

Pathway in 2014, and we compared them to data for the same named 

exercises that occurred within Pacific Pathways in 2015. We assessed 

the reliability of the cost and force package data by interviewing 

knowledgeable officials about the data and the steps that they had taken 

to verify their accuracy. We determined that the data were sufficiently 

 4

Brigade combat teams are the Army’s smallest combined arms units that can be 

committed independently. These units consist of roughly 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers and can 

be one of three types—infantry, armor, and Stryker. Each of these brigades contains a 

headquarters element, which provides command, control, and supervision of the tactical 

operations of the brigade, and multiple battalions. Maneuver battalions are units of roughly 

500 to 900 soldiers that are designed to employ forces in an operational area to achieve a 

position of advantage. 

5

See H.R. Rep. No. 114-02 at 116-117 (2015) accompanying H.R. 1735, a bill for the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016.
Page 3 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

reliable for the purpose for providing contextual information related to 

costs and the size of exercise force packages. We also reviewed unit 

readiness data, unit briefings, and the I Corps’ readiness assessment 

framework for Pacific Pathways, and we compared assessment efforts to 

criteria contained in the Army’s guidance on conducting cost benefit 

analyses.6 In reviewing the potential benefits, we analyzed and compared 

the mission and capabilities of the Pacific Pathways task forces and 

Marine Expeditionary Units to identify potential overlap, duplication, and 

key differences between the two. Finally, we interviewed relevant 

command and unit officials throughout the Pacific theater who had key 

roles in planning for and executing operations to discuss these issues and 

corroborate our findings, including officials from USARPAC, I Corps, 25th 

Infantry Division, Eighth Army, the brigades that had completed five of the 

seven Pathway operations at the time of our review, sustainment units 

that had supported the operations, and U.S. embassy representatives 

based in host nations that had been involved in Pacific Pathways.

To determine the extent to which the Army has synchronized plans and 

incorporated training objectives of supporting units to maximize the 

training value of Pacific Pathways for all participating Army forces, we 

reviewed command guidance, orders, standard operating procedures, 

and other planning documents, such as rehearsal of concept and courseof-action briefings. We also conducted a content analysis of command 

and unit after-action reviews from each of the Pacific Pathway operations 

starting with the first (Pacific Pathways 14-1) and ending with the most 

recently completed operation as of July 2016 (Pacific Pathways 16-1) to 

identify challenges experienced by units during the planning and 

execution of each Pathway operation. In conducting this analysis, we 

developed a list of categories relevant to the planning and execution of 

Pacific Pathways, and we then reviewed the after-action reviews by 

operation to identify challenges. We placed the challenges in the 

appropriate categories for each operation and tracked them to determine 

whether any of had occurred continuously over the course of multiple 

operations. Additionally, we reviewed lessons learned documents, 

briefings on the Army Warfighting Assessment, and other papers on 

Pacific Pathways. We compared the Pacific Pathways planning process 

 6

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Cost and Economics), U.S. Army 

Cost Benefit Analysis Guide, Version 3.1 (Apr. 24, 2013). 
Page 4 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

to criteria found in Army guidance on operational planning, and to 

standards for internal control related to establishing an organizational 

structure, assigning responsibility, and delegating authority, in order to 

determine whether there were gaps in planning.7 We also used criteria 

from a GAO report that identifies core principles for effective stakeholder 

participation, as drawn from literature reviews and policies from leading 

federal agencies, to identify whether there were any gaps in the process 

by which USARPAC incorporates the Pacific Pathways’ supporting units 

as stakeholders in the operations and seeks out and integrates their 

training objectives.8 Finally, we interviewed command and unit officials 

throughout the Pacific theater who had key roles in planning for and 

executing Pacific Pathway operations to discuss these issues and 

corroborate our findings, including officials from USARPAC, I Corps, 25th 

Infantry Division, Eighth Army, brigades that had completed five of the 

seven Pathway operations at the time of our review, and sustainment 

units that had supported the operations. See appendix I for a listing of the 

organizations we met with during this review.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to November 2016 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 7

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication 5-0, The Operations 

Process (May 2012). GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO-14-704G (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014)).

8

GAO, Fisheries Management: Core Principles and a Strategic Approach Would Enhance 

Stakeholder Participation in Developing Quota-Based Programs, GAO-06-289 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006). This report identifies core principles for effective 

stakeholder participation, as drawn from literature reviews and policies from leading 

federal agencies in stakeholder participation. We are applying these criteria to the process 

through which supporting units—considered to be stakeholders in Pacific Pathways—are 

involved in Pacific Pathways planning and design.
Page 5 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

U.S. Pacific Command is one of the Department of Defense’s six 

geographic combatant commands and is responsible for a variety of 

functions across the Asia-Pacific region, including planning for and 

conducting missions such as security cooperation, humanitarian 

operations, and combat operations.9 Its area of responsibility comprises 

36 nations, including India, the Philippines, and Thailand, and stretches 

from the waters off the west coast of the United States to the western 

border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole. U.S. Pacific 

Command is supported by component commands—USARPAC, U.S. 

Pacific Fleet, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, and U.S. Marine Forces Pacific—

which, along with each of the military services, are responsible for 

organizing, training, and equipping their forces to execute U.S. Pacific 

Command operational requirements.

To address U.S. Pacific Command operational requirements, the Army 

has assigned more than 100,000 soldiers to the Asia-Pacific region, 

including USARPAC; one field army—Eighth Army—in South Korea; one 

Corps headquarters—I Corps—in Washington State; two division 

headquarters—25th Infantry Division and 2nd Infantry Division—in Hawaii 

and South Korea, respectively; and numerous brigade combat teams.

According to an Army regulation on exercises, military exercises seek to 

simulate wartime operations in realistic, battle-focused settings in order to 

train units for combat and supporting organizations to mobilize, deploy, 

and sustain these forces.10 Army forces participate in joint and multilateral 

exercises that are directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, the 

Army’s major commands, including USARPAC, develop and execute 

Army-specific exercises. According to USARPAC documentation, 

USARPAC conducts about 25 large-scale exercises in the Asia-Pacific 

 9

The other five geographic combatant commands are U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central 

Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Southern 

Command. 

10Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-28, Army Exercises, (Dec. 

9, 1997).

Background

Army Forces in the Pacific

Planning and Funding for 

Military Exercises
Page 6 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

region on an annual basis, including those conducted as part of Pacific 

Pathway operations.

Joint, multilateral, and Army-specific exercises—including those are that 

are executed as part of a Pacific Pathway operation—are to be planned, 

executed, and evaluated through the Joint Event Life Cycle. The Joint 

Event Life Cycle is a 12- to 18-month process that includes multiple 

planning conferences, such as a concept development conference, initial 

planning conference, mid-planning conference, and final planning 

conference. Each successive planning event further develops the concept 

of the exercise and, according to USARPAC officials, grows the planning 

audience, which can include partner nations. For example, the concept 

development conference is intended to identify the training requirements 

and exercise objectives, while the mid-planning conference is to approve 

the plans and training developed through and between the preceding 

conferences. According to USARPAC officials, each exercise has specific 

objectives that are aligned with U.S. Pacific Command theater security 

goals. A primary training audience is identified for each exercise, and the 

training objectives of the exercise are to be tailored to that audience 

through collaboration between USARPAC and the host nation. With 

regard to Pacific Pathways, USARPAC officials stated that the task force 

is the primary training audience for the exercises that occur within each 

Pathway operation, although other units that participate may also get 

training value. Each exercise can include multiple training events 

involving the host nation and the U.S. training unit, such as live fire events 

that integrate multiple combat and support functions, or computerassisted training to test command and control functions.

Army exercises are funded through a combination of Army exercise 

funding and—for those joint exercises that are directed by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff—joint exercise and transportation funding, which can be 

used to cover specific incremental expenses for Army units that are 

participating in the exercises, such as transportation for people and 

equipment to the exercises, or travel costs for personnel to attend 

planning conferences. Participating units can also use operation and 

maintenance funding that is designated for their training and readiness to 

fund some exercise costs associated directly with their participation, such 
Page 7 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

as the cost of maintenance on their equipment.11 According to USARPAC 

officials, units would expend this funding for training and maintenance 

regardless of their participation in Pacific Pathways.

USARPAC’s stated objectives for Pacific Pathways are to use existing 

joint, multilateral, and Army-specific military exercises to improve and 

sustain readiness, shape the Asia-Pacific region through increased 

engagement, and enhance the capabilities of foreign partners’ land forces 

in support of U.S. Pacific Command’s theater security objectives. In 

addition, Pacific Pathways is designed to provide USARPAC with 

opportunities to address many of the Army Warfighting Challenges, 

including how to develop situational understanding, how to shape security 

environments, and how to ensure interoperability in a joint and 

multinational environment.12 Each Pathway operation links a series of 

three to four of these pre-existing exercises into a single operation (see 

right side of figure 1 below). Prior to Pacific Pathways, these exercises 

were conducted as stand-alone events where a single unit would deploy 

to conduct one exercise and then return to its home station, as seen on 

the left side of figure 1 below.

 11Operation and maintenance appropriations fund Army installations and units, including 

the costs of military exercises and other training. Within the operation and maintenance 

appropriation, funding for exercises is specifically provided through an Army account 

designated for international support. 

12The Army Warfighting Challenges are problems identified by the Army, the solutions to 

which are intended to improve the combat effectiveness of the current and future force. 

Combining Exercises 

within Pacific Pathways to 

Improve Readiness and 

Increase Engagement
Page 8 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Figure 1: Comparison between the Concepts of Operation for Stand-Alone Exercises Prior to Pacific Pathways and Exercises 

Conducted as Part of Pacific Pathway 16-1

As of September 2016, USARPAC had completed six Pacific Pathway 

operations to date, as shown in table 1 below, and it planned to complete 

a seventh operation by October 2016. The first was the proof of concept 

in 2014, followed by three Pathways in 2015 and two as of September 

2016. A third Pathway operation for 2016 is being executed from June 

through October 2016. According to USARPAC documentation, 

USARPAC intends to conduct three Pathway operations each year, going 

forward. According to command officials and documentation, future 

Pacific Pathway operations could include different combinations of 

exercises and partner nations, as well as other U.S. military services, 

depending on the objectives for the Pathway operation.
Page 9 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Table 1: Pacific Pathway Operations Conducted as of September 2016

Pacific Pathway Unit Leading Task 

Force and Number of 

Personnela

Exercises

14

Aug. – Nov. 2014

2-2 Stryker Brigade 

Combat Team (BCT)

~820 personnel

Keris Strike (Malaysia)

Garuda Shield (Indonesia)

Orient Shield (Japan)

15-1

Jan. – May 2015

2-25 Stryker BCT

~880 personnel

Cobra Gold (Thailand)

Foal Eagle (South Korea)

Balikatan (Philippines)

15-2

Jun. – Oct. 2015

3-25 Infantry BCT

~840 personnel

Hamel (Australia)

Garuda Shield (Indonesia)

Keris Strike (Malaysia)

15-3

June-July, Aug. – Nov. 2015

1-25 Stryker BCT

~420 personnel

Khan Quest (Mongolia)

Orient Shield (Japan)

Hoguk (South Korea)

16-1

Dec. 2015 – May 2016

1-2 Stryker BCT

~835 personnel

Cobra Gold (Thailand)

Foal Eagle (South Korea)

Balikatan (Philippines)

16-2

May – Sept. 2016

2-2 Stryker BCT

~700 personnel

Hanuman Guardian 

(Thailand)

Salaknib (Philippines)

Garuda Shield (Indonesia)

Keris Strike (Malaysia)

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army Pacific data. | GAO-17-126

a

In addition to the brigades identified here, other units and personnel also provided enabling 

capabilities to the task forces.

The brigades charged with leading the task forces complete training on 

their mission-essential tasks prior to deploying for Pacific Pathways, 

including a rotation through one of the Army’s Combat Training Centers.

This approach to pre-Pathways training was identified as part of the 

Pacific Pathways concept, but a USARPAC Pacific Pathways concept 

paper has indicated that future Pathway operations could use home 

station or other training venues to prepare for the operation. The task 

forces deploy with a package of their own equipment, which is also 

tailored to the requirements of the exercises.

While all of the Pathway operations move equipment to the exercises via 

ship, the type of vessel used to move the equipment varies. For example, 

Pacific Pathway 15-1 and Pacific Pathway 16-1 used dedicated organic 

sealift vessels to move the exercise equipment throughout the region, but 

Training and Movement of 

Pacific Pathways Task 

Forces
Page 10 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Pacific Pathway 16-2 used a chartered commercial vessel.13 Other Pacific 

Pathway operations have used an Army logistics support vessel or 

commercial liners to move equipment.14 According to command officials 

and documentation, personnel participating in Pacific Pathways travel to 

the exercises via air, with the exception of a small number of personnel 

who travel aboard the vessel to assist with maintenance when the 

Pathway operation utilizes a military ship to move the exercise 

equipment.

Each Pacific Pathway operation involves numerous commands and units. 

USARPAC is responsible for designing the Pacific Pathway operations, 

including setting strategic objectives, designating which exercises will be 

a part of each Pathway operation, and planning for transportation of 

equipment. I Corps has been tasked by USARPAC with planning the 

operations, including conducting mission analysis to determine how best 

to meet the operation’s requirements, issuing operation orders, and 

coordinating elements of sustainment. Different operational headquarters 

or commands within or assigned to the Asia Pacific region, such as 25th 

Infantry Division and U.S. Army Alaska, provide mission command for the 

operation as the task force moves throughout different locations in the 

region.15

Pacific Pathways also involves multiple commands and units that provide 

sustainment and logistical support to the task force, including some that 

fall outside of USARPAC’s organizational structure. For instance, U.S. 

 13Organic sealift vessels are vessels that are owned by the U.S. government and are 

capable of large-scale transportation of equipment and supplies by sea. Military Sealift 

Command officials said that they have dedicated organic sealift vessels to support certain 

Pathway operations because the requirements of those operations necessitated the use of 

such vessels. 

14The Army’s logistics support vessel is designed to give the Army strategic capability to 

deliver its own vehicles and cargo within a theater of operations. It is the largest watercraft 

in the Army fleet, is equipped with front and rear ramps that allow for expedited loading 

and off-loading, has the ability to load any vehicle in the Army’s inventory, and can hold up 

to 15 M1 Abrams battle tanks. 

15According to Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 6-0, Mission Command (May 17, 

2012), mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander 

using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to 

empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.

Organizations Involved in 

Pacific Pathways
Page 11 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Transportation Command and its subordinate commands provide 

transportation and port handling support to the Pacific Pathway 

operations. USARPAC officials stated that the other U.S. Pacific 

Command component commands have not been directly involved in the 

planning or design of Pacific Pathways, although they have participated in 

joint exercises that occur as part of the Pathway operations and, in some 

instances, have utilized the Pacific Pathways vessels to move some of 

their equipment to the joint exercises that comprised that operation. 

USARPAC officials said that identifying opportunities for joint integration 

will be an objective in the design for future Pacific Pathway operations. 

See appendix II for more detail about many of the commands and units 

that have participated in Pacific Pathways.

USARPAC has identified Pacific Pathways costs and has taken steps to

assess some of the associated benefits, but it has not conducted an 

analysis that fully assesses the program’s benefits relative to its costs, to 

capture its value for decision makers. USARPAC and other Army officials 

have stated that Pacific Pathways provides certain benefits, including the 

ability to provide a more robust force package to exercises in the AsiaPacific region and to train multiple organizations and commands by 

conducting a 90-day expeditionary operation—as opposed to a series of 

stand-alone foreign military exercises conducted by several different, and 

smaller, units—and they have taken some steps to assess some of the 

program’s benefits. However, USARPAC has not conducted a 

comprehensive analysis that demonstrates the initiative’s value, or its 

benefits in light of its costs for external organizations. 

USARPAC has identified its costs for Pacific Pathways and the Army has 

dedicated some funding for the program, although its current funding has 

fallen short of USARPAC’s requests. USARPAC initially estimated that 

each Pathway operation would cost about $13.1 million on average, or 

about $39.3 million annually under its plan to conduct three Pathways a 

year. To date, the cost of individual Pacific Pathway operations has 

varied, but the total cost of all three operations in 2015 was about $34.5 

million. This was about $18.1 million more than the cost of the same 

named exercises prior to Pacific Pathways having been initiated, or about 

twice as much as the prior exercises, as shown in table 2 below.

Army Has Identified 

Pacific Pathways 

Costs and Benefits, 

but Has Not 

Comprehensively 

Assessed Them

USARPAC Has Identified 

Pacific Pathways Costs 

and Requested Funding 

for the Program
Page 12 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Table 2: Cost Comparison of Fiscal Year 2015 Pacific Pathway and Pre-Pacific 

Pathway Exercises

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army Pacific data. | GAO-17-126

a

The cost data for these exercises derive from 2013—the last complete year before Pacific Pathways 

began in 2014— for all exercises except Orient Shield, which uses 2012 cost data.

b

U.S. Army Pacific did not participate in these exercises in 2013. Orient Shield was canceled due to 

sequestration, and prior to 2015, Hoguk was a South Korean unilateral exercise. As a result, this 

table uses 2012 exercise cost data for Orient Shield and does not include Hoguk costs prior to Pacific 

Pathways. However, the exercise cost of Hoguk in 2015, under Pacific Pathways, was roughly 

$64,500—a small portion of the total cost.

The additional cost of the exercises under Pacific Pathways is driven by 

the fact that the initiative, by design, provides a larger force package, 

which comes with associated transportation costs. For example, the cost 

of transportation alone for Pacific Pathway 15-1 was $9.4 million, roughly 

equal to the total cost of the same named exercises in 2013. The force 

package provided to these exercises in 2015 was much larger—more 

than double in most categories—than what had been sent to the 

exercises prior to Pacific Pathways, as table 3 below shows. While Pacific 

Pathways carries an additional cost, based on USARPAC’s estimates, it 

would have been more costly to transport the Pacific Pathway 15-1 force 

package using the previous transportation model of conducting each 

2015 Pacific Pathway 

Exercises 

Exercise Cost 

under Pacific 

Pathways

(in $millions)

Exercise Cost 

Prior to Pacific 

Pathwaysa

(in $millions)

Cost Difference

(in $millions)

15-1: Cobra Gold, Foal 

Eagle/Key Resolve, and 

Balikatan $18.8 $9.4 $9.4

15-2: Keris Strike, Garuda 

Shield, and Talisman 

Sabre $9.4 $5.9 $3.5

15-3: Khan Quest, Orient 

Shieldb, and Hogukb $6.3 $1.2 $5.2

Total cost $34.5 $16.5 $18.1
Page 13 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

exercise as a stand-alone event and using a commercial liner as the 

primary mode of transport.16

Table 3: Force Package Comparison of Pacific Pathway and Pre-Pacific Pathway Exercises

Forces

Stryker 

Vehicles

Other 

Vehicles and 

Rolling 

Equipment Helicopters

Unmanned 

Aerial 

Vehicles

Containers of 

Equipment

Primary 

Mode of 

Equipment 

Transport

Total Cost

(in $millions)

Pacific Pathway 15-1 exercises

Cobra Golda

880b

0 0 0 0 0

Dedicated 

organic sealift 

vessel

$18.8

Foal 

Eagle/Key 

Resolve 34 220 11 1 114

Balikatan 18 147 9 1 67

Fiscal year 2013 exercises

Cobra Gold 350 0 0 2 0 24

Commercial 

linerc

$9.4

Foal 

Eagle/Key 

Resolve 58 0 4 0 0 10

Commercial 

liner

Balikatan 329 0 17 0 0 21

Commercial 

liner

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army Pacific data. | GAO-17-126

Note: There are some smaller items and associated modes of equipment transport, such as repair 

parts shipped via Fedex, that are not represented in this table.

a

The vessel used for Pacific Pathway 15-1 hit a reef en route to Cobra Gold and U.S. Army Pacific 

was unable to use the equipment on the vessel for that exercise.

b

This represents the number of personnel that deployed in the task force for Pacific Pathway 15-1 and 

is not specific to any of the three exercises conducted with the operation. 

c

A commercial liner is a type of sealift in which commercial carriers offer regularly scheduled vessel 

transportation to the general public.

 16USARPAC developed a series of hypothetical transportation scenarios that estimated 

how much it would cost to transport the larger force packages that it deployed to exercises 

under Pacific Pathways using the prior transportation model of conducting each exercise 

as a stand-alone event. For instance, in one of these scenarios, transporting the amount 

and type of equipment used in Pacific Pathway 15-1 would have been six times as costly if 

it had been transported using the legacy transportation model rather than a dedicated 

organic sealift vessel, as it was in Pacific Pathway 15-1. However, according to 

USARPAC’s analysis, it is unlikely that USARPAC would have shipped this much 

equipment using the legacy transportation model because of the high cost. 
Page 14 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Some additional costs incurred during a Pacific Pathway operation, such 

as meals ready to eat or maintenance costs, are not factored into the 

tables above. For example, participating unit officials told us that when 

they use their equipment over the course of a Pathway they are 

increasing the maintenance and flying hour expenditures for that 

equipment and have to conduct maintenance accordingly. However, 

according to USARPAC officials, maintenance costs would be incurred by 

the units at some point regardless of whether the units conducted training 

at home station or on a Pathway. The use of equipment during a Pathway 

can also contribute to non-financial costs, such as a temporary decrease 

in units’ equipment readiness ratings. For instance, according to afteraction reviews, two of the task forces that deployed for Pathway 

operations in 2015 experienced delays in repairing their equipment due to 

difficulties in obtaining repair parts while in the Asia-Pacific region.17

Additionally, Pacific Pathways could be incurring some opportunity costs 

by using funding that could be allocated to other subordinate commands 

within USARPAC. For example, a commander of a major subordinate 

command in the region expressed concern that the USARPAC operation 

and maintenance funding going to Pacific Pathways could reduce the 

amount of funding available to support other commands in the region.

In fiscal years 2014 and 2015, USARPAC conducted Pacific Pathways 

using a combination of joint and Army exercise funding, as well as its own 

operation and maintenance budget. For example, in 2015 USARPAC 

funded nearly half of the total $34.5 million Pacific Pathways costs out of 

its existing budget. For fiscal year 2016, the Army requested $13.9 million 

in funding for Pacific Pathways, and according to Army Headquarters and 

USARPAC officials, Pacific Pathways received $13.0 million in funding. 

For the next fiscal year, the Army requested $13 million, but according to 

USARPAC officials they will receive $7.9 million in the Army’s fiscal year 

2017 budget due to Army funding decrements. USARPAC has continued 

to fund some of the costs of the Pacific Pathway operations in 2016 

through its operation and maintenance budget and, according to

 17According to I Corps officials and documentation, the task forces that participated in 

Pacific Pathways 16-1 and 16-2 were able to more effectively ship and receive spare parts 

while deployed, enabling them to maintain higher levels of sustained equipment 

readiness. Given the challenges experienced by the early task forces, equipment 

readiness rates remain a consideration when examining Pacific Pathways’ potential nonfinancial costs. 
Page 15 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

USARPAC officials, plans to continue doing so in 2017. According to 

USARPAC officials, continuing to fund Pacific Pathways in this manner 

will become unsustainable, and the command is requesting an additional 

$26 million in future years to fund all three Pathways on an annual basis.

According to USARPAC officials, they did not conduct or submit a formal 

cost-benefit analysis to support the approval of Pacific Pathways funding 

in the fiscal year 2016 budget request, as is required for all new or 

expanded programs or unfunded requirements per Army guidance.18 The 

Army Cost Benefit Analysis Guide states that such an analysis should 

include a clear value proposition that describes the tangible results or 

value that a decision maker can expect from implementing the 

recommended course of action, along with its benefit to the Army.19

USARPAC officials stated that they did not submit a cost-benefit analysis 

to the Secretary of the Army when Pacific Pathways was initiated 

because they viewed it as an innovation of an existing program and 

because the initial Pacific Pathway operations in 2014 and 2015 were 

conducted using existing funding. However, USARPAC requested 

additional funding for Pacific Pathways in fiscal years 2016 and beyond. 

In light of this, understanding the full costs and benefits of Pacific 

Pathways would help the Department of Defense and the Army determine 

appropriate budgetary trade-offs.

Although USARPAC has not conducted a comprehensive analysis 

assessing the benefits that Pacific Pathways has provided and could 

provide given its additional costs, officials from the units and commands 

we met with, including officials from five of the seven Pacific Pathways 

task forces, told us that participating in Pacific Pathways provided 

significant readiness and other benefits.

Pacific Pathways task force officials cited readiness benefits from the 

initiative that traditional exercises and Combined Training Center 

rotations do not provide. They stated that while the exercises had always 

 18Headquarters, Department of the Army, memorandum, Cost Benefit Analysis to Support 

Army Enterprise Decision Making (Dec. 30, 2009).

19Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Cost and Economics), U.S. Army 

Cost Benefit Analysis Guide, Version 3.1 (Apr. 24, 2013).

Participants We Met with 

Have Identified Benefits 

from Pacific Pathways

Benefits to Pacific Pathways 

Task Forces
Page 16 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

provided some tactical training benefits to the training units, Pacific 

Pathways has provided the task force with the opportunity to deploy, 

maintain, and operate with their own equipment in an expeditionary 

environment, just as they would in wartime or in response to a disaster. 

For example, officials in the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade told us that the 

speed, efficiency, and safety of their port operations have improved 

because of Pacific Pathways. Every time they entered or left a port on 

Pacific Pathway 15-1, they had to assemble or disassemble their 

helicopters. At the beginning of the Pathway operation, this task took 

them about 12 to 14 hours, but by the time they returned from the 

Pathway operation they were able to reduce that time to 4 hours. As a 

result, officials said that they have improved the speed, efficiency, and 

safety of their port operations and have been able to validate their ability 

to operate in a real-world environment. Figure 2 below shows helicopters 

partially disassembled and loaded on the vessel during Pacific Pathway 

16-1.

Figure 2: Helicopters Loaded on Vessel during Pacific Pathway 16-1

Task force officials also told us that one of the key readiness benefits the 

Pacific Pathways initiative provides is the opportunity to execute mission 

command, or the exercise of authority and direction by the commander 

when conducting operations, in an expeditionary environment. Although 

brigade commanders also conduct mission command during combat 
Page 17 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

training center rotations—the key training event that prepares brigades for 

operations—officials told us that Pacific Pathways is much more 

complicated, as it more closely simulates a real-world deployment in the 

Pacific in which they conduct dispersed mission command across multiple 

countries. In the area of mission command, several task forces identified 

their ability to train to these tasks over the course of their Pathway 

operation, allowing them to sustain a rating of “trained”—the highest of 

three possible ratings in unit training assessments— in such tasks over 

the course of the operation. See table 4 below for the mission command 

tasks to which the task force was able to train during Pacific Pathway 15-

1.

Table 4: Assessment of Pacific Pathway 15-1 Activities That Accomplished Mission Command Tasks

Mission Command 

Tasks Activities

Bilateral 

Military 

Decision 

Making 

Processa Bilateral 

Training

Platoon Level 

Live Fire 

Exercise

Platoon Level 

Combined 

Arms Live Fire 

Exercise

Company Level 

Combined Arms 

Live Fire Exerciseb

Battalion Level 

Field Training 

Exercisec

Conduct command post 

operations      

Conduct military 

decision making 

process  - - - - -

Execute tactical 

operations -     

Maintain continuity of 

mission command      

Execute the operations 

process  - - - - -

Legend: =number of repetitions over the course of the Pathway operation; - = no repetitions identified by unit

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army Pacific data. | GAO-17-126

a

The military decision-making process is an iterative planning methodology used to understand the 

situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order.

b

A combined arms live fire exercise is an exercise integrating combat arms, combat support, and 

combat service support functions, which trains units to move and maneuver and to employ weapon 

systems using service ammunition.

c

A field training exercise is an exercise simulating combat conditions in the field that emphasizes 

command and control at all levels in battle functions using actual and simulated forces.

There are a number of Army organizations in the Pacific Command region 

that are responsible for logistics and sustainment of the joint force in 

wartime. According to command officials, deploying into multiple countries 

and ports on each Pathway operation has helped these organizations to 

Benefits to Logistics and 

Sustainment Organizations
Page 18 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

test concepts, identify capability gaps, and gather information about 

operating in the Pacific in preparation for their wartime mission. Several of 

the Army sustainment and logistics officials who support Pacific Pathways 

stated that the program allowed them to train to their mission 

requirements, such as executing reception, staging, onward movement, 

and integration operations with a large force, in parts of the Asia-Pacific 

region that they otherwise would not have had the opportunity to access.

Both the 10th Regional Support Group and the 835th Transportation 

Battalion are based out of Okinawa, Japan, but their regional area of 

responsibility extends to the Philippines and Thailand, among other 

countries. According to officials from these units, Pacific Pathways allows 

them to become familiar with how best to load and unload equipment, 

conduct port operations, and provide food, water, and lodging to U.S. 

forces training in these countries. For example, the 10th Regional Support 

Group provided tents, air conditioning units, and power generators for an 

exercise in the Philippines that was part of Pacific Pathway 16-1. 

Additionally, officials from logistics and sustainment commands, such as 

the 10th Regional Support Group and the 835th Transportation Battalion 

in Japan, told us that they were able to conduct training through Pacific 

Pathways that allowed them to move from “partially trained” to “trained” in 

some of their training tasks and subtasks.

Officials in operational headquarters under USARPAC’s command, such 

as I Corps and 25th Infantry Division, who previously had little 

engagement in exercises noted that Pacific Pathways has provided them 

with opportunities to exercise mission command in complex, real-world 

environments and to execute command transitions in theater, replicating 

how they may operate during wartime or disaster response operations. 

Officials from the 25th Infantry Division said that previously, during legacy 

exercises, the training unit, usually a force smaller than 350 soldiers, 

required only minimal mission command and sustainment.20 Under Pacific 

Pathways, the task force, consisting generally of more than 800 soldiers, 

is under the mission command of several different headquarters across 

 20According to U.S. Army Pacific officials, prior to the initiation of contingency operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, its participation in legacy exercises in the Pacific was much 

larger, particularly in Cobra Gold in Thailand, to which U.S. Army Pacific sent about 900 

soldiers in 1999. However, according to these officials, from 2002 to 2014, these 

exercises produced minimal progression from year to year due to constrained availability 

of soldiers, equipment, and funding.

Benefits to Corps and Division 

Headquarters
Page 19 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

the course of the operation. For example, on Pacific Pathway 15-1, the 

25th Infantry Division had mission command of the task force during 

exercises in Thailand and the Philippines both at the beginning and at the 

end of the operation, but the 8th Army in Korea assumed mission 

command during the second exercise of the Pathway operation. This 

replicates how the mission command would transition if these units had to 

deploy onto the Korean Peninsula in support of a contingency operation. 

See figure 3 below for examples of some of the training benefits that 

officials in sustainment units and operational headquarters identified 

based on their support of Pacific Pathway 16-1.

Figure 3: Examples of Training Benefits Identified by Officials in Sustainment Units and Operational Headquarters during 

Pacific Pathway 16-1
Page 20 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

U.S. Pacific Command, USARPAC, and U.S. embassy officials also cited 

a number of unique strategic benefits resulting from Pacific Pathways that 

exceed those of the traditional exercise model. U.S. embassy officials 

throughout the region stated that the larger force package Pacific 

Pathways brings has significantly improved the quality and level of 

training with partner nation forces, which in turn supports security 

cooperation goals. Figure 4 below compares the size of the force 

packages brought to Foal Eagle/Key Resolve in 2013—prior to Pacific 

Pathways—with those of the same event in 2015, when it occurred as 

part of Pacific Pathway 15-1. According to USARPAC and embassy 

officials, the partner nations view this increased presence as well as 

higher levels of senior leader engagement at the military exercises as a 

sign of enhanced U.S. commitment to the region. In addition, USARPAC 

officials told us that multiple countries in the region, including Bangladesh, 

Brunei, Cambodia, Japan, and Singapore, have expressed a desire to be 

included in Pacific Pathways.

Figure 4: Comparison between Force Package Sizes for Foal Eagle/Key Resolve Before versus During Pacific Pathways

Note: Foal Eagle is an annually occurring time period during which the U.S. conducts a series of 

exercises with the South Korean military. Key Resolve is an exercise that occurred during that 

timeframe in which the Pacific Pathway 15-1 task force participated.

Benefits to U.S. Pacific 

Command, USARPAC, and 

Partner Nations
Page 21 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

USARPAC officials stated that Pacific Pathways also provides deterrence 

and another crisis response option to Pacific Command by having forces 

forward-deployed in the region for about 90 days at a time. After Pacific 

Pathways was first announced in late 2013, the description of it as a crisis 

response option led to questions by some senior defense officials, as 

cited in the press, and by the House Armed Services Committee that it 

might be duplicating the role of the Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary 

Unit in the Pacific.21 In late 2014 USARPAC clarified its intent for Pacific 

Pathways, reiterating that the task force’s central purpose is to build Army 

readiness and that its force package should be built according to the 

objectives of the exercises, not to respond to a crisis or natural disaster. 

While we found that these two forces have some similarities in terms of 

their capabilities, there are also key differences. For example, both the 

Marine Expeditionary Unit and the Pathways task force contain mission 

command nodes that could command forces responding to a crisis and 

report back to a higher headquarters, as well as forces that could provide 

a range of other support during a response, such as fixed site security. 

However, according to Marine Corps guidance, the Marine Expeditionary 

Unit is trained and designed for contingency and crisis response. As 

such, it deploys on its own vessel, is largely self-sustaining, and can 

operate independent of a well-established airport or seaport. It is also 

equipped for these operations and deploys with weapon systems, 

amphibious assault vehicles, an aviation element with attack helicopters, 

fighter attack aircraft, and cargo planes, and recovery equipment. 

Conversely, according to USARPAC officials and documentation, the 

Pacific Pathways task force is designed and equipped to conduct the 

exercises and build readiness, and it generally requires support from 

other U.S. Army units and access to well-established airports and 

seaports to deploy its forces and equipment.

U.S. Pacific Command officials stated that a forward-deployed Pacific 

Pathways task force could provide some capability, such as helicopters 

with heavy lift capabilities in a crisis response situation. For instance, if a 

Pacific Pathways task force is deployed in the region and there is a 

humanitarian assistance or disaster relief event, U.S. Pacific Command 

 21The Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit is a maritime infantry force that is forward 

deployed and prepared to respond to contingencies as part of the U.S. quick-response 

force, capable of accomplishing numerous missions, including responding to crises and 

providing humanitarian assistance.
Page 22 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

would identify the task force, its capabilities, and its proximity to the event 

for a potential response, just as it would for any other force that was in the 

region. However, U.S. Pacific Command officials noted that pulling a 

Pacific Pathways task force off an exercise carries its own risk of 

potentially damaging the relationship with the partner nation conducting 

the exercise, and this is something they would also factor into the 

decision.

While USARPAC has identified Pacific Pathways costs and multiple units 

have taken steps to assess the benefits of participating in the program 

from their perspectives, they have not conducted a comprehensive 

analysis that weighs the initiative’s benefits relative to its costs to fully 

capture the value of the initiative for external stakeholders.

Several Pacific Pathways individual task forces and other participating 

units have developed briefings showing how training conducted under 

Pacific Pathways is related to tasks they execute to achieve and maintain 

readiness. For example, following the completion of Pacific Pathways 15-

1, 15-2, and 16-1, the task forces developed briefings quantifying certain 

key readiness tasks and linking activities conducted through Pacific 

Pathways to their training tasks.

Furthermore, higher level commands have attempted to capture the 

benefits of Pacific Pathways. For instance, USARPAC has developed 

multiple briefings and analyses looking at how to best conduct Pacific 

Pathways or to support its request for funding for the initiative. These 

represent useful efforts to analyze or describe individual elements of the 

initiative and certain benefits that it provides, but none of them 

comprehensively captures the initiative’s costs and benefits. For example, 

USARPAC conducted an analysis that compared the financial costs of the 

Pacific Pathways transportation model to the prior exercise transportation 

model—specifically comparing estimates of what it would cost to move 

the same sized force packages under each model—in an effort to show 

transportation cost avoidance related to conducting sequential exercises 

rather than multiple stand-alone exercises. This analysis also describes 

readiness benefits of using dedicated organic sealift vessels, but it does 

not discuss other benefits, such as the benefits of deploying larger force 

packages, and as such provides only a partial picture of the value of 

Pacific Pathways. Additionally, beginning with Pathway 16-1, I Corps

developed a readiness assessment framework, which it then updated for 

Pathway 16-2, to assess the training benefits of Pacific Pathways at 

different levels of command and to capture the different strategic effects 

that the program is having on the theater.

USARPAC Units Are 

Taking Steps to Assess 

Pacific Pathways Benefits 

but Have Not Conducted a 

Comprehensive Analysis 

to Assess These Benefits 

in Light of Costs
Page 23 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

This assessment framework includes more than 100 indicators, organized 

around measures of effectiveness and linked to the Army’s warfighting 

challenges. For example, the assessment framework includes an 

indicator measuring the hours needed to establish a tactical operations 

center in a country that is ready to receive incoming forces. The I Corps’

Pacific Pathway operations order has tasked the Pathways task force as 

the primary unit for collecting the data for these indicators. However, as of 

July 2016, I Corps had not received any data from the task force for 

Pacific Pathway 16-1—the only Pathway operation that had thus far been 

completed since the framework was introduced. According to I Corps 

officials, once the data are collected, the end result of the readiness 

assessment framework will be to ensure that the Pathway operation is 

achieving its intended objectives, including increasing readiness, and to 

improve subsequent Pathways—not to capture the comprehensive value 

of the program.

A cost-benefit analysis is a decision-making tool used to help determine 

the best-value course of action before solving a problem or taking 

advantage of an opportunity. While USARPAC did not conduct a costbenefit analysis to support its request for funding Pacific Pathways, the 

Army’s Cost Benefit Analysis guide states that such an analysis should be 

a living document so that the decision maker can make informed 

decisions based on the best available information.22 Going forward, the 

incorporation of principles from this guide in the current assessment 

process, or the development of another analysis using these principles, 

could assist USARPAC in more fully capturing the value of the program. 

For example, according to this Army guidance, all financial and nonfinancial costs and benefits of a proposed program and any alternatives 

should be identified and compared against each other in order to 

determine a recommended course of action in which the benefits more 

than justify the costs.

While the assessments described above capture certain benefits of the 

program achieved by certain units, none of these assessments 

comprehensively captures all of the financial and non-financial costs 

incurred and benefits gained from Pacific Pathways, or compares them to 

 22Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Cost and Economics), U.S. Army 

Cost Benefit Analysis Guide, Version 3.1 (Apr. 24, 2013). 
Page 24 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

alternative training. For example, while the I Corps’ Pacific Pathways 

readiness assessment framework is potentially the most comprehensive 

of all the assessment efforts, there are a number of supporting 

commands and other units that are not factored into the framework, such 

as logistics and sustainment organizations that derive training benefits 

and value from Pacific Pathways, but were not tasked with collecting data 

related to the indicators.

In addition, according to Army officials, there can be efficiencies gained 

through Pacific Pathways that could represent a financial or other benefit.

For example, 25th Infantry Division officials told us that instead of paying 

to deploy a battalion to execute platoon gunnery training at a home 

station training facility in Hawaii, the battalion was able to train on a range 

in South Korea through Pacific Pathways. These same officials said that 

as a result, Pacific Pathways allows them to avoid the cost of shipping a 

battalion to the training facility and frees up the facility for training by 

another unit. Additionally, I Corps officials said that the task force for 

Pacific Pathway 16-2—based out of Joint Base Lewis McChord in 

Washington—was planning to conduct platoon live fires while deployed 

on the operation, thus enabling it to avoid having to deploy to Yakima 

Training Center—about 160 miles from Joint Base Lewis McChord—for 

such training.

Finally, none of the assessments compare Pacific Pathways costs and 

benefits against those of other trainings, but some of the data from the 

units’ readiness benefit briefings and I Corps’ readiness framework could 

be used to compare the initiative with other trainings to better understand 

the relative value that Pacific Pathways provides. For example, I Corps’

framework tasks units with gathering data on the number of combined 

arms live fire exercises conducted during the Pathway operation. These 

data could be compared with the number of combined arms live fire 

exercises conducted in other types of training, such as the traditional 

foreign exercise model, combat training centers, or home station 

trainings.

The previous USARPAC Commander and other USARPAC officials have 

highlighted the need to develop an analysis or assessment that captures 

the overall value of the program for external stakeholders, including the 

need to compare Pacific Pathways with other conventional Army training 

methods. By conducting a more comprehensive analysis that assesses all 

Pacific Pathways costs and benefits and compares them with other types 

of training, USARPAC would be better positioned to inform Department of 
Page 25 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Defense and Army decision-makers who consider the program and any 

related budgetary trade-offs.

The Army has taken some steps to plan Pacific Pathways as a cohesive 

operation, but it faces challenges in doing so, and it may be missing 

opportunities to maximize the training value of the initiative for all 

participating Army forces. First, USARPAC and I Corps have taken steps 

to overcome challenges resulting from efforts to integrate Pacific 

Pathways into its existing exercise planning process, but they have not 

established an approach that more fully synchronizes Army plans, 

stakeholders, and objectives. Further, although Pacific Pathways provides 

some potentially unique training opportunities for commands that are 

directed to support the operations, USARPAC may be missing 

opportunities to better leverage training objectives of supporting units.

USARPAC and I Corps have taken a number of steps to plan for Pacific 

Pathways as a cohesive operation, including efforts to mitigate difficulties 

resulting from overlaying the initiative with the pre-existing exercise 

planning process. However, they continue to face challenges in the early 

synchronization of Pathway planning efforts and in ensuring that the 

decisions made for the individual exercises are aligned with the broader 

objectives of the Pathway operation, because they have not established 

an approach that more fully synchronizes Army plans, stakeholders, and 

objectives.

USARPAC has taken steps to plan for Pacific Pathways as a cohesive 

operation rather than a series of stand-alone exercises. Prior to Pacific 

Pathways, the exercises that now occur within the Pathway operations 

were conducted as stand-alone events. According to joint training 

guidance and Pathways planning documentation, each exercise was—

and still is—planned and executed through a series of exercise-specific 

planning conferences within the Joint Event Life Cycle. According to 

USARPAC officials, these conferences have often been led by a civilian 

exercise planner at USARPAC or other major subordinate command, 

such as the Eighth Army, and they have involved the host nation and 

other participating joint and Army units. Command officials said that these 

exercise planners were largely responsible for planning the details of the 

event, and the participating units would conduct the exercise. USARPAC 

and division officials referred to this approach as an administrative 

The Army Faces 

Challenges in 

Synchronizing 

Planning for Pacific 

Pathways as a 

Cohesive Operation 

and Incorporating the 

Training Objectives of 

Supporting Units

USARPAC Has Taken 

Steps to Plan for Pacific 

Pathways as a Cohesive 

Operation but Faces 

Challenges in the Early 

Synchronization of 

Planning Efforts

USARPAC Has Taken Steps to 

Plan for Pacific Pathways as a 

Cohesive Operation
Page 26 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

movement for the training units, requiring minimal mission command and 

limited sustainment.

Command officials told us that by combining multiple exercises and 

deploying larger force and equipment packages, Pacific Pathways 

increases the readiness benefit of the exercises for U.S. Army and host 

nation forces. However, it also increases the complexity, number of 

stakeholders, and potential for fragmentation in the planning process. The 

series of Joint Event Life Cycle planning conferences for each individual 

exercise is at the core of planning for Pacific Pathways, but unit afteraction reviews from multiple Pathway operations indicated that this 

structure has sometimes hindered USARPAC’s and I Corps’ efforts to 

execute each Pathway operation as a cohesive operation.23 Pacific 

Pathways is designed, in part, to provide commands and units an 

opportunity to conduct a theater-wide rehearsal for how the command 

would operate if it had to support a contingency. In that sense, according

to command and unit officials, some of the friction that they have 

experienced is actually beneficial in that Pacific Pathways compels 

commands and units to work out relationships and systems before having 

to employ them for a contingency.

However, based on challenges identified by units that have participated in 

Pathway operations, some of this friction also creates inefficiency, such 

as a lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities that has led to confusion 

about command relationships and gaps in sustainment. USARPAC and I 

Corps have taken a number of steps to overcome these challenges as the 

initiative has matured, in part by developing a more cohesive planning 

process for Pacific Pathways. These steps include the following:

• Development of a Pacific Pathways-specific orders process: The lack of 

timely, cohesive orders to guide the operations and clarify roles and 

responsibilities was a concern cited for some prior Pathway operations. 

For example, an after-action review from Pacific Pathway 15-1 stated that 

orders were rarely published for Pacific Pathway events, resulting in 

 23Additionally, USARPAC officials stated that USARPAC and I Corps face constraints in 

planning with the host nations that exceed their control to fully mitigate. For instance, host 

nations may lack the planning capacity to identify key details of the exercises, such as 

training locations, host nation exercise participants, and training objectives, until late in the 

planning process.
Page 27 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

conflicting guidance from different organizations and confusion within the 

units about requirements. In response, USARPAC and I Corps have 

developed a Pathways-specific orders process, including a USARPAC 

Pacific Pathways Campaign Order to provide the Commander’s guidance 

and intent, and USARPAC Planning Orders that provide high-level 

planning guidance to I Corps, establish the roles of key supporting 

commands, and now for Pacific Pathway 17-1 include individual exercise 

operation orders as appendixes. Beginning with Pacific Pathway 16-1, I 

Corps began issuing Operation Orders that cover the entire Pathway and 

provide detailed information on the operation’s mission and end state as 

well as what supporting activities the participating organizations will 

conduct. Taken together, these actions are intended to better 

operationalize planning for Pacific Pathways.

• Creation of Pacific Pathways planner position: According to USARPAC 

officials, while USARPAC’s exercise directorate leads the planning for the 

individual exercises, in early 2015 USARPAC moved the responsibility for 

synchronizing planning across the exercises for Pacific Pathways from its 

exercise directorate to its future operations directorate. USARPAC has 

also created a Pacific Pathways planner position with the intention of 

integrating individual exercise planning with the strategic goals and 

objectives for the Pathway operations to create more cohesive 

operations. Command and unit officials said that in some previous cases, 

the USARPAC exercise planners were unaccustomed to having to plan 

with the other exercises in mind. USARPAC officials said that the role of 

this Pathways planner is to mitigate challenges that may result from a

single unit executing three separately planned exercises by coordinating 

across the individual exercise planners.

• Establishment of a Pacific Pathways Concept Development Workshop to 

design operations and synchronize timing of exercise planning 

conferences: In January 2016, USARPAC held a Pacific Pathways 

Concept Development Workshop focused on fiscal year 2017 Pathway 

operations to discuss unit sourcing, refine the concepts of operation, and 

better align the timing of individual exercise planning conferences, which 

have overlapped for at least two Pathway operations. USARPAC also 

planned to hold a Training and Exercise Working Group in August 2016 

to synchronize USARPAC exercises and training events, including 

discussions of the design for future Pacific Pathway operations. This is a 

semi-annual event, and an official said that, going forward, USARPAC 

intends for these working groups to address the content that was covered 

at the Concept Development Workshop. In addition, USARPAC and I 

Corps hold a number of Pacific Pathways synchronization meetings each 

week to discuss issues related to operations and sustainment for current 

and future Pathway operations.
Page 28 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

• Establishment of a sustainment task force to clarify sustainment roles 

and responsibilities and provide support: Each Pacific Pathway operation 

may involve a number of different sustainment commands that provide 

support for different exercises. In order to better provide sustainment and 

help address a lack of clarity related to sustainment responsibilities that 

units have cited, I Corps and the 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment 

Command have developed a sustainment task force concept for Pacific 

Pathway operations.24 Each sustainment task force includes a range of 

logistics and sustainment subject matter experts to identify and 

coordinate required support, and an official from 593rd Expeditionary 

Sustainment Command said that having the task force has helped to 

provide greater predictability and clarity in Pacific Pathways sustainment 

roles and responsibilities.

• Collection of lessons and observations to improve future operations: 

Officials at numerous commands and units in the Pacific have noted the 

value of the knowledge gained from Pacific Pathways for future 

operations in theater, such as operating in the ports and roadways of 

partner nations and gaining a better understanding of how to operate 

unmanned aerial vehicles in certain countries. More broadly, USARPAC 

officials said that Pacific Pathways provides a venue for identifying 

capability gaps in support of U.S. Pacific Command operational and 

contingency plans. Within the USARPAC enterprise, Pacific Pathway 

observations and recommendations for improvement are captured 

through an after-action review process across multiple levels of 

command after each Pacific Pathway operation. These forums are 

generally designed to improve future Pathway operations, although 

command and unit officials said that the information from these afteraction reviews can be utilized in planning for any operation. According to 

officials, some units have also updated their standard operating 

procedures or are in the process of developing specific guidance based 

on lessons from Pacific Pathway operations, such as a “smartbook” that 

outlines standard procedures for requesting and providing sustainment 

across the different classes of supply. Organizations outside of the 

USARPAC enterprise have also identified Pacific Pathways as a venue 

for learning and assessment. For instance, according to USARPAC 

 24The 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command provides deployable mission command 

to support joint forces; supports sustainment, theater opening, and joint reception, staging, 

onward movement, and integration to enable freedom of action in the Pacific; and 

provides trained and ready forces in support of unified land operations. 
Page 29 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

documentation, Army Training and Doctrine Command is utilizing Pacific 

Pathways 16-2 and 16-3 as venues for conducting the Army Warfighting 

Assessment in 2017, scheduled to occur from June through October 

2016, to assess a range of capabilities in the Pacific theater, including 

U.S. and partner nation power projection and reception, staging, onward 

movement, and integration, as well as expeditionary maneuver.25 The 

Commander of U.S. Pacific Command has also issued guidance to the 

command and other service components to look for joint opportunities to 

integrate with the assessment as a means to gain insight into the joint 

force’s ability to identify, validate, and develop solutions to address 

common joint operational warfighting challenges.

According to command and unit officials, the planning and execution of 

Pathway 16-1 was improved from prior operations, due in part to 

increased coordination among organizations, more detailed orders, a 

better understanding of the roles of key players, and a greater awareness 

of sustainment requirements while deployed. For example, according to 

unit officials and after-action reviews, during the fiscal year 2015 

operations, supporting units had struggled to ship spare parts, particularly 

Stryker parts, to Pacific Pathways task forces in countries where such 

spare parts are not available, such as Japan and Korea, resulting in 

delayed maintenance and decreased operational readiness rates for their 

equipment. However, during Pacific Pathway 16-1, the task force and 

supporting units were able to ship five packages of Stryker parts to Korea 

in a timely fashion, enabling them to conduct maintenance and to depart 

the country with 41 out of 42 Strykers fully operational—a significant 

improvement over the experience of the prior two brigades that deployed 

to Korea during Pathways based on the operational readiness rates of 

these units’ Strykers.26 Several of the steps being taken to develop a 

more cohesive planning process have been targeted toward planning for 

 25The Army Warfighting Assessment is the Army’s capstone event to test and assess 

emerging materiel, doctrinal, and conceptual solutions to current and future operational 

challenges and provides the Army a venue to achieve objectives such as training 

readiness, future force development, and joint/multinational interoperability. 

26The brigades that conducted Pacific Pathways 15-1 and 15-3 both experienced 

challenges shipping spare Stryker parts to their deployed battalions, resulting in 

decreased operational readiness rates for the deployed units. For example, according to 

unit documentation, during Pathway 15-3, the operational readiness rate for the deployed 

battalion dropped below 60 percent, meaning than fewer than 60 percent of the deployed 

Strykers were operational. 
Page 30 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

future operations, and officials said that they do not expect to see the full 

results of their efforts until 2017.

While these actions represent positive progress toward addressing 

planning challenges, USARPAC and I Corps continue to experience 

some difficulty in synchronizing Pathways planning efforts at an early 

point, before individual exercise planning, and in ensuring that decisions 

made for the individual exercises are aligned with the broader objectives 

of the Pathway operation. Army guidance on the operational planning 

process states that commanders are to encourage active collaboration 

among all organizations affected by the pending operations to build 

shared understanding, participate in course-of-action development and 

decision-making, and resolve conflicts before publication of the plan or 

order.27 In addition, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government states that management should establish an organizational 

structure, assign responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve the 

entity’s objectives, including determining the level of authority that should 

be delegated to key roles.28 USARPAC and I Corps officials have stated 

that they are trying to shift planning for Pacific Pathways to get ahead of 

the individual exercise planning life cycle—which begins up to 12 months 

in advance of the individual exercises. These long planning timeframes 

can make it difficult to immediately integrate lessons learned into 

subsequent operations. For example, USARPAC officials said that the 

lessons that they learned from the 2014 Pacific Pathway operation 

regarding synchronization across the Joint Event Life Cycle were too late 

to affect the 2015 planning cycle. However, officials responsible for 

planning elements of Pacific Pathways have noted that some of the 

ongoing planning efforts are occurring either at the wrong levels of 

authority, such as that of an exercise planner instead of a commander 

with operational authority, or too late in the process to fully synchronize 

planning across exercises.

 27Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Doctrinal Publication 5-0, The Operations 

Process (May 2012).

28GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).

Challenges Remain in 

Synchronizing Early 

Planning Efforts and 

Decision-Making for 

Pacific Pathways
Page 31 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

According to command officials, previously, when exercises were 

conducted as stand-alone events, key decisions and planning were 

delegated to a much lower level, such as that of an exercise planner, 

because the effects of any one decision were limited to that exercise, but 

for Pacific Pathways, some seemingly simple decisions have potentially 

broader effects. We heard of instances in which some key Pathway 

objectives and assumptions were not known by planners or commanders 

and, as a result, decisions were made for individual exercises that had 

unintended implications for the broader Pathway operations. Officials

from I Corps said that some of these decisions are not rising to the 

appropriate level of authority or visibility, such as that of general officers 

with a broader understanding of the effects of any one decision on the 

entire operation. For example, for Pacific Pathway 16-2:

• I Corps officials said that a transportation planner made an isolated 

decision to air lift equipment to the Philippines for a single exercise 

without having a full understanding of the equipment needed, given that 

the country would be hosting two different exercises during that same 

time period. This ultimately resulted in a more complex and costly 

approach to moving equipment to the Philippines than if the full scope of 

the exercise requirements had been factored into the decision ahead of 

time.

• According to USARPAC and I Corps officials, the Pacific Pathways task 

force commander made a late decision based on operational 

requirements to provide catered meals to the task force while deployed in 

one country, but did so outside of the exercise planning process and 

without initially notifying the exercise planner at USARPAC. This decision 

conflicted with the planning assumptions that had been made and were 

being executed by the USARPAC exercise planners to provide prepackaged rations that would be prepared by the units, resulting in some 

challenges in identifying funding and contractors. Ultimately, the Army 

was able to identify a contract solution, but USARPAC officials said that 

prior to Pacific Pathways such a decision would have been made by the 

exercise planners.

Officials from brigades that participated in prior Pacific Pathways also 

noted concerns about how decisions were being made during planning for 

those operations, citing challenges related to planners making decisions 

without the operational authority to do so, or a lack of clarity during 

regular synchronization meetings regarding who would be the appropriate 

decision-maker for certain issues, due in part to a lack of clarity in 

guidance. USARPAC officials said that some of this lack of clarity is due 

to USARPAC’s efforts to plan for Pacific Pathways as an operation 
Page 32 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

instead of a series of exercises, which involves shifting more decisionmaking to commanders instead of to exercise planners.

I Corps has been conducting mission analysis, developing courses of 

action, and issuing orders for Pacific Pathway operations in accordance 

with the Army’s operational planning process, but an I Corps official said 

that they continue to struggle with determinations about when to execute 

this process relative to the individual exercise planning conferences. An I 

Corps planner said that they currently begin to do formal mission analysis 

at the time of or after the initial exercise planning conferences, but that 

they do not issue the operation order until just before—or after, in some 

instances—the final planning conferences. While this allows for more 

detailed orders, it does not necessarily ensure that all USARPAC and 

other command exercise planners and the participating units have a 

shared understanding of the objectives and assumptions at the outset of 

individual exercise planning. Moreover, decisions made in the planning 

conferences drive many of the broader Pacific Pathway requirements, 

some of which may be outside of USARPAC’s control. USARPAC officials 

said that while they have some flexibility in planning within the Joint Event 

Life Cycle process, they have to coordinate with the host nations, which 

do not always provide timely approval of key decisions. As seen in figure 

5 below, which depicts the timeline of key planning events for Pacific 

Pathway 16-2, mission analysis and course-of-action development did not 

occur until after some of the exercise planning conferences had begun. 

However, these planning events included key decisions or identified 

outstanding questions about force packages, capabilities, and funding, 

which could have affected how the exercises were planned.
Page 33 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Figure 5: Timeline of Key Planning Events for Pacific Pathway 16-2

Note: A warning order is a preliminary notice of an order or action and planning directive that provides 

initial planning guidance, among other things.

After-action reviews of prior Pathway operations have recommended that 

a Pathways planning conference specific to each Pathway operation be 

held prior to the start of the individual exercise life cycle that would 

include all U.S. participating units and exercise planners in order to gain a 

shared understanding of the mission. The planning order for Pacific 

Pathway 16-1 also directed that USARPAC host such a conference, but I 

Corps officials said that this did not occur. According to USARPAC 

officials, such conferences are costly and difficult to schedule, and the 

officials said they believe that such issues are dealt with in pre-existing 

planning forums, such as operational planning team meetings and 

synchronization meetings that occur regularly at the USARPAC and I 

Corps levels once planning for each operation has begun. However, 

challenges in these areas have persisted despite the regularly held 

synchronization meetings. The Pacific Pathways Concept Development 

Workshop, or semi-annual training and exercise working groups, could 

potentially serve as such a forum, but planning officials said that the 
Page 34 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

workshop for fiscal year 2017 was not as beneficial as they had hoped. 

For example, an exercise planner noted that it was focused on a general 

approach for all of the Pathway operations in a fiscal year instead of the 

objectives of each individual Pathway, and that it did not result in useful 

output to drive the planning of the operations going forward.

A Pacific Pathways planner noted the need to further modify the 

operational planning process for Pathways in order to better fit the 

exercise planning cycle, such as by conducting mission analysis early, 

before the exercise planning conferences begin; issuing preliminary 

products and guidance; and then refining the analysis after the 

conferences have begun. Another potential tool that this planner 

suggested was the development and issuance at the outset of planning of 

an assumptions brief that would lay out all of the basic constructs for the 

operation—such as how classes of supply will be provided, and what 

equipment the task forces will be allowed to bring—and would be 

consistently applied in each exercise and throughout the planning. In 

cases where such facts may not be known up front or where late 

requirements are identified that are outside of USARPAC’s control, such 

a tool could provide guidance on the types of decisions that may have 

broader implications for the Pathway operations and outline how, and by 

whom, such decisions should be made.

Pacific Pathways is still a relatively new program, having been 

implemented only 2 years ago, and officials said that it can take time for 

lessons from early operations to be fully integrated. As USARPAC 

proceeds in refining its Pacific Pathways planning approach, it may 

continue to experience challenges and inefficiency associated with its 

efforts to execute Pathways as a cohesive operation without modifying 

planning processes and clarifying guidance to ensure that key objectives, 

assumptions, and appropriate levels of authority for key decisions are 

identified and communicated to all stakeholders ahead of the exercise 

planning cycle.

There are many potential training benefits of Pacific Pathways for units 

throughout the Pacific, but there is no top-down effort within the Pacific 

Pathways planning process to deliberately seek out organizations’

training objectives and incorporate them into the design of each Pacific 

Pathway operation. Much like the broader planning of Pacific Pathways, 

the development of training objectives for the Pathway operations is 

largely focused on the exercises that occur within the Pathway operation, 

and according to command officials, the task forces executing the Pacific 

USARPAC’s Pathways 

Planning Process May Be 

Missing Opportunities to 

Train Supporting Units
Page 35 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Pathway operations continue to be viewed as the primary U.S. training 

audience within the exercises. However, the size and complexity of the 

operations under Pacific Pathways create potentially unique training 

opportunities for joint and supporting units to exercise the capabilities 

they would be required to provide in a contingency. Many of these training 

opportunities occur naturally as units provide support for Pacific Pathways 

as part of their core missions. For example,

• USARPAC has utilized dedicated organic sealift vessels from Military 

Sealift Command for two Pathway operations to move equipment from 

location to location throughout the operation.29 While these vessels are 

generally tasked with moving equipment, according to a Military Sealift 

Command official, Pacific Pathways provides atypical opportunities to 

exercise ship crews, load and unload vessels with military rolling stock, 

and work with host nations to access ports and execute bilateral 

agreements. The organic sealift vessels that to date have been dedicated 

to support Pacific Pathways have been activated out of a reduced 

operating status.30 Aside from activations like that for Pacific Pathways, 

officials from U.S. Transportation Command said that these vessels are 

generally given only short periods (typically 3 to 5 consecutive days) of 

training—referred to as maintenance, or surge, activations—so as to 

provide necessary time afloat to conduct maintenance. However, Pacific 

Pathways provides additional opportunities to conduct steady-state 

operations in an operational environment.

• Army transportation battalions support the Pacific Pathway operations by 

loading equipment onto and unloading it from the ship at ports in each 

country.31 For instance, the 835th Transportation Battalion based out of 

Okinawa, Japan, has supported multiple Pacific Pathway operations by 

executing port operations in countries such as Thailand and the 

Philippines. According to the battalion’s commander, the size (for 

example, up to 700 pieces of cargo) and types of equipment packages 

 29Military Sealift Command provides ocean transportation for the Department of Defense 

to sustain the warfighting forces and deliver specialized maritime services in support of 

national security objectives in peace and war.

30Reduced operating status refers to a vessel or ship that has been taken out of full 

operating status because of decreased operational requirements.

31Transportation battalions conduct surface deployment, distribution, and water terminal 

port operations to support and sustain the joint warfighter
Page 36 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

(for example, Strykers and helicopters) under Pathways provide that 

battalion with a more complex training opportunity than other events that 

it supports, and provide multiple repetitions of the deployment process in 

a short period of time, including uploading and downloading equipment, 

as well as planning for stowage on the vessels.

In addition, some units have identified training opportunities, beyond 

those naturally incurred from providing directed support, designed to 

shape their involvement in Pacific Pathway operations so as to derive an 

additional training benefit. Such efforts, however, have according to unit 

officials been initiated from the bottom up, based on experience from 

participating in prior Pacific Pathway operations. For example, 19th 

Expeditionary Sustainment Command officials told us that they had 

recently identified a potential opportunity to use the task forces deploying 

to Korea to exercise a combined mission requirement with the Korean 

Army.32 The command was planning to use future Pacific Pathway 

operations to exercise its capability to receive a force with its associated 

equipment on the Korean Peninsula, set up staging areas, and facilitate 

the movement of the force from the seaport to a specified inland location. 

The officials said that absent Pacific Pathways, to accomplish this training 

they have loaded up equipment already in Korea and moved it back and 

forth from the pier—essentially creating movement for the sake of 

movement. Conducting the training using the Pacific Pathways task 

forces could provide the command more value because of the size and 

type of equipment package. Officials said that they had not previously 

realized that they had the ability to shape Pathway operations to achieve 

their own training objectives, and they are looking for additional 

opportunities within Pacific Pathways to integrate other elements from 

within the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command to maximize their 

training value, such as using the command’s military police battalion to 

escort and provide force protection for the convoys in the future.

Officials from other organizations, such as U.S. Army Japan and the 

593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command, also told us that they are 

beginning to consider how they can better leverage their participation in 

Pacific Pathways to achieve some of their training objectives and 

maximize training value, such as exercising the use of intermediate 

 32The 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command provides operational sustainment and 

mission command of sustainment operations in the Republic of Korea. 
Page 37 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

staging bases where forces and equipment would be staged prior to 

movement to another location, or employing more expeditionary 

sustainment capabilities, such as using water purification systems instead 

of purchasing bottled water. Officials from U.S. Army Japan further noted 

that this is an evolution that occurs as commands become more familiar 

with Pacific Pathways and the opportunities it presents.

According to core principles of stakeholder participation identified by 

GAO, effective stakeholder participation includes actively conducting 

outreach and soliciting stakeholder input, involving stakeholders early and 

throughout the decision-making process, and including all stakeholder 

interests.33 USARPAC officials said that the supporting units have 

opportunities to train on those mission-essential tasks that directly 

support the overall exercise and objectives of the primary training 

audience, and that the units can identify training objectives for themselves 

throughout the process, such as through the exercise planning 

conferences and the after-action review process. Additionally, USARPAC 

stated that they expect and would welcome input from participating units, 

as the responsibility for unit training rests with the unit commander. 

However, some challenges exist that may prevent supporting units from 

doing so. For instance, after-action reviews from the past three Pathway 

operations identified challenges related to supporting units not being 

integrated into the exercise planning conferences, and for two operations 

these reviews specifically identified missed opportunities for these 

supporting units to provide input to the training objectives. In particular, 

officials from the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command who had 

identified potentially unique training opportunities within Pacific Pathways 

said that while they do not attend the exercise planning conferences led 

by USARPAC, they intended to work through their higher commands to 

try to shape future exercises. However, those higher commands are 

some of the same who noted challenges related to providing input to 

training. In this regard, USARPAC officials said that funding limitations, 

limits on the number of personnel allowed at the conferences, and 

 33GAO, Fisheries Management: Core Principles and a Strategic Approach Would 

Enhance Stakeholder Participation in Developing Quota-Based Programs, GAO-06-289 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006). This report identifies core principles for effective 

stakeholder participation, as drawn from literature reviews and policies from leading 

federal agencies in stakeholder participation. We are applying these criteria to the process 

through which supporting units—considered to be stakeholders in Pacific Pathways—are 

involved in Pacific Pathways planning and design.
Page 38 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

competing requirements for the units can affect the extent to which 

supporting units participate in the planning conferences. Further, 

USARPAC officials said that the supporting units are responsible for 

determining how to maximize resources to get training value from Pacific 

Pathways based on the commander’s intent issued in the Pacific Pathway 

orders, and noted that some commands may be better than others at 

leveraging Pathways’ training value.

Given the frequent rotations of military personnel within commands and 

given the unique opportunities that may be available only under Pacific 

Pathways, reliance on supporting units to recognize these opportunities 

and shape their personnel’s participation may not be sufficient to 

maximize training value across the theater. Creating a more integrated 

planning process—whether through the existing planning conferences or 

other means—that deliberately seeks out and incorporates the training 

objectives of supporting units as appropriate could assist USARPAC and 

its supporting units in identifying opportunities to more fully leverage 

some of the unique training benefits available from Pacific Pathways.

Pacific Pathways is an innovative platform for enabling USARPAC and 

Army forces throughout the region to build expeditionary readiness, 

rehearse deployment and other key tasks required for potential 

operations, and enhance relationships with partner nations in the Pacific 

region. As Pacific Pathways continues to evolve, USARPAC can leverage 

the successes and the challenges of executing Pathway operations to 

modify its approach in assessing the initiative as a whole and in planning 

for future Pathway operations. USARPAC and other units throughout the 

Pacific have identified many benefits of the Pacific Pathways initiative, but 

they have not conducted a comprehensive analysis of these benefits 

relative to costs, thereby limiting their effectiveness in communicating the 

value of the initiative to external stakeholders, such as those making 

budgetary decisions within DOD and Congress. USARPAC and its 

subordinate commands and units have experienced challenges in 

synchronizing their planning process because they have not more fully 

established an approach and issued clear guidance that integrates all 

Army planners and clearly identifies the objectives, assumptions, and 

level of authority appropriate for key decisions ahead of the exercise 

planning cycle for each Pathway operation. Some of the friction that the 

Army has experienced could be beneficial in that it can help commands 

and units to identify issues and work out relationships and systems before 

having to employ them for a contingency. However, without further 

refinements to the planning process, participants may continue to 

Conclusions
Page 39 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

experience unnecessary friction and inefficiency. Finally, some of the 

supporting units we spoke with observed after participating in Pacific 

Pathway operations a unique potential for realistic training that more 

closely mirrored their wartime missions, but there is no top-down 

emphasis in place for having supporting units’ training objectives 

integrated in the planning process. Leveraging their operational training 

objectives early in the planning process, as appropriate, could enhance 

the value of Pacific Pathways as a theater-wide rehearsal.

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Commander of 

U.S. Army Pacific to take the following three actions to assess and 

enhance the value of Pacific Pathways:

1. To fully determine the value of Pacific Pathways and communicate it 

to decision makers, conduct a comprehensive analysis of the benefits 

of Pacific Pathways relative to its costs. Such an analysis could both:

• incorporate financial and non-financial costs and benefits of the 

initiative, to include readiness benefits for logistics and 

sustainment units, any training efficiencies or cost avoidance 

resulting from Pacific Pathways, and non-financial costs, such as 

decreased equipment readiness rates; and

• compare the costs with the benefits of training conducted under 

the Pacific Pathways initiative against that conducted through 

other Army trainings, such as home station training, combat 

training centers, or other exercises.

2. To better synchronize planning across all commands and units and 

thereby achieve a more cohesive operation, modify existing 

USARPAC and I Corps planning processes and clarify guidance, as 

appropriate, that integrates all stakeholders and clearly identifies the 

objectives, assumptions, and level of authority appropriate for key 

decisions prior to the exercise planning cycle for each Pathway 

operation.

3. To more fully leverage the theater-wide training value of Pacific 

Pathways for all participating units, seek and incorporate supporting 

units’ training objectives, as appropriate, into the Pacific Pathways 

planning process.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with 

the first recommendation and concurred with the other two 

recommendations. DOD’s comments are summarized below and 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 40 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

reprinted in appendix III. USARPAC also provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated as appropriate.

DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation, that USARPAC 

conduct a comprehensive analysis of the benefits of Pacific Pathways 

relative to its costs. In its response, DOD stated that USARPAC had 

conducted a deliberate analysis of costs and benefits that led to the 

initiation of the Pacific Pathways program. DOD added that, based on 

subsequent operational experience and analysis, USARPAC now has an 

explicit understanding of the strategic benefits of the program, its costs, 

and the returns on investment in relation to alternatives. The results of 

USARPAC’s analysis are presented in DOD’s comments, and included

the potential for longer sustained decisive action readiness for brigades 

resulting from participation in Pacific Pathway operations and benefits for 

allies and partners, among other things. In its comments, USARPAC 

acknowledged that it believes that further study and analysis of brigades’ 

readiness ratings to gain a better understanding of the readiness benefits 

of Pacific Pathways is warranted and would help inform development of 

the Army’s Sustainable Readiness Process. Accordingly, DOD stated 

that by September 2018, USARPAC would submit an analysis to 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, that assesses the impact of 

Pacific Pathways on sustainable readiness. We agree that such an 

analysis would be beneficial in further clarifying the value of the initiative 

for brigades and communicating it to decision makers.

With regard to DOD’s statement that USARPAC had conducted a 

deliberate analysis of the costs and benefits of the program that led to the 

initiation of the Pacific Pathways program, this report cites a number of 

analyses that USARPAC has conducted to determine how best to 

conduct Pacific Pathways or to support its request for funding for the 

initiative, such as USARPAC’s analysis comparing the financial costs of 

the Pacific Pathways transportation model to the prior exercise 

transportation model. In response to DOD’s comments, we expanded our 

discussion of these analyses within the report to acknowledge DOD’s 

efforts. However, as noted in the report, while these individual analyses 

provide certain insights into the initiative, none of them captures the 

breadth of Pacific Pathways’ costs and benefits and thus, do not provide 

a comprehensive assessment of the initiative’s value. Moreover, while 

USARPAC may have an understanding within the command of the 

strategic benefits of the program and the returns on investment relative to 

alternatives, external stakeholders—such as those making budgetary 

decisions in DOD and Congress—may not. While USARPAC may benefit 

from conducting a comprehensive assessment, we made clarifications to 
Page 41 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

the report to further emphasize that external stakeholders would be key 

beneficiaries of such an assessment. As stated in the report, while we did 

not recommend that the Army conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis, we 

do believe that incorporating principles from such analyses could assist 

USARPAC in more fully capturing the value of the program for external 

stakeholders, as USARPAC officials have highlighted. In light of 

USARPAC’s requests for additional funding for Pacific Pathways going 

forward, we continue to believe that a comprehensive analysis of Pacific 

Pathways costs and benefits, including comparison with other types of 

training, would better position USARPAC to more broadly communicate 

the value of the initiative to Department of Defense, Army, and 

congressional decision-makers as they determine budgetary trade-offs. 

Combining the data from previously conducted analyses, including the 

addendum that DOD provided with its response to the report, with 

USARPAC’s planned sustainable readiness analysis could be one way of 

achieving this aim.

DOD concurred with our second recommendation that USARPAC modify 

existing USARPAC and I Corps planning processes and clarify guidance, 

as appropriate, that integrates all stakeholders and clearly identifies the 

objectives, assumptions, and level of authority appropriate for key 

decisions prior to the exercise planning cycle for each Pathway operation. 

In its response, DOD stated that by September 2017, USARPAC will 

establish improved planning processes and guidance that fully integrate 

all stakeholders and clearly identify the objectives, assumptions, and level 

of authority for key decisions prior to the exercise planning cycle for each 

Pathway exercise. 

DOD concurred with our third recommendation that USARPAC seek and 

incorporate supporting units’ training objectives, as appropriate, into the 

Pacific Pathways planning process. In its response, DOD stated that by 

September 2017, USARPAC will exercise greater leverage of the training 

value of Pacific Pathways with participating units and incorporate their 

training objectives, as appropriate, into the Pacific Pathways 

comprehensive planning process.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, and the Navy, as 

well as the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the report is 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 42 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-5431 or RussellC@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV.

Cary B. Russell

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 43 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Departments and Organizations 

That GAO Interviewed

Page 44 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

In support of our work, we met with officials from the following 

Department of Defense (DOD) and State Department organizations 

during our review. We selected these DOD organizations based on their 

oversight, planning, and execution roles related to the Pacific Pathway 

operations. In addition, we met with U.S. embassy officials from seven out 

of the eight countries where the Pacific Pathway operations had taken 

place.

• Office of the Secretary of Defense

• Joint Staff

• U.S. Pacific Command

• U.S. Army Pacific

• 8th Theater Sustainment Command

• I Corps

• 25th Infantry Division

o 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

o 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

o 25th Combat Aviation Brigade

• 7th Infantry Division

o 1st Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division

o 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division

• 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command

• Eighth Army

• 2nd Infantry Division

• 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command

• U.S. Army Alaska

• 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

• U.S. Army Japan

• 10th Regional Support Group

• U.S. Marine Corps Pacific

• U.S. Pacific Fleet

• U.S. Transportation Command

• Military Sealift Command

• Surface Deployment Distribution Command

• 835th Transportation Battalion

• 837th Transportation Battalion

• U.S. Army

• Headquarters, Department of the Army

• U.S. Army Forces Command

• Army Materiel Command

• 404th Army Field Support Battalion

• Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

• Special Operations Command Pacific

Appendix I: Departments and Organizations 

That GAO Interviewed

DOD Organizations
Appendix I: Departments and Organizations 

That GAO Interviewed

Page 45 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

• State Department Headquarters

• U.S. Embassy Manila, Philippines

• Deputy Chief of Mission

• Defense Attaché

• Joint United States Military Assistance Group - Philippines

• U.S. Embassy Seoul, Korea

• Political-Military Affairs

• Defense Attaché

• Joint United States Military Assistance Group - Korea

• Defense Attaché, U.S. Embassy Tokyo, Japan

• Joint United States Military Assistance Group, U.S. Embassy Bangkok, 

Thailand

• Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Jakarta, Indonesia

• Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Canberra, Australia

• U.S. Embassy Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

• Office of Defense Cooperation

• Defense Attaché

State Department 

Organizations
Appendix II: Key Department of Defense (DOD) 

Organizations That Have Participated in Pacific 

Pathways

Page 46 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Figure 6: Key DOD Organizations That Have Participated in Pacific Pathways

Appendix II: Key Department of Defense 

(DOD) Organizations That Have Participated 

in Pacific Pathways
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 47 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense

Subsequent to the Army's 

letter, the GAO report 

number was revised to 

GAO-17-126.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 48 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 49 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 50 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 51 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 52 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 53 GAO-17-126 Army Pacific Pathways 

Cary Russell, (202) 512-5431, or russellc@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, James A. Reynolds, Assistant 

Director; Tracy Barnes; Kasea Hamar; Amie Lesser; Carol Petersen; 

Michael Silver; Cheryl Weissman; and Amanda Weldon made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100187)
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