2020 IL App (4th) 200207-U 

NO. 4-20-0207 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

KATHERINE MOORE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 

KAYLA E.L. HALLER, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Sangamon County 

No. 17L271 

Honorable 

Adam Giganti, 

Judge Presiding.

 

 JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Trial court judgment is affirmed as plaintiff forfeited every issue she raised on 

appeal. 

¶ 2 On January 22, 2020, a jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, Katherine 

Moore, in the amount of $9102. Plaintiff appeals, raising the following issues: (1) the trial court 

erred by denying plantiff’s motion to bar evidence of a pre-existing condition; (2) the court erred 

when it barred plaintiff from introducing medical bills from certain medical providers; and 

(3) the jury’s award is against the manifest weight of the evidence presented. Plaintiff asks for a 

new trial on her damages. We affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On December 6, 2017, plaintiff filed her complaint against defendant, Kayla E.L. 

Haller, after a December 21, 2015, automobile accident. Plaintiff alleged she was injured as a 

FILED

November 19, 2020

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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direct and proximate result of defendant’s negligence. Defendant’s car rear-ended plaintiff’s 

car—while plaintiff was stopped in traffic—with enough force to break plaintiff’s seat and total 

both vehicles. 

¶ 5 Prior to trial, Dr. Matthew Link, a chiropractor who treated plaintiff, sat for an 

evidence deposition. During the deposition, Dr. Link was questioned about plaintiff’s 

chiropractic treatment for back issues prior to the accident in this case. On December 19, 2019, 

plaintiff filed a motion to bar evidence of her prior back injuries and treatment she received for 

those injuries. On January 14, 2020, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to bar this evidence. 

¶ 6 The jury trial in this case began on January 21, 2020. Plaintiff called defendant as 

an adverse witness. Defendant testified she collided with plaintiff’s vehicle “pretty hard” from 

behind. Defendant’s car was totaled in the accident. After the accident, plaintiff told defendant 

she was okay but her neck hurt. 

¶ 7 Plaintiff, 31, testified she worked as a sign language teacher at Jacksonville High 

School and was an adjunct professor for sign language at Richland Community College. 

Plaintiff was the only occupant of her vehicle at the time of the accident. Her car was totaled, 

and her head hurt badly after the accident. Her husband took her to Prompt Care where she told 

the medical providers she had been in a car accident and had a headache. Prompt Care told her 

she should go to the emergency room, which she did. When she left the emergency room that 

night, she still had a headache.

¶ 8 Plaintiff went to the Walton Clinic on December 23, 2015, because she was 

having low-back pain. She stated she first went to the Walton Clinic in 2012 or 2013 for lower 

back pain during a pregnancy. The treatment helped, and she discontinued treatment. After her 

daughter’s birth, she lost weight and felt better. She went back to the Walton Clinic in 2014 
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because of back pain during another pregnancy. Again, she stopped the treatment after she 

delivered her baby. She sought no other chiropractic care or physical therapy for her back until 

after the accident at issue. 

¶ 9 Plaintiff testified she felt good and lived an active life before the accident. She 

enjoyed horseback riding before her accident. Following the accident, between December 2015 

and October 2017, she started having bad back pain after teaching all day. Some days, plaintiff 

could not even lift her one-year-old daughter. She was unable to do much housework after the 

accident, but this had improved as long as she took breaks. The neck pain and headaches she 

suffered following the accident resolved fairly quickly. 

¶ 10 In addition to chiropractic care, plaintiff was also prescribed medicine, although it 

did not provide much relief. The chiropractic treatment provided relief on the day of treatment, 

but her pain would return the next day. She stopped going to the Walton Clinic because it was 

not providing the relief she wanted. On her own, without a medical referral, plaintiff went to the 

Orthopedic Center of Illinois in August 2016. She took part in physical therapy at the 

Orthopedic Center, but it did not help. Plaintiff then began receiving steroidal injections in her 

lower back. The injections worked well, but the effects would wear off. She did not plan on 

getting more treatment for her back unless her condition worsened. At the time of trial, she 

testified she was doing pretty well with only mild back pain. 

¶ 11 When plaintiff’s counsel attempted to question plaintiff about a list of dates and 

charges for different medical providers (plaintiff’s exhibit No. 1), defense counsel objected, 

arguing plaintiff could not lay a proper foundation for most of the charges. The trial court 

agreed, stating plaintiff’s physician needed to be present “to testify to what you’re trying to 

introduce into evidence.” Defense counsel did stipulate certain medical bills could be admitted 
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into evidence, including a $135 bill from Prompt Care, a $937 bill from St. John’s Hospital 

emergency room, a $605 emergency room physician’s bill, and bills for Dr. Link’s chiropractic 

treatment from December 23, 2015, to August 16, 2016, totaling $6425. 

¶ 12 On cross-examination, defense counsel asked plaintiff about her pre-accident 

treatment. Plaintiff testified she started treatment at the Walton Clinic on April 29, 2013, 

complaining she suffered low-back pain 26 to 50 percent of the time. She did not remember 

when she told Dr. Walton her back problems had started. She did tell Dr. Walton her pain, 

which was severe at times, might be related to her gaining weight during her pregnancy. After 

she delivered her child, she decided to end treatment on her own because her back pain had 

improved. She saw Dr. Walton again in October 2014 for low-back pain, which she rated as a 7 

on a scale of 1 to 10. She saw Dr. Walton 38 times between October and December 2014. She 

again ended this course of treatment on her own. 

¶ 13 Plaintiff testified she did not have back pain when she went to Prompt Care an 

hour after the accident or when Prompt Care directed her to go to the emergency room. She did 

have a headache and complained of neck pain at the emergency room. Ten days after the 

accident, plaintiff returned to Prompt Care and still made no complaints regarding back pain. A 

month after the accident, plaintiff went to the emergency room but did not complain of low-back 

pain. 

¶ 14 Plaintiff testified she could not recall whether the condition of her back after she 

saw Dr. Link for the last time was better than the condition of her back before the accident. This 

was the last thing the jury heard directly from plaintiff. Most of the medical charges plaintiff 

was not allowed to admit as evidence were for care she received after she stopped seeing Dr. 

Link. 
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¶ 15 Dr. Link’s evidence deposition was then read into evidence. During the 

deposition, plaintiff made a continuing objection to evidence of plaintiff’s pre-accident injuries 

and treatment based on a lack of both relevance and foundation. Dr. Link testified plaintiff 

received two courses of chiropractic treatment at the Walton Clinic from Dr. Adrian Walton. 

The first course of treatment began on April 23, 2013, for lower back issues she was suffering 

between 26 to 50 percent of the time. Plaintiff could not recall when her back problems began. 

She thought her issues might have been attributable to weight she gained during pregnancy. Dr. 

Walton diagnosed her with lumbar subluxation. 

¶ 16 According to Dr. Link, plaintiff’s next course of chiropractic treatment began on 

October 13, 2014. She had complaints of lower back pain (7 out of 10) and neck discomfort (4 

out of 10). Dr. Walton diagnosed plaintiff with lumbar subluxation, cervical spine subluxation, 

and myalgia. Dr. Link estimated plaintiff was seen at the Walton Clinic 15 to 20 times between 

October 13 to December 3, 2014. On November 17, 2014, plaintiff’s lower back pain had 

decreased to 4 out of 10. On November 24, 2014, she rated her “mid-back pain” as a 5 out of 10. 

On December 3, 2014, plaintiff indicated she was having aching “mid-back” pain 30 percent of 

the time. Dr. Walton recommended plaintiff continue receiving treatments, but she did not 

return until December 23, 2015, two days after the accident.

¶ 17 Plaintiff complained of lower back and neck pain as a direct result of the 

collision. Dr. Link testified plaintiff received treatment from him similar to what she received 

from Dr. Walton. Over time, her pain decreased with treatment. On August 16, 2016, at 

plaintiff’s last treatment with Dr. Link, plaintiff rated her pain as follows: headaches—0; neck 

pain—1; and lower back pain—3. Pursuant to plaintiff’s self-evaluated pain ratings, she had less 

pain at the end of her third course of treatment than at the end of her first and second courses of 
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treatment. As of August 16, 2016, Dr. Link still recommended plaintiff to continue treatment

twice per week. However, she did not return. 

¶ 18 Dr. Link testified, regardless of the accident at issue here, he would have 

recommended plaintiff receive chiropractic care because he believed she probably would have 

required it. However, he indicated plaintiff might have determined she did not need further 

chiropractic treatment absent the accident. Dr. Link testified the accident was a new injury, 

causing damage to plaintiff’s body and accelerating the need for her to have more chiropractic 

care. He believed she returned for treatment because of conditions caused by the accident. 

However, Dr. Link agreed plaintiff’s pre-accident back problems played a role in plaintiff’s 

post-accident condition. 

¶ 19 On January 22, 2020, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and assessed 

damages in the sum of $9102 ($1000 for pain and suffering and $8102 for necessary medical 

care, treatment, and services received). The jury’s damage award was subject to a $10,000 offset 

for expenses already paid by defendant’s insurer. 

¶ 20 On January 30, 2020, plaintiff filed a posttrial motion pursuant to section 2-1202 

of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1202 (West 2018)). According to the motion, the 

trial court erred by allowing Dr. Link’s testimony regarding plaintiff’s prior back injuries and 

prior chiropractic treatment for those injuries. Plaintiff also argued the trial court erred by not 

allowing plaintiff to introduce all of the medical bills she incurred after the collision. Finally, 

plaintiff argued the jury’s award for damages was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 21 On April 14, 2020, the trial court denied plaintiff’s posttrial motion. This appeal 

followed. 

¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 23 As previously stated, plaintiff raised three issues on appeal. However, plaintiff’s 

brief contains no real analysis on any of the issues. Instead, she mostly provided extended 

quotations from cases—when she cited cases—and the record without explaining how the law 

and facts support her claims of error. 

¶ 24 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) states an appellant’s 

brief shall include: 

“Argument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons 

therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on. *** 

Citation of numerous authorities in support of the same point is not favored. 

Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral 

argument, or on petition for rehearing.” 

This court has stated “mere contentions, without argument or citation of authority, do not merit 

consideration on appeal.” People v. Hood, 210 Ill. App. 3d 743, 746, 569 N.E.2d 228, 230 

(1991). “Contentions supported by some argument but by absolutely no authority do not meet 

the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7),” now Rule 341(h)(7). Hood, 210 Ill. App. 3d 

at 746, 569 N.E.2d at 230. An appellant must present clearly defined issues and cite pertinent 

authority. This court “is not simply a depository into which the appealing party may dump the 

burden of argument and research.” Hood, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 746, 569 N.E.2d at 230. 

¶ 25 Because plaintiff failed to comply with these requirements, she forfeited all three 

issues she raised on appeal for the following reasons. First, she failed to cite any authority or 

provide any analysis supporting her argument the jury’s damage award was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Instead, she simply stated, “Given the fact that this was a liability case, 

with a major impact which caused the Plaintiff to seek immediate care and treatment for years 
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after, and had continuing problems with her back up to the time of trial, a verdict of a little over 

$9,000.00 is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence ***.” 

¶ 26 Second, plaintiff provided no authority or reasoning to support her assertion the 

trial court abused its discretion in not allowing her to introduce medical bills based on her 

testimony alone. Instead, her argument focused on her ability to testify as to the cause of her 

injuries.

¶ 27 Finally, with regard to plaintiff’s assertion the trial court abused its discretion by 

allowing defendant to introduce evidence of plaintiff’s pre-collision chiropractic treatment for a 

pre-existing back condition, plaintiff merely quotes extensively from both our supreme court’s 

opinion in Voykin v. Estate of Deboer, 192 Ill. 2d 49, 733 N.E.2d 1275 (2000)—which we note is 

at least relevant to the issue raised on appeal—and the record in this case and draws summary 

conclusions with no supporting analysis. For example, she states: (1) “The injury which the 

Plaintiff suffered previously and complained of in this case are not such that a lay person can 

readily appraise the relationship, if any, between those injuries without expert assistance”; 

(2) “Defendant was unable to lay a sufficient foundation under [Voykin] to show that the prior 

successful treatments of over one year ago are relevant to causation, damages, or some other 

issue of consequence”; and (3) “Defendant failed to demonstrate why the prior injury is relevant 

to causation, damages, or some other issue of consequence as required.” 

¶ 28 Regardless of plaintiff’s forfeiture of this final issue, the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in allowing evidence of plaintiff’s prior condition. Generally, we will not disturb a 

trial court’s evidentiary ruling unless the trial court abused its discretion. Felber v. London, 346 

Ill. App. 3d 188, 189, 803 N.E.2d 1103, 1104 (2004). “An abuse of discretion will be found only 

where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Felber, 346 Ill. 
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App. 3d at 189, 803 N.E.2d at 1104. 

¶ 29 In Voykin, our supreme court rejected the “same part of the body rule,” which 

essentially provided “if a plaintiff has previously suffered an injury to the same part of the body, 

then that previous injury is automatically relevant to the present injury simply because it affected 

the same part of the body.” Voykin, 192 Ill. 2d at 57, 733 N.E.2d at 1279. However, the 

supreme court did not ban all evidence of prior injuries in all cases. The court noted a “prior 

injury may be relevant to establish that the plaintiff had a preexisting condition for which the 

defendant is not liable and that the defendant is liable only for the portion of the damages that 

aggravated or increased the plaintiff’s injury.” Voykin, 192 Ill. 2d at 58, 733 N.E.2d at 1280. A 

party who seeks to introduce evidence of a prior injury must show how the prior injury and 

current injury are related. The supreme court noted: 

“In most cases, the connection between the parts of the body and past and current 

injuries is a subject that is beyond the ken of the average layperson. Because of 

this complexity, we do not believe that, in normal circumstances, a lay juror can 

effectively or accurately assess the relationship between a prior injury and a 

current injury without expert assistance. Consequently, we conclude that, if a 

defendant wishes to introduce evidence that the plaintiff has suffered a prior 

injury, whether to the ‘same part of the body’ or not, the defendant must introduce 

expert evidence demonstrating why the prior injury is relevant to causation, 

damages, or some other issue of consequence. This rule applies unless the trial 

court, in its discretion, determines that the nature of the prior and current injuries 

are such that a lay person can readily appraise the relationship, if any, between 

those injuries without expert assistance.” Voykin, 192 Ill. 2d at 59, 733 N.E.2d at 
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1280. 

In Voykin, the defendant introduced evidence the plaintiff had neck problems before the accident 

at issue in the case. Voykin, 192 Ill. 2d at 60, 733 N.E.2d at 1280-81. During closing arguments, 

the defendant argued the jury should find in his favor, in part, because the plaintiff had 

complained of neck pain before the automobile accident. Voykin, 192 Ill. 2d at 60, 733 N.E.2d at 

1281. 

¶ 30 Our supreme court found the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to 

introduce evidence of the plaintiff’s neck problems before the accident. The court explained the 

defendant did not establish what the pre-accident neck injuries were, when the plaintiff suffered 

them, or when he last suffered them. Voykin, 192 Ill. 2d at 60, 733 N.E.2d at 1281. According 

to our high court, “Without expert testimony establishing both the nature of plaintiff’s prior 

‘neck problems’ as well as the relationship between those prior problems and plaintiff’s current 

claim, an average juror could not readily appraise the effect of the prior problems upon plaintiff’s 

current claim.” Voykin, 192 Ill. 2d at 60, 733 N.E.2d at 1281. 

¶ 31 The situation in the case sub judice is distinguishable from the situation in Voykin. 

In this case, defendant did not introduce evidence plaintiff had experienced back problems in the 

past without also providing information as to what plaintiff’s back problems were, when she 

suffered them, and when she last sought treatment for those problems prior to the accident in this 

case. The facts in this case are closer to those in Felber rather than Voykin. 

¶ 32 In Felber, the Second District rejected an argument the trial court erred in 

allowing the defendant in that case to introduce evidence of Felber’s injuries preceding the 

February 20, 1999, automobile accident at issue in that case. Felber, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 189, 

193, 803 N.E.2d at 1104, 1107. Felber sought to keep the defendant from presenting any 
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evidence regarding a 1997 car accident where Felber was injured. While prohibiting the 

defendant from introducing evidence regarding the prior accident, the trial court allowed the 

defendant to ask about Felber’s medical condition from January 1, 1998, to the time of trial. 

Felber, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 190, 803 N.E.2d at 1105. 

¶ 33 At trial, Felber testified she had gone to a chiropractor from February to 

September 1998 for shoulder and neck pain. Felber, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 190, 803 N.E.2d at 1105. 

She began treatment with Dr. Richard Feeley in November 1998. Her neck had improved by the 

end of 1998. However, she was still having some problems with it during the first six weeks of 

1999. Two days before the accident at issue in the case, she saw Dr. Feeley and described her 

neck as “ ‘feeling pretty good.’ ” Felber, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 190, 803 N.E.2d at 1105. 

¶ 34 When the February 1999 accident occurred, Felber was wearing a neck brace. 

After the accident, she went to the emergency room and had pain in her neck, her lower back, 

between her shoulder blades, and in the back of her head. She testified she had not experienced 

the back pain before the February 1999 accident. Felber, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 190, 803 N.E.2d at 

1105. Felber saw Dr. Feeley two days after the accident, and he suggested she continue the 

treatment, including manipulation, acupuncture, and nutritional supplements, she was receiving 

before the accident. Dr. Feeley also prescribed muscle relaxants, more frequent visits, and, in 

April 1999, physical therapy. Felber, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 190, 803 N.E.2d at 1105. 

¶ 35 Felber’s testimony showed she had a history of problems with her neck. On 

cross-examination, she said she started seeing a chiropractor after she hurt her neck while 

backing her car out of a garage. She also stated she had neck pain two weeks after riding a roller 

coaster in August 1998. Felber, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 190, 803 N.E.2d at 1105. In October 1998, 

she began physical therapy for her neck and back, which included ultrasound and massage 
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therapy. Felber acknowledged the treatment she received from Dr. Feeley both before and after 

the accident was similar. Regardless of the accident at issue in the case, Felber anticipated she 

would have needed to continue her treatment. Felber, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 190-91, 803 N.E.2d at 

1105-06. 

¶ 36 Dr. Feeley testified Felber’s condition had changed after the accident when he 

examined her on February 22, 1999. She had a “ ‘nonphysiological ligamentous strain of the 

upper neck,’ ” which Dr. Feeley had not seen absent trauma. The doctor said the strain was 

consistent with Felber’s description of the accident. He opined “the injuries that he found on 

February 22, 1999, were ‘directly causally related’ to the collision.” Felber, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 

191, 803 N.E.2d at 1106. It was also his opinion Felber’s complaints of numbness in her arms 

and hands were related to the collision. Felber, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 192, 803 N.E.2d at 1106. 

Further, “[h]er symptoms of neck pain, numbness in the arms, and shoulder pain were ‘directly a 

continuation of relationship to the trauma’ from the collision.” Felber, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 192, 

803 N.E.2d at 1106. 

¶ 37 In rejecting Felber’s argument the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to 

introduce evidence of the plaintiff’s prior injuries at trial, the Second District stated: 

“Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the evidence in this case is 

such that the jurors could readily appraise the relationship between the injuries of 

which Felber complained after the collision and her preexisting injuries without 

additional expert assistance; thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

allowing [defendant] to introduce evidence of Felber’s preexisting injuries. 

Unlike the evidence in Voykin, there was specific testimony, from both Felber and 

Dr. Feeley, regarding the extent of Felber’s preexisting injuries and symptoms 
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and the treatments she received in the months, even days, before the collision. 

Both Felber and Dr. Feeley were specifically questioned about Felber’s condition 

after the collision, and Dr. Feeley testified about the possible effects of the 

collision on Felber’s preexisting condition. This is precisely the type of testimony 

that obviates the need for additional expert testimony. Unlike the evidence in 

Voykin, the nature of Felber’s prior condition and its possible relationship to her 

current claim were clearly established. The jury was free to make its own 

determination, in light of both parties’ description of the collision, whether the 

collision caused, or contributed to, Felber’s current condition. We find no abuse 

of discretion in the trial court’s admission of testimony regarding Felber’s prior 

injuries.” Felber, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 193, 803 N.E.2d at 1107. 

¶ 38 As in Felber, the testimony of plaintiff and her doctor made the need for 

additional expert testimony unnecessary to link plaintiff’s pre-accident and post-accident issues. 

Plaintiff had two prior courses of chiropractic treatment for back problems, and the treatment she 

received after the accident was similar to the treatment she received before. Dr. Link stated he 

would have recommended plaintiff continue receiving chiropractic care even if she had not been 

involved in the accident. Dr. Link did testify “the car accident was a new injury that caused 

damage to her body and accelerated the need for chiropractic care and very possibly may have, 

by causing more damage by being in an accident, weakened her body, requiring more 

chiropractic care.” However, he also testified the problems plaintiff had with her back before the 

accident played a role in her condition after the accident. The jury was free to reach its own 

conclusions whether the accident caused or contributed to plaintiff’s current condition. As a 

result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this evidence. 
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¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 40 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in this case.

¶ 41 Affirmed.