### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 00 60 -C V

______________________________ THE L AMAR CORPOR ATI ON, Appe llant

V. THE CI TY OF L ONGVI EW, TEXAS, Appellee

On Appea l from the 188th J udicial District Court

Gre g g County , Texas Trial Court No. 2006-2381- A

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice Carte r2 O P I N I O N T h e C i t y o f Lon gv i ew Di re ct o r o f P l an n i n g (D i re ct o r) d en i e d t h e L am ar C o rp o ra t i o n 's (Lamar) a

pplication for wor

k permits on three of its billboards. L amar appea led the Dir ec t o r's decision to the City

of L ong view Z oning B oard of Adjustment (B oard) and, base d on the ar g ument that an unconstitutional taking of private proper ty without just compensation would result, reque sted

a var iance of a c ity

ordinanc e re quir i n g remova l of the billboards. The B oard de nied to apply the varia nce, a ffirming the Director' s decision. L amar filed a suit for de clar atory judgme nt in the district court. Thr oug h resolution of cross motions for summ ary judgme nt, the di strict court affirmed the Boa rd' s decision, and this appe al ensue d. We affir m the district court' s summary judgme nt on the unconstitutional taking issue. Howeve r, we dismiss the rema ining appea l f or want of jurisdiction. I. F actual and Proc edural History A. Basic Overview of Issues and Ordinan ces Wit hin 1,500 fee t of Heritag e P laza Park, L amar ere cted and maintained thre e off -pre mises outdoor billboard s i gn s . There afte r, the City of L ong view (City

) passe d an ordina

nce pr ohibiting billboards within 1,500 fee t of a public park. L ONG VI EW , T EX ., R EV . O RD I N A N CE S c h

. 8 5 , a rt
. III , § 85-60 (2003) . L amar ' s billboards were g randf ather ed in and we re a llowed to rema in under a "nonc onforming sign" status. Nonconf orming signs " need not be rec onstructed," but are to be " kept in g ood repa ir and mai nt ain ed i n a s afe co nd it io n. " L ONG VI EW , T EX ., R EV . O RD I N A N CE S ch. 85, art. I V, § 85-80 (2003).3

W h i l e n o s i gnca nb e a l t er edu n t i l a p e r m i t h as b ee ni s s u ed , "[ n ] o rm al m ai n t en an ce , p ai n t i n g,

re pa int ingor

c le anin g of

a sig n w ithno str

uc tur a l c ha

ng e s" e xemp ts t

he need to reques t a

pe rm it. L ONG VI EW , T EX ., R EV . O RD I N A N CE S ch

. 8 5 , ar t
. I , § § 8 5 -4 , 8 5 -5 (2 0 0 3 ). A n o n co n fo rm i n g s i gn lo ses it s s tat us if

it "is di sm ant led for any

pu rpo se o th er t han mai nt enan ce op erat io ns ." L ONG VI EW , T EX ., R EV . O RD I N A N CE S ch. 85, ar t. I V, § 85-81 (2003)

. Wit hout a per

mit, L amar

dismantled all three sig ns, repa ired or r eplac ed all sig n fac e fr ames

an d s u p p o rt i n g m e mb e r s c o n n e c t i n g t h e p o s t s , an d r e m o v e d a l l c a t w a l k s o nt h e s i g n s . A d d i t i o n a l l y, L amar remove d and re place d two supporting posts on one sig n and one suppor ting post on anothe r. The B uilding Inspection Depa rtment sent L amar a notice of violation, insisting that pe rmits for work on the billboards wer e re quired. L amar applied for

the sig n permits and d es cr ibed the wor k as "struc ture re pair." The pe rmits were denied. F inding t h at L am ar essentially rebuilt its signs, the Dire ct o r d ecide d L amar had dismantled its billboard for a rea son "othe r than maintena nce op e ratio ns " and inf

or me d L a mar that it wa s re qu ir e d to tak e the sig ns do wn be c a us e it h a d lo st i ts nonconfor

ming status per section 85-81. L amar appea led the denial of the work pe rmit to the Boar d

and a sk e d th e B oa

rd to i nte rp re t se c tio n 8 5- 81 to d e te rm ine wh e the r L a mar' s si g ns ha d in fa c t lo st the ir status in l ig ht o f L a mar' s ar g ume nt that it wa s per fo rm ingma int e na nc e a s r e qu ir e d b y

oth e r c ity ordinanc es. L amar also asked for a varia nce of section 85-81, a

rg uing that an unconstitutional taking of pr ivate pr op e rt

y wi tho ut j us t c omp e ns a tio n w ou ld o c c ur if L a mar w a s r e qu ir e d to re mov e its4

signs. L amar

was notified of

the B oard' s decision to de ny a " reque st to appeal the inter pretation of th e si gn ord in ance. " B. P roce dural Hi story in District Court Th e re a ft e r, L a mar f

ile d a pe tit ion fo r d e c lara

tor y re lief in Gregg Co un ty

Di str ic t Co ur

t to decla re: 1) t he work done on L amar ' s billboards was norma l maintenance , which did not require a pe rm it; 2) L a mar' s sig ns did no t los e the ir no nc on fo rm ing status ; and 3) L a mar w a s n ot r e qu ir e d to

remove the s igns. I n an amended petiti on, L amar also asked the trial court to dec lare section 85-81 unconstitutional as a taking of pr ivate prope rty without just compensation if the court dete rmined th e ord in ance p reve nt ed "m ain ten ance o pera ti on s t o t he s up po rtst ruct ures ." The City filed a ple a to the jurisdiction which wa s never hear d

. I t al so filed a motion for

s u m m ar y j u d gm en to nL am ar 's cl ai m s fo r de cl ar at o ry j u d gm en t an d s u m m ary j u d gm en to nt h e C i t y 's counter claim that L amar ' s signs lost their nonconforming status and shoul d be re moved. L amar filed its own mo tio n f

or su mma ry jud g me nt o n it s c la im s, argui ng that, s inc e the sig ns we re on ly dismantled for maintena nce ope rations, they

did n ot lose their nonconf orming status. L amar alternatively

argued that, if the City ' s interpre tation of section 85-81 w as cor rec t, the ordinanc e would constitute an unconstitutional taking as applied to it. The trial court de nied L amar ' s motion fo r su mma

ry jud g me nt, g ra

nte d the City ' s mot ion , a ff ir me d the B oa

rd ' s de c isi on that th e sig ns los t their nonconf

orming status, and orde red the signs be remove d.5

The standa

rd for revie wing a traditional motion for summ ary judgme nt is well established. See Sy sc o Foo d Se rv

s. , Inc . v. Tra

pn e ll , 8 90 S.W. 2d

79 6, 80 0 ( Te x. 19 94 ); Nix on v . Mr

. Pr op . M gm t. Co. , 690 S.W .2d 546, 548–49 (Tex. 1985). We revie w de novo a sum mary judgme nt to determine whether a par ty ' s rig ht to pr ev ai l is established as a matter of law

. Dicke y v. Club Corp. of Am. , 12 S.W .3d 172, 175 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied) . A par ty moving f or traditional summary judgme nt is char g ed with the burde n of establishing that there are no g enuine issues of material fa ct and it is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. T EX . R. C IV . P. 16 6a (c ); M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v

. W

illri ch , 28 S.W. 3d

22 , 2 3 ( Te x. 20 00 ) ( pe r c ur iam) . Ama tte r i s c on c lus ive ly established if ordina

ry minds c ould not differ

as to the conc lusion to be drawn f rom the evide nce. Trit on Oil &

Gas Corp. v

. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc

. , 644 S.W .2d 443, 446 (Tex. 1982). When both sides move for sum mary judgme nt, the court is to review both sides' summary judgme nt evidenc e, dete rmine all questions prese nted, and r ender the judg ment the tri al co urt should have rende red. See FM

Pr op s. Op e ra tin g Co . v . Ci ty of A us tin , 22 S.W .3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000). II. With the Exception of the Unconstitutional Takin g Issue, There Is No Sub jec t-M atte r Jurisdi ction Over This Dispu te Te xas l aw s pe c ifies that, b e c a us e the B oa

rd is a qu a si- jud ic ia l bo dy , th e dis tr ic t c ourt sit s only as a c ourt of re view by

writ of certiorar i. T EX . L O CA L G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 211.011 (Ve rnon 2 0 0 8) ; City of San Antonio v. El Dorado Amusement Co. , 195 S.W .3d 238, 249 (Tex. App.—San An ton io 2 00 6, pe t. d e nie d) ; W . Tex. W ater Refiners, Inc. v . S & B Bev erage Co. , 915 S.W .2d 623, 626 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no writ); Bd. of A djustment of City of Corpus Christi v. Flores , 8606

S.W. 2d 62 2 (T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 19 93 , w ri t de nie d) ; se e Cur re yv . Ki mp le , 577 S.W .2d 508, 512 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tex arka na 1978, wr it ref' d n.r.e. ) (c onstruing pr ior statute). This ce rtiorar i

re qu ir e me nt is an adm in is tr ati ve re med y pro vi dedby

th e Tex as L ocal Gov ernm ent Co de, whic h mu st be ex hausted before board decisions may be brought be fore the cour ts. El Dorado Amuseme nt Co. , 195 S.W .3d at 250. A s uit not brought pursua nt to statutory

provisions is an impermissibl e collate ral attack. Id. (dismissing appe llant's a ppeal not broug ht by writ of certiorar i for lack of subject-matter jur isd ic tio n) . Wh e n p ro pe rl y br ou g ht, the on ly

qu e sti on wh ic h ma

y be ra ise d by a pe tit ion

fo r w ri t of cer tiorari is the leg ality

of the B oard' s order . T EX . L O CA L G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 21 1. 01 1( a ); City of Sa n An ge lo v . Bo e hm e Ba k e ry , 144 Tex. 281, 190 S .W.2d 67, 69 (1945) (construingprior statute); El Dorado Amuseme nt Co. , 195 S.W. 3d a t 25 0; Bd. of A djustment of City of P iney Point Village v. Amelang , 737 S.W .2d 405, 406 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1987, writ denied)

. B e fo re we a

pp ly the fa c ts o f o ur c a se to t

he ru le ou tli ne d a

bo ve , w e no te that on e c a se c a lls into question the principle that filing a wr it of cer tiorari is a jurisdictional re quirement. Teague v. City of J ac k sb or o , 190 S.W .3d 813 (Tex. A pp.—For t Worth 2006, pet. denied)

. Teague involved

an ap peal of

a conde mnation matter g overne d by a rule simil ar to Sec tion 211.011. T EX . L OC AL G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 21 4. 00 12 (V e rn on 20 08 ); Teague , 190 S.W .3 d at 815. The a ppeal wa s eff ectuated t hroug h an action for declar atory and injunctive re lief. Relying on a n El Paso Court of Ap pe a ls d e c isi on statin g tha t Se c tio n 2 14 .0 01 2 r e qu ir e d th e fi lin g of a wr it o f c e rt ior ari a s a jurisdictional prere quisite, the City of Jacksboro fil ed a plea to the jurisdiction. Teague , 190 S.W .3dDa v is a lso re ite rate d, " Th e wr it of c e rt ior ari is the me tho d by wh ic h the c ourt c on du c ts i ts 1 revie w; its purpose is to require a z oning board of adjustment to forwa rd to the cour

t the rec ord of the par ticular zoning de cision being challeng ed." 865 S.W .2d at 942. 7 a t 81 5; Ma rti ne

z v . E l P as o , 1 6 9 S

. W

. 3 d

4 8 8 , 4 9 2 (T ex . Ap p . — E l P as o 2 0 0 5 , p et
. d en i ed ) ( al t h o u gh court dismissed case due to inadequa te brief ing, it we nt on to elaborate there was no jurisdiction over administrative appe al wher e plaintiff f iled petition for bill of review instead of petition for writ of

cer tiorari). The court in Te ague denied the ple a, re asoning that the Martinez case was in conf

lict with the Texas Supreme Court' s decision in Da v is v . Zo nin g B oa rd of A dju stm e nt of Ci ty

of L a Po rte , 865 S.W .2d 941 (Tex. 1993)

. Our revie w of the ove rturned de cision in Da v is re ve a ls that a petition for writ of certiorar i was filed. Da v is v . Zon ing Bd . o f A dju stm e nt o

f Cit yof L a P or te , 853 S.W .2d 650, 651 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 1993), r e v 'd , 865 S.W .2d 941. Moreove r, the Texas Supreme Court in Da v is mere ly held that the issuanc e of a wri t of c e rt ior ari is n ot a jur isd ic tio na l r e qu ir e me nt. Da v is , 865 S.W .2d at 942. For these reasons, we disag ree with Teague 1 and re asser

t, based on the a

bundance of other c asela

w addr essing this iss ue, that filing a petition for writ of ce rtiorar i is necessa ry in or der to exhaust admini strative re medies and a void the revie w from being considere d a collate ral attack on the B oard' s decision. L amar did not f ile a verifie d petition f

or writ of ce rtiorar i. I nstead, L amar filed petitions for decla ratory relief . Ba sed on t h e l an guag e set out in Section 211.011 in which the L eg islature intended appe als of B oard de cisions to be broug ht throug h a p et ition for writ of ce rtiorar i, the orig inal and ame nded petition for declar atory relief and alleg ations contained the rein we reDuring oral a rg ument, L amar ' s counsel ar g ued the Te x as Supreme Court' s decision in Tellez 2 v. City of Socorro clar ified that this Court has subject-matter juris d i ct i o n o v er this disput e. 226 S.W .3d 413 (Tex. 2007) . I t did not. Te lle z me re ly sta nd s f or the pr op os iti on

that di smi ssa l of

su it is not require d wher e a board is not named as a par ty and that plea ding a lleg ations of illeg ality is not a jurisdictional re quirement. Id. a t 4 1 4

. I n f a c t , a r e v i e w o f t h e c a s e b e l o w d e m on str a te s th a t a proper petition f

or writ of ce rtiorar i was filed in Tellez

. Se e Te lle z v . Ci ty of S oc orro , 164 S.W .3d 823, 826 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005), r e v 'd , 226 S.W .3d 413. 8 insufficient to conf

er jurisdiction on the district cour t. There fore , except for the unc onstitut ional 2 taking issue, we vaca t e the district court' s summary judgme nt rulings a

nd dismiss the ca se. See Hailey v . Siglar , 194 S.W .3d 74, 82 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied)

. III . Re quir ing Re m ov al of Lam ar 's Signs Di d No t Am ount to an U nc ons ti tu ti ona l Ta king A. We Hav e Jur isdi c ti on t o C ons ide r th e Unc ons ti tu ti ona l Ta king Iss ue A par ty may obtain judicial revie w of an adminis trative action if it adver sely aff ects a vested proper ty rig ht or otherwise violates a c onst i t u t i o n al rig ht. Te x . D e p't o f P ro te c tiv e & Re

gu lator y S ervs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc. , 1 45 S.W. 3d 17 0, 17 2 ( Te x. 20 04 ); Co n t' l Ca s. Ins. Co. v. Fu nc tio na l R esto ra tio n A sso c s. , 1 9 S. W.3 d 3 93 , 4 04 (T e x. 20 00 ); City of Amarillo v. Hanc ock, 150 Tex. 231, 239 S .W.2d 788, 790–91 (1951). Where a constitutional taking issue is broug ht, it can be considere d even thoug h other c l ai m s are dismiss ed for failure to exhaust admini strative re medies under Section 211.011 of the Te x as Gove rnment Code. Ce nte no v . Ci ty of A lam o H

e igh ts , No. 04- 00-00546-CV, 2001 WL518911, at *3 (Te x . App.—San Ant o n i o May 16, 2001, no pet.) (not desig nated f

or pu b lication); se e als o Hitchcoc k v. B d. of Trust ees, Cypre ss-Fairbanks Inde

p. Sch. Di st ., 232 S.W .3d 208, 219 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2007, no pet.).9

I n its mo t ion for summary judgme nt, L amar

argued that sec tion 85-81, providing f or te rm inatio n o f non c on fo rm ing sig ns , co ns tit ute d an un c on sti tut ion a l tak ingof pr op e rt y wi tho ut j us t

c o mp e n s a t i o na s p r o h i b i t e d u n d e r A rt i c l e I, S e c t i o n1 7 o f t h e T e x a s C o n s t i tu t i o n . A rt i c l e I, Section 17 require s pay

ment of ade quate c ompensation when pr ivate prope rty is taken for public use. Howeve r, since a ll property is held sub

j ec t t o the valid exercise of the police powe r, a c ity

is not require d to compensate for losses oc casione d by the proper and r easona ble exercise of

that power

. City of C oll e ge Sta tio n v . Tu rtl e Ro c k

Cor p ., 68 0 S.W. 2d 80 2, 80 4 ( Te x. 19 84 ); Lom ba rd o v . Ci ty of Dallas , 124 Tex. 1, 73 S .W.2d 475, 478–79 (1934). B. Rem oval of Lam ar's Bill boards per City Ordinan ce Is Not an Unconstitution al Taki ng A city may

enac t rea sonable re g ulations to promote the health, saf ety , and g ener al welf

are of its pe ople. Tur tleRo c k Cor p ., 68 0 S. W.2 d at 80 5; Lombardo , 73 S.W .2d at 478. The que stion of wh e the r a pol ic e po we r re g ulatio n is pro pe r or wh e the r it con sti tut e s a com pe ns a ble takin g is a question of law. Tur tleRo c k Cor p ., 68 0 S. W.2 d at 80 4; Hu nt v . Ci ty of S an An ton io , 462 S.W .2d 536, 539 (Tex. 1971). The c oncept of public we l fare has a

broad r ang e. Tur tleRo c k Cor p ., 680 S.W. 2d a t 80 5. I f r e a so na

ble min ds may

dif fe r a s to wh e the r a

pa rt ic ula r zo nin g or din anc e ha s a

su bs tanti a l r e la tio ns hip to the pu bli c he a lth , sa fe ty , mor a ls, or g e ne ra l we lf are , th e or din anc e mus t stand as a valid exercise of the city ' s police powe r. Id. ; Hunt , 462 S.W .2d at 539. A city ordinanc e is presumed to be va lid, and an " extraord i n ar y burden" rests on one attacking a city ordinanc e. Tur tleRo c k

Cor p ., 680 S.W .2d at 805; Hunt , 462 S.W .2d at 539.10

Although the re is no brig ht line for distinguishing betwee n an exerc ise of the police power wh ic h d oe s con sti tut e a

takin g and

on e wh ic h d oe s n ot, the re are tw o r e la te d r e qu ir e me nts take n in to consideration when assessing validity of an ex er ci s e o f police pow er. Tur tleRo c k Cor p ., 680 S.W. 2d a t 80 4; Hunt , 462 S.W .2d at 539. Fir st, the regulation must be adopted to ac complish a leg itimate goa l; it m ust be " substantia lly related" to the health, saf ety , or g ener al welf

are of the people. Tur tleRo c k

Cor p ., 68 0 S. W.2 d at 80 5; Lombardo , 73 S.W .2d at 479. S econd, the regulation must be rea sonable; it c annot be ar bitrary

. Tur tleRo c k

Cor p ., 680 S.W .2d at 805; City of U niv . P ar k

v . B e nn e rs , 485 S.W .2d 773, 778 (Tex. 1972). I n other wor ds, it must "substantially " a dvance the leg itimate g oals of the c ity

. Ma y he w v . To wn o

f Su nn y v ale , 964 S.W .2d 922, 933–34 (Tex. 1998). The purpose of the City ' s sign ordinanc e is to "promote the he alth, safe ty , and we lfare " of the City ' s citiz ens by balanc [i ng ] t he rig ht of individuals a nd businesses to identify

themselves and c onvey messag e s w it

h th e r ig h t o f

th e p u b li c to b e p r o te c te d

a g a in s t t

h e u n r e s tr icted pr oliferat io n of sig ns . I t is fu rt he r i nte nd e d to e nc oura g e sig ns wh ic h a re we ll desig ned; which pr eser

ve loca lly rec og nized

v a lu e s o f c o mm unity appea ranc e; which pr ote c t pu

bli c inv e stm e nt i n, and th e char act e r o f, pu bli c tho ro ug hf

are s; w hic h a id in the attrac tion of shoppers and other visitors who are important to the economy of the ci t y ; [ an d] which reduce hazards to motorists and pedestria ns travelingon the public roadw ay s . . . . L ONG VI EW , T EX ., R EV . O RD I N A N CE S ch. 85, ar t. I , § 85-1 (2003). Specifica lly , the nonconf orming sig n o rd ina

nc e is d e sig ne d to : 1) ke e p un ma int a ine d sig ns fr om i nju ri ngmot or ist s and

pe de str ians ; 2) a ttr a c t busi ne ss to the City ; and 3) pr e se rv e the be a uti fi c a tio n o f t

he City ' s r e sid e nti a l are a s, pa rk s, fore sts, and playg rounds by preve nting pr oliferation of signs in those area s . As such, theL amar cites our c ase of Adcoc k v. King in s u pport of it s p o s it io n . 5 2 0 S. W. 2 d 4 1 8 ( T e x. 3 Civ. App.—Te x arka

na 1975, no writ). The Adcoc k decision was based on a Tex as S upreme Court opinion, City of Cor

pus Christ i v. Allen , 152 Tex. 137, 254 S .W.2d 795 (1953). W e b eli eve the Adcoc k opin ion incorre ctly

applied the Allen case . I n Allen , a salva g e compa ny which had be en op e ratin g fo r s e ve ra l y e ars wa s r e zon e d. B a se d o n the ne w zon ing or din anc e , the c ity a tte mpt e d to require the business to move to another loc ation. The Te x as Supreme Court state d: W i t h re s p ec t t o z o n i n g o rd i n an ce s wh i ch at t em p ta r et ro ac t i v e e ff ec t , as p et i t i o n er 's ordinanc e does here , it is said: "A s a g ener al rule, the restri ct i o n s o f a zoning or din anc e or re g ulatio n may no t be ma de re tr oa c tiv e . Suc h re g ulatio ns mus t r e la te 11 nonconfor

ming sig n ordinanc e is substantially related t o the publ ic heath, safety , and g ener al welf are of the City ' s citiz ens. The f irst prong under Turtl e Roc k Corp. is met. See 680 S.W .2d at 805. Municipal zoning or d i n an ces requiring the termination of nonc onforming uses under

re asonable conditions are w ithin the scope of municipal police power . M u rm u r Co r p . v . B d

. of Adjustment of Cit

y of Dallas , 718 S.W .2d 790, 794 (T ex . App.—Dallas 1986, w rit ref ' d n.r.e.)

. Property owner s do not acquire a constitutionally protec ted vested r i gh t in property uses once

commence d or in zoning cla ssifications once ma de. Id. T h er e ar e strongpolicy arguments and de mon str a

ble pu bli c ne e d f

or the fa ir and re a so na

ble te rm inatio n o f n on c on fo rm ingpr op e rt y us e s. Id. These use s most often do not disap p ea r, b u t t end to thrive in monopolistic posit ions in the community

. Id. To pr e ve nt t he ind e fi nit e e xiste nc e of no nc on fo rm ingsig ns , it

is reas on a

ble to

r e qu ir e a n o n c o n f

o r mi n g s ig n ' s te r

mi n a ti o n if it is r e b u il t o r d is ma n tl e d f o r p u r p o ses other tha n maintenanc e. The rea sonable ter mination of L amar ' s nonconfor ming sig ns throug h section 85-81

acc omplishes the goa ls of the sig n ordinanc e outlined above , and is ther ef o re not arbitrar

y . The second pr ong under Turtl e Roc k Corp. is also met. See 680 S.W .2d at 805. 3to the future r ather than to exis ting building s and uses of la n d , an d o rd i n arily

they may not operate to remove exis ting building s and use s not in conformity with the restric tions applicable to the district, at lea st where such buildings a nd uses ar e not nu isa nc e s and the ir re mov a l is n ot j us tif ie d a s p ro mot ingthe pu

bli c he a lth , mo ra ls, saf ety , o r wel fare. " Id. (citations omitted). I n Adcoc k , there was no issue of r et ro ac t i v e ef fec t. The salvag e y ard ha d been in ope ration for

some time when it was annexed into the city and constituted a nonc onforming us e . H ow e ve r, the sa lva g e y ard c on tin ue d to op e rate fo r se ve ra l y e ars wh e n a fi re oc c ur re d. Th e c ity ordinanc e allowed the s alvag e y ard to apply for a building per

mit if rebuilding c osts did not ex cee d six ty perc ent of the va lue. When the city denied the pe rmit, suit was filed al l egi n g an un c on sti tut ion a l ta

kin g . T his Court

fo un d th a t, sin c e the sa lva g e y ard wa s no t a nu isa nc e or a pu bli c health, saf

ety , or we lfare conce rn, the ordina nce ope rate d as an unconstitutional taking . I n this, we b el i ev e t h at opi nion was in err or. As opposed to Allen , in Adcoc k , th e r e w a s n o qu e s ti o nof retroa ctive application. The ordinanc e in que stion ha d been in e ffe ct for y ear s and the sa lvag e y ard was a nonconfo rm i ng use which w as allowe d to continue until it burned, which broug ht into play a pp lic a tio n o f t

he or din anc e re qu ir inga

pp ro va l to re bu ild

the no nc on fo rm ingus e . F or the se re a so ns , we do not believe Adcoc k is controlling a

uthority in this case. 12 The two-pr ong ed test in Tur tleRo c k Cor p . does not end the inquiry

. Mayhe w , 964 S.W .2d at 935. A re g ulatory

taking can a lso occu r wh en go vernme ntal ag encie s impose restrictions that

e ith e r de ny land ow ne rs a ll e c on omi c a lly via ble us e of the ir pr op e rt y or un re a so na

bly int e rf e re wi th their rig hts to enjoy and use the ir proper ty
. Id. A re striction denies all ec onomically viable use of

a proper ty only wher e it r ender s the prope rty valueless. Id. (citing Do lan v . Ci ty of T iga rd , 5 12 U. S. 37 4, 38 5 ( 19 94 )) . L a mar a sse rt s th a t a c on str uc tio n o f t his or din anc e in the City ' s f a vo r w ou ld r e su lt in unconstituti onal taking as applied in this instance. L amar did not present any summary judgme nt evidenc e demonstrating that its proper ty would be re nder ed v alueless if r emoval of the billboards

wa s re qu i re d

. De t er m i n i n g wh et h er t h e go v ern m en th as u n re as o n ab l y i n t er fe re d

wi t h a l an d o wn er 's rig ht to use and enjoy

proper ty require s a consideration of two fac tors: the economic impact of theW e a l s o n o t e t h a t t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e n o n c o n f

o r m i n g u s e w a s n o tb a s e d

o na c t i o nb y t h e C i t y, 4 but rather , was ba sed on L amar ' s actions to perf orm work on its billboards. 13 regulation and the extent to which the re g ulation inter fe re s with disti nct investment-bac ked

e xpe c ta tio ns . Id. Sin c e L a mar fa ile d to ra ise any a lle g a tio ns or

pr e se nt a ny e vid e nc e on

the se iss ue s, the City may rely

on the pre sumed constitutionality of the ordina

nce. Te x . B oll W e e v il Eradication Found., Inc. v . Lewellen , 952 S.W .2d 454, 475 n.12 (Tex. 1997) (noting statutes should be aff orded pr e su mpt ion

of c on sti tut ion a lity

); Shelby Ope rators Co. v. Ci ty of W askom , 9 6 4 S. W. 2 d

7 5 , 8 2 ( T e x. App.—Texarkana

1997, pet. denied) . There fore , we f ind that no taking of private proper ty without just compensation occur red be cau s e L amar

has fa iled to overc ome the pre sumption of constitutionalit y of t he ordinance. Be cause the City rea sonably

exercised its police powe r, it is not 4 require d to make compe nsation for L amar ' s losses, if any

. S e e Tu r tl e R o c k

Co rp. , 680 S.W .2d at 804. IV. Conclusion We affir m the district court' s finding that L ong view City Ordinanc e sec tion 85-81 does not constitute a taking of L amar ' s private proper ty without just compensation. Due to L amar ' s failure14

to exhaust admini strative re medies by not bring ing this suit in accor dance with Section 211.011 of the Texas Gover

nment Code and instead a ss er t i n g a collate ral attack on the B oard' s decision, we dismiss the district court' s judgme nt on all other ca uses for w ant of jurisdiction.

J ack Ca rter J ustice Date Submitted: October 29, 2008 Date D ecide d: November 21, 2008