U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

Scientific Investigations Report 2010–5173

Prepared in cooperation with the Missouri University of Science and Technology

Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central 

United States Earthquake—Science Needs of the 

Response and Recovery Community
Front cover. Map of the Central United States showing location of the New Madrid Seismic Zone.

Back cover. Map of seismicity (red circles—size is proportional to magnitude between 3 and 7.5) in the Central and Eastern 

United States since 1964.
Proceedings of Preparing for a Significa

Central United States Earthquake—

Science Needs of the Response and 

Recovery Community

nt 

Edited By Emitt C. Witt, III

Scientific Investigations Report 2010–5173

U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

Prepared in cooperation with the Missouri University of Science and Technology
U.S. Department of the Interior

KEN SALAZAR, Secretary

U.S. Geological Survey

Marcia K. McNutt, Director

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia: 2010

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Suggested citation:

Witt, E.C., III, ed., 2010, Proceedings of preparing for a significant Central United States earthquake—Science needs 

of the response and recovery community: U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2010–5173, 76 p.
iii

Preface

Imagine waking up at 2 o’clock in the morning by a violent rumbling that causes ceilings 

to fall, furniture to topple over, and windows to break. Your home is crumbling, it is dark, and 

by the time you realize what is going on the shaking stops. You quickly determine that your 

family members are okay, but you also realize your power is out, all the windows are broken, 

and there is substantial damage to your home possibly making it unsafe to remain inside. The 

temperature outside is in the 20s, there is a heavy snow on the ground, and the flu season is 

at its peak with two of your family members affected. Unfortunately your family is one of 

thousands in a similar circumstance and the response to your needs may not be immediate, if at 

all. Could an earthquake like this happen unannounced? It did in the Central United States during the great New Madrid earthquake of 1811–12. A resident of New Madrid, Missouri writes 

(Martin, 1848):

“On the 16th of December 1811, about 2 o’clock, AM, we were visited by a violent 

shock of an earthquake accompanied by a very awful noise resembling loud but 

distant thunder, but more hoarse and vibrating, which was followed in a few minutes 

by the complete saturation of the atmosphere with sulphurious vapor, causing total 

darkness. The screams of the affrighted inhabitants running to and fro, not knowing 

where to go, or what to do—the cries of the fowls and beasts of every species—the 

crackling of trees falling, and the roar of the Mississippi—the current of which was 

retrograde for a few minutes, owing as is supposed to an irruption in its bed—formed 

a scene truly horrible.”

 Eliza Bryan, March 22, 1816

The residents of the Central United States during the great New Madrid earthquake were 

accustomed to living rugged life styles. Electrical power was not a reality, water was drawn 

from shallow hand-dug wells or retrieved from streams, food was hunted or grown, and the 

homes typically were log structures with dirt floors. Though these inhabitants were primitive by 

today’s standards, they could survive because they did not rely on the supporting infrastructure 

we rely on today. What would you do if such an event struck as you read this? As a society, are 

we prepared for a similar event? Could you live for an extended period without power, refrigeration, heat, air conditioning, or fresh water?

Missouri and its adjacent states have experienced more than 450 recorded earthquakes 

greater than magnitude 3 since 1964 (Petersen and others, 2008); however, none of these 

Central United States earthquakes has been as severe as the 1811-12 event. The 1811–12 events 

actually were a series of three very large earthquakes followed by many smaller but significant 

aftershocks (Johnston and Schweig, 1984). Ground shaking was reported as far away as Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Charleston, South Carolina. 

Seismicity in the Central United States is related to two major interplate fault systems buried deep within the Mississippi River and Wabash/Ohio River alluvium. They are collectively 

known as the New Madrid and the Wabash Valley Seismic Zones. The New Madrid Seismic 

Zone extends north along the Mississippi River from Memphis, Tennessee, to the confluence 

of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. The Wabash Valley Seismic Zone extends north along the 

Wabash River from its confluence with the Ohio River to Terre Haute, Indiana. Together, these 

two seismic zones cover an area nearly 45,000 square miles. The cities of St. Louis, Missouri: 

Memphis, Tennessee: Little Rock, Arkansas; and Evansville, Terre Haute, and Indianapolis, 

Indiana, all are located in or adjacent to the New Madrid and the Wabash Valley Seismic Zones.

Geologic studies of seismic activity for the region indicate that both zones are capable of 

producing large magnitude earthquakes (Gomberg and Schweig, 2006). Unfortunately, little is 

known about the mechanisms supporting large earthquakes in the Central United States, and 

few earthquakes of significant magnitude happen with any frequency in this region. This has 

led to complacency among Central United States residents regarding the potential for another 
iv

destructive earthquake. When a future significant earthquake does happen, it likely will occur 

without warning, causing widespread confusion and delayed response. A significant event could 

cause substantial damage and interrupt the east to west flow of transportation, communication, 

electricity, natural gas, and oil throughout the United States. Preliminary estimates indicate 

that economic losses from a magnitude 7.7 event in the New Madrid Seismic Zone could reach 

$50–$80 billion in direct losses alone (Elnashai and others, 2008). There could be thousands of 

fatalities, tens of thousands of injured victims, and hundreds of thousands left without homes. 

Much is being done to prepare the region for a significant earthquake. But like any disaster, 

many lessons are not often learned until the event occurs and many lives are lost. 

On August 12–15, 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey and Missouri University of Science 

and Technology hosted “Preparing for a Significant Earthquake: Science Needs of the Response 

and Recovery community,” in Rolla, Missouri. The purpose of this conference was to bring 

together scientists, engineers, and the response and recovery community who are stakeholders 

in activities resulting from a significant no-notice seismic event in the Central United States. 

The objective was to provide a regional forum for the presentation, exchange of ideas, and 

potential solutions involved with preparing for a significant Central Unites States earthquake. 

The conference opened communication avenues with academia, government, non-government 

agencies, and the private sector to address the current and forecasted needs of the response 

and recovery community. The ultimate objective was to facilitate the development of relevant 

science in preparation for a significant Central United States earthquake similar to the events of 

1811–12, and to begin establishing a long-term consistent system of data development that can 

support holistic interpretations leading to products that can support the response and recovery 

community following an earthquake. 

This report contains the abstracts and selected papers for oral and poster sessions and the 

results of the breakout and table-top sessions. During the three day conference workshop participants learned about first response training, attended presentations from esteemed speakers, 

and participated in a facilitated discussion on the next steps necessary to prepare for a significant seismic event in the Central United States. The first day of the conference consisted of six 

training events:

• Missouri’s State Emergency Management Agency’s (SEMA) Structural Assessment and 

Visual Evaluation (SAVE) training;

• The Central United States Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC) summary brief of the 

Disaster Medicine 101 course and an overview of public health concepts related to the 

earthquake threat in the New Madrid Seismic Zone;

• Red Cross training in mass care; 

• The U.S. Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear School’s presentation 

on the employment of joint task forces of military, federal, Department of Transportation, and local organizations in a disaster environment;

• The Missouri National Guard’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team’s 

(CST) exploratory session on how CSTs can support the emergency response community during a seismic event. The class also included a live demonstration of specific 

communications capabilities including a live “hot zone” video, video teleconference, 

and Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) capabilities; and

• Central Plains EarthScope Partnership presentation on the coalition of universities, 

schools, State geological surveys, and State and Federal agencies organized to promote 

earth science research and education in Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Missouri by utilizing the National Science Foundation-funded EarthScope facility.

The second day of the conference addressed specifically topics, including the consequences 

of a major earthquake, engineering effects and stresses, socioeconomic impacts, mitigation 
v

plans for transportation and infrastructure, geological and structural monitoring, and geologic 

mapping activities. The third day was divided into two tracks to facilitate discussion and input 

into the needs of the response and recovery community. Presentations focused on Federal and 

State agency mapping activities, and the lessons learned from State and Department of Defense 

natural disaster exercises. Both tracks included a facilitated panel discussion to develop a list of 

challenges to response and recovery operations that can be supported through relevant science 

and engineering activities. SEMA also conducted a table-top exercise that brought concerns 

from the response and recovery community to the attention of the science community. Comments made by speakers not affiliated with the USGS do not necessarily reflect the positions of 

the USGS.

Lessons Learned and Next Steps

A survey of attendees indicated that most were somewhat to extremely concerned that a 

significant no-notice earthquake could strike within the New Madrid region. Most all indicated 

that their organizations had some sort of a plan for responding to such an event and the roles 

of these individuals would include coordination, science advising, inspection engineering, data 

collection, and geospatial information provider. All respondents indicated that science and 

engineering was used extensively in their response and recovery plans. They recommended better cooperation between research groups, and more specific data collection and analysis of the 

region’s geology. 

From the geospatial perspective, respondents cited the need for better elevation data and 

a current structures database that meets the Homeland Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP) 

guidelines. Geospatial products that were communicated as being valuable for implementing 

response plans included road maps, image maps, topographic maps, geologic hazard maps, GIS 

databases, river and stream stage data, and locations of earthquake epicenters.

Although we may never be able to predict the coming of the next great New Madrid earthquake, we do know that such events have occurred with some frequency in the past, and that 

recurrence is a probability. In the case of intraplate seismicity, what we know is not necessarily 

what we understand. Science can take us only so far in the understanding of the earth’s dynamic 

process; it is up to society to be prepared. This conference was extremely successful in bringing 

the science and response communities together. Never before has this been done with the goal 

of identifying from both camps the needs for preparing for a significant catastrophic earthquake. During the three days there was much discussion, interaction, and certainly praise from 

the attendees for having such an event. Through further refinement it should serve as a model 

to facilitate our need for open, cross-discipline communication on natural disaster preparation. In the end, it is recognized that scientists, emergency managers, and community planners 

together are collectively the responders. The exchange of ideas among this group will facilitate 

the best use of limited resources. When the “big one” happens there will be a limited number 

of responders to help thousands of people in need; therefore it is critical that science focus its 

research on ways to mitigate the catastrophe and prepare the emergency managers to do their 

jobs more efficiently. Likewise, it is critical that emergency managers and resource planners 

engage with the scientific community to ensure their needs are communicated.

References

Petersen, M.D., Frankel, A.D., Harmsen, S.C., Mueller, C.S., Haller, K.M., Wheeler, R.L., Wesson, R.L., Zeng, Yuehua, Boyd, O.S., Perkins, D.M., Luco, Nicolas, Field, E.H., Wills, C.J., 

and Rukstales, K.S., 2008, Documentation for the 2008 update of the United States National 

Seismic Hazard Maps: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2008–1128, 61 p. (Also 

available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2008/1128/.)
vi

Johnston, A.C., and Schweig, E.S., 1984, The enigma of the New Madrid earthquakes of 

1811–1812: Annual Review Earth Planetary Science, v. 24, p. 339–384.

Elnashai, A.S., Jefferson, T., Cleveland, L.J., and Gress, T., 2008, Impact of earthquakes on 

the central USA: New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic Earthquake Response Planning 

Project, Final Phase I Report, MAE Center Report No. 08–02, p. 94.

Gomberg, J., and Schweig, E., 2006, Earthquake hazard in the heart of the homeland: U.S. 

Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2006–3125, p. 4. (Also available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/

fs/2006/3125/.)

Martin, Joshua, 1848, Lorenzo Dow’s Works: John B. Wolff, Washington, Ohio, printer, 

p. 344-346.

Acknowledgments

A special thanks to the conference organization committee who over the course of a year 

worked together to plan and execute a successful conference. The committee included: Krista 

Karstensen, Laura Grentz, Sue Evers, Allen ‘AJ’ Lehmen, Steve Besemer, Eugene ‘Buddy’ 

Schweig, Oliver Boyd, Russ Caton, Bob Bauer, Sue Turner, Neil Anderson, Raymond Fox, 

Steve Tupper, Mimi Garstang, Joe Gillman, Genda Chen, Jim Pasley, Ronaldo Luna, Brian 

Blake, Phyllis Steckle, Richard Stephenson, Angie Rolufs, Greg Reed, Andrea Dargush, Larry 

Pierce, Jeff Spooner, Mark Newell, Carl Shapiro, David Rogers, David Hoffman, and the editor, Emitt Witt.

Thank you to all of the speakers and poster contributors for presenting your research and 

findings. The conference organization committee was honored to have three distinguished 

keynote speakers for this event; U.S. Representative, Jo Ann Emerson; Missouri Adjutant 

General, King E. Sidwell; and the Missouri State Emergency Management Agency Director, 

Ron M. Reynolds.

The sponsors of the conference are to be commended for their contributions and interest. 

These organizations include the Fort Leonard Wood chapter of the Society of American Military Engineers; St. Johns Health System; the Missouri State Emergency Management Agency; 

the Missouri Department of Natural Resources, Division of Land and Geologic Survey; the 

Center for Transportation Infrastructure and Safety; the U.S. Geological Survey; and the Missouri University of Science and Technology.

Special recognition goes to the Mr. Steve Tupper for securing funds from the Fort Leonard 

Wood chapter of the Society of American Military Engineers to support the luncheon and the 

keynote presentation given by the Missouri Adjutant General, and to Dr. Randall Huss, President of St. John’s Health System–Rolla for his interest and generous contribution to support 

scholarships for first responders throughout the State. Without the contributions offered by 

these two organizations, this conference could not have been such a success.

Pre-conference training was a successful addition to this conference. Special thanks 

goes to Steve Besemer, Edna Bridges, Roger J. Arango, Lt. Col. Christian Van Alstyne, 

Lt. Col. David Boyle and the 7th Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team, 

Tina Niemi, Ross Black, and Kelly Liu. 

Lastly, a special ‘thank you’ goes to the more than 300 individuals who participated as 

attendees at the conference. Your interest and enthusiasm in the subject clearly demonstrates 

the need for further preparations in the region. We look forward to your future participation in 

similar events.
vii

Contents

Preface ...........................................................................................................................................................iii

Lessons Learned and Next Steps ......................................................................................................v

References .............................................................................................................................................v

Acknowledgments ...............................................................................................................................vi

The Agenda .....................................................................................................................................................1

Tuesday, August 12, 2008—Training Opportunities: ........................................................................1

Wednesday, August 13, 2008 ...............................................................................................................1

Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 1: Science, Maps, and Engineering .....................................1

Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 2: Federal and State Response and Recovery ...................2

Keynote Addresses........................................................................................................................................2

U.S. Representative Jo Ann Emerson ..............................................................................................2

Major General King E. Sidwell ............................................................................................................3

Ronald M. Reynolds ..............................................................................................................................4

Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and Papers for Wednesday, August 13, 2008 .....................................6

The USGS Earthquake Hazard Program ...........................................................................................6

Consequences Resulting from a Major Earthquake in the Central United States .....................6

Post-Conference Paper ..............................................................................................................6

Overview of Likely Consequences of a Magnitude 6.5+ Earthquake 

in the Central United States .................................................................................6

Abstract .......................................................................................................................6

Introduction ...............................................................................................................7

Discussion ...................................................................................................................7

Shaking Intensity Versus Distance .........................................................................7

Potential Economic Impact of Soil Liquefaction ...................................................8

Shaking Intensity Varies According to Underlying Geology ...............................8

Likely Impacts of Most Probable Quake ................................................................8

Planning Aspects .....................................................................................................11

Regional and National Economic Impacts .........................................................12

Conclusions ..............................................................................................................12

References ................................................................................................................13

Earthquake Hazards (Timing/Reoccurrence/Probability of an Event) ................................................14

Conference Abstract ..........................................................................................................................14

Post-Conference Paper .....................................................................................................................14

Earthquake Hazard and Recurrence in the New Madrid Region ......................................14

Abstract ..............................................................................................................................14

Introduction .......................................................................................................................14

Earthquake Hazard ...........................................................................................................14

Earthquake Ground Motions ...........................................................................................14

The Earthquake Source ...................................................................................................15

Earthquake Recurrence ...................................................................................................16

Paleoseismology and Large Infrequent Earthquakes .................................................16

Earthquake Recurrence from the Instrumental Catalog ............................................17
viii

Conclusions .......................................................................................................................18

Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................18

References .........................................................................................................................19

State and Regional Impact of Central U.S. Earthquakes on the 

Physical Infrastructure .........................................................................................................21

Conference Abstract .................................................................................................................21

Post-Conference Paper ............................................................................................................21

Earthquake Impact on the Built Environment in the Central United States ............21

Abstract .....................................................................................................................21

Introduction ..............................................................................................................21

Definition of Scenario Components ......................................................................22

An Overview of Impacts Assessment Results ...................................................23

Conclusions ..............................................................................................................24

References ................................................................................................................24

Resilience, Response, and Recovery: Societal Components of Catastrophe ..........................25

State-of-the-Art Earthquake Research for Critical Transportation Systems ............................25

Missouri Department of Transportation (MoDOT) Earthquake Preparedness .........................25

The Advanced National Seismic System: Earthquake Monitoring for 

Science, Engineering, Rapid Response, and Public Information ..................................25

Conference Abstract .................................................................................................................25

Post-Conference Paper ............................................................................................................25

Monitoring by the Science Community .........................................................................25

Reference Cited ................................................................................................................27

Critical Infrastructure Monitoring: The Bill E. Emerson Memorial Bridge ................................27

Products and Capabilities of the Science/Engineering Community for 

Emergency Response ...........................................................................................................27

Conference Abstract .................................................................................................................27

Post-Conference Paper ...........................................................................................................28

Products and Capabilities of Science/Engineering Community 

for Earthquake Response and Recovery .........................................................28

Abstract .....................................................................................................................28

Introduction ..............................................................................................................28

Discussion .................................................................................................................28

Conclusion ................................................................................................................29

References ................................................................................................................29

Highway Bridge Performance During the May 12, 2008, M7.9 Wenchuan 

Earthquake in China ..............................................................................................................29

Conference Abstract .................................................................................................................29

Post-Conference Paper ............................................................................................................30

Highway Bridge Performance During the May 12, 2008, M7.9 

Wenchuan Earthquake of China .......................................................................30

Abstract .....................................................................................................................30

Introduction ..............................................................................................................30

Bridges Near the Earthquake Fault ......................................................................30

Structures Near the Epicenter ..............................................................................30

Structures Away from the Epicenter ....................................................................31
ix

Other Representative Damages ............................................................................32

Bridge Span Loss .....................................................................................................32

Column Shear Cracks ..............................................................................................34

Conclusions ..............................................................................................................34

Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and Papers for Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 1: 

Science, Maps, and Engineering .................................................................................................35

The National Map: Status of National Geospatial Base Data in the Central 

United States ..........................................................................................................................35

Conference Abstract .................................................................................................................35

USGS-State Partnerships and the Future of Standard Quadrangle Maps ................................35

Conference Abstract .................................................................................................................35

Post-Conference Paper ............................................................................................................35

USGS Standard Quadrangle Maps for Emergency Response ..................................35

Abstract .....................................................................................................................35

Introduction ..............................................................................................................36

Discussion .................................................................................................................36

Conclusion ................................................................................................................38

References ................................................................................................................38

Data Sources and Development for the New Madrid Seismic Zone in Missouri ....................39

Conference Abstract .................................................................................................................39

New Data for a New Age ..................................................................................................................39

Conference Abstract .................................................................................................................39

The Land Use Portfolio Model: A GIS-based Decision Support System for 

Evaluating Seismic Risk Mitigation Policies .....................................................................39

Conference Abstract .................................................................................................................39

Post-Conference Paper ............................................................................................................40

Application of the Land Use Portfolio Model for the Analysis of 

Long-term Earthquake Risk Mitigation Policy in the 

zzCity of Memphis, and Shelby County, Tennessee .......................................40

Introduction ..............................................................................................................40

Study Area ................................................................................................................41

Earthquake Hazard ..................................................................................................41

Building Inventory ....................................................................................................41

Building Fragility and Vulnerability .......................................................................42

Expected Losses ......................................................................................................43

Benefit-Cost Model .................................................................................................43

Status and Next Steps ............................................................................................44

References ................................................................................................................44

Missouri’s Catastrophic Event Planning .........................................................................................45

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Spatial Data and Capabilities ......................................................45

The Role of USNORTHCOM in Disaster Response ........................................................................45

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................45

FEMA Region VII Response and Recovery Operations Planning ...............................................45

Presentation Titles and Abstracts for Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 2: 

Federal and State Response and Recovery ...............................................................................46

SONS07 Overview ...............................................................................................................................46
x

USGS Lessons Learned from SONS07 ............................................................................................46

SEMA ‘07 Statewide Earthquake Exercise .....................................................................................46

The Role of Missouri National Guard to Civil Authorities Following a 

Seismic Event .........................................................................................................................46

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................46

Draft National Catastrophic Earthquake Plan ................................................................................46

New Madrid Earthquake Table-Top Exercise ................................................................................46

The Scenario...............................................................................................................................46

The Exercise ...............................................................................................................................47

Pre-Event Concerns ..................................................................................................................47

Area E .........................................................................................................................................47

Area C .........................................................................................................................................49

Area G .........................................................................................................................................49

Area B .........................................................................................................................................49

Area I .........................................................................................................................................49

Post-Event Concerns .................................................................................................................50

Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 .....................................50

Analytical and Experimental Studies on Seismic Behavior of RC Bridge 

Columns Subjected to Combined Loadings ......................................................................50

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................50

Torsional-Flexural-Shear Interaction Characteristics of RC Bridge 

Columns under Simulated Seismic Loading .....................................................................50

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................50

Introduction.................................................................................................................................51

Experimental Program ..............................................................................................................51

Test Specimen Details ..............................................................................................................51

Effect of Transverse Spiral Reinforcement Ratio .................................................................53

Effect of Shear Span/Aspect Ratio under Combined Loadings .........................................54

Flexure-Shear-Torsion Interaction Diagrams........................................................................55

Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................................55

Acknowledgments .....................................................................................................................56

References ..................................................................................................................................56

Hazards Assessment of St. Charles County—Earthquake and Flood ........................................57

Community and Regional Resilience Initiative: Revealing Resilience in the 

Memphis Area........................................................................................................................57

Surface Wave Velocity Measurements in the Deep Sediments of the 

Mississippi Embayment ........................................................................................................57

Promises and Challenges of Data Collected to Aid the St. Louis Area 

Earthquake Hazards Mapping Project ...............................................................................58

Promises and Challenges of Data Collected to Aid the St. Louis Area 

Earthquake Hazards Mapping Project ...............................................................................58

Abstract ......................................................................................................................................58

Introduction.................................................................................................................................58

Discussion ...................................................................................................................................60

Conclusion...................................................................................................................................61

References ..................................................................................................................................62
xi

MoDOT Earthquake Preparedness ..................................................................................................67

The New Madrid Earthquake Scenario ..........................................................................................67

Central U.S. Post Earthquake Technical Information Clearinghouse Efforts ............................67

ARCHER—Airborne Real-time Cueing Hyperspectral Enhanced Reconnaissance ................68

The U.S. Geological Survey 2008 Update to the National Seismic Hazard 

Maps for the Central and Eastern United States .............................................................68

Detailed Surficial Material Geologic Maps Over Existing Columbia Bottoms 

and Granite City 7.5’ Quadrangles Within the St. Louis Area 

Earthquake Hazard Mapping Project .................................................................................68

Geotechnical Earthquake Instrumentation at the Bill E. Emerson Memorial Bridge, 

Cape Girardeau, Missouri ....................................................................................................69

Conference Abstract .................................................................................................................69

Post-Conference Paper ............................................................................................................69

Geotechnical Earthquake Instrumentation at the Bill E. Emerson 

Memorial Bridge, Cape Girardeau, Missouri ..................................................69

Abstract .....................................................................................................................69

Introduction ..............................................................................................................69

Site Conditions and Seismic Hazard .....................................................................70

Geotechnical Instrumentation ...............................................................................70

Site Response Analysis at Instrument Array UIUC–1 ........................................71

Conclusions ..............................................................................................................72

Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................74

References ................................................................................................................74

Development of Composite Dispersion Curves for the Determination of 

Shear Wave Velocity Profiles ..............................................................................................74

Communicating Earthquake Mitigation with the Health/Hospital Community: 

Moving from Information to Action and Closing the Loop ..............................................75

Determining Social Impacts and Needs Assessments based upon 

HAZUS-MH Damage and Loss Estimates .........................................................................75

Multistate Technical Information Clearinghouse ..........................................................................75

Seismic Hazard, Risk, and Mitigation Policy in the New Madrid Seismic Zone ......................76

Figures

 Overview of Likely Consequences of a Magnitude 6.5+ Earthquake in the 

Central United States

By J. David Rogers

 1. Map showing seismic source zones in the Central United States .......................................7

 2. Graph showing contrast between damping of shaking intensity with distance from 

seismic sources in California and the Midwestern United States .......................................8

 3. Graphs and diagram showing effect of soil thickness on peak ground acceleration 

from a magnitude 6.8 earthquake striking the Creve Coeur Bridge on the southern bank 

of the Missouri River about 110 kilometers from a quake centered in South Central 

Illinois ..............................................................................................................................................9

 4. Graph showing variation in expected spectral acceleration with 

alluvial thickness in the St. Louis, Missouri area ..................................................................10
xii

 5. Future earthquake hazard maps of the Midwestern United States 
xiii

 10. Overview of the viaduct structure ..................................................................................34
xiv

 3–4. Graphs showing:
xv

Conversion Factors

SI to Inch/Pound

Multiply By To obtain

Length

foot (ft)

mile (mi)

0.3048

1.609

meter (m)

kilometer (km)

Area

square mile (mi2

) 2.590 square kilometer (km2) 

Inch/Pound to SI

Multiply By To obtain

Length

centimeter (cm)

millimeter (mm)

meter (m)

kilometer (km)

0.3937

0.03937

3.281

0.6214

inch (in.)

inch (in.)

foot (ft) 

mile (mi)

Area

square kilometer (km2

) 0.3861 square mile (mi2

)

Flow rate

meter per second (m/s) 3.281 foot per second (ft/s) 

Vertical coordinate information is referenced to the North American Vertical Datum of 1988 

(NAVD 88).

Horizontal coordinate information is referenced to the North American Datum of 1983 (NAD 83).

Altitude, as used in this report, refers to distance above the vertical datum.

Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United 

States Earthquake—Science Needs of the Response and 

Recovery Community

Emitt C. Witt III, Editor

The Agenda

The following is the agenda as presented during the 

conference. The agenda, along with a questionnaire contained 

in a conference padfolio, was provided to each participant of 

the conference. Powerpoint presentations for each speaker can 

be found at http://conference.mst.edu/newmadridconf/presentations.html.

Tuesday, August 12, 2008—Training 

Opportunities:

Structural Assessment and Visual Evaluation Training

Missouri State Emergency Management Agency

Community Disaster Response Training

The Central United States Earthquake Consortium 

(CUSEC)

The American Red Cross

Using Civil Support Teams (CSTs) For Seismic Event 

Responses

The U.S. Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear School

The Missouri National Guard’s Wepons of Mass 

Destruction Civil Support Team

The Central Plains Earth Scope Partnership (CPEP)

Central Plains EarthScope Partnership

Wednesday, August 13, 2008

0800-0845 Welcome

0845-0915 Keynote Speaker, U.S. Representative 

Jo Ann Emerson

0915-0945 The USGS Earthquake Hazard Program

0945-1000 Break 

1000-1025 Consequences Resulting from a Major 

Earthquake in the Central United States

1030-1055 Earthquake Hazards (Timing/Reoccurrence/

Probability of an Event)

1100-1125 State and Regional Impact of Central United 

States Earthquakes on the Physical 

Infrastructure

1130-1155 Resilience, Response, and Recovery: 

Societal Components of Catastrophe

1200-1315 Lunch 

Keynote Speaker, Major General King 

Sidwell

1330-1400 State-of-the-Art Earthquake Research for 

Critical Transportation Systems

1400-1430 Missouri Department of Transportation 

(MoDOT) Earthquake Preparedness 

1430-1500 Break 

1500-1530 The Advanced National Seismic System: 

Earthquake Monitoring for Science, 

Engineering, Rapid Response, and 

Public Information

1530-1600 Critical Infrastructure Monitoring: 

The Bill E. Emerson Bridge

1600-1630 Products and Capabilities of the Science/

Engineering Community for Emergency 

Response 

1630-1700 Highway Bridge Performance During the 

May 12, 2008, M7.9 Wenchuan Earthquake 

in China

1700-2000 Networking Reception 

Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 1: Science, 

Maps, and Engineering

0830-0845 Opening Remarks

0845-0915 The National Map: Status of National 

Geospatial Base Data in the Central United 

States

0915-0945 USGS-State Partnerships and the Future of 

Standard Quadrangle Maps 

0945-1000 Break 

1000-1030 Data Sources and Development for the New 

Madrid Zone in Missouri

1030-1100 New Data for a New Age
2 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

1100-1130 The Land-Use Portfolio Model: A GISbased Decision Support System for 

Evaluating Seismic Risk Mitigation Policies

1130-1200 Panel/Discussion: Geospatial Information

1200-1315 Lunch 

Keynote Speaker, Ronald Reynolds

1330-1400 Missouri’s Catastrophic Event Planning

1400-1430 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Spatial Data 

and Capabilities 

1430-1500 Break

1500-1530 The Role of USNORTHCOM in Disaster 

Response

1530-1600 FEMA Region VII Response and Recovery 

Operations Planning

1600-1630 Panel/Discussion: Federal and State 

Government Resources

1630-1645 Closing Remarks

Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 2: Federal and 

State Response and Recovery 

0830-0845 Opening Remarks

0845-0915 SONS07 Overview

0915-0945 USGS Lessons Learned from SONS07

0945-1000 Break 

1000-1030 SEMA ’07 Statewide Earthquake Exercise

1030-1115 The Role of Missouri National Guard to 

Civil Authorities Following a Seismic Event

1115-1200 Panel/Discussion: Federal and State 

Response and Recovery

1200-1315 Lunch 

Keynote Speaker, Ronald Reynolds

1330-1400 Draft National Catastrophic Earthquake Plan

1400-1630 Panel/Discussion: New Madrid Earthquake 

Table-Top Exercise

1630-1645 Closing Remarks

Keynote Addresses

U.S. Representative Jo Ann Emerson 

U.S. Representative Emerson represents Missouri’s Eighth 

District.

Thank you for your warm welcome. I am very glad to be 

at this conference today because you are all going to address a 

critical issue for our region and our nation.

I know from personal experience in Congress how 

difficult it can be to direct much-deserved attention and the 

resources to the New Madrid Seismic Zone. I have made this 

repeated point as a member of the Homeland Security Appropriations subcommittee and as a current member of the Interior Appropriations subcommittee: we have a sleeping giant 

beneath our feet. Eventually it is going to wake up. We will 

have no notice when the New Madrid Seismic Zone unleashes 

a major earthquake on our region. We have to prepare today 

like it will happen tomorrow. That is the major reason why I 

am glad for this Conference. The cooperation and coordination 

of experts, emergency management officials and the media 

that is present in this room today focuses us all on what is 

being done to prepare, and what remains to be done before we 

can call ourselves ready.

Over 75 million Americans in 39 states are at direct risk 

of damage as a result of an earthquake. The primary sources 

of this danger are on the West Coast and in the New Madrid 

Seismic Zone. However, every American will surely experience the consequences of a major earthquake in the Central 

United States, at the nexus of American ground transportation 

infrastructure, where pipelines for natural gas distribute fuels 

to the nation, in the heart of the U.S. agricultural and manufacturing economies. The 1994 earthquake in Northridge, California caused $15 billion in property damage—it was the most 

expensive natural disaster in the history of our nation up until 

Hurricane Katrina. But a coastal earthquake is not the same 

as an earthquake in the center of the continent. A major quake 

in the New Madrid Seismic Zone would be felt from coast to 

coast—both literally and figuratively. 

Very few of the bridges across the largest river in our 

continent would be passable. The major transportation 

corridors of the Heartland would be disrupted or destroyed. 

Interstate 40—cut in half; Interstate 55—broken into pieces; 

Interstate 57—totally impassable. 

Set aside the fact that these thoroughfares would be relied 

upon to carry relief and aid to the areas worst hit and consider 

that these roads carry the commerce of our entire nation. They 

are the link between East and West, between the Mid-South 

and the North-East, carrying food and goods to the urban 

centers of our whole nation. Pipelines from Texas that travel 

thru the heartland deliver fuel to every corner of the Northeast 

and Upper Midwest. If ruptured, repairs to those lines would 

take months or more—and those regions of our country would 

be forced to limp through winter on limited supplies of home 

heating fuel. 

Ultimately, the economy of our entire nation rests on 

this region. If these systems fail? Decimation. I don’t use the 

word “cataclysm” lightly, but I am using it today. A major 

earthquake here in the Heartland would be nothing less than 

that. And we have a precedent to measure the power of such 

an event. The largest earthquakes in the history of the lower 

48 states were the 1811–12 earthquakes in the New Madrid 

Seismic Zone. Three of them were estimated at over 8.0 on the 

Richter scale.

Now, an earthquake at 6.0 is about 32 times more powerful than an earthquake at 5.0. An 8.0 earthquake literally 

boggles the mind. Scientifically, I am sure the experts in this 

room could measure the energy of this event—but in terms of 

lives and property, economic repercussions and the infrastructure of our nation—no one can measure the danger we face.

An earthquake similar in magnitude to the one predicted 

in the New Madrid Seismic Zone during the next 50 years 
Keynote Addresses 3

occurred in China on May 12, 2008. This powerful quake 

toppled buildings, schools and chemical plants. It weakened 

dams, contributed to landslides, damaged the infrastructure 

necessary to the emergency response, and killed more than 

70,000 people. 

While this event happened a hemisphere away from 

Missouri, it should serve as a wake-up call to the destructive 

force of a major, no-notice seismic event.

Closer to home, less than four months ago, on April 18, 

2008, we experienced a 5.2 magnitude earthquake near southern Illinois. This quake was felt for as long as 30 seconds as 

far West as Kansas City and as far East as Atlanta, Georgia. 

While the damage was minimal, it is an indication that seismic 

activity—and possibly severe activity—can still occur in the 

Central United States today.

If this region should experience an earthquake similar to 

the Chinese quake, we can expect many of the same consequences in the New Madrid Seismic Zone and surrounding 

areas. The world will watch how we handle this situation, and 

tough questions will be asked of us in the aftermath. 

This conference will bring to light many of the preparations we have made as well as what we could expect from a 

major seismic event. Hopefully, we will be able to identify 

areas of concern—response and recovery issues we may not 

yet have considered. I mentioned Hurricane Katrina earlier; 

right here in Rolla we constructed the post-disaster maps that 

were used to respond to that storm. The same technologies 

would certainly be called upon after an earthquake.

So we must ask: Have we incorporated all the other 

lessons of Katrina into the response and recovery plans for a 

major New Madrid Seismic Zone earthquake? Are we making 

the proper connection between our response plans and seismic 

science, engineering and sociology? Do we have enough data, 

and the right kind, in the right format, for our recovery plans? 

Finally, are the scientific products we’re counting upon easily 

understood by and useful to our emergency responders? These 

are questions that will dominate this forum and press us to 

discuss the bedrock issues (if you will) of earthquake response 

and recovery. The bottom line is this: we may not know when 

to expect an earthquake, but we can make many reasonable 

assumptions about what to expect. The more familiar individuals are with the earthquake plan, the better able they will be to 

help themselves. Empowering them lifts a crucial burden from 

first responders as we all come together in response to a worstcase scenario. Even a simple discussion of aftershocks, which 

can be nearly as intense as the original event, can help bring 

the public to a better understanding of the “what” we may be 

dealing with—and aftershocks provide a poignant example 

of how science has made it possible to predict the timing and 

location of seismic events.

I’ve made a priority of stressing the importance of these 

plans to citizens in our region. I’ve brought a congressional 

coalition together to address the threat of an earthquake in the 

New Madrid Seismic Zone. I’m fighting for Federal funding 

to continue geographic hazard mapping. We must anticipate 

difficult circumstances: bridges that cross the Mississippi 

River may fare better than the innumerable bridges along our 

highways that cross over creeks and smaller tributaries. Power 

and gas lines are deadly threats to homeowners. Phone lines 

and cell phone towers will make communications impossible. 

Water lines may be unstable—creating challenges not just in 

putting out earthquake-related fires, but also in finding safe 

drinking water.

This conference can give us the confidence and the 

background knowledge to meet all of these challenges as best 

as we can under impossible conditions. To all of the speakers 

and poster presenters who have gathered for this occasion, I 

cannot express my appreciation enough. We are so fortunate 

to have our nation’s brightest minds working on all of these 

unique problems posed by an earthquake in the middle of the 

continent.

I commend the sponsors of this conference for their 

vision and dedication, including the U.S. Geological Survey, 

the Missouri University of Science and Technology, the 

Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, the Society 

of American Military Engineers, St. John’s Health System, the 

U.S. Army and the Center for Transportation, Infrastructure 

and Safety. Your support for this event is crucial. Furthermore, 

I would like to thank you, the audience on this occasion, for 

your attendance and participation in this important fact-finding 

event. You are here because you believe preparation is not just 

important—it is critical.

I am very pleased that my two good friends, Major 

General King Sidwell, Adjutant General of the Missouri 

National Guard, and Ron Reynolds, Director of the Missouri 

State Emergency Management Agency, are here this week as 

Keynote Speakers. If a major earthquake were to occur in this 

region, these individuals will be at the forefront of response 

and recovery operations. Their participation in this conference is a clear sign of the promise that exists for collaboration 

between the scientific community and first responders. And 

finally, I’d like to single out Emitt Witt, the Conference Chairperson, and his team for organizing this event. Their effort 

in developing the agenda and involving so many partners is 

clearly the type of exceptional leadership that I and others in 

Congress hope is cultivated throughout our Federal services 

agencies. Thanks again to all of you. We are very lucky to 

have so many great advocates for this purpose. I wish you a 

very productive conference as we all continue to work towards 

a state of total preparedness for whatever the future may hold.

Major General King E. Sidwell

Major General King E. Sidwell served as Adjutant General 

of the Missouri National Guard from 2005–08. The address 

below was written and delivered by Col. L Mark A. McCarter, 

Missouri National Guard, and is used in place of the keynote 

address.

The Missouri National Guard (MONG) response to an 

earthquake is essential to the citizens of Missouri. Preparedness through training, planning, interagency efforts, and 
4 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

appropriate application of military capabilities to support civil 

authorities are essential tenets of the MONG response. Today, 

the Missouri National Guard stands prepared to support the 

citizens of the State of Missouri in any natural/man-made 

disaster.

Today, the Soldiers and Airmen of the Missouri National 

Guard are the most trained, intelligent, and prepared than 

at any time in its history. Missouri has deployed over 

8,000 Soldiers and several hundred Airmen into combat operations since 2001. These combat experiences transfer over to 

the preparedness of soldiers to support the citizens of our state. 

The ability to operate in small groups, exercise leadership, 

deliver commodities, and finally exercise independent judgment in life and death situations. These abilities are logical 

transition points to military support to civil authorities. 

Similar to the individual training experiences, the units 

within the Missouri National Guard have deployed and have 

gained collective experience. Brigade level commands, battalion level commands, commodity distribution units, engineer 

units, and communication units are a few examples of the kind 

of war fighting experience that transitions to military support 

to civil authorities. The application of these competent capabilities enables quicker support to the citizens of our state. Our 

organizations continue to train and develop those skills that 

are essential to timely and effective collective capability application. The Missouri National Guard has responded effectively 

to the Governor of Missouri 13 times in past 3 years.

For a New Madrid earthquake scenario, our intent is to 

automatically activate every member of the MONG immediately upon the identification of a 6.5 or higher earthquake in 

the New Madrid Fault. The foundation of this response force 

is based on the Governor’s intent to push resources as soon 

as possible to the affected area. It will take every effort of the 

State and maximum Federal resources to effectively move 

from response phase to a recovery phase. If in the event of a 

6.4 or below, the local MONG commanders are empowered 

by state statute to respond to save life, limb, or property. They 

will take immediate action to assist/support the local civil 

authorities to ensure that human suffering is reduced.

Additional immediate actions include establishing 

communication with affected county leadership, reconnaissance of available ground routes, identify supportable runways 

to deliver supplies and assist in evacuation. All of these 

actions are in support of the civil authorities, not in lieu of 

civil authorities.

As the situation develops, the MONG will assist civilian authorities with receiving Federal response support. This 

will be in the form of other uniformed soldiers from other 

State National Guard, Department of Defense Forces, FEMA 

manpower, and FEMA supplies for affected citizenry. Earthquake response is a team sport and will require the citizenry to 

reach out and help those in need. 

Although the MONG is a strong force of over 

11,000 Soldiers and Airmen, this will not be enough to provide 

adequate assistance to our citizens within Missouri. The chart 

below indicates the true availability given on 2 Aug. 08.

Fortunately, there are many systems in place to assist the 

MONG with its response. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), signed by all 54 States and territories, is a Governor to Governor agreement to provide any 

assets available to the requesting state. The EMAC procedure 

has proven utility with operations in support of Hurricanes 

Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike recovery.

Ronald M. Reynolds

Missouri Governor Matt Blunt named Ronald M. Reynolds 

Director of Missouri State Emergency Management Agency in 

January 2005. 

Thank you and Good Afternoon. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today at this important event. I want to 

thank USGS, Missouri University of Science and Technology and others who have worked to organize this conference. 

I want you to know that the State Emergency Management 

Agency appreciates your efforts and is happy for the opportunity to participate. There are several members of SEMA here 

today and I would ask that they stand and be recognized at this 

time.

I want to talk to you today about our agency and how we 

are involved in planning to respond after a major earthquake 

in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. First, SEMA’s mission is 

to save lives. Our task is to coordinate the state’s response, 

while working with our local and Federal partners, following 

a significant event such as an earthquake. We work on plans, 

exercises, and coordinate response and recovery efforts with 

other State agencies and departments, in order to protect the 

lives and safety of Missourians.

If you take a look at SEMA’s organizational structure, 

you’ll see that we are part of the Missouri Department of 

Public Safety. I report to the Director of the Department, who 

in turn reports to the Governor. We are divided up into Operations, Planning, Logistics and Fiscal sections, along with the 

Missouri Emergency Response Commission and our Statewide 

Volunteer Coordinator. 

In case you are not aware of how SEMA assists jurisdictions, we do not become involved after an event until we are 

requested to do so by that local jurisdiction. Once a major 

event occurs which is beyond the scope of the local responders 

to handle, the State can provide assistance once the Governor declares a State of Emergency. SEMA then begins to 

coordinate the State-level response and assists the Governor 

in asking the President for a Federal disaster declaration, if 

needed. Once a Federal disaster is declared, we can then also 

begin receiving assistance from FEMA and other Federal-level 

partners.

In case you have not heard by this point of this conference, Missouri is Earthquake Country. There are two fault 

systems which are in Missouri or nearby—the New Madrid 

Seismic Zone and the Nemaha Seismic System, which runs 

through eastern Kansas and could affect our western border.
Keynote Addresses 5

We do have history of moderate and large earthquakes 

within the State. Of course, beginning in late 1811 and 

continuing into 1812, we experienced hundreds of earthquakes. Some of those earthquakes were among the strongest 

ever felt in the United States. We continue to have about 200 

to 250 earthquakes per year in the New Madrid Zone. Some 

other notable earthquakes since the 1811–12 events include 

the 1895 magnitude 6 earthquake in Charleston, earthquakes 

in the magnitude four and five range in the early 1990s near 

Chaffee and Risco, and the 5.2 magnitude earthquake near 

Mount Carmel, Illinois, that was felt over much of Missouri. 

Fortunately, though, we have not had a damaging earthquake 

in the Midwest for many years. I certainly hope we can 

continue that trend, but we must be ready just in case that 

trend changes.

We have been working on a catastrophic earthquake 

response plan in the State for the past several years. Governor Blunt approved this plan in 2007. The plan is actually an 

annex to our existing State emergency operations plan. We 

invited all of the State agencies and departments to the table 

to help us formulate this annex—many of those agencies 

already had their own catastrophic earthquake plan in place. 

The State’s catastrophic event annex—known as Annex Y—

was exercised during our statewide earthquake exercise in 

June of 2007. All State agencies, their Federal partners, and 

80 local jurisdictions from around the State participated in this 

exercise.

One of the new things that is part of our annex is the idea 

of an automatic response, which means once we know that an 

earthquake of a 6.5 magnitude or greater has occurred in or 

near Missouri, we begin our response activities. An earthquake 

that large is likely to damage some jurisdictions’ ability to 

communicate with us, so if we know a significant earthquake 

has occurred and we cannot communicate with that area, we 

are going to be pro-active and respond as soon as possible.

Part of that response, which also is identified in Annex Y, 

is that our State Emergency Operations Center will be activated, with DPS leadership serving as the Unified Command. 

We will open our Area Coordination Centers in Sullivan for 

Region “C” and in Poplar Bluff for Region “E”. This will 

allow us to better manage our response at points closer to 

the affected area while maintaining overall coordination of it 

from our State EOC. We have also been working to pre-script 

anticipated resource requests that could be sent out after an 

earthquake through the Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact. This is important because we know we will need 

personnel and equipment from other States and, since we 

will not be the only State affected by this event, we will be in 

competition with those States for these valuable items.

Prior to the 2007 statewide earthquake exercise, SEMA 

helped to organize regional exercises to help those involved 

prepare for that main exercise. We developed a local planning 

template based off of our Annex Y and distributed it to the 

47 counties considered to be the most “at risk.” This planning 

template is Annex “O” to the local emergency plans. We held 

workshops in Hannibal, Poplar Bluff and Sullivan to formally 

introduce Annex O to local jurisdictions and assist them with 

utilizing it. We will soon be holding additional workshops to 

help local emergency managers complete work on their local 

annexes.

At those local planning workshops, we held breakout sessions to discuss critical parts of these catastrophic 

event annexes. Those sessions dealt with: Direction and 

Control, Search and Rescue, Damage Assessment, Evacuation, Medical, Housing, Transportation, Communications, 

and Emergency Public Information. These correspond with 

some of the key ESF’s which fall under the National Incident 

Management System.

In recent years, logistics has played a larger role in 

emergency management planning and response. You must 

remember that logistics will play a huge role in our response 

to a catastrophic earthquake. The amount of resources that will 

be needed following a New Madrid event is significant. The 

National Guard will play a key role in assisting us at staging 

areas and point-of-distribution sites; the private sector will be 

badly needed to step in and assist us with our many resource 

shortfalls, and the coordination of personnel and equipment 

moving in, around, and then out of the affected area will be a 

huge and challenging undertaking.

The State of Missouri has been fortunate to have a great 

working relationship with Director Hainje and his staff at 

FEMA Region VII. The planning challenges brought on by 

New Madrid have made it more important for us to work 

even closer together. We are working to identify resource 

gaps, prescript resource requests, plan with our neighboring 

States of Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska, and to better familiarize ourselves with EMAC and how we might use it after an 

earthquake.

Our State is one of eight States in the Central United 

States Earthquake Consortium, or CUSEC. We all try to work 

together through CUSEC to coordinate our planning efforts for 

a catastrophic New Madrid earthquake. Of course, knowing 

that “the Big One” will affect most if not all of these States 

means we will likely not be able to assist one another and will 

likely be competing for assets from outside the Midwest. It 

will likely be very difficult, if not impossible, to communicate with some of our neighboring States right after a large 

earthquake. These eight States also fall under four FEMA 

regions, which presents planning and response challenges on 

the Federal level.

So what are the State assets that we do have for our 

anticipated disaster response?

We have the Missouri Seismic Safety Commission, 

which is a group of 17 citizens from various backgrounds 

who address seismic safety issues around the State. The 

Commission recently released their updated Strategic Plan 

for Earthquake Safety in Missouri. That plan was divided 

into Objectives about: Increasing Awareness and Education, 

Reducing Hazards through Mitigation, Improving Emergency 

Response, Improving Recovery Response, and Assessing the 

Earthquake Hazard in Missouri.
6 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

Missouri also benefits from our CERT teams, which are 

Community Emergency Response Teams. We would expect to 

need them after a major earthquake for such tasks as basic first 

aid and search-and rescue.

The SAVE Coalition is a group of architects, engineers 

and other building professionals who could be used as a 

volunteer State asset to go to an affected area to help quickly 

assess structures. We have about 1,000 members currently in 

our SAVE database.

Another Missouri asset would be Missouri Task Force 

One for Urban Search and Rescue, along with our DMAT 

folks from the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams.

In any disaster, we depend on the help of volunteers. We 

anticipate after a catastrophic earthquake, our MO-VOAD 

(Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters), Faith-Based 

Organizations, and the Partnership for Disaster Response 

would be of great assistance to SEMA and to the residents 

who were affected by the earthquake. Organizations such as 

Americorps, the American Red Cross, and the Salvation Army 

have been of great assistance to us in previous disasters. Our 

Volunteer Coordinator, Dante Glinecki, is continuing to work 

with those and other worthy organizations to ensure that our 

volunteers will be able to provide help to our citizens in the 

most efficient manner.

Governor Blunt recently attended the kickoff meeting for 

his Faith-Based Initiative, which was held in Jefferson City. 

Additional training meetings will be held soon in all regions of 

the State.

In summary, a catastrophic earthquake in the New Madrid 

Seismic Zone will impact the entire United States in one way 

or another. Business, transportation and energy will certainly 

be affected. We are in the process of coordinating local, State, 

and Federal plans along with coordinating plans with our other 

CUSEC States. We are continuing to work with our volunteer 

organizations, with the business community on response and 

recovery issues, and with the media on public information 

issues we anticipate will arise after an event. We are also now 

working on pre-scripting requests for personnel and resources 

which can be quickly sent out to FEMA and through EMAC. 

This is a process that should be a continuous one, as we update 

and exercise our plans to better prepare for this catastrophic 

event.

I would like to thank Mr. Emitt Witt from USGS in Rolla 

and the others involved in organizing this terrific conference. This is certainly a subject very much on the minds of 

us at SEMA and we appreciate the interest in this conference. 

Please feel free to contact me or any of my staff if we may be 

of assistance to you in the future.

Thank you. 

Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and 

Papers for Wednesday, August 13, 2008

The USGS Earthquake Hazard Program

By David Applegate

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 20192, applegate@

usgs.gov

Abstract not submitted.

Consequences Resulting from a Major 

Earthquake in the Central United States

By J. David Rogers

Department of Geological Sciences & Engineering, Missouri 

University of Science and Technology, Rolla, Missouri 65409, 

rogersda@mst.edu

Abstract not submitted.

Post-Conference Paper

Overview of Likely Consequences of a Magnitude 6.5+ 

Earthquake in the Central United States

By J. David Rogers

Abstract 

A very real threat is posed to developed urban areas of 

the United States by three distinct seismic sources zones, 

located in the upper Mississippi Embayment, along the 

Wabash Valley, and beneath South Central Illinois. The 

most likely damaging earthquake is a magnitude 6.0 to 6.8 

event, which has a 25 to 40 percent probability of occurrence 

in the next 50 years. This risk is much greater than other 

places, such as California, because the basement rocks are 

less fractured and seismic energy is conveyed over 10 times 

more efficiently than in California. The impedance contrast 

between the unfractured basement rock and the unconsolidated alluvial cover creates a situation promoting more site 

amplification than any other location in the world. A quake 

in the upper end of that expected range (M>6.5) could cause 

unprecedented damage to the American Midwest, because 

the region is crisscrossed by numerous pipelines, commercial 

transportation corridors, power transmission grid network, 
Figure 1. Seismic source zones in the Central United States. 

South Central Illinois is an area of diffuse seismicity which is not 

well documented or yet understood, because it is covered by 

glacial outwash.

Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and Papers for Wednesday, August 13, 2008 7

telecommunications networks, and so forth. It is impossible 

to accurately gauge the potential economic impact of such an 

event, because it would be unprecedented, and many human 

factors, such as the public’s perception of the disaster and 

the time to recover from such a widespread catastrophe, are 

impossible to manage or estimate with any reliability. Recent 

natural disasters have shown that the role of the news media in 

influencing the public’s perceptions of the disaster recovery is 

growing each year. These perceptions tend to control the ultimate extent of the loss because people refrain from economic 

activity (spending) until the perceived crisis is concluded. 

Scientists, engineers, emergency responders, and relief agencies are all encouraged to work with the news media in any 

natural disaster, to provide cogent explanations of recovery 

plans and operations, which can serve to encourage the actual 

recovery. 

Introduction 

The New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) was responsible for over 2,000 earthquakes in 1811–12, felt throughout 

the upper Mississippi and lower Ohio River Valleys, when 

very few settlers lived west of the Mississippi River (Fuller, 

1912). At least four of these earthquakes had surface wave 

magnitudes (Ms

) of ~8+ (Nuttli, 1973; 1987), which are now 

believed to have been moment magnitudes (M) of between 7.0 

and 7.5 (Bakun and Hooper, 2004). M6.0–6.2 quakes occurred 

at either end of the NMSZ in 1843 (Marked Tree, Arkansas) 

and 1895 (Charleston, Missouri). Despite these events, the 

seismic threat posed by the NMSZ was not included in any 

of the region’s municipal building codes until 2002, when St. 

Louis and St. Charles Counties in Missouri adopted the International Building Code (IBC). 

In 1973, the NMSZ was more-or-less “re-discovered” 

during geologic studies for a nuclear power plant in West 

Memphis, Arkansas, which came under review by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC). Soon thereafter (1974) 

the NRC engaged the advice and expertise of the USGS to 

assist in regional monitoring (Russ, 1982). These monitoring 

activities enlarged to include regional evaluations of relative 

seismic risk after an earthquake prediction by Iben Browning 

in December 1990, which garnered national attention (Spence 

and others, 1993). 

Between 1979–99 the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone 

(WBVSZ) was investigated and eventually recognized as 

another seismic source zone (Bristol and others, 1979; Bear 

and others, 1997), although it has not been monitored as 

closely as the NMSZ (fig. 1). The WBVSZ is thought to be 

responsible for M5+ quakes in 1968, 1987, and 2008. An 

amorphous zone of active seismicity also exists in South 

Central Illinois (SCI), (McBride and others, 1997), which has 

spawned M5+ quakes in 1838, 1857, and 1891. These seismic 

source zones are shown in figure 1.

In 2002, the U.S. Geological Survey released new 

earthquake probabilities for the New Madrid Seismic Zone, 

based on recent paleoseismic studies (Tuttle and others, 2002). 

A magnitude 6.0 or greater earthquake has an estimated 

25–40 percent chance of occurrence in the next 50 years. Such 

an earthquake could pose serious risk of damage to schools 

and masonry buildings between Memphis and St. Louis. The 

USGS also estimates a 7–10 percent chance of a magnitude 

7.5–8.0 earthquake occurring in the next 50 years (equal to the 

four largest quakes in 1811–12).

Discussion

Shaking Intensity Versus Distance

The most troubling aspect of Midwestern quakes is the 

severe site amplification that exists in alluvial-filled valleys 

and dissected loess-covered uplands (Anderson and others, 

1996). This is because of the marked impedance contrast 

between the unconsolidated alluvium and aeolian loess (Vs ~ 

185 m/sec) and the less fractured Paleozoic age basement 

rocks, which typically transmit shear waves (Vs) at a speed of 

~2,800 m/sec (Chung, 2007). This means that seismic energy 

travels much farther and is felt more severely in the Midwest 

than in regions subject to more tectonic deformation, like 

California (fig. 2). If the alluvial or aeolian sediments are more 

than 12 to 15 m thick, site amplification can be magnified by 

as much as 1,300 percent for M6 earthquakes occurring 200 

to 300 km from their source (Rogers, Karadeniz, and Chung, 

2007). This creates a situation making Midwestern quakes 

much more lethal than California quakes of equal source 

magnitude, because there is less damping of seismic energy.
Figure 2. Contrast between damping of shaking intensity with 

distance from seismic sources in California and the Midwestern 

United States (from Bolt, 2003). Most damping models before 2000 

were biased by data from California earthquakes.

8 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

Potential Economic Impact of Soil Liquefaction

Liquefaction is a failure mechanism by which cohesionless materials (sand and silt) lose shear strength when the 

pore water pressure equals the effective confining stress. It 

is usually limited to the upper 50 feet and typically occurs 

in silt, sand and fine gravel. Recent sand blows dot the 

landscape surrounding New Madrid, Missouri, testifying to 

massive liquefaction, across a larger land area than any other 

U.S. earthquake (Fuller, 1912). Recent studies by Chung and 

Rogers (2010) predict massive liquefaction could occur in the 

Mississippi and Missouri River flood plains for magnitude 

>6.5 quakes emanating from the NMSZ, WVSZ, or SCI areas, 

where the depth of saturated alluvium exceeds ~18 m. Loess 

covered upland areas would be at far less risk for liquefaction. 

Though their main spans are supported on concrete caissons 

extending into the underlying bedrock, the simply-supported 

approach spans of most highway and railroad bridges are 

vulnerable to collapse if the driven piles supporting them tilt 

(lurch) in response to localized liquefaction. Fiber optic cables 

strung across these same bridge corridors bridges would 

also be severed in this scenario. The major river valleys are 

filled with old channels, cutoffs, and oxbows. Many of these 

features have been infilled to support development. Transportation infrastructure crossing such fills would be at greater risk 

because these areas can be expected to shake more violently 

than adjacent portions of the flood plains.

Shaking Intensity Varies According to Underlying Geology

Shaking intensity is controlled by a factor called ‘Seismic 

Site Response.’ The type, depth, and size of fault, combined 

with physical properties of the Earth’s crust and geophysical 

properties of overlying surficial soils, all combine to affect 

the seismic site response. Site response is used to describe the 

fundamental period of vibration and lateral forces generated 

by a typical earthquake at any particular site. The thickness of 

unconsolidated soils also affect the peak ground acceleration 

that can be generated at any given site, as shown in figure 3.

The potential effect of soil thickness on shaking intensity 

is often portrayed in response spectra. A response spectrum 

is a plot of the maximum amplitudes of simple oscillators of 

varying periods (for example, consider a series of inverted 

pendulums of increasing height) produced by a recorded or 

assumed ground motion. The effect of soil thickness in the 

lower Missouri River floodplain on the response spectra is 

shown on figure 4. This illustrates the variation in expected 

spectral acceleration with alluvial thickness in the St. Louis 

area.

As a consequence, the alluvial thickness is the single 

most important factor in expected seismic site response in 

the Midwest. Future seismic hazard maps for the Midwestern 

United States will likely take the general form presented in 

figure 5, which is based on the areal distribution and thickness 

of Pleistocene and Holocene age alluvial filled floodplains. 

Likely Impacts of Most Probable Quake

The probability of a moderate earthquake occurring in the 

New Madrid Seismic Zone in the near future is high (fig. 6). 

Scientists estimate that the probability of a magnitude 6 to 

7 earthquake occurring in this seismic zone within the next 

50 years is higher than 90 percent. Such an earthquake could 

hit the Mississippi Valley at any time. Recent simulations at 

the Missouri University of Science and Technology (Missouri 

S&T) suggests that a M6.5 quake emanating from the NMSZ 

would adversely affect structures sitting on fill, alluvium, and/

or other unconsolidated materials more than 15 m thick. Those 

structures most impacted would likely be taller buildings or 

towers, with fundamental periods of vibration > 0.70 seconds. 

Embankments placed on unconsolidated alluvial materials, 

where fill + alluvium > 15 m thick. Structures more than eight 

stories high situated on old soil-filled basins greater than 25 to 

35 m thick would also be subject to marked amplification of 

incoming seismic energy. 

Some of the critical infrastructure that would likely be 

impacted by a M6.5 quake at a distance from 210 to 240 km 

include: multiple span bridges (in particular, tail spans); buried 

oil, gas, coal slurry, water, and sewer pipelines crossing flood 

plains; high voltage (tall tower) transmission lines crossing 

flood plains; power plants situated along major river channels; 

water treatment and sewage treatment plants along channels; 

and underground storage tanks. Non-critical transportation 

infrastructure elements that would likely be affected include: 

barge traffic on navigable channels; fuel pumps made inoperative by loss of electricity; drainage ditch network in reclaimed 

flood plains; railroad corridors; interstate and secondary highway network; airport runways, and fuel handling 
Figure 3. Effect of soil thickness on peak ground acceleration from a magnitude 6.8 earthquake striking the Creve Coeur Bridge on the 

southern bank of the Missouri River about 110 kilometers from a quake centered in South Central Illinois.

Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and Papers for Wednesday, August 13, 2008 9

facilities; and municipal off-stream water storage. Refined 

product service lines convey petroleum products between 

refineries and major metropolitan markets, from which these 

products are distributed. Significant disruption of the domestic refined product distribution lines has never occurred. The 

‘shock factor’ of fuel unavailability would be unprecedented, 

likely necessitating rationing. Five of the six crude oil and 

natural gas pipelines crossing the Mississippi River could 

be compromised in a M6.5+ earthquake emanating from the 

NMSZ (fig. 7). Four of the nine largest natural gas trunk lines 

in the United States also cross the Mississippi River and could 

be expected to suffer considerable damage in a M6.5+ quake. 

There are seven major pipelines crossing the Mississippi River 

in eastern St. Charles County, just north of St. Louis. All of 

these lines are buried in the loose unconsolidated sediments 

of the Missouri-Mississippi River flood plain most susceptible 

to liquefaction. Spillage of these lines would contaminate the 

municipal water supply for St. Louis. 

The Bill Emerson Bridge, across the Mississippi River 

in Cape Girardeau, Mo. is the only highway bridge south of 

St. Louis that has been designed to resist earthquake ground 

motions. The newer highway bridges in St. Louis area, 

constructed since 1995, have also been designed for seismic 

loads. The I-64/US 40 double deck section in downtown St. 

Louis was recently retrofitted for seismic loading. None of the 

railroad bridges have been designed or detailed for seismic 

loads. 

Most fossil fuel and nuclear power plants are located on 

unconsolidated alluvium, including many along the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. The effect of power generation loss 

depends on a number of factors, including the time of year an 

earthquake strikes. The largest impacts would likely be those 

stalling disaster recovery, and some short term overloading of 

the surrounding transmission grid. Recovery time would be 

the single greatest effect on economic recovery of the region. 

The speed of recovery, ease of recovery, time span of recovery, 
Figure 4. Variation in expected spectral acceleration with 

alluvial thickness in the St. Louis, Missouri area.

Figure 5. Future earthquake hazard maps of the 

Midwestern United States will likely look something 

like this; highlighting those areas underlain by 

unconsolidated alluvium, along major river channels. 

The intensity of shaking will depend on the earthquake 

epicenter. In this case, a quake emanating from the 

northern end of the New Madrid Seismic Zone has 

been assumed.

10 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake
Figure 7. Major pipelines (in green) and highway bridges (red 

squares) in the New Madrid Seismic Zone, compiled by David 

Hoffman at Missouri University of Science and Technology. The 

faults are shown as dashed red lines, while the approximate limits 

of the underlying Reelfoot Rift are delineated by dashed pink lines.

Figure 6. Plot comparing earthquake magnitude and frequency 

for the New Madrid Seismic Zone, modified from Cramer (2001). 

The most likely destructive earthquake is an magnitude 6 to 6.6 

event, which is believed to have a recurrence frequency of once 

every 70+/- 15 years. The last magnitude6+ quake occurred in 

1895.

Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and Papers for Wednesday, August 13, 2008 11

and the public perception of recovery success all figure prominently in the various models examining the potential economic 

impact of a M>6 earthquake emanating from the NMSZ. In 

today’s culture, the economic impact of being without electrical power is stupendous. Most homes and businesses cannot 

function for more than a few days without electricity. Businesses forced to relocate rarely return to their original predisaster locations, because of the cost. These problems were 

born out in the M6.9 Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989 and the 

M6.7 Northridge quake in 1994. These quakes saw a record 

number of business failures occur in their wake, and economic 

recovery did not occur for about 10 years. 

Planning Aspects

State emergency management agencies need to identify 

critical facilities and components for disaster response on 

an unprecedented level, in regards to loss of transportation 

infrastructure, fuel pipelines, and electrical power. Some of the 

more vulnerable components of these systems include: cellular 

phone transmission towers; fiber optic data transmission 

cables; insuring redundancy in electrical power grid; identifying alternate routes and fuel sources for emergency responders and alternate route packaging for commerce; realizing 

the limitations of temporary shelters; and employing sensor 

systems using GPS location fixed motes to provide monitoring 

feedback of transient conditions. Unlike atmospheric events, 

such as hurricanes, earthquakes strike without warning. There 

is no evacuation ahead of the actual event. As a consequence, 

gasoline will be unavailable in areas without electrical power. 

Government agencies will not be able to count on sufficient 

aerial response assets, such as helicopters, to rescue stranded 

victims unless we know where they are located. We can expect 

that an earthquake will take down a fair number of the cellular 

repeater towers and that telephone transmission systems will 

be overtaxed. 

Text messaging and GPS receivers are rapidly emerging as the preferred method of hailing assistance in the wake 

of disasters, natural or man-caused. This is because text 

messaging does not require as much bandwidth as voice calls. 

Disaster victims are more likely to have a text message reach 

someone than a voice call. 

GPS-equipped phones can also transmit user’s location when calling 911, although this capability will likely 

be compromised. Cell towers will likely be compromised 

(iPhones employ triangulation between existing cell towers 

to fix their positions). However, victims may be able to text 

message coordinates or an interstate mile marker taken from a 

phone or external GPS device, even if cell towers are down. 

Everyone agrees that people have to be educated about 

what to do in specific scenarios. Extreme events, like combat, 

are always treacherous because most responders don’t have 
12 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

first-hand experience with such catastrophes. Mass evacuations are difficult to plan for without recurring exercises and a 

thorough program of public education (this was born out in the 

response to the 1960 Chilean tsunami). Emergency managers 

will be lucky to get two-thirds of any populace to evacuate an 

area ahead of a natural disaster, if it is the first exposure to the 

natural peril. Those people with children are more prone to 

leave than those without children. 

Emergency responders should be provided with appropriate training to “expect the unexpectable;” which requires 

considerable innovation (for example, San Francisco’s loss of 

fire mains in the 1989 Loma Prieta quake). The most effective instruction is usually performed by responders who have 

personal experiences to share. Realistic training is the most 

crucial aspect of preparedness (for example, fire fighters 

practicing on real fires). Sending responders to other agency’s 

disasters is probably our single best training option; there is no 

education like experience. 

Regional and National Economic Impacts 

A 1992 study by the National Research Council (National 

Research Council, 1992) estimated that a repeat of a M7.5 

to 7.7 event on the New Madrid Seismic Zone would cause 

upwards of $30 billion in damage. A more recent study 

has revised that estimate (Mid-America Earthquake Center 

[MAE], 2008). Now a M 7.7 event on the southwest arm 

of the NMSZ would cause $200 million in hard damage to 

Memphis alone, and $50 to $70 billion in overall damage to 

the affected region. Comparisons between projected damages 

and actual damages are extremely complex, for many reasons, 

not the least of which is that fickle factor so aptly dubbed 

“public confidence.”

It is difficult to estimate local, regional, and national 

disaster-driven economic impacts. The FEMA HAZUS 

software models cannot accurately gage many of the most 

important metrics, such as: infrastructure disruption impacts 

(as opposed to structural damage); trickle-down economic 

impacts, such as loss of confidence by consumers; people’s 

reactions (for example, people tend to hold onto their money 

after any sort of disaster, such as the 9/11 attacks); and the 

record number of retail business failures that usually result 

(for example, 70 percent of the retail businesses in downtown 

New Orleans were lost in Hurricane Katrina in 2005). 

Other “spin-off” and “spin-down” factors are very 

difficult to gage. In Hurricane Katrina, the government is 

implementing a plan to remunerate those people who lost 

their homes and personal property. This process, along with 

re-building, will likely take from 3 to 10 years, or longer, 

to implement. Adjacent residents may not have lost their 

homes, but have lost their jobs/livelihood, the ability to sell 

their homes and relocate; and difficulty getting homeowners 

insurance. 

When raw materials or product stockpiles are suddenly 

or unexpectedly reduced/or their flow is constricted; the 

news media reports the potential shortages and all sorts of 

speculation ensues. This speculation can easily lead to inflated 

prices, which triggers consumer reaction, and often leads to 

unforeseeable consequences, such as a drop in sales of SUVs 

while everyone waits to see what will happen to the price of 

gasoline at the pump.

Media coverage is essential to the success or failure of 

any emergency response scenario. Media tends to search out 

stories that elicit emotional responses or show graphic images 

to spike their viewing audience. Media market consultants 

recognize that viewers tend to select one channel rather than 

all others during any important event, often remaining loyal 

to that station thereafter (for example, CNN in 1990–91 Gulf 

War; Fox News in 2003 Iraq invasion).

Conclusions

Based on historic activity and paleoseismic studies, the 

New Madrid Seismic Zone is overdue for triggering a magnitude 6 earthquake (Tuttle and others, 2002). Quakes of up 

to M7 could also emanate from the Wabash Valley Seismic 

Zone or the amorphous zone of seismic activity in South 

Central Illinois, although these are less probable (Street and 

others, 2004). An earthquake of M6.5 in the NMSZ could 

exert serious damage to densely populated urban areas of the 

Midwest, such as St. Louis, 220 to 300 km away from the 

NMSZ. 

The most vulnerable components are petroleum product 

pipelines, highway and railway bridges, fiber optic communications, tall structures, cellular repeater towers, electric transmission line towers, and power plants situated along major 

rivers. The loss of any or all of these infrastructure elements 

could severely affect these urban centers and serve to stall 

economic recovery of America’s heartland, which lies at the 

center of vast transportation and commerce corridors. 

A major complication with economic recovery will be the 

perception of public confidence about the recovery. The public 

receives virtually all of their information through mainstream 

media outlets. The media swiftly deploy their best correspondents into harm’s way to report on conditions. Live streaming 

via satellite and video phone has changed viewer’s expectations of being able to witness historic events when they occur. 

The media depends on cueing from: 1) government agencies 

and officials; 2) the public (via cell phones and e-mail); or 

3) from other media outlets (local affiliates, wire services, 

newspapers). They only tend to report what fails; not what 

remains standing.

Whether we like it or not, emergency responders are 

obliged to “court the media.” The television media covers the 

“breaking news” as never before, and their stories are now 

posted Online for everyone to view. Those stories can instill 

public confidence or hinder it. We shouldn’t forget that news 

networks are profit-making corporations operating in a highly 

competitive marketplace. Courting positive media coverage 

is not only an essential aspect of disaster response, it will be 

good for the nation’s economy and benefit the recovery, more 

than most scientists or engineers realize.
Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and Papers for Wednesday, August 13, 2008 13

References

Anderson, J.G., Lee, Y., Zeng, Y., Day, S., 1996, Control of 

Strong Motion by the Upper 30 Meters: Bulletin of the 

Seismological Society of America, v. 86, no. 6., 

p. 1,749–1,759. 

Bakun, W.H., and Hopper, M.G., 2004, Magnitudes and Locations of the 1811–1812 New Madrid, Missouri, and the 

1886 Charleston, South Carolina, Earthquakes: Bulletin of 

the Seismological Society of America, v. 94:1 (February), 

p. 64–75. 

Bear, G.W., Rupp, J.A., and Rudman, A.J., 1997, Seismic 

interpretation of the deep structure of the Wabash Valley 

Fault System, Special issue on investigations of the Illinois 

basin earthquake region, Seismological Research Letters, 

v. 68 (4), p. 624–640. 

Bolt, B.A., 2003, Earthquakes, 5th ed.: W.H. Freeman, New 

York. 

Bristol, H.M., and Treworgy, J.D., 1979, The Wabash Valley 

fault system in southeastern Illinois: Illinois Institute of 

Natural Resources, Illinois State Geological Survey Division, Urbana, Illinois, Circular 509, p. 20. 

Chung, J.W., 2007, Development of a Geographic Information 

System-Based Virtual Geotechnical Database and Assessment of Liquefaction Potential for the St. Louis Metropolitan Area: Ph.D. dissertation in geological engineering, 

University of Missouri-Rolla. 

Chung, J.W., and Rogers, J.D., 2010, Simplified Method for 

Spatial Evaluation of Liquefaction Potential in the St. Louis 

Area: Journal of Geotechnical & Geoenvironmental Engineering, v. 136:4.

Cramer, C.H., 2001, The New Madrid Seismic Zone: capturing variability in seismic hazard analyses: Seismological 

Research Letters, 72, p. 664–672.

Fuller, M.L., 1912, The New Madrid Earthquake: U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin 494. 

McBride, J.H., Sargent, M.L., and Potter, C.J., 1997, Investigating possible earthquake related structure beneath the 

southern Illinois basin from seismic reflection: Special issue 

on investigations of the Illinois basin earthquake region, 

Seismological Research Letters, v. 68 (4), p. 641–649.

Mid-America Earthquake Center (MAE), 2008, Impacts of 

Earthquakes on the Central USA: for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), by the Mid-America 

Earthquake Center, University of Illinois, available online at 

http://mae.cee.uiuc.edu/.

National Research Council (NRC), 1992, The Economic Consequences of a Catastrophic Earthquake—Proceedings of 

a Forum: NRC Commission on Engineering and Technical 

Systems, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 

Nuttli, O.W., 1973, The Mississippi Valley earthquakes of 

1811 and 1812—Intensities, ground motion and magnitudes: Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, 

v. 63, no. 1, p. 227–248.

Nuttli, O.W., 1987, The effects of earthquakes in the central 

United States, Report for Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Memphis, 

Tennessee, 33 p.

Rogers, J.D., Karadeniz, D., and Chung, J.W., 2007, The 

Effect of Site Conditions on Amplification of Ground 

Motion in the St. Louis Area: Proceedings of the 4th 

International Conference on Earthquake Geotechnical 

Engineering, June 25–28, 2007, Thessaloniki, Greece, Paper 

no. 1768, 11 p. 

Russ, D.P., 1982, Style and significance of surface deformation in the vicinity of New Madrid, Missouri, Investigations 

of the New Madrid: U.S. Geological Survey Professional 

Paper 1236, p. 95–114.

Spence, W., Herrmann, R.B., Johnston, A.C., and Reagor, G., 

1993, Responses to Iben Browning’s Prediction of a 1990 

New Madrid, Missouri, Earthquake: U.S. Geological Survey 

Circular 1083. 

Street, R.L., Bauer, R.A., and Woolerly, E.W., 2004, Short 

Note—Magnitude Scaling of Prehistorical Earthquakes 

in the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone of the Central United 

States: Seismological Research Letters, v. 75, no. 5, 

p. 637–641.

Tuttle, M.P., Schweig, E.S., Sims, J.D., Lafferty, R.H., Wolf, 

L.W., and Haynes, M.L., 2002, The earthquake potential of 

the New Madrid Seismic Zone: Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America 92, p. 2,080–2,089.
14 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

Earthquake Hazards (Timing/

Reoccurrence/Probability of an Event)

By Oliver Boyd

U.S. Geological Survey, 3876 Central Avenue, Suite 2, Mail 

Stop 966, Memphis, Tennessee 38152, (901) 678-3463, 

olboyd@usgs.gov

Conference Abstract

In this paper, I give the reader an appreciation for 

earthquake hazard, and particularly earthquake recurrence, in 

the New Madrid region. The earthquake hazard in the New 

Madrid region is of the same order as that in the Western 

United States at hazard levels of interest to public and private 

sectors. Earthquakes in the Central United States are less 

frequent—a magnitude 6 or above occurring on average once 

every ~100 years, but the ground motions, for the same size 

earthquake, are greater, resulting in roughly the same level of 

hazard.

Post-Conference Paper

Earthquake Hazard and Recurrence in the New 

Madrid Region

By Oliver Boyd

Abstract

In this paper, I give the reader an appreciation for 

earthquake hazard, and particularly earthquake recurrence, in 

the New Madrid region. The earthquake hazard in the New 

Madrid region is of the same order as that in the Western 

United States at hazard levels of interest to public and private 

sectors. Earthquakes in the Central United States are less 

frequent—a magnitude 6 or above occurring approximately 

once every ~100 years—but the ground motions for the same 

size earthquake are greater, resulting in roughly the same level 

of hazard.

Introduction

Earthquake hazard refers to how the Earth’s surface 

responds to earthquakes. Earthquake risk, on the other hand, 

refers to how earthquake hazard affects the man-made environment. Herein, I cover two aspects of earthquake hazard: 

earthquake ground motion and earthquake recurrence. For the 

former, I present felt areas for similar sized earthquakes in 

the Central and Western United States to show how ground 

motions differ between these regions. For the latter, I present 

results from paleoseismology, a discipline that can address 

the recurrence of large and rare events, such as those that 

occurred in 1811–1812. I then discuss the recurrence of small 

to moderate events, which can be addressed using the instrumental seismicity catalog. 

Earthquake Hazard

Earthquake hazard analysis (Reiter, 1990) addresses 

the questions, “How hard and how often will the ground 

shake?” To answer these questions, we need to know how 

seismic energy propagates away from the earthquake. How 

quickly will ground motions die off with distance from the 

earthquake? At the site for which we are considering ground 

motions, how do local site effects amplify or dampen ground 

motions? We also need some basic information about the 

earthquake sources. Where are they located? How big are 

they? How often do they occur? 

The U.S. Geological Survey produces the National 

Seismic Hazard Maps (Petersen and others, 2008). These maps 

address these questions and show the ground shaking that is 

expected to be exceeded with either a 2 percent or 10 percent 

chance in the next 50 years. These maps are a critical input to 

the International Building Codes, are used to evaluate risk, and 

help emergency managers prepare for earthquake hazards. 

Earthquake Ground Motions

One thing that makes earthquakes in the Central and 

Eastern United States more damaging relative to earthquakes in the West is that, in the east, ground motions do not 

die off as quickly with distance from the earthquake. The 

area over which the estimated Modified Mercalli Intensity 

(MMI) was VII or greater (at least strong shaking with minor 

structural damage) for the 1811–1812 earthquakes is about 

200,000 square miles (Johnston, 1996) while for the 1906 San 

Francisco event, a similar magnitude earthquake, it is only 

about 12,000 square miles (Lawson, 1908; Nuttli, 1973), an 

order of magnitude smaller. A comparison of “Did you feel 

it?” reports for two smaller earthquakes shows that a M5 

earthquake in Illinois was felt over a much greater area (more 

than 20 States) than a M5 earthquake in California (fig. 1; 

D. Wald, U.S. Geological Survey, oral commun., 2008).

In addition to seismic energy not dying off quickly 

with distance in the Central and Eastern United States relative to the Western United States, Central and Eastern U.S. 

earthquakes tend to have greater stress drops for the same 

magnitude earthquake (Atkinson and Silva, 1997; Campbell, 

2003), which means that ground shaking at higher frequencies 

is more severe. Furthermore, local site conditions in both the 

Western and Central and Eastern United States and elsewhere 

play an important role (Cramer, 2006). When soft sediments 

overlie hard rock, ground motions can be amplified and last 

considerably longer (fig. 2). For example, Memphis lies near 

the middle of the Mississippi embayment, not far from the 

southern strand of New Madrid seismicity, and sits more than 

about one-half a mile of loose sediment. Both factors, proximity to the earthquake source and the thick column of loose 

sediment, can act to increase earthquake ground motions in 
Figure 1. “Did you feel it?” felt intensities for the 2007, magnitude 5.4 Alum Rock, California earthquake and the 2008, magnitude 5.2 

Mt. Carmel, Illinois earthquake. “Did you feel it?” figures courtesy of D. Wald. Black lines are State boundaries. Red lines are country 

boundaries.

94 W 92 W 90 W 88 W 86 W 84 W 82 W

34 N

36 N

38 N

40 N

42 N

IL

IN

KY

MO

TN

38664 responses in 2386 ZIP areas. Max intensity: VII

94 W 92 W 90 W 88 W 86 W 84 W 82 W

34 N

36 N

38 N

40 N

42 N

0 100 200

km

128 W 126 W 124 W 122 W 120 W 118 W 116 W

32 N

34 N

36 N

38 N

40 N

42 N

63789 responses in 456 ZIP areas. Max intensity: VI

128 W 126 W 124 W 122 W 120 W 118 W 116 W

32 N

34 N

36 N

38 N

40 N

42 N

0 100 200

km

INTENSITY I II-III IV V VI VII VIII IX X+

SHAKING

DAMAGE none Light Moderate Moderate/Heavy Heavy Very heavy

Not felt Weak Strong Very strong Severe Violent Extreme

none none Very light

Light Moderate

200 km

400 km

Figure 2. Ground-motion time series for a location inside and 

outside the Mississippi embayment 280 kilometers from the 2008 

Mt. Carmel, Illinois earthquake. Time series courtesy of C. Cramer.

Outside embayment

Inside embayment

TIME IN SECONDS

100 150 200 250

AMPLITUDE

Earthquake Hazards (Timing/Reoccurrence/Probability of an Event) 15

Memphis relative to locations farther from the fault located on 

hard rock.

The Earthquake Source

In addition to assessing how quickly ground motions die 

off with distance from an earthquake source and the effects of 

local site conditions on ground motion, we need to know more 

about the earthquakes themselves. Where are the earthquakes 

located? What are their magnitudes? How often do they 

occur?

In figure 3A, I present a map of earthquakes in the 

Central and Eastern United States that have occurred since 

1964 when seismic monitoring became a priority. There are 

many earthquake sources in the Central and Eastern United 

States: along the Appalachians, northwest up into eastern 

Canada, southeast from eastern Tennessee down across South 

Carolina, across Oklahoma and Texas, up through Nebraska 

and South Dakota, and in the New Madrid region along the 

Mississippi river, the location of the 1811–1812 series of 

earthquakes (Johnston and Schweig, 1996).

When we look more closely at seismicity in the New 

Madrid region (fig. 3B), among the first things we notice are 

northeast and northwest trends of seismicity, which appear to 

delineate faults. These bands of seismicity and nearby earthquakes are referred to collectively as the New Madrid Seismic 
Figure 3. A) Map of seismicity (red circles—size is proportional to magnitude between 3 and 7.5) in the Central and 

Eastern United States since 1964. The inset (B) depicts seismicity along New Madrid Seismic Zone. The dotted outline 

in A refers to the region considered in the recurrence analysis using the instrumental catalog.

A

B

37°

36°

35°

91° 90° 89° 88°

MISSOURI

KENTUCKY

TENNESSEE

ARKANSAS

ILLINOIS

16 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

Zone, and we think that the 1811–1812 series of events took 

place somewhere along these bands. Seismicity also occurs to 

the northeast of the New Madrid zone in the Wabash Valley 

seismic zone, which is where the April 18th, 2008, Mt. Carmel 

earthquake occurred (Herrman and others, 2008).

Earthquake Recurrence

Paleoseismology and Large Infrequent Earthquakes

Many small to moderate earthquakes have occurred in the 

Central and Eastern United States in the last 40 years, but how 

should we prepare for future earthquakes? Will they be damaging? How often do damaging earthquakes occur? The expectation of damage from future earthquakes can be addressed by 

reviewing the effects of some significant, moderate to large, 

historic earthquakes in the region (Stover and Coffman, 1989; 

Wheeler and others, 2003).

On April 18, 2008, a M5.2 earthquake occurred near 

Mt. Carmel, Illinois. There were no casualties and only minor 

damage such as toppled chimneys and masonry that fell out 

from around windows. It was felt in more than 20 States 

from Florida to Canada and resulted in more than 45,000 felt 

reports. Stepping back to the 1960s, Illinois experienced 

another moderate earthquake, a M5.4. Like the more recent 

earthquake, there was damage to chimneys and the masonry 

around windows. It was felt in 23 States from Minnesota to 

Georgia and Pennsylvania to Kansas. Just before the turn of 

the 20th century, in 1895, a M6.6 earthquake occurred near 

Charleston, Missouri. Damage was much more extensive. 

Chimneys toppled throughout Charleston and to a lesser 

extent, in Cairo, Illinois. Windows shattered and plaster walls 

cracked. Liquefaction features were produced along a line 

roughly 20 miles long. In the mid-19th century, there was 

another large earthquake, a M6.3 in Marked Tree, Arkansas. 
Earthquake Hazards (Timing/Reoccurrence/Probability of an Event) 17

This quake produced damage in Memphis, 40 miles away. 

Like other moderate earthquakes in the region, it produced 

damage consisting of toppled chimneys, shattered windows 

and cracked walls. The most famous historic earthquakes 

occurred in 1811–1812 and were known as the New Madrid 

Earthquakes of 1811–1812. The event consisted of three large 

earthquakes, each about a month apart, somewhere between 

magnitude 7 and 8 (Johnston and Schweig, 1996; Hough 

and others, 2000; Bakun and Hopper, 2004). Chimneys were 

knocked down as far away as Cincinnati, Ohio, 350 miles 

from the epicenter. Trees near the epicenter were snapped and 

uprooted and landslides occurred along the river bluffs. Fortunately, the region near the epicenter was sparsely populated.

Large earthquakes leave behind clues in the geologic 

record, and to understand these catastrophic events paleoseismology, a field of study in which researchers use geological 

markers to interpret the location, timing, and magnitude of 

prehistoric earthquakes, is essential. Practicing paleoseismology in the Central and Eastern United States is rather difficult 

given that earthquake ruptures rarely reach the surface and can 

be buried by hundreds of meters of sediment. Within regions 

of more active tectonics and arid climate like the Western 

United States, this is not the case. Rupture features may be 

preserved at the surface for tens and maybe hundreds of years. 

Paleoseismologists can trench across these features to study 

faults and their offsets. Geologic markers such as old stream 

channels are easily seen to be displaced across active faults. 

But in the Central and Eastern United States, where fault slip 

rates are low and processes like erosion and deposition rapidly 

destroy or bury the geologic record, more indirect approaches, 

such as the study of liquefaction features, must be made.

The liquefaction features that have provided the most 

insight into earthquake recurrence in the New Madrid region 

are sand blows. During strong shaking, sandy water-saturated 

layers may liquefy. If a crack can form in the competent silt 

and clay layers above, pressurized sand and water can break 

through and erupt onto the surface (sand blow), possibly 

burying dateable remains such as charcoal, sticks, or human 

artifacts. A sand blow in which there are two episodes of 

liquefaction, one from 1811–1812 and one from a prior large 

earthquake (Tuttle and Schweig, 1996; Li and others, 1998), as 

shown in figure 4A. To give some idea of the extent of liquefaction, figure 4B shows an aerial photograph with sand blows, 

the lighter colored areas, strewn through fields in southeastern 

Missouri. Some are from 1811–1812, but others are from 

earlier events. 

From the study and dating of sand blows, paleoseismologists have determined that there have been several series of 

large earthquakes occurring at least three times in the last 

1,500 years (Tuttle and others, 2002). The average recurrence 

interval for the most recent, well studied events is about 500 

years. Therefore, based on this information and the assumption that the New Madrid region will continue to experience 

earthquakes at the same rate as it has in the past, the probability of a repeat of an 1811–1812 type earthquake in any 50 year 

period is about 10 percent.

Earthquake Recurrence from the Instrumental Catalog

Another means of assessing recurrence, particularly for 

smaller earthquakes, is with the use of instrumental seismicity. 

Based on the seismicity observed in the New Madrid region 

(the dotted outline in fig. 3A), we can ask, for example, what is 

the annual rate of earthquakes greater than or equal to magnitude 5 or greater than or equal to magnitude 6? To answer this 

question, we assume that the number of earthquakes greater 

than or equal to some magnitude follows an exponential (or 

so-called Gutenberg-Richter) relation (fig. 5). We also assume 

the following completeness as was used in the USGS National 

Seismic Hazard Maps. Reporting of earthquake magnitudes is 

considered complete for earthquakes greater than or equal to 

M3 occurring since 1974, greater than or equal to M4 occurring since 1940, greater than or equal to M5 occurring since 

1860, and greater than or equal to M7 occurring since 1800 

(Frankel and others, 1996).

This assumption is common in seismology. When you 

look at nearly any earthquake catalog, you see an exponential magnitude-versus-frequency relationship, N(≥M)=10a-bM. 

The number of earthquakes having a magnitude greater than 

or equal to M is equal to 10 raised to a constant a minus a 

constant b times magnitude. The a-value reflects the overall 

level of seismic activity; greater a-values indicate more 

seismicity. The b-value reflects the relative frequencies of 

large and small earthquakes. Worldwide, b is generally close 

to 1, which means that, for example, magnitude 4 earthquakes 

occur ten times more often than magnitude 5s or that magnitude 5s occur ten times more often than magnitude 6s.

When we perform this analysis for seismicity for the New 

Madrid region (fig. 5), we find an a-value of 3.48 ± 0.15 (for 

M equal to or greater than 0) and a b-value of 0.92 ± 0.05. 

The estimation of a- and b-values is performed on incremental rates of earthquakes rather than cumulative rates. In other 

words, a line is fit to the log of the number of earthquakes 

occurring within magnitude bins rather than fitting a line to 

the log of the number of earthquakes greater than or equal to a 

given magnitude. An outline of this method as well as its justification is documented in Weichert (1980). If the b-value were 

exactly 1, the a-value would represent the minimum magnitude we would expect to see once per year, on average. We can 

then use this equation and these values to ask how often we 

expect to see a magnitude greater than or equal to 5. This turns 

out to be, on average, about once every 11 to 17 years. For a 

magnitude greater than or equal to 6, we can expect to see one 

about once every 80 to 150 years. The ranges in return periods 

result from synthesizing random catalogs with an earthquake 

catalog subject to the aforementioned levels of magnitude 

completeness.

This analysis is, however, imperfect and uncertain. 

Because the earthquake catalog is limited to a short period of 

time relative to the return period of magnitude 5 and larger 

earthquakes, we could easily argue that earthquakes with these 

magnitudes are poorly represented. It is interesting to see that 

in figure 5, the number of earthquakes greater than about M4.7 
Figure 4. A) Profile of two episodes of sand blow formation (Tuttle and Schweig, 1996; Li and others, 1998) and 

B) sand blows (light colored areas) throughout fields in southeast Missouri. The photo in 4A was taken by M. Tuttle. 

The aerial photo in 4B was taken by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1964.

Clay Loam

A

B

18 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

lies beneath the predicted values, which may indicate that 

the future rate of magnitude 5s will be greater than what has 

been observed in the instrumental record. It should be noted 

that an analysis using the instrumental catalog does not apply 

to large New Madrid type earthquakes, which in many cases 

do not follow exponential recurrence behavior (Schwartz and 

Coppersmith, 1984).

The return periods of M5 and M6 earthquakes can be 

expressed in terms of the probability of occurrence within a 

given period of time as was presented for the large 1811–1812 

type earthquakes. The probability of a magnitude 5 or greater 

in any 50-year period in the entire New Madrid region is very 

high, between 95 and 99 percent. The probability of a magnitude 6 or greater is somewhere between 28 and 46 percent.

Conclusions

In this article, several points were made with regard 

to earthquake hazards: those related to earthquake ground 

motions and those related to earthquake probabilities. With 

respect to the former, seismologists have observed that earthquake ground motions maintain energy to greater distances 

and have greater high-frequency energy content in the Central 

and Eastern United States relative to the Western United 

States. They may also be amplified and last longer depending 

on the thickness of soft sediment beneath a site of interest. 

With respect to earthquake probabilities, observations from 

paleoseismology and the instrumental catalog are essential. 

From the instrumental catalog, we find that a magnitude 6 or 

larger earthquake can be expected once every 90 to 135 years 

in the New Madrid region, while, from paleoseismology, we 

find that a repeat of an 1811–1812 type series of earthquakes 

may be expected once every 500 years, on average. In terms 

of the probability that these earthquakes will occur in any 

50-year period, these return periods correspond to roughly 37 

percent and 10 percent probability, respectively. 

Acknowledgments

Charles Mueller, Mark Peterson, and Art Frankel 

provided outstanding reviews of the original manuscript. I 

also want to acknowledge Emitt Witt, Krista Karstensen, and 

Ronaldo Luna for organizing a very successful conference in 

which this work was presented.
Figure 5. The annual rate of earthquakes greater than or equal to magnitude, M, versus magnitude for the New Madrid 

region (dotted outline in figure 10A). Red circles with black outlines are observations. The black line is a fit to the data and 

the dashed green lines represent the standard deviation. The red shaded region between magnitudes 7 and 8 represents 

the recurrence of the New Madrid earthquakes, which is determined from paleoseismology.

3 4 5 6 7 8

10

MAGNITUDE

N(≥M) PER YEAR

10−1

10−2

10−3

101

Earthquake Hazards (Timing/Reoccurrence/Probability of an Event) 19

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earthquake source spectra for California earthquakes: Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, v. 87, no. 1, 

p. 97–113.

Bakun, W.H., and Hopper, M.G., 2004, Magnitudes and 

locations of the 1811–1812 New Madrid, Missouri, and 

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p. 64–75.

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America, v. 93, no. 3, p. 1,012–1,033.

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America, v. 96, no. 6, p. 2,008–2,020.

Frankel, A.D., Mueller, C.S., Barnhard, T., Perkins, D.M., 

Leyendecker, E.V., Dickman, N., Hanson, S., and Hopper, M.G., 1996, National Seismic Hazard Maps—Documentation June 1996: U.S. Geological Survey Open File 

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2008, Illinois earthquake—An ANSS monitoring success: 

Seismological Research Letters, v. 79, no. 6, p. 830–843.
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Hough, S.E., Armbruster, J.G., Seeber, L., and Hough, J.F., 

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of the 1811–1812 New Madrid earthquakes: Journal of Geophysical Research, v. 105, no. B10, p. 23,839–23,864.

Johnston, A.C., 1996, Seismic moment assessment of earthquakes in stable continental regions—III. New Madrid 

1811–1812, Charleston 1886 and Lisbon 1755: Geophysical 

Journal International, v. 126, p. 314–344.

Johnston, A.C., and Schweig, E.S., 1996, The enigma of the 

New Madrid earthquakes of 1811–1812: Annual Review of 

Earth and Planetary Sciences, v. 24, p. 339–384.

Lawson, A.C., 1908, Atlas of maps and seismograms accompanying the Report of the State Earthquake Commission 

upon the California Earthquake of April 18th, 1906.

Li, Y., Schweig, E.S., Tuttle, M.P., and Ellis, M.A., 1998, Evidence for large prehistoric earthquakes in the northern New 

Madrid seismic zone, central United States: Seismological 

Research Letters, v. 69, no. 3, p. 270–276.

Nuttli, O.W., 1973, The Mississippi Valley earthquakes on 

1811–1812: intensities, ground motions, and magnitudes: 

Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, v. 63, 

p. 227–248.

Petersen, M.D., Frankel, A.D., Harmsen, S.C., Mueller, 

C.S., Haller, K.M., Wheeler, R.L., Wesson, R.L., Zeng, 

Yuehua, Boyd, O.S., Perkins, D.M., Luco, Nicolas, Field, 

E.H., Wills, C.J., and Rukstales, K.S., 2008, Documentation for the 2008 Update of the United States National 

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dating prehistoric liquefaction features—Lessons learned 

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Earthquake Hazards (Timing/Reoccurrence/Probability of an Event) 21

State and Regional Impact of Central U.S. 

Earthquakes on the Physical Infrastructure

By Amr Elnashai

Mid-America Earthquake Center, Civil and Environmental 

Engineering Department, University of Illinois, Urbana, 

Illinois, 61801, aelnash@illinois.edu

Conference Abstract

The Central United States is a seismically active area 

with infrequent but potentially catastrophic earthquakes, as 

evidenced by the 1811 and 1812 earthquakes. These earthquakes occurred as a cluster of 3 large magnitude events in 

late 1811 and early 1812 in the New Madrid region. This study 

seeks to determine the maximum probable impacts of a repeat 

of the 1811–12 earthquakes in the New Madrid Seismic Zone, 

as well as other seismic activity in the region. The earthquake 

impact assessment models discussed herein utilize the best 

available hazard characterizations and regional inventory 

for the Central United States. An examination of numerous scenarios shows that a Mw7.7 earthquake on the New 

Madrid Fault system generates the most substantial damage 

to buildings and lifelines in Tennessee, Missouri, Kentucky 

and Illinois depending upon the location of the fault rupture. 

A single scenario event for the State of Tennessee shows 

direct economic losses of nearly $60 billion with more than 

60,000 casualties (both injuries and fatalities). Severe damage 

and losses are estimated for the other seven States, as detailed 

in the presentation.

Post-Conference Paper

Earthquake Impact on the Built Environment in the Central 

United States

By Lisa J. Cleveland1 and Amr S. Elnashai 2

Abstract

The Central United States, a seismically active area 

with infrequent but potentially catastrophic earthquakes, as 

evidenced by the 1811 and 1812 earthquakes. These earthquakes occurred as a cluster of 3 large magnitude events in 

late 1811 and early 1812 in the New Madrid region. This study 

seeks to determine the maximum probable impacts of a repeat 

1

Technical Project Manager, Mid-America Earthquake Center, Civil and 

Environmental Engineering Department, University of Illinois, 1239b Newmark Civil Engineering Lab, 205 N. Mathews Avenue, Urbana, Illinois 61801, 

(217) 244-1696, lclevel2@illinois.edu.

2

Director, Mid-America Earthquake Center, Civil and Environmental Engineering Department, University of Illinois, 2129e Newmark Civil Engineering Lab, 205 N. Mathews Avenue, Urbana, Illinois 61801, (217) 265-5497, 

aelnash@illinois.edu

of the 1811–12 earthquakes in the New Madrid Seismic Zone, 

as well as other seismic activity in the region. The earthquake 

impact assessment models discussed herein utilize the best 

available hazard characterizations and regional inventory 

for the Central United States An examination of numerous scenarios shows that a Mw7.7 earthquake on the New 

Madrid Fault system generates the most substantial damage 

to buildings and lifelines in Tennessee, Missouri, Kentucky 

and Illinois depending upon the location of the fault rupture. 

A single scenario event for the State of Tennessee shows 

direct economic losses of nearly $60 billion with more than 

60,000 casualties (both injuries and fatalities). Severe damage 

and losses are estimated for the other seven States, as detailed 

in the paper. 

Introduction

Scenario earthquake impact assessments provide estimates of damage to infrastructure and the effects of that 

damage on the exposed population. Emergency response 

agencies utilize the best available damage and loss predictions to prepare for disaster response in a post-earthquake 

environment. Conversely, organizations charged with mitigations review impact assessment damage estimates and identify 

critical infrastructure for repair and retrofit before catastrophic 

events with the intent of improving the performance of those 

structures during an earthquake. Furthermore, government 

agencies and private organizations make use of earthquake 

impact assessments to promote individual and community 

preparedness and educate vulnerable areas on the possible 

impacts of earthquakes. 

Seismic activity in the Central United States is less 

frequent than the west coast. However, because of the geological differences between the two regions, earthquakes in the 

Central United States would affect a much larger area than 

a comparable event on the west coast. Amongst the largest 

earthquakes in United States history are the three earthquakes 

in the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). During the winter 

of 1811–12 three earthquakes with magnitudes between 7 and 

8 shook the Central United States and were reportedly felt 

many hundreds of miles further away (Hough and Bilham, 

2006). Many earthquakes are recorded in the Central United 

States, all of which are only mildly destructive. More recently, 

a magnitude 5.2 earthquake on April 18, 2008, in southern 

Illinois was reportedly felt in Georgia and Kansas which are 

hundreds of miles from the epicenter near West Salem, Illinois 

(U.S. Geological Survey, 2008). 

The Mid-America Earthquake Center (MAEC) is investigating the impacts of various earthquakes on the Central 

United States in an effort to provide county, State and Federal 

emergency planners with the impact estimates necessary to 

develop comprehensive response plans based on realistic and 

scientifically-defendable damage and loss predictions. This 

multi-year, multi-phase project includes the examination of 

various seismic events including those in the New Madrid, 

Wabash Valley, and East Tennessee Seismic Zones. Initial 
Figure 1. Fictitious faults (red) used to characterize the 

uncertainty in source location for New Madrid earthquakes. 

Circles are earthquakes with magnitude greater than or equal to 

3.0 since 1976.

32°

34°

90°

36°

38°

40° 88° 86° 92° 94°

22 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

investigations of roughly 250 counties nearest to the New 

Madrid Fault primarily focused on the effect of earthquake 

hazard on impact assessment results. Various source mechanisms were considered including point and line sources. In 

addition, the effect of liquefaction susceptibility was evaluated. Estimates indicate economic losses range from $40 to 

$50 billion with more than 35,000 casualties (Elnashai and 

Cleveland, 2007) when line source fault representation and 

liquefaction susceptibility are used. Current modeling efforts 

seek to build upon the knowledge gained in these initial 

studies and improve upon the damage and loss estimates 

provided by these preliminary models. Additionally, the 

region of interest is larger and includes the States of Alabama, 

Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, 

and Tennessee. 

Definition of Scenario Components

It is highly probable that the New Madrid Fault will 

generate the most catastrophic seismic event while the Wabash 

Valley and East Tennessee Faults will generate moderate 

earthquakes of magnitude 6 to 7. Even with source zones 

identified, the exact source, path, and rupture mechanism must 

still be determined before conducting scenario earthquake 

impact assessment. One of the most important considerations 

in scenario definition is the seismo-tectonic environment of 

the region under consideration. The NMSZ is not a single 

fault but rather a region in which ruptures are likely to occur. 

Indeed, the 1811–12 events were probably associated with 

three different faults. The location of the NMSZ is illustrated 

in figure 1. The line represents the most likely rupture location, though it is possible for seismic events to deviate slightly 

from this fault layout (Johnston and Schweig, 1996). The fault 

itself is comprised of three segments, with each segment representing a possible rupture. This means that only the northeast 

segment may rupture at a given time, for example. It also is 

possible that a single segment ruptures, a second segment 

follows weeks or months later, and the final segment ruptures 

in some additional period of time. Only individual segment 

fault ruptures are used in this study each with a magnitude of 

Mw7.7. Though not shown here, additional scenario events 

considered include a Mw7.1 in the Wabash Valley Seismic 

Zone and a Mw5.9 in the East Tennessee Seismic Zone. 

Developing the most comprehensive and precise earthquake impact models requires the best available input data. 

Once the scenario source is chosen the method used to define 

ground motion must be determined. Elnashai and Cleveland 

(2007) confirmed that using the line source definition of 

ground motion in the Central United States produces significantly greater impacts and also represent a more realistic 

depiction of ground shaking. The U.S. Geological Survey 

(USGS) developed three sets of ground motion maps representing magnitude Mw7.7 events on each segment of the New 

Madrid Fault. Soil amplification is accounted for in these 

maps using a two-dimensional soil model (Cramer, 2006). 

The soil data utilized to develop these maps are designed for 

regional-level analyses only because of the coarse level of 

refinement in soil characterization. Each set of maps includes 

peak ground acceleration (PGA), peak ground velocity (PGV), 

short-period spectral acceleration (Sa

 0.3 sec.), and long-period 

spectral acceleration (Sa 1.0 sec.) since the modeling software, 

HAZUS-MH MR2 (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

2006), requires these ground shaking parameters. Reference is 

made to figure 2 for the PGA map used to model the southwest 

fault segment rupture.

Hazard is further defined by ground deformation which is 

modeled with liquefaction susceptibly maps. The liquefaction 

data included in this study was developed based on a proxy 

correlating a National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program 

(NEHRP) soil site class (A–F) to a relative level of liquefaction susceptibility (spanning from ‘none’ to ‘very high’). 

The combination of ground shaking and ground deformation 

provides better description of regional hazard in the Central 

United States where soft and liquefiable soils significantly 

affect the behavior of structures and performance of lifelines. 

Achieving the most accurate impact assessment also 

requires the best available inventory. There are numerous 

types of infrastructure common to earthquake impact assessment, such as general buildings (residential, commercial, and 

so forth), transportation lifelines, utility lifelines and high 

potential-loss facilities (dams, levees, hazmat, and so forth.) 
Figure 2. Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) for the Southwest 

Fault Extension of the New Madrid Seismic Zone.

0.07–0.15

0.15–0.25

0.25–0.35

0.35–0.45

0.45–0.55

0.55–0.65

0.65–0.75

0.75–0.85

0.85–0.95

0.95–1.10

1.10–1.23

Peak ground 

 acceleration 

 (g)

MISSOURI

KENTUCKY

TENNESSEE

ARKANSAS

ILLINOIS

MISSISSIPPI ALABAMA

INDIANA

EXPLANATION

0 60 120 MILES

0 60 120 KILOMETERS

92° 91° 90° 89° 88° 87° 39°

38°

37°

36°

35°

34°

Earthquake Hazards (Timing/Reoccurrence/Probability of an Event) 23

as well as population demographic data. In addition to the 

location of each infrastructure components, various structural 

parameters are required to complete an analysis. Several critical parameters include structural system, height or length, year 

of construction and level of seismic design and replacement 

value of each structure for the computation of economic loss. 

The study conducted by the MAEC sought to update the 

inventory data for critical structures such as essential facilities 

for emergency response and lifelines. The Homeland Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP) Gold Dataset from 2007 

(National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Office of America, 

2007) was used to update a pre-existing set of inventory 

provided with the impact assessment program, HAZUS-MH 

MR2. The HSIP provides more than 200 datasets detailing the 

locations and characteristics of various critical infrastructure 

systems throughout the United States. The addition of 200,000 

critical facilities across the eight States of interest substantially 

improved the quality of inventory data. Inventory improvements were made to essential, transportation, utility and high 

potential-loss facilities. Two new inventory types were added 

to the utility inventory as well, namely major regional transmission pipelines for oil and natural gas. 

An Overview of Impacts Assessment Results 

A total of ten scenarios were completed throughout the 

eight States. A NMSZ event was modeled for each State while 

impact assessments were also conducted for Wabash Valley 

and East Tennessee events in Indiana and Alabama, respectively. The New Madrid scenarios considered the single fault 

rupture closest to the State of interest. This was designed to 

provide the worst case impacts for each State. Several States 

showed significantly greater impacts than others such as 

Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri and Tennessee, and are the focus 

of this discussion.

The State of Illinois is most critically impacted by a 

rupture of the northeast segment. Approximately 30,000 buildings in southern Illinois are moderately or more severely 

damaged leading to ~6,300 casualties, which include all 

injuries and fatalities. In many cases moderate damage 

indicates cracking of interior non-structural walls and large 

cracks in chimneys. More than 100 hospitals, fire stations, and 

police stations are not operating the day after the earthquake, 

severely inhibiting the healthcare sector’s ability to care for 

the injured and provide emergency services. Travel in southern Illinois is impeded by more than 250 damaged bridges. 

Roughly 70,000 households are without drinking water and 

electricity the day after the earthquake and is likely to prevent 

residents from remaining in their homes. Direct economic 

losses are estimated at more than $34 billion with $27 billion 

attributed to utility lifeline damage alone. 

The NMSZ scenario event for Kentucky is located 

along the northeast segment as well. Most of the impacted 

infrastructure is located in western Kentucky. Approximately 

the same number of essential facilities is not operating and 

the same number of bridges damaged in Kentucky as were 

affected in Illinois. Conversely, more than 500 waste water 

facilities and 1,000 communication facilities are damaged. 

Also, more than 100,000 are expected to be without drinking 

water the day after the earthquake in western Kentucky. More 

than 82,000 buildings are moderately or severely damaged and 

lead to nearly 10,000 casualties. Total direct economic losses 

exceed $46 billion in Kentucky alone, which is 75 percent 

greater than Illinois.

An event nucleating from the central segment of the 

fault is employed in the scenario earthquake for the State of 

Missouri. Nearly 85,000 buildings incur moderate or more 

severe damage and more than 95 percent of the buildings 

are residential structures. Of the 85,000 buildings damaged, 

37,000 experience complete damage meaning these structures 

are damaged beyond repair. Such extensive damage to residential buildings causes nearly 16,000 casualties. In addition, 

nearly 200 schools are damaged, severely reducing the number 

of public shelter locations for those displaced because of the 

earthquake. Also, most hospitals, police, and fire stations 

in southeast Missouri are not operating immediately after 

the earthquake leaving residents without critical emergency 

services and medical care. Transportation lifelines are critically impaired with nearly 1,400 bridges and 30 airports in 

southeast Missouri not functioning. Without these lifelines it is 

difficult for residents to evacuate and emergency aid workers 

to enter the most severely affected regions. About 1,600 

communication facilities are damaged, requiring emergency 

aid teams to seek alternate forms of communication immediately after the event. Water pipelines experience more than 

15,000 leaks and 20,000 breaks leaving nearly 150,000 people 

without drinking water in southeast Missouri. Total direct 

economic losses reach nearly $40 billion, with $25 billion 

attributed to utility lifeline loss alone.
Table 1. Damage and loss values.

Type of damage or loss Illinois Kentucky Missouri Tennessee

At least moderately damaged buildings 29,500 81,600 84,600 258,000

At least moderately damaged bridges 260 200 1,360 900

Total casualties (injuries and fatalities) 6,250 9,740 15,600 63,100

Total direct economic losses ($, billions of dollars) $34.1 $46.0 $38.7 $56.6

24 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

The State of Tennessee incurs far greater damage than 

any other State in the New Madrid region. The scenario 

earthquake for this State employs a rupture of the southwest 

segment. This generates significant shaking in the city of 

Memphis which has a highly vulnerable population of unreinforced masonry (URMs) buildings. Nearly 260,000 buildings 

are moderately damaged to completely destroyed, with nearly 

50,000 being URMs. Such extensive damage to residential 

buildings causes more than 63,000 total casualties, which is 

far more than the three previous scenarios combined. At least 

4,000 of those casualties are fatalities and another 15,000 injuries require hospitalization. 

Most counties in western Tennessee, where most of 

the casualties occur, are without operational hospitals in 

the days immediately after the earthquake, inhibiting the 

region’s ability to care for the injured. More than 600 schools, 

120 police stations and 250 fire stations are damaged and all 

are located in western Tennessee as well. Nearly 900 bridges 

are severely damaged limiting the amount of aid workers and 

supplies that can enter the most affected counties in western 

Tennessee. Thousands of utility facilities are damaged, 

particularly communication facilities which show nearly 

3,500 damaged structures. Regional and local natural gas 

pipelines incur 16,000 leaks and more than 10,000 breaks 

in nearly 50,000 miles of pipelines and will require substantial repair work to render the pipeline network operational 

again. Nearly 450,000 households are without drinking water 

while 425,000 households are without electric power the day 

after the event. Such widespread service losses will prevent 

residents from staying in their homes, even if the structures 

themselves are not damaged. Total direct economic losses are 

far greater than previous scenarios at nearly $57 billion. More 

than $40 million is attributed to building losses while $15 

billion is attributed to utility lifelines. 

Various scenarios are employed for each State impact 

assessment and hence the individual States should not be 

added directly to determine regional impacts, though the 

following table does permit general estimations of possible 

regional impacts. In these four States alone, several hundred 

thousand buildings and thousands of bridges are likely 

damaged by a New Madrid event. It is possible that more than 

100,000 casualties occur and direct economic losses exceed 

$150 or $200 billion as shown in table 1. When the remaining four States are considered these regional estimates will 

be even greater. All the above does not include economic loss 

from indirect effects, such as business interruption, loss of 

market share, loss of tax revenue base and others.

Conclusions

This study investigates the effect of various earthquakes 

on the Central United States. Catastrophic earthquakes on the 

New Madrid fault are considered, as well as less severe events 

on the Wabash Valley and East Tennessee faults, though the 

New Madrid events are the primary focus of this discussion. 

When conducting scenario impact assessment it is critical to 

consider the best available inputs such as hazard characterization and regional infrastructure inventory. As shown here, the 

location of faulting can vary within the NMSZ and impact 

assessment results change substantially based on the rupture 

location chosen, the site condition, and the susceptibility to 

large ground deformation. 

Though these models were current when the study was 

completed, numerous advances in hazard and structural 

response modeling have taken place since then and must be 

considered via new modeling for Central United States earthquakes. More comprehensive soil amplification and liquefaction susceptibility maps for the eight States of interest will 

improve the hazard characterization throughout the region. 

Various new types of inventory are now being considered 

and include long-span bridges, dams, levees and hazardous 

materials facilities. New fragility relationships for buildings 

and bridges are also available and will be used in the next 

generation of impact assessment models. Continued efforts to 

improve impact assessment modeling will lead to more accurate results and ideally provide emergency response planners, 

mitigation teams and the public with a better understanding 

of the potential effects of earthquakes in the Central United 

States. The detailed results from the study reported in this 

paper are available in a report downloadable from https://

www.ideals.uiuc.edu/handle/2142/8971.

References

Cramer, C., 2006, Quantifying the uncertainty in site amplification modeling and its effects on site-specific seismichazard estimation in the Upper Mississippi Embayment 

and adjacent areas: Bulletin of the Seismological Society of 

America, v. 96, no. 6, p. 2,008–2,020.
Earthquake Hazards (Timing/Reoccurrence/Probability of an Event) 25

Elnashai, A.S., and Cleveland, Lisa, 2007, Importance and 

Challenges of Earthquake Impact Assessment in the Central and Eastern United States: Asian-Pacific Network of 

Centers for Earthquake Engineering Research Conference, 

Hong Kong, China, May 29–30, 2007.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2006, HAZUS-MH 

MR2 Technical Manual, Washington, D.C., 304 p.

Hough, S.E, and Bilham, R.G, 2006, After the Earth Quakes: 

Elastic Rebound on an Urban Planet, New York Oxford 

University Press, 321 p.

Johnston, A.C., and Schweig, E.S., 1996, The Enigma of the 

New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811–1812: Annual Review of 

Earth and Planetary Sciences, v. 24, p. 339–384.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Office of Americas/

North America and Homeland Security Division (PMH), 

2007. 

Homeland Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP) Gold Dataset, May 23, 2007, Bethesda, Md.

U.S. Geological Survey, 2008, Illinois Earthquake is a WakeUp Call, accessed September 5, 2008, at http://www.usgs.

gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1919.

Resilience, Response, and Recovery: Societal 

Components of Catastrophe

By Arleen A. Hill

Department of Earth Science, The University of Memphis, 

Memphis, Tennessee 38152, aahill@memphis.edu

Abstract not submitted.

State-of-the-Art Earthquake Research for 

Critical Transportation Systems

By Phillip Yen

Federal Highway Administration, McLean, Virginia 22101 

wen-huei.yen@fhwa.dot.gov

Abstract not submitted.

Missouri Department of Transportation (MoDOT) 

Earthquake Preparedness

By Eileen Rackers

Missouri Department of Transportation, Jefferson City, 

Missouri 65102, eileen.rackers@modot.mo.gov

Abstract not submitted.

The Advanced National Seismic System: 

Earthquake Monitoring for Science, 

Engineering, Rapid Response, and Public 

Information

By Mitch Withers

Center for Earthquake Research and Information (CERI) 

University of Memphis, Memphis, Tennessee 38152, 

mwithers@memphis.edu

Conference Abstract

Seismic monitoring in the Central United States is a 

cooperative effort by six institutions organized under the 

umbrella of the Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS). 

These partners include Center for Earthquake Research and 

Information (CERI) at the University of Memphis, St. Louis 

University (SLU), the University of Kentucky (UKY), the 

University of South Carolina at Columbia (USC), and the U.S. 

Geological Survey (USGS).

The mission of the ANSS is to provide accurate and 

timely data and information products for seismic events, 

including their effects on buildings and structures, employing modern monitoring methods and technologies. The 

ANSS includes 7000 measuring instruments and associated 

infrastructure and human resources at a capitalization cost 

of $170 million and $47 million each year for operation 

and maintenance (U.S. Geological Survey Circular 1188, 

An Assessment of Seismic Monitoring in the United States; 

Requirement for an Advanced National Seismic System). 

Public Laws 106-503 and 108-360 authorize full funding but 

annual appropriations are about 10 percent and operation and 

maintenance costs preclude appreciable additional modernization. Significant improvements are realized since the ANSS 

inception in 2000 though there remain significant gaps in data 

(for example, sparse coverage and/or obsolete hardware) and 

product quality disparities in different parts of the country 

(from lack of instrumentation, software, infrastructure, and 

human resources).

Post-Conference Paper

Monitoring by the Science Community

By Mitch Withers

Seismic monitoring in the Central United States is a 

cooperative effort by six institutions organized under the 

umbrella of the Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS). 

These partners include Center for Earthquake Research and 

Information (CERI) at the University of Memphis, St. Louis 

University (SLU), the University of Kentucky (UKY), the 

University of South Carolina at Columbia (USC), and the U.S. 

Geological Survey (USGS).
Figure 2. Conceptual diagram of seismic data flow.

0 500 1,000 MILES

0 500 1,000 KILOMETERS

25°

30°

35°

40°

45°

105°

95° 85°

75°

Figure 1. Advanced National Siesmic System (ANSS) seismic 

stations in the Central and Eastern United States.

26 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

The mission of the ANSS is to provide accurate and 

timely data and information products for seismic events, 

including their effects on buildings and structures, employing modern monitoring methods and technologies. The 

ANSS includes 7,000 measuring instruments and associated 

infrastructure and human resources at a capitalization cost 

of $170 million and $47 million each year for operation and 

maintenance (U.S. Geological Survey, 1999). Public Laws 

106-503 and 108-360 authorize full funding but annual 

appropriations are about 10 percent and operation and maintenance costs preclude appreciable additional modernization. Significant improvements are realized since the ANSS 

inception in 2000 though there remain significant gaps in data 

(for example, sparse coverage and/or obsolete hardware) and 

product quality disparities in different parts of the country 

(from lack of instrumentation, software, infrastructure, and 

human resources).

Monitoring in the Central and Eastern United States is 

accomplished using a national backbone network, regional 

monitoring, and urban strongmotion monitoring. The national 

backbone operated by the USGS provides a uniform level 

of high quality coverage across the entire country with a 

threshold of about magnitude 3.5. Higher density coverage 

is implemented as resources permit by regional partners in 

areas of relatively elevated hazard as defined by a 10 percent 

probability of exceeding 8 percent g in ground motion within 

the next fifty years (U.S. Geological Survey, 2002, hazard map 

as of this writing). The map in figure 1 shows the locations 

of broadband (squares) shortperiod (triangles) and strongmotion (diamonds) instrumentation operated by the USGS 

National Earthquake Information Center (brown) and the 

USGS National strong motion program (unfilled diamonds), 

CERI (red), SLU (green), UKY (yellow), USC (magenta) and 

Virginia Tech (orange). There just under 300 stations on the 

map.

Data flowing from an earthquake which generates seismic 

waves that travel outward away from the epicenter not unlike 

ripples from a pebble in a pond is illustrated in figure 2. These 

waves are measured by seismic instruments and those data are 

sent, in many cases by radio to a processing facility. In many 

instances the processing facility is remote and unstaffed where 

data are concentrated, stored as backup, and forwarded to a 

central facility. The central facility exchanges data in nearreal-time with other seismic networks usually using public 

internet. The ANSS regional processing facility at CERI 

processes more than 900 channels and each channel contains 

from 40 to 100 data points per second. The data are processed 

to produce rapid automated alarms and reviewed products.

The ANSS provides a suite of products available from 

one source but with contributions from all participants. 

There are at least two primary benefits to this system. First, it 

provides one-stop shopping instead of gathering components 

and different pieces of information from different seismic 

networks. The ANSS combines those pieces into a single 

seamless product suite. Secondly, it provides for a base level 

of product availability for the entire country regardless of the 

capabilities of any individual seismic network. See http://

www.anss.org/products.

The products include recent earthquake maps and lists, 

maps of intensity based on felt reports, maps of ground 

shaking based on instrumental observations where instrumentation is sufficiently dense, an email and cell phone earthquake 

notification service, earthquake catalogs and data, and nearreal-time images of seismograms.

The magnitude 5.2 earthquake in southeast Illinois on 

April 18, 2008 serves as a good example of an ANSS monitoring success as well as highlights notable shortcomings because 
Figure 3. Intensity map for the magnitude 5.2 southern Illinois 

earthquake of April 18, 2008.

Earthquake Hazards (Timing/Reoccurrence/Probability of an Event) 27

of lack of instrumentation and infrastructure. There were 

more than 38,000 felt reports (fig. 3) for this earthquake from 

Chicago to Atlanta.

The earthquake provided the best data set to date for a 

Central and Eastern United States earthquake that provides 

an observation of how seismic waves attenuate with distance. 

This is a key parameter in estimating seismic hazard. The 

earthquake also provided an excellent opportunity to calibrate 

the ANSS instrumentation. There were also excellent data 

to provide estimates of sedimentary basin amplification and 

resonance, also critical to accurate estimates of seismic hazard. 

These and more data like it help to provide the basic science 

necessary to more accurately estimate hazards and thereby 

develop better informed building codes that safeguard lives 

and property without undue conservatism that may unnecessarily increase development costs.

Additional information is available at http://www.anss.

org and at http://www.ceri.memphis.edu.

Reference Cited

U.S. Geological Survey, 1999, An assessment of seismic 

monitoring in the United States, requirement for an 

advanced national seismic system: U.S. Geological Survey 

Circular 1188, 55 p. (Also available at http://pubs.er.usgs.

gov/publication/cir1188).

Critical Infrastructure Monitoring: The 

Bill E. Emerson Memorial Bridge

By Genda Chen

Department of Civil Engineering, Missouri University of Science and Technology, Rolla, Missouri 65401, 

gchen@mst.edu 

Abstract not submitted.

Products and Capabilities of the Science/

Engineering Community for Emergency 

Response

By Robert Bauer

Illinois State Geological Survey, Champaign, Illinois 

61820-6964, bauer@isgs.uiuc.edu

*Publication authorized by the Director, Illinois State Geological Survey

Conference Abstract

Many scientists and engineers from State and Federal 

agencies, universities, consulting firms and professional organizations participate in post-earthquake response and recovery. 

Collectively, they bring a wide range of experience, documentation procedures, equipment, and facilities. 

Some of these experts, such as State and Federal agency 

representatives, are responsible for gathering data and providing advice to their emergency management officials who use 

this information for decision support during response and 

recovery operations. Structural engineers and building code 

officials can provide rapid inspections of structures to assess 

entry conditions which are posted on buildings. All of these 

experts are collecting data using various techniques and equipment to document perishable features associated with buildings, infrastructure and the earth surface. Ideally, information 

is compiled at central locations and provided to the public 

through information officers, via press releases, interviews 

and internet content. This allows for maximum distribution of 

information on what is known, what can be expected and ways 

to stay safe during aftershocks and future events. 

To help with analysis and explanation, earthquake data 

are combined with various maps, aerial photography, satellite 

imagery, and other remotely sensed ground conditions that 

are available from State and national clearinghouses and with 

newly acquired imagery from specially tasked aircraft flights 

and satellites. In addition to response and recovery efforts, 

all information is later used to better understand and predict 

impacts from future earthquake events to help mitigate future 

damage. 
28 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

Post-Conference Paper 

Products and Capabilities of Science/Engineering 

Community for Earthquake Response and Recovery*

By Robert A. Bauer

Abstract

Many scientists and engineers from State and Federal 

agencies, universities, consulting firms and professional organizations participate in post-earthquake response and recovery. 

Collectively, they bring a wide range of experience, documentation procedures, equipment, and facilities. 

Some of these experts, such as State and Federal agency 

representatives, are responsible for gathering data and providing advice to emergency management officials who use 

this information for decisions during response and recovery 

operations. Structural engineers and building code officials 

can provide rapid inspections of structures to assess entry 

conditions which are posted on buildings. All of these experts 

are collecting data using various techniques and equipment 

to document perishable features associated with buildings, 

infrastructure, and the earth surface. Ideally, information 

is compiled at central emergency operation locations and 

provided to the public through information officers, via press 

releases, interviews, and internet content. This centralization 

of information and communication allows for maximum distribution of information on what is known, what can be expected 

and ways to stay safe during aftershocks and future events. 

To help with analysis and explanation, earthquake data 

are combined with maps, aerial photography, satellite imagery, 

and other remotely sensed ground conditions that are available from State and national clearinghouses and with newly 

acquired imagery from specially tasked aircraft flights and 

satellites. In addition to immediate response and recovery 

efforts, all information is later used to better understand and 

predict impacts from future earthquake events to help mitigate 

potential future damage. 

Introduction

Immediately following a damaging earthquake, a number 

of State and Federal emergency management agencies are 

responsible for handling and alleviating life threatening situations. They are assisted by a cadre of other agencies which 

have resources or capabilities that can be brought to bear on 

the situation. Part of this also is a group who more fully document the effects of the earthquake, who may be with State and 

Federal agencies, academia, or consulting firms. Shortly after 

the event some of this information is valuable for emergency 

response and long term recovery. Furthermore, it is of value 

for understanding the event and its effects from shaking and 

damage related to the Central United States conditions. Each 

group brings different products and capabilities for use during 

response and recovery.

Discussion

Following a damaging earthquake, the first information 

available is provided by the U.S. Geological Survey’s seismograph networks. The information is automatically analyzed 

and then distributed within minutes by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). The USGS distributes this information 

through an email, cellular phone, and pager notification 

system. Anyone can sign up for receiving the data constrained 

by different magnitudes, location and hours of notification 

set by the user. Once this notification is sent, anyone who felt 

the event may use the website to fill out a questionnaire “Did 

You Feel It?” Thousands of people perform this task within 

minutes, producing the first map showing levels of shaking 

and potential damage indicated by the Intensity Scale. Following the deployment of the “Did You Feel It?” map, the USGS 

produces a ShakeMap which uses the seismograph instruments 

in the region to produce a map of ground motion and shaking 

intensity.

The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in each State 

is opened when damage is suspected, assistance may be 

warranted, or a coordinated assessment may be required. 

The EOC handles policy (strategic) decisions. It is usually a 

fixed facility located within the State’s capital city and has 

the ability to communicate to outside sources, view incident 

specific information and allocates resources. It is isolated from 

confusion, media and weather. The EOC has designated desks 

for 20 to 30 different agencies with resources or capabilities 

to assist in the response. The State geological survey occupies 

one of these positions to analyze and explain reported earthquake information and to assist in communicating these interpretations, safety messages, and aftershock expectations to 

both responders and the public through the designated public 

information officers. The EOC and its associated agencies are 

responsible for the assistance to citizens within their State, but 

unaffected States may be called on to assist in damaged States 

through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. 

If the event causes a large amount of damage, a field or 

forward operations center may be established by the emergency managers. This center is located close to the disaster 

area, can provide immediate on-scene response, and coordinates disaster site operations. Most State emergency management agencies and some other agencies such as State police 

are equipped with recreational or tractor trailer vehicles 

equipped for this field operation. For a damaging event, 

scientific and engineering investigators would be coming 

into the damage area to document perishable information. 

The State geological surveys, in cooperation with their State 

emergency managers, are responsible for setting up a technical 

clearinghouse near the forward operations center to coordinate 

and assist this influx of investigators. With smaller events 

and no forward operations center established, the technical 

clearinghouse may be located within the geological survey’s 

main office where a coordination of a much smaller number of 

people can be easily handled. Utah has published their State 

geological survey’s response plan (Solomon, 2001).
Earthquake Hazards (Timing/Reoccurrence/Probability of an Event) 29

The technical clearinghouse would be part of a system 

where investigators would be credentialed at some location 

and their specialty coordinated with others so that critical 

areas and features will be fully documented. These investigators would also be responsible for providing regular status 

updates to the forward operations center for immediate 

response and relay critical information to the EOC. The technical clearinghouse is intended to relieve emergency managers 

from coordinating the investigators and provide emergency 

managers with an accounting of investigators’ locations in 

case people need to be removed from certain areas because of 

life threatening circumstances. For a large earthquake, there 

will be investigators who specialize in liquefaction, landslides, 

fault rupture, lateral spreading, societal impacts, infrastructure 

damage, bridge performance, seismic retrofit performance, 

structural engineering, deployment of portable seismographs 

(Bodin and others, 2003), and so forth. Short reports from the 

California Geological Survey on their clearinghouse activities 

for the Loma Prieta and Northridge earthquakes can be found 

in Streitz and others (1990), and Nathe (1999), respectively.

In addition to the investigator coordination role, the 

technical clearinghouse would also be staffed with geographic 

information system (GIS) specialists and resources to track, 

summarize, and display documented damage on various 

maps. Other State specialists include interpreters of remotely 

gathered information from satellites through the International 

Charter which can be tasked to gather imagery during disasters 

and from high altitude flights which could be tasked through 

State and Federal agencies.

The Central United States geologic conditions which 

allow ground motions to travel a much farther distance than 

Western United States, results in more than one State responding to damage within their State boundaries from even a 

moderate earthquake. An example is the April 18, 2008, 

Mt. Carmel 5.4 magnitude earthquake which caused damage 

in three States and was felt in 28 States and Canada. The 

Central United States Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC) State 

Geologists along with CUSEC, CERI, and USGS are working 

to establish a regional technical clearinghouse run by CERI/

USGS in Tennessee. This regional clearinghouse would collect 

information from the individual State technical clearinghouses 

to develop a regional perspective required for the Federal 

response plan (Holzer and others, 2003).

Conclusion

Damaging earthquakes in the Central United States 

present unique emergency responses as compared to the 

earthquakes in the Western United States since the geologic 

conditions allow damaging ground motions to travel greater 

distances causing damage in multiple States even for moderate earthquakes such as the 5.4 magnitude event of April 18, 

2008. The State and Federal agencies responsible for handling 

or alleviating life threatening situations following damaging 

earthquakes continue to develop and coordinate response plans 

for this multistate response.

References

Bodin, Paul, Pavlis, Gary , Schweig, Eugene, Gomberg, Joan, 

2003, A Rapid Array Mobilization Procedure (RAMP) 

Agreement for the Central United States: U.S. Geological 

Survey Open-File Report 03–15, 21 p. (Also available at 

http://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/ofr0315).

Solomon, B.J., 2001, Utah Geological Survey EarthquakeResponse Plan and Investigation Field Guide: Utah Geological Survey Open-File Report 384, 61 p.

Holzer, T.L., Roger, D., Borcherdt, C.D., Comartin, R.D., 

Hanson, C.R., Scawthorn, K.T., and Youd, T.L., 2003, The 

Plan to Coordinate NEHRP Post-Earthquake Investigations. 

U.S. Geological Survey Circular 1242, 20 p. (Also available 

at http://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/cir1242).

Nathe, S.K., 1999, Activities of the California Post-Earthquake Information Clearinghouse. California Division of 

Mines and Geology, California Geology March/April 1999, 

p. 13–16.

Streitz, R., Sydnor, R.H., Barrows, A.G., and Spittler, T.E., 

1990, Loma Prieta Earthquake Response Activities of the 

Division of Mines and Geology. California Division of 

Mines and Geology, Special Publication 104, p. 127–142.

Highway Bridge Performance During the 

May 12, 2008, M7.9 Wenchuan Earthquake in 

China

By Genda Chen

Department of Civil Engineering, Missouri University of Science and Technology, Rolla, Missouri 65401, 

gchen@mst.edu 

Conference Abstract

A five-member U.S. reconnaissance team (Dr. Genda 

Chen, Dr. Youssef Hashash, Mr. Curtis Holub, Mr. Mark 

Yashinsky, and Dr. Phillip Yen) visited China on July 20–24, 

2008, to inspect 14 highway bridges that were affected by the 

May 12, 2008, Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan Province. In 

this paper, surface features of the seismic fault rupture near 

two bridge sites, representative bridge damage scenarios, and 

main lessons learned from the earthquake are documented and 

discussed.
Northeast end 

Southwest end 

Ming River Surface rupture

Figure 1. Surface rupture of the 

earthquake fault.

30 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

Post-Conference Paper

Highway Bridge Performance During the May 12, 2008, 

M7.9 Wenchuan Earthquake of China

By Genda Chen

Professor and Interim Director, Center for Infrastructure 

Engineering Studies, Missouri University of Science and Technology, 224 Engineering Research Center, 500 W. 16th Street, 

Rolla, Missouri 65409-0710, Phone: (573) 341-4462, Fax: 

(573) 341-6215, Email: gchen@mst.edu

Abstract

A five-member U.S. reconnaissance team (Dr. Genda 

Chen, Dr. Youssef Hashash, Mr. Curtis Holub, Mr. Mark 

Yashinsky, and Dr. Phillip Yen) visited China on July 20–24, 

2008, to inspect 14 highway bridges that were affected by the 

May 12, 2008, Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan Province. In 

this paper, surface features of the seismic fault rupture near 

two bridge sites, representative bridge damage scenarios, and 

main lessons learnt from the earthquake are documented and 

discussed.

Introduction

At 06:28:01 (UTC) on May 12, 2008, an M7.9 earthquake hit the Wenchuan County in Sichuan Province, China. 

The Wenchuan earthquake and several strong aftershocks 

resulted in massive landslides and rock falls. They damaged 

more than 1,000 bridges, approximately 20 of which had to be 

replaced. Massive landslides covered or undermined the roads, 

making it difficult to bring in equipment and supplies during 

the earthquake evacuation and response. These events caused 

approximately 70,000 fatalities and economic loss of more 

than $110 billion in U.S. dollars.

The Wenchuan earthquake 

occurred in the LongmenShan thrust zone, 10 km 

beneath the earth’s surface. 

Its epicenter is located at 

30.989°N and 103.329°E 

near a town called Yingxiu 

in Wenchuan County, 

Sichuan Province. The 

highest recorded peak 

ground acceleration is 

approximately 0.65 g. 

Within the first three 

months after the main 

shock, at least 35 aftershocks with magnitudes 

equal to or greater than 

M5.0 were recorded with 

the strongest aftershock of 

M6.4. The Longmen-Shan 

thrust zone was formed 

by the Eastern Tibetan Plateau pushing against the Sichuan 

Basin. The thrust zone has three faults: the front fault 

(Guanxian-Jiangyu-Guangyuan), the center fault (YingxiuBeichuan-Chaba-Linjueshi), and the back fault (Wenchuan-Maoxian-Qingchuan). Based on the distribution of 

aftershocks, approximately 300 km of the faults was estimated 

to have ruptured, breaking the ground surface along the 

Yingxiu-Beichuan segment of the center fault (210 km) and 

the Guanxia-Jiangyu segment of the front fault (70 km). The 

highest vertical fault displacements measured were more than 

5 m.

Bridges Near the Earthquake Fault

Structures Near the Epicenter 

The surface rupture of the center fault in the LongmenShan fault zone was observed in Yingxiu. As illustrated in 

figure 1, the thrust fault appeared to cross the Ming River at 

a right angle. The earthquake left behind a distinct dislocation on the riverbed at the northeast (NE) end of the surface 

rupture. The northwest (NW) side of the fault on the upstream 

of the river moves upward against the southeast (SE) side of 

the fault. The fact that one deck panel along the expressway 

elevated viaduct was still supported by one pier in figure 1 

indicated the sudden push by a near-field pulsing effect.

Over the Ming River and approximately 500 meters north 

(upstream) of the fault is the Mingjiang Bridge, as shown in 

figure 2A. The bridge is a T-girder structure with two-column 

bents that are supported on pile shafts. It had some damage 

because of a landslide at the east span. As a result, a Bailey 

bridge was built over the east span to carry vehicles. The 

bridge structure is nearly parallel to the fault line. In comparison with the nearby elevated viaduct (fig. 2B), which is 

perpendicular to the fault line, the Mingjiang Bridge suffered 

considerably less damage because of the near-field directivity 

effect of the earthquake fault.
Figure 2. Mingjiang Bridge versus viaduct near the epicenter in Yinxiu Town.

A Parallel to the Fault B Perpendicular to the Fault

East Span

Figure 3. Surface rupture along the Old Highway near the collapsed building.

Figure 4. Surface rupture at Xiaoyudong Bridge site (http://www.uky.

edu/KGS/geologichazards/Sichuan_Earthquake.pdf). 1.5 m 

Collapsed 

building 

Collapsed 

building 

Earthquake Hazards (Timing/Reoccurrence/Probability of an Event) 31

On the other side of the Ming River was a five-story 

building with a construction joint between two similar parts 

as illustrated in figure 1. The right side of the building was 

completely collapsed while the left side of the building lost 

the second story and suffered structural damage in walls. As 

shown in figure 1, a sudden change was also evidenced on the 

slope of the mountain behind the building. A closer examination at the old Dujiangyan-Wenchuan highway in front of the 

building indicated that the vertical dislocation was approximately 1.5 m as illustrated in figure 3.

Structures Away from the Epicenter 

At the Xiaoyudong Bridge (31.1859°N and 103.7677°E) 

between the front and center faults in the 

Longmen-Shan fault zone, surface rupture 

was also observed as shown in figure 4 (http://

www.uky.edu/KGS/geologichazards/Sichuan_

Earthquake.pdf). The vertical offset was more 

than 1 m. The highest peak ground acceleration of 0.65 g recorded during the Wenchuan 

earthquake was actually taken from somewhere 

northeast but close to the Xiaoyudong Bridge.

Built in the 1980s, Xiaoyudong Bridge 

was a four-span reinforced concrete (RC) arch 

structure with long approaches, supported on 

two abutments and three intermediate bents. 

Each bent consisted of one cap beam and two 

rectangular columns; it was supported on two 

drilled shaft foundations of 2 m each in diameter. The bridge deck of each span was supported 

by five planar structures of 40 m long, each being an 

arch strengthened with two struts. The arch and struts 

were both supported on the pile cap of drilled shafts. 

The bridge deck is integrally cast with the top of strut 

and arch but seated at the bent caps and abutments. 

Expansion joints exist at each abutment and bent.

The two spans on the west side of the bridge 

collapsed and the easternmost span were severely 

damaged as shown in figure 5. The remaining span 

suffered little damage. It can be seen from figure 5 that 

Bent 2 is located in the middle of the river with the 

longest pile shafts exposed above the ground. Bent 2 

was significantly tilted while the other intermediate bents 

appear to have little rotation. The difference in the stiffness of 

various bents most likely contributed to the collapse of two 

western spans. Under severe shaking, Bent 2 rotated, resulting 

in unseating of the two spans. The bent cap was approximately 

850 mm across; the seat length of each girder was approximately 300 mm, which is limited for strong shaking at the 

bridge site.

The easternmost span also suffered significant damage. 

As shown in figure 6, shear failures were observed on the top 

end of the struts and on the bottom end of the arches. The 

shear key on the east abutment was damaged. At the top end, 
Bent 1 

West abutment 

Bent 5

East abutment

Span 1 Span 2 Span 3 Span 4 Bent 2 Bent 3 Bent 4 

Span 4

Abutment

Strut Arch

Arch against 

the levee 

Shear 

failure

Shear 

failure

Shear key failure 

Figure 5. Overview of the damaged Xiaoyudao Arch bridge.

Figure 6. Damage in the easternmost span.

32 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

each strut seems to be reinforced with 15 #25 bars (metric 

unit). Some of them were fractured.

The damage scenario to the easternmost span is likely 

caused by the surface fault near the east abutment as shown in 

figure 4. When the hanging wall of the thrust fault moved up 

right relative to the foot wall that supported the east abutment, 

the levee began to bear on the arches and added significant 

shear forces and bending moments especially at the east ends 

of the arches. Designed for axial forces, the arches failed in 

shear at their east ends. The top end of the arches remained 

intact due mainly to its larger section. Because of the shear 

failure in arches, the east span deflected downward substantially, as evidenced in figure 6, and added more loads to the 

strut, resulting in its shear failure as well. At the same time, 

Span 4 pushed toward Bent 4 and caused flexural cracks at the 

pile shaft.

Other Representative Damages

Bridge Span Loss 

Near the Nanba Town, a 10-span river crossing (on a 10° 

skew) was under construction during the earthquake, as shown 

in figure 7. Each 6 m long span was simply supported on 

two-column bents and seat-type abutments with 560 mm seats. 

As shown in figure 8, each span consisted of eight precast box 

girders with a cross section of 1,067 mm by 1,520 mm. Each 

girder was supported on two 200 mm round elastomeric bearings at each end. The girders were in place but the concrete 

deck had not yet been poured at the time of the earthquake as 

seen from figure 8.

As shown in figures 7 and 8, most of the box girders 

of the new bridge were dropped into the river and the twocolumn bents were distorted. The edge box girders were transversely displaced by approximately 760 mm. The extensive 

damage in the 10-span bridge likely resulted from several 

factors: the deck had not been poured, no transverse bracing or 

shear key was used, and girders were slightly skewed. Many 

bents were leaning or distorted with no visible damage above 

the waterline.

Miaozhiping Highway from Dujiangyan to Wenchuan was also under construction during the earthquake. The 

highway was scheduled to open in October, 2008. The bridge 

of approximately 1.4 km long consisted of three segments: 

a southeast (SE) approach span, a main span, and a northwest (NW) approach span, as illustrated in figure 9. The SE 

approach span was a two-span, RC girder structure with 50 m 

span length each. The bridge deck was supported on five RC 

girders and two-column bents with several cross struts. The 

main bridge was a continuous, non-prismatic, three-span 

structure supported on two intermediate wall piers with 125 m, 

220 m, and 125 m length, respectively. The superstructure was 

a single-cell box girder structure. The depth of each girder 

varied approximately from 1.5 m to 4.5 m. The NW approach 

span had three segments of 250 m, 250 m, and 100 m, respectively. Each of the two longer segments had five spans of 50 m 
Elastomeric pad 

for box girders

Main span Northwest approach span 

Southeast approach 

span

One span loss 

Shear key

failure

Figure 8. Damage to the 10-span bridge under construction.

Figure 7. Damage scenario of the 10-span bridge under construction during the earthquake.

Figure 9. Overview of the Miaozhiping bridge.

Earthquake Hazards (Timing/Reoccurrence/Probability of an Event) 33
Bent 1 Bent 2 Bent 3

Bent 4 Bent 5 

Southeast approach 

Northwest approach 

Shear failure

Figure 10. Overview of the viaduct structure.

34 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

long, supporting 10 RC girders. The shorter segment had two 

spans of 50 m each.

All girders of the Miaozhiping Bridge were simply 

supported on the bents for dead load but bridge decks were 

continuous for live load. The bents were as tall as 105 m. In 

the main span of the bridge, bents were 40 m deep into water 

in the Zidingdu Reservoir of the Dujiangyan Dam. Expansion 

joints were used between the parts and between the approach 

and main bridge.

The most severe damage was to the end span of a fivespan T-girder segment that became unseated at the expansion 

joint end, fractured in the continuous deck at the other end 

because of gravity load, and fell off the supporting bent caps 

during the earthquake. The bent seats were approximately 300 

mm in length but the bridge experienced at least 500 mm of 

longitudinal movement because of earthquake shaking. Since 

the columns of each bent were approximately 105 m tall, the 

accumulated displacement at the bent cap was likely substantial during the earthquake.

Column Shear Cracks 

Mianyang Airport Viaduct is a “U” shaped structure built 

in 2001. The middle of the “U” shaped structure is a double 

deck system of the airport terminal. Two approaches (NW and 

SE) are connected to the upper level of the airport. They are 

supported on two-column bents as shown in figure 10.

The SE approach consists of a five-span structure 

supported on columns of varying heights. The five-span 

structure is continuous with expansion joints at both ends. The 

diameter of the upper portion of the columns (approximately 

1.0 m) is smaller than that of the lower portion (approximately 

1.5 m). The columns have a smooth #5 (metric) spiral spaced 

at 15 cm and 32 cm - #29 for longitudinal reinforcement. The 

NW approach also has five spans. They are similar to those 

on the SE approach except that the lower portion of the tallest 

circular columns at Bent 5 is connected by a concrete wall 

as shown in figure 10. The concrete wall makes Bent 5 much 

stiffer than its adjacent bents.

The column damage at Bent 5 of NW approach likely 

resulted from several factors: large gravels used in the 

concrete mix (approximately 100 mm), loose tie bars, and the 

relatively rigid wall effect that leads to an irregular stiffness 

distribution. Signs of torsion on cracked columns resulting from asymmetry in stiffness of the structure most likely 

caused the different levels of shear damage in two columns at 

Bent 5. The SE approach structure had minor flexural cracks at 

the lower portion of the columns at Bent 4.

Conclusions

The May 12, 2008, Wenchuan earthquake will have 

potential effect on China’s seismic hazard evaluation near 

known faults and bridge design in earthquake areas. Such an 

effort would ensure that China could rely on its highway infrastructure during the frequent earthquakes that strike this and 

other regions. Based on the field reconnaissance, the following 

observations can be made:

1. The collapse of most arch and girder bridges is associated with surface rupturing of the faults in the LongmenShan Thrust Zone. A significant portion of roadways and 

bridges were pushed away or buried by overwhelming 

landslides in the mountainous terrain of steep slopes.

2. The representative damage types in bridge superstructure 

include unseating of girders, longitudinal and transverse 

offset of decks, pounding at expansion joints, and shear 

key failure.

3. The bearings of several girder bridges were either crushed 

or displaced substantially. The substructure and foundation of bridges were subjected to shear and flexural 
Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and Papers for Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 1: Science, Maps, and Engineering 35

cracks, concrete spalling, stirrup rupture, excessive displacement, and loss of stability.

4. More damage occurred in simply-supported bridges in 

comparison with continuous spans. The directivity effects 

on the bridges near the earthquake epicenter were evidenced during the earthquake.

Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and 

Papers for Thursday, August 14, 

2008—Track 1: Science, Maps, 

and Engineering

The National Map: Status of National Geospatial 

Base Data in the Central United States

By Kari Craun

U.S. Geological Survey, 1400 Independence Road, Rolla, 

Missouri 65401, kcraun@usgs.gov

Conference Abstract

In the early 1990s, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 

completed first-time topographic mapping of the conterminous United States at a nominal scale of 1:24,000. Since the 

completion of primary-scale mapping for the United States, 

the agency’s base mapping program has focused on development of digital mapping products, in many cases derived from 

the information contained in the primary scale topographic 

maps. As the average age of the information contained on 

the topographic maps nears a quarter of a century, the USGS 

is focused on developing The National Map, or nationally 

consistent, seamless base topographic data to create the next 

generation of topographic maps and derived products. Conceptually, The National Map will provide the programmatic and 

technological infrastructure for bringing information from 

multiple sources together into a seamless, consistent, current 

set of base geographic data for the nation. 

In 2008, the USGS and its partners nearly have 

completed public domain, digital coverage of the Nation 

for primary-scale or equivalent base geographic data for 

eight themes. These themes include orthoimagery, elevation, 

hydrography, geographic names, land use/land cover, structures, transportation, and boundaries. The currency, quality, 

and consistency of these data for the Central United States 

varies by geographic area based on a number of criteria, 

including data availability from partners and historical funding 

availability from appropriated and reimbursable sources to 

improve the data. One goal of The National Map is to work 

with partners to improve and maintain these data.

USGS-State Partnerships and the Future of 

Standard Quadrangle Maps

By Laurence R. Moore

U.S. Geological Survey, 1400 Independence Road, 

Mail Stop 308, Rolla, Missouri 65401, 573-308-3661, 

lmoore@usgs.gov

Conference Abstract

The 1:24,000-scale topographic quadrangle was the 

primary product of the U.S. Geological Survey’s (USGS) 

National Mapping Program from 1947 to 1992. This map 

series includes about 54,000 map sheets for the conterminous United States, and is the only uniform map series ever 

produced that covers this area at such a large scale. 

This map series partially was revised under several 

programs, starting as early as 1968, but these programs were 

not adequate to keep the series current. Through the 1990s the 

emphasis of the USGS mapping program shifted away from 

topographic maps and toward more specialized digital data 

products. Topographic map revision dropped off rapidly after 

1999, and stopped completely by 2004.

Since 2001, emergency-response and homeland security 

requirements have revived the question of whether a standard 

national topographic series is needed. Emergencies such as 

Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and California wildfires in 2007–08 

demonstrated that familiar maps are important to first responders. Maps that have a standard scale, extent, and grids help 

reduce confusion and save time in emergencies.

Traditional maps are designed to allow the human brain 

to quickly process large amounts of information, and depend 

on artistic layout and design that cannot be fully automated. 

In spite of technical advances, creating a traditional, generalpurpose topographic map is still expensive. 

Although the content and layout of traditional topographic maps probably is still desirable, the preferred packaging and delivery of maps has changed. Digital image files are 

now desired by most users, but to be useful to the emergencyresponse community, these files must be easy to view and easy 

to print without specialized geographic information system 

expertise or software. 

Post-Conference Paper

USGS Standard Quadrangle Maps for Emergency 

Response

By Laurence R. Moore

Abstract

The signature product of the U.S. national map series 

is the 7.5-minute topographic quadrangle. This series was 

completed in 1992 and few of its maps have been revised 
36 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

since. Most maps in this series are cast on an outdated datum 

and do not contain a full-line Universal Transverse Mercator 

(UTM) grid, making them unsuitable for emergency response 

operations, even where the content is still current. Hurricane 

Katrina and other recent (2008) emergencies have revived 

the debate about whether or not traditional, printed maps 

are still important. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is 

reviving 1:24,000-scale quadrangle maps by designing new 

products that are essentially image maps with linework and 

text enhancements. State and local agencies are interested in 

participating in the design and production of new quadrangle 

maps; a cooperative project with the State of Missouri to map 

part of the New Madrid Seismic Zone is in progress.

Introduction

National mapping programs have been a characteristic 

of nation-states since the mid‐1700s. The national mapping

program of the United States dates from the Jefferson 

administration and has been the responsibility of the USGS 

since 1879. In the 20th century, the signature product of this 

program was the 1:24,000‐scale, 7.5-minute topographic

quadrangle.

The original production history and the revision history 

of the 7.5‐minute topographic series for the coterminous

48 States is shown in figure 1. The program began after World 

War II and peaked in the 1970s and 80s. The map series officially was declared complete in 1992.

Revision programs became significant starting in the 

1960s. In the 1990s, several digital revision programs were 

attempted, with the objective of revising topographic maps 

quickly and cheaply. These programs did not meet their goals 

of high-quality maps at low cost, and by 2004 the USGS had 

stopped publishing topographic maps except for reprints to 

replace shelf stock. 

Discussion

Following the completion of the 7.5-minute topographic 

map series, the USGS mapping program turned its attention to 

other types of geospatial data, particularly four national digital 

datasets: the National Hydrography Dataset, the National 

Orthoimage Database, the National Elevation Database, and 

the Geographic Names Information System. At the same time, 

budgets and staffing of the mapping program were shrinking (fig. 2). In the 1960s, the topographic mapping program 

employed around 2,000 people; by 2005, that number had 

been reduced to about 250.

One reason for this shift in emphasis and resources is 

that traditional topographic mapping is expensive. The cost 

of the original 7.5-minute series, expressed in 2007 dollars, 

was on the close order of $1,000 per square mile, or about 

$3 billion to map the coterminous 48 States. Estimates based 

on the 1990s digital revision programs indicate that modern 

information technology might reduce this cost by an order of 

magnitude if the same maps were made today. Cost reduction to $100 per square mile is an improvement, but is still 

about $5,000 per quadrangle. Elapsed time also is considered 

a hidden cost. The clean, graceful appearance of a traditional 

map requires human craftsmanship, which is inherently slow.

The cost of traditional mapping, combined with the ready 

availability of other types of spatial data, call into question the 

need for traditional maps. The allocation of resources in most 

government mapping agencies, including the USGS, implies 

that this is a settled question; however, Hurricane Katrina and 

other recent emergencies have revived the debate.

The U.S. Senate’s report (2006) on Hurricane Katrina 

said, “Officials from nearly every search-and-rescue agency 

told Committee staff that they lacked basic maps of the 

area. At one point, State and local officials tore maps out of 

telephone books, so that out-of-state search-and-rescue teams 

could have some sense of where they were going. However, 

high floodwaters in New Orleans hid street signs from view, 

complicating their efforts.” 

It seems reasonable to suppose that the rescuers referred 

to in this quote were not geographic information system (GIS) 

oriented; that when the power was out and the city was filling 

up with water, they wanted traditional paper maps, not digital 

spatial data. Telephone-book street maps are not appropriate 

for emergency response operations for many reasons, including the lack of standard scale and standard coordinate systems.

The search-and-rescue problem of accurately communicating location by voice radio or short text message was 

acute during Katrina. People trapped in their homes could 

call for help on cell phones, but could describe their location 

only by street address. As noted in the Senate report, street 

signs and house numbers were destroyed or under water, and 

many rescue crews were not familiar with the area. Converting 

addresses to geographic coordinates did not solve the problem 

because first responders had no common protocols for using 

coordinates. 

The cartographic aspect of this problem is that most 

USGS 7.5-minute topographic quadrangles are published 

on the outdated North American Datum of 1927 (NAD 27), 

and most do not have full-line grids of the type needed for 

search-and-rescue operations (table 1). The need for maps 

with current content is important, but the need for maps on 

modern coordinate systems and with common grids is critical 

and urgent.

In the wake of World War II, the U.S. military designed 

the Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) to address the 

location problem. Recently, a civilian version of the MGRS, 

the U.S. National Grid (USNG), was adopted as a Federal 

Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) standard. This standard, 

and the direction of OMB Circular A-16 and Executive Order 

12906, made the USNG the official grid system of the Federal 

government; however, the USNG is not yet implemented in a 

national map series and is not familiar to most domestic 

emergency response organizations.

To address these issues, the USGS is now working on 

a new generation of quadrangle maps. These maps will not 

duplicate the 7.5-minute topographic map series, because 

current (2008) data sources do not easily support production 
Figure 1. Currency of 7.5-minute topographic maps for the coterminous 48 States. The red line is the currency 

of the set of original printings (median = 1968), the blue line is the currency of the set of most recent revisions 

(median = 1979). About 54,000 quadrangles.

Figure 2. National Mapping Program Employees, selected years for which data are 

available.

QUADRANGLES REVISED PER YEAR

DATE OF MAP SOURCE MATERIALS

1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Latest revision

Original mapping

3,500

3,000

2,000

2,500

1,000

1,500

0

500

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEEES

YEAR

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

3,500

3,000

2,000

2,500

1,000

1,500

0

500

Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and Papers for Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 1: Science, Maps, and Engineering 37
Figure 3. Detail of an image map quadrangle showing the image 

background, line and place enhancements, grid systems, and map 

margin.

Table 1. Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) 

representation and datums of 7.5-minute quadrangles.

[UTM, Universal Transverse Mercator; NAD 27, North American 

Datum of 1927; NAD 83, North American Datum of 1983]

NAD 27 NAD 83

UTM tick marks 29,320 1,467

Full UTM grid 13,014 371

38 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

of traditional topographic maps. In the near term, the core 

characteristics of these new maps will include:

• Static, printable images (as opposed to dynamic 

GIS data)

• Can be viewed and printed with normal office software 

and normal computer expertise

• Orthoimage background, enhanced with some map 

linework, point features, and place names

• Standard 7.5-minute extent

• 1:24,000 scale

• Traditional map collars

• NAD 83/WGS 84 datum

• Transverse Mercator projection 

• Full 1,000-meter U.S. National Grid

The first two items in this list are addressed by using 

layered GeoPDF as the physical format of the product. 

GeoPDF is a proprietary format of TerraGo Technologies that 

adds georeferencing information to a standard Adobe Portable 

Data Format (PDF) file. Such a product is a softcopy analog 

of a traditional map, allowing map users to find coordinate 

locations and make simple measurements without specialized 

skills or software.

The third item in the list declares the product to be 

cartographically simple. It leverages the fact that high-quality 

orthoimagery is common, relatively cheap, and (thanks to 

Google and other online maps) is familiar to today’s map 

users. The simplicity of map content means the product can be 

made quickly and, therefore, can be kept up to date with the 

most recent data available (fig. 3).

The packaging and presentation is traditional, even oldfashioned. The hypothesis is that familiar map forms have 

value to workers in stressful field conditions.

Because standardized quadrangle maps are valuable 

resources for search-and-rescue and emergency response, 

State and local governments have strong incentives to help 

create such maps. State and local agencies often own better 

GIS data than Federal agencies and are more familiar with 

ground conditions. Partnerships between the USGS and State 

and local agencies may assist with creating a new national 

map series. In Missouri, a partnership of this type has been 

formed between the Missouri Spatial Data Information Service 

(MSDIS) and the USGS. The two organizations are working 

on a pilot project of about 50 quadrangles in the New Madrid 

Seismic Zone in southeast Missouri. The USGS is providing 

standards and technical support; MSDIS is gathering the data 

and doing the actual work of making the maps.

Conclusion

Traditional topographic maps are still valued for many 

field operations, including search‐and‐rescue and emergenc

response. Though a national map series with the same look 

and content as the 7.5-minute topographic series may not be 

possible today, it is possible to produce relatively inexpensive 

large- and medium-scale quadrangle maps. Key characteristics of these maps include being cast on a standard coordinate system, having a standard scale, being easily viewable 

and plottable without advanced GIS or computer expertise, 

and having a full-line UTM grid conforming to the USNG 

standard.

References

Federal Geographic Data Committee, 2001, United States 

National Grid (USNG), FDGC‐STD‐011‐2001, access

August 2007, at http://www.fgdc.gov/standards/standards_

publications/.

Office of Management and Budget, Circular A–16 Revised, 

2002, accessed September 2008, at http://www.whitehouse.

gov/omb/circulars/a016/a016_rev.html.
Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and Papers for Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 1: Science, Maps, and Engineering 39

United States Senate, 2006, Hurricane Katrina—A Nation Still 

Unprepared: Special Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, accessed August 

2008, at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/

katrinanation.html.

The White House, Executive Order 12906, 1994, accessed 

September 2008, at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/

library/direct/orders/20fa.html.

Data Sources and Development for the New 

Madrid Seismic Zone in Missouri

By Tim Haithcoat

University of Missouri Geographic Research Center, Columbia, Missouri 65211-6170, haithcoatt@missouri.edu

Conference Abstract

This presentation will outline the data development 

activities that the State of Missouri is conducting in collaboration with many partners within the New Madrid Seismic Zone. 

The talk will outline the parameters gathered to outline the 

data collection activity, the processes and activity currently 

underway, and the products and deliverables that will result 

from these activities to include new 7.5-minute quadrangle 

maps, structures data, map books, GeoPDF files, and other 

map or map-like information that the State is going to predeploy within this area.

New Data for a New Age

By Dean Gesch

U.S. Geological Survey, Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57198, 

gesch@usgs.gov

Conference Abstract

Geospatial data are a critical resource in planning for, 

responding to, and recovering from natural disasters. In 

particular, digital elevation data have many applications for 

natural disasters, including portrayal of topography on base 

maps, 3-D visualization of affected sites, hydrologic modeling, 

inventory of manmade structures, and vulnerability mapping. 

The U.S. Geological Survey’s (USGS) National Elevation 

Dataset (NED) provides the best publicly available elevation data for the United States in a multi-resolution database 

derived from various sources, including existing topographic 

maps, photogrammetry, and remote sensing. High-accuracy, 

high-resolution elevation data derived from airborne lidar 

(light detection and ranging) surveys are currently being used 

to upgrade many areas in the NED. These data have proven 

useful in response to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, 

including inundation modeling and studying storm surge 

dynamics. Derivative products from high-resolution lidar are 

being used to model susceptibility to debris flows in southern 

California wildfire areas. The high-resolution elevation data 

provide an important framework within which ground-based 

lidar survey data can be referenced. Because of the multitude 

of geospatial data applications that require highly accurate, 

up-to-date topographic surface measurements, the USGS is 

working with Federal, State, local, and industry partners to 

explore the concept of a national lidar survey so that all areas 

may benefit from the availability of high-quality elevation data 

and derivative products. The lessons learned from recent disaster events, especially Hurricane Katrina, demonstrate the high 

value in the ready availability of high-accuracy lidar elevation 

data in the NED immediately following a disaster event. The 

same benefits would be realized if high-quality elevation data 

were available for both planning and immediate response to a 

high-impact earthquake event in the Central United States.

The Land Use Portfolio Model: A GIS-based 

Decision Support System for Evaluating Seismic 

Risk Mitigation Policies

By Paul Hearn

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 20192, 

phearn@usgs.gov

Conference Abstract

Policy decisions regarding the mitigation of natural 

hazards are made by Federal, State, and local government 

agencies, as well as by the private sector and individuals. 

Because resources are rarely sufficient to provide full protection from hazards, some compromise or tradeoff between 

safety and cost is necessary. The societal objective is to find a 

reasonable level of mitigation to reduce damage without incurring unacceptable expenses. While mitigation choices affect 

the vulnerability of specific locations, government policy 

implementation will have unanticipated consequences for 

urban areas that include negative and positive effects on property values. Individual risk preferences for loss reduction and 

mitigation choices are affected by these policies, (such as tax 

incentives, building codes, ordinances, and regulations). For 

this reason, determining the effectiveness of any one policy 

requires GIS-based regional risk assessments to evaluate the 

societal benefits and costs to a community.

The Land Use Portfolio Model (LUPM) is a GIS-based 

modeling, mapping, and risk communication tool designed 

to assist communities in understanding and reducing naturalhazards vulnerability and in making loss reduction investment 

decisions. Memphis, Tennessee was chosen as a test site to 

evaluate the usefulness of the model to local planning authorities, emergency managers, and businesses in evaluating the 
40 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

economic consequences of alternative earthquake mitigation 

strategies.

The goal of this effort is to adapt the LUPM to develop 

a web-based tool for the quantitative policy analysis of 

improved construction standards for commercial and public 

property. The tool is designed to allow local managers and 

agency staff to quickly estimate the regional return on mitigation investment for a proposed level of risk reduction. 

Probabilistic seismic hazards analysis (PSHA) is used 

to generate loss probability curves characterizing the vulnerability of private commercial and public buildings. Variable 

planning horizons are used to represent typical lifetimes of 

commercial and public buildings and infrastructure (50–75 

years). Varying the planning period makes it possible to 

distinguish between the different private and public asset 

lifetimes and their sensitivities to risk, and to account for these 

differences in cost-benefit analyses. The model also allows for 

buildings to be removed from the calculations when they reach 

the end of their productive lifetimes, and for new buildings to 

be added based on a user-selected growth rate. Ultimately, the 

tool will allow planners to characterize the continuum of risks 

and mitigation costs for the entire range of possible earthquake 

magnitudes and planning horizons, and in this way better 

represent different policy options.

Post-Conference Paper

Application of the Land Use Portfolio Model for the 

Analysis of Long-term Earthquake Risk Mitigation Policy 

in the City of Memphis, and Shelby County, Tennessee

By P.P. Hearn, Jr.3, R.L. Bernknopf4, D. Strong3, N. Luco5, 

and E. Karaca6

Introduction

Earthquakes occurring near major population centers 

can have devastating consequences. Thanks to the substantial 

public and private investment in developing and implementing 

seismically resistant building codes in the United States, the 

loss of life during major earthquakes within the last several 

decades has been relatively small. However, U.S. cities in 

seismically active areas continue to be vulnerable to structural 

damage to buildings and infrastructure, indirect functional 

losses to critical facilities, economic disruption, and substantial decreases in the standard of living. State and local officials 

responsible for crafting policies to protect lives and infrastructure from natural hazards face a daunting task. Since the costs 

3

Eastern Geographic Science Center, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, 

Virginia.

4

Western Geographic Science Center, U.S. Geological Survey, Menlo Park, 

California.

5

Geologic Hazards Team, U.S. Geological Survey, Golden, Colorado.

6

Swiss Re, Armonk, New York.

of mitigation make it impossible to afford complete protection, policy makers make tradeoffs between ensuring a level 

of protection and the accompanying costs to limit risk to an 

acceptable level for a portfolio of buildings in a community. 

These choices are made even more difficult by the inherent 

complexity of forecasting the timing and magnitude of seismic 

events, the resulting damages to buildings and infrastructure, 

and the level of protection and costs associated with alternative building codes. Furthermore, effective mitigation policies 

must also distinguish between the different planning horizons 

(effective lifetimes) associated with public and private assets. 

All of these factors must be taken into account when conducting a benefit-cost analysis of building standards for earthquake 

risks to a given building portfolio. 

Traditional benefit-cost analysis usually is predicated 

on evaluating changes in individual welfare. This paper does 

not use this standard welfare economics framework because 

an individual decision about mitigation investments may 

not represent a social optimum. Instead it relies on a framework that assumes a community has an objective to limit its 

earthquake risk. Further, we assume that the inhabitants of a 

community are willing to pay a mitigation cost to achieve that 

objective. But, is the cost of implementing a particular standard cost effective in limiting the level of risk? To answer this 

question, policy makers must draw on knowledge from multiple fields of expertise, including geology, seismology, engineering, statistics, computer science, geographic information 

systems (GIS) technology, economics, and sociology. While 

risk-related work in all of these fields has become increasingly 

sophisticated, integrated and non-proprietary efforts combining physical science, engineering, information technology and 

social science are a relatively recent phenomenon (Bernknopf 

and others, 2001; Bernknopf and others, 2007; Jones and 

others, 2007; Sherrouse and others, 2008). 

Because of the relative infrequency of earthquakes and 

the consequent lack of data, models and simulation studies are 

usually required. An increasingly active field is the integration of data and models in Decision Support Systems (DSS) 

that allow users to quickly evaluate and compare different 

mitigation scenarios. The USGS Land Use Portfolio Model 

(LUPM) is a GIS-based modeling, mapping, and risk communication tool designed to assist communities in understanding 

and reducing natural-hazards vulnerability and in making loss 

reduction investment decisions (Bernknopf and others, 2001). 

The LUPM has been tested in both Squamish, British Columbia, and Watsonville, Calif. (Bernknopf and others, 2001, 

Wein and others, 2006). Memphis, Tennessee, was chosen as 

another test site to evaluate the usefulness of the LUPM to 

local planning authorities, emergency managers, and businesses in evaluating the economic consequences of alternative 

earthquake mitigation strategies. 

This paper describes the technical approach taken to 

adapt the LUPM to a web-based and GIS-enabled DSS for 

use by decision makers in Memphis, Tennessee, in evaluating alternative earthquake risk mitigation strategies. The 

DSS is intended to provide: 1) quantitative policy analysis of 
Figure 1. Topographic map of the New Madrid Seismic Zone showing 

earthquakes greater than magnitude 2.5 (circles) of the Central United 

States. Red circles are earthquakes that occurred after 1972 (U.S. 

Geological Survey (USGS) Preliminary Determination of Epicenters (PDE) 

catalog). Blue circles are earthquakes that occurred before 1973 (USGS 

PDE and historical catalog). Larger earthquakes are represented by larger 

circles. Yellow patches show urban areas with populations greater than 

10,000. (From Frankel and others, 2009).

93° 92° 91° 90° 89° 88° 87° 86°

41°

40°

39°

38°

37°

36°

35°

34°

33°

0 50 100 MILES

0 50 100 KILOMETERS

Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and Papers for Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 1: Science, Maps, and Engineering 41

construction standards for earthquake risk mitigation 

for commercial and public property for long planning 

periods by estimating the expected return on investment for a proposed level of safety, and 2) estimation 

of the net benefits (losses avoided less mitigation costs) 

of alternative building standards as a regional policy 

for earthquake risk mitigation.

Study Area

The city of Memphis and surrounding Shelby 

County lie within the New Madrid Seismic Zone, 

which extends from northeast Arkansas, through 

southeast Missouri, western Tennessee, and western 

Kentucky to southern Illinois. Historically, this area 

has been the site of some of the largest earthquakes in 

North America (fig. 1). Earthquakes with magnitudes 

greater than 7.0 occurred in this area between 1811 and 

1812. The estimated recurrence interval of a moment 

magnitude 7.0 or larger earthquake is approximately 

500 years (Gomberg and Schweig, 2002). Metropolitan Memphis has a dense urban population near 

faults capable of producing major earthquakes and 

has a 25–40 percent probability of being affected by 

a magnitude 6.0 or greater earthquake in the next 50 

years. Furthermore, the Central United States has a 

relatively low regional attenuation. In other words, 

seismic energy can travel faster than in the West and 

thus an earthquake can do damage over a greater area 

than for the same magnitude earthquake in the Western 

United States.

Earthquake Hazard

Considering the potential for earthquakes and 

the low regional attenuation mentioned in the preceding section, the USGS has developed so-called urban 

seismic hazard maps for Memphis/Shelby County, 

Tennessee (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/regional/ceus/

products/grid_download.php). Analogous but less 

region-specific hazard maps have also been developed 

by the USGS for the entire United States and its territories (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazmaps). These maps 

are interpolated from seismic hazard curves that report 

the mean annual frequencies of exceedance (roughly 

equal to annual exceedance probabilities) computed via 

probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA; Cornell, 

1968) for each in a range of ground shaking intensity levels. As explained in a later section, the hazard 

curves for Memphis are used in calculating the risk 

analysis results that are in turn used by the LUPM to 

analyze risk mitigation policy options.

Building Inventory

Using the built-on and vacant land parcels in 

Shelby County and the existing building inventory 

developed by French and Muthukumar (2006), a hypothetical inventory of future commercial buildings on vacant parcels was simulated 

in a time series of investments. The zoning assigned to each of the 

existing buildings in the inventory was determined using parcel data 

provided by Shelby County. Then, for each of the vacant parcels, 

possible buildings that could be built on the parcel based on existing buildings with the same zoning code were simulated. For a given 

vacant parcel, the assigned building type was chosen by selecting it at 

random from the 50 closest existing buildings with the same zoning 

code as the vacant parcel. A check of whether the randomly selected 

building fits in the area of the vacant parcel was performed, and if it 

did not another building was randomly selected. Only one building 

was selected for each vacant parcel.
Figure 2. Structural fragility 

curves were combined with 

loss-for-a-given-damage-state 

estimates to produce vulnerability 

curves for generic building types 

and each of the five building 

code options.

42 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

The properties of each building include number of 

stories, structure type, occupancy type, replacement cost, 

contents value, total value (that is, replacement cost plus 

contents value), zoning, and land value. All of the properties 

of the simulated buildings are taken to be the same as those 

of the randomly-selected existing building except the replacement cost. The building inventory developed by French and 

Muthukumar (2006) has replacement costs assigned to the 

existing buildings, but their variability is surprisingly large, so 

alternatively replacement costs were assigned using unit cost 

data from HAZUS (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

2003) and the square footage of the buildings. As a first 

approximation, values of building contents were not considered in this study.

The vacant parcels considered for projecting future 

commercial or industrial buildings are limited to the following zoning codes: light or heavy industry; planned, local, 

or highway commercial; central business; and limited or 

general office. The total number of vacant parcels within 

these zoning codes is 5,145. Depending on the selected 

growth rate, all the parcels in the inventory may or may not 

be filled. Agricultural parcels are not included even though 

some of the commercial or industrial buildings in the building inventory used are located on existing agricultural parcels. 

4,423 of the 5,145 simulated buildings are classified as 

commercial/industrial.

Building Fragility and Vulnerability

Building fragility curves relate ground motion intensity 

(for example, spectral acceleration, Sa

) to the probability of 

exceeding various building damage states or performance 

levels. Building vulnerability curves relate ground motion 

intensity to the expected loss in value because of structural 

damage. Both are integral components of seismic risk assessment tools or studies. These curves are used with building 

inventory and ground motion intensity estimates in deterministic scenario earthquake studies, or in probabilistic risk 

assessments like the one described in this paper that consider 

all possible seismic events. The results of the seismic risk 

assessment may be used for evaluation of different seismic 

design codes, retrofit or mitigation options, and for emergency 

and recovery planning.

Building fragility and vulnerability curves may be developed either for a specific building with known structural and 

nonstructural characteristics, or for a generic building type 

representing a group of buildings with similar seismic design 

properties and configurations (Porter and others, 2001). In 

the former approach, building-specific fragility curves can be 

derived through rigorous analysis of the building response 

under various ground shaking levels. In the latter approach, 

buildings are categorized based on general characteristics 

such as their lateral force resisting system, height, and design 

code, and generic fragility curves are developed using generic 

structural properties and/or based on past performance of 

buildings. While building-specific fragility curves provide 

more accurate information for a particular structure, they are 

computationally intensive to develop and their applicability to 

nominally similar buildings is questionable. On the other hand, 

while being less accurate or even inapplicable for a particular 

building, generic fragility curves can be relatively simple to 

develop for a large number of building types, which allows for 

probabilistic seismic risk assessment on a regional level. For 

the mitigation policy analysis tool described in this paper, we 

focus on generic fragility and vulnerability curves.

The fragility and vulnerability curves for generic building 

used for the mitigation policy analysis tool described in this 

paper were computed by Karaca and Luco (2008; 2009) using 

the building capacity (or pushover) curves and related building 

parameters provided in HAZUS (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003). The fragility curves were developed 

for all of the 36 building types and 4 seismic design levels 

considered in HAZUS, and also for each in a range of different 

design ground motion intensities in order to compute fragility 

curves for each of five design code options considered. The 

resulting building fragility curves were then used to derive 

vulnerability curves for all combinations of building types and 

occupancy classes considered in HAZUS (fig. 2). Since the 

derived fragility and vulnerability curves are all conditioned 

on Sa

, they can be combined with available seismic hazard 

data like that for Memphis in a seismic risk assessment study.
Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and Papers for Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 1: Science, Maps, and Engineering 43

Expected Losses

Expected losses per annum (equation 1) have been 

computed by Karaca and others, (2009) for each individual 

building and the five design code options by coupling the 

building vulnerability curves with the seismic hazard curves, 

all of which are described above:

E L E L GM a P GM a a[ ] [ | ] [ ] = ∑ = = (1)

where 

E[L] is the expected annual loss for an individual 

building with a given design option at a 

given location, 

E[L|GM=a] is the expected loss under a given ground 

motion level approximately equal to a, and 

P[GM=a] is the probability of the ground motion.

From these calculations, a database was populated for the DSS 

which contains loss estimates at the 5,145 separate vacant 

parcels and for the five different design code options. Full 

probability distributions of losses per annum have also been 

calculated by Karaca and Luco, but those results have not yet 

been incorporated into the LUPM.

Benefit-Cost Model

For benefit-cost analysis and planning, a community 

can utilize a net present value criterion7 for investment decisions that incorporates the life cycle of the investment in, for 

example, a stricter building code (that is, the planning time 

period for investment), the expected losses avoided from 

code implementation (benefit of one code relative to another), 

and a one-time investment cost in mitigation as the basis for 

evaluating the return on investment for a loss-reduction policy. 

Our objective is to provide an analysis tool that incorporates 

a probabilistic hazard assessment to characterize the expected 

return on investment and decision risk associated with 

choosing a regional mitigation strategy. This type of analysis 

approach to policy evaluation can be applied in an investment 

portfolio risk assessment to compare alternative earthquake 

building codes. Different building codes may have different 

provisions and subsequent costs, and may perform differently 

under extreme conditions. The coupling of the probabilistic seismic hazard assessment with a portfolio investment 

approach will provide a clearly defined set of options and 

choices for decision makers. The first step in this type of benefit-cost analysis under uncertainty (Graham, 1981) estimates 

the net present value of a range of loss-reduction mitigation 

7

Present value is the value on a given date of a future payment or series 

of future payments, discounted to reflect the time value of money and other 

factors such as investment risk. Present value calculations are widely used in 

business and economics to provide a means to compare cash flows at different 

times on a meaningful “like to like” basis. Net present value is defined as the 

total present value (PV) of a time series of cash flows. It is a standard method 

for using the time value of money to appraise long-term projects.

strategies, in this case of stricter building codes, as follows. 

First, the user selects the input variables, which include:

• planning horizon (time period in which the estimate is 

calculated),

• growth rate (number of new buildings built each year), 

• discount rate8, and 

• mitigation cost (in this case relative to the current 

building code).

The net present value of the mitigation choice for a building at location k is based on both the mitigation cost and the 

expected annual losses avoided by the stricter construction 

standard or building code. The net benefit (expected losses 

avoided) for a single new building in each year after it is 

added to the building inventory is calculated using equation 2:

b E L E L k k current k proposed = [ ] [ ] , , - (2)

where 

E[L]k,current and E[L]

k,proposed are the expected annual losses for 

the current and proposed (that 

is, stricter) building codes, 

respectively, which are computed 

as explained in the preceding 

section. 

Next, the present value of the mitigation strategy for the 

building is calculated using equation 3:

PV

b

r

c

r k

k

t

k

t

t t

T

k

= ( ) + − = ( ) + ∑ 1 1

(3)

where

PVk = Present value of mitigation for building k in 

year zero, net of mitigation cost

ck = mitigation cost, that is, the increase in 

construction costs as a result of proposed 

stricter building code

T = Planning horizon in years

r = discount rate

t

k

 = Year that building k is added to the building 

inventory (zero-based)

Next, to obtain a regional estimate of the benefit of implementing a loss-reduction policy, B, we sum for all the locations affected by the policy for the region (equation 4) (that 

is, where new buildings were constructed during the planning 

horizon):

B PV k

K

= k

=

∑1

(4)

8

The discount rate is the interest rate used to discount the value of an investment in an asset from what this investment would have been worth if invested 

to earn interest for the length of the planning horizon.
Figure 3. Schematic showing the sequence of calculations 

and input variables needed for regional benefit-cost estimates. 

A database of building loss estimates are pre-calculated offline 

(upper dashed box). After the user selects the input variables, 

the Decision Support Systems (DSS) accesses the database 

and calculates the regional benefit-cost estimate online (lower 

dashed box).

Figure 4. Initial prototype of Memphis Decision Support Systems 

(DSS) map viewer with sample setup and results screen.

44 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

where K is the total number of buildings built during the planning horizon. That is to say,

K = g∙T (5)

where

g is the number of new buildings built each 

year, and 

T is the planning horizon. 

Because they are computationally intensive, the calculations of expected annual loss estimates are performed offline 

(Karaca and others, 2009) and a database of loss estimates is 

generated for use by the Web-based DSS. Once the input variables have been selected by the user, the DSS then calculates 

B and generates a tabular report. A schematic of this sequence 

is shown in figure 3.

Status and Next Steps 

Work is currently underway to write computer code to 

web-enable the benefit-cost equations, integrate these with the 

database of loss estimates, and design a prototype graphical 

user interface for the web-based DSS. An initial design for 

the map viewer, with hypothetical data input and run-output 

screens is shown in figure 4. A working prototype is expected 

to be completed by late 2009, followed by a period of testing, 

refinements, and eventual transfer of the completed DSS to 

cooperators in 2010.

References

Applied Technology Council, 1996, Seismic Evaluation and 

Retrofit of Concrete Buildings, Redwood City, Calif.

Bernknopf, R., Dinitz, L., Rabinovici, S., and Evans, A., 2001, 

A portfolio approach to evaluating natural hazard mitigation 

policies—An application to lateral-spread ground failure 

in coastal California: International Geology Review, v. 43, 

p. 424–440.

Bernknopf, R.L., Hearn, P.P., Wein, A.M., and Strong, D., 

2007, The Effect of Scientific and Socioeconomic Uncertainty on a Natural Hazards Policy Choice, MODSIM07, 

7 p.

Cornell, C.A., 1968, Engineering Seismic Risk Analysis: 

Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America (BSSA), 

v. 58, p. 1583–1606.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003, HAZUS-MH 

MR-1 Technical Manual, Washington, D.C.

Frankel, A.D., Applegate, D., Tuttle, M.P., and Williams, 

R.A., 2009, Earthquake hazard in the New Madrid Seismic Zone remains a concern: U.S. Geological Survey Fact 

Sheet 2009–3071, 2 p. (Also available at http://pubs.usgs.

gov/fs/2009/3071/.)

Gomberg, J., and Schweig, E., 2002, Earthquake Hazard in the 

Heart of the Homeland, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 

FS–131–02, 4 p. (Also available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/

fs-131-02/.)

Graham, D., 1981, Cost-benefit analysis under uncertainty, 

American Economic Review, v. 71, p. 715–725.

Karaca, E., and Luco, N., 2008, Development of hazard-compatible building fragility and vulnerability models: Proceedings of the Fourteenth World Conference on Earthquake 

Engineering, Beijing, China.
Presentation Titles, Abstracts, and Papers for Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 1: Science, Maps, and Engineering 45

Karaca, E., Luco, N., and Milburn, T., 2009, Expected annual 

losses in Memphis, Tenn., for five candidate seismic design 

alternatives: Seismological Research Letters, v. 80, no. 2, 

p. 310 (abstract).

Karaca, E., and Luco, N., 2009, Development of seismic 

hazard compatible building fragility functions: Application 

to HAZUS building types, under revision for publication in 

Earthquake Spectra.

Jones, L., Bernknopf, R., Cannon, S., Cox, D.A., Gaydos, 

L., Keeley, J., Kohler, M., Lee, H., Ponti, D., Ross, S., 

Schwarzbach, S., Shulters, M., Ward, A.W., and Wein, A., 

2007, Increasing resiliency to natural hazards—A strategic plan for the Multi-Hazards Demonstration Project in 

Southern California: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File 

Report 2007–1255. (Also available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/

of/2007/1255/.)

Porter, K.A., Kiremidjian, A.S., and LeGrue, J.S., 2001, 

Assembly-based vulnerability of buildings and its use 

in performance evaluation: Earthquake Spectra 17(2), 

p. 291-312.

Sherrouse, B.C., Hester, D.J., and Wein, A.M., 2008, Potential 

effects of a scenario earthquake on the economy of Southern California—Labor market exposure and sensitivity 

analysis to a magnitude 7.8 earthquake: U.S. Geological 

Survey Open-File Report 2008–1211, 26 p. (Also available 

at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2008/1211/.)

Wein, A., Journeay, M., Bernknopf, R., Chung, C., Champion, 

R., Ng, P., 2006, Natural Hazards and Planning for the 

Future in Squamish, British Columbia, Canada: Geophysical Research Abstracts, v. 8, 29–1–2006

Missouri’s Catastrophic Event Planning

By Greg Reed

Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, Jefferson 

City, Missouri 65102, Greg.Reed@sema.dps.mo.gov

Abstract not submitted. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Spatial Data and 

Capabilities

By Teri Alberico

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul, Minnesota 

55101-1638, teri.alberico@usace.army.mil

Abstract not submitted. 

The Role of USNORTHCOM in Disaster 

Response

By Col. Barry Fowler

U.S. Northern Command, Kansas City, Missouri 64131, 

Barry.Fowler@us.army.mil

Abstract

The United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) located in Colorado Springs, Colo., has geographic 

responsibility for the lower 48 States and Puerto Rico and 

US Virgin Islands for “defense support to civil authorities” 

(DSCA) operations. USNORTHCOM is prepared to respond 

to disasters, natural and manmade, when directed by the 

Department of Defense (DoD) in accordance with the National 

Response Framework. Plans and preparations are made using 

the “all hazards” incident response; thereby enabling response 

operations applicable to a wide variety of incidents such as 

hurricanes, wildfires, floods, and earthquakes.

The 1st Air Force, US Army North, and U.S. Fleet Forces 

Command are subordinate to USNORTHCOM and are vital 

to the accomplishment of DSCA missions. US Army North 

has positioned a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) in each 

of the 10 FEMA regions. The DCO normally works in direct 

support of FEMA and serves as the single point of contact for 

DoD resources during disaster response operations. During 

disaster response operations, the DCO reports directly to 

USNORTHCOM.

The New Madrid Seismic Earthquake Zone is considered 

a high impact incident with national consequences. The DCOs 

in Region VII, V, IV and VI (all adjacent to or containing the 

NMSZ) regularly participate in State, regional and National 

level exercises, planning sessions, and conferences. Region 

VII DCO has participated in several NMSZ events with the 

Missouri SEMA, National Guard, CUSEC, and has also 

conducted its own site visits and training exercises. 

USNORTHCOM and its cadre of DCOs are committed to providing DSCA operations in support of the National 

Response Framework and the identified primary agency, 

(FEMA, for example).

FEMA Region VII Response and Recovery 

Operations Planning

By Dianne Wilson

Federal Emergency Management Agency, Kansas City, 

Missouri 64114-3372, dianne.wilson@dhs.gov 

Abstract not submitted. 
46 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

Presentation Titles and Abstracts for 

Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 2: 

Federal and State Response and 

Recovery

SONS07 Overview

By Paul Hogue

Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium, Memphis, Tennessee 

38118, phogue@cusec.org

Abstract not submitted.

USGS Lessons Learned from SONS07

By David Russ

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 20192, 

druss@usgs.gov

Abstract not submitted.

SEMA ‘07 Statewide Earthquake Exercise

By A.J. Lehmen

Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, Jefferson 

City, Missouri 65102, aj.lehmen@sema.dps.mo.gov

Abstract not submitted.

The Role of Missouri National Guard to Civil 

Authorities Following a Seismic Event

By Col. Mark A. McCarter

Missouri National Guard, Jefferson City, Missouri 65101, 

mark.a.mccarter@us.army.mil

Abstract

The Missouri National Guard (MONG) response to an 

earthquake is essential to the citizens of Missouri. Preparedness through training, planning, interagency efforts, and 

appropriate application of military capabilities to support civil 

authorities are essential tenets of the MONG response. Today, 

the Missouri National Guard stands prepared to support the 

citizens of the State of Missouri in any natural/man-made 

disaster.

Draft National Catastrophic Earthquake Plan

By Michel S. Pawlowski

Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C. 

20472, michel.pawlowski@dhs.gov

Abstract not submitted.

New Madrid Earthquake Table-Top Exercise

By A.J. Lehmen

Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, Jefferson 

City, Missouri 65102, aj.lehmen@sema.dps.mo.gov

(Summary by Emitt C. Witt and Krista A. Karstensen)

As part of the fact-finding theme of this conference, 

the Missouri State Exercise Officer for the State Emergency Management Agency developed a table-top exercise 

designed to be an informal discussion highlighting the needs 

of the response and recovery community and the gaps that 

the scientific community can assist in bridging. The exercise 

approached this topic from two fronts—1) What does the 

scientific community know/not know, have in possession, or 

are developing that can help communities prone to earthquake 

activity in their planning, response and recovery to an catastrophic earthquake event?; and 2) What does the community 

emergency management group have and need that the scientific community could provide assistance with? The table-top 

exercise focused on pre-event and post-event needs as related 

to a large magnitude event.

The Scenario

The scenario of the table-top exercise was developed 

by the USGS Center for Earthquake Research, Memphis, 

Tennessee (fig. 1). The scenario includes an M 7.7 earthquake 

centered near Blytheville, Missouri, at depth of 10 km around 

2 pm on June 19, 2007. Estimated Mercalli Intensities indicate 

the most intense damage along the Mississippi River near 

Memphis, Tennessee, in a northeast direction to New Madrid, 

Missouri. In these areas shaking from the scenario event is 

considered violent to extreme. Structures that are capable of 

resisting moderate earthquakes likely sustained very heavy 

damage. Further away from the epicenter, the cities of Nashville, Tennessee, to the east and Little Rock, Arkansas, to 

the west received moderate shaking with light damage to all 

structures. On a regional scale, it is likely that electrical power 

is off, natural gas lines disrupted, and transportation infrastructure damaged.
Figure 1. A depiction of a U.S. Geological Survey Shake Map 

showing a New Madrid Seismic Zone scenario of magnitude 7.7 

centered near Blytheville, Missouri.

Presentation Titles and Abstracts for Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 2: Federal and State Response and Recovery 47

The Exercise

The exercise was structured to bring individuals to the 

table that could contribute to the conversation. The State Exercise Officer pre-invited Emergency Management Directors 

(EMDs) from select counties in each of the State’s emergency 

response areas (fig. 2). These EMDs along with their State 

Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) Area Coordinators built a set of questions related to the event that could be 

fielded by the science and engineering community. Likewise, 

during the exercise a similar set of questions were built by the 

scientists.

Pre-Event Concerns

The following are pre-event concerns offered by both the 

response and recovery and science community.

• Are currently available models good predictors of 

damage caused by significant earthquakes? They seem 

outdated and lack sufficient detail for local response 

communities to act upon. Also, the overall projections 

generated by the models are too coarse and therefore 

lack usefulness.

• What products are currently available from the USGS? 

Most of this was described during the plenary session 

of the conference, but some EMDs were concerned 

again that USGS earthquake products were too course 

and lack specifics that could help them at the local 

level.

• What surface maps are available for use by county, city 

planners, and the National Guard? We could use map 

information with more detail such as location of mines, 

caves, sinkholes, depth of unconsolidated material, and 

locations of quarry stone and/or sand deposits. These 

products need to be pre-staged and will be helpful during the recovery process planning.

• A list of other concerns for pre-event consideration 

include the effects seasonality will play on the severity of damage resulting from an earthquake; effects on 

water tables and wells; effects on center-pivot irrigation systems; concerns about drainage structures, and 

sewage systems, tributaries; concerns about bridge 

collapse and bridge approaches; the survivability of the 

fiber optic network and power sub-stations; how do we 

deal with pipeline rupture and HAZMAT; and what do 

we do about our educational facilities.

Priority concerns were categorized based on emergency 

response areas E, C, G, B, and I (fig. 2). Each of these areas 

will be impacted differently during an event and are likely 

to have variable roles in dealing with their citizens. Furthermore, areas that are not as heavily impacted are likely to be 

the responders for the areas that are more severely damaged. 

The following are concerns broken down by emergency 

management area.

Area E

Area E is located in southeast Missouri and will be the 

hardest hit during a significant New Madrid event. Area E 

includes the 13 counties of Iron, Butler, Wayne, Ripley, New 

Madrid, Dunkin, Pemiscot, Stoddard, Mississippi, Scott, 

Madison, Bollinger, and Cape Girardeau (fig. 2). With the 

exception of Cape Girardeau, Area E is primarily a rural 

agricultural community with a heavy reliance on transportation infrastructure and community water supplies. The 

following are questions and concerns presented by Area E 

representatives:

1. The Missouri Department of Transportation exercise was 

canceled. This would have provided essential information 

about that organization’s ability to respond to the State’s 

critical infrastructure.

2. How do water tables differ and how does it effect lique

faction? The science community responded that groundwater tables will vary seasonally and with variable 

amounts of rainfall. The Area E representatives were 

very concerned about liquefaction given the evidence 

that it happened to a large degree during the 1811–12 

earthquakes. Therefore, they wanted to know the likelihood of liquefaction and its extent.

3. There was some discussion of the need for the scientific 

community to do detailed soil surveys of the airports and 

runways. These will be important responder staging areas 
DOUGLAS 

TEXAS 

HOWELL 

BATES 

BARRY 

DENT 

SHANNON 

FRANKLIN 

MACON 

VERNON 

PIKE 

OZARK 

SALINE 

CASS 

HENRY 

WAYNE 

POLK 

OREGON 

LINN 

BUTLER 

JOHNSON PETTIS 

NODAWAY 

CALLAWAY 

BENTON 

STODDARD 

LACLEDE 

RAY CARROLL 

BOONE 

WRIGHT REYNOLDS 

TANEY 

IRON 

CHARITON 

PHELPS 

MILLER 

RIPLEY 

GREENE 

AUDRAIN 

HARRISON 

CRAWFORD 

JASPER 

CAMDEN 

MONROE 

ADAIR 

LINCOLN 

OSAGE 

SULLIVAN 

BARTON 

NEWTON 

MORGAN 

KNOX HOLT 

CLARK 

JEFFERSON 

DALLAS 

DADE 

SAINT 

CLAIR 

JACKSON 

RALLS 

COOPER 

LEWIS 

STONE 

LAFAYETTE 

BOLLINGER 

PULASKI 

WEBSTER 

PERRY 

MARIES 

CARTER 

DAVIESS 

CEDAR 

DUNKLIN 

LAWRENCE 

SHELBY 

CHRISTIAN 

GENTRY 

ATCHISON 

CLAY 

PUTNAM 

SCOTT 

COLE 

PLATTE 

MADISON 

MERCER 

MARION 

MCDONALD 

HOWARD 

LIVINGSTON 

PEMISCOT 

WARREN 

DEKALB 

GRUNDY 

CLINTON 

ANDREW 

RANDOLPH 

SAINT 

CHARLES 

SAINT 

LOUIS GASCONADE 

HICKORY 

MONTGOMERY 

CALDWELL 

SCOTLAND 

CAPE 

GIRARDEAU 

MONITEAU 

BUCHANAN 

MISSISSIPPI 

FRANCOIS 

SAINT 

SAINTE GENEVIEVE 

WORTH 

SCHUYLER 

SAINT 

LOUIS 

CITY

NEW

MADRID

WASHINGTON 

0 25 50 100 MILES

0 5025

75

75 100 KILOMETERS

96° 95° 94° 93° 92° 91° 90° 89°

40°

39°

38°

37°

36°

Base from U.S. Geological Survey National Atlas 

of the United States, 2005, 1:2,000,000

Albers Equal-area Conic projection

Standard parallels 29°30′ and 45°30′,

central meridian 92°30′

H B

A

F

C

I

D

G E

Figure 2. Division of Missouri into emergency response areas (Steve Bessemer, Missouri State Emergency Management 

Agency, written commun., 2008).

48 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake
Presentation Titles and Abstracts for Thursday, August 14, 2008—Track 2: Federal and State Response and Recovery 49

following a significant event. It was recommended that 

the science community perform soil borings and analysis. 

It was also recommended that infrastructure be assessed 

to identify structure sustainability and identify potential 

points of failure. The science community responded that 

doing these things becomes a matter of scale and resource 

availability.

Area C

Area C is located in east Central Missouri and covers 

11 counties (fig. 2). These include Pike, Lincoln, Warren, 

St. Charles, St. Louis, Franklin, Jefferson, Washington, St. 

Francois, Ste. Genevieve, and Perry. Area C includes the city 

of St. Louis and several smaller incorporated jurisdictions 

surrounding the city including communities south along the 

Mississippi River. Seven of 11 counties have populations 

within the soft alluvial sediments of the river so there is 

concern about infrastructure failure. The scenario predicts only 

light to no damage for structures in this area, nevertheless, 

Area C representatives had the following concerns:

1. Can the scientific community provide soil overlay maps 

and can geotechnical maps overlay current hazard maps? 

The science community said yes but personnel and funding resources are the primary issue in preventing this from 

happening. The science community said that problems 

infrastructure will encounter are not solely because of 

liquefaction.

2. Who will arrive first? Will there be too many resources 

too quickly? There were no answers to these questions 

because they did not relate to the science community.

3. The scientific community needs to help paint a better 

picture of what will happen, and they need to know more 

clearly what areas will be affected. Also, there needs to 

be a better way to communicate its science to the community. Area C representatives want to know what can 

be expected and where is the safest place to be. The most 

important need is to educate communities to be selfsustaining. This is something the Central U.S. Earthquake 

Consortium is working on. 

Area G

Area G is located to the southwest of Area E and is 

largely a rural forested region of Missouri (fig. 2). This area 

includes the counties of Wright, Texas, Shannon, Reynolds, 

Carter, Ripley, Oregon, Howell, Ozark, and Douglas. Geologically the area is relatively stable with respect to the potential 

for liquefaction, but representatives have their concerns. The 

Missouri evacuation plan for a significant earthquake will 

route people through this area to the westernmost portions of 

the State, so the overall theme of this area’s concern is; are 

we prepared to deal with damaged infrastructure and overwhelmed resources?

1. Because much of Area G is located in a region of Missouri that is heavily karst, representatives were concerned 

about the potential problems sinkholes may pose. They 

wanted to know if earthquakes could trigger collapses and 

they wanted to know if scientists could produce detailed 

sinkhole maps. The Missouri Department of Natural 

Resources indicated that they have a sinkhole database; 

USGS mentioned that they are involved with karst 

research to develop sinkhole collapse probability maps.

2. Scientists need to hear from the response community what 

types of map layers would help them the most.

3. The science and first response community indicated that 

they must consider having common staging points during 

an earthquake emergency. This will facilitate effective 

communication between the two groups and will help 

provide situational awareness for mass care or the “human 

factor” of the event.

Area B

Area B is located in the northeastern portion of Missouri 

and is composed of 16 counties that include Putnam, Schuyler, 

Scotland, Clark, Lewis, Marion, Ralls, Monroe, Randolph, 

Chariton, Linn, Sullivan, Adair, Macon, Knox, and Shelby 

(fig. 2). Four of 16 counties border the Mississippi River and 

are within the severe Mercalli Intensity zone. This is largely 

because of the deep sediments that underlay most of the real 

estate along the Mississippi River flood plain. Representatives 

for the area indicate that infrastructure is the primary concern. 

They asked if the area should invest in soil surveys to identify 

soil properties. And, could this information help the scientific 

community. The response was yes.

Area I

Area I is located in the south-central portion of Missouri 

and is composed of six counties that include Maries, Phelps, 

Dent, Crawford, Pulaski, and Laclede (fig. 2). This is the 

closest area to the event that will sustain the least amount 

of damage; therefore, it is likely that Area I responders will 

be the first line of defense during an earthquake emergency. 

Resources that could be tasked to support response and 

recovery following a significant earthquake include the USGS 

offices and Missouri University of Science and Technology, 

Ft. Leonard Wood, two large hospitals, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources, and the National Guard. Concerns 

of Area I representatives include the need to identify how 

responders can get from one place to another, and to identify 

alternate routes in the case of bridge collapses, road obstructions, and so forth. 
50 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

Post-Event Concerns

Following the initial earthquake event there will be a 

flurry of activity related to the response. The Missouri SEMA 

will begin implementing its earthquake response plan. This 

plan was developed using the principles of the National 

Response Framework and the National Incident Management 

System. While this plan focuses on the needs of the “human 

factor” of the event, SEMA as well as others in the response 

community see the potential value of having the science 

community at the table. The concerns the response and recovery community have include:

1. How will USGS and other science organizations be 

integrated at the local level? Is there a deployment plan 

for science that complements the response and recovery 

community plan?

2. Local response organizations need to know that scientists 

are coming to their location; what credentials will be used 

to identify members of the science community; will there 

be a plan for the locations scientists will visit; need to 

know arrival and departure times/dates; what disciplines 

will be represented; what will scientists need access to; 

and what is it scientists are specifically looking for.

3. Local and State response organizations want to know if 

data will be shared with the non-science community in a 

timely manner. Will there be timely comparison of actual 

data with pre-event data to help responders in their mission to maintain a common operating picture?

4. Are USGS personnel and other science organizations 

trained in the National Incident Management System?

Abstracts and Papers from Poster 

Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008

Analytical and Experimental Studies on Seismic 

Behavior of RC Bridge Columns Subjected to 

Combined Loadings

By Abdeldjelil Belarbi, Suriya Prakash Shanmugam, 

and Young-min You

Department of Civil, Environmental and Architectural 

Engineering, Missouri University of Science and Technology, 

Rolla, Missouri 65401, belarbi@mst.edu

Abstract

Reinforced concrete (RC) columns of skewed and curved 

bridges and bridges with unequal spans and column heights 

can be subjected to combined loadings including axial, 

flexural, shear, and torsional loadings during an earthquake. 

Multi-directional earthquake motions with significant vertical 

excitations, structural constraints because of stiff deck, movement joints, soil condition, and foundations may also lead to 

combined loadings. The combination of axial, bending, shear, 

and torsion in RC bridge columns can result in complex failure 

modes. Under a National Science Foundation-National Earthquake Engineering Simulation research project with objectives 

to understand the behavior of bridge columns under seismic 

loadings, experimental and analytical studies are conducted to 

investigate the performance of RC columns under combined 

loadings including torsion. The main variables being considered in the experimental study are (1) the ratio of torsion to 

bending moment (T/M), (2) the ratio of bending moment to 

shear (M/V), and (3) level of detailing for high and moderate seismicity (low or high spiral ratio). The experimental 

results are used to develop and calibrate the design interaction 

equations. Based on the experimental results, damage and 

ductility models that account for the combined loading effects 

are also being developed from design point of view. Normalized interaction diagrams for displacement and rotational 

ductility levels are also presented and discussed. Analytical 

study focuses on developing mechanical models to predict 

the interaction effects for RC columns under combined loadings. However, knowledge of the interaction between axial, 

bending, shear, and torsion in RC bridge columns is very 

limited. This paper presents an overall summary of the major 

findings and relevant results from both the experimental and 

analytical studies and provides new directions in the design 

and detailing of RC bridge columns under seismic loading.

Torsional-Flexural-Shear Interaction 

Characteristics of RC Bridge Columns under 

Simulated Seismic Loading

By Suriya Prakash Shanmugam, Abdeldjelil Belarbi, 

and Young-min You

Missouri University of Science and Technology, Department 

of Civil, Environmental and Architectural Engineering, Rolla, 

Missouri 65401

Abstract

Reinforced concrete (RC) columns of skewed and curved 

bridges and bridges with unequal spans and column heights 

can be subjected to combined loadings including axial, 

flexural, shear, and torsional loadings during an earthquake. 

The combination of axial, bending, shear, and torsion in RC 

bridge columns can result in complex failure modes. Under an 

National Science Foundation-National Earthquake Engineering Simulation funded project, experimental and analytical 

studies are conducted to investigate the performance of RC 

columns under combined loadings including torsion. The 

main variables being considered in the experimental study are 
Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 51

(1) the ratio of torsion to bending moment (T/M), (2) the ratio 

of bending moment to shear (M/V), and (3) level of detailing 

for high and moderate seismicity (low or high spiral ratio). 

The experimental results are used to develop and calibrate 

the design interaction equations. Based on the experimental 

results, damage and ductility models that account for the 

combined loading effects are also being developed from 

design point of view. Analytical study focuses on developing mechanical models to predict the interaction effects for 

RC columns under combined loadings. This paper presents 

an overall summary of the major findings and relevant results 

from both the experimental and analytical studies and provides 

new directions in the design and detailing of RC bridge 

columns under seismic loading.

Introduction

RC bridge columns can be subjected to torsional 

moments in addition to axial, bending, and shear forces during 

earthquake excitations. The addition of torsion is more likely 

in skewed or curved bridges, bridges with unequal spans or 

column heights, and bridges with outrigger bents. Construction of bridges with these configurations is often unavoidable because of site constraints. In addition, multi-directional 

earthquake motions, significant vertical motions, structural 

constraints because of stiff decks, movement of joints, abutment restraints, and soil conditions may lead to combined 

loading effects including torsion. This combination of seismic 

loading and structural constraints can result in complex 

failure modes of these bridge columns. Very few experimental results are reported in the literature on the behavior of 

rectangular columns under combined loadings. Otsuka and 

his team (Otsuka and others, 2004) studied nine rectangular 

columns under pure torsion, bending/shear and different ratios 

of combined bending and torsional moments. The authors 

concluded that the pitch of the hoop lateral tie significantly 

affected the hysteresis loop of torsion. Later, Kawashima 

and his colleagues (Tirasit and others, 2005) reported tests 

on RC columns under three loading conditions. The authors 

reported that the flexural capacity of RC column decreases 

and the region of plastic deformation tend to move above the 

typical flexural plastic hinge region as the rotation-drift ratio 

increases. Recently, Belarbi and his team (Belarbi and others, 

2008) tested a number of columns at different torsion-to-bending moment (T/M) ratios. 

They observed that the effects of combined loading 

reduce the flexural and torsional capacities, as well as affect 

the failure modes and deformation characteristics. They determined that with an increase in torsion-to-bending moment 

(T/M) ratios, the energy dissipation capacity decreases. There 

are rational models available for analyzing the interaction 

between axial and bending loads. 

The behavior of columns under bending with and without 

axial loadings has been extensively investigated by a number 

of researchers. Park and Ang (1985), Priestly and Benzoni 

(1996), Priestly and others (1996), and Lehman and others 

(1998) have all investigated and proposed various models 

for predicting the seismic performance behavior of columns 

taking into account the axial loading effect on bending 

capacity. Analytical models for RC columns in the past have 

primarily focused on inelastic flexural behavior and usually 

decoupled with shear and torsion. In addition to axial load, 

shear force, and bending moment, bridge columns can be 

subjected to torsional loadings. Torsional loadings can significantly affect the flow of internal forces and deformation capacity of RC columns. These in turn can affect the performance 

of vital components of bridges and consequently affect the 

daily operation of the transportation system. However, there 

have been no analytical models developed including the effect 

of flexure-shear-torsion interaction for assessment of seismic 

performance of RC circular bridge columns. In this direction, 

You and Belarbi (2008) developed a model for RC circular bridge columns under pure torsion with or without axial 

loading effect based on the softened truss model. The paucity 

of test results of RC circular columns with different reinforcement ratios under combined bending, shear and torsion 

loadings has hindered the development of analytical models. 

Therefore, the research work done in this study will be helpful 

not only for the enhancement of knowledge on the behavior of 

RC circular bridge columns under cyclic combined loadings 

but also for providing experimental data towards the development of rational analytical models. 

Experimental Program

The main variables considered in this study are (1) the 

ratio of torsion-to-bending moment, (2) column aspect ratio 

(H/D) to simulate a flexural or shear dominant response, 

and (3) level of detailing for high and moderate seismicity. 

The aspect ratio plays an important role in determining the 

behavior of columns dominated by flexure or by shear. For 

the columns tested in single curvature, the aspect ratio is 

defined as the ratio of height (M/V=H) to diameter (D). The 

study consisted of testing circular columns at high aspect 

ratio (H/D=6) with low shear and at low aspect ratio (H/D=3) 

with moderate shear at different levels of torsion-to-bending 

moment ratios with two different spiral reinforcement ratios 

(?t

) as shown in table 1. The hysteretic lateral load-displacement response, torsional moment-twist response, reinforcement stress variations, and plastic hinge characteristics for the 

individual tested columns can be found elsewhere (Belarbi and 

others, 2008; Suriya Prakash and others, 2008). In particular, 

the effect of spiral reinforcement ratio and aspect ratio on 

behavior of RC circular columns under combined loadings is 

focused in this paper.

Test Specimen Details 

The half-scale test specimens were designed to be 

representative of typical existing bridge columns. The column 

dimensions and reinforcement layout are shown in fig. 1A. 
Figure 1. (A) Column cross sectional detail and (B) test setup elevation.

Support blocks

Strong floor

Hydraulic jack

Load cell

Steel strands

(inside column)

Strong wall

Test column

Two hydraulic 

actuators 

Load stub

Anchors

X

Y

Z (out)

12–25-mm 

diameter

25-mm clear cover 

9.5-mm or 12.7-mm diameter

@ 76-mm o.c. 

Strain gages

Loading direction

B

A

B

C

D

A

Table 1. Test matrix.

[Mpa, megapascal; H/D, aspect ratio; T/M, torsion to bending moment ratio]

Test columns Compressive strength 

(Mpa)

Spiral ratio

(percent)

Longitudinal ratio

(percent)

Aspect ratio

(H/D)

Torsion to bending moment ratio

(T/M)

M/V(12)–T/M(0) 33.4 0.73 2.1 6

M/V(12) –T/M(0.1) 29.7 .73 2.1 6 0.1

M/V(12) –T/M(0.2) 26.5 .73 2.1 6 .2

M/V(12) –T/M(0.4) 25.7 .73 2.1 6 .4

M/V(12) –T/M(∞) 37.9 .73 2.1 6 ∞

M/V(12) –T/M(0.2) 41.2 1.32 2.1 6 .2

M/V(12) –T/M(0.4) 41.2 1.32 2.1 6 .4

M/V(6) –T/M(0) 25.8 1.32 2.1 3 0

M/V(0) –T/M(∞) 28 1.32 2.1 3 ∞

M/V(6) –T/M(0.2) 28.7 1.32 2.1 3 .2

M/V(6) –T/M(0.4) 26.8 1.32 2.1 3 .4

52 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

These RC columns had a diameter of 610 mm and clear 

concrete cover of 25 mm. The total height of the column for 

columns with aspect ratio of 6 was 4,550 mm and the effective 

height was 3,650 mm from the top of the footing to the centerline of the applied forces. Similarly, total height for columns 

with aspect ratio of 3 was 2,750 mm and the effective height 

was 1,850 mm from the top of the footing to the centerline of 

the applied loads. The axial load because of the superstructure 

dead weight was assumed to be 7 percent of the capacity of the 

columns. The longitudinal and spiral reinforcement ratios were 

2.1 percent and 0.73 percent, respectively. In order to investigate the effectiveness of spiral reinforcement ratio under 

combined torsion and bending moments, spiral reinforcement 

ratio was increased from 0.73 percent to 1.32 percent. Detailed 

information of the material properties of the test specimens 

can be found elsewhere (Belarbi and others, 2008 and Suriya 

Prakash and others, 2008).
-7.5 -6 -4.5 -3 -1.5 0 1.5 3 4.5 6 7.5 9

-360

-330

-300

-270

-240

-210

-180

-150

-120

-90

-60

-30

0

30

60

90

120

150

180

210

240

270

300

330

TWIST/LENGTH (DEG/M)

TORSIONAL MOMENT (kN-m)

Pure torsion

Spiral ratio = 0.73 percent

Spiral ratio = 1.32 percent

First yielding of spiral

Utimate torque

Figure 2. Torsional hysteresis under pure torsion with different 

spiral reinforcement ratios (?t

).

Figure 3. Comparison of torsion-bending moments curves for 

various combined loading ratios [?t

, spiral reinforcement ratio in 

percent].

T/M=0.2, ?t=0.73 percent

T/M=0.4, ?t

=0.73 percent

T/M=0.2, ?t

=1.32 percent

T/M=0.4, ?t

=0.32 percent

0

40

80

120

160

200

240

280

320

360

-900 -750 -600 -450 -300 -150 0 150 300 450 600 750 900

BENDING MOMENT (kN-m)

TORSIONAL MOMENT (kN-m)

Locking side Unlocking side

T/M=0.4

T/M=0.2

T/M=0.4

T/M=0.2

Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 53

Effect of Transverse Spiral Reinforcement Ratio

Increase in spiral reinforcement ratio improves the shear 

strength and confinement of the concrete core for the columns 

tested under combined bending-shear. However, there is only 

marginal strength increase because of an increase in the spiral 

reinforcement ratio for the flexure dominated columns with 

low longitudinal reinforcement ratio and adequate confinement. Significant improvement in performance with increase 

in spiral reinforcement ratio can be achieved for cases under 

pure torsional loading. The hysteresis curves of columns with 

spiral reinforcement ratio of 0.73 percent and 1.32 percent are 

presented in the figure 2. Soon after cracking, the yielding of 

spirals was observed in the subsequent loading cycle of the 

column with spiral reinforcement ratio of 0.73 percent. This 

implies that the spiral ratio of 0.73 percent is in the neighborhood of the minimum design requirement for a torsional 

design. It is worth mentioning that 1 percent spiral ratio is a 

more practical value in the design of bridge columns in the 

United States. To offset the cracking level from yielding level, 

the spiral ratio was increased to 1.32 percent and again tested 

under pure torsion. The angle of diagonal cracks was nearly 

39 to 42 degrees relative to the cross section (horizontal) of 

the column. The spalled region occurred near the top of the 

column at the completion of the test. 

The torsional moment versus twist curves are approximately linear up to cracking and thereafter become nonlinear 

with a decrease in the torsional stiffness. The column with 

a spiral reinforcement ratio of 1.32 percent had a higher 

post-cracking stiffness. The yielding strength increased by 

20 percent and the ultimate strength by 30 percent because 

of an increase in spiral reinforcement ratio from 0.73 percent 

to 1.32 percent. More importantly, significant increase in 

rotational ductility was achieved because of an increase in 

spiral reinforcement ratio. Torsion-bending moment loading 

curves for the columns tested under combined bending and 

torsional moments are shown in figure 3 As shown in the 

curves, all specimens reached their torsional capacity before 

reaching their flexural capacity. However, the longitudinal 

rebars yielded before the spirals. Hence, the failure sequence 

in all the specimens were in the order of flexural cracking, 

followed by shear cracking, longitudinal bar yielding, spalling, spiral yielding, and then overall failure by buckling of 

the longitudinal bars right after significant core degradation. 

Yielding of the longitudinal and spiral reinforcement occurred 

relatively close to each other for the columns reinforced with 

a spiral reinforcement ratio of 0.73 percent. By increasing the 

spiral reinforcement ratio, significant improvement in torsional 

and bending strengths was achieved. Torsion-bending moment 

interaction diagrams were determined at peak torsional 

moment (fig. 4A) and peak shear (fig. 4B) for all columns. It 

should be noted that the T/M ratio was maintained closely to 

the desired loading ratio in all columns until the peak torsional 

moment was attained in the unlocking direction. Soon after 

reaching the peak torsional strength, it was impossible to 

maintain the desired loading ratio as the torsional stiffness was 
-1,000 -800 -600 -400 -200 0 200 400 600 800 1,000

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

BENDING MOMENT (kN-m)

Locking side Unlocking side

TORSIONAL MOMENT (kN-m)

M/V=12, T/M=0.2 ?t=1.32 percent

M/V=12, T/M=0.4 ?t

=1.32 percent

M/V=6, T/M=0.4 ?t

=1.32 percent

M/V=6, T/M=0.2 ?t

=1.32 percent

T/M=0.4

T/M=0.2

T/M=0.4

T/M=0.2

Figure 4. Torsion-bending moments interaction diagrams. 

(A) Peak shear. (B) Peak torsion [?t

, spiral reinforcement ratio in 

percent].

BENDING MOMENT (kN-m)

TORSIONAL MOMENT (kN-m)

Locking side Unlocking side

Locking side Unlocking side

Spiral ratio (?t)=0.73 percent

Spiral ratio (?t

)=0.73 percent

-900 -750 -600 -450 -300 -150 0 150 300 450 600 750 900

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

TORSIONAL MOMENT (kN-m)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

T/M=0.4

T/M=0.2

T/M=0.1

T/M=0.0

T/M=0.4

T/M=0.2

T/M=0.1

T/M=

∞

T/M=0.0

Spiral ratio (?t)=0.73 percent

Spiral ratio (?t

)=0.73 percent

Just before failure

at high torsional

degradation

T/M=0.4

T/M=0.2

T/M=0.1

T/M=0.0

T/M=0.4

T/M=0.2

T/M=0.1

T/M=?

T/M=0.0

A

B

Figure 5. Comparison of torsion-bending loading curves for two 

different aspect ratios [?t

, spiral reinforment ratio in percent].

54 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

degrading much faster in the unlocking and locking directions. 

However, the bending strength was degrading faster than the 

torsional strength in the locking direction for the columns with 

a spiral reinforcement ratio of 1.32 percent and hence the load 

ratio could not be maintained to complete the test. 

Effect of Shear Span/Aspect Ratio under 

Combined Loadings

The behavior of RC columns can be classified into 

flexure dominated or shear dominated or with significant 

flexure-shear interaction. The aspect ratio of the column determines the level of flexure-shear interaction. In order to adopt 

the plastic analysis methods in the design of RC members 

by assigning the plastic hinges at the weak regions, inelastic 

response at these regions must be assessed in the presence 

of combined loadings including torsion. Specifically, designers would prefer to quantify flexural response such that the 

dependability of flexural plastic hinges can be assessed under 

dominant shear/torsional loads. Test results of the six columns: 

one tested under cyclic pure bending (H/D=3), one column 

tested under cyclic pure torsion (H/D=3), and four columns 

tested under combined cyclic bending and torsion with 

different ratios of T/M such as 0.2 and 0.4 but with different 

shear spans (H/D=6 and 3) were used to investigate the effect 

of shear span under combined loadings including torsion. 

Analytical models were used to predict the behavior of column 

with aspect ratio of 6 under bending-shear and pure torsion 

respectively. All the columns had a spiral reinforcement ratio 

of 1.32 percent. Torsion-bending moment loading curves for 

the columns tested under combined bending and torsional 

moments but with two different aspect ratios are shown in 

figure 5. As shown in these curves, the columns with low and 

high aspect ratio reached their torsional and bending moment 

capacity almost simultaneously in the unlocking direction. 

However, it is somewhat different in the locking direction. 
Figure 6. Torsion-bending moments interaction diagrams. 

(A) Peak torque. (B) Peak shear [?t

, spiral reinforcement ratio in 

percent].

BENDING MOMENT (kN-m)

TORSIONAL MOMENT (kN-m)

Locking side Unlocking side

Locking side Unlocking side

M/V=6, ?t=1.32 percent

Predictions from 

 analytical model

M/V=12, ?t

=1.32 percent

-1,000 -800 -600 -400 -200 0 200 400 600 800 1,000

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

TORSIONAL MOMENT (kN-m)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

T/M=0.4

T/M=0.2

T/M=0.0

T/M=0.4

T/M=0.2

T/M=

∞

T/M=0.0

Just before failure

at nonlinear range

of loading

T/M=0.4

T/M=0.2

T/M=0.1

T/M=0.0

T/M=0.4

T/M=0.2

T/M=0.1

T/M=?

T/M=0.0

A

B

Just before failure

at nonlinear range

of loading

M/V=6, ?t=1.32 percent

Predictions from 

 analytical model

M/V=12, ?t

=1.32 percent

Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 55

After yielding of the spiral and longitudinal reinforcement, 

the bending and torsional strength increased in a non-linear 

fashion because of the locking effect of spiral which resulted 

in better confinement of concrete core. Hence, the ratios were 

not closely maintained in the locking direction. No significant 

change in the torsional and bending strengths was observed 

with change in the aspect ratio. This is mainly because of the 

flexural failure mode in the columns with high and low aspect 

ratio. However, the effect of aspect ratio would have been 

more pronounced if the failure modes were in shear. Torsionbending moment interaction diagrams were determined at 

peak torsional moment (fig. 6A) and peak shear (fig. 6B) for 

tested columns. It should be noted that the T/M ratio was not 

maintained closely to the desired loading ratio in the locking 

direction because of highly nonlinear behavior because of 

locking effect of spiral reinforcement. This resulted in variation of bending and torsional stiffness in a non-linear fashion 

after the spiral and longitudinal bar yielding. 

Flexure-Shear-Torsion Interaction Diagrams

The test results were subsequently used to create threedimensional interaction diagrams as shown in figure 7. 

Interaction curves for columns with spiral reinforcement ratios 

of 0.73 percent and 1.32 percent and with aspect ratio of 3 

and 6 are shown in figure 7. The torsional capacity as well as 

bending capacity has been determined to reduce because of 

the effect of combined bending and torsion. The interaction 

between bending and torsion depends on a large number of 

factors, such as the amount of transverse and longitudinal reinforcement, aspect ratio of the section, and concrete strength. 

As explained in the previous sections, increase in the spiral 

reinforcement ratio resulted in a better performance. It is to be 

noted that there was no degradation in strength because of a 

change in aspect ratio or moment to shear ratio, as the columns 

failed predominantly in flexure. For the columns with low 

transverse reinforcement ratio of 0.73 percent, degradation in 

strength and stiffness increased with increases in torsion-tobending moment ratios. This demonstrates that transverse reinforcement ratio of 0.73 percent which may be adequate from 

a flexural design point of view may not satisfy the expected 

design performance in the presence of torsional loadings.

Concluding Remarks

Based on this experimental and analytical investigation, 

the following major concluding remarks can be drawn:

• The combination of bending and torsion had the effect 

of reducing the torque required to cause yielding of 

the transverse reinforcement and the peak torsional 

component.

• Similarly, the combination of bending and torsion had 

the effect of reducing the bending moment required to 

cause yielding of the longitudinal reinforcement and 

the peak component of bending moment.

• Under combined torsion and bending, the torsional 

stiffness degraded more rapidly than the bending 

stiffness under increasing increments of displacement/

rotation.

• The degradation in strength of the column under pure 

torsion was contained by increasing the spiral ratio. 
Figure 7. Three-dimensional bending-shear-torsion interaction 

diagrams. (A) Peak torque. (B) Peak shear.

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

0 150 300 450 600

750 900

600

400

200

0

H/D=6, ?t=1.32 percent

H/D=3, ?t

=1.32 percent

H/D=3, ?t

=0.73 percent

BENDING MOMENT (kN-m)

TORSIONAL MOMENT (kN-m)

SHEAR (kN)

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

0 150 300 450 600

750 900

600

400

200

0

H/D=6, ?t=1.32 percent

H/D=3, ?t

=1.32 percent

H/D=3, ?t

=0.73 percent

BENDING MOMENT (kN-m)

TORSIONAL MOMENT (kN-m)

SHEAR (kN)

Predictions from 

analytical models

Predictions from 

analytical models

56 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

Increasing the spiral reinforcement ratio helped to 

increase the torsional strength and rotational ductility 

by increasing deformational capacity after yielding.

• Increase in the spiral reinforcement ratio resulted in 

more confinement and thereby helped reducing the 

degradation of bending as well as torsional strength 

under combined bending moments and torsion.

• There was no reduction in bending and torsional 

strength with reduction in shear span. This was mainly 

because of predominant flexural failure mode because 

of the low longitudinal reinforcement ratio considered 

in this study. However, the energy dissipation under 

bending and torsion reduced considerably with reduction in shear span ratio.

• Energy dissipation capacity and equivalent damping 

ratio under combined bending and torsion increased 

with increases in spiral reinforcement ratio. However, 

they decreased with increases in torsion to bending 

moment ratio and reduction in shear span ratio. 

Acknowledgments

This study was funded by NSF-NEESR, National University Transportation Center (NUTC) and Intelligent Systems 

Center (ISC) of Missouri University of Science and Technology. Their financial support is gratefully acknowledged.

References

Belarbi, A., Suriya Prakash, S., and You, Y.M., 2008, Effect 

of spiral ratio on behavior of reinforced concrete bridge 

columns under combined loadings including torsion: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Advances 

in Structural Engineering and Mechanics, Jeju, Korea. 

May 26–28, p. 1,190–1,205.

Lehman, D.E., Calderone, A.J., and Moehle, J.P., 1998, 

Behavior and design of slender columns subjected to 

lateral loading: Proceedings of Sixth U.S. National Conference on Earthquake Engineering, EERI, Oakland, Calif., 

May 31–June 4, Paper No. 87.

Otsuka, H., Takeshita, E., Yabuki, W., Wang, Y., Yoshimura, 

T., and Tsunomoto, M., 2004, Study on the seismic performance of reinforced concrete columns subjected to torsional 

moment, bending moment and axial force: 13th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Vancouver, Canada, 

August 1–6. Paper No. 393. 

Park, Y.J., and Ang, A.H.S., 1985, Mechanistic seismic damage model for reinforced concrete: Journal of Structural 

Engineering, ASCE, v. 111, no. 4, p. 722–739.

Priestly, M.J.N, and Benzoni, G., 1996, Seismic performance 

of circular columns with low longitudinal reinforcement 

ratios: American Concrete Institute Structural Journal, 

v. 93, no. 4, p. 474–485.

Priestly, M.J.N, Seible, F., and Calvi, G.M., 1996, Seismic 

design and retrofit of bridges: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 

New York, 686 p.
Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 57

Suriya Prakash, S., Belarbi, A., and Ayoub, A., 2008, Cyclic 

behavior of RC bridge columns under combined loadings including torsion: Sixth Seismic National Conference 

on Highways and Bridges, Charleston, South Carolina. 

July 27–30.

Tirasit, P., Kawashima, K., and Watanabe, G., 2005, An experimental study on the performance of RC columns subjected 

to cyclic flexural torsional loading: Second International 

Conference on Urban Earthquake Engineering, Tokyo, 

Japan, p. 357–364.

You, Y.M., and Belarbi, A., 2008, An analytical model to 

predict the behavior of circular reinforced concrete columns 

subjected to combined loadings including torsion: October 11–14, 14th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Beijing, China.

Hazards Assessment of St. Charles County—

Earthquake and Flood

By Ronaldo Luna9, PhD, PE, and Amy L. Morris10

Located on the northernmost limits of the St. Louis 

metropolitan area, St. Charles County has been, and continues to be, one of the fastest-growing counties in the country. 

Bounded by the Missouri River on the south and the Mississippi River on the north, St. Charles County is predominantly 

flat, low-lying terrain at great risk to periodic flooding. The 

county also is well within the area of influence for several 

local seismic zones, increasing the susceptibility to earthquake damage. Given the apparent risk to flood and earthquake, this study applied the latest version of the GIS driven 

software program: HAZUS-MH, to assess both hazards for 

St. Charles County in terms of damages, social impact, and 

economic losses. With this technology, it is not only possible 

to compare the extent of damage or losses between various 

scenarios but also between the different hazards. It is the intent 

of this research to inform St. Charles County of the possible 

consequences associated with each hazard scenario as well as 

determine which natural hazard is of most concern so that the 

county officials may then pursue the proper recourse. 

Community and Regional Resilience Initiative: 

Revealing Resilience in the Memphis Area

By Arleen Hill, Sarah Walen, Dave Lannom, and 

Thomas J. Wilbanks

Department of Earth Science, The University of Memphis, 

Memphis, Tennessee 38152, aahill@memphis.edu

9

Department of Civil, Environmental and Archictectural Engineering, Missouri University of Science and Technology, Rolla, Missouri, 65401 rluna@

mst.edu.

10Shannon & Wilson, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri.

The six county Memphis Urban Area (MUA) serves as 

one of three communities of focus for Oak Ridge National 

Lab’s Community and Regional Resilience Initiative 

(CARRI). In collaboration with partner organizations and 

community advocates the CARRI-MUA research and community engagement team is learning what resilience means to 

stakeholders; how that resilience is expressed at the neighborhood, community and regional scales; and what steps might 

be taken to enhance or reinforce resilience. This community 

learning will merge with that gained in the Charleston, South 

Carolina, and Gulfport, Mississippi, to inform a national effort 

to document and describe key characteristics of resilience. 

Traditional and participatory research approaches are 

used here. Local expertise, relationships and the social 

fabric of place are actively integrated with hazards and risk 

knowledge. Strong ground motion associated with the New 

Madrid Seismic Zone including existing hazard assessments and related planning efforts and opportunities figure 

prominently in this study. Resilience in the MUA in the mind 

of the community team must consider the low probability, 

high consequence event as well as chronic disruptions. This 

complement of threat types is revealing insights into the characteristics of resilience at multiple scales. 

Preliminary findings emphasize: communication, 

relationships, training and planning, identification of at-risk 

residents pre-disaster, and managing and informing expectations across the community. While details may be place 

specific the lessons learned here will inform the resilience 

framework for the larger CARRI program. For more information or to contribute to this work in progress please visit: www.

resilientus.org or contact any of us. 

Surface Wave Velocity Measurements in the 

Deep Sediments of the Mississippi Embayment

By Brent R. Rosenblad, Jonathan Bailey, and 

Jianhua Li

Department of Civil Engineering, University of Missouri, 

Columbia, Missouri 65211, rosenbladb@missouri.edu

Results are presented from surface wave velocity 

measurements performed in the Mississippi Embayment to 

develop shear wave velocity (VS

) profiles of the deep sediments in this region. Measurements were performed at eleven 

locations in Arkansas, Tennessee, and Missouri. Eight of the 

sites were located adjacent to seismic stations operated by 

the Center for Earthquake Research and Information (CERI) 

at the University of Memphis. This study utilized a unique 

low-frequency field vibrator that was recently developed as 

part of the Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation 

(NEES) program. Surface wave energy was actively excited 

down to frequencies of less than 1 Hz, generating surface 

waves with wavelengths of 600 m or greater at most sites. 

Shear wave velocity (VS

) profiles were developed to depths 

of more than 200 m. The VS values typically ranged from 
58 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

approximately 100 m/s near the surface to more than 600 m/s 

at the maximum profiling depths. Several distinct transitions in 

VS values were observed at variable depths among the eleven 

sites. An average VS developed from the eleven sites was in 

good agreement with VS models that have been developed for 

the deep sediments of the Embayment. 

Promises and Challenges of Data Collected 

to Aid the St. Louis Area Earthquake Hazards 

Mapping Project

By Conor Watkins

U.S. Geological Survey, Mid-Continent Geographic Science 

Center, Rolla, Missouri 65401, 573-308-3780 (phone), 

573-308-3794 (fax), cwatkins@usgs.gov 

http://mcmcweb.er.usgs.gov/mcgsc/

St. Louis Area Earthquake Hazards Mapping Project is 

a cooperative effort of the U.S. Geological Survey and other 

public and private entities. The project includes collection of 

geotechnical data from other sources to assist with subsurface characterization in the project area, which encompasses 

approximately 3,100 square kilometers of Missouri and 

Illinois within the St. Louis Metro area. Sources include the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Missouri Department of 

Transportation, and engineering firms. Interpretation of these 

data will aid the prediction of site response at various localities throughout the project area and the production of seismic 

hazards maps based on scenario earthquakes affecting the 

region. 

The use of data from other sources provides a tremendous 

cost savings to the project and allows for a greater density of 

information in the prediction of seismic hazards. However, 

data from various sources arrive in a variety of formats and 

standards. Often, data collected for a specific project only 

cover a limited area. Good examples are geotechnical borings 

from the Missouri Department of Transportation and the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, which tend to be restricted to the 

locations of highways or flood protection levees, respectively. 

Older data often arrive in analog formats lacking a welldefined spatial reference. Paper maps and photographs must 

be digitally scanned and georeferenced to existing cospatial 

imagery and maps. Geotechnical data contains varying levels 

of detail which must be accounted for when using them for 

subsurface characterization.

Promises and Challenges of Data Collected 

to Aid the St. Louis Area Earthquake Hazards 

Mapping Project

By Conor M. Watkins

U.S. Geological Survey, Mid-Continent Geographic Science 

Center, Rolla, Missouri 65401, 573-308-3780 (phone), 

573-308-3794 (fax), cwatkins@usgs.gov 

http:/mcgsc.usgs.gov//

Abstract 

The St. Louis Area Earthquake Hazards Mapping Project 

is a U.S. Geological Survey coordinated study of how surficial 

materials within a selected portion of the St. Louis metropolitan area will respond to seismic shaking. The study includes 

collection of geotechnical data from other sources to assist 

with subsurface characterization in the project area, which 

encompasses approximately 1,711 square miles (4,432 square 

kilometers) of Missouri and Illinois, in the St. Louis metropolitan area. Data sources include both public and private entities. Interpretation of this data will aid the prediction of site 

response to earthquakes at various localities throughout the 

project area and the production of seismic hazards maps based 

on scenario earthquakes affecting the region.

Introduction

The St. Louis Area Earthquake Hazards Mapping Project 

is a generalized study of how surficial materials within the St. 

Louis metropolitan area will respond to seismic shaking. This 

study, coordinated by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 

covers 29 7.5-minute USGS quadrangles in the St. Louis area 

(fig. 1). 

Part of the study includes the collection of geotechnical 

data from outside sources to assist in the subsurface characterization of materials within the project’s boundaries. Data 

sources include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), 

the Missouri Department of Natural Resources, the Missouri 

Department of Transportation, municipal and county agencies, and engineering firms. Interpretation of this information 

will aid in the prediction of site response within the project 

area and the production of hazards maps relevant for scenario 
Figure 1. Extent of study area (modified from Chung, 2007).

Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 59
Figure 2. 1956 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers levee boring plan and locations near downtown St. Louis georeferenced according to 

modern aerial photography. The individually digitized points were manually entered into a vector dataset. [images adapted from U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, 1956]

60 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

earthquakes (earthquakes of a specific magnitude emanating 

from a specific location) affecting the region.

The use of data from other sources provides a tremendous cost savings to the project, allowing for a greater density 

of information to be collected. However, data from various 

sources arrive in a variety of formats and standards. Often, 

data collected for a specific project covers only a limited 

area, resulting in non-uniform densities. An example of this 

are geotechnical borings from the Missouri Department of 

Transportation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers which 

tend to be restricted to the locations of highways or flood 

protection levees, respectively. Historic data often arrive in 

analog formats lacking a spatial reference. Paper maps and 

photographs must be digitally scanned and georeferenced 

to existing cospatial imagery and maps. Geotechnical data 

contain varying levels of detail, depending on the source and 

original purpose, which must be accounted for during use for 

subsurface characterization.

The objective of this task is to integrate data from 

various sources into a uniform database so they can be used 

for subsurface characterization beneath the study area and to 

assist in creating area-wide seismic hazards maps. The project 

area encompasses a diverse geologic setting. Conditions vary 

from uplands with Paleozoic bedrock at a shallow depth to 

the floodplains of the Missouri and Mississippi River with 

120 feet (ft) [36.6 meters (m)] or more of unconsolidated 

Quaternary alluvium overlying bedrock. These floodplains 

have a shallow water table and are subject to liquefaction. The 

concentration of critical infrastructure including refineries, 

pipelines, power plants, electrical transmission lines, highways, and railroads in these vulnerable areas makes them of 

particular interest.

Discussion

Data collected from the USACE and a local levee district 

were integrated into a GIS database. Geotechnical borings 

and associated plan maps for levees along the Illinois side of 

the Mississippi River, the St. Louis floodwall, and the Melvin 

Price Locks and Dam were provided by the USACE St. Louis 

District. None of this data were originally in electronic format 

and all had to be digitally scanned and georeferenced to other 

cospatial imagery so that it could be used in a GIS database. 
Figure 3. Example of 1956 U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers levee boring showing depth to refusal (R).

Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 61

The levee report (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1956) 

was useful as it contained a high density of deep subsurface 

information along levees just east of the Mississippi River 

near St. Louis. Once the boring plan maps from the 1956 

document were properly georeferenced according to modern 

aerial photography, individual boring locations were input as 

points in vector GIS datasets to be imported into the geotechnical database. This point based dataset was overlain atop 

the georeferenced boring plan and modern aerial imagery for 

convenient display (fig. 2). 

An example boring log from the USACE illustrates 

a borehole that was advanced to a depth of around 116 ft 

(35.4 m) below the ground surface before encountering refusal 

(symbolized by R) (fig. 3) (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

1956). Although these borings do not provide an absolute 

number as to the depth to bedrock, they do provide useful 

information and indicate that the bedrock surface lies around 

115–120 ft (35.0–36.6 m) beneath unconsolidated Quaternary 

alluvial floodplain deposits.

A USACE boring log from 1963 at a location in the City 

of St. Louis north of downtown and beneath the St. Louis 

floodwall shows greater detail, including a core 5 ft (1.5 m) 

into bedrock, than the 1956 borings on the east side of the 

Mississippi River (fig. 4). More than 65 ft (19.8 m) of junk fill 

including cinders, wood, crushed concrete, steel, and underground piping were encountered before native materials were 

reached. Such heterogeneous fill materials make the modeling of ground response because of seismic shaking difficult 

because of the high variability over short distances.

A 1972 USACE boring log from the Melvin Price Locks 

and Dam (LD 26 Replacement) provides detailed information including depth to bedrock, Atterberg limits (where 

appropriate), gamma logging, standard penetration test (SPT) 

blow counts, electrical resistivity, and spontaneous potential 

(fig. 5). Such details, especially blow counts, aid in the ability 

to predict how such ground will respond and whether or not 

liquefaction will occur during an earthquake.

Data provided by the Howard Bend Levee District, 

a private entity in Maryland Heights, Missouri, along the 

Missouri River, has provided boring locations (fig. 6) and two 

corresponding boring logs (fig. 7A and 7B). This work was 

conducted according to modern sampling and testing methods 

as part of a project to upgrade the levee to 500-year flood 

protection. The recently opened (2003) Page Ave. (Mo Route 

364) extension passes through the area with its main bridge 

over the Missouri River located in the center left and Creve 

Coeur Lake in the lower right of the boring plan (fig. 6), 

respectively.

This data arrived in digital format but lacked a spatial 

reference for use with GIS. The image was georeferenced to 

the same imagery that was used to georeference the USACE 

plan maps mentioned earlier.

Boring SW-9 from the Howard Bend Levee District was 

conducted using modern method and shows depth of bedrock 

at 125.6 ft (38.3 m) and includes SPT blow count data (fig. 7A

and 7B). Although these logs do not core 5 ft (1.5 m) into the 

underlying bedrock as is done in modern USACE borings, 

they include standard penetration test (SPT) blowcounts and 

indicate that the bedrock surface lies approximately 115–125 

ft (35.0–38.1 m) beneath a cover of unconsolidated Quaternary 

alluvium comprising the Missouri River floodplain.

Conclusion

The integration of data from unique sources into a 

uniform database will greatly assist with the subsurface characterization and subsequent modeling of site response because 

of a seismic event in the surrounding region. Use of existing 
Figure 4. Example of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers boring log (from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1964) illustrating more than 

65 feet (19.8 meters) junk fill beneath the St. Louis floodwall.

62 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

data has the benefit of providing substantial cost savings but 

has its own challenges. Often, the data were collected for an 

entirely different purpose and formats/standards are highly 

variable among various sources. This information must be 

transformed to a uniform standard to be used in the creation of 

hazards maps.

References

Chung, J., 2007, Development of a geographic information 

system-based virtual geotechnical database and assessment 

of liquefaction potential for the St. Louis metropolitan area: 

Rolla, Missouri, Missouri University of Science and Technology, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri–Rolla, 

169 p.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, 1956, Investigation of Underseepage, Mississippi River Levees, Alton to Gale, Illinois,” 

Waterways Experiment Station Technical Memorandum 

No. 3–430.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army District St. Louis, 

1964, Flood Protection—St. Louis, Mo., Reach 3: Construction of floodwall and sewer alterations, Items F–6B and 

S–13A.
Figure 5. This boring log from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1972) was logged according to modern standards 

and shows greater amounts of detail than older standards for Corps of Engineers borings. 

Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 63
Figure 6. Boring plan (modified from Shannon and Wilson, 2003) illustrating the location of four borings to bedrock as provided by the 

Howard Bend Levee District.

64 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake
Figure 7. Boring log SW-9 from Shannon and Wilson (2003) shows depth of bedrock at 125.6 feet (38.3 meters) and includes 

standard penetration test (SPT) blow count data within the Howard Bend Levee District.

Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 65
Figure 7. Boring log SW-9 from Shannon and Wilson (2003) shows depth of bedrock at 125.6 feet (38.3 meters) and includes 

SPT blow count data within the Howard Bend Levee District.—Continued

66 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake
Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 67

MoDOT Earthquake Preparedness

By Don Hillis and Rick Bennett

Missouri Department of Transportation, Jefferson City 

Missouri, 65109, Don.Hillis@modot.mo.gov

Missouri Department of Transportation is a key player 

in nearly all emergencies and disasters. The transportation 

system is critical to response and recovery from events as well 

as the economy of the Nation.

A major earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone 

is considered the worst-case scenario for a disaster in the 

State of Missouri. MoDOT has been actively planning for 

the earthquake scenario since 1997. In concert with numerous other agencies the MoDOT Earthquake Plan continues to 

be improved based on input from exercises, real events and 

routine reviews. Our plan is a very robust plan that is proving 

to mesh well with the overall State of Missouri response.

The MoDOT Earthquake Plan is part of our all-hazards 

“Incident Response Plan”. This plan has recently been 

re-structured and is a true “living document”. It can be 

updated, improved or revised at any time for any reason. 

MoDOT has responded to numerous real-world disasters and 

large-scale events in the last several years, including the recent 

earthquake near Mt. Carmel, Illinois, not to mention numerous winter weather events and flooding events. Each of these 

provides opportunities to improve our ability to respond and 

improve our plan.

The New Madrid Earthquake Scenario

By Greg Hempen

URS Corporation, St. Louis, Missouri 63110, 

hempen69@sbcglobal.net

Scenarios are assessments of a specific potential hazard, 

herein earthquakes, to determine how it would affect a 

community. The Earthquake Engineering Research Institute 

(EERI) has been a leader in creating earthquake scenarios. 

The New Madrid Chapter of EERI has begun development of 

the New Madrid Earthquake Scenario (NMES). The NMES is 

scheduled for completion in February 2012, the Bicentennial 

of the Great New Madrid Series of Earthquakes. The NMES 

will follow EERI’s Guidelines for Developing an Earthquake 

Scenario (March 2006). 

The NMES will provide a comprehensive impact assessment of scientifically credible earthquakes in the New Madrid 

Seismic Region. The Scenario will include risk-reduction 

recommendations for individual, public, and corporate interests from future Central U.S. earthquakes. 

The Scenario is intended to provide intermediate data 

and products, culminating in a report in February 2012. Our 

interest is to reach the broad base of possible participants 

(reflecting EERI’s broad focus from seismology to sociology) and resolve pressing seismic safety issues for the Central 

United States. Working groups will recommend scenario 

products, aid in deciding the “Scenario event,” and produce 

their sector’s portion of the New Madrid Earthquake Scenario 

report. One of these products is the Symposium planned for 

September 2008, “Seismic Sources (Hazards) in the Central 

United States: Is New Madrid all there is?” Another conference on proper Central U.S. Earthquake Time Histories is 

planned for May 2009. Other meetings, conferences, and 

products will be developed for the NMES’ report, as resolved 

by the working groups. 

Central U.S. Post Earthquake Technical 

Information Clearinghouse Efforts

By Jim Wilkinson, Norman C. Hester, Stephen 

Patrick Horton, and Theresa I. Jefferson

Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium, Memphis, Tennessee 

38118, jwilkinson@cusec.org

In the Central United States, a Post Earthquake Technical 

Information Clearinghouse Plan has been developed to coordinate research activities, and to facilitate collaboration between 

the emergency management and research communities. 

Because a damaging earthquake in the Central United States 

will affect several States, a Multistate Technical Information 

Clearinghouse (MSTIC) Coordination Plan to link State technical information clearinghouses (STICs) is proposed. This 

paper describes beginning efforts to define the role and functions of a MSTIC as well as formalize plans with emergency 

management agencies to facilitate collaboration and coordination between STICs and the MSTIC.

A review of the history and functions of technical clearinghouses was conducted. The need for, structure, and roles of 

the MSTIC were defined. A plan for using the Post-Earthquake 

Information Management System, currently being developed 

by the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program 

(NEHRP) to share and integrate information between STICs 

and the MSTIC was formulated.

Using lessons learned from previous clearinghouse 

efforts, this study identified a number of issues that need to be 

addressed and resolved before the occurrence of an event in 

order for the MSTIC to be effective. These include: clearinghouse hosting and linkage, data collection, data organization 

and archival, and data dissemination. 

The unique multistate impact created by an earthquake in 

the Central United States necessitates the need for a plan that 

goes beyond current standard clearinghouse plans. This paper 

proposes the use of a MSTIC that would enable it to collaborate and coordinate the work of multiple STICs. 
68 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

ARCHER—Airborne Real-time Cueing 

Hyperspectral Enhanced Reconnaissance

By Lt. Col. Carolyn S. Rice

Civil Air Patrol, Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri 65305, 

ricecs@hughes.net 

ARCHER is a custom-designed system of hyperspectral imaging (HSI) hardware and software, with real world 

applications in the areas of search and rescue, disaster impact 

assessment and relief, and in the area of homeland security. 

ARCHER HSI executes three separate algorithms for 

target acquisition and detection: 

• Spectral signature matching—can be programmed to 

look for specific colored objects.

• Anomaly detection—compares objects on the ground 

and identifies colors that do not “fit” in with the normal 

background environment. 

• Change detection—executes a pixel-by-pixel comparison of current ground conditions versus ground 

conditions obtained in a previous examination over the 

same area.

HSI is a daytime, non-invasive technology, which works 

by analyzing an object’s reflected light. It cannot detect objects 

at night, underwater, under dense cover, underground, under 

snow, or inside buildings. Optimum time to fly is at midday 

with the sun high in the sky. This provides maximum solar 

illumination and maximum reflected light. The sensor must 

“see” at least one square meter of the object being searched 

for in order to locate it. ARCHER is designed for missions 

optimally flown at 2,500 ft. above ground level, at a ground 

speed of 90–100 knots. 

The U.S. Geological Survey 2008 Update to the 

National Seismic Hazard Maps for the Central 

and Eastern United States

By Oliver S. Boyd, Mark D. Petersen, Arthur D. 

Frankel, Stephen C. Harmsen, Charles S. Mueller, 

and Russell L. Wheeler 

U.S. Geological Survey, Memphis, Tennessee 38152-3050, 

olboyd@usgs.gov

Updated U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) National 

Seismic Hazard Maps of the contiguous 48 States were 

finalized in April of 2008. These maps, depicting ground 

motion values (spectral response and peak acceleration) with 

2 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent chances of being exceeded 

in 50 years, are used in building codes, insurance industries, 

and emergency preparedness. Regional and topical workshops 

were convened to discuss the latest understanding of source 

models and ground motion relationships for the United States, 

resulting in a consensus estimate of seismic hazard. The work 

presented here outlines the changes in and subsequent impacts 

of revisions to the USGS National Seismic Hazard Maps for 

the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). 

 In the CEUS, the maps include improved estimates of 

source location and description, updated ground-motion relationships and advances in seismic hazard methodology. For 

example, the New Madrid source zone was fully revamped. 

Among the various improvements, the locations of fault traces 

coincide more closely with seismicity, logic trees were added 

to consider a longer recurrence on the northern arm, and an 

algorithm was adopted to account for recurrence of 1811–12 

type clustered events. 

Overall, the updated ground-motion relationships tend to 

decrease seismic hazard in the CEUS relative to hazard in the 

previous (2002) maps. The most unusual effect results from 

the clustering algorithm, for which seismic hazard increases in 

the center of the New Madrid Seismic Zone, decreases at its 

northern and southern ends, and then increases again as sites 

become equidistant from the three New Madrid sources.

Detailed Surficial Material Geologic Maps 

Over Existing Columbia Bottoms and Granite 

City 7.5’ Quadrangles Within the St. Louis Area 

Earthquake Hazard Mapping Project

By Scott Kaden

Missouri Division of Geology and Land Survey, Rolla, 

Missouri 65401, scott.kaden@dnr.mo.gov

Missouri Division of Geology and Land Survey (DGLS) 

has produced geologic maps of surficial materials for the 

Missouri portion of the Columbia Bottom and Granite City 

7.5-minute USGS quadrangles as part of the St. Louis Earthquake Hazard Mapping Project. Surficial materials mapping 

comprise the first phase of seismic hazard mapping. It serves 

to reduce the level of uncertainty in the three-dimensional 

distribution of surficial material units and their related physical properties.

Boring data from the St. Louis Surficial Materials Database, previously developed by DGLS, was used to develop 

three-dimensional spatial variation of surficial material units. 

Other available subsurface data and stratigraphic profiles was 

reviewed and compared with published small-scale surficial material maps and other previously developed genetic 

and lithostratigraphic surficial material models to facilitate 

mapping. These data points were used to verify surficial material type and thickness as well as generating top of bedrock 

elevation contours. 

This analysis is necessary to assess the response of the 

soil column and liquefaction potential in response to different 

magnitude earthquakes and potential for site amplification. 

In addition, the accuracy and precision of earthquake hazards 

maps being prepared by the St. Louis Area Earthquake Hazard 

Mapping Project Technical Working Group will be improved.
Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 69

Post-Conference Paper

Geotechnical Earthquake Instrumentation at the Bill E. 

Emerson Memorial Bridge, Cape Girardeau, Missouri

By Scott M. Olson14, Youssef M.A. Hashash15, and Oscar 

Moreno-Torres16

Abstract

The Bill Emerson Memorial Bridge in Cape Girardeau, 

Missouri is located near the most seismically active region 

in the Central and Eastern United States, the New Madrid 

Seismic Zone. Because of the bridge’s importance to the 

regional and national transportation system, the University 

of Illinois installed new geotechnical instrumentation at the 

bridge to significantly augment the existing instrumentation 

package with funding from the Advanced National Seismic 

System (ANSS) program of the United States Geological 

Survey (USGS). The geotechnical instrumentation includes 

piezometers and dense downhole accelerometer/inclinometer arrays that will measure ground response in soils that 

are predicted to liquefy and laterally spread during future 

earthquakes as well as in soils that have been remediated to 

prevent liquefaction. The combined geotechnical and structural instrumentation will provide unprecedented opportunities 

to capture strong, near-field ground motions in the Central 

United States, observe the process involved in liquefaction 

and laterally spreading, and record and study soil-structure 

interaction for a major bridge. Equivalent linear, nonlinear 

total stress and nonlinear effective stress site response analyses 

were performed to estimate the instrument response to shaking 

corresponding to 2 percent, 10 percent, and 50 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years hazard levels.

Introduction

Opened in 2003, the Bill Emerson Memorial Bridge 

over the Mississippi River from Cape Girardeau, Missouri to 

East Cape Girardeau, Illinois represents a significant component in the regional and national transportation system. As 

the only 4-lane Mississippi River crossing in 30 miles to the 

south (Cairo, Illinois) and 100 miles to the north (St. Louis), 

the bridge also is critical to emergency response and recovery. The 4-lane structure carries about 14,000 vehicles per 

day (VPD) (circa 2003), and by 2015 it is projected to carry 

about 26,000 vpd. The cable-stayed bridge structure consists 

14 Assistant Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering Department, 

University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, 61801, email: 

olsons@illinois.edu

15 Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering Department, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, 61801, email: 

hashash@illinois.edu

16 Graduate Research Assistant, Civil and Environmental Engineering 

Department, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, 

61801, email: omoreno2@illinois.edu

Geotechnical Earthquake Instrumentation at 

the Bill E. Emerson Memorial Bridge, Cape 

Girardeau, Missouri

By Scott M. Olson11, Youssef M.A. Hashash12, and 

Oscar Moreno-Torres13

Conference Abstract

The Bill Emerson Memorial Bridge in Cape Girardeau, 

Missouri is located near the most seismically active region 

in the Central and Eastern United States, the New Madrid 

Seismic Zone. Because of the bridge’s importance to the 

regional and national transportation system, Profs. Scott Olson 

and Youssef Hashash at the University of Illinois, via funding 

from the Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS) program 

of the United States Geological Survey (USGS), installed new 

geotechnical instrumentation at the bridge to substantially 

augment the existing instrumentation package. 

The geotechnical instrumentation includes piezometers 

and dense downhole accelerometer/inclinometer arrays that 

will measure ground response in soils that are predicted to 

liquefy and laterally spread during future earthquakes as well 

as in soils that have been remediated to prevent liquefaction. 

The combined geotechnical and structural instrumentation will 

provide unprecedented opportunities to capture strong, nearfield ground motions in the Central United States, observe 

how soils liquefy and laterally spread, and record and study 

soil-structure interaction for a major bridge.

Here, we describe the geotechnical instrumentation 

package and details of its installation, and present potential 

instrument responses for a number of scenario New Madrid 

earthquake events, including M5.5, 6.5, and 7.5 earthquakes 

occurring at a distance of 30 km.

11 Assistant Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering Department, 

University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, 61801, email: 

olsons@illinois.edu

12 Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering Department, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, 61801, email: 

hashash@illinois.edu

13 Graduate Research Assistant, Civil and Environmental Engineering 

Department, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, 

61801, email: omoreno2@illinois.edu
Figure 1. Representative soil profile for Mississippi River floodplain in Illinois.

70 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

primarily of two main towers and cables that support the 

bridge deck. 

Located about 30 km from the New Madrid Seismic Zone 

(NMSZ), seismic loading and soil liquefaction were major 

elements of the bridge design. Nearly 80 accelerometers were 

installed on the structure during construction to monitor structural response to potential seismic shaking. In addition, six 

accelerometers were installed at or below grade in Missouri 

and in Illinois to monitor input seismic ground motions. Celebi 

(2006) provides details of the seismic structural monitoring of 

the Bill Emerson Memorial Bridge. 

This paper describes the geotechnical instrumentation 

package installed as part of a U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 

Advanced National Seismic Systems (ANSS) grant to monitor 

potential seismic liquefaction and lateral spreading, and presents predicted instrument responses for a number of scenario 

NMSZ events. 

Site Conditions and Seismic Hazard

On the Missouri side of the river, approximately 10 to 

13 m of stiff residual clays and silts overlie limestone bedrock 

and form a bluff overlooking the Mississippi River floodplain 

in Illinois. The Illinois floodplain consists of approximately 

6 m of soft to medium stiff and loose to medium dense interbedded alluvial clays, silts, and sands. Below the interbedded 

soils, approximately 10 m of medium dense silty sands and 

sands with standard penetration test (SPT) blow counts (N) 

from about 10 to 35 are encountered. These soils are highly 

susceptible to liquefaction as discussed subsequently. From 

approximately 16 to 30 m, the sands become coarser and 

denser with SPT N values ranging from about 25 to more than 

50. Limestone bedrock underlies the residual and alluvial soils 

across the site and is known to be karstic (T. Cooling, URS 

Corporation, written commun.). Groundwater is located about 

4 m below the ground surface in the Illinois floodplain.

During the design studies (Woodward-Clyde 

Consultants, 1994), shear wave velocities (VS) 

were measured at two locations in the overburden 

soils and bedrock. Additional shear wave velocity 

measurements were obtained (by Drs. Tom Noce 

and Tom Holzer of the USGS) in the Illinois alluvium during this ANSS project using seismic cone 

penetration tests. A representative section through 

the Illinois alluvium, including estimates of VS, 

drained friction angles, coefficient of at-rest earth 

pressure, and an estimate of overconsolidation 

ratio (OCR) is presented in figure 1.

Seismic hazard at the site is dominated at 

all return periods by the NMSZ, the northern end 

of which is about 30 km from the bridge site. 

The NMSZ is capable of developing M~7.5+ 

earthquakes and the estimated peak ground 

accelerations (PGA) from the USGS Seismic 

Hazard Map are 0.03 g, 0.28 g, and 1.11 g for 

50 percent, 10 percent, and 2 percent probability 

of exceedance (PE) in 50 years, respectively. The latter two 

events are capable of triggering extensive liquefaction and 

lateral spreading in the medium dense sands and silty sands at 

the site (Woodward-Clyde Consultants, 1994). 

Geotechnical Instrumentation

As part of a USGS ANSS project, the first two authors 

installed geotechnical instrumentation to measure ground 

behavior during potential liquefaction and lateral spreading, 

and the resulting affect on ground motion, soil-structure interaction, and embankment stability, as well as the effectiveness 

of ground modification performed below the Illinois approach 

embankment. Instruments installed at Pier 8 (UIUC–1) 

consisted of two strain-gage piezometers and a MEMS-based 

ShapeAccelArray (SAA) shown in figure 2. A similar array 

(UIUC–2) was installed at the toe of the approach embankment (near Pier 15; fig. 2) adjacent to ground improvement 

installed by the Illinois Department of Transportation. Photos 

of the UIUC -2 installation are shown in figure 3. The SAA 

is a combined downhole accelerometer array (five depths 

record seismic events) and in-place inclinometer manufactured by Measurand, Inc. The piezometers were installed 

one-third and two-thirds of the way into the liquefiable sands 

at depths corresponding to accelerometer depths. A third array 

(UIUC–3) was established adjacent to the existing “free-field” 

downhole accelerometer array to maximize data obtained from 

the existing array. At this location, two strain gage piezometers 

were installed in the liquefiable sands, with one piezometer 

adjacent to the one accelerometer installed in the alluvium. To 

date, the instruments have not been triggered by earthquake 

shaking.

The instruments are wired to an automated data acquisition system that communicates via a wireless local area 

network to a central data storage and processing computer 

located near the Missouri approach embankment. The 
Figure 2. Locations of geotechnical instrumentation arrays UIUC–1 and UIUC–2.

Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 71

enclosures for the data acquisition system and the battery 

storage system, the solar panels that power the system, and the 

wireless antenna are illustrated in figure 3F.

Site Response Analysis at Instrument Array UIUC–1

To examine possible instrument response for various 

earthquake scenarios, we performed one-dimensional (1D) 

site response analyses using equivalent linear, nonlinear total 

stress, and nonlinear effective stress methods using DEEPSOIL v3.5 (Hashash and others, 2008). We also compared 

the nonlinear effective stress site response analysis results 

to simplified methods for estimating liquefaction triggering and excess porewater pressure (PWP) generation. As 

large earthquakes have not been recorded in the Central and 

Eastern United States (CEUS), we preliminarily used synthetic 

bedrock motions (for Site Class B) generated by SMSIM 

(Atkinson and Boore, 1995) for the site response analyses. 

For this study, input motions were generated that correspond 

to 2 percent, 10 percent, and 50 percent PE in 50 years and 

propagated through the representative profile presented in 

figure 1. This profile corresponds closely to the subsurface 

conditions encountered at array UIUC–1. 

A sample set of bedrock and surface acceleration time 

histories computed in the nonlinear effective stress analysis 

for the 2 percent PE in 50 years hazard level is presented 

in figure 4. These results exhibit distinct ground motion 

incoherency 2 to 3 seconds after the start of shaking. The 

ground motion incoherency and long period motion observed 

3 seconds after the start of shaking are consistent with seismic 

liquefaction occurring early during ground shaking (Youd and 

Carter, 2005). Similar results were observed for other synthetic 

ground motions corresponding to a 2 percent PE in 50 years 

hazard level. Triggering of liquefaction was less severe for 

synthetic ground motions corresponding to a 10 percent PE 

in 50 years hazard level, and liquefaction was not predicted 

for synthetic motions corresponding to a 50 percent PE in 

50 years hazard. 

Simplified liquefaction potential analyses were performed 

using the cyclic stress method (Seed and Idriss, 1971; 

Whitman, 1971) as last updated by Youd and others (2001). 

Cyclic resistance ratios (CRR) were estimated using the 

SPT-based method updated by Youd and others (2001) and 

using the VS

-based method proposed by Andrus and others 

(2004). Cyclic stress ratio (CSR) was computed using the 

PGA computed at the surface from the nonlinear total stress 
Figure 3. Geotechnical instrumentation, installation, and data acquisition in Illinois.

A B C

D E F

72 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

analyses, then rd was used to calculate the cyclic stress ratio 

variation with depth. All other procedures described by Youd 

and others (2001) were used. The factor of safety against triggering level-ground liquefaction is:

FS CRR

CSR liq = (1)

Marcuson and Hynes (1990) proposed correlations between 

excess PWP ratio, ru

, and FSliq for sands and gravels, where ru

is defined as: 

r u u

x

vo

=  ’ (2)

where 

ux = excess PWP and 

σ’vo = initial vertical effective stress. 

An ru value equal to unity corresponds to the triggering of 

liquefaction. 

A comparison of maximum ru profiles computed using 

the simplified method (equations 6 and 7) and using nonlinear 

effective stress site response analyses for synthetic ground 

motions corresponding to each hazard level (2 percent, 

10 percent, and 50 percent PE in 50 years) is shown in 

figure 5. The simplified method predicts liquefaction throughout the medium dense sands from about 4 m to 16 m below 

grade, as well as in the dense sands from 21 m to 26 m and 

from 29 m to 30 m (fig. 5A). In contrast, the nonlinear effective stress site response analyses shows less severe liquefaction, predicting liquefaction around 5 m and from about 13 

to 15 m below grade. The sands between 5 and 13 m are 

predicted to experience PWP increases, but not liquefaction. 

Below 21 m, small ru

 values are predicted, but at levels well 

below that corresponding to liquefaction. 

Comparisons for a sample ground motion corresponding 

to the 10 percent and 50 percent PE in 50 years, respectively, 

are illustrated in figures 5B and 5C. As illustrated in figure 5B

for the 10 percent PE in 50 years, the simplified method 

predicts significantly higher ru

 values than the nonlinear 

effective stress site response analysis, although the zones of 

sand that exhibit PWP increase are similar. For the 50 percent 

PE in 50 years example, neither the simplified method nor 

the nonlinear effective stress site response analysis predicted 

excess PWP generation.

Conclusions

As part of a USGS ANSS project, the first two authors 

installed geotechnical instrumentation at the Bill E. Emerson 
Figure 5. Example comparisons of excess porewater pressure ratios predicted by nonlinear effective stress site response analysis 

and simplified liquefaction analysis. (A) 2 percent probability of exceedence (PE) in 50-year ground motion, (B) 10 percent PE in 

50-year ground motion, and (C) 50 percent PE in 50-year ground motion.

A B C

Figure 4. Ground motion incoherency predicted by nonlinear effective stress site response analysis.

Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 73
74 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

Memorial Bridge to significantly augment the existing structural instrumentation on the bridge. The geotechnical instruments will measure ground response in soils that are predicted 

to liquefy and laterally spread during strong earthquakes. The 

combined geotechnical and structural instrumentation provides 

unprecedented opportunities to capture strong, near-field 

ground motions in the Central United States.

Predictions of instrument responses for scenario New 

Madrid earthquakes were made using equivalent linear, 

nonlinear total stress, and nonlinear effective stress site 

response analyses. The nonlinear effective stress results 

predicted significant ground motion incoherency at the 

2 percent PE in 50 years hazard level. These analyses also 

predicted less severe porewater pressure generation for the 

2 percent and 10 percent PE in 50 years hazard levels than 

simplified empirical methods. No excess porewater pressure 

generation was predicted for the 50 percent PE in 50 years 

hazard level using either the site response analyses or the 

simplified method. 

Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by U.S. Geological 

Survey, Department of the Interior, under USGS Agreement 

No. 06CRGR0006 under the guidance of Drs. Woody Savage 

and Bill Leath of the USGS. Dr. Mehmet Celebi (USGS) 

provided information on the existing structural instrumentation. Mr. Bryan Heartnagel (Missouri Department of Transportation, MoDOT) provided bridge plans and served as a point 

of contact for MoDOT. Mr. Greg Smothers (Illinois Department of Transportation, IDOT) served as a point of contact 

for IDOT. Mr. Joe Zdankiewicz (IDOT) provided geotechnical reports for the Illinois approach. Their input is gratefully 

acknowledged. The views and conclusions contained in this 

document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either 

express or implied, of the U.S. Government or the individuals 

mentioned above.

References

Andrus, R.D., Stokoe, K.H., and Juanga, C.H., 2004, Guide 

for shear-wave-based liquefaction potential evaluation: 

Earthquake Spectra, 20(2): p. 285–458.

Atkinson, G.M., and Boore, D.M., 1995, Ground-motion 

relations for Eastern North America: Bulletin of the 

Seismological Society of America, 85(1), p. 17–30.

Celebi, M., 2006, Real-time seismic monitoring of the new 

Cape Girardeau bridge and preliminary analyses of recorded 

data: an overview: Earthquake Spectra, 22(3), p. 609–630.

Hashash, Y.M.A., Park, D., Tsai, C., and Groholski, D., 2008, 

DEEPSOIL v.3.5: user manual and tutorial. 

Marcuson, W.F., and Hynes, M.E., 1990, Stability of slopes 

and embankments during earthquakes: Geotechnical 

Seminar presented to ASCE/Pennsylvania Department of 

Transportation.

Seed, H.B., and Idriss, I.M., 1971, Simplified procedure 

for evaluating soil liquefaction potential: Journal of the 

Soil Mechanics and Foundations Division, 107(SM9), 

p. 1,249–1,274.

Whitman, R.V., 1971, Resistance of soil to liquefaction and 

settlement: Soils and Foundations, 11(4), p. 59–68.

Woodward-Clyde Consultants, 1994, Geotechnical seismic 

evaluation proposed new Mississippi River bridge (A-5076) 

Cape Girardeau, MO.: Project Geotechnical Report 

No. 93C8036-500.

Youd T.L., Idriss, I.M., Andrus, R.D., Arango, I., Castro, G., 

Christian, J.T., Dobry, R., Finn, W.D., Harder, L.F., Hynes, 

M.E., Ishihara, K., Koester, J.P., Liao, S.C., Marcuson, W.F., 

Martin, G.R., Mitchell, J.K., Moriwaki, Y., Power, M.S., 

Robertson, P.K., Seed, R.B., and Stokoe, K.H., 2001, Liquefaction resistance of soils—summary report: Journal of 

Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering, 127(10), 

p. 817–833.

Youd, T.L., and Carter, B., 2005, Influence of soil softening and liquefaction on spectral acceleration: Journal of 

Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering, 131(7) 

p. 811–825.

Development of Composite Dispersion Curves 

for the Determination of Shear Wave Velocity 

Profiles

By Scott Stovall, Andy Kizzee, and Shahram Pezeshk

Department of Civil Engineering, The University of Memphis, 

Memphis, Tennessee 38152, spstovll@memphis.edu

Spectral analysis of surface waves (SASW) and refraction micro-tremors (ReMi) are two non-intrusive methods 

used for determining in situ shear-wave velocities. While both 

methods applied individually have been shown to produce 

reasonable results, both suffer from poor resolution for specific 

frequency ranges. The SASW method produces good results 

in the upper 30 meters controlled by frequencies above 5 Hz 

where signal to noise ratios are acceptable. The ReMi method 

produces good results in the frequency range of 2 to 15 Hz but 

suffers from lack of high frequency ambient noise and spatial 

aliasing. By combining the two methods, we can produce a 

composite dispersion curve with higher accuracy in both low 

and high frequency ranges resulting in a better determination 

of shear wave velocity profile.
Abstracts and Papers from Poster Session—Wednesday, August 13, 2008 75

Communicating Earthquake Mitigation with 

the Health/Hospital Community: Moving from 

Information to Action and Closing the Loop

By Sue L. Evers and Cathleen Carlisle

Federal Emergency Management Agency HQ and Region VII, 

Kansas City, Missouri 64114-3372, sue.evers@dhs.gov

Under the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction 

Program, roles of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) include guidance development, building codes and standards, training, outreach, State and local 

coordination, and partnerships. To achieve the technology 

transfer, FEMA has produced many publications, moving the 

research findings into technical documents, then into training 

and outreach. The challenge has been to move from providing 

information to achieving action from recipients of the information. This project will discuss how we are moving to close 

the loop. Since January of 2005, there have been more than 

200 earthquakes along the New Madrid Seismic Zone, many 

of which were widely felt throughout the region. When and 

where the next one will occur, and how large it will be, are 

questions that are difficult, if not impossible, to answer with 

any certainty, but reducing the vulnerability from damages is 

possible.

Hospitals have unique nonstructural components, including special equipment and unique infrastructure systems. Even 

during smaller-sized earthquakes, nonstructural components of 

hospitals can cause injury and/or varying amounts of damage. 

Furthermore, hospitals must remain operational during and 

after an earthquake. By using sound, cost effective mitigation techniques, operations can be maintained and losses can 

be reduced, and in some cases eliminated. With our partners, 

we took the segments most critical to hospital functionality 

following an earthquake and packaged the information in plain 

language with photos of hospital earthquake damage and the 

mitigation fixes. Our plan is to follow up with class participants and report back on the actual implementation.

The St. Louis Area Regional Response System 

(STARRS) and its sponsoring partners hosted two one-day 

workshops on earthquake mitigation for hospitals. Some of the 

topics covered included the earthquake hazard, State earthquake program overview, FEMA existing buildings program, 

and nonstructural mitigation for hospital facilities.

Determining Social Impacts and Needs 

Assessments based upon HAZUS-MH Damage 

and Loss Estimates

By Theresa I. Jefferson, John Harrald, and Frank 

Fiedrich

Center for Technology, Security, and Policy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Alexandria, Virginia 22314, 

tjeff@vt.edu

A FEMA funded catastrophic planning and preparedness project is focusing on utilizing essential scientific and 

technical modeling results to predict potential physical and 

human consequences should a New Madrid Seismic Zone 

(NMSZ) earthquake occur. The software program, HAZUSMH, a public-domain application, is being utilized to produce 

damage and loss estimates based on a scientifically defendable 

scenario. This paper describes the methodology developed to 

translate the damage and loss estimates into a variety of social 

impacts and needs assessments. 

Through interviews with various emergency response 

organizations, an inventory of the most valuable information necessary for making decisions regarding planning and 

response was compiled. This data was used to determine the 

various social impacts and needs assessments to be modeled.

A methodology was developed for utilizing HAZUS 

outputs to determine the following:

• “At risk” populations.

• Sheltering and commodities requirements.

• Chronic illnesses requiring medical support.

• Pet sheltering.

• Sheltering analysis.

• Vulnerability analysis.

• Emergency fuel requirements.

• Security issues—prison populations.

HAZUS-MH was originally designed as a mitigation 

tool. This is the first large scale effort to adapt the modeling results to a planning and preparedness environment. By 

translating the outputs of HAZUS into information describing 

social impacts and needs assessments it is possible to provide 

the emergency management community with the information they need to develop effective response strategies and to 

determine the capabilities and capacity required for response 

to a catastrophic event.

Multistate Technical Information Clearinghouse

By Jim Wilkinson and Theresa I. Jefferson

Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium, Memphis, Tennessee 

38118, jwilkinson@cusec.org

Natural disasters occur infrequently, limiting our ability 

to develop an inclusive knowledge base concerning such 

events. The ability to study, interpret, and document findings 

immediately following a damaging seismic event, is a critical 

step in furthering our understanding of events, allowing for 

effective awareness, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts. 

In the Central United States, a Post Earthquake Technical 

Information Clearinghouse (PETIC) Plan has been developed 

to coordinate research activities, and to facilitate collaboration 
76 Proceedings of Preparing for a Significant Central United States Earthquake

between the emergency management and research communities. Because a damaging earthquake in the Central United 

States will affect several States, a Multistate Technical 

Information Clearinghouse (MSTIC) Coordination Plan to 

link State technical information clearinghouses (STICs) is 

proposed. This paper describes initial efforts to define the role 

and functions of a MSTIC as well as formalize plans with 

emergency management agencies to facilitate collaboration 

and coordination between STICs and the MSTIC. 

Seismic Hazard, Risk, and Mitigation Policy in 

the New Madrid Seismic Zone

By Zhenming Wang

Kentucky Geological Survey, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky 40506, zmwang@uky.edu

Large earthquakes of about M7.5 that are similar to those 

that occurred during 1811–12 in the New Madrid Seismic 

Zone are of great concern for the communities in the Central 

United States, particularly in northeastern Arkansas, western 

Kentucky, southeastern Missouri, and northwestern Tennessee. It has been determined that these large earthquakes 

occurred several times in the past few thousands of years with 

an average recurrence interval of 500 to 1,000 years. It has 

also been determined that these large earthquakes concentrated along the New Madrid faults coincide with present-day 

seismicity. All these indicate that the communities in the 

Central United States are facing significant seismic hazards. In 

terms of magnitude, the seismic hazard can be measured as an 

M7.5 earthquake, with an average recurrence interval of 500 

to 1,000 years. The median peak ground accelerations (PGA) 

are estimated to be about 0.25 g in Memphis and 0.1 g in St. 

Louis, respectively. Therefore, in terms of ground motion at a 

specific site, the seismic hazard can be measured as a 0.25 g 

PGA in Memphis or 0.1 g PGA in St. Louis with recurrence 

interval of 500 to 1,000 years, respectively. A PGA of 0.3 g 

with a recurrence interval of 500 to 1,000 years can also be 

estimated in Paducah, Kentucky. These are estimated seismic 

hazards based on the current scientific understanding of the 

New Madrid Seismic Zone. These hazard estimates, however, 

may not be enough for making mitigation policy because a 

policy decision is based more on seismic risk than on seismic 

hazard. 

Seismic hazard and risk are two fundamentally different concepts, and the definition of seismic risk is broad and 

subjective. In a general term, risk is the probability (chance) of 

harm if someone or something (vulnerability) is exposed to a 

hazard. In a quantitative term, risk is defined by three parameters: probability, a level of hazard, and exposure (time and 

asset). Therefore, seismic risk is generally defined as the probability of experiencing a level of seismic hazard or loss for a 

given exposure (time and asset), for example, 5–10 percent 

probability of exceedance of a M7.5 earthquake in 50 years, 

5–10 percent probability of exceedance of 0.25 g in 50 years 

in Memphis, and 0.1 g in St. Louis. These risk estimates are 

based on 1) time-independent (Poisson) model that could 

be used to describe the occurrences of earthquakes; 2) an 

exposure such as a building or bridge with a life of 50 years. 

If the fragility curve (a relation between damage potential 

and ground motion level) for a building or bridge is known, 

seismic risk in terms of economic loss can also be estimated. 

For example, if a PGA of 0.1 g could cause $10,000 damage 

to a building in St. Louis, the estimated seismic risk for the 

building is 5–10 percent probability of exceedance of $10,000 

in 50 years. 

These are estimated seismic hazards and risks posed 

by the large earthquakes in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. 

These risk estimates should be the bases for any mitigation 

policy consideration.

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