HIGHWAY 

EMERGENCY RELIEF

Strengthened

Oversight of Project 

Eligibility Decisions 

Needed

Report to the Subcommittee on 

Transportation, Housing and Urban 

Development, and Related Agencies, 

Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives

November 2011

GAO-12-45

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
 United States Government Accountability Office 

Highlights of GAO-12-45, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and 

Urban Development, and Related Agencies, 

Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives 

November 2011 

HIGHWAY EMERGENCY RELIEF 

Strengthened Oversight of Project Eligibility 

Decisions Needed 

Why GAO Did This Study 

The Federal Highway Administration 

(FHWA), within the U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), administers the 

Emergency Relief Program to provide 

funds to states to repair roads 

damaged by natural disasters and 

catastrophic failures. In 2007, GAO 

reported that in recent years states’ 

annual demand for emergency relief 

funds often exceeded the program’s 

$100 million annual authorization from 

the Highway Trust Fund and required 

supplemental appropriations from 

general revenues to address a backlog 

of funding requests from states. GAO 

recommended that FHWA tighten 

eligibility standards and coordinate with 

states to withdraw unneeded 

emergency relief funds, among other 

actions. For this report, GAO reviewed 

(1) Emergency Relief Program funding 

trends since 2007, (2) key program 

changes made in response to GAO’s 

2007 report, and (3) the extent to 

which selected emergency relief 

projects were approved in compliance 

with program eligibility requirements. 

GAO reviewed projects in New York, 

Texas, and Washington state, states 

selected based on the amount and 

frequency of funding allocations since 

2007, among other factors. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO makes several recommendations 

including that FHWA establish (1) time 

frames to limit states’ requests for 

emergency relief funds and to close 

completed projects and (2) 

standardized procedures for reviewing 

emergency relief documentation and 

making eligibility decisions. DOT 

provided technical comments on 

project time frames and costs which 

GAO incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found 

From fiscal years 2007 through 2010, the Emergency Relief Program received 

about $2.3 billion, of which $1.9 billion came from three supplemental 

appropriations compared with about $400 million authorized from the Highway 

Trust Fund. FHWA allocated this funding to 42 states and 3 territories to reduce 

the backlog of funding requests, with $485 million in unfunded requests 

remaining as of June 2011. This backlog list did not include funding requests for 

August 2011 damages from Hurricane Irene. Because the program lacks time 

frames to limit states from requesting funds years after events occur, the June 

2011 backlog list includes about $90 million for events that occurred prior to fiscal 

year 1994. Without time limits for emergency relief funding requests, FHWA’s 

ability to anticipate and manage future program costs is hindered. 

In response to GAO’s 2007 report, FHWA withdrew about $367 million of 

unobligated emergency relief funds from states and redistributed most of this 

funding for other emergency relief needs. However, additional funding remains 

unused, including (1) at least $63 million allocated to states before fiscal year 

2007 that has yet to be obligated to projects and (2) $341 million obligated 

between fiscal years 2001 and 2006 that remains unexpended. Due to a lack of 

time frames for states to close-out completed projects, FHWA lacks project 

status information to determine whether unexpended funding is no longer needed 

and could be deobligated. FHWA has not addressed GAO’s 2007 

recommendation to revise its regulations to limit the use of emergency relief to 

fully fund projects that have grown in scope and cost as a result of environmental 

or community concerns. The Emergency Relief Program faces the continued risk 

of escalating costs due to projects that have grown in scope beyond the 

program’s goal of restoring damaged facilities to predisaster conditions. 

GAO’s review of 83 emergency relief project files in three FHWA state offices 

found many instances of missing or incomplete documentation—as such, GAO 

was unable to determine the basis by which FHWA made many eligibility 

determinations. For example, about half of the project files did not include 

required repair cost estimates, and 39 of 58 (67 percent) emergency repair 

projects approved for 100 percent federal funding did not contain documentation 

of completion within 180 days—a requirement for states to receive 100 percent 

federal funding. FHWA lacks clear requirements for how states submit and 

FHWA approves key project documentation, which has resulted in FHWA state 

offices applying eligibility guidelines differently. Establishing standardized 

procedures for reviewing emergency relief documentation and making eligibility 

decisions would provide greater assurance that projects are in fact eligible and 

that FHWA makes eligibility determinations consistently and transparently. 

Instances of Missing or Incomplete Emergency Relief Project Documentation 

GAO-identified areas of concern regarding eligibility Instances 

Missing or incomplete detailed damage inspection reports 47 of 83 

Missing repair cost estimates 42 of 83 

Missing or incomplete dates for 100 percent federal funding projects 39 of 58 

Missing documentation for specific improvements 6 of 15 

Source: GAO analysis of Emergency Relief Project documentation in three FHWA state offices. View GAO-12-45 or key components. 

For more information, contact Phillip R. Herr at 

(202) 512-2834 or herrp@gao.gov
Page i GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Letter 1 

Background 4

Supplemental Appropriations Comprise Most Emergency Relief 

Funding Provided to States, and a Backlog of Funding Requests 

Remains 13

FHWA’s Program Revisions Have Not Fully Addressed Prior 

Concerns 22

Incomplete Information in Emergency Relief Project Files in Three 

States Raises Concerns about FHWA’s Eligibility Decisions and 

Program Oversight 30

Conclusions 39

Recommendations for Executive Action 40

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 43

Appendix II Summary of Emergency Relief Funding for Projects at Devils Lake, 

North Dakota 47

Appendix III Results of GAO’s File Review of Emergency Relief Project 

Documentation Available in Three FHWA Division Offices 49

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 56

Tables

Table 1: Types of Projects Receiving State Oversight versus FHWA 

Oversight 11

Table 2: Emergency Relief Program Obligations and Expenditures, 

Fiscal Years 2001 through 2006 26

Table 3: Instances of Missing or Incomplete Project Documentation 31

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Figures

Figure 1: Examples of Emergency and Permanent Repairs 6

Figure 2: Emergency Relief Project Processes and Areas of 

Responsibility 8

Figure 3: Total Emergency Relief Program Funding, Fiscal Years 

2007 through 2010 14

Figure 4: Emergency Relief Allocations by State, Fiscal Years 2007 

through 2010 16

Figure 5: Unobligated Emergency Relief Allocations Withdrawn 

from States since 2007 by the Fiscal Year in Which the 

Events Occurred 23

Figure 6: Results of GAO’s File Review of Emergency Relief 

Projects in Three FHWA Division Offices 49

Abbreviations

Caltrans California Department of Transportation

DDIR detailed damage inspection report

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

FMIS Fiscal Management Information System

SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 

 Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users

S.R.1 State Route 1

TXDOT Texas Department of Transportation

WSDOT Washington State Department of Transportation

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

November 8, 2011

The Honorable Tom Latham

Chairman

The Honorable John W. Olver

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and 

 Urban Development, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

In recent years, many states have experienced natural disasters, such as 

hurricanes, floods, and storms, which have caused catastrophic damage 

to transportation infrastructure and overwhelmed the capacity of state and 

local governments to respond and recover. Reconstruction after these 

events can cost taxpayers billions of dollars. As part of the continuing 

federal role in responding to and recovering from natural disasters and 

similar events, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), within the 

U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), administers the Emergency 

Relief Program which provides funding to repair or reconstruct federal-aid 

highways and roads on federal lands damaged or destroyed by natural 

disasters and other catastrophic events.1

Since 1972, Congress has authorized $100 million annually in contract 

authority for FHWA’s Emergency Relief Program to be paid from the 

Highway Trust Fund.2

 

1

Federal-aid highways are roads that are eligible to receive federal funding through a 

series of formula grant programs collectively known as the federal-aid highway program. 

About 1 million miles of roadway across the country are eligible for federal aid and these 

roads accounted for about 83 percent of the vehicle miles traveled on the nation’s 

roadways in 2007. The federal government has provided assistance to states in response 

to natural disasters for many years. The Emergency Relief Fund was established in 1938 

(Act of June 8, 1938, 75th Cong., 3d. Sess., ch. 328, § 4, 52 Stat. 633, 634-635).

However, in recent years the Highway Trust Fund 

2

The Highway Trust Fund is funded on a user-pay principle; it derives revenues primarily 

from taxes collected on motor fuel and truck-related items and distributes that revenue to 

the states primarily though a series of formula grant programs collectively known as the 

federal-aid highway program. The Highway Trust Fund was created in 1956 (Highway 

Revenue Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, § 209, 70 Stat. 387, 397). Contract authority 

allows federal agencies to incur obligations in advance of appropriations. A subsequent 

appropriation is needed to liquidate the obligations. Pursuant to this authority, up to $100 

million is authorized to be obligated in any one fiscal year for the program. Any 

unobligated balance remains available until expended. 23 U.S.C. § 125(c)(1). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

has not been the only source of funds for the Emergency Relief Program.

The $100 million annual authorization of contract authority has remained 

constant since 1972, and due to inflation, it has declined in real value.

States’ need for assistance from fiscal years 1998 through 2006 

consistently exceeded the $100 million annual authorization of contract 

authority, resulting in a backlog of funding requests that reached $740 

million in 2004. As a result, the program has relied on supplemental 

appropriations for 86 percent of its funding from fiscal years 1998 through 

2006.3 In past years, supplemental appropriations were drawn from the 

Highway Trust Fund. However, with the enactment of the Safe, 

Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for 

Users (SAFETEA-LU) in August 2005, Congress authorized additional 

necessary funding for the Emergency Relief Program in excess of the 

$100 million annual contract authority to be appropriated from general 

revenues.4

In our 2007 report, we identified a significant fiscal imbalance between 

available funds and eligible projects in the Emergency Relief Program.5

As requested and in light of these concerns, this report reviews (1) FHWA 

Emergency Relief Program funding trends since our 2007 report, (2) key 

changes to the Emergency Relief Program implemented in response to 

concerns raised in our 2007 report, and (3) the extent to which selected 

We found that FHWA was not recapturing or redistributing unused 

Emergency Relief Program allocations to states with immediate program 

needs, as specified in FHWA’s program guidance. We also raised 

concerns about the use of emergency relief funds to fully finance projects 

whose scope and costs had grown as a result of environmental and 

community concerns. We made several recommendations to FHWA to 

improve its management, including ensuring that unneeded emergency 

relief allocations were withdrawn on a timely basis so the backlog of 

unfunded requests could be addressed, and to revise program 

regulations to tighten the eligibility criteria for emergency relief funding, 

among other recommendations.

 

3

GAO, Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal Imbalance

and Long-term Sustainability, GAO-07-245 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2007).

4

Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 1112, 119 Stat. 1144, 1171 (2005).

5

GAO-07-245. 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

emergency relief projects were approved in compliance with program 

eligibility requirements.

To identify Emergency Relief Program funding trends and key changes 

made to the program since our 2007 report, we reviewed federal statutes, 

including supplemental appropriation acts, and FHWA data on emergency 

relief allocations to states from fiscal years 2007 through 2010. Our scope 

of work did not include any Emergency Relief Program activities in 

response to Hurricane Irene, which occurred in August 2011. We also 

reviewed and analyzed financial data from FHWA’s fiscal management 

information system (FMIS) on emergency relief allocations and 

obligations to states as of May 31, 2011, as well as funds that were 

obligated to and expended by states for events occurring from fiscal years 

2001 through 2010. We reviewed the procedures used by FHWA to enter 

and verify data into FMIS, and we found the data to be sufficiently reliable 

for our purposes. We also reviewed FHWA Emergency Relief Program 

regulations and guidance, including FHWA’s Emergency Relief Manual as 

revised in 2009. We interviewed FHWA officials in the Office of Program 

Administration to determine why and how specific changes were made to 

the program.

To determine the extent to which selected emergency relief projects were 

approved in compliance with program eligibility requirements, we 

reviewed federal statutes, regulations, and FHWA guidance on 

emergency relief eligibility requirements and examined a sample of 

emergency relief project files in three FHWA division offices. We selected 

a nongeneralizable sample of 88 emergency relief project files from 

FHWA division offices in three states—New York, Texas, and Washington 

state—to demonstrate the range of practices and projects that the 

Emergency Relief Program funds across the country. Five of the 88 

projects in our review had been withdrawn by states because, in part, 

FHWA had determined them ineligible for emergency relief funds, 

bringing the total number of projects reviewed to 83. We selected New 

York, Texas, and Washington state because they were among the states 

receiving the most funding allocations from fiscal years 2007 through 

2010, among other factors. We chose the files according to several 

criteria, including a criterion to examine a mix of active and closed 

projects that were obligated more than $1 million in emergency relief 

funds. Prior to our site visits, we requested that the division offices 

provide all documentation they maintain for each of the projects selected 

in our sample, which represented approximately 67 percent of all 

emergency relief funds that FHWA obligated to those states during that 

time period. We reviewed all the documentation provided during our site 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

visits, and requested follow-up information as necessary. To gather 

additional information on the project files, we reviewed the procedures 

used to manage and oversee emergency relief projects and interviewed 

officials in the FHWA division offices and state departments of 

transportation for all three states. We provided the results of our file 

review to FHWA for their comment and incorporated their responses as 

appropriate.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2010 to November 

2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides a 

more detailed description of our scope and methodology.

We provided a copy of this report to DOT for review and comment. DOT 

officials provided technical comments by e-mail, including information on 

Emergency Relief Program time frames and growth of project costs. We 

incorporated this information into the draft as appropriate.

The Emergency Relief Program, authorized by section 125 of title 23 of 

the U.S. Code, provides assistance to repair or reconstruct federal-aid 

highways and roads on federal lands that have sustained serious damage 

from natural disasters or catastrophic failures. Congress has provided 

funds for this purpose since at least 1938. Examples of natural disasters 

include floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, tsunamis, severe 

storms, and landslides. Catastrophic failures qualify if they result from an 

external cause that leads to the sudden and complete failure of a major 

element or segment of the highway system that has a disastrous impact 

on transportation. Examples of qualifying causes of catastrophic failures 

include acts of terrorism or incidents such as a barge striking a bridge pier 

causing the sudden collapse of the structure or a truck crash resulting in a 

fire that damages the roadway. For natural disasters or other events to be 

eligible for emergency relief funding, the President must declare the event 

to be an “emergency” or a “major disaster” under the Robert T. Stafford 

Background 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act6 or the governor must 

declare an emergency with the concurrence of the Secretary of 

Transportation.7

Since 1972, Congress has authorized $100 million annually in contract 

authority for the Emergency Relief Program to be paid from the Highway 

Trust Fund. Accordingly, FHWA may obligate up to $100 million in any 

one fiscal year for the program. Any unobligated balance remains 

available until expended.8

Additionally, obligations to a single state resulting from a single natural 

disaster or a single catastrophic failure may not exceed $100 million.9 In 

some cases, Congress has enacted legislation lifting this cap for largescale disasters. Moreover, as provided in FHWA’s regulations, states are 

eligible for assistance under the Emergency Relief Program if the cost of 

the damage from a single event exceeds $700,000 for emergency 

assistance.10

The Emergency Relief Program’s authorizing statute and FHWA’s 

regulations and guidelines distinguish between emergency and 

The $700,000 threshold includes the damage cost for all 

sites in any state affected by the disaster. According to FHWA guidance, 

each prospective damage site must have at least $5,000 of repair costs to 

qualify for funding assistance—a threshold intended to distinguish 

unusually large expenses eligible for emergency relief funding from costs 

that should be covered by normal state maintenance funding.

 

6

Pub. L. No. 93–288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974), as amended, codified at 42 U.S.C. ch. 68. In 

September 2011, the Federal Emergency Management Agency issued the National 

Disaster Recovery Framework which provides a structure for federal, state, tribal, and 

local agencies to coordinate disaster recovery activities in response to Stafford Act events, 

which may include emergency relief from FHWA. See Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, National Disaster Recovery Framework: Strengthening Disaster Recovery for the 

Nation (Washington, D.C., September 2011).

7

23 U.S.C. § 125(d).

8

23 U.S.C. § 125(c)(1).

9

23 U.S.C. § 125(d). 

10The criteria for administering emergency relief funds are set out in 23 C.F.R. Part 668.

See, also, FHWA, Emergency Relief Manual (Washington, D.C., November 2009). The 

$700,000 threshold reflects a presumption that lesser repairs should be covered as heavy 

maintenance or routine repair activities and paid for using other funds. See 23 C.F.R. 

§ 688.105.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

permanent repairs. Emergency repairs are made during and immediately 

following a disaster to quickly restore essential highway traffic service, 

minimize the extent of damage, or protect remaining facilities, including 

removing debris and constructing detours and temporary roadway 

surfaces. Permanent repairs are undertaken, normally after emergency 

repairs have been completed, to restore seriously damaged highway 

facilities to predisaster conditions. In some instances, such as the 

destruction of a bridge, complete replacement may be needed. In these 

cases, the bridge would be rebuilt to current design standards11

Figure 1: Examples of Emergency and Permanent Repairs

(see fig. 1 

for photographs of typical emergency and permanent repair examples).

 

11The Emergency Relief Manual makes a distinction between current design standards 

and “betterments,” which change the function or character of the facility and are discussed 

later in this report. The program manual states that repaired facilities may be built to 

current design standards, which could result in improved or added features that do not 

change the function or character of the facility. For example, a repaired length of roadway 

may have wider lanes or shoulders and additional roadside safety hardware that result 

from following current design standards. According to the manual, these features are not 

betterments.
 

Page 7 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

The Emergency Relief Program may fund up to 100 percent of 

emergency repair project costs incurred within the first 180 days following 

an eligible disaster.12 The program funds permanent repair projects and 

emergency repair project costs after the first 180 days at the percentage 

normally provided for work on that type of federal-aid highway.13 For 

example, the federal share for interstate highway projects is 90 percent of 

the cost, and the federal share for most other federal projects is 80 

percent.14 Also, construction on permanent repairs must begin by the end 

of the second fiscal year following the year in which the disaster 

occurred;15

Figure 2 shows processes and areas of responsibilities for the 

Emergency Relief Program.

however, FHWA may grant time extensions for projects 

needing extensive environmental evaluation, litigation, or complex rightof-way. In addition, the program is not intended to pay for “betterments,” 

projects that change the function or character of the highway facility, such 

as expanding road capacity. However, FHWA may determine that 

betterments are eligible for program funding if they pass a benefit-cost 

test that weighs their cost against the prospective cost to the Emergency 

Relief Program for potentially chronic future repairs.

 

1223 U.S.C. § 120(e). 

13The Emergency Relief Program also funds the repair of roads on federal lands through 

the Emergency Relief for Federally Owned Roads Program, which is administered through 

FHWA’s Office of Federal Lands Highway. This program is intended to fund unusually 

large expenses to repair and reconstruct roads and bridges on federal lands that are 

seriously damaged by a natural disaster or a catastrophic failure. The program may fund 

100 percent of the cost of repairs to federal roads.

14States with high percentages of federally owned public lands may be reimbursed at a 

higher federal share percentage, in accordance with a predetermined sliding scale 

percentage. 

1523 C.F.R. Part 668. 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Figure 2: Emergency Relief Project Processes and Areas of Responsibility

a

FHWA division offices located in each state review applications for 

emergency relief submitted by the state departments of transportation

and decide the eligibility of emergency relief projects. Once the division 

A governor’s declaration is not required if the President has declared the event to have been an 

emergency or major disaster under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 

Act.
 

Page 9 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

office determines that an event is eligible for funding, it requests an 

emergency relief allocation from FHWA’s Office of Program 

Administration, which manages the allocation of emergency relief to 

division offices.16 If funding is not immediately available, the request is 

added to a nationwide list of funding requests, known as the emergency 

relief backlog list, which is used to apprise Congress of states’ requests 

for funding for specific events. As funding becomes available for 

obligation—either through the program’s $100 million annual 

authorization of contract authority or through a supplemental 

appropriation from Congress—FHWA enters into a project agreement for 

individual projects formalizing the conditions of its project approval and 

incurs obligations, based on the damage estimates prepared by states 

and approved by FHWA.17

As with other federal-aid highway programs, FHWA reimburses the states 

for emergency relief work as that work is completed and invoiced. If 

emergency relief funding is not immediately available for emergency relief 

work, FHWA may obligate other available transportation funds18 as may 

be necessary for the immediate execution of emergency relief work and 

reimburse any funds actually expended once emergency relief funds 

become available.19

The level of FHWA’s oversight in the design and construction of federalaid projects, including emergency relief, is determined by the 

Because estimates are based on circumstances 

existing at the time funds are obligated, more funding is sometimes 

obligated than is ultimately needed. FHWA may deobligate unexpended 

funds which will not be needed by states, increasing the amount of funds 

available for obligation for use for other projects.

 

16FHWA allocates available budget authority to states in a manner that is in some 

respects similar to the process by which funding is apportioned for purposes of the 

federal-aid highway formula grant programs. Unlike those programs, however, allocation 

has no statutory or even regulatory basis. However, as with apportionments, when funds 

are allocated, cash is not actually disbursed. Instead, states are notified that they have 

federal funds available for their use. As projects are approved, funding is obligated. 

Federal funds are only expended when the federal government makes payments to the 

states for costs as work is completed.

1723 U.S.C. § 106(a)(2),(3).

18Only funds for programs authorized under title 23 of the U.S. Code are available for 

emergency relief work.

1923 U.S.C. § 125(c)(2).
 

Page 10 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

classification of the roadway. Since the passage of the Intermodal 

Surface Transportation Efficiency Act in 1991,20 states have been allowed 

to assume an increased amount of oversight responsibility for the design 

and construction of federal-aid projects. However, this expanded authority 

does not diminish FHWA’s responsibility to determine whether projects 

are eligible for federal funds or ensure that federal funds are efficiently 

and effectively managed. States are primarily responsible for oversight of 

federal-aid highway projects, including emergency relief, on federal-aid 

highways that are off the National Highway System—which represent 

approximately 83 percent of the nation’s road miles. In addition, states 

may assume responsibility for National Highway System projects not on 

the Interstate Highway System.21 State departments of transportation may 

approve design plans and estimates and conduct project inspections to 

ensure the completion of emergency relief projects, among other things.

FHWA exercises full oversight responsibility for many projects on the 

Interstate Highway System, as shown in table 1.22

 

20Pub. L. No. 102–240, § 1016, 105 Stat. 1914, 1945 (1991), codified as positive law at 23 

U.S.C. § 106(c). See, also, 23 U.S.C. § 106(g) requiring federal oversight.

21The National Highway System is approximately 160,000 miles of roadway, and it 

includes the Interstate Highway System as well as other roads important to the nation’s 

economy, defense, and mobility.

22Each state’s department of transportation and the FHWA division office in that state 

have a federal-aid program stewardship and oversight agreement in place which 

documents the expectations and roles and responsibilities of the state and FHWA in 

implementing the federal-aid highway program. 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Table 1: Types of Projects Receiving State Oversight versus FHWA Oversight 

Type of project Mileage Design and construction oversight Exceptions 

Federal-aid highways off 

the National Highway 

System

798,000 State assumes oversight responsibilities for design, 

plans, specifications, estimates, contract awards, and 

inspection of projects.

State determines state 

oversight is not appropriate

National Highway 

System, non-Interstate 

routes 

115,000 State may assume the oversight responsibilities for 

design, plans, specifications, estimates, contract 

awards, and inspections of projects.

State or FHWA determines 

state oversight is not 

appropriate

National Highway 

System, Interstate routes

47,000 FHWA exercises full oversight responsibilities to (1) 

prescribe design and construction standards, (2) 

approve design plans and estimates, (3) approve the 

selection of the contract award, (4) inspect the 

progress of construction, and (5) render final 

acceptance on projects when they are completed.

Certain types of projects, or 

projects below a dollar 

threshold, where FHWA and 

state have agreed state 

oversight is appropriate

Source: GAO analysis.

Although FHWA administers the Emergency Relief Program in the same 

manner as the regular federal-aid highway program, there are important 

differences between the two. The regular program derives revenues from 

highway users and funding is provided on a multiyear basis through 

formulas designed to ensure that each state receives its “fair share” 

based on estimated contributions to the Highway Trust Fund. Since the 

passage of SAFETEA-LU, a majority of emergency relief funds, as we 

have reported, have derived from general revenues, for expenses that for 

the most part cannot be planned for, and states compete for funding 

based on need. While formula funding for the regular federal-aid highway 

program is limited by amounts annually apportioned to the states, any 

emergency relief funds that a state receives are in addition to such 

apportionments. And while regular federal-aid program projects require a 

state to match its federal funding amount, emergency repair projects may 

qualify for 100 percent federal funding.

Our 2007 report identified concerns regarding FHWA’s financial oversight 

of the Emergency Relief Program and the program’s eligibility criteria and 

made several recommendations to FHWA.23

• First, we found that FHWA was not routinely recapturing all unused 

program funds allocated to states—including unused unobligated 

emergency relief funds as well as unexpended obligated funds—that 

 

23GAO-07-245. 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

were not needed for eligible projects. This contributed to a situation in 

which states with immediate disaster needs were placed on the 

backlog list of states requesting funds, while states with no current 

disaster needs retained their allocations.24

• Second, we expressed concern that the scope of eligible activities had 

expanded in recent years as a result of congressional waivers or 

FHWA rulemaking to revise eligibility criteria. As a result, emergency 

relief funds were being used to fully finance projects that had 

expanded in scope and costs beyond the typical emergency relief 

project. To address this concern, we recommended that FHWA 

tighten the eligibility criteria for funding, which could include limitations 

on the use of emergency relief funds to fully finance projects that grew 

in scope and costs as a result of environmental and community 

concerns.

We therefore 

recommended that FHWA division offices annually coordinate with 

states to identify unused emergency relief funds and withdraw any 

unneeded amounts. Funds in excess of any outstanding need, if any, 

would be identified to Congress for rescission or to reduce future 

appropriations.

• Third, we noted that the lack of a standard definition of what 

constitutes an eligible damage site might allow many smaller costs to 

be charged against the program and recommended that FHWA clarify 

its program manual to better define an eligible site.

 

24GAO-07-245. 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

From fiscal years 2007 through 2010, Congress provided more than $2.3 

billion to the Emergency Relief Program, including more than $1.9 billion 

in three supplemental appropriations from general revenues and about 

$400 million in contract authority paid from the Highway Trust Fund (see 

fig. 3). The supplemental appropriations represented 83 percent of the 

program’s funding over that time period. This percentage has been fairly 

consistent over time: 86 percent of the total Emergency Relief Program 

funding provided from fiscal years 1990 through 2006 came from 

supplemental appropriations.25

 

25GAO-07-245. 

Supplemental 

Appropriations 

Comprise Most 

Emergency Relief 

Funding Provided to 

States, and a Backlog 

of Funding Requests 

Remains 

From Fiscal Years 2007 

through 2010, Congress 

Provided More than $2.3 

Billion for Emergency 

Relief Events and to 

Address a Backlog of 

Unfunded Requests
 

Page 14 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Figure 3: Total Emergency Relief Program Funding, Fiscal Years 2007 through 2010

a

In fiscal year 2007, FHWA received almost $102 million in contract authority rather than the typical 

$100 million. The additional $2 million was the Emergency Relief Program’s share of additional 

budget authority provided to all highway programs to align total highway budget authority with revised 

revenue from the Highway Trust Fund for that year.

b

U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations 

Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, title IV, ch. 8, 121 Stat. 112, 160 (2007).

c

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. K, title I, 121 Stat. 1844, 2384 

(2008).

d

Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 

110-329, div. B, title I, ch. 10, 122 Stat. 3574, 3598 (2008). 

Two of the supplemental appropriations that Congress provided to the 

Emergency Relief Program since fiscal year 2007 were used to address 

the backlog of unfunded emergency relief requests from states. In May 

2007, Congress provided $871 million26

 

26U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 

Appropriations Act, 2007. Pub. L. No. 110-28, title IV, ch. 8, 121 Stat. 112, 160 (2007). 

to help clear a backlog of $736 

million in funding requests from 46 states. In September 2008, when the 

backlog list reached more than $560 million, Congress provided $850 

million to address this backlog and provide additional funds for future 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

requests.27 In December 2007, Congress provided $195 million for the 

reconstruction of the Interstate 35 West Bridge in Minnesota.28

FHWA has allocated all of the $2.3 billion provided to the program since 

fiscal year 2007, as well as an additional $100 million carried over from 

previously provided program funding, among 42 states and three 

territories.

 

29

 

27Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, 

Pub. L. No. 110-329, div. B, title I, ch. 10, 122 Stat. 3574, 3598 (2008).

Sixty-five percent of the allocations (almost $1.6 billion) went 

to six states—California, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, Texas, and 

Washington state (see fig. 4). California received almost $538 million, the 

most of all states, and most of this was a result of the 2005–2006 winter 

storms. Washington state was allocated almost $166 million in response 

to 10 events ranging from a single event estimated to cost $1 million to 

about $58 million to respond to flooding caused by severe rains in 

December 2007.

28Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. K, title I, 121 Stat. 

1844, 2384 (2008). This supplemental appropriation followed separate legislation passed 

soon after the bridge collapsed, in which Congress authorized $250 million in emergency 

relief funds for this project. See Pub. L. No. 110-56, § 1(c), 121 Stat. 558 (2007).

29Of the $2.4 billion that FHWA allocated to states from fiscal years 2007 through 2010, 

about 59 percent ($1.4 billion) was allocated for events that occurred during those years.

FHWA allocated the remaining 41 percent ($988 million) for events that occurred from 

fiscal years 2001 through 2006. 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Figure 4: Emergency Relief Allocations by State, Fiscal Years 2007 through 2010

Note: The three territories that were provided allocations from fiscal years 2007 through 2010 were 

American Samoa ($23 million), Puerto Rico ($20 million), and U.S. Virgin Islands ($730,591).
 

Page 17 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

In our 2007 report we noted that Congress has, on occasion, expanded 

Emergency Relief Program eligibility criteria and increased the amount of 

program funding to respond to specific disasters.30 For example we noted 

that Congress directed the Emergency Relief Program to fund 100 

percent of all repair and reconstruction of highways, roads, and bridges 

necessitated by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, because the states’ 

resources were inadequate to deal with the string of disasters.31

• Collapse of the Interstate 35 West Bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Since 2007, FHWA allocated about $373 million

From 

fiscal years 2007 through 2010, FHWA allocated about $484 million in 

emergency relief in response to two events—one in Minnesota and one in 

North Dakota.

32 for the 

reconstruction and repair of an 8-lane, 1,900 foot bridge spanning the 

Mississippi River which collapsed on August 1, 2007, killing 13 people 

and injuring 145 others.33 Five days after the disaster, Congress 

passed legislation that authorized the use of emergency relief funds 

for the repair and reconstruction of the bridge, waived the $100 million 

limitation on emergency relief obligations, and established a 100 

percent federal share for all repair costs for the project.34

• Basin flooding of roadways at Devils Lake, North Dakota. Since fiscal 

year 2007, North Dakota was allocated more than $111 million in 

emergency relief funding for projects associated with Devils Lake—a 

large natural basin that lacks an outlet for rising water to flow out of 

 

 

30GAO-07-245. 

31Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriation to Address Hurricanes 

in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, ch. 9, 119 

Stat. 2778 (Dec. 30, 2005). 

32This amount includes $195 million made available through the December 2007 

supplemental appropriation. 

33The National Transportation Safety Board later determined that the probable cause of 

the collapse was inadequate load capacity of critical bridge components due to an error in 

the bridge’s design. See National Transportation Safety Board, Collapse of I-35W 

Highway Bridge, Minneapolis, Minnesota, August 1, 2007, Highway Accident Report 

NTSB/HAR-08/03 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 14, 2008). Emergency Relief Program rules 

define a catastrophic failure as a sudden failure of a major element or segment of a 

federal road which is not primarily attributable to gradual and progressive deterioration or 

lack of proper maintenance. 

34Pub. L. No. 110-56, § 1(a), (b), 121 Stat. 558 (2007).
 

Page 18 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

the lake. Starting in the early 1990s, the lake level has risen 

dramatically, threatening adjacent roadways. Although Emergency 

Relief Program regulations define a natural disaster as a sudden and 

unusual natural occurrence, FHWA determined that the gradual and 

predictable basin flooding at Devils Lake is eligible for Emergency 

Relief Program funding.35 In 2005, through SAFETEA-LU, Congress 

authorized up to $10 million of Emergency Relief Program funds to be 

expended annually, up to a total of $70 million, to address an 

additional problem at Devils Lake and make repairs to certain roads 

which were impounding water and acting as dams.36 In the absence 

of other authority, this funding must come out of the $100 million 

annual authorization of contract authority, effectively reducing the 

annual emergency relief funding available to other states. As of March 

2010, the Emergency Relief Program has provided more than $256 

million for projects related to Devils Lake flooding.37

In recent years, Congress has provided significant supplemental funding 

to the Emergency Relief Program, but as of June 2011, a $485 million 

backlog of funding requests from states remained. This backlog did not 

include funding requests for August 2011 damages from Hurricane Irene. 

The backlog list provides a snapshot of states’ funding requests at a 

given time and is subject to change as states experience new eligible 

events. According to guidance in FHWA’s Emergency Relief Manual, 

requested amounts are based on the states’ anticipated need for 

emergency relief for the current fiscal year and may be less than the total 

emergency relief needs for any specific event.

The June 2011 backlog list contained almost $90 million in formal funding 

requests for several events that occurred between 1983 and 1993 that 

were previously determined to be eligible by FHWA. Specifically, 

California requested almost $83 million for a single, long-term project in 

response to a 1983 rockslide, known as Devil’s Slide, and an additional 

$6.5 million for four other events from fiscal years 1990 through 1993.

 

35In 1996, FHWA amended its Emergency Relief Program regulations to explicitly provide 

that raising road grades in response to an unprecedented rise in basin water levels was 

an emergency relief-eligible activity. 23 C.F.R. § 668.109(b)(8).

36Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 1937, 119 Stat. 1510 (2005).

37App. II provides additional information on Devils Lake emergency relief projects. 

Emergency Relief Faces 

Risk from Escalating Costs 

of Events Occurring in 

Past Years
 

Page 19 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

According to FHWA, these requests are for approved emergency relief 

events with projects that have had delays due to environmental issues or 

cost overruns.

Once an event has been approved for emergency relief by FHWA, current 

program rules do not establish a time limit in which states must submit all 

funding requests for repairs. Although FHWA requires states to submit a 

list of projects within three months of approving a state’s application for 

emergency relief,38

Devil’s Slide tunnel for State Route 1 in California. Total costs 

estimated to be more than $631 million in emergency relief funds resulted 

from the ongoing construction of a tunnel in response to a 1983 landslide 

in California. The Devil’s Slide area in California is an unstable cliff 

formation on the Pacific coast near San Francisco that is subject to 

reoccurring rock slides onto State Route 1 (S.R.1). Following a major 

landslide over the winter of 1983 that closed S.R.1 for 3 months, the 

California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) began to pursue the 

idea of relocating S.R.1 away from the slide area. The project required a 

comprehensive environmental impact study, which took several years to 

complete. The study was subsequently challenged in U.S. District Court, 

which delayed construction for several more years and resulted in an 

additional environmental review. As we reported in 2007, in the years that 

passed since the original environmental impact study, community 

attitudes shifted in favor of relocating S.R.1 by way of a tunnel through 

the mountain behind Devil’s Slide so that S.R.1 would not be affected by 

future rock slides. In 1998, Congress declared the Devil’s Slide project to 

be eligible for emergency relief

eligibility stemming from an approved event does not 

lapse, and a state’s list of projects may be amended at any time to add 

new work. Consequently, FHWA faces the risk of receiving 

reimbursement requests from states for projects years after an event 

occurs, including requests for projects that have experienced significant 

delays and cost increases over time, due to environmental or community 

concerns. The June 2011 backlog list included project funding requests 

for two events that occurred more than 10 years ago and which 

demonstrate FHWA’s risk of escalating long-term costs due to older 

events.

39

 

3823 C.F.R. § 668.113(a).

and, after an additional environmental 

39The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 

1217(a), 112 Stat. 107, 214 (1998). 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

review, the tunnel alternative was selected in 2002 and construction of a 

pair of 4,200-foot-long, 30-foot-wide tunnels began in 2006—23 years 

after the originating emergency relief event. 

Construction of the tunnel is ongoing, with a planned completion in March 

2013. To date, FHWA has obligated about $555 million in emergency 

relief funds to the Devil’s Slide tunnel project out of an estimated cost of 

$631 million. The $631 million total project cost estimate includes the $83 

million requested on the June 2011 backlog list—which is for work 

completed during fiscal year 2011—as well as an additional $120 million 

to be requested in the future to fully reimburse Caltrans to complete the 

project. 

Alaskan Way Viaduct in Seattle, Washington. The June 2011 backlog 

list also contained a “pending” request of $40.5 million from Washington 

state in response to a February 2001 earthquake which damaged the 

Alaskan Way Viaduct—a 2-mile double-deck highway running along 

Seattle’s waterfront.40 In the months after the event, FHWA approved 

$3.6 million for emergency relief repairs to cracks in several piers 

supporting a section of the viaduct, which were completed by December 

2004. At the time of the earthquake, the Washington State Department of 

Transportation (WSDOT) had begun considering options for replacing the 

viaduct, which was approaching the end of its design life. After continued 

monitoring, WSDOT found that the viaduct had experienced accelerated 

deterioration as a result of the earthquake and requested $2 billion in 

emergency relief to replace the viaduct. Congress directed FHWA and 

state and local agencies to determine the specific damages caused by 

the earthquake and the amount eligible for emergency relief.41

 

40According to FHWA’s Emergency Relief Manual, a pending request is considered an 

initial estimate of emergency relief needs that is subject to change and is not to result in 

an actual emergency relief allocation. Instead, pending requests are used to keep FHWA’s 

Office of Program Administration apprised of the most current needs for any known 

eligible event. 

In 

response, FHWA found that while the replacement of the entire viaduct 

was not eligible for emergency relief, the project was eligible to receive 

$45 million to replace the section of the viaduct damaged by the 

41SAFETEA-LU directed DOT, along with WSDOT and the city of Seattle, Washington, to 

conduct a comprehensive study to determine the specific damage to the Alaskan Way 

Viaduct from the 2001 earthquake and the amount of assistance from the emergency 

relief fund for which the viaduct is eligible. Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 1934, 119 Stat. 1482.
 

Page 21 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

earthquake.42

The lack of a time limit for states to submit emergency relief funding 

requests raises the risk of states filing claims for additional funding years 

after an event’s occurrence, particularly for projects that grow significantly 

in cost or scope over time. States may have good reasons for submitting 

funding requests years after an event—particularly for larger-scale 

permanent repairs that may take years to complete—but such projects 

can grow unpredictably. The example of the relocation of S.R.1 away 

from Devil’s Slide and the cost and scope increases that resulted from 

more than two decades of delays to complete lengthy environmental 

reviews and address community concerns is case and point. The 

absence of a time limit for states to submit funding requests hinders 

FHWA’s ability to manage future claims to the program and creates a 

situation where Congress may be asked to provide additional 

supplemental appropriations for emergency relief years after an event 

occurs. Furthermore, states requesting emergency relief funds for 

projects many years after an event raises questions as to whether the 

repairs involved meet the goal of the Emergency Relief Program to 

restore damaged facilities to predisaster conditions. 

FHWA further found that if WSDOT decided to move 

forward with a more comprehensive replacement project for the entire 

facility, the estimated amount of emergency relief eligibility could be 

applied to that project. WSDOT now plans to replace the entire viaduct 

with a bored tunnel under downtown Seattle, with an estimated cost of 

almost $2 billion. According to FHWA’s Washington state division office, 

the $40.5 million listed on the June 2011 emergency relief backlog list will 

be obligated toward the construction of the larger replacement project for 

the viaduct.

In 2007 we recommended that FHWA revise its regulations to tighten 

program eligibility criteria, which could include limitations on the use of 

emergency relief funds to fully finance projects that grew in scope and 

cost as a result of environmental and community concerns. In July 2011, 

DOT’s regulatory agenda43

 

42FHWA, WSDOT, Seattle City Department of Transportation, Alaskan Way Viaduct 

Emergency Relief Eligibility, Report to Congress (Washington, D.C., June 2007). 

included a planned rulemaking for the 

Emergency Relief Program that would, among other actions, consider 

43The regulatory agenda is a semiannual summary of all current and projected 

rulemakings, reviews of existing regulations, and recently completed actions of the DOT. 
 

Page 22 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

specific time restrictions for states when filing a claim for emergency relief 

eligible work.44 However, in October 2011, FHWA withdrew this planned 

item from its agenda. According to an FHWA official, the planned 

rulemaking was withdrawn because it was premature and because FHWA 

is still determining what changes if any are needed to address GAO’s 

2007 recommendations.

Since our 2007 report, FHWA has implemented a process to withdraw 

unused allocations and reallocate funding to benefit other states. FHWA 

undertook these actions in response to our recommendation to require 

division offices to annually coordinate with states to identify and withdraw 

unused allocations that are no longer needed so funds may be used to 

reduce the backlog of other program requests.45

In fiscal years 2010 and 2011, FHWA division offices coordinated with 

states to identify and withdraw unused allocations representing 

approximately $367 million in emergency relief funds from a total of 25 

Since 2007, FHWA has 

based its allocations on a state’s estimate of anticipated emergency relief 

obligations for the fiscal year. Prior to fiscal year 2007, FHWA’s policy 

was to allocate the full amount of each state’s emergency relief request, 

based on total available program funds.

 

44According to DOT’s Spring 2011 regulatory agenda, the rulemaking would have

considered amending 23 C.F.R. Part 668 to update the annual threshold for an 

emergency relief event, raise the site threshold and clarify the definition of a site and other 

definitions, and provide specific time limit restrictions for states when filing a claim for 

emergency relief eligible work. This rulemaking would also have considered requiring

states to develop a plan for obligation needs for emergency relief funding and impose 

restrictions on the applicability of "quick release" emergency relief allocations. 

45GAO-07-245. We also recommended that in the event these funds are not needed for 

other eligible projects, FHWA should identify these funds to Congress either for rescission 

or to reduce future appropriations.

FHWA’s Program 

Revisions Have Not 

Fully Addressed Prior 

Concerns 

FHWA Now Has 

Procedures to Withdraw 

Some Unused Emergency 

Relief Allocations from 

States, But Lacks

Information to Verify 

Whether Additional 

Unused Allocations Are 

Still Needed
 

Page 23 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

states and 2 territories.46

Figure 5: Unobligated Emergency Relief Allocations Withdrawn from States since 

2007 by the Fiscal Year in Which the Events Occurred

To withdraw unused funds from states, FHWA 

reviews its financial database, FMIS, to identify the amount allocated to 

each state that has not been obligated to specific projects. FHWA then 

asks each state to identify remaining fiscal year need for new obligations 

and the amount of any allocations that will no longer be needed. FHWA 

then withdraws the amount determined by the state to be no longer 

needed and reallocates that amount to other nationwide emergency relief 

needs, such as unfunded requests on the backlog list. Most of the 

withdrawn allocations were originally allocated to states from fiscal years 

2003 to 2006, as shown in figure 5. Of the $299 million that was 

withdrawn for events occurring from fiscal years 2003 to 2006, about 

$230 million was withdrawn from Florida.

Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

 

46The $367 million in unused allocations were withdrawn on two separate occasions: on 

December 1, 2009, FHWA withdrew $105 million, and on November 24, 2010, FHWA 

withdrew $262 million. 
 

Page 24 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

FHWA reallocated $295 million of the $367 million withdrawn from states 

for other nationwide requests.47

As of the end May 2011, $493 million that FHWA allocated to states in 

response to events occurring since 1989 remains unobligated.

According to FHWA, the remaining $72 

million that was withdrawn but not yet reallocated will be made available 

to states in future allocations.

48 A 

significant portion of this amount likely reflects the recent allocation of 

$320 million in April 2011. However, at least $63 million of the 

unobligated balance is for older allocations, provided prior to fiscal year 

2007. Specifically, New York’s unobligated balance includes almost $52 

million provided after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks for 

roadway repairs delayed due to ongoing building construction around the 

World Trade Center site.49

Although the Emergency Relief Manual states that FHWA division offices 

are to identify and withdraw unused program funding allocations annually, 

we found several instances in which division offices applied unused 

allocations from existing events to new events in the same state without 

requesting a new allocation. Specifically, our file review at the FHWA

FHWA’s New York division reported that these 

repairs are not expected to be completed until 2014. In addition, 

California maintained an unobligated balance of more than $11 million 

from the October 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. According to FHWA 

California division officials, FHWA sought to withdraw some of this 

allocation, but Caltrans and local officials indicated that this allocation was 

necessary to complete environmental mitigation and bike path projects 

that were part of reconstruction of the collapsed Bay Bridge connecting 

San Francisco and Oakland in California.

 

47FHWA redistributed this $295 million, as well as other funds made available to the 

program, through two separate allocations to states. In March 2010, FHWA allocated 

approximately $339 million to states, which included amounts from the first withdrawal of 

$105 million from December 2009. In April 2011, FHWA allocated $320 million to states, 

which included amounts from the second withdrawal of $262 million. 

48Unobligated funds refer to amounts that have been allocated to states by FHWA, but 

have yet to be obligated for specific projects. This amount includes all allocations to states 

as of the end of May 2011.

49In total, as of the end of May 2011, $97 million made available to New York for 

emergency relief in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks has yet to be 

used. This includes the unobligated balance of $52 million, as well as an additional $45 

million that has been obligated to projects but not expended as of the end of May 2011.

This unexpended balance is discussed later in this report. 
 

Page 25 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Washington state and New York state division offices identified three 

events from fiscal years 2009 and 2010 that the division offices approved 

as eligible and funded with allocations that were no longer needed from 

previous events. This practice, which was permitted in the 1989 version of 

the Emergency Relief Manual, limits FHWA’s ability to track unobligated 

balances for specific events and determine whether those funds are no 

longer needed and may be withdrawn. FHWA took steps to limit divisions 

from using this practice by removing language permitting the practice in 

the 2009 Emergency Relief Manual. According to FHWA, this change was 

made so that funds could be more equitably distributed across the nation 

to address the backlog of funding requests, rather than allowing states to 

hold unused funds in reserve for future events.

Although FHWA removed the language permitting this practice from the 

manual, FHWA has not provided written guidance to its divisions to 

prohibit them from applying unused allocations to new events in the same 

state, and the practice is still being used. For example, in February 2011, 

FHWA’s headquarters allowed the Washington state division to shift 

unused funds from a prior event to a new event, and in doing so, the 

division office did not submit a request for an allocation of funds for those 

new events and FHWA headquarters did not provide an allocation for 

those events. Consequently, FHWA headquarters did not have a record 

for the events, nor did it know the amount of funds made available by the 

division for these events. Furthermore, FHWA headquarters officials were 

unable to determine how prevalent this practice was across division 

offices. As a result, FHWA headquarters lacks information on what 

funding was made available and remains unobligated to states for specific 

events. Because Emergency Relief Program funding is not subject to the 

annual limits that the regular federal-aid highway program is, states have 

an incentive to retain as much emergency relief funding as possible by 

not returning unused funds. The lack of information on the amount of 

funds that could be made available for specific events could prevent 

FHWA from verifying whether allocations provided to states are still 

needed or may be withdrawn and used to meet current needs.
 

Page 26 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

In addition to the unused allocations, substantial amounts of obligated 

emergency relief funding have not been expended. About $642 million in 

emergency relief funding obligated for states from fiscal years 2001 

through 2010 remains unexpended as of May 2011—including about 

$341 million in emergency relief funds obligated from fiscal years 2001 

through 2006.50

Table 2: Emergency Relief Program Obligations and Expenditures, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2006 

In total for the Emergency Relief Program, 8 percent of all 

funding obligated from fiscal years 2001 through 2006 has yet to be 

expended (see table 2).

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total

Obligations $360 $67 $195 $1,082 $1,991 $758 $4,454

Expenditures 314 65 191 1,072 1,803 667 4,113

Unexpended balance 46 2 5 10 188 91 341

Percent expended 87% 97% 98% 99% 91% 88% 92%

Source: GAO analysis of FHWA financial data.

Note: The amounts provided for each fiscal year were rounded to the nearest million and may not add 

to the total amount provided due to rounding.

Almost half of the unexpended balance from fiscal years 2001 through 

2006 is for projects in response to several extraordinary events that 

occurred during those years, including the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks in New York and Gulf Coast Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma 

in 2005. Specifically, about $45 million of the $46 million that remains 

unexpended for fiscal year 2001 is for repair projects to facilities around 

the World Trade Center site in New York City. Of the $188 million that 

remains unexpended for fiscal year 2005, about $118 million is for 

projects in Louisiana in response to Hurricane Katrina. As of the end of 

May 2011, FHWA obligated about $952 million to 155 emergency relief 

projects in Louisiana for this event and has since made reimbursements 

to the state for all but 1 of these projects, providing approximately 88 

percent of the amount obligated.

 

50Unexpended funds refer to program funding that has been obligated to specific projects 

but has yet to be paid out to states (expended) in reimbursement for completed work.

In Addition to Unused 

Allocations, Obligated 

Funds Remain 

Unexpended 
 

Page 27 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Although substantial unexpended obligated funding remains, FHWA lacks 

information to determine the amount that is unneeded and could be 

deobligated because there is no time frame for closing out completed 

emergency relief projects. FHWA division officials in New York and Texas 

reported that many emergency relief projects are administered by local 

public agencies, including towns and counties, and these entities are 

often slow to process their reimbursement requests through the state 

department of transportation. As such, FHWA lacks information on the 

status of these projects and whether projects are ongoing or have been 

completed. For example, in Texas, 28 of 30 projects since 2007 included 

in our file review were listed as active in FHWA’s national database, 

FMIS. However, according to Texas Department of Transportation 

(TXDOT) officials, construction on 23 of the 28 active projects was in fact 

completed and waiting to be closed out. FHWA division office officials 

reported that FMIS is not a project management system and does not 

provide the actual status of the construction of projects. As such, states 

may have completed some emergency relief projects but not processed 

reimbursement requests from local public agencies or completed final 

project financial audits. Projects remain active in FMIS until final vouchers 

have been processed to reimburse states. DOT’s Office of Inspector 

General and external independent auditors have both identified inactive 

or unexpended obligations as a significant concern within FHWA.51

Without clear time frames for states to close out completed emergency 

relief projects, FHWA lacks important information on the status of projects 

and whether unexpended project funds are no longer needed and may be 

deobligated to be made available for other emergency relief projects.

FHWA has yet to address our longstanding concern about, and our 2007 

recommendation for addressing, the use of emergency relief funds to 

finance projects that have grown in scope beyond the original intent of the 

program, which is to restore damaged facilities to predisaster 

 

51DOT, Agency Financial Report Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 8, 2010), and 

DOT, Office of Inspector General, Report on Inactive Obligations, FHWA, Report No. FI2004-039 (Washington, D.C., Mar. 31, 2004). 

Prior Concerns about 

Project Eligibility Have Yet 

to Be Addressed
 

Page 28 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

conditions.

52 In 1996, we questioned FHWA’s decision to use more than 

$1 billion in emergency relief funds to replace the Cypress Viaduct in 

Oakland, California, which collapsed as a result of the Loma Prieta 

earthquake in October 1989.53

Although FHWA took steps to address our 1996 recommendation,

FHWA engineers initially estimated that 

replacing the destroyed structure along its predisaster alignment would 

cost $306 million. In response to public concern, Caltrans identified 

several alternative alignments that it studied in a 2-year environmental 

review. In 1991, Caltrans and FHWA decided to replace the destroyed 

1.5-mile structure, which had bisected a residential area, with a new 5-

mile structure running through active rail yards. This cost estimate later 

increased to more than $1.1 billion at the time of our 1996 report—an 

increase of almost $800 million from FHWA’s initial estimate of $306 

million to restore the facility to its predisaster condition. As such, we 

questioned whether the improvements and costs resulting from the 

significant relocation and changes in scope should have been funded 

through the Emergency Relief Program rather than the regular federal-aid 

highway program. We recommended that FHWA modify its guidance to 

clearly define what costs can be funded through the Emergency Relief 

Program, particularly when an environmental review recommends 

improvements or changes to the features of a facility from its predisaster 

condition in a manner that adds costs and risks to the project.

54

 

52Our 2007 recommendation was that FHWA revise its regulations to tighten program 

eligibility criteria, which could include limitations on the use of emergency relief funds to 

fully finance projects that grew in scope and cost as a result of environmental and 

community concerns. We also recommended that Congress consider tightening the 

eligibility criteria for emergency relief funding, either through amending the purpose of the 

Emergency Relief Program, or by directing FHWA to revise its program regulations. 

in 

2007, we reported several cases in which the Emergency Relief Program 

was used to fund large projects—such as a bridge replacement or road 

relocation—that were either delayed, had grown in project scope and 

costs, or went beyond the original intent of the Emergency Relief Program 

53GAO, Emergency Relief: Status of the Replacement of the Cypress Viaduct, 

GAO/RCED-96-136 (Washington, D.C: May 6, 1996). The Cypress Viaduct was a twotiered portion of Interstate 880 and an integral component of the area’s transportation 

system. 

54In response to our recommendation, FHWA amended its guidance to more clearly 

indicate when limits should be placed on emergency relief funding, and when full funding 

is appropriate, and we closed this recommendation. 
 

Page 29 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

to restore damaged facilities to predisaster conditions.55 First, we noted 

that relocating California S.R.1 at Devil’s Slide could have been 

addressed through the state’s regular federal-aid highway program, rather 

than through the Emergency Relief Program. If the regular federal-aid 

highway program had been used, the project would not have been eligible 

for 100 percent federal funding,56 and the federal government would have 

saved an estimated $73 million.57 Second, we reported that the 

reconstruction of the U.S. Highway 90 Biloxi Bay Bridge in Mississippi—

which was destroyed in August 2005 during Hurricane Katrina—grew in 

scope and cost by $64 million as a result of community concerns.

Specifically, in response to a concern raised by a local shipbuilder about 

the proposed height of the new bridge, Mississippi department of 

transportation expanded the scope of the bridge reconstruction to 

increase the bridge height to allow for future ships to pass under the 

bridge. The original design was to provide an 85-foot clearance at a cost 

of $275 million, but this scope was expanded to its current design to 

provide a 95-foot clearance at a cost of $339 million.58

FHWA has clarified its definition of an eligible damage site as we 

recommended in 2007, through its revisions to its Emergency Relief 

Manual in 2009. Specifically, FHWA’s 2009 revisions clarified that 

grouping damages to form an eligible site based solely on a political 

subdivision (i.e., county or city boundaries) should not be accepted. This 

change addressed our concern that FHWA division offices had different 

interpretations of what constituted a site, such that damage sites that 

were treated as eligible for emergency relief in one state may have not 

been eligible in another state.

 

55GAO-07-245. 

56The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 established the federal share as 100 

percent at the time the Devil’s Slide rockslide occurred. See 23 U.S.C. § 120(f)(1982). In 

addition, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), enacted in 1998, 

made the Devil’s Slide project eligible for Emergency Relief Program funding. Pub. L. No. 

105-178, § 1217(a), 112 Stat. 107, 214 (1998). 

57Had the Devil’s Slide project been funded through the state’s regular federal-aid 

highway program, it would have been eligible to receive 88.5 percent federal funding or 

approximately $558 million—about $73 million less than the $631 million estimated total 

project cost to be reimbursed through the Emergency Relief Program.

58GAO-07-245. 
 

Page 30 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

In our review of 83 selected emergency relief project files in three FHWA 

division offices, we found that many of the project files reviewed did not 

contain documentation called for in the Emergency Relief Manual to 

support FHWA decisions that projects met program eligibility 

requirements.59

The Emergency Relief Manual directs FHWA division offices to maintain 

files containing information on the methods used to evaluate disasters 

and FHWA’s assessment of damages and estimates of cost. According to 

the Emergency Relief Program regulations, program data should be 

sufficient to identify the approved disaster and permit FHWA to determine 

the eligibility of the proposed work.

Of the 83 projects in our review (totaling about $198.5 

million in federal funds), 81 projects (about $192.8 million in federal 

funds) had at least one instance of missing or incomplete documentation. 

As a result of this missing information, we were unable to determine the 

basis of FHWA’s eligibility decisions for many of the projects in our file 

review.

60

 

59Among the 88 projects in our review, 5 projects had been withdrawn by states as FHWA 

had determined them ineligible for emergency relief funds, or they were reimbursed 

through a third party insurance settlement, bringing the total number of projects reviewed 

to 83. 

In our file review, we identified 

several areas of concern with FHWA’s eligibility determinations based on 

6023 C.F.R. § 668.113.

Incomplete 

Information in 

Emergency Relief 

Project Files in Three 

States Raises 

Concerns about 

FHWA’s Eligibility 

Decisions and 

Program Oversight

Documentation for Many 

Project Files We Reviewed 

Was Missing, Incomplete, 

or Inconsistent
 

Page 31 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

missing, incomplete, or inconsistent documentation, as illustrated in table 

3 and described below (see app. III for detailed results of our file review).

Table 3: Instances of Missing or Incomplete Project Documentation 

Areas of concern regarding eligibility New York Texas

Washington 

state 

Total

instances

Missing or incomplete detailed damage inspection 

reports

16 of 22 28 of 28 3 of 33 47 of 83

Missing repair cost estimates 12 of 22 14 of 28 16 of 33 42 of 83

Missing or incomplete emergency repair completion 

dates to support 100 percent federal funding

18 of 18 0 of 17 a 21 of 23 39 of 58

Missing betterment justification

b

1 of 1 0 of 4 5 of 10 6 of 15

Source: GAO analysis of FHWA Emergency Relief Program documentation.

c

a

The 18 projects with emergency repairs in New York provided only a month and year for the 

completion of repairs. Without a specific date we could not confirm completion was within 180 days of 

the disaster occurrence. These 18 projects are indicated as partially complete for having a completion 

date on file for 100 percent funded work in app. III, figure 6.

b

Fifty-eight of the 83 projects in our review included emergency repairs and were approved to receive

100 percent federal share funding for either all or a portion of the total project cost.

c

Forty-seven of 83 project files (57 percent) lacked documentation for onsite damage inspections. In particular, they did not include a detailed 

damage inspection report (DDIR) or the DDIR was not complete.

According to the Emergency Relief Manual, on-site detailed damage 

inspections are conducted by the applicant or a state department of 

transportation representative if the applicant is a local public agency, and 

an FHWA representative, if available, to determine the extent of damage, 

scope of repair work, preliminary estimate of the repair cost, and whether 

a project is eligible for emergency relief funding. FHWA provides its 

division offices with a DDIR form that states may use to document their 

inspections and provide critical information necessary for determining 

project eligibility, such as a listing of preliminary repair cost estimates for 

equipment, labor, and materials for both emergency and permanent 

repairs. Without such information on file for some projects, we could not 

confirm that FHWA had that information to make emergency relief project 

eligibility determinations.

Fifteen of the 83 projects in our review were identified as betterments in project documentation or by 

FHWA division office officials with whom we spoke.

These documents may be missing due to lack of clear requirements from 

FHWA. FHWA requires documented on-site damage inspections but does 

Missing or Incomplete Detailed 

Damage Inspection Reports 
 

Page 32 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

not have a clear requirement for how states submit the inspections to 

FHWA officials or for how they approve inspection reports; as a result, the 

three division offices we visited applied the Emergency Relief Manual

guidelines differently. For example, none of the 28 project files we 

reviewed in Texas included a DDIR because FHWA’s Texas division 

office relies instead on a “program of projects,” which is a spreadsheet of 

all projects requesting emergency relief funds. In response to a draft 

version of this report, FHWA’s Office of Program Administration explained 

that state departments of transportation may use any format to submit the 

data necessary for FHWA to make an eligibility determination. FHWA’s 

Texas division officials stated that they find the program of projects useful 

and believed it to be an FHWA requirement; however, we found that the 

Emergency Relief Manual guidance was ambiguous and did not directly 

state that this document can be used in place of DDIRs. One section the 

Emergency Relief Manual indicates that the state department of 

transportation is to submit the program of projects to the FHWA division 

office, but it also states that the program of projects should relate the 

damage to that described in the DDIRs. Furthermore, the manual 

suggests in an appendix that the program of projects is actually a 

package of all DDIRs resulting from the detailed damage inspections.

In addition, our file review found that the project descriptions in the 

program of projects did not always provide the detailed information 

regarding damages and proposed repairs outlined in the Emergency 

Relief Manual and found on a DDIR. For example, for one Texas project 

totaling close to $1.7 million in both emergency and permanent repairs, 

the project description was the same for both emergency and permanent 

repairs and did not indicate what specific repair activities were conducted 

for each repair type. Differentiation between emergency and permanent 

repairs is important because emergency repairs are eligible for a higher 

federal share and do not require prior FHWA authorization. Without 

documentation showing a clear distinction between the emergency and 

permanent repairs—information that should be identified and documented 

on a DDIR per program guidance—we could not determine the basis for 

FHWA’s decision that this project met the eligibility requirements for both 

repair types. Overall, we found the program of projects was less useful 

than the DDIR for evaluating the full range of information necessary to 

determine the basis for FHWA’s eligibility determinations.

We found that about half of the projects in our sample (42 of 83) did not 

include repair cost estimates. The Emergency Relief Manual states that at 

a minimum the division office’s project file should contain copies of the 

FHWA field engineer’s assessments on damage and estimates of cost. 

Missing Repair Cost Estimates
 

Page 33 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Officials in each of the FHWA division offices that we visited reported that 

the state’s department of transportation is responsible for preparing repair 

cost estimates, but that FHWA area engineers also conduct some on-site 

inspections to verify the cost estimates provided. In total, 42 projects in 

our sample did not include any repair cost estimates; thus, we could not 

confirm that FHWA officials had this information to make eligibility 

determinations for those projects. For example, a portion of two projects 

in our sample for emergency and permanent repairs was to remove sand 

from drainage ditches and was initially approved by the FHWA Texas 

division office for reimbursement of up to $1.3 million, although the project 

file included no repair cost estimate for any of the work associated with 

the project. Additionally, no information was available in the project file to 

explain the FHWA Texas division office’s decision to later approve a 

nearly 40 percent increase from $1.3 million to the final approved amount 

of $1.85 million. In responding to a draft of this report, DOT stated that the 

cost of the project increased because more sand was removed from the 

drainage ditches than originally estimated. However, no documentation of 

this change was included in FHWA’s project files.

FHWA officials reported that the division office in Texas reviews a sample 

of preliminary cost estimates based on risk, among other factors, prior to 

making any eligibility decisions. According to the officials, FHWA’s Texas 

division office reviewed preliminary cost estimates of at least 10 of the 30 

projects included in our file review before determining eligibility. The 

officials also reported that this sampling approach is consistent with 

FHWA’s stewardship agreement with TXDOT and the fact that states 

have assumed oversight responsibility for design and construction of 

many federal-aid highway projects, including emergency relief projects.61

 

6123 U.S.C. § 106(c)(2) states that for projects that are not on the National Highway 

System, the state shall assume the responsibilities of the Secretary of Transportation 

under this title for design, plans, specifications, estimates, contract awards, and inspection 

of projects, unless the state determines that such assumption is not appropriate.

FHWA also reported that TXDOT’s oversight responsibilities do not 

extend to determining whether particular projects are eligible for federal 

funds. Furthermore, the Emergency Relief Manual states that Emergency 

Relief Program eligibility determinations reside with FHWA, and estimated 

repair costs should be documented to determine eligibility. As such, the 

practice of reviewing a sample of preliminary cost estimates does not 

appear to be consistent with the requirements in the Emergency Relief 
 

Page 34 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Manual, and as a result, we could not determine the basis of FHWA’s 

eligibility decisions for those project cost estimates it did not review.

We found other cases in which cost increases were not documented 

according to the internal policies established by each of the division 

offices we visited. In New York and Texas, FHWA division officials stated 

they require additional documentation to justify cost increases of 25 

percent or more. In Washington state, FHWA division office officials 

stated they require additional documentation if costs increase by 10 

percent or more. Yet 14 percent of the project files we reviewed (12 of 83) 

showed total cost increases that exceeded the limits established by the 

three division offices and no additional documentation was on file to 

support the increases.

62

The majority of the emergency repair project files that we reviewed did 

not include documentation demonstrating that emergency repairs were 

completed within 180 days from the event to be eligible for 100 percent 

federal reimbursement.

 

63

The Emergency Relief Manual does not clearly establish specific

requirements that states demonstrate and FHWA verify the date of project 

Fifty-eight of the 83 projects we reviewed 

included emergency repairs approved to receive 100 percent federal 

funding reimbursement if repairs were completed within 180 days of the 

event occurrence. However, 39 of the 58 (67 percent) did not have 

documentation on file to show the completion date of those repairs (see 

table 3). In total, only 14 of 58 (24 percent) emergency repair projects 

provided a completion date that was within 180 days of the event’s 

occurrence. For the majority (39 of 58) of projects, we were unable to 

confirm whether the emergency repairs were completed within 180 days 

and whether these projects were eligible to receive 100 percent federal 

reimbursement. 

 

62For example, the FHWA Washington state division had approved a project to repair 

erosion on a state road caused by flooding, including improvements to the roadway for 

which a cost-savings to the Emergency Relief Program was claimed. The approved DDIR 

on file indicated a total estimated cost of $2 million, but our review of FMIS records found 

that the total cost had grown to $2.8 million—36 percent more than the approved 

estimate—without documentation to support the increase.

63Emergency repairs must be completed within 180 days from the event to be eligible for 

100 percent federal funding. See 23 U.S.C. § 120(e); also see the FHWA regulation 23 

C.F.R. § 668.107(a).

Missing or Incomplete 

Emergency Repair Completion 

Dates to Support Eligibility for 

100 Percent Federal Funding 
 

Page 35 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

completion. As such, FHWA lacks a standardized process for verifying 

the completion of emergency repairs within 180 days on projects for 

which it does not exercise full oversight. By law, states assume oversight 

responsibility for the design and construction of many federal-aid highway 

projects,64 including the vast majority of emergency relief projects in the 

three divisions we visited. As such, the states—rather than FHWA—were 

responsible for conducting final inspections of emergency relief projects. 

States are required to conduct a final inspection for all federal-aid 

highway projects under state oversight, and these inspections could be 

useful to determine federal share eligibility of emergency repairs if they 

provide project completion dates. While officials in each of the three state 

departments of transportation told us that they conduct final inspections of 

emergency repairs, we found only two final inspection reports prepared 

by states in FHWA’s records to confirm the completion of emergency 

repairs within the required time frame. In addition, when we reviewed final 

inspection reports from one of the state departments of transportation in 

our review, we were frequently unable to verify completion dates. 

Specifically, 11 of the 12 final inspections performed by officials at New 

York State Department of Transportation for projects in our review did not 

include project completion dates. Although the Emergency Relief Manual

states that FHWA division offices reserve the right to conduct a final 

inspection of any emergency relief project, only the FHWA Texas division 

reported conducting spot inspections for a sample of emergency relief 

projects.65

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOT stated that the FHWA New 

York state division office uses other means to verify completion of 

emergency repairs within 180 days. According to DOT, the state often 

submits its DDIRs to FHWA after emergency repairs are completed, 

which allows FHWA to verify the eligibility and completion of an 

emergency repair when it reviews the DDIR. DOT reported that the 

FHWA division office does not sign the DDIR until it confirms the work is 

completed, and that its signature indicates verification that the work was 

performed within the required time frame. However, our file review found 

 

6423 U.S.C. § 106(c)(2).

65These inspections include an on-site review of completed work and documentation 

maintained in the TXDOT project files to determine whether emergency repair project 

charges were incurred after the 180 day time frame, and if so, whether the federal share 

was changed to 80 percent.
 

Page 36 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

that 14 of the 18 emergency repair projects in New York that were 

approved for 100 percent federal funding did not have an FHWA 

signature on the DDIR. 

In addition to a lack of documentation, we found eight instances in which 

permanent repair projects may have incorrectly received 100 percent 

federal share reimbursement.66 According to the Emergency Relief 

Manual, absent specific legislative approval, permanent repair work is not 

to be considered emergency repair work even if it is completed within 180 

days. However, we found instances in which projects were determined to 

be permanent repairs based on information in the project files, but were 

later authorized to receive 100 percent federal share. For example, in one 

project in our review, FHWA’s Washington state division office approved 

permanent repairs to a state highway for $2.6 million in estimated 

damages caused by a landslide. Our review of FHWA financial records 

for this project indicates that FHWA later authorized a federal 

reimbursement of $5.3 million, roughly 99 percent of the total project cost 

of nearly $5.4 million. FHWA Washington state division officials reported 

that this project was considered to be a permanent repair performed as 

an incidental part of emergency repair work.67

 

66Permanent repair projects—and emergency repair project costs after the first 180 

days—are typically reimbursed using an 80 or 90 percent federal share depending on the 

percentage normally provided for work on that type of federal-aid highway.

However, the project files 

did not include any emergency repair work to accompany the approved 

permanent repairs. According to these officials, the FHWA Washington 

state division interpreted the 2003 version of the Emergency Relief 

Manual as allowing incidental permanent work to be funded at 100 

percent federal share either with or as emergency repair work. However, 

the manual states that during the 180 day period following the disaster, 

permanent repair work is reimbursed at the normal pro rata share unless 

performed as an incidental part of emergency repair work. As such, 

based on the program guidance, this project should have been 

reimbursed at 86.5 percent federal share.

67Eight of the Washington state projects in our sample included incidental repairs. An 

incidental repair is a permanent repair performed as an incidental part of the emergency 

repair work. Prior to the November 2009 revisions to the Emergency Relief Manual, 

FHWA treated incidental repairs as eligible for reimbursement based on 100 percent 

federal share. The incidental repairs included in the total took place prior to the manual 

revision and received 100 percent federal share reimbursement.
 

Page 37 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

A primary purpose of the Emergency Relief Program is to restore highway 

facilities to predisaster conditions, not to provide improvements or added 

protective features to highway facilities. However, according to FHWA 

regulations and the Emergency Relief Manual, such improvements may 

be considered eligible betterments if the state provides economic 

justification, such as a benefit-cost analysis that weighs the cost of the 

betterment against the risk of eligible recurring damage and the cost of 

future repair through the Emergency Relief Program.68

• Lack of documentation of required benefit-cost analyses. Six of the 15 

projects (40 percent) identified as betterments in our review did not 

contain the required benefit-cost analyses in their files to justify the 

betterment.

In our file review 

we identified two areas of concern regarding betterments, including 

instances of missing documentation of benefit-cost analyses:

69

• Lack of documentation indicating whether projects include 

betterments. We found that it was often difficult to determine which 

projects included betterments, as FHWA lacks a standard process for 

where and how betterments should be identified in project 

documentation. The Emergency Relief Manual states that betterments 

must receive prior FHWA approval and that further development of 

As a result we were unable to determine the basis on 

which FHWA approved these six betterments. We also found one 

instance in which the benefit-cost analyses used to justify an 

approved betterment did not meet Emergency Relief Program 

requirements. Specifically, FHWA’s New York division office approved 

a betterment of almost $1.6 million to repair and improve a damaged 

roadway and shoulder caused by an April 2007 storm. However, we 

found that the report prepared to justify the betterment did not weigh 

the cost of the proposed betterment against the risk of future 

damages and repair costs to the Emergency Relief Program, as 

required by program regulations. Consequently, we were unable to 

determine the basis on which FHWA approved the $1.6 million 

betterment.

 

6823 C.F.R. § 668.109(b)(6). The Emergency Relief Manual states that a proposed 

betterment may be considered eligible for emergency relief if it includes a benefit-cost 

analysis demonstrating a projected savings in future recurring repair costs under the 

Emergency Relief Program. 

69The 15 projects in our sample were identified as betterments based either on 

documentation in the files or by FHWA division office officials with whom we spoke.

Missing and Inconsistent 

Support for Betterments
 

Page 38 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

contemplated betterments should be accomplished with FHWA 

involvement, necessitating that proposed betterments are specifically 

identified. We found eight project files with indications that the projects

may have included betterments that were not identified explicitly in 

project documentation or by FHWA officials.70

FHWA provides considerable discretion to its division offices to tailor the 

Emergency Relief Program within states and lacks a standard mechanism 

to specifically identify whether a project includes a betterment. FHWA’s 

Office of Asset Management has developed an Economic Analysis Primer 

for FHWA division offices to use when evaluating benefit-cost analyses 

for federal-aid program projects. However, neither the Emergency Relief 

Manual nor the Economic Analysis Primer provide sample benefit-cost 

analyses or specific guidance on what information should be included in 

the benefit-cost analysis to demonstrate that the proposed betterment will 

result in a savings in future recurring repair costs under the Emergency 

Relief Program. Because we had found betterments without 

documentation of the required benefit-cost analyses on file and identified 

possible betterments that were not explicitly identified as such, we could 

not confirm that federal funds were being reimbursed in accordance with 

the requirements of the Emergency Relief Program. Further, absent 

specific guidance for identifying and approving betterments to its division 

offices, FHWA cannot be assured that the Emergency Relief Program is 

being administered consistently.

For example, following 

the completion of emergency repairs to remove debris and protect a 

bridge against erosion caused by a landslide, the FHWA Washington 

state division office approved an additional $3.7 million in permanent 

repairs in response to continued erosion and movement of the hillside.

The documentation in the project file indicated that this permanent 

work was added to stabilize the slide area in anticipation of future 

flooding. According to officials from the FHWA Washington state 

division, this slide stabilization project was a betterment, but the 

project file did not contain documentation to indicate that this project 

was in fact a betterment.

 

70These eight projects were identified as possible betterments because the project files 

contained documentation discussing cost savings to the Emergency Relief Program or the 

scope of work matched the Emergency Relief Manual descriptions of the types of repairs 

that are only eligible for emergency relief funding if the project is an FHWA approved 

betterment. Examples provided in the Emergency Relief Manual include stabilizing slide 

areas and slopes, lengthening or raising bridges, replacing culverts with bridges, and 

adding lanes to the highway, among others.
 

Page 39 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

The federal government plays a critical role in providing financial 

assistance to states in response to natural disasters and other 

catastrophic events. Given the costs of these events and the significant 

fiscal challenges facing both states and the federal government, it is 

increasingly necessary that federal financial support be delivered in an 

effective, transparent, and accountable manner so that limited funds are 

put to their best use. FHWA’s stewardship of the Emergency Relief 

Program could be better structured to meet that necessity.

First, because some emergency relief projects can be delayed for many 

years due to environmental or community concerns and projects can 

grow significantly in scope and cost, the federal government faces the risk 

of incurring long-term costs for such projects. FHWA has limited tools to 

control its exposure to the costs of older events and ensure that as 

projects grow in scope and cost that they do not go beyond the original 

intent of the program, which is to assist states to restore damaged 

facilities to their predisaster conditions. Once an event has been 

approved for emergency relief by FHWA, the Emergency Relief Program 

as currently structured does not limit the time during which states may 

request additional funds and add projects, which increase the size of 

FHWA’s backlog list. Because Emergency Relief Program funding is not 

subject to the annual limits of the regular federal-aid highway program, 

states have an incentive to seek as much emergency relief funding as 

possible. Consequently, without reasonable time limits for states to 

submit funding requests for such older events, FHWA’s ability to 

anticipate and manage future costs to the Emergency Relief Program is 

hindered, as is Congress’ ability to oversee the program. Furthermore, 

without specific action by FHWA to address the recommendation from our 

2007 report that it revise its emergency relief regulations to tighten 

eligibility criteria, the Emergency Relief Program will continue to face the 

risk of funding projects with scopes that have expanded beyond the goal 

of emergency relief and may be more appropriately funded through the 

regular federal-aid highway program.

Second, while FHWA has taken some important steps in response to our 

2007 report to manage program funding by withdrawing unobligated 

balances from states, it faces challenges in tracking allocations that have 

been provided to states. In particular, because FHWA division offices 

have allowed states to transfer unobligated allocations from an existing 

event to new events, and because FHWA headquarters is not tracking 

which divisions have done so, FHWA headquarters does not have the 

information needed to identify and withdraw all unneeded funds. In 

addition, without time frames to expedite the close-out of completed 

Conclusions 
 

Page 40 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

emergency relief projects, FHWA lacks useful information to help 

determine whether obligated but unexpended program funds are no 

longer needed and could be deobligated.

Finally, the fact that we could not determine the basis of FHWA’s eligibility 

decisions in three states on projects costing more than $190 million raises 

questions about whether emergency relief funds are being put to their 

intended use and whether these issues could be indicative of larger 

problems nationwide. While federal law allows states to assume oversight 

over design and construction of much of the federal-aid highway program, 

including many emergency relief projects, FHWA is ultimately responsible 

for ensuring that federal funds are efficiently and effectively managed and 

that projects receiving scarce emergency relief funds are in fact eligible. 

This is especially important in light of the fact that emergency relief funds 

have been derived principally from general revenues in recent years and 

that the funds that states receive are above and beyond the funding limits 

for their regular federal-aid highway program funds. Without clear and 

standardized procedures for divisions to make and document eligibility 

decisions—including documenting damage inspections and cost 

estimates, verifying and documenting the completion of emergency repair 

projects within the required time frame, and evaluating information 

provided to justify proposed betterments—FHWA lacks assurance that 

only eligible projects are approved, and that its eligibility decisions are 

being made and documented in a clear, consistent, and transparent 

manner.

To improve the accountability of federal funds, ensure that FHWA’s 

eligibility decisions are applied consistently, and enhance oversight of the 

Emergency Relief Program, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Transportation direct the FHWA Administrator to take the following four 

actions:

• Establish specific time frames to limit states’ ability to request 

emergency relief funds years after an event’s occurrence, so that 

FHWA can better manage the financial risk of reimbursing states for 

projects that have grown in scope and cost. 

• Instruct FHWA division offices to no longer permit states to transfer 

unobligated allocations from a prior emergency relief event to a new 

event so that allocations that are no longer needed may be identified 

and withdrawn by FHWA.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 41 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

• Establish clear time frames for states to close out completed projects 

in order to improve FHWA’s ability to assess whether unexpended 

program funds are no longer needed and could be deobligated.

• Establish standardized procedures for FHWA division offices to follow 

in reviewing emergency relief documentation and making eligibility 

decisions. Such standardized procedures should include:

• clear requirements that FHWA approve and retain detailed 

damage inspection reports for each project and include detailed 

repair cost estimates;

• a requirement that division offices verify and document the 

completion of emergency repairs within 180 days of an event to 

ensure that only emergency work completed within that time frame 

receives 100 percent federal funding; and

• consistent standards for approving betterments, including 

guidance on what information the benefit-cost analyses should 

include to demonstrate that the proposed betterment will result in 

a savings to the Emergency Relief Program, and a requirement 

that FHWA approval of funding for betterments be clearly 

documented.

We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment. DOT 

officials provided technical comments by email which we incorporated into 

the report, as appropriate. In response to our finding that the Emergency 

Relief Program lacks a time limit for states to submit emergency relief 

funding requests, and our recommendation to establish specific time 

frames to limit states’ ability to request emergency relief funds years after 

an event’s occurrence, DOT noted that the program does include general 

time frames for states to submit an application and have work approved. 

We incorporated this information into the final report; however, since a 

state’s list of projects may be amended at any time to add new work, we 

continue to believe that FHWA’s ability to anticipate and manage future 

costs to the Emergency Relief Program is hindered absent specific time 

frames to limit states’ requests for additional funds years after an event’s 

occurrence. Such time frames would provide FHWA with an important 

tool to better manage program costs.

DOT also commented that its ability to control the costs of some of the 

projects cited in the report that have grown in scope and cost over the 

years is limited in some cases by the fact that DOT received statutory 

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 42 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

direction from Congress to fund these projects. For example, Congress 

directed FHWA to provide100 percent federal funding for all emergency 

relief projects resulting from Hurricane Katrina in 2005. We incorporated 

additional information to recognize this statutory direction; however, a 

determination by Congress that a particular event should qualify for relief 

under the Emergency Relief Program, or for other individual actions, does 

not relieve FHWA of its stewardship and oversight responsibilities. Except 

as Congress otherwise provides, this includes its responsibility to 

determine whether enhancements to projects or betterments are 

consistent with its regulations and the intent of the Emergency Relief 

Program to restore damaged facilities to predisaster conditions. We 

continue to believe that, as a steward of public funds, FHWA generally 

has the discretion to take reasonable steps to limit the federal 

government’s exposure to escalating costs from projects that grow in 

scope over time.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 

days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 

to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of 

Transportation. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on 

GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-2834 or herrp@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix IV.

Phillip R. Herr

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 43 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

To identify Emergency Relief Program funding trends since our 2007 

report,1

To identify key changes to the Emergency Relief Program implemented in 

response to concerns raised in our 2007 report, we reviewed 

recommendations made to FHWA in our 2007 report and FHWA 

Emergency Relief Program regulations and guidance, including FHWA’s 

Emergency Relief Manual, as revised in 2009. We compared information 

in the current version of the Emergency Relief Manual with information in 

the previous version to determine which elements were revised. We 

interviewed FHWA officials in the Office of Program Administration to 

determine why specific changes were made, and we interviewed officials 

in three FHWA division offices to determine how program changes were 

implemented. To corroborate information provided by FHWA regarding its 

process of withdrawing unused Emergency Relief Program funds from 

states, we reviewed FMIS data on the emergency relief funds that were 

allocated among all states and territories, obligated to specific projects, 

and the remaining unobligated balance for all active Emergency Relief 

Program codes as of May 31, 2011. To determine other amounts of 

program funding that remained unused, we reviewed data in FMIS on the 

amount of emergency relief funding obligated to specific projects and 

expended by all states and territories for events occurring from fiscal 

we reviewed federal statutes, including supplemental 

appropriations to the Emergency Relief Program made since 2007, and 

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) documentation on annual 

funding authorizations to the program. We also reviewed FHWA data on 

emergency relief funds allocated to states in response to emergency relief 

events from fiscal years 2007 through 2010, as provided by FHWA’s 

Office of Program Administration. We interviewed FHWA officials in the 

Office of Program Administration to gather specific information on how 

data on allocations was collected and we also reviewed FHWA financial 

data on total allocations to states from FHWA’s fiscal management 

information system (FMIS). We interviewed officials from FHWA Federal 

Lands Highway, FHWA’s North Dakota Division Office, and the North 

Dakota state department of transportation concerning funding and project 

activities for the Devils Lake, North Dakota, emergency relief projects. To 

gather additional information on the Devil’s Slide project in California, we 

interviewed the FHWA California division office and reviewed information 

on the estimated project costs.

 

1

GAO-07-245. 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 44 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

years 2001 through 2010. We provided FHWA officials with our

methodology for gathering data from FMIS to ensure that our data queries 

were accurate. To ensure the reliability of data collected in FMIS we 

interviewed FHWA officials on the procedures used by FHWA and states’ 

departments of transportation to enter and verify financial information 

entered into FMIS. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes.

To determine the extent to which selected emergency relief projects were 

awarded in compliance with program eligibility requirements, we reviewed 

federal statutes and regulations, and FHWA guidance on emergency 

relief eligibility requirements. We selected a nongeneralizable sample of 

state department of transportation and FHWA division offices in three 

states—New York, Texas, and Washington state. The states selected are 

not representative of the conditions in all states, the state departments of 

transportation, or FHWA division offices, but are intended to be examples 

of the range of practices and projects being funded by the Emergency 

Relief Program across the country. These states were selected based on 

several criteria:

1. The overall amount of emergency relief funding allocated to a state 

from fiscal years 2007 through 2010, to identify those states that were 

allocated the most funding (at least $15 million) over that period, 

based on allocation data provided by FHWA headquarters.

2. Frequency of funding requests to identify those states that requested 

funds for three or more fiscal years from 2007 through 2010.

3. The occurrence of an eligible emergency relief event since FHWA 

updated its Emergency Relief Manual in November 2009. For our 

purposes, we used emergency relief eligible events beginning 

October 1, 2009, as a proxy for identifying states with emergency 

relief events since the November 2009 manual update.

A total of 10 states met all three criteria. We narrowed our selection down 

by eliminating those states that experienced outlier events, such as North 

Dakota’s reoccurring basin flooding at Devils Lake and the catastrophic 

failure of the Interstate 35 West bridge in Minnesota. We judgmentally 

selected New York, Texas, and Washington state to reflect a geographic 

dispersion of states.

We reviewed a sample of emergency relief project files in the FHWA 

division office in each of these states to determine whether the project 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 45 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

files included required or recommended documentation cited in federal 

statute, regulations, and FHWA program guidance. Such documentation 

included the President or state governors’ proclamation of a disaster, 

detailed damage inspection reports, cost estimates for repairs, 

photographs of the damage, and other information. Across the three 

division offices, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 88 Emergency 

Relief Program files out of a total universe of 618 project files for 

emergency relief projects approved by FHWA in those states from fiscal 

years 2007 through 2010. Among the 88 projects in our review, 5 projects 

had been withdrawn by states as FHWA had determined them ineligible 

for emergency relief funds, or they were reimbursed through a third party 

insurance settlement, bringing the total number of projects reviewed to 

83. The project files we reviewed represented approximately 67 percent 

of all emergency relief funds obligated to those states during that time 

period.2

1. All projects with more than $1 million in obligated federal funds 

between fiscal years 2007 and 2010, including a mix of active and 

closed projects and various event or disaster types.

Those projects were selected based on the following criteria:

2. Projects with more than $1 million in obligated federal funds for events 

from fiscal years 2001 through 2006 on the list of formal emergency 

relief funding requests as of March 7, 2011, that were either currently 

active or were completed more than five years after the event 

occurred.

3. Projects that had other characteristics that we determined to warrant 

further review, such as events with $0 amounts listed in FHWA’s 

FMIS database for total cost or which had expended relatively small 

amounts of funding compared with the obligated amounts in FMIS.

Prior to our site visits, we requested that the division offices provide all 

documentation they maintain for each of the projects selected in our 

sample. We reviewed all the documentation provided during our site 

visits, and requested follow-up information as necessary. In conducting 

our file review, a GAO analyst independently reviewed each file and 

completed a data collection instrument to document the eligibility 

 

2

We also reviewed three older projects in Washington state that were selected because 

the projects had more than $1 million in obligated federal funds from events in fiscal years 

2001 through 2006 and were on the backlog of funding requests at the time of review. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 46 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

documentation that was included for each file. A second reviewer 

independently reviewed the file to verify whether the specific information 

identified by the first reviewer was present in the file. The analysts met to 

discuss and resolve any areas of disagreement until a consensus was 

reached on whether the required information was included in the file. To 

gather additional information on the project files we reviewed and the 

procedures used to manage and oversee emergency relief projects, we 

interviewed officials in the FHWA division offices and the departments of 

transportation in our three selected states. We provided the results of our 

file review to FHWA for their comment and incorporated their responses 

as necessary within our analysis.

Lastly, we contacted state and local audit organizations through the 

National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers, and Treasurers for 

the three states we reviewed, as well as North Dakota, to obtain reports 

or analyses that were conducted on FHWA’s Emergency Relief Program.

None of the states in our review had conducted substantive work on the 

Emergency Relief Program.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2010 to November 

2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Summary of Emergency Relief 

Funding for Projects at Devils Lake, North 

Dakota

Page 47 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Devils Lake in North Dakota lies in a large natural basin and lacks a 

natural outlet for rising water to flow out of the lake. Starting in the early 

1990s, the lake level has risen dramatically—nearly 30 feet since 1992—

which has threatened the roadways near the lake which were built in the 

1930s and 1940s when lake water levels were lower. In April 2000, 

FHWA issued a memorandum that authorized raising the roads at Devils 

Lake in response to a predicted rise in the water level of the lake that was 

within 3 feet of causing inundation, as forecasted by the National Weather 

Service or U.S. Geological Survey. This allowance to repair roadways 

prior to damages incurred by an event is a unique provision for the FHWA 

Emergency Relief Program, which otherwise funds only post-disaster 

repair or restoration. The basin flooding events at Devils Lake also 

precipitated a related problem at Devils Lake, as some communities 

around the lake plugged culverts under roadways to impound rising water 

and protect property from flooding, which increased the roadways’ risk of 

failure. These roads were subsequently referred to as “roads-acting-asdams” which required additional improvements to ensure their structural 

integrity to serve as dams.

Devils Lake projects involve multiple stakeholders, depending on the 

location and type of roadway. FHWA’s North Dakota division office is 

responsible for overseeing the Emergency Relief Program projects 

administered by North Dakota department of transportation. FHWA’s 

Office of Federal Lands Highway is responsible for the oversight of the 

Emergency Relief on Federally Owned Roads program, which covers 

projects on the Spirit Lake Tribe Indian Reservation. The Central Division 

of Federal Lands Highway leads the overall coordination among the 

federal, state, and local agencies. FHWA reported that the two FHWA 

offices are working together to address the roads-acting-as dams projects 

which affect state highways and roads on the Sprit Lake Tribe Indian 

Reservation. The North Dakota department of transportation and the 

Spirit Lake Tribe are responsible for administering the construction 

projects on their respective roads.

To ensure the integrity of the roads at Devils Lake, Congress included 

funding provisions in Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation 

Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) to raise the roadways and 

make improvements to roads-acting-as-dams. Through SAFETEA-LU, 

Congress authorized up to $10 million of Emergency Relief Program 

funds to be expended annually, up to a total of $70 million, for work in the 

Appendix II: Summary of Emergency Relief 

Funding for Projects at Devils Lake, North 

Dakota 
Appendix II: Summary of Emergency Relief 

Funding for Projects at Devils Lake, North 

Dakota

Page 48 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Devils Lake region of North Dakota to address the roads-acting-as-dams 

situation.1 These funds are known as section 1937 funds for the provision 

in SAFETEA-LU which authorized them. In the absence of other authority, 

this $10 million must come out of the $100 million annual authorization of 

contract authority that funds the Emergency Relief Program, effectively 

reducing the annual emergency relief funding available to other states to 

$90 million. SAFETEA-LU also included language that exempted the work 

in the Devils Lake area from the need for further emergency declarations 

to qualify for emergency relief funding.2

According to a June 24, 2011, FHWA policy memo, the final allocation of 

section 1937 funds was made on March 16, 2011, and the $70 million 

limit has been reached. Although rising water levels at Devils Lake are 

expected to continue into the future, no further federal-aid highway funds 

are eligible to raise roads-acting-as-dams or to construct flood control and 

prevention facilities to protect adjacent roads and lands. 

 

1

Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 1937, 119 Stat. 1510 (2005).

2

Ibid. § 1937 (a)
Appendix III: Results of GAO’s File Review of 

Emergency Relief Project Documentation 

Available in Three FHWA Division Offices

Page 49 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Figure 6 represents the results of our review of 88 selected project files 

from FHWA’s division offices in New York, Texas, and Washington state. 

Our data collection instrument was used to collect the values for each 

field during our file review, and that information was summarized and 

analyzed by at least two GAO analysts (see app. I for a complete 

discussion of our file review methodology).

Figure 6: Results of GAO’s File Review of Emergency Relief Projects in Three FHWA Division Offices 

Appendix III: Results of GAO’s File Review of 

Emergency Relief Project Documentation 

Available in Three FHWA Division Offices
Appendix III: Results of GAO’s File Review of 

Emergency Relief Project Documentation 

Available in Three FHWA Division Offices

Page 50 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Results of GAO’s File Review of 

Emergency Relief Project Documentation 

Available in Three FHWA Division Offices

Page 51 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Results of GAO’s File Review of 

Emergency Relief Project Documentation 

Available in Three FHWA Division Offices

Page 52 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Results of GAO’s File Review of 

Emergency Relief Project Documentation 

Available in Three FHWA Division Offices

Page 53 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Results of GAO’s File Review of 

Emergency Relief Project Documentation 

Available in Three FHWA Division Offices

Page 54 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

a

These projects had been withdrawn by states as they had been determined ineligible by FHWA for 

emergency relief funds or were reimbursed through a third party insurance settlement.
Appendix III: Results of GAO’s File Review of 

Emergency Relief Project Documentation 

Available in Three FHWA Division Offices

Page 55 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

b

The information provided included the month and year repairs were completed; without an exact 

date, we could not confirm completion was within 180 days of the disaster occurrence.

c

The completion dates provided were beyond the first 180 days after the disaster occurrence and 

were also for a mix of emergency and permanent repairs, but the state or division remarks field in 

FHWA’s Fiscal Management Information System modifications to the federal-aid project agreements 

noted completion within 180 days. 

d

The state or division remarks field in FHWA’s Fiscal Management Information System modifications 

to the federal-aid project agreements noted that portions of the repairs were not completed within 180 

days of the disaster occurrence and the federal share was modified appropriately.

e

These project files contained an indication that the project was a betterment—for example, 

discussion of the project’s cost savings to the Emergency Relief Program—although the term 

betterment was not specifically used, or the scope of work of the project matched the Emergency 

Relief Manual’s description of betterments.
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 56 GAO-12-45 Highway Emergency Relief

Phillip Herr, (202) 512-2834 or herrp@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, other key contributors to this 

report were Steve Cohen, Assistant Director; Hiwotte Amare; Matt 

Barranca; Melinda Cordero; Lorraine Ettaro; Colin Fallon; Bert Japikse; 

Catherine Kim; Hannah Laufe; Kelly Liptan; Scott McNulty; Josh Ormond; 

and Tina Won Sherman.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(546043)
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