Survey of the Information Analysis

And Infrastructure Protection Directorate

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of Inspector General

Office of Inspections, Evaluations, & Special Reviews

OIG-04-13 February 2004

Notice: The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Counsel to the Inspector General, 

has reviewed this report and excised information according to the Freedom of Information Act, 

5 U.S.C. Section 552, as amended. 

Preface

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Offi ce of Inspector General (OIG) was established 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports 

prepared by the OIG periodically as part of its oversight responsibility with respect to DHS to 

identify and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the program, 

operation, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and offi cials of 

relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations herein, if any, have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge 

available to the OIG, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. 

It is my hope that this report will result in more effective, effi cient, and/or economical operations. 

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

Clark Kent Ervin

Inspector General

Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page i

Contents

Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 1

Results in Brief .............................................................................................................................. 1

 Background.................................................................................................................................... 2

Purpose, Scope and Methodology................................................................................................... 3

Programs of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (by offices

 and divisions)................................................................................................................................. 4

 The Budgetary Programs of the IAIP....................................................................................... 4

 Organizational Chart of IAIP................................................................................................... 5

 Administration and Outreach – Office of the Under Secretary ............................................... 7

 Homeland Security Operations Center .................................................................................. 10

 Intelligence and Warning - Office of Information Analysis.................................................. 12

 Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets – Office of Infrastructure Protection ....... 16

Issues for Inspections/Evaluations............................................................................................... 21

 Hiring Personnel to Work in a Classified Environment Takes a Substantial Amount

 of Time .................................................................................................................................. 21

 The Ability of IAIP to Exchange Threat Information Electronically with Partners is 

 Necessary to Fulfill its Mission ............................................................................................ 22

 Maintaining Close Partnerships that Facilitate Unobstructed Information Flows is 

 Crucial to the Success of IAIP .............................................................................................. 23

 The Extent of IAIP’s Involvement With the Homeland Security Advisory System is

 Not Clear ............................................................................................................................... 24

 IAIP Needs to Develop a Prioritized List of Critical Infrastructure and Assets ................... 24
Page ii Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13

Contents

Appendices

Appendix A: Summary of IAIP Statutory Functions............................................................ 26

Appendix B: Lead Agencies and Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Key Assets................ 27

Appendix C: IAIP Response to OIG .................................................................................... 28

Appendix D: Major Contributors to this Report................................................................... 29

Appendix E: Report Distribution ......................................................................................... 30

 

Abbreviations

CAEO Competitive Analysis and Evaluation Office

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COS Chief of Staff 

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DoD Department of Defense

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FTE Full Time Equivalent

FY Fiscal Year

HSA Homeland Security Act

HQBO Headquarters Business Office

HSAS Homeland Security Advisory System

HSC Homeland Security Council 

HSOC Homeland Security Operations Center

HV/HPS High Value/High Probability of Success 

IA Office of Information Analysis

IAIP Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate

ICD Infrastructure Coordination Division 

IMRD Information Management and Requirements Division

IP Office of Infrastructure Protection

IT Information Technology

IWD Information and Warnings Division

NCS National Communication System 

NCSD National Cyber Security Division

NSTAC National Security Telecommunication Advisory Committee

 NS/EP National Security Emergency Preparedness 

OIG Office of Inspector General
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page iii

Contents

PPO Planning and Partnerships Office 

PSD Protective Security Division 

RAD Risk Assessment Division

TTIC Terrorist Threat Integration Center

Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 1

OIG

Department of Homeland Security

Office of Inspector General

Introduction

The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate was 

created to support a key strategic mission of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS). IAIP analyzes and integrates terrorist threat information, 

mapping those threats against both physical and cyber vulnerabilities to critical 

infrastructure and key assets, and implementing actions that protect the lives of 

Americans, ensures the delivery of essential government services, and protects 

infrastructure assets owned by US industry. IAIP is unique in that no other 

federal organization has the statutory mandate to carry out these responsibilities 

under one organizational framework. 

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this survey to learn more about 

the department’s plans for IAIP and to prepare us for more detailed future work 

as part of our general oversight responsibility for DHS and its component parts. 

Issues of particular importance to us were:

• The methodology for transferring and integrating the functions and agencies 

responsible for protecting critical infrastructure into IAIP;

• How IAIP offices and divisions are working (or intend to work) with nonDHS entities to protect critical infrastructure; and

• IAIP’s ability to communicate with entities within DHS and other federal, 

state, local, and private sector partners.

Additionally, we endeavored to determine the obstacles IAIP faces in “standingup” the organization. We reviewed and analyzed documents pertaining to IAIP 

and interviewed IAIP officials from May 2003 through July 2003.

Results in Brief

Since its establishment approximately nine months ago, IAIP has faced the 

daunting task of becoming fully operational as a new directorate, while 

maintaining the workload it acquired from legacy agencies. In addition to 

maintaining a full workload, IAIP has also encountered several other complicating 
Page 2 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

factors. For example, during the past nine months, IAIP has been hampered by 

turnover of key management positions. Also, IAIP has dealt with severe space 

problems, as many of its personnel are required to work from separate locations 

throughout the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, or to work with one or more 

other people at one workstation at the department’s headquarters.

In addition to these difficulties, the OIG has identified several other issues that 

may warrant future inspections. During interviews, executives within IAIP

maintained that the inability to hire personnel who have, or can quickly obtain, 

the necessary security clearances to work in a classified environment was a major 

obstacle to IAIP becoming fully operational. Another obstacle often cited by IAIP 

executives was its inability to connect to secure systems and databases residing 

at other agencies. Future inspections geared toward making recommendations 

on how to shorten the clearance process for new hires and assessing the 

progress made in systems connectivity would help IAIP advance in its mission. 

Though not identified as a current issue by IAIP executives, much of the future 

success of IAIP depends on its ability to maintain close partnerships with other 

federal departments and agencies that have homeland security responsibilities 

for infrastructure sectors not covered by DHS. Close partnerships with the 

intelligence and law enforcement communities are also vital to the success of 

IAIP. A future inspection that measures how well IAIP maintains its partnerships 

with key outside agencies would help to gauge the effectiveness of IAIP in 

supporting the overall mission of DHS. Finally, IAIP plays an important role 

in analyzing threat information in support of the Homeland Security Advisory 

System (HSAS).1 However, it is not clear how intelligence will be deemed 

actionable, or what the intelligence requirements are for the different threat 

conditions. An inspection that will clarify these matters may promote a more 

effective, efficient, and economical process for changing the threat condition.

Background

In response to the recognized need for a coordinated, national approach2 to protect 

the homeland against potential terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the Homeland 

1

 The Homeland Security Advisory System provides a means to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks 

against federal, state, local, and private sector authorities and the American people by characterizing appropriate levels of 

vigilance, preparedness, and readiness in a series of graduated threat conditions.

2

 Before DHS was created in November 2002, protecting the homeland was primarily a federal responsibility and was mainly 

coordinated through the military, the intelligence agencies, the Department of Justice, and the Department of State. Since the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, homeland security has become a national rather than a federal responsibility because the 

federal government alone cannot protect the entire country. 
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 3

Security Act (HSA) of 2002, resulting in the creation of DHS. The primary 

strategic objectives of the DHS are:

• To prevent terrorist attacks within the homeland;

• To reduce the vulnerability of the homeland to terrorism; and

• To minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist acts that 

occur within the homeland. 

IAIP was vested with responsibility to analyze and integrate terrorist threat 

information, map threats against both physical and cyber vulnerabilities to critical 

infrastructure and key assets, and implement actions that protect the lives of 

Americans, ensure the delivery of essential government services, and protect 

infrastructure assets owned by U.S. industry. IAIP carries out its mission through 

the Administrative and Outreach, Intelligence and Warning, and the Protecting 

Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets programs, as well as the Homeland Security 

Operations Center.

 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

The objective of this survey was twofold. First, we sought to gain a basic 

understanding of IAIP, including learning the missions of the offices and divisions 

within IAIP, defining the operational relationships between those offices and 

divisions, diagramming internal and external terrorist threat information flow, 

and identifying the obstacles impeding IAIP’s ability to become fully operational. 

Second, this survey provided an opportunity to identify issues suited for future 

detailed inspections or audits. With regard to programs or operations meriting 

special or focused attention, we reviewed and analyzed the following:

• Documentation pertinent to DHS and IAIP including program guidance, 

policy memorandums, briefing packages, meeting notes, Internet websites, 

and various news articles;

• Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 

25, 2002);

• Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001);

• Congressional testimony, namely the joint hearing with both the Judiciary 

Committee and the Select Committee on Homeland Security, on “The 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and its Relationship with the 

Departments of Justice and Homeland Security,” July 22, 2003;

• Congressional testimony, namely the Subcommittee on Intelligence and 

Counter-Terrorism to the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, 
Page 4 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

“Improving the Department of Homeland Security’s Information Sharing 

Capabilities,” July 24, 2003; and

• IAIP organizational chart as of August 11, 2003. 

We interviewed key IAIP officials, including the Under Secretary, the Assistant 

Secretary for Information Analysis, the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure 

Protection, and the Director of the Homeland Security Operations Center. 

In addition, we interviewed the Chief of Staff and the office directors for 

the Risk Assessment Division, the Information and Warnings Division, the 

Infrastructure Coordination Division, the Protective Security Division, the 

National Communications System, the Planning and Partnership Office, and the 

Competitive Analysis and Evaluation Office. 

The bulk of the interviews conducted during the interview phase of this survey 

were conducted from May 2003 to July 2003 under the authority of the Inspector 

General Act of 1978, as amended. Follow-up questions regarding the National 

Asset List were answered on December 16, 2003.

Programs of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

Directorate (by offices and divisions)

Guided by the requirements of the HSA, IAIP combines the capability to: (1) 

identify and assess current and future threats to the nation’s critical infrastructure; 

(2) communicate identified threats and issue warnings to relevant federal, state, 

local, private, and international partners; and (3) implement strategies to protect 

the nation’s critical infrastructure. No other government agency has the statutory 

mandate to combine these capabilities under one organizational framework. 

Consequently, many refer to IAIP as the “central information nerve center” of the 

overall effort to protect the homeland and, thus, of DHS.

The Budgetary Programs of IAIP

IAIP administers the (1) Administrative and Outreach Program; (2) Intelligence 

and Warning Program; (3) Homeland Security Operations Center; and (4) 

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets Program. Baseline personnel 

and funding statistics as provided by IAIP are reported in the following table.
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 5

Table 1 – Projected, authorized personnel and funding statistics for FY 2004

Programs/Operations Center FTEs Budget

($000)

Administrative and Outreach Program

Homeland Security Operations Center

Intelligence and Warning Program

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets Program

Total 692 $1,032,000

These three programs and one operations center can be traced generally to specific 

offices and divisions within IAIP. The Administrative and Outreach Program 

is roughly equivalent to the Office of the Under Secretary and the personnel 

assigned to support the Under Secretary and administrative and outreach functions 

of IAIP. The Intelligence and Warning Program is roughly equivalent to the 

Office of Information Analysis (IA), and the Protecting Critical Infrastructure 

and Key Assets Program is roughly equivalent to the Office of Infrastructure 

Protection (IP).

Organizational Chart of IAIP

IAIP’s organizational chart supplied, as of August 11, 2003, is presented below.

Chart 1 – The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

 Directorate

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets Program

Competitive Analysis and Evaluation Office

Under Secretary

Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis

(ASIA)

Risk Assessment Division Infrastructure Coordination Division

National Communications System

Protective Security Division

Homeland Security Operations Center

Intelligence and Warning Program

Administration and Outreach Program

Homeland Security Operations Center

TBD

Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection

(ASIP)

Headquarters Business Office

Chief of Staff

(included in the US/IAIP FTEs)

Planning and Partnerships

Information & Warnings Division National Cyber Security Division

TBD
Page 6 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

On March 1, 2003, when certain offices and functions of 22 agencies merged to 

create DHS, IAIP inherited elements from five legacy agencies, including:

• National Infrastructure Protection Center (Federal Bureau of Investigation)

• Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (Department of Commerce)

• Federal Computer Incident Response Center (General Services Administration)

• National Communications System (Department of Defense)

• Office of Energy Assurance (Department of Energy)

Merging these five legacy elements into a fully functioning directorate is 

an ongoing process. Since merging, IAIP has made several changes to its 

organizational structure. One of the more significant changes involved the 

placement of the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) within IAIP. 

Previously, the HSOC was assigned to the Office of the Secretary and was 

budgeted under the Management and Administration Program of DHS. Another 

significant change was the establishment of a National Cyber Security Division 

(NCSD). Both of these changes are reflected in the current organizational 

chart. However, as IAIP streamlines processes and refines communication 

among internal offices, divisions and external partners, the OIG understands that 

additional changes in the current organizational structure may be necessary. In 

fact, the OIG has learned that additional changes in the organizational structure 

are under consideration. These changes are intended to enhance the ability of 

IAIP to meet the 19 responsibilities assigned to it by the HSA. Such changes 

could involve converting the Information and Warnings Division (IWD) within 

the IA into the Information Management and Requirements Division (IMRD), 

moving the Planning and Partnerships Office (PPO) from the Office of the Under 

Secretary to the IP, and making the National Communications System (NCS) into 

a peer of the Infrastructure Coordination Division (ICD) rather than keeping it as 

a subordinate. 

Under the current organizational structure, IA is responsible primarily for 

identifying and assessing current and future threats to the nation’s critical 

infrastructures. The HSOC is responsible for communicating identified threats 

and issuing warnings to relevant federal, state, local, and private sector partners. 

The IP is responsible for implementing strategies to protect the nation’s critical 

infrastructure. Of the 19 responsibilities assigned to IAIP by the HSA, 16 are to 

be carried out by IA and three are assigned to IP, with close collaboration between 

IA and IP on seven of these responsibilities (Appendix A.). One of the goals of 

executive management is for the IA and IP to function seamlessly regarding these 

assignments. 
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 7

During non-crisis operations, information arrives through IAIP-watch, resident 

intelligence agency desks, resident law enforcement agency desks, and resident 

response agency desks within the HSOC, as well as through contacts among the 

13 infrastructure sectors (Appendix B). Once information is processed within 

IAIP, warning and mitigation strategies are then communicated to relevant 

partners through the HSOC or through line-operational divisions (e.g., the 

Infrastructure Coordination Division) after coordination with HSOC to points 

of contacts among the 13 infrastructure sectors – an environment where IAIP

listens with many ears and speaks with many mouths. During near-crisis or 

crisis operations, information flows through the HSOC and, in general, lineoperational divisions will be discouraged from maintaining separate channels of 

communication with the contacts developed through the course of regular noncrisis operations. Line-operational divisions will still be able to communicate 

with their contacts in the sectors; however, they will be encouraged to do so 

through the HSOC so the message will be more controlled – an environment 

where IAIP listens with one ear and speaks with one mouth. 

Administration and Outreach – Office of the Under Secretary

The Office of the Under Secretary is comprised of: (1) the Under Secretary; 

(2) the Chief of Staff; (3) Headquarters Business Office; (4) the Competitive 

Analysis and Evaluation Office; and (5) the Planning and Partnership Office. The 

following chart highlights the position of the Office of the Under Secretary within 

IAIP: 

 Chart 2 – The Office of the Under Secretary

COS

HBO

PPO

CAEO

Under Secretary

ASIA

RAD I&WD

HSOC ASIP

ICD PSD NCSD

NCS

Under Secretary

Competitive Analysis and Evaluation Office

Headquarters Business Office

Chief of Staff Planning and Partnerships Office
Page 8 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

Ø Chief of Staff (COS)

The primary responsibility of the COS is to administer and manage IAIP’s 

staff. Embodied within this responsibility is the coordination of the 

directorate’s offices and line-operational divisions, assuring that they are 

integrated and operating in full collaboration with the HSOC. However, 

several issues appear to be inhibiting this integration process. One of the 

more obvious involves the 499 Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) that IAIP 

inherited from legacy agencies. Of these 499 FTEs, only 174 were filled 

by personnel who actually left their legacy agency and made the transition 

into IAIP. The other 325 have remained vacant for the first six months of 

IAIP’s existence. The element that contributed the most to this personnel 

shortage was the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). When 

NPIC transferred into IAIP, personnel who actually left the FBI filled only 

18 of the 307 FTEs targeted for transfer. The other 289 were vacant. Other 

complicating issues include turnover of key leadership positions, slower than 

anticipated consolidation of administrative functions, and logistical problems 

caused by IAIP’s multiple office locations spread throughout the Washington 

metropolitan area. 

Ø Headquarters Business Office (HQBO) 

The HQBO was established to provide IAIP components with the necessary 

planning, financial, facilities, and acquisition support required to satisfy 

their mission objectives and to ensure compliance with all federal and DHS 

regulatory and policy requirements. The Director of Business Operations is 

responsible for administering, managing, and overseeing all activities in the 

HQBO; coordinating business operations functions and activities across the 

IAIP; and reporting progress to its primary customers, the Under Secretary, 

the COS, and the assistant secretaries for IA and IP. 

One of the high priority challenges facing the HQBO, as well as the COS, 

is IAIP’s immediate need to fill its ranks with sufficiently trained and 

appropriately cleared staff to meet the needs of IAIP senior management and 

all IAIP divisions. Further, it is anticipated that within next five years, the 

IAIP will experience tremendous growth in terms of acquiring additional 

highly skilled staff as well as services, technologies, and tools that will enable 

the IAIP to refine its mission. The HQBO and the COS face the challenge 

of identifying issues and factors that influence the size and shape of IAIP’s 

budget, staffing, and technology.
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 9

Ø Competitive Analysis and Evaluation Office (CAEO)

The mission of the CAEO is to reduce the risk and consequences of terrorist 

attacks on the homeland by helping to ensure that IAIP products and services 

are tested, and of the highest quality and value. 

The CAEO helps DHS anticipate terrorist actions -- and thus improve DHS 

threat warnings, collection requirements, and mitigation measures - - by 

organizing DHS “strategic red cell” sessions. During these sessions, the 

CAEO brings in outside experts from private industry, the military, the 

intelligence and law enforcement communities, and elsewhere to provide an 

independent assessment of where, how, and when terrorist may attempt to 

strike.

The CAEO plans to test and validate risk assessments on infrastructure 

through physical and cyber “red teaming.” By emulating terrorist mindsets, 

doctrines, and tactics, CAEO red teams will provide its customers, mainly IP, 

with a snapshot of critical infrastructure and cyber security vulnerabilities, 

categorize them according to risk, and identify safeguards to mitigate the 

vulnerabilities.

In addition, the CAEO:

• Develops, coordinates, and conducts interagency and IAIP exercises to 

test and improve procedures for managing terrorist threats and attacks, 

as well as organizes conferences and seminars.

• Conducts impartial in-house and outside reviews of IAIP products, 

services, and processes -- including measuring customer feedback on 

these products -- and works with IAIP components to develop quality 

standards.

Ø Planning and Partnership Office (PPO)

At the core of IAIP’s mission is the need to build and maintain strong, 

strategic relationships with critical infrastructure sectors and key asset 

industries. This task is assigned to IAIP’s PPO. The PPO is responsible 

for developing and supporting the development of partnerships for IAIP

divisions with state and local government, private industry, and international 

communities for national planning, outreach and awareness, information 

sharing, and protective actions. Specifically, the PPO:
Page 10 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

• Develops, coordinates and supports partnerships for IAIP divisions 

with international communities, state and local government and other 

federal agencies, public sector, and academic institutions for outreach 

and awareness, information sharing and protective action programs; 

• Develops, coordinates, and implements national outreach and 

awareness programs for IAIP divisions; 

• Manages and provides executive agent support to advisory councils 

and cross-sector partnerships; and,

• Develops, maintains and reports progress against national integrated 

strategies and implementation plans for critical infrastructure 

protection.

Successfully implementing productive partnerships requires expertise in 

information analysis and infrastructure protection processes and policies, the 

interest of potential partners, and skills in creating mutual benefits among an 

array of stakeholders. Before the PPO can become fully functional, offices 

and divisions within IAIP must understand the benefits of their interaction 

with each other as well as external participants. The PPO must also develop 

standardized protocols and processes as they apply to entities inside and 

outside IAIP. 

Homeland Security Operations Center

The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) is the nation’s single point 

for tracking federal, state, local and private sector terrorist threat information 

to secure the homeland. It operates 24 hours per day, seven days a week. It 

maintains and shares domestic situational awareness; coordinates security 

operations; detects, prevents, and deters terrorist incidents; and facilitates the 

response to all critical threats. During a crisis, 
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 11

The following chart highlights the HSOC’s position within IAIP:

Chart 3 – The Homeland Security Operations Center

Under the operational control of IAIP, the HSOC houses staff from various 

elements of the intelligence and law enforcement communities such as the CIA, 

National Security Agency, Secret Service, and FBI, as well as elements from 

organizations such as the Department of State, Department of Energy and the 

National Emergency Management Association.3 In addition, an IAIP cell or 

“IAIP-watch” is located in the HSOC. IAIP-watch serves as a channel for the 

flow of threat information to and from the divisions within IAIP.

COS

HBO

PPO

CAEO

Under Secretary

ASIA

RAD I&WD

HSOC ASIP

ICD PSD NCSD

NCS

Homeland Security Operations Center

3

 The National Emergency Management Association is a professional organization for state emergency management directors. 

Its mission is to provide leadership and expertise in emergency management, serve as an information and assistance resource, 

and to advocate continuous improvement in emergency management procedures.
Page 12 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

Intelligence and Warning – Office of Information Analysis

The Office of Information Analysis (IA) is comprised of two divisions:the Risk 

Assessment Division and the Information and Warnings Division. The primary 

mission of IA is to provide a full range of intelligence support to components 

within DHS, as well as relevant partners outside of DHS. IA provides this 

support by serving two roles: first, as an information “fusion center,” and, 

second, as an information “dissemination manager.” As an information fusion 

center, IA gathers and integrates threat information from the intelligence and 

law enforcement communities, as well as from other components within DHS. 

Once the information has been gathered and integrated, it is then analyzed and 

processed into a usable format for distribution. As an information dissemination 

manager, IA ensures that threat information is shared appropriately by issuing 

threat advisories, bulletins, and warnings to relevant partners both internal 

and external to DHS. Finally, IA supports the administration of the HSAS, by 

providing independent analysis of threat information in support of decisions to 

raise or lower the national threat condition. 

The following chart highlights IA’s position within IAIP:

Chart 4 – The Office of Information and Analysis

Ø Risk Assessment Division (RAD)

RAD is charged with becoming the most authoritative source in the federal 

government for assessing the overall threat that terrorists pose to homeland 

COS

HBO

PPO

CAEO

Under Secretary

ASIA

RAD I&WD

HSOC ASIP

ICD PSD NCSD

NCS

Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis

Risk Assessment Division Information & Warnings Division
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 13

security. It is also charged with mapping these threats against vulnerabilities 

and providing actionable advisories to relevant partners both internal and 

external to DHS. The RAD is considered to be an intelligence gatherer, rather 

than an intelligence collector. The difference is the RAD accumulates and 

analyzes information passed to it by sources whose mission is to seek out raw 

intelligence.4 The RAD does not participate in activities such as recruiting 

informants or intercepting communications.

The RAD accomplishes its core intelligence mission by integrating and 

analyzing threat information primarily from the intelligence and law 

enforcement communities and DHS operational and intelligence components. 

The RAD is also authorized to establish a two-way exchange of information 

with its state, local, and private sector partners. 

5

The HSOC 

is the lead operations center within DHS that is responsible for monitoring 

and conducting a first level assessment of incoming threat information and 

any appropriate response. The HSOC is staffed with representatives from 

the intelligence and law enforcement communities, Department of Defense 

(DoD), and various civilian agencies. 

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), a joint venture among the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI), the DoD, Department of State, and DHS, serves as another important 

4

 Raw intelligence is a colloquial term meaning collected information that has not yet been converted into finished 

intelligence.
Page 14 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

source of information for the RAD. In contrast to the HSOC, the director 

of TTIC does not report to the IAIP Under Secretary but to the Director of 

Central Intelligence as the head of the entire U.S. intelligence community. 

The TTIC’s mission is to integrate and analyze terrorist-related information 

to form the most comprehensive threat picture possible, whether it pertains 

to threats overseas or to the homeland. In many respects, the missions of the 

TTIC and the RAD overlap. However, the TTIC’s mission is more specific 

than the analytic mission performed within DHS by the RAD in that TTIC 

primarily focuses on threats developing overseas.6

By contrast, the RAD has both a more focused and overarching mission in 

defending the homeland than TTIC. The RAD, as a division of IA, has the 

statutory mandate to analyze all incoming threats to homeland security and 

then to assess their credibility

Another important difference is that the RAD has the 

mandate to communicate these assessments in a timely manner to state, local, 

and private sector partners. The RAD does this through its close relationships 

with the HSOC, IP, and the state and local office of DHS. The importance 

and uniqueness of the RAD’s relationships with its counterpart divisions 

within the IP cannot be overstressed. The TTIC does not have the mandate 

to communicate or interact with state, local, and private sector partners, nor 

does it have a direct relationship with divisions within the IP that implement 

protective measures.

The TTIC is reported to be a willing partner in the exchange of threat 

information.7 However, the OIG was told during senior executive interviews 

that DHS must weigh in more heavily with TTIC, particularly in its corporate 

ownership of analytic products produced for the President, Secretary 

of Homeland Security, and other senior officials. According to these 

interviews, the intelligence product coming out of the TTIC would benefit 

6

 In a letter to Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, dated June 17, 2003, Secretary Ridge, attempting to clarify the difference 

between TTIC and the analytical work being performed within DHS, wrote, “Other agencies have specific analytic functions 

that relate to the war on terrorism performed to support their respective and specialized mission. ...Information pertaining to 

threats overseas [primarily collected by the CIA and analyzed by TTIC] is an important part of the overall analytic mosaic 

supporting the global war on terrorism.”

7

 On July 22, 2003, at a joint oversight hearing with the Committee on the Judiciary and Select Committee on Homeland 

Security, Acting Assistant Secretary for IA confirmed that TTIC has provided IA all the threat information that he has 

requested since he assumed that position. 
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 15

from the expertise and unique information access which RAD analysts have. 

Furthermore, DHS and the TTIC should share staffing strategies to ensure that 

they build compatible skill sets and missions rather than compete for the same 

personnel resources and missions. 8

Ø Information and Warnings Division (IWD)

Initially, the IWD was assigned two critical responsibilities. One of these 

responsibilities was managing the entire internal and external information 

requirements process of IAIP. As part of this process, the IWD “pushes” 

information to relevant internal and external partners by coordinating the 

IAIP-watch within the HSOC and disseminating open-source9 warnings to 

state, local, and private sector partners -- functioning much like an information 

traffic cop. The IWD “pulls” information from relevant internal and external 

partners by developing information sharing and intelligence requirements 

designed to extract specific data that is necessary to obtain a more complete 

and comprehensive threat picture. The IWD works closely with the RAD 

and counterpart divisions within the IP to determine information sharing and 

intelligence requirements. 

9

 Information that is publicly available through such media as newspapers, television, and the Internet.
Page 16 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

The IWD also is responsible for administering the HSAS. Once the Secretary, 

in consultation with members of the Homeland Security Council (HSC), 

decides to raise or lower the national threat condition, the IWD is charged 

with coordinating the actual notification of relevant partners about the change 

in threat condition. The IWD fulfills this role by maintaining a call list of 

contacts among key media outlets and state, local, and private sector officials. 

The IWD works closely with the HSOC throughout the notification process. 

In addition to administering the HSAS, the IWD is expected to produce 

information bulletins and warnings, coordinate the Secretary’s morning 

summary, and have input in the overnight development briefing and the 

President and Secretary’s monthly report.10

The OIG has been told that the IWD may be disbanded in favor of a division 

that would focus almost exclusively on IAIP’s information requirements. 

The new division most likely will be called the “Information Management 

and Requirements Division” (IMRD) and will transfer old IWD elements 

responsible for watch and warning functions to the HSOC. Now that the 

HSOC has been moved into IAIP consolidating all watch and warning 

functions in the HSOC would eliminate the need to maintain two different 

entities within IAIP with the same functions. The future success of the 

IMRD will depend on how well organizations within the intelligence and 

law enforcement communities respond to the information requirements it 

sets. IAIP officials told the OIG that the IMRD’s utility would be strongly 

influenced by the responsiveness of agencies such as the FBI and the CIA

when tasked by the IMRD to collect certain intelligence or conduct specific 

investigations.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets – Office of 

Infrastructure Protection

The mission of the IP is to implement protective measures to reduce 

vulnerabilities in the nation’s critical infrastructure.11 According to the “National 

Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures,” dated February 

10 The President or other officials in the White House, as well as the Secretary, receive a report that outlines trends in 

suspicious incidents. Initially, this report was distributed on a weekly basis and then eventually on a bi-weekly basis. 

Currently, it is distributed on a monthly basis. 

11 The Patriot Act defines critical infrastructure as “those systems and assets, whether physical or virtual [cyber], so vital to 

the United States that the[ir] incapacity or destruction... would have a debilitating impact on the security, national economic 

security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 17

2003, critical infrastructure can be categorized into 13 infrastructure sectors and 

five key assets. There are eight federal lead departments and agencies, including 

DHS, which have a role in coordinating protection activities and cultivating 

long-term collaborative relationships with counterparts from each of the 13 

infrastructure sectors and five key assets (Appendix B). However, as authorized 

in the HSA, only DHS has the overarching responsibility to be the primary liaison 

and facilitator for cooperation among all federal departments and agencies, as 

well as state, local and private sector partners.

As the primary liaison and facilitator within DHS during non-crisis operations, 

the IP takes a broad approach to protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure by 

working closely with: (1) the IA and other organizations within DHS; (2) federal 

lead departments and agencies responsible for protecting infrastructure sectors 

and key assets that do not fall under the immediate control of DHS; (3) state, 

local, and private entities; and (4) international entities to reduce infrastructure 

vulnerabilities and deny the use of the infrastructure as a weapon to attack 

Americans. Within the context of a national approach, the IP is increasing the 

nation’s capability to secure critical infrastructure and key assets, as well as 

high profile events,

Second, based on assessed vulnerabilities, the 

IP will provide training and plans for protective measures to assist owners and 

operators in securing the critical infrastructure and key assets within their control. 

The IP’s goal is to mitigate quickly vulnerabilities and risks, while simultaneously 

helping state, local, and private sector partners develop the capability to mitigate 

vulnerabilities and risk themselves. By building these capabilities into national 

partners, the IP intends to reduce the nation’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks 

through a sector-wide approach.
Page 18 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

Appendix VI

Report Distribution

The following chart highlights IP’s position within IAIP:

 Chart 5 – The Office of Infrastructure Protection

Ø Infrastructure Coordination Division (ICD)

ICD provides core expertise in all the nation’s infrastructure sectors and key 

assets; monitors the operational status of those infrastructure sectors and key 

assets; supports the two-way sharing of critical infrastructure information 

between DHS and other federal, state, local, and private sector partners; and 

supports infrastructure incident/event response, mitigation, and recovery. 

Additionally, the ICD is charged with protecting proprietary and business 

sensitive data, implementing and executing the Critical Infrastructure 

Information program12, and executing National Security Emergency 

Preparedness (NS/EP) programs. 

To accomplish its mission and functions, the ICD works closely with 

the RAD, Protective Security Division (PSD), and eventually with the 

National Computer Security Division (NCSD) to provide analyses across 

all infrastructure sectors and key assets. After assessing current trends in 

terrorist threats to the nation’s critical infrastructure, the ICD determines the 

requirements for protective measures and then actively pursues partnerships 

COS

HBO

PPO

CAEO

Under Secretary

ASIA

RAD I&WD

HSOC ASIP

ICD PSD NCSD

NCS

Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection

Infrastructure Coordination Division Protective Security Division National Cyber Security Division

National Communications System

12 Based on the authority of the HSA, the Critical Infrastructure Information program provides for tracking receipt, validation, 

protection against unauthorized disclosure, and destruction of infrastructure information. 
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 19

with other government and private sector entities to safeguard 

Ø National Communications System (NCS)

NCS is the lead IAIP element for developing and maintaining 

collaborative relationships to support the critical infrastructure sector on 

communications. To do this, the NCS: (1) monitors the vulnerabilities 

of the telecommunications industry; and (2) coordinates national security 

and emergency preparedness communications for the federal government 

during non-terrorism related emergencies, terrorist attacks, and recovery and 

reconstitution operations. Organizationally, the NCS reports to the ICD. The 

NCS is the only organization that merged into IAIP without losing its legacy 

name or mission assignment.

The NCS combines the assets of 23 federal departments and agencies to 

address the full range of national security and telecommunications emergency 

preparedness issues. The NCS applies its interagency planning efforts in 

developing NS/EP special telecommunications services to support IAIP and 

national security missions.

The NCS also provides a means of collaborating with executives from the 

communications and information technology industries who are part of 

the President’s National Security Telecommunication Advisory Committee 

(NSTAC).13 The NSTAC provides industry based advice and expertise to the 

President on issues and problems related to implementing national security 

and emergency preparedness. Additionally, through its relationships with 

other federal departments and agencies and the NSTAC, the NCS serves as 

another conduit for receiving information about potential terrorist attacks 

against the nation’s critical infrastructure. 

Ø Protective Security Division (PSD)

PSD is to coordinate strategies for protecting the nation’s critical, physical

infrastructure. The PSD works closely with the ICD. The ICD identifies 

critical infrastructure elements and passes the information to the PSD. 

The PSD uses this information to conduct risk assessments and determine 

remediation plans for identified vulnerabilities. 

13 The NSTAC is composed of up to 30 executives representing the major communications and network service providers 

and information technology, finance, and aerospace companies, such as Verizon, Bell South, Lockheed Martin, The Boeing 

Company, and Electronic Data Systems. 
Page 20 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

The PSD receives terrorist threat information and analysis from the RAD 

and other open sources, such as state and local governments. Based on 

this information, the PSD formulates terrorist capability disruption and 

remediation strategies. By implementing disruption strategies, the objective 

of PSD is to upset the ability of terrorists to establish the means for attack. 

By implementing remediation strategies, 

the objective of the PSD is to deter or disrupt terrorist attacks, or 

minimize their impact if they occur. 

The PSD also has an important advisory and training function. Advisory and 

training services will be delivered to state, local, and private sector partners 

by a network of protective security specialists as well as Protective Security 

Advisors posted throughout the country. Based upon identified critical assets, 

threats, and incidents, the PSD may provide an advisory team to work with 

state and local public safety officials and infrastructure owners and operators 

to make assets within their control more secure. Additionally, the PSD has 

been working with its state, local, and private sector partners to identify and 

list critical infrastructure assets

Ø National Cyber Security Division (NCSD)

The mission of the NCSD is to implement the National Strategy to Secure 

Cyberspace which includes identifying, analyzing and reducing cyber 

threats and vulnerabilities; disseminating cyber-threat warning information; 

coordinating incident response; providing technical assistance in continuity of 
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 21

operations and recovery planning; and outreach, awareness, and training. The 

newly formed NCSD is to be a fusion point of expertise for cyber security. 

The NCSD also is to use the expertise of various law enforcement, defense, 

and intelligence agencies to provide multi-layered cyber security protection. 

Furthermore, the NCSD is to serve as a single point of contact for the public 

and private sectors for addressing cyber security issues in the United States. 

The NCSD is to work closely with other IAIP offices and divisions and 

maintain contacts with other federal, state and local governments, and the 

private sector to fulfill its mission.

Issues for Inspections/Evaluations 

As we studied IAIP in order to understand its mission and how its offices and 

divisions operate, we identified several issues that could be impeding the ability 

of IAIP to become fully operational. Consequently, these issues may be suitable 

for future inspections. 

Hiring Personnel to Work in a Classified Environment Takes a 

Substantial Amount of Time

Because of its close interaction with the intelligence and law enforcement 

communities, IAIP handles some of the most sensitive work within DHS. To 

work in this environment, most IAIP personnel require access to information that 

is classified at the Top Secret level or higher. Obtaining the necessary clearance 

can be a time consuming process for new employees. In some cases, it can take 

a year or more before a background investigation can be completed and the new 

employee is deemed suitable for a clearance. Even when the person hired already 

has a security clearance, a full background investigation may still be necessary 

because clearances are not universally accepted by other agencies within the 

intelligence and law enforcement communities. For these reasons, a majority of 

IAIP executives interviewed by the OIG identified hiring personnel who can work 

quickly within a classified environment as one of the major obstacles impeding 

the directorate’s ability to become fully operational.

The time necessary to obtain a clearance is also an impediment for state, local, 

and private sector personnel. The delay affects both the general distribution of 

threat information and the actual participation of state, local, private sector, and 

contract support personnel on IAIP analytical teams or in the HSOC. A recent 

executive order granted the Secretary authority to set the standard for security 
Page 22 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

clearances going to state, local, and private sector personnel. 14 Despite this 

authority, many state and local law enforcement personnel are experiencing 

significant delays in getting clearances to obtain information from federal 

sources. A future inspection could focus on whether the clearance process for 

DHS new hires and personnel from state and local governments, the private 

sector, and contractor support can be shortened without sacrificing security. Such 

an inspection could examine the feasibility of utilizing state and local police 

officers to augment the background investigative process. It may also examine 

the reasons agencies reject other agencies’ decisions granting clearances and why 

there is no universally accepted clearance process.

The Ability of IAIP to Exchange Threat Information Electronically 

with Partners is Necessary to Fulfill its Mission

One of the keys to the success of DHS is establishing connectivity with both its 

internal and external partners. Having the capability to send and receive timely, 

accurate, and reliable information, is necessary if IAIP is to fulfill its mission as 

the lead intelligence gathering and warning directorate within DHS. In fact, the 

HSA requires DHS to establish procedures that facilitate the free exchange of 

threat information among agencies at all levels of government and the private 

sector. The HSA also requires DHS to report to congressional committees on how 

well it shares information with its partners.15 

To establish connectivity among its partners that is compatible, IAIP must have 

the necessary resources, including: 

• personnel with the necessary security clearances and technical experience to 

operate and maintain information systems;

• facilities to receive and store intelligence data; and 

• networks and messaging systems within IAIP that allow for secure electronic 

communication with internal, other federal, state, local, and private sector 

partners.

IAIP has already begun to identify its top priorities for sharing and processing 

information. 

14 “Bush Greenlights Ridge on Security Clearances Outside Beltway,” Congressional Quarterly, by Jim McGee, July 30, 

2003.

15 These requirements are found in the Homeland Security Act, Section 892 (b)(1) & (2), and Section 893. 
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 23

A

future inspection could identify IAIP’s methodology 

for developing connectivity with its partners and make recommendations for 

corrective action.

Maintaining Close Partnerships that Facilitate Unobstructed 

Information Flows is Crucial to the Success of IAIP

DHS is now the cabinet-level department responsible for coordinating the 

protection of American citizens and infrastructure from terrorist attacks. The 

Secretary charged IAIP with carrying out this responsibility. Therefore, IAIP is 

accountable for transmitting terrorist threat information to its federal counterparts, 

as well as to state and local law enforcers -- our nation’s first line of defense 

against terrorist attacks. IAIP also maintains channels to receive threat-related 

information. Information IAIP receives may originate from federal, state, local, 

private sector or any other sources. Since IAIP is an intelligence gatherer rather 

than an intelligence collector, its success is largely dependent on its federal, state 

and local, and private sector partnerships. 

The acting Assistant Secretary for IA expressed his satisfaction with the manner 

in which information flows both vertically (i.e., between IAIP and its state, 

local, and private sector partners), and horizontally (i.e., between IAIP and its 

federal partners such as the CIA, FBI, and other members of the intelligence 

community). However, in a recent congressional hearing,16 a member of the 

House Select Committee on Homeland Security stated, “It is nearly two years 

since the attacks of September 11th, and information sharing on the terrorist threat 

to America is still dangerously disconnected between different agencies of the 

federal government and between the federal government and state and local law 

enforcement officials.” 

A future inspection could document the impact of security clearance issues on 

information sharing, particularly at the state, local, and private sector levels and 

connectivity and electronic data sharing issues among IAIP’s federal partners. In 

addition, the study should chronicle the existence of conflicting or duplicative 

information channels within IAIP or among its state, local, and private sector 

or federal partners and how such alternative channels might be integrated. This 

16 Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism to the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, “ Improving 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Information Sharing Capabilities,” July 24, 2003.
Page 24 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

review could complement a planned, internal IAIP study that will be conducted 

jointly with the Border and Transportation directorate.17

The Extent of IAIP’s Involvement With the Homeland Security 

Advisory System is Not Clear

The purpose of HSAS is to provide a comprehensive and effective means 

to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks to federal, 

state, and local authorities and to the American people. This advisory system 

characterizes appropriate levels of vigilance, preparedness, and readiness in a 

series of graduated threat conditions. As previously mentioned, the Secretary, in 

consultation with the HSC, determines the threat condition. IAIP supports the 

management of the HSAS by providing analysis of threat information in support 

of decisions to raise or lower the national threat level and for coordinating the 

actual notification of a threat condition change.

Although IAIP participates in analyzing threat information in support of the 

HSAS, it is not clear what information is specific enough to act upon. The 

intelligence requirements for the different threat conditions are unclear. Also, 

as noted previously in the RAD discussion, not all threat information that could 

affect the threat condition is vetted through IAIP.

Therefore, the OIG could initiate an inspection of how IAIP interacts with the 

Secretary and others involved in making the decision to elevate or lower the threat 

condition. Also, such an inspection could evaluate the adequacy and timeliness of 

information used for authorizing changes in the threat level.

IAIP Needs to Develop a Prioritized List of Critical Infrastructure and 

Assets

Identifying critical infrastructure is a critical step in implementing a national 

infrastructure protection plan. Once identified and validated, these critical 

infrastructure and key assets are catalogued into a prioritized national list that 

assigns the appropriate security level based on a comprehensive risk analysis of 

all assets identified on the list. It is expected that this national prioritized list will 

serve as a baseline for making decisions on which critical infrastructure and key 

assets to safeguard first. In line with this expectation, Congress has requested that 

17 July 31, 2003 memorandum from IAIP Under Secretary and the Border and Transportation Security Under Secretary, 

“Invitation to Participate in Joint Studies.” 
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 25

IAIP provide a detailed program plan outlining a proposed scope, total estimated 

costs, and schedule for completing a comprehensive risk analysis and assessment 

of vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructure by December 15, 2003. 

The Protective Security Division (PSD) is responsible for maintaining a 

prioritized national list of critical infrastructure and key assets. Through 

interviews, the OIG has learned that PSD has solicited data from state and local 

partners on certain critical infrastructure and key assets. 
Page 26 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

Summary of IAIP Statutory Functions 

No. Statutory Function

1 Vulnerability Assessment IP

2 National Plan to Secure Infrastructure IP

3 “Map” Threats against vulnerabilities IP

4 Recommend Infrastructure Protective Measures IA/IP

5 Ensure timely and efficient access to DHS of all homeland 

security information IA

6 Administer the Homeland Security Advisory System IA

7 Make recommendations for homeland security information 

sharing policies IA

8 Disseminate information analyzed by DHS to other federal, 

state, and local government entities and the private sector IA

9

Consult with appropriate federal Intelligence Community and 

law enforcement officials to establish collection priorities and 

strategies and represent DHS in all “requirements” processes.

IA

10

Consult with state and local governments and the private sector 

to ensure appropriate exchanges of terrorist threat-related 

information

IA

11

Ensure that information received is protected from 

unauthorized disclosure and used only for the performance of 

official duties

IA/IP

12 Request additional information from other federal, state, local 

government agencies and the private sector IA/IP

13 Establish and use secure information technology infrastructure IA/IP

14

Ensure that information systems/databases are compatible with 

one another and other federal agencies and treat information in 

accordance with applicable Federal privacy law

IA/IP

15 Coordinate training and other support to DHS and other 

agencies to identify and share information IA/IP

16 Coordinate with IC elements and federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies “as appropriate” IA

17 Provide intelligence analysis and other support to the rest of 

DHS IA

18 Perform such other duties as the Secretary may provide IA/IP

19 Identify, Detect, and Assess Terrorist Threats to Homeland IA

Appendix A

Summary of IAIP Statutory Functions
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 27

Appendix B

Lead Agencies and Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Key Assets

Lead Agency Critical Infrastructure 

Sectors 18

1 Department of Homeland Security Emergency Services

2 Department of Homeland Security Information and 

Telecommunications

3 Department of Homeland Security Transportation

4 Department of Homeland Security Postal and Shipping

5 Department of Homeland Security

All departments and agencies Government

6 Department of Agriculture Agriculture

7

Department of Agriculture

Department of Health & Human 

Services

Food

8 Environmental Protection Agency Water

9 Department of Health & Human 

Services Public Health

10 Department of Defense Defense Industry Base

11 Department of Energy Energy

12 Department of the Treasury Banking and Finance

13 Environmental Protection Agency Chemical Industry & 

Hazardous Materials

Key Assets

1 Commercial Assets

2 Government Facilities

3 Dams

4 Nuclear Power Plants

5 National Monuments

18 Source: National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures dated February 2003.
Page 28 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 

Appendix C

IAIP Response to OIG
Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13 Page 29

Appendix D

Major Contributors to this Report

Bradley J. Harp, Program Analyst, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections, Evaluations, and Special Reviews

Carlton I. Mann, Program Analyst, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections, Evaluations, and Special Reviews

Frank A. Parrott, Program Analyst, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections, Evaluations, and Special Reviews
Page 30 Survey of IAIP Directorate - OIG-04-13

Appendix E

Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

Under Secretary, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, 

Department of Homeland Security

Additional Information and Copies

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG), 

Office of Inspections, Evaluations, and Special Reviews at (202) 254-4205 or 4208, or 

fax your request to (202) 254-4304.

OIG Hotline

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603 or write to Department of Homeland Security, Washington, 

DC 20528, Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG 

seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.