The for mal desig nation of Rule 59(e ) is “Motion to Alter or Ame nd a Judgment.” 1 A p ro pe r R

ule 59 (e ) m oti on

“ mus t r e ly

on on e of thr e e g ro un ds : ( 1) an inte rv e nin g c ha ng e in controlling law; (2) the availability of newevidenc e; or (3) the nee d to corre ct a c lear err or of law or pre vent manife st injust ice.” N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Re insurance Co. , 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 1 UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E AST ERN D ISTRIC T OF P EN NSY LV AN IA COMI TÉ DE APOYO A L OS TRABA J ADORES AGRÍ COL AS, et al.,

Pla int if fs , v. SOL I S, et al., De fe nd ants . CI VI LACTI ON No. 09-240

Pollak, J
. November 24, 2010 OP IN ION As dis c us se d mo re fu lly

in t his c ourt ’s Au g us t 30 , 2 01 0 o pin ion and or de r ( do c ke t no s. 80, 81), the plaintiffs in this case challeng ed var ious regulations conce rning the H-2B worke r prog ram. The relief

Ig rante d included an or der r emanding , without vacatur , cer tain portions of 2 0 C
. F. R
. § 6 5 5
. 1 0 (b )( 2 ) ( 2 0 1 0 ). T h at re gu l at i o nd i ct at es th e m an n er i nwh i ch p re v ai l i n g wa ge deter minations (“PWDs”) for H- 2B w orker s are calc ulated. I order ed the De partment of L abor (“D OL ”) to promulg ate ne w rules c oncer ning pr evailingwag e ca lculations within 120 day s—i.e., by no later tha

n Dec ember

28, 2010. On September

10, 2010, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Add Additional Relief unde r F eder al Rule of Civil P roce dure 59( e) ( docket no. 82)
. On Octobe r 27, 2010, in docke t no. 94, Idenied 1 Case 2:09-cv-00240-LP Document 97 Filed 11/24/10 Page 1 of 8(3d Cir. 1995). The decision to g rant re lief under Rule 59(e) is within t he discre tion of the district court. Id.

I n their Rule 59(e ) re ply

brief ( docket no. 91) , plaintiffs furthe r re quested that 2 employ ers a g ree to pay

wag es under

the new me thodology

retroa ctive to Dec ember

28, 2010. That re quest is now moot because it was premised on pla intiffs’ re adingof the August 30 order as re quiring that the new r ules be in effect

on De c e mbe r 2 8 ( the date Ihave no w c ha ng e d to J anuar y 18, 2011, and have desig nated a s the date of publication, not the eff

ective date). 2 that motion in part, leavingone aspe ct of the motion to be addr essed late r. In the portion of the motion Idealt with, I

declined to va cate the wag e re g ulations and Iclar ified that the 120-da y deadline w as for

publication of new

rules, not for the eff

ective date of ne w rules. In a supplemental re sponse to the Rule 59(e) motion (docket no. 93), the D OL had re quested a

30-day extension. I g rante d this request in part, a nd extended the dea dline by 21 day s, to J anuar

y 18, 2011. This opinion addresses the f inal component of pla intiffs’ Motion to Add Additional Re lie f, in whic h th e y

a sk thi s c ourt

to o rd e r t he DO Lto i ssu e c on dit ion a l c e rt if ic a tio ns to employ ers se ekingto hire H-2B worke rs. Specific ally , plaintiffs ask this court to prohibit DOL from issuing a

n H-2B labor c ertifica

tion unless and until the employ er a g ree s to pay a pre vailing wag e set by

the new me thodology

as soon as that methodolog y become s eff

ective. Plaintiffs

2 argue that this relief

is nece ssary

to preve nt a “manif

est injustice” bec ause, a

bsent such re lief, employ ers who obta in PW Ds prior to the e ffe ctive date of the ne w re g ulations would continue pa yingwa g e s d e ri ve d f

ro m an inva lid

wa g e ra te , e ve n a ft e r t

he ne w r e g ulatio ns take e ff e c t. I. Under plaintiffs’ propose d relief , the DOL would continue to issue PWDs and labor
cer tifications under the invalid methodology , but as soon as the ne w rules a re e ffe ctive, Case 2:09-cv-00240-LP Document 97 Filed 11/24/10 Page 2 of 8The DO Ldoes re cog nize some fl e xibil ity in t he wa g e to b e pa id, but it mis take nly 3 as s u m es th ato n l y

th e e mp l o y er , an d

n o tth e D OL, h as th e au th o ri ty t o ra i s e w age s d

uri n g a period of e mploy

ment. See Def

.’s Resp. at 13 (doc ket no. 89) (“ [E] mploy ers a re r equire d to pay the pre vailing w ag e as a

minimum , but employ ers may pay a hig her w ag e in their discr etion.”) For example, the fac t that an employ er must attest that it “will pay the offe red 4 wag e duringthe entire period of the approve d H-2B labor c ertification,” 20 C.F.R. § 655.22(e) (2010), is anothe r manife station of the limitations that the re g ulations place on the employ er , and it does not, as the DOL

asser ts, bear on the DOL ’s ability to require employ ers to pay wag es under a revised PWD. 3 previously -ce rtified employ ers would be require d to obtain (and pa y ) a ne w PWD. The DOL
a sse rt s th a t th is r e lie f w ou ld f or c e it t o v iol a te its ow n r e g ulatio ns , a nd the DO Lpr ima

ri ly po int s to 2 0 C. F .R. § 6 55 .1 0( d) (2 01 0) , w hic h s tate s in fu ll: Va lid ity pe ri od . T he NPC [Natio na l Pr oc e ssi ngCe nte r] mus t sp e c if y the va lid ity period of the preva iling wa g e, which in no event may be more than 1 year or less than 3 mo nth s f

ro m th e de te rm inatio n date . F or e mpl oy me nt that is le ss tha

n o ne y e ar i n duration, the pre vailing w ag e dete rminat i o n shall apply and shall be pa id the preva iling wa g e [sic] by the employ er, a t a m i n i m um, for the dur ation of the e mpl oy me nt. The DO Lcontends that thi s provision prec ludes the DOL from re quiring employ ers to pay a hig her w ag e bec ause it mandates that an e mploy er “ shall” pay t h e PW D “f or the duration of employ ment.” The DOL

appea rs to argu e t h at t he provision sets both a floor a nd a ce iling on the wag e to be paid “f

or the duration of employ

ment.” B ut this construction glosses ove r the phra se “at a minimum,” w h i ch m an i fe s t l y sets a floor a

nd not a ce iling. Nothing in § 655.10( d), nor a ny 3 related re g ulation, preve nts the DOL from devisinginterim measure s to r ed u ce t h e impact of the 4 de fi c ie nt m e tho do logy . T hu s an e mpl oy e r mus t pay a va lid wa g e fo r the dura tio n of e mpl oy

me nt, but it do e s n ot f

oll owtha t an e mpl oy e r m

us t c on tin ue pa yingthat w a g e a ft e r i t ha s b e e n de e me d to be the pr oduct of a

n invalid regulation. In s um, no thi ng in the re g ulatio ns pr e c lud e s the DO Lfr om i ssu ingc on dit ion a l c e rt if ic a tio ns . Case 2:09-cv-00240-LP Document 97 Filed 11/24/10 Page 3 of 8I n r e je c tin g the DO L ’s int e rp re tatio n o f § 65 5. 10 (d ), Ido no t a do pt p la int if fs ’ 5 interpre tation. Under pla intiffs’ view, a n employ er must obtain a ne w PWD if the duration of e mpl oy me nt e xten ds be y on d th e ini tia l va lid ity pe ri od se t by the NPC . T hu s p la int if

fs se e m to argue that once a PWD “expires,” the DOL is free to impose a hig her PWD. Howeve r, in the prea mble to the final rule pr omulgating the c urre nt PW D re g ime, the DOL noted that “the De pa rtme nt h a s r e vis e d § 65 5. 10 (d ) t o c lari fy that w he re the dura

tio n o f a job op po rt

un ity is l e ss than one year

or less [sic] , the pre vailing w ag e dete rmination will be valid for the dur ation of the job op po rt

un ity .” L a

bo r C e rt if ic a tio n Pr oc e ss a

nd En fo rc e me nt f

or Te mpo ra ry Em plo y me nt i n Occ upations Other Tha

n Ag riculture or

Reg istered Nur sing in the United States (H-2B Workers), 73 Fe d. Reg . 78020, 78029 (De c. 19, 2008). Thus, thoug h inartfully worde d, § 655.10(d) dictates that a

PW D must be paid, at a

minimum , for the dur ation of employ ment, even if

the ini tia l va lid ity

pe ri od is l e ss t ha n th e duratio n o f e mpl oy

me nt. 4 Th e DO L c on te nd s th a t it s int e rp re tatio n is e nti tle d to de fe re nc e be c a us e the DO L is i nte rp re tin g its
own re g ulations. But this court does not owe defe renc e whe n, as in this case, the ag ency ’s interpre tation is “‘plainly

err oneous.’” See Drake v . FAA , 291 F.3d 59, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Bowles v. Sem inole Rock &Sand Co. , 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). 5

II. Although issuanc e of c onditional certifications would not vi olate existi ng regulations, the question remains whe ther, a s plaintiffs contend, this court’ s equitable powe r is sufficie ntly broad as to authorize this court to order the DOL to provide such r elief. Under the Administrative Pr oc e dure Ac t, “ the re vie wi ngc ourt sh a ll h old

un lawf ul a nd se t a sid e a g e nc y

a c tio n, fi nd ing s,
and c on c lus ion s f

ound to b e . . . a

rb itr ary , c a

pr ic iou s, an a

bu se of dis c re tio n, or

oth e rw ise no t in
acc ordanc e with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) . In addition, however , “[a] court sitti ng in review of an a dminist rative a g ency is vested with equity

power s . . . .” Ind. &Mich. Elec tric Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n , 502 F.2d 336, 346 ( D.C. Cir. 1974). “[W ]hi le the cour t must act within the bo un ds of the statut e and

wi tho ut i ntr

ud ingup on

the a dmi nis tr a tiv e pr ov inc e , it may a dju st i ts relief to the exigenc ies of the c ase in a ccor dance with the equitable pr inciples g overningjudicial Case 2:09-cv-00240-LP Document 97 Filed 11/24/10 Page 4 of 8The NAACP litigation pre dates the 1986 split of the H- 2 prog ram into the cur rent 6 H-2A ( ag ricultural) and H- 2B ( non-agricultural) reg ime. SeeI mmigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L . No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, Sec. 301(a ) (1986)
. 5 action.” Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 364, 372 (1939). Thus re viewingcourts have imposed time lim its on ag ency action, Zambrana v. Califano , 651 F.2d 842, 844 ( 2d Cir. 1981), require d an ag ency

to refund e x cessive f

ees le vied upon re g ulated entities, Allied-Signal v. US NC , 988 F.2d 146, 153 ( D.C. Cir. 1993), and orde red a n ag ency to appoint a plaintiff to a perma nent position after the ag ency had ar bitrarily delayed his ce rtification, Hondros v. U.S. Civil Service Comm ’n , 720 F.2d 278, 298 ( 3d Cir. 1983). Plaintiffs have c ited instances in which a district court has sha

ped a r emand or der, but none of the case s is precisely on point. Pl aintiffs re ly

most heavily

on two case s, both captioned NAACP v. Donovan , in which the district cour t ordere d the DOL

to gr ant a c erta in ty

pe of conditional H-2 labor

cer tification. At the time of the NAA CP suits, all H-2 worker s had to be 6 paid at or a

bove the a dverse eff

ect r ate ( “AER”)
. NAACP v. Donovan , 558 F. Supp. 218, 220 (D .D .C. 19 82 ); se e ge ne ra lly NAACP v. Donovan , 737 F.2d 67, 68–69 ( D.C. Cir. 1984). The AER is calculated ea ch y ear by the DOL on a state- by -state ba sis. I n mid-1982, the DOL had failed to issue AERs for

that y ear , and the DO Lwas orde red to e stablish an AER befor e the e nd of the y ear . NAA CP , 558 F. Supp. at 221 n.6. To a ddress the de lay ed issuance of the wa g e rate, the district court e njoined the DOL from issuing la

bor ce rtifications unless and until the g rowe r ag ree d to pay

its workers at the 1982 AER once it wa s established. Id. at 226. In the meantime, employ ers we re to pa

y worke rs at the 1981 AE R. Id. at 255. In a subseque nt case , the ag ency
was a g ain orde red to issue the sa me ty pe of c onditional certifications after f ailing to timely

issue Case 2:09-cv-00240-LP Document 97 Filed 11/24/10 Page 5 of 8SeeU.S. Dep’t of L abor, A pplication for Pre vailing Wag e De termination, 7 av ail ab leat http:// www.f

oreig nlaborc ert.doleta .g ov/pdf/ETA_F orm_9141.pdf (la st visit ed Nov. 23, 2010). Plaintiffs also rely on two unpublished H-2 ca ses in which district judg es direc ted 8 ag ricultural e mploy ers to plac e funds in esc row. In Tri-Count y Growers v. B rock, 85-0038-M (N.D. W. Va. Aug ust 28, 1985), and Vi rg ini a A gr ic . G ro we rs A ss’n v . D on ov an ( “VA GA ”) , 83-0146-D ( W.D. Va. April 26, 1985), e mploy ers c halleng ed an H -2 piec e-r ate wa g e re g ulation. The judg es issued pre liminary injunctions ag ainst the DOL , prec luding it from e nforc ing the challeng ed wa g e re g ulations. But the cour ts also ordere d the employ ers to plac e funds in esc row to ensure that the worke rs would be r efunde d should the new re g ulations be upheld.

Tri- Cou nty

Growe rs and VAGA are inapposite. First, a s in NAA CP , the challeng ed wa g e ca lculations were issued on a state- by -state, r ather than employ er- by -employ er, basis. Second, the c onditional certifications did not , as plaintiffs re quest here , require employ ers to ag ree to pay

a wa g e base d on a re g ulation that had y et to be promulg ated. Instead, the 6 an AER in 1983. NAACP v. Donovan , 566 F. Supp. 1202, 1210 (D.D .C. 1983). Plaintiffs argue that the NAA CP relief descr ibed above is “indistinguishable” from the relief they reque st here. B ut this claim ignore s the distinctions between the A ER—which applied to all H-2 visas at the time of the NAACP lit ig a tio n— and the H- 2B pr e va ili ngwa g e rate reg ime. AERs are issued on a state- by -state ba sis, where as H-2B preva iling wa g es ar e issued on an employ er- by -employ er ba sis. See20 C.F .R. § 6 55 .1 0( a ) ( 20 10 ). H- 2B e mpl oy e rs mus t
s u b m i t an ex t en s i v e ap p l i ca t i o nfo r aP W D, an d th e N P C mu s tp ro v i d e a ni n d i v i d u al i z edwa ge 7 calc ulation within 30 day s of the re quest. Id. § 655(b)( 6). Unde r plaintiffs’ pr oposed re lief,
ever y H-2B employ er who rec eived a conditional labor c ertification would have to obtain a ne w PW D a f te r th e D O Lis s u e d

r e v is e d w a g e r e g u lati o n s . Co n d it io n a l c e rti f ic a ti o nin th is c o n te xt would thus involve considera bly more e x tensive administration and mana g ement than, a s in the NAACP litigation, simply order ing e mploy ers to pay a new statewide w ag e. I

there fore find that plaintiffs’ re quested re lief would stretc h this court’s equitable a uthority considera

bly further than the re medial orde rs in the NAA CP litigation. 8 Case 2:09-cv-00240-LP Document 97 Filed 11/24/10 Page 6 of 8employ ers ha d to ag ree to pay wag es base d on a re g ulation that had alre ady been issued, but that h a d b e e ns u s p e n d e d

p e n d i n g a

l e g a l c h a l l e n g e . C o n d i t i o n a l c e rt i f i c a t i o n s w e r e a c c o r d i n g l y a natura l incident to the preliminary injunction, and such circ umstances a re not pre sent in this case. I n it s b ri e f, the DO Lstate d th a t, “ a s a matte r o f p oli c y ,” H- 2B e mpl oy e rs sh ou ld 9 be re quired to pay

wag es under

the new r egulations as soon as they are eff ective, a nd that such a require ment would be “c onsistent with DOL ’s mandate .” De f.’s Resp. at 9 (docke t no. 89) (“D OL would pref

er to a pply the new pr evailingwag e methodolog y to as many

worke rs as po ssi ble .” ). Thus the on ly a pp are nt i mpe dim e nt t o th e DO Limp le me nti ngthe pr op os e d r e lie f i s the DOL ’s misconce ption that the regulations preclude it from doing so. 7 Moreove r, a c onditional certification order would blur the line betwee n this court’s
reme dial authority

and the DO L ’s administrative author ity
. See, e .g. , Fed. Power Comm’n v. Idaho Power Co. , 344 U.S. 17, 21 (1952) (the power “‘to a ffirm, modify , or set aside ’ the orde r of the Commission ‘in whole or in part’. . . . is not power to exercise an e ssentially administrative function” ( quoting APA § 706) ). The D OL is surely better positioned than this court to devise a set of proc edure s for e nsuring that the new r egulation takes oper ative ef fec t as soon as possible. I f t he DO Lc ho os e s to imp os e a c on dit ion a l c e rt if

ic a tio n r e g ime , the a g e nc y ha s th e e xpe rt ise to 9 deter mine how, when, a

nd in what form that r eg ime should be implemented. SeeMerr ick Gar land, Dere

gulation and Judicial Review , 98 H A RV . L. R EV . 507, 564 (1995) ( “[B]eca use the
essenc e of the executive func tion is t he exerc ise of discre tion, a court tra nsg resse s the separ ation of po we rs wh e n it

dic tate s th a t an a g e nc y

take on e pa

rt ic ula r a c tio n in ste a d o f o the rs wi thi n it s discretionar

y prer og ative.”) . Acc ording ly , the final c omponent of plaintiffs’ Motion to Add Additional Relief, which a sks this court to order the D OL to issue conditional labor
cer tifications, is denied. III . In s umm ary , th e DO Lha s f a ile d to ide nti fy

any fa c e t of its re g ulatio ns that w ou ld Case 2:09-cv-00240-LP Document 97 Filed 11/24/10 Page 7 of 88

prec lude it from issuing c onditional labor ce rtifications. Thoug h it would be sensible for the DOL to adopt measure s to mini miz e the a dverse eff ects of the invalid methodology , Iconclude that it is not within my

equitable powe r to instruct the DOL to do so. An appropr iate orde r
acc ompanies this opinion.

Case 2:09-cv-00240-LP Document 97 Filed 11/24/10 Page 8 of 8