DEFENSE 

INFRASTRUCTURE

Actions Needed to 

Strengthen Utility 

Resilience Planning

Report to the Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate

November 2016

GAO-17-27

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-27, a report to the 

Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate

November 2016

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

Actions Needed to Strengthen Utility 

Resilience Planning

What GAO Found

Based on GAO’s survey of Department of Defense (DOD) owned utility systems, 

there were 4,393 instances of utility disruptions caused by equipment failure for 

fiscal years 2009 through 2015 and the results of our survey and interviews with 

DOD installation officials indicated that these disruptions have caused a range of 

financial and operational impacts. Survey respondents identified several factors 

that contributed to equipment failures that led to disruptions, such as equipment 

operating beyond its intended life; poor equipment condition; and equipment not 

being properly maintained. Survey respondents reported over $29 million in 

financial impacts for fiscal years 2009 through 2015. Installation officials reported 

experiencing operational impacts such as a week-long shut down of operations

at an Army facility on Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey.

Information about utility disruptions is not consistently available to DOD utility 

owners and managers at the installation level. Specifically, 151 out of 364 survey 

respondents stated that they did not have information on utility disruptions for 

any fiscal year from 2009 through 2015. An overarching reason GAO found for 

disruption information not being available is that the services vary in the extent to 

which each has issued guidance to collect and retain utility disruption information 

at the installation level. The Army has some guidance to report utility disruptions,

but we found that some installations did not consistently have this information 

available. The Air Force and Marine Corps do not have current guidance 

directing the installations to track utility disruption information. The Navy issued 

new guidance in 2015 which, if implemented as directed, may improve the 

collection of utility disruption information. According to installation and 

headquarters officials, there are benefits to collecting utility disruption information 

since it can be used to identify repairs and to prioritize funding for those repairs. 

However, without guidance directing installations to collect information about all 

types of utility disruptions, service officials may not have the information needed 

to make informed decisions or to compete effectively for limited repair funds. 

DOD’s implementation of the Sustainment Management System (SMS), a 

software tool to conduct standardized condition assessments, may not provide it

with comparable and reliable facility condition index (FCI) data -- a metric used to 

make strategic investment decisions. In 2013, to improve the reliability of FCI 

data, DOD directed the services to use SMS which standardizes the way the 

services conduct condition assessments and calculate the FCI. According to 

officials, the SMS module for utility systems is still in development, but modules 

for other facilities, such as buildings, are complete and in use. While the SMS 

process is intended to provide DOD with credible FCI data, GAO found the 

process could result in differences in the FCI because the services are able to 

customize settings, called condition standards, within the process. Variation 

among the condition standards could result in facilities having differences in the 

FCI although the assessed physical conditions of the facilities are the same. As a 

result, the FCI data would not be comparable. Without taking steps to ensure 

that the services’ condition standards for the utilities module, which is under 

development, will provide the department with comparable and reliable FCI data, 

the SMS utilities module may not provide DOD information that is comparable 

across the department.

View GAO-17-27. For more information, 

contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD installations rely on utilities, such 

as electricity, to accomplish their 

missions and disruptions can hamper 

military operations. Senate Report 114-

49 included a provision for GAO to 

report on DOD-owned utility 

disruptions. This report (1) describes

the number, causes and impacts of 

utility disruptions caused by the failure 

of DOD-owned utility infrastructure for 

fiscal years 2009 through 2015; (2) 

assesses the extent to which owners 

and managers of DOD-owned systems 

have access to utility disruption 

information; and (3) assesses the 

extent to which the implementation of a 

standardized facility condition 

assessment process provides DOD 

consistent information about its utility 

systems. 

GAO surveyed a representative group 

of 453 DOD-owned electric, water, 

wastewater, and natural gas utility 

systems, evaluated DOD policies and 

reports, interviewed officials, and 

conducted interviews with several 

survey respondents who experienced 

the most disruptions.

What GAO Recommends

To improve utility system information, 

GAO is recommending that the Army, 

Air Force, and Marine Corps take steps 

or provide guidance to consistently 

collect disruption information, and that 

while the SMS utilities module is under 

development, DOD take steps to 

ensure that the services apply 

condition standards consistently. DOD 

concurred with the recommendations 

to collect disruption data and partially 

concurred with the other 

recommendation stating that it would 

determine if further consistent 

condition standards are needed.
Page i GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Letter 1

Background 6

Reported Disruptions of DOD-Owned Utility Systems Cause a 

Range of Financial and Operational Impacts 11

Owners and Managers of DOD-Owned Utility Systems Do Not 

Have Consistently Available Information about Utility 

Disruptions 25

DOD Is Implementing a Standardized Condition Assessment 

Process to Improve Data Reliability, but It Could Result in 

Differences in the Facility Condition Index across the Services 29

Conclusions 38

Recommendations for Executive Action 39

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 40

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 42

Appendix II Survey on DOD-Owned Utility Resilience 48

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 80

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 82

Tables

Table 1: Status of Department of Defense Electric, Water, 

Wastewater and Natural Gas Utility Systems, as of 

January 1, 2015 7

Table 2: Department of Defense Facility Condition Index 

Categories 9

Table 3: Responses to GAO Survey of DOD-Owned Utility 

Systems: Number of Reported Disruptions by Military 

Service, Fiscal Years 2009-2015 12

Table 4: Responses to GAO Survey of DOD-Owned Utility 

Systems: Reported Financial Impacts of Disruptions on 

DOD-Owned Utility Systems Caused by Equipment 

Failure for Fiscal Years 2009 through 2015 18

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Table 5: Hypothetical Example of How Different Condition 

Standards Affect the Calculation of the Facility Condition 

Index for an Electric Utility 36

Table 6: Study Population for GAO Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Systems 43

Table 7: Original Sample Size for GAO Survey on DOD-Owned 

Utility Systems 44

Figures

Figure 1: Facility Condition Index (FCI) Equation 8

Figure 2: Responses to GAO Survey of DOD-Owned Utility 

Systems: Number of DOD Reported Utility Disruptions for 

Fiscal Years 2009 through 2015 by Utility System Type 

and by Military Service 13

Figure 3: Responses to GAO Survey of DOD-Owned Utility 

Systems: Reported Decade of Original Installation of 

DOD-Owned Utility Systems 15

Figure 4: Responses to GAO Survey of DOD-Owned Utility 

Systems: Reported Decade of Most Recent Project to 

Repair a Significant Part or Parts of the DOD-Owned 

Utility System 16

Figure 5: Burnt Electrical Feeder Cable That Caused a Major 

Disruption to an Army Facility on Joint Base McGuire-DixLakehurst, New Jersey 21

Figure 6: Water Pipe Rupture at Naval Support Facility, Indian 

Head, Maryland 23

Figure 7: Example of a Water System Repair at Naval Station 

Great Lakes, Illinois 24

Figure 8: Condition Standards for Determining Repair Needs Used 

in DOD’s Sustainment Management System Module for 

Buildings (BUILDER), by Military Service 35
Page iii GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Abbreviations 

Department of Defense DOD

Facility Condition Index FCI

Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD

Sustainment Management System SMS

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Page 1 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

November 14, 2016

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Department of Defense (DOD) installations serve as platforms from which 

the department employs forces across the full spectrum of military 

operations. These installations rely on the use of utilities, such as 

electricity and water, to accomplish their missions. For example, reliable 

electric and water utility services are critical to the launch missions at 

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida. Without electricity to power 

key communication and radar functions and water to absorb the excess 

heat and noise generated during rocket launches, a launch mission would 

have to be cancelled. Risks to the reliable provision of utility services on 

DOD installations can come from a variety of sources, such as extreme 

weather, mechanical failures, and even cyberattacks. For example, in 

2015 we found that Vandenberg Air Force Base had experienced 

electrical disruptions in 2010 and 2013 due to failures from on-base 

equipment, resulting in delayed satellite launches.1

In 2015 we also found that disruptions caused by the failure of DODowned utility infrastructure, such as the disruption described above, may 

have played a larger role in disruptions experienced by DOD installations 

than had been indicated by DOD’s annual reporting on disruptions.2 We 

found that because DOD had not specifically identified and logged 

instances of disruptions caused by the failure of DOD-owned utility 

infrastructure, the department did not have comprehensive information 

 1

GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Improvements in DOD Reporting and Cybersecurity 

Implementation Needed to Enhance Utility Resilience Planning, GAO-15-749

(Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2015).

2

Section 2925 of Title 10 of the United States Code requires DOD to report to Congress 

on a number of facility energy requirements, including the number of utility disruptions on 

military installations. This information is reported in DOD’s Annual Energy Management 

Reports. Copies of DOD’s Annual Energy Management Reports can be found here: 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/IE/FEP_Energy_Reports.html.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

about utility disruptions.3 Given the possibility that disruptions result in 

serious operational impacts, decision makers need reliable information to 

ensure that resources are available to take necessary steps at 

installations and across the department to increase resilience.4

Furthermore, according to a DOD official, an ongoing DOD study found 

that the reliability of energy utility infrastructure on an installation is an 

important factor to consider when determining the cost-effectiveness of 

energy resilience strategies to enhance mission assurance.

According to DOD’s real property inventory from fiscal year 2014, DOD 

manages nearly 562,000 facilities with a combined plant replacement 

value5 that the department estimates at about $880 billion.6 This includes 

more than 181,000-utility facilities with a plant replacement value of more 

than $158 billion. According to DOD, all facilities, to include utility 

infrastructure, are to be sustained and recapitalized, as necessary, to 

ensure that they are in the right condition to support the department’s 

missions. However, according to DOD, the department has been 

accepting significant risk in its recent budgets for facilities, to include 

utility infrastructure. For example, in April 2016, the Acting Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment testified 

that DOD has been accepting significant risk in its budgets for maintaining 

facilities because its fiscal year 2017 budget request was 10 percent less 

 3

See GAO-15-749.

4

In order to provide DOD and Congress with improved information to use in DOD’s utility 

resilience planning efforts, we recommended that DOD revise its reporting guidance to 

collect and report on disruptions caused by the failure of DOD-owned utility infrastructure. 

The department did not concur with our recommendation, stating that reporting on these 

disruptions provides a “low value proposition;” that the data collected by the department 

for the Energy Reports are not being used to guide its strategic decisions; and that 

collecting the data would be “onerous.” However, we continue to believe that the collection 

of this information could benefit DOD’s efforts to ensure that its installations are prepared 

for and have the ability to recover from utility disruptions that impact mission assurance on 

its installations. See GAO-15-749.

5

Plant replacement value is used as a common measure of facility and inventory size, as 

well as a basis for generating facility condition ratings and estimating recapitalization 

requirements. Factors that determine a facility’s plant replacement value include the 

facility’s size; the average cost for constructing a similar, average-sized facility to current 

standards; costs for labor, equipment, materials, and currency exchange rates overseas; 

costs for project planning and design, historical architecture and materials, and overhead; 

and inflation adjustments. 

6

We obtained and analyzed records from DOD’s Real Property Asset Database for fiscal 

year 2014 (the most recent data available at the time of our report).
Page 3 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

from the previous year and the department and has seen worsening 

condition ratings for its facilities.7

Senate Report 114-49 accompanying S. 1376, a bill for the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, included a provision for 

us to review information on utility disruptions on DOD installations due to 

the failure of DOD-owned infrastructure, among other things. This report 

(1) describes the number, causes and impacts of utility disruptions 

caused by the failure of DOD-owned utility infrastructure for fiscal years 

2009 through 2015; (2) assesses the extent to which owners and 

managers of DOD-owned utility systems have access to information 

about disruptions caused by equipment failures; and (3) assesses the 

extent to which the department’s implementation of a standardized facility 

condition assessment process provides it with consistent information 

about the condition of utility systems.8

To determine the number of disruptions of DOD-owned utility systems9

that occurred between fiscal years 2009 through 2015, their causes, and 

the impact of the disruptions, we conducted a survey of a stratified 

random sample of 453 DOD electric, water, wastewater, and natural gas 

utility systems that were owned by the active component of one of the 

four military services and located on a U.S. or overseas installation with a 

plant replacement value of $100 million or more. Our survey included 

questions about the disruptions caused by equipment failure, the impacts 

of those disruptions, and the characteristics of the DOD-owned utility 

systems, among other things. To inform the design of our survey 

instrument and help ensure the validity and reliability of our testimonial 

 7

Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2017 Department of Defense Budget Request for Energy, 

Installations, and Environment before the Subcommittee on Military Construction, 

Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies; Statement of Mr. Pete Potochney, Performing the 

Duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense Energy, Installations and Environment.

8

In 2013 the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed the services to implement 

a standardized condition assessment process in order to improve the reliability of its 

facilities’ condition data, called the facility condition index (FCI). See The Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Memorandum, Standardizing 

Facility Condition Assessments (Sept. 10, 2013).

9

In this report, when we refer to DOD-owned utility systems we are including systems that 

are owned by one of the military services and systems where the military service pays for 

the majority of the operation and maintenance of the utility system. Some utility systems, 

mostly those located overseas, may not be owned by the military service but the military 

service may be responsible for funding the operation and maintenance of the system. See 

appendix I for more information.
Page 4 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

survey evidence, we discussed the survey topics and appropriate 

recipients with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

and the military services, developed the survey with GAO subject matter 

analysts and technical survey experts, and conducted pretests with 

officials who had work experience managing and operating DOD-owned 

utility systems. Furthermore, the survey instrument was independently 

reviewed by a survey design expert within GAO.

We based the analysis in this report on 364 completed surveys, which is 

an 80 percent response rate.10 Generally, in this report, the results of this 

survey are presented as statistical estimates about the population of 

1,075 electric, water, wastewater, and natural gas utility systems 

described in appendix I. In cases where we use these estimates, we 

describe the results as estimates and we generally refer to the entire 

population of “utility systems” or “utility managers.”11 Because some 

questions did not apply to all respondents, some of the questions in our 

survey were answered by an insufficient number of respondents to 

reliably generate an estimate of the overall population. In these cases, 

rather than presenting a population estimate, we report on the number of 

respondents in our sample who answered that question. To obtain 

additional information about the impact of utility disruptions caused by the 

failure of DOD-owned utility infrastructure, we conducted follow-up 

interviews with selected respondents who reported the most disruptions. 

We asked respondents to describe the impacts of specific disruptions and 

we also collected and reviewed documentation, such as records in 

maintenance information systems and project proposals.

To assess the extent to which owners and managers of DOD-owned 

utility systems have information about disruptions caused by equipment 

failures, we included a question in our survey regarding the availability of 

information on disruptions for fiscal years 2009 through 2015 and a 

question about the usefulness of disruption information in managing utility 

 10We actually received 379 completed surveys, but determined through a screening 

question in our survey that 15 of the respondents did not own and were not responsible for 

paying the majority of the operation and maintenance of the system and excluded them 

from our analyses. The analysis in this report is based on those 364 survey responses, 

which is an 80 percent response rate. In addition, the full results from the 364 surveys are 

presented in appendix II. 

11We express our confidence in the precision of estimates with a margin of error. This is 

the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples 

we could have drawn. Margins of error are provided along with each sample estimate in 

the report.
Page 5 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

systems. Based on the survey responses, we followed up with 143 survey 

respondents who reported not having any information on disruptions for 

any fiscal year, in order to confirm their responses and to determine the 

reasons why information was not available. We also interviewed service 

officials regarding policies and practices related to the collection and use 

of utility disruption information. Finally, we compared installation practices 

to standards regarding the identification, analysis and response to risks 

as described in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government.12 In addition, we reviewed reports from federal agencies 

and utility management organizations, such as management guides 

issued by the Environmental Protection Agency and the American Public 

Power Association, which describe the information that is useful in the 

management and operation of utility systems.

To assess the extent to which the department’s implementation of a 

standardized facility condition assessment process provides DOD with 

consistent information about the condition of utility systems, we reviewed 

policy documents and reports describing the development and 

implementation of a new standardized condition assessment process and 

reviewed how DOD plans to use the condition information to monitor and 

oversee the achievement of department-wide goals. Additionally, we 

collected and reviewed documents such as briefings, training documents, 

and a user guide that describe how the new standardized condition 

assessment process will assess and rate the condition of utility systems 

and related infrastructure. We also conducted interviews with DOD and 

service officials regarding the development of the standardized process 

and how the department intends to use the information to inform 

decisions. Finally, we compared DOD’s process for generating the 

condition information with standards regarding the use and management 

of data as described in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government.13 For more information about the scope and methodology, 

please see appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to November 2016, 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

 12GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C., Nov. 1, 1999). There is a 2014 version of these standards. However, 

we are using the version from 1999 since the scope of our audit covers fiscal years 2009 

through 2015.

13GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 
Page 6 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

A DOD-owned electric, water, wastewater, or natural gas system is 

composed of multiple components — the equipment, fixtures, pipes, 

wires, and other structures used in the generation and distribution of 

electric power, the supply of natural gas, the treatment and distribution of 

potable water, or the collection and treatment of wastewater. According to 

our review of records maintained by the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment, as of January 1, 

2015, the military services own or have been operating and maintaining 

as many as 1,954 electric, potable water, wastewater, and natural gas 

utility systems located in the United States, in its territories, or overseas 

(see table 1).14 From these 1,954 systems, we determined that 1,075 of 

these electric, water, wastewater and natural gas utility systems were 

owned by the active component of one of the four military services and 

located on an installation with a plant replacement value of $100 million or 

more.15

 14The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment maintains 

records on the ownership status of utility systems serving DOD installations in support of 

its utilities privatization program. These records did not clearly indicate whether the 

overseas utility systems were owned or maintained by DOD. We took steps to verify the 

ownership of these systems through our survey. For more information, please see

appendix I.

15For more information on how we determined the utility systems included in the scope of 

this review, please see appendix I. 

Background

Utility Infrastructure

Owned by DOD
Page 7 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Table 1: Status of Department of Defense Electric, Water, Wastewater and Natural 

Gas Utility Systems, as of January 1, 2015

Status

Location Privatized Owned or Operated and 

Maintained by a Military 

Servicea

Total

United States 331 1,252 1,583

U.S. Territories 3 27 30

Overseas 236 675 911

Total 570 1,954 2,524

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. | GAO-17-27

a

The records maintained by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and 

Environment on the ownership status of utility systems serving DOD did not clearly indicate whether 

some systems, mostly those overseas, were owned or operated and maintained by DOD. We took 

steps to verify the ownership of these systems through our survey.

In addition, the records maintained by the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment indicate 

that DOD has privatized 570 electric, water, wastewater and natural gas 

utility systems. According to DOD, since 1997 the department has been 

attempting to privatize its utility systems because military installations 

have been unable to maintain reliable utility systems due to inadequate 

funding and competing installation management priorities. DOD officials 

stated that privatization is the preferred method for modernizing and 

recapitalizing utility systems and services by allowing military installations 

to benefit from private-sector financing and efficiencies. We previously 

reported that with private-sector financing, installations obtain major 

upgrades to their utility systems and pay for these improvements over 

time through the utility services contracts using operation and 

maintenance funds.16 Furthermore, in 2005, that while utility privatization 

may have provided for quicker system improvements than otherwise 

 16We reviewed DOD’s utility privatization program in 2005 and 2006 and made several 

recommendations to include that DOD revise the guidance for preparing economic 

analyses in order to be able to compare costs of privatization and continued government 

ownership. DOD disagreed with these recommendations and we consider them closed 

and not implemented. See GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Managing Issues Requiring 

Attention in Utility Privatization, GAO-05-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2005). GAO, 

Defense Infrastructure: Actions Taken to Improve the Management of Utility Privatization, 

but Some Concerns Remain, GAO-06-914 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2006). 
Page 8 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

might have been available, the services’ economic analyses of the costs 

of privatization gave an unrealistic sense of savings.17

To promote efficient and economical use of America’s real property 

assets and ensure management accountability for implementing federal 

real property management reforms, the President on February 4, 2004, 

signed Executive Order 13327, Federal Real Property Asset 

Management. This executive order created the Federal Real Property 

Council, established the role of the senior real property officer, and 

authorized the creation of a centralized real property database. The 

Federal Real Property Council worked with the General Services 

Administration to develop and enhance an inventory system known as the 

Federal Real Property Profile, which was designed to meet the executive 

order’s requirement for a centralized database that includes all real 

property under the control of executive branch agencies. The 2013 

Federal Real Property Council guidance for real property inventory 

reporting defines 25 real property data elements. One data element is the 

facility condition index (FCI).18

The FCI of real property under the control of executive branch agencies is 

collected in the Federal Real Property Profile database. The FCI provides 

a general measure of a building’s or structure’s condition at a specific 

point in time, see figure 1.

Figure 1: Facility Condition Index (FCI) Equation

 17At the time of our 2005 report, DOD and service officials stated that utility privatization 

had helped installations achieve major system improvements which would not have been 

otherwise possible due to inadequate funding caused by the competition for funds and 

budget allocation decisions. See GAO-05-433.

Real Property Condition 

Metric: The Facility 

Condition Index
Page 9 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Repair needs, as defined by the Federal Real Property Council, signify 

the amount necessary to restore a building or structure to a condition 

substantially equivalent to the original condition. Plant replacement value, 

as defined by the Federal Real Property Council, signifies the cost of 

replacing an existing building or structure so that it meets today’s 

standards. The FCI is reported on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, in which 

the higher the FCI, the better the condition of the building or structure.

According to a DOD official, the FCI is used to understand the health of 

the department’s portfolio so that decision makers can be better informed 

when making investment decisions. DOD guidance requires that each 

service maintain a current inventory count and up-to-date information 

regarding, among other things, the FCI of each facility in its inventory.19

DOD calculates the FCI as defined by the Federal Real Property Council, 

and records the FCI in its Real Property Assets Database. DOD grouped 

FCI calculated ratings into four bands, ranging from good to failing 

condition, to allow the services and defense agencies to group facilities 

by condition for the purpose of developing investment strategies. The four 

FCI categories are shown in table 2.

Table 2: Department of Defense Facility Condition Index Categories 

Facility Condition Index Condition Category

90 to 100 percent Good condition

80 to 89 percent Fair condition

60 to 79 percent Poor condition

0 to 59 percent Failing condition

Source: Department of Defense. | GAO-17-27

Since 2003 we have issued several reports on federal real property 

issues such as repair and maintenance backlogs, among other things.20

For example, in October 2008 we reported that six real property holding 

agencies, including DOD, respectively use different methods to define 

and estimate their repair and maintenance backlogs.21 Further, we 

 19 DOD Instruction 4165.14, Real Property Inventory and Forecasting (Jan. 17, 2014).

20 For the list of these reports, see the Related GAO Products section at the end of this 

report.

21 GAO, Federal Real Property: Government’s Fiscal Exposure from Repair and 

Maintenance Backlogs Is Unclear, GAO-09-10 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 16, 2008).

Real Property 

Management
Page 10 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

reported that the backlog estimates do not necessarily reflect the costs 

that agencies expect to incur to repair and maintain assets essential to 

their missions or to avert risks to their missions. For example, the General 

Services Administration identified $7 billion in repair needs for work to be 

done from fiscal year 2007 and within the next 10 years on its facilities, 

and DOD provided an FCI value for its facilities.22 We recommended that 

the Office of Management and Budget, in conjunction with the Federal 

Real Property Council and in consultation with the Federal Accounting 

Standards Advisory Board, should explore the potential for developing a 

uniform reporting requirement in the Federal Real Property Profile that 

would capture the government’s fiscal exposure related to real property 

repair and maintenance. We further recommended that such a reporting 

requirement should include a standardized definition of repair and 

maintenance costs related to all assets that agencies determine to be 

important to their mission, and therefore capture the government’s fiscal 

exposure related to its real property assets. The Office of Management 

and Budget generally concurred with the report and agreed with our 

recommendation. Our recommendation was implemented in 2011 when 

the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, as supported by the 

Office of Management and Budget and in coordination with other federal 

agencies, amended existing standards for financial reporting of deferred 

repairs and maintenance to establish uniformity across reporting 

agencies.

We also previously reviewed DOD’s efforts to manage its real property 

inventory, including the need for continued management attention to 

support installation facilities and operations, among other things. In 2011 

we reported that within the DOD Support Infrastructure Management high 

risk area, the management and planning for defense facilities 

sustainment—maintenance and repair activities necessary to keep 

facilities in good working order—no longer remained on the high risk list 

because DOD had made significant progress in this area at that time.23

Specifically, we found that DOD took steps to verify the accuracy of its 

inventory of real property and to develop a facilities sustainment model 

that provides a consistent and reasonable framework for preparing 

estimates of DOD’s annual facility sustainment funding requirements. In 

 22 While DOD’s report to the Federal Real Property Profile in 2007 only reported the FCI, 

the department did report about $72 billion in deferred maintenance for its real property in 

its 2007 financial report.

23 GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2011).
Page 11 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

addition, since 2011 DOD has continued to take steps to improve its 

ability to assess and record the condition of its infrastructure. One 

improvement is the development of a standardized process for assessing 

facility conditions. In 2016 we reported that individual services have 

reported varying levels of progress in implementing this process. We 

recommended that DOD revise its guidance to clarify how the services 

are to indicate when a facility condition rating recorded in DOD’s Real 

Property Assets Database is based on the standardized process.24 DOD 

partially concurred with our recommendation and stated that the OSD 

conducts periodic reviews of the service’s implementation of the 

standardized process to ensure they are making progress.

Respondents to our survey of DOD-owned utility systems identified 4,393 

instances of utility disruptions caused by the failure of DOD-owned 

equipment for fiscal years 2009 through 2015, and the results of our 

survey and interviews with DOD installation officials indicated that these 

disruptions have caused a range of financial and operational impacts. 

Several factors contributed to the equipment failures that lead to 

disruptions to DOD-owned utility systems, such as the utility equipment 

operating beyond its intended life.

Of the 364 respondents to our survey, 143 reported a total of 4,393 utility 

disruptions caused by equipment failure for fiscal years 2009 through 

2015.25 Table 3 shows the number of survey respondents, respondents 

reporting disruptions, and the total number of disruptions reported for 

fiscal years 2009 through 2015, by service.

 24 GAO, Defense Facility Condition: Revised Guidance Needed to Improve Oversight of 

Assessments and Ratings, GAO-16-662 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 23, 2016). 

25We asked survey respondents to report the number of disruptions their utility systems 

experienced each fiscal year. We defined a disruption as being caused by the failure of 

DOD-owned equipment or by the under-performance of utility infrastructure based on 

operating environment standards and based on lasting more than 5 minutes. We clarified 

that we did not want survey respondents to report disruptions to the system that were 

caused by the failure of a commercial or privatized utility system; natural events such as a 

storm, earthquake, or fire; intentional or planned disruptions; or disruptions lasting less 

than 5 minutes. 

Reported Disruptions 

of DOD-Owned Utility 

Systems Cause a 

Range of Financial 

and Operational 

Impacts

Reported Disruptions of 

DOD-Owned Utility 

Systems Caused by 

Equipment Failure
Page 12 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Table 3: Responses to GAO Survey of DOD-Owned Utility Systems: Number of 

Reported Disruptions by Military Service, Fiscal Years 2009-2015

Military Service Air 

Force

Army Marine 

Corps

Navy Total

Number of respondents 103 93 34 134 364

Respondents reporting one or 

more disruption

56 24 5 58 143

Number of disruptions reported 2,036 784 86 1,487 4,393

Source: GAO 2015 Survey of DOD-Owned Utility Systems. | GAO-17-27

Of the 4,393 reported disruptions, the majority were on electric and water 

utility systems. Specifically, 1,838 disruptions were on electric utility 

systems and 1,942 were on water utility systems. In addition, 270 

disruptions were on natural gas utility systems and 343 were on 

wastewater systems. Figure 2 shows the number of reported disruptions 

for fiscal years 2009 through 2015, by utility system type and by service.
Page 13 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 2: Responses to GAO Survey of DOD-Owned Utility Systems: Number of 

DOD Reported Utility Disruptions for Fiscal Years 2009 through 2015 by Utility 

System Type and by Military Service

According to our survey results and interviews with installation officials, 

several factors contribute to causing equipment failures that lead to 

disruptions of DOD-owned utility systems. Survey respondents indicated 

that some causes of equipment failures that led to utility disruptions 

between fiscal years 2009 and 2015 included:

• the equipment was used beyond its intended life;

• the condition of the equipment was poor;

• the equipment had not been properly maintained;

Several Factors Contribute 

to Utility Disruptions
Page 14 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

• or the equipment was handling service volumes beyond its intended 

capacity.26

According to installation officials, some utility systems are experiencing or 

are at risk of experiencing disruptions because the equipment is operating 

beyond its intended life. For example, an official from Naval Station Great 

Lakes, Illinois, stated that the water system is more than 90 years old —

beyond its serviceable life which she estimates at about 50-60 years. The 

increasing age of the system causes the system’s condition to deteriorate 

and results in more unplanned disruptions. In another example, Air Force 

officials from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, stated that the 

majority of the installation’s water distribution pipes were originally 

installed in the 1940’s and due to the age of these pipes there is an 

increased risk for a significant disruption. However, officials stated that 

they are currently not experiencing frequent or severe disruptions to the 

water system due to equipment failure.

Based on our survey results, the majority of DOD-owned utility systems 

are between 55 and 65 years old but have also completed a repair project 

that replaced a significant part or parts of the system in the last 15 years. 

Specifically, we estimate, based on information reported in our survey 

responses, that approximately 25 percent of DOD-owned utility systems 

were originally installed between 1941 and 1950 and approximately 24 

percent between 1951 and 1960 (see figure 3).

 26In our survey we asked respondents to indicate if various causes of disruptions to their 

utility systems were common or uncommon. Our survey results did not indicate that a 

particular cause was more common than others. For more information, see the full 

presentation of the survey results in appendix II.
Page 15 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 3: Responses to GAO Survey of DOD-Owned Utility Systems: Reported Decade of Original Installation of DOD-Owned 

Utility Systems

To supplement the information about the age of the utility systems, 

through our survey we also collected information on when a significant 

part or parts of the system was repaired or replaced. Over time parts of 

the utility systems are repaired and replaced through maintenance 

activities because certain parts have a shorter serviceable life than 

others. Describing the age of the system based on when the system was 

originally installed does not capture the fact that parts have been replaced 

over time and that certain components of a system may be newer than 

other components. Based on our survey results, more than half of DODowned utility systems have had a significant part or parts of the systems 

replaced in the last 15 years. Specifically, we estimate that approximately 

16 percent of DOD-owned utility systems have most recently completed a 

significant repair between 2001 and 2010, and 37 percent between 2011 

and 2015 (see figure 4).
Page 16 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 4: Responses to GAO Survey of DOD-Owned Utility Systems: Reported Decade of Most Recent Project to Repair a 

Significant Part or Parts of the DOD-Owned Utility System

In addition, according to our survey results the poor condition of 

equipment is a contributing factor leading to disruptions. For example, 

officials from Naval Station Mayport, Florida, stated that some of the 

disruptions they reported in the survey were caused by electrical 

equipment that was in poor condition. Specifically, the officials reported 

that the existing distribution system serving the installation’s on-base 

housing is unreliable, not in compliance with code, poorly designed, and 

past its expected useful lifespan of 50 years.

Furthermore, according to some installation officials we interviewed, the 

utility systems experienced failures because the systems have not been 

properly maintained. For example, officials from Joint Base LewisMcChord, Washington, stated that some of the disruptions they reported 

resulted from the lack of expertise to perform maintenance. Specifically, 

these officials stated that a well failed in the summer of 2015 because 

prior repairs to the well were performed improperly, in part because they 

were performed by personnel without specialized training, and tools had 

been mistakenly left inside the well. In other examples, officials told us 

that they are aware of necessary repairs, however, they have been 

unable to complete them due to lack of funding. According to responses 

provided to our survey, we estimate that approximately 29, 32, and 35 
Page 17 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

percent of DOD-owned utility systems experienced funding shortfalls for 

fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015 respectively.27

To mitigate the funding shortfall, based on the survey responses we 

estimate that approximately 33 percent of utility managers deferred entire 

planned maintenance and repair projects and 41 percent deferred 

portions of planned maintenance and repair projects.28 In an interview 

with officials from Naval Station Bremerton, they stated that an electrical 

substation has experienced several failures, disrupting electricity to 

shipyard operations, because there are several condition deficiencies and 

it is poorly configured (i.e., the substation has a mixture of different parts 

and equipment that do not function efficiently together), making the 

operation and maintenance of the substation challenging. Officials 

reported that they have known about these issues with the substation for 

years, but they have not submitted a project to update the system 

because they believed it would not compete well for funding. Officials said 

that a lack of available funding for the electric system has caused them to 

delay a utility infrastructure project on this substation, a critical component 

of the electric system. In another example, an official from Naval Station 

Great Lakes, Illinois, stated that an assessment study of the water system 

recommended a phased recapitalization of the system, however, these 

repairs have been deferred due to lack of funding. In another example, 

officials from Marine Corps Air Station Yuma stated that the installation’s 

wastewater 50-year old infrastructure does not comply with current 

standards and guidelines, but due to funding shortfalls repairs or 

replacements have not been completed.

 27These estimates have a margin of error no larger than plus or minus 4.8 percent at the 

95 percent level of confidence.

28These estimates have a margin of error of no larger than plus or minus 6.9 percent at 

the 95 percent level of confidence. In addition, we asked about factors that led to the 

funding shortfall. We estimate that approximately 55 percent of respondents stated that a 

contributing factor to why they experienced a funding shortfall was because other funding 

needs within their respective military services or and 54 percent stated that other funding 

needs at the installation had a higher priority than the utility system. Approximately 30 

percent stated that a contributing factor was an increase in unplanned maintenance needs 

for the system. These estimates have a margin of error of no larger than plus or minus 6.9 

percent at the 95 percent level of confidence. For more information, see appendix II. 
Page 18 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Based on our survey responses and follow-up interviews with installation 

officials, disruptions of utility systems caused by the failure of DODowned equipment caused a range of financial and operational impacts.29

Of the 143 respondents who reported experiencing one or more utility 

disruptions, 100 reported information about financial impacts – the money 

spent repairing the disruption and mitigating its effects. These 

respondents reported experiencing a total of over $29 million in financial 

impacts for fiscal years 2009 through 2015 (see table 4). Respondents 

reported experiencing financial impacts that ranged from no financial 

impacts, or zero, to those indicating as much as $7.5 million in impacts in 

1 year. Table 4 shows the total financial impacts by survey respondents 

for utility disruptions caused by equipment failure for fiscal years 2009 

through 2015 by service and utility type.

Table 4: Responses to GAO Survey of DOD-Owned Utility Systems: Reported 

Financial Impacts of Disruptions on DOD-Owned Utility Systems Caused by 

Equipment Failure for Fiscal Years 2009 through 2015

Service Utility Type Total Reported Financial 

Impacts for Fiscal Years 2009 

through 2015

Army Electric $1,144,074

Water $3,164,000

Wastewater $421,000

Natural Gas $25,000

Navy Electric $2,811,300

Water $2,233,400

Wastewater $1,014,000

Natural Gas $75,100

Air Force Electric $2,590,127

Water $5,279,514

Wastewater $706,188

Natural Gas $264,698

 29We defined fiscal impacts as the money spent repairing the disruption and mitigating its 

effects. For example, the costs of the replacement part and the cost of the personnel 

needed to complete the repair would be considered in the fiscal impact.

Reported Financial and 

Operational Impacts of 

Utility Disruptions
Page 19 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Service Utility Type Total Reported Financial 

Impacts for Fiscal Years 2009 

through 2015

Marine Corps Electric $17,646

Water $9,375,000

Wastewater $500,000

Natural Gas $0

Total $29,621,047

Source: GAO 2015 Survey of DOD-Owned Utility Systems. | GAO-17-27

In our follow-up interviews with survey respondents, some officials 

explained that they were unable to estimate the financial impacts of 

disruptions. For example, an official from MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, 

stated that they did not report any financial impacts of disruptions 

because it would have been too difficult and time consuming to manually 

search through all of the records to identify the costs. In addition, officials 

from Naval Station Bremerton explained that any estimate of the costs 

associated with the fiscal impacts of the disruptions would be unreliable 

because they could not definitively calculate the total costs of all of the 

repair work performed for each disruption. However, they stated that the 

Navy conducted an in-depth study of unplanned utility outages on the four 

major Navy shipyards, in part to determine the causes of the outages and 

the impacts of the outages on the Navy’s ship repair and maintenance 

efforts. According to Navy officials, the study determined that the 

unplanned outages were mostly caused by the equipment failure of Navyowned utility equipment and that the outages had led to delays in repair 

efforts and approximately $58 million in lost productivity.30

In addition, based on our survey responses, disruptions caused by the 

failure of DOD-owned equipment cause a range of operational impacts. In 

our survey, we asked the respondents who reported one or more utility 

disruptions to report how common various operational impacts were. 

Based on their responses, in fiscal year 2015, we estimate that 

approximately 39 percent of DOD-owned utility managers commonly or 

very commonly experienced no operational impacts from disruptions, 

approximately 51 percent commonly or very commonly experienced 

minor operational impacts, and approximately 27 percent commonly or 

 30The Navy’s costs and the costs obtained through our survey are not comparable. The 

Navy study included costs associated with lost productivity in their calculation of the fiscal 

impacts of the unplanned outages. Our survey did not include costs associated with lost 

productivity. 
Page 20 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

very commonly experienced moderate operational impacts, such as 

delays or reduced capability of some assets. Further, major operational 

impacts were less common. Also in fiscal year 2015, we estimate that 

approximately 9 percent of DOD-owned utility managers commonly or 

very commonly experienced major operational impacts.31

Our interviews with installation officials provided additional examples of 

operational impacts of disruptions. For example, an official from Joint 

Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, provided an example of a 

moderate operational impact. He stated that a power line exploded on the 

Lakehurst annex and caused an electric disruption to a major Army 

facility. The official explained that the power line that exploded was 

installed in 1945 and was past its expected service life. Operations at the 

Army facility were shut down for an entire week while staff arranged to 

have several large generators installed at the facility. The facility ran on 

generator power for the next 3 weeks while contracted repairs to the line 

were completed. Figure 5 shows a burnt electrical feeder cable that 

caused a major disruption to this Army facility.

 31These estimates have a margin of error no larger than plus or minus 9.4 percent at the 

95 percent level of confidence.
Page 21 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 5: Burnt Electrical Feeder Cable That Caused a Major Disruption to an Army 

Facility on Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

Similarly, in another example the Naval Undersea Warfare Center located 

in Keyport, Washington, officials stated that in 2013 a complete base 

electrical disruption was caused when a battery failed at a switching 

station and then led to cascading failures across the base. Officials stated 

that operations at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center stopped because 

there was minimal back-up electricity generating capability at the time.

In addition, the lack of preventive maintenance has led to disruptions. 

Officials from Naval Auxiliary Landing Field San Clemente Island, 

California, stated that the installation experienced an 8-hour island-wide 

electrical disruption because seven utility poles caught fire in May 2014. 

Officials were able to re-route power to some areas of the island, but 

some areas were without power for the full 8 hours. The utility poles 

caught fire because the insulator – a specific type of support used to 

attach an electrical distribution line to the utility pole that prevents the 

electricity from flowing to the pole itself – was corroded and covered with 

salt, dust and debris. The salt and dirt formed a conductive layer on the 

insulator that can create a “flashover” where the electricity flashes over 
Page 22 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

the corroded and polluted insulator and can lead to a fire on the utility 

pole. Officials stated that these insulators can be washed to mitigate the 

potential for such incidents. However, the system needs to be shut down 

in order to perform the work, and, because of the installation’s continuous 

training operation schedule, it is difficult to schedule this maintenance.

In another example, Navy officials from Naval Station Mayport, Florida, 

stated that a series of electric disruptions in enlisted housing resulted in a 

proposed $2.9 million project for improvements to the distribution system. 

According to the project documentation from April 2015 we reviewed, the 

poor condition of the infrastructure had caused 20 disruptions in the past 

two years. Some of the disruptions affected the entire neighborhood, and 

the disruptions lasted between 6 and 20 hours each.

Navy officials from Naval Support Facility Indian Head, Maryland, stated 

that in 2012 the installation’s water system experienced a major rupture to 

a segment of pipe that typically carries approximately 4,000 gallons per 

minute. The rupture caused a drop in pressure that decreased the volume 

of water going through the pipe to about 700 to 800 gallons per minute. 

This disruption caused a temporary shut-down in mission activities 

because the drop in water pressure impacted the fire suppression 

capabilities. The officials stated that they ultimately replaced 5 of their 60 

miles of water pipe due to this incident which cost approximately $2.0 

million. Figure 6 shows a water pipe rupture at Naval Support Facility, 

Indian Head, Maryland.
Page 23 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 6: Water Pipe Rupture at Naval Support Facility, Indian Head, Maryland

Source: U.S. Navy. | GAO-17-27

In situations with smaller leaks in the water pipes, it may be more difficult 

to find the problem. Figure 7 below demonstrates an example of repair

work associated with a leak or break in a water pipe at Naval Station 

Great Lakes, Illinois. Officials explained that the trench is not typically this 

large, but the leak could not be found initially. The maintenance workers 

had to dig the trench where the water was initially seen to be coming out 

of the ground and had to continue expanding the trench until the leak was 

found.
Page 24 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 7: Example of a Water System Repair at Naval Station Great Lakes, Illinois
Page 25 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Based on our analysis of survey responses and our follow-up interviews, 

we determined that information on utility disruptions is not consistently 

available to owners and managers of utilities at the installation level. 

According to our survey responses, 151 out of 364 survey respondents 

reported that they did not have information on utility disruptions for any 

fiscal year from 2009 through 2015.32 By contrast, 213 out of 364 survey

respondents stated that they had information on disruptions for at least 

one fiscal year, and the availability of information on disruptions increased 

for the more recent years.

We followed up with the respondents who reported not having information 

on disruptions to confirm their responses and to determine why such 

information was not available. We confirmed that 53 respondents did not 

have information, 52 stated that they did have information, several of 

whom said that they misread the question and their answer should have 

been that they had information but experienced no disruptions, and 38 did 

not respond to our follow-up. In addition, we did not follow up with 8 

respondents, 6 of whom said that they were unfamiliar with the system or 

whom did not believe they had the information necessary to complete the 

survey, and 2 of whom submitted survey responses after we began our 

follow up efforts.

The 53 respondents who reported not having disruption information 

provided various reasons why the information was not available. Some 

reasons include that the maintenance of the system is provided by a 

contractor and the contract does not require the collection and reporting 

of the disruption information; that the maintainers of utilities do not always 

indicate in the records they keep the cause of the outage, such as 

disruptions caused by equipment failure, versus other causes, such as 

storm damage; and that the maintenance history is not always available 

due to personnel turnover.33 In addition, some respondents reported that 

they might be able to determine the number of disruptions caused by 

 32This result was unexpected because during our pre-tests with each military service, the 

pre-testers indicated that information on the disruptions would be available at the 

installation level. Some of these officials explained that information on disruptions may not 

be available all the way back to fiscal year 2009, however. Also, as explained in our scope 

and methodology in appendix I, we asked each military service to identify the most 

appropriate officials to respond to our survey. Based on our survey results, our 

respondents have been in their current roles for an average of 4.5 years and have an 

average of about 6 years of experience working with their respective utility systems.

33Our survey collected information about the types of staff members who maintain the 

utility systems. See appendix II for more information.

Owners and 

Managers of DODOwned Utility 

Systems Do Not 

Have Consistently 

Available Information 

about Utility 

Disruptions
Page 26 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

equipment failure, but that they would need to manually search through 

the maintenance records which is a time-consuming task.

An overarching reason we found for disruption information not being 

available is that the services vary in the extent to which each has issued 

guidance to collect and retain utility disruption information at the 

installation level. Specifically,

• The Army has an annual requirement for utility managers to report a 

wide range of information about utility systems through the Installation 

Status Report process. This process requires utility managers to 

report unplanned electric utility disruptions and interruptions to water 

distribution infrastructure. Further, the process has requirements to 

report instances of equipment failure for water treatment and 

distribution equipment and wastewater treatment and collection 

equipment. There is not a specific requirement to report disruptions of 

natural gas systems, but there is a requirement to report on surveys 

done to detect the presence of leaks in the distribution piping. 

However, we found that some of the Army installations did not 

consistently have information about disruptions.

• The Air Force does not have a requirement for installations to collect 

and retain utility disruption data. Air Force installation officials stated 

that there used to be an instruction from a major Air Force command 

that required the reporting of utility disruption information, but that this 

instruction was superseded and the reporting requirement for utility 

disruptions was not included in the new guidance.

• The Marine Corps also does not have a requirement for installations 

to collect and retain utility disruption data. A Marine Corps 

headquarters official stated that he was considering developing such 

guidance.

• The Navy issued guidance in September 2015 to improve its ability to 

collect timely and accurate information about utility disruptions that 

occur on Navy installations by requiring the collection and reporting of 

disruption data beginning in fiscal year 2016.

34 According to the 

guidance, the Navy needs accurate utility disruption data in order to 

make informed decisions for utility investments because disruption 

data is a key factor utilized in prioritizing utility repair projects, among 

 34Navy Facilities Engineering Command Memorandum, Utility Outage Reporting Metrics 

and Accountability Plan (Sept. 18, 2015).
Page 27 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

other things.35 In the guidance, the Navy included specific instructions 

for how the utility disruption data were to be documented at the 

installation level. Specifically, the guidance instructs the public works 

departments or base operations and support contractors to track all 

utility outages in the Navy’s maintenance work order information 

system known as “MAXIMO”. For example, for unplanned utility 

outages lasting greater than 5 minutes, the installation officials or 

contracting staff are to enter information about the incident, response 

and repair in a MAXIMO work order outage log. In addition, 

installation officials or contracting staff are required to identify the 

cause of the utility outage and to enter that numerical code into 

MAXIMO (that is, 0 for false alarm, 1 for loss of commercial 

power/utility, 2 for weather-related disruptions, 3 for equipment 

failures, and so on). Furthermore, the guidance states that any new

base operating and support contracts should include a provision for 

the contractors to report utility disruption information into MAXIMO 

and to include instructions on how to report that information.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that 

management should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to 

achieving the defined objectives, and that analyzing and estimating the 

significance of risks provides the basis for responding to the risks.36 In 

addition, we reviewed reports from federal agencies and utility 

management organizations that recommend that utility system managers 

record and use information about the disruptions that occur on their 

systems in order to manage their systems effectively.37 For example, 

according to the American Public Power Association, reliability statistics 

calculated by using data on disruption frequency and duration constitute a 

quantitative basis for good decision making.

 35The Navy’s process is called the Utility Investment Risk Assessment. A Center for Naval 

Analyses study was performed on the Navy’s process and found, among other things, that 

it was worthwhile to collect more accurate, comprehensive data on utility disruptions. For 

example, data on the number of unplanned utility disruptions may be useful indicators on 

when to spend money on maintenance and whether future disruptions may be more likely 

to occur. Moreover, the accurate and comprehensive data are needed to make certain 

that the prioritization process provides a solid basis for distributing funds among 

installations. 

36GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

37Industry leading practices included information from organizations such as the 

International Standards Organization, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 

the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Transportation Pipeline and 

Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. 
Page 28 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

The collection and retention of utility disruption information is useful for 

two reasons. First, installation-level officials stated that disruption 

information is useful in operating and maintaining the utility system. 

Based on the responses to our survey, we estimate that 82 percent of 

utility managers considered this information to be somewhat or very 

useful.38 In addition, installation officials we interviewed identified several 

ways in which they used disruption information. For example, at Naval 

Station Great Lakes, Illinois, an official stated that while she was not 

aware of a policy requiring that she track disruptions to the utility systems, 

she did track disruptions on the water system, including information on 

the disruption’s location and date. She stated that she used the 

information to focus on areas of the water system that were experiencing 

multiple disruptions, to plan maintenance, and to inform funding 

decisions. In addition, an official from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, stated 

that he tracks outages because it is considered a good engineering 

practice. He stated that tracking disruptions on the electric system helped

him to determine reliability, operations and maintenance budgets, 

preventative maintenance requirements, and areas of the system that 

needed more attention.

Second, utility disruption information may help installations compete for 

project repair funding. According to Army, Navy, and Air Force officials, 

they use disruption information, among other information, when 

prioritizing funding for utility repairs in a particular budget year. For 

example, the Air Force’s risk-based project funding model uses utility 

outage information, among other variables, to prioritize projects. Also, as 

discussed above, the Navy’s utility project prioritization process to make 

risk-based investment decisions uses utility disruption information, among 

other variables, to determine the highest priority projects. According to the 

Navy’s guidance, the prioritization process helps them ensure that limited 

repair funding is directed to the most important projects.

Installations that collect and retain information about utility disruptions 

may be better able to manage and operate the utility system and compete 

for scarce project funds because they have the available data to justify 

the project. A Marine Corps official stated that he was considering 

developing a requirement for installations to track utility disruption 

information. In addition, as stated above, the Navy recently issued 

 38This estimate has a margin of error no larger than plus or minus 4.1 percent at the 95 

percent level of confidence.
Page 29 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

guidance to improve its ability to track utility disruptions because it needs 

this information to make informed decisions. The Navy’s guidance, if 

implemented as directed, may help installations track utility disruption 

information and thus enable them to make sound decisions. On the other 

hand, installation-level utility system owners and managers who do not 

have access to information about disruptions may not have the 

information they need to make informed decisions or to compete 

effectively for limited repair funds.

DOD is currently implementing a standardized condition assessment 

process to improve the data reliability of its facility condition data. DOD’s 

standardized assessment process for utility systems is currently in 

development, and the initial version has limited capabilities to assess the 

condition of the utility infrastructure. Further, the military services are 

allowed to customize certain settings within the process which could 

result in differences in the FCI across the services.

In 2013, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed the 

services to implement a standardized condition assessment process in 

order to improve data reliability, and specifically the credibility of the 

FCI.39 Prior to 2013 the guidance issued by OSD did not require a 

standardized condition assessment process, and the respective services 

used different methodologies to assess the condition of their facilities, 

including utility systems. As a result of the services’ nonstandardized 

approach, OSD determined that the FCI data lacked credibility as a 

measure of DOD facility quality.

 39Memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, Subject: Standardizing Facility Condition Assessments (Sept. 10, 2013).

DOD Is Implementing 

a Standardized 

Condition 

Assessment Process 

to Improve Data 

Reliability, but It 

Could Result in 

Differences in the 

Facility Condition 

Index across the 

Services

DOD Is Implementing a 

Standardized Condition 

Assessment Process to 

Improve Data Reliability
Page 30 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

According to the 2013 OSD memorandum, the department needed to 

implement the standardized assessment process to ensure that it had 

consistent and reliable condition data in order to make sound strategic 

investment decisions. According to an OSD official, the department relies 

on the FCI to make these decisions, in part, because the FCI allows OSD 

to assess the department’s and the individual services’ abilities to 

maintain the facilities at the condition necessary to achieve the 

department’s missions. In addition, decision makers use the FCI to 

monitor progress toward department-wide goals and to prevent further 

accumulation of deferred maintenance. Those goals include the 

establishment of an inventory-wide 80 percent minimum FCI score for 

each military service to meet annually for the facilities they manage, 

beginning in fiscal year 2016. Another goal is the identification of facilities 

in failing condition, with an FCI of below 60, in support of the 

department’s efforts to reduce the inventory of failing facilities.40

Our survey results indicate that operators of DOD-owned utility systems 

stated that knowledge about the condition of the infrastructure is useful. 

Specifically based on our survey responses, we estimate that utility 

managers consider knowledge about the condition of the system to have 

a somewhat or very positive effect on the ability to avoid or prevent 

equipment failure (68 percent); to manage risk associated with equipment 

failure (72 percent); to identify funding needs (76 percent); and to extend 

the utility system’s usable service life (71 percent), among other things.41

The 2013 OSD memorandum directed the services to use the 

Sustainment Management System (SMS) software, developed by the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Construction Engineering Research 

Laboratory, as the standardized condition assessment process. SMS is a 

suite of web-based software modules designed to help facility engineers, 

technicians, and managers make asset management decisions regarding 

when, where, and how best to maintain facilities and their key 

 40In 2014 OSD issued a memorandum requiring the services to submit certain information 

in the mitigation plans for facilities in failing condition, including estimated cost-todemolish, mothball, repair, or replace the failing facility, and a notional fiscal year for 

funding the mitigation. The memorandum does not require the services to fund the 

inventory-wide condition rating goal or plans for addressing failing facilities, citing 

budgetary challenges facing the department. See the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Memorandum, Facility Sustainment and 

Recapitalization Policy (Apr. 29, 2014).

41These estimates have a margin of error of no larger than plus or minus 5.0 percent at 

the 95 percent level of confidence.
Page 31 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

components. According to the 2013 OSD memorandum, the services are 

required to use SMS both to derive and to record the FCIs of facilities 

supported by SMS in their respective real property databases by 

September 2017. For assets not yet supported by SMS, such as utilities, 

the 2013 OSD memorandum directed the services to perform inspections 

with qualified personnel to determine existing physical deficiencies and to 

estimate the cost of maintenance and repairs using industry cost 

guides.42 According to U .S. Army Corps of Engineers officials, they are 

still in the process of developing modules that will respectively cover the 

following utilities: water, sewer, storm sewer, electrical, gas, and thermal 

systems.

According to officials from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, DOD’s 

standardized process for assessing the condition of utility infrastructure is 

currently under development, and the initial version has limited 

capabilities to assess the condition of the utility infrastructure. U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers officials stated that the initial version of the SMS 

module for electric and water utility systems has been under development 

since 2014 and is scheduled to undergo initial testing in November 2016. 

Further, according to U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials, their 

organization and the Air Force are the two organizations working on 

development of the utilities SMS module, but representatives from the 

other services have participated in the utilities SMS working committee 

meetings. In addition, according to Air Force Officials, the Air Force has 

provided funding to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to fund the 

development of the initial version of the SMS utilities module for electric 

and potable water utility systems. However, according to U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineer officials, additional funding from the other services is 

needed to further develop the capabilities of the electric and water 

modules and to develop additional modules for other utility systems, such 

as for wastewater or natural gas systems.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials responsible for developing DOD’s 

initial version of the utilities module stated that the initial version uses a 

simplified condition assessment process. The simplified condition 

assessment process uses two variables, age and expected service life, to 

determine the condition of the utility infrastructure. Alternatively, in SMS 

 42The operational SMS modules include BUILDER and ROOFER for assessing building 

conditions, PAVER for pavements, and RAILER for railroad infrastructure.

Standardized Condition 

Assessment Process for 

Utility Infrastructure is 

under Development, and 

the Initial Version Has 

Limited Capabilities
Page 32 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

modules for other facilities, such as buildings, more comprehensive 

assessment processes are used to determine the condition of the facility. 

These comprehensive assessment processes provide objective and 

repeatable inspections on various facility components based on 

knowledge of component criticality, the expected and observed 

deterioration of components, among other things. Upon completion of the 

inspection any identified defects are recorded and categorized by distress 

type (for example, blistered, broken, damaged, cracked, or corroded), 

among other things.

According to U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials, the rating criteria for 

future versions of the SMS utilities module will be established with 

consideration of existing rating systems from within DOD and industry. 

For example, Navy officials told us that they provided funding to U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers in fiscal year 2015 to evaluate the integration of 

Navy utility condition assessment rating methods into the SMS utilities 

module. This study examines the Navy’s utility condition assessment and 

risk-based rating methods for integration into the SMS condition 

assessment process for utilities. According to Navy officials, as of May 

2016, the service has not received the results of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineer integration study. Navy officials indicated that they use 

disruption information as one variable in their rating methodology.

As discussed previously in this report, installation officials and our survey 

respondents have stated that disruption information is useful when 

making decisions about the utility system. The Army, Navy, and Air Force 

use disruption information as one variable in their frameworks for 

prioritizing funding for utility projects. According to one installation official 

at Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma, the official would like to be able to 

use the disruption information with the SMS module to support repair and 

investment decisions. The installation officials stated that age may not

always be a good indicator of condition for a utility system, as a 

component or part might be relatively new but causing disruptions 

nonetheless. Furthermore, Navy installation officials from Naval Station 

Mayport, Florida, told us that information about disruptions is especially 
Page 33 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

useful when much of the utility infrastructure is below ground and cannot 

be easily observed.43

DOD’s standardized process allows the military services to customize 

certain settings in the SMS system that affect repair need decisions, 

which can result in differences in the FCI. The customizable settings are 

called “condition standards,” and these are the standards at which the 

service wishes to maintain the facility’s components or equipment. These 

condition standards may vary depending upon how critical a particular 

component is to the overall facility or mission and each service develops 

their own condition standards. For example, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers hypothetically explained that on the one hand the Navy may 

want to set a high condition standard for a water system that is used to 

supply water to cool nuclear reactors for its home-ported nuclear 

submarines because this is a critical mission. On the other hand, the 

Army may want to set a lower condition standard for its water system that 

is used to supply water for grounds maintenance because this is a lower 

priority. 

These standards are compared to the current condition assessment of 

the facility. Differences between the standards and the assessment 

determine when repair work is needed for a particular piece of 

infrastructure, and whether or not repair work is needed affects the FCI 

calculation. If the inspected condition is above the condition standard then 

the SMS system does not identify any repair work. If the inspected 

condition falls below the condition standard then the SMS system 

identifies the necessary repair work. SMS estimates the costs of the 

identified repair work and then the system users determine if they want to 

conduct the repairs. The SMS system uses the estimated cost of the 

repair as the numerator in the FCI equation.

According to U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials, the services have 

not yet developed condition standards for their utilities because the SMS 

module for utilities is still being developed. However, the services have 

developed condition standards for use in other SMS modules and U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers officials stated that the design of the SMS 

 43We estimate that 22 percent and 37 percent of DOD-owned utility managers considered 

it somewhat or very challenging, respectively, to update information about the condition of 

the utility system because the infrastructure is underground and difficult to access. These 

estimates have a margin of error no greater than plus or minus 4.9 percent at the 95 

percent confidence interval. For additional challenges, see appendix II. 

Differences among 

Services’ Settings within 

the Standardized 

Condition Assessment 

Process Could Result in 

Differences in the Facility 

Condition Index
Page 34 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

module for utilities will be similar to other existing SMS modules. Further, 

the officials stated that the condition standards for the utilities module will 

operate similarly to how the condition standards operate in existing SMS 

modules. Therefore, to conduct our analysis we reviewed the condition 

standards used by the services in an existing SMS module for buildings, 

called “BUILDER”.

The services have grouped condition standards into categories, such as 

high, medium, and low. According to U.S. Army Corps of Engineer 

officials, condition standards in the high category would be assigned to 

facilities that are mission-critical or generally more important to maintain. 

For example, officials at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida, stated 

that the installation’s electric and water systems are critical to supporting 

the launch mission, however, the wastewater system is not as essential. 

Specifically, the electric system powers equipment for communication and 

radar tracking and the water system provides water to the launch pads to 

absorb excess heat and noise generated during launches. If the utility 

SMS module is implemented at Cape Canaveral, an Air Force official 

indicated that they would likely assign high condition standards to the 

electric and water systems and a lower condition standard to the 

wastewater system.44

We found that while the four services generally use similar categories of 

condition standards – such as high, medium, and low – they respectively

assign different numerical values to standards within the same category. 

For example, each service has a category called “medium,” but the 

values range from 60 to 75 depending on the service. Figure 8 depicts the 

service condition standards for the BUILDER SMS module.

 44According to officials from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida, the installation 

may not transition to the SMS module for utility systems because the electric, water, and 

wastewater utility systems are currently being considered for privatization.
Page 35 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 8: Condition Standards for Determining Repair Needs Used in DOD’s 

Sustainment Management System Module for Buildings (BUILDER), by Military 

Service 45

To illustrate how different condition standards affect the FCI calculation, 

we developed a notional example, as illustrated in table 5, showing an 

electric distribution system.46 The example assumes that each 

 45We depicted three condition standards (High, Medium/Intermediate, and Low) used by 

the services. However there are condition standards not used by all the services. For 

example, the Army has a condition standard for maintaining an asset in “Very High”

condition that sets the threshold for repair at 90, while the other services highest condition 

rating is to maintain an asset in a “High” condition. Further the Navy has a condition 

standard to maintain an asset in “Run-to-Failure” condition with a condition standard value 

of 0; while the Air Force also has a condition standard to maintain an asset in “Run-toFailure” condition with a condition standard value of 40.

46According to U.S. Army Corps of Engineer officials, the utilities SMS module is currently 

under development. We used the condition assessment framework used in the operational 

SMS module called BUILDER to derive the notional electric utility system example.
Page 36 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

hypothetical organization owns and operates an electric distribution 

system, A through D, and each system has exactly the same 

infrastructure – overhead power lines, a transformer, and a switching 

station — was installed at the same time, and has the exact same plant 

replacement value ($500,000). Also, each part of the system has the 

same assessed physical condition from SMS. However, each hypothetical 

organization has different condition standards for this notional electric 

distribution system. We used the “Medium/Intermediate” condition 

standard found in figure 8 for this notional example. We created notional 

maintenance and repair costs for cases when the assessed physical 

condition from SMS was lower than the condition standard.47 As shown in 

our example, the result of differences in the condition standards is that 

the FCIs are different, even though the assessed physical condition is the 

same. In this notional example, hypothetical organizations A, B, and D 

appear to have repair needs, while hypothetical organization C does not 

appear to have any repair needs. Table 5 illustrates how different 

condition standards from four hypothetical organizations produce different 

FCI values.

Table 5: Hypothetical Example of How Different Condition Standards Affect the 

Calculation of the Facility Condition Index for an Electric Utility

Sustainment Management System (SMS) Steps to Calculate the Facility

Condition Index (FCI)I)

System and 

Components

Physical 

Condition 

from 

SMS

Condition 

Standard 

Repair 

Needed 

(Yes or 

No)

SMSDerived 

Repair 

Costs

(in $)

Sum of 

All 

Repair 

Costs

(in $)

SMS Derived (FCI)

Electrical Distribution System A

Overhead 

power line

65 75 Yes $15,000 $100,000 FCI = [1-

($100,000/$500,000)

Transformer 75 75 Yes $85,000 x 100] = 80

Switching 

Station

85 75 No $0 

Electrical Distribution System B

 47The notional repair cost for the overhead power lines is $15,000 and for the transformer

$85,000. Since the condition of the switching station never falls below the condition 

standard, we did not create a repair cost. Also, in this example, since each electrical 

distribution system is exactly the same, the repair costs to address the deficiencies in the 

condition would also be the same. 
Page 37 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Sustainment Management System (SMS) Steps to Calculate the Facility

Condition Index (FCI)I)

System and 

Components

Physical 

Condition 

from 

SMS

Condition 

Standard 

Repair 

Needed 

(Yes or 

No)

SMSDerived 

Repair 

Costs

(in $)

Sum of 

All 

Repair 

Costs

(in $)

SMS Derived (FCI)

Overhead 

power line

65 71 Yes $15,000 $15,000 FCI = [1-

($15,000/$500,000) 

x 100] = 97 Transformer 75 71 No $0 

Switching 

Station

85 71 No $0 

Electrical Distribution System C

Overhead 

power line

65 60 No $0 $0 FCI = [1-

($0/$500,000) x 100] 

= 100 Transformer 75 60 No $0 

Switching 

Station

85 60 No $0 

Electrical Distribution System D

Overhead 

power line

65 75 Yes $15,000 $100,000 FCI = [1-

($100,000/$500,000) 

x 100] = 80 Transformer 75 75 Yes $85,000 

Switching 

Station

85 75 No $0 

Source: GAO notional information based on analysis of service condition standards used in the BUILDER module of the Sustainment 

Management System. | GAO-17-27

According to the 2013 OSD memorandum, the department requires 

reliable condition information, in the form of the FCI, to manage the 

department’s facilities and to make informed investment decisions. OSD 

officials stated that the FCI is one of multiple sources of information that 

can be used to support the department’s investment decisions concerning 

a single asset or portfolio of assets. Further, according to Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government, to be useful, information 

should be accurate, complete, and credible, among other factors.48

However, DOD has not taken action to ensure that the condition 

standards to be developed by the services for the utilities module will 

provide the department with comparable and reliable FCI data. According 

to DOD officials, the services should have the flexibility to set the 

condition standards for their utility infrastructure and other facilities as 

 48GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
Page 38 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

they deem appropriate based on mission criticality and other factors. 

DOD officials stated that the services need to have the flexibility to 

prioritize the condition of some utility systems and facilities above others 

so that they can direct their limited repair and maintenance budgets to the 

most important needs. We agree that some facilities may need to be put 

in the high standard versus the low or medium standard based on mission 

criticality, but it is unclear why the standards vary within the same 

category (i.e., high, medium low). Further, according to the OSD 2013 

memorandum, DOD is implementing a new standardized process to 

assess the condition of its facilities because its previous guidance allowed 

the services to implement an unstandardized approach to assessing the 

condition of their facilities, which resulted in a FCI that lacked credibility.

OSD officials also stated that they had not compared the services’

existing condition standards and that they would consider looking into the 

differences of these standards across the services. Without taking steps 

to ensure that the services’ condition standards for the utilities module

and other modules will provide the department with comparable and 

reliable FCI data, the SMS utilities module, currently under development, 

may not provide DOD information that is comparable across the 

department’s facilities. As a result, DOD may not be able to reliably 

assess progress toward meeting department-wide goals and DOD may 

continue to receive FCI data that lacks credibility as a measure of DOD 

facility quality.

Disruptions to DOD-owned utility systems have caused financial impacts 

and impacts to DOD operations and missions. Information about these 

disruptions can help DOD operate and maintain the utility systems, 

including identify these impacts and take steps to prevent or mitigate such 

disruptions. However, utility disruption information is not consistently

available at the installation-level. We determined that some military 

services had guidance in place that required installations to collect and 

report some utility disruption data, and others did not. The Army has a 

service-wide requirement to collect and report electric and water utility 

disruption data, instances of equipment failure for water and wastewater 

systems, and to perform leak detection surveys for natural gas systems. 

However, we found that some of the Army installations did not 

consistently have information about disruptions available. The Air Force 

and Marine Corps do not have a service-wide requirement to collect and 

report utility disruption data. The Navy issued new reporting guidance 

beginning in fiscal year 2016 that if implemented as directed may provide 

the Navy installations with the guidance and procedures necessary to 

Conclusions
Page 39 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

collect disruption information to make informed decisions for utility 

investments.

49 The majority of DOD-owned utility system owners and 

managers consider this type of information to be beneficial, for example 

some officials stated they use this information to determine where 

resources need to be focused to maintain the utility infrastructure. As a 

result, those who do not have such information may be at a disadvantage

when making maintenance decisions or competing effectively for limited 

repair funds.

The current standardized process for assessing condition in the SMS 

modules already developed allows the military services to customize 

certain settings – called condition standards. The military services have 

developed different thresholds for the various categories of condition 

standards, which can result in different FCI ratings across the services for 

facilities assessed in the same condition. OSD’s goal for implementing 

the SMS assessment system is to have consistent, comparable and 

reliable FCIs across its portfolio of assets to make informed management 

decisions. Without taking steps to ensure that the services’ condition 

standards for the utilities module will provide the department with 

comparable and reliable FCI data, the SMS utilities module, currently 

under development, may not provide DOD information that is comparable 

across the department’s facilities. As a result, DOD may not be able to 

reliably assess progress toward meeting department-wide goals. Further, 

DOD risks continuing to receive FCI data that lacks credibility as a 

measure of DOD facility quality.

To improve the information that DOD, military service officials, and 

installation-level utility system owners and maintainers need to make 

maintenance or other investment decisions, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense take the following three actions:

• Direct the Secretary of the Army to take steps to implement existing 

guidance so that disruption information is consistently available at the 

installation level;

• Direct the Secretary of the Air Force to issue guidance to the 

installations to require the collection and retention of disruption; and

 49The time frame of our review included fiscal years 2009 through 2015. Therefore, the 

disruption data we collected through our survey was not affected by the Navy’s guidance, 

which went into effect in fiscal year 2016. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 40 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

• Direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to issue guidance to the 

installations to require the collection and retention of disruption 

information.

To provide DOD with more consistent information about the condition of 

DOD-owned utility systems as DOD continues to develop the SMS 

module for utility systems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and 

Environment, in coordination with the military services, take actions to 

govern the consistent use of condition standards of utility systems to be 

assessed using the SMS utilities module, and if applicable, for other 

facilities assessed using other SMS modules. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its 

written comments, reproduced in appendix III, DOD concurred with our 

first three recommendations that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps to take steps or provide guidance to 

consistently collect disruption information. DOD partially concurred with 

our fourth recommendation that the Secretary of Defense take steps to 

implement the consistent use of condition standards for utility systems to 

be assessed using the SMS utilities module. DOD stated it will continue to 

work with the Military Departments to determine if further opportunities 

exist to establish consistent condition standards within the SMS for utility 

systems. We continue to believe, by taking such steps the department will 

have assurances that the SMS utilities module will provide the 

department with comparable and reliable FCI data, which decision 

makers use to monitor progress towards department-wide goals and 

prevent further accumulation of deferred maintenance.

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 41 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

We are providing copies to the appropriate congressional committees; the 

Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and 

Environment; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the 

report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix IV.

Brian J. Lepore

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 42 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

To determine the number of disruptions of DOD-owned utility systems 

that occurred between fiscal years 2009 and 2015, their causes, and the 

impact of the disruptions, we administered a survey to a representative 

sample of 453 DOD-owned utility systems located in the United States 

and overseas, producing results generalizable to the DOD-owned utility 

population.

A copy of the full questionnaire and aggregate responses for all closeended questions are included in appendix II. The practical difficulties of 

conducting any survey may introduce errors, commonly referred to as 

nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in interpreting a particular 

question or sources of information available to respondents can introduce 

unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in developing 

the questionnaire, collecting the data, and analyzing them to minimize 

such nonsampling error (see below).

Using records maintained to manage and oversee DOD’s Utility 

Privatization Program within the Office of the Secretary of Defense of 

Energy, Installations, and Environment, we took several steps to identify 

the utility systems included in our study population and our sample 

design. Our scope included electric, water, wastewater, and natural gas 

utility systems that were owned by the active component of one of the 

four military services and located on a U.S. or overseas installation with a 

plant replacement value of $100 million or more. Some utility systems, 

mostly those located overseas, may not be owned by the military service 

but the military service may be responsible for funding the operation and 

maintenance of the system. When we refer to DOD-owned utility systems 

in this report we are including both systems that are owned by one of the 

military services and systems where the military service pays for the 

majority of the operation and maintenance of the utility system.

To determine the electric, water, wastewater and natural gas systems 

owned by DOD, we reviewed records maintained by the Installation 

Energy Office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, 

Installations, and Environment and we identified 1,954 systems located 

within and outside the United States. Next, we compared this list of utility 

systems with the fiscal year 2015 Base Structure Report to determine 

which systems resided on installations with a plant replacement value of 

$100 or more and that were owned by the active component of one of the 

military services. This resulted in a total of 1,075 systems — 770 systems 

located in the United States and 305 systems located outside the United 

States – that made up our study population (see table 6).

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Sample Design and 

Survey Development and 

Administration
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 43 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Table 6: Study Population for GAO Survey on DOD-Owned Utility Systems

Systems within the 

United States

Systems Located 

Outside the United 

States

Total

Air Force Active 234 42 276

Electric 53 14

Water 66 14

Wastewater 67 14

Natural Gas 48 0

Army Active 150 181 331

Electric 39 64

Water 42 52

Wastewater 40 61

Natural Gas 29 4

Marine Corps Active 61 33 94

Electric 19 11

Water 18 10

Wastewater 15 11

Natural Gas 9 1

Navy Active 325 49 374

Electric 93 16

Water 92 14

Wastewater 97 13

Natural Gas 43 6

Total 770 305 1,075

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.

We drew a random stratified sample of 469 utility systems from the 

population frame of 1,075 systems (see table 7). In order to be able to 

make generalizable statements about each of the four types of utilities, 

we did the following. First, we split the sample population into five strata;

the first four correspond to the four types of utilities located in the United 

States.1 The fifth stratum comprises all utilities located on U.S. military 

installations outside the United States. The reason we used a fifth stratum 

 1

A strata is a mutually exclusive subdivision of a population defined in such a way that 

each sampling unit can belong to only one subdivision or stratum. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 44 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

for the systems outside of the United States was because the ownership 

status of these systems was not clear from the records maintained by the 

department. By separating these systems into their own strata we could 

draw our sample in such a way that we would still be able to generalize 

the survey results for the utility systems within the United States even if 

all of the overseas systems were in fact not owned by one of the military 

services nor did the services pay for the majority of the operation and 

maintenance of the utility system. Furthermore, in order to verify that the 

systems we included in our sample were within our scope, we included a 

question in the survey which asked respondents to state if the system 

was owned by the military service and if the service was responsible for 

paying the majority of the operation and maintenance of the system, as 

discussed below.

In each stratum we used systematic random selection to identify the 

systems to include in the sample. Each armed service was represented in 

the sample in proportion to the total number of each type of utility system 

which they operate. In addition, the sample from each stratum received 

an allocation large enough to support an estimate with a margin of error 

no larger than plus or minus 10 percentage points at the 95 percent level 

of confidence. This was then adjusted for an expected response rate of 

70 percent. See table 7 for the original sample size adjusted for an 

assumed 70 percent response rate.

Table 7: Original Sample Size for GAO Survey on DOD-Owned Utility Systems

Stratum Sample size adjusted for assumed 

70 percent response rate

Electric Systems in the United States or its 

territories

93

Water Systems in the United States or its 

territories

96

Wastewater Systems in the United States or its 

territories

96

Natural Gas Systems in the United States or its 

territories

79

All utility system types located outside the United 

States 

105

Total 469

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data. | GAO-17-27
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 45 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

To identify the survey respondents, we supplied a list of the sampled 

utility systems to each of the military services, which reviewed the list and 

identified the appropriate official at the installation to respond to our 

survey. During this process, 16 of the systems were removed because, 

for example the military service officials informed us that the system had 

been privatized, or that the installation on which the survey was located 

had been closed, among other things. We removed these 16 systems 

from our original sample of 469 systems, which left 453 systems.

To inform the design of our survey instrument and help ensure the validity 

and reliability of our results, we met with officials from OSD and the 

military services and explained the intent and design of the survey to 

ensure that, in general, the intended survey recipients would have the 

knowledge and resources to respond to our survey. GAO analysts and 

technical survey experts designed the survey and conducted four

pretests, one with each military service, with officials who had work 

experience managing and operating DOD-owned utility systems at the 

installation level to ensure that survey questions collected the expected 

information and to obtain any suggestions for clarification. Furthermore, 

the survey instrument was independently reviewed by a survey design 

expert within GAO. Our survey included questions about the number of 

disruptions that occurred on the installation for fiscal years 2009 through 

2015 caused by equipment failure, the impacts of those disruptions, and 

the characteristics of DOD-owned utility systems, among other things.

To distribute the survey, we sent an email to each respondent with a link 

to the web-based version of the survey with a unique user name and a 

password. To ensure the most possible responses, we kept the military 

services informed of the completion status and we also kept the survey 

open from December 18, 2015, through March 31, 2016. In total, we 

distributed 453 surveys.

Out of the 453 surveys distributed, 379 managers or operators of DODowned utility systems completed the survey for a response rate of 84 

percent. To verify that the completed surveys were within our scope, we 

analyzed the results of a question in the survey which asked respondents 

to state if the system was owned by the military service and if the service 

was responsible for paying the majority of the operation and maintenance 

of the system. We determined that 15 respondents reported that the utility 

system was neither owned by the military service nor operated and 

maintained using a majority of appropriated funds. We removed these 15 

surveys from our list of completed surveys, which resulted in a list of 364 

Analysis of Respondents
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 46 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

completed and in-scope surveys. The analysis in this report is based on 

those 364 survey responses.

Because we followed a probability procedure based on random 

selections, our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we 

might have drawn. Since each sample could have provided different 

estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular 

sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval. This is the interval 

that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the 

samples we could have drawn. Confidence intervals are provided along 

with each sample estimate in the report. Generally in this report the 

results of this survey are presented as statistical estimates about the 

population of 1,075 electric, water, wastewater, or natural gas utility 

systems described above. In cases where we are using these estimates, 

we describe the results as estimates and generally refer to the entire 

population of “utility systems” or “utility managers.” Because some 

questions did not apply to all respondents, some of the questions in our 

survey were answered by an insufficient number of respondents to 

reliably generate an estimate of the overall population. In these cases, 

rather than presenting a population estimate, we reported on the number 

of respondents in our sample who answered that question.

To obtain additional information about the impact of utility disruptions 

caused by the failure of DOD-owned utility infrastructure, we conducted 

follow-up interviews with a selected set of respondents who reported the 

most disruptions. We asked respondents to describe the impacts of 

specific disruptions and we also collected and reviewed documentation, 

such as records in maintenance information systems and project 

proposals.

To assess the extent to which owners and managers of DOD-owned 

utility systems have information about disruptions caused by equipment 

failures, we included a question in our survey regarding the availability of 

information on disruptions from fiscal year 2009 through 2015 and a 

question about the usefulness of disruption information in managing utility 

systems. Based on the survey responses, we followed-up with all 146

survey respondents who reported not having any information on 

disruptions for any fiscal year to confirm their responses and to determine 

the reasons why information was not available. We received responses 

from 89 survey respondents. We also interviewed service officials 

regarding policies and practices related to the collection and use of utility 

disruption information. Finally, we compared installation practices to 

standards regarding the identification, analysis, and response to risks as 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 47 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

described in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.2

In addition, we reviewed reports from federal agencies and utility 

management organizations, such as management guides issued by the 

Environmental Protection Agency and the American Public Power 

Association, which describe the information that is useful in the 

management and operation of utility systems.

To assess the extent to which the department’s implementation of a 

standardized facility condition assessment process provides DOD 

consistent information about the condition of utility systems, we reviewed 

policy documents and reports regarding DOD’s efforts to improve the 

reliability of the condition information it collects to manage its 

infrastructure. We reviewed policies and documents describing the 

development and implementation of a new standardized condition 

assessment process, called the Sustainment Management System, 

developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and how DOD plans to 

use the condition information to monitor and oversee the achievement of 

department-wide goals. Additionally, we collected and reviewed 

documents such as briefings, training documents, and user guides that 

describe how the new standardized condition assessment process will 

assess and rate the condition of utility systems and related infrastructure. 

We also conducted interviews with DOD officials and the military services 

regarding the development of the standardized process and how the 

department intends to use the information to inform decisions. Finally, we 

compared DOD’s process for generating the condition information with 

standards regarding the use and management of data as described in 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.3

We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to November 2016, 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 2

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C., Nov. 1, 1999). 

3

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 48 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

The questions that we asked in our survey on DOD-owned utility systems 

are shown below. Our survey was comprised of mostly close-ended 

questions. In this appendix, we include all survey questions and 

aggregate results of responses to the closed-ended questions; we do not 

provide information on responses provided to the open-ended questions. 

See appendix I for details of the analysis that led to the results reported 

here.

1. What is your current role with the utility system?

[Open ended]

2. How long have you been in this role?

Estimated average number 

of months

95 percent confidence 

interval – lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent confidence 

interval – upper bound 

(percentage)

54.1 47.7 60.4

3. How long have you worked with the utility system?

Estimated average number 

of months

95 percent confidence 

interval – lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent confidence 

interval – upper bound 

(percentage)

71.9 63.6 80.2

4.

Does your military service own the infrastructure of this utility

system? (Check one.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent confidence 

interval – lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent confidence 

interval – upper bound 

(percentage)

Yes 91.1 87.6 93.9

No 8.2 5.5 11.6

Don’t know 0.7 0.1 2.2

Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Survey Overview

Section 1: Respondent 

Characteristics
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 49 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

a) Does your military service pay for the majority of the operation and

maintenance of this utility system through appropriated sustainment,

restoration and modernization (SRM) funding? (Check one.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent confidence 

interval – lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent confidence 

interval – upper 

bound (percentage)

Yes 79.5 75.4 83.6

No 18.1 14.2 22.0

Don’t know 2.4 1.1 4.5

This section asks about some of the characteristics of this utility system. 

Please answer only for utility infrastructure that is DOD-owned.

5. Does the utility system perform the following functions? (Check one

per row.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound

(percentage)

Electric Utility Systems

Produce Electricity 0.0 0.0 2.9

Distribute Electricity 75.5 65.6 83.7

Both Produce and 

Distribute Electricity

23.6 15.5 33.4

No or Don’t know to 

Both

0.9 0.0 5.3

Wastewater Utility Systems

Treat wastewater 1.3 0 6.9

Collect Wastewater 53.7 43.5 64

Both treat and collect 

wastewater

34.4 24.7 44.2

No or Don’t Know to 

Both

10.5 5.1 18.6

Water Utility Systems

Treat potable water 0 0 3 

Distribute potable water 42.8 33 52.6

Section 2: DOD-Owned 

Utility System 

Characteristics
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 50 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound

(percentage)

Both treat and distribute 

potable water

56.2 46.4 66.1

No or Don’t know to both 0.9 0 5.6

Natural Gas Utility System

Distribute Natural Gas

Yes 92.3 82.8 97.5

No 6.2 1.7 15.1

Don’t Know 1.5 0 8.4

6. When was this utility system originally installed? (Check one.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval – 

lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval –

upper bound 

(percentage)

1920 or earlier 6.1 3.9 9.1

1921-1930 1.6 0.6 3.4

1931-1940 6.4 4.1 9.4

1941-1950 24.9 20.6 29.3

1951-1960 24.4 19.9 28.8

1961-1970 8.1 5.4 11.5

1971-1980 4.5 2.6 7.3

1981-1990 6.1 3.8 9.1

1991-2000 2.2 0.9 4.5

2001-2010 0.2 0.0 1.5

2011-2015 0.7 0.1 2.6

Don’t know 14.8 11.3 18.9
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 51 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

7. When was the most recent recapitalization project completed on this 

utility system, which replaced a significant part or parts of the system? 

(Check one.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval –

lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval –

upper bound 

(percentage)

1920 or earlier 0.3 0.0 1.6

1921-1930 0.0 0.0 0.8

1931-1940 0.0 0.0 0.8

1941-1950 0.8 0.2 2.4

1951-1960 0.5 0.0 1.9

1961-1970 0.2 0.0 1.5

1971-1980 3.8 2.0 6.5

1981-1990 7.0 4.5 10.1

1991-2000 8.8 6.0 12.3

2001-2010 16.4 12.7 20.8

2011-2015 36.9 31.8 42.0

Don’t know 25.2 20.7 29.7

8. Which of the following best describes the types of employees that 

conduct maintenance on this utility system, as of September 30, 

2015? (Check one.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval –

lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval –

upper bound 

(percentage)

Mostly Government 

Employees

61.7 56.6 66.7

About equally split 

between 

Government and 

Contractors

7.5 4.9 10.8

Mostly Contractors 30.1 25.4 34.8

Don’t know 0.7 0.1 2.3
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 52 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

9. How many full-time equivalent (FTE) government employees operate 

and maintain this utility system, as of September 30, 2015? (Check

one.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval –

lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval –

upper bound 

(percentage)

0 19.7 15.7 23.7

1-10 54.8 49.6 60.1

11-20 13.5 10.1 17.7

21-30 4.1 2.2 6.9

31-40 2.6 1.1 5.0

41-50 1.3 0.4 3.0

51 or more 3.3 1.6 5.9

Don’t know 0.7 0.1 2.3

10. For fiscal year 2015, what was the size of this utility system in terms 

of the amount of commodity delivered on a typical day? (Enter 

number.)

[open ended]

11. How many people use this utility system during a typical weekday? 

(Check one.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval –

lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval –

upper bound 

(percentage)

Less than 499 8.9 6.1 12.5

500-1,000 9.0 6.1 12.6

1,001-5,000 25.5 20.9 30.2

5,001-10,000 26.6 22.0 31.3

10,001-20,000 14.6 11.2 18.7

20,001-30,000 7.1 4.6 10.3

30,001-40,000 2.1 0.9 4.1

40,001-50,000 0.0 0.0 0.8

50,001 or more 1.9 0.8 3.9

Don’t know 4.3 2.4 6.9
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 53 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

12. In which fiscal year (FY) were the facility condition index ratings for 

the infrastructure associated with this utility system last updated? 

(Check one.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval –

lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval –

upper bound 

(percentage)

FY 2015 48.0 42.7 53.2

FY 2014 12.2 9.0 16.0

FY 2013 3.1 1.6 5.5

FY 2012 1.5 0.5 3.4

FY 2011 1.4 0.5 3.3

FY 2010 1.3 0.4 3.1

Before FY 2010 9.4 6.5 13.1

Don’t know 23.1 18.7 27.5

13. How frequently is the facility condition index rating for the 

infrastructure associated with this utility system updated? (Check

one.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval –

lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval –

upper bound 

(percentage)

More than once a 

year

5.2 3.1 8.2

Once a year 35.6 30.5 40.6

Once every 2 years 2.4 1.1 4.5

Once every 3 years 7.7 5.1 11.1

Once every 4 years 1.8 0.7 3.7

Once every 5 years 5.8 3.6 8.7

Less than once 

every 5 years

14.6 11.0 18.8

Don’t know 27.0 22.3 31.6

Section 3: DOD-Owned 

Utility System Condition 

Information
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 54 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

14. Did you use any of the following to update the facility condition index 

rating for the infrastructure associated with this utility system? (Check

one per row.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Inspections 

performed 

during 

scheduled 

preventative 

maintenance

Yes 57.5 52.4 62.6

No 17.7 13.8 21.7

Don’t know 24.8 20.3 29.3

Operator 

inspection, 

performed by 

system 

engineers or 

utility system 

operators

Yes 62.9 57.9 67.9

No 13.6 10.2 17.5

Don’t know 23.6 19.2 27.9

Formal 

condition 

assessment, 

performed by 

specialists

Yes 47.9 42.8 53.1

No 25.4 21.0 29.9

Don’t know 26.6 22.1 31.2

Other Yes 13.0 9.5 17.1

No 11.6 8.5 15.3

Don’t know 75.4 70.9 80.0
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 55 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

15. To what extent do the following represent challenges in updating the 

facility condition index of the utility system? (Check one per row.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Lack of time to 

conduct an 

assessment

Not a 

challenge

15.6 11.9 19.9

A minor 

challenge

18.6 14.4 22.7

Somewhat 

challenging

28.1 23.4 32.7

Very 

challenging

28.6 23.9 33.3

Don’t know 9.2 6.3 12.8

Lack of trained 

or qualified 

personnel

Not a 

challenge

25.4 20.8 30.1

A minor 

challenge

23.1 18.6 27.6

Somewhat 

challenging

25.0 20.5 29.5

Very 

challenging

18.2 14.3 22.1

Don’t know 8.3 5.5 11.7

Lack of the 

necessary 

equipment to 

perform the 

assessment

Not a 

challenge

25.4 20.8 30.1

A minor 

challenge

21.1 16.7 25.5

Somewhat 

challenging

26.8 22.2 31.4

Very 

challenging

16.3 12.5 20.1

Don’t know 10.4 7.4 14.2

Infrastructure 

is 

underground 

and difficult to 

access

Not a 

challenge

15.3 11.6 19.6

A minor 

challenge

17.3 13.2 21.3
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 56 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Somewhat 

challenging

21.6 17.4 25.8

Very 

challenging

36.9 32.0 41.8

Don’t know 8.9 6.1 12.5

Conducting

the 

assessment 

requires that 

the utility 

system be 

shut down

Not a 

challenge

32.1 27.1 37.0

A minor 

challenge

17.4 13.3 21.4

Somewhat 

challenging

21.8 17.4 26.1

Very 

challenging

15.7 12.1 19.9

Don’t know 13.1 9.7 17.1

Conducting 

the 

assessment 

may damage 

the utility 

infrastructure

Not a 

challenge

50.1 44.8 55.3

A minor 

challenge

20.5 16.2 24.8

Somewhat 

challenging

11.3 8.2 15.0

Very 

challenging

4.9 2.9 7.6

Don’t know 13.3 9.9 17.3

Assessment 

results do not 

provide useful 

information

Not a 

challenge

50.7 45.4 56.0

A minor 

challenge

18.2 14.0 22.3

Somewhat 

challenging

10.3 7.4 14.0

Very 

challenging

2.9 1.4 5.2
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 57 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Don’t know 17.9 13.9 21.9

Other Not a 

challenge

13.6 9.4 18.9

A minor 

challenge

1.8 0.5 4.6

Somewhat 

challenging

0.3 0.0 2.4

Very 

challenging

6.5 3.7 10.4

Don’t know 77.8 72.3 83.2

16. Does information about the condition of the utility system positively or 

negatively effect your ability to do the following? (Check one per row.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Provide 

required level 

of service

Very or 

somewhat 

negative effect

9.1 6.3 12.6

No Effect 31.3 26.4 36.2

Very or 

somewhat 

positive effect

55.3 50.1 60.5

Don’t know 4.3 2.5 6.9

Avoid/prevent 

equipment 

failures

Very or 

somewhat 

negative effect

9.1 6.3 12.6

No Effect 18.5 14.4 22.7

Very or 

somewhat 

positive effect

67.8 62.9 72.8

Don’t know 4.6 2.6 7.3
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 58 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Manage risk 

associated 

with equipment 

failures

Very or 

somewhat 

negative effect

8.0 5.4 11.2

No Effect 15.0 11.3 19.3

Very or 

somewhat 

positive effect

72.3 67.6 77.0

Don’t know 4.7 2.8 7.5

Identify, refine 

and improve 

maintenance 

strategies and 

plans

Very or 

somewhat 

negative effect

7.2 4.8 10.4

No Effect 9.9 6.9 13.5

Very or 

somewhat 

positive effect

78.7 74.4 82.9

Don’t know 4.3 2.5 6.9

Predict and 

plan short-term 

repairs and 

maintenance 

needs

Very or 

somewhat 

negative effect

6.8 4.4 9.9

No Effect 11.8 8.6 15.7

Very or 

somewhat 

positive effect

77.4 73.0 81.8

Don’t know 4.0 2.3 6.6
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 59 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Predict and 

plan long-term 

repairs and 

maintenance 

needs

Very or 

somewhat 

negative effect

7.1 4.7 10.3

No Effect 7.7 5.1 11.0

Very or 

somewhat 

positive effect

80.9 76.9 85.0

Don’t know 4.3 2.4 6.9

Identify 

funding 

requirements

Very or 

somewhat 

negative effect

7.4 4.9 10.7

No Effect 10.7 7.6 14.6

Very or 

somewhat 

positive effect

76.5 72.0 80.9

Don’t know 5.4 3.3 8.3

Extend the 

utility system’s 

usable service 

life

Very or 

somewhat 

negative effect

7.4 4.9 10.6

No Effect 16.2 12.5 20.6

Very or 

somewhat 

positive effect

71.1 66.3 75.8

Don’t know 5.3 3.2 8.1

Other Very or 

somewhat 

negative effect

0.4 0.0 2.5

No Effect 16.7 11.9 22.5
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 60 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Very or 

somewhat 

positive effect

2.9 1.1 6.0

Don’t know 79.9 74.5 85.3

17. How confident are you about the current reliability of this utility 

system? (For the purposes of this survey, reliability is the ability of a 

utility system to perform its functions under normal and extreme 

operating conditions.) (Check one.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval –

lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval –

upper bound 

(percentage)

Extremely confident 9.5 6.7 13.0

Very confident 37.7 32.6 42.8

Moderately 

confident

39.4 34.2 44.5

Somewhat confident 9.5 6.6 13.0

Not at all confident 3.2 1.6 5.7

Don’t know 0.7 0.1 2.3

18. Do the following issues negatively impact your confidence in the 

current reliability of this utility system? (Check one per row.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Deferred 

maintenance

Yes 57.1 51.9 62.3

No 39.5 34.4 44.6

Don’t know 3.4 1.8 5.9

Lack of 

personnel

Yes 58.1 52.9 63.2

No 39.7 34.5 44.8
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 61 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Don’t know 2.3 1.0 4.4

Lack of funding Yes 65.7 60.8 70.6

No 30.9 26.1 35.7

Don’t know 3.4 1.8 5.8

Weather 

conditions

Yes 33.7 28.9 38.5

No 65.4 60.6 70.2

Don’t know 0.9 0.2 2.6

Climate change Yes 18.0 13.9 22.1

No 78.1 73.8 82.5

Don’t know 3.8 2.1 6.4

Poor condition 

of the 

infrastructure

Yes 58.3 53.2 63.4

No 39.0 33.9 44.1

Don’t know 2.7 1.3 5.0

Wildlife 

interference

Yes 12.2 9.0 16.0

No 86.3 82.3 89.7

Don’t know 1.5 0.5 3.4

Excessive 

demand beyond 

designed 

system 

capabilities

Yes 17.4 13.4 21.3

No 79.3 75.0 83.5

Don’t know 3.4 1.7 5.9

Age (the 

system is 

nearing or has 

reached its 

expected 

serviceable life)

Yes 63.2 58.2 68.3

No 33.3 28.3 38.2

Don’t know 3.5 1.8 5.9

Other Yes 6.6 4.2 9.8

No 6.8 4.4 10.0

Don’t know 86.6 82.5 90.0
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 62 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

19. How many major maintenance and repair projects (projects costing 

more than $250,000) were completed on this utility system in the 

following fiscal years? (Please only include those major maintenance 

and repair projects that were planned projects, please do not include 

unplanned projects.) (Check one per row.)

Response Estimated

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound 

(percentage)

FY 2013 0 56.3 51.1 61.6

1 20.0 15.7 24.3

2 6.7 4.3 10.0

3 2.2 1.0 4.4

4 2.0 0.8 4.2

5 0.3 0.0 1.6

More than 5 0.6 0.1 2.3

Don’t know 11.7 8.5 15.6

FY 2014 0 62.7 57.6 67.8

1 15.8 12.1 20.1

2 5.9 3.6 8.9

3 3.4 1.7 5.8

4 0.8 0.2 2.4

5 0.8 0.2 2.4

More than 5 1.1 0.3 2.9

Don’t know 9.4 6.5 13.1

FY 2015 0 64.3 59.3 69.4

1 17.8 13.8 21.9

2 6.8 4.4 10.0

3 0.8 0.2 2.4

4 0.6 0.1 2.0

5 1.3 0.4 3.1

More than 5 0.9 0.2 2.6

Don’t know 7.5 4.9 10.9

Section 4: DOD-Owned 

Utility System Funding 

Information
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 63 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

20. From fiscal years 2013 to 2015, were there funding shortfalls for this 

utility system?

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound 

(percentage)

FY 2013 Yes 29.0 24.4 33.6

No 52.6 47.4 57.8

Don’t know 18.4 14.3 22.5

FY 2014 Yes 31.7 27.0 36.3

No 53.2 48.0 58.3

Don’t know 15.2 11.5 19.4

FY 2015 Yes 34.9 30.2 39.7

No 51.9 46.8 57.0

Don’t know 13.2 9.7 17.2

21. From fiscal years 2013 to 2015, did the following factors contribute to 

a shortfall of funding for this utility system?

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Other funding 

needs within the 

service had a 

higher priority

Yes 54.9 48.0 61.8

No 30.4 23.9 36.8

Don’t know 14.7 10.1 20.4

Other funding 

needs on the 

installation had a 

higher priority

Yes 53.9 47.0 60.8

No 32.6 26.0 39.2

Don’t know 13.5 9.1 19.0

Sequestration Yes 20.6 15.1 27.1

No 50.7 43.6 57.8

Don’t know 28.7 22.3 35.1

Increase in 

unplanned 

maintenance 

needs

Yes 29.6 23.3 35.9
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

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Page 64 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

No 55.2 48.4 62.1

Don’t know 15.2 10.5 21.0

This utility 

system is going 

to be privatized 

or therwise 

removed from 

DOD ownership

Yes 9.4 5.7 14.4

No 79.7 74.0 85.3

Don’t know 11.0 7.0 16.1

Other Yes 12.4 7.2 19.5

No 17.0 11.1 24.4

Don’t know 70.6 62.8 78.4

22. From fiscal years 2013 to 2015, did you take any of the following 

actions to mitigate the shortfall?

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Deferred 

entire planned 

maintenance 

and repair 

projects

Yes 33.2 26.7 39.6

No 54.7 47.9 61.6

Don’t know 12.1 7.9 17.4

Deferred 

portions of 

planned 

maintenance 

and repair 

projects

Yes 40.9 34.0 47.7

No 46.1 39.2 53.1

Don’t know 13.0 8.7 18.4
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

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Page 65 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Sought 

opportunities 

to obtain 

alternative 

funding 

sources (i.e., 

3rd party 

financed 

projects)

Yes 26.7 20.7 32.7

No 62.2 55.5 68.8

Don’t know 11.2 7.2 16.4

Other Yes 6.4 2.7 12.4

No 22.7 15.7 31.0

Don’t know 70.9 63.0 78.8

a. If you deferred entire maintenance and repair projects due to 

funding shortfalls then to what extent did this deferred 

maintenance effect the reliability of this utility system?

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval –

lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval –

upper bound 

(percentage)

No negative effect 3.0 0.4 10.4

Minor negative 

effect

57.6 45/6 69.6

Moderately negative 

effect

23.1 13.5 35.4

Major negative 

effect

8.5 3.1 17.9

Don’t know 7.8 2.5 17.6
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 66 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

b. If you deferred portions of maintenance and repair projects due to 

funding shortfalls then to what extent did this deferred 

maintenance effect the reliability of this utility system?

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval –

lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval –

upper bound 

(percentage)

No negative effect 5.1 1.4 12.8

Minor Negative 

effect

56/4 45.6 67.2

Moderately negative 

effect

22.4 13.9 33.0

Major negative 

effect

5.9 1.9 13.2

Don’t know 10.2 4.4 19.4

For the purposes of this survey, please report the following type of 

disruptions on this utility system.

Include:

• Disruptions in this utility system to users or to (a) mission-reliant 

asset(s) lasting more than 5 minutes due to the failure of DOD-owned 

equipment or the under-performance of utility infrastructure based on 

operating environment standards

Do not include:

• Disruptions of less than 5 minutes

• The failure of a commercial or privatized electricity generation system

• Natural events such as a storm, earthquake, fire, etc. that damage the 

equipment

• Intentional or planned disruptions

Section 5: DOD-Owned 

Utility System Disruption 

Information
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 67 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

23. To what extent is information about utility disruptions due to 

equipment failures useful in operating and maintaining the utility 

system? (Check one.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval –

lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval –

upper bound 

(percentage)

Very or somewhat 

useful

82.2 78.1 86.2

Not very or not at all 

useful

9 6.2 12.5

Don’t Know 8.9 6.1 12.4

24. For which of the following fiscal years do you have information on the 

disruptions cause by equipment failure on this utility system? (Check

one per row.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound 

(percentage)

FY 2009 Yes 34.2 29.1 39.2

No 35.6 30.5 40.8

Don’t know 30.2 25.3 35.1

FY 2010 Yes 36.3 31.1 41.4

No 33.8 28.7 38.8

Don’t know 29.9 25.0 24.8

FY 2011 Yes 38.2 33.0 43.4

No 32.4 27.4 37.4

Don’t know 29.4 24.6 34.3

FY 2012 Yes 41.2 35.9 46.5

No 32.1 27.1 37.2

Don’t know 26.7 21.9 31.4

FY 2013 Yes 47.2 41.9 52.5

No 28.9 24.0 33.7

Don’t know 23.9 19.4 28.5

FY 2014 Yes 49.8 44.5 55.1

No 28.0 23.3 32.8
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 68 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound 

(percentage)

Don’t know 22.2 17.8 26.6

FY 2015 Yes 56.1 50.9 61.4

No 26.4 21.7 31.0

Don’t know 17.5 13.4 21.5

a. In each fiscal year, how many disruptions did this utility system 

experience?

(For zero disruptions, check “no disruptions”.)

Disruptions_____________

No disruptions______

Section completed (If there were no disruptions in this fiscal year, 

skip the rest of the questions in this fiscal year and go to next 

fiscal year)

[Open ended]

b. Approximately how many minutes was the utility service disrupted 

for during each fiscal year?

Minutes_________________

[Open ended]

c. Approximately what were the fiscal impacts of the utility 

disruptions reported for each fiscal year?

(Fiscal impact is the money spent repairing the disruption and 

mitigating the effects. For example, the cost of the replacement 

parts and the cost of the personnel needed to complete the repair 

would be considered in the fiscal impact.)

Dollars_____________

[Open ended]
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 69 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

d. How common were the following operational impacts of the utility 

disruptions reported in each fiscal year?

(Operational impacts are any impacts that the disruptions had on 

the ability of the installation to operate and to accomplish its 

mission.)

No Operational Impacts.

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound 

(percentage)

2009 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

50.0 36 64

Very common 

or common

43.7 29.7 57.7

Don’t know 6.3 1.4 17

2010 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

44.8 32.1 57.6

Very common 

or common

45.9 33.0 58.7

Don’t know 9.3 3.3 19.7

2011 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

47.3 34.9 59.7

Very common 

or common

45.7 33.3 58.1

Don’t know 7.0 2.1 16.3

2012 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

58.5 46.9 70.0

Very common 

or common

35.1 23.8 46.3

Don’t know 6.5 2.0 14.9
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 70 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

2013 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

52.6 42.3 63.0

Very common 

or common

39.3 29.1 49.5

Don’t know 8.1 3.4 15.7

2014 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

55.0 44.7 65.2

Very common 

or common

40.2 30.0 50.3

Don’t know 4.9 1.5 11.4

2015 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

57.0 47.6 66.3

Very common 

or common

39.4 30.2 48.7

Don’t know 3.6 0.9 9.2

Minor Operational Impacts, such as causing minimal delays. 

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound 

(percentage)

2009 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

41.0 26.9 56.2

Very common 

or common

50.6 36.4 64.7

Don’t know 8.5 2.4 20.0

2010 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

43.8 30.7 56.8

Very common 

or common

46.6 33.4 59.7

Don’t know 9.7 3.4 20.4
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 71 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound 

(percentage)

2011 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

45.1 32.5 57.7

Very common 

or common

48.7 36.0 61.4

Don’t know 6.2 1.6 15.6

2012 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

48.9 37.2 60.6

Very common 

or common

44.7 33.1 56.4

Don’t know 6.4 2.0 14.7

2013 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

47.6 37.0 58.2

Very common 

or common

45.2 34.7 55.7

Don’t know 7.2 2.8 14.8

2014 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

43.9 33.7 54.2

Very common 

or common

51.2 40.9 61.5

Don’t know 4.9 1.5 11.4

2015 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

46.0 36.6 55.4

Very common 

or common

51.4 42.0 60.7

Don’t know 2.6 0.5 7.8
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 72 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Moderate Operational Impacts, such as causing delays or the reduced capability of some 

systems.

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound 

(percentage)

2009 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

66.6 51.5 79.5

Very common 

or common

25.0 13.5 39.8

Don’t know 8.4 2.4 20.0

2010 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

69.5 55.5 81.3

Very common 

or common

20.7 10.8 34.2

Don’t know 9.8 3.5 20.7

2011 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

64.5 51.2 76.2

Very common 

or common

26.9 16.5 39.7

Don’t know 8.6 3.0 18.4

2012 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

60.6 49.0 72.1

Very common 

or common

32.9 22.1 45.1

Don’t know 6.6 2.1 15.2

2013 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

67.8 58.2 77.4

Very common 

or common

25.1 16.6 35.4

Don’t know 7.1 2.7 14.5
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 73 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound 

(percentage)

2014 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

66.2 56.3 76.2

Very common 

or common

29.5 20.0 39.0

Don’t know 4.2 1.1 10.8

2015 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

68.4 59.7 77.0

Very common 

or common

27.3 19.3 36.5

Don’t know 4.4 1.4 10.1

Major Operational Impacts, such as causing major delays or shutting down large number 

of systems or assets.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound 

(percentage)

2009 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

89.5 77.5 96.5

Very common 

or common

2.0 0.1 10.9

Don’t know 8.5 2.4 20.0

2010 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

87.2 75.0 94.8

Very common 

or common

4.2 0.5 14.4

Don’t know 8.6 2.7 19.4

2011 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

85.3 74.1 92.9
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 74 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound 

(percentage)

Very common 

or common

6.2 1.7 15.2

Don’t know 8.6 3.0 18.4

2012 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

88.6 78.9 94.9

Very common 

or common

5.0 1.3 12.9

Don’t know 6.4 2.0 14.7

2013 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

87.5 78.9 93.6

Very common 

or common

5.4 1.7 12.3

Don’t know 7.1 2.7 14.5

2014 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

85.2 76.2 91.8

Very common 

or common

9.8 4.5 17.9

Don’t know 5.0 1.5 11.6

2015 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

87.8 80.2 93.2

Very common 

or common

8.6 4.1 15.4

Don’t know 3.6 0.9 9.1

(Other)
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 75 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound 

(percentage)

2009 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

18.4 6.1 38.4

Very common 

or common

0.0 0.0 10.9

Don’t know 81.6 61.6 93.9

2010 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

13.9 4.5 30.1

Very common 

or common

0.0 0.0 8.4

Don’t know 86.1 69.9 95.5

2011 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

15.2 5.0 32.3

Very common 

or common

0.0 0.0 8.9

Don’t know 84.8 67.7 95.0

2012 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

14.7 4.9 31.4

Very common 

or common

2.9 0.1 15.5

Don’t know 82.3 65.1 93.3

2013 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

15.0 6.2 28.7

Very common 

or common

4.4 0.5 15.1

Don’t know 80.5 66.1 90.8

2014 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

10.3 3.4 22.8
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 76 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– lower bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence interval 

– upper bound 

(percentage)

Very common 

or common

4.2 0.5 14.5

Don’t know 85.4 72.0 94.0

2015 Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

9.8 3.6 20.3

Very common 

or common

3.2 0.4 11.2

Don’t know 87.0 75.8 94.3

25. How common are the following causes of disruptions on this utility 

system? (Check one per row.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

The 

equipment is 

being used 

beyond its 

intended life

Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

49.2 43.8 54.5

Common or 

very common

43.7 38.5 48.9

Don’t know 7.1 4.6 10.4

The condition 

of the 

equipment is 

poor

Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

52.2 46.8 57.5

Common or 

very common

41.2 36.0 46.4

Don’t know 6.6 4.2 9.9
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 77 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Factors 

external to the 

system are 

causing 

disruptions 

such as a 

disruption on 

another utility 

system, 

wildlife 

interference, 

external 

construction, 

or operator 

fault

Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

57.6 52.3 62.9

Common or 

very common

35.7 30.6 40.9

Don’t know 6.7 4.2 10.0

The 

equipment is 

not performing 

according to 

operating 

environment 

standards

Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

82.0 77.8 86.1

Common or 

very common

10.8 7.6 14.6

Don’t know 7.3 4.7 10.6

The 

equipment 

has not been 

properly 

maintained

Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

70.0 65.1 74.9

Common or 

very common

24.1 19.6 19.6

Don’t know 5.9 3.6 9.0
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 78 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

The 

equipment is 

being asked to 

handle service 

volumes 

beyond its 

intended 

capacity

Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

79.8 75.4 84.2

Common or 

very common

13.3 9.7 17.6

Don’t know 6.9 4.4 10.2

Other Very 

uncommon or 

uncommon

3.6 1.4 7.4

Common or 

very common

9.5 5.6 14.7

Don’t know 86.9 81.2 91.4

26. How likely would any of the following prevented some of the 

disruptions on this utility system? (Check one per row.)

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Improved 

preventative 

maintenance, 

inspections 

and repairs

Not at all likely 19.8 15.6 24.0

Somewhat 

likely

37.3 32.0 42.5

Very likely 35.7 30.5 40.8

Don’t know 7.2 4.7 10.5
Appendix II: Survey on DOD-Owned Utility 

Resilience

Page 79 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Response Estimated 

Percentage

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – lower 

bound 

(percentage)

95 percent 

confidence 

interval – upper 

bound 

(percentage)

Replacement 

of degraded 

and unreliable 

equipment

Not at all likely 12.3 9.0 16.3

Somewhat 

likely

25.9 21.2 30.7

Very likely 54.9 49.6 60.2

Don’t know 6.9 4.4 10.1

Increase in 

personnel to 

perform 

maintenance 

and repairs

Not at all likely 18.2 14.1 22.4

Somewhat 

likely

32.2 27.1 37.3

Very likely 40.8 35.5 46.1

Don’t know 8.8 6.0 12.3

Other Not at all likely 2.8 1.0 6.1

Somewhat 

likely

0.0 0.0 1.5

Very likely 8.1 4.5 13.1

Don’t know 89.1 83.8 92.2
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 80 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 81 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 82 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant 

Director; Michael Armes; Carl Barden; Tracy Barnes; Jon Ludwigson; 

Carolyn Cavanaugh; Randy De Leon; Steven Putansu; Amie Lesser; 

Cheryl Weissman; Erik Wilkins-McKee; and Tonya Woodbury made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 83 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Related GAO Products

Defense Facility Condition: Revised Guidance Needed to Improve 

Oversight of Assessments and Ratings. GAO-16-662. Washington, D.C.: 

June 23, 2016.

Facilities Modernization: DOD Guidance and Processes Reflect Leading 

Practices for Capital Planning. GAO-15-489. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 

2015.

Defense Infrastructure: Improvements in Reporting and Cybersecurity 

Implementation Needed to Enhance Utility Resilience Planning. 

GAO-15-749. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2015.

High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February 

2011.

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support 

Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of 

Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. GAO-09-336. Washington, D.C.: 

March 30, 2009.

Federal Real Property: Government’s Fiscal Exposure from Repair and 

Maintenance Backlogs Is Unclear. GAO-09-10. Washington, D.C.: 

October 16, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: Continued Management Attention Is Needed to 

Support Installation Facilities and Operations. GAO-08-502. Washington, 

D.C.: April 24, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: Actions Taken to Improve the Management of 

Utility Privatization, but Some Concerns Remain. GAO-06-914. 

Washington, D.C.: September 5, 2006.

Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and 

Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support. GAO-05-556. 

Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005.

Defense Infrastructure: Managing Issues Requiring Attention in Utility 

Privatization. GAO-05-433. Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2005.
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 84 GAO-17-27 Defense Infrastructure

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic 

Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities. 

GAO-03-274. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003.

(100229)
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